No.

21-19

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
10 Meade Avenue, Building 50
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

MASTERING THE FUNDAMENTALS (BCT)

U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS

COMBINED CENTER - TRAINING
May 2021

ARMS CENTER No. 21-19

May 2021
Approved For Public Release Approved For Public Release
Distribution Unlimited Distribution Unlimited
 CENTER for
ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
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 M A S T E R I N G TH E FU N D A M EN TA LS

Foreword
Focus: It is easy to say, but much harder to do in this instantaneous,
information-driven age. Often, many experienced leaders find it challenging
to focus on what really matters. The minute any leader takes charge of his
formation, the ability to focus dissipates for a variety of reasons. Unforeseen
higher-echelon actions or reactions, unanticipated problems with Soldiers,
and a seemingly endless litany of tasks constitute just a few reasons why
focus can be difficult.
Whatever the challenges, the Army’s overall purpose never changes. Sure,
we have been better or worse at times for a myriad of reasons, but the mission
of the U.S. Army remains to fight and win our nation’s wars. It serves as the
fundamental reason we recruit Soldiers the way we do. It is the fundamental
reason driving all Army modernization initiatives. It is what drives personnel
initiatives.
The Army’s increased emphasis on taking care of Soldiers and combatting
corrosive behaviors is an essential task. Without focusing on our Soldiers,
we endanger the ability to accomplish the missions our nation expects of its
Army. Regardless, some may struggle to understand the link between caring
for Soldiers and our ability to organize, equip, train, and prepare for combat.
General William E. DePuy said it best when he stated that, “Nice, warm
human relationships are satisfying and fun, but they are not the purpose of
an Army. Establishing the most marvelous, friendly, warm, sympathetic, and
informed relationships is unimportant, except in the context of making the
teamwork better. In that context, it is all important.”1
We know our Army cannot accomplish its mission without cohesive small
teams. However, focusing solely on cohesive teams or corrosive behavior,
independent of a common purpose, achieves limited results. Soldiers and
leaders must have a purpose linked to the fundamental reason their team
exists. No winning team has ever accomplished anything of significance
without first defining a common purpose and subsequently focusing on what
mattered to achieve that purpose. Soldiers and leaders must be focused on
what fundamentally matters in their formation to help fight and win the
nation’s wars.

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By focusing formations on mastering a handful of fundamental tasks, leaders

begin to transform purpose into capability. We build teams specifically to
accomplish these tasks. We maintain equipment to accomplish these tasks.
We care for each other so that we can accomplish these tasks. We execute all
organizational activities to enable us to accomplish these tasks on the future
battlefield.
Regardless of echelon, the Army needs units to be masters in a handful of
fundamental tasks. By focusing an organization’s energy on a few, simple,
achievable tasks, leaders create a purpose that directly contributes to the
Army’s mission. Every effort in the organization begins and ends with that
purpose in mind, from our care for Soldiers to our training, maintenance, and
leader-development programs.
As a leader at any level, you must take the time to create a common focus for
your organization the minute you take charge. This National Training Center
publication provides the nexus for a conversation every leader should have
at every echelon in his formation. What is our focus? In what areas must we
be experts?
Before you start telling your Soldiers to master the fundamentals, take the
time to have a conversation with your team. What are those fundamental
tasks at echelon? How do you structure every organizational activity around
the tasks? How do they collectively contribute to the overarching purpose
and reason for your organization’s existence? How does the accomplishment
of these tasks nest with the essential task of cohesive small units? Your
subordinates will thank you.
Purpose leads to focus, and focus leads to fundamental tasks that drive
every aspect of great units. Focus minimizes confusion and maximizes
teamwork. True teamwork builds cohesive units that care for one another,
because everyone matters. Genuine teamwork builds trust and confidence
in ourselves, the organization, and one another. Repetitive practice leads to
teams that can truly master the fundamentals.
As always, if you or any member of your team requires assistance, do not
hesitate to ask.

COL Michael J. Simmering

Outlaw 01
Operations Group
The National Training Center and Fort Irwin

Endnote
1. DePuy, William E. Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy. Ed. COL
Richard M. Swan. Combat Studies Institute. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1994, page 120.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Section I
Mastering the Fundamentals�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������1

Chapter 1
Refocusing on Battle Focus �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������3

Chapter 2
Winning at the Point of Contact �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������11

Chapter 3
The Mission-Essential Task Crosswalk: A Dying Art���������������������������������������������������15

Chapter 4
Multi-Echelon Training and Company and Platoon Situational
Training Exercise Design�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������23

Chapter 5
Leader Tasks: Setting the Conditions for Effective Collective Training�������������������31

Section II
Brigade Operations Recommended Focused Task Areas �����������������������������������������35

Chapter 6
Winning at the Point of Contact: The Brigade-Level Readiness Fight ���������������������37

Chapter 7
The Armored Brigade Combat Team Headquarters�����������������������������������������������������41

Chapter 8
The Brigade Headquarters and Headquarters Company �������������������������������������������43

Chapter 9
The Brigade Combat Team Tactical Command Post in an
Armored Brigade Combat Team �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������47

Chapter 10
The Brigade Intelligence Section ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������49

Chapter 11
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Terrain Analysis �������������������������������������53

Chapter 12
The Brigade Fire Support Element�������������������������������������������������������������������������������57

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Chapter 13
The Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element
in a Brigade Combat Team Command Post�����������������������������������������������������������������59

Chapter 14
The Signal Staff Section in Brigade Combat Team Command
Posts and the Signal (S-6) Section�������������������������������������������������������������������������������61

Chapter 15
Protect and Defend the Brigade Upper Tactical Internet��������������������������������������������63

Section III
Cavalry Squadron Operations Recommended Task Focus Areas�����������������������������65

Chapter 16
Cavalry Squadron in an Armored Brigade Combat Team�������������������������������������������67

Chapter 17
The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop in a Cavalry Squadron�������������������������71

Chapter 18
The Cavalry Troop in an Armored Brigade Combat Team �����������������������������������������75

Chapter 19
The Armor Company in a Cavalry Squadron���������������������������������������������������������������81

Chapter 20
The Forward Support Troop in a Cavalry Squadron
Armored Brigade Combat Team �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������85

Section IV
Combined Arms Battalions Recommended Task Focus Areas���������������������������������91

Chapter 21
The Combined Arms Battalion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������93

Chapter 22
The Main Command Post in a Combined Arms Battalion�������������������������������������������97

Chapter 23
The Fire Support Element in a Combined Arms Battalion �����������������������������������������99

Chapter 24
The Battalion S-6 Section in a Combined Arms Battalion ���������������������������������������101

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Chapter 25
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company and Combat Trains
Command Post Operations in a Combined Arms Battalion�������������������������������������103

Chapter 26
The Armor Company in a Combined Arms Battalion �����������������������������������������������109

Chapter 27
The Mechanized Company in a Combined Arms Battalion���������������������������������������113

Chapter 28
The Forward Support Company in a Combined Arms Battalion �����������������������������117

Section V
Field Artillery Battalion Recommended Task Focus Areas���������������������������������������123

Chapter 29
The Field Artillery Battalion in an Armored Brigade Combat Team�������������������������125

Chapter 30
The Main Command Post in a Field Artillery Battalion���������������������������������������������129

Chapter 31
The Field Artillery Battalion S-6 Section���������������������������������������������������������������������131

Chapter 32
The Headquarters and Headquarters Battery in a Field Artillery Battalion�������������133

Chapter 33
The Field Artillery Battery �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������135

Chapter 34
The Forward Support Company in a Field Artillery Battalion�����������������������������������139

Section VI
Brigade Engineer Battalion Recommended Task Focus Areas�������������������������������145

Chapter 35
The Engineer Battalion in a Brigade Combat Team���������������������������������������������������147

Chapter 36
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company in a
Brigade Engineer Battalion�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������153

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Chapter 37
Military Police in a Brigade Combat Team�����������������������������������������������������������������155

Chapter 38
The Mobility Augmentation Company and Echelon-Above-Brigade Sapper
Company�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������157

Chapter 39
The Alpha and Bravo Companies in a Brigade Engineer Battalion�������������������������159

Chapter 40
The Engineer Construction Company and Engineer Support
Company in an Echelon-Above-Brigade Battalion ���������������������������������������������������161

Chapter 41
The Military Intelligence Company in a Brigade Combat Team�������������������������������163

Chapter 42
The Unmanned Aircraft System Platoon in a Military
Intelligence Company���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������165

Chapter 43
The Signal Company ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������167

Chapter 44
The Echo Forward Support Company in a Brigade Engineer Battalion �����������������173

Section VII
Sustainment Battalions Recommended Task Focus Areas�������������������������������������175

Chapter 45
The Brigade Support Battalion �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������177

Chapter 46
The Sustainment Battalion Main Command Post �����������������������������������������������������183

Chapter 47
The Headquarters and Headquarters Company Brigade Support Battalion�����������187

Chapter 48
Headquarters and Headquarters Company Field-Feeding Section�������������������������189

Chapter 49
The Distribution Company in a Brigade Support Battalion �������������������������������������191

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Chapter 50
The Transportation Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion �����������������������������������193

Chapter 51
The Supply Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion�������������������������������������������������195

Chapter 52
The Fuel and Water Platoon in a Brigade Support Battalion �����������������������������������197

Chapter 53
The Field Maintenance Company, Brigade Support Battalion���������������������������������199

Chapter 54
The Maintenance Control and Area Support Platoon
Field Maintenance Company���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������201

Chapter 55
The Maintenance Platoon, Field Maintenance Company �����������������������������������������203

Chapter 56
The Brigade Support Medical Company, Brigade Support Battalion����������������������205

Chapter 57
Preparing for Success: A Deliberate Convoy Preparation
Notification-Hour Sequence�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������211

Glossary�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������215

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FIGURES
Figure 2-1. Training approach ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13

Figure 3-1. Brigade-focused METs for an ABCT�����������������������������������������������������������������18

Figure 3-2. Squadron-prioritized METs�������������������������������������������������������������������������������19

Figure 3-3. Scout platoon high-payoff battle tasks �����������������������������������������������������������20

Figure 4-1. Multi-echelon training (platoon STX)���������������������������������������������������������������26

Figure 4-2. Multi-echelon training (company STX)�������������������������������������������������������������29

Figure 16-1. Recommended mission-essential task crosswalk

for an ABCT cavalry squadron���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������69

Figure 21-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for

a combined arms battalion in an ABCT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������95

Figure 29-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk

for the FA Battalion of an ABCT�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������128

Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB���������������������������������149

Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB (continued)�������������150

Figure 45-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk

for the brigade support battalion���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������182

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TABLES
Table 57-1. Example N-hour sequence �����������������������������������������������������������������������������212

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SECTION I

Mastering the Fundamentals

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CHAPTER 1

Refocusing on Battle Focus

COLONEL MICHAEL J. SIMMERING, COMMANDER,
OPERATIONS GROUP
Within many units, a lack of focus presents a consistent challenge on a daily
basis. Too often, organizational energy dissipates as we leap from training
events, to maintenance efforts, to personnel readiness with seemingly little
rhyme or reason to our efforts. Unsynchronized activities on the part of many
higher headquarters, a failure to plan properly, and knee-jerk reactions to
perceived or emerging challenges further complicate subordinates’ ability to
focus. To build better formations, Soldiers and leaders must have the ability
to focus on what truly matters: The next battle.

WHY ARE WE HERE?

Any combat-seasoned leader will say the most critical aspect of a mission
statement is the purpose. Purpose gives organizations focus, constitutes the
reason for existence, and drives organizational activities. The purpose of our
Army is to win the nation’s wars. There is no other real purpose behind an
Army. We deter adversaries to prevent fighting wars. We reassure allies to
build wartime alliances. We fight for the sole purpose of winning.
Oftentimes, organizations find themselves unable to convey their true purpose.
Some units stretch from deployments, to home-station training events, to
combat training centers, and back to deployments without ever understanding
the underlying purpose of Army activities. Each brigade combat team (BCT)
within the Army serves a unique purpose, contributing to the Army’s ability
to fight and win the nation’s wars. Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team
(19 January 2021),1 explains why each type of BCT exists in the Army:
● Armored brigade. The armored brigade combat team (ABCT) organizes
to concentrate overwhelming combat power utilizing mobility, protection,
and firepower to conduct offensive tasks with great precision and speed
and defensive tasks to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize
forces, and develop favorable conditions for offensive action.
● Infantry brigade. The infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) is an
expeditionary, combined arms formation optimized for dismounted
operations in complex terrain and can conduct entry operations by ground,
air land, air assault, or amphibious assault (via surface or vertical) into
austere areas of operations with little or no advanced notice.

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● Stryker brigade. The Stryker brigade combat team (SBCT) gains the
initiative early, seizes and retains key terrain, any locality, or area, the
seizure of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant and
conduct massed fire, fire from a number of weapons directed at a single
point or small area to stop the enemy.
If these statements are accepted as the succinct, fundamental reason for why
these BCTs exist, then commanders should theoretically be able to direct
every effort within their formations toward making that underlying purpose
a reality for the Army. At the end of the day, every commander must have a
mission focus and central purpose around which his organization exists. If
your BCT does not have an overarching, combat-focused purpose, then you
have to ask what drives your organization on a daily basis? If you are not
focused on the combat capability of your unit, then your are probably wasting
your time.

CREATING TIME
Often cited by commanders, acknowledged by superiors, and lamented
by subordinates, time is in short supply for the Army. Because the Army
consists of fallible human beings—each with individual backgrounds, needs,
and desires—no leader can simply put a checklist of tasks together to create
a combat-ready force. Outside of real combat, the time required to build a
group of individuals into a cohesive team willing to fight and die for each
other is a high standard. Each unit wrestles with unique challenges and with
creating a combat-ready force in a world that has become more complicated.
Focus helps create the time subordinates need to build cohesive units.
No army has ever had every resource it requires. In 1999, General Robert
W. Cone wrote, “We are limited by money, repair parts, facilities, and most
importantly Soldier training time.”2 If time and other resources are not
increased to build combat-ready formations, two viable options remain: First,
units can “do less” better, and, second, units can “do the same” to a lesser
standard.
Given the Army’s well-understood predisposition against lowering
combat-proven standards, leaders are left with the single option of doing less.
Doing less implies an understanding of risk and a deliberate choice. Leaders
at every level are left asking themselves what they need to focus on.
Focus ensures all aspects of subordinates’ efforts contribute to the overall
priority for the greater team and the time to accomplish their prescribed tasks
to standard. Focus provides leaders a means to hold subordinates accountable
for the unit’s performance, and provides superiors a means to allocate their
most precious resource: Soldier time.

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ACHIEVING TASK FOCUS

The concepts of fleeting resources and focusing on fundamentals are
not new. However, few consciously accept risk and deliberately choose
to focus on only a handful of tasks. In an age where there are prescribed
mission-essential task lists (METLs) from the Department of the Army level,
leaders have devolved to simply do what they are told. They fail to execute the
requisite mission analysis and create a viable course of action that balances
resources available to provide their formation the ability to focus. The Army
has been here before.
The process of achieving focus has always begun with the approval of a unit’s
mission-essential tasks (METs). In the absence of a real-world contingency,
today’s leaders are told to focus on prescribed METs. In fact, Headquarters,
Department of the Army prescribes these METs down to the company level.
Although necessary for standardization absent a clear and present enemy,
prescribed METs do not absolve leaders of their responsibility to focus
their formation. Time has arguably become more limited in the present
environment. This notion does not negate the leader’s responsibilities. As
leaders, we must “discipline ourselves to focus tactical training on complete
mastery of a relatively small number of training tasks. Our ability to execute
these critical tasks violently and aggressively at the section and platoon level
provides the foundation for mission success.”3 Today, Army doctrine calls
these battle tasks, but the approach is the same.
In some cases, every prescribed MET cannot be trained to a high standard,
given the current resource constraints and primarily because of time.
At echelon, each task selected creates a cascading pyramid of supporting
subordinate tasks that must be trained to the same high standard. Leaders
must be unapologetically selective in where they choose to focus their energy.
Take the following experience of General Martin E. Dempsey as a case study:
When General Dempsey took command of the 5,200 Soldiers
of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1996 at Fort Carson,
CO, he found a unit unsettled by transition. They had recently
relocated from Fort Bliss, TX. Much of the leadership had
changed during the transition. They had absorbed Soldiers from
inactivating units at Fort Carson. They were in an unfamiliar
place and unfamiliar with the new leadership of the post.

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Compounding the issues brought about by the transition

was the fact that it came at a time when the Department of
the Army had become notorious for publishing numerous
detailed, expansive, and mandatory instructions of things that
had to be accomplished as a priority by unit commanders and
Soldiers across the Army. This was not the first time General
Dempsey had seen this. In peacetime, everyone develops an
opinion about when the armed forces will next be needed,
and what they will be doing. Such was the case in 1996. Each
headquarters at every level sought to reduce risk of being wrong
about the requirements of the next deployment by adding to
the tasks required of subordinate headquarters. But, of course,
as Dempsey knew, when everything is a priority, nothing is a
priority.
So when General Dempsey took command, the first question
he was asked by the unit’s leaders was how he would prioritize
their activities. It was a fair question. But rather than answer
for them, and rather than take the list and simply place tasks in
some descending order of importance, Dempsey gathered his
team leaders and asked them, “What’s the one thing?” But they
were not exactly sure what he meant. What is the one thing that
will define your time as a leader in this regiment?
Through a collaborative process, General Dempsey and the
leaders of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment arrived at a
conclusion. An armored cavalry regiment exists to provide a
corps commander with information. Therefore, everyone was a
scout. It served as the overarching purpose of the organization.
Subsequently, they narrowed their METL down to the single
mission that most contributed to their ability to provide the
corps commander with information: the movement to contact.4
At the brigade level, General Dempsey narrowed the focus of his
organization to a single mission to best train his formation for combat based
on a fundamental purpose for which the Army designed the organization. To
succeed in today’s environment, the process has not changed.

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When subordinate commanders take a similar approach, they unlock the

power of focusing their formations. For example, a combined arms breach at
the brigade level might be the most complicated mission executed routinely
at the National Training Center (NTC). We must use observers to call
accurate indirect fires to suppress the enemy on a portion of the objective.
Simultaneously, we must orchestrate the obscuration of other enemy forces
through artillery or ground-delivered smoke. Finally, we must maneuver
support, breaching, and assault forces into position to violently overwhelm
the enemy with direct and indirect fires to seize the objective. The task of a
combined arms breach represents an orchestra of lower-level collective tasks
that must be executed properly. In the words of General Cone, a subordinate
of General Dempsey at the time:
This is all very impressive and the principle reason commanders
have two field-grade officers and a staff to help think this
through. But what does that mean to a tank platoon sergeant? I
would submit it means little or nothing in terms of his success.
The business of winning at the platoon level means lethal
execution of a handful of critical tasks … our job is to focus the
energies of platoons on mastering a set of simple, critical tasks,
which will lead to success in a variety of missions.5

Review your unit METs. Decide the tasks you really want to focus on.
Then, and most importantly, identify the five or six platoon-level
critical collective tasks you must master to achieve a high level of
proficiency.

Today’s commanders should take the same approach: Decide on the reason
the organization exists, review unit METs, decide the tasks to focus on, and
identify the supporting METs that contribute to the organization’s focus.
Then, and most importantly, work with subordinate leaders to identify the
five or six platoon-level, high-payoff critical collective battle tasks that must
be mastered to achieve a high level of proficiency in those unit METs.
This publication provides that recommended MET crosswalk for an
ABCT commander. It also provides critical collective task (i.e., battle task)
recommendations for each platoon within an ABCT. It is okay if you do
not agree on these tasks, but focus your formation on what is important at
echelon. Your fundamental tasks are those that become the building blocks
driving your organization’s entire training regime.

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DEFINING MASTERY
Another common challenge beyond the ability to focus is defining what
constitutes success during training to execute these tasks. Leaders and
Soldiers alike want to know the standard. Leaders all want a checklist. The
training and evaluation outlines published at the Department of the Army
level provide a solid foundation to standardize efforts, but they do little
to help leaders understand what true mastery implies. Simply executing a
checklist will never guarantee success in war. There are too many variables
involved and there are times subordinate leaders must instantaneously decide
their next action based on their trained instinct.
Training to master the most fundamental tasks must take place on a realistic
battlefield. Soldiers should not encounter the friction, chaos, and uncertainty
of battle for the first time during war. To train properly, that environment must
be created for them. Most importantly, to collectively train organizations
properly, the enemy must be encountered. Small units must be forced to deal
with the tiring action, reaction, counteraction process of battle. To master the
fundamentals, you must accomplish these training tasks against “resistance
provided by a living, breathing, and thinking opposing force (OPFOR) or
enemy. Simply stated, in order to win, you have to be able to beat somebody.”6
Some units prioritize live-fire exercises (LFXs) above maneuver situational
training exercises. Ideally, LFXs present the same level of rigor to small
units. However, no LFX can possibly replicate the resistance of a competitive
OPFOR. Even at the NTC, where we possess a living, breathing, live-fire
system driven by members of Operations Group, we cannot replace the
friction and chaos induced by the professional 11th Armored Cavalry
Regiment OPFOR.
Leaders must examine their idea of mastering these fundamental skills. If
your idea of success revolves around a series of checklists or a throwaway
enemy force, you are not preparing your Soldiers for the rigor of combat. To
master a task, it must be executed successfully under battlefield conditions
against a competitive enemy. At the end of the day, someone is labeled the
loser, and another the winner.

REPETITION
Leaders often complain about their ability to execute repetitions and sets
to achieve true mastery. By focusing your formation on what matters, true
mastery is possible. However, mastery is only possible, if you are willing to
put in the repetitions. Too many formations focus on the execution of a single
iteration of a task and then simply move on to the next task. That approach
builds an acceptance of mediocrity, not mastery.

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I have seen and experienced both models. In my first exercise as a platoon

leader where I served as an observer, my regimental commander subjected
the unit to a grueling 72-hour exercise designed to train platoons in every
conceivable task. I watched platoons pour through this centralized exercise
never really understanding what they did wrong and with zero opportunity to
correct mistakes.
In my second exercise, I participated as part of the training audience. General
Cone had taken a much more focused approach. To this day, I can recall
how different the event appeared. Every platoon conducted an actions on
contact lane first, which was designed to teach platoons how to react to forms
of direct contact. As a scout platoon leader, my platoon spent two days on
that lane executing numerous iterations. We did not get it right the first time.
We got better the second time. We did well the third time. However, we
did it repeatedly until we were confident in our ability to execute. Between
iterations, leaders ramped up or ramped down the OPFOR to achieve specific
learning outcomes. The training event contained built-in time for repetition
of the most basic tasks. Every iteration consisted of execution, remediation
of identified shortcomings, and re-execution.
Home-station training events must provide small units (squads and platoons)
the resources to achieve mastery. For the average BCT, it takes at least 70 to
80 percent of a unit’s annual resources to achieve mastery in only a handful of
platoon-level tasks throughout the formation. The remaining 20 to 30 percent
of the resources are then dedicated to company-level training at home station
and then to training battalion and brigade staffs.
Commanders can only achieve mastery through the repetition of a handful
of critical collective tasks at the small-unit level. Remove any part of the
equation, and it will not work. Focus + Repetition = Mastery.

THE “SO WHAT” OF FOCUS + REPETITION = MASTERY

Many leaders do not understand what this approach to training has to do
with the current challenges confronting the Army. They will exclaim, “You
are focusing too much on readiness” or “we need to focus on building unit
cohesion” or “we need to teach our formations to be intolerant” of certain
behaviors. These leaders do not understand how to build a team.
Nobody is more disappointed in the Army than that first-term Soldier who
is part of a unit that loses consistently. The Soldier who feels that nobody
cares, like his efforts do not matter, and believes he is unimportant cannot feel
good about the Army. The Soldier who does not believe in his leaders cannot
feel good about the Army. The Soldier in a unit where nothing makes sense
cannot feel good about the Army.

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By focusing the predominance of efforts on building lethal small units,

we cannot help but focus on building teams or creating an environment of
inclusion because everyone matters. The maintenance of equipment begins
to matter because it directly impacts the ability to execute fundamental tasks.
Sergeant’s Time Training becomes more focused because small-unit leaders
know exactly what they will be expected to do. Taking care of a Soldier’s
challenges becomes possible because subordinate leaders find themselves
less encumbered by the mandatory and more focused on the necessary.
Achieving mastery of the fundamentals increases a leader and Soldier’s
confidence in their ability to execute their wartime tasks. A Soldier confident
in their leaders and fellow Soldiers sees the Army in a more positive light.
They begin to believe in each other. That belief carries the team forward.

CONCLUSION
At our very core, small-unit leaders only serve two functions for the Army:
Leading Soldiers and small units during battle, and preparing Soldiers and
small units to fight the battle.7
The Foundational Training Strategy published by U.S. Army Forces Command
seeks to provide the time for small-unit leaders to do what they must do
to build teams. However, the best strategy executed by leaders unwilling to
accept risk will fail. Without focusing on subordinates’ efforts, leaders eat
away at the time the Army senior leadership is attempting to create. Without
a conscious, disciplined decision regarding an organization’s focus, time will
remain an issue. Without acknowledging that only practice makes perfect,
leaders will accept less than mastery of the fundamentals at the small-unit
level. Regardless of what you decide to brief to your superiors, your Soldiers
will know whether they are part of a combat-ready, winning organization that
cares for them. Soldiers always know.

Endnotes
1. Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, 19 January 2021, Chapter 1.
2. Cone, Robert W. “Battle Focused Training.” Leadership: The Warrior’s Art. Ed.
Christopher Kolenda. The Army War College Press. 2001, page 310.
3. Cone, page 311.
4. Dempsey, Martin E. and Brafman, Ori. Radical Inclusion. Missionday Press,
2018, pages 94-96.
5. Ibid., page 313.
6. Cone, page 311.
7. Malone, Dandridge M. COL (Ret). Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense
Approach. Presidio Press. Novato, CA, page 2.

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CHAPTER 2

Winning at the Point of Contact

GENERAL MICHAEL X. GARRETT, COMMANDING GENERAL,
U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND
General Michael X. Garrett assumed duties as the 23rd Commander of
U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), Fort Bragg, NC, on 21 March
2019. As commander of the U.S. Army’s largest organization, he commands
215,000 active duty Soldiers, and 190,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve, while
providing training and readiness oversight of U.S. Army National Guard. In
total, the FORSCOM team includes 745,000 Soldiers and 96,000 Civilians.
General Garrett has commanded at every level from company through Army
Service component command, and led units in combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Shortly after I took command of FORSCOM, I received my initial counseling
from then-Chief of Staff of the Army, General Mark Milley. He looked me
dead in the eye and said, “Mike, you’re responsible for the readiness of our
Army.” I sat back in my chair and thought, “Wow … that’s a really big deal!”
But, after I thought about it for another minute or two, I realized, “While this
is a big deal, we have—and will continue—to get it done.”
When I assumed command in March 2019, the Army was in a strong readiness
posture. This was due in large part to my predecessor, General Abe Abrams,
and the Army senior leaders, because as a whole, the Army had been surging
on readiness for large-scale combat operations for about three solid years.
As I conducted my initial commander’s assessment, I traveled across the
country engaging our leaders and Soldiers, and observing training—particularly,
rotations at our combat training centers (CTCs). It occurred to me that while
our battalions and brigades were more ready than they had ever been, at
lower echelons, quite frankly, we were not as good as I thought we were.
The Army’s surge on readiness produced significant gains in our readiness
metrics—across all components—and we absolutely needed that focus to
produce those gains. However, these readiness levels came at the expense
of individual Soldier skills, and our crews, teams, squads, and platoons.
Although generally capable, we were not as proficient with our weapons,
equipment, and systems as we could be. We lacked mastery of our warfighting
fundamentals.

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It appeared to me that we had a mismatch between our training strategy,

our readiness models, and readiness metrics. The FORSCOM readiness
model relied on a 12-month training strategy. Our brigades, however, found
themselves trying to execute their training strategy with only seven to nine
months of available time. Intensifying this were the impacts of operational
requirements and resource constraints. When it came to training, we had a
difficult time meeting the strict, codified requirements for crew qualifications,
gunneries, and live-fire exercises in accordance with our training strategy
—which were already tough—while simultaneously managing continuous
personnel turnover within our brigades. As a result, our armored brigade
combat teams had to shoot multiple sustainment gunneries each year, and our
artillery formations were trapped in continuous section certification cycles,
which further exacerbated the time challenges in our brigade combat teams.
Our Soldiers could shoot, but not necessarily maneuver, which meant they
were losing more than they were winning at the point of contact. All of these
conditions when combined created palpable and unsustainable stress on the
force.
Over the course of my 36-year career, the best units I have been in had highly
trained crews, squads, and platoons that could win at the point of contact. In
other words, when these small teams encountered an obstacle—anticipated
or not—they could quickly defeat it and move on to the next objective.
Winning at the point of contact generates organizational momentum, which
permeates throughout the unit. The formations where I experienced this sort
of momentum achieved it through disciplined training and high standards on
individual and small-unit tasks.
Regardless of the location or mission, the Soldiers in our crews, squads, and
platoons will be the first to make contact with the enemy, and it is at that point
they must decisively prevail. I believe that you can have the best strategy
in the world, but if you cannot win at the point of contact, you cannot
win—period.
To be clear, the concept of “winning at the point of contact” extends to all of
our warfighting functions and military occupational specialties, and beyond
the contact layer. Whether it is a tank crew acquiring and engaging targets
faster than the enemy crew does, a cyber operations specialist neutralizing a
web-based threat, or a wheeled vehicle mechanic troubleshooting faults on a
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, the expert execution of
actions on contact creates organizational momentum.
Winning at the point of contact requires squads and platoons to gain positional
advantage by mastering transitions between movement and maneuver. This
momentum frees commanders to drive the operations process, and consolidate
gains, which sustains the momentum created.

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In other words, momentum creates temporal space where commanders and

their staffs are not solely focused on the immediate close fight. They can focus
on what is next: On sustaining momentum, on using resources to win the next
fight, and the next, rather than resources consumed to “save the day.” That
temporal space allows them to better integrate and synchronize warfighting
capabilities at echelon, shaping the future fight and enabling more wins while
preserving combat power.
That is why winning at the point of contact matters. So, how do we get there?
In my fiscal year 2020 training guidance, I describe a training progression
aimed at mastering the fundamentals at the individual, crew, and squad
level, and progressing though multiple repetitions and sets, under varying
conditions. I call this the “Foundational Training Strategy” (see Figure 2-1).

Figure 2-1. Training approach

We want to reinforce that we train to standard, not to time. This means

commanders must make time for subordinate units to retrain, do it again until
they get it right, and never get it wrong. More than just skill acquisition,
mastery is a mindset. It is difficult to achieve and requires grit, persistence,
and determination. Most importantly, it requires time.
Strengthening leader development is something I think a lot about; it is a
Freedom 6 priority. Small-unit training is one of the best ways to develop
leaders, and investment in leader development is essential, especially today
as we wrestle with the competing demands for our noncommissioned officer
(NCO) talent.

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That is why I directed commanders to dedicate and protect time each week
for what we call “Leaders Time Training.” Now, for many of you, this might
sound a lot like the old Sergeant’s Time Training (STT), and it should. The
fact is that, over the years, this sort of protected time to focus on the basics
became passé, or at least perceived as such. As a result, commanders did not
prioritize STT, which led to inconsistent application across the force. I have
always believed that by increasing emphasis on individual and small-unit
skills, and empowering NCOs to execute this training, Soldiers can become
masters of the fundamentals, and in turn, those Soldiers will, one day, train
their Soldiers to a level of mastery.
Anyone who has been around the Army long enough will tell you that our
training strategy is anything but revolutionary. However, since adopting the
Foundational Training Strategy last year, we are beginning to see concrete,
positive returns on our investment. Our CTC cadre are reporting an increase
in successful defense operations at echelon, from orders process planning
to defense preparation. Cadre also report that units are entering the 14-day
force-on-force period at increased levels of proficiency, which has led to the
World-Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) being more challenged when faced
with rotational training unit defenses. Our ability to “close the gap” with
OPFOR at the CTCs is a direct result of investing the necessary time for
repetitions during home-station training.
Although these reports are promising, we still have work to do. Commanders
at echelon must improve their ability to integrate the full measure of
their forces during conflict. For example, units that do not incorporate
Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided (TOW) missiles;
Javelin teams; mine plow and rollers; chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE); communications; and maintenance find
themselves challenged to win at the point of contact against a near-peer
threat. Commanders need to ensure that their training glide path incorporates
a holistic approach while gaining efficiency through multi-echelon training
to ensure that critical areas are not overlooked. According to the CTC cadre,
small oversights such as these become readily apparent when conflict begins.
Increased repetitions and sets at the lower echelons result in better trained
small units, but, as I stated earlier, the foundational approach applies to all
warfighting functions, and includes staffs. When commanders and staffs
commit to the repetitions and sets, they are more prepared to drive the
operations process and can synchronize operations, while building tactical
readiness, generating real options. That is how we master the fundamentals.
People often ask me why I, a four-star commander, am so focused on
our Army’s lowest echelons. Every time, my answer is, “That is where we
win ... and if you haven’t already heard ... winning matters.”

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CHAPTER 3

The Mission-Essential Task

Crosswalk: A Dying Art
Colonel Michael J. Simmering, Commander,
Operations Group
This chapter conducts a simple mission-essential task (MET) crosswalk for
an armored brigade combat team (ABCT). Beginning with the underlying
purpose of an armored brigade (BDE) and logically linking focused tasks
at echelon, it depicts the critical linkages that must drive all organizational
activities to successfully focus team and small-unit activities when no
deployment-related assigned mission exists. It culminates with four to six
critical, high-payoff tasks at the platoon level designed to most impact an
organization’s ability to perform its focused METs.
Many leaders fail to focus their formations because they believe that
Department of the Army-mandated METs absolve them of their responsibility
to conduct a thorough analysis. Nothing could be further from the truth. Army
Regulation (AR) 600-20, Army Command Policy (24 July 2020), highlights
training as the top peacetime priority:
The commander is responsible for all aspects of unit readiness.
Training is the cornerstone of unit readiness and must be the
commander’s top peacetime priority. Establishing a positive
leadership climate within the unit and developing disciplined
and cohesive units contributes to combat readiness and sets the
tone for social and duty relationships and responsibilities within
the command. As the primary unit trainers, commanders must
develop their leaders to extract the greatest training value from
every opportunity in every activity in order to build combat
readiness and prepare their units and Soldiers to rapidly deploy
and accomplish their decisive action missions.1

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Further, Field Manual (FM) 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World (5 October
2016), acknowledges that commanders must be selective:
A battle-focused unit trains selectively. It cannot train to
standard on every task at once, whether due to time, or other
resource constraints. A unit that attempts to train to proficiency
all the tasks it could perform only serves to diffuse its training
effort. A unit that simultaneously trains to all its capabilities at
once will most likely never achieve a T or T- in all those tasks.
Focusing on the tasks to train, based on the higher commander’s
guidance, and taking into account that time and resources are
limited, is battle-focused training.2
Therefore, commanders who fail to dissect the Army’s prescribed METs at
echelon and fail to balance time and resources available are derelict in one of
their primary responsibilities as a commander.
Beyond examining the underlying purpose of the formation, the following does
not explain the rationale for each choice. The remainder of the publication,
where linkages are examined, dives deeper into the rationale for each task at
echelon. Regardless of whether or not you agree, as a commander, you need
to ask yourself, “Have I focused the effort of my formations on what truly
matters?”

THE ARMORED BRIGADE PURPOSE

Field Manual (FM) 3-96, Brigade Combat Team (19 January 2021), and the
Army clearly explain the reason ABCTs are kept in the Army inventory.
The ABCT organizes to concentrate overwhelming combat
power. Mobility, protection, and firepower enable the ABCT
to conduct offensive operations with great precision and speed.
The ABCT conducts defensive operations to defeat an enemy
attack, buy time, economize forces, and develop favorable
conditions for offensive actions.3
The ABCT exists for the sole purpose of concentrating overwhelming offensive
or defensive combat power against an enemy. The critical capabilities of an
ABCT to accomplish these tasks consist of mobility, protection, firepower,
precision, and speed. In short, when a U.S. Army ABCT encounters an enemy
formation, it is expected to achieve its objectives. Nothing is more powerful
as a ground formation within the U.S. Army than an ABCT.

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Narrowing down the purpose of an ABCT begins to reveal characteristics that

must be trained into the formation. All parts of an ABCT must be mobile; it
must sustain large distances, and be capable of coordinating across multiple
formations quickly to concentrate combat power. Although the list could
go on, just establishing an underlying purpose begins to create focus for
subordinate units.

THE ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM DIRECT

MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS
After examining the directed METs, commanders should ask themselves,
“Which METs I have been directed to train most contribute to the underlying
purpose of the organization?” The following are the current Headquarters,
Department of the Army (HQDA)-directed METs for an ABCT:
● Conduct Area Security (07-BDE-1272).
● Conduct an Area Defense (17-BDE-1030).
● Conduct a Movement To Contact (17-BDE-1074).
● Conduct an Attack (17-BDE-1094).
● Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-BDE-4800).
By looking at the directed METs for an ABCT, the commander can quickly
determine that only three METs contribute to the overarching purpose of an
ABCT: attack, movement to contact, and defense. Although area security and
deployment operations might be important, only the remaining three tasks
directly relate to the organization’s overall purpose.
Furthermore, depending on time and resources, commanders can logically
argue that a movement to contact results in two possible sequels: an attack
or a defense depending on the size of the enemy force encountered and the
conditions of the encounter. Further, an attack is launched when commanders
see a clearer enemy picture. Focusing on an attack vice a movement to
contact could absolve subordinate commanders of their responsibility to
develop the situation during home-station training. Lastly, if trained properly,
a movement to contact can be used as a method to train an attack if training
conditions are properly managed.
Regardless, the direction for the ABCT is clear: There are offensive-directed
tasks and defense-directed tasks. For the purposes of focusing formations,
we will narrow the focus for this ABCT to two focused METs for training.
The brigade combat team (BCT) will accept risk in the remaining three by
ensuring these two tasks are truly mastered. The tasks for this ABCT are
movement to contact and area defense. Figure 3-1 presents the following
focus for our ABCT.

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ABCT Purpose HQDA-Directed METs (ABCT)

Concentrate overwhelming • Conduct Area Security.
offensive or defensive combat • Conduct Area Defense.
power against an enemy.
• Conduct Movement to Contact.
• Conduct Expeditionary Deployment.

Brigade-Focused METs
• Conduct Area Defense.
• Conduct Movement to Contact.

Figure 3-1. Brigade-focused METs for an ABCT

Often forgotten when focusing on unit training programs, commanders must

tell their subordinates how they plan to fight their formation to accomplish
these brigade-level selected METs. Although doctrine provides a solid
foundation, this step more than any other delves into the art of command.
It requires commanders to understand the personalities, strengths, and
weaknesses of their subordinate commanders, and the culture within
subordinate units. Doing so allows commanders to capitalize on units’
strengths while minimizing the effects of organizational weaknesses.
For example, when envisioning conducting a brigade-level movement
to contact, most brigade commanders will default to the doctrinal idea of
placing the cavalry squadron to identify the disposition and composition of
enemy forces. However, which battalion best coordinates with other members
of the team? Which organization acts most decisively and aggressively?
Which battalion best handles unknown situations. These all sound like
mundane questions, but in reality, they represent the most critical questions
a commander must answer to help focus the training for subordinate units.
The battalion that acts most aggressively and decisively might represent the
main effort as the BDE transitions from a movement to contact to a hasty
attack. A battalion that typically excels at developing the situation might be
the battalion that serves as the advanced guard for the BCT. The battalion that
best coordinates with other members of the team might be a unit that brings
together a combined arms breach and serves as the breach force formation
for the BCT.
The number of questions and corresponding answers could literally be
endless, and limited only by the imagination of a commander. The resulting
answers to these types of questions help focus subordinate unit-training
programs. They provide lower echelon leaders a critical understanding of
how their formation contributes to the overall success of the team.
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SUBORDINATE BATTALION AND BELOW-FOCUSED

MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS
Once commanders select the METs best suited to train the BCT and decide
how they intend to utilize subordinates, commanders must crosswalk these
METs for their subordinate elements to ensure a consistent focus and a nesting
of purpose. Although seemingly mundane at the higher levels, the power of
the process becomes more apparent when examining small-unit tasks at the
platoon level.
Figure 3-2 depicts a crosswalk from the BCT level down to a scout platoon
within a cavalry troop in the cavalry squadron.

Brigade-Prioritized METs
• Conduct Area Defense.
• Conduct Movement to Contact.

Cavalry Squadron (ABCT) (HQDA-Directed)

• Conduct Area Defense. 07-BN-1272
• Conduct a Screen 17-SQDN-9225
• Conduct a Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9315
• Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9315
• Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations. 55-BN-4800

Squadron-Prioritized METs
• Conduct Guard. 17-SQDN-9222
• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9314

Figure 3-2. Squadron-prioritized METs

The BDE commander visualized utilizing the cavalry squadron well ahead of
the main body to allow time for defensive preparation. Additionally, seeking
to train the BDE’s ability to concentrate overwhelming defensive combat
power, the BCT commander consulted current doctrine, which states “The
tasks required of a screening unit are minimal compared to other security
missions. Therefore, the screening force may have a wide coverage.”4
Additionally, the BCT commander realized that by training his unit to conduct
a proper guard within an assigned area of operations, the subordinate elements
of the HQDA-directed task of screen and area security could automatically be
trained. Finally, the BCT commander examined the additional requirements
of a guard mission and realized that this mission automatically forced the
cavalry squadron to integrate enabling fires and other assets from the main

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body of the BCT. By training a guard mission properly, the BCT commander
builds a formation capable of conducting reconnaissance, “attacks, defends,
and delays as needed to provide reaction time and maneuver space to the
protected force.”5

Squadron-Prioritized METs
• Conduct Guard. 17-SQDN-9222
• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9314

Cavalry Troop METs (HQDA-Directed)

• Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272
• Conduct Route Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4000
• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4010
• Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4011
• Conduct Screen. 17-TRP-9225
• Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations. 55-CO-4830

Cavalry Troop-Prioritized METs

• Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272
• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4010
• Conduct Screen. 17-TRP-9225

Scout Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks

• Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012
• Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 71-PLT-5100
• Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-PLT-4011
• Establish an Observation Post. 07-PLT-9016
• Conduct Screen. 17-PLT-4010

Figure 3-3. Scout platoon high-payoff battle tasks

Given the BCT-level missions of movement to contact and an area defense,

the tasks that must be trained have been narrowed to a high level in every scout
platoon down to five tasks (see Figure 3-3). Subsequently, these tasks should
drive activities for all scout platoons within the cavalry squadron, and shape
and inform all crew- and individual-level training within the organization.
They should drive maintenance efforts, personnel efforts, individual training,
and a host of other activities within the organization to accomplish these five
high-payoff tasks.

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CONCLUSION
Whether or not individual readers agree with the tasks selected in the above
examples is irrelevant. Commanders must take the time to deliberately focus
the efforts of their subordinates. Adding additional tasks as time and resources
allow is possible; however, without beginning with a focused training regime,
commanders risk individual subordinates arriving at their own conclusions.
In the above construct, a cavalry squadron commander might choose to worry
more about operating across a broad front, independently placing greater
emphasis on a screen. Scout platoon leaders might decide independently that
their individual ability to conduct a route reconnaissance is more important
than other tasks. In these cases, commanders relegate their responsibility of
providing purpose, direction, and motivation to those that they lead. They
risk subordinates arriving at their own conclusion and not maximizing the
finite resources available to make sure their organization is prepared to fight
as part of a combined arms team.

Endnotes
1. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 24 July 2020, page 2.
2. FM 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, 5 October 2016, page 1-8.
3. FM 3-96, Brigade Combat Team, 19 January 2021, page 1-15.
4. FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Operations, 1 July 2015, page 6-39.
5. Ibid., page 6-58.

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CHAPTER 4

Multi-Echelon Training and Company

and Platoon Situational Training
Exercise Design
LTC Erik Oksenvaag, MAJ James Braudis, and MAJ Karl
Kuechenmeister, Operations Group
INTRODUCTION
Leaders across the U.S. Army are challenged with maintaining highly
functioning and lethal teams given the resources available. This is not a new
challenge. Truncated training glide paths, cancellations of individual and
collective training and short-notice adjustments to calendars characterize the
operating force’s struggles, not just during the past year but for the last several
decades since the U.S. has chosen to use the military instrument of power
more frequently. As the U.S. negotiates these ambiguous times, adversaries
on the international stage remain. Adversaries are training, adjusting, and
adapting to the “new normal” just as the U.S. is attempting to do so on a daily
basis.
To prepare Army formations and focus training, it must be creative and
thoughtful in the design. Specifically, the Army must utilize multi-echelon
training to harden teams for the crucible of ground combat. Multi-echelon
training must remain the vehicle to maximize readiness and enable
exploitation of the Army’s most fleeting resource: time. This publication can
help provide a framework for multi-echelon training and can explain how this
methodology applies to a battalion and brigade combat team (BCT) when
executing platoon- and company-level situational training exercises (STXs).
Ideally, these STXs can demonstrate how to synchronize resources to enable
impactful, simultaneous training to increase lethality within the depth of a
formation.

MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING
This chapter describes two models on how a battalion can conduct platoon
STXs and a BCT can conduct company STXs using a multi-echelon
approach. Key to understanding is to clearly articulate the definition for
multi-echelon training. Simply put, it is a method to train subordinate
elements and all warfighting functions, systems, and processes of the higher
unit or echelon within the same exercise. Multi-echelon training is the best
method to efficiently use time, and it is the surest way to add repetition before
entering into a field-training exercise, combat training center (CTC) rotation,
or a real-world deployment.
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THE BATTALION TRAINING MODEL: PLATOON

SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES
Battalions can train their respective platoons utilizing this creative approach
to provide every facet and function internal to the unit an opportunity to grow
and achieve repetition. The central data point that must be understood is the
resources required for the primary training event, which for this example is a
platoon STX. As units address and analyze the land and terrain associated with
the platoon STX, they can envision how the greater company and battalion
can align and creatively determine how they can construct the exercise to
achieve simultaneity in the training event.
Specifically, company and battalion command and control nodes including
the combat trains command post (CTCP) and field trains command post
(FTCP) can be templated on the terrain adjacent to the platoon STX. Now
that the battalion staff can physically envision the location of units and assets,
they can split efforts between two planning teams. One team can deep-dive
into the training objectives and lane design for the platoon STX, and the other
can determine how it can incorporate company- and battalion-level functions
into the platoon STX.
As planning and resource coordination is completed, the battalion should
ideally have a tactical approach to deployment into the training area. A
simple operation order that addresses a detailed plan for how the battalion
will “uncoil” from the cantonment area and sequence movement to the field
can have a huge return on investment. If the operation order is issued out
soon enough, a battalion combined arms rehearsal can precede movement
and provide the staff, company, and battalion commanders the chance to
conduct a free repetition at this crucial step in the preparation for the combat
phase of an operation. Once D-day arrives and the battalion is set to deploy
to the training area, it is advisable to employ the tactical command post first
as a command and control node that can discreetly control the movement
of companies into the field. This entire micro-concept, known as “fight
to the field” can again provide several systems and processes a chance to
be exercised. The result of the fight to the field concept is the battalion
assembled in a tactical assembly area with the CTCP and FTCP assembled in
the rear area. The final event before the battalion releasing from the tactical
assembly area to conduct training should be establishment of the battalion
main command post and execution of a key battle rhythm event, specifically
a commander’s update brief (CUB).

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As the battalion transitions from the fight to the field to execution of platoon
STXs, the main command post is situated and ready to conduct current
operations (CUOPS) and fulfill the six functions of a command post. The
reception and tracking of information will naturally occur as the company
command post passes along information associated with the platoon STX.
The tracking of information, update and management of a holistic common
operational picture, and the execution of disciplined battle rhythm events (shift
change, two- and seven-minute drills, battle update briefs, and CUBs) will be
solid repetitions for the battalion staff as it negotiates the execute phase of the
operations process. Additional functions that will be closely monitored and
controlled by the main command post include logistics package (LOGPAC)
operations, downed vehicle evacuation to the unit maintenance collection
point, field maintenance, and casualty evacuation to Role 1 medical care as
part of the platoon STX. All these battalion-level functions occur as part of
the greater scenario for platoon-level training.
The last component of the multi-echelon approach to a battalion-led platoon
STX is designing a way to exercise the plan and prepare phase of an operation
while executing CUOPS (see Figure 4-1). Specifically, the planners and
staff need to practice receiving a BCT-level tactical order and conducting
the military decision-making process (MDMP). As part of planning for the
event, the staff needs to seek support from the BCT staff or simply take a
BCT-level order off the shelf, potentially from an old command post exercise
or CTC rotation. Often, an installation’s mission command training center
can provide the resources such as a BCT-level order that can help fulfill this
objective. If time and proficiency permit, there is utility in having the staff
conduct a rapid decision-making and synchronizing process drill to further
build familiarity in truncated tactical problem solving. It may seem daunting
at the battalion level to conduct, but if properly planned and thought out, a
unit can truly exercise all of the systems, processes, and crucial functions at
a crawl or walk pace. This will help solidify standard operating procedures
(SOPs), build familiarity and confidence, and help define how the battalion
fights, while providing world-class training for their respective platoons.

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Figure 4-1. Multi-echelon training (platoon STX)

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PREPARING FOR MULTI-ECHELON TRAINING AT THE

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM LEVEL
Battalion and BCT operations officers must identify training resource shortfalls
for company-level STXs and combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFXs),
as available resources will vary for each installation. For example, battalions
and BCTs should look to internally resource requirements such as opposing
force (OPFOR), observer coach/trainers (OC/Ts), and evaluators as other
units’ training or deployment schedules may preclude the sharing of these
tasks. However, the model does not specify evaluators, and OC/Ts must be
certified by the BCT to establish a single standard before collective training.
Additionally, it is recommended that BCT organic enablers be trained and
certified before their maneuver company training. This is so they receive
the requisite training and retraining time, are properly integrated into the
maneuver plan, and that there are no detractors during maneuver training and
certification. Note: This model provides an example for the cavalry squadron
troop STX, but it is recommended that this training occurs before combined
arms battalion company STXs. When the multi-echelon approach is applied
at the BCT level, it will train and certify companies, troops, and batteries.

THE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM TRAINING MODEL:

COMPANY SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES
The following training model, in a prescribed four-week block of time
planned and resourced by the BCT and executed by companies and
battalions, is an example of multi-echelon training focused on company
STXs and CALFXs (see Figure 4-2). This enables the BCT to execute
training across all warfighting functions through repetition, and creates a
focus for the BCT enablers by supporting the company STX and CALFX.
This provides maneuver companies two weeks of focused training at echelon
with execution of BCT-established STX lanes, and the execution of company
CALFXs with appropriate enabler support. In addition, the employment as an
OPFOR creates additional training opportunities for platoons and companies.
One of the most important aspects of this model is the execution of tactical
sustainment by the brigade support battalion (BSB) and respective battalion
forward support companies. To truly take advantage of this training
opportunity as a crawl or walk phase before the CTC run, the BCT must
employ its brigade support area and establish its respective battalion-level
field trains and combat trains. Different installations and range complexes
dictate the distance and lines of communication, but proficiency of tactical
sustainment through disciplined LOGPACs and logistics release points from
the BSA to the company level can only be achieved through repetition and
practice. Many units choose to not practice tactical sustainment at home
station and rely on administrative movements of logistics to support training.
These units never practice to build and refine their SOPs through disciplined

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repetition and synchronized execution. Reception, staging, onward

movement, and integration (RSOI), and training on day one at the National
Training Center is too late for a unit to learn how to execute sustainment from
BCT to company echelon.
Another crucial aspect of multi-echeloned training is establishing BCT
and battalion command nodes (main command post, tactical command
post when necessary, FTCP, and CTCP) to increase command and control
training opportunities at home station. The deliberate employment of
these nodes creates the opportunity to operate and validate command and
control systems, build and refine command post SOPs, and execute required
battle-rhythm reporting and command post functions. These established
command posts allow staffs to practice CUOPS and plans in a tactical
environment across all warfighting functions. To train CUOPS staffs, they
need to be stressed through larger amounts of data and a higher demand
of battle tracking to create a common operational picture to prepare them
for upcoming CTC rotations. Company STX and CALFX lanes create that
CUOPS demand including multiple battalions and companies executing
various training events with reporting on friendly and enemy dispositions
being routed from companies, to battalion CUOPs, to BCT staff. In addition,
BCT and battalion plans can conduct MDMP training to practice required
planning horizons, future operations, and transitions to enable a successful
one-third, two-thirds rule from BCT to battalion levels.
This model allows the BCT CUOPS to create venues for the commander’s
update assessments and CUBs, from battalion commanders to the
brigade commander using available command and control systems in
the upper and lower tactical internet to synchronize effects across the
battlefield. In this model, these effects are the placement of OPFOR,
OC/Ts, evaluators, combat power available, and placement of enablers in
time and space to support the training event.
When properly resourced and synchronized, this model will enable BCTs to
achieve a higher level of readiness and prepare them to deploy to a theater
of operations or CTC. If time is a constraint for collective training at the
battalion and BCT levels, it is recommended that units focus on creating lethal
platoons and companies through the synchronization of fires and maneuver,
and execution of tactical sustainment in the field.

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Figure 4-2. Multi-echelon training (company STX)

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CONCLUSION
As the most professional and lethal Army in the world, it must continually
look at its methods and practices to building lethal teams of teams.
As the Army contends with a shifting world, external constraints on
training timelines, and specifically prioritizing lower echelons at squad
and platoon level, it must seize every opportunity to train BCT- and
battalion-level functions across various warfighting functions. Meticulous
planning and disciplined execution of multi-echeloned training at
platoon- and company-level STXs or LFXs can yield training readiness at
the battalion and BCT echelons in preparation for future CTC rotations or
deployments. Many BCTs will not have the opportunity for a battalion- or
BCT-level FTX, and must create other opportunities to rehearse and train
higher-level functions. Multi-echeloned training is the only viable option to
start building and refining the ability to synchronize across various warfighting
functions at the BCT and battalion levels through repetition, learning from
mistakes before stepping into a CTC rotation.

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CHAPTER 5

Leader Tasks: Setting the Conditions

for Effective Collective Training
Operations Group, National Training Center
As members of Operations Group formulated the mission-essential tasks
(METs) for an armored brigade combat team, three tasks repeatedly presented
themselves as a point of debate: operation orders (OPORDs), troop leading
procedures (TLP), and rehearsals. Members of the team debated whether
these tasks truly constitute a collective task. Per Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) 7-0, Training (31 July 2019), “collective tasks require organized
team or unit performance, leading to the accomplishment of a mission or
function.”1 In other words, for something to be defined as a collective task, it
must produce a collective action vice an individual response. In Field Manual
(FM) 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World (5 October 2016), the Army
labeled these as “leader tasks.”2
Regardless of debate over semantics, these leader tasks underpin the
execution of every MET for companies and every battle task at the platoon
level and below. Commanders must take the time to train and certify their
leaders in their ability to quickly and succinctly conduct TLP, issue an
OPORD, and conduct a rehearsal. Focusing on training these tasks for all
company-level leaders and below best ensures a common understanding
throughout the organization and prepares them to execute the collective task
at hand. Training these three tasks will maximize resources and time, as they
target METs to be successful at the National Training Center (NTC). The
following are recommended tasks:
● Conduct TLP (71-CO-5100).
● Conduct Rehearsals (07-CO-5009).
● Prepare an OPORD (071-326-5626).

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CONDUCT TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES

TLP receive more stress than all the other common tasks. Unit plans must
be flexible and consider contingencies. An attack can be executed with
minimal planning and it is driven by battle drills. This is not so with the
defense, especially against an armored threat. All Soldiers must have a clear
understanding of how they fit into the defense. Engagement, disengagement,
and displacement criteria must be clear and concise. Junior leaders on the
ground need to trust their superiors to make rapid decisions based on these
criteria. Requiring permission from the company command post results
in additional casualties and lost time. Soldiers also need to know priority
intelligence requirements and the decisions they drive.

CONDUCT A REHEARSAL
Competency allows Soldiers to be familiar with the operation, practice
anticipated actions, synchronize effects and efforts, and improve overall
performance during the mission. Companies should rehearse mounted
maneuver during home-station training. Commanders should not assume
their sections know how to use terrain, change formations on the move, or
react to contact. Based on several rotations during the past year, the most
commonly skipped areas of TLP were the conduct reconnaissance and execute
rehearsals steps. Even if time is short, a well-trained company can leverage
minimal force rehearsals and use maps or digital systems to reconnoiter its
objectives. Repetition, achieved during home-station training, enables the
company to accelerate timelines. Commanders should review their standard
operating procedures (SOPs) with senior noncommissioned officers and
determine where talent exists within the company to assign responsibilities
to assist with TLP.
The NTC requires leaders to execute TLP in a dynamic, time-constrained
environment. Leaders must prioritize the steps to create a detailed, thorough
plan while adhering to the one-third, two-thirds rule. Commanders should
train their leaders on the various types of rehearsals and reinforce the need
to focus on synchronizing efforts. Mechanized infantry platoons and squads
should be proficient at their individual Soldier tasks and battle drills. This
requires formal instruction and situational training exercises to achieve a
level of mastery.

PREPARE AN OPERATION ORDER

The OPORD is a plan format to assist subordinate units with the conduct of
military operations. An OPORD describes the situation the unit faces, the
mission of the unit, and the supporting activities the unit will conduct to
achieve the commander’s desired end state. In time-compressed situations,
leaders must begin their plans with actions on the objective and backwards
plan accordingly.

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Leaders use verbal orders when operating in an extremely time-constrained

environment. These orders offer the advantage of rapid distribution, but
they risk important information being overlooked or misunderstood. One
common trend at the NTC is that verbal orders lead to a company failing to
transition from movement to maneuver and culminate at their probable line
of deployment. Verbal orders are usually followed by written fragmentary
orders.
Leaders issue written plans and orders that contain text and graphics.
Graphics convey information and instructions through military symbols.
They complement the written portion of a plan or order and promote clarity,
accuracy, and brevity. Staffs often develop and disseminate written orders
electronically to shorten the time needed to gather and brief the orders group.
Leaders need to ensure that orders contain only the information needed to
facilitate effective execution. Orders should not repeat what is in unit SOPs.
They should be clear, concise, and relevant to the mission.

Endnotes
1. ADP 7-0, Training, 31 July 2019, paragraph 1-9.
2. FM 7-0, Train to Win in a Complex World, 5 October 2016, page B-7.

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SECTION II

Brigade Operations
Recommended Focused Task Areas

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CHAPTER 6

Winning at the Point of Contact:

The Brigade-Level Readiness Fight
General Michael X. Garrett, Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces Command
The U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Foundational Training
Approach is designed to ensure small units are manned, equipped, and
trained to win at the point of contact. It is important that we master the
fundamentals to achieve overmatch against any enemy we may face. We
see success with this approach; however, we are continually assessing and
refining our training, conducting retraining as necessary, and developing our
company-level leaders, which will ensure we win at the point of contact.
Much like FORSCOM generates readiness for any contingency, brigade
and battalion commanders generate company-level readiness for large-scale
combat operations and multi-domain operations to include meeting any other
assigned mission requirements. It is our brigade and battalion commanders
—organizational commanders—who measure readiness and build lethal
commanders and leaders at the company level at the point of contact.
The Army is people, and ready people are the foundation of Army readiness.
Time and risk management are the critical dependencies of our Army
senior leaders’ action plan to prioritize people and teams. Organizational
commanders are outside the proverbial knife fight of direct leadership.
Company-level leaders—direct leaders—require protected time to get to
know their Soldiers and build individual and collective readiness. Direct
leaders require observation, coaching, training, risk assumption, and
development from experienced, objective organizational leaders. They
produce highly trained, disciplined, and fit squads, platoons, and companies
as the foundation of our Army’s readiness.

HOW THE BRIGADE LEVEL ASSESSES WINNING AT THE

POINT OF CONTACT
Battalion and brigade commanders bridge the gap between operational
objectives and tactical tasks for company level and below. The brigade staff has
the experience and formal, professional military education to measure if task
performance achieves standards. Whether preparing for a specified mission
or maintaining readiness for large-scale combat operations and multi-domain
operations, the brigade staff confirms the companies are doing things right
through an external evaluation program. The organizational commanders have
the competence, demonstrated commitment, and sufficient vision to assess if
the platoons and companies are doing the right things.
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When companies achieve the “sweet spot” of doing the right things well, the
battalion and brigade commanders report their readiness in Army metrics.
Two of those metrics, the monthly unit status report (USR) and quarterly or
semiannual training briefs (Q/SATB) serve different but supporting purposes.
The USR demonstrates how well the unit used resources (time, money,
people, and equipment) as a predictor of potential. It affects all levels of
objective decision making from the potential deployment of that unit to that
unit’s priority for the assignment of the next military occupational specialty
critical to the success of the unit. Subjectively, the Q/SATB allow the
organizational commanders to measure the knowledge, skills, and attributes
of direct leaders and identify shortfalls to prioritize resources as a contract to
achieve readiness.
That contract, the product of the Q/SATB, is strengthened and reinforced
iteratively. I believe the “special sauce” (borrowing from Lieutenant
General Jim Rainey) of our Army is the existence of leader attributes
demonstrated through leader competencies from organizational commanders
to direct leaders. Organizational commanders provide purpose, direction,
and motivation to win at the point of contact. There are three primary ways
battalion and brigade commanders use to build the next generation of senior
leaders while maintaining strength and overmatch at company level and
below today.
First, battalion and brigade commanders counsel platoon leaders and
company commanders to set expectations and provide purpose. Counseling
allows the organizational commanders to empower the direct leaders to use
their intellect and develop the way forward.
Second, battalion and brigade commanders observe company-level leaders
to motivate and reinforce success directly. Observation demonstrates
presence as well as building vertical trust. Observation, although supported
by technology, cannot be done behind a desk, through an application, or
from a text or radio transmission. Rather, organizational commanders must
be present with their direct leaders to understand the struggle, and, more
importantly, discern growth, maturity, or failure to overcome the challenge.
Third, battalion and brigade commanders engage in commander-to-leader/
commander-to-commander dialogue, which embodies character in building
empathy and discipline to achieve comprehensive success at the point of
contact. Dialogue enables the organizational commander to understand fully
the operational environment of the direct leader, while ensuring understanding
of the importance of the mission set and associated constraints important
to the direct leader. Together, the commanders and leaders at echelon will
synchronize tasks and resources in time, space, and purpose to win.

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We develop, execute, and assess training to ensure that if failure happens,

it happens in the training environment. It is essential that organizational
commanders set conditions, prioritize resources, underwrite initiative, assume
risk, and measure and assess success in the training environment. Whether
conducting home-station, multi-echelon training, or fighting Geronimo
or Black Horse at our combat training centers (CTCs), when we fail, we
retrain until we achieve the standard. We do not have the luxury to make the
failure a note in the back of our green book to revisit under better conditions.
Retraining creates the muscle memory—the repetitions and sets—necessary
to empower our smallest tactical units win at the point of contact.

PLANNING IS RESOURCE INFORMED

Battalion and brigade commanders have the unique perspective—bridging
the gap between the operational Army and tactical readiness—to understand
and enforce the purpose of tailored readiness. Tailored readiness is not paying
for an ounce of readiness more than is required for the mission at hand.
A practical example of tailored readiness is eliminating the perception of
gated training requirements for a brigade to attend a CTC rotation. Our CTCs
are exceptionally agile and can dial up or down rotational events, depending
on the brigade’s road to readiness.
It is urban legend that gates exist for a brigade to conduct discreet events
sequentially or in sum during its training ramp to a CTC. The aspiration to
achieve those events coupled with small unit deployments, new equipment
fielding, modernization training, and ad hoc defense support to civil authorities
leads to an untenable operational tempo. Subsequently, our Army senior
leaders seek to reduce that tempo, not to coddle Soldiers, but to increase the
priority of the lethality of our smallest tactical units and provide expectation
management to those Soldiers and their families. The Army’s Regionally
Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM) creates a culture
to balance readiness and modernization while understanding people are the
number-one priority. A CTC rotation is a training event to generate readiness,
not just assess readiness.
Home-station training must be creative and comprehensive. When a
platoon conducts a live-fire exercise, the company command post controls
the operation while the battalion tactical command post resources, and the
brigade operations center assesses the performance and effectiveness of the
training. Because of a variety of reasons such as personnel turnover, new
equipment fielding and training, or support to a sister unit, the brigade
and battalion may not have the time or resources to conduct separate
field-training exercises. Therefore, the they must seek to exercise the staff
and operations process, while time and resources priority remains with squad,
platoon, and company readiness.

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Tailored readiness demands battalion and brigade commanders to develop

critical readiness conditions for subordinate units. For example, the critical
readiness condition for the battalion task force on the road to the Operation
Atlantic Resolve mission will look different from the critical readiness
conditions for the infantry brigade combat team slated to assume the
immediate response force mission. Critical readiness conditions allow the
organizational commanders to counsel and achieve shared understanding
with the direct leaders. They provide the metrics for the battalion and brigade
commanders to observe, assess, and measure readiness vertically. Critical
readiness conditions facilitate productive commander-to-commander dialogue
to answer the questions of what was supposed to happen, what happened,
and what comes next. Finally, they are an agile product of the battalion and
brigade commanders’ understanding of the operational environment and
communicating that visualization down and in as well as up and out.

CALL TO ACTION
The Soldiers in our squads, platoons, and companies are always the first to
make contact with the enemy. It is at that point they must decisively prevail.
To do this, battalion and brigade command teams provide the leadership,
which includes assessment that ensures squads, platoons, and companies can
prevail at the point of contact. We balance readiness and modernization with
a foremost understanding that people are our number-one priority. Battalion
and brigade commanders must understand tailored readiness and develop
critical readiness conditions to guide their direct leaders. Assessment ensures
our company-level units are training the right tasks the right way to build
readiness to win at the point of contact.
Reporting that readiness enables operational and strategic planning. Leading
and counseling done with candor, when added to character and commitment
of company-level leaders, increases competence and courage to produce
overmatch at the point of contact. Providing time, underwriting initiative,
assuming risk, and assessment are the battalion and brigade commander’s
repetitions and sets. I’ll say it again, when our commanders at echelon
commit to repetitions and sets, synchronization occurs, we prioritize people,
our lowest echelons master the fundamentals, and we are prepared to win at
the point of contact.

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CHAPTER 7

The Armored Brigade Combat Team

Headquarters
Operations Group, National Training Center
As part of its focused training program, the brigade combat team (BCT)
should pay particular attention to the natural transition point as a movement
to contact transitions to a hasty attack or a hasty defense. Typically, brigades
find themselves challenged with transitioning from offensive tasks to
defensive tasks or vice versa. The following are the top collective training
tasks an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) headquarters (HQ) should be
trained in while at home station:
● Conduct a Movement to Contact (07-6-1072).
● Conduct an Area Defense (07-6-1028).
If the members of an ABCT HQ and subordinate HQ focus on these tasks and
master how to identify and set conditions to transition between them before
their National Training Center (NTC) rotation, their organization stands a
greater chance of success. The ABCT HQ and subordinate HQ should avoid
the following common pitfalls:
● Becoming overly focused on current operations, with stovepipes between
the operations and intelligence sections neglecting to synchronize and
coordinate across warfighting functions.
● Failing to plan branches and sequels with clearly identified conditions for
successful transition.
● Utilizing an exercise checklist strictly adhering to designated timelines,
avoiding conditions, and H-hour timelines.
● Failing to create and fight utilizing the brigade’s fighting products,
enabling synchronization across the BCT and subordinate HQ.
● Not having or training sufficient battle-tracking standard operating
procedures (SOPs) and products across the BCT and subordinate HQ to
support rapid information flow, analysis, and dissemination.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the BCT HQ must establish SOPs and train
to enable the identification of transitions. This process begins with planning.
The brigade staff must clearly understand the commander’s visualization
of the fight and plan potential branches and sequels between offensive and
defensive operations. The BCT staff must establish conditions and triggers
within the plan that enable success, embedding them into the brigade fighting
products such as an information collection matrix, enemy event templates,
H-hour timelines, and decision support matrixes.
Brigade and subordinate HQ current operations personnel need to utilize
and fight with these fighting products as they strive to answer priority
intelligence requirements and accurately determine the enemy’s course of
action. While on the offense, HQ personnel should pay attention to where
and when the brigade may culminate based on situation reports and logistics
statuses. This leads to raising questions such as the current location of combat
configured loads to establish the brigade’s approaching defense. The staff
must understand what and how the brigade should consolidate the gains
achieved from recent offensive operations. In the defense, conditions focused
on the percentage of enemy destroyed and friendly ammunition, causalities,
and combat power status must be known to inform the decision to re-initiate
offensive operations. The goal is to quickly regain the initiative. These
decisions are facilitated by maintaining an accurate and up to date common
operational picture across all brigade command posts supported by routine
reporting, dissemination, and updating of information.

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CHAPTER 8

The Brigade Headquarters and

Headquarters Company
Operations Group, National Training Center
The headquarters and headquarters company constitutes one of the most
unique organizations for a brigade combat team (BCT). While it encompasses
the approximately 140 Soldiers in the brigade staff, it also provides a company
headquarters, commander, and first sergeant for administrative functions. In
a field environment, most brigades find it challenging to define roles and
responsibilities for this unique company-level headquarters.
An armored brigade combat team (ABCT) headquarters and headquarters
company’s (HHC’s) tactical function boils down to a few simple functions the
brigade commander must personally empower the HHC commander and first
sergeant to accomplish. These functions are support to the main command
post, preparation and planning for movement of the main command post,
sustaining the main command post, and securing the main command post.
Everything a brigade HHC command team does should revolve around one
of these tasks.
Placing the onus of these tasks on the operations sergeant major or the brigade
executive officer detracts from their primary responsibilities of operating the
staff and coordinating activities across the BCT. Brigade commanders should
make their HHC commander responsible for conducting quartering party
activities, battle rostering staff members for tactical road marches during
jumps, etc.
The following are collective training tasks that serve as the primary collective
training focus for a brigade HHC to support the BCT. These tasks should be
trained in-depth during home-station training:
● Support Command Post for Companies (71-CO-0433).
● Perform Quartering Party Activities (63-CO-4008).
● Conduct Sustainment Support Operations (Company) (63-CO-4574).
● Conduct Staging Activities (55-CO-4826).
● Perform Command Post Security (19-PLT-2203).

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The Combined Arms Training Strategy (CATS) tasks provide an objective

task evaluation matrix for each task and the performance steps and measures
by which to assess the training events. If the members of an HHC brigade in
a BCT focus on these tasks and master them before their National Training
Center (NTC) rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success.
The HHC BDE command teams should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Not clearly defining what roles the HHC brigade is the key owner of in
supporting a command post, versus what the brigade staff (executive
officer, S-3, operations sergeant major) see as the HHC brigade’s role.
● Not executing situational training exercises on quartering party roles and
responsibilities.
● Not understanding what elements and enablers will be a part of the
BDE main command post/tactical command post before execution,
therefore, limiting planning, understanding, and capacity for sustainment
requirements.
● Lack of rehearsing and/or having a codified system (standard operating
procedures [SOPs]) in place for staging, preparation, and onward
movements.
● Lack of rehearsals, training, and allocation of the right personnel to
the security plan for a command post, ensuring it is survivable in
large-scale combat operations.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the HHC brigade must clearly understand
the personnel it will have assigned and what each person’s role is within
the HHC BDE’s fight for the BCT. Once this is determined, the HHC BDE
must plan training that will incorporate all of its personnel, including the
BDE staff, to ensure roles and responsibilities in a non-garrison environment
are understood by everyone. This is done in a realistic training environment
where personnel can test systems and SOPs over distance and ensure they
are using the equipment and enablers the unit will deploy with. The HHC
BDE command team must have multiple playbooks that allow them to
dynamically task-organize people according to the BCT commander’s and
executive officers’ desire for command node emplacement.

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The HHC BDE is responsible for ensuring the BDE command nodes can
stage, prepare, and conduct tactical movement to a point of advantage and
then ensure its survivability through security. To do this, the HHC BDE trains
elements on the five collective training tasks outlined in this chapter. SOPs
are codified so that everyone knows who and what the quartering party for
each echelon of command node establishment entails. The HHC BDE must
have a logistical understanding of how it will sustain multiple command
nodes over distance for full operating capacity. The HHC BDE must be a
force multiplier that knows all levels of command post operations, ensuring
the main command post, mobile command group, and tactical command post
can operate simultaneously, over distance, while properly sustained. The
HHC BDE must also ensure command nodes are properly protected through
a vigorous training path allowing the BCT’s command nodes to be successful
and able to execute command and control functions for the BCT.
A key issue that plagues HHC BDEs is the lack of a codified training plan
that focuses on the five collective tasks. An HHC BDE commander must
allow ample time to train these tasks and ensure the support of all enablers,
including those external to HHC BDE throughout the BCT. An HHC BDE
commander plans and prepares a training plan to allow time to train in these
five collective training tasks. The BCT commander and staff should be
aware of this training plan and the needed training events that require their
participation. Doing so will result in a HHC BDE that is a well-trained and
enabling organization.

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CHAPTER 9

The Brigade Combat Team

Tactical Command Post in an
Armored Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
As a subordinate element of the headquarters and headquarters company, the
brigade combat team (BCT) tactical operations center is too often forgotten
until the eve of a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. Many brigades
are still challenged in identifying when, where, and why to deploy a tactical
command post (TAC). Instead, they attempt to operate it continuously
throughout the rotation. This approach leads to staff burnout, untrained
personnel operating critical systems, and ill-defined roles and responsibilities
for all command posts at the BCT level.
Brigades must first understand when they intend to employ a BCT-level
TAC. Second, to ensure continuous operations, commanders must understand
the science of how they are allocating personnel for a troop-to-task. Third,
commanders must understand the human limitations of their organizations.
After determining how brigades will fight the TAC, they should focus on the
following high-payoff collective tasks for all BCT TAC personnel while at
home station:
● Prepare for Tactical Operations (71-BCT-5120).
● Establish a Brigade/Group Command Post in an Operational Environment
(71-BCT-0050).
● Conduct Information Collection (71-BCT-2300).
● Control Field Artillery Fire Missions (06-BCT-5053).
● Coordinate Air-Ground Operations When Providing Attack Aviation
Support (01-BCT-0436).
If the members of a BCT TAC in an armored brigade combat team (ABCT)
focus on these tasks and master them before their NTC rotation, their
organization has a greater chance of success.

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The BCT TAC members should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Waiting until a deployment or combat training center (CTC) rotation to
validate TAC systems and setup.
● Not having sufficient battle-tracking products for a main command post
and TAC.
● Not conducting a thorough battle handover before sending out the TAC.
● Neglecting to provide clear expectations for how long and with what
assets a TAC will provide command and control (C2) support for the BCT.
● Becoming overly focused on C2 operations and neglecting local
sustainment and security considerations.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the BCT staff must identify the personnel
it will assign to the BCT TAC and determine the amount of C2 support the
TAC can realistically provide for the BCT. Once this is determined, the
BCT must validate the TAC setup and its systems. This is done in a realistic
environment where all personnel can test systems over distance, concurrently
with the operations of other C2 nodes, and without relying on any equipment
the unit will not deploy with.
Although the BCT TAC cannot fully replicate the C2 functions of a main
command post, it must strive to maintain as much situational awareness
and battle-tracking capabilities as possible. This involves having duplicates
of the products found at the main command post and ensuring these products
are updated as accurately as possible during a battle handover. In the
event that unit has limited numbers of certain platforms (Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], Distributed Common Ground
System- Army [DCGS-A], etc.), the BCT must determine an appropriate time
to transition control of these platforms to the TAC.

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CHAPTER 10

The Brigade Intelligence Section

Operations Group, National Training Center
Many commanders do not realize the brigade intelligence (S-2) section in
a field environment grows immensely. Absorbing a portion of the brigade
combat team’s (BCT’s) military intelligence company during tactical
operations, personnel fail to train together for the first time until they operate
in a field environment.
The military intelligence training strategy, published by U.S. Army Forces
Command, provides a venue for collective training. However, as a team, the
brigade S-2 section must be trained to help the commander see the battlefield
and understand the multiple possible futures facing the BCT, based on
possible enemy actions.
The following are the top staff tasks a BCT S-2 section must include in
home-station training to better drive operations and support situational
understanding in the BCT main command post:
● Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) (34-SEC-3180).
● Maintain the Intelligence Portion of the Common Operational Picture (COP)
(34-4-3175).
● Develop the Intelligence Running Estimate (34-4-3183).
● Provide Intelligence Support to Information Collection Planning (34-
SEC-3173).
● Provide Intelligence Support to the Targeting Process (06-BDE-2000).
If the BCT S-2 section prioritizes these collective tasks in its training strategy,
the BCT stands a better chance of synchronizing efforts at the decisive point
and disrupting the enemy commander’s decision cycle during training and
in large-scale combat operations. The BCT S-2 section should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Not thoroughly developing enemy courses of action (ECOAs) and leaving
them as concepts.
● Failure to maintain fighting products (event template [EVENTEMP]).
● Failure to transition information between future operations and current
operations.

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● Overreliance on echelons above brigade intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance (ISR) assets.
● Failure to synchronize the information collection plan with a friendly
scheme of maneuver.
The BCT S-2 section facilitates the commander’s understanding of the
operational environment and variables through IPB. Too frequently,
BCT S-2 sections conduct IPB by following a rigid “check-the-block”
process that starts with a generalized terrain analysis that fails to assess the
decisive advantage of micro-terrain. From there, the S-2 section moves to
develop ECOAs that are conceptual in nature, and finishes in a generalized
time-distance analysis captured in an EVENTEMP.
As a BCT S-2 section fighting product, the EVENTEMP is the basis for
establishing the latest time information is of value (LTIOV) in support of
information collection planning and asset synchronization. Similarly, the
EVENTEMP also establishes shared understanding between the BCT for
speed of recognition (forms of contact), speed of decision making (branch
plan or sequel), speed of action (synchronization of warfighting functions),
and operational tempo (maneuver). If the S-2 section is unable to create and
maintain an EVENTEMP, it is unlikely the BCT will effectively synchronize
effects at the decisive point against an opposing force.
Although BCT S-2 sections frequently fail to conduct detailed IPB,
Maintaining the Intelligence Portion of the COP (34-4-3175), in combination
with, Develop the Intelligence Running Estimate (34-4-3183), are the second-
and third-most untrained tasks observed at NTC. These critical tasks support
the following collective tasks:
● Establish the COP for Brigades (71-BDE-5319).
● Develop a Running Estimate (71-BDE-5144).
● Army Tactical Task (ART) 2.2.4, Provide Tactical Intelligence Overwatch.
The COP and the intelligence running estimate provide the BCT commander
and staff with the metrics required to assess the tactical situation through
measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. BCT S-2 sections
that do not train and are unprepared to maintain a COP and intelligence
running estimate often fail to achieve shared understanding within the BCT.

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The basis for maintaining a COP and running estimate starts with an
effective information collection plan. Information collection is frequently
mischaracterized as a purely intelligence function, and independent, rather
than nested, with the maneuver plan. For intelligence to drive operations and
for operations to enable intelligence, the information collection plan must be
detailed, synchronized, and operationalized with the BCT’s reconnaissance,
maneuver, and fires plan. Training and development for successful execution
of information collection starts with understanding that information collection
must incorporate all warfighting functions. Typically, an overreliance on
division and above ISR support is the result of inadequate IPB, and a failure
to integrate ground reconnaissance and maneuver forces into the information
collection plan.

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CHAPTER 11

Intelligence Preparation of the

Battlefield: Terrain Analysis
MAJ Cortis Burgess, CPT Crescencio Padilla,
and CW3 Bary McMaster
Brigade Intelligence Trainers, Operations Group,
National Training Center
The intelligence warfighting function (IWfF) facilitates the commander’s
understanding of the operational environment and variables through
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) conducted during the
military decision-making process (MDMP). Paramount to successful IPB is
understanding the threat and the operational environment in-depth to describe
how the enemy will fight. Observations gathered at the National Training
Center (NTC) demonstrate that brigade combat team (BCT) intelligence
staffs lack the knowledge and experience required to develop enemy
courses of action (ECOAs) during IPB that are feasible, acceptable, suitable,
distinguishable, and complete. The inability of IWfF personnel to develop
appropriate ECOAs is not directly associated with whether they understand
the opposing force’s capabilities; rather, it is their inability to operationalize
terrain.
Too frequently, IPB is conducted by the BCT intelligence staff following
the “check-the-block” process. From there, the intelligence staff
moves to develop ECOAs that are conceptual in nature, and finishes
in a generalized time-distance analysis captured in an event template
(EVENTEMP). Neither the ECOA nor EVENTEMP captures the effects
of terrain on mobility, survivability, or weapons system employment.
Time-distance analysis is the basis for establishing a latest time information
is of value (LTIOV) in support of information collection planning and asset
synchronization. Time-distance analysis in support of shaping operations
prevents an opposing force from achieving positions of relative advantage.
Time-distance analysis also establishes speed of recognition (forms of
contact), speed of decision making (branch plan or sequel), speed of
action (synchronization of warfighting functions), and operational tempo
(maneuver).

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Current home-station training models for BCT intelligence staffs severely

overlook the importance of describing the operational environment and its
effect on military operations. Similarly, digital mission command training
exercises do not capture or provide the means for intelligence staffs to
validate their IPB by witnessing the effects of terrain on the opposing force
commander’s decision making. In addition, mission command training
exercises do not provide the fidelity of after action reviews that prove
IPB wrong. By training this way, against an enemy that is unconstrained
or advantaged by the use of its warfighting functions in the terrain, the
intelligence staff is unable to achieve sufficient proficiency in IPB. As a
result, intelligence staffs provide conceptual and unrealistic ECOAs that do
not support effective friendly maneuver planning during MDMP.
To effectively train and build proficiency among the BCT intelligence staff
on the collective tasks, Conduct Mission Analysis (71-BDE-5112),1 and
Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (34-SEC-3180),2 the
BCT IWfF requires close training with the maneuver force. Cross-functional
training opportunities provide intelligence staffs a better understanding and
visualization of the multiple variables that impact military operations and
decision making.
Through observation and experimentation, instead of lecturing over a
map, the BCT IWfF is better postured to enter the enemy’s planning cycle;
understanding and visualizing its scheme of maneuver; and predicting actions,
reactions, and counteractions based on how the operational environment and
force characteristics affect operations. Finally, IPB does not stop at orders
production; rather, it is a continuous process of analyzing the enemy scheme
of maneuver against its characteristics and terrain. The opposing force
commander is constantly reassessing its scheme of maneuver, and changing
directions in the middle of the fight to achieve a position of relative advantage
by controlling the tempo. The intelligence staff must train for, and practice
returning to, updating IPB products constantly throughout a training event.

REFERENCES
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process, 31 July
2019.
ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces,
31 July 2019.
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield, 1 March 2019.
ATP 3-34.80, Geospatial Engineering, 22 February 2017.

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Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, 6 October 2017.

Training Circular (TC) 6-0.2, Training the Mission Command Warfighting
Function for Battalions, Brigades, and Brigade Combat Teams, 15 July 2019.

Endnotes
1. TC 6-0.2, Training the Mission Command Warfighting Function for Battalions,
Brigades, and Brigade Combat Teams, pages 2-35, 2-36.
2. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 12

The Brigade Fire Support Element

Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the collective training tasks a fire support element in a
brigade combat team should focus on during home-station training:
● Prepare the Fire Support Plan (06-BDE-5062).
● Synchronize Fire Support (06-BDE-1084).
● Produce the Fire Support Plan (06-BDE-1081).
● Conduct Battle Tracking (06-BDE-1079).
● Perform a Transfer of Fire Support Operations to an Alternate Fire Support
Element (06-BDE-6060).
If a fire support element supporting a brigade combat team focuses on these
collective training tasks and masters them, the fire enterprise and brigade
combat team stands a better chance of remaining synchronized and successful
at the National Training Center. The fire support element should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Failure to integrate in planning and produce draft products.
● Lack of fighting products and poor dissemination.
● Failure to synchronize fire support with information collection.
● Lack of analog products and common operational picture.
● Failure to transfer control of fires to the brigade tactical command post.
Fighting products are essential for the brigade to remain synchronized and
understand the fire support plan. Fighting products should be standardized
through their standard operating procedure. As the brigade staff begins
planning, the fire support officer or fires planner must understand when
products should be developed and refined within the military decision-
making process (MDMP). Developing draft products in conjunction with
specific steps of the MDMP are vital to efficient orders production. Products
should be developed and disseminated in time to allow subordinates to
conduct bottom-up refinement.

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During brigade planning, the fire support officer or fires planner must
understand the information collection plan and maneuver plan to ensure fires
are synchronized. To ensure fires are synchronized with information collection,
the fire support officer or fires planner must discuss information collection
asset capabilities and focus areas to determine if the assets can identify
targets or triggers and provide assessments. This can also be accomplished by
comparing the information collection synchronization matrix with the target
synchronization matrix and correcting any gaps identified.
Brigade fire support elements sometimes struggle to battle track and maintain
understanding of the maneuver situation and fire support situation. This can
be traced directly to the lack of analog fighting products, running estimates,
and a fires common operational picture. Analog fighting products are vital to
current operations as they provide options for the fire support element, brigade
battle captain, or brigade commander to provide direct fires against dynamic
targets. Running estimates provide an overview of the constraints, limitations,
and current situation of the fires enterprise, if updated correctly. Running
estimates should also be provided to the fires planner for consideration in
future operations. A fires common operational picture is essential to avoiding
fratricide or other firing incidents. A fires common operational picture
should be kept up-to-date and contain all fire support coordination measures,
maneuver graphics, and enemy situation templates.
Transferring the control of fires between the brigade main command post
and the tactical command post needs to be well-planned and rehearsed at
home station. Fires personnel, vehicles, and equipment expected to support
the tactical command post should be identified in the brigade or field artillery
battalion’s standard operating procedures. Equipment and vehicles must be
fully mission capable to support the brigade main command post and tactical
command post. Analog products and a copy of the fires common tactical
picture must accompany the tactical command post as it maneuvers forward
in preparation for the main command post transferring control of fires.
Failure to have equipment, vehicles, personnel, or products will result in a
fires coverage gap and derail synchronization of the brigade fires enterprise.

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CHAPTER 13

The Air Defense Airspace

Management/Brigade Aviation Element
in a Brigade Combat Team
Command Post
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top air defense airspace management (ADAM)/
brigade aviation element (BAE)-related collective training tasks a brigade
combat team (BCT) main command post in a BCT should focus on during
home-station training:
● Emplace the ADAM/BAE Shelter (44-SEC-9101).
● Integrate Airspace Management in BCT Operations (44-SEC-9106).
● Coordinate Air-Ground Operations When Providing Attack Aviation
Support (44-BCT-0436).
● Coordinate Air Defense in Support of BCT Operations (44-BCT-1007).
● Provide ADAM Cell Input to the Common Operational Picture (44-BCT-
9102).
These tasks show the objective task evaluation matrix for each task and the
performance steps and measures by which to assess the training events. If a
brigade ADAM/BAE focuses on these five tasks and masters them before
its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of success. The
ADAM/BAE at the brigade main command post should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Senior members of the ADAM/BAE often perform multiple roles in the
main command post.
● Airspace priorities are not identified during the military decision-making
process (MDMP).
● The unit airspace plan (UAP) is not adequately developed during the
MDMP.
● The primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan is not
developed to support the aviation task force or air defense artillery (ADA)
battery.

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● Battle handovers during command and control node transitions (main

command post to tactical command post) are ineffective.
● Airspace user synchronization is not rehearsed.
● Graphics are not disseminated, resulting in high risk of fratricide.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the ADAM/BAE must ensure it allocates
the appropriate number of personnel to tasks, and ensure they are extensively
cross-trained. It should verify the BCT commander’s preference between
fires and aviation. The ADAM/BAE should develop a simple UAP during
course of action development that is easy to understand for airspace users,
and integrate with aviation and ADA units early to develop and exercise
a solid PACE plan. It should allocate sufficient personnel and equipment
to the mobile command post. Finally, the ADAM/BAE should ensure the
fires planner, aviation planner, tactical command post, and ADA battery
commander brief during rehearsals (at a minimum, information collection,
fires, and combined arms rehearsal), disseminate airspace graphics across
the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) through the Data Distribution
Service (DDS), and build analogue products for battalions.

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CHAPTER 14

The Signal Staff Section in Brigade

Combat Team Command Posts and the
Signal (S-6) Section
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a signal section
(S-6) in a brigade combat team (BCT) must plan for and successfully
incorporate into the orders process, and should focus on during home-station
training:
● Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies
(11-CO-9060).
● Provide Network Switching Services for the Brigade Signal Company/
Platoon (11-CO-9070).
● Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-
9075).
● Conduct Combat Network Radio Retransmission Operations (11-CW-
7017).
● Perform Predeployment Maintenance Activities (43-CO-4805).
The S-6 section has a unique working relationship with the elements of
the signal company that supports the BCT. It must effectively develop the
planning portion of these tasks to ensure commanders and subordinate leaders
are able to communicate across formations. The signal staff should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and communications
maintenance.
● Failure to ensure operators (10-level) understand and are able to complete
basic tasks (S-6 Soldiers filling radios, etc.).
● Failure to conduct S-6 synchronization meetings.
● Failure to follow through with task completion.
● Lack of local security at retransmission sites.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the S-6 section must be engaged in the
entire planning and operations process. Communications maintenance
must be a command emphasis. Developing a section of the maintenance
meeting dedicated to communications equipment will facilitate this effort
and ensure issues and tasks are tracked until resolved. Individuals must treat
communications systems with the same attention to detail as a weapons
system. Develop a training program that empowers Soldiers to teach
communications refreshers, instead of enabling a lack of understanding
culture by “just getting it done” to do it faster. Conduct routine S-6 section
synchronization meetings across the echelon so units become familiar with
challenges and provide mutual support through effective crosstalk.

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CHAPTER 15

Protect and Defend the Brigade

Upper Tactical Internet
MAJ Ben Hunter and CW4 Willie Newkirk
Operations Group, National Training Center
Brigade combat teams (BCTs) face a contested cyber environment where the
ability to securely operate tactical internet (TI) will change the outcome of
battle. Threats include nation states, criminals, and insiders who will damage
systems or steal information if given the opportunity. Focus should be given
to the following fundamental tasks to protect upper-TI systems:
Align personnel with their roles and responsibilities. Form a brigade
network operations and security center (NOSC) for conducting cyberspace
operations under the supervision of the brigade information systems engineer
(26B). Network technicians (255N, 25N) and services technicians (255A,
25B) perform cyberspace security actions within the Department of Defense
Information Network (DODIN) operations mission for their systems by
reducing or eliminating vulnerabilities and ensuring availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Cyber defenders (255S,
25D) execute cyberspace defense actions to defeat specific threats by
detecting and mitigating threats. In a tactical environment, network, services,
and defenders should physically sit together to ensure information flows
rapidly within the NOSC.
Maintain cyber hygiene. The foundation for a secure and defensible
upper-TI is cyber hygiene. Doctrinally, cyber hygiene exemplifies cyberspace
security actions performed in support of DODIN operations. Many of these
actions support the cybersecurity compliance program that must be executed
by regulation. Deploy the latest baseline operating systems and patch all
network infrastructure, servers, and clients. Control administrative accounts
through the principle of least privilege. Some command and control systems
require excessive permissions during configuration, but they should be
immediately restricted after deployment. Enforce secure configurations
through policy and central management tools. Deploy host-based security
to every endpoint, including program of record (POR) systems. There are no
exceptions to policy for host-based security. Use the full features of firewalls
that operate at the application layer and treat all networks as untrusted.

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Gain visibility into security events. Everyone gets breached sooner or

later; ensure to posture to detect an incident. Detect in-depth by operating the
security information and event management (SIEM) software provided by the
program of record. SIEM becomes a single pane of glass for monitoring. Many
event sources exist natively within networks and must be added to SIEM for
correlation. Pull logs and events from all existing systems including endpoint
security, system logs, network traffic such as NetFlow, and applications such
as domain name system (DNS) and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
(DHCP). Deploy network security monitoring sensors throughout networks
at choke points after all primary logging sources are in SIEM. Real-time
monitoring, triage, incident analysis, coordination, and response are the core
tasks of cyberspace defense actions.
Enforce physical security standards. Weak physical security is one
of the easiest ways for threat actors to access classified information. The
physical security program belongs to the brigade S-2, but physical controls
protecting information systems are the responsibility of the S-6. The S-6 and
S-2 must work together to limit access to only people who are cleared and
need to know. Many organizations fail to consider the importance of physical
security in a field environment.
Practice incident response. When the inevitable security incident
occurs, the team must be prepared to execute the incident response process.
The phases of incident handling are preparation, detection, containment,
eradication, and recovery. Reports of each cyber incident must flow efficiently
to the division and across battalion headquarters. Resolve incidents under the
guidance of the brigade NOSC and prevent recurrence of the same incident
by implementing secure configuration or changing procedures.

REFERENCES
Army Techniques Publication 6-02.71, Techniques for Department of Defense
Information Network Operations, 30 April 2019.
Army Regulation 25-2, Army Cybersecurity, 4 April 2019.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01B, Cyber Incident
Handling Guide, 10 July 2012.
Department of the Army Pamphlet 25-2-17, Incident Reporting, 8 April 2019.
Field Manual 6-02, Signal Support to Operations, 13 September 2019.
Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 8 June 2018.
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication
800-61, Revision 2, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, August
2012.

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SECTION III

Cavalry Squadron Operations

Recommended Task Focus Areas

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CHAPTER 16

Cavalry Squadron in an
Armored Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
Army doctrine clearly lays out the fundamental role of an armored brigade
combat team (ABCT) cavalry squadron.
The cavalry squadron’s fundamental role is to perform
reconnaissance and security to provide accurate and timely
information across the area of operations. Reconnaissance
and security provides the ABCT commander with combat
information to develop situational understanding, make plans
and decisions quickly, and visualize and direct operations. The
cavalry squadron has the capability to defend itself against
most threats.1
Although many Combined Arms Training Strategies-specified tasks relate
to the overarching role of a cavalry squadron inside a brigade combat team
(BCT), at the end of the day, the cavalry squadron essentially needs to
accomplish two tasks: Move forward to develop the situation, and provide
time and space for a BCT to act. Therefore, when challenged by training time
and resources, the cavalry squadron builds the greatest amount of readiness
possible by focusing on its ability to execute the following two tasks to a high
standard:
● Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-SQDN-9314).
● Conduct a Guard (17-SQDN-9222).
Properly constructed, a zone reconnaissance includes specified areas for
subordinates to reconnoiter. Additionally, a properly constructed zone
reconnaissance during training exercises emphasizes the critical decision
points that must take place. What role does the cavalry squadron play
inside of an overall BCT information collection effort? How does the
cavalry squadron nest properly with the BCT planning timeline to initiate
reconnaissance in a timely manner? Does the BCT transition to a hasty attack
or hasty defense based on information from the squadron? Does the cavalry
squadron become decisively engaged to continue to buy time and space for
the BCT commander? Each of these aspects can be trained amid a properly
constructed zone reconnaissance lane.

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Similarly, a guard mission challenges the squadron to integrate enabling

assets from outside its organic units. It requires the integration of fires
and possibly engineer elements to perform a guard effectively in a
combined arms fashion. By properly constructing a guard mission during
home-station training, the cavalry squadron maximizes time and resources to
train its central role of providing time and space for the BCT commander. The
cavalry squadrons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of an effective and efficient operations process.
● Lack of sustainment systems and processes that enable continuous
reconnaissance and security operations.
● Failure to integrate and synchronize intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and fires.
● Failure to rehearse and conduct reconnaissance handover with combined
arms battalions (CABs).
Squadron staffs often lack an effective and efficient operations process
that enables rapid receipt, analysis, production, and distribution of an
operation order and fighting products to the troops. An ineffective operations
process prevents effective integration and synchronization of warfighting
functions and prevents subordinate units from clearly understanding priority
intelligence requirements or BCT decision points. An inefficient operations
process at the squadron consumes time that troops and platoons need for
troop leading procedures. Squadrons also fail to develop and rehearse
expeditionary sustainment and maintenance systems in a way that enables
continuous reconnaissance and security. Maintenance collection points are
frequently too far to the rear with incomplete manning or equipment, and
fail to rapidly repair vehicles and return them to the fight. Squadrons that
fail to synchronize their intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance assets, and
echelon fires cannot maneuver effectively at the National Training Center
(NTC). Frequently, the maneuver plan does not synchronize information
collection and fires because of independent planning by different staff sections
and an ineffective war game during course of action analysis. Squadrons fail
to conduct effective reconnaissance handovers with the CABs and fail to
coordinate effectively with task force scouts during reconnaissance handover.
Troops typically arrive to NTC with little experience working with task force
scouts and do not follow any standard operating procedures, checklists, or
measures of performance for reconnaissance handover. This prevents the
squadron from effectively communicating critical information to the CABs.
Figure 16-1 illustrates the complete recommended mission-essential
task crosswalk for an ABCT cavalry squadron including platoon-level,
high-payoff tasks.

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Cavalry Squadron (ABCT)(HQDA Directed)

BDE-Prioritized METs Conduct Area Security. 07-BN-1272
Conduct Area Defense. Conduct a Screen. 17-SQDN-9225
Conduct Movement to Contact. Conduct a Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9314
Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9315
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800

SQDN-Prioritized METs
Conduct Guard. 17-SQDN-9222
Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-SQDN-9314

Cavalry Troop METs (HQDA Directed) SQDN Tank Company METs (HQDA Directed)
Conduct Area Security. 17-CO-1272 Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272
Conduct Route Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4000 Conduct Area Defense. 17-CO-1030
Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4010 Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-CO-1074
Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-TRP-4011 Conduct an Attack. 17-CO-1094
Conduct Screen. 17- TRP-9225 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Armored Company-Prioritized METs
Cavalry Troop-Prioritized METs Conduct Area Defense. 07-CO-1030
Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272 Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-CO-1074
Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 71-PLT-5100
Conduct Screen. 17-TRP-9225 Tank Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012
Scout Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Conduct Tactical Movement. 07-PLT-1342
Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012 Conduct an Attack by Fire. 07-PLT 1256
Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 71-PLT-5100 Conduct an Area Defense. 07-PLT-1030
Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-PLT-4011
Establish an Observation Post. 7-PLT-9016 Forward Support Troop METs (HQDA Directed)
Conduct Screen. 17-PLT-4010 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Provide Field Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
SQDN HHT METs (HQDA-Directed) Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830 Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 63-CO-4574
Support Command Posts for Companies. 71-CO-0433 Forward Support Troop-Prioritized METs
Provide Field Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
SQDN HHT-Prioritized METs Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 63-CO-4574 Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882
Support Command Posts for Companies. 71-CO-0433 Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment OPS. 63-CO-4574 Perform Field Maintenance. 43-CO-4552

Medical Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Distribution Platoon High-Payoff Tasks

Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-PLT-0312 Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition. 55PLT0012
Provide Emergency Medical Treatment. 08-PLT-0313 Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
Provide Ground Ambulance EVAC Support. 08-PLT-0319 Conduct Logistics Package Support. 63-TS-3390
Treat CBRN-Contaminated Casualties. 08-PLT-0232 Conduct Tactical Convoy. 63-TS-2924
Defend Convoy Elements. 63-TS-2924
High-Payoff Leader Tasks
Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100 Maintenance Control Section High-Payoff Tasks
Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009 Set up Maintenance Section(s). 43-PLT-4570
Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626 Conduct Support Maintenance OPS. 63-TS-4021
Perform Maintenance Control Functions. 63-TS-4021
These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon Perform Allied Trades and Recovery Services. 43-PLT-1503
sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the
initiation of collective training. Field-Feeding, High-Payoff Tasks
Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501

Figure 16-1. Recommended mission-essential task

crosswalk for an ABCT cavalry squadron

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Endnote
1. Army Techniques Publication 3-20.96, Cavalry Squadron, 12 May 2016.

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CHAPTER 17

The Headquarters and Headquarters

Troop in a Cavalry Squadron
Operations Group, National Training Center
The headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT) of a cavalry squadron serves
a unique purpose with fewer capabilities to influence the brigade combat
team (BCT) fight than a combined arms battalion headquarters company.
Other than the assigned medical platoon, the HHT focuses predominately
on enabling command and control of the squadron and manning the combat
trains command post (CTCP) to coordinate sustainment activities.
In certain tactical situations, the HHT commanders might be asked to provide
command and control for attached elements; therefore, their ability to receive
and integrate attachments is important in specific instances. Regardless, the
operations of the CTCP and support to the squadron main command post
are of primary importance to an HHT. The following are the top collective
training tasks an HHT in a cavalry squadron should focus on during
home-station training:
● Conduct Sustainment Support Operations (Company) (63-CO-4574).
● Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment Operations (Company) (63-CO-
4000).
● Support Command Posts for Companies (Company) (71-CO-0433).
If an HHT in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters them
before its rotation at the National Training Center (NTC), its organization
stands a greater chance of success. The HHT should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lacking preventive maintenance checks and services, and maintenance
control systems.
● Failure to maintain or bring protection equipment (chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and explosives).
● Lack of logistics status reporting format, times, and procedures.
● Lack of local security.
● Lack of repetitions in operating a command post.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the commander and first sergeant must build
a culture of maintenance, assign a noncommissioned officer (NCO) from each
staff section to oversee maintenance in the HHT, ensure each NCO is trained on
Army standards for maintenance, and ensure equipment in the formation has
an actual technical manual -10. The HHT commander must supervise loadout
for NTC with input from the executive officer and first sergeant. Staff section
officers in charge (OICs) and noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs)
must brief the commander on any modified table of organization equipment
they plan to leave at home station. Additionally, the commander and first
sergeant must ensure the unit packs Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit
Technology (JSLIST) in a consolidated connex box for issue at NTC or that
is issued to every Soldier, packed and verified before loadout. The squadron
S-4 must create and enforce a standardized logistics status format focused on
quantities for classes of supply being reported; avoid a “green, amber, red, and
black” system. Ensure the squadron uses this format and sends reports over
a common communications medium (for example, the Joint Battle
Command-Platform [JBC-P] system) in accordance with the unit’s standard
operating procedures during the train-up to NTC. The HHT commander and
first sergeant must establish a security plan and posture at the CTCP. Vehicles
and crews at the maintenance collection point, commonly co-located with the
CTCP, are part of the security plan. The CTCP should have AT4s and a Stinger
for local security. Finally, the CTCP should train as a troop command post
and alternate squadron command post during training events. Establish the
CTCP during weekly squadron maintenance activities to track maintenance
status across the squadron.

THE MEDICAL PLATOON IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

The following are the top collective training tasks a medical platoon in a
cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:
● Manage Health Service Support Operations (Platoon) (08-PLT-0312).
● Provide Emergency Medical Treatment, Non-Medical (Platoon) (08-PLT-
0313).
● Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (Platoon) (08-PLT-
0319).
● Treat Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN)
Contaminated Casualties (Platoon) (08-PLT-0232).

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If a medical platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters

them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of
succeeding in the environment it encounters. The medical platoon should
avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Not integrating with staff during the military decision-making process
(MDMP).
● Not clearly delegating roles and responsibilities in the platoon.
● Not updating the medical material mobilization planning tool.
● Not enforcing maintenance standards.
Medical officers (MEDOs) must understand they are not platoon leaders,
but members of the special staff. The MEDO must coordinate through the
S-4 to meet the commander’s intent for medical support. The MEDO attends
MDMP sessions and update briefs. The MEDO works through the S-4 to
ensure the concept of medical support effectively supports the maneuver
plan. The MEDO attends rehearsals, and maintains and distributes the
medical common operational procedure. Medical platoon standard operating
procedures should outline the roles and responsibilities for each section
and each NCO to increase the effectiveness of the platoon. Several duties
must be specified including the evacuation sergeant, triage sergeant, and
Class VIII sergeant. The Class VIII sergeant is responsible for establishing
the local account for the squadron and monitoring the Class VIII on hand
in the platoon and with line medics. This aids in planning and forecasting
Class VIII supply requests. The MEDO and platoon sergeant reinforce a
culture of maintenance, assign an NCO from each section to oversee their
section’s maintenance, ensure each NCO is trained to the Army standard on
maintenance, and ensure equipment is assigned with a technical manual -10
on hand. The MEDO and platoon sergeant must supervise the loadout for
their section and brief the commander on any equipment they plan to leave
at home station.

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CHAPTER 18

The Cavalry Troop in an

Armored Brigade Combat Team
(Operations Group, National Training Center)
Trained properly, armored brigade combat team (ABCT) cavalry troops
provide a tremendous amount of flexibility and maneuver space. Improperly
trained, cavalry troops constitute some of the most vulnerable formations
within a brigade combat team (BCT). They likely will be the first to make
direct contact with enemy forces. More so than other company-level
formations, the decisions a cavalry troop commander makes on the ground
affect the entire scheme of maneuver for a BCT. To overcome these inevitable
outcomes, commanders must appropriately focus home-station training.
The zone reconnaissance and screen are the hallmark of cavalry troop
operations. Providing sound reconnaissance and security guidance is the
responsibility of the brigade commander and further refined by the squadron
commander.
The final fundamental task for a cavalry troop to train in preparation for a National
Training Center (NTC) rotation is area security. At NTC, commanders are
often forced to commit cavalry troops to secure an assailable flank or a portion
of the BCT front. During these critical transition periods, displacement might
not be feasible. Disengagement might not be feasible. Reinforcements from
follow-on forces might not be feasible. During these finite periods, the task
of area security more aptly describes the following tasks cavalry troops are
asked to perform:
● Conduct Area Security (07-CO-1272).
● Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-TRP-4010).
● Conduct Screen (17-TRP-9225).
The most common cavalry troop home-station training shortcomings expose
themselves at NTC during transition periods. During these times, commanders
at the brigade and squadron levels push their troops forward using the simple
mantra of “scouts out.” Although great for building unit pride and cohesion,
this approach simplistically pushes cavalry troops forward on the battlefield
in a hasty fashion without considering the enemy positions they must
reconnoiter, the terrain and its effects, or the very forces they are tasked to
protect. The following are common shortcomings:

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● Failure to develop a situation template (SITTEMP).

● Failure to plan and synchronize fires.
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), maintenance
enforcement, and field maintenance team positioning.
● Failure to train and develop troop command posts.
Troop commanders frequently fail to fully analyze the enemy situation
and typically restate the information received from the squadron S-2.
They must refine the SITTEMP the S-2 provides and plot range rings for
anti-tank systems, mortars, and artillery to understand where to transition
from movement to maneuver and how to synchronize friendly fires with
dismounted and mounted maneuver. An inability to depict the enemy
prevents proper planning and synchronization of mortars and artillery. It
also prevents effective employment of the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle.
Failing to visualize the enemy effectively results in decisive engagement,
failure to achieve reconnaissance objectives, premature disengagement,
or destruction of the troop. Commanders routinely fail to understand
maintenance systems and often retain portions of the field maintenance teams
too far forward. Field maintenance teams should keep the M88, contact truck,
and a maintenance team with the troop trains. The remainder of the field
maintenance team, including the forward repair system and the supply stock
list should remain at the maintenance collection point. Troop commanders
routinely fail to establish clear priorities of work resulting in inconsistent
maintenance and a broken workflow with Department of the Army (DA)
Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (1 March
1991). This leaves the troop lacking parts required to maintain combat power
as they continue the fight. Troops often fail to identify, train, and develop
their command post personnel during training progressions. This leads
to command posts lacking in reporting standards or tracking systems and
frequently pulls the commander into managing routine reports. Command
post personnel should train at all events and be treated as a vehicle crew.

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THE SCOUT PLATOON IN A CAVALRY TROOP

(ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)
The following are the top collective training tasks a scout platoon in a cavalry
squadron (ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
● Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (71-PLT-5100).
● Conduct Area Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4011).
● Establish an Observation Post (07-PLT-9016).
● Conduct Screen (17-PLT-4010).
If a scout platoon in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) focuses on these tasks and
masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance
of success. Scout platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to properly develop a SITTEMP.
● Failure to plan for and employ dismounts.
● Failure to plan fires.
● Failure to establish priorities of work, especially maintenance.
To avoid common pitfalls, platoon leaders must properly analyze the enemy
plan and refine the SITTEMP provided to them. Platoon leaders often
restate what they receive from their commander and fail to refine the picture
of how the enemy will fight for the platoon. This lack of understanding
drives poor maneuver decisions that lead to decisive engagements and the
destruction of friendly forces. Platoons fail to identify appropriate locations
for vehicle drop-offs of their dismounts outside of anti-tank system range,
or do not ensure dismounts are properly equipped for their mission. Failure
to standardize dismount kits and inspect them leads to observation posts
without long-range communications or anti-tank weapons. Platoon leaders
fail to echelon fires as they maneuver, and typically only call for immediate
suppression while in contact. Platoons fail to issue clear priorities of work,
fail to ensure operators properly conduct maintenance and PMCS, and fail to
ensure mechanics verify faults.

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THE SCOUT SECTION IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

(ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)
The following are the collective training tasks a scout section in a cavalry
squadron (ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:
● Supervise Scout Platoon Tactical Formations (171-123-1306).
● Perform Techniques of Movement (171-121-4057).
● Integrate Direct Fires (07-PLT-3027).
● Integrate Indirect Fire Support (07-PLT-3036).
● Conduct Reconnaissance Handover (17-PLT-4025).
If scout platoon sections focus on these tasks and master them before their
NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of success. Scout
platoon sections should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of proper PMCS.
● Failure to follow priorities of work.
● Inability to use dismounted and mounted elements in mutually supportive
roles.
● Failure to understand and identify probable lines of contact.
● Senior scouts and section noncommissioned officers (NCOs) not involved
in troop leading procedures (TLP).
To avoid the common pitfalls, NCOs must ensure they enforce maintenance
standards and supervise daily PMCS with a technical manual -10 and record
faults on DA Form 5988-E. NCOs must enforce priorities of work within their
sections to maintain a high level of readiness. Section leaders fail to dismount
far enough from anti-tank fires or close enough to the enemy to maintain tempo.
Section leaders often emplace dismounts in position without proper equipment
because of a lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs), precombat
checks (PCCs), or precombat inspections (PCIs). Dismounts must have
long-range optics, Javelins, and radios. Sections often fail to transition
from movement to maneuver because of a lack of understanding of the
enemy situation and probable lines of contact. Sections frequently become
decisively engaged or are destroyed when making contact with mounted
forces against enemy anti-tank systems. Section leaders and NCOs within the
section must participate in the platoon’s planning. Participating in planning
improves the section’s understanding of the mission and assists the platoon
leader and platoon sergeant in completing TLP in time for sections to finish
preparations.

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INDIVIDUAL AND CREW TASKS IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

(ARMORED BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM)
The following are the individual and crew training tasks a cavalry squadron
(ABCT) should focus on during home-station training:
● Engage Targets Using the Weapon Systems on a Bradley Fighting Vehicle
(071-001-0006).
● Engage Targets With an M240B/M240L Machine Gun (071-025-0007).
● Engage Targets With a Javelin (071-060-0005).
● Perform Voice Communications (113-COM-1022).
● Inspect Personnel and Equipment (071-328-5301).
● Conduct TLP (150-LDR-5012).
● Conduct Movement Techniques by a Platoon or Section (071-326-5630).
● Prepare a Situation Report (171-121-4051).
● Plan a Reconnaissance Mission (171-123-1313).
● Camouflage Yourself and Your Individual Equipment (052-COM-1361).
● Conduct Movement Techniques by a Squad (071-326-5610).
● Coordinate With Adjacent Units (171-121-4034).
If individuals and crews in a cavalry squadron (ABCT) focus on these tasks
and master them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater
chance of success. Individuals and crews should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Lack of PCCs and PCIs.
● Failure to properly conduct PMCS.
● Failure to boresight.
● Lack of familiarization of equipment and platforms.
● Failure to report in a timely and accurate manner.
● Inability to use the right movement technique and formation.

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To successfully fight and train at NTC, individuals and crews must perform
the tasks listed above to standard. Individuals and crews often arrive at
the NTC unfamiliar with assigned weapons, optics, and communications
equipment and are ineffective on the battlefield. Individuals and crews fail to
conduct PCIs or PCCs, and frequently send individuals forward with not
mission-capable equipment or without critical equipment. Units do not
arrive with functional tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) or
individuals do not realize that many useful checklists reside in unit TACSOPs.
Crews fail to conduct PMCS to standard resulting in the loss of combat power
to compounding vehicle faults over time. Developing training on how to
complete DA Form 5988-E, developing an SOP, and strictly enforcing the
SOP is crucial to maintaining equipment at NTC or in the field. Units must
ensure their crews know how to operate multiple integrated laser engagement
system (MILES) and boresight daily.

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CHAPTER 19

The Armor Company in a

Cavalry Squadron
Operations Group, National Training Center
The tank company in a cavalry squadron serves a unique purpose, enabling
the squadron to retain and seize terrain. It provides the lethal firepower
needed to set the final conditions required before the commitment of
combined arms battalions into the fight. Most often at the National Training
Center (NTC), the commitment of the squadron’s tank company represents
the final culminating step of the squadron’s mission to shape the fight for the
brigade combat team (BCT). At this point, higher headquarters typically tell
the tank company to execute one of two tasks: To either reinforce a cavalry
troop’s security effort, or reinforce a cavalry troop’s reconnaissance effort.
However, the following training tasks depict the movement to contact as one
of the most critical. Although many units treat reinforcing a cavalry troop’s
reconnaissance effort as an attack, at the lowest levels, regardless of the clarity
of the enemy situation, everything becomes a movement to contact. Gaining
situational awareness, moving forward, establishing initial contact with the
smallest element possible, and then massing the effects of combat power of
the committed platoon or company to destroy, disrupt, or delay an enemy is at
the heart of the tank company’s role on the decisive action battlefield:
● Conduct an Area Defense (Tank Platoon) (17-PLT-1030).
● Conduct a Movement to Contact (Armor and Mechanized Infantry
Company Team) (Armored Brigade Combat Team [ABCT]) (17-CO-
1074).
Armor companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of a trained and functional command post.
● Lack of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for routine actions such
as establishing a tactical assembly area, stand-to, and forward passage of
lines.
● Lack of accurate logistics status (LOGSTAT) reporting.
● Lack of experience with logistic release point (LRP) operations.

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Companies often lack a trained and functional command post capable of

performing the six command post functions. Company commanders should
establish their command post whenever possible at home station. Frequently,
company command posts are only established during company-level or higher
collective training. However, commanders can establish their command post
during weekly maintenance operations, crew gunnery, or other collective
training to further develop the command post and its personnel. Similarly,
commanders should operationalize logistics during training events. Instead
of establishing a fuel truck at the gunnery range for service station operations,
commanders can train multiple tasks, enforce LOGSTAT reporting from
platoons, establish LRPs, and gain proficiency at LRP procedures. Companies
benefit from entering NTC with established SOPs. Actions that happen
frequently, such as establishing a tactical assembly area and conducting
stand-to should have checklists in an SOP that can easily be passed from
platoon leaders to tank commanders and gunners for execution.

THE TANK PLATOON IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank platoon in a cavalry
squadron should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Tactical Movement (Platoon) (07-PLT-1342).
● Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
● Conduct an Area Defense (Tank Platoon) (17-PLT-1030).
● Conduct an Attack by Fire (Platoon) (07-PLT-1256).
If a tank platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these tasks and masters
them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance of
success. Tank platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of accurate LOGSTAT reporting.
● Lack of established SOPs for priorities of work during troop leading
procedures (TLP).
Platoon sergeants must submit timely and accurate LOGSTATs and
consumption reports to the company or troop executive officer. The executive
officer must forecast the next 24, 48, and 72 hours accurately to allow time
for supplies to be routed to the company or troop. This is enabled by accurate
LOGSTATs from the platoons. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants should
develop SOPs that establish priorities of work for their crews during TLP.
Once the company or troop commander issues a warning order that describes
the type of operation, the platoons can begin preparing for the mission and
conduct rehearsals. Platoon SOPs should define what each crewmember
does for mission preparation. For example, the driver conducts preventive

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maintenance checks and services (PMCS) before operations, the loader

conducts machine gun maintenance, and gunner conducts boresight. Platoons
can then focus on mission-specific rehearsals. Many crew and platoon
preparations can be completed before the company or troop operation order,
allowing time for precombat inspections and checks, rehearsal of battle drills,
or rehearsals of the operation.

THE TANK CREW IN A CAVALRY SQUADRON

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank crew in a cavalry
squadron should focus on during home-station training:
● Boresight an M1A2 System Enhanced Package Tank With a Muzzle
Boresight Device (Crew) (17-CW-5695).
● Engage Targets With the Main Gun From an M1-Series Tank (Crew) (17-
CW-5622).
● Occupy a Vehicle Firing Position (Crew) (17-CW-2500).
● Conduct Recovery of a Tracked Vehicle (Crew) (17-CW-5160).
If the tank crews in the cavalry squadron focus on these tasks and master
them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater chance of
success. Tank crews should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of conducting boresight routinely.
● Lack of PMCS and maintenance.
The squadron needs lethal tank crews and platoons to succeed. Crews must
focus on maintenance and boresight operations to demonstrate lethality. Tank
commanders must enforce routine boresight procedures while at NTC, ideally
twice daily. A technique that works well is to boresight immediately following
stand-to and an hour before end evening nautical twilight. Additionally, tank
commanders must enforce before, during, and after PMCS daily. PMCS must
be conducted using a technical manual -10 and not from memory. A culture
of ownership of equipment and maintenance must start at home station. The
tank commander is responsible to ensure all actions to maintain the vehicle
are done to standard every day, ensure that mechanics verify faults, and ensure
that the Department of the Army Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and
Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991), makes it to the platoon sergeant.

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CHAPTER 20

The Forward Support Troop in a

Cavalry Squadron
Armored Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group
Sustainment of reconnaissance and security operations challenges every
armored brigade combat team cavalry squadron. The vast distances,
ambiguous situations, and evolving nature of the battlefield present a robust
problem set for every squadron. Additionally, current doctrine regarding
tactics, techniques, and procedures for sustainment on the large-scale combat
operations battlefield remains underdeveloped.
Combined Arms Training Strategy currently does not provide a training
and evaluation outline for critical sustainment tasks such as establish a field
trains command post (FTCP) or unit maintenance collection point. Further,
the current Headquarters, Department of the Army-directed mission essential
tasks do not adequately cover each of the fundamental tasks a forward support
company must enable in a large-scale combat operations scenario construct.
The maintenance teams from the forward support troop (FST) must be capable
of conducting field maintenance operations. The company headquarters
should be established with primary responsibility for FTCP operations. The
distribution platoon must be split between the combat trains command post
(CTCP) (emergency Class III and V supply) and the FTCP (logistics package
operations). The FST must understand how to ensure troopers remain fed
during combat operations. The entire company must be trained to operate
over distance from the brigade consolidation area to the battalion rear area.
Wherever they are located on the battlefield, the elements of the FST must
be capable of protecting themselves. The following are the top collective
training tasks an FST should focus on during home-station training:
● Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
● Provide Field Feeding Support (10-CO-0556).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
● Establish Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
● Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).

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The FST should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Lack of knowledge on doctrinal sustainment operations.
● Lack of integration between the FST and S-4 for sustainment operations.
● Lack of troop command post operations.
● Undefined duties and responsibilities for key leaders in an operational
environment.
● Not maintaining communications.
Challenges within an FST mimic the challenges with most forward support
companies, albeit on an amplified scale. The extended distances for an
FST, challenges of negotiating combined arms battalion battlespace, and
communications more prominently impact a FST. Therefore, increased
attention to these areas and ensuring the right leaders are placed at the points
of friction, best mitigates the challenges these organizations face.
Doctrinal sustainment operations should be reviewed and compared to the
squadron’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) on sustainment operations
to provide insight on the differences and expectations. Army Techniques
Publication 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (5 February 2016), Chapter 7,
provides guidance on sustainment operations and the CTCP. Understanding
doctrinal sustainment also provides defined duties and responsibilities for
the S-4 (logistical planner) and FST (logistics executioner), which can avoid
miscommunication, lack of integration and synchronization, and lack of
logistical support. If the FST executive officer, who usually runs command
post operations, operates away from the main troop command post, then
ensure that the FST headquarters element executes command post operations
in accordance with published SOPs. Analog tracking, battle tracking, and
digital communications (frequency modulation [FM], Joint Capabilities
Release [JCR], and Joint Battle Command-Platform [JBC-P]) are all critical
to the success of the FST as it provides the FST commander a clear picture of
the FST and logistics for the battalion. Communications is key to maintaining
command and control and visibility of all assets. Lastly, FST commanders
need to provide clear, concise duties and responsibilities to key leaders
within the company according to their position, role, and location (FTCP,
CTCP, and forward logistics element). That means, ensuring that each leader
understands his role, expectations, and responsibilities. For example, if the
executive officer is at the FTCP, is he expected to attend brigade support
battalion logistics synchronization? Does he communicate with the BSB for
any issues, friction points, or concerns, or is he there just to be a body in the
brigade support area?

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THE DISTRIBUTION PLATOON, FORWARD SUPPORT

TROOP
The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution platoon in a
cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:
● Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
● Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
● Conduct Logistics Package Support (63-TS-3390).
● Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
● Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).
If a distribution platoon in a cavalry squadron focuses on these five tasks and
masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance
of success. The distribution platoon should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Failure to execute logistic release point (LRP) procedures.
● Improper execution of mounted land navigation.
● Inadequate load plans and tie-down procedures.
● Lack of blackout driver training using night-vision devices.
● Lack of local security
● Lack of integration and synchronization with the CTCP or FTCP forward
to troop trains.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the distribution platoon must train on
and validate procedures for executing LRPs contained in the unit tactical
standard operating procedures. Additionally, the distribution platoon must
train on mounted land navigation and blackout driving in less than 25-percent
illumination. During home-station training, the platoon leader and platoon
sergeant must enforce proper load planning and cargo tie-down procedures.
They must conduct precombat inspections and checks as part of troop leading
procedures as a matter of routine. The distribution platoon must develop and
train on its SOPs and enforce a minimum of a 25-percent security posture. The
distribution platoon should incorporate stand-to procedures during training.
Additionally, the distribution platoon should execute resupply operations and
LRPs with first sergeants in accordance with unit SOPs during all training
events.

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THE MAINTENANCE CONTROL SECTION, FORWARD

SUPPORT TROOP
The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance control
section in a cavalry squadron should focus on during home-station training:
● Set Up Maintenance Section(s) (63-TS-4021/43-CO-0020).
● Conduct Preventive Maintenance Checks and Services (63-TS-3398/43-
CO-4575).
● Conduct Support Maintenance Operations (63-TS-4021/10-CO-0029).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (63-TS-4021/43-CO-4506).
● Perform Recovery Operations (63-TS-4021/43-CO-4071).
If a maintenance control section in a cavalry squadron focuses on these five
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a
greater chance of success. The maintenance control section should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Having a not mission-capable common operational picture (COP) not
reflecting the equipment status report.
● Lacking maintenance, recovery, and support requirements.
● Lacking shop stock list management at the field maintenance team.
● Struggling to monitor Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E,
Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991),
workflow and parts requisition.
● Lacking local security in the maintenance control point.
● Mismanagement of parts requisitions and petroleum, oil, and lubricants
consumption reporting.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the squadron maintenance officer and

squadron maintenance technician must develop a not mission-capable COP
that reinforces the equipment status report accuracy. All vehicles, JBC-P
systems, communication equipment, and ancillary equipment must reflect
proper administrative numbers in the Global Combat Support System-Army
(GCSS-Army). Equipment deadlines must reflect accurately by bumper
number in the equipment status report, and the maintenance control
section must track them on the not mission-capable COP. At home-
station training, the squadron must conduct field maintenance away
from the motor pool during gunnery, situational training exercises, and
live-fire exercises to reinforce and validate expeditionary processes,
reporting, and DA Form 5988-E workflow. The maintenance control section
must develop a maintenance collection point SOP that includes stand-to and
provides local security posture of at least 25 percent. Units must train on their
SOPs during home-station training.

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SECTION IV

Combined Arms Battalions

Recommended Task Focus Areas

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CHAPTER 21

The Combined Arms Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center
The central role of an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) combined
arms battalion (CAB) is “to close with and destroy enemy forces using fire,
maneuver, and shock effect, or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack.”1
The very nature of an ABCT CAB’s role on the modern battlefield requires
the ability to move quickly, combine capabilities dynamically, and coordinate
among multiple units to rapidly achieve the desired effects.
Although seemingly simple, these aspects of a CAB’s fundamental role imply
lethal crews and platoons that know each other, can coordinate, and can bring
overwhelming firepower to bear to compel an enemy to react. Given a CAB’s
fundamental purpose on the battlefield as part of an ABCT, commanders can
narrow the focus of their battalions to train these critical capabilities.
As a result, CABs should focus their home-station training on three specific
mission-essential tasks (METs). First, CABs must be capable of rapidly
moving forward on the battlefield and establishing contact with the smallest
element possible, rather than marching the entire formation into an enemy
engagement area. Second, when the enemy situation is more developed,
CABs must be able to quickly coordinate across the battalion to mass
firepower to accomplish brigade combat team (BCT)-level objectives. Finally,
once seized, CABs must retain terrain or critical areas to prevent an enemy
from performing a successful attack or counterattack. The following are the
top collective training tasks a CAB should focus on during home-station
training:
● Conduct an Area Defense (17-BN-1030).
● Conduct a Movement to Contact (17-BN-1074).
● Conduct an Attack (17-BN-1094).
Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to assess
proficiency in executing tasks. These three tasks constitute the majority of
battalion-level activities during a typical rotation at the National Training
Center (NTC). Furthermore, these tasks serve as the foundation for CABs
during large-scale combat operations as units are always either attacking
(when on the move) or defending (when stationary). Units conduct a
movement to contact when the situation is uncertain, followed by a transition
to a hasty attack or defense based on information gained by the unit in contact.

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A CAB should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Failing to synchronize warfighting functions and combined arms.
● Lack of specificity in the unit’s task organization.
● Unclear unit boundaries.
● Lack of anticipating transition points and supporting the CAB through
replenishment operations.
● Inadequate systems for timely and accurate reporting.
To overcome these pitfalls, CABs should routinely incorporate personnel from
outside the CAB, such as the fire support element personnel and engineers, to
build familiarity, refine standard operating procedures (SOPs), and increase
staff integration. The CAB’s fire support element should be integrated into
the CAB’s main command post layout and current operations section. CABs
should develop a planning SOP, clearly defining the minimum requirements
for annex A, task organization. This should include the “effective as of” date
and time group and the appropriate command and support relationships.
Staffs should rehearse terrain management and the development of graphic
control measures to support the commander’s intent. These graphic control
measures enable subordinate freedom of action by assigning company
areas of responsibility that allow greater control over the employment of
direct- and indirect-fire weapon systems. Units should execute Joint Battle
Command-Platform (JBC-P) and Joint Capabilities Release (JCR) training
to build familiarity with passing graphics via digital command and control
systems. Even during home-station training, companies should coordinate
through the CAB S-4 and the forward support company to receive classes of
supply and execute resupply via logistics package operations at a logistics
release point. Lastly, CABs should develop a detailed primary, alternate,
contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan by warfighting function for all
reports. A single PACE plan lacks the specificity required for a company
executive officer to understand how to send a yellow-1 logistics status when
the JBC-P breaks or for the battalion fire support officer to request field
artillery fires when the frequency modulated fires digital system goes down.
Figure 21-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for a CAB in
an ABCT. By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons of the BCT
increase their likelihood of success.

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Combined Arms Battalion (ABCT)(HQDA Directed) METs

Conduct Area Security. 07-BN-1272
BDE-Prioritized METs Conduct an Area Defense. 17-BN-1030
Conduct Area Defense. Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-BN-1074
Conduct Movement to Contact. Conduct an Attack. 17-BN-1094
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800

Battalion-Prioritized METs
Conduct an Area Defense. 17-BN-1030
Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-BN-1074
Conduct an Attack. 17-BN-1094
Infantry Company/Team METs (HQDA Directed) Armor Company/Team METs (HQDA Directed)
Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272 Conduct Area Security. 07-CO-1272
Conduct Area Defense. 17-CO-1030 Conduct Area Defense. 17-CO-1030
Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-CO-1074 Conduct a Movement to Contact. 17-CO-1074
Conduct an Attack. 17-CO-1094 Conduct an Attack. 17-CO-1094
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Infantry Company/Team-Prioritized METs Armored Company/Team-Prioritized METs
Conduct a Movement to Contact. 07-CO-1074 Conduct a Movement to Contact. 07-CO-1074
Conduct an Attack in an Urban Area 07-CO-1261 Conduct an Attack. 17-CO-1094
Breach an Obstacle (With Engineer Support). 07-CO-3073 Breach an Obstacle. 17-CO-3070
Conduct an Area Defense. 07-CO-9003 Conduct an Area Defense. 17-CO-1030
Infantry Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Tank Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012 Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012
Conduct Mounted Movement INF PLT. 071-420-0008 Conduct Tactical Movement. 07-PLT-1342
Conduct an Attack by an M2 BFV PLT. 071-420-0020 Change Formation While Mounted. 17-PLT-D9435
Conduct an Attack by a MECH INF PLT (Urban). 071-440-0022 Establish ABF/SBF. 07-PLT-1256, 07-PLT-300
Conduct an Area Defense. 07-PLT-1030 Conduct a Linkup. 07-PLT-1063
HHC METs (HQDA Directed) Forward Support Company METs (HQDA Directed)
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 63-CO-4574 Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
Support Command Posts for Companies. 71-CO-0433 Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882
HHC-Prioritized METs
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 63-CO-4574
Support Command Posts for Companies. 71-CO-0433 Forward Support Company-Prioritized METs
Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment OPS. 63-CO-4574 Provide Field Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
Scout Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882
Conduct Actions on Contact. 07-PLT-9012 Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Conduct Zone Reconnaissance. 17-PLT-4010 Perform Field Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
Conduct Area Reconnaissance. 17-PLT-4011
Conduct Route Reconnaissance. 17-PLT-4000 Distribution Platoon High-Payoff Tasks
Conduct Reconnaissance Handover. 17-PLT-4025 Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition. 55-PLT-0012
Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
Mortar Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Conduct Logistics Package Support. 63-TS-3390
Operate Mortar FDC. 07-PLT-5072 Conduct Tactical Convoy. 63-TS-2924
Process a Mortar Call for Fire. 07-PLT-5090 Defend Convoy Elements. 63-TS-2924
Reciprocal Lay and Aiming Circle. 07-PLT-D9268
Maintenance Control Section High-Payoff Tasks
Medical Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions. 43-CO-4053
Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-PLT-0312 Perform Recovery OPS. 43-CO-4071
Provide Emergency Medical Treatment. 08-PLT-0313 Establish a MAINT COLL and Classification PT. 43-CO-4393
Provide Ground Ambulance EVAC SUP. 08-PLT-0319 Perform Maintenance Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
Treat CBRN Contaminated Casualties. 08-PLT-0232 Conduct Maintenance Repairs and Inspections. 43-CO-7040

High-Payoff Leader Tasks Field-Feeding, High-Payoff Tasks

Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100 Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009 Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501
Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626
These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon
sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the
initiation of collective training.

Figure 21-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for a

combined arms battalion in an ABCT

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Endnote
1. Army Techniques Publication 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion, 5 February 2016.

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CHAPTER 22

The Main Command Post in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top training tasks a main command post (MCP) in a
combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Command Post Operations (150-MC-5200).
● Provide Input for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (150-MC-
2210).
● Perform a Rehearsal (150-MC-5122).
● Integrate the Command and Control Network (150-MC-5251).
● Establish the Common Operational Picture (150-MC-5315).
Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to assess
proficiency in executing tasks. These five tasks provide the foundational
functions of the MCP and enable it to receive, analyze, process, and share
information. An MCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● No future operations (FUOPS) to current operations (CUOPS) handover.
● Poor layout that stifles warfighting function integration and collaboration.
● Failure to perform basic preventive maintenance checks and services of
MCP equipment.
● Unclear responsibilities during command post transitions.
To avoid these common pitfalls, MCP staff should rehearse the formal
handover of a plan from the FUOPS section to the CUOPS section. This
should include a deliberate backbrief of the plan with WfF representatives. By
design, MCP setup and layout should facilitate crosstalk and communication
between staff sections. This collaboration is difficult to achieve when staffs
stovepipe information flow in separate vehicles. Analog products such as
map boards, combat power trackers, enemy kill charts, and printed fighting
products should be positioned where the staff can easily update them. Units
should routinely set up their MCP at home station to validate command
post standard operating procedures (SOPs) and identify equipment issues.
Each staff section should receive training on how to set up, tear down, and
maintain command post equipment. Particular attention should be paid to

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communications equipment and generators. A lone specialist cannot maintain

these systems and troubleshoot the inevitable faults that arise from operations
in austere conditions. Furthermore, the more familiar staff members are with
the command post equipment, the more they can leverage the capabilities
organic to a combined arms battalion MCP. Lastly, units should review their
command post SOP and ensure it includes the actions associated with a
deliberate transition between the tactical command post, MCP, and company
trains command post. SOPs should include responsibilities and authorities
associated with key personnel at each of these command posts during a
transition.

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CHAPTER 23

The Fire Support Element in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the collective training tasks a fire support element in a
combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Produce the Fire Support Plan (06-BN-1081).
● Develop an Observation Plan (061-284-4009).
● Conduct Rehearsals (Battalion/Squadron Fire Support Element and
Company/Troop Fire Support Team [FIST]) (06-TM-5089).
● Process the FIST Fire Plan (06-TM-5048).
● Conduct FIST Fire Missions (06-TM-5046).
If a fire support element supporting a combined arms battalion focuses on
these collective training tasks and masters them, the fires enterprise and
combined arms battalion stand a greater chance of remaining synchronized
and achieving success at the National Training Center (NTC). The fire support
element should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to maintain vehicles (Bradley fire support vehicle and other fire
support vehicles), communications equipment, and associated fire support
systems (Fire Support Sensor System, stand-alone computer units, or
ruggedized handheld terminal units).
● Lack of fighting products and poor dissemination.
● Lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities within the fire support
element.
● Failure to develop an observation plan.
● Lack of fire support plan understanding among the company/troop FIST.
At NTC, units struggle to properly identify if a Bradley fire support vehicle
or other fire support vehicles are fully mission capable. Fire support
noncommissioned officers must ensure fire support and communications
equipment are fully mission capable and should not just report the vehicles
maneuverability and weapon system status. A Bradley fire support vehicle
and other fire support vehicles that cannot observe or communicate should be
considered not mission capable.

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Fighting products are essential for the company/troop FIST to remain

synchronized and understand the fire support plan. Fighting products should
be standardized using standard operating procedures (SOPs). Fire support
officers must understand when products should be developed and refined
within the military decision-making process (MDMP) and troop leading
procedures. Products should be developed and disseminated to provide
adequate time for subordinates to develop bottom-up refinements.
Roles and responsibilities within the fire support element and FIST should be
provided in an SOP while referencing Army Techniques Publication 3-09.42,
Fire Support for the Brigade Combat Team (01 March 2016), and Field
Manual 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations (30 April 2020).
Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, fire support elements and
FISTs struggle to identify priorities of work and become desynchronized and
unable to focus on the execution of fires.
Rehearsals are vital for the synchronization and proper execution of the fires
plan. Rehearsals must be conducted at all echelons to ensure understanding
at the lowest level. Within the rehearsals, an observation plan should be
discussed. Observation plans should consider risk-estimate distances
combined with line of sight to develop primary, alternate, and possibly
tertiary observation posts. During the rehearsal, each target should be briefed
with its associated task and purpose in the form of a fire support task. This
will provide understanding and importance of a target to the company/troop
FIST.

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CHAPTER 24

The Battalion S-6 Section in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a battalion signal
(S-6) section in a combined arms battalion should focus on during
home-station training:
● Establish a Combat Network Radio Voice/Data Network (11-6-8009).
● Conduct Combat Network Radio (CNR) Retransmission (RETRANS)
Operations (11-CW-7017).
● Establish a Satellite Transportable Terminal (Warfighter Information
Network-Tactical [WIN-T] Increment 1)(11-CW-7021).
● Operate the Command Post Node (11-CW-7023).
● Provide Tactical Radio Support (11-CO-5002).
If a battalion S-6 section in a combined arms battalion focuses on these
five tasks and masters them before its National Training Center rotation, its
organization stands a greater chance of success. The battalion S-6 section
should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Not conducting precombat checks or inspections to standard for CNR
RETRANS operations.
● Before, during, and after signal maintenance is not conducted to standard.
● Lack of command post location planning.
● Not conducting systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device
(SPEED)/line-of-sight (LOS) analysis.
● Not spending time providing tactical radio support.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, combined arms battalion S-6 officers in

charge and noncommissioned officers in charge should use the certification
outlined in Training Circular 6-02.1, The United States Army Signal Corps
2019 Training Strategy (11 July 2019), for their RETRANS team and
CPN/Satellite Transportable Terminal (STT) team. Weekly repetitions of
establishing and conducting preventive maintenance checks and services
of RETRANS equipment and the CPN/STT are crucial to S-6 personnel
identifying broken equipment, training on the equipment, and becoming more
proficient on troubleshooting procedures. Signal maintenance needs to be
prioritized similar to wheeled maintenance. Services and signal maintenance
activities should be tracked on the equipment status report and discussed at
weekly maintenance meetings to fix shortfalls and broken signal equipment
across the battalion. S-6 officers in charge need to plan in coordination
with the S-3 operations sergeant major for future command post locations
using SPEED or a similar LOS analysis tool. Lastly, the S-6 section should
prioritize tactical radio support throughout maintenance activities and field
exercises to maintain the signal equipment across the battalion.

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CHAPTER 25

The Headquarters and Headquarters

Company and Combat Trains
Command Post Operations in a
Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top training tasks a headquarters and headquarters
company (HHC) in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during
home-station training:
● Maintain Communications (63-CO-4017).
● Coordinate Replenishment/Sustainment Operations (63-CO-4000).
● Coordinate Transportation Support Requirements with Battalion
Headquarters (55-CO-0076).
● Establish a Company Command Post (71-CO-0050).
The HHC commander has the responsibility of ensuring every Soldier in the
company is trained to support combat trains command post (CTCP) operations.
In practice, the CTCP coordinates supply and personnel movement across the
area of operations in support of the CAB commander’s requirements. The
CTCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of functioning Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P)/Joint
Capabilities Release (JCR) systems.
● Inadequate forecasting to anticipate requirements.
● Failure to track battalion operations and reporting.
To serve as a command post, the CTCP must communicate with other entities
in the brigade combat team’s area of operations. Since the CTCP is normally
positioned 5 to 8 kilometers away from the CAB’s main command post, it will
likely require beyond line-of-sight communications platforms. The JBC-P/
JCR capability provides reliable communications for the CTCP no matter the
distance from the CAB main command post or field trains command post.
Additionally, units should consider how to manage the process of receiving
battle damage and casualty reports. Normally, the S-1 and S-4 sections compile
these reports and submit reconstitution and personnel regeneration packets.
The brigade combat team may require these reports over Nonsecure Internet
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) systems. The unit Combat Service
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Support Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI) should be tested

before any operation, especially with up to three CAISIs at the CTCP (S-1,
S-4, and HHC). The CAB S-1 and S-4 are key players in replenishment and
sustainment operations and transportation. The S-4 should be trained on how
and when to communicate with the forward support company commander,
brigade combat team S-4, and support operations officer. From forecasting
and movement of supplies by the distribution platoon to requesting recovery
assets, the S-4 executes duties from the CTCP. The S-1 should also train
on casualty evacuation operations and how to contact Role 1, Role 2, and
mortuary affairs to get Soldiers back into the fight. The CTCP serves as the
CAB’s alternate command post; therefore, it requires personnel from HHC to
operate it and battle track. Several CTCPs struggle to receive and distribute
information. This may be caused by lack of equipment and manning shortfalls.
The CTCP requires staff sections to provide a representative to work out of
the CTCP to provide continuity in the event of the main command post being
destroyed.

THE SCOUT PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a scout platoon in a CAB
should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
● Conduct Zone Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4010).
● Conduct Area Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4011).
● Conduct Route Reconnaissance (17-PLT-4000).
● Conduct Reconnaissance Handover (17-PLT-4025).
Scout platoons should use the training and evaluation outline (T&EO) for
each task to assess proficiency in executing tasks. These tasks constitute the
majority of scout activities during a typical rotation at the National Training
Center (NTC). Furthermore, the supporting collective and individual tasks
associated with these five collective tasks provide a thorough training plan
for units preparing for large-scale combat operations. Scout platoons should
avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of operational combat power (M2A3 Bradley).
● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (Long-Range Acquisition
System [LRAS], Target Reconnaissance Infrared Geolocating Range
Finder [TRIGR], Raven, Javelin, or high-frequency radio).

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● Lack of the commander’s reconnaissance guidance (focus, tempo,

engagement and disengagement criteria, displacement criteria, or bypass
criteria).
● Lack of local security.
To avoid these pitfalls, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant should enforce
maintenance standards, and provide leader participation and supervision
during preventive maintenance checks and services. During home-station
training, the platoon should validate load plans and review where specialized
equipment is stored or mounted. The platoon should develop a standardized
priority of work for each vehicle in the platoon. This level of detail enables the
platoon to rapidly execute priorities of work during a consolidation period.
Understanding the importance of detailed commander’s reconnaissance
guidance cannot be overstated. This guidance allows the platoon to understand
how to execute actions on the reconnaissance objective. CAB leadership
should be prepared to provide detailed commander’s reconnaissance
guidance. Additionally, the scout platoon should work closely with the CAB
S-2 section to develop the information collection synchronization matrix
and collection plan. Developing working relationships with the S-2 section
enhances the platoon’s ability to answer commander’s critical information
requirements and enables the commander to make decisions. Scout platoons
should rehearse planning and executing local security operations. This
includes defining minimum security posture requirements (normally, no
less than 25-percent awake at all times) and incorporate stand-to procedures
during field exercise.

THE MORTAR PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a mortar platoon in a CAB
should focus on during home-station training:
● Operate a Mortar Fire Direction Center (07-PLT-5072).
● Process a Mortar Call for Fire (07-PLT-5090).
● Reciprocal Lay With Aiming Circle (07-PLT-D9268).
Units should use the T&EO for each task to assess proficiency in executing
tasks. These three tasks constitute the majority of mortar platoon activities
during a typical rotation at NTC. Furthermore, these tasks serve as the
foundation for other collective tasks the platoon may be required to execute.
Mortar platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Inadequate maintenance focus, specifically the M1064 mortar track.
● Lack of Infantry Mortar Leader Course (IMLC)-qualified Soldiers.

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● Shortfalls with a functioning JBC-P or JCR.

● Lack of a CAB fire support standard operating procedure (SOP) that
includes mortar employment.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant
must work with their maintenance section to ensure vehicles are maintained
properly. Because of the age of the M1064 and the challenges of operating
the equipment in the austere environment of NTC, platoons may not be
able to maintain all their vehicles. During the year, several mortar platoons
arrived to NTC without IMLC-qualified Soldiers. This shortfall limits the
platoon’s ability to provide indirect fire support for the CAB. The mortar
platoon sergeant should closely monitor the status of IMLC qualifications
in the platoon and promptly highlight issues to battalion leadership as
needed. The mortar platoon should field and train with modified table of
organization and equipment-authorized equipment before arriving to NTC.
Over the past year, several mortar platoons failed to bring working JBC-P or
JCR platforms and possessed marginal very high frequency (VHF),
frequency modulated (FM) radios. The platoon should execute technical
rehearsals at home-station using its equipment to validate the functionality
of sensor-to-shooter links. The fire direction center serves as a safety check
when clearing ground in support of indirect fire missions. It cannot perform
this requirement without working command and control systems. The mortar
platoon leader and platoon sergeant should work closely with the CAB S-3
and fire support officer to validate the unit’s fires SOP and tactical standard
operating procedures (TACSOPs). The SOP should include details such as
responsibilities, positioning authorities, unit basic loads, and fire mission
processing procedures.

THE MEDICAL PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a medical platoon in a
combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Manage Health Service Support Operations (08-PLT-0312).
● Provide Emergency Medical Treatment (08-PLT-0313).
● Provide Sick Call Services (08-PLT-0316).
● Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (08-PLT-0319).

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Army Techniques Publication 4-02.3, Army Health System Support to

Maneuver Forces (9 June 2014), should be used in conjunction with the
aforementioned T&EOs to develop training plans and assess training
proficiency. Medical platoon training should focus on supporting the
commander’s scheme of maneuver while retaining a focus on the delivery of
medical care. The following are common pitfalls the medical platoons should
avoid:
● Failure to plan.
● Lack of a medical SOP.
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives
(CBRNE), and enhanced conventional weapons training.
● Lack of support for casualty evacuation.
● Lack of mass casualty training.
● Lack of patient tracking.
To overcome these pitfalls, the CAB medical officer and platoon sergeant
must ensure they focus on planning and continuous training. Planning is a
dynamic and continuous process. During home-station training, the medical
officer should include noncommissioned officers and the surgeon/physician
assistant when developing platoon SOPs. A standardized priority of work
should be identified and developed for each section in the platoon to ensure
everyone can immediately start working through the list of tasks during a
consolidation period. Additional emphasis should be placed on operations
in a CBRNE-contaminated environment, decontamination operations, triage
of patients, and evacuation considerations. The medical officer and platoon
sergeant should develop a mass casualty plan and include company leaders
to ensure a shared understanding of responsibilities during mass casualty
operations. Enforce patient tracking using electronic systems, or if not
available, rehearse the application of appropriate documentation and forms
during home-station training.

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CHAPTER 26

The Armor Company in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a tank company should
train on to be effective at the National Training Center (NTC). These tasks are
often the building blocks of larger tasks and areas the task force commander
should expect company commanders to execute with minimal guidance:
● Conduct Movement to Contact (17-CO-1074).
● Breach an Obstacle (17-CO-3070).
● Conduct Area Defense (17-CO-1030).
● Conduct an Attack (17-CO-109407-CO-1342).
Tank companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services.
● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (plows; rollers; or chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives [CBRNE] equipment).
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of local security.
● Lack of forecasting consumption (water, food, fuel, or ammunition).
Tank companies normally operate aggressively while at NTC; however,
every attack eventually transitions to a defense, and every defense provides
the company with an opportunity to prepare for an attack. Companies cannot
afford to forgo the steps of establishing local security while they consolidate,
reorganize, and prepare for future operations. The armor company executes
combined arms breaches as part of a larger combined arms force. Leaders
should become familiar with and rehearse their possible roles in supporting
the combined arms battalion execute breaching fundamentals. A commander
should not wait to discover the plows and rollers do not work because of lack
of inspecting equipment before the rotation. The occupation of an assembly
area is a deliberate task that provides the space and time for troop leading
procedures (TLP), maintenance, and sustainment to occur. The failure

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to occupy an assembly area stems from units not following their standard
operating procedures (SOPs). The composition and tasks of a quartering party,
priorities of work, and necessary security should be understood throughout
the company and trained at home station.

TANK PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS BATTALION

The following are the top collective training tasks a tank platoon should focus
on during home-station training to be effective at NTC. These tasks are often
the building blocks of larger tasks and are areas the company commander
should expect platoon leaders to execute with minimal guidance:
● Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
● Conduct Tactical Movement (07-PLT-1342).
● Change Formation While Mounted (17-PLT-D9435).
● Establish Attack by Fire/Support by Fire (07-PLT-1256, 07-PLT-3000).
● Conduct a Linkup (07-PLT-1063).
Units should use the training and evaluation outline for each task to
assess proficiency in executing tasks. These tasks constitute the majority of
platoon-level activities during a typical rotation at the NTC. Tank platoons
should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services.
● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (plows, rollers, or CBRNE
equipment).
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of local security.
● Lack of consumption reporting (water, food, fuel, or ammunition).
Tank platoons must fight while in maneuver formations and make use
of available cover to prevent losses. Platoon leaders should rehearse changing
formations and intentionally limit very high frequency (VHF), frequency
modulated (FM), Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P), or Joint
Capabilities Release (JCR) systems to stress the platoon’s ability to maintain
tempo in a degraded environment. Typically, tank platoons support other
company team requirements from an attack by fire or support by fire position.
These tasks often occur during rearward passage of lines or forward passage
of lines operations and should be rehearsed during home-station situational
training exercises. Platoon leaders should review unit SOPs and ensure tank
commanders understand the procedures for linkup with the passing unit.

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To overcome the pitfalls stated above, platoon leaders must educate their
Soldiers on equipment including systems within the M1 tank. Classes
with field maintenance team representatives should be held to quickly and
accurately identify faults, correctly record faults within the Army system of
record, and return the tank to fully mission capable status. Platoon leaders
should work with platoon sergeants to review standards for priorities of work
with consolidating and reorganizing. This should include considerations for
local security and camouflage, and preparing range cards and sector sketches.
Lastly, the platoon sergeant should work with the company executive officer
to validate reporting formats and confirm the primary, alternate, contingency,
emergency (PACE) plan to ensure the platoon provides accurate and timely
logistics status reports.

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CHAPTER 27

The Mechanized Company in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry
company in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during
home-station training:
● Conduct Movement to Contact (07-CO-1073).
● Conduct an Attack in an Urban Area (07-CO-1261).
● Breach an Obstacle (With Engineer Support) (07-CO-3073).
● Conduct an Area Defense (07-CO-9003).
The mechanized infantry should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of planning and rehearsals at the company level.
● Failure to maintain movement formations and control during movement
to contact and actions on contact.
● Lack of casualty evacuation plans.
● Failure to understand field maintenance operations and forecasting classes
of supply (especially Class I, III, V, and IX).
● Not integrating mounted and dismounted anti-tank systems into offense
and defense schemes of maneuver.

THE MECHANIZED PLATOON IN A COMBINED ARMS

BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry
platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Actions on Contact (07-PLT-9012).
● Conduct a Mounted Movement Infantry Platoon (071-420-0008).
● Conduct an Attack by an M2 Bradly Fighting Vehicle (BFV) Platoon
(071-420-0020).

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● Conduct an Attack by a Mechanized Infantry Platoon (Urban) (071-440-

0022).
● Conduct an Area Defense (07-PLT-1030).
The mechanized infantry platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of direct fire and graphic control measures (specifically in support
of urban operations).
● Failure to execute deliberate planning and rehearsals at the platoon level.
● Failure to anticipate the probable line of contact and planning for dismount
points.
● Not maintaining control of the platoon element during actions on the
objective or actions on contact (tactical patience).

THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY SQUAD IN A COMBINED

ARMS BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks a mechanized infantry
squad in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Movement Techniques by a Squad (071-326-5610).
● Conduct Maneuver of an M2 BFV Section/Squad (071-420-0007).
● Conduct an Attack on a Building (M2 BFV) (Urban) (071-440-0014).
● Conduct a Point Anti-Armor Ambush (M2 Squad) (071-326-5804).
● Conduct a Defense (Mounted Section) (Urban) (071-440-0016).
The mechanized infantry squads should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Squad leaders fail to conduct mission-specific battle drill rehearsals.
● Lack of integration of a dismounted infantry maneuver with BFV support
(to include understanding).
● Managing the dismounted Soldier’s loads across restricted terrain
movements.
● Failure to conduct Soldier-level precombat checks and inspections.

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The National Training Center (NTC) requires leaders to execute troop leading
procedures in a dynamic, time-constrained environment. Leaders must
prioritize these steps to create a detailed, thorough plan while adhering to
the one-third, two-thirds rule. Commanders should train their leaders on the
various types of rehearsals and reinforce the need to focus on synchronizing
efforts. Mechanized infantry platoons and squads should be proficient at their
individual Soldier tasks and battle drills. This requires formal instruction
and situational training exercises to achieve a level of mastery. Furthermore,
Soldiers should be proficient on the employment of all modified table of
organization and equipment-authorized weapon systems and aiming devices
under limited visibility and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
enhanced conventional weapons conditions. Particular attention should
be paid to the employment of anti-tank weapon systems such as the
FGM-148 Javelin missile and the M2 BFV’s Tube-Launched, Optically
Tracked, Wireless-Guided Bunker Buster (TOW 2B) system.
Vehicle load plans should be inspected during home-station training events to
validate unit standard operating procedures and ensure the requisite classes of
supply are accounted for. This includes considerations for situational obstacle
construction and its associated Class IV requirements. Additionally, company
and platoon leaders should inspect command and control systems to repair
faults ahead of deploying to NTC. Platoons should train on integrating their
M2 BFVs with dismount squads when fighting in restrictive terrain. This
includes the employment of heavy weapons to reduce bunkers or built-up
fighting positions in urban areas.
Lastly, leaders at all echelons in the mechanized infantry company should
spend time cross training on vehicle maintenance. The dismounts squads
will struggle to reach their objectives if the M2 BFVs are not mission
capable. Therefore, everyone in the company should have a vested interest
in maintaining their assigned equipment. This requires leaders to use the
eight-step training model (especially step 2, train the trainers) to educate their
Soldiers on how to work, employ, and maintain equipment.

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CHAPTER 28

The Forward Support Company in a

Combined Arms Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a forward support
company (FSC) in a combined arms battalion (CAB) should focus on during
home-station training:
● Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
● Establish Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
● Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).
The FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of knowledge on doctrinal sustainment operations.
● Lack of integration between the FSC and S-4 for sustainment operations.
● Untrained company command post operations.
● Undefined duties and responsibilities for key leaders in an operational
environment.
● Not maintaining communications.
Doctrinal sustainment operations should be reviewed and compared to the
CAB’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) on sustainment operations
to provide insight on the differences and expectations. Army Techniques
Publication 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion (5 February 2016), provides
guidance on sustainment operations and the combat trains. Understanding
doctrinal sustainment also provides defined duties and responsibilities for
the S-4 (logistical planner) and the FSC (logistics executioner), which can
avoid miscommunication, lack of integration and synchronization, and lack
of logistical support. If the FSC executive officer, who usually runs command
post operations, operates away from the main company command post, then
ensure the FSC headquarters element executes command post operations
in accordance with published SOPs. Analog tracking, battle tracking, and
digital communications (frequency modulation [FM], Joint Capabilities
Release [JCR], or Joint Battle Command-Platform [JBC-P]) are critical to
the success of the FSC, because it provides the FSC commander a clear

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picture of the FSC and logistics for the battalion. Communication is key
to maintain command and control and visibility of all assets. Lastly, FSC
commanders need to provide clear and concise duties and responsibilities to
key leaders within the company according to their position, role, and location
(field trains command post [FTCP], combat trains command post [CTCP],
or forward logistics element). This means ensuring each leader understands
his role, expectations, and responsibility (i.e., if the executive officer is at
the FTCP, is he expected to attend brigade support battalion [BSB] logistics
synchronizations? Does he communicate with the BSB concerning issues,
friction points, or concerns, or is he there just to be a body in the BSA?).

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD TRAINS

COMMAND POST
The following are the collective training tasks an FSC in a CAB should focus
on during home-station training to establish an FTCP:
● Maintain Continuity of Command and Control (71-CO-5250).
● Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-CO-5100).
● Establish a Company Command Post in an Operational Environment (71-
CO-0050).
● Conduct a Hasty Displacement (63-CO-4023).
● Occupy an Assembly Area (07-CO-9014).
By focusing and mastering these five tasks before a National Training Center
(NTC) rotation, the FTCP will provide effective support to the CAB.
An FTCP FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of proper personnel at the FTCP.
● Inability to communicate with the CTCP and battalion.
● Junior leaders positioned at the FTCP not having a clear understanding of
their roles and responsibilities.
● Lack of synchronization with the BSB support operations officer for
resupply.
● Not understanding the role of the FTCP and integrating into the BSB and
maneuver battalion plan.

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The FTCP is typically co-located with the BSA for the purpose of
synchronizing and integrating the FSC with BSB operations. The FTCP
provides the connection between the CAB and the BSB for any support
requirements. The FSC commander must carefully analyze which personnel
and assets will remain at the FTCP that could increase the ability to provide
adequate and timely logistical support to the maneuver battalion. Distribution
assets including company supply trains are recommended to position at the
FTCP so they can build out unit breaks and provide tailored supply packages
to companies. Personnel from the maintenance control section should also
remain at the FTCP, because they are the connection and processing for Class
IX parts from the supply support activity. They provide a forcing function to
ensure the flow of Class IX parts forward to the unit maintenance collection
point. Effective FTCP operations require functioning command and control
systems to communicate with other command posts in the CAB (main
command post, unit maintenance collection point, and CTCP). The FTCP
should include a JBC-P/JCR tactical operations center kit or, at a minimum,
a working vehicle kit. Soldiers assigned to the FTCP should understand their
responsibilities and receive a copy of the unit’s command post SOP to enable
disciplined initiative.

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD-FEEDING

SECTION
The following are the top collective training tasks a field-feeding section in
an FSC in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:
● Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).
● Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation (10-PLT-4501).
By focusing on and mastering these tasks before an NTC rotation, the
field-feeding section can provide appropriate Class I support to the CAB. A
field-feeding section in an FSC should avoid the following pitfalls:
● Failure to adhere to sanitation standards and regulations.
● Failure to utilize assault kitchens as an option for hot chow.
● Lack of proper licensing on equipment.
● Lack of knowledge or synchronization of a maneuver plan to understand
a ration meal cycle.
● Inability to conduct night-driving operations.

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The constant forward movement of a CAB leaves limited time for the
field-feeding section to set up, prepare, cook, and tear down. Leaders should
consider the option of employing assault kitchens rather than containerized
kitchens, because they provide greater flexibility. Safety and sanitation
regulations must be well known and adhered to. Although it is easier to have
a field shower and hygiene location near the field-feeding area for the Army
food service specialists, proper spacing of personal hygiene areas must be
maintained to preserve combat power. FSC commanders and first sergeants
should check to ensure the field-feeding section understands and employs
safety and sanitation requirements. Every Soldier in the field-feeding section
should be properly licensed on the section’s equipment. The section should
be able to operate a prime mover along with a trailer. In addition to licensing,
the section should be able to drive under limited visibility conditions. A
critical part of field-feeding support is knowing the ration cycle and how it
ties in with the maneuver plan. Field-feeding sections should work to obtain
the CAB’s plan to understand Class I requirements.

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY DISTRIBUTION

PLATOON
The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC distribution platoon
in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:
● Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
● Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
● Conduct Logistics Package Support (63-TS-3390).
● Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
● Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).
A distribution platoon in an FSC should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of knowledge on different types of logistics release point operations.
● Failure to conduct convoy briefs, rehearsals, and precombat checks and
inspections.
● Lack of knowledge to conduct mounted land navigation.
● Inability to execute nighttime operations.
● Lack of proper knowledge on convoy operations.

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The distribution platoon serves as the lifeline between sustainment

support and the CAB; therefore, it should train on and rehearse different
methods of distribution in accordance with Army Techniques Publication
4-90, Brigade Support Battalion (18 June 2020). Logistics release point
operations should be rehearsed in conjunction with other unit training events.
Platoon leadership should practice the troop leading procedures for all
home-station training events and ensure convoy briefs are executed along with
rehearsals, precombat checks and inspections, and communications checks.
Platoons should also train on convoy operations and cover battle drills,
convoy composition, order of march for commodities, and communications
plans. Leaders should stress the importance of land navigation training and
ensure modified table of organization and equipment-authorized equipment
functions. Every vehicle commander should carry a map and understand
how to plot the current location and destination, and provide directions
to the driver. Additionally, leaders should ensure Soldiers train on how to
operate their equipment under limited visibility conditions. This is especially
important given the requirements placed on the distribution platoon to push
classes of supply at all hours.

THE FORWARD SUPPORT COMPANY FIELD MAINTENANCE

PLATOON
The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC field maintenance
platoon in a CAB should focus on during home-station training:
● Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).
● Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).
● Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-
4393).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
● Conduct Maintenance Repairs and Inspections (43-CO-7040).
A field maintenance platoon in an FSC should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Failure to properly inventory and label containers (shop stock list [SSL]).
● Lack of demand analysis before deployment.
● Not maintaining an analog tracker for combat slant and equipment status
reports.
● Failure to properly employ the field maintenance teams into the
maintenance support plan.

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● Lack of ability to maintain an effective workflow of Department of the

Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection
Worksheet (1 March 1991).
The maintenance platoon relies heavily on its SSL to minimize the turnaround
time on critical pacing items. The organization and proper inventory of its
containers provides a quick identification and the location of parts when
needed. The shop office needs to ensure inventories are conducted per Army
Regulation 710-2, Supply Policy Below the National Level (28 March 2008),
and replenish parts as they are consumed. Besides the SSL, auto replenishment
and re-order points need to be identified and annotated to upkeep the unit’s
SSL. Before a combat training center rotation, battalion maintenance teams
should review demand analysis to determine shop and bench stock demands
and order Class IX supplies accordingly. By doing so, the platoon will decrease
repair time and maintain combat power. The shop office mainly works off
the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) connectivity
and the very small aperture terminal (VSAT) in operational environments;
however, analog trackers are just as important. They provide a quick look at
the combat slant and a running log of equipment statuses. Analog trackers
also provide continuity when the unit maintenance collection point displaces,
or in between VSAT hours. As a system of record and annotation of identified
faults, DA Form 5988-E serves as the communication bridge between vehicle
crews and maintenance enterprise. The maintenance platoon should establish
a feasible DA Form 5988-E workflow plan that supports the maneuver
units, maneuver plan, and maintenance operations. Field maintenance teams
should also train on their own recovery and repair capabilities along with
communications systems required for coordination with the unit maintenance
collection point.

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SECTION V

Field Artillery Battalion

Recommended Task Focus Areas

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CHAPTER 29

The Field Artillery Battalion in an

Armored Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
Army doctrine clearly defines the fundamental role of a field artillery (FA)
battalion in an armored brigade combat team (ABCT):
“The field artillery has the role of destroying, defeating, or
disrupting the enemy with integrated fires to enable maneuver
commanders to dominate in unified land operations. The FA
battalion also provides counterfire against enemy mortar,
cannon, and rocket elements ... The FA battalion performs
basic FA tasks derived from Field Manual 7-15, The Army
Universal Task List, to include: deploy and conduct maneuver;
develop intelligence; employ fires: close combat, shaping, and
counterfire; perform sustainment; exercise mission command;
protect the force.1
The FA battalion is responsible for synchronizing and sustaining indirect fire
throughout the operation, acquiring and developing an observer plan, and
assisting the ABCT with employing and managing indirect fire assets. The
following are collective tasks that provide the greatest amount of readiness:
● Control Field Artillery Operations (06-BN-1021).
● Direct the Employment of FA Acquisition Assets (06-BN-2006).
● Conduct Battalion Fire Missions (06-BN-5001).
● Synchronize Fires (06-BN-5076).
● Conduct Fires (06-BN-6011).
To effectively deliver timely and accurate indirect fires in support of an ABCT,
it is imperative for a FA battalion to control FA operations. The FA battalion’s
ability to synchronize fires and integrate acquisition assets, employing them
in support of a brigade combat team’s targeting process, provides the brigade
the capability to detect and deliver fires. ABCTs collectively demonstrate
their ability to synchronize fires when conducting battalion fire missions,
massing their guns at the decisive point.

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A field artillery battalion should avoid the following common pitfalls:

● Incomplete rehearsals.
● Desynchronized or incomplete primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) plans.
● Poor analysis of required effects versus fire order standards.
● Failure to integrate a complete a sustainment plan into future operations.
FA battalions in ABCTs often find that the execution of their plan hinges on
the completeness of the field artillery support plan (FASP) and how it was
rehearsed. Although the battalion must take part in the greater fires enterprise
and is often beholden to the brigade’s plan and rehearsal schedule, there is
plenty the FA battalion can do internally to ensure success of an operation.
The battalion should ensure the PACE plan has a variety of systems, not just
different methods or channels using the same equipment. The fires digital
net is not holistically different from the fires voice net. These both are likely
frequency modulation and would be considered primary number one and
two, as opposed to primary and alternate. Battalions should incorporate high
frequency, blue force trackers and other systems into the PACE plan. The plan
must also be synchronized to the higher and lower command node locations.
Planners must consider use of retransmission teams and transitions from the
main command post to tactical command posts.
On the fire mission processing side, fire orders should reflect the effects
desired against the enemy in the impact area. The battalion must work
with the brigade intelligence section and the battalion S-2 to understand
the disposition and composition of the enemy the battalion will fire upon.
Understanding who and what the enemy is, combined with the effects desired
by the commander, should drive the fire orders given at the battalion level.
A battery fire mission of three rounds of high explosive will not destroy an
enemy tank formation.

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To ensure the battalion is capable of completing fire orders, planners must

ensure a complete sustainment plan is integrated into the FASP. Ammunition
management is paramount. Sustainment and operation planners should have
a shared understanding of what and where combat configuration loads are
located. Leaders from the battalion level down should understand the time
and distance required to replenish ammunition, how much ammunition they
can carry, and at what trigger they must call forward for that ammunition.
Additionally, other commodities must be accounted for through regular
battle rhythm events like logistic status reports and maintenance meetings.
Specifically, maintenance for an M019A6/7 Paladin must be a main concern
for battalion leaders. Equipment service reports must reflect ground truth,
and Department of the Army Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and
Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991), workflows must be incorporated into
battle rhythms and plans.
Finally, a complete tactical and technical rehearsal will synchronize all
these parts. The tactical rehearsal should not be an operation order brief.
Subordinate commanders and staff sections should brief their actions
throughout the operation as briefed in time and space. The S-3 should lead
the tactical rehearsal and the S-2 should brief the enemy situation. The
result of the tactical rehearsal is the collective understanding of all units
and identification of significant issues with the plan. The battalion should
complete, at minimum, two technical rehearsals. The first should be internal
to the battalion to validate primary and alternate shooters, and provide
bottom-up refinement to the brigade’s fire support plan. The second rehearsal
should be completed with the entire fires enterprise, sensor to shooter, and
should end with complete understanding of the mission flow as the operation
unfolds and the method by which the mission should be sent to the shooter.
Focusing on these challenges during home-station training will allow for a
successful National Training Center rotation and deployment.
Figure 29-1 depicts the mission essential/battle task crosswalk for the FA
battalion of an ABCT. By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons
of the BCT increase their likelihood of success.

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Field Artillery Battalion (ABCT)(HQ DA Directed) METs

Control Field Artillery OPS. 06-BN-1021
BDE-Prioritized METs Direct Employment of FA Acquisition Assets. 06-BN-2006
Conduct Area Defense. Conduct Battalion Fire Missions. 06-BN-5001
Conduct Movement to Contact. Synchronize Fires. 06-BN-5076
Conduct Fires. 06-BN-6011
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800
Field Artillery Battalion (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
Control Field Artillery OPS. 06-BN-1021
Direct Employment of FA Acquisition Assets. 06-BN-2006
Conduct Battalion Fire Missions. 06-BN-5001
Synchronize Fires. 06-BN-5076
Conduct Fires. 06-BN-6011
HHB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed) FA Battery (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)
Occupy a Tactical Area for HHB. 06-BTRY-3000 Occupy a Tactical Area. 06-BTRY-3001
Perform Recon Ops for ARTY Positions. 06-BTRY-3005 Perform RECON OPS for SP ARTY Positions. 06-BTRY-3003
Establish an Aid Station. 06-SEC-3005 Process Fire Missions. 06-BTRY-5424
Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
FA Battery (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
HHB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs Occupy a Tactical Area. 06-BTRY-3001
Occupy a Tactical Area for HHB. 06-BTRY-3000 Perform RECON OPS for SP ARTY Positions. 06-BTRY-3003
Perform Recon Ops for ARTY Positions. 06-BTRY-3005 Process Fire Missions. 06-BTRY-5424
Establish an Aid Station. 06-SEC-6025
Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515 FDC High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Process Fire Missions. 06-PLT-5424
Target Acquisition PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks Conduct Emergency Fire Missions. 06-PLT-5010
Provide Input to the Targeting Process. 06-BN-5435 Determine Firing Data. 06-SEC-5016
Emplace a Weapons Locating. 06-SEC-2046 Perform Fire Mission in Degraded Mode. 06-SEC-5027
Reconnoiter a LCMR Position. 06-SEC-5088 Perform the Transfer of Fire Direction BOC
Locate Targets with a Radar System. 06-SEC-6047 Control Functions. 06-BTRY-6009

FSC METs (HQDA Directed) FA PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks

Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830 Occupy a Tactical Area. 06-BTRY-3001
Provide Field Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056 Establish Firing Capability for a Paladin PLT. 06-PLT-5012
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518 Control a FA Unit Move. 06-PLT-1038
Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882 Conduct TLP. 71-PLT-5100
Conduct Area Security. 06-BTRY-4004
FSC-Prioritized METs
Provide Field Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056 High-Payoff Leader Tasks
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518 Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882 Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009
Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727 Prepare an Operation Order (OPORD). 071-326-5626
Perform Field Maintenance. 43-CO-4552 These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon
Distribution PLT High-Payoff Tasks sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the
Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition. 55-PLT-0012 initiation of collective training.
Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
Conduct LOGPAC Support. 63-TS-3390 Field-Feeding, High-Payoff Tasks
Conduct Tactical Convoy. 63-TS-2924 Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
Defend Convoy Elements. 63-TS-2924 Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501

MAINT Control Section High-Payoff Tasks

Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions. 43-CO-4053
Perform Recovery OPS. 43-CO-4071
Establish MAINT COLL and Classification PT. 43-CO-4393
Perform MAINT Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
Conduct MAINT Repairs/Inspections. 43-CO-7040

Figure 29-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk

for the FA Battalion of an ABCT

Endnote
1. Army Techniques Publication 3-09.23, Field Artillery Cannon Battalion, 24
September 2015, page 1-2.

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CHAPTER 30

The Main Command Post in a

Field Artillery Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a main command post
(MCP) in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station
training:
● Establish an Operations Center (06-BN-1063).
● Prepare the Field Artillery Operations Estimate (06-BN-1036).
● Control a Field Artillery Unit Move (06-BN-1038).
● Conduct the Operations Process for Command and Control (71-BN-
5100).
● Perform a Rehearsal (71-BN-5122).
If an MCP in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters
them before its National Training Center rotation, it stands a greater chance
of success. The MCP should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of leader involvement in command post site selection.
● Not adhering to the doctrinal military decision-making process (MDMP)
steps.
● Lack of tactical and technical rehearsals.
● Lack of communication across warfighting functions within the MCP.
The site selection for the MCP must take into account the ability to
communicate with subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters,
along with dispersed sections such as retransmission and radar. The staff
should understand the inputs and outputs required by each staff section to
effectively contribute to the MDMP. Staff sections outside the S-3 section
do not identify friction points early in the planning process or maintain a
running estimate throughout the exercise. Maintaining a running estimate
by staff section identifies friction points and planning considerations that
assist in planning during a condensed MDMP timeline. Tactical and technical
rehearsals provide shared understanding across the staff and subordinate
units. Technical rehearsals identify friction points in the target list worksheet
and allow time to adjust the firing order before execution. Communication
across the staff within the MCP ensures a shared understanding and ensures
leaders are informed when issues arise.
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CHAPTER 31

The Field Artillery Battalion

S-6 Section
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the collective training tasks a battalion S-6 section in a
field artillery (FA) battalion should focus on during home-station training.
These tasks focus on specific training shortcomings observed at the National
Training Center (NTC) as a supplement to basic military occupational
specialty proficiency and unit training:
● Establish a Combat Network Radio (CNR) Voice/Data Network (11-6-
8009).
● Select a Radio/Retransmission Station (RETRANS) Site (113-611-1000).
● Conduct CNR RETRANS Operations (11-CW-7017).
● Conduct Table IV through VI certification for RETRANS and Satellite
Transportable Terminal/Command Post Node Crews (Section 3-2 of
Training Circular 6-02.1, The U.S. Army Signal Corps 2019 Training
Strategy [11 July 2019]).
● Install Army Navy (AN)/Vehicle Radio Communications-104
High Frequency Vehicular Radio or Similar Equipment (13-620-4001).
● Prepare a High-Frequency Plan for AN/Portable Radio
Communications-150 Using Radio Programming Application Software
(113-620-2000).
These identified collective tasks provide FA battalion S-6 sections a list of
tasks that directly address challenges at NTC and increase their chances
for success during their rotation. FA battalion S-6 sections should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and precombat
checks and inspections for CNR RETRANS operations.
● Lack of knowledge on brigade maneuver and RETRANS plans.
● Inability to perform systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device
(SPEED)/line-of-sight (LOS) analysis.
● Inability to perform night driving and land navigation.
● No integration with the battalion fire direction center.

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These common pitfalls affect all levels of the FA battalion S-6 section.
Inexperienced junior Soldiers who are unable to perform preventive
maintenance checks and services on their equipment prevent RETRANS
team chiefs and section noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOIC) from
planning effectively and conducting precombat checks and inspections. Basic
Soldier tasks such as land navigation and night driving are often ignored or not
properly prioritized, causing delays and failure when establishing RETRANS
sites. Qualified drivers and tank commanders are also often reassigned to
provide coverage elsewhere, creating military occupational specialty and
skill-level mismatches for RETRANS teams and other functional teams
within the section or headquarters and headquarters battery (i.e., a 25Q
noncommissioned officer who does land navigation will be assigned as a
RETRANS team chief, or the S-6 NCOIC is forced to emplace RETRANS
to ensure he arrives at the site). S-6 officers in charge and NCOICs hinder
their ability to perform their functions as primary staff officers and planners
when they are unable to utilize SPEED or other LOS analysis tools and do not
understand the brigade’s maneuver and RETRANS plans.
The FA battalion is a brigade-level asset, and its staff must understand the
brigade’s view of the fight and its operational plans; therefore, the FA battalion
S-6 must also understand the brigade’s maneuver plan and RETRANS plan to
effectively plan the FA battalion’s signal support and maintain its link to the
fires enterprise. FA battalion S-6 sections often do not have any interaction
with the battalion fire direction center, which degrades its ability to function
because of a lack of redundant signal support (i.e., fires digital via local access
network/Warfighter Information Network-Tactical [WIN-T]) or the ability
to collect critical products to support the five requirements for accurate fire
(i.e., no plan to collect meteorological data).

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CHAPTER 32

The Headquarters and Headquarters

Battery in a Field Artillery Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters and
headquarters battery (HHB) in a field artillery battalion should focus on
during home-station training:
● Occupy a Tactical Area for Headquarters Battery (06-BTRY-3000).
● Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Artillery Positions (HHB) (06-
BTRY-3005).
● Establish an Aid Station (06-SEC-6025).
● Provide Unit Supply Support (10-CO-4515).
● Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-CO-4830).
If an HHB in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters
them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization
stands a greater chance of success. An HHB should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lack of leader coordination in command post site selection.
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Failure to directly delegate logistical and security tasks.
● Inability to maintain security and logistical support to satellite units.
The HHB command team and leaders must ensure they are involved beyond
the accountability aspect of battery leadership. The HHB commander is the
primary person responsible for maneuvering the battalion’s main command
post from one place to another. Just as a firing battery commander is
responsible for reconnaissance, security, and occupation of a position, so is
the HHB commander for the main command post. The HHB first sergeant
should be the primary leader responsible for logistics and security of the
main command post and satellite units such as radar, medical platoon, and
retransmission sections. In the event the HHB command team is unable
to monitor these responsibilities directly, they must clearly delegate the
authority to complete these tasks.

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THE TARGET ACQUISITION PLATOON IN A FIELD

ARTILLERY BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks a target acquisition platoon
in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Provide Input to the Targeting Process (06-BN-5435).
● Emplace a Weapons Locating Radar (06-SEC-2046).
● Reconnoiter a Lightweight Countermortar Position (06-SEC-5088).
● Locate Targets With a Radar System (06-SEC-6047).
If a target acquisition platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these
four tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands
a greater chance of success. Target acquisition platoons should avoid the
following pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services and maintenance.
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of digital communications capability and experience.
● Radar site selection criteria is not understood.
● Lack of communication with the S-2 regarding a counterfire picture.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the target acquisition platoon leaders and
platoon sergeant must ensure they enforce maintenance standards and
provide the right leader focus to daily preventive maintenance checks and
services. By establishing checklists within the platoon standard operating
procedures, priorities of work are understood and executed to standard.
Home-station training should include digital sustainment training to ensure
everyone understands the equipment and its operation. Proper training and
mentorship of the radar section chiefs ensures they understand proper site
selection. Conducting site reconnaissance for follow-on positions can help
ensure movements are quick and effective. Finally, the counterfire section
must incorporate itself into the intelligence warfighting function to help
the S-2 see what the enemy fire support assets are doing on the battlefield.
This leads to accurate analysis of the enemy situation, and feeds valuable
information to the targeting working group.

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CHAPTER 33

The Field Artillery Battery

Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery battery
should train focus on during home-station training:
● Occupy a Tactical Area (06-BTRY-3001).
● Perform Reconnaissance Operations for Self-Propelled Artillery Positions
(06-BTRY-3003).
● Process Fire Missions (06-BTRY-5424).
● Conduct Expeditionary Deployment Operations (55-CO-4830).
If a field artillery battery in a combined arms battalion focuses on these four
tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation,
its organization stands a greater chance of success. Field artillery batteries
should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of troop leading procedures (TLP).
● Lack of maintenance standards and Department of the Army (DA) Form
5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March
1991) workflow.
● Lack of local security.
● Lack of rehearsals.
● Inability to manage ammunition.
To avoid these common pitfalls, battery leaders must focus on adhering to
one-third, two-thirds planning before major movements, and issue
fragmentary orders as the operating environment changes. Often, units begin
by issuing detailed operation order briefs at the battery and platoon level,
but fail to continue TLP during later phases of the operation. Similarly, the
battery defense is not consistently addressed in a unit’s priorities of work.
Leaders at all levels in the battery must be diligent about conducting thorough
preventive maintenance checks and services, beginning with operators
correctly filling out DA Form 5988-E, that is verified by a supervisor and
confirmed by a maintenance team. The result of the preventive maintenance
checks and services process is valid national stock numbers for parts required
for a specific administrative number. Units that fail to maintain an accurate
equipment status report struggle to catch up on maintenance as operational

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tempo increases, testing the capabilities of the equipment. Batteries must

ensure operations centers are fighting off common products that have the
capability of tracking ammunition by howitzer, palletized load system,
and ammunition carrier. Batteries should not fight with “hot and cold”
fire direction centers (FDCs), but rather one “hot” and one “warm” FDC,
ensuring battle tracking and firing capability maintains, regardless of the rest
plan. Batteries should continually rehearse technical and tactical aspects of
specific operations. Batteries should also rehearse typical battle drills such
as platoon operations center (POC) transfers, ammunition updates, and fire
support coordination measure scrubs.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery FDC should
focus on during home-station training:
● Process Fire Missions (06-PLT-5424).
● Conduct Emergency Fire Missions (06-PLT-5010).
● Determine Firing Data (06-SEC-5016).
● Perform the Fire Mission in Degraded Mode on the M109A6/7 Paladin
Howitzer (06-SEC-5027).
● Perform the Transfer of Fire Direction Battery Operations Center (BOC)
Control Functions (06-BTRY-6009).
If a field artillery FDC in a combined arms battalion focuses on these five
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a
greater chance of success. The field artillery FDC should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lack of common tracking products (BOC and POC).
● Lack of understanding on degraded operations.
● Limited understanding of Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS) capabilities.
● Improper emergency fire mission procedures.
● Lack of knowledge troubleshooting fire missions.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the fire direction officers and

noncommissioned officers must ensure the battery has common BOC and
POC tracking products so both centers can assume either role efficiently.
FDCs must train on conventional and special mission types. In concert with
the platoon, FDCs must develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for
troubleshooting to decrease fire mission processing times. The battery must
ensure it is proficient at degraded operations, such as voice fire commands,
and understands when to switch from digital to degraded mission processing,
because of fire missions type and capabilities of the systems (specifically
AFATDS). Batteries must understand the process of conducting an emergency
fire mission, such as laying the howitzer, determining the best possible firing
unit location, and ensuring accurate firing data is computed. Failure to include
all FDCs in rehearsals often results in delayed effects and can be remedied by
conducting internal battery rehearsals with both POCs.

THE FIELD ARTILLERY PLATOON

The following are the top collective training tasks a field artillery platoon
should focus on during home-station training:
● Occupy a Tactical Area (06-BTRY-3001).
● Establish Firing Capability for a Paladin Platoon (06-PLT-5012).
● Control a Field Artillery Unit Move (06-PLT-1038).
● Conduct TLP (71-PLT-5100).
● Conduct Area Security (06-BTRY-4004).
If a field artillery platoon in a combined arms battalion focuses on these
five tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands
a greater chance of success. The field artillery platoon should avoid the
following pitfalls:
● Lack of platoon defensive plan.
● Lack of maintenance standards.
● Lack of ammunition management.
● Lack of personnel management.
● Inaccurate logistics status reporting.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, leaders must continually adhere to priorities

of work within their individual battalion and battery tactical standard
operating procedures. Platoons should adjust security as necessary through
every new emplacement. Leaders should check for range cards under day
and night conditions and readjust to ensure interlocking sectors of fire.
Platoon leaders should also take a vested interest in validating running
Department of the Army (DA) Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and
Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991), and prioritizing turn-in of DA Form
5988-E for any pacing item that is not mission capable and requires a part
on order. Coordination between internal maintenance assets is key to ensure
national stock numbers are accurately reflected so vital combat power can
be regenerated as training progresses. Additionally, platoon leaders play
a vital role in ensuring accurate ammunition data is tracked at the gunline
and in all ammunition carries to feed information to POCs. Without leader
involvement at the gunline, howitzers are often unable to support preplanned
targets because they do not have the right munition type or quantity on board
the howitzer. Similarly, platoon leaders must understand the ground truth and
ensure they track and submit accurate commodities data in their logistics
status reports.

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CHAPTER 34

The Forward Support Company in a

Field Artillery Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a forward support company
(FSC) in a field artillery battalion should focus on during-home station
training:
● Provide Field-Feeding Support (10-CO-0056).
● Establish a Company Headquarters (63-CO-4518).
● Direct Distribution Operations (63-CO-4882).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
● Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
If an FSC in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks and masters
them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation, its organization
stands a greater chance of success. The FSC should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lack of command and control architecture. Who has decision authority
(Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy [24 July 2020])?
What is the task organization of the FSC? How is equipment from the
modified table of organization and equipment leveraged to help the FSC
commander visualize combat trains (primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency [PACE] plan)?
● Failure to adhere to the “bump plan” with respect to truck crews and
platforms.
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of security at logistics nodes.
● Misunderstanding and delineation of roles and responsibilities between
the S-4 and FSC.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the FSC commander and first sergeant must
first understand their roles and responsibilities and how they differ from the
battalion S-4. The S-4 provides all consumption analysis and synchronizes
resupply timelines and triggers with the battalion S-3 throughout all phases
of the military decision-making process (MDMP). The FSC commander
provides feedback throughout the MDMP, as the senior logistician develops
the concept of support with the battalion S-4. The FSC commander and first
sergeant own this product. The S-4 determines the “what” and FSC provides
the “how” regarding the concept of support. The FSC must establish firm and
clear understanding of command and support relationships and must leverage
existing equipment to assist in visualizing the combat trains. The FSC must
give special consideration to its PACE plan, the FSC commander location,
the positioning of its distribution platoon and maintenance platoon, and any
agreements with other command teams for support.

THE FIELD-FEEDING TEAM IN A FORWARD SUPPORT

COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks a field-feeding team in a
FSC in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).
● Perform Field Sanitation Functions (08-CO-0002).
If a field-feeding team in a field artillery battalion focuses on these tasks and
masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance
of success. The field-feeding team should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other
maintenance.
● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (containerized kitchen
versus assault kitchen, and field sanitation centers).
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Establishing how the Army culinary specialists (92Gs) are integrated into
the greater security plan when the ration cycle is M-M-M.
● Failure to leverage available distribution assets to deliver rations.

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The FSC headquarters section must plan ahead to avoid these common
pitfalls. First, if a ration cycle is M-M-M, commanders must understand how
to leverage the cooks in their formations. Can they man a fighting position?
Are they trained to man an entry control point? If the cooks are not cooking,
what are they doing? Too often in a ration cycle where M-M-M is planned
and implemented for greater than three days, observer coach/trainers observe
cooks who are underutilized at NTC. On the other hand, when units observe a
ration cycle of A-M-A, FSC commanders often rely on cooks to deliver rations
directly to the battery (separate from normal logistics package operations) or
rely on unit first sergeants to pull rations from the combat trains command
post. Although both methods may benefit and enhance the overall concept
of support, there is a missed opportunity to streamline distribution activities
and alleviate work strain on cooks and the distribution platoon, if rations and
general supplies are not integrated together into the concept of support.

THE DISTRIBUTION PLATOON IN A FORWARD SUPPORT

COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution platoon in a
FSC in a field artillery battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition (55-PLT-0012).
● Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
● Conduct Logistics Package Support (63-TS-3390).
● Conduct Tactical Convoy (63-TS-2924).
● Defend Convoy Elements (63-TS-2924).
If a distribution platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these five tasks
and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater
chance of success. The distribution platoon should avoid the following
pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other
maintenance impacting haul capacity.
● Lack of understanding of concept of support (resupply triggers, and
method of distribution versus method of resupply).
● Failure to adhere to rest and work cycles.
● Lack of comprehension of combat trains (field trains command post
versus combat trains command post composition).

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To avoid these common pitfalls, the distribution platoon leader and platoon
sergeant must ensure they focus attention on how the FSC supports logistic
package operations to the battalion and where commodities are stored inside
the combat trains with a push/pull concept. Although individual training of
Soldiers and crew is paramount (night-driving training, radio operations,
navigation, and battle command systems integration), it is equally important
that the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders understand the
sustainment fight 24, 48, and 72 hours out and how the S-4 receives and
processes that data from logistics status reports. Additionally, the platoon
leaders must understand the method of distribution and resupply (i.e., tailgate
and unit distribution wastes time, the logistics release point and service
station does not). Without this knowledge, it is extremely difficult for the
FSC commander to rely on or leverage the expertise in the platoon to meet
the intent for sustainment.

THE MAINTENANCE PLATOON IN A FORWARD SUPPORT

COMPANY IN A FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION
The following are the top collective training tasks an FSC in a field artillery
battalion should focus on during home-station training:
● Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).
● Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).
● Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-
4393).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
● Conduct Maintenance Repairs and Inspections (43-CO-7040).
If a maintenance platoon in a field artillery battalion focuses on these tasks
and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater
chance of success. The maintenance platoon should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● An unclear command relationship between field maintenance teams and
battery (attached, operational control, and tactical control).
● Failure to establish a Department of the Army Form 5988-E, Equipment
Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (1 March 1991) turn-in cycle.
● Failure to track parts between the brigade combat team supply support
activity and field maintenance teams, and parts tracking outside the
brigade combat team.

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● Roles and responsibilities not clearly defined between maintenance

platoon leaders and the maintenance control section.
● Passback of field maintenance support.
To avoid these common pitfalls, maintenance professionals should focus
on how maintenance best supports the battalion in the most efficient
manner. There is no approved solution for how to accomplish this end state.
Determining the command support relationships for the field maintenance
teams and other maintenance individuals will greatly reduce friction during
a rotation.

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SECTION VI

Brigade Engineer Battalion

Recommended Task Focus Areas

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CHAPTER 35

The Engineer Battalion in a Brigade

Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
Army doctrine concerning the roles of an engineer battalion in a brigade
combat team (BCT) is broader than that of the previously defined battalions
in the BCT because of the nature of the role that a brigade engineer battalion
(BEB) plays in the organizational construct.
The BEB provides organic engineer, military intelligence,
signal (anti-tank Stryker BCT only), planning, and execution
capabilities to the BCT.1
The BEB in each BCT provides a baseline of combat capabilities
that can be augmented with specialized units from the echelons
above brigade. The assistant brigade engineer section within
the BCT staff identifies the required augmentation and
coordinates its application. Each BCT has organic geospatial
engineering capabilities to provide a baseline of geospatial
support. Additional Army, joint, multinational, interagency,
and other engineering capabilities may be available and task-
organized to augment the BCT for various phases of operation.
Additional engineer operational force is a complementary and
interdependent relationship between four major unit categories
(organic engineer, engineer headquarters, baseline engineer,
and specialized engineer).2
The BEB has a variety of missions and required focal areas because of the
diverse nature of its subordinate units. To best nest these enablers and focus
them in support of the armored brigade combat team (ABCT)-prioritized
mission-essential tasks (METs), the BEB can train in the following tasks:
● Provide Engineer Support to Mobility Operations (05-BN-0010).
● Conduct Engineer Countermobility Operations (05-BN-0012).
● Conduct Survivability Operations (05-BN-0013).
● Conduct Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN)
Operations (11-BN-9000).
● Manage Information Collection (34-CO-3001).

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BEBs focus on providing mobility and countermobility support to the BCT. If

the battalion and the staff focus on these five training tasks, they stand a greater
chance of success during their rotation. The battalion staff cannot ignore the
military intelligence or signal company. However, the most complex tasks the
engineer battalion staff will be asked to complete are the engineer missions:
Planning and executing a combined arms breach through complex obstacles;
and planning, resourcing, and tracking a deliberate defense across multiple
engagement areas. The BEBs should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to maintain and have standard operating procedures for all
communications equipment.
● Failure to integrate with the brigade plans cell throughout the military
decision-making process (MDMP).
● Use of newly published or unrehearsed report formats.
● Lack of local security.
● Inaccurate or incomplete running estimates.
● Inadequate differentiation and implementation of a tactical command post
versus a tactical operations center.
To avoid these common pitfalls, staffs should publish tactical standard
operating procedures and rehearse them at least once during a tactical
field exercise. This field exercise should primarily make use of distributed
meetings over frequency modulation, high frequency, or Joint Battle
Command-Platform, and focus on timely reporting, managing obstacle
construction and breach operations. During garrison operations, staff must
routinely communicate with their counterparts at brigade to develop effective
working relationships.
Figure 35-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle task crosswalk for the BEB.
By focusing training on these tasks, the lower echelons of the BCT increase
their likelihood of success.

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BEB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs

Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
BDE-Prioritized METs Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001
Conduct Area Defense. Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800
Conduct Movement to Contact.
BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001

HHC BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)

A and B Company BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)
Coordinate Company Support OPS. 63-CO-4050
Conduct Reconnaissance Planning. 05-CO-0410
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518
Provide Engineer SPT for Mobility OPS. 05-CO-1025
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Provide EN SPT to Explosive Hazards Clearing. 05-CO-1700
Provide Engineer SPT to Countermobility. 05-CO-2012
HHC BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
Coordinate Survivability OPS. 05-CO-3000
Occupy New Operating Site. 63-30-4009
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830
Establish Company Headquarters. 10-CO-4817
Treat Casualties. 08-CO-003
Evacuate Casualties. 08-CO-004 A and B CO BEB (ABCT) METs (HQDA Directed)
Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515 Provide Engineer SPT for Mobility OPS. 05-CO-1025
Provide Engineer SPT to Countermobility. 05-CO-2012
MP Company METs (HQDA Directed) Coordinate Survivability OPS. 05-CO-3000
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Perform Support to Mobility. 19-CO-1002 Sapper PLT (ABCT) High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Perform Support to Security. 19-CO-3111 Create a Lane-Through Obstacle with Explosives. 05-PLT-1000
Perform Police OPS. 19-CO-4001 Emplace Situational Obstacles. 05-PLT-2001
Perform Detention OPS. 19-CO-3111 Emplace a Volcano Minefield. 05-PLT-2011
Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013
MP Company-Prioritized METs
Perform MP Support to Breaching. 19-CO-1401 Construction PLT (ABCT) High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Perform Convoy Security. 19-CO-2004 Construct a Tank Ditch. 05-PLT-2015
Perform Detention OPS. 19-CO-3111 Construct Protective Earth Walls and Berms. 05-PLT-3002
Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013
Mobility Assurance Company METs (HQDA Directed) Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
Conduct Reconnaissance Planning. 05-CO-0410
Provide EN Support for Mobility OPS. 05-CO-1025 High-Payoff Leader Tasks
Provide EN Support to Countermobility. 05-CO-2012 Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
Coordinate Survivability OPS. 05-CO-3000 Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830 Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626
Mobility Assurance Company Prioritized METs These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
Provide EN Support for Mobility OPS 05-CO-1025 company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon
Provide EN Support to Countermobility 05-CO-2012 sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the
Coordinate Survivability OPS 05-CO-3000 initiation of collective training.

MAC Sapper Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks

Reduce an Obstacle With a MICLIC. 05-3-D0015
Create a Lane with a MICLIC. 05-4-D0005
Establish a Lane Using Mechanical Techniques. 05-PLT-1001
Reduce an Obstacle with a Bangalore. 05-3-D0003
Perform an Obstacle Reconnaissance. 05-PLT-1004

MAC Countermobility Platoon High-Payoff Battle Tasks

Emplace a Volcano Minefield. 05-PLT-2011
Emplace a Disrupt/Fix Volcano Minefield. 05-4-D0008
Perform Reload of the Volcano (Ground). 05-4-D3016
Construct a Wire Obstacle. 05-PLT-2019

Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB

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BEB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs

Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
BDE-Prioritized METs Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001
Conduct Area Defense. Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800
Conduct Movement to Contact.
BEB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs
Provide EN Support to Mobility OPS. 05-BN-0010
Conduct EN Countermobility OPS. 05-BN-0012
Conduct Survivability OPS. 05-BN-0013
Conduct DODIN OPS. 11-BN-9000
Manage Information Collection. 34-CO-3001

Military Intelligence Company METs (HQDA Directed) Brigade Signal Company METs (HQDA Directed)
Conduct Aerial Reconnaissance Missions. 01-CO-9015 Provide Network TRANS Path for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9060
Manage IC Requirements. 34-CO-3001 Provide Net Switching Services for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9070
Perform Situation Development. 34-CO-3002 Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075
Conduct Human Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3003 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830
Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3004
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
BDE Signal Company-Prioritized METs
Military Intelligence Company-Prioritized METs Provide Network Trans Path for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9060
Coordinate Unit Access to the Intel Architect. 34-CO-0012 Provide Net Switching Services for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9070
Conduct Aerial Reconnaissance Missions. 01-CO-9015 Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075
Manage Information Collection Requirements. 34-CO-3001
Conduct Human Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3003 HCLOS High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection. 34-CO-3004 Provide Network Transmission Path. 11-CO-9060
Establish a Multi-Channel LOS Radio Terminal. 11-CW-7022
UAS PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Conduct AVN Mission Planning/Preparation. 01-CO-5198 RETRANS High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Integrate Aircraft Survivability Measures to Provide Tactical Radio Support for BDE SIG CO. 11-CO-9075
the AVN Mission. 01-CO-5163 Conduct CNR RETRANS OPS. 11-CW-7017
Conduct UAS Surveillance Missions. 01-SEC-7927 Operate a CNR System. 11-CW-8013
Perform UAS Screening Missions. 01-SEC-7928

Forward Support Company METs (HQDA-Directed) NOSC High-Payoff Battle Tasks

Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830 Conduct Automated TCF Activities. 11-CW-7303
Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056 Conduct Cybersecurity. 11-CW-6530
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518 Establish Tactical Switching Node. 11-CW-6002
Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882 Conduct IDM/Content Staging CS activities. 11-CW-7113
Conduct Enterprise Management. 11-CW-7166
Forward Support Company Prioritized METs
Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056 High-Payoff Leader Tasks
Establish Company Headquarters. 63-CO-4518 Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100
Direct Distribution OPS. 63-CO-4882 Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009
Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727 Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626
Perform Field Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon
Distribution PLT High-Payoff Tasks sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the
Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition. 55-PLT-0012 initiation of collective training.
Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
Conduct Logistics Package Support. 63-TS-3390
Conduct Tactical Convoy. 63-TS-2924 Field-Feeding High-Payoff Tasks
Defend Convoy Elements. 63-TS-2924 Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058
Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501
MAINT Control Section High-Payoff Tasks
Perform Field MAINT Team Functions. 43-CO-4053
Perform Recovery OPS. 43-CO-4071
Establish a MAINT COLL and Classification PT. 43-CO-4393
Perform MAINT Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
Conduct MAINT Repairs and Inspections. 43-CO-7040
Perform an Obstacle Reconnaissance. 05-PLT-1004

Figure 35-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BEB

(continued)

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Endnotes
1. Army Techniques Publication 3-34.22, Engineer Operations—Brigade Combat
Team and Below, 5 December 2014, page 1-12.
2. Ibid., page 1-15.

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CHAPTER 36

The Headquarters and Headquarters

Company in a Brigade Engineer
Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the critical collective tasks a headquarters and headquarters
company (HHC) in a brigade engineer battalion (BEB) should focus on
during home-station training:
● Occupy a New Operating Site (63-30-4009).
● Establish Company Headquarters and Administrative Areas (10-CO-
4817).
● Treat Casualties (08-CO-003).
● Evacuate Casualties (08-CO-004).
● Provide Unit Supply Support (10-CO-4515).
The HHCs should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Not anticipating the resource needs of the BEB headquarters.
● Not understanding the tactical requirements of the BEB headquarters.
● Lack of a tactical assembly area (TAA) location and TAA jumps.
● Lack of TAA security plans.
● Sluggish employment of the Role 1 medical care facility and lack of
dedicated security to transport casualties to the Role 2 medical care
facility.
● Unclear expectations, roles, and responsibilities among HHC elements
and BEB headquarters for managing and maintaining the TAA.

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The primary mission of an HHC is to provide support to the battalion staff so

it is cable of planning, executing, and monitoring the fight. This mission is
best accomplished by understanding the operational tempo and anticipating
the needs of the battalion commander. Considerations include planning TAA
jumps, integration of on-ground elements for security, rapid employment of a
Role 2 facility, and identifying security elements to move casualties to a Role
2 facility. Success comes from a shared understanding of the TAA plan, clear
understanding of roles and responsibilities, and personal investment in the
plan among the company commander, battalion staff, and battalion command
team. Friction occurs when clear expectations about TAA management
and maintenance are not shared between the company and staff, resulting
in delayed and disorganized TAA jumps, inadequate security posture, and
critical resource shortages that diminish the BEB’s effectiveness in supporting
the decisive fight.

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CHAPTER 37

Military Police in a
Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a military police company
in support of a brigade combat team should focus on during home-station
training:
● Perform Military Police Support to Breaching (19-CO-1401).
● Perform Convoy Security (19-CO-2004).
● Perform Detention Operations (19-CO-3111).
If a military police company in support of a BCT focuses home-station
training on these three tasks, it is likely to excel during its rotation at the
National Training Center. Military police companies should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of clearly established command and support relationships.
● Inability to provide an effective capabilities brief to supported units, and
coordinate with the BCT provost marshal.
● Failure to follow troop leading procedures.
● Failure to maintain or bring special equipment (detainee collection
point kit; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear equipment;
route signage kit; Joint Capabilities Release/Joint Battle Command-
Platform; or recovery assets).
● Failure to understand and follow a published brigade engineer battalion
tactical standard operating procedure (TACSOP).
● Failure to ship organic rolling stock.

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Avoiding these common pitfalls requires meticulous preparation beginning

several months before the scheduled rotation. Military police companies
must coordinate with the brigade combat team provost marshal to schedule
capabilities briefs with the brigade combat team commander, brigade combat
team staff, and supported battalion leaders to ensure they understand how
to best employ military police capabilities. Company commanders must
develop and publish a company TACSOP, then evaluate and enforce it during
train-up for the rotation, and make changes to it as necessary based on an
ongoing evaluation of the document. The company should share its TACSOP
with the supported brigade combat team and request the brigade combat
team’s TACSOP. Soldiers should understand and follow key elements of the
TACSOPs.

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CHAPTER 38

The Mobility Augmentation Company

and Echelon-Above-Brigade
Sapper Company
National Training Center
The following are the top collective tasks a sapper company and mobility
augmentation company (MAC) should focus on during home-station training
before a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC):
● Reduce an Obstacle With A Mine-Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC)
(05-3-D0015).
● Create a Lane With a MICLIC (05-4-D0005).
● Establish a Lane Through an Obstacle Using Mechanical Techniques
(05-PLT-1001).
● Reduce an Obstacle With a Bangalore Torpedo (05-3-D0003).
● Perform an Obstacle and Restriction Reconnaissance (05-PLT-1004).
The following are the top collective tasks a countermobility platoon (mobility
augmentation company [MAC] only) should focus on during home-station
training before a rotation at the NTC:
● Emplace a Volcano Minefield (05-PLT-2011).
● Emplace a Disrupt/Fix Volcano (Ground) Minefield (05-4-D0008).
● Perform Reload of the Volcano (Ground) (05-4-D3016).
● Construct a Wire Obstacle (05-PLT-2019).
The sapper and MAC companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of planning, coordination, and rehearsals when employing the
Volcano minefield.
● Failure to understand the trigger to initiate the emplacement of the
minefield based on the decision support matrix.
● Failure to use the REACT formula (R > E+A+C+T, where R = time for
enemy travel, E = emplacement time for munitions, A = arming time
of munitions, C = command and control time for direction to emplace, and
T = travel time for emplacement asset).

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● Failure to communicate and integrate with scouts and friendly units

conducting rearward passage of lines.
● Lack of rehearsals conducted with the breach, support, and assault forces,
especially if the supported task force has never worked with a MAC or
sapper company.
● Not advocating to the task force the requirement for a maneuver platoon
to serve as a security element for the breach force, which greatly enhances
the speed, survivability, and success of a breach.
● Lack of crew proficiency and knowledge on the MICLIC and Volcano
systems.
● Inability at the platoon-leader level to brief capabilities to task force
commanders.
● Lack of ability to communicate inside and outside of the unit (Joint Battle
Command-Platform/Joint Capabilities Release, frequency modulation, or
reporting).

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CHAPTER 39

The Alpha and Bravo Companies in a

Brigade Engineer Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks combat engineer and
equipment support platoons in an alpha or bravo company, brigade engineer
battalion (BEB), should focus on during home-station training before a
rotation at the National Training Center:
● Create a Lane Through an Obstacle Using Explosive Techniques (05-PLT-
1000).
● Emplace Situational Obstacles (05-PLT-2001).
● Emplace a Volcano Minefield (05-PLT-2011).
● Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).
Platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to understand when to change from movement to maneuver and
proper maneuver techniques (see Army Techniques Publication 3-90.1,
Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team [27 January 2016]
Chapter 2, pages 33-42).
● Lack of planning, coordination, and rehearsals when employing the
Volcano minefield.
● Failure to understand the trigger to initiate the emplacement of the
minefield based on the decision support matrix,
● Failure to use the REACT formula (R > E+A+C+T, where R = time for
enemy travel, E = emplacement time for munitions, A = arming time of
munitions, C = command and control time for direction to emplace, and T
= travel time for emplacement asset).
● Failure to communicate and integrate with scouts and friendly units
conducting rearward passage of lines.
● Failure to execute proper engagement area development (see Army
Doctrine Publication 3-90, Offense and Defense [31 July 2019]).

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● Lack of understanding the terrain’s effect on engagement area development

(see Field Manual [FM] 3-90-1, Offense and Defense Volume 1 [22 March
2013]).
● Failure to understand the enemy’s movement effect on engagement area
development (see FM 3-90-1).
Failure to understand the concepts behind these pitfalls results in increased
casualties and poor effects on the enemy. To avoid these pitfalls, platoons
must understand and train on the fundamentals of patrolling (planning,
reconnaissance, security, control, and common sense). Squads need to
understand demolitions, the capabilities of their equipment, and how to
breach a variety of obstacles. Platoons need to practice constructing obstacles
that tie into terrain and report progress to the company command post.

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CHAPTER 40

The Engineer Construction Company

and Engineer Support Company in an
Echelon-Above-Brigade Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks an engineer support
company or an engineer construction company should focus on during
home-station training before a rotation at the National Training Center:
● Construct a Tank Ditch (05-PLT-2015).
● Construct Protective Earth Walls and Berms (05-PLT-3002).
● Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).
● Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-CO-5100).
The engineer support company and engineer construction company should
avoid the following pitfalls:
● Lack of leaders and Soldiers understanding the decisive action training
environment (not thinking tactically).
● Lack of understanding the company’s dig rates and relaying it to battalion.
● Failure to properly plan tactical movement and route selection to transport
equipment in rough terrain.
● Not using time wisely when conducting rehearsals.
● Failure to establish tactical assembly area security (sector sketch, sergeant
of guard, or interlocking sectors of fire).
● Lack of communication inside and outside of the unit (frequency
modulation, Joint Battle Command-Platform, training on systems
employment, or lack of basic issue items).

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CHAPTER 41

The Military Intelligence Company in a

Brigade Combat Team
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a military intelligence
company in a brigade combat team should focus on during home-station
training:
● Coordinate Unit Access to the Intelligence Architecture (34-CO-0012).
● Manage Information Collection Requirements (34-CO-3001).
● Conduct Human Intelligence Collection (34-CO-3003).
● Conduct Signals Intelligence Collection (34-CO-3004).
● Perform Situation Development (34-CO-3002).
The military intelligence company should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services, and other
maintenance (vehicles, communications equipment, and specialty
equipment).
● Failure to codify task-organization relationships of signals intelligence
and human intelligence teams in a written order.
● Failure to update system software (Intelligence Processing Center-2,
Prophet, or Global Broadcast Service [GBS]).
● Failure to establish a reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) plan.
● Failure to submit requests for access (GBS, National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
[SIPRNET] tokens, satellite communications, etc.).

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CHAPTER 42

The Unmanned Aircraft System

Platoon in a Military Intelligence
Company
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks an unmanned aircraft
system (UAS) platoon in a military intelligence company should focus on
during home-station training:
● Conduct Aviation Mission Planning and Preparation (01-CO-5198).
● Integrate Aircraft Survivability Measures Into Aviation Missions (01-CO-
5163).
● Conduct UAS Surveillance Missions (01-SEC-7927).
● Perform UAS Screening Missions (01-SEC-7928).
A UAS platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to conduct air defense artillery threat assessment.
● Failure to conduct analysis of jumps and their impacts on crew rest.
● Failure to establish a reliable primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) plan.
● Failure to understand the brigade combat team collection plan.
● Lack of local security.

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CHAPTER 43

The Signal Company

Operations Group
The signal company is a unique and versatile company that only has four
mission-essential tasks, three of which are important to the readiness of the
rotational unit. Each applies to a different section within the company:
● Conduct Combat Network Radio (CNR) Retransmission (RETRANS)
Operations (11-CW-7017).
● Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-
9075).
● Provide Network Switching Services for Brigade Signal Companies (11-
CO-9070).
The following is the list of the most important collective tasks for the signal
company in preparation for a combat training center rotation. The signal
company should arrive trained in these tasks. These tasks encompass the core
of what the signal company does and is known for, enabling the brigade to
talk across the battlefield.
The network extension platoon (upper tactical internet [TI]):
● Establish a Satellite Transportable Terminal (11-CW-6050).
● Establish a Tactical Switching Node (11-CW-6002).
● Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies (11-
CO-9060).
● Establish a Multi-Channel, Line-of-Sight Radio Terminal (11-CW-7022).
The network extension platoon (lower TI):
● Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-
9075).
● Operate a CNR System (11-CW-8013).
● Operate a Radio RETRANS Station Using a Single Channel Ground and
Airborne Radio System Family of Radios (113-000-1001).
● Select a Radio RETRANS Site (113-611-1000).

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Common struggles for the signal company include but are not limited to the
following:
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Failure to bring spare equipment.
● Lack of reporting.
● Failure to conduct command post operations (tracking personnel status,
logistics status, and communications status).
● Failure to conduct drivers training and night driving.
● Failure to conduct land navigation.
● Failure to conduct preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS),
and equipment testing.
Most companies perform the first two collective tasks successfully, because
this is the training they focus on while at home station. However, companies
need to focus on RETRANS and high capacity, line-of-sight (HCLOS)
operations as well. For the company to be successful, they need to focus on
all the tasks. Company Soldiers must acquire muscle memory to be proficient.
While doing motor pool operations, Soldiers should establish a RETRANS
site inside the motor pool. While setting up the upper TI, Soldiers need to
incorporate HCLOS operations.

BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANIES

The following are the top collective training tasks a brigade signal company
in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training to
provide HCLOS capabilities while in a battlefield environment:
● Provide a Network Transmission Path for Brigade Signal Companies (11-
CO-9060).
● Establish a Multi-Channel Line-of-Sight Radio Terminal (11-CW-7022).
If a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion focuses on these
tasks and masters them before its National Training Center (NTC) rotation,
its organization stands a greater chance of success. Signal companies should
avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Failure to conduct before, during, and after signal maintenance.
● Failure to conduct precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections
(PCIs) for HCLOS operations.
● Lack of tactical and technical knowledge.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, commanders and first sergeants need to be

aggressive in their approach to HCLOS training. Command teams including
platoon leaders should use the certification outlined in Training Circular (TC)
6-02.1, The United States Army Signal Corps 2019 Training Strategy (11 July
2019). Weekly repetitions of establishing and conducting PMCS is crucial in
identifying and repairing and replacing broken equipment. Signal maintenance
needs to be prioritized similar to that of wheeled maintenance. Services and
signal maintenance activities should be tracked on the equipment status
report and at weekly maintenance meetings. Platoon leader involvement is
key to ensure PCCs and PCIs are completed correctly. Additionally, training
on equipment by executing static displays, site placement and displacement,
and validating HCLOS transmission with a distant end will enable HCLOS
personnel to become more proficient in HCLOS operations.

BRIGADE SIGNAL COMPANIES (RETRANSMISSIONS)

The following are the top collective training tasks a brigade signal company
in a combined arms battalion should focus on during home-station training to
provide RETRANS capabilities while in a battlefield environment:
● Provide Tactical Radio Support for Brigade Signal Companies (11-CO-
9075).
● Conduct CNR RETRANS Operations (11-CW-7017).
● Operate a CNR System (11-CW-8013).
If a brigade signal company in a combined arms battalion focuses on these
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a
greater chance of success. Signal companies should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Failure to conduct before, during, and after signal maintenance.
● Failure to conduct PCCs and PCIs for CNR RETRANS operations.
● Lack of tactical and technical knowledge.
● Failure to provide tactical radio support.
To avoid these common pitfalls, commanders and first sergeants need to
be aggressive in their approach to RETRANS training. Command teams
including platoon leaders should use the certification outlined in TC 6-02.1
for their RETRANS teams. Weekly repetitions of establishing and conducting
PMCS of RETRANS equipment is crucial in identifying, repairing, and
replacing broken equipment. Signal maintenance needs to be prioritized
similar to that of wheeled maintenance. Services and signal maintenance
activities should be tracked on the equipment status report and at weekly
maintenance meetings. Platoon leader involvement is key to ensure PCCs

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and PCIs are completed correctly. Additionally, training on equipment by

executing static displays, site placement and displacement, and validating
of RETRANS mode will enable RETRANS personnel to become more
proficient in RETRANS operations.

NETWORK OPERATIONS AND SECURITY CENTER

To effectively conduct Department of the Defense Information Network
(DODIN) operations, the brigade S-6 must form a network operations and
security center (NOSC). The following are the top collective training tasks
the NOSC should focus on during home-station training:
● Conduct Automated Technical Control Facility Activities (11-CW-7303).
● Conduct Cybersecurity (11-CW-6530).
● Establish a Tactical Switching Node (11-CW-6002).
● Conduct Information Dissemination Management/Content Staging
Activities (11-CW-7113).
● Conduct Enterprise Management (11-CW-7166).
If the NOSC focuses on these tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation,
its organization stands a greater chance of success. The NOSC should avoid
the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of upper TI transport and services validation.
● Unscreened access to networks and systems.
● The help desk consumed with operator tasks.
● Passively monitoring network and systems.
● Separation of network, system, and cyber defense technicians.
To avoid these common pitfalls, NOSC personnel should validate transport
and services through human-to-human communications, not an Internet
Control Message Protocol ping. A ping may show the network path is
there; however, it does not confirm that the ports, protocols, or services are
functional. Test whether a Command Post of the Future (CPOF) operator can
create a pasteboard viewable by another operator, or the S-3 can talk to the
division via Ventrilo. Digital systems enable human interaction, so focus on
ensuring people can communicate.

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The NOSC needs to be aware of how command and control systems,

workstations, and servers communicate; which protocols are required; and
where this network traffic occurs. For example, a CPOF client box will need
to connect to CPOF servers and other domain services, but should never need
to communicate directly with another CPOF client.
Make it easier for every operator and S-6 by placing common instructions
and references on every desktop. This will alleviate help-desk congestion.
These references include items such as a phone book, how-to instructions,
and links to portals and shared drives that can easily be pushed through group
policy.
The NOSC must be proactive in monitoring the network with outages and
reasons for the outages. Reach out to battalions to determine why a terminal
or system is down. This may require the use of lower TI assets in the primary,
alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan such as frequency
modulation or Joint Battle Command-Platform. Without being proactive, it
could be hours or days before support or parts reach the degraded command
post.
Finally, the network, systems, and cyber defense personnel need to co-locate
and collaborate to provide a robust and secure network. Without collaboration,
each entity focuses on individual priorities instead of the priorities of the
brigade S-6 and commander.

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CHAPTER 44

The Echo Forward Support Company

in a Brigade Engineer Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks distribution and
maintenance platoons in an echo forward support company (FSC) brigade
engineer battalion (BEB) should focus on during home-station training
before a rotation at the National Training Center:
Maintenance platoon:
● Perform Field Maintenance Team Functions (43-CO-4053).
● Perform Recovery Operations (43-CO-4071).
● Establish a Maintenance Collection and Classification Point (43-CO-
4393).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
Distribution platoon:
● Conduct Logistics Package Support (63-CO-4546).
● Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution Operations (10-CO-0237).
● Transport Palletized Loads of Ammunition for an FSC (55-SEC-0012).
The distribution and maintenance platoons should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lack of technical manuals on-hand to conduct preventive maintenance
checks and services, and other maintenance at the Soldier level.
● Failure to bring special equipment (straps; night-vision devices (NVDs);
basic issue items; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
enhanced conventional weapons equipment).
● Lack of established priorities of work (very small aperture terminal,
command post establishment, security, etc.).
● Failure to establish tactical assembly area security (sector sketch, sergeant
of the guard, or interlocking sectors of fire).

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● Lack of ability to communicate inside and outside of the unit (frequency

modulation, Joint Battle Command-Platform, training on systems
employment, or lack of basic issue items).
● Lack of trained operators capable of conducting logistics package
operations during limited visibility (adequate amount of NVDs, operator
knowledge of equipment, limited experience using NVDs, and not trained
in night land navigation).

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SECTION VII

Sustainment Battalions
Recommended Task Focus Areas

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CHAPTER 45

The Brigade Support Battalion

Operations Group, National Training Center
Army doctrine defines the role of a brigade support battalion (BSB) to:
... provide sustainment support (logistics and medical support)
to a brigade combat team. The BSB core competencies are
planning, synchronization, and execution of sustainment to
support brigade combat team operations. The BSB performs the
following functions: distribution management and operations,
transportation, supply support, field maintenance, and Role 2
medical care.1
The following tasks are based on a deeper inspection of doctrinal roles and
responsibilities a BSB would need to accomplish during a large-scale combat
operation. The following tasks were selected as those that nested with the
armored brigade combat team (ABCT)-prioritized METs and should be
focused on during home-station training before deployment to the National
Training Center (NTC):
● Coordinate Onward Movement for the Battalion (55-BN-4862).
● Conduct Actions Associated With Area Defense (63-BN-4885).
● Establish the Battalion Sustainment Operations Center (63-BN-4884).
● Coordinate Distribution Support (63-BN-4033).
● Establish a Command Post (Forward) (63-BN-4016).
Similar to other battalions, the BSB needs to conduct movement throughout
the battlespace to conduct sustainment, while the ABCT conducts either an
area defense or a movement to contact. Additionally, it must secure itself
against discrete threats from infiltrating forces or hostile actors. These
actions must occur in conjunction with the BSB’s continued sustainment and
distribution operations. Finally, the BSB must be able to conduct distribution
management and operations; coordination for this is essential for its command
post operations.

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BSBs should use the associated training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) to
train these top tasks before deploying to NTC. Although these tasks are not
explicitly outlined in the mission-essential task list (METL) tasks or T&EOs,
the prioritization and integration of the following subtasks will greatly
increase the BSB’s success while deployed at the NTC:
● Organically deploy and displace the common authorized stockage list.
● Adhere to priorities of work during the establishment of a perimeter
defense.
● Standardize and rehearse sustainment operations center command and
control processes and systems.
● Conduct an operationalized communication exercise (COMMEX) to
validate upper and lower tactical internet (TI), and local internet service.
A BSB should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● The BSB not acting as the sustainment coordinator for the brigade combat
team and synchronizing efforts (particularly related to distribution) across
the BSB base companies and forward supply companies.
● The BSB stopping short of establishing a defense in-depth and engagement
areas in support of its brigade support area (BSA) defense.
● Lack of published, shared, and rehearsed standard operating procedures
(SOPs).
● The BSB not conducting an operationalized COMMEX to validate upper
and lower TI systems.
● The BSB stopping short of a full command post exercise (CPX), therefore,
falling short of truly validating command and control systems.
To avoid common pitfalls, BSB commanders need to take ownership of their
role as the sustainment coordinators for the brigade combat team to the degree
that field artillery battalion commanders take ownership of their role as the
fires coordinator for the brigade combat team. They need to parallel plan with
the brigade combat team to synchronize the sustainment plan (particularly
the sustainment distribution plan) starting at the future operations and plans
horizons, and not the current operations horizon that is common among BSBs
today.

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BSBs need to increase lethality training and focus on survivability tasks

in addition to their core sustainment proficiency training. Operationalizing
sustainment tasks while in garrison is a great avenue of approach to this end.
BSBs need to stop operating one way while in garrison, and transitioning to
operating in a different, operationalized manner while supporting the BCT in
a field environment.
The BSB staff often attempts to holistically figure out and develop battalion
tactical standard operating procedures (TACSOPs) while at their combat
training center rotation. The lack of an established TACSOP and staff
proficiency in tailoring and integrating respective warfighting efforts to the
sustainment warfighting function is commonly observed in the early stages
of the rotation. The rippling effect of not having a standardized or clearly
communicated battalion TACSOP creates unnecessary friction and impedes
efficiency from the BSB platoon level to the battalion. Subordinate units
must invest in the battalion TACSOP and be nested. Furthermore, having
an established SOP that is not clearly communicated or rehearsed will only
provide the unit a 50-percent solution. Units must conduct rehearsals of
established standards and processes to reach close to maximum capability.
Only through the combination of understanding the established standards
and processes, and building muscle repetition will a BSB succeed in being
efficient, effective, and sustainable. The following are common observations
from a lack of an established and rehearsed TACSOP:

The Battalion Main Command Post Layout

Lack of digital and analog mission-critical common operational pictures
(COPs) inside the battalion main command post with detailed data necessary
for the commander to make a decision and enable shared understanding:
logistics common operational picture (LOGCOP), maneuver common
operational picture (BLUECOP), enemy common operational picture
(REDCOP), and base defense common operational picture.
Lack of a robust communications primary, alternate, contingency, and
emergency (PACE) plan internal and external to the unit and warfighting
functions. At times, either the staff fails to identify what it takes to fight
in a contested environment under secure communications (how many
SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET] hardware,
laptops, and pertinent software are needed) or consequently fails to stress
or load test its communications PACE plan based on the standard systems
on-hand or fully mission capable to command and control.

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BSA Occupation and Establishment

Units struggle to execute priorities of work upon BSA occupation at battalion
and company levels. Units fail to understand the time-sensitive, sequential
actions-on-objective tasks from occupying and establishing respective
company sectors, establishing 360 security, filling out standard range
cards, to establishing beyond line-of-sight communications. Units do not
visualize what 100-percent company fighting positions manning or weapon
capabilities look like; where company casualty collection points are located;
what medical capabilities and limitations are available; what entry control
point procedures are in place to control and account for personnel, assets, and
commodity flow; etc.
Often, the BSB validates its upper TI systems, but leaves companies to
validate lower TI systems. This course of action can be successful, if
companies have solid guidance on how to conduct the COMMEX, have
well-trained communications representatives, and provide accurate, timely
reporting. Often, guidance is lacking and the understanding of what fully
mission capable means varies from company to company. For example, fully
mission capable means a message can be sent and received from both ends.
Without this shared understanding, companies may consider their systems
are fully mission capable simply because systems turn on or send messages.
However, companies do not verify whether they have the ability to receive
messages. Another common issue is that a unit will validate frequency
modulation (FM) by swapping hand microphones and batteries to test the
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radio.
This is an issue because it does not show the radio’s actual capability. If
the radio itself works, but the unit does not have the hand microphones,
batteries, operational vehicle radio communications, etc., the system does
not necessarily add capability to the unit. It is simply a spare component.
Additionally, the S-6 scrambles to get updates from the companies and
lacks true asset visibility until it receives accurate numbers. This affects the
S-6’s ability to plan and assist companies. A successful technique is to make
the COMMEX a deliberate operation, with the FM and Joint Capabilities
Release (JCR)/Joint Battle Command-Platform (JBC-P) tactical operations
center kits being monitored at the company or battalion level, depending
on confidence level and understanding. Company communications
representatives troubleshoot basic issues, and S-6 representatives assist with
issues the communications representatives cannot fix. The radiotelephone
operator monitoring the tactical operations center kits keeps a tracker
by bumper number of the systems that are successfully validated through
two-way communications checks. If there are multiple radios in a vehicle,
they should be noted as radio A or B for validation. If the validation is at
the company level, the S-6 should conduct spot checks and receive updates
throughout the validation.

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As stated, oftentimes, units will conduct an upper TI COMMEX to validate

their Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) nodes. Although this
step is essential, it is not the end of validation. To validate command and
control systems, similar to Command Post of the Future (CPOF) or Distributed
Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A), units must conduct a command
post exercise. The COMMEX tests the functionality of systems and is run by
the S-6, but the command post exercise tests the operations of these systems
and is run by the S-3. The command post exercise requires users to log into
the systems, validate their accounts, and verify they can utilize services (i.e.,
mail, file sharing, chat, Ventrilo, etc.). If the command post exercise is not
conducted correctly with all services validated by operators, several issues
occur that can delay operations, such as not able to receive orders, realizing
users do not have valid accounts and need to request them, lacking situational
awareness because of no access higher headquarters’ common operational
picture, etc.
Figure 45-1 depicts the mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the BSB
of an ABCT.

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BSB (ABCT) (HQDA Directed) METs

BDE-Prioritized METs Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-BN-4800
Conduct Area Defense. Direct Establish of Subordinate Units and HQ. 63-BN-4019
Conduct Movement to Contact. Conduct Sustainment Operations. 63-BN-4028
Coordinate Distribution Support. 63-BN-4033
Conduct Actions Associated with Area Defense. 63-BN-4885

BSB (ABCT)-Prioritized METs

Coordinate Onward Movement for the BN. 55-BN-4862
Conduct Actions Associated with Area Defense. 63-BN-4885
Establish the BN Sustainment OPS Center. 63-BN-4884
Coordinate Distribution Support. 63-BN-4033
Establish Command Post (Forward). 63-BN-4016

HHC BSB METs (HQDA Directed) Distribution Company METs (HQDA Directed)
Provide Field-Feeding Support. 10-CO-0056 Provide ATHP Support. 09-TM-0125
Provide Unit Supply Support. 10-CO-4515 Conduct Bulk Petroleum Distribution OPS. 10-CO-0237
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830 Direct Distribution Company Supply OPS. 10-CO-0717
Manage Transportation OPS. 55-CO-4557
HHC BSB Prioritized METs Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Define Base Defense Roles/Responsibilities. 07-CO-3027 Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Implement CBRN Protective Measures. 10-CO-9201 Establish Company HQ. 63-CO-4518
Employ CCD Techniques. 05-CO-3003
Plan, Integrate, and Establish OPS. 07-PLT-9016 Distribution Company-Prioritized METs
Conduct Tactical Convoy. 55-CO-4003
Field-Feeding High-Payoff Tasks Defend Convoy Elements. 55-CO-4006
Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area. 10-CO-0058 Conduct Hasty Displacement. 63-CO-4023
Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation. 10-PLT-4501 Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Medical Company METs (HQDA Directed) Transportation PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-CO-0312 Provide Motor Transport Support. 55-PLT-0011
Manage Ground Evacuation OPS. 08-CO-0350 Conduct Actions on Contact–PLT. 07-PLT-9013
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 08-CO-1302 Set Up Truck Platoon. 55-PLT-0007
Conduct FHP. 08-CO-8104 Conduct an Area Defense–PLT. 07-PLT-9003
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830
Supply PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
Medical Company METs (HQDA Directed) Conduct Tactical Convoy. 55-CO-4003
Manage Health Service Support OPS. 08-CO-0312 Conduct Actions on Contact–PLT. 07-PLT-9013
Manage Ground Evacuation OPS. 08-CO-0350 Establish SSA OPS. 10-PLT-0015
Conduct Sustainment Support OPS. 08-CO-1302 Conduct an Area Defense–PLT. 07-PLT-9003
Conduct FHP. 08-CO-8104 Provide ATP Support–AHA. 09-PLT-0125
Conduct Expeditionary Deployment. 55-CO-4830
Fuel and Water PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
HQ PLT, BSMC High-Payoff Battle Tasks Transportation Bulk Petroleum. 55-CO-0041
Conduct Ambulance Shuttle OPS. 08-CO-0353 Conduct Actions on Contact–PLT. 07-PLT-9013
Provide Medical Supply Support. 08-CO-4515 Occupy an Assembly Area–PLT. 07-PLT-5181
Establishing a Company Command Post. 71-CO-0050 Conduct an Area Defense–PLT. 07-PLT-9003
Develop a COP Using Overlays/Graphics. 011-15B-001
Maintenance Company METs (HQDA Directed)
Evacuation PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks Conduct Support Maintenance OPS. 43-CO-0029
Conduct Ambulance Shuttle OPS. 08-CO-0353 Perform Field-Level Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
Record Treatment on a TC3 Card. 081-COM-0113 Conduct Expeditionary Deployment OPS. 55-CO-4830
Provide Ground Ambulance EVAC SPT. 08-CO-0319 Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Evacuate Patients from Supported Units. 08-CO-0354 Establish Company HQ. 63-CO-4518
Provide Motor Transport Support. 55-PLT-0011
Maintenance Company-Prioritized METs
High-Payoff Leader Tasks Conduct Unit Defense. 63-CO-0727
Conduct TLP. 71-CO-5100 Perform Field-Level Maintenance. 43-CO-4552
Conduct Rehearsals. 07-CO-5009 Perform MAINT Control Functions. 43-CO-4506
Prepare an OPORD. 071-326-5626 Perform Predeployment MAINT Activities. 43-CO-4805
These tasks should be a leader-development focus for every
company commander, first sergeant, platoon leader, platoon Maintenance PLT High-Payoff Battle Tasks
sergeant, and squad leader within the formation before the Conduct TLP. 71-PLT-5100
initiation of collective training. Conduct Tactical Movement. 07-PLT-1342
Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions. 05-PLT-3013
Set up Forward Repair PLT HQ/Sections. 43-PLT-4531

Figure 45-1. Mission-essential/battle-task crosswalk for the

brigade support battalion

Endnote
1. Army Techniques Publication 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, 18 June 2020.

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CHAPTER 46

The Sustainment Battalion Main

Command Post
MAJ James Hubbard, Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Trainer
INTRODUCTION
Combat sustainment support battalions (CSSBs) operating within a division
support area and brigade support battalions (BSBs) operating within a
brigade support area require command and control. A sustainment battalion
main command post (CP) is no different from a maneuver battalion main CP
in that it is the center of all staff functions, controlling and synchronizing
current and future operations, and exercising the operations process. Unlike
a maneuver battalion, a sustainment battalion does not traditionally fight out
of multiple CPs such as the main and tactical CPs. It does however have the
ability to split into a main CP and early entry CP.

THE MAIN COMMAND POST AND THE EARLY ENTRY

COMMAND POST
According to Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-93.1, Combat
Sustainment Support Battalion (19 June 2017), a CSSB can support a
main CP and an early entry CP.1 “The main CP is a facility containing the
majority of the staff designed to control current operations, conduct detailed
analysis, and plan future operations.”2 “An early entry CP is a lead element
of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions
of the headquarters are deployed and operational.”3 Similarly, ATP 4-90,
Brigade Support Battalion (19 June 2020), explains that a BSB commander
“can establish an early entry CP to help them control operations during the
deployment phase of operations.”4
The best use of a sustainment battalion’s doctrinal capability to simultaneously
form an early entry and main CP is for displacement. BSBs and CSSBs at
the National Training Center (NTC) often launched an early entry CP to
their desired future location to conduct reconnaissance of the new site and
establish a command and control node. Once established, the early entry CP
can assume command and control of the battalion while the main CP at the
rearward site breaks down, relocates, and establishes at the new site.

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WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS AND INTEGRATING CELLS

Doctrine states that commanders organize their CPs into various cells,
including functional cells and integrating cells. Sustainment battalions often
struggle to find the personnel and equipment (based on the modified table of
organization and equipment [MTOE]) to establish these cells in an effective
manner. To be successful, sustainment commanders must prioritize what cells
they create, and develop methods to gain efficiencies by combining multiple
integrating cells into single entities. Of specific interest, is the current
operations integration cell, doctrinally “the focal point for the execution of
operations.”5
Observations at the NTC consistently revealed that a doctrinal current
operations integrating cell is the linchpin of successful sustainment operations,
overlaid with the supported brigade combat team’s scheme of maneuver. By
virtue of having a map, a convoy tracker, and radio, a sustainment battalion
has a current operations section. But is it effective? Are all warfighting
functions present? Does it facilitate a common operating picture?
Commanders struggle to establish a current operations section that includes
a cross-section of the entire staff, and therefore all assigned warfighting
functions, for multiple reasons. First and foremost, commanders default to
establishing a field CP in a manner similar to their garrison headquarters:
With compartmentalized sections and offices. Second, limited personnel
and equipment based on MTOE is an issue. Finally, some believe that
establishing a CP that is dispersed in nature—covering multiple tents and/
or mounted workspaces, such as the M1087 Expandable Van Shelter, or
“expando-van”—offers a degree of protection. In this construct, a common
practice is an S-1/S-4 space, S-2/S-3 space, S-6 space, and a support operations
(SPO) space. Unfortunately, the result is a very compartmentalized staff, or
the classic stovepipe analogy. When asked, commanders would explain that
the SPO space is the future operations or plans cell, while the S-2/S-3 space
is the current operations cell. Unfortunately, the S-2/S-3 space (or the current
operations section) almost never includes all warfighting functions. This is a
departure from doctrine, but more importantly, it impedes the effectiveness of
the current operations cell and the overall CP itself.
The mistake of the stovepipe CP leads to each staff section, or cluster of two
or three staff sections, which are working hard and doing the best they can,
but ultimately failing because they are working independently of each other.
A stovepiped CP can perform the following three of the four CP functions
defined by ATP 4-93.1:6
● Plan and prepare for operations.
● Receive, analyze, and disseminate information.
● Prepare reports.

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However, a stovepiped CP cannot adequately perform the fourth: Control

operations, integrate resources, and synchronize current operations. For
this reason, the CP current operations cell should contain all representatives
possible.
A main CP current operations section with an S-1 representative can maintain
situational understanding of the accountability of the battalion and other units
within the support area as elements are continuously departing and returning.
An S-2 representative is required to update the common operational picture
of the supported units’ ever-evolving scheme of maneuver and the enemy’s
constantly changing location and composition. The S-4 representative must
inform the team on the status of internal battalion resources so the S-3 can
integrate those resources into the current operation. An S-6 representative
is vital to keep the CP up on all forms of communication and rapidly
troubleshoot problems as they arise. A SPO representative can inform the
battalion commander of how a last-minute change will impact the operation
96 hours from now. Finally, the current operations cell with a protection cell
representative can command and control the battalion’s area defense fight in
the event of enemy contact.

SURVIVABILITY OF THE MAIN COMMAND POST

Although uncommon, one or two battalion commanders at the NTC have
deliberately stovepiped their CP with survivability as the main consideration.
For example, if indirect fires destroys their S-2/S-3 tent or current operations
integrating cell, then they can relocate the cell to the S-4 tent. Although a sound
concept, when a main CP is dispersed in this manner, its ability to accomplish
what a main CP must achieve is impeded. Furthermore, commanders may
establish a compartmentalized CP in the name of survivability, but emplace
the sections only meters apart, well within the destructive radius of even a
60-millimeter mortar round, which defeats the purpose of dispersion and
simultaneously degrades the synergy of the staff. In effect, dispersing a main
CP in this manner is the worst of both worlds.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Sustainment commanders should pay particular attention to establishing a
main CP with a doctrinal current operations integrating cell with all warfighting
functions present and synergized. As discussed, it is difficult if not impossible
for sustainment battalions to create all of the functional and integrating
cells that doctrine recommends because of personnel and equipment issues.
Commanders need to combine the current operations integrating cell and
the protection-integrating cell. Both cells are of vital importance in a peer
or near-pear fight during large-scale combat operations. Both cells require
all staff sections and warfighting functions present, in addition to every
available communications platform. Each cell needs as perfect as possible
situational awareness to accomplish its mission. The best thing a commander

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can do to gain efficiencies between these two very requirement heavy cells
is to combine them. The current operations cell and all the personnel and
equipment dedicated to it, should simultaneously serve as the protection cell.
When the first round impacts the support area, the S-3 should stand up, not
as the battalion operations officer, but as the protection cell officer in charge,
and start commanding the fight. Under this construct, the S-3 will already
have all the personnel, warfighting functions, communications equipment,
and situational awareness to do so.

SUMMARY
Doctrine explains that BSBs and CSSBs are resourced to operate out of main
CPs and early entry CPs. It also explains that sustainment battalions are
capable of establishing a current operations integrating cell within the main
CP, a vital section of any CP that contains representation from all staff sections
and warfighting functions. Sustainment commanders struggle to establish an
effective CP because they do not establish an effective current operations cell
with all appropriate representation present. For several reasons, sustainment
battalion CPs in the field are built compartmentalized and stovepiped that
impede the synergy of the staff, detract from shared situational awareness
and understanding, and cannot adequately perform all tasks and functions
necessary of a CP. Therefore, commanders must place special emphasis in the
structure, organization, and composition of their CPs with a special focus in a
true fusion of all staff and warfighting functions within the current operations
integrating cell. Combining the current operations integrating cell with the
protection cell will gain efficiencies and set up the support area for success
in a fight against a near-peer enemy during large-scale combat operations.
Sustainment commanders establishing a secure support area, commanded
and controlled by a doctrinal CP, is a key building block for success in the
fight to come.

Endnotes
1. ATP 4-93.1, Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, 19 June 2017, page 2-4,
paragraph 2-22 – 2-23.
2. Field Manual [FM] 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations,
5 May 2014, page 1-1, paragraph 1-4.
3. Ibid., page 1-3, paragraph 1-12.
4. ATP 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, 19 June 2020, page 2-14, paragraph 2-88.
5. FM 6-0, Page 1-8, paragraph 1-44.
6. ATP 4-93.1, Page 2-4, paragraph 2-21.

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CHAPTER 47

The Headquarters and Headquarters

Company Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters and
headquarters company, brigade support battalion should focus on during
home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center
(NTC):
● Define Base Defense Roles and Responsibilities (07-CO-3027/19-
CO-9016).
● Implement Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Protective
Measures at the Company Level (03-CO-9201).
● Employ Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Techniques (05-CO-
3003).
● Occupy an Assembly Area (Company) (07-CO-5181).
● Conduct Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).
If a headquarters and headquarters company focuses on these five tasks and
masters them before their NTC rotation, their organization stands a greater
chance of success. The HHC should avoid the following pitfalls:
● Lack of a clear task and purpose for the HHC command team.
● Failure to have enough certified Raven operators (or all operators come
from same section).
● Lack of established priorities of work during expeditionary reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration.
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance operations.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the HHC command team needs to develop its
role in the battalion’s operation with the battalion commander and command
sergeant major regarding base defense and patient holding-area operations.
A clear understanding of how the HHC command team can best support the
battalion helps the entire organization by assigning a task to a commander
that the staff may not have the capacity to handle.

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Operating the battalion’s main intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

asset is critical to enabling the battalion to conduct reconnaissance of convoy
routes and future brigade support area locations. Typically, the only Raven
operators come from the battalion’s S-2, which is authorized three personnel
(an officer in charge, noncommissioned officer in charge, and analyst). To
ensure the Raven can be employed when needed, trained Soldiers from across
the staff can benefit the battalion’s planning efforts.
Building combat power early is necessary, as the support battalion is
critical for the brigade’s success in large-scale combat operations. The
HHC typically attempts to execute a full planning cycle and build combat
power simultaneously, and it can result in neither effort being executed well.
Understanding how to get the company through the expeditionary reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration requirements rapidly can allow
the staff to plan follow-on operations thoroughly and allow subordinate units
proper time to execute troop leading procedures.
Lastly, maintenance operations are critical to the company’s success.
Designating time daily to PMCS and ensuring the Department of the Army
Form 5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March
1991), is turned in pays dividends 96 hours into operations. Failing to execute
PMCS typically results in critical pieces of equipment (containerized kitchens,
multi-temperature refrigerated container system, Satellite Transportable
Terminal, or generators) becoming inoperable.

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CHAPTER 48

Headquarters and Headquarters

Company Field-Feeding Section
Operations Group, National Training Center
Outlined below are the top training tasks that a field-feeding section in a
headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of a brigade support
battalion should focus on during home-station training before deployment to
the National Training Center (NTC):
● Establish a Field-Feeding Kitchen Area (10-CO-0058).
● Maintain Field-Feeding Safety and Sanitation (10-PLT-4501).
Units should use the training and evaluation outline to assess proficiency
in executing tasks. By focusing and mastering these tasks before an NTC
rotation, the field-feeding section can provide appropriate Class I support
to the brigade support battalion. A field-feeding section should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of proper licensing on equipment.
● Inability to execute night-driving operations
● Lack of integration of the field-feeding team into a protection plan during
an M-M-M ration cycle.
● Lack of communication through the battalion S-4 to the brigade food
service section.
To avoid these common pitfalls, the field-feeding team needs to have a
deliberate drivers training plan and provide Soldiers the opportunity to train on
the equipment they are expected to utilize. Typically, Soldiers have minimal
experience driving assigned equipment and are inexperienced driving at night
because of garrison dining facility shift requirements. Commanders need to
prioritize night drivers training so their Soldiers are prepared to navigate and
operate equipment at night.
The field-feeding team is underutilized within the HHC protection plan,
especially when the battalion is on an M-M-M ration cycle. The section can
provide support to the protection of the brigade support area when the ration
cycle permits. Typically, the Soldiers do not have a task and purpose if they
are not preparing the next meal, which leaves them underutilized.

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Lastly, communication between the field-feeding team to the food service

section within the brigade S-4 is limited and unclear. The typical garrison
channel of communication—the section’s senior noncommissioned officer to
the food service technician—is not compatible in the field environment. The
logistics status report, submitted through the battalion S-4, is the primary
means of communication for the field-feeding team. The senior field-feeding
team noncommissioned officer struggles to communicate with the battalion
S-4 effectively to ensure the battalion has what it needs. Training this line of
communication during garrison operations can give the battalion’s S-4 more
experience handling these planning considerations.

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CHAPTER 49

The Distribution Company in a Brigade

Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a distribution company
in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training
before deployment to the National Training Center:
● Conduct Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).
● Defend Convoy Elements (55-CO-4006).
● Conduct Hasty Displacement (63-CO-4023).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
If a distribution company in a brigade support company focuses on these
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a
greater chance of success. Distribution companies should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Lack of coordination with supporting units.
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance.
● Lack of troop leading procedures and precombat checks and inspections.
● Lack of established priorities of work.
● Lack of local security.

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To avoid these common pitfalls, company leaders must focus on coordinating

with supporting units, either directly or indirectly, for linkup times and
locations before launching a logistics package from the brigade support area.
Company leaders should enforce maintenance standards and ensure Soldiers
understand how to conduct a proper PMCS to avoid mission delays caused by
shortcomings. While at home station, focus on proper enforcement of the one-
third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to
understand the importance of conducting precombat checks and inspections
and what they entail, while leaders need to be aware of key items that could
cause issues during a mission (lack of night-vision devices, food, water, etc.).
The company should develop a standardized priority of work for each platoon
and section to ensure Soldiers understand their roles and responsibilities
when occupying a new area (security, communications, supply points, etc.).
Concurrently, the company needs to develop a local security plan nested with
the battalion that enforces supply points to secure primary and secondary
fighting positions during the field training exercise.

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CHAPTER 50

The Transportation Platoon in a

Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a transportation platoon
in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training
before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):
● Provide Motor Transport Support (55-PLT-0011).
● Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
● Set Up a Truck Platoon (55-PLT-0007).
● Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).
If a transportation platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a
greater chance of success. The transportation platoons should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance.
● Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
● Lack of convoy security.
To avoid these common pitfalls, platoon leaders must focus on enforcement of
maintenance standards and ensure their Soldiers understand how to conduct
proper PMCS to avoid delays of missions because of shortcomings. While
at home station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one
third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to
understand the importance of conducting precombat checks and inspections
what they entail. Leaders need to know key items that could cause issues on
a mission (lack of night-vision devices, food, water, etc.). Platoon leaders
should ensure convoy security is integrated into missions habitually, and
Soldiers understand their roles in security of the convoy.

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CHAPTER 51

The Supply Platoon in a

Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a supply platoon in a
brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training before
deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):
● Conduct a Tactical Convoy (55-CO-4003).
● Conduct Actions On Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
● Establish Supply Support Activity Operations (10-PLT-0015).
● Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).
● Provide Ammunition Transfer Point Support—Ammunition Holding
Area (09-PLT-0125).
If a supply platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these tasks and
masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands a greater chance
of success. The supply platoon should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance.
● Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
● Lack of local security.
To avoid these common pitfalls, platoon leaders must enforce maintenance
standards and conduct proper PMCS to avoid delays. While at home
station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one-
third, two-thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers
need to understand the importance of conducting precombat checks
and inspections and what they entail. Leaders need to know key
items that could cause issues during displacements of supply points (lack of
night-vision devices, proper securing of loads, etc.). Platoon leaders should
focus on development of a local security plan that is nested with the company,
and enables sections to secure themselves with primary and secondary
fighting positions during a field training exercise.

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CHAPTER 52

The Fuel and Water Platoon in a

Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a fuel and water platoon
in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training
before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):
● Transport Bulk Petroleum (55-CO-0041)
● Conduct Actions on Contact (Platoon) (07-PLT-9013).
● Occupy an Assembly Area (Platoon) (07-PLT-5181).
● Conduct an Area Defense (Platoon) (07-PLT-9003).
If a fuel and water platoon in a brigade support company focuses on these
tasks and masters them before its NTC rotation, its organization stands
a greater chance of success. The fuel and water platoon should avoid the
following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance.
● Lack of troop leading procedures, and precombat checks and inspections.
● Lack of convoy security.
To avoid these common pitfalls, maintenance standards must be enforced
and Soldiers must understand how to conduct proper PMCS. While at home
station, focus needs to be given on proper enforcement of the one third, two-
thirds rule for training events. At the same time, Soldiers need to understand
the importance of conducting their precombat checks and inspections and
what they entail. Leaders need to know key items that could cause issues on
a mission (lack of night-vision devices, proper hoses for liquid distribution,
etc.). Platoon leaders should ensure convoy security is integrated into
missions habitually, and Soldiers understand their roles in convoy security.

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CHAPTER 53

The Field Maintenance Company,

Brigade Support Battalion
National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a field maintenance
company in a brigade support battalion should focus during home-station
training before deployment to the National Training Center:
● Perform Predeployment Maintenance Activities (43-CO-4805).
● Conduct Unit Defense (63-CO-0727).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
● Perform Field Maintenance (43-CO-4552).
The field maintenance companies should avoid the following common
pitfalls:
● Roles and responsibilities not being clearly defined.
● Not having required special maintenance tools on hand.
● Not establishing mutually supportive fighting positions.
● Not establishing a clear process for Department of the Army (DA) Form
5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March
1991), within the brigade support area.
● Not leaning forward on the support operations section to anticipate
maintenance requirements.
To avoid these common pitfalls, a field maintenance company command team
needs to ensure the commodity shops are properly nested with the brigade
concept of support (as defined by the support operations section, brigade S-4
section, and maneuver battalion requirements) and the company is providing
brigade-level support during brigade training events in garrison. Roles and
responsibilities need to be clearly defined for running company priorities of
work. All required special maintenance tools, test maintenance diagnostic
equipment, maintenance support devices, and Class IX support packages
must be on hand for providing field-level maintenance.

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Mutually supportive fighting positions must be part of the brigade support

area defense plan, and unit sector sketches must be properly nested within
the brigade support battalion’s base defense plan. The shop office must have
a clear process for DA Form 5988-E workflow within the brigade support
area to allow brigade support battalion units to properly execute dispatching
procedures within a defined cycle.
The company must lean forward on the support operations section and
forward support company requirements to properly allocate specialty
maintenance capability based on a defined priority of support across the
brigade. Maintenance companies need to manage maintenance support and
base defense manning requirements concurrently. Maintenance companies
must continually leverage the brigade support battalion executive officer for
refinement of the internal maintenance cycle among adjacent units during
field operations.

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CHAPTER 54

The Maintenance Control and

Area Support Platoon
Field Maintenance Company
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance control and
area support platoon in a brigade support battalion should focus on during
home-station training before deployment to the National Training Center:
● Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-PLT-5100).
● Provide Inspection and Classification Support (43-PLT-0006).
● Perform Maintenance Control Functions (43-CO-4506).
● Set Up Maintenance Platoon Headquarters and Sections (43-PLT-4570).
The maintenance control and area support platoons should avoid the following
common pitfalls:
● Not doing proper site selection for maintenance commodity shops.
● Not establishing communications with the company headquarters.
● Not establishing clear priorities of work within the brigade support area
(BSA).
● Not establishing a clear process for Department of the Army (DA) Form
5988-E, Equipment Maintenance and Inspection Worksheet (01 March
1991) workflow for within the BSA.
To avoid these common pitfalls, a maintenance control and area support
platoon leader needs to ensure the platoon establishes a layout plan for
the company headquarters, maintenance control and service, and recovery
section. Digital and analog communications must be established between the
platoon headquarters, maintenance control section, company headquarters,
and support operations. Roles and responsibilities need to be clearly defined
for running platoon priorities of work. Required maintenance special tools,
test maintenance diagnostic equipment, maintenance support devices,
and Class IX support packages must be on hand for providing field-level
maintenance.

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The platoon must have clearly defined fighting positions and sector sketches
properly nested with the company unit defense plan. The maintenance control
section must have a clear process for DA Form 5988-E workflow within the
BSA to allow brigade support battalion units to properly execute dispatching
procedures on a defined cycle. The maintenance control section must monitor
the status of all work requests throughout the workflow process, managing
Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-A) or logistics information
systems reports to minimize maintenance downtime.
The platoon must have an established recovery plan with properly trained
H8/H9-qualified personnel for conducting service and recovery operations.
Personnel must be proficient with operating Joint Battle Command-Platform
to properly relay maintenance requirements with forward maintenance
sections conducting field-level maintenance.

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CHAPTER 55

The Maintenance Platoon,

Field Maintenance Company
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a maintenance platoon
in a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training
before deployment to the National Training Center:
● Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (71-PLT-5100).
● Conduct Tactical Movement (07-PLT-1342).
● Construct Vehicle Fighting Positions (05-PLT-3013).
● Set Up Forward Repair Platoon Headquarters and Sections (43-PLT-
4531).
Maintenance platoons should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Not doing proper site selection for maintenance commodity shops.
● Not establishing communications with the company headquarters.
● Not establishing crew-served fighting positions within the brigade support
area.
● Not conducting drivers training.
To avoid common pitfalls, a maintenance platoon leader needs to ensure
the platoon establishes a layout plan for the platoon headquarters; field
maintenance; ground support equipment; and missile, electronic, and
armament repair sections. Digital and analog communications must be
established between the platoon headquarters, company headquarters, and
commodity maintenance sections. Roles and responsibilities need to be
clearly defined for running platoon priorities of work. Required maintenance
special tools, test maintenance diagnostic equipment, maintenance support
devices, and Class IX support packages must be on hand for providing
field-level maintenance.

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The platoon must have clearly defined fighting positions and sector sketches
properly nested with the company unit defense plan. Vehicle crew-served
fighting positions must be properly emplaced and integrated with the overall
brigade support area defense plan. The platoon must be prepared to execute
base defense operations and provide field-level maintenance concurrently.
Personnel should have experience conducting entry control point operations.
Personnel must also be proficient with operating Joint Battle Command-
Platform to properly relay maintenance requirements with forward
maintenance sections conducting field-level maintenance. Personnel need to
conduct proper drivers training before executing tactical convoy operations.

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CHAPTER 56

The Brigade Support Medical

Company, Brigade Support Battalion
Operations Group, National Training Center
The following are the top collective training tasks a medical company in
a brigade support battalion should focus on during home-station training
before deployment to the National Training Center (NTC):
● Manage Health Service Support (08-CO-0312/08-TM-0220/1).
● Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
● Maintain Communications (63-CO-4017/441-14H-1036/113-25U-1009).
● Inspect Cargo Shipping Documents (551-88N-3001).
● Perform Duties as a Driver Trainer/Examiner (551-88M-2426).
Medical companies should avoid the following common pitfalls:
● Lack of preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), and other
maintenance.
● Lack of established priorities of work and rest cycles.
● Failure to integrate the company commander and first sergeant into
brigade medical planning or maintaining communications.
● Failure to conduct an operation order (OPORD) brief and observe
subordinate leaders’ briefs.
The brigade support medical companies (BSMCs) arrive to NTC having
practiced on Role 2 medical care under little to no duress. However, Soldiers
and leaders do not fully grasp the importance and nuances derived from this
task to more easily facilitate their establishment of Role 2 medical care.
Before any detailed planning is done, being thoroughly practiced on this task
can alleviate many of the issues experienced with Role 2 medical care caused
by the operational environment of NTC. The most common issues are lack
of established teams to facilitate offload of equipment, established teams to
set up tents, no power distribution (with primaries and alternates), and lack
of equipment in the Role 2 medical facility. Another common issue is ebbing
and flowing of personnel based on leaders directions, resulting in personnel
being underutilized. This planning needs to be solidified in the platoon and
company tactical standard operating procedures, outlining required tasks that
can be planned based on the personnel and time available during particular
missions.

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BSMCs do not arrive at NTC having thoroughly exercised their

ambulance exchange point (AXP) operations. Although practiced at home
station-training, it lacks the dynamic operations seen at NTC over extended
ground lines of communications with time and/or conditions-based triggers
for multiple AXPs. This causes the BSMC and evacuation platoon to not track
or be aware of the triggers to activate or deactivate AXPs, which are found
in several products in the brigade (for example, the OPORD, fragmentary
order, annex F, appendix 3 to annex F, and the brigade’s medical common
operational picture). Ultimately, this results in an increased died-of-wounds
rate from delayed start points of BSMC platforms, and missed patient
handoffs caused by traveling to incorrect AXPs.
The BSMC, as the brigade combat team commander’s role of care, has
brigade-level influence on medical operations. The most successful BSMCs
accomplish this task by maintaining effective communications with the
brigade, specifically the surgeon section, administrative and logistics
operations center, BSB, maneuver battalions (specifically Role 1 medical
care), and their organic platoons. This is facilitated by establishing all their
platforms including Joint Battle Command-Platform, Joint Capabilities
Release, two frequency modulation (FM) Advanced System Improvement
Programs (ASIPs) with OE-254/GRC antennas, and Combat Service Support
Automated Information System Interface (CAISI). These systems are used
by BSMCs to establish their medical communications for combat casualty
care and Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network [NIPRNET]).
Commonly, BSMC command posts only establish one FM ASIP that jumps
between BSB and company nets, and JBC-P that lacks chat groups for the
entirety of the brigade’s medical community. This is further extended to the
treatment platoon that is authorized by the modified table of organization
and equipment (MTOE) to have the ability to run FM communications from
the Role 2 medical facility (line-item number P40750 with any Army Navy
[AN]-Vehicle Radio Communication [VRC] configuration), minimizing the
requirement of runners that often becomes the primary means. A point in this
execution that requires planning and rehearsing is the utilization of the AN/
VRC radio communications system, because the BSMC is only authorized
enough AN/VRC systems for its vehicles. This requires the platoon and
company to identify how to establish this internal, static FM communication
system. At home-station training, PMCS and testing can significantly reduce
the issues most commonly experienced at the NTC.

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BSMCs attend the NTC with an overall solid understanding of what

equipment it requires to facilitate the full capability of its broad operations.
In turn, the company has a general understanding of what platforms transport
individual pieces of equipment, containers, and personnel. However, Soldiers
and company leaders lack the meticulous level of analysis, planning, and
documentation on how to truly configure and annotate their loads to maximize
their lift capability and operational efficiency. This leads to the following
issues:
● Delayed displacement operations by attempting to “fit” equipment into
vehicles.
● The inability to locate critical pieces of equipment stored deep and far
forward in their light medium tactical vehicles and trailers.
● Lack of the ability to transport organic equipment as required by BSMC
doctrine.
● Loss of government property because of damaged or unsecured loads.
As outlined in the training and evaluation outline, the BSMC should verify
these load plans monthly. Although potentially excessive, it ensures accuracy
of loads, understanding by all Soldiers, and facilitates ease in displacement
operations.
When the BSMCs arrive at NTC, at the platoon level, there is lack of driver’s
training, night-driver’s training, and licensed personnel for all vehicles
assigned to the BSMC. Unfamiliarity with vehicle platforms, especially
using night-vision devices, leads to patient delay of care moving from point
of injury through the roles of care to Role 3 care. This delay in or slowed
movement leads increased driver fatigue, and resources being drawn away
from Role 2 care for prolonged periods of time. Delay in movement is often
caused by lack of properly licensed personnel available to move vehicles,
and is extended to BSMC displacements. BSMCs should prepare for NTC at
the platoon level to conduct extensive drivers training with an emphasis on
night-drivers training and driving using night-vision devices. Newly arrived
personnel should have gone through proper driver’s training and licensed on
all vehicles assigned to the BSMC, regardless of their duty position.

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COMMON PITFALLS MEDICAL COMPANIES SHOULD AVOID

Historically, all units, including the BSMC, attend NTC with vehicles and
equipment not mission capable, often with known issues brought forward
from home station with ambitions of correcting faults at NTC. Before
attending NTC, specifically on rolling stock, faults need to be identified
using thorough PMCS and subsequently corrected. This mindset needs to
continue at NTC with daily, in-depth PMCS to identify and correct minor
faults before they become significant. Specifically for the BSMC, this
results in the brigade losing one of its few medical evacuation platforms
or Role 2 care attempting to cross-load equipment to accomplish an initial
operating capability on its next displacement while forced to leave other
mission-critical equipment behind. To assist with this issue, the BSMC
should conduct a PMCS course at home station using applicable technical
manuals on its rolling stock and ensure those Soldiers who operate the rolling
stock attend the course. Every rolling stock needs a hard copy of the technical
manual. Leaders need to oversee and spot-check Soldiers conducting PMCS
to ensure Soldiers are adhering to the standard before and during NTC.
The BSMC, as with all medical units, is tasked with a 24-hour unknown
work cycle. This unpredictable work cycle can wreak havoc on the morale,
effectiveness, and safety of the BSMC if not effectively managed. Several
ways the BSMC can positively influence these impacts is by establishing and
rehearsing priorities of work, duties and responsibilities, and a work and rest
cycle. The most common friction comes during Role 2 care displacement
operations for priorities of work and duties and responsibilities. A way of
alleviating this friction is by establishing a detailed displacement timeline
with the priorities of work depicting what is required, and when and who
owns the responsibility. However, duties and responsibilities extend to daily
sustainment operations (who and when are generators refueled and checked,
water buffalo filled, trash collected and thrown, etc.). The work and rest cycle
is most commonly impacted in the evacuation and treatment platoons. All too
often, a single casualty is in-bound, resulting in all MEDEVAC platforms and
treatment personnel spun up for prolonged durations to result in a majority of
personnel not utilized and watching. The decision of mass casualty should be
the only time all personnel are available for patient care, but even this should
be scalable. These factors need to be rehearsed at home station in an austere
environment through platoon and levels up using field exercises. During
a field exercise, the company will be able to facilitate internal training on
priorities of work, but should coordinate with adjacent and higher echelons
to facilitate the mass casualties work and rest cycle.

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The BSMC commander and first sergeant are often the most senior medical
service corps officers and Army Medical Department (Career Management
Field 68) in the brigade combat team. Often, both have previously served
in the brigade combat team surgeon section, and are the command team
of the brigade commander’s role of care. The pair have the experience to
positively shape the brigade combat team medical operations. However,
because of numerous factors, the pair are often not requested to assist in
providing input into the medical concept of support. The BSMC command
team must ensure it is integrated into the brigade medical concept, providing
the ground-up refinement for the duration of the operation. Furthermore, the
command team must not let the limited communications platforms organic to
the BSMC prevent this integration (utilize in-person visits and scheduled
Secret Voice over Internet Protocol conversations). The command team
should start this integration with the brigade surgeon section at home station
by conducting a synchronization meeting, at minimum bimonthly, potentially
directly before or after the brigade medical synchronization meeting. This
synchronization meeting should not only cover current operations as a brigade,
but also how it is going to operate in the field (duties and responsibilities,
“swim lanes,” how the BSMC and surgeon sections are wanting to fight,
limitations and constraints of the BSMC, etc.) to build confidence and rapport
among the teams.
As part of the Basic Officer Leader Course, Captains Career Course, Senior
Leader Course, and Master Leader Course, the company command team has
been instructed and presented multiple OPORD briefs and received formal
guidance on troop leading procedures (TLP) in the institutional setting. The use
of the company OPORD and TLP should not be exhausted at the institutional
setting and should continue within the BSMC. The BSMC command team
often takes the BSB OPORD and repeats it to the company, if an OPORD
brief is even conducted. The company command team must process the
BSB OPORD and appendix 3 to annex F to provide concise OPORD briefs
applicable to its company. Often, leaders within the BSMC do not utilize
their TLP, which makes this overall process vague and incomplete. Field
Manual 3-21.11, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team Infantry Rifle Company
(29 April 2014), Appendix D, provides an excellent input/output process
the company command team can follow to significantly reduce these issues.
Additionally, the command team should watch and validate subordinate
leaders’ OPORD briefs to their subordinates to ensure the mission statement,
commander’s intent, tasks to subordinates, and coordinating instructions are
correct, which can create success for the BSMC and subsequently brigade
medical operations. The TLP and OPORD processes need to be trained down
to the team leader level and integrated into daily operations at home station,
teaching muscle memory of conducting these processes. Therefore, by the
time the BSMC attends NTC, leaders at every echelon can efficiently execute
all aspects without requiring guidance or refinement in the overarching
process, and the command team can verify details of the operations.
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THE HEADQUARTERS PLATOON/SECTION, BRIGADE

SUPPORT MEDICAL COMPANY
The following are the top collective training tasks a headquarters platoon in
a BSMC should focus on during home-station training before deploying to
NTC:
● Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
● Provide Medical Supply Support (08-CO-4515/081-68J-3102).
● Establishing a Company Command Post in an Operational Environment
(71-CO-0050).
● Develop a Common Operational Picture Using Overlays and Graphics
(011-15B-0011).

THE TREATMENT PLATOON, BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL

COMPANY
The following are the top collective training tasks a treatment platoon in
a brigade support medical company should focus on during home-station
training before deploying to NTC:
● Manage Health Service Support Operations (08-CO-0312/08-TM-0220/1).
● Provide Patient Administration Services (08-DET-0230/081-68G-1042).
● Provide Emergency Medical Treatment (08-PLT-0313).
● Provide Patient Holding (08-CO-0318).

EVACUATION PLATOON, BRIGADE SUPPORT MEDICAL

COMPANY
The following are the top collective training tasks an evacuation platoon in
a BSMC should focus on during home-station training before deploying to
NTC:
● Conduct Ambulance Shuttle Operations (08-CO-0353/08-TM-0319).
● Conduct Patient Accountability (081-70E-2000).
● Provide Ground Ambulance Evacuation Support (08-CO-0319).
● Evacuate Patients From Supported Units (08-CO-0354).
● Manage Ground Evacuation Operations (08-CO-0350/55-PLT-0011).

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CHAPTER 57

Preparing for Success:

A Deliberate Convoy Preparation
Notification-Hour Sequence
SFC Richard Norris and MAJ James Hubbard,
Sustainment Trainers
A common struggle among units at the National Training Center (NTC)
is synchronizing sustainment with operational demands. Even the most
developed operational plans suffer when something as simple as a late start
point (SP) by an individual logistical package (LOGPAC) takes place. Late
SPs are typically the result of failure to adequately plan and prepare for the
mission, leading to operators identifying a dead-lined piece of equipment
shortly before the SP, leaders dedicating an inadequate amount of time to
supply loading, or precombat checks (PCCs) and precombat inspections
(PCIs) pinpointing deficiencies (from communications issues to weapon
problems) too late to fix before an on-time SP.
No unit at the NTC is immune from these common maladies. These are
struggles shared by the composite supply companies and composite truck
companies of the combat sustainment support battalions, the A distribution
companies of brigade support battalions (BSBs), and the forward support
companies of maneuver battalions. The only solution is dedicating as much
time as possible for deliberate mission preparation.

THE NOTIFICATION-HOUR SEQUENCE

A well-defined notification-hour (N-hour) sequence establishes a timeline
for LOGPAC preparation. Troop leading procedures (TLP) are used
by company-, platoon-, squad-, and section-level leaders to prepare for
missions. But TLP and a deliberate preparation process require time. The
battalion implementing an N-hour sequence and battle tracking the execution
of that sequence help the companies prepare for execution in two ways. First,
it structures the time available to address personnel and equipment issues
leading up to mission execution. Second, it manages the time by providing the
battalion situational awareness and early warning if that preparation begins to
fall behind. Then, the battalion can surge efforts to get the preparation back
on track.

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RECOMMENDATION
The N-hour sequence is an essential tool to address issues during LOGPAC
preparation. Table 57-1 is an example of an effective N-hour sequence
observed at NTC.
Table 57-1. Example N-hour sequence
N-24 Convoy commander notified of the mission.
N-24-20 Convoy commander analyzes personnel, equipment, supplies,
and the route needed for convoy.
N-20-19 Personnel are notified of convoy requirements.
N-19 The convoy manifest of personnel, equipment, supplies, and
route is submitted to the battalion operations officer (S-3).
N-19-17 Preventive maintenance checks and services of equipment
is performed; necessary equipment replaced or maintenance
notified of the need for repairs; all vehicles are fueled.
N-17-13 Commodities are loaded, strapped, and recorded on the load
plan.
N-13-12 Vehicles are staged for convoy departure; equipment and
personnel manifests are locked at the battalion level; PCCs
conducted.
N-12-4 Personnel rest.
N-4 Personnel wake up.
N-3 Final PCIs of equipment and personnel; the S-2 provides an
intelligence update to the convoy commander.
N-2 Convoy brief conducted.
N-1 A hard stop to drop equipment that is not mission capable for
the mission is completed.
N-1 Final rehearsals are conducted.
N-Hour SP
Note: Convoy preparation on a time constraint affects personnel rest. To
allow more time for personnel rest, other personnel can prepare convoy
loads and check equipment while operators rest.

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CRASHING THE SEQUENCE

When NTC coaches provide the above N-hour sequence to the rotational
training unit, the first response is that a preparation cycle that consumes
24 hours is unrealistic. The notion that a unit would have more than 24 hours
of notice to provide to the executing company or platoon is a lofty goal.
This mindset is an indicator that sustainment units struggle to get ahead
of requirements and too often fall into a more reactionary stance when it
comes to mission preparation and execution. Units must combat this mindset
with more future operations planning, and interface with the maneuver
planners sooner to better forecast requirements. Continuous coordination
with higher and adjacent units, and a solid method for battle tracking
within the current operations cell of the BSB headquarters, tied with the
proper use of the military decision-making process (MDMP) will mitigate
a number of concerns. Additionally, issuing warning orders and maintaining
current running estimates will ensure timely and accurate dissemination
of information to subordinate units, ultimately facilitating the successful
execution of the N-hour sequence.
Unfortunately, last-minute sustainment requirements will develop during
large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The nature of armed conflict against
a peer or near-peer enemy ensures that logistical forecasts are never perfect,
and sustainers will need to react to shifts in the scheme of maneuver and the
resulting concept of support. However, if sustainers become more practiced
at deliberate mission forecasting and allow time for more deliberate mission
preparation, they will be better postured to crash these systems and react in a
timelier manner. The unit that is proficient on deliberate mission preparation
and on-time execution is the unit most suited to truncate its preparation and
execution timelines down from 24 hours to 12 hours, or even 4 hours when
the situation warrants. This unit will find success regardless of the timeline
because it has the requisite system in place.

SUMMARY
Units training for LSCO at NTC struggle to execute sustainment as planned
and on time based on the supported scheme of maneuver because of shortfalls
in mission preparation. A deliberate and battle-tracked, N-hour preparation
sequence will facilitate success via structured time management. The unit
that is disciplined in this endeavor will be the unit that is most prepared to
modify its system and still enjoy mission success. Rising to the occasion when
the unexpected happens, preparation sequences shortened to meet emerging
and changing sustainment requirements is always a key to success. However,
this can never be the primary course of action. Sustainment organizations
must develop systems and adhere to those systems in a disciplined manner to
consistently prepare for success in the fight to come.

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GLOSSARY
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ABCS Army Battle Command System
ABCT armored brigade combat team
ABF attack by fire
ADAM air defense airspace management
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AHA ammunition holding area
AN Army Navy
AR Army Regulation
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation
ART Army Tactical Task
ASIP Advanced System Improvement Program
ATHP ammunition transfer holding point
ATK attack
ATP ammunition transfer point, Army Techniques
Publication
AVN aviation
AXP ambulance exchange point
BAE brigade aviation element
BAS battalion aid station
BCT brigade combat team
BDE brigade
BEB brigade engineer battalion
BFV Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BLUECOP maneuver common operational picture
BN battalion
BOC battery operations center
BSA brigade support area
BSB brigade support battalion
BTRY battery
C2 command and control

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CAB combined arms battalion

CAISI Combat Service Support Automated Information
Systems Interface
CALFX combined arms live-fire exercise
CATS Combined Arms Training Strategy
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives
CCD camouflage, concealment, and deception
CDR commander
CNR Combat Network Radio
CO company
COLL collection
COMMEX communication exercise
COMMO communications
COP common operational picture
CP command post
CPOF Command Post of the Future
CS combat support
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CSSB combat sustainment support battalion
CTC combat training center
CTCP combat trains command post
CUB commander’s update brief
CUOPS current operations
DA Department of the Army
DCGS-A Distributed Common Ground System-Army
DDS Data Distribution Service
DEF defense
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DNS domain name system
DODIN Department of Defense Information Network
ECOA enemy course of action

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EN engineer
EVAC evacuation
EVENTEMP event template
FA field artillery
FASP field artillery support plan
FDC fire direction center
FHP force health protection
FM Field Manual, frequency modulation
FORSCOM U.S. Army Forces Command
FSC forward support company
FTCP field trains command post
FUOPS future operations
GBS Global Broadcast Service
GCSS-Army Global Combat Support System-Army
HCLOS high-capacity, line of sight
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHT headquarters and headquarters troop
HICON higher command
HQ headquarters
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
IBCT infantry brigade combat team
IDF indirect fire
IDM information dissemination management
IMLC Infantry Mortar Leader Course
INF infantry
IPB intelligence preparations of the battlefield
ISO in support of
IVO in the vicinity of
IWfF intelligence warfighting function
JBC-P Joint Battle Command-Platform
JCR Joint Capabilities Release
JSLIST Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology
LFX live-fire exercise

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LOGCOP logistics common operational picture

LOGPAC logistics package
LOS line of sight
LRAS Long-Range Acquisition System
LRP logistics release point
LSCO large-scale combat operations
LTIOV latest time information is of value
MAC mobility augmentation company
MAINT maintenance
MASCAL mass casualty
MCP main command post
MDMP military decision-making process
MECH mechanized
MEDO medical officer
MET mission-essential task
METL mission-essential task list
MICLIC mine-clearing line charge
MICO military intelligence company
MILES multiple integrated laser engagement system
MOB mobilization
MOS military occupational specialty
MP military police
MRAP Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected
MSN mission
MTC movement to contact
MTR mortar
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NOSC network operations and security center
NTC National Training Center
NVD night-vision device
OBJ objective

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OBS observation
OC/T observer coach/trainer
OIC officer in charge
OPFOR opposing force
OPORD operation order
OPS operations
PACE primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection
PLT platoon
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
POC platoon operations center
POR program of record
PT point
PTDO prepare to deploy order
Q/SATB quarterly or semiannual training briefs
ReARMM Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization
Model
RECON reconnaissance
REDCOP enemy common operational picture
RETRANS retransmission
RFF request for forces
RSOI reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
RTU rotational training unit
SBCT Stryker brigade combat team
SBF support by fire
SCT scout
SIEM security information and event management
SINCGARS Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITEMP situation template
SOP standard operating procedure
SP start point

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SPEED systems planning, engineering, and evaluation device

SPO support operations
SPT support
SQD squad
SQDN squadron
SSA supply support activity
SSL shop stock list
STT Satellite Transportable Terminal, Sergeant’s Time
Training
STX situational training exercise
SUP support
TAA tactical assembly area
TAC tactical command post
TACSOP tactical standard operating procedure
TCF technical control facility
T&EO training and evaluation outline
TI tactical internet
TLP troop leading procedures
TOC tactical operations center
TOW Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided
TOW 2B Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided
Bunker Buster
TNG training
TRIGRF Target Reconnaissance Infrared Geolocating Range
Finder
UAP unit airspace plan
UAS unmanned aircraft system
UMCP unit maintenance collection point
USR unit status report
VHF very-high frequency
VRC Vehicle Radio Communications
VSAT very small aperture terminal
WIN-T Warfighter Information Network-Tactical

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
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Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1350

MASTERING THE FUNDAMENTALS (BCT)

U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS

COMBINED CENTER - TRAINING
May 2021

ARMS CENTER No. 21-19

May 2021
Approved For Public Release Approved For Public Release
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