CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory

Author(s): Mark T. Calhoun

Source: Army History, No. 80 (Summer 2011), pp. 22-37
Published by: U.S. Army Center of Military History
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 Bust of Carl von Clausewitz, National Defense University, Fort McNair, D.C.

CLAUSEWITZ JOMINI
d
n
A

Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military Theory

By Mark T. Calhoun

22 Army History Summer 2011

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 ilitary thought reflects the truths relating to operational art and against France. His military service was
influence of contemporary tactics. However, this standard inter- lengthy and continuous, spanning from
intellectual trends. One can, pretation fails to address a more basic 1792 until his death in 1831. Clausewitz
therefore, achieve a deeper understand- question that one must answer before did not begin to study and write mili-
ing of a military theorist’s ideas by fully understanding either theorist’s tary theory, however, until his enroll-
studying them within the broader con- ideas—whether these men’s concepts ment in 1801 at the Berlin Institute in
text that influenced their development. qualify as military theory, or represent the Military Sciences. He therefore built
Our comprehension of the influential something else entirely. his theoretical efforts on a foundation
ideas about military matters offered in One must approach a comparison of ten years’ prior active service in the
the early nineteenth century by Antoine of Jomini and Clausewitz with cau- army of his homeland.1
Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz tion. Contrary to the manner in which Jomini began his military career in
is particularly enhanced by an examina- many depict them today, these theo- 1798 at the age of nineteen, when he
tion of the intellectual milieus in which rists’ ideas contain such significant used personal connections to gain em-
they evolved. While Jomini’s Art of differences that they resist evaluation ployment as secretary to the minister
War traces its lineage to the French according to a common framework. of war of the newly established Helvetic
Enlightenment, Clausewitz’s On War Nevertheless, modern students of Republic. Jomini left this post in 1801
reveals the influence of a German intel- military theory may benefit from a and spent the next three years working
lectual movement that built upon but deliberate comparison of the pur - in the Paris financial markets. While in
significantly departed from the core pose, structure, and key assertions of Paris, Jomini read the works of the lead-
ideas of Enlightenment thinkers. As these authors’ most important works, ing eighteenth-century military think-
a result, these two military theorists, Jomini’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s ers and in 1802 began writing a didactic
despite sharing similar backgrounds On War. Such a comparison illustrates essay on the fundamental principles of
as career military professionals during the fallacy of presenting their writings war. However, upon reading Heinrich
the Napoleonic era, arrived at highly as two examples of military theory von Bülow’s Geist des neueren Kriegs-
dissimilar viewpoints on the nature that differ only in terms of scope or systems (Spirit of the Modern System of
and characteristics of military conflict. relevance. The following analysis War), which had appeared in a French
This topic holds particular relevance demonstrates that these works instead translation in 1801, Jomini’s dissatisfac-
within the professional military edu- represent very different forms of mili- tion with his own first manuscript led
cation system, in which instructors tary thought, based on fundamentally him to throw it into the fire. Starting
often describe Clausewitz and Jomini opposed intellectual foundations. over, he published in 1804 and 1805 the
as two sides of the same coin. In the first two volumes of a series intended
typical approach, students learn that to support his didactic theorizing by
each man derived his ideas from the bACkground comparing the campaigns of Frederick
experience of the French Revolution Clausewitz and Jomini each devel- the Great to those of the French Revo-
and the Napoleonic Wars, developing oped their ideas while serving as officers lution. These historical works enabled
different but complementary military in the armies of the Napoleonic Wars, Jomini to cultivate a reputation as a
theory. This narrative depicts Clause- but their military careers progressed military thinker and in 1805 to secure a
witz’s ideas as relevant today mainly at along highly dissimilar paths. Clause- post on the staff of Marshal Michel Ney,
the intersection of policy and strategy, witz enlisted in the Prussian Army as one of Napoleon’s senior lieutenants.
while Jomini’s—still extant in the form a twelve-year-old officer cadet in 1792 Thus began Jomini’s lengthy career as a
of most modern militaries’ doctrinal and saw his first combat one year later staff officer, first in the French and later
“principles of war”—hold enduring while serving with the First Coalition in the Russian Army.2

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Retired Army Lt. Col. Mark T. Calhoun is an assistant professor at the School of Advanced Military Studies of the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he has taught since February 2009. After graduating in 1988 from the University of
Louisiana at Lafayette with a bachelor’s degree in chemistry, he served as a U.S. Army officer for twenty years. He was a Chinook helicopter pilot
and platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and in Operation Desert storm in Iraq in 1991. He returned to Iraq
with the division in 2005 to 2006 as its director of plans and exercises. He holds a master’s degree in history from the U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College and a second master’s degree from the School of Advanced Military Studies. He is currently writing a dissertation on
the military career of General Lesley J. McNair in a doctoral program in history at the University of Kansas.

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 Photograph © The State Hermitage Museum, photo by Vladimir Terebenin, Leonard Kheifets, Yuri Molodkovets
The State Hermitage Museum, St. Petersburg, Russia

Antoine-Henri Jomini, by George Dawe, before 1826

24 Army History Summer 2011
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 Two implications arise from the dif- “Jomini’s writings present a startling
ferences in the early stages of Clause- symmetry, for he ended very nearly at intelleCtuAl trAditions
witz and Jomini’s careers as soldiers the place where he began.” Jomini even Jomini and Clausewitz formed their
and theorists. The first of these is the arranged to promote the immutability perspectives on warfare within the con-
impact on their motivation for writing of his principles after his death, having text of distinctly different intellectual
military theory. Although Clausewitz his biographer Ferdinand Lecomte traditions. Jomini’s thinking epitomizes
focused his early writings on the need publish an edited version of Jomini’s the Enlightenment, an eighteenth-
for governmental and military reform Art of War in 1894. Near the end of century movement of philosophers and
after Prussia’s defeat in 1806, he dem- his life, Jomini had asked Lecomte to scientists united in the belief that man
onstrated from the beginning a more write a supplement to Jomini’s treatise could, through proper application of
fundamental interest in the phenom- to support his view that new technolo- the faculty of reason, fully understand
enon of war itself.3 After the fall of Na- gies would not alter the principles of the universe and its diverse phenome-
poleon, Clausewitz shifted his primary war he had offered many years before.7 na. Influenced by the dramatic achieve-
research interest from Prussian military The intransigence with which Jomini ments of contemporary scientists and
organization to the development of a defended his claims contrasts with de- mathematicians, practitioners of many
general theory of war. This project con- cades of evidence demonstrating their diverse disciplines sought to apply sci-
sumed much of his time and intellectual variance with reality. entific methods to explain and predict
effort between 1818 and 1830 while The second implication of the two the behavior of the natural world.
administering the General War College men’s different backgrounds is that of Enlightenment-inspired military
in Berlin. There he wrote the work that divergent perspectives. Jomini’s early theorists and historians Paul Gideon
his widow Marie would posthumously study of contemporary military theory, Joly de Maizeroy (1719–1780), Jacques
publish as On War.4 uninformed by any practical experi- Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert
By contrast, Jomini’s initial efforts as ence in war, led to his understanding (1743–1790), Henry Humphrey Evans
a military theorist preceded his active of warfare as a fundamentally simple Lloyd (1718–1783), each of whom
service. He secured and maintained phenomenon that, like any other sci- served in the French Army, and Adam
his postings as a staff officer on the ence, conformed to universal principles. Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow (1757–
strength of his intellectual reputation. Jomini claimed to have identified those 1807), a Prussian officer, believed that
In contrast to Clausewitz’s desire to principles and found an audience in the study of history could reveal uni-
discern the fundamental nature of war, early nineteenth-century Europe hungry versal principles of warfare in much
Jomini’s primary motivation appears to for just this kind of formulaic approach the same way that mathematical analy-
have been “a frantic scramble to suc- to military theory.8 Witnessing the sis revealed the secrets of physics. The
ceed by making an impression on some ever-increasing scale and devastation of most provocative of these theorists,
key man.”5 Put simply, Jomini’s success war, readers drew comfort in Jomini’s perhaps, was Bülow, who built upon
as a military professional relied on the simple explanations and assurances. By the ideas of his predecessors while
widespread acceptance of his ideas. For contrast, Clausewitz’s early experience simultaneously seeking to discredit
more than fifty years, Jomini focused on of combat and his struggle to identify them by providing a mathematically
arguing for and later defending their the various causes of his beloved Prus- precise tactical system. He argued that
validity. This resulted in the publication sia’s demise resulted in his view of his theories could offer the key to vic-
of a dizzying number and assortment of war as a complex and unpredictable tory by enabling scientific prediction
books, including reprints, updates, and phenomenon. Over the following three of the outcome before armies engaged
in some cases, the same book merely decades, Clausewitz grew even more in battle. These theorists provided
published under a different title or convinced that the only universal truths useful analysis of tactical issues such
volume number.6 about war lay in its staggering complex- as the relative strengths of line and
During the years he spent postulat- ity. Any principles of war one might column formation and the optimal
ing his military views, Jomini also discern served only to identify broad locations of bases of supply relative
developed a distinct intellectual inflex- generalities, none of which consistently to movement routes. However, while
ibility and an intolerance of criticism. held true in the fog and friction of actual their claims of scientific methodology
As a result, the central characteristics combat. It is difficult to imagine how served as their strongest attraction to
of Jomini’s ideas remained consistent the motivations and perspectives of two contemporary Enlightenment think-
from the publication of his first two military thinkers could have differed ers, these assertions did not appear
volumes in 1804 through the comple- more fundamentally than did those convincing during the international
tion in 1838 of his capstone work, the of Jomini and Clausewitz. While their conflicts spawned by the French
Art of War, which he continued to different motivations stemmed largely Revolution, when their theories failed
defend until his death in 1869. While from their unique personal circum- to anticipate or explain the dramatic
many of Jomini’s works examined re- stances, one must analyze the intellectual changes in warfare that unfolded.9
cent military history, his first and last climate within which each man worked Unlike most of his Enlightenment-
writings in particular focused on his to understand how they developed such influenced predecessors, Jomini devel-
theory of war. As John Alger puts it, divergent outlooks on war. oped his theories after the upheavals

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 Photograph © Nationalmuseum, Stockholm

A martial portrait of King Frederick the Great of Prussia by Antoine Pesne, before 1758

26 Army History Summer 2011

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spawned by the French Revolution, on these challenges to Enlightenment views, shaped by the differing per-
sparing him the difficulty of adapting a thought, “A German cultural self- spectives and intellectual traditions
previous body of work to the radically awareness emerged in reaction against that influenced their thinking. Jomini
changed nature of warfare. He also French intellectual imperialism, and held true to Enlightenment tradition
avoided continuing the trend of devel- developed, in response to Napoleonic when creating his system of universal
oping increasingly complex geometric political imperialism, in a clear political principles. Clausewitz, by contrast, saw
systems of warfare. Nevertheless, direction with a strong emphasis on the any attempt to reduce the complex
Jomini built his theoretical approach primacy of the state.”12 phenomenon of war to a simple system
on the foundations established by En- Clausewitz began to think about the of universal principles as an exercise in
lightenment thought, leading to a fun- phenomenon of war and the future wel- futility, although he did believe in the
damentally reductionist and predictive fare of his native Prussia in the midst value of generalization at some level.
approach. In the spirit of his age, of this intellectual transformation. He While their theorizing may appear
Jomini aimed to identify the universal thus saw the world in a wholly different similar on the surface, comparison of
principles central to the art of war and light than the Enlightenment-inspired the purpose and form of their treatises
claimed to have discerned them in his thinkers who had dominated military and the key ideas they contained dem-
study of the campaigns of King Fred- theory up to that time. Clausewitz’s onstrates the substantial differences
erick the Great of Prussia, who reigned formal military education began in that resulted from their conflicting
from 1740 to 1772. Jomini focused on 1801 when, at the age of twenty-one, world views.
Frederick’s practice of striking a frac- he gained admittance to the military in-
tion of the enemy’s army with all of his stitute in Berlin. There, his intellectual ComPAring ClAusewitz’s on war And
own and based his principles largely development commenced in earnest. Jomini’s art oF war
on this one central theme.10 While Clausewitz benefited in particular from
he added to and revised his system of the influence of the school’s director,
principles throughout his life, Jomini Gerhard von Scharnhorst, who en- PurPose
never significantly diverged from the couraged his interest in military theory After providing a survey of war,
core ideas he developed by studying while instilling in him the conviction diplomacy, and policy in the first two
Frederick’s campaigns through the that theory must stand up to the test of chapters of the Art of War, Jomini
lens of Lloyd’s and Bulow’s Enlight- reality. Scharnhorst was a pragmatic moves to the central purpose of this
enment viewpoint. Ironically, Jomini thinker who stressed the interrelation- work, stating “It is proposed to show
therefore spent his lifetime attempting ship of military campaigns with the that there is one great principle un-
to explain Napoleonic warfare through social and political circumstances sur- derlying all the operations of war,—a
the lens of pre-Revolutionary, Enlight- rounding them.13 principle which must be followed in
enment-inspired military methods of Scharnhorst’s pragmatism and rela- all good combinations.”15 Jomini then
clockwork precision.11 tivist approach greatly influenced immediately provides a list of four
Near the end of the eighteenth cen- Clausewitz’s thinking, but Clausewitz maxims that make up this overarching
tury, new intellectual trends emerged remained convinced of the feasibil- principle. One thus finds when read-
as a reaction to both the deficiencies ity of developing a general theory of ing Jomini that even seemingly simple
of Enlightenment models and the war. However, unlike Enlightenment- principles consist of a set of subordinate
events of the French Revolution. This inspired thinkers, he rejected the notion tenets, each of which Jomini further
response developed most vigorously in such a theory could reduce war to a mere subdivides and qualifies in subsequent
Germany, where writers increasingly mathematical exercise or provide im- sections of the treatise. This is true even
focused on the inherent complexity mutable principles that would guarantee when Jomini himself refers to his “one
of nature and argued that it could not victory. Rather, it would illuminate war’s great principle.” The four maxims that
be explained by a Newtonian scien- universal characteristics while allowing embrace Jomini’s “one great principle”
tific model. Romantics like Friedrich for the unique patterns of events that are the following:
Wilhelm Schelling saw nature’s phe- characterized each particular war. In his
nomena as endlessly diverse and man’s efforts to understand the phenomenon 1. To throw by strategic movements
relationship to nature as constantly of war, Clausewitz built upon his foun- the mass of an army, successively,
changing. A historical approach to dation in the emerging German intel- upon the decisive points of a theater
understanding human reality evolved, lectual trends through intensive study of war, and also upon the communica-
in which all comprehension was seen as of history, mathematics, and philosophy. tions of the enemy as much as possible
the subjective result of the dynamics of This convinced him of the requirement without compromising one’s own.
one’s particular time and place. These to test military theory against practical 2. To maneuver to engage fractions
and other trends in German science reality and to account for the influence of the hostile army with the bulk of
and philosophy led to a conviction of both the physical and psychological one’s forces.
among leading German intellectu- factors prevalent in war.14 3. On the battle-field, to throw the
als that reality does not conform to Jomini and Clausewitz thus devel- mass of the forces upon the decisive
universal laws or principles. Building oped fundamentally opposed world point, or upon that portion of the

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 hostile line which it is of the first im- of the work. Further, this principle oping a theory of war, to determine
portance to overthrow. demonstrates that in 1838 Jomini still if, given the failure of other theorists’
4. To so arrange that these masses saw war as a phenomenon subject to attempts, this is even possible. As U.S.
shall not only be thrown upon the de- the application of a simple overarching Army War College professor Antulio
cisive point, but that they shall engage principle, a formula for victory made Echevarria points out, Clausewitz de-
at the proper times and with energy.16 up of several supporting principles, ele- termined that several key challenges
ments, and maxims. The Art of War is limit the feasibility of formulating a
Jomini concedes that the simplicity of his textbook, and it will reveal the secret theory of war.19
this principle will invite criticism, but he of victory to his students—if only they The first challenge results from the
assures his readers that he will describe are able to understand and apply his influence of psychological forces such
fully its key elements in the succeeding system of principles. as hostility, danger, and the intellectual
chapters, and pronounces that a student Clausewitz argues that a system of qualities of the commander. These
who, after reading the Art of War, can- principles and rules fails to account for forces interact in unpredictable ways,
not understand how to determine the “the endless complexities involved” in leading to “the disproportionate part
decisive points “may well despair of ever war and therefore results in theoretical assigned to the play of probability and
comprehending strategy.”17 constructs that bear little resemblance chance” that frustrates any attempt
This central principle, divided into to the actual practice of war.18 Clause- to calculate their overall effect on the
four parts, therefore contains the essen- witz sets out to correct this error in outcome. A second challenge lies in
tial elements of Jominian thought, al- On War by taking a new approach to war’s inherently interactive nature.
though Jomini does revisit and expand military theory. He begins by identify- Here Clausewitz points out that no in-
upon each separate part in later sections ing the difficulties involved in devel- dependent variables exist in war—no
action occurs in isolation because each
action will result in a positive reaction.
Château de Versailles, France/Bridgeman Art Library

Due to this complex process of inter-

action, a theory of general principles
cannot account for all the possible
responses ensuing from the unique
judgments and talents each combat-
ant applies to the conflict, as “the very
nature of interaction is bound to make
it unpredictable.” Clausewitz sees a
third challenge in the unreliability
of information in war, a result of the
many unobservable actions taken by
the various participants. As Clause-
witz puts it, most of the action in war
takes place “in a kind of twilight”; no
principle can account for the resulting
uncertainty. Since one can never be
certain of the reliability of informa-
tion, “once again for lack of objective
knowledge one has to trust to talent
or to luck.”20
Clausewitz concludes that these
three challenges make a theory in the
form of a positive doctrine or model
impossible to construct and that they
demonstrate that “talent and genius
operate outside the rules, and theory
conflicts with practice.” Rather than
giving up on his quest for a general
theory of war, however, Clausewitz
overcomes these problems by funda-
mentally redefining military theory.
Rather than a manual for action, it
is a framework of inquiry, a means
to study and grow familiar with the
Napoleon Crossing the Alps on 20 May 1800, by Jacques-Louis David, 1803, showing recurring patterns of military actions.
France’s first consul guiding troops through the Swiss Alps into Italy

28 Army History Summer 2011

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Based on this insight, Clausewitz’s out of order, or collections originally by representing it as an argument
purpose is to develop a theory that intended to consist of a predetermined for the subordination of military
will serve as a guide to the student of set of volumes but later modified to activity to civilian control. However,
war that will “light his way, ease his suit the whims of his contemporary Clausewitz’s description of war as
progress, train his judgment, and help readership. This convoluted publish- an extension of policy is actually a
him to avoid pitfalls.”21 ing history makes an examination of method of classification, intended
Thus, Clausewitz’s intent in writing the evolution of Jomini’s ideas very to place war within a clearly defined
his theory differs significantly from difficult to achieve simply by reading category of human activity that one
that of Jomini. Jomini sought to sim- his printed works, particularly since so can then study in accordance with
plify war through a system of principles few exist in English. Two facts remain the overall philosophical construct of
that would reveal the key to victory in clear, however. Jomini’s primary moti- the work. His system of classification
all cases. By contrast, Clausewitz per- vation throughout his career continued derives from Kantian logic, which
ceived that war’s inherent complexity to be publishing and selling books to a Clausewitz studied under Johann
drives its participants to act outside any popular audience, and the Art of War Kiesewetter, a clear-thinking and
system of rules. He therefore strove to contains new content in the introduc- skilled lecturer in mathematics and
provide a framework within which to tory chapters that did not exist in the logic, and a significant influence on
study and embrace the phenomenon of many books Jomini wrote before the the young Prussian during his years
war itself. In Clausewitz’s view, his the- posthumous publication of Clause- at the military institute in Berlin.27
ory would be successful “if it helps the witz’s On War.24 Kiesewetter emphasizes the impor-
commander acquire those insights that, Despite Jomini’s confusing publish- tance of both form and substance in
once absorbed into his way of thinking, ing history, the “fundamental principle theory, explaining that correct form
will smooth and protect his progress, of war” that was central to the Art of would enable a disciplined approach
and will never force him to abandon War can be consistently found in the through appropriate arrangement of
his convictions for the sake of any ob- works that Jomini published since early observations and concepts. Thus, rather
jective fact.”22 In short, Clausewitz and in his career.25 Jomini apparently found than studying war in a purely logical
Jomini each expressed their intended it necessary to respond in 1838 to ideas manner as a distinct scientific phenom-
aim in developing their military theory, he encountered in On War, which had enon, Clausewitz seeks to illuminate its
revealing fundamental differences in appeared five years before, leading him interdependent social nature by classi-
what they sought to achieve. to include the introductory chapters on fying it as a member of the category of
military diplomacy and policy in his human activity understood as policy.28
Art of War. These chapters, however, Similarly confusing to many read-
form do not offer particularly original in- ers is Clausewitz’s use of dialectical
The form of On War and the Art of sights, nor does their inclusion appear reasoning in describing his theoretical
War reflects the differing purposes for to affect fundamentally the content ideas. This is most evident in Book
which Clausewitz and Jomini devel- of the rest of the work. Rather, they One, in which he establishes a model
oped their ideas. Describing strategy serve merely as a prelude to the im- of absolute war to which, in theory,
as “the art of making war upon the mutable principles that remained the any conflict should escalate due to the
map,” Jomini focuses his discussion centerpiece of his ideas throughout his contestants’ ever-increasing efforts to
of strategy primarily on the applica- writing career and that make up the win. Clausewitz then proceeds to de-
tion of military principles to the actual majority of the treatise. construct the concept of absolute war
conduct of war. This represents the The form of On War is both fun- by holding it up to the test of reality,
primary difference between Jomini damentally different from that of the demonstrating that many factors limit
and his Enlightenment predecessors, Art of War and harder to discern, the contestants’ ability or willingness
who focused almost entirely on tac- making its interpretation challenging. to apply the ever-increasing means
tics. Jomini developed his theoretical In particular, Clausewitz’s key ideas necessary to achieve their ends. There-
publications by transforming lessons often lose their meaning when they fore, war in the real world is always
selectively drawn from historical are divorced from his theory’s unify- limited to some degree by prevailing
examples into the many subordinate ing structure—a problem routinely circumstances, including lack of popu-
principles and maxims that supported evidenced in commentators’ selective lar support or material resources. In
his overarching principle.23 quoting from On War. Clausewitz’s time, intellectuals in many
The Art of War embodies the cul- For example, many of Clausewitz’s fields used dialectical reasoning, which
mination of a confusing multitude interpreters focus on his description involved the contrasting of opposites,
of reprints, rewrites, and works pub- of the relationship between politics in their discourse. Clausewitz’s use of
lished with identical content under and strategy, which he expresses in this form of reasoning enables him to
various titles and at different times. the phrase “war is merely the con- establish in On War a framework upon
Jomini’s body of work also contains tinuation of policy by other means.”26 which to build a detailed and practical
many updated and expanded editions Modern readers regularly misinter- analysis of ends and means in real war
of previous works, volumes published pret and overemphasize this phrase by contrasting them to the theoretical

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concept of absolute war, a logical con­ the degree to which one should con­ several decades, critics often interpret
struct familiar to his contemporaries. sider On War a final reflection of his Clausewitz’s theory as unfinished and
Contrary to some interpretations, theory. Two notes that he left behind, therefore of questionable value. Some
Clausewitz does not directly pattern one of them undated, generated much more recent scholars, however, dispute
his use of dialectical reasoning after of the debate and confusion that has this interpretation. One of them, Azar
Hegel, who contrasted an idea with its surrounded this topic. In the undated Gat, argues that Clausewitz wrote the
contradiction, thesis against antithesis, note, Clausewitz described his realiza­ undated note in 1827 and spent several
to raise the idea to the level of synthe­ tion that he could no longer ignore his years working on the planned revision
sis or perfection. Rather, Clausewitz’s conviction that the ideal war of pure before his death.31 Others, most re­
dialectic is of the more general type, theory conflicted with the practical cently John Shy, insist that the evidence
intended not to achieve synthesis but conduct of war he had both experi­ indicates that Clausewitz wrote the
rather to contrast extremes, showing enced in his life and gleaned through undated note in 1830 and died without
that practical reality exists somewhere historical study. To resolve this conflict, undertaking the revisions to On War he
in between, depending on the nature of Clausewitz began a major revision of had intended, as Clausewitz scholars
the specific situation.29 the entire work, declaring in the un­ Michael Howard and Peter Paret had
Another issue of form that creates dated note: “The first chapter of Book argued.32 Antulio Echevarria provides
challenges for readers of Clausewitz is One alone I regard as finished.” The perhaps the most cogent resolution of
editors of the 1976 translation of On this ongoing debate, arguing that the
War concluded Clausewitz “presum­ point is moot since Clausewitz’s own
ably” prepared this undated note in description of his planned revision in
1830, with the implication that a revi­ the other, dated note of 1827 suggests
sion of On War of the scope Clausewitz his later ideas would merely clarify
described could not have progressed and simplify, rather than nullify, his
much by the time of his death only one earlier concepts. Therefore, although
year later.30 On War may in its form appear to be
Compared to the relative stabil­ an “unfinished” work, modern readers
ity of Jomini’s work, which he refined should view it as a full expression of
but did not significantly change over Clausewitz’s genius.33

The Battle of Marengo, 14 June 1800, by Louis Lejeune, 1801, depicts a critical victory by Napoleon’s forces over Austrian troops in
northern Italy, a triumph that solidified his power in France.

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 Two key implications derive from nalize his theory, using it as the intellec­ plication of the concept as a description
this comparison of the form of On War tual foundation on which to integrate of lines of communication and sup­
and the Art of War. First, the relative their training and experience to create ply. By contrast, Jomini applies lines
simplicity of Jomini’s presentation an intuitive awareness of the factors at of operation in the sense of offensive
makes his ideas more accessible and play in combat. These dissimilarities in maneuver, retreat, and communication
easier to interpret than Clausewitz’s both the form and purpose of On War with friendly units. Nevertheless, he de­
theory, which, although conform­ and the Art of War reveal themselves in velops the idea with the same geometric
ing to a construct that was standard each work’s theoretical content. precision and assurances of universal
among the philosophical works of his applicability, defining strategy as sim­
time, is difficult for modern readers to ply “the art of bringing the greatest
understand. Second, Jomini’s Art of ideAs part of the forces of an army upon the
War serves as a field guide of practi­ The concepts Jomini propounds in important point of the theater of war
cal advice for the conduct of warfare the Art of War differ from his predeces­ or the zone of operations.” Jomini de­
through the application of universal sors’ theories in that, unlike their focus clares that the general’s identification of
principles, while Clausewitz’s On War on tactical matters, Jomini focuses his decisive points “is not a difficult matter
represents a broader attempt to un­ system of universal principles at the when he is aided by the hints I have
derstand the immutable nature of war level of strategy. Thus, he concentrates given on the subject.” Expanding on
while recognizing each individual war’s on the handling of large units on cam­ this theme, Jomini introduces the idea
variability due to the subjective charac­ paign rather than tactical units in battle. of interior and exterior lines, advocat­
teristics of its particular time and place. Nevertheless, his intellectual founda­ ing use of the former when benefiting
Jomini’s work is a guidebook intended tion in the Enlightenment led him to from a central position and an overall
to accompany the general to war, while apply a similarly scientific approach, closer proximity of friendly units than
Clausewitz wished his readers to inter­ as seen in the concepts for which he that of the enemy’s, while arguing for
is best known: lines of operation and the latter when relative weakness or
decisive points. barriers to movement make maneuver
Jomini does not invent “lines of op­ upon an enemy flank the wiser course.
eration”—Lloyd introduces the phrase Jomini provides a sketch of French
and Bülow focuses on it—but Jomini operations at the end of 1793 to illus­
criticizes their overly mechanical ap­ trate these universal principles for the

Château de Versailles, France/Bridgeman Art Library

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reader. By contrast, Clausewitz avoids the center of gravity becomes much only at the centers of certain concepts;
such prescriptive methods and derides more complex. The location and nature we neither wish nor can give them
the concept of interior and exterior of the center of gravity, as well as the sharp outlines. The nature of the matter
lines as a “lopsided principle that could possible existence of more than one should make this obvious enough.”36
never govern a real situation.”34 such center, depend on the coherence The interrelationship of policy and
Clausewitz’s concept most closely and interaction of the forces involved. war serves as a matter of form in On
related to Jomini’s lines of operation is There may be one center of gravity or War, where it functions as the basis
the center of gravity, which Clausewitz many, and the center of gravity may for the theory’s ends-means analysis
describes as the “focal point of force be a city, an alliance, or public opin- within a dialectical framework that
and movement, upon which the larger ion, rather than the enemy’s army. contrasts absolute war with war in re-
whole depends.”35 In its pure form True to form, Clausewitz is again us- ality. However, Clausewitz illustrates
the concept is quite linear, depicting ing dialectical reasoning to describe a and elaborates upon this idea in his
destruction of the enemy’s center of complex idea, one quite simple in its description of the “wondrous trin-
gravity—usually the main body of the pure form but exceedingly intricate in ity.”37 Jomini describes diplomacy’s re-
enemy army—as the key to victory. reality. Clausewitz explains, “We want lationship to war merely to show how
However, when moved from the realm to reiterate emphatically that here, as this will influence the war’s character
of theory to the real world of practice, elsewhere, our definitions are aimed and the military objectives it should

The Battle of Smolensk, 17 August 1812, by Jean Charles Langlois, 1839, illustrates a costly victory by Napoleon midway on the road
from Poland to Moscow, in which he captured an important city but failed to destroy the Russian armies that opposed him.

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achieve. By contrast, Clausewitz em- an object suspended between three paper.”39 This observation stands in
phasizes that war does not suspend magnets.” Thus, in terms of its clas- stark contrast to Jomini’s assertion that
diplomacy between its contestants. sification as a form of human activity, strategy is “the art of making war upon
Rather, while the political aim is war is a subset of policy; however, in the map.” Clausewitz identifies danger,
always at the forefront, an interrela- practice war’s inner nature can change exertion, uncertainty, intelligence, and
tionship exists between the political because of the complex interaction chance as the components of general
process and the conduct of war; one of violence, chance, and policy—the friction, and characterizes friction as a
can modify the ends based on the “wondrous trinity.”38 constant factor in war—one with which
impact of victories or defeats, or due Finally, Clausewitz’s concepts of fric- an effective general must have direct
to changes in the materiel means avail- tion and genius further demonstrate experience if he is to have any chance
able or the political will to continue the the divergence of his perspective from of overcoming it.40
struggle. Due to this interrelationship, that of Jomini’s. Clausewitz built on Clausewitz’s emphasis on these hu-
“war is more than a true chameleon.” nineteenth-century German inter- man factors is one of the key distin-
Not only will its outward appearance est in the study of man as an active, guishing features of his theory from
adapt to circumstances, its inner imaginative participant in the inter- that of Jomini, and it helps explain
nature and “dominant tendencies”— related whole of nature, emphasizing many of the underlying differences
violence, chance, and policy—will vary the physical and psychological effects between them. While Jomini does not
in relationship to each other as well. of the experience of combat on the completely neglect the importance of
Therefore, a valid theory cannot fix men involved in it. He describes these genius or the human element in war,
values to any one of these tendencies; effects as friction, “the only concept that the fundamental difference between
rather, it must maintain “a balance more or less corresponds to the factors his view and Clausewitz’s was that
between these three tendencies, like that distinguish real war from war on of primacy. Unlike Clausewitz, who

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argues for the primacy of fog, friction, offset the effects of this friction and victory. 44 Yet, while granting that
and chance, occasionally overcome achieve “any degree of virtuosity.”42 unforeseen events can influence the
by rare military genius but otherwise Courage might enable the general to conduct of operations, Jomini con­
only surmounted through experience triumph over the danger and exertion cludes that those generals who pos­
and training, in Jomini’s view primacy of combat, but only the combination sess a good strategic coup d’oeil—the
always rests in the immutability of his of courage with heightened pow­ ability to quickly assess the situa­
principles. As quoted above, Jomini ers of intellect could elevate him to tion and skillfully adjust a plan in
considers the measure of genius to be the level of military genius. Theory execution—are better equipped to
the skill with which a commander could alone does not create genius; on the deal with uncertainty. However, un­
employ in combat the fundamental contrary, genius rises above theory. like Clausewitz, who recognizes that
principles of war he is elucidating. Jo- Thus, Clausewitz asserts, “what genius genius enables a degree of capability
mini grants that adhering to his central does is the best rule, and theory can that rises above the level of theory,
principle of identifying the decisive do no better than show how and why Jomini quickly reduces the concept
point is difficult, so he provides in the this should be the case.”43 One should of coup d’oeil to nothing more than
Art of War discussions that would sup­ note that Clausewitz does not present the ability to apply his principles cor­
ply “all necessary explanations for its genius as the only means to overcome rectly: “There is, in fact, one truth of
application upon the field.”41 war’s challenges—this is the purpose remarkable simplicity which obtains
By contrast, Clausewitz argues no of education, training, and experience. in all the combinations of a methodi­
system of principles could overcome Rather, he is arguing that genius en­ cal war. It is this:—in every position
the effect of friction. While peacetime ables insight and innovation that will a general may occupy, he has only to
maneuvers or the direct experience consistently frustrate any adversary decide whether to operate by the right,
of combat could familiarize soldiers relying on a fixed system of principles. by the left, or by the front.”45
with the frictions and fog of war, only Although Jomini is clearly uncom­ This approach contrasts sharply
exceptional gifts of intellect and tem­ fortable with the idea that genius with the views of Clausewitz, who
perament could enable the general to could trump the primacy of the sees theory as merely a framework
principles of war he had formulated,
he admits that because one could not
foresee or avoid the whims of chance,
factors that therefore stood outside
the bounds of theory, the application
of his principles might not guarantee

Headquarters, German Army Forces Command, Koblenz

Die Tafelrunde (The Roundtable), by Josef Schneider, c. 1966, showing Clausewitz

seated at left, portrays the lively Prussian military discourse of his era.
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within which to develop the intellect validity in practical application.47 By all ends. This construct allows for the full
through the study of war. For his part, three measures, On War surpasses the range of escalatory options. In contrast,
Jomini believes his theory could obvi- Art of War as theory. Jomini’s work, also land-centered,
ate the need for heightened intellect A military theoretician faces a sig- merely describes the various types of
by providing even the average general nificant challenge in achieving a level war as a prelude to presenting a set of
universal principles that could, if only of abstractness sufficient to ensure that principles very specifically geared to the
applied correctly, consistently lead his theory is not merely a description of conduct of a conventional war aimed at
to victory. warfare in his own experiential frame of achieving decisive victory by defeating
reference. In this respect, both Clause- the enemy’s army.
witz and Jomini are clearly products of Finally, a theory should demon-
imPliCAtions the Napoleonic era, heavily influenced strate empirical relevance by holding
While most scholars consider both by its dramatic military events. Never- true when tested against reality, or
Jomini and Clausewitz to be military theless, each developed a distinct theo- in the case of military theory, against
theorists, we should question to what retical approach. While Jomini derives warfare in practice. By this measure,
degree the Art of War and On War from his review of history a system of Jomini’s work, at least initially, clearly
demonstrate the intellectual rigor detailed universal principles, Clausewitz fared worse than that of Clausewitz,
generally expected of theory. To this first identifies theoretical truths or laws as evidenced by Jomini’s increas -
end, let us first consider the dictionary and then applies rigorous historical tests ingly strained attempts to uphold his
definition of the term. to determine their validity. Jomini’s in- theory’s validity after Napoleon skill-
ductive method, limited by the relatively fully employed Jomini’s principles in
“Theory”: narrow range of military history from the campaigns of 1814 and 1815 but
1. The analysis of a set of facts in their which he derives his principles, fails to still failed to achieve victory. Jomini’s
relation to one another; produce an abstract theory, despite his dogged adherence to the validity of his
2. abstract thought: speculation; best efforts to portray his product as principles and maxims and his refusal
3. the general or abstract principles such. In contrast, by beginning with a to consider the effects of the friction
of a body of fact, a science, or an art; broad description of the phenomenon described by Clausewitz virtually guar-
4a. a belief, policy, or procedure pro- of war as a struggle between opponents antees that his theory would not hold
posed or followed as the basis of action; attempting to impose their will on one up against the test of reality. Ironically,
4b. an ideal or hypothetical set of facts, another, Clausewitz could seek truths although the empirical evidence of the
principles, or circumstances—often throughout human history that could First World War should have landed a
used in the phrase “in theory”; illuminate its practice. History there- death blow to any remaining believers
5. a plausible or scientifically accept- fore does not provide the source of his in Jomini’s validity, his stature actu-
able general principle or body of prin- ideas, but instead serves as a means to ally rose after the war. This result was
ciples offered to explain phenomena; test them. Clausewitz excludes from largely due to the efforts of B. H. Liddell
6a. a hypothesis assumed for the sake his theory any principles he deems too Hart, who managed to unfairly identify
of argument or investigation; specific or contextual, and even when re- Clausewitz as the theoretical source of
6b. an unproved assumption: con- tained, their validity is always contingent the “suicidal obsession with the Great
jecture; or on their interaction with the universal Battle,” while reenergizing Jomini’s
6c. a body of theorems presenting a characteristics of war—friction, and the lines of operation by popularizing
concise systematic view of a subject. 46 interplay of violence, chance, and policy, his derivative “strategy of the indirect
the “wondrous trinity.” approach” as the means to break the
Based on this wide range of mean- Similarly, a theory should possess gridlock of the modern battlefield.48
ings, both Jomini and Clausewitz intersubjectivity—a broad applicabil- Despite the fact that of the two, only
clearly produced works that qualify as ity within its discipline. In terms of Clausewitz’s theory demonstrates
theory, as have many military commen- military theory, this quality applies the three characteristics described
tators and reformers who have followed to the various types of war. Some of above, Jomini’s theory has ironically
in their footsteps. In light, however, of Clausewitz’s critics point out his ne- fared better over time. While modi-
each authors’ stated purpose, let us hold glect of maritime warfare or his brief fied forms of Jomini’s principles of
Jomini and Clausewitz to standards as discussion of popular insurrections, or war are found in the doctrine of most
demanding as those they set for them- “wars of the people.” Nevertheless, he modern armies and the relative merits
selves. One modern standard for evalu- carefully constructs his theory within of exterior versus interior lines are still
ating theories describes three essential the framework of an ends-means analy- debated at the U.S. Army’s staff col-
traits they should possess: abstractness, sis, accommodating both total war as lege, modern scholarship on Clause-
or an independence of specific time practiced by Napoleon and the much witz has failed to arrive at consensus
and place; intersubjectivity, or an ap- more frequent limited war, which re- on even the most basic issues of his
plicability to more than one specific sults from political constraints on the meaning or modern applicability. This
subject; and empirical relevance, or means available to achieve the desired phenomenon has a deceptively simple

35
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cause that traces back to the intellec­ before its time. His awareness of the doctrinal development—a search for a
tual traditions within which the two interconnectedness and complex feed­ holy grail that Clausewitz clearly rec­
authors developed their ideas. back processes inherent in the human ognized as futile. One can only hope
As described above, Jomini embod­ activity of war resulted in his intuitive that further advances in the study of
ies the Enlightenment conviction that recognition of combat as a distinctly nonlinearity will increase awareness
all natural phenomena conform to nonlinear phenomenon. Clausewitz of the interconnected complexity of
universal laws that science can iden­ achieved this insight despite the fact the patterns of human activity—such
tify and subject to mathematically that the mathematicians of his day had as the ties between policy and war.
precise calculation. According to this yet to develop a mathematical method Only an enhanced understanding of
view, theory can enable prediction by for dealing with such systems. Only the the meaning and prevalence of non­
providing the means to characterize advent of modern computer science linearity will enable military theorists
clear cause-and-effect relationships, and advanced techniques of probabil­ to grasp the true nature of Clausewitz’s
and phenomena can be broken into ity analysis would provide the tools to genius by understanding his theory
component parts and studied in isola­ deal with complex, nonlinear systems, for what it is, rather than attempting
tion from each other. Defined more and even today, those tools remain to shoehorn it into the prescriptive
broadly as linear reductionism, this sci­ somewhat blunt instruments. Clause­ category of reductionist, linear mili­
entific world view dominates Western witz realized that the practice of war tary thinking represented by Jomini
education and scientific inquiry to this eludes precise calculation or predic­ and his many Enlightenment-inspired
day—a fact that is not surprising given tion; rather, one can only understand counterparts.
the achievements of the reductionist war through probabilistic analysis that
scientific approach in such diverse accounts for the effects of friction and
disciplines as physics, mathematics, the interdependence of the infinite
and chemistry.49 Nevertheless, a grow­ and varied components of the whole.
ing number of modern scientists have This profound awareness of the nature
in the past few decades become aware of complex human processes is as re­ notes
of the fact that despite the empirical markable in its anticipation of future 1. For a concise biography of Carl von Clause­
usefulness of linear reductionism, the scientific progress as it is frustrating to witz, see Beatrice Heuser, “Introduction,” in
vast majority of natural phenomena those who desire a simple, predictive, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, abridged edition
are nonlinear, dynamic processes that linear theory that promises to supply (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.
are highly sensitive to initial conditions the key to victory. vii–xxxiv. On the Berlin Institute, see Charles
and therefore demonstrate complex Edward White, The Enlightened Soldier: Scharn­
and unpredictable behavior.50 horst and the Militärische Gesellschaft in Berlin,
Social systems in particular display ConClusion 1801–1805 (New York, 1989). Other works that
complex behavior and therefore do The foregoing comparison demon­ inform my analysis of Clausewitz’s work include
not submit to reductionist methods strates that Clausewitz’s work qualifies Carl von Clausewitz, Historical and Political
of predictive analysis. Unfortunately, as a valid, intellectually rigorous theory Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel
nonlinear science, described in its of war, while Jomini’s merely serves Moran (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
various forms as complexity, chaos, as a subjective guidebook of doctrine 1992); Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz
chaoplexity, or complex process theory, and principles that is better suited to (London: Pimlico, 2002); and Andreas Herberg-
must compete with the allure of linear the study of Napoleonic warfare than Rothe, Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory
science’s simplicity and its ability to to the varied phenomena of war as a of War (New York: Oxford University Press,
furnish adequate solutions to the most whole. This insight should enable the 2007).
common problems confronting scien­ contemporary reader to understand 2. For biographical information on Jomini,
tists.51 Even today, modern Western the form, purpose, and main ideas of see Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought
education relies primarily on reduc­ each author’s work within the frame­ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp.
tionist, Newtonian thinking, making work of his own time and place, while 109–10; John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of
the mental adjustment to a nonlinear illustrating the challenge posed by Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nu­
world view particularly challenging. the continued application of linear, clear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
This alone largely explains the contin­ reductionist thinking to the study of University Press, 1986), pp. 143–85; Charles
ued appeal of Jomini’s relatively simple a human activity that unquestionably Messenger, “Introduction,” in Antoine Henri
Art of War with its rules, maxims, and resides within the realm of nonlinear, Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell
principles; and the persistent debate dynamic phenomena. and W. P. Craighill (1862; Mechanicsburg, Pa.:
over the meaning and relevance of Modern-day military developments Stackpole Books, 1996), pp. v–vi. John I. Alger,
Clausewitz’s On War. demonstrate the effects of reduction­ “The Origins and Adaptation of the Principles
Both the strengths and weaknesses ism’s influence not only in the longev­ of War” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command
of Clausewitz’s theory stem from ity of Jominian principles, but also and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
the fact that he grasped the realities in the ongoing quest for prediction Kans., 1975), posted at http://cgsc.cdmhost
of nonlinearity a century and a half and certainty in combat systems and .com/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/

36 Army History Summer 2011

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p4013coll2&CISOPTR=2253&filename= 20. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 137–40, first 37. Howard and Paret rendered the origi­
2304.pdf, and idem, Antoine-Henri Jomini: and second quotes, p. 139, third and fourth nal German (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) as
A Bibliographical Survey, Occasional Paper 3, quotes, p. 140. “remarkable trinity” in the 1976 version of
U.S. Military Academy Library (West Point, 21. Ibid., pp. 140–41, first quote, p. 140, italics their translation of On War and, upon further
N.Y.: U.S. Military Academy, 1975), analyze in original, second quote, p. 141; Gat, History of reflection, as “paradoxical trinity” in the revised
the evolution of Jomini’s ideas and discuss Military Thought, pp. 121–24. 1984 edition of the translation. See Clause­
their incorporation into the military doctrine 22. Clausewitz, On War, p. 147. witz, On War, p. 89, both editions. Echevarria
of various states. 23. Gat, History of Military Thought, pp. provided the more literal and strictly accurate
3. Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State (Ox­ 114–15. Jomini endured criticism throughout translation, “wondrous trinity.” See Echevarria,
ford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 148. his career for his selective and inaccurate use of Clausewitz and Contemporary War, pp. 69–74,
4. Heuser, “Introduction,” pp. xxxiii–xxxiv; historical examples to support his ideas. 81, quote, p. 69.
Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern 24. Alger, Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey, 38. Jomini, Art of War, p. 13; Clausewitz, On
Strategy, p. 196. pp. iii–iv, 18. War, p. 89, quotes.
5. Shy, “Jomini,” p. 157. 25. Alger uncovers the reason for the con­ 39. Clausewitz, On War, p. 119.
6. Alger, Jomini: A Bibliographical Survey. sistency of these principles in his bibliographic 40. Ibid., pp. 104, 119–22, first quote, p. 119.
7. Ibid., pp. 19–20, quote, p. 19. study, revealing that Marshal Louis-Alexandre 41. Jomini, Art of War, pp. 71, quote,
8. Ibid., pp. iii–iv. Berthier, Napoleon’s chief of staff, severely 77–132.
9. Gat, History of Military Thought, pp. 27–55, criticized Jomini for failing to include a con­ 42. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 100, quote, 122.
69–96; R. R. Palmer, “Frederick, Guibert, Bül­ clusion in the first two volumes of a planned 43. Ibid., p. 136.
ow” in Makers of Modern Strategy, pp. 91–119. five-volume military history that he wrote 44. Richard M. Swain, ‘“The Hedgehog
10. Shy, “Jomini,” p. 154. For more on what while working on Napoleon’s staff. Under and the Fox’: Jomini, Clausewitz, and His­
Frederick referred to as his “oblique” attack, see this pressure, Jomini wrote a separate Résumé tory,” Naval War College Review 43 (Autumn
Robert M. Citino, The German Way of War: des principes généraux de l’art de la guerre 1990): 106. This is classic Enlightenment
From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich (1807) containing his general principles. These reductionism—Jomini simply factored out
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), principles then appeared in the conclusion of the variables he deemed too difficult, and
pp. 50–51. virtually every subsequent work Jomini wrote. therefore too unimportant, to include in
11. Gat, History of Military Thought, p. In addition to satisfying Berthier, this forced his theory.
110–13. For more on the “clockwork” metaphor, Jomini to maintain consistency with a hastily 45. Jomini, Art of War, p. 337, emphasis in
see Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of developed set of principles throughout the rest the original.
Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of his career. See ibid., pp. iv, 6–7. 46. “Theory,” Merriam-Webster Online Dic­
of Modernity (New York: Columbia University 26. Clausewitz, On War, p. 87. tionary, 2008, posted at http://www.merriam­
Press, 2009), pp. 37–62. 27. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary webster.com/dictionary/theory.
12. Gat, History of Military Thought, pp. War, p. 41; Paret, Clausewitz and the State, p. 69. 47. Paul D. Reynolds, A Primer in Theory
141–57, quote, p. 151. 28. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary Construction (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
13. Paret, “Clausewitz,” p. 189; Heuser, War, pp. 37–41. 1971), p. 13.
“Introduction,” pp. xiii–xix; Antulio J. Eche­ 29. Ibid., p. 38; Clausewitz, On War, p. 517. 48. Shy, “Jomini,” pp. 180–81, quotes, p. 181.
varria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War 30. The two notes are printed in Clausewitz, 49. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz and the
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), On War, pp. 69–70, 70–71, quotes, p. 70. Non-Linear Nature of Warfare: Systems of
pp. 43–44. 31. Gat, History of Military Thought, pp. 257– Organized Complexity,” in Clausewitz in the
14. Paret, Clausewitz and the State, pp. 81–85; 65. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: Twenty-First Century, ed. Hew Strachan and
Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War, A New Approach to War (Lawrence: University Andreas Herberg-Rothe (New York: Oxford
pp. 46–50. Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. xiii–xv, supports University Press, 2007), pp. 49–50.
15. Jomini, Art of War, p. 70. Gat’s reasoning. 50. Mark T. Calhoun, “Complexity and
16. Ibid. 32. John Shy, review of Sumida, Decoding Innovation: Army Transformation and the
17. Ibid., p. 71. Clausewitz, in Journal of Military History 73 Reality of War” (Ms, School of Advanced
18. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and (April 2009): 642–44. Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ­ 33. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
eton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), War, pp. 5–7. Kans., 2004), pp. 24–49, posted at http://www
p. 134. 34. Jomini, Art of War, pp. 322, first quote, .dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&
19. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary 324, 328, second quote, 330–33; Clausewitz, On doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA429156; Ilya
War, p. 30. In short, as Echevarria points out, War, pp. 135–36, third quote, p. 136. Prigogine, The End of Certainty (New York:
Clausewitz identified several aspects of war un­ 35. This translation is Echevarria’s, which W. H. Freeman, 1989).
addressed by Enlightenment-inspired theorists renders the original German more literally 51. Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Non­
that make war a phenomenon defined in today’s than does the Howard and Paret translation. linearity, and the Unpredictability of War,”
terminology as “nonlinear.” Clausewitz sought See Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary International Security 17 (Winter 1992/1993):
to develop a theory that would account for these War, pp. 177–90, quote, p. 177. 62–66. For the definition and origin of the term
nonlinear aspects of war, an insight addressed 36. Clausewitz, On War, pp. 485–87, 596–97, chaoplexity, see Bousquet, Scientific Way of
in more detail below. quote, p. 486. Warfare, pp. 34, 164.

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