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CONCEPT OF BLENDING CONVENTIONAL AND UNCONVENTIONAL

WARFARE —OPTIONS FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

INTRODUCTION

1. Military doctrine is the fundamental principle by which military forces guide their
actions to attain the objective.1 In the mid of 1990s the Draft Operations of War, Volume
One came into being to provide Bangladesh Army’s own war fighting doctrine and ideas to
give a functional shape to warfare. This is yet to be finalized and accepted as a doctrine.

2. Bangladesh has to maintain an army to protect territorial integrity and national

sovereignty. But our economic constraints restrict us having a sophisticated and large
army. Though our Army’s standard of training is comparable to any modern army of the
world, yet we lack in equipment and weapons. Formulating and implementing a suitable
defence plan for Bangladesh is a nightmare of any military strategists. The legacy of
serious mistakes by British during formation of India and Pakistan basing on religious
faiths forsaking the defence consideration is still borne by Bangladesh. Having a strong
regional superpower in all sides, Bangladesh thus faces a serious predicament. With
developing economy and poor resource base, many adverse factors of the security of
small states are common in our country.

3. Again, we have to ensure our security within available resources. Hence, we need
to strike a balance between the demand and resources and defend our motherland. The
situation may seem bleak but we have many advantages, too. With a vast homogenous
population, we have a reasonably strong professional military force. Integration of these
two vital components can overcome many odds and achieve wonders. Our Liberation War
is a glaring example in this context. Once adequately motivated and suitably trained,
Bengali soldiers can be as courageous as any other martial race. The Indo-Pak war in
1965 and our glorious war of liberation in 1971 bear the testimony. Not many countries in
the world earned a new flag through armed struggle. Moreover, history possesses
examples where combined might of military and people routed superpowers. All we need
is a concerted effort of all sections of society to evolve a plan and a devoted nation to
prepare and execute those with commitment and determination.

4. To achieve our aim after striking a balance between two conflicting factors, our
design of operations should envisage a concept of blending Conventional Warfare (CW)
and the Unconventional Warfare (UCW) against any potential aggressor. " In future
conflicts Bangladesh Army must be prepared to blend conventional and unconventional
warfare in the implementation of national strategy"2…“Unconventional Warfare is not
regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather should be waged simultaneously
with conventional war. In fact, the campaign plan should conceive the operational
1Draft Operations of War, Volume One, (Dhaka: Army Headquarters, General Staff Branch, Military Training
Directorate, 1997), p. 1-1.
2Ibid, p. 2-6
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employment of the Unconventional Force as one of its major operations or battle and
establish its relationship with other component parts".3

5. This Blending of CW and UCW is not a new concept. As a doctrine, the

simultaneous prosecution of CW and UCW in our war fighting strategy is under active
consideration. It has been used in the past in various forms and intensity. But we should
not mix up the concept of Total People's War and the concept of blending. Total People's
War is the concept to be adopted at the last stage when conventional fighting will no more
be possible or practicable. Our proposed blending CW and UCW aims to avoid slipping
down to that dangerous stage. Total People's War is a protracted war where Conventional
Force (CF) will adopt 'Descending Transformation' to fight as guerrilla force in order to
gain time for future 'Ascending Transformation', aiming at a counter offensive to obtain a
decision. Such transformations are: Mao's Long March and the final overthrow of Chiang
Kaishek's forces, Indo- China wars fought by the Viet Mins and the Viet Congs.4

6. The blending is based on a concept of force multiplier, where the UCW

components would act as the compounding force to conventional component. Our
adversary is superior to us militarily in terms of manpower and assets. We lack in
geographical depth to fight a pure conventional war for a long time. CW simultaneously
with UCW at operational and tactical levels, from the very beginning throughout its length
and breadth, will help in compensating for adversary's numerical superiority and own
inadequate geographical depth.

7. The above concept obviously would call for conducting battles behind the enemy
line and destroying logistic bases. The modern concept of conducting a deep battle will
play an important role in shaping the battle in our advantage, so that our main effort can
strike the enemy at our desired time and place. We assume that this concept is the
cornerstone of our future doctrine. However, before a concept can mature into a doctrine it
involves a process of research, tests, trials and analysis. This research work is one such
step in our effort towards crystallization of the future doctrine of war for Bangladesh Army.
This paper will discuss a few conceptual and relevant issues including historical
perspective, terrain and threat analysis. The concept of blending will then be discussed.
Finally, the paper will suggest methods of training and recommendations to implement the
concept.

AIM

8. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of blending CW and UCW and
suggest measures for implementing the concept in Bangladesh.

DEFINITIONS, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND THREAT ANALYSIS

3ibid.
4Quamruzzaman, Mohammad, psc, Lieutenant Colonel, Blending of Conventional and Unconventional
Warfare - My Experience at Destranor Division, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics
(SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
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Definitions

9. CW. Operations, which are conducted by CF i.e. Army, Navy, Air, auxiliary and
para military forces following established doctrine and principles of war, are termed as
CW. These forces wear uniform during operations and are subjected to Geneva
Convention.5

10. Unconventional Force (UCF). ‘It is a significantly large and organised force
operating behind the enemy lines with well established chain of command within the
framework of a well conceived plan. Though they generally merge with the population and
operate in small groups to avoid physical destruction, they are capable of rapid
concentration when large tasks are contemplated. This means that unconventional war
involves both major and minor actions deep inside enemy line with the purpose of creating
a significant impact on the conduct of campaigns and battles along the traditional front’...
‘They usually concentrate on key enemy capabilities such as his C2 centres, fire support
systems, air bases, logistic installations, lines of communication, air defence equipment.’ 6

11. UCW. Operations, which are conducted by forces other than CF, are known as
UCW. These forces normally do not wear uniform during operations, live off the
ground/mass population and are not subjected to Geneva Convention. It involves a broad
spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held/ controlled or
politically sensitive territory. UCW includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of
guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a
low visibility, covert or clandestine in nature. Predominantly indigenous personnel, usually
supported and directed in varying degrees by external source during all condition of war,
may prosecute these interrelated aspects of UCW collectively.7

12. Guerrilla Warfare. Military or paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or

hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. It complements, supports, or
extends conventional military operations or to wear down his resistance.

13. Total People’s War. Total people’s war means all conventional and UCF of a
nation fighting unconventional form of warfare against the enemy. It means complete
utilization and mobilization of all resources available to a nation, i.e. economic, political
and social to the war effort. In other words, the entire population is drawn or involved in
the war effort in some form or the other and the nation is unable to defend itself with
conventional form of war.

5AHQ Project Study-1998 by HQ 46 Independent Infantry Brigade.

6Draft Operations of War, op cit.
7Draft Operations of War, op cit.
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Historical Perspective

14. Vietnam War. The Vietnam War was one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts and
struggle of the Vietnamese for their Independence which world has seen since 1945. This
30 years war ended with disastrous defeat firstly to French Army and then to the US Army.
Both the mighty armies were defeated by a comparatively lightly armed Vietminh guerrilla
force, who fought mostly unconventional war. According to Jone Pimiott 8 there were
mainly two reasons; Firstly, the ability of the Vietminh ground force to operate effectively in
extreme terrain and climate condition and secondly, French and US Army fought against a
highly motivated nation. Americans followed piece meal offensive against the guerrilla
force where they suffered heavy casualty. General Giap the commander of the Vietminh
force, forced both the armies to fight isolated battles. He did it by unconventional operation
before he launched conventional offensive. Both French and Americans had superiority in
technology but they could not protect themselves from unconventional threat posed by the
Vietminh force, which led them into defeat.

15. Afghan War. On 27 December 1979, Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, which was
well planned, organized and prepared against a weak opposition9. The resistance offered
by the Afghan guerrilla who fought against a conventional and superior Soviet Army
became a history. Soviet armed forces were trained and conditioned to fight against
sophisticated enemies on European battlefield. In Afghanistan, they faced tremendous
difficulties due to the mountainous, rocky and barren terrain. Soviet Army used to avoid
direct confrontation with the Afghan Mujahideen. Whereas the Afghan resistance fighter
laid ambush and attacked on the Soviet led forces and thus forced them to be sufficiently
dispersed before launching any conventional operations. Soviet lines of communication
were never secure. At one stage Soviets had to invite insurgent warfare experts from
Vietnam to Afghanistan to learn the counter resistance tactics. 10 But Soviet ground
forces retained their conventional tactics as far as possible. On 14 February 1989, the
last Soviet column left Afghanistan.

16. Liberation War of Bangladesh. The people of Bangladesh started the bloody war
to establish their freedom, right and independence against the occupant Pakistani Army
after the fateful night of 25 March 1971. Initially resistance was from the brave Bengali
defence members. But after 17 April 1971, under General M A G Osmani, Mukti Bahini
(Freedom Fighters) started guerrilla war operating in 11 sectors. Freedom Fighters were
the regular and irregular forces; people from different sphere of life joined voluntarily and
formed about 100,000 irregular fighters. After organizing Mukti Bahini into different
sectors, regular infantry brigade was formed to conduct conventional battle. 11 Initially the
freedom fighters fought unconventional war all along the border areas and carried out
deep operation inside Bangladesh. They could successfully soften up the occupant army
and made them vulnerable, which could finally create favourable condition for joint
conventional offensive on 21st November 1971. Battle of Belonia Bulge, Kamalpur, Attack

8Author of Vietnam the Decisive Battle first published in Great Britain, 1990.
9Edgar O’Balance , Afghan Wars :1839-1992, First English edition 1993, p89.
10Ibid, p101.
11Major General Imamuzzaman, Bangladesh War of Liberation ,Second edition, 2002, p.22.
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on Nakshi, Akhaura, etc. are the example of simultaneous joint offensives blending CW
and UCW.

Terrain Analysis

17. Bangladesh is a low-lying country traversed by numerous rivers and has a coastline
of about 710 kilometres12. In Bangladesh, rivers are prominent features of the landscape.
Two important rivers Ganga and Bramhaputra originate from Indian Territory. There are
number of other important rivers, which actually create separate segments of the total land
in Bangladesh. Other than rivers there are number of bills and marshy areas found in
southeast and north-west region of the country, which varies from restricted to severely
restricted areas. Small and scattered hills lie along the eastern and northern borders with
India. Most important are Chittagong Hill Tracts, covered with thick forest and present a
difficult terrain. There are forest areas also, namely Sundarban the largest mangrove in
the south-west part of Bangladesh. Whole Bangladesh is criss-crossed by rivers, roads
and railways. The numerous rivers of Bangladesh provide good communication facilities
from almost all direction. Rivers are integrated with overland road and railways network.
Presently there are number of high-speed mobility corridors available which facilitate all
types of movement from the border areas into the capital city.

Threat Analysis

18. External Security includes preservation of sovereignty that means free from
external aggression. Though Bangladesh did not face any significant military or territorial
threat, yet it does not mean there is no potential threat for Bangladesh. 13 Bangladesh has
common boundary with India and Myanmar. Basing on the geo-strategic location and
present global situation India and Myanmar are the likely military threat to Bangladesh.
Threat may be limited from both India and Myanmar or in particular, an all out offensive
from India.

a. Threat from India. India dominates economic and military power in south
Asia, which influences Bangladesh also. Geo-strategically Bangladesh is located in
the South Asian region almost sand-witched by Indian territories on three sides. A
number of high-speed mobility corridor from India lead into the centre part of
Bangladesh. Sea outlet is vulnerable to the hegemony of powerful navies in the
area. All major rivers of Bangladesh that sustain her ecology and agricultural
economy originate from India. This tyranny of geography is a great source of threat
to the national interest of Bangladesh.14 India has bilateral dispute with all her
neighbouring nations. Unresolved border demarcation is a long issue between India
and Bangladesh, which made the relation strained. Padua and Raumari incident in
2001 is the testimony of such relation. India has problem with Srilanka, Maldives,
Nepal and Pakistan. Bangladesh would always have supreme effort to safeguard
her economic, political and military power from such threat to deter any aggression.
12Kausher , Climate Change and Sea-level Rise: the Case of the Coast, Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad
(BUP), Dhaka, 1993, p-1.
13Brigadier General Saifuddin, psc, Evaluation of Threats to National Security and Interests, Bangladesh
Army Journal. 14th issue, June 1989.
14Brig(Now Major general) ATM Zahirul Alam ,psc and Lt Col Abul Kalam Md. Humayan Kabir, psc have
discussed on Military Threat on Security’ in Bangladesh Army Journal, 28 th issue, January 2000.
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But possibilities of Indian aggression cannot be ruled out. Military intellectuals think
this type of offensive against Bangladesh might be of limited offensive.15 Because
now superpowers are trying to use the concept of limited offensive as their power
projection. Threat country may also try to capture the whole territory in order to
establish their control in Bangladesh.

b. Threat from Myanmar. Southwest tip of Myanmar border with

Bangladesh is infested with protracted activities of insurgents, which Myanmar
may exploit to move her regular force in our border areas. In 1978, the refugee
problem started and in the process in 1991, Rejupara incident took place16. Until
today good number of Rohingya refugees, wait to return to Myanmar. This would
continue to strain the relation between the two countries. But military intellectuals
think a conventional military threat is less likely, but border skirmishes or low
intensity conflict is most likely.

c. Analysis. Any confrontation with our potential enemy will have the
following implications for Bangladesh, which must be kept in mind:
(1) Bangladesh will be deprived of sanctuary outside its border, a much-
needed support, to conduct and continue a war against a superior enemy.
Vietminh had China and Afghans had Pakistan as their sanctuaries for their
struggle against USA and the then USSR respectively.
(2) Bangladesh will face difficulty in procuring war materiel from abroad.
Potential aggressor borders Bangladesh on three sides, and can effectively
block air and water routes as well. The only possibility is through Myanmar, if
diplomatic plot can be won.
(3) The threat is likely to dominate air space throughout that will hinder
the movement and operations of own CF.
(4) The threat will have overwhelming superiority in terms of CF ratio as
well as resources including long range weapons.

NEED FOR BLENDING CW AND UCW

Existing Concept

19. Our existing battle plan involves fighting a delaying battle in phases up to the
riverbanks around Dhaka known as ‘Dhaka Bowl’. Formations thereafter will switch to
'Total Peoples War'. It is envisaged that participation of general mass in this phase will
create a situation where the occupation army will be forced to withdraw. Mobilisation of
international community to defuse the tension until mediation of a cease- fire will be tried
throughout. The present conventional concept outlines for a defensive battle for a period
of 30 days by formations. Formations will fight from series of lines of defence in their own
area of operations. After defending own areas for approximately 21 days the formations

15AHQ project Study Paper, Joint Training System In Bangladesh Armed Forces And Modalities To Improve
Inter Services Interaction Through Training And Other Activities presented by 9 Infantry Division, p.6-7.
16Major Majibur Rahman, Blending Conventional and Unconventional Warfare, Group Research Paper(GRP),
Staff course-25, November, 2000, p.7.
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will enter into their 4 th phase of operation. Another 9 days will be fought for the retention
of Dhaka.

20. Weaknesses of the Existing Concept. The plan has few serious drawbacks as
follows17:

a. The plan accepts defeat and aims at only delaying it.

b. It leaves the population of the occupied territory at the mercy of the invading
force.

c. It expects popular support to remain even after loosing the battle, which is
less likely.

d. It is passive in nature.

e. It is dependent on international community and expects them to solve the

problem.

f. ‘Total Peoples War’ remains an ad-hoc arrangement and the plan would be
effective after the battle has already been lost.

g. The invader may achieve her political objective before the plan of 'Total
Peoples War' could be effective.

h. The plan will impose a prolonged war on to the nation without a safe
sanctuary.

j. The invader may turn the ‘Total Peoples War’ into civil war.

21. Viability of Present Concept. Identifying the weaknesses of the existing plan,
we can conclude that people of the country would not accept any defeat from the military.
Therefore, at the beginning of the ‘Total Peoples War’ phase, when the military will need
the popular support, they might find a population, which is hostile. Because of our small
country and huge population, our operational depth and manoeuvrability are restricted.
Due to existence of number of mighty rivers, switching of forces from one sector to the
other will be hazardous. Perforce we may have to plan our battles sector wise. In case of
enemy's aggression, it is for sure that we will have to face enemy's major thrust from all
sides of our border following all major approaches. As such, Bangladesh Armed Forces
need the concept of blending the CW with the UCW.

22. The Core Issue. The great Prussian strategist Karl Von Clauswitz enumerates
five general conditions for successful irregular warfare in coordination with operations
carried out by a regular army. These are:

a. The war must be carried out in the interior of the country.

17The Strategic Implications of Unconventional Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel Abu Sohel, psc, Bayonet, House
Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
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b. The war cannot hinge upon a single battle.

c. The theatre of war must extend over a considerable area.

d. The national character must support the war.

e. The terrain must be irregular and difficult.

Outcome of Blending CW And UCW

23. A Synergetic Effect. Modern battles are combined arms operations that
involve synchronization of various Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS). Since
Bangladesh has less war resources, therefore to produce battle-winning effect for decisive
result we need to blend unconventional effort with other conventional BOS.18
Unconventional effort with conventional war will engage enemy force throughout their
length and breadth for making them paralyse of taking correct and timely decisions. That
will create opportunity to defeat enemy by conventional war.

24. Creating A Fluid Situation. Making the battlefield fluid is an important factor
for an inferior force (in comparison to threat capabilities) like Bangladesh. Unorthodox
and non-linear engagement of the threat force by employing unconventional means of war
can make the battlefield fluid. Fluidity can be made by spreading the fighting throughout
the length and breadth of the battlefield by blending conventional and UCF. Fluid condition
forces the enemy commander to take the wrong decision. 19 This will also diffuse his evil
intention and disrupt his rear areas.

25. Conservation of Fighting Power in Defensive Campaign. Future battlefield is

likely to be intense, technology based, multi-dimensional and costly affair. 20 Because of
the strategic policy Bangladesh will conduct a defensive campaign. For Bangladesh it will
be difficult to continue long time such type of operation in future battlefield scenarios,
because of the limited national resource. This actually suggests the conservation of
limited resources for opportune moment while enemy will reach his culmination and
prolong the battle until the international communities react. It will be possible provided
UCF operates taking the full advantages of friendly terrain and weather condition in
conjunction with conventional efforts.

26. To Increase the Depth21and Reduce the Inter-formation Gaps. Due to the
geographical reason, the strategic depth is very less from international boundary to the
centre of the country. In defensive campaign attacker must not be allowed to by pass the
defence. It is suggested that theatre forces should always be echeloned in depth to
frustrate enemy victories and contest every inch of ground by constantly mounting losses
on enemy forces. Maintaining large reserves will also assist commanders to achieve the
required depth. In operational level, deep operation in defensive campaign is possible by

18Draft Ops Of War, volume one, p. 3-25.

19Ibid, p. 3-6.
20Ibid, p. 1-6.1-7, 1-8 & 1-9.
21Joint Warfare-13, Joint Warfare –A3 précis, DSCSC, Mirpur Cantonment, p. 13-3 & 13-4.
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aircrafts and long-range weapons in the preparatory phase for disrupting enemy’s rear.
But in Bangladesh, military hardware is limited. The Area of Responsibility (AOR) of all the
formations is vast in comparison to their strength. Therefore, the gap produced within and
between the formation to be plugged in order to deter any outflanking, infiltration or
bypassing the defensive position. However, UCF and their operation inconformity with the
conventional war can increase the depth and reduce the gaps.

27. Integrating Populace as A Force Multiplier. National will can be principal wining
factor in case of Bangladesh as we have witnessed in 1971 during our Liberation War.
Bangladesh offered galvanised resistance against the Pakistani occupant army for its
survival.22 People of Bangladesh are highly patriotic and motivate. The population is now
about 133 million and it will increase in future. This highly motivated population is an asset
or force multiplier for the nation as well as for the campaign planners. The people’s
participation in our overall war effort can be materialised by blending conventional and
UCW.

28. Cumulative Effect. The cumulative effects of innumerable small tactical initiatives
can become a major factor in changing the overall military posture of enemy. It can be
done through UCF especially the guerrillas in conjunction with the operations of friendly
CF. The psychological effect of the real damage stemming from the activities by the UCF
and the concurrent conventional military pressure may compel enemy to turn his posture
from strategic offensive to strategic defensive. ‘To shield themselves from the multiple pin-
pricks and bee stings inflicted by the guerrillas, conventional forces are forced to allocate
more and more of their effort to defence.’23 In Bangladesh, suitable environment is
available for adopting the concept of blending CW and UCW as per above theory. Having
identified the requirement it is time to explain what the concept is and how to implement
the concept.

CONCEPT OF BLENDING CW AND UCW

Proposed Concept

29. Simultaneity of operations throughout the depth of the battle space creates fluidity
that helps in retaining initiative to simulate fog and fear for the enemy commanders. Right
from the outbreak of hostility the battle must be taken to enemy territory to initiate
dissatisfaction amongst the people of enemy so that they go against their government’s
decision. The basic vulnerabilities of our country originate from the lack of depth and the
concept of blending intends to increase it by the operation of UCF in the rear of the
enemy, even in her territory. When CF will fight the battle in and around the international
boundary, an UCF would operate at the rear of the invading force by carrying out minor
operations (Raid, Ambush, Spoiling Attack, Sabotage, etceteras). Numerous non-linear
actions by the UCF will overwhelm the Command, Control, Communication and
Intelligence (C3I) of the invaders.

22Draft Ops Of War , op cit, p.1.

23Trevor N. Dupuy, International Military and Defense Encyclopaedia, Volume 6, (Washington,
New York: Brassey’s (US) Inc. 1993) p. 2811.
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30. The concept envisages that in future conflicts, Bangladesh Army must be prepared
to blend CW and UCW in achieving national goal. This denotes that UCW is not to be
regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war rather should be waged simultaneously
as an adjunct to the conventional war. For effective implementation and synchronisation
with all sister services, organisational set up, Command and Control (C2) arrangement
must be worked out in detail well before the outbreak of war.

Role and Employment of UCF and CF

31. The UCF will be employed to carry out operations at the rear and flank of the
advancing enemy. At the same time they may also be employed to provide early warning
to the CF. The targets for deep operation may be selected at Army, Division or at Brigade
level basing on the situation templates. Those targets to be selected which will help in
shaping the battlefield to own design. UCF will hit High Value Targets (HVTs) and
sometimes strategic targets creating disorder in their civil and military activities. As a
result, at the very outset of the war enemy will be concerned about his rear area security
and employ more troops to protect those.

32. While selecting targets for UCF, their capabilities will also have to be kept in mind.
Capabilities pertinent to availability of forces, logistic support, fire support, intelligence,
etceteras will predominantly outline the criterion for target selection. However, there are
some other noteworthy factors like indigenous support, which, when integrated properly
with the unconventional operation effort would substitute many shortfalls and augment the
operational capability. Basing on the capability of the UCF they may be employed for
following tasks:

a. Destruction of command and control centres, fire support system, air bases,
logistic installations, lines of communications, air defence equipment, mobility
assets, troops and armour concentrations.

b. Interdiction to enemy follow up echelons.

c. Reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition.

d. Forward air controllers for directing friendly aircraft on HVTs.

e. Reduction of enemy war effort by hitting the strategic targets to play havoc
and create chaos within civil population.

f. Laying ambushes and conduct raids on enemy’s route of movements and

flanks.

g. Destruction of bridges, choke points and defiles.

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33. The CF of respective divisions will deploy in their AOP as per the operational plan.
As the battle situation develops, they should be able to identify the main effort of the
enemy and concentrate forces accordingly keeping strong mobile reserve. Different
layers of defence to be prepared prior to initial engagement. While the UCF gradually
cause attrition to enemy war potentials, the CF will engage the enemy’s forward
elements at the decisive time and place.

End State of Blending Conventional and UCW

34. Blending of conventional and UCW will facilitate to achieve greater degree of
success in terms of neutralising and annihilating the adversary’s Centre of Gravity
(CG). By continuously destroying his HVTs, he will be brought to a culmination point
and will be forced to abandon the invasion. However, even after that if the enemy
continues with aggression, a situation will be created to go for a protracted war.
Bangladesh in turn will try to get the international opinion in her favour, so that the
invader pulls out her forces under international pressure.

Possible Ways of Force Generation

35. Option – 1. In this option, platoon size strength from an infantry battalion may be
shed to organize, train, provide leadership to the UCF and conduct unconventional
operation. This platoon size regular force will organize a company size UCF to operate
within a battalion Area of Interest (AOI). The UCW company will be commanded by a field
officer and platoons will be commanded by captains. Sergeants will command sections.
The company will operate under direct command of the Battalion Commander of the
battalion in whose area it will operate. They should be strongly equipped with small,
portable but effective weapons. For this, it is suggested that each section should posses
minimum two light machine guns, one rocket launcher, one grenade firing rifle and
maximum possible sub machine guns. There should be a 60 mm mortar platoon in each
UCF company. (Diagrammatic Layout as at Annex A)

36. Option – 2. In this option, an UCW battalion will be organised by shedding troops
from a conventional brigade. The way of force generation will remain same. The UCW
battalion will operate within the AOI of the conventional brigade. Three UCW companies
will be located in the regular battalion’s AOR but brigade headquarters through the UCW
battalion headquarters will centrally control their operation. An UCW company will remain
as a brigade reserve (brigade UCW reserve). Brigade headquarters will select targets and
task the UCF. UCF battalion commander will act as an advisor to the brigade commander.
(Diagrammatic Layout as at Annex A)

37. Option – 3. In this option a brigade sized UCF will operate in each division AOI.
The UCF will be generated and organised by the troops of conventional brigades. They
will operate under direct control of Division Headquarters. (Diagrammatic Layout as at
Annex A)

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38. Integration of Special Force. In all the options, Division Headquarters will
centrally control and task the special force (elements of para commando battalion) that is
likely to be received from Army asset for deep special operations.

39. An Analysis.

a. A close study at the options shows that the way of force generation is almost
same in all the options. What is different from one to another is the C2 aspect and
the level at which the UCF is going to operate. In option - 1, UCF will operate in a
company concept with orders from regular battalion commander. In option –2, UCF
will operate in a battalion concept with orders from brigade headquarters. In option
– 3, the division will fight with 4 brigades (three conventional and one
unconventional brigade).

b. In option – 1, brigade commander himself has very less scope to influence

the UCW, because, UCF are fighting under command of the regular battalions.
Again, regular battalion commander within his means has scanty scope to foresee
the battle in deep areas and across the border, whereas, brigade commander is in
a better position to foresee and control the battle in a particular sector including
deep operation. In this aspect, though division commander will be in even a better
scenario of the total battle area, but in option – 3, the UCW is going to be too much
centralised. Therefore, considering the aspect of “leaving initiative to the
subordinate headquarters” and better flexibility in UCW we feel that option – 2 is
suitable for us.

Command, Control and Communication (C3) Arrangement

40. In the blending scenario, a superior aggressor has to be dealt with creative tactics
and operational art. This will warrant a flexible C2 set up for effective direction and
guidance. A viable plan will be executed by the UCF under a well laid out chain of
command. The control arrangement will be such so that small groups can be tasked for
independent mission and concentrate again for a major operation with minimum delay.
The CF commander will be the overall commander of any particular sector or area within
which both CF and UCF will operate. For purpose of control, there could be two options;
the UCF may be directed to every target by the CF headquarters or mission type orders
can be given to the UCF commanders and the UCF commander then make detail plans
and task the subordinates. According to the proposed option we feel that the second
option is better. However, there is then a great need for coordination between the CF
headquarters and the UCF.

41. Communication will play a vital role in control and coordination of operation in such
an unorthodox approach. For functional C2 system a good communication network must
be set up before committing troops for operation. It is felt that communication should be

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provided up to platoon level. The means of communication between the UCF and CF
could be wireless, mobile telephone, walkie-talkie set or any other means. However,
indigenous ideas for evolving suitable means of communication may also be worked out
for effective control and coordination.

Fire Support for UCW

42. Fire support of the UCF during their operation will mainly be originated from
portable support weapons (like mortars, 75 mm recoilless rifles, rocket launchers,
etceteras), artillery and air. Unlike conventional warfare, artillery will be employed with in a
very narrow spectrum to support the operation of the UCF. Both medium and field artillery
may be employed to support the operations. Medium guns may be deployed in such a
manner so that their range covers the areas of operation of UCF. In case of field artillery,
option may be to group small detachments of field guns (a section) with the UCF who can
also infiltrate deep inside enemy territory. For this, 105 mm Pack Howitzer is a good
option. Because, this gun can be dismantled and carried man packed or mule packed.
However, in all cases the UCF should be allotted with artillery observers with good
communication facilities. Here one point may be mentioned that if we share presently held
scanty artillery resources for UCF operation, then our CF are likely to run out of fire
support. Few individuals from the UCF should also be trained in the procedure of calling
for artillery fire. The aspect of air support may also be coordinated while conducting the
UCW. Targets for battlefield air interdiction may well be conforming to the targets for
UCW.

Logistics for UCW

43. Simultaneous application of both conventional and unconventional method of

warfare requires related logistic support system capable of meeting the demand of fluid
battle condition. The conventional logistic support system relies on better-established line
of communications and a set pattern of logistic train. Hence, the major drawback of
conventional logistic support system is its inflexible nature and reliance on the central
base for replenishment. Such a set pattern of logistic support system will be unable to
provide necessary support to UCF. To ensure requisite supply to UCF’ operation
conventional supply and transport infrastructure to be augmented by indigenous
resources. In most cases UCF will have to live off the land. But in all cases arrangements
must be made to supply ammunition, mines and explosives to UCF. When operating
across the border, UCF will be given foreign currencies for their sustainment. At the
strategic and operational level, logistic plan may cater for building up of stocks at the
selected places.

VIABILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE CONCEPT

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44. The dimension of battlefield and nature of conflict is continuously changing.

Accordingly, operational doctrine also needs to be changed or modified to meet the
requirement of time. Being a developing third world country, it becomes very difficult for us
to keep pace with the modern hi-tech battlefield, but our task of defending the country is
unchanged. Therefore, evaluation and modification of operational doctrine is particularly
required for us.

45. The proposed concept allows us to engage and hit the enemy from all the sides as
against that of hitting his head only with our limited conventional combat resources by
using conventional tactics. This concept is expected to confuse, bleed, attrite and slow
down the enemy. Enemy will be forced to divert their attention towards their rear. A
successful “Deep Operation” when the enemy is preparing for launching offensive or at
any critical point in the front can seriously jeopardize his mission / task / operation in front
and upset his time plan.

46. However, the success of this concept will greatly be influenced by the fact that how
quickly the integration can be done. As in the proposed concept it was suggested that
UCF will be comprised of regular, Para Military (BDR, Ansar and VDP), retired personnel
and civilian volunteers, therefore, it is assumed that maximum effort will be required to
organize and integrate the civilian volunteers only. The total process of integration should
not take long time, because, most of these elements had been a part of a conventional /
semi-conventional force. Organizing them along with other civilian volunteers would not be
very difficult. The concept of blending are now being practiced / exercised in various forms
in all formation’s collective exercises. The feed back of the exercises show encouraging
signs towards adopting it as a doctrinal concept in our operating policy.

47. We talked about lack of geographic depth of our country. The lack of geographic
depth can be compensated by adoption of UCW by the blended / integrated force, which
is not possible by only a pure CW by the regular forces. This doctrine, if adopted officially,
will definitely deprive our adversary in any future war against us from achieving a quick
culmination they hope for.

48. The idea of complete switching over to Total People’s War i. e. UW by all of the
regular forces may not be a desirable concept for us. In that case, enemy may take the
advantage of absence of visible presence of the CF and may try to install a puppet
government and force the country into a civil war. What can be done in blended scenario
is after the third phase of battle, in fourth phase the intensity of unconventional operation
by regular force may be undertaken intensively. Battalions and brigades will shed more
number of regular troops for organising and conducting UC operations.

49. Proposed concept does not involve extra expenditure. Extra expenditure every year
will be incurred mainly due to arrangement of training and accommodation for a short
period and arrangement for daily allowance for non-regular forces for the exercise /
training duration. However, in case of war higher monitory benefit may be thought of for
the UCF. This will encourage people to participate in UCW. As C2 structure of the UCF
will remain with regular forces, it will help to organize, train and conduct the operation in a
perfect way.
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50. According to the draft operations of war, “the true UCF is a significantly large and
organized force operating behind the enemy lines along a well established chain of
command with in the framework of a well conceived plan. Though they generally merge
with the population and operate in small groups to avoid physical destruction, they are
capable of rapid concentration when large tasks are contemplated. This means that UCW
involves both major and minor actions deep inside enemy line with the purpose of creating
a significant impact on the conduct of campaigns and battles along the traditional
battlefront. The golden rule is to have an UCF of the same size of a conventional force. If
the former can be made stronger, so much the better”. Here they hinted to have a
battalion size UCF operating in a battalion Area of Operation (AOP). But we proposed a
company size UCF to operate in a battalion AOP under brigade control. This was done
keeping in mind the peacetime training, management of forces and requirement of regular
force to be shed by the battalions to conduct the UCW. It was felt that shedding one
platoon strength from a regular battalion to organize the UCW will not hamper the task of
the battalion. But to organize UCW of a battalion strength in a battalion AOP,
approximately a company or company minus regular force will be required to be spared
which is likely to hamper the task of a battalion in the present scenario. However, an
option may be kept to arrange a company plus (approximately 200 – 250 persons)
strength UCF basing on the development of the battle, training standard of the UCF and
task of the battalion.

TRAINING

51. Our auxiliary forces are not trained in line with regular forces and retired personnel
will be semi-trained. It will necessitate refresher training at some intervals for the UCF.
The District Armed Forces Board will organise training for the UCF once in two years in
co-ordination with the local division headquarters. The training team will impart training on
field craft, weapon handling, minor tactics, explosive handling and combat intelligence.
The duration of this training should be of four weeks. For this prior co-ordination with all
agencies is essential.

52. Transition from conventional to unconventional footing by the regular force would
necessitate a corresponding change in both mind and attitude of our soldiers. Troops
should be trained to operate in small groups. Junior leaders must be trained to lead their
under commands independently.

53. The soldiers will need to overcome psychological barrier of integrating

unconventional warfare. This will need extensive training during peacetime so that the
blending takes place as natural as transition from one operation of war to the other.

54. Bangladesh Navy and Airforce should include UCW training for all their personnel
during peacetime. They should also organise refresher training annually.

55. All second and third line forces, i.e. Bangladesh Rifles, Bangladesh Ansars, Village
Defence Party, Bangladesh National Cadet Corps and Armed Police Battalions of
Bangladesh police should train all their personnel on UCW during the peacetime.

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56. Training on UCW shall mainly comprise minor operations, that is raid, ambush,
patrolling, tank- hunting, hideout, guerrilla warfare, use of mines and explosives,
sabotage, small scale attacks, field craft and training on small arms including firing.

57. Compulsory military training may be introduced for all able-bodied male personnel
who are seeking higher education after intermediate, both at home and abroad or taking
public or private jobs. This training can be organised annually for duration of 4 weeks in
each district headquarters by each Area Headquarters. This training can be open to all
civilian volunteers as well.

58. Training on UCW should also be organised by each Area Headquarters in their
respective districts as soon as the government orders general mobilisation. This training
should continue throughout the war for all civilian volunteers who would join the
unconventional war.

59. Training may be provided to the reservists, paramilitary forces, BNCC, and civilian
volunteers as a continuous process. Formations may arrange training camps once in
every 2 years for all reservists under that formation AOR. The reservists can be trained as
a full-fledged reserve unit in the operational role. A joint exercise may be conducted every
year.

60. The commander of the UCF receives mission type orders from the overall
commander. Fire support is vulnerability for the UCF. A significant portion of UCF should
be trained in engineering tasks so that they do not rely solely on CF support.

61. Joint exercises involving CF, UCF and civil administration may be conducted to
bring in cohesiveness, co-ordination with a view to pursuing a common cause during
national crisis. The exercise may be organised once in every 3 years. Such exercise will
help to identify the training requirements, feasibility of logistic system, areas of co-
ordination between armed forces, civil administration and mass population.

CONCLUSION

62. The prime task of the CF is to safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the country. For conducting such operations, special equipment like aircraft, long-range
artillery, missile systems and information technologies are essential elements. To
overcome this deficiency we need to look for other options, like blending of conventional
and UCF. Countries mentioned in historical perspective have successfully blended CW
and UCW and achieved their desired goal against superior adversaries.

63. The barriers mentioned strongly suggest the adoption of a new concept that blends
CW and UCW. In the history of warfare, there are many examples of blending
conventional with the UCF. Well-organised US force with sophisticated equipment could
not withstand the cumulative outcome of Vietnamese conventional and UCFs' operations
during the Vietnam War.

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64. Bangladesh should resort to this concept because it is a concept of fighting war
against an adversary who enjoys numerical and technological superiority. The terrain of
Bangladesh is mostly suitable for the conduct of UCW yet it offers the conduct of limited
conventional operations. The marshes, rivers, green hills and forests offer a considerable
restriction on large-scale CF’ manoeuvre. But these can be of significant importance to the
CF operations if the operation of UCF forces can be blended together. Blending of CW
with UCW is likely to induce hope instead of fighting hopelessly out numbered.

65. Here UCW is not to be regarded as an aftermath of the conventional war, rather
should be waged simultaneously as an adjunct to the conventional war. The harmonious
actions of both conventional and UCF can bring dividend in neutralising enemy’s centre of
gravity and destroy high value targets. The main components of this force are regular and
unconventional forces. The UCF could be comprised of auxiliary forces, reservists, BNCC,
VDPs, Ansars and trained populace.

66. This concept helps in shaping the battlefield to own requirements. In other word the
unconventional operations multiplies the combat effectiveness of conventional operations.
Many reasons can be drawn to blend these two types of operations. But the most
significant reasons are to reduce the expenses of prolonged war, to overcome the
difficulties of maintaining large CF during peace time. The foremost factor is the
integration of these two types of forces for accomplishing the assigned mission. The
conduct of these types of operation should aim at breaking enemy forces' cohesion and
creating a diversion in the enemy commanders' mind.

67. The blended conventional and UCF needs an integrated organisational structure as
well as a C2 set up. This force is composed of three elements; these are the regular
forces, the auxiliary-paramilitary forces and the trained segment of population. The regular
forces form the nucleus of this blended force. The success of this force will depend on the
concurrent operations of both forces. At the strategic level, the enemy’s centre of gravity
consists of the military, the government and the will of the people.24 Exposing and
attacking enemy's centre of gravity remains important in these types of operations. While
the enemy HVTs and terrain features are identified in conventional war, breaking enemy's
will to fight becomes the principal focus for all UCW. The logistic plan must cater for
building up stocks at selected places in these levels. The key concept of logistic support in
such types of operation is based on correct assessment of logistic needs and the duration
of the operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

24Referred to collectively as Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’.

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68. The detailed study on the blending CW and UCW put forward the following
recommendations:

a. The highest level of command should conceive the concept of blending and
formulate required policies, issue directives to achieve the desired end state at all
levels.

b. Attitudinal change is a prime requirement. We should understand the

concept properly and change our mind already set on Total People’s War.

c. The field formations should generate UCFs for conducting such operations.
The overall C2 should be vested on these formations to carry out UCW in their own
Area of Responsibility. SCT and WCT Exercise should be the tool for reviewing the
concept periodically.

d. UCF should be organised on AOR basis. Respective formation headquarters

should organise and prepare UCF during peacetime. The formations should also
arrange training for these forces and issue guidance on their possible employment
during emergency.

e. The organisational structure of such forces within the formations should be

based on headquarters, where the regular battalion headquarters will command the
unconventional company size force and the regular brigade headquarters will
command a battalion UCF and so on.

f. Once the people has been sufficiently motivated, trained and integrated, the
implementation must be relentlessly pursued. At national level, the mobilisation
should get its share of budget and allocation of resources.

g. Logistic requirement of these forces are the responsibility of respective

formations during peacetime training and war.

h. All arms course should include UCW in their course curricula. All aspects of
UCW including the role and effect in various operations may be published as a
General Staff Training Pamphlets (GSTP). Current series of publications may be
modified to incorporate a chapter on UCW.

j. A telescopic research on training, logistics, C2, force generation should

continue for necessary modifications.

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Mirpur Cantonment MOHAMMAD ALAM TAREQUE

Major
Group Leader, Sub Syn 7A
Student Officer
November 2002 27th Army Staff Course

Annexes:

A. Force Generation.

Distribution:

Sponsor Directing Staff

Defence Services Command and Staff College
Mirpur Cantonment, Dhaka

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books
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1. Imamuzzaman, Major General (Retired) Bangladesh War of Liberation, Second

Edition, UPL, 2001
2. Mahindra, Major General S, Terrorist Games Nations Play, Lancer Publishers Pvt
Ltd.
3. Palit, Major General D. K. The Lightning Campaign the Indo-Pakistan War 1971,
New Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Limited, 1972.
4. Rashid, Haroon, Geography of Bangladesh, Dhaka: The University Press Limited
1991.
5. Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift - Thoughts on Twenty First Century Warfare,
Brassey's, London, 1994.
6. Safiullah, Major General K M, Bangladesh at War, Academic Publishers, Dhaka,
1989.
7. Sarkesian, Sam C, Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era, Greenwood
Press, London, 1993.
8. Shaikh, Lieutenant Colonel A M, India's Victory in Bangladesh, Army Publishers,
Delhi, 1982.
9. Singh, Major General Luchhman, Victory in Bangladesh, Dehra Dun: Natraj
Publishers 1981.

Journals

10. Ahsan, Monowar, Captain, Improvised Training for Unconventional Warfare,

Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment,
Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
11. Chengappa, Bidanda M, Senior Fellow, IDSA, Pakistans Compulsions for the Kargil
Misadventure, Collected from WWW.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-2.html.
12. Haque, Major Md Fayzul, Bangladesh : A Geo-political Study, Bangladesh Army
Journal, 13th Issue, December 1988.
13. Hazary, Chowdhury Mohammad Azizul Haque, Organisational Structure of
Unconventional Force, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T),
Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
14. Mahmood, Lieutenant Colonel Tahir, Being Unconventional in Conventional
Environment, The Citadel, No. 3/95.
15. Quamruzzaman, Mohammad, psc, Lieutenant Colonel,Blending of Conventional
and Unconventional Warfare - My Experience at Destranor Division, Bayonet, House
Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet,
December 2001, Issue-6.
16. Rahman,Mir mushfiqur, Major, Interdiction by Unconventional Forces- A method of
Planning and Execution,Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T),
Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
17. Sohel, Abu,Lieutenant Colonel , psc, The Strategic Implications of Unconventional
Warfare, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), Jalalabad
Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.
18. Wadud, Alauddin Mohammad Abdul , Lieutenant Colonel, BP, psc, Military Theory
and Doctrine-An Analysis of Their Relationship, Bangladesh Army Journal, 22nd Issue,
June 1994.
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19. Yussuf, Ashraf Abdullah,psc, Lieutenant Colonel, Command and Control Setup in
the Blending Environment, Bayonet, House Journal of School of Infantry and Tactics
(SI&T), Jalalabad Cantonment, Sylhet, December 2001, Issue-6.

Project Study Period Papers

20. Blending Conventional and Unconventional Methods of Operations is one of the

Battlefield Imperatives. How Can Bangladesh Army Fit in this Imperative in Our Fighting
Concept? Presented by 46 Independent Infantry Brigade 1998.
21. Offensive Operation is the Key to Success in War. How Bangladesh Armed Forces
Can Cope With this Requirement With Modified Doctrine? Presented by 19 Infantry
Division.

Training Manual

22. Draft Operations of War, Volume One, Dhaka: Army Headquarters, General Staff
Branch, Military Training Directorate, 1997.
23. FM 100 – 5, Operations, US Army Command and General Staff Collage, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, 1993.

Group Research Papers

24. 23 Staff Course, Momen, Anwarul, Major, Group Leader.

25. 25 Staff Course, Rahman, Majibur, Major, Group Leader.
26. 26 Staff Course, Islam, Salahuddin, SM, Major, Group Leader.

Interview

27. Lieutenant Colonel Mohammad Quamruzzaman, psc, Member of The Concept

Writing Board, Military Operations Directorate, Army Headquarters.

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