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Securing SCADA-based Critical Infrastructures: Challenges and Open Issues

Article in Procedia Computer Science · January 2019

DOI: 10.1016/j.procs.2019.08.086

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 Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
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ScienceDirect
Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000
Procedia
Procedia Computer
Computer Science
Science 15500 (2018)
(2019) 000–000
612–617 www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia
www.elsevier.com/locate/procedia

The 5th International Workshop on Cyber Security and Digital Investigation (CSDI 2019)
The 5th International Workshop
Auguston19-21,
Cyber2019,
Security and Digital
Halifax, CanadaInvestigation (CSDI 2019)
August 19-21, 2019, Halifax, Canada
Securing
Securing SCADA-based
SCADA-based Critical
Critical Infrastructures:
Infrastructures: Challenges
Challenges and
and
Open Issues
Open Issues
Noshina Tariqaa , Muhammad Asimaa , Farrukh Aslam Khanb,∗
Noshina Tariq , Muhammad Asim , Farrukh Aslam Khanb,∗
a National University of Computer and Emerging Sciences, A. K. Brohi Road, H-11/4, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
a National University of Computer and Emerging
b Center of Excellence in Information AssuranceSciences,
(CoEIA),A. K. Brohi
King Saud Road, H-11/4,
University, Islamabad
Riyadh 11653,44000, Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
b Center of Excellence in Information Assurance (CoEIA), King Saud University, Riyadh 11653, Saudi Arabia

Abstract
Abstract
Conventionally, the security of critical infrastructures was mainly focused on environmental threats. Cyber attacks, nevertheless,
Conventionally, the security
have shifted the attention of critical
to various infrastructures
other was mainly
threats and damages. Thefocused
attackersontry
environmental threats. Cyber
to exploit vulnerabilities attacks, nevertheless,
in networks and Internet
have shifted the attention to various other threats and damages. The attackers try to exploit vulnerabilities in networks
of Things (IoT) technologies, since these technologies are the integral part of the critical systems. Therefore, the vulnerability and Internetof
of Things
Critical (IoT) technologies,
Infrastructure since cyber
(CI) against these technologies
threats has ledarethe
theneed
integral part ofmodern
to devise the critical systems.
security Therefore,
measures. the vulnerability
Unavailability of
or failure
Critical
of one CIInfrastructure (CI) against
can cause enormous cyber threats
devastation has ledtothe
and damage theneed to devise
society, economymodern
and security
stability measures. Unavailability
by provoking or failure
cascading failures to
of oneother
many CI can causeinfrastructures.
related enormous devastation andsecurity
Traditional damage measures
to the society, economy
attempt to caterand stability by
well-known provoking
emerging cascading
threats; failures
however, to
strong
many
and other related
adaptive securityinfrastructures. Traditional
measures/techniques security measures
are inevitable to defend attempt to cater well-known
against innovative attacks. Thisemerging threats;a however,
paper presents survey onstrong
cyber
and adaptive
threats securitymeasures
and defense measures/techniques are necessity
to highlight the inevitablefor
to defend
securingagainst innovativecritical
SCADA-based attacks.infrastructures
This paper presents a surveyanoninsight
and provides cyber
threats and defense measures to highlight the necessity
into the security challenges and open issues in this regard. for securing SCADA-based critical infrastructures and provides an insight
into the security challenges and open issues in this regard.
c 2019

© 2018 The
The Authors.
Authors. Published
Published by
by Elsevier
Elsevier B.V.
B.V.
c 2018

This is The
an Authors.
open access Published
article by
under Elsevier
the CC B.V.
BY-NC-ND license
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
This is an open access article under
Peer-review under responsibility
responsibilityof the
ofthe CC BY-NC-ND
theConference license
ConferenceProgram
Program (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Chairs.
Chairs.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
Keywords: SCADA-based systems; Critical Infrastructure; Cyber security
Keywords: SCADA-based systems; Critical Infrastructure; Cyber security

1. Introduction
1. Introduction
Last two decades are known for pivotal advancements in computing and communication technologies with a
Last two
plethora decades
of new smartare known
objects for pivotal
known advancements
as Internet in computing
of Things (IoT). and communication
These “things” technologies
range from wearable with
devices likea
plethora
smart watches to large-scale infrastructures, such as water, energy, information, health services, transport, andlike
of new smart objects known as Internet of Things (IoT). These “things” range from wearable devices fi-
smart
nancialwatches to They
services. large-scale infrastructures,
are connected such as towater,
to one another provideenergy, information,
services health services, transport,
through Internet-connected and fi-
control system
nancial services.
management. AnyThey are can
system connected
becometocritical
one another to provide
when the servicesbecome
vulnerabilities throughthreats
Internet-connected control
to cause various kindssystem
of de-
management. Any system can become critical when the vulnerabilities become threats to cause various kinds of de-
structive impacts to social systems, energy, security, health and other parts of the society. Failure of an infrastructure
structive impacts of
or unavailability to the
social systems,
services canenergy, security, health
cause enormous and other
devastation andparts
damageof the
to society. Failure
the society, of an infrastructure
economy and stability.
or unavailability of the services can cause enormous devastation and damage to the society, economy and stability.

∗ Farrukh Aslam Khan. Tel.: +966-11-4697341 ; fax: +966-11-469523.

∗ Farrukh Aslam Khan. Tel.: +966-11-4697341 ; fax: +966-11-469523.
E-mail address: [email protected]
E-mail address: [email protected]
1877-0509  c 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
1877-0509
This c 2018

is an open Thearticle
access Authors. Published
under by Elsevier B.V.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
1877-0509
This © 2019
is an open Thearticle
access Authors. Published
under by Elsevier B.V.
the Conference
CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Peer-review under responsibility of the Program Chairs.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
10.1016/j.procs.2019.08.086
 Noshina Tariq et al. / Procedia Computer Science 155 (2019) 612–617 613
2 Noshina et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000

This failure may spread to other parts causing cascading failures to many other related infrastructures with terrible
consequences [1]. Therefore, security against cyber attacks is a primary concern, as the attack may degrade and disrupt
various services and cause environmental and economic deterioration.
To observe, monitor and control the whole cycle of business processes and data, most of the current industrial
critical infrastructures (CIs) are based on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Researchers
expect that the usage of SCADA systems by 2020 is expected to increase up to 300 million Euros [2], requiring
more sophisticated monitoring and control to counter unplanned and uncertain situations. To support the complex
monitoring of interlinked and composed systems, it is inevitable to develop high-end SCADA systems, keeping in view
the requirements of the upcoming generation of architectures. For instance, the project of European Architecture for
Service Oriented Process-Monitoring and Control (AESOP) opened a path to integrate the SCADA systems and cloud
based web services, which resulted in providing a system with extremely complex and largely distributed monitoring
platform.
Ethernet and Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) are commonly used to connect and provide
communication between web-based services in traditional SCADA systems. However, reliance on these protocols may
enhance a potential risk of cyber attacks and other malicious activities by external intruders [2]. Advance SCADA-
based CI systems are considered to be highly complex and sophisticated systems. These modern, real-time and smart
SCADA systems are the main focus of many cyber threats and attacks, due to inter-connectivity and standard com-
munication methods. They require security systems beyond firewalls and intrusion detection systems, such as trusted
systems, demilitarized zones, efficient authentication systems, and fortified systems and protocols [3].
This paper presents a comprehensive review of different cyber attacks made on SCADA-based CIs and highlights
the challenges, threats, and open issues for securing such systems. In addition, some state-of-the-art defense measures
and mechanisms are also discussed in this paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Critical infrastructure evolution and inter-dependencies are
given in section 2. Section 3 highlights the cyber attacks on SCADA-based CI. The CI Security challenges and open
issues are discussed in section 4. Different defense measures for SCADA-based CI are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Critical Infrastructure

When a system carries out critical procedures and functions, it is referred to as a critical infrastructure, due to its
influence on other interdependent devices, processes and sub-systems [4]. CI comprises many heterogeneous subsys-
tems, which interact with each other through a network. For example, in power grid systems, there are centralized
high voltage transmission systems to which substations of transformation are linked and the transformers are linked
to the consumers through distribution channels.

Fig. 1. SCADA system evolution: (a) Monolithic SCADA systems with remote terminal units: First generation, (b) Distributed SCADA systems:
Second generation, (c) Networked SCADA System: Third generation, (d) IOT-Cloud based SCADA System: Fourth Generation.
614 Noshina Tariq et al. / Procedia Computer Science 155 (2019) 612–617
Noshina et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000 3

According to many authors, 1960s was the establishment era of the SCADA system. Alexandru [5] classified
SCADA systems evolution into technological and architectural transformations. The architecture evolution can further
be divided into four major generations as per their functional capabilities, as shown in Fig. 1. The evolution started
with monolithic SCADA systems with Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) as the first generation and with the advent of
distributed systems, the second generation came into being where RTUs were connected to communication servers
using WAN. The emergence of new equipment vendors in the market, industrial growth, and increase in automated
processes triggered the need of the next generation of SCADA systems, referred to as networked SCADA systems
or third generation SCADA systems. In fourth generation, IoT and cloud play a vital role. The IoT concept refers
to different devices or sensors that collect data from remote locations and are connected to SCADA master using
wireless LANs; the collected data is sent to cloud for further processing. These systems are not only easy to maintain
and integrate, but they also provide faster data availability, scalability, efficiency and cost reduction.
For enhanced performance, CIs work interdependently on other infrastructures. For example, incidents like 9/11
terrorist attack, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Tohoku earthquake and Tsunami in 2011 [6] showed that critical infrastruc-
ture inter-dependencies caused cascading and accelerating catastrophic failures. Therefore, it is crucial to understand
the dependencies and inter-dependencies of CIs [7]. Inter-dependencies cause many aggravating challenges. Table 1
shows different types of infrastructure inter-dependencies.

Table 1. Types of infrastructure inter-dependencies.

Types of inter-dependencies Description

Physical inter-dependency The output of one infrastructure is the input to another. Failure or disturbance in one infrastructure will
cause cascading failing effect on the other.
Cyber inter-dependency Based on networking and advanced computer technologies. Failure or disturbance of one infrastructure may
(or may not) affect the functionality of the other infrastructure.
Geographic inter-dependency Infrastructures are in physical proximity to one another. Failure or disturbance of one infrastructure may (or
may not) affect the functionality of the other infrastructure.
Logical inter-dependency Infrastructures are logically linked, depending upon actions, decisions, policies or regulations made by
humans.

3. Cyber attacks on SCADA-based CI

Nowadays, cyber threats are considered as the major concern in both the government and non-government orga-
nizations. Many of the attacks are carried out with ‘Trojan horses’ [8] that are distributed through email links and
attachments. They are very difficult to detect as they appear to be real. The ‘STUXNET’ worm infection [9] exploited
the control critical infrastructure inadequacy of the regulatory systems. Another obtrusive strategy for SCADA-based
CI paralysis is to flood and overwhelm the carrier bandwidth. For example, in 2003, the ‘SLAMMER’ worm affected
a nuclear power plant and two utilities in the United States [10]. In 2012, a malware attack ‘Flame‘ captured data,
taped audio on Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) and made attacks on network traffic [11]. Another malware attack,
‘Dragonfly‘ hit the energy sector by using spam emails [12].
Besides cyber attacks on SCADA-based CI, social engineering and insider attacks are also hazardous to its security.
Through social engineering, the attacker infiltrates into a system for malicious activities. Another threat is the presence
of attackers from inside the organization. These type of attacks are considered as the most damaging as the attacker
knows the internal structure of the system and can easily bypass the security barriers [13]. For example, an attack on
sewage control system in Queensland, Australia caused the sewage flood. The attack was launched through a flash
drive [14].
Phishing is also another type of cyber attack that is used for stealing the confidential information to gain monetary
benefits. These attacks are carried out through many ways, such as contacting through a fake website for stealing
banking details of a user [15]. Another form of cyber attack is the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, where
a large volume of data and traffic are sent to the nodes/servers for consuming their resources. These types of attacks
make it difficult to distinguish between the real ones and the counterfeits. Another sophisticated form of the cyber
attack is Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack [16]. It works by interrupting the communication between the devices
 Noshina Tariq et al. / Procedia Computer Science 155 (2019) 612–617 615
4 Noshina et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000

and sending malicious codes to compromise a system. Table 2 presents some of the adverse cyber attacks made on
CIs.

4. CI Security challenges and open issues

The CIA triad1 is broadly used for defining and implementing security in information systems [13]. While consid-
ering the CIA triad for SCADA systems, the integrity and availability are more important factors than confidentiality.
The security goals are always followed by safety, reliability, robustness and maintainability of the system (the supreme
goal for critical systems). According to Park and Lee [25], the new standards should combine CIA triad with critical
safety requirement for CIs. Furthermore, SCADA systems have more security issues due to the legacy problems, for
example, using the out-dated software and operating systems, which are not supported by a large number of vendors.
Another issue with the SCADA systems is that they have not been redesigned for a long time due to their continuous
working. Existing systems employ different and conflicting security mechanisms for their safety. Therefore, there is
no single security mechanism to combine all the existing mechanisms, which opens the door for more research.

Table 2. Different types of cyber attacks on CI.

Attack Consequence Instigation Attack type Impact Severity
Ransomware attacks on SCADA sys- Locked PLCs, spread of a ransomware Vulnerable PLCs, weak authentication, External Financial loss High
tems [17] weak integrity control
Attacks on industrial robots [18] Auto-execution of malicious node, altered Vulnerable OS and web interface, weak au- External Sabotaged throughput, safety threat, finan- High
robot firmware thentication cial loss
FDI Attacks on real-time market model Fabricated data, profit gain from selling Vulnerable AMI and sensor network External Disrupted smart grid operations, profit loss High
and state estimation systems [19] and purchasing of virtual power
Remote attacks on IoT-enabled traffic con- Eavesdropping, remotely controlled traffic No encryption and authentication mecha- Internal DoS attack causing road accidents, loss of High
trol systems [20] lights nisms credibility
Remote attacks on mission-critical systems Mission-critical systems on acquired ship, Weak authentication, weak web interfaces, External Human injuries, financial loss High
on a ship [34] compromised navigation system no network segmentation
Attack on e-health infrastructure [34] Compromised hospital medical devices Vulnerable PMDs and web interface, weak External Loss of credibility, threat to human lives High
authentication
Phishing attacks on a container port sys- Compromised devices Outdated OS, vulnerable network proto- External Loss of credibility, threat to human lives High
tems and devices [21] cols, no network isolation, weak authenti-
cation mechanism
Spear-phishing attack on smart grid [22] Credential stealth, control over SCADA Vulnerable OS, weak authentication, no External Power outage, disrupted services, loss of High
system network isolation credibility
Worm attack on SCADA systems [23] Self-replication, exploited access privi- No network isolation Internal Compromised infrastructure, decreased ef- Medium
leges ficiency
Attacks on SCADA honeypots [24] Modified device functionality, pump shut Weak security policies, vulnerable servers External Loss of functionality, disrupted produc- High
down tion, device damage, loss of credibility

With the evolution of CI and IoT, the current SCADA systems need to be upgraded for handling massive amount of
big data generated by these devices. For instance, large smart grids produce large amount of data that cannot be han-
dled with the current cloud computing techniques. CISCO came up with the observation that current cloud computing
infrastructure cannot cope with the generated data volume, variety and velocity [26]. Therefore, the direct upload-
ing of data to the cloud for storage, processing and analysis requires large data transferring capabilities. Therefore,
the introduction of fog computing has provided the solution to many problems commonly found with cloud-based
SCADA systems. It offers transient data storing and analysis at the edge of the network. It reduces the amount of data
transmission and storage to the cloud and provides a better solution for delay-sensitive applications.
The major obstacles in merging the CI data with the cloud computing environment involve strict requirements for
security, low latency, and integration with high service availability. The most critical issue is the absence of efficient
and strong security and user authentication systems in cloud platforms having limited control and screening of data
replication in the cloud. Therefore, there is a strict need of data security approaches and mechanisms along with
maximum control on authentication and authorization [26].
As fog computing is a nontrivial extension of cloud computing, it has inherited many security and privacy issues
from the cloud [27]. Therefore, this inherited difficulty may hamper the integration of fog with SCADA-based CI. The
existing nature of SCADA systems already lacks efficient security and privacy mechanisms; hence, cloud computing
integration will pose more threats for the overall security of the network. For instance, the addition of a new smart
device with inherited security issues will result in a security threat for the whole network. Further, the connection of
smart devices with the cloud having reduced security mechanisms may also result in a security breach in the whole
network and may easily be attacked.

1 Confidentiality, integrity and availability

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Noshina et al. / Procedia Computer Science 00 (2018) 000–000 5

5. SCADA-based CI defense measures

The failure in CI is observed in four dimensions2 . One solution to strengthen the security of SCADA systems is
‘defense in-depth’. In defense in-depth, several layers of security are implemented through different technologies and
intrusion detection systems to prevent security breaches and to avoid single-point-of-failure [10]. Hurst et al. [28]
noted that it is the most efficient strategy if all the security layers work independently. For every possible attack,
the defense in-depth strategy involves the application of different protection layers for expanding the security shield.
However, the application of this strategy on resource-constrained devices is a critical task, such as devices with limited
storage and computation capabilities.
For countering the security issues in computer networks, many approaches have been proposed for the CI security.
Shiri et al. [29] presented the idea of deploying multiple intrusion systems for protection against intrusion attacks.
This approach resulted in increased efficiency and security by decreasing the workload on a single mechanism. Some
novel solutions for mitigating intrusion detection and DoS attacks are proposed in [19, 30, 31, 32]. Another useful
mechanism for mitigating DoS attacks is Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans
Apart (CAPTCHA). Different types of CAPTCHAs are available in the literature [33]. Fovino et al. [35] presented
the idea for detecting complex cyber attacks in the SCADA systems by combining signature-based intrusion systems
with state analysis.
In reality, every single day possesses a new threat for the existing vulnerabilities [36]. The application of smart
meters in smart electric grid shows this trend [28]. A framework based on the TCP/IP is proposed in [37] for smart
meters data communication and secure traffic analysis. Patil et al. [38] proposed a Multi-Player attack detection model
for smart meter security in smart grid systems. In [39], a Comprehensive Packet Inspection-based (CPI) firewall model
for SCADA security is presented. Baker et al. [2] proposed a security toolbox for integrity, security, and privacy of
SCADA-based IoT critical infrastructure at the fog layer.

6. Conclusion

Industries always look for solutions to improve their performance and stability of their systems’ flexibility, fault
tolerance, security and cost effectiveness. The contemporary society fails to pursue its functionality if its critical
infrastructures (CIs) malfunction. Cyber security is an important concern in SCADA-based CIs and these systems
are constantly under higher threat levels. Apart from environmental threats, CIs security measures must cope with
sophisticated cyber attacks. Sub-optimal security measures may eventuate in cascading failure in SCADA-based CIs
as rebuilding from scratch is impracticable. Therefore, it is inevitable to envision and design such security mechanisms
that are light-weight and meet the present and evolving security demands of CIs.

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