CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

COMMON PROVISIONS

The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. (Section 1,
Article IX, 1987 Constitution).

ROTATIONAL SCHEME OF APPOINTMENTS. – The Chairman and the Commissioners

shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven [7] years “without reappointment.” Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven [7] years, a Commissioner for
five [5] years, and another Commissioner for three [3] years, “without
reappointment.”

Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the UNEXPIRED TERM of the
PREDECESSOR. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity. (Section 1 [2], Article IX [B] [C] and [D], 1987
Constitution). [BAR 2010; BAR 2015; BAR 2018]

❖ REASONS FOR STAGGERING OF TERMS: (1) To LESSEN the OPPORTUNITY of the President to
APPOINT a majority of the body during his term; (2) To ensure CONTINUANCE of the body, which
always retains 2/3 of its membership; (3) The system is expected to STABILIZE the POLICIES of
the body as maintained by the remaining members. 1

❖ In Funa vs. COA, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012, it was held that the provision, on its face, DOES
NOT PROHIBIT a “PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT” from COMMISSIONER to CHAIRMAN as long
as the Commissioner has NOT SERVED the FULL TERM of SEVEN YEARS, further qualified by the
third sentence of Section 1 [2], Article IX [D] that the APPOINTMENT to any vacancy shall be
ONLY for the UNEXPIRED PORTION of the TERM of the PREDECESSOR.

In addition, such promotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the
rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the Commission membership such that the
AGGREGATE of the SERVICE of the COMMISSIONER in said position and the term to which he
will be appointed to the position of Chairman MUST NOT EXCEED SEVEN YEARS so as not to
disrupt the rotational system in the Commission.

1 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, [1995 Edition], p. 289.

 CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE OF COMMISSIONS

They are CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED; may not be abolished by statute. (Section 1,

Article IX, 1987 Constitution).

The Constitutional Commissions shall be INDEPENDENT. (Section 1, Article IX, 1987

Constitution).

❖ In Funa vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, the issue is whether
the designation of CHAIRMAN of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, as member of the Board of
Directors or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity,
impairs the independence of the CSC.

HELD: The designation impairs the independence of the CSC. Undoubtedly, the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under
the CONTROL of the PRESIDENT. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a
government entity that is under the control of the President WITHOUT IMPAIRING the
INDEPENDENCE vested in the CSC by the 1987 Constitution.

The Commission shall enjoy FISCAL AUTONOMY. Their approved annual

appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released . (Section 5, Article IX,
1987 Constitution).

❖ In Civil Service Commission vs. Department of Budget and Management, GR No. 158791, July
22, 2005, it was held that the “NO REPORT, NO RELEASE” policy may NOT be validly enforced
against offices vested with FISCAL AUTONOMY, without violating Section 5, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.

❖ N.B.: CONGRESS is not prohibited from REDUCING the APPROPRIATIONS of Constitutional

Commissions BELOW the AMOUNT appropriated for them for the PREVIOUS YEAR.

❖ In CHR Employees Association vs. CHR, G.R. No. 155336, July 21, 2006, it was held that the
CREATION of CHR may be CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED, BUT IT IS NOT, in the strict sense, a
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION. Thus, it cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit.

Each COMMISSION EN BANC may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall NOT
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. (Section 6, Article IX, 1987
Constitution).
❖ In Aruelo, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 107852, October 20, 1993, the Supreme Court held that the
COMELEC cannot adopt a rule PROHIBITING the filing of certain pleadings in the REGULAR
COURTS. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all
courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

❖ In Uy vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 97108, March 4, 1992, the Supreme Court held that the power
vested in the COMELEC to promulgate its rules of procedure NEITHER confers upon itself the
jurisdiction to issue the PREROGATIVE WRITS.

Members of the Constitutional Commissions can be removed from office only by

IMPEACHMENT. (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a TEMPORARY or

ACTING CAPACITY. (Section 1 [2], Article IX [B] [C] and [D], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002, it was ruled that an AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENT is a PERMANENT APPOINTMENT because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact
that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments DOES NOT alter its
permanent character.

PROHIBITED OFFICES and INTERESTS

No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other
office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the “practice of any profession”
OR in the “active management or control of any business” which, in any way,
“may be affected by the functions of his office,” nor shall he be financially
interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. (Section 2, Article IX-A, 1987 Constitution).

❖ NOTE: In Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, the
Supreme Court held that the prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or
employment MUST NOT, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied in an EX-
OFFICIO CAPACITY as provided by law and “as required by the primary functions of said
officials’ office”. The reason is that these posts DO NOT comprise “any other office” within the
contemplation of the constitutional prohibition BUT are properly an imposition of ADDITIONAL
DUTIES and FUNCTIONS on said officials. [BAR 2015]

In Funa vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, respondents insist
that Duque’s ex officio designation as member of the GOVERNING BOARDS of the GSIS,
PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF is allowed by the primary functions of his position as the CSC
Chairman.
 HELD: The GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are “NOT PERSONNEL-RELATED”. HENCE, when the CSC Chairman
sits as a member of the governing Boards of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, he may
exercise these powers and functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC
Chairman. This situation goes against the principle behind an ex officio position, and must,
therefore, be held unconstitutional.

POWERS and FUNCTIONS of EACH COMMISSION

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

The Civil Service Commission is the CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY of the

Government. (Section 3, Article IX [B], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Lopez vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92140, February 19, 1991, the Supreme Court
held that the law limits the Commission’s authority only to whether or not the appointees
possess the legal QUALIFICATIONS and the appropriate CIVIL SERVICE ELIGIBILITY, nothing else.

The Commission has NO AUTHORITY TO REVOKE an APPOINTMENT simply because it believes

that someone is better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment of the discretion
vested solely in the APPOINTING AUTHORITY.

❖ In Torregoza vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 101526, July 3, 1992, the issue is whether or
not a writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the CSC to grant the privilege of securing
an appropriate Civil Service Eligibility under RA 6850 “Granting Civil Service Eligibility under
certain conditions to government employees appointed under provisional or temporary status
who have rendered a total of seven [7] years of efficient service.”

HELD: The Writ of Mandamus WILL NOT LIE as the responsibility of the CSC in implementing the
law is NOT MINISTERIAL, besides, what the law granted is a MERE PRIVILEGE and not a right to
those who are qualified according to the standards to be set by the Commission.

❖ In Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115863, March 31, 1995, the Supreme Court
held that the Civil Service Commission CANNOT ABOLISH the CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE
BOARD (CESB). The CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.

❖ In Debulgado vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111471, September 26, 1994, the Supreme
Court held that the CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and
other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power includes the authority to recall an
appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and
regulations.

❖ In University of the Philippines vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001, the
Supreme Court held that even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the
CSC had NO AUTHORITY TO DICTATE to UP the OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL of its PERSONNEL. x x x CSC
is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its
 functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their
concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law. In short, ON ITS OWN, the CSC
does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls.

JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and

agencies of the government, INCLUDING government-owned or controlled
corporations “with original charters”. (Section 2 [1], Article IX [B], 1987 Constitution).


❖ NOTE: Under the present state of the law, the TEST in determining whether a government-
owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil Service Law is the MANNER OF ITS
CREATION such that government corporations created by SPECIAL CHARTER are subject to
its provisions while those incorporated under the general CORPORATION LAW are NOT within
its coverage.2

Thus, in Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation vs. Leogardo,
G.R. No. 58494, July 5, 1989, it was held that the PNOC-EDC having been incorporated under
the GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, is a government-owned or controlled corporation whose
employees are subject to the provisions of the LABOR CODE.

❖ In Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing Corporation, G.R.
No. L-49677, May 4, 1989, the Supreme Court held the workers of NHC are covered by the
LABOR CODE, the NHC being a government-owned or controlled corporation WITHOUT an
ORIGINAL CHARTER.

❖ In University of the Philippines vs. Regino, G.R. No. 88167, May 3, 1993, the Supreme Court held
that UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service because it was created by a special law and
HAS AN ORIGINAL CHARTER.

❖ In CSC vs. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, June 11, 2009, the Supreme Court held that the
POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES is a government-owned or controlled
corporation WITH ORIGINAL CHARTER. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed,
first and foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases
of complaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants.

❖ In Mateo vs. CA, G.R. No. 113219, August 14, 1995, it was held that the REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
have NO JURISDICTION to entertain cases involving DISMISSAL of officers and employees
covered by the CIVIL SERVICE LAW.

❖ In Light Rail Transit Authority [LRTA] vs. Venus, G.R. No. 163782, March 24, 2006, it was held that
the employees of LRTA, a government-owned and controlled corporation WITH ORIGINAL
CHARTER, are covered by CIVIL SERVICE RULES.

2 Philippine National Oil Company – Energy Development Corporation vs. Leogardo, G.R. No. 58494, July 5, 1989.
❖ In Olanda vs. Bugayong, G.R. No. 140917, October 10, 2003, the Supreme Court held that
DISCIPLINARY CASES and cases involving PERSONNEL ACTIONS affecting employees in the civil
service including appointment through certification, promotion, transfer, reinstatement,
reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion and separation are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION which is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to
the civil service.

❖ In Go vs. CA, G.R. No. 172027, July 29, 2010, the Supreme Court held that the REALLOCATION
and DEMOTION directed by the Department of Budget and Management [DBM] which
resulted in the diminution of benefits of Go involves PERSONNEL ACTION in the government.
Thus, the proper remedy available to Go is to question the DBM denial of his protest before the
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION which has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving PERSONNEL
ACTIONS, and NOT before the Office of the President.

❖ NOTE: The COMMISSION shall have ORIGINAL DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION over all its officials
and employees and over all cases involving CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATION ANOMALIES or
IRREGULARITIES.3

❖ In Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7,
2017, the issue is “whether the CSC had the jurisdiction to resolve the appeal filed by the PAO
and to reverse CESB Resolution No. 918.”

HELD: The CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. As the central personnel
agency of the government, the CSC has broad authority to pass upon ALL CIVIL SERVICE
MATTERS including the CES.

REVIEW of FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS and DECISIONS of CSC

❖ In Department of Education vs. Cuanan, G.R. No. 169013, December 16, 2008, the Supreme
Court held that the remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution issued by the CSC is to file
a PETITION FOR REVIEW thereof UNDER RULE 43 of the Rules of Court within fifteen days from
notice of the resolution.

❖ NOTE: The SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of CERTIORARI under RULE 65 of the Rules of Court may be
resorted to only when: (1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction OR with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; AND (2) there is NO APPEAL, or any PLAIN, SPEEDY,
and ADEQUATE REMEDY in the ordinary course of law.4

❖ NOTE: In Civil Service Commission vs. Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, April 29, 1999, it was held
that the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION is now ALLOWED to APPEAL dismissals of charges or
EXONERATION of respondents in administrative disciplinary proceedings. HOWEVER,
Dacoycoy maintained the rule that the PRIVATE COMPLAINANT is a mere GOVERNMENT
WITNESS without a right to appeal.5

❖ NOTE: In The National Appellate Board [NAB] of the National Police Commission [NAPOLCOM]
vs. Mamauag, G.R. No. 149999, August 12, 2005, it was held that the government party that

3 Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
4 Mahinay vs. CA, G.R. No. 152457, April 30, 2008.
5 See The National Appellate Board [NAB] vs. Mamauag, G.R. No. 149999, August 12, 2005.
 can appeal is NOT the DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY or tribunal which previously heard the case
and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be one that is PROSECUTING the administrative case against the respondent.
Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing
the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in
prosecuting the respondent.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS

ENFORCE and ADMINISTER all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. (Section 2 [1], Article IX [C],
1987 Constitution).

❖ In Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr., G.R. No. 104848, January 29, 1993, the Supreme Court held that
the ASSUMPTION of JURISDICTION by the TRIAL COURT over a case involving the ENFORCEMENT
of the ELECTION CODE is AT WAR with the plain CONSTITUTIONAL COMMAND, the implementing
statutory provisions, and the hospitable scope afforded such grant of authority so clear and
unmistakable in recent decisions.

❖ In Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004, the
Supreme Court held that the ascertainment of the IDENTITY of a POLITICAL PARTY and its
legitimate OFFICERS is a matter that is well within the authority of COMELEC.

❖ In Guevarra vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-12596, July 31, 1958, the Supreme Court held that the
COMELEC has the statutory POWER TO CITE for CONTEMPT. However, the power may be
exercised only by the COMELEC when it is performing a “QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION”.

DEPUTIZE, “with the concurrence of the President”, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Section 2 [4], Article IX [C], 1987 Constitution).

INVESTIGATE and, where appropriate, PROSECUTE cases of violations of election

laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices. (Section 2 [6], Article IX [C], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Arroyo vs. DOJ, G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012, it was held that the other prosecuting
arms of the government, such as the DOJ, now exercise CONCURRENT jurisdiction with the
COMELEC to conduct PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION of all ELECTION OFFENSES and to
PROSECUTE the same.
❖ NOTE: When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary
investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files
the INFORMATION in the PROPER COURT, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of
the court. The COMELEC cannot conduct a REINVESTIGATION of the case WITHOUT the
AUTHORITY of the COURT or unless so ordered by the court.6

“SUPERVISION OR REGULATION OF FRANCHISES ” – The Commission may, during the

election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
or permits for the operation of transportation and other public ut ilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Suc h
supervision or regulation shall aim “to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space,
and the right to reply,” including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates “in connection with the
objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections ”.
(Section 4, Article IX [C], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Natonal Press Club vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 102653, March 5, 1992, petitioners ask the
Supreme Court to strike down as unconstitutional Section 11 [b] of RA 6646 which “PROHIBITS
THE SALE or DONATION of PRINT SPACE and AIR TIME for CAMPAIGN or OTHER POL ITICAL
PURPOSES EXCEPT TO THE COMELEC”.

HELD: Section 11 [b] is a VALID exercise of POLICE POWER. The COMELEC has been expressly
authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the
franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information --- to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply among candidates.

❖ In Social Weather Stations, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, it was held that the
RESTRICTION on the PUBLICATION of ELECTION SURVEY RESULTS constitutes a “PRIOR
RESTRAINT” on the exercise of FREEDOM of SPEECH.

The grant of power to the COMELEC under Section 4 of Article IX-C, is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among candidates.

❖ In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-119694, May 22, 1995, it was held that
to compel PRINT MEDIA companies to DONATE COMELEC-SPACE amounts to TAKING of
private personal PROPERTY for public use or purposes WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION.

❖ In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
132922, April 21, 1998, it was held that the RADIO and TELEVISION BROADCASTING
COMPANIES, which are given franchises, DO NOT OWN THE AIRWAVES and FREQUENCIES
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary PRIVILEGE of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of
PUBLIC SERVICE.

6 People vs. Delgado, G.R. Nos. 93419-32, September 18, 1990.

❖ In Sanidad vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 90878, January 29, 1990, COMELEC issued a Resolution,
“PROHIBITING COLUMNISTS or COMMENTATORS from CAMPAIGNING FOR or AGAINST
THE PLEBISCITE ISSUES.”

HELD: What was granted to the COMELEC was the POWER TO SUPERVISE and REGULATE the USE
and ENJOYMENT of FRANCHISES. COMELEC was NOT granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. MEDIA PRACTITIONERS exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are NEITHER the FRANCHISE HOLDERS nor the CANDIDATES.

This form of regulation is tantamount to a RESTRICTION of petitioner’s FREEDOM of EXPRESSION

for no justifiable reason.

❖ In 1-UTAK vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015, the issue is whether or not RESOLUTION
NO. 9615, “WHICH PROHIBITS THE POSTING of any ELECTION CAMPAIGN or
PROPAGANDA MATERIAL in PUVs and TRANSP ORT TERMINALS” are valid regulations.

HELD: RESOLUTION NO. 9615 unduly INFRINGE on the fundamental right of the people to
“FREEDOM OF SPEECH”. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners
of PUVs and private transport terminals, to EXPRESS their PREFERENCE, through the posting of
election campaign material in their property, and CONVINCE others to agree with them.

❖ In Adiong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, the issue is whether or not the
COMELEC may “PROHIBIT THE POSTING of DECALS and STICKERS on MOBILE PLACES
PUBLIC or PRIVATE”, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas
that it fixes.

HELD: The prohibition unduly INFRINGES on the citizen’s fundamental “RIGHT of FREE SPEECH”
enshrined in the Constitution. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to EXPRESS
his PREFERENCE and, by displaying it on his car, TO CONVINCE others to agree with him.

No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for VIOLATION of ELECTION

LAWS, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President “without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.” (Section 5, Article IX [C], 1987
Constitution).

JURISDICTION OF THE COMELEC

Exercise exclusive ORIGINAL JURISDICTION over all contests relating to the

elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective Regional, Provincial, and City
Officials, and APPELLATE JURISDICTION over all contests involving elective
Municipal Officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, OR involving
elective Barangay Officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction . (Section 2
[2], Article IX [C], 1987 Constitution).
 Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective Municipal and Barangay Offices shall be FINAL, EXECUTORY, and NOT
APPEALABLE. (Section 2 [2], Article IX [C], 1987 Constitution).

❖ N.B.: In Galido vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 95346, January 18, 1991, the Supreme Court held that
the fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective
MUNICIPAL and BARANGAY OFFICES are FINAL, EXECUTORY and NOT APPEALABLE, DOES NOT
preclude a recourse to the Supreme Court by way of a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION of CERTIORARI.

❖ N.B.: In Relampagos vs. Cumba, G.R. No. 118861, April 27, 1995, the Supreme Court held that
the COMELEC has the AUTHORITY to issue the EXTRAORDINARY WRITS of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus ONLY in aid of its “APPELLATE JURISDICTION.”

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. “All such election cases shall be
heard and decided IN DIVISION,” Provided that Motions for Reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Section 3, Article IX [C], 1987
Constitution).

❖ In Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992, the Supreme Court held that
election cases include PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES, and all such cases must first be
heard and decided by a DIVISION of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, DOES
NOT have the authority to hear and decide the same at the first instance.

❖ In Balindong vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 153991-92, October 16, 2003, the Supreme Court held
that the requirement mandating the hearing and decision of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies, at the first instance by a DIVISION of the COMELEC, and not by
the poll body as a whole, is MANDATORY and JURISDICTIONAL.

❖ N.B.: In Municipal Board of Canvassers of GLAN vs. COMELEC, GR No. 150946, October 23,
2003, it was held that the COMELEC EN BANC can act directly on matters falling within its
“ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS.”

It is only when the exercise of “QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS” are involved that the COMELEC is
mandated to decide cases first IN DIVISION, and then, upon motion for reconsideration, en
banc. [BAR 2018].

In Baytan vs. COMELEC, GR No. 153945, February 4, 2003, it was held that the PROSECUTION
of ELECTION LAW VIOLATORS involves the exercise of the COMELEC’s ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS. Thus, the COMELEC EN BANC can directly approve the recommendation of its Law
Department to file the criminal information for double registration against petitioners in the
instant case. There is no constitutional requirement that the filing of the criminal information be
first decided by any of the divisions of the COMELEC.

In Jaramilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003, it was held that CORRECTION
of a MANIFEST MISTAKE in the addition of votes or an erroneous tabulation in the statement
of votes, involves the exercise of the COMELEC’s ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS. Thus, the COMELEC
 EN BANC can directly act on it in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.

REVIEW of FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS and DECISIONS of COMELEC

Each Commission shall decide by a MAJORITY VOTE of all its Members, any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission. (Section
7, Article IX [A], 1987 Constitution).

❖ N.B.: In Sevilla vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203833, March 19, 2013, it was held that a MAJORITY
VOTE REQUIRES a vote of “FOUR [4] MEMBERS” of the COMELEC EN BANC. In other words,
the vote of four [4] members must always be attained in order to decide, irrespective of the
number of Commissioners in attendance.

❖ N.B.: In case the opinion is EQUALLY DIVIDED among the members of the COMELEC en banc,
or the necessary MAJORITY CANNOT BE HAD Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure mandates a REHEARING.7

IF ON REHEARING NO DECISION IS REACHED, the action or proceeding shall be DISMISSED “if

originally commenced” in the Commission; “in appealed cases,” the judgment or order
appealed from shall stand AFFIRMED.8

Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or

ruling of each Commission may be brought to the SUPREME COURT on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. (Section 7,
Article IX [A], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. L-31455, February 28, 1985, the
Supreme Court held that what is contemplated by the term FINAL ORDERS, RULINGS and
DECISIONS of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of
by the said body in the exercise of its ADJUDICATORY or QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS. “THE
COMELEC RESOLUTION AWARDING THE CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF ACME” was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTIONS over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed
as a final order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.

❖ In Ambil vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000, it was held that the DECISION must
be a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC EN BANC.

❖ N.B.: In Macabago vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152163, November 18, 2002, it was held that as a
general rule, an “ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER” of the COMELEC is NOT a proper subject of a
special civil action for certiorari. BUT when the COMELEC acts capriciously or whimsically, with
GRAVE ABUSE of DISCRETION amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing such an order,

7 Marcoleta vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009.

8 Ibid.
 the aggrieved party may seek redress from the Supreme Court via a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.

❖ In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000, it was
held that the FILING of a MOTION for RECONSIDERATION may be glossed over: (1) to prevent
a miscarriage of justice; (2) when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor; (3) when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity; or (4)
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy
remedy available.

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

POWERS and DUTIES

The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine,
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining
to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instru mentalities,
including Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations “with original charters,”
and on a POST-AUDIT BASIS: (a) Constitutional Bodies, commissions and offices
that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) Autonomous
State Colleges and Universities; (c) Other government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government,
which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the
audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures,
including temporary or special PRE-AUDIT, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government
and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Section 2 [1], Article IX [D], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Sambelli vs. Province of Isabela, G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992, it was held that the COA is
also charged with the duty to EXAMINE and AUDIT ALL ACCOUNTS pertaining to the
EXPENDITURE or USES of FUNDS owned by or pertaining to, the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities.

❖ In Yap vs. COA, G.R. No. 158562, April 23, 2010, it was held that in view of the public purpose
requirement, ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES and BENEFITS must be shown to be NECESSARY or
RELEVANT to the fulfillment of the OFFICIAL DUTIES and FUNCTIONS of the government officers
and employees.

❖ In Baldoz vs. COA, G.R. No. 199114, July 16, 2013, the Supreme Court held that salaries of
government employees clearly constitute public funds which should, at all times, be properly
accounted for. In this relation, the Constitution vests the COA with the primary responsibility to
ensure that any irregularity in the disbursement of the same is cleared, or any attendant
illegality be proscribed.
 The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this
Article, “to define the scope of its audit and examination,” establish the
techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the “prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or
unconscionable expenditures,” or uses of government funds and properties.
(Section 2 [2], Article IX [D], 1987 Constitution).

❖ In Veloso vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, it was held that the COA is vested with
the AUTHORITY TO DISALLOW ILLEGAL or IRREGULAR DISBURSEMENTS of GOVERNMENT FUNDS.

❖ In Dela Llana vs. COA, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, it was held that the conduct of a PRE-
AUDIT is NOT a MANDATORY duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This
discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the
exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.

❖ In Orocio vs. COA, G.R. No. 75959, August 31, 1992, it was held that in determining whether an
expenditure of a Government agency or instrumentality such as the NPC is irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable, the COA should NOT be BOUND by
the OPINION of the LEGAL COUNSEL of said agency or instrumentality which may have been
the basis for the questioned disbursement. Otherwise, it would indeed become a toothless tiger
and its auditing function would be a meaningless and futile exercise.

JURISDICTION of COA

No law shall be passed exempting “any entity of the government” or its subsidiaries
in any guise whatever, OR “any investment of public funds,” from the jurisdiction
of the Commission on Audit. (Section 3, Article IX [D], 1987 Constitution).

❖ NOTE: The Constitution vests in the Comission on Audit audit jurisdiction over GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS “with original charters,” as well as GOCCs
“without original charters.” GOCCs “with original charters” are subject to COA’s PRE-AUDIT,
while GOCCs “without original charters” are subject to COA’s POST-AUDIT.9

❖ In Feliciano vs. COA, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004, it was explained that LOCAL WATER
DISTRICTs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their SPECIAL CHARTER. Since, under the
Constitution only government-owned or controlled corporations may have special charters,
the ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED
CORPORATIONS with a SPECIAL CHARTER.

❖ In Barbo vs. COA, G.R. No. 157542, October 10, 2008, it was held that the COA has the authority
and jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a WATER
DISTRICT.

9 Feliciano vs. COA, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004.

❖ N.B.: In Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. COA, G.R. No. 91890, June 9, 1995, it was held that, PAL
HAVING CEASED to be a GOVERNMENT-OWNED or CONTROLLED CORPORATION, is NO LONGER
UNDER THE AUDIT JURISDICTION of the COA.

REVIEW of FINAL ORDERS, RESOLUTIONS and DECISIONS of COA

❖ In Saligumba vs. COA, G.R. No. L-61676, October 18, 1982, it was held that THE POWER TO
REVIEW COA’s decisions refers to “MONEY MATTERS” and NOT TO ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
involving the discipline of its personnel.

CASES:

1. Funa vs. Duque III, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014

The Constitutional Commissions shall be INDEPENDENT. (Section 1, Article IX, 1987 Constitution).

In Funa vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014, the issue is whether the
designation of CHAIRMAN of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, as member of the Board of Directors
or Trustees of the GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF, in an ex officio capacity, impairs the
independence of the CSC.

HELD: The designation impairs the independence of the CSC. Undoubtedly, the GSIS, PHILHEALTH,
ECC and HDMF and the members of their respective governing Boards are under the CONTROL of
the PRESIDENT. As such, the CSC Chairman cannot be a member of a government entity that is
under the control of the President WITHOUT IMPAIRING the INDEPENDENCE vested in the CSC by
the 1987 Constitution.

2. Matibag vs. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 02, 2002

While Congress was not in session, the President appointed Antero as Secretary of the Department
of Tourism (DOT), Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), Clodualdo as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights (CHR), and Emmanuel as Philippine Ambassador to Cameroon. The following day,
all the appointees tooke their oath before the President, and commenced to perform the functions
of their respective offices.
Characterize the appointments, whether permanent or temporary; and whether regular or interim,
with reasons.
A civil society group, the Volunteers Against Misguided Politics (VAMP), files suit, contesting the
legality of the acts of the appointees and claiming that the appointees should not have entered
into the performance of the functions of their respective offices, because their appointments had
not yet been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Is this claim of VAMP correct? Why
or why not? (2016 BAR EXAM)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The appointment of Antero as Secretary of Tourism is ad interim because it is subject to
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and was made while Congress was not in
session. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance, because it is permanent and
cannot be withdrawn after its acceptance. (Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 [2002])
The appointment of Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration is regular and
permanent. It is not required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He can start
performing his duties upon acceptance of the appointment. (Section 16, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
The appointment of Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission is ad interim because
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments and was made while Congress
was not in session. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance of the appointment,
because it is permanent and cannot be withdrawn.
The appointment of Dexter as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is regular and
permanent upon his acceptance. It is not required to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. He can start performing his duties upon his acceptance. (Bautista v. Salonga 172
SCRA 160 [1989])
The appointment of Emmanuel as ambassador to Cameroon is ad interim because it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. (Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution)
The claim of VAMP is not correct. The Commission of Investigation and the Commission on Human
Rights can immediately start performing their functions upon acceptance since they are not
required to be confirmed. The Secretary of the Department of Tourism and the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, can immediately start performing their duties upon acceptance, since
their ad interim appointment is permanent.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes

specified in the Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on
Appointments, or adjournment by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on
the appointment. There is no dispute that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an
ad interim appointment, the appointee can no longer be extended a new appointment,
inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission in the exercise of its checking
power on the appointing authority of the President. Such disapproval is final and binding on both
the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad interim appointment is by-passed
because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize, there is no final
decision by the Commission to give or withhold its consent to the appointment. Absent such
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment [Matibag v. Benipayo, supra.].

In Matibag v. Benipayo, supra., the Supreme Court said that when an ad interim appointment (of
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections) is not confirmed (as it was by-passed, or that there
was not ample time for the
Commission on Appointments to pass upon the same), another ad interim appointment may be
extended to the appointee without violating the Constitution.

In Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002, it was held that an AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
is a PERMANENT APPOINTMENT because it TAKES EFFECT IMMEDIATELY and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments OR until the next adjournment of Congress.
NOTE: An AD INTERIM appointee DISAPPROVED by the Commission on Appointments can NO
LONGER be EXTENDED a NEW APPOINTMENT. The disapproval is a final decision of the commission
on appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the
President.

❖ In Matibag vs. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002, it was ruled that an AD INTERIM
APPOINTMENT is a PERMANENT APPOINTMENT because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that
it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments DOES NOT alter its permanent
character.

3. Funa vs. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

• The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the
expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed
term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The
appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration
of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution.
• Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or
impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering
of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D).
• Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full
term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any
position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the
Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment.
• A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is
eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of
the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment,
provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired
period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that
the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by
impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a
movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to
Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or
office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the
strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
• Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

4. Dela Llana vs. Chairperson COA, G. R. No. 180989, February 07, 2012

The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself. Because of
the doctrine of separation of powers which demands that proper respect be accorded the other
departments, courts are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other
basis that can be used for a decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case.
See: Zandueta v. de la Costs, supra.; De la Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294.

In Dela Llana vs. COA, G.R. No. 180989, February 7, 2012, it was held that the conduct of a PRE-
AUDIT is NOT a MANDATORY duty that this Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion
on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority
to define the scope of its audit and examination.