E3S Web of Conferences 241, 03003 (2021) https://doi.org/10.

1051/e3sconf/202124103003
ICEPP 2020

Computational Modelling and Prediction of Consequences in

Case of Accidental Releases of Hazardous Substances in an
Industrial Plant
Vlad Mihai Pasculescu1,*, Marius Simion Morar1, Cristian Raul Cioara1, Ligia Ioana Tuhut1, and Andrada Denisa Babut1
1
National Institute for Research and Development in Mine Safety and Protection to Explosion – INSEMEX, 32-34 G-ral Vasile Milea
street, 332047, Petrosani, Hunedoara county, Romania

Abstract. Storing relatively large amounts of hazardous materials under certain conditions can lead to
high-risk situations. In industrial units, the assessment of the amplitude and severity of the consequences of
the identified major accidents is done in order to provide data on site intervention and emergency planning.
This study aims to assess the consequences of untimely releases of hazardous explosive / toxic substances in
an industrial unit by graphical modelling and analysis of such accident scenarios using specialized software
tools. The main activity of the industrial unit under study consists in the manufacture, processing and
marketing of essential oils and their derived products.

1 Introduction Storing relatively large amounts of hazardous materials

under certain conditions can lead to high-risk situations.
The purpose of the major risk prevention policy and the The hazard of a major accident is determined by the
purpose of the safety management system is to implement coexistence of several risk factors, as presented in Table
within the industrial units the legal provisions to prevent 1:
major accidents, and in case of a major accident, to
succeed, through the actions taken, to minimize the Table 1. Risk factors
impact and amplitude.
Given the legal provisions in force on the control of Probable risk factor
major accident hazards involving dangerous substances
industrial units have to adopt policies to prevent major - storage and transport of toxic and
accidents involving dangerous substances and must have environmentally dangerous substances;
appointed a responsible for security management. Chemical - accidental spills of toxic or environmentally
hazardous substances;
The policy for the prevention of major accidents
- toxic flue gas dispersions in case of fire.
involving dangerous substances on site is drawn up in
- storage of combustible and flammable
order to achieve, in a short time, in an organized and Fire / substances;
unitary way, the measures of protection, intervention and Explosion - use of flammable substances at boiling
reduction of the effects resulting from a major accident temperatures.
involving dangerous substances.
The document on major accident prevention policies, The activity carried out on the studied site involves
prepared in writing, based on the major accident hazards, the storage, handling and processing of chemicals
identified on the site of a company, defines the overall (hazardous substances), the presence of this type of
objectives of the operator and the principles of action for product being the defining aspect of safety management
the control of major accident hazards. and as such its concept is based mainly on good
Protection and intervention measures refer to management of storage and handling.
dangerous substances that are used or produced in the In the process of identifying and assessing major
economic unit under study. hazards, documents should be used regarding: the
The assessment of the amplitude and severity of the properties of the substances that may be present on the
consequences of the major accidents identified is made in site and the environmental monitoring as well as the
order to provide data on site intervention and emergency results of investigations carried out following possible
planning [1]. incidents and accidents in the unit or similar units [2]. It
ensures a clear link between the identified risk and the
measures taken, through a hierarchical approach, in order
2 Major hazards identification and
assessment
*
Corresponding author: [email protected]
© The Authors, published by EDP Sciences. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
E3S Web of Conferences 241, 03003 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202124103003
ICEPP 2020

to avoid major accidents or, ultimately, to minimize the irreversible or serious long-term effects affecting
effects by applying safety practices at each workplace [3]. health or self-evacuation
Within the article, there is carried out a systematic • ERPG 1 represents the value of the concentration in
analysis of site risks, applying quantitative analysis the air of a substance, expressed in ppm or mg / m3,
methods by modelling accident scenarios using above which it is predictable that most people,
specialized software tools [4, 5, 6, 7]. including susceptible individuals, will suffer
appreciable discomfort, irritation, ie asymptomatic
effects that do not affect the senses. However, the
3 Considerations on quantitative risk effects do not cause disability, are transient and
assessment of toxic dispersions reversible when exposure ceases
Simple models for hazard identification and qualitative
When these limits are not available, the AEGL (1, 2
risk analysis are not always sufficient and as such it is
and 3) or Teels (1, 2 and 3) thresholds are used.
sometimes necessary to use detailed assessments [8].
There are several methods for carrying out a quantitative
risk assessment. The choice of a particular technique is 4 Problem setup and numerical study
specific to the analyzed accident scenario.
To assess the risk associated with potential major
accidents identified by qualitative risk analysis, the 4.1 General description of the industrial unit
methodology "based on consequences" is also used; also
called "deterministic approach" which is based on 4.1.1 Activity
assessing the consequences of possible accidents, without
quantifying the probability of these accidents, thus The main activity carried out on site is the manufacture
avoiding the inherent uncertainties that arise in the and processing of essential oils and their derived products.
explicit quantification of the frequencies of potential Essential oils and derived products are used in the
accidents. cosmetics, pharmaceutical, perfumery and aromatherapy
This method has a rational basis similar to the "worst industries.
case scenario imagined". It is considered that if, for the The activities carried out on site, in the safety-relevant
worst case scenario, sufficient measures are taken to parts of the site, are those associated with the processing,
protect the population, then, for each possible accident, packaging and storage of the hazardous substances used.
less serious than the worst, measures will also be These activities are:
sufficient to protect the population. • reception and unloading of dangerous substances -
The consequences of accidents are taken into account raw materials, auxiliaries from cars;
quantitatively, by calculating the distance at which the • the actual storage in the storage warehouses;
physical quantity describing the consequences (in this • their processing in the installations in the production
case the toxic concentration) reaches a limit value hall;
(threshold) corresponding to the beginning of the • packaging of finished products and fractions for
manifestation of undesirable effects. The thresholds used storage;
in this paper are in accordance with the legislation of • storing them in the appropriate warehouses;
some EU countries (values are not uniform at EU level). • loading and shipping the finished products by car.
In addition to the distance corresponding to the lethal Other on-site activities related to the main activities
threshold value of the physical quantity that describes the are:
consequences, another distance is estimated, • providing utilities: water, gas, electricity;
corresponding to the beginning of the "irreversible • office activities;
effects". This distance is used to separate areas with a • preventing and extinguishing fires, combating
sensitive population (schools, hospitals) or densely accidental pollution;
populated areas from sources of danger.
• waste management.
The effects generated by the occurrence of an
The main hazards that can cause a major accident on
accident depend on the type of scenario that defines the
site are [10]:
analysed accident and the value of the determined
• fire hazard;
specific indicator. Damage caused by toxic dispersions
can be estimated based on the following threshold values • explosion hazard;
[9]: • hazards of air pollution and intoxication of
personnel with toxic flue gases resulting in case of
• ERPG 3 represents the value of the concentration in
fire or explosion;
air of a substance expressed in ppm or mg / m 3,
above which it is foreseeable that most people, • hazard of soil pollution with contaminated water
including susceptible individuals, will suffer life- resulting from a fire;
threatening effects or may cause death; • hazard of soil pollution in case of spills of
• ERPG 2 represents the value of the concentration in hazardous substances on unprotected surfaces;
the air of a substance expressed in ppm or mg / m3, • chances of intoxication in case of ingestion, in
above which it is foreseeable that most people, particular of substances with high toxicity.
including susceptible individuals, will suffer

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ICEPP 2020

4.1.2 Location and vulnerable points Table 2. Identified vulnerable points

The objective is located in an industrial and peripheral

area in the north-eastern part of a territorial Type Codification
administrative unit of municipal type, in the vicinity of
the site being identified several vulnerable areas in case Educational institutions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
of major industrial accidents (up to a distance of about 5
km ) and which are shown in Table 2.
The geospatial location of the vulnerable areas i are Churches 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
shown in Figure 1.
The balance of areas on the industrial site is as Hospitals 20
follows:
• total surfacce: 37.910 m2;
Shopping centres 21, 22, 23
• built area: 6.228 m2;
• free surface: 12.317 m2 din care:
• grassy surface: 10.000 m; Public institutions 24, 25, 26, 27, 28
• orchards: 2.317 m2.
• the surface occupied with networks, access roads, Residential areas 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34
concrete platforms: 19365 m2.
Currently, only one economic operator operates on
the site.

Fig. 1. Location plan of vulnerable points (within a radius of about 5 km)

4.2 Software tools operational procedures or by implementing other

measures to eliminate them.
For the calculation of indicators for major accident
scenarios was used Phast 8.23, software with which
computer simulations can be performed, bringing a huge 4.3 Selection and modelling of typical site-
opening in the field of research through the possibilities specific accidents
of analyzing situations that may pose a potential hazard
The installations from the industrial unit may be subject
to people, property or the environment and to quantify
to leakage of hazardous liquid substances and vapor
them according to their severity [11].
emissions caused by [12, 13]:
The consequences can then be managed or reduced by
• Leaks from pumps, flanges, valves and other fittings;
designing the industrial process or installation, modifying

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ICEPP 2020

• Cracks due to mechanical stress: vibration, decrease in concentrations. Areas affected by high
weakening of the material caused by high concentrations and exposure times are larger in the
temperatures, corrosion, material defects or case of low wind speeds and as such this situation is
improper maintenance; more dangerous. In the presented simulations a
• Human error through wrong manoeuvres or other speed of 1 m/s is used for the most unfavourable
non-compliant operations. The occurrence of leaks situation and 3 m/s for the average situation.
in technological installations is favoured by: • atmospheric stability is another factor that greatly
o Existence of joints and other sealing influences the dispersion, the state of atmospheric
elements in tanks, pumps, reactors and stability being the most unfavourable and as such
pipes used in the presented simulations. Class E is used
o Relatively high temperatures (above for the most unfavourable situation and class D for
evaporation temperature) at distillation / the average situation;
rectification columns; • the relative humidity of the air does not significantly
o Unloading of products from means of influence the dispersion and as such we used the
transport (mobile equipment). value of 50% for the unfavorable situation and 75%
In the case of leakages of liquid substances with a for the average.
certain degree of volatility, evaporation can produce • atmospheric temperature is one of the parameters
dispersions which, depending on the characteristics of the that does not significantly influence the dispersion
substance, can be toxic and / or flammable but also the evaporation rate of some liquids. As
Due to the existing protection systems in case of such, in the presented simulations we used a
liquid leaks, they will reach the drainage systems temperature of 37 0C for the unfavourable situation
(retention tanks, collection basins) which limits the and 9 0C for the average situation, which can be
spreading surface of a possible leak and therefore the considered representative for the location area of the
evaporation surface and implicitly the amount of vapours analysed objective.
in the dispersion. • for the roughness of the land, the urban type was
Also, a good positioning of the gutters and drains can used. This type of terrain has high roughness and
greatly limit the surface of a possible leak on platforms high turbulence, because the chemical cloud moves
outside the actual retention system. on a surface with many friction-generating elements,
The existence of covered collection basins is also very such as trees or small buildings (residential,
important because it does not allow the accumulation of industrial areas or forests).
liquid in the retention tank or on concrete surfaces and
transfers it to a closed system where evaporation is Scenarios of accidents with major consequences were
greatly diminished and the vapours formed do not selected for the quantitative risk analysis, although the
disperse directly into the air. risk of occurrence of events with serious consequences is
Leaks are dangerous due to: low or at most medium. A reasonable scenario as well as
• risk of poisoning personnel. Exposure to high a worst case scenario were selected and analysed.
concentrations of highly toxic products may result In the following there are presented the results
in severe intoxication of operating or response obtained by quantitative risk analysis, by modelling
personnel. possible scenarios that result in the release into the
• fire and explosion hazard. Vapours of flammable atmosphere of toxic / explosive hazardous substances
substances may ignite and cause fire. located on the site of the industrial unit.
• danger of soil, surface and groundwater pollution.
Many of the substances on the site are 4.3.1 Scenario 1 - The leakage of the entire quantity
environmentally hazardous and if they reach of substance (500 kg) from a tank located in the
unprotected areas in large quantities and area of the production hall
concentrations can cause local pollution.
The hypotheses that were taken into account in • Hazardous substance: Chlorine, Quantity: 500 kg,
performing the simulations are: normal atmospheric temperature and pressure.
• the measurement height (relative to ground level) of
the airborne concentration of the toxic substance has It is considered the worst case scenario, in which the
no significant effect on dispersion, as such the entire amount of existing chlorine leaks from the tank.
representation of the results is made for the The simulation results are presented in the following:
concentrations calculated at a height of 10 m above
the ground. A. Unfavourable weather conditions (Figure 2 – Figure 3)
• wind speed significantly influences the Dangerous area: Toxic area of the vapour cloud
characteristics of the toxic cloud, in the sense that a - ERPG 1 = 1 ppm
high speed generates an elongated cloud, which - ERPG 2 = 3 ppm
propagates quickly over a relatively long distance, - ERPG 3 = 20 ppm
with a relatively rapid decrease in concentrations
and a low speed generates a wider cloud, which
propagates slowly over a long distance, with a slow

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ICEPP 2020

It is considered a reasonable scenario, in which a

breakdown occurs and the amount of hydrogen chloride
existing leaks from the tank.
The simulation results are presented in the following:
A. Unfavourable weather conditions (Figure 6 – Figure 7)
Dangerous area: Toxic area of the vapour cloud
- ERPG 1 = 3 ppm
- ERPG 2 = 20 ppm
- ERPG 3 = 150 ppm

Fig. 2. Toxic area of the gas cloud

Fig. 6. Toxic area of the gas cloud

Fig. 3. Toxic cloud maximum footprint

B. Average weather conditions (Figure 4 – Figure 5)

Dangerous area: Toxic area of the vapour cloud
- ERPG 1 = 1 ppm
- ERPG 2 = 3 ppm
- ERPG 3 = 20 ppm

Fig. 7. Toxic cloud maximum footprint

B. Average weather conditions (Figure 8 – Figure 9)

Dangerous area: Toxic area of the vapour cloud
- ERPG 1 = 3 ppm
- ERPG 2 = 20 ppm
- ERPG 3 = 150 ppm

Fig. 4. Toxic area of the gas cloud

Fig. 8. Toxic area of the gas cloud

Fig. 5. Toxic cloud maximum footprint

4.3.2 Scenario 2 - The leakage of the entire quantity

of substance from a 1 m3 container located on the
weighing platform

• Hazardous substance: Hydrogen chloride, Quantity:

1 m3, normal atmospheric temperature and pressure.
Fig. 9. Toxic cloud maximum footprint

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E3S Web of Conferences 241, 03003 (2021) https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/202124103003
ICEPP 2020

Fig. 10. Toxic cloud – ERPG levels (Chlorine leakage, 500 kg, unfavourable weather conditions)

Fig. 11. Toxic cloud – ERPG levels (Chlorine leakage, 500 kg, average weather conditions)

5 Conclusions
Following the modelling of the 2 possible accident For Scenario 2 – leakage of the entire quantity of
scenarios, the following conclusions can be drawn: substance from a 1 m3 container located on the weighing
For Scenario 1 – leakage of the entire quantity of platform:
substance (500 kg) from a tank located in the area of the
production hall • unfavourable weather conditions: the residential
areas adjacent to the industrial unit are in the toxic
• unfavourable weather conditions: points 30 (640 m), area of the vapour cloud. Also, the water treatment
31 (790 m), 32 (580 m), 33 (350 m) (residential plant 28 and the educational unit 7 are in the area of
areas), educational unit 7 (870 m) and water attention (tangential to the cloud of toxic gases) -
treatment plant 28 (360 m) are located in the risk Figure 12;
area - Figure 10; • average weather conditions: toxic area of the cloud
• the identified vulnerable point located in the area of does not reach any vulnerable points - Figure 13.
attention is the residential area 32 (580 m) – Figure
11

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ICEPP 2020

Fig. 12. Toxic cloud – ERPG levels (Hydrogen chloride leakage, 1 m3, unfavourable weather conditions)

Fig. 13. Toxic cloud – ERPG levels (Hydrogen chloride leakage, 1 m3, average weather conditions)

This paper was developed within the Nucleu- 4. F. G. Popescu, D. Pasculescu, M. D. Marcu, V. M.
Programme, carried out with the support of Romanian Pasculescu, Mining of Mineral Deposits, 14 (4), 40-
Ministry of Education and Research, project no. PN-19- 46, (2020)
21-02-01, project title: Techniques and solutions for 5. M. Leba. A. Ionica, R. Dobra, V. M. Pasculescu,
developing the scientific and technical competences for Environ Eng Manag J, 13 (6), 1365-1370, (2014)
prevention and protection to explosions (in Romanian: 6. V. M. Pasculescu, E. Ghicioi, M. S. Morar, D.
Tehnici si solutii pentru dezvoltarea competentelor Pasculescu, M. C. Suvar, Quality - Access to Success,
stiintifice si tehnice de prevenire si protectie la explozie). 20, 25-30, (2019)
7. V. M. Pasculescu, N. I. Vlasin, E. Ghicioi, G. D.
Florea, M.C. Suvar, Environ Eng Manag J, 18 (4),
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ICEPP 2020

11. Phast Software features. Available on

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