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2008-01 Mapping The Conflict - Borders - Part 2 - Negotiating Borders (Thus Far)

Both sides come to negotiations over borders with positions informed by their own experiences and understandings of the current territorial situation. Recognition of the 1967 line as the legitimate border constitutes an historic concession to Israel. Any deviations from the 1967 lines must be mutually compensated by land swaps.

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33 views20 pages

2008-01 Mapping The Conflict - Borders - Part 2 - Negotiating Borders (Thus Far)

Both sides come to negotiations over borders with positions informed by their own experiences and understandings of the current territorial situation. Recognition of the 1967 line as the legitimate border constitutes an historic concession to Israel. Any deviations from the 1967 lines must be mutually compensated by land swaps.

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Mapping the Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict Solution
The question of borders

Part 2: Negotiating Borders (so


far)
Presented by
S. Daniel Abraham’s Center for Middle East Peace

Prepared by Dan Rothem


In collaboration with Lara Friedman
Borders (review)

• Both Israelis and Palestinians come to negotiations over borders with


positions that are informed by their own experiences and understandings
of the current territorial situation, their own sense of ‘reasonable’
concessions for each side, and their own ‘red lines’ (real and perceived).
• These experiences and understandings form the basis for each side’s
“classic approach” to negotiating the issue.
• Keeping in mind these ‘classic approaches’ to borders can help in
understanding the areas of potential agreement, the real negotiating ‘red
lines,’ and the areas where compromises are necessary and possible.
Elements of the Classic Palestinian
Approach to Borders (review)
• Since the Peel Commission, each historical development has diminished
the land under Palestinian control and increased the land under
Jewish/Israeli control.

• Recognition of the 1967 line as the legitimate border and the basis of
negotiations – in essence, Palestinian acceptance of Israel on 78% of the
land of historic Palestine – constitutes an historic concession to Israel.

• All Israeli settlement activity beyond the 1967 line violates international
law, including in East Jerusalem.

• The West Bank and Gaza Strip must be considered a single territorial unit
and a safe passage must be established to allow unimpeded movement
between them.
Expected Palestinian Positions in
Negotiations (review)
•these
Any agreement must be based on the 1967 lines and must refer explicitly to
lines.

•claim
The starting point of any agreement must be recognition of the Palestinian
to 100% of the land of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, based on the
1967 lines and constituting 22% of historic Palestine.

•represents
The Palestinian concession regarding the remaining 78% of historic Palestine
the final Palestinian position regarding the amount of territory it
will concede.

•compensated
Any deviations from the 1967 lines must be mutually agreed on and
by land swaps that are equal in quantity and quality.

•Such land swaps should be minimal (2% or less of the total land area).
•established.
A safe passage route between the West Bank and Gaza Strip must be
Classic Israeli Borders Approach
(reflecting traditional military thinking)
Classic Israeli borders approach (review)

• The 1967 lines have no legal standing and are not sacred.

• The fate of the territories will be resolved in negotiations, without regard to


prior claims by the Palestinians.

• Israeli interests require the annexation of large, expanded settlement


blocks and areas around Jerusalem.

• Israeli security requires a long-term presence in all or part of the Jordan


Valley.
Expected Israeli Position in Negotiations
(review)
• Israel may accept the legitimacy of the 1967 lines, as mentioned in the
Bush speech of 2002 and as referenced in the 2004 Israeli-US exchange
of letters (referred to as the 1949 Armistice Line).

• Israel will be prepared to make “painful compromises” and evacuate


many West Bank settlements (with the route of the barrier as the likely
starting point), but will not compromise on some land that it views as
strategically vital or that is home to large settler populations.

• Land swaps will be considered, but not according to a 1:1 ratio.

• Safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be viewed
as a Palestinian entitlement but rather as an Israeli concession that will
be used as negotiating leverage.
The Previous Round of
Final Status Negotiations
• “Camp David” is often mentioned in discussions of what Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations in the past were able (or not able) to
achieve, and by inference, what negotiations can be expected to
achieve (or not achieve) in the future.
• In this context, it is important to clarify what “Camp David” actually
means.
“Camp David” and the Chronology of
Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Negotiations

The Camp David summit of July 2000 was only one event in a series of
events surrounding Final Status discussions that took place between the
fall of 1999 and January 2001:

• Fall 1999: official negotiations


• Winter 1999-Spring 2000: break (to pursue negotiations with Syria)
• May 2000: intense negotiations in Stockholm
• July 2000: the Camp David summit
• September 2000: intense negotiations (35 meetings)
• October 2000: Sharm al-Sheikh Summit
• December 23, 2000: President Clinton articulates the “Clinton
Parameters”
• January 2001: the Taba negotiations
Camp David - July 2000

There was never one authoritative “Camp David proposal” or


“Camp David map”

The Israeli side presented several maps at Camp David, most of which
reflected the Israeli traditional military/security approach on borders (as
described earlier in this presentation).

These maps depicted proposals along the lines of:

• around 12% Israeli annexation of settlement blocks,


• another 10-11% of special long-term arrangement in the Jordan Valley,
• the rest (roughly 77%) in three non-contiguous areas, to become a
Palestinian State once an agreement was signed.
Camp David - July 2000

Verbally, other Israeli border schemes (reflecting a somewhat more


pragmatic traditional military/security approach) were communicated
during the summit, including a scheme proposing:

• 9 percent annexation, 1 percent swap


• limited Israeli presence along the Jordan River
• willingness to transfer (some) Arab parts of Jerusalem to Palestinian
sovereignty
Map of Israeli
proposal at
Camp David
(provided by a The map depicts the
Palestinian source) Israeli demand for
continued control
over key settlement
blocks, and the entire
greater Jerusalem
area; Israeli demands
for two east-west
land corridors; and
the demand for an
Israeli presence
and/or control in most
of the Jordan Valley
(various shades of
blue).
It includes no
offsetting land swaps.
Clinton’s Parameters –
Articulated by President Clinton on December 23,
(Territory) 2000
[begin quote]

... Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90%’s, between 94-
96% of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.

The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3% in addition to
territorial arrangement such as a permanent safe passage.

The parties should also consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs.
These are creative ways for doing this that should address Palestinian and Israeli needs and
concerns.

The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:
• 80% of the settlers in blocks
• Contiguity
• Minimize annexed areas
• Minimize the number of Palestinians affected
Clinton’s Parameters - December 23, 2000

Clinton never presented a map reflecting his principles


Hypothetical
map reflecting
one application
of the Clinton
parameters:
• 6% Israeli
annexation of
settlement blocks
(in blue)
• 3% in offsetting
land swaps (in
light green)
Taba - January 2001

• The final round of Final Status negotiations took place in Taba (Egypt) in
January 2001. 

• In Taba, Israel presented a map depicting the annexation of 8% of the


West Bank.

• The map did not depict any land swaps, but the negotiations dealt with
the idea more thoroughly than in the past.
Map presented
by Israel at
Taba,
depicting:
• 8% annexation of
settlement blocks
(in blue)
• 92% of the West
Bank under
Palestinian
control (in dark
green)
• No land swaps
Some lessons
•At no time in any official Israeli or American proposal did the words “1967
lines” or “1967 borders” appear.

•Recognition of the 1967 lines was implied, however, since they were the
lines used as the basis for calculating percentages of land under Israeli and
Palestinian control.

•In terms of land Israel was willing to see end up under Palestinian control,
Israel shifted from the “40%-plus” approach that guided the interim
agreements to a “100%-minus” approach.

•However, neither Israel nor the U.S. ever embraced the “100% Principle”
(i.e., that a peace agreement will be based on Israel relinquishing control
over 100% of the land in question, with any annexed land being
compensated for through 1:1 land swaps, as was the basis for peace
agreements with Egypt and Jordan).
Where to from here?
Possible points of agreement on borders
A model formula:

Borders will be based on the 1967 lines with agreed-


upon modifications that will include land swaps equal in
size (1:1) and will take into consideration the parties’
security and demographic interests while maintaining
• Includes explicit reference to 1967 (as demanded
territorial contiguity. by the
Palestinians)
• Includes idea of modifications to 1967 borders (as demanded by the
Israelis)
• Includes concept of 1:1 land swaps (as demanded by the
Palestinians)
• Places no limitation on size of modifications and swaps (as
demanded by the Israelis)

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