r.

o s
by Richard P. F eynman

(edited by Ralph Leighton)

to investigate the
! Challenger accident, which
WAS INVITED TO WASHINGTON
you presumably
all know about.
First of all, NASA has many projects.
In this lecture I'm going to use the word
"NASA" always to mean just that work asso-
ciated with the Shuttle, and I don't imply any
other connections.
Before I tell you about the Shuttle, I
thought it would be interesting to you all to
see the costume that I assumed in order to
move among the natives without being too
conspicuous in Washington. They wear this
kind of coat because it's a little bit cold there
- there's snow sometimes. They think it's
because it's cold there, but, as a matter of
fact, they wear such coats on the inside of
their buildings, which are well heated.
Further, it turns out that you can put this
coat on to walk short distances - from one
building to another - or from a building to
a taxi, if it's any longer distance. However,
they are not satisfied with this. They seem
to have a strange fear of the cold, because on
top of this they put other coats if they wish
to step outside. Now that you've seen the
equipment, I'm going to take it off.
This briefcase is not quite accurate. It's
what they have, and I tried buying one in
order to complete my disguise when I first
started out. But I discovered, first, that
they're expensive, and second, that they can't
contain a great deal of material. So I bought
instead a kind of soft-covered traveling case
which carried enough stuff so that when I'd
Feynman's special report on the reliability of leave, I could have everything in my case -
the Shuttle, which appeared as an appendix to whereas they all left with their cases under
the commission report, may be obtained by their arms, carrying big books in their hands.
requesting a copy from E&S. To remind you for just a moment about

6 ENGINEERING & SCllNCE / FALL 1987

Was ·

7
 the Shuttle (below), the central part is the the story is that one of the SRBs failed.
tank for fuel (liquid hydrogen and liquid oxy- There was a leak in a joint between two sec-
gen); the engine, which bums that fuel, is at tions. Hot gas leaked out of the joint and
the back end of the orbiter, which looks ultimately burned a hole in the side of the
something like an airplane. The crew sits in tank where the hydrogen was, and the flight
For hfiQfJ the Shuttle is joined the front of the orbiter. In order to boost the was a failure.
to a large tank (the central Shuttle in the beginning, there are two solid- I'm making this part of my talk relatively
portion) containing liquid file!. core rockets, called "SRBs" (for solid rocket short, because most of you already know this.
On either side of the tank are
the solid rocket boosters. one boosters). They are ignited for about two There's putty and other things, but the ulti-
of which failed, causing the minutes before they are discarded and later mate seal is supposed to be two rubber rings,
Challenger disaster. recovered in the sea. As most of you know, called O-rings, which are approximately a
quarter of an inch thick and lie on a circle 12
ft. in diameter - that's something like 37 ft.
around (top right). When the SRB was origi-
nally designed by the Morton Thiokol Com-
pany, it was expected that the pressure from
the rocket would squash the O-rings so the
joint would be securely sealed. What hap-
pened instead is, the joint is stronger than the
wall (it's three times thicker), so that under
pressure the wall bows outward, causing the
joint to open a little - enough to lift the
rubber O-rings off the seal area. This
phenomenon is called "joint rotation" in the
lingo the engineers use, and it was discovered
very early, when they were still designing,
before the Shuttle flew.
Although the pieces of rubber are called
O-rings, they're not used the way O-rings are
normally used. In ordinary circumstances,
such as for sealing oil in the motor of an
automobile, although there are sliding parts
and rotating shafts, the gaps are always the
same. An O-ring just sits there in a fixed
position. But in the case of the Shuttle, the
gap expands as the pressure builds up in the
rocket. And to maintain the seal, the rubber
has to expand fast enough to close the gap -
in fractions of a second. Thus the resilience
of the rubber became a very essential part of
the design. When the Thiokol engineers were
discovering these problems, they went to the
Parker Seal Company, who manufactures the
rubber, to ask for advice. The Parker Seal
Company told Thiokol that O-rings were not
meant to be used that way, so they could give
no advice.
Although it was known from nearly the
beginning that the joint was not working as it
was designed to, Thiokol kept struggling with
the device. They made a number of make-
shift improvements. One was to put shims in
to keep the joint tight (bottom right). At first
they thought they would adjust each shim to
the right thickness as they went around (the
rocket would become slightly out of round
after each use), but that was expensive, so

8 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE! FALL 1987

they made all the shims the same thickness.
Of course, it wasn't enough. The joint still
leaked, and they were thinking how to fix it,
and the Shuttle kept flying. That is one of
things you have to understand: The program
kept going, no matter what.
Now I want to tell about my own experi-
ences in connection with this. A few days
after the accident, on a Friday, I got a call
from William Graham, who was the Acting
Director of NASA. Mr. Graham had been a
student of mine - at Caltech, and also at the
Hughes Aircraft Company, where I gave a
series of lectures - and thought maybe I
would be of some use to the investigation.
When I heard it would be in Washington, my
immediate reaction was not to do it. I have a
principle of not going anywhere near Wash-
ington or having anything to do with
government.
So I called various friends like Al Hibbs This cross section of the solid
and Dick Davies, trying to find an excuse rocket booster (top, left) shows
why I shouldn't accept, but they all said I the rubber O-rings that encir-
should. Then I spoke to my wife. "Look," cle the rocket at the joints.
I said. "Anybody could do it. They can get Because the joint is stronger
than the wall, the wall bows
somebody else." "No," said Gweneth. And outward, causing the joint to
she explained how she thought I would make open slightly, which lifts the
a unique contribution - in a way that I am O-rings off the seal.
modest enough not to describe. Nevertheless,
I believed what she said. So I said, "OK. I'll
accept."
So on Sunday, as I went to the telephone
to call Mr. Graham, I announced to
Gweneth, "I'm going to commit suicide for
six months. I won't be able to do any work
with this physics problem I've been having One solution to this problem
fun with; I'm going to do nothing but work was to insert shims to keep
the joint tight, as shown at
on the Shuttle - for six months." I want
left·
you to understand my attitude at the time: I
hadn't realized that it would take two years to I'll show you the first page of the notes I
get the Shuttle flying again. I was going to try made in the briefing (see next page). You'll
to work very hard so we could get everything find that on the second line it says, "O-rings
straightened out as quickly as possible. show scorching in clevis check." That means
The next day, Monday, I got a telephone hot gas had burned through the O-rings on
call at 4 pm: "Mr. Feynman, you have been several occasions. Furthermore, they told me
accepted onto the commission" - which by that the zinc chromate putty had bubbles, or
that time was a "presidential" commission, holes. It turned out that yes, indeed, through
headed by former Secretary of State William those holes the gas came in to erode the
P. Rogers. The first meeting would be in O-rings. So already, on the second line of my
Washington, on Wednesday. So Tuesday, briefing, I was told what was the matter wi.th
I asked Al Hibbs to get people at JPL who the Shuttle.
knew something about the Shuttle project to The guys at JPL gave me a lot of other
brief me on it right away. I want to say right information. They told me about the
now that I got nothing but wonderful engines, which are remarkable devices in the
cooperation from JPL, and that briefing was sense that the engineering involved is very
fantastic. good. They are way beyond normal. They
In order to prove how successful it was, are the most powerful engines for their weight

9
 further and further, into worse and worse ter-
ritory, until we finally find the address - by
interpolation, between two numbers. It was
an empty lot there, with no number on it.
So now, what to do? I asked the taxi
driver to go all the way back over this whole
distance. (Meanwhile, my secretary tells me,
she got a call from Washington: "Where is
he?") Then I noticed that my hotel was right
across the street from NASA. Perfect. Right
across the street. (In fact, it was also across a
different street, on the other comer, from
where the commission later had its offices.)
I thought, "What the hell, NASA's right
across the street. I'll go to NASA. Somebody
there must know where the meeting is." So I
went into NASA, up to Mr. Graham's office,
and somebody knew. They showed me the
room. There, the room was full of people.
There were television lights and everything,
and all I could do was squash in the back and
think, "How the hell am I gonna get to the
front where I belong?" I worried about this
for awhile. Then I overheard a little bit
Thefirst page of Feynman's that have ever been built. NASA was claim- about what they were saying, and it was evi-
notes from the February 4 ing that the engines were in the regular range dently a different subject!
JPL briefing shows suspicion of engineering, but they're not; the engines
of the O-rings in the second
In the meantime, somebody from Mr.
line.
had many difficulties that the guys at JPL Graham's office had found the location of
told me about. (I found out later that the Mr. Rogers' office by phoning around and
people who worked on the engines always came down to get me. I finally made it to Mr.
had their fingers crossed on each flight, and Rogers' law offices a few blocks away, where I
the moment they saw the Shuttle explode, met the other commissioners. Over the
they were all sure it was the engines. But of course of the commission, we all became very
course, the TV replay showed a flame coming good friends. We worked very hard together.
out of one of the solid rocket boosters.) This first meeting was the beginning of a very
Anyway, the point is that I got briefed. effective commission - with the exception of
And this was done with lots of energy, just Mr. Chuck Yeager, who came to one meeting
like the old days at Los Alamos, one guy after for about half an hour, and then absented
the other: first the rocket, then the engines, himself from the commission in order to be
and so forth. A guy would say, "We don't free so he could make criticisms of it.
know about that; Lifer knows about that. Well, this first meeting was just a get-
Let's get Chuck Lifer in on this." So it was together. But Mr. Rogers did discuss the
a very intensive briefing, the kind of thing I importance of our relationship to the press
love, and I sucked up all the information like and how we have to be very careful with the
a sponge. I'm all set to go to Washington, press. "I know Washington," he kept saying.
and I go to Washington. (By the way, I took "We have to proceed in an orderly manner
the "red-eye" across the country so I could and be careful of leaks to the press."
stay here on Tuesday to learn about the Shut- The next meeting we had, on Thursday,
tle. But the red-eye I never took again - was a public meeting - to start things off
you're so sleepy when you get there.) right with the press. By the way, we arrived
I check into the Holiday Inn early at that meeting in limousines. We never got
Wednesday morning, I get into a taxi, and limousines again, but this time we arrived in
read the address of Mr. Rogers' office to the limousines. I sat in the front seat. The driver
driver. We start off. Mr. Rogers' office was says to me, "I understand a lot of very impor-
supposed to be near the hotel somewhere - tant, famous people are coming to this meet-
the hotel was located near the Capitol and ing ... "
near everything big - but we go on and on, "Yeah, I s'pose ... "

10 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE / FALL 1987

 "Well, I collect signatures," he says. sioners were retired, so they could spend 100
"Could you do me a favor ... " percent of their time. I also said I could
"Sure," I say. spend 100 percent; I had everything arranged
I'm reaching for my pen when he contin- here at Caltech. (Nobody at Caltech ever said
ues, " ... and find Mr. Armstrong for me, so I a word to me that I was shirking my work
can get his signature?" There are always here, and I appreciate that.)
greater people. I tried very hard to get something to do.
That meeting was a public briefing. A In the meeting I kept explaining that public
briefing in a public meeting is almost impos- briefings don't work with me; I have to talk
sibly inefficient, because other people ask to the technical people directly. Mr. Rogers
questions, and they're not the questions you explained that we were going down to Ken-
want to ask, and you've got to sit through all nedy Space Center in Florida on the follow-
that, and so on, and so on. It's very ing Thursday. Then we would start our
ineffective, and I began to learn how boring investigation.
such things can be. The NASA officials were Next Thursday? I wanted to get going
telling me only a small fraction of all the much quicker than that, and kept explaining
things I had learned at JPL two days before. that I could work much more efficiently if I
We had all come to the meeting in went on my own and talked to people
limousines, and when we came out, some of directly, and I kept mentioning different
the limousines were still there. One of the things I'd like to do. Then the meeting
commissioners was a general, General would be interrupted by a letter coming in for
Kutyna, who looked very handsome and very Mr. Rogers, or something. He would read it
impressive in his uniform. But what - during which time various other commis-
impressed me was his request: "Where is the sion members would whisper to me, "I'd like
nearest Metro station?" Right away I liked to work with you if you get a job" - and
him, and I found out that my judgement in then Mr. Rogers would look up, apparently
this case was excellent. forgetting that I had been talking, and call on
That night I wrote out for myself what somebody else.
kinds of questions I thought we should ask Finally, I would get the floor again. I
and all the things I wanted to study. I laid would start my stuff again, and there would
out the whole business, hoping to see what be another "accident." The meeting stopped
the rest of the commission wanted to do in while I was still talking, and the last words
our next meeting. were by Mr. Armstrong, the vice chairman.
The next day, Friday, was more effective. He said we wouldn't be doing any of the
General Kutyna told us in considerable detail detailed investigative work. Well, the only
what an accident investigation was like and thing I'm any good at is detailed work!
how it was done, using the Titan missile as an I was devastated. I was depressed and
example. I was very impressed with this. I very uncomfortable. After the meeting I went
was happy to learn that most of the questions up to Mr. Rogers. "Look," I said. "We've
I was going to ask were the kinds of questions got nothing to do for five days!"
one should ask, except that the investigation He said, "Well, what would you have
should be done in a much more methodical done if you hadn't been on the commission?"
fashion than I had imagined. "I would have gone to Boston to consult
At the end of this discourse, Mr. Rogers, for the Thinking Machine Company."
who is not a technical man, said, "Yes, your "Well, you go to Boston to consult, and
investigation was a wonderful success, but we come back in five days."
can't use those methods on our flight because I couldn't take that. I was wound up like
we can't get as much information as you had a spring, ready to go to work. I had intended
on yours." That was patently false, because to "commit suicide" - do nothing else but
the Shuttle, having people in it, was moni- work for the commission - for six months,
tored much more carefully, so we had enor- and I had nothing to do. I was very
mously more information than they had on depressed. I left that meeting feeling terrible.
the Titan. So there wasn't any doubt that we Soon I thought of something. I called up
could do it. Mr. Graham, and said, "Listen, Bill, We're
In the meeting Mr. Rogers asked each of not doing anything for five days! I want to
us how much time we could spend working get started! I want to DO something!"
on the commission. Many of the commis- He says, "Sure! You could go to Johnson,

11
 where they take the telemetry; you could go Mr. Rogers said, "Well, do you want me
to Marshall, where they make the engines; or to bother everybody and bring them together
you could go to Kennedy." again for a meeting on Monday to discuss
I didn't want to go to Kennedy, because this?"
it would look like I was trying to get informa- I said, "Yes!"
tion before the rest of the commission did. So he dropped the subject. Then he said,
That was not what I was trying to do; I just "I've heard you don't like your hotel. Let me
wanted to get started. Sally Ride had said she put you in a good hotel."
wanted to work with me if I got something to I told him everything was fine with the
do, and I knew she was at Johnson, so I said hotel, and that I was perfectly satisfied with
I'd go there. it. I just wanted to get to work! But he tried
So Graham says, "That's fine, you can do again, so I had to tell him, "Mr. Rogers, I am
that. I know David Acheson, who's on the not interested in my personal comfort, only
commission. He's a good friend of Rogers. in the ability to do something!"
I'll call him and see what he thinks." About He said, "OK, go to NASA. It's OK."
half an hour later, Mr. Acheson calls me: That's where our conversation ended.
"I think it's a great idea, but I can't convince So, I went. I got a private briefing all day
Rogers. Rogers refuses to say why he's at NASA on the engines and on the seals.
against it, and I just don't know why I can't The briefing on the seals was by Mr. Weeks.
convince him that you should get started." It was a continuation of my JPL briefing,
Meanwhile, Mr. Graham thought of a with many more details, including the history
compromise: He would bring people into of these matters: how the problem had been
NASA headquarters, there in Washington, to discovered very early, how there had been
brief me the next day, on Saturday. But Mr. "bum-throughs," "erosion," "blow-bys," and
Rogers called me up and said he didn't want what-not, on flight after flight - how many
me to do that. He kept explaining that we there were, and how each flight readiness
have to proceed in an orderly manner. I tried review had looked at the information and
to explain how a technical person can talk to decided it was all right to fly.
another technical person and get information At the end of this long report on the prob-
very quickly, and that I wanted to DO some- lem of the seals, there was a page with recom-
thing! I complained that we had had several mendations (see below). This is how all
meetings by now, but we hadn't yet discussed information is communicated in NASA-
who was going to do what, or how to get by writing everything down behind little black
started on the investigation. circles, called "bullets."
The NASA report on the seals
indicates a contradiction
between the first and sixth
recommendations.
 When I looked at the recommendations, assembly people, the engineers, and every-
the thing that struck me was the contradic- body else low enough down.
tion between two of the bullets: The first one Later that day, General Kutyna called me
says, "The lack of a good secondary seal in up on the telephone. "I was working on my
the field joint is most critical. Ways to carburetor, and I was thinking. You're a pro-
reduce the effects should be incorporated as fessor," he says. "What. sir, is the effect of
soon as possible to reduce criticality." Then, cold on the rubber seals?"
further down the page, it says, "Analysis of I caught on immediately to what he was
existing data indicates that it is safe to con- thinking of. The temperature was 29° when
tinue flying with existing design ... "- with the Shuttle flew, and the coldest previous
some other conditions, such as using 200 lbs. launch was 53°. I said, "You know as well
of pressure in the leak test. (By the way, we as I do. It gets stiff and loses its resiliency."
discovered later that the leak test itself was That gave me a clue. Of course, that's all he
causing the holes in the putty and was part had to tell me, and it was a clue for which I
of the reason for the failure of the seals!) got a lot of credit later. But it was his idea.
I pointed out this contradiction and said, The professor of physics always has to be told
"What analysis?" It was some kind of com- what to look for. You just use your knowl-
puter model. A computer model that deter- edge to answer the questions.
mines the degree to which a piece of rubber That weekend, the New York Times put
will burn in a complex situation like that - out an article about a man named Cook, who
is something I don't believe in! was in the budget department of NASA. Mr.
I also found out that the matters that were Cook had written a letter to his superior a
causing trouble were brought up only at the year earlier, saying that the engineers knew
"flight readiness review," where they were there was something wrong with the seals,
deciding whether to fly or not. There are so that they might have to fix the problem, and
many considerations in deciding whether to it might be expensive. Mr. Cook was working
fly, yet they brought up these critical matters out the budget and recommended that NASA
only under those circumstances. In between prepare for the contingency that it would sud-
the flights, there was no discussion of the denly need a big load of money to fix this
problem - how it's going along, or whether problem of the seals.
there's some progress. This gets into the New York Times, and
So, what was really happening was that so we have to have a special meeting. It's the
NASA had developed an attitude: If the seals press, you see; we have to match the press. So
leaked a little and the flight was successful, it on Monday, everybody was called to a meet-
meant that the seal situation wasn't serious. ing anyway! But I remind you, we still
Therefore, the seals could leak and it would hadn't had any meetings in which we did any
be all right - it was no worse than the time work. At this emergency closed meeting, we
before. got some interesting information: The NASA
Such an attitude is, of course, extremely people who had been looking at the television
dangerous. One or two out of five seals pictures of the launch saw preliminary indica-
leaked - and only some of the time - so tions that there was smoke coming out of one
it's obviously a probabilistic matter, a thing of the joints just at lift-off.
you have no control over, an uncertainty. More interesting still was a report by a
And it's not obvious that the next time you man named MacDonald from the Thiokol
fly, the uncertainty won't click over a little bit Company, who came to the meeting on his
more, statistically, and the seal will fail. And own. He said that the Thiokol Company
it did, in fact, fail. engineers had noticed the low temperature,
The next morning, Sunday, Mr. Graham had been worrying about their seals, had
took me with his family to the National Air known about the resilience not being there.
and Space Museum. There we saw a moving Furthermore, they knew that when it is cold,
picture about NASA, and it was so well done the grease in the seals is very viscous so it
that I almost cried when I sawall the people can't move fast enough to close the gaps.
involved at every level, how enthusiastic ev- The engineers were very, very worried about
erybody was, and how eager they were to it just before the flight and reported to the
make things work. That made me even more people at Marshall that they should not fly
determined to help straighten things out as below 53° temperature, and that night it was
quickly as possible and to talk to the Shuttle 29°. But the engineers were told that that was

13
 an appalling decision, that they should think time we discovered something, we would
it over again, and they were given some quickly have an open meeting to bring out
apparently logical reason. the new material.) But I thought, "It's like an
(By the way, there were lots of apparently act: We have to hear the same things in the
logical reasons all over this business, but a lit- open meetings as in the closed meetings, and
tle common sense shows you that they're only we won't learn anything new. And the infor-
apparently logical. For example, the succes- mation I got from NASA about the rubber is
sion of blow-bys was getting more serious, so useless."
they kept changing the criteria of what they I'm feeling lousy and I'm eating dinner;
accepted, saying, "It flew before, so it must be I look at the table, and there's a glass of ice
OK." Try playing Russian roulette that way: water. I think, "Damn it, I can find out
You pull the trigger and it doesn't go off, so about that rubber without sending notes to
it must be OK to do it again, right?) NASA and getting back a stack of papers; all
We later learned that in the discussions I've got to do is get a sample of the rubber,
inside Thiokol, the engineers were still saying, stick it in ice water, and see how it responds
"We shouldn't fly," but the managers made a when I squeeze it! That way, I can learn
decision nevertheless to go ahead and fly, and something new in a public meeting!"
then they gave the usual, apparently logical I ask NASA for a piece of the rubber. It's
reason, which was - never mind, I couldn't impossible to get; they're very, very careful,
ever understand it. It's hopeless. and every piece of material is checked and
At any rate, that morning I had asked the counted and everything else, so you can't just
question about how resilient the rubber is, go down to the stockroom and pick up a
and, as always, NASA was very cooperative at piece of rubber. But Mr. Graham remem-
giving me information. That afternoon I got bered there were two pieces of the rubber in
a stack of papers, the first page of which said, the field joint model NASA had shown us
"Mr. Feynman of the commission wants to before and was going to use again in the open
know about the resiliency of the O-ring meeting. The two pieces of rubber were the
rubber at low temperatures ... "- and it's real thing about an inch and a half long each.
sent to the next subordinate. The subordi- We decided to meet in Mr. Graham's office
nate writes to another subordinate, "Mr. the next morning before the meeting to see if
Feynman of the presidential commission I could take the model apart. (In the open
wants to know ... " and so on, down the line. meeting I would have to take the model apart
In the middle there's a paper with the answer, quickly.)
and then there's a series of papers - the sub- The next morning I get up early. I come
mission papers - which explain that "this is out of the hotel - it's snowing a little bit -
in answer to your request at such-and-such a and I'm dressed up in that outfit (my suit)
time." because I'm going to the public meeting later.
So I get this stack of papers, just like a A taxi comes up, and I say to the driver, "I
sandwich, and in the middle the answer is want to go to a hardware store."
given to the wrong question! The answer I He says, "A hardware store? There's no
got was: When you squeeze the rubber for hardware stores here. The Capitol is just up
two hours at a certain temperature and pres- the street - we're in downtown Washing-
sure, what happens when you let go - how ton!" Then he remembered where he had
long it takes to creep back - over hours. seen a hardware store once, some distance
And I was talking about fractions of a second away, and we went there. I waited around
during launch when the gap in the field joint for it to open, and then I bought myself some
is suddenly changing. So the information was screw drivers, pliers, clamps, and so on,
of no use. because I wasn't sure exactly what I would
We were going to have a public meeting need.
the next day. I was already getting tired of When I got to NASA I began thinking the
these public meetings and briefings because clamps were too big to put into a glass. So to
they were so time-consuming and of so little get some small clamps I went to the medical
use. I thought, "Now we're going to have an department of NASA, where I had gone
open meeting, and we're going to say exactly several times before (my cardiologist was try-
the same things that we did in the closed ing to take care of me by telephone). I went
meeting." (It was a good idea: Mr. Rogers up to Graham's office. He was very coopera-
wanted to keep the public informed, so every tive, as always, and we saw that I could open

14 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE / FALL 1987

 William Rogers (/ttt) swears
in the commission at the
National Academy (jf Sciences.
From left are Neil Armstrong,
Sally Ride, Robert Rommel,
Major General Donald
Kutyna, Arthur Walker, Jr.,
Joseph Sutter, David Acheson,
Feynman, Albert Wheelan,
and Robert Hotz.

the model very easily with just a pair of the Air Force. Sally Ride still had a job at
pliers. So there was the rubber, right in my NASA. Everyone on the commission had
hand, and although I knew it would be more some kind of connection and therefore some
dramatic and honest to do the experiment kind of weakness, but I was apparently
directly in the meeting, I cheated - I invincible.
couldn't resist. I tried it. And, after all, it But General Kutyna warned me that
would be quite a flop if it didn't work! So, when they fly airplanes, they have a rule:
following the example of having a closed Check six. Most airplanes are shot down this
meeting before an open meeting, I must tell way: A guy is flying along, looking in all
you I discovered it worked before I did it in directions, and feeling very safe. An airplane
the open meeting. flies up behind him (at "six o'clock"; "twelve
I kept wanting to do my experiment all o'clock" is directly in front), and he gets hit.
during the meeting, but General Kutyna, who So you always have to check six o'clock. So
was sitting next to me, gave me advice. He I began to write, "Check six!" on every note
had given me advice before. At the first pub- paper I had and developed a kind of
lic meeting he had leaned over and said, paranoia.
"Copilot to pilot: Comb your hair." So now For example, I have a cousin who previ-
he was saying, "Copilot to pilot: Not now!" ously had been with the Associated Press as
So when he told me, "Now!" I did it, and White House correspondent and is now 'with
everything went all right. As you probably CNN; I also have a nephew who works for
know, I demonstrated that the rubber had no the Washington Post. When I had some time
resilience whatever when you squeezed it at I would visit with them - eating dinner, and
that temperature, and that it was very likely so on. It was very pleasant, but we made
a partial cause of the accident. We all agreed sure we never said a word about anything
later that that, in fact, was true. I was doing, because I didn't want to be
On Wednesday, February 12, we had no responsible for any leaks. I told Mr. Rogers
meeting, so I wrote a letter home. I told my that I had these associations with the press.
wife she was right, that in certain ways I was He smiled and said, "It's perfectly all right.
unique. One of the ways I was unique was I used to work for so-and-so"- he had some
that I was not connected to any organization connection with the press too. He just
- I had no weakness from that point of laughed; there was no problem. But my
view. I was, of course, connected with Cal- paranoia had developed to such a point that I
tech, but that's not a weakness! For example, thought, "That was too easy; he's going to get
General Kutyna was in the Air Force, so he me that way!" So I stopped seeing my
couldn't say everything exactly the way he cousin. That was stupid: There were no
wanted, because he might get in trouble with problems; it was just my state of mind.

15
 I did, however, keep talking to the press So I stayed at Kennedy a few more days.
- openly, always giving my name. (I didn't I ran around and found out more about the
want any hocus-pocus about "unidentified pictures from the photograph guys; I found
sources," or anything.) My cousin had taught out about the ice that had been on the launch
me that the press is not something to be pad from the ice crew. They told me they
afraid of, and it turns out to be true. I found had gotten some funny numbers for the tem-
that out several times. The first time was perature on the morning of the launch, and
when the New York Times put out an article we discussed what was wrong. We called up
after I did the ice water experiment; during the people who made the instrument, and
the public meeting I had no time to explain tried to find out how the instrument was built
what its meaning and importance were, but so we could understand the errors, but they
they had it all explained perfectly. suddenly clammed up, obviously afraid that
Another time, NBC interviewed me - they were going to be blamed for the Shuttle
they caught me in the lobby of my hotel. disaster.
They interviewed me for 15 to 20 minutes - I explained to the manufacturer that the
the lady reporter was very short and very nice instruments were not used in accordance with
- and I talked in my usual, careful, profes- their manual (they had been used too soon
sorial way, with all the caveats and so forths after being taken out of the box), and we
and so ons. I saw the interview later on the wanted to know what the effect of that misuse
"Nightly News": I was on for about two would be on the apparent temperature read-
seconds - I say something, and BOOM! - ings, and so forth. I finally got them to
it's over. But it was good: The report carried explain it all. They said our errors were
the line of what I said, and the reporter put reproducible. So we set up an experiment in
the context around it, saying things like, "The which we reproduced the circumstances, and
professor went on to say that this was only we corrected the temperature readings. I'm
the result of a mathematical model and might only trying to say I was working hard.
be uncertain" - stuff like that. It was excel- Another thing came up while I was run-
lent. It was very short, carefully put together, ning around down there at Kennedy. I had
and excellent - except for one thing: predicted that Mr. Rogers was going to try to
Because I'm not experienced, I didn't look fix me by overloading me - by giving me a
into the camera when I spoke. Instead, it lot of stuff to do. Sure enough, it happened;
looked like I was talking to my dog. the commission staff in Washington kept
Well, finally, on Thursday, we get to Ken- sending me things to do. But as the instruc-
nedy. The main briefing turned out to be the tions came in, I had done them already -
way I thought it would be - we didn't get they didn't realize how fast I am at getting
any useful information just looking around at information and understanding it and going
the "gee-whiz" place. But before that, we had on to the next thing.
two meetings in which we got a lot of infor- The only thing they sent me that I didn't
mation. We got a detailed look at the pic- do had to do with a certain memo whose
tures of the smoke, which made it very existence they had discovered. During the
apparent that the leak of gasses through the assembly of the SRBs, someone had written
seal had started immediately after ignition, cavalierly, "Let's go for it!" The staff didn't
then somehow plugged itself up temporarily, like that attitude on the part of the workers,
and finally ended up with a flame coming and they wanted to find that piece of paper.
through. We also got all the details on the By that time I knew how much paper there
Thiokol-Marshall discussions, in which the was in NASA so I was sure it was a trick to
engineers never changed their minds; only the make me get lost and to do nothing. So I did
manager did, under pressure from Marshall. nothing about it.
After two days at Kennedy, we were sup- I talked to Mr. Lamberth, who was in
posed to return to Washington. I thought, charge of the assembly of the SRBs. He told
"Now, at last, here I am. Now I've got a me about the problems he had with the work-
chance to talk to everybody." men. They had had a little accident earlier,
I told Mr. Rogers I wanted to stay at Ken- and he had to discipline them about it, and
nedy, and he said, "I'd prefer that you didn't then he told me about another incident: The
stay down here, but of course you can do SRBs become a little bit out of round after
whatever you want." each use. When the workers were trying to
I said, "Well, OK, then, I'll stay." make the rocket round again with the round-

16 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE I FALL 1987

ing machine - a rod with a hydraulic press tor Hollings said, "So who have ya got, there,
on one end and a nut on the other - they on your commission? Ya got a couple of
were only supposed to go up to 1250 lbs., astronauts, a Nobel prizewinner, a general,
according to the manual. But they couldn't some businessman, and a couple of lawyers.
get it squashed enough that way, so they took What you really need is gumshoes, who will
a wrench and tightened the nut on the other be right down there at Kennedy, eating lunch
end of the rod to squeeze it some more. That with the very guys who do the work on the
made the rocket round, all right, but one of Shuttle."
the workmen noticed that the pressure had And Mr. Rogers was able to reply, "You'll
gone up to 1350 lbs. that way. Well, a gauge be interested to know, Senator, that the
measures the force applied to a rod from Nobel prizewinner is down there at Kennedy,
either end, so tightening the nut increases the right now, doing exactly that!" (Although
pressure past 1250 lbs., of course! So Mr. Mr. Rogers couldn't have known it, I was
Lamberth admonished the workers to follow actually eating lunch with some of the engi-
the manual. He said the workers weren't like neers at exactly that time.) So Mr. Rogers
they used to be, and he was very disturbed. gradually realized I wasn't quite so useless.
So I go down and talk to the workers. We got to respect each other very much-
First of all, I'm surprised to find that the fore- I think he ultimately respected me, and I cer-
man doesn't know anything about this tainly do respect him for his abilities.
admonishment. He knew about the 1350 I went back to Washington, and I got into
lbs., but he didn't know he had been admon- more and more difficulties. The next meeting
ished. He said, "No, we weren't admonished; we had was a public meeting, and I was ques-
we were following the procedures in the tioning Mr. Lund of the Thiokol Company,
manual." Sure enough, the manual said to who had changed his mind about launching
tighten the nut after the pressure reaches the Shuttle. Somebody at Marshall had told
1250 lbs. - it said so in black and white! It him to put on his "management hat" instead
didn't say that tightening the nut would of his "engineering hat," and so he changed
increase the pressure; the people who wrote his opinion. I was asking him, "Don't you
the manual probably weren't quite aware of understand the principles of probability?"
that. So the workmen had, in fact, followed when suddenly I had this feeling of the
the manual perfectly. (I later found out that Inquisition.
as a result, the manual was revised to allow Mr. Rogers had pointed out to us that we
for higher pressure, and that only the ought to be careful with these people, whose
hydraulic jack was to be used to increase the careers depended on us. He said, "We have
pressure. The step about tightening the nut all the advantages. We're sitting up here,
was eliminated.) they're sitting down there; they have to an-
So Mr. Lamberth really didn't know what swer our questions, we don't have to answer
happened underneath. He said he had their questions. It isn't fair." Suddenly all
admonished the workmen, but he never this came back to me and I felt terrible. I
talked to them directly. So he had the idea couldn't do it the next day, so I went back to
that his workmen were no longer like they California, just for a day or two, to rest up.
used to be, but I tell you, they really were. While I was in Pasadena, I went over to
They had a lot of information but no way to JPL and discussed the enhancement of the
communicate it. The workmen knew a lot. pictures with Jerry Solomon and Meemong
They had noticed all kinds of problems and Lee; they were studying the flame that had
had all kinds of ideas on how to fix them, but appeared on the side of the SRB just before
no one had paid much attention to them. the main fuel tank exploded. I had just been
The reason was: Any observations had to be in Washington, hearing the NASA managers
reported in writing, and a lot of these guys talk through a fog. What a difference - just
didn't know how to write good memos. But like with the photograph guys and the ice
they had very good knowledge, they worked crew at Kennedy, everything was so direct
very hard, and they were very enthusiastic. and simple at Caltech and JPL. What a
While I was doing my work down at Ken- difference!
nedy, Mr. Rogers was in Washington appear- We finally split up into working groups,
ing before a Congressional committee. and I went to Marshall with General
(Congress was considering whether to set up Kutyna's group. The first thing that hap-
its own investigation of the accident.) Sena- pened there was, a range safety officer by the

17
 name of Ulian came to tell us about a discus- The engine is extremely complex and
sion he had had with NASA higher-ups about hard to understand, and the engineers were
safety. Mr. Ulian had to decide whether to explaining to me how it worked, showing
put explosive charges on the side, so ground slide after slide. I asked my usual dumb-
control could destroy the Shuttle in case it sounding questions.
was falling onto a city. The big cheeses at After a while, Mr. Lovingood, a middle
NASA said, "Don't put any explosives on, manager there, said, "Mr. Feynman, we've
because the Shuttle is so safe. It'll never fall been going for two hours now. There are 123
onto a city." pages, and we've only covered 20."
Mr. Ulian tried to argue that there was "It's all right, don't worry," I said. "I'm
danger. One out of every 25 rockets had confident that it'll go faster as we go along,
failed previously, so Mr. Ulian estimated the but I want my questions answered at the
probability of danger to be about one in 100 beginning. Otherwise, I can't understand it."
- enough to justify the explosive charges. Suddenly I got an idea. I said, "All right,
But the higher-ups at NASA said that the I'll tell you what. In order to save time, the
probability of failure was one in 100,000. main question I want to know is this: Is there
That means if you flew the Shuttle every day, the same misunderstanding, or difference of
the average time before your first accident understanding, between the engineers and the
would be 300 years - every day, one flight, management associated with the engines, as
for 300 years - which is obviously crazy! we have discovered associated with the solid
Mr. Ulian also told us about the problems he rocket boosters?"
had with the big cheeses - how they didn't Mr. Lovingood says, "No, of course not.
come to the meetings sometimes and all Although I'm now a manager, I was trained
kinds of other details. as an engineer."
Then I thought of this question: By now I gave each person a piece of paper. I
we had found out that the flight failed said, "Now, each of you please write down
because one of the seals had broken, and the what you think the probability of failure for a
higher-ups had told us they didn't know any- flight is, due to a failure in the engines."
thing about the seals problem - even though I got four answers - three from the
I was able to find out about it right away at engineers and one from Mr. Lovingood, the
JPL, before I even went to Washington. We manager. The answers from the engineers all
saw that NASA had no system for fixing the said, in one form or another (the usual way
problem, even though engineers were writing engineers write - "reliability limit," or
letters like, "HELP!" and "This is a RED "confidence sub so-on"), almost exactly the
ALERT!" Nothing was happening. My ques- same thing: one in about 200. Mr.
tion was: Does this lack of communication Lovingood's answer said, "Cannot quantify.
between engineers and management also exist Reliability is determined by studies of this,
in other places? I thought, "I oughta find out checks on that, experience here"- blah, blah,
whether this is a characteristic of the whole blah, blah, blah.
system, or whether it's true just for Morton- "Well," I said, "I've got four answers.
Thiokol, and we happened to find out about One of them weaseled." I turned to Mr.
it because the O-rings busted." So I told the Lovingood and said, "I think you weaseled."
people at Marshall I wanted to find out about He says, "I don't think I weaseled."
the engines. I wanted to talk to a couple of "Well, look," I said. "You didn't tell me
engineers without any managers around. what your confidence was; you told me how
"Yes, sir, we'll fix it up. How about you determined it. What I want to know is:
tomorrow morning at 9:00?" After you determined it, what was it?"
The next day I come in, and there's He says, "100 percent." The engineers'
engineers, all right, but there's also managers, jaws drop. My jaw drops. I look at him,
and a great, big book: Presentation Made on everybody looks at him - and he says,
February Such-and-Such to Commissioner "Uh ... uh, minus epsilon!"
Richard P. Feynman - all prepared during "OK. Now the only problem left is, what
the night. is epsilon?"
"Geez! It's so much work!" I said. He says, "One in 100,000." So I showed
"No, it's not so much work; we just put Mr. Lovingood the other answers and said, "I
the regular papers in that we use all the see there is a difference between engineers
time." and management in their information and

18 ENGINEERING &: SCIENCE / FALL 1987

knowledge here, just as there was in the case At each meeting we were asked to vote, so I
of the rocket, but let me not bother you thought it would be efficient to vote for the
about it; let's continue with the engine." same color we had decided on in the meeting
So they continued telling me about the before - but it turned out I was always in
engine, and soon 1 understood how it worked. the minority! We finally chose red. It came
Then they told me about all the problems out blue.
they had had with it - blades cracking, and At any rate, after one of the meetings I
all kinds of other difficulties. And 1 discov- was talking to Sally Ride about my experi-
ered the same game, just as in the case of the ences investigating the engines and the avion-
solid rocket boosters, of reducing criteria and ics, and 1 noticed that she didn't seem to
accepting more and more errors that weren't know about the special report I had ,,,ritten
designed into the device. - the one Mr. Keel told me he would show
Later 1 also checked the avionics, the to everybody. So 1 said to Mr. Keel, "Sally
software NASA uses on its computers for hasn't seen my report."
controlling the Shuttle from launch to land- He says to his secretary, "Oh, make a
ing, to find out if a similar situation existed copy of Mr. Feynman's report and give it to
there. But in this case, on the contrary, Ms. Ride."
everything was very good; the engineers and Then 1 discovered Mr. Acheson hadn't
the managers communicated well with each seen it.
other, and they were all very careful not to "Make a copy and give it to Mr.
change their criteria of acceptance during Acheson."
flight reviews. I found the avionics com- 1 finally caught on, so 1 said, "Mr. Keel,
pletely satisfactory. I don't think anybody has seen my report."
1 wrote up what 1 found out about these So he said to his secretary, "Make a copy
things into a special report, hoping that the for all the commissioners and give it to
other members would see it for discussion. I them."
sent it to Al Keel, the executive officer whom Then 1 said, "I thought you told me you
Mr. Rogers had selected to coordinate every- showed it to everybody."
thing on the commission. He told me on the "I meant I showed it to the entire staff."
telephone that he had received it and that he Needless to say, when I asked the
would show to everybody. members of the staff about it, none of them
By this time we were beginning to write had seen it either.
up our part of the main report about the When the commissioners read my report,
accident. General Kutyna had set up a whole all of them thought there was a lot of good
system at Marshall for doing so. It lasted stuff in it, and it ought to be in the commis-
about two days before we got a message from sion report somewhere. But we couldn't dis-
Mr. Rogers: "Come back to Washington. You cuss it, because all we were doing was this
shouldn't do the writing down there." So we word-smithing stuff on what was already writ-
went back to Washington, and Mr. Graham
lent me an office and a secretary who was
very, very good. I helped our group write up
its part of the main report - with a lot of
input from Mr. Keel.
All this time I had expected that we would
be meeting in Washington to discuss what we
had found out so far, to think it out together
and look at it from different perspectives -
in addition to the astronauts there were
lawyers and industrialists, there were scientists
and engineers, and so on - and to discuss
with each each other where to go next. But
in our meetings" all we ever did was what
they called "word-smithing"- correcting
punctuation, refining phrases, and so on.
We never had a real discussion of ideas!
Besides the word-smithing, we discussed
the typography and the color of the cover.

19
 ten - not adding anything new. We were So I thought this tenth recommendation
working on the summary report for the wasn't appropriate and said so. We argued
President - I'll call it the main report - back and forth a little bit, but then I had to
which was relatively brief. Later, as back-up catch a plane to New York, where I was
data and other information, we were going to going for the weekend. While I was in the air-
put out a series of appendices. So, I thought, plane, I thought about it some more, and the
there are two possibilities for my report. It more I thought about it, the more I thought
could be in the main report - but it would what a mistake it looks like - just like one
have to be rewritten in that case, because the of the NASA reports, like the one I had seen
style of the main report was different - or it back at the beginning, with the contradictory
could be put out later as an appendix. bullets: There's all these troubles, but in the
Although some of the members felt end we recommend to keep on flying!
strongly that it ought to go in the main I knew I didn't like it. Furthermore, we
report, I thought I'd compromise, and let it hadn't discussed it at a meeting! It was just
go in as an appendix. But in order to get my Mr. Rogers' idea. I didn't want to call up
report in as an appendix, it had to be put into Mr. Rogers and argue with him on the tele-
the document system computer, which was phone, so I quietly and thoughtfully wrote
quite elaborate and very good, but different out a letter to him, carefully explaining why
from the computer system I had written my I didn't like the tenth recommendation. To
report on at home. They had an optical make sure it got there right away, I dictated
scanner for transferring it, so I asked them to my letter over the telephone to Mr. Rogers'
do that, and they said, "Of course." secretary, who typed it up and handed it to
I'd go away for a while, and when I'd him right in his office!
come back, it would be lost. But I kept push- When I came back from New York, Mr.
ing on it, watching it, nursing it along, and I Rogers told me that he had read my letter.
finally got it through to the point where it He said he agreed with it, but that I was
was, at last, in the hands of a real editor, a out-voted.
capable man by the name of Hansen, who I said, "How was lout-voted, when there
changed all my whiches to thats and thats to was no meeting?" I thought my ideas about
whiches. this were worth discussing with the other
Mr. Hansen fixed up my report without commissioners, and I wanted to know what
changing the sense of it. Then Mr. Keel fixed they thought about my arguments.
it up so it could go in as an appendix: He put "I know, but I called each one of them
all kinds of big circles around whole sections, up," he said, "and they've all agreed. They've
with Xs through them; there were all kinds of all voted for it."
thoughts left out. He explained to me that So I said, "Well, I'd like a copy of this
my report was repetitious with the main recommendation," and I went off to make a
report, and I argued that it's much easier copy of it. When I came back, Mr. Keel said
to read something that's all together, and he forgot that they hadn't talked to Mr. Hotz
because it was going to be an appendix, - Mr. Hotz was there, you see, so I could
repetition didn't matter. ask him right away. They forgot that they
Finally, the commission had its last meet- hadn't talked to Mr. Hotz. I went to lunch
ing. It was about the recommendations we with Mr. Acheson and Mr. Hotz, and it
would make to the President. We made nine seemed like Mr. Hotz agreed with me. When
recommendations. The next day, I'm stand- we went back to Mr. Rogers' office, Mr.
ing around in Mr. Rogers' office when he Acheson explained to me, "It's only 'mother-
says, "I thought we would add a tenth recom- hood and apple pie.' If this were a commis-
mendation: "The commission strongly sion for the National Academy of Sciences,
recommends that NASA continue to receive your objections would be proper. But since
the support of the Administration and the this is a presidential commission, we should
nation ... " In our four months of work as a say something for the President."
commission, we had never discussed that "I don't understand the difference," I said.
issue. It wasn't in our directive from the (Being naive at the right time is often a good
President. We were only to look at the idea.) "I just don't understand. Why can't I
accident, find out what caused it, and make be careful and scientific when I'm writing a
recommendations to avoid such accidents in report to the President?" (Being naive doesn't
the future. always work: My argument had no effect.)

20 ENGINEERING &. SCI""NCE / FALL 1987

 I was very concerned by all this, and I "Fear not!" I said, "I'm not gonna change
came home for a while, very disturbed. my mind. Just give me the arguments, and
I then got the idea - which I hadn't had fear not."
before - to call up some of the other com- So he gave me all the arguments, none of
missioners. I'll call them A, B, and C. which had any effect. The arguments were
I call A. He says, "What tenth recommen- all kinds of crazy things. For example, "If
dation?" you don't accept the tenth recommendation,
I call B. He says, "Tenth recommenda- they're not going to accept the compromise
tion? What are you talking about?" they already made about putting your report
I call C. He says, "Don't you remember, in as an appendix." I didn't worry about that
you dope? I was in the office when Rogers one, because I didn't have to sign the main
first told us, and I don't see anything wrong report, and I could always put out my report
with it." by myself.
Although some of the commissioners Another argument was that they noticed
agreed with the tenth recommendation, I I was always talking to the press and would
still thought we should have discussed it in a claim I was doing this as a publicity stunt to
meeting. I had also been railroaded into sell more copies of my book. That one made
modifying my report, even though it was me smile, because I could imagine the
going to appear only as an appendix. I laughter it would produce from my friends
talked to my sister, who used to work in at home. I knew that nobody I cared about
Washington. would believe it.
She said, "Well, if they do that to your But finally, I did compromise. I said,
report, what happens to all the work you did "Instead of making it a recommendation, just
on the commission? Your contribution make it a concluding thought and change the
wouldn't be seen. It would appear as if you wording from 'strongly recommends' to sim-
didn't do anything." ply 'urges.'"
I said, "Aha!" and I sent a telegram to Mr. They accepted that.
Rogers: A little bit later, Mr. Keel calls me up:
"Can we say' strongly urges?'''
"PLEASE TAKE MY SIGNATURE OFF THE FRONT I said, "No. Just 'urges.'"
PAGE OF THE REPORT UNLESS TWO THINGS So I put my name on the main report, my
OCCUR: 1) THERE IS NO TENTH RECOMMENDA-
TION, AND 2) MY REPORT APPEARS AS AN
report got in as an appendix, and everything
APPENDIX WITHOUT MODIFICATION FROM was all right. We gave our report to the
VERSION #23 OF MR. HANSEN." President on a Thursday in a ceremony at the
White House in the Rose Garden. The report
I knew by this time I had to define every- was not to be publicized until Monday, so the
thing carefully! (By the way, everything had President could study it.
23 versions. It has been noted that comput- During those three days the newspaper
ers, which are supposed to increase the speed reporters were working like demons. They
at which we do things, have not increased the knew the report was finished, and they were
speed at which we write reports. We used to trying to scoop each other to find out what
make only three versions - because they're was in it. They kept calling me up because
so hard to type - and now we make 23 ver- I had been so cooperative before. I told my
sions!) secretary to say that I had no comment on
The result of this telegram was that Mr. anything; I would answer all their questions
Rogers and Mr. Keel tried to compromise. on Tuesday at my news conference.
They asked General Kutyna to be the inter- Well, I didn't know it, but someone had
mediary, because they knew he was a friend leaked that this argument had gone on. The
of mine. What a good friend of mine he was, only man who knew about it, I think, was
they didn't know. Mr. Hotz. He may have thought it would
The general calls me up, and right away help me in pushing my point, but for what-
he says, "Hello, professor, I'm in the Penta- ever reason, it leaked. Some paper in Miami
gon, and nobody can listen to this call. Let started it, and soon the story was running all
me first tell you, I'm with you. But I've been over about this argument between me and
given the job of convincing you to change Mr. Rogers. So when the reporters called me
your mind, and I have to give you all the up, they'd get the message, "He has nothing
arguments. " to say; he'll answer all your questions at his

21
 never can, because that's the way you're built!
I am a weak human, too, so I cannot resist
telling you what I think is the problem.
When NASA was trying to go to the
moon, it was a goal that everyone was eager
to achieve. Everybody was cooperating,
much like the efforts at Los Alamos. There
was no problem between the management
and the other people, because they were all
trying to do the same thing. But then, after
going to the moon, NASA had all these peo-
ple together, all these institutions, and so on.
You don't want to fire people and send them
out in the street when you're done. So the
problem is what to do.
You have to convince Congress that there
exists a project this organization can do. In
order to do so, it is necessary (at least it was
apparently necessary in this case) to exag-
President Reagan accepts the press conference on Tuesday." gerate - to exaggerate how economical the
commission's report in the That sounded very suspicious, so my press Shuttle was going to be; to exaggerate the big
Rose Garden of the White conference turned out to be very popular. scientific facts that would be discovered. (In
House. Feynman stands
at right. That's what most of the questions at the news every newspaper article about the Shuttle
conference were about. So I would like to there was a statement about the useful zero-
say again that I don't have any problem with gravity experiments - such as making phar-
Mr. Rogers. In fact, I have a very good atti- maceuticals, new alloys, and so on - on
tude towards him. I think he is a wonderful board, but I've never seen in any science arti-
man, and he really ran the commission well cle any results of anything that have ever
- although in a way that at first I didn't come out of any of those science experiments
understand. And I think I was a real prob- which were so important!) So NASA exag-
lem for him much of the time. gerated how little the Shuttle would cost, they
finally, I would like to say something exaggerated how often it could fly, to such a
about the general deterioration of NASA - pitch that it was obviously incorrect - obvi-
and the fact that there was no information ous enough that all kinds of organizations
coming up from the engineers to the manage- were writing reports, trying to get the
ment. Just the other day I was reading a Congress to wake up to the fact that NASA's
book by Harvey Brooks in which he talked claims weren't true.
about innovation. He explained that innova- I believe that what happened was -
tion doesn't have to be the direct invention of remember, this is only a theory, because I tell
a machine; an innovation could be the way you, people don't agree - that although the
things are made, such as the Ford mass pro- engineers down in the works knew NASA's
duction line or, as in another of his examples, claims were impossible, and the guys at the
the management system developed at NASA top knew that somehow they had exaggerated,
for the Apollo program, which involved the the guys at the top didn't want to hear that
cooperation of so many contractors and sub- they had exaggerated. They didn't want to
contractors. The system they evolved was an hear about the difficulties of the engineers -
innovation, a great development. This was the fact that the Shuttle can't fly so often, the
more than 20 years ago. But in the mean- fact that it might not work, and so on. It's
time, something happened that happens to better if they don't hear it, so they can be
many human innovations - it deteriorated. much more "honest" when they're trying to
The question is: How and why? I don't get Congress to OK their projects.
know. So my theory is that the loss of common
I invented a theory, which I have dis- interest - between the engineers and scien-
cussed with a considerable number of people, tists on the one hand and management on the
and many people have explained to me why other - is the cause of the deterioration in
my theory is wrong. But I don't remember cooperation, which, as you've seen, produced
their explanations as to why it's wrong - you a calamity. D

22 ENGINEERING & SCIENCE I FALL 1987