Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi

Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile

Candidate number: 20339

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

In The Trial of Henry Kissinger Christopher Hitchens attempts to “form the basis of legal prosecution:
for war crimes, for crimes against humanity, and for offenses against common or customary or
international law, including conspiracy to commit murder, kidnap and torture 1”, against the former
Secretary of State and National Security Advisor. Hitchens’s work has sparked intense debate both in
international relations and history circles. Opinions are widely ranging, from Scharf’s notion that
Kissinger’s actions “may represent bad foreign policy but not constitute conspiracy to commit crimes
against humanity2”, Douglass’s point that Hitchens tends to ignore context and motive 3, to Edsforth’s
praise, that “Hitchens’ book succiently lays out in the clearest possible language a rational case for
regarding the former National Security Advisor, … as a villain4”. In this essay, I will review
Hitchens’s chapter on United States involvement in Chile during and in the aftermath of Salvador
Allende’s election, from September 5, 1970 to September 11, 1973, and its complicity in the Pinochet
regime. In my view the case against Kissinger is one of the strongest in Chapter 5, as Hitchens breaks
with his tendency to gloss over primary sources and historiography here the most. Furthermore, his
main charge against Kissinger, “The personal suborning and planning of murder, of a senior
constitutional officer [Gen. Schneider Chief of the Chilean General Staff] in a democratic nation –
Chile – with which the United States was not at war5”, comes down to a clear, individual
responsibility, as opposed to a multi-player decision making process such as the ‘crimes’ Hitchens
lists in his chapter on Indochina. In what follows, focusing extensively on Hitchen’s main charge
against Kissinger and to a lesser extent on the accompanying charges, I hope to show however, that
even with the archival evidence released during the Clinton administration’s Chile Declassification
Project6, Hitchens’s account is inconclusive, as he fails to bring in all relevant sources to the
discussion, even from those that he takes note of. Instead, he focuses on marginally relevant or self-
interested evidence provided by Kissinger’s political opponent, may be not so unsurprisingly. After
all, his book too “is written by a political opponent of Henry Kissinger7.”

The charges

US involvement in Chile and in the murder of General Schneider was already established by a Senate
investigation in 1975 (dubbed the Church Committee). Since then, the story of CIA meddling in Chile
is more widely known. The CIA was active in Chile for more than a decade, successfully steering the
ship of Chilean democracy away from the socialist Salvador Allende 8. However, on September 4,

1
Hitchens 2014, xxxvii
2
Scharf 2001, 304
3
Douglas 2003, 229
4
Edsforth 2003, 233
5
Hitchens 2014, xxxix
6
Kornbluh 2016, 203-204
7
Hitchens 2014, xliii
8
Dallek 2007, 230-231

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

1970, the hitherto second largest recipient of US per capita aid and home to one billion dollars of US
investment, the long-standing Chilean democracy gave a 36.2% of the votes on its presidential
elections to Allende9. This made him the forerunner for the Congressional run-off vote – held in the
absence of a 51% majority – on October 24. By September 4, various US governmental departments
and agencies were engaged in a discussion regarding the possible next step 10. In the summer, National
Security Study Memorandum 97 pointed out, that “We identify no vital U.S. national interests within
Chile.11”, and many concluded that any operation against Allende post elections, would be “a stupid
effort12”. Nonetheless, by September 15, all pieces of US policy were in place to prevent Allende from
assuming the presidential office13.

Hitchens picks up the events on September 15, the day on which “a series of Washington meetings”
between the Nixon administration and Donald Kendall, the President of Pepsi Cola, “essentially
settled the fate of Chilean Democracy14”. The powerful US business interests in Chile pushed Nixon to
order the director of the CIA to get rid of Allende “Not concerned risks involved … $10,000,000
available, more if necessary15” – as Helms’s notes tell the events. According to Hitchens, Kissinger
though previously unconcerned with Chile “took seriously this chance to impress his boss. 16”

Following Nixon’s orders, Hitchens tells us, the CIA “two-track” policy was set up, a diplomatic track
through the US Ambassador in Santiago, Edward Korry, and a covert track aimed at the
“destabilization, kidnap and assassination, designed to provoke a military coup 17” in Chile. To
facilitate a “coup climate” the first step for Track II. to succeed was getting rid of Chile’s
constitutionalist Chief of General Staff, General René Schneider. Once learning about these plans,
Kissinger claims (for Hitchens falsely) in his memoirs, Track II. was aborted. 18 However, the plan of
CIA’s associates in Santiago, General Viaux and General Valenzuela, to kidnap Schneider and stage a
coup in its aftermath by then gained momentum and went on, and Hitchens alleges, with Kissinger’s
knowledge and approval. He argues, that the documentary evidence to the contrary is a mere “paper
alibi” to cover his tracks19. Nonetheless, despite CIA financial and matériel support, after two abortive
attempts on October 19 and 20, equipped with US provided sub-machine guns (although not utilised)
on October 22 Schneider was shot in full daylight in his car, leading the Chilean nation not into open

9
Michales 1976; Lawrence 2008; one billion dollar, according to ambassador Korry, stated on October 14
10
Lawrence 2008
11
Memorandum August 18, 1970.
12
Dallek 2007, 233
13
Ibid. 231-235
14
Hitchens 2014 83
15
Helms’s notes quoted in Ibid. 83
16
Ibid. 84
17
Ibid.
18
Kissinger 1979,674
19
Hitchens 2014, 100

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

revolt against, but rallying around Salvador Allende. On October 24 Allende’s presidency was
confirmed by the Chilean Congress, General Schneider died due to his wounds on October 25, and
Nixon and Kissinger set out for the long haul.

Kissinger set out the Nixon administrations policies for the following three years in National Security
Council’s Decision Memorandum 9420. Its goals and effects were to undermined the socialist president
of Chile through economic harassment, covert support for his opposition and facilitating contacts with
friendly military officers. Washington’s persistence bore fruits on September 11, 1973, when the
Chilean military led by General Augusto Pinochet besieged Allende’s presidential palace, following
which Allende was found dead, thousands were massacred, tens of thousands imprisoned and tortured
throughout Chile. According to Hitchens this however affected only in the positive direction
Kissinger’s relations with Chile, turning a blind eye to its international and domestic terrorist
activities.

Hitchens charges Kissinger with direct responsibility for the murder of general Schneider, and
complicity in the overthrow and death of Salvador Allende and the human rights violations of the
Pinochet regime. Since the main charge of Hitchens against Kissinger is the murder of General
Schneider in the chapter, in what follows I will focus largely on Hitchens argument supporting his
charge.

The evidence

Hitchens’s main charge against Kissinger in Chapter 5 of the Trial of Henry Kissinger is his
participation in the “murder of a senior constitutional officer in 21” Chile. A month after Nixon issued
his orders instructing Helms to get rid of Allende, the CIA introduced Kissinger to Roberto Viaux’s
plans of kidnaping the general on October 1522. On an October 14 40 committee meeting, both Korry
and Karamessines, deputy director of CIA planning, took note of the dim chances a Viaux led coup
would entertain, and the unpredictable nature of Viaux23. Due to the grim assessment, as Kissinger
testified in 1975 and in his memoirs, Kissinger “turned off” the operation later that afternoon. In his
memoirs, he explains that “All the CIA reports to Haig and me were similarly negative. The effort was
terminated by me on October 1524”. If Kissinger’s account was true, General Schneider fell victim the
“The CIA personnel in Chile” who “apparently thought that the order applied only to Viaux; they felt
they were free to continue with the second group of plotters, of whom the White House was

20
Hanhimaki 2003, 104
21
Hitchens 2014, xxxix
22
Ibid. 86
23
Memorandum for the Record, October 14, 1970.
24
Kissinger 1979, 674

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

unaware25.” Nonetheless, according to Hitchens Kissinger only tells half of the truth, constructing a
“paper alibi”. Contrary to his senate testimony, memoirs, and documentary evidence where Kissinger
claims that he had “turned off” the Viaux plot on October 15, Hitchens joins Simeur Hersh in arguing
that these only served to ensure deniability for the Nixon White House 26.

Hitchens brings five pieces of evidence to support his claims. However, considering these his
argument faces some issues, chief among them his failure to deny Kissinger’s defence: that the CIA
took matters into its own hand, interpreting orders selectively following the October 15 decision to call
off Track II. His first two pieces of evidence imported – though uncited – from Hersh, regarding the
efforts of CIA operatives efforts to cover their own tracks does little to implicate Kissinger, they
merely prove what the Church Committee had already proved in 1975, that there was a CIA operation
in Chile27. His third evidence borrowed from Hersh, the Democratic and soon to be fired Ambassador
Korry’s view about Kissinger being engaged in a blame game considering their obvious political
differences should be treated with some caution in any case28. Hitchens appears to assume that neither
the Santiago CIA station nor Langey did anything without Kissinger’s direct approval in Chile. In fact
he routinely refers to the CIA’s Chilean Task Force as “Kissinger’s Track II group” – as if
Karamessines was one of Kissinger’s aides down the corridor from his office, which is clearly a false
assumption about the deputy director of CIA planning.

Furthermore, Hitchens also points to the memo of an October 15 White House meeting between
Kissinger, Haig and Karamessines, the meeting when the decision to “defuse the Viaux plot” has been
made. Hitchens points out, that the Memo indeed takes note about „the decision to defuse the Vaux
coup plot” – in line with Kissinger’s defence. However, it also notes „, at least temporarily29”.
Furthermore, the very words in which this message was to be delivered, in Hitchens’s assessment was
inciting. The message’s highlights reads as “Preserve your assets …. The time will come when you
with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support30.” While there is
definitely some merit to this, the full message it can be read as a genuine, albeit mistaken effort. In any
case, Viaux needed no incitement from any US official by the time the message was delivered.
Hitchens omits that when the Santiago CIA operatives approached Viaux on the October 18 to call his
plan off, Vieux told them that the plan is moving forward regardless31. 10:30 PM on the same day,
Colonel Wilmert was informed by Valenzuela that the chain of events setting off the military takeover
will begin the following evening, with the kidnapping of General Schneider, a plan Viaux was
25
Kissinger 1979, 676
26
Hersh 1983, 285
27
Hitchens 2014, 98
28
Ibid. 100
29
quoted in Hitchens 2014, 93 (emphasis Hitchens’s)
30
Memorandum of Conversation, October 15, 1970
31
Kornlbuh 2013, 27

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

“knowledgeable” of32. An appreciation of the agency of the Chilean military does not undermine
Hitchens’s point in general, nonetheless it takes away the force of the evidence against Kissinger.

Nonetheless, according to Hitchens, the wording of Kissinger’s stand-down message only incited
Viaux, joined forces with Valenzuela, and on the October 19 the Viaux and Valenzuela groups in a
combined effort made their first of a series of three attempts to kidnap general Schneider 33. On the
morning of October 20, an urgent cable awaited Station Chief Hecksher from Washington . The CIA
headquarters requested reports from Santiago on the events of the previous evening urgently, as
“Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to queries from high levels34”. This cable is
the crown witness of Hitchens for Kissinger’s continued role in the Chilean events. According to
Karamessines’s testimony, “the words ‘high levels’ referred directly to Kissinger 35”. Kissinger did not
called off the Viaux plot, Hitchens argues, he merely “wanted two things simultaneously. He wanted
the removal of General Schneider… And he wanted to be out of the picture… However, Kissinger
needed the crime slightly more than he needed, or was able to design, deniability 36” rests his case
Hitchens.

Nonetheless, this last evidence however also faces a key problem: Hitchens doesn’t show, that the
meeting actually took place, or that any other meeting would have taken place between October 18
and 22. In its absence Hitchens find it difficult to prove both knowledgeability and responsibility on
Kissinger’s behalf.

On October 15, Kissinger on the one hand “defused” the Viaux plot, but Hitchens overlooks that on
the other hand also made it clear to Karamessines that the Nixon White House did not abandon its
preference for a military takeover in Chile. The memo of their conversation concludes “on Dr.
Kissinger’s note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in
sight—now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new
marching orders are given37.” It is against this blanc-check order of Kisinger, repeating Nixon’s order
given a month earlier, that the operational guide stating “It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup38” sent on October 16 from Washington has to be read. Following the 40
Committee meeting on October 14, where both Ambassador Korry and Karamessines stated that
Viaux appeared to be their only options for a military coup39, it is no wonder, that Kissinger concluded
that “It now appears certain that Allende will be elected President of Chile in the October 24
32
Ibid.
33
Hitchens 2014, 95
34
quoted in Ibid. 96
35
Ibid. 99
36
Ibid. 100
37
Memorandum of Conversation, October 15, 1970
38
Telegram October 16, 1970
39
Memorandum for the Record, October 14, 1970.

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

Congressional run-off elections40”, a view also held by the CIA momentarily. “Unless there is a
sudden economic crisis or a serious civil disturbance, the Chilean military probably will not intervene
and Salvador Allende will be elected President on 24 October41.” – an October 17 CIA document
reads. The operational guideline sent on October 16 to the Santiago Station against the backdrop of
Kissinger’s orders and the prevailing mood in Washington cannot be interpreted as an unauthorised,
rouge CIA message. This additional piece of evidence is necessary for Hitchens to be able to proclaim,
that Kissinger did not call-off the idea of a coup in general, merely the particular plan that he was
briefed about by Karamessines.

Furthermore, Hitchens also fails to take account of Karamessines’s testimony to the Church
Committee, according to which the CIA kept Kissinger’s office briefed during the period between
October 18 and 2242. The CIA station in Santiago communicated kidnapping plot on October 19 to
Langley, following 10:30 pm meeting between Colonel Wilmert and Valenzuela and a separate
meeting between a false-flag officer and Viaux on October 18 both confirmed that the kidnapping and
the following military coup43. According Karamessines’s testimony, he briefed Kissinger’s office the
following day on October 19, at 3:30 PM, and according to his diary on October 22 following
Schneider’s murder44. It could be put forward, that the CIA chief of covert operations would be
engaged in the same blame-game as Kissinger. However, considering the orders received on October
15 from Kissinger, the CIA had little reason to lie about briefing Kissinger’s office. As shown by
Kornbluh, Karamessines’s testimony read together with the October 19 report from Santiago, and the
concluding remarks of the October 15 meeting of “keeping the pressure” on Allende and all other
evidence cited by Hitchens strengthen the Hitchens’s prima facea case against Kissinger, that in fact
he was knowledgeable of the events following his telephone call with Nixon announcing the coup
being turned off45.

The evidence cited by Hitchens for the rest of his claims, the CIA working together with Pinochet’s
supporters before and after the coup, making Kissinger complicit is non-existent, and as such
inconclusive. He supports his claim for CIA cooperation with the Chilean military by citing the US
Navy attaché’s ambiguous claims with regards to his close relationship with the Chilean officers
participating in the coup, and citing the coup as “Our D-Day.” The document is difficult to read, but it
makes no reference to cooperation beyond information gathering46 Hitchens also points to the
extensive literature on FUBELT. However here too, it becomes clear that the US activities in between
40
Memorandum, undated.
41
Paper October 17, 1970.
42
Kornbluh 2013, 32
43
Ibid. 27, CIA SECRET cable October 19, 1970
44
Ibid. 32, Hersh 1983, 288;
45
Transcript of a Telephone Conversation, October 15, 1970.
46
Situation Report #2, October 1, 1973,

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

1970 and 1973 were more passive than Hitches hints at. In fact, the evidence provided both by
Kornbluh and Hamer point to the fact, that the CIA although was hopeful of a coup, its activities with
the military were constrained to information gathering47. It is true, that Washington went a long way to
create the conditions for a coup, that much is acknowledged by Kissinger as well in his phone
conversation with Nixon following the September 11, 1973 coup48:

K: We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them. [We] created the conditions as great as
possible.

P: That is right.

Beyond frequent information gathering from the military, the CIA’s activities involved during this
period financial support for opposition political movements – referred to by Kissinger continuously as
“Democratic opposition49” – and publications playing up Allende’s attack on democracy50. However,
the claim that Allende was overthrown because of CIA funding to opposition parties and periodicals
ignores the correlative: virtually all opposition parties supported the military’s coup because of
Allende’s very real and very deep policy failures51.

Hitchens finally turns to point out Kissinger’s complicity in the crimes of the Pinochet regime. Here
the evidence is Kissinger’s well known conduct towards friendly countries, and cites Kissinger’s
personal conversation with Pinochet in 1976. In the absence of space for a wider discussion of is last,
to Hitchens’s main charge less relevant point, Kissinger’s personal communication and negotiation
style deserves a note here. Isaacson pointed out already in 1992, “Kissinger’s attempts to appeal to
varying viewpoints”. He “was able to take on the subtle colorations of whatever environment he was
in, almost by instinct.52” This style of Kisinger renders the interpretation of his true purposes and
motivation in conversation especially difficult to assess, and more evidence is needed to establish core
US policy. One may call it complicity, nonetheless it is this unique negotiation skill of Kissinger that
earned him the title of the architect of détente, and of course the correlative “flawed architect”.

The verdict:

In Chapter 5 of the Trial of Henry Kissinger Hitchens charges Kissinger, that he was personally
involved in the murder of general Schneider, however, unfortunately fails to provide convincing

47
Kornbluh 2013, 95; Hamer 2011, 221
48
Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger) and President Nixon September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m., FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume XXI
49
Kissinger 1982,383
50
Kornbluh 2013, 88 citing Kissinger’s Covert Action Program for Chile
51
Lawrance 2008, 278
52
Isaacson 1992, 191-192

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

enough evidence to this regard, even if the case is otherwise strong against the former Secretary of
State. Without being able to establish the direct connection between Kissinger’s orders and the CIA,
Kissinger’s defence stands – something that is easily overturned even based on the direct quotations of
Hitchens. With regards to Kissinger’s complicity and potential involvement with the coup of 1973 and
the crimes of the Pinochet regime, the evidence cited by Hitchens simply do not prove the narrative he
is trying to build. Edsforth’s claim, that “Hitchens book is not principally directed to academic
scholars” is evidently true, nonetheless, it fails most with regards to his attempt to give “a rational case
for regarding” Kissinger “as a villain53”. By drawing on contested testimonies, citing irrelevant
evidence often and failing to connect them to Kissinger personally, Hitchens’s books contribution to
either the historical literatature or the public discourse could only serve as the ‘bang’ needed to
revitalize it and direct attention to key topics in the debate.

53
Edsforth 2003, 233

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

Bibliography
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. London: Penguin (2007)
Douglas, Lawrence. “Eichman in Jerusalem, Kissinger in the Hauge?’ Salmagundi, No. 137/138
(Winter – Spring 2003) pp. 223-231
Edsforth, Ronald. “Christopher Hitchens and the Trial of Henry Kissinger, a Response to Lawrence
Douglas” Salmagundi, No. 137/138 (Winter – Spring 2003) pp. 232-238
Hamer, Tanya. Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. University of North Carolina Press
(2011) pp. 220-340
Hanhimaki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American foreign Policy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press (2004)
Hersh, Symour. The Price of Power: Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House. London: Faber and
Faber Limited (1983)
Hitchens, Christopher. The Trial of Henry Kissinger, London: Atlantic Books (2014)
Isaacson, Walter. Henry Kissinger: A Biography. London: Faber and Faber Limited (1992)
Kornbluh, Peter. “The Declassified Pinochet File: Delivering the Verdict of History” Radical History
Review, Issue 124 (January 2016)
Kornbluh, Peter. The Pinochet File: A declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability. London:
The New Press (2013)
Kornbluh, Peter. “Showdown in Santiago: What Really Happened in Chile?” Foreign Affairs, Vol 93.
No 5. (September/October 2014) pp. 168-174
Kornbluh Peter. “Declassifying U.S. Intervention in Chile”. NACLA Report on the Americans, 32:6
(1999) pp. 36-42
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. (1982)
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. London: George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. (1979)
Lawrence, Mark Atwood “History from Below: The United states and Latin America in the Nixon
Years” in Logewall, Fredrik and Preston, Andrew. Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations,
1969-1977. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2008)
Michaels, Albert. “The Alliance for Progress and Chile’s ‘Revolution in Liberty’, 1964-70”, Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 18:1 (1976) 74-99.
Scharf, Michael P. “Statesman or War Criminal?” Agni, No. 54. Amnesty International Fortieth
Anniversary (2001), pp. 299-305

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Candidate number: 20339 TRC: Dr Roham Alvandi
Course Code: HY331 Chapter under review: Chapter 5, Chile
Word count: 3367

Primary sources:
CIA SECRET cable from Santiago Station [Report on Plan to Kidnap Gen. René Schneider and
Initiate a Military Coup], October 19, 1970 in Kornbluh 2013, 68-71
“Situation Report #2”, Department of Defense, U.S. Milgroup, October 1, 1973, National Security
Archives, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/docs/doc21.pdf
“Memorandum From the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs
(Meyer) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” Washington, August
18, 1970. in FRUS, Volume E–16: Chile 1969–1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015
“Memorandum for the Record”, Washington, October 14, 1970. in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile 1969–
1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014
“Memorandum of Conversation” Washington, October 15, 1970. in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile 1969–
1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014
“Memorandum of Conversation” Washington, October 15, 1970. in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile 1969–
1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014
“Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President
Nixon” Washington, undated., in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile 1969–1976, Washington: Government
Printing Office, 2014
“Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Chile” Washington, October 16,
1970, 1408Z., in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile 1969–1976, Washington: Government Printing Office,
2014
“Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency” Washington, October 17, 1970. in FRUS,
Volume XXI: Chile 1969–1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014
“Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)” Washington, October 15, 1970. in FRUS, Volume XXI: Chile
1969–1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014
“Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon” September 16, 1973, 11:50 a.m., in FRUS, Volume XXI:
Chile 1969–1976, Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014

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