Chapter 20

Non-Religion and Atheism

Caleb Schaffner and Ryan T. Cragun

1 Introduction

The other chapters in this part examine the process and experience of leaving
a variety of different religions. However, there are several topics that those oth-
er chapters do not address, and the aim of this chapter is to fill some of these
lacunae. Specifically, we are hoping to offer some insight into both the beliefs
of those who have left religions in general – in our particular case, atheists –
and explore how confident atheists are that they have made the correct deci-
sion. In a sense, then, we are examining those who have already left religions,
but with the aim of understanding how certain they are in their new beliefs.
This connects back to the broader topic of leaving religion both because the
people who were interviewed for this study all left religions but also because it
is exploring whether those who have left religion in general consider returning
to religion.
We explore two aspects of this question. First, we examine the various ways
that atheists understand their new worldview, as not all atheists understand
atheism to mean the same thing. Second, we explore how dogmatic atheists
are with their new beliefs. Are atheists open to the possibility that they are
wrong? And, if so, to what extent are they open to this possibility?
To address these questions, we draw upon data gleaned from 201 surveys
and fifty semi-structured interviews with Chicagoland atheists who had exited
religion. The former contained scales measuring childhood religiosity, child-
hood religious ethnocentrism, and present-day dogmatism, which form our
quantitative analysis. Fifty interviewees were randomly selected from survey
participants. Interviews lasted twenty to seventy minutes, investigating pres-
ent-day beliefs concerning atheism, among other topics. Many reflected on
their previous theistic beliefs, offering varying degrees of certainty that they
would not return. Their explanations are the focus of our qualitative analysis.

2 Previous Research and Empirical Material

Religious beliefs (and disbeliefs) often are central to people’s identities, serving
as a foundation upon which more mundane beliefs rest. Thouless (1935) noted

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Non-Religion and Atheism 243

that respondents in his research rated their belief or disbelief in god as more
certain than ordinary, knowable topics. Given the primacy many attach to re-
ligion (or atheism), there are advantages to being certain. Those most certain
about the existence of god rate higher in emotional stability and life satisfac-
tion, regardless of whether they are certain of god’s existence or non-existence
(Galen and Kloet 2011).
Interestingly, there is no consensus about the epistemological belief re-
quired to be a genuine atheist, even among researchers and authors. Some
atheist literature (for example Cliteur 2009) uses a lenient definition, describ-
ing it merely as the lack of belief in a deity. Often this is termed “negative athe-
ism.” One of the most prominent contemporary atheists, Richard Dawkins
(2006), would fall into this camp, describing himself as just shy of absolute
certainty.
In contrast, many dictionaries (for example Merriam Webster and Cam-
bridge) use a stricter, positive atheist definition, that is the complete certainty
that a god does not exist. In her publications, Madalyn Murray O’Hair would
often define atheism in this way, stressing an atheist must completely reject
the possibility of any deity (Schaffner 2012). Around the world, the number of
people who identify as positive atheists is increasing, but projections based
primarily on fertility rates suggest that atheists may shrink as a percentage of
the world’s population in coming decades due to higher rates of fertility in pre-
dominantly religious countries (Pew Research Center 2015). However, within
developed countries, the percentage of people who are atheists and/or nonre-
ligious is increasing and projected to continue to increase (see also Stinespring
and Cragun 2015). Below, we explore how the individuals we interviewed un-
derstand atheism and illustrate that their conceptions of atheism are varied
and nuanced.
In addition to trying to understand how those who have left religions under-
stand their new beliefs, prior research has also begun to explore the extent to
which individuals who have left religions are confident they have made what
they perceive to be the correct decision. In other words, how dogmatic are
atheists? One possible contributor to the dogmatism of atheists that prior re-
search has noted (Hunsberger and Altemeyer 2006) but not adequately tested
is whether the religion in which atheists were raised was also dogmatic. If in-
dividuals raised in very dogmatic, ethnocentric religions who leave those reli-
gions remain dogmatic, this could be evidence for a hangover effect from one’s
prior religion. Variation in dogmatism is a prime domain to probe for evidence
of residual or hangover influences from one’s religious upbringing.
Some research has explored these types of hangover effects, like one’s ad-
herence to gender ideology (Cottee 2015) or dietary customs (Davidman 2014).
However, one prominent hole in the exit literature concerns the effects of the

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244 Schaffner and Cragun

religious intensity of one’s upbringing on current dogmatism. It is possible that

the strength of one’s religious upbringing may resonate into the present day.
Hunsberger and Altemeyer (2006) suggest that a deeper and more intense
experience with theism may increase the certainty that it is incompatible with
oneself, resulting in increased atheist dogmatism. Altemeyer (2012) maintained
this hypothesis in a personal correspondence, predicting a weak-to-moderate
positive correlation (r = +.3) between religious emphasis during one’s upbring-
ing and present-day dogmatism. We test this hypothesis below.
Although very little prior research supports it, the inverse is also possible:
higher levels of religiosity during one’s upbringing may result in lower levels of
atheist dogmatism. Having been a devout believer growing up only to leave the
faith may allow one to view their current beliefs more tentatively, as the best
available explanation rather than as a certainty. Below we present some data
that allow us to examine whether childhood religiosity influences the dogma-
tism of atheists.

3 New Findings Focusing on “leaving religion”

After leaving their original religion, our interviewees took a variety of trajecto-
ries which all eventually culminated in atheism. Roughly twenty-eight percent
considered themselves atheists immediately upon leaving their original reli-
gion. Another nine percent formally joined another religion before they ceased
believing in a god or higher power.
As noted, there is controversy in defining atheism. Responses from our inter-
viewees revealed similar variability, with some stressing certainty that a deity
does not exist and others offering less certainty. Survey participants identified
themselves as having one of four epistemological stances about the existence
of a deity: positive atheists, hard agnostics, soft agnostics, and apathetic athe-
ists. Positive atheists are completely certain of the non-existence of any de-
ity. These were the single most numerous epistemological group, comprising
forty-four percent of all valid survey responses. Representing the dictionary-
definition of atheist, their explanations were numerous, but generally terse.
In comparison, those who were not positive atheists devoted considerable in-
terview time to explaining their stances and justifying their application of the
“atheist” label, apparently aware that their claims would be contested by some
of their peers.
Unlike most positive atheists, Regina1 offered her reasoning at length. It
proved memorable and unique among the fifty interviews. She reasoned that,

1 All names are pseudonyms.

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Non-Religion and Atheism 245

as the non-existence of anything is unprovable, atheism entails a degree of

faith, whereas agnosticism does not. She defined atheism as a religion, where-
as agnosticism is a stance about how knowable god or gods are. Implicit here
is that religion is defined by faith in something that cannot be conclusively
proven:

I think atheism is a religion. I believe being agnostic is non-religious. But

I think atheists… You have to believe that there is no god. Agnostic you
don’t really know. You need proof in either direction. There is no proof
that god does not exist. There’s just a lack of evidence that he does. You
really have to believe that he doesn’t exist. So I count that as religion.

Most interesting about Regina’s delineation was its resemblance to tactics

used by the Religious Right to oppose and attempt to diminish the teaching of
evolution and secular morality in classrooms, by equating them with religious
faith. Regina was cognisant that this stance differed from the majority of rank-
and-file atheists, pointing to it as the key way she differed from her peers:

And the way that I definitely know I differ from other atheists is the fact
that I do think of atheism as a religion. I don’t think a lot of atheists think
that we have to have faith to be atheists. But I definitely think that you
have to have faith to be atheists: faith in the lack of god, as opposed to
faith in a god.

Again, Regina was distinct as far as the interview sample was concerned. While
others were similarly certain, most stress the impossibility of a deity, rather
than explicitly portraying atheism as tantamount to religion. She was the only
one to wrestle with how to prove a negative and attempt to resolve it in such
a manner.
Those who were epistemologically hard agnostics stated that they did not
think it was possible for humans to ever definitively know whether or not god
exists. Like Regina, Trent similarly talked about the impossibility of proving a
negative like the non-existence of a deity. While Regina solved this impasse
by stressing that atheism is a faith (and that she was among its faithful), Trent
took a different route. As it is impossible to prove the existence of a negative,
all atheists are necessarily agnostic by definition, according to Trent.

Trent: Well, I mean, basically I think to an extent every atheist is agnostic.

Because you just can’t know if there’s a god. I mean it’s infallible.
Interviewer: Would you want to elaborate a bit, on how it’s truly unknow-
able in the end?

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Trent: Yeah. The claim that if I said I have an invisible dinosaur in my

backyard. You can’t see him or feel him. Only I can. If no one’s looking.
That’s an infallible statement. No one can say that surely doesn’t exist.
That’s basically god. Because we don’t really know his attributes. People
have different points of view of what god is. The Christian god on the
other hand, you can basically say he’s untrue, because of different his-
torical events that never happened the flood and stuff like that, that are
attributed to him.

While Trent and Regina both used broad brush strokes to address the lines be-
tween atheism and agnosticism, they painted different pictures. Trent framed
atheists as a subgroup within the broader category of agnostics, while Regina
designated atheism a religious category, distinct from the areligious, epistemo-
logical category of “agnostic.”
The final three sentences in Trent’s reply illuminate how atheists can exhibit
certainty that their beliefs will not change. Trent – and other atheists – can be
certain about the non-existence of the gods of world religions because those
deities have miracles and historical events attached to their names, which can
be falsified by scientific investigation or the lack of corroborating evidence. In
contrast, when Trent talked about being unable to definitively prove the non-
existence of a god, he was talking about a deity in the abstract sense: a Deist
conception of god, which has no specific worldly effects to investigate.
Those whose beliefs made them soft agnostics limited the above statement
to themselves, stating that they personally did not know whether or not a deity
exists. After leaving religion, Lionel initially considered himself to be agnostic,
before self-identifying as atheist. When pressed for any additional argument
or event which precipitated this shift, Lionel could not point to any precise
watershed moment. Instead, he stated:

At that point it was maybe a switch in the label I would use. But it wasn’t
that I had a huge switch in my belief then… Technically I wouldn’t even
quite call myself an atheist today, just because I don’t put too much stock
in my ability to be sure in such a fundamental thing. I just think they’re
plenty of things with the universe that I’m not capable of understanding.
And its ultimate cause in nature is probably the biggest. But, that said,
I think that the possibility of there being a god is so extremely unlikely
that for all intents and purposes I’m an atheist.

Lionel’s reasoning was not unique among the interviews. Several other par-
ticipants mentioned being personally unsure to some degree. Multiple

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Non-Religion and Atheism 247

r­espondents actually quantified their certainty of a god’s non-existence:

99-point-some-amount-of-nines-repeating percent. Lionel and these other re-
spondents essentially “rounded up” to consider themselves atheists. Lionel’s
stance was distinguished from Trent’s by the scope of uncertainty: whereas
Trent did not consider it possible for humans to ever be certain of the non-
existence of god, Lionel’s response was more measured, limited to himself
Finally, the epistemologically apathetic were unconcerned with whether or
not a deity exists. Patrice started from a point similar to Trent, laying the foun-
dation for explaining his lack of complete certainty with a metaphor. However,
he fell into a different category than Trent: epistemologically apathetic.

Patrice: And even though I don’t believe in god, I don’t believe god exists,
I don’t know there’s no higher power, obviously. I don’t believe one exists
and I don’t believe if it did exist – hypothetically speaking – I don’t be-
lieve it would care anything about what’s going on here. But I can’t know
for sure. And I know that theoretically that’s supposed to be agnostic.
But I don’t believe in the god in the same way that I don’t believe that the
moon is made of cheese. I don’t believe in it but it’s not like an ambiguous
‘I don’t believe in it,’ I don’t believe in it because there’s no reason to. So
I identify as atheist even though the more atheist purists would call me
‘agnostic.’
Interviewer: Functionally atheist as opposed to epistemologically atheist?
Patrice: Yeah. That’s a good way to put it. Functionally atheist, that’s a
good way to put it.

Where Patrice diverged from Trent is how he handled this inability to prove a
negative. Trent concluded that it is beyond the realm of human ability to do so.
In contrast, Patrice did not care about the proposition, opting to live his life as
a functional atheist and put the prospect out of his mind.
Furthermore, Patrice’s assertion that “there’s no reason to” believe in a god
that would not “care about what’s going on here” demonstrated that, similar to
Trent, he conceptualised such a deity as wholly removed and uninterested in
human affairs. Often, negative atheists do not rule out what they conceptualise
as a deistic god, while they feel completely confident stating that more specific
conceptions of a god – such as the Abrahamic god – do not exist.
The “functionalist atheist” label accurately summarised Patrice’s decision to
live his life without concern about a god or religious dogma. Others used simi-
lar terminology, such as Glenn, who stated, “I guess I live my life as a de facto
atheist. I don’t live my life in a way that I believe there’s going to be any kind of
retribution by a deity.” Underscoring that one’s actions are identical to positive

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248 Schaffner and Cragun

atheists is one key avenue which negative atheists use to legitimise their ap-
plication of the “atheist” label.
We now turn to our findings regarding dogmatism. In recounting their exit
narratives, sixty percent of interviewees researched joining another religion,
though very few formally joined any. The religions researched ranged from
Islam to Baháʾí to Mormonism. Seven interviewees had a brief quest phase,
researching and entertaining the possibility of joining multiple different re-
ligions. Some immediately dove into atheism, while others first dipped their
toes into multiple religions. Eventually, all respondents reached a level of cer-
tainty that no religion is satisfactory and no argument could persuade them
of the existence of any deity. In recounting acquaintances’ futile attempts to
persuade her to attend their church, Tracy memorably summarised their at-
titudes towards her disbelief:

I had somewhat similar experiences with other people, where they just
think that if I just pray with them they’ll change my mind. I’m afraid of
dogs and people are like ‘If you just meet my dog you’ll be okay.’ It’s just
the same thing with god.

Like Tracy, individuals must be confident enough in their disbelief to discount

the possibility of ever amending some of their most central convictions in or-
der to return to theism. However, in the interviews, there were differing levels
of certainty. While many were positive that their beliefs could now never be
changed by any life event or argument for theism, others’ expectations were
more tempered. Five interviewees specifically mentioned the potential revers-
ibility of their beliefs. One clear example was Brad, who stated that “atheism is
just a working assumption for my worldview.”
Another case was Kelsey. She was a self-starter, raised by Catholic parents
who were not particularly religious. At ten, she became more interested in re-
ligion, stressing, “I don’t think that a change was noticeable to most people. It
was very private.” She prayed and read the bible frequently in her room. She
also attended some Catholic retreats. Since leaving religion and becoming an
atheist, she reported some concern that she may return to theism later in her
life:

Kelsey: There’s definitely a little bit of feeling that, since I was raised re-
ligious, a fear that maybe I would go back to it. And I really don’t want
to. And I think that’s part of spending… I spent the first fifteen years
of my life believing in something. And it’s weird to think that for those

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first fifteen years I was wrong. And I’m afraid that someday when I’m old
I will go back to it and I really don’t want to. I guess that’s a fear that
I have…
Interviewer: That it’s so ingrained in you that down the road you might
want to?
Kelsey: Yeah. And definitely me right now I really hope not. But… yeah,
it’s definitely weird because it is taught at such a young age.

Brad and Kelsey demonstrate that some atheists consider it possible that their
identity might not be permanent; their identity is capable of changing with
more information or later in their lives. This possibility was unwelcome and
greeted with concern, as in Kelsey’s case where she really hoped she would not
return to believing in a god or higher power. Nevertheless, the interviewees
who mentioned the prospect served as one pole on the spectrum of dogma-
tism: a more cautious stance, contrasted with absolute certainty.
In light of Altemeyer’s (2012) suggestion of a potential correlation between
childhood religiosity and atheistic dogmatism, we specifically tested that claim
using three scale measures. The first scale was a forty-point dogmatism mea-
sure that does not specifically reference religion. The mean in our sample was
17.0; the standard deviation was 5.8. We also developed two measures of child-
hood religiosity. The first measured emphasis placed on religiosity in one’s
childhood. This scale ranged from zero to forty-eight, with a mean of 25.1 and
standard deviation of 13.0. The second measured how ethnocentric or exclu-
sive one’s childhood religion was. This scale ranged from zero to twenty-four,
with a mean of 11.6 and standard deviation of 6.7. We regressed these variables
along with a variety of control variables on dogmatism (results not shown), but
for parsimony we report here simple bivariate correlation coefficients.

Table 20.1 Correlations Between Dogmatism, Religiosity, and Religious

Ethnocentrism (* p < .05, ** p < .01)

Dogmatism Religiosity Religious

Ethnocentrism

Dogmatism
Religiosity .01
Religious Ethnocentrism .17* .71**

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250 Schaffner and Cragun

Only childhood religious ethnocentrism behaves according to Altemeyer’s

(2012) predictions, exhibiting a positive correlation with dogmatism which is
significant at a .05 level. Childhood religiosity has no discernable impact on
dogmatism. In fact, upon controlling for its considerable overlap with child-
hood religious ethnocentrism, it actually has a marginal (p<.10), negative im-
pact on dogmatism (results not shown).
Overall, the effects of one’s childhood religion are nuanced, with the two
prongs having unique effects. Childhood religious ethnocentrism behaves as
hypothesised by Altemeyer’s correspondence (2012). Recall his prediction was
aimed at the umbrella concept of childhood “religious emphasis,” rather than
specifically on either prong which comprises it. Those raised with more nega-
tive views of other religious groups maintain the strict dichotomy between
their own beliefs and others, even after overhauling their belief system upon
exit. They remain steadfast in their new beliefs, seeing little chance of amend-
ing them in the future. This provides evidence that stances learned in religion
can result in a hangover effect, with a continuation of the sharp differentiation
between one’s new, atheistic beliefs and competing options.
In contrast, childhood religiosity behaves opposite to initial expectations.
While it has no effect when the only measure considered, controlling for child-
hood religious ethnocentrism isolates its unique contributions. When compar-
ing two individuals who received identical messages concerning their faith’s
acceptance of outside groups, the individual with a more religious upbringing
is expected to be less dogmatic in the present day. Being so personally invested
in a religion, only to eventually exit can sensitise one to the tentative nature of
their present beliefs.
Kelsey serves as a perfect example, as seen in her survey results. She ranked
above average in childhood religiosity, yet below average in childhood religious
ethnocentrism. Believing so fervently in her pre-teens and early teens, only to
eventually leave, made it conceivable that her beliefs may again change. The
tendency to belief might be deeply ingrained inside her. Her explanation con-
tains two strands: cognisance that even one’s most central beliefs can drasti-
cally change and the possibility that a tendency towards Catholicism cannot
ever be completely uprooted.
For those whom religion was a particularly central aspect of their identity
growing up, their childhood dogmatism may persist even in light of shifts in
other beliefs and values. Specific, consciously-recognised instances of resid-
ual influences of one’s childhood religion appear to survive the transition to
atheism. Our data suggest that being raised with a strong distinction between
one’s in-group and out-group carries over to new beliefs to some degree, even

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Non-Religion and Atheism 251

as one switches religious reference groups. Some maintain a strict distinction

between their beliefs and others, stressing certainty in the superiority and
­ultimate correctness of their present answers to major, existential questions.
But the correlation is not particularly strong, suggesting that this is true of just
a minority of atheists or a generally weak effect. For other atheists, having been
deeply invested in a belief system only to exit leads one to consider the tenta-
tive nature of their present beliefs. Further analysis is needed, but our results
suggest a small, persistent effect of one’s childhood religion, even when the
specific faith – and theism in general – is disavowed.

4 Conclusion

Our aim in this chapter has been to illustrate that among those who have left
religion in general, in our case atheists, there is not universal certainty. What
it means to be an atheist differs, with some insisting on the non-existence of
any and all gods, while others find the question irrelevant to their daily lives.
Likewise, the degree of confidence atheists exhibit in their new worldview var-
ies and appears to have at least some connection to childhood religiosity, even
if the relationship is not particularly strong. As the other chapters in this part
illustrate, many people leave religions. While most atheists and a growing per-
centage of the nonreligious are remaining atheists and nonreligious, respec-
tively (see Merino 2011), our research suggests that there is the possibility that
members of both groups could change their views and adopt theism or join a
religion. However, such transitions are uncommon. As secularisation theorists
have long argued (Bruce 2013), once you go secular, you rarely go back.
Our chapter illustrates that scholars are just beginning to explore the pro-
cess of leaving religion in general. In order to have a clear understanding of
what it is like to become nonreligious, scholars need better ways of measuring
types of nonreligion, like those we employed above, as well as better ways of
measuring types of religious upbringing. In addition to these variables, it is,
of course, necessary to understand the environment in which a religious exit
takes place (for example, How religious is the surrounding society? Family?
Friends?) and an individual’s social location (for example, Are they part of a
racial and/or gender majority? Are they well-educated? Wealthy?). Tentatively,
we suggest that, while childhood religious experience will no doubt be filtered
through variables like environment and social location, it may remain an im-
portant factor influencing how nonreligion and atheism are manifest after
people leave religions.

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252 Schaffner and Cragun

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