Bersamin v. People - G.R. No. 239957
Bersamin v. People - G.R. No. 239957
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SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Jesus Trinidad y Bersamin (Trinidad)
assailing the Decision2 dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution3 dated May 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598, which affirmed the Decision4 dated November 7, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 155678 and 155679 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition under Section 28 (a) in relation to Section 28 (e) (1),
Article V of Republic Act No. (RA) 10591.5
The Facts
On December 12, 2014, an Information6 was filed before the RTC charging Trinidad with violation of RA 10591, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
On or about November 14, 2014, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, being then a private person, without any lawful authority, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in [his] possession and under [his] custody and control one (1) unit
[c]aliber .38 revolver marked Smith & Wesson with serial number 833268 with markings "RJN", a small
arm, loaded with six (6) pieces live ammunitions of caliber .38 with markings "1RN, 2RN, 3RN, 4RN,
5RN and 6RN", without first securing the necessary license or permit from the Firearms and Explosives
Office of the Philippine National Police, in violation of the above-entitled law.
Contrary to law.7
The prosecution alleged that at around 8:30 in the evening of November 14, 2014, members from the Philippine
National Police (PNP)-Pasig Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation, with Police Officer (PO) 1 Randy S.
Sanoy (PO1 Sanoy) as the poseur buyer and PO1 Rodrigo J. Nidoy, Jr. (PO1 Nidoy) as the back-up arresting
officer, to apprehend a certain "Jessie" who, purportedly, was involved in illegal drug activities at Aurelia St.,
Barangay Bagong Hog, Pasig City.8 After the alleged sale had been consummated, PO1 Nidoy arrested Trinidad,
frisked him, and recovered from the latter a 0.38 caliber revolver loaded with six (6) live ammunitions tucked at his
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back, as well as a 0.22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions and two (2) magazines (subject firearms
and ammunition) which were found beside the gate of his house.9 When asked if he has any documentation for the
same, Trinidad claimed that they were merely pawned to him. After marking the seized items, they proceeded to the
nearby barangay hall and conducted inventory and photography thereof, and then went to the police station where
the request for ballistic examination was made.10 Finally, the seized items were brought to the crime laboratory,
where, after examination, it was revealed that "the firearms are serviceable and the ammunitions are live and
serviceable."11 During trial, Trinidad's counsel agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to possess or
carry firearms of any caliber at the time of his arrest.12
For his part, Trinidad denied the accusations against him, claiming, among others, that aside from the present case,
he was also charged with the crime of Illegal Sale and Possession of Dangerous Drugs, which arose from the same
incident, but was, however, acquitted13 therein for, inter alia, failure of the prosecution to prove that Trinidad
was validly arrested thru a legitimate buy-bust operation. He then formally offered in evidence the said acquittal
ruling, which was objected by the public prosecutor for being immaterial and irrelevant to the present case.14 The
RTC admitted said evidence only as part of Trinidad's testimony.15
In a Decision16 dated November 7, 2016, the RTC found Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts
of violation of RA 10591, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate
period of ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to eleven (11) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count.17
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition, considering that: (a) PO1 Nidoy positively identified the firearms presented before the
court as the same firearms seized and recovered from Trinidad's possession; and (b) Trinidad admitted that he is
not a holder of any license or permit from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit. It gave credence to the positive,
clear, and categorical testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses rather than Trinidad's defenses of denial and alibi.18
It likewise held that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges is immaterial to this case, opining that the ground for his
acquittal is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search and seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of
the dangerous drugs.19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision21 dated January 25, 2018, the CA affirmed Trinidad's conviction with modification, sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count.22 The
CA ruled that the evidence for the prosecution convincingly established all the elements of the crime charged as
Trinidad: (a) was caught in possession and control of two (2) firearms, consisting of one (1) .38 caliber23 revolver
loaded with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .22 caliber rifle loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions, as well as
two (2) magazines during the conduct of the buy-bust operation; and (b) failed to show any permit or license to
possess the same, simply claiming that the said firearms were pawned to him.24 It likewise noted that Trinidad's
counsel agreed to the stipulation that Trinidad has no license to possess or carry the subject firearms at the time of
his arrest.25 Finally, it agreed with the RTC's opinion that Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs charges was due to the
prosecution's failure to prove the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs, and not due to his supposed
questionable arrest.26
Dissatisfied, Trinidad moved for reconsideration,27 but was denied in a Resolution28 dated May 31, 2018; hence,
this petition.
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld Trinidad's conviction for the crime
charged.
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"At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and
the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law."29
"Section 2,30 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through
or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which,
such search and seizure becomes 'unreasonable’ within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To
protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),31 Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree."32
"One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental
to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made – the process cannot be reversed."33
A lawful arrest may be affected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, a warrantless arrest may be
done when, inter alia, the accused is caught in flagrante delicto,34 such as in buy-bust operations in drugs cases.35
However, if the existence of a valid buy-bust operation cannot be proven, and thus, the validity of the in flagrante
delicto warrantless arrest cannot be established, the arrest becomes illegal and the consequent search incidental
thereto becomes unreasonable.36 Resultantly, all the evidence seized by reason of the unlawful arrest is
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.37
In this case, Trinidad essentially anchors his defense on the following contentions: (a) his arrest stemmed from a
purported buy-bust operation where the illegal drugs and the subject firearms and ammunition were allegedly
recovered from him; (b) this resulted in the filing of three (3) Informations against him, two (2) of which are for
violations of RA 916538 (which were tried jointly), while the other pertains to the instant case; and (c) his acquittal39
in the drugs cases should necessarily result in his acquittal in this case as well. In finding these contentions
untenable, the courts a quo opined that the resolution in the drugs cases is immaterial in this case as they involve
different crimes40 and that "the ground for the acquittal x x x is neither unlawful arrest nor unlawful search or
seizure, but the procedural flaw in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs."41
However, a more circumspect review of the decision absolving Trinidad of criminal liability in the drugs cases reveals
that he was acquitted therein not only due to unjustified deviations from the chain of custody rule,42 but also on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a valid buy-bust operation, thereby rendering
Trinidad's in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest illegal and the subsequent search on him unreasonable.43
Thus, contrary to the courts a quo's opinions, Trinidad's acquittal in the drugs cases, more particularly on the latter
ground, is material to this case because the subject firearms and ammunition were simultaneously recovered from
him when he was searched subsequent to his arrest on account of the buy-bust operation.
The Court is aware that the findings on the illegality of Trinidad's warrantless arrest were made in the drugs cases,
which are separate and distinct from the present illegal possession of firearms and ammunition case. Nevertheless,
the Court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of such findings as evidence, and apply them altogether for the
judicious resolution of the same issue which was duly raised herein. To be sure, the general rule is that the courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases. However, this rule admits of
exceptions, such as when the other case has a close connection with the matter in controversy in the case at
hand.44 In Bongato v. Spouses Malvar,45 the Court held:
[A]s a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings,
even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. There are
exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to
ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it may consult
decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or applicable to the
case under review. In some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in
other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases "may be so
closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice."46
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Here, an examination of the ruling47 in the drugs cases (which Trinidad offered as evidence and the RTC admitted
as part of his testimony48 ) confirms that the drugs cases and this case are so interwoven and interdependent of
each other since, as mentioned, the drugs, as well as the subject firearms and ammunition, were illegally seized in a
singular instance, i.e., the buy-bust operation. Hence, the Court may take judicial notice of the circumstances
attendant to the buy-bust operation as found by the court which resolved the drugs cases. To recall, in the drugs
cases, the finding of unreasonableness of search and seizure of the drugs was mainly based on the failure of PO1
Sanoy's testimony to establish the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation against Trinidad as said testimony was found
to be highly doubtful and incredible.49 This circumstance similarly obtains here as in fact, the testimonies of both
PO1 Nidoy50 and PO1 Sanoy51 in this case essentially just mirror on all material points the latter's implausible
narration in the drugs cases. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the subject firearms and ammunition
are also inadmissible in evidence for being recovered from the same unreasonable search and seizure as in the
drugs cases. Since the confiscated firearms and ammunition are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged in this
case, Trinidad's acquittal is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 25, 2018 and the Resolution dated May 31,
2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39598 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jesus
Trinidad y Bersamin is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and Hernando,[*] JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
Designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated December 18, 2018.
1
Rollo, pp. 12-31.
2
Id. at 35-47. Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-
Leagogo and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring.
3
Id. at 49-51.
4
Id. at 87-97. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Maria Paz R. Reyes-Yson.
5
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF," otherwise known as the "COMPREHENSIVE
FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT," approved on May 29, 2013.
6
Dated December 12, 2014; rollo, pp. 59-61.
7
Id. at 59-60.
8
See id. at 36-37.
9
See id. at 37-38.
10
See id. at 38.
11
Id.
12
See id.
13
See Joint Decision dated March 1, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 154 in Criminal
Case Nos. 19814-D-PSG and 19815-D-PSG penned by Presiding Judge Achilles A. A.C. Bulauitan; id. at
200-210.
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14
See id. at 39.
15
See id. at 92.
16
Id. at 87-97.
17
Id. at 96.
18
See id. at 94.
19
See id. at 95.
20
See Brief for the Accused-Appellant dated July 24, 2017; id. at 66-85.
21
Id. at 35-47.
22
See id. at 47.
23
Erroneously indicated as ".22 caliber revolver" in the CA Decision; id. at 42.
24
See id.
25
See id. at 43-44.
26
See id. at 44-45.
27
See motion for reconsideration dated February 20, 2018; id. at 52-58.
28
Id. at 49-51.
29
People v. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016), citing Manansala v. People, 775 Phil. 514, 520 (2015).
30
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 CONSTITUTION reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
31
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 CONSTITUTION reads:
Section 3. x x x.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
32
Sindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 428 (2016).
33
See id.
34
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE provides:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense[.]
35
See People v. Amin, G.R. No. 215942, January 18, 2017, 814 SCRA 639, 646. See also People v. Rivera,
790 Phil. 770, 779-780 (2016).
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36
See People v. Lim, 435 Phil. 640, 664 (2002).
37
See id.
38
Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002,
REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF
1972, As AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on June
7, 2002.
39
See rollo, pp. 200-210.
40
See id. at 45.
41
See id. at 95.
42
See id. at 207-209. See also People v. Paming, G.R. No. 241091, January 14, 2019; People v. Bambico,
G.R. No. 238617, November 14, 2018; People v. Mama, G.R. No. 237204, October 1, 2018.
43
See rollo, pp. 205-207. See also Sindac v. People, supra note 32; People v. Manago, 193 Phil. 505
(2016); Comerciante v. People, 764 Phil. 627 (2015).
44
See Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 390 (2015), citing Tiburcio v. People's Homesite &
Housing Corporation, 106 Phil. 477, 483-484 (1959).
45
436 Phil. 109 (2002).
46
Id. at 117-118; citations omitted.
47
See rollo, pp. 200-210.
48
In T'Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. v. Solilapsi, (442 Phil. 499, 513 [2002]), the Court held:
Courts may be required to take judicial notice of the decisions of the appellate courts but not of the decisions
of the coordinate trial courts, or even of a decision or the facts involved in another case tried by the same
court itself, unless the parties introduce the same in evidence or the court, as a matter of convenience,
decides to do so. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
49
See rollo, pp. 206-207.
50
TSN, August 17, 2015, pp. 3-22 and TSN, May 16, 2016, pp. 16-46.
51
TSN, June 13, 2016, pp. 1-9.
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