ECSP REPORT | JANUARY 2024 VOLUME 17 | ISSUE 01

POPULATION TRENDS
AND THE FUTURE OF
US COMPETITIVENESS
By Jennifer D. Sciubba, Lauren Risi,
and Sarah B. Barnes
ECSP Report: Volume 17, Issue 01
Authors: Jennifer D. Sciubba, Phd, Wilson Center Global Fellow; Author, 8 Billion and Counting: How Sex,
Death, and Migration Shape Our World; Lauren Risi, Director, Environmental Change & Security Program,
Wilson Center; Sarah B. Barnes, Director, Maternal Health Initiative, Wilson Center
Series Editor: Lauren Risi
Managing Editor: Richard Byrne
Production Editor: Angus Soderberg
Design and Layout by the Wilson Center: Sharon McGill
Research assistance provided by: Claire Doyle and Deekshita Ramanarayanan
Acknowledgements: In addition to the sources cited, this report draws on information provided by
Alex Ezeh, Phd, (Drexel University), Jack Goldstone, Phd, (George Mason University and Wilson Center),
Elizabeth Leahy Madsen (Population Reference Bureau), Kathleen Mogelgaard (Population Institute), and
Ai-jen Poo (National Domestic Workers Alliance).
This report was made possible through the generous support of The Population Institute.
© January 2024, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Cover: Population Year 2020, © Worldmapper.org

Residents in Beni region greet peacekeepers passing by in a MONUSCO armoured personnel carrier.. (Sylvain Liechti / Flickr)
Demographic issues intersect with the gamut of policy priorities
on the congressional agenda: the economy, health care, edu- A note on terms
cation, immigration, foreign policy, and Social Security. In the
Since we want to compare across
latter case, for example, projections indicate that an aging US
regions and across time in this
population and the decline in the worker-to-beneficiary ratio will
paper, the best measure to
exhaust Social Security funds by 2040, in the absence of reform.
indicate overall patterns in birth
As host to the largest immigrant population worldwide, the
is the total fertility rate, or the
United States has seen not only the benefits from a growing
average number of children
workforce in the face of low fertility rates, but also political
expected to be born to a woman
division in response to that immigration.
in her lifetime. This is not the same
Although demography is important, how population trends in- as fecundity, which is the ability to
fluence policy outcomes is often overlooked or misunderstood. produce children. Thus, when demo­
graphers refer to fertility as being
Some population issues are an immediate and direct concern— “up,” or “down,” they are referring
as one sees clearly in the increased mortality rates due to the to actual births, and not fecundity.
COVID-19 pandemic, or in spikes in the number of asylum Also: a total fertility rate of roughly
seekers in the wake of conflict or instability. As all levels of gov- 2 children per woman is considered
ernment continue to prepare for such “shocks,” understanding “replacement level.” Thus, conver­
demography is necessary for foresight exercises to anticipate sations about fertility rates generally
them. Yet population dynamics are also important underlying refer to “below replacement” as
drivers of long-term shifts. For example, demographic trends in leading towards a population even-
fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration—the three building tually shrinking (absent immigration),
blocks of demographic change—affect the US labor market and while “above replacement”
its domestic consumer base. (See “A note on terms,” at right.) indicates positive population growth.

The same situation holds true in other countries, and thus im-
pacts the United States’ global economic competitiveness. If 2023 Fertility Rates
some countries with shrinking workforces, like many of those
Around the World
in Europe, do little to adapt to their new demographic reality Australia 1.60
(e.g., failing to reform low retirement ages and unsustainable Brazil 1.62
entitlement levels), they could become less attractive eco- China 1.19
nomic partners for demographically younger states. If regions Iran 1.68
and countries with relatively larger and younger workforces,
Mexico 1.79
like sub-Saharan Africa or Indonesia, attract global capital and
Nigeria 5.06
become strong economic hubs through partnerships with US
Russia 1.52
competitors, the United States could lose its edge.
USA 1.66
Population dynamics also affect national security and stability. 0 1 2 3 4 5
Average number of children per woman
The strategic environment will necessarily change as allies of
the US (including South Korea and Germany) and competitors Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2022 Revision

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 1

(China and Russia), adapt to their own aging populations. For example, the massive surge in China’s labor
force, which was a driver of its post-1980 economic growth and emergence as a global power, is now over
as decades of declining birth rates catch up to that nation’s working age population. There is also mount-
ing evidence of a relationship between youthful populations and civil conflict, with possible lessons to be
found in the long US involvement in Afghanistan, which has one of the highest fertility rates and poorest
human rights records in the world.

Finally, the energy and resource demands of the world’s 8 billion people—which vary greatly across re-
gions—have implications for efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Is it possible to achieve global
climate goals and close energy deficits at the same time? Places such as India (the world’s most populous
country) or sub-Saharan Africa (the only region of the world with a population growth rate over 2%) articulate
this challenge. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, 600 million people lack access to electricity.

Population is a powerful dynamic. Yet US policy makers would be wise not to see any demographic trend
as deterministic, whether at home or abroad. Doing so can lead to severely under- or overestimating the
economic and national security effects that trends create. No demographic trend is inherently good or bad;
national responses matter.

While the shift from high to low fertility around the globe is much maligned among those who portend
economic collapse, the overall picture of global population is positive. We’ve made tremendous strides in
health and longevity, stretching a life expectancy at birth of 31 years in 1900 to over 73 years today, adding
what amounts to an “extra life” for people over the last century. With the right investments, we can ensure
the world stays on a path towards greater prosperity in the future.

Portrait of a large family, Botswana. (Lucian Coman / Shutterstock)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 2

 Today’s population moment is different
While we have come a long way since the start of the 20th century, the global population has changed dra-
matically even within our present century. The infant mortality rate has been halved, from 53 deaths per
1,000 live births in 2000 to 26 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2023. We have gained nearly seven years in
global life expectancy, and the fertility rate has fallen from 2.7 to 2.3 children per woman on average. And
demonstrating the widening global demographic divide, the median age of populations in high-income coun-
tries has gone from 35 years to 41 years, while increasing only by 1.8 years among low-income countries.

These momentous changes have big implications for the economic and security interests of the United States,
and they pose new challenges and opportunities for its policymakers. In short, past approaches that proved
successful may not be effective in the present and near future. And the challenges that persist—e.g., inad-
equate health and caregiving services and immigration—are likely to be made worse if policies fail to take
into consideration global demographic trends and how they will impact the United States and its interests.

As noted above, the drivers of population trends are fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration. The
downward trend in fertility rates since the 1960s has led to the most significant change in global popula-
tion dynamics.

Due to decades of low fertility rates, the populations of more than 30 countries are shrinking, including US
adversaries like China and Russia, and US allies such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Many more coun-
tries are experiencing significant population aging. In short, this means that their populations are growing
older (with rising median ages and fewer young people), even if their overall numbers have not yet begun
to shrink. This aging has implications for national security and economic prosperity.

Total Fertility Rate (1950–2023)

7.00

6.00 Low-income
countries

5.00
Lower-
middle-income
countries
4.00
PER WOMAN

3.00 World

2.00

1.00 High-income
countries

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

Source: UN World Population Prospects, 2022 Revision

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 3

At the same time, because of their youthful populations and higher fertility rates, the world’s poorest and
least stable countries will boast young and rapidly growing populations for decades to come. This growth is
ensured, even as fertility rates continue to fall in these nations. As a result, these countries will have large
potential workforces but also continue to face both governance challenges and a limited ability to provide
basic services to their populations, which are growing rapidly but also bringing with them a low tax base.

This demographic divide in fertility rates, mortality rates, and migration challenges between higher and low-
er income countries means wide disparities in the issues various countries face. Yet our highly integrated
world also means that they will translate into shared global economic and security challenges.

Just a few decades ago, the vast majority of the world’s people lived in countries with high fertility rates.
In 2000, 41 countries (out of 196 total) had total fertility rates of at least 5—meaning that, on average,
women in these countries had 5 or more children in their lifetimes. Yet in 2022, there were only 8 coun-
tries with fertility rates that high. Two-thirds of our 8 billion people live in a place with below replacement
fertility. Generally speaking, the higher a country’s fertility rate, the younger the population. Due to declining
fertility rates and increased life expectancy, our populations are becoming more “top-heavy,” with greater
proportions of older people.

Although fertility rates are declining everywhere, they have done so at different rates in different places,
creating varied population experiences for countries and regions around the globe. Even across Africa, the
world’s demographically youngest continent, fertility rates continue to decline. And in African countries that
still have high fertility rates on average, rates are declining in cities.

A grandmother takes care of her grandchild in Jakarta. (Reza Syah Fahlevi / Shutterstock)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 4

For instance, fertility rates are highest in the Sahel region of
A demographic
north-central Africa. While they have not fallen as quickly as some
demographers expected, they have fallen. Yet, even with these divide in fertility rates,
declines, as the following discussion on age structure will lay out,
mortality rates, and
these populations will remain young and growing for decades,
giving them a different set of challenges and opportunities than migration between
higher income countries face.
higher and lower-
Death patterns, or mortality, have seen remarkable shifts as well. income countries
Communicable diseases are no longer the top killer anywhere
in the world. Great strides also have been made in malaria and means wide disparities
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment. Yet many communicable dis- in the issues countries
eases kill exclusively in lower income countries, furthering the
demographic and health divides between rich and poor countries. face. Yet our highly
The global divide in health is important to remember as Congress integrated world
allocates resources for global health and development. If funding
for communicable diseases and health infrastructure should stall also means that they
or fall off the agenda, morbidity and mortality in lower income will translate into
countries could undermine global development goals like the
Sustainable Development Goals. shared challenges.
Migration is the final building block of population. There have been fewer shifts in migration patterns over
the past generation. It was important then, it is important now, and it will likely continue to be important
in similar ways in the future. The United States remains the top recipient of migrants worldwide, by a large
margin, and political divisions over attitudes towards migration will continue to play a large role in electoral
politics in North America and Europe.

These trends in fertility rates and longevity mean we are heading into a new world. Populations have never
been as old as they are now. They will only continue to grow older, and the total number of aging countries
will continue to grow over the next 20 years. In this new world, we must rethink what retirement, work,
family structures, and infrastructure look like. Which policies can best serve the needs of these diverse and
changing populations? And in places where population growth, high fertility rates, and youthful population
age structures exist, what does this tell us about needed investments that can expand rights and opportu-
nities, especially for women and girls?

Pursuing specific population targets is a poor use of resources, however. Policies aiming to directly raise
or lower fertility rates often do little to move the needle, whether in the United States or abroad. Thus, we
must look beyond women’s childbearing to solve population challenges. Policy makers would be better
served by focusing on improving quality of life for citizens already born, and by adapting to new demographic
realities. They should try to make the most of the human capital resources already available. The societies
that do this—rather than trying to reverse population aging—will come out on top.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 5

 The care economy
The global care economy—the paid and unpaid labor related to caregiving such as childcare, older
person care, and domestic chores—is a critical sector that enhances economic growth, gender
equity, and women’s empowerment. Care work makes all other work possible. Finding ways to
provide adequate caregiving is not a new dilemma, but it has been exacerbated in the inevitable
and unprecedented shift of older persons growing proportionally larger relative to younger persons.
As people live longer, we have essentially created another generation. Yet we have done little to
address the resources required to create a dignified quality of life for this “new” generation.

Care work is economically

valuable, but also undervalued.
Increase in Older Persons in the US
Women and girls contribute Age 60+ (1973–2043)
more than 70% of total global
2043: 105 million
caregiving hours (paid and 2033: 96 million
unpaid) and perform more
2023: 81 million
than 75% of unpaid care 2003: 48 million
work. While women make 1973: 30 million 14.5%
up only 47% of the global 16%
paid workforce, they make
Population
ages 60+
up 89% of home health care
24%
workers and 94% of child-
27%
care workers. Unpaid care 28%
work presents additional
challenges for women. It is Percentage
estimated that 647 million of population
aged 60+
full-time unpaid caregivers
around the world are not
seeking a job due to their caregiving responsibilities. Most of them (93%) are women. For these
women, absence from the job market can mean missing the opportunity to accrue earnings over
time that would result in greater income security in their old age, either through personal savings
or by qualifying for higher Social Security benefits.

Another subset of unpaid caregivers is the “sandwich generation” of caregivers. People in this
group provide unpaid care to an adult while also caring for a child or children under the age of 18. In
wealthier countries with older populations, the “sandwich generation” results from a combination
of high life expectancy and delayed fertility. However, in sub-Saharan African countries, with twice
as many “sandwiched” caregivers, high fertility increases the probability of generational overlap
between older and younger generations.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 6

 Age structure matters Age
100+
Age
100+
Birth Year
Birth Year
1923 or earlier
1923 or earlier
95 1928
95 1928
Age structure refers to the various proportions of a society comprised of different age groups. Generally,90
85Age
90
1933
1933
1938 Birth Year
85 19231938
or earlier
80100+ 1943
those are children and youth not yet in the workforce, those in their working ages, and the segment of the75 95
80
75
1948 1928
1933
1943
1948
70 90 1953
1953
population that has exited the workforce into retirement.
70
65 85 1958 1938
65 1958
60 80 1963 1943
60 19481963
55 75 1968
55 1968
50 70 1973 1953
Political demographers often use median age as shorthand to compare age structures around the globe. 45 65
50
45
1978 1958
1973
19631978
40 60 1983
40 19681983
In 2023, for instance, these range from a low of 14.5 years in Niger to a high of 54.3 years in Monaco. 35 55 1988
35 19731988
30 50 1993
45 30 19781993
25 1998
Societies with higher median ages will have relatively higher proportions of older people, and vice versa.20 40
25
20
2003
19831998
19882003
15 35 2008
15 19932008
A country’s age structure is not deterministic, but it does set the scene for political,
MALE FE MALE
economic, and social
10
5 25
30
10
2013
2018
19982013
20 5 MALE FE MALE 20032018
0 2,000,000 2,000,000 2023 20082023
dynamics. What we know about age structure also can help us anticipate
1,000,000
1,000,000 the
Number offuture.
0
persons 0
Number of persons
15 0 2,000,000 1,000,000
1,000,000 2,000,000
2013
10
5 MALE FEMALE 2018
0 2023

Population by 1–Year Birth

Age Year
Groups and Sex (2023)
Birth Year
600 500 400 300 200 100 0 100
Number of persons (in thousands)
200 300 400 500 600

Birth
BirthYear
Year
Age Age 1923 or earlier
100+AgeAge
100+1923 19231923 or earlier
or earlier
100+ 100+ 100+or earlier
1923 or earlier 1928 1923
1923
or earlier
or earlier
95100+
100+
19281928
Japan Monaco
95192895 1928 1933 1928
1928
95 95 95 95
90 90 19331933
90 90 1933
90 90 90 1933 1938 1933
1933
85 85 19381938
85 85
80 80851938
85 85 1938 1943 1938
1938
19431943
80 80
75 75801943
80 80 1943 1948 1943
1943
19481948
75 75 1948 75 1948 1953 1948
1948
70 70 75
75
19531953
70 70
65 65701953
70 70 1953 1958 1953
1953
19581958
65 65
60 6065 65 65 1958
1958 1963 1958
1958
19631963
60 60
55 55601963
60 60 1963 1968 1963
1963
19681968
55 55
50 50551968
55 55 1968 1973 1968
1968
19731973
50 50 1973 50 1973 1978 1973
1973
45 45 50
50
19781978
45 45
40 40451978
45 45 1978 1983 1978
1978
19831983
40 40
35 3540 40 40 1983
1983 1988 1983
1983
19881988
35 35
30 30351988
35 35 1988 1993 1988
1988
19931993
30 30
25 25301993
30 30 1993 1998 1993
1993
19981998
25 25
20 2025 25 25 1998
1998 2003 1998
1998
20032003
20 20 2003 20 2003 2008 2003
2003
15 15 20
20
20082008
15 15
10 10152008
15 15 2008 2013 2008
2008
20132013
10 10 2013 10 2013 2018 2013
2013
5 105 10 20182018
5 5 M A L E M AFLEEM A LFE M A L E 2018 5 2018 MM A LAEL E F EFM EM A LAEL E 2023 2018
2018
0 05 5 20232023
0 2,000,000
0 2,000,000 1,000,0001,000,000 0 0 1,000,0001,000,000 2,000,000
3002023
0 03 0 250
2,000,000 2023 200 2 150 100 1 50 0 0 50 100 1 150 200 2 250 300 3 20232023
Number of
Number
persons
of persons 600600300 250
500500 200
400400 150
300300 100
200200 10050 of of
100
Number
Number 0 0 (in0 millions)
persons
persons 50
100100 100
200200 300300150 400400200 500500 250 600600
300
Source: United Nations Data Portal
Age
Number of persons Birth Year Number
Number
Numberof of
personsof(inof(in
Number
persons persons
persons
thousands)
thousands) Source: United Nations Data Portal

100+ 100+
100+ 1923 or earlier 1923
1923
or earlier
or earlier

Niger USA
95 95 95 1928 1928
1928
90 90 90 1933 1933
1933
85 851923 1938or earlier
85 or earlier
1923 1938
1938
100+ 100+
80 801928
80 1943
1928 1943
1943
95 95
75 751933
75 1948
1933 1948
1948
90 90
70 701938
70 1953
1938 1953
1953
85 85
65 651943
65 1958
1943 1958
1958
80 80
60 601948
60 1963
1948 1963
1963
75 75
55 551953
55 1968
1953 1968
1968
70 70
50 501958
50 1973
1958 1973
1973
65 65
45 451963
45 1978
1963 1978
1978
60 60
40 401968
40 1983
1968 1983
1983
55 55
35 351973
35 1988
1973 1988
1988
50 50 1993
30 301978
30 1978 1993
1993
45 45 1998
25 251983
25 1983 1998
1998
40 40 2003
20 201988
20 1988 2003
2003
35 35 2008
15 151993
15 1993 2008
2008
30 30 2013
10 101998
10 1998 2013
2013
25 25
5 MA LE FEMA LE 5 5
2003 2018
2003 2018
2018
20 20 2023
0 0 0
2008 2008 2023
2023
15 15 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 100 200 300 400 500 2013 3600
3 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3
2013 Number
Number
of of
persons
persons
(in (in
millions)
millions)
10 10 Number of persons (in thousands)
5 5 Number of persons in thousands 2018 2018 Number of persons in millions
100+ 2023 2023 1923 or earlier
0 0
300 95300250 250 200Source:
200 150United Nations
150 100 100 Data
50 Portal
50 0 0 50 50 100 100 150 150 200 200250 250
300 300 1928
90 Number of
Number
persons
of persons 1933
Source: United
Source:Nations
UnitedData
Nations
Portal
Data Portal
85 1938
80
75
Countries with younger age structures are more likely to experience political instability and poverty. They 1943
1948
70 1953
65 have also been the most likely to develop challenges such as armed civil conflict, low levels of social and 1958
60 1963
55
50
economic development, losses of liberal democracy even in the midst of democratic transitions, and coups 1968
1973
45 1978
40 d’état. Countries with median ages under 25 years have a higher likelihood of breaking out into revolution- 1983
35 1988
30
25
ary conflicts. This group includes most countries in Western and Eastern Africa (but not Northern, and not 1993
1998
2003
all of Southern Africa); several countries in Central Asia, like Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan; Haiti;
20
15 2008
10 2013
5
0
Guatemala; and some island states in Oceania, like Papua New Guinea. Many of the most at-risk countries 2018
2023
3 2 1 0 1 2 3
are focus countries
Numberof the
of persons ten-year US Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.
(in millions)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 7

More than half of the world’s future population growth to 2050 will occur in sub-Saharan Africa, and more
than forty percent of that region’s growth will come from just four countries: the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. The number of people aged 15-59 years old globally will grow by
676 million, net, between 2023 and 2050. That same population in Africa will grow by 686 million, meaning
that much of the world’s future growth comes from Africa, whose population increases offset losses else-
where. It is crucial to ensure this workforce has the opportunities needed to be most productive.

This will be a challenge. Niger, which experienced a coup in 2023, is embedded in a region that reflects
similar political and demographic challenges to its own. With one of the world’s highest fertility rates, the
population of Niger will double every 19 years. In order to just maintain the current dismal levels of school
and healthcare access, Niger has to double the number of schools, its physical infrastructure, and even its
jobs every 18 years. 76% of girls in Niger are married before they are 18, and the average age of a moth-
er’s first birth is 18.5 years, compared to 27 in the United States. Early marriage and childbearing restricts
women’s ability to seek education and income-earning opportunities outside the home, both of which are
necessary to give women more equal participation in society.

Diving deeper, we find that often, the younger women are when they have their first baby, the higher
their fertility overall. Early onset of childbearing creates smaller intergenerational age gaps, which lead to
higher infant and child mortality. Thus, investments in education (especially for girls) and voluntary family
planning—investments that yield economic dividends and increase gender equity while lowering fertility
rates—can put them on a more sustainable path. Even if Niger’s total fertility rate decreases by 50% today,
its population will continue to grow, which demonstrates that policies aiming to change fertility rates are
insufficient to address the unique needs of youthful societies.

Doctor visits an older patient. (Media Lens King / Shutterstock)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 8

Numerous countries lie somewhere in the middle of the age structure spectrum, however. India is emblem-
atic of these “middle-aged” countries. While it is now the world’s most populous country, its fertility rate is
currently below replacement level. Due to population momentum (see text box on page 12), India’s population
will keep growing for many decades, but the number of new entrants to the labor force has already peaked.

And although it is relatively younger than China or European countries, India will have to invest more in
its current working age population to help its citizens be as productive and prosperous as possible. They
have a long way to go. India’s rate of female labor force participation is 24% (as opposed to 61% in China).

It is too soon to tell how India will respond to its shifting population, but some pessimists argue they are
not doing enough and will see a ceiling on their economic growth far lower than China’s has been. Rapidly
falling fertility rates have put India on a similar path as Iran and Thailand—two other nations with some of
the most rapidly aging populations in the world. These countries won’t stay middle-aged for long, and they
face the double challenge of addressing the needs of their currently youthful populations while preparing
for an aging population just around the corner.

Proportion of Older Persons Relative to Population

Number of years for the proportion of the population
10% 25% aged 60+ to increase from 10% to 25% of the total population.
Thailand 2002 2026 24 years
Iran 2018 2044 26 years TOTAL YEARS
China 2000 2029 29 years
Mexico 2015 2051 36 years
India 2020 2059 39 years

Higher-income countries are on the upper end of the age structure scale. One consequence of their below
replacement fertility is an accompanying shrinkage of their working-age population. Immigration is one way
to expand the potential workforce, as it allows states to target specific skills gaps. The United States has
below replacement fertility (around 1.6 children per woman on average), but the overall population continues
to grow because of robust immigration—a trend that has mostly recovered in the post-COVID era. Canada
and Australia also follow this model. However, it is federal policies—and not the supply of immigrants who
want to move—that are the single most important factor in determining the level of immigration. Countries
like Japan and South Korea, with effective policies to limit immigration, show this clearly.

Another policy choice to expand the workforce is to extend working ages and bring in underutilized seg-
ments of the labor force, typically women. The impact of doing so can be huge. The labor force participation
rate of 55-64 year-olds in the United States is 65%, just below the OECD average. By contrast, Iceland’s
rate for that same age group is 84% and Japan’s is 80%.

There are currently 42 million Americans in this 55-to-64-year age group, and there will consistently be between
39 and 42 million such persons over the next twenty years (after this, the number will actually rise.) Changing

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 9

laws and norms to make sure this segment of the potential workforce is engaged now will yield dividends in
the future, both for the overall economy, as well as for individual wellbeing and income security.

While nations with younger populations run a higher risk of conflict, the inverse is not necessarily true.
Countries with older, or more “mature,” age structures have to date been the most peaceful. Yet a greater
number of countries with less democratic institutions have now achieved older age structures, and we
have yet to witness a pacifying effect. For instance, despite their aging and shrinking populations, China
and Russia continue to project military power beyond their borders. Political power is highly concentrated
in both countries, so leaders can reallocate economic resources to meet national goals.

In the case of China, specifically, it is unclear how its population aging will impact its economy. China’s
working age population peaked a decade ago and the country is rapidly shrinking; youth unemployment
is over 20%. But demography isn’t China’s only or biggest impediment to economic growth. Debt-fueled
housing speculation has led to a real estate crash. The government is reinvesting in manufacturing, even as
its domestic consumer market is reticent to buy, and trade partners are reticent to accept, Chinese exports
that would increase their trade deficit. There is a role for policy choices, but the ones China’s leadership is
making may not stimulate economic growth and right the flailing economy.

Happy mother with happy kids, Niger, Niamey (buraktumler / Shutterstock)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 10

 Population momentum
Population momentum often refers to the tendency of a population to continue growing even after
fertility rates fall to—or below—replacement level. Fertility rates in India, Mexico, and Vietnam are
all below replace­ment, for instance. But their populations will continue to grow for several decades,
because the higher fertility in their past means a larger number of potential mothers in the present
and near future. Population momentum works the other way as well. This is why even when fertil-
ity rates increase, a population can still shrink—as would be the case in South Korea. The number
of potential mothers in those societies remains small. The figures below help visualize population
momentum works. Understanding its power underscores why policies that target population size or
fertility rates are often misguided. Tomorrow’s parents have already been born, as have tomorrow’s
students, workers, and retirees. To a certain degree, the population of the future is already baked in.

Age Population by 1–Year Age Groups and Sex (2023) Birth Year
100+ 1923 or earlier
95 1928
90 1933
85 1938
80 India 1943
75 1948
70 1953
65 1958
60 1963
55 1968
50 1973
45 1978
40 1983
35 1988
30 1993
25 1998
20 2003
15 2008
10 M A LE FE M A LE 2013
5 2018
0 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000 14,000 2023
Number of persons (in thousands)
100+ 1923 or earlier
95 1928
90 1933
85 1938
80 South Korea 1943
75 1948
70 1953
65 1958
60 1963
55 1968
50 1973
45 1978
40 1983
35 1988
30 1993
25 1998
20 2003
15 2008
10 2013
5 2018
0 2023
500 450 400 350 300 250 220 150 100 50 6 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Source: United Nations Data Portal Number of persons (in thousands)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 11

 Climate change
Together, climate change and population trends are shaping our future in unprecedented ways.
Climate change—and responses to it—will increasingly influence where people live, the work they
do, and how they plan for their futures. Over the long term, population trends also have implications
for climate change vulnerability. A recent analysis by the Population Institute found that in the coun-
tries ranked most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, population growth rates are more than
double the global average. Such growth results in greater numbers of people exposed to impacts,
greater strain on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and coastal resources, and can affect
community capacity to adapt. As climate change adaptation plans are further elaborated, greater at-
tention to population trends is warranted.

In the near-term climate change interacts directly with population trends primarily through migration
patterns. Migration is expected to increase in response to climate impacts. Already we have seen
significant increases in the numbers of people displaced due to extreme weather events. But while
climate change interacts with the drivers of migration, how climate and migration are linked is far
from simple. We cannot simply overlay climate on a map and see where people will move. Certain
dynamics allow people to adapt; others force decisions to move; and still others keep people trapped
in a bad situation. As a report published by ECSP observed: “Climate change is in fact driving people’s
decisions to move. But it does so in dynamic and complex ways interwoven with more traditional
drivers of migration: a search for economic or educational opportunities, the tug of social and familial
ties, or to escape conflict or avoid persecution.” Many assessments rely upon forecasts that do not
take these political, social, and economic complexities into account. And often lost in the nuances of
policy discussions of these issues is the fact that migration has long been an important and effective
adaptation strategy, bringing benefits to both sending and receiving communities.

Migrants, mainly from Venezuela, seek asylum before Title 42 ends at the Mexico-US border in Juarez, Mexico, May, 2023 (David Peinado Romero / Shutterstock)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 12

Policy recommendations
Policymakers beholden to short campaign and election cycles can find it difficult to justify investments that
yield outcomes only measured in generations. Yet glimpsing the world through a demographic lens shows
how investments today can have massive implications for the future.

For example, the Sahel region will fail to achieve long term stability unless the underlying drivers of its insta-
bility are addressed, including rapid population growth and lack of women’s empowerment. Seen through
this lens, foreign assistance to the region that supports education and health are investments in a more
peaceful and stable future. Likewise, failing to invest or reform can bake in decades of continued struggle.

Another case is retirement infrastructure. Whether it is retirement ages, entitlements budgets, or the care
economy, such structures are difficult to reform once they are in place—even when demographic pressures
make such reforms imperative. Investment in the care economy, for example, will pay dividends in the future
as populations age, easing strains on the budget and making the economy more resilient towards shocks.

A demographic lens points to several key lessons the policy community should consider in this “new world”:

• There is a need for comprehensive policy approaches that recognize the interconnectedness
of health, education, economic prosperity, and national security. US policy making structures
facilitate single-issue or siloed approaches, but they may not have the desired impact when factors
such as migration, health, and reproductive choices are so complex. For example, although high
fertility contexts likely need improved access to family planning, availability of contraception is not
the only factor in childbearing. When investments in health are paired with investments in educa-
tion, they can create a multiplying effect that can lead to changes in fertility preferences. Providing
access to both puts the decision-making power in the hands of communities and empowers women
to make choices. The challenge is to recognize and account for complexity.

• Policymakers should work across the scales of decision-making, including at the local level.
Local nuances make one-size-fits-all approaches less effective. Investments seen as aid or charity
will not lead to sustainable change. The existing institutions through which the United States has long
made its investments have not always empowered local partners operating in target communities.
USAID has recognized this by launching a “localization” strategy. Other US policymakers would be
wise to do so as well, building up and sustaining direct support to local NGOs, and engaging with
local actors, all of which allows countries to channel and direct funds independently. This approach
will go a long way in building goodwill while also ensuring that funds are used more effectively.

• Invest in health, education, and the care economy. Significant research suggests that increas-
ing access to health services, including voluntary family planning, and providing quality education
yields significant economic and security benefits. According to the Copenhagen Project, every $1
invested in universal access to contraceptives yields $120 of annual social, economic, and environ-
mental benefits.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 13

 • Build strategic partnerships with African countries. As the demographically youngest continent,
and one of the few regions with robust future population growth, African countries will play an in-
creasingly significant role in the global economy. African youth have the potential to power the world’s
workforce, and the continent itself is a potential economic hub for the globe.

• Recognize migration as an important adaptation strategy that can strengthen overall resil-
ience in both sending and receiving communities if facilitated through sound policy. With
populations in the United States, Europe, and much of Asia aging, and virtually all of the world’s
working age population in the next two decades coming out of African countries, migration will
continue its role as a critical economic force. And, as the impacts of climate change are increas-
ingly felt, it will persist and grow—especially in communities where the population is left with little
choice but to move.

Sources: Social Security.gov, ECSP Report Vo. 16, New Security Beat, OCHCR, UNCTAD, Statista, UN
Population, Journal of International Affairs, UN Department of Social and Economic Affairs, TED, MIT Press,
The Care Economic Knowledge Hub, World Economic Forum, Oxfam, Economic Policy Institute, International
Labor Organization, Population and Development Review, Atlantic Council, Global Political Demography, U.S.
Department of State, The Wilson Center, Girls Not Brides, CIA, World Bank, Center for Disease Control,
Census.gov, OECD, Council on Foreign Relations, New York Times, The Population Institute, USAID, OASIS
Sahel, Copenhagen Consensus Center

West front of the United States Capitol building in Washington, DC. (Tada Images / Shutterstock.com)

ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND SECURITY PROGRAM 14

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027

The Wilson Center

wilsoncenter.org
woodrowwilsoncenter
@thewilsoncenter
202.691.4000

Environmental Change and Security Program

Lauren Herzer Risi | Director
wilsoncenter.org/ecsp
[email protected]
@newsecuritybeat
@newsecuritybeat
202.691.4000

Young people gather in Tafawa Balewa square, Lagos, Nigeria. (Tolu Owoeye / Shutterstock)