MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES THE SUDAN CAMPAIGNS 1881-1898 a ROBERT WILKINSON-LATHAM MICHAEL ROFFEEDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES THE SUDAN CAMPAIGNS 1881-1898 Text by ROBERT WILKINSON-LATHAM Colour plates by . MICHAEL ROFFEFirst published in Great Britain in 1976 by Osprey Publishing, Elms Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford OXz gLP, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected] © 1976 Osprey Publishing Ltd. Reprinted 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984 (twice), 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996. 1999 All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should he addressed to the Publishers. ISBN 0 85045 2546 Filmset in Great Britain Printed in China through World Print Ltd. FOR A CATALOGUE OF ALL, BOOKS PUBLISHED BY Osprey MILITARY, AUTOMOTIVE AND AVIATION PLEASE WRITE TO: ‘The Marketing Manager, Osprey Direct USA, PO Box 190, Sterling Heights, MI 483 11-0130, USA. Email: [email protected] ‘The Marketing Manager, Osprey Direct UK, PO Box 140, Wellingborough, Northants, NN8 4ZA, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected] Vistr Osprey’s WEBSITE AT: hupy/www.osprey-publishing:co.ukThe Sudan Campaigns 881-1898 The British Army of the 18808 When the British army intervened in Egyptian affairs in 1881 to smash the revolt of the Turko- Egyptian army under Arabi Pasha, it was still in the throes of the greatest reorganisation in its history. The regimental system, the time-honoured practice of denoting a regiment's seniority by its number in the Line, had been swept away with the stroke of a pen. No longer would a regiment be known by its number (and perhaps its sup- plementary title, many of which were given in 1782) but solely by its new ‘Territorial Title’ Regimental individuality was also lost as the new system ~ commonly called the Cardwell reforms but really following the recommendations of the Stanley Committee—amalgamated two numbered line regiments to form the first and second battalions of each ‘Territorial’ regiment. In many cases this marriage was resented by both regiments, since a number of the mergers effected seemed to be without reason. As George Bernard Shaw wrote: ‘The British soldier can stand up to any- thing except the British War Office.’ The only regiments not affected were those numbered 1 to 25 inclusive, which already had two battalions; and also the 79th Highlanders. The main idea behind the reforms was that in each regiment one battalion would serve overseas on a tour of duty while the other remained for home defence, trained recruits and provided drafis for the battalion abroad. In addition, each regiment was also now allocated a fixed depot and a recruiting area. In fact, the use of county titles for a number of regiments was propitious since it gave the soldiers a permanent home and the civilians a sense of pride in their county regiment. Besides the formation of these new regiments with titles in place of numbers, the cherished facing colours on the collars and cuffs of tunics were standardised. No more the grass green facings of the 24th, or the gosling green of the 5th Fusiliers; gone for ever the purple of the 56th and the yellow of the 57th. In their place, it was dictated that all Royal Regiments would wear blue facings, all English and Welsh regiments would wear white, Scottish regiments yellow, and Irish regiments green. Now the only distinction between, say, English non-Royal regiments lay in the regimental name embroidered on the shoulder strap, since even regimental-pattern buttons had been done away with in the early 1870s. ‘The British army was like most other European armies of the late nineteenth century except that it was a volunteer and not a conscripted force. As Alfred de Vigny wrote, ‘An army is a nation within a nation . . .” and of the British army this, ‘The interior of Fort Mex, Alexandria after the British naval bombardment, July 1882. British soldiers are inspecting the damage done to the defences and artillery, while warships ‘can be seen standing-off in the distance. (Isabel and Aline Scott-Elliot)was undoubtedly true. Wolseley said in his Soldier's Pocket Book that ‘The soldier is a peculiar being that can alone be brought to the highest efficiency by inducing him to believe that he belongs to a regiment that is infinitely superior to the others round him.’ While the armed forces, stood apart from normal society, being con- sidered as de Vigny wrote‘... one of the vices of our age’, they were as Kipling was quick to point out ‘... no thin red ’eroes, nor we aren't no blackguards too. But single men in barricks, most remarkable like you...’ The life was hard and disciplined and the pay abysmally low, but the regiment gave to its members a home and ~ in peace time at least — food and lodging, in return, for which the ‘Soldiers of the Queen’ were ex- pected to maintain the ‘Pax Britannica’. The basic pay of the private was a shilling a day, ‘the Queen’s shilling’, out of which stoppages had formerly been made for uniform and food. Officers of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, Egypt 1882, Note the various patterns of ‘frock’ tunics, some with breast pockets and some without, also the different ways of ‘wearing the ‘Sam Browne’ belt and equipment. (Isabel and ‘Aline Scott-Elliot) However, a series of reforms led to the introduc- tion of free food by 1870; this resulted in the soldier receiving every penny of his shilling, al- though beer money was discontinued. In 1876, each man was given 2d. a day more, but this was termed deferred pay and was only payable on discharge as a lump sum to help the soldier settle into civilian life. ‘Good Conduct badges’, as they were called, carried an extra 1d, aday after three years’ exemplary service, but this period was later reduced to two years. Service, as in other volunteer armies, had originally been for twenty-one years, but in 1870 a system of twelve years’ service was introduced by Secretary of State for War, Edward Cardwell. Even in 1882 there were still a certain number of ‘old soldiers’ left in the army; William Robertson, who later rose from the ranks to become a Field-Marshal, wrote in 1877 that ‘The system introduced by Mr. Cardwell under which men enlisted for twelveyears’ regular service, had not yet had time to get into full swing. Regiments were, therefore, still composed mainly of old soldiers who, although very admirable comrades in some respects and with a commendable code of honour of their own, were in many cases addicted to rough behaviour, heavy drinking, and hard swearing. They could not be blamed for this. Year in and year out they went through the same routine, were treated like machines — of an inferior kind — and having little prospect of finding decent employment on the expiration of their twenty-one years’ engagement, they lived only for the present, the single bright spot in their existence being the receipt of a few shillings — perhaps not more than one ~ on the weekly pay-day.’ Barrack life was harsh and often insanitary Men lived, slept and ate in their barrack room, the Government allowing 1 Ib. of bread and 12 02, of meat per day per head. Groceries, vegetables and other extras were provided by the men them- selves. Bennet Burleigh, war correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, described what rations were issued to the soldier on campaign in the Sudan in 1898: ‘He usually has a “grand appetite” when campaigning. On active service the Government ration allowed him comprises (inclusively) — bread 1} Ib., meat 14 Ib., tea 4 ounce, sugar 2} ounces, salt } ounce, rice $ ounce, pepper 1/36th ounce, fresh vegetables $ Ib., or in lieu of latter, That was what he got at 3 ounces onions, daily Dekesh. For fresh vegetables he received onions 3 ounces of. In addition he could purchase, by payment out of his own pocket, one-third more of each article. As a matter of fact, he constantly bought food, a grateful country not even giving its troopsin the field sufficiently varied diet, Nowa- days the commonest folk at home look for some- thing more than plain bread and tough meat. The meat ration issued was poor, and ran largely to Officers and men of the Egyptian army parading in marching order with packs, Cairo 182, The summer white uniform is shown, In winter a blue uniform was worn. (Isabel and Aline Scott-Elliot)‘Friendlies’. Sudanese tribesmen friendly to F; Egyptian army officers mounted on camels, 1682. Aline Seo Eliot) st, with isabel and bone ~ 4 1b. of meat to 1b. of bone. In the regimental canteens, cheese, tinned milk, jams, sardines, bacon, tinned fruits, tea, coffee, date pudding, soup, etc. were sold in large quantities to the men. Were a smart contractor to take up the job, the War Office and the country might, on those lines, succeed in making campaigns pay for themselves. I commend the suggestion to them. At any rate, they would recover every farthing of the soldier’s pay, and a trifle over.’ Wellington had described the army private as ‘the scum of the carth’ ini the early 1800s, and by 1880 the service had not attracted many recruits of a better calibre. True, there was selection on joining, but most of the men enlisted only because they lacked. a trade or were starving. No wonder the large industrial slums of Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and London yielded the majority of the rank and file, ‘The reforms of the 1870s had done much to better the lot of the soldier, but there was still a long way to go. Officers such as Sir Garnet Wolseley realised the amateur aspect of the British army compared with the professional spirit shown by the Prussians. Up until 1871 officers had purchased commissions and promo- tion; Cardwell put a stop to this practice, but even so officers were still not educated in their profession. During the 1882 campaign Sir Garnet complained that ‘I have seen splendid battalions 6 kept in the rear while others of inferior quality were sent to the front because the general com- manding did not dare employ against the enemy a corps whose commanding officer was manifestly incompetent . . . I hold that itis criminal to hand over in action the lives of gallant soldiers to men who are deplorably ignorant of the elements of their profession . . ” As for the rank and file, the Rev. G. J. Hardy in his book The British Soldier (1915) described the types of recruits that were daily accepted. ‘When trade is bad we get good recruits and when good, bad ones. The army is still recruited mainly from, the class of manual labour . . . Only 49 recruits in, a thousand can be described as well educated.” If the officers were unprofessional and the rank and file recruited from the illiterate and starving, the backbone of the army was, as throughout history, ‘the Non-commissioned man’. Junior officers and soldiers alike depended on the harsh judgment, skill and devotion to duty of the non- ‘commissioned officers, the army professionals who — often of intimidating countenance — were a breed unto themselves. Everything in their li was done ‘by the book’, yet they were the mainstay of cach and every regiment. A regiment with good NCOs was an efficient piece of military ma- chinery. The soldier was not encouraged to think; this was done by the non-commissioned officer who was the vital link between the rankand file and the officers. During the 1880s and 1890s the private soldier, the shilling-a-day man, was solely required to act as a mindless brick in a human wall, and the system of drill ensured that the ‘wall’ would stand against anything. Discipline had been maintained by the lash, loss of pay and confinement. In 1868 flogging was declining in the army, and in 1881 an Act of Parliament abolished At the end of a campaign, the soldier probably received a medal with ‘bars’ to denote his par- ticipation in various battles and actions, but once a war was over it was back to ‘peace-time soldier- ing’ and boring garrison life In Egypt and the Sudan in the 1880s the British soldier was dressed as he always had been, in red or scarlet, the only concession to heat being the white-covered cork helmet. Sweltering in his, ‘grey-back’ shirt and searlet frock, encumbered with straps of white buff leather equipment, and carrying a rifle (the Martini-Henry) that kicked like a mule, British troops began an association with Egypt and the Sudan that was to endure until the Anglo-French expedition of 1956 was aborted by pressure from the United States ‘The charge of the Royal Horse Guards at Kassassin, Septem= ber 1882, by Seceombe, This painting carried by cavalry during the campai The eAngh-Evyptian-Army ‘The Anglo-Egyptian army that fought Mahdism in the Sudan, at first on its own but later with the aid of British troops, was formed after the Arabi revolt of 1881-2, The previous army was a ‘Turco-Egyptian force in which the British had no say. The new Egyptian conscripted army was at first limited to 6000 men with twenty-five British officers, but was later increased to over 18,000 men and 140 white officers. It consisted of cighteen battalions of infantry; six of these, numbered 9 to 14, were made up of Sudanese blacks, whose terms of service differed from those of the Egyptians. Each infantry battalion was divided into six companies of 100-120 men, giving a total battalion strength — with band and stretcher-bearers ~ of between 650 and 750 men. Of the Egyptian or fellah battalions, 1 to 4 and 5 to 18 were officered by the British, while battalions 5 to 8 were led by so-called ‘native officers’. British officers usually numbered three for a fellak battalion and four for a Sudanese battalion. The native officers were usually Turkish,Circassian or Albanian, but there were also a few Egyptians. In the Sudanese battalions there were usually a few native captains or subalterns, but as G. W. Stevens tells us, . . . lack of education, keeps them from higher grades No British officer held a lower rank than that of Major or Bimbashi, and matters were so arranged that there was never a native officer senior to a British one in the same battalion. Command of a battalion usually fell to a Lieutenant-Colonel or Kaimakam, but he was usually addressed by the courtesy title of Bey. Battalion commanders were usually captains or majors in the British army, and Bimbashis were subalterns. Each battalion also had a ‘Sergeant Whatsis- name’, as Kipling affectionately called him — a British non-commissioned officer whose task was to drill and make soldiers out of the raw material at his disposal. The NCOs, either colour sergeants or sergeants, were volunteers like the officers. ‘The uniform of the infantry battalions and other arms of the service was a brown jersey, sand- coloured trousers and dark blue puttees. Head wear was the tarbush with a cover, the Egyptian battalions having a neck flap in addition, They were armed with the Martini-Henry rifle and long socket bayonet. All the cavalry were Egyptian conscripts and most of their squadron leaders were British officers. As G. W. Steevens wrote in With Kitchener to Khartoum, the reason for ‘all-Egyptian’ cavalry was that‘... a black can never be made to understand that a horse needs to be groomed and fed.’ The cavalry consisted of ten squadrons, cach numbering about 100 men. ‘The Egyptian artiHery had two batteries of field artillery armed with Maxim-Nordenfeldt quick-firing 9-pounders or 18-pounders with a double shell, *. . . handy little creatures which a couple of mules draw easily.’ The horse battery was armed with 12-pounder Krupp guns, and the other two field batteries with g-pounders. Again, all the gunners were Egyptian conscripts and the battery commanders British. Finally, there was the 800-strong camel corps, divided into eight companies composed of half Sudanese and half Egyptian troops with five white officers. There were also the usual non combatant services. 8 The conscripted Egyptian soldier or fellah, representing one in every 500 of the population, was required to serve for six years with the colours and a further nine with the reserve or police. His pay was a piastre a day (equivalent to 24d. in 1898) which Steevens gleefully wrote was ©. . a magnificent salary, equal to what he would usually be making in full work in his native village.’ The black Sudanese soldier was liable to be enlisted where found, and served for life. He was paid a basic 14 shillings a month to begin with and a family allowance of 33d. per day for those who had permission to marry. Unaccustomed to garrison and town life, the Sudanese battalions were usually quartered on the frontier. Many of the Sudanese recruits were former enemies, the better prisoners and deserters being enlisted into one of the black battalions. Valentine Baker Pasha, an ex-officer of the 10th Hussars who had been court-martialled and dis- missed from the service over his alleged conduct with a woman in a railway carriage, was offered the post of Commander-in-Chief of the new Anglo- Egyptian army, but at the last moment (some say through the intervention of Queen Victoria) the offer was withdrawn. Baker was then given the command of a ramshackle police force, the Egyptian ‘Gendarmerie’. The Dervish Army ‘The original Dervish army that did very much as it pleased in the Sudan during 1881-4 under the command of the Mahdi, the spiritual and tempor- al leader long awaited by Mohammedans, was very different from the army formed by his successor, the Khalifa, which was finally destroyed at Omdurman in 1898. Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Al-Sayid Abdullah was the son ofa boat-building carpenter, and was born in 1844. His father claimed that he was descended from the Prophet, and in 1861 Mohammed Ahmed became a Summaniya Derv- ish, a member of a strict Moslem sect. The word Dercish means a Moslem friar vowed to povertyOfficers and men of the Queen’s Own 's in the traditional infantry square . Note the red yrees around the men’s sun Iso worn by the officers the addition of a regimental pattern badge on the front, (Isabel and Aline Scott-Elliot) and austerity, and the self-proclaimed Mahdi demanded these virtues in the followers — or whom he “‘ansars’, as he preferred to term them rallied to his cause. ‘Their original ‘uniform’, ifit ean be called that, was the jibbah, a plain cotton garment; later, as E. N. Bennet, war correspondent of the West- minster Gazette pointed outin his book, The Downfall of the Dervishes* . .. the Mahdi, who was somewhat ascetic — in theory, at any rate, if not in practice ~ ordered his followers to sew black patches upon their nice white coats, as tokens of humility. But alas for human frailty, what was intended to curb the spiritual pride of the faithful became a direct incentive to the vainglorious adornment of their persons! The ladies of Omdurman were strongly opposed to the dowdiness of the black patches upon their husbands and lovers, and, under the influence of the more aesthetic circles of Dervish society, the white gibbehs were gradually tricked out with gaudy squares of blue, red and purple.’ The initial religious frenzy which enabled the Mahdi to defy the Egyptian army, and to massacre and defeat it, abated when he died in June 1885, some months after the death of General Gordon ~ ‘Gordon of Khartoum’, who was killed defending that city. The successor to the Mahdi was the Khalifa, Abdullah the Taiaishi, a chief of the Baggara wibe who had been considered the Mahdi’s right hand as early as 1883. The Khalifa reformed the followers into an organised army upon European lines. War correspondent Bennet Burleigh described this reformation: ‘He to a great extent replaced the mad fury of the early dervishes by the introduction of military organisation among the wild tribes, endeavouring, though in a crude way, to adopt the system of training and tactics employed in the Egyptian army. Of late he has succeeded in so far modifying the original tribal system of conducting warfare, that his infantry, cavalry, and artillery are ordered and commanded much in the Euro- pean fashion. The emirs and lesser leaders now: adays wear distinctive insignia showing their rank; and, more wonderful still, the restless Baggara cavalry have been dragooned, and made to drill and work by squadrons. It is, however, in the handling of military supplies and keeping the accounts of stores that the Mahdists have ap- parently not only sensibly copied, but bettered, the instruction of the Khedival commissariat department. Some of the dervish accounts, prob- ably kept by Coptic clerks, which fell into my hands at Hafir, Dongola, and elsewhere, showed, that, down to the uttermost pound of beans or packet of small-arms ammunition, nothing was sued without a written warrant, and that receipts for everything were taken and the stores 9on hand could be ascertained at a glance.” The Dervish army was divided into four separate parts, cach to perform a specific duty. Firstly there were the mounted horsemen who were all Baggara tribe Arabs; then camelmen, composed of Danagla and Jaalin tribesmen. The rest of the army consisted of foot soldiers: the Jehadia, who were Sudanese blacks (with a few ‘Arabs) armed with rifles, and the swordsmen and spearmen who were commanded by Emirs and organised into Rubs equivalent to battalions. Discipline was hard in the Dervish army; smoking, drinking, wearing fine clothes and jewellery, festivities, dancing and bad language were all met with severe punishments which in- cluded flogging up to 1000 lashes. Rations were issued on a strict basis and given out in ardebs equivalent to 5°6 bushels. Arabs received { per month, Jehadia J, and Baggara 4 Each portion of the army was subdivided into sections with section leaders; they were required to parade at regular intervals, but there was no battle training. The inborn skill and resources of the Dervish made him a first-class fighting soldier, one of the best with which ‘Tommy Atkins’ had brushed. As Rudyard Kipling, the unofficial spokesman for the British soldier, wrote in his famous poem ‘Fuzzy Wuzzy’: ‘We've fought with many men across the seas, ‘An’ some of ’em was brave an’ some was not; ‘The Paythan an’ the Zulu an’ Burmese; But the Fuzzy was the finest o° the lot.” Charles Neufeld, a German trader who had ventured into the Sudan in 1885 in search of gum-arabic and beet captured by the Khalifa, wrote in the account of his twelve years of captivity, A Prisoner of the Khaleefa, about the efficiency and unbeatable fighting qualities of the Dervish. ‘At close quarters the dervish horde was, more than a match for the best drilled army in Europe. Swift and silent in their movement, covering the ground at four or five times the speed. of trained troops, every man, when the moment of attack came accustomed to fight independently of orders, lithe, supple, nimble as cats and as bloodthirsty as starving man-eating tigers, utterly regardless of their own lives, and capable of con- tinuing stabbing and jabbing with spear and 10 sword while carrying half a dozen wounds, any of which would have put a European hors de combat — such were the 75,000 to 80,000 warriors which the Khalifa had already... Artillery, riflesand bayon- ets would have been of little avail against a horde like this rushing a camp by night.” Egyptand the Sudan Surely enough “When Allah made the Sudan”, say the Arabs, “he laughed”. You can almost hear the fiendish echo of it crackling over the fiery sands, wrote G.sW. Stevens, famous war cor- respondent of the Daily Mail. The events which occurred in the Sudan were very closely allied to Egyptian affairs, and to see how Britain became involved in Egypt one must look briefly back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. For hundreds of years Egypt had been under thedomination offoreign rulers; Arabs, Mamlukes and finally the Turks who engulfed it in the vast Ottoman Empire. By the beginning of the nine- teenth century this once vast empire had started to decay rapidly and various powers, especially Russia, were watching it with more than passing interest. Britain first became interested in Egypt in 1798 when the French, under Napoleon, invaded the country. Ever conscious of protecting India, the British government was frightened that the young Frenchman might make a bid to attack their Eastern empire by the overland route. In British eyes, the overland route to India depended almost entirely on Egypt and the eastern Mediterranean, previously considered to be of little strategic im- portance. The route to India had always been via the Cape of Good Hope, but Britain now decided to adopt preventive measures to guard the alternative entry. Malta and Gibraltar were re- garded as being of great strategic significance and became first-line naval bases. The Turkish rule of Egypt also suffered under this new-found im- portance. During the early years of the nineteenth century Viceroys of the Sultan of Turkey were appointed, the first being Mohammed Ali, acolourful rogue dubbed ‘The father of modern Egypt’. He had in his former years been a harsh ruler, but his skill and wit had enabled him to gain a certain amount of autonomy from the Sultan of Turkey in Egyptian affairs, even though he was unable to read or write until he was forty, The importance of Egypt was apparent to Britain when shortly after the accession of the Viceroy Mohammed Ali a certain British officer, Lieutenant Waghorn, organised an ‘overland’ route connecting the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. This venture flourished and soon a regular route was establishing. Ships came from Britain to Alexandria where they discharged their pas- sengers and cargo; these were then transported by Waghorn’s efficient river boats and baggage animals to Suez, where passengers and goods alike were put aboard Bombay-bound vessels. This ‘short cut’ took at least four weeks from the journey to India. To Britain, Egypt had assumed a vital importance. Meantime, Mohammed Ali had not been con- tent with ruling in Egypt. In 1821 he cast an eye southwards to the substantial lands lying below Egypt — the Sudan. Having conquered the northern part of this hostile and barren country by force, he found an untapped source of first- class fighting men, slaves and ivory. For the Egyptian economy this new-found wealth proved of immeasurable value. During the fifteen years between 1860 and 1875, more than 400,000 Sudanese were captured and sold by the Arab slave traders. As supplies of potential slaves in one part of the country dried up, so the Arabs moved to another area, and as a result some of the many Sudanese trihes ceased to exist. Besides the slavers, Egyptian troops had ‘colon- ised’ the area, or at least set up garrisons to help enforce Egyptian rule. Taxes were collected by harsh and brutal means, and corruption on the part of the Egyptian officials was rife. The thinoceros-hide whips wielded by the tax-collect- ors not only extracted the last few piastres, they also started something of more serious con- sequence. It was the British who were later to reap the harvest of years of Egyptian misrule, By the time of the Crimean War in 1854, Said Pasha had inherited the Viceregal throne and ‘The battle of Tel-el-Kebir, September 1882. First in the Fray’ by F. Dadd. Men of the Cameron Highlander: ing the earthworks constructed by Arabi Pasha and bayoneting the gunners. (National Army Museum/IIlustrated London News) opened the country to European tradgrs and experts, Amongst these was the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps who, inspired by Waghorn’s idea, elaborated it to consider the possibility that acanal could be cut connecting the Mediterranean and Red Sea, shortening still further the route to the East. Said Pasha, always open to the per- suasive tongue of the Frenchman, who was neither engineer nor builder, agreed to allot him large areas of land, free labour and mineral rights plus permission to realise his lifetime’s dream, Britain, for obvious reasons, opposed the canal project in order to protect her interests in India, and the Foreign Office went so far as to warn the Government that ‘At present India is unattack- able. It will no longer be so when Bombay is only 4,600 miles from Marseilles.’ Because of the Crimean War, in which Britain and France were allied, little pressure could be brought to bear against the project, however, and the idea went ahead. At the crucial point, as digging com- menced, Said Pasha died; financial crises arose and under the forcibly re-negotiated terms of the new Viceroy, Ismail Pasha, work ceased. IAfter the battle of Tel-cl-Kebir. The arrival of Lord Wolseley and his staff at the bridge of Tel-el-Kebir while prisoners are collected and soldiers slake their thirst. Painting by Elizabeth Butler. (Parker Gallery) The company formed by de Lesseps claimed compensation and the arbitrator, no less a person than Napoleon III, awarded £3 million damages. To meet this bill Ismail Pasha agreed to forfeit his profits from Egypt’s shares in the canal to that amount, in return for immunity from further claims. Egypt’s national debt had increased from £3% million in 1841 to a staggering £94 million by 1876, mainly to Britain, France, Russia and. other European countries. On 17 November 1869, at a £2-million ceremony, the Suez Canal was opened, but during the next few years Egypt’s economy de- clined rapidly. The assumption of the title of Khedive by Ismail Pasha alone cost the country £1 million which was paid to the Sultan of urkey. By 1875 the foreign bankers who had financed Egypt began to worry and in that same year Britain unwittingly cemented herself to Egypt and the Sudan The major user of the Canal had been Britain, who, having been unable to prevent its construc tion, endeavoured to bring it under her control. In an unprecedented move Prime Minister Disraeli borrowed £4 million from the Rothschild banking family to purchase the shares of the Khedive, which represented 44 per cent of the capital. On 25 November 18 12 , Disraeli wrote to Lady Bradford informing her of his action, State secret’ he wrote, ‘certainly the most im- portant of the year.’ Secrecy had been uttermost in the Prime Minister’s plans because as he wrote, ‘The day before yesterday, Lesseps, whose Company has the remaining shares, backed by the French Government, whose agent he was, made a great offer. Had it succeeded, the whole of the Suez Canal would have belonged to France, and they might have shut it up! We have given the Khedive 4 millions sterling for his interest, and run the chance of Parliament supporting us. We could not call them together for the matter, for that would have blown everything to the skies, or to Hades.’ The news was received with over- whelming applause by Britain and other countries. Queen Victoria wrote that ‘what she liked most was, it was a blow at Bismarck’, while the King of the Belgians hailed it as ‘the greatest event of modern politics, Europe breathes again . . .” Through this move Britain had increased her interest in Egyptian affairs. In April the following year her involvement deepened when the bank- rupt Egyptian government suspended payments of interest and debts. Britain and France, as the two imperial powers to whom owed most, imposed, on Ismail a Commission of the Debt, a type of ‘receivership’ which in effect gave them control of aEgyptian affairs, In 1879, after an abortive revolt stirred up by Ismail, the British and French de- manded that the Sultan of Turkey should depose him, In his place Tewfik, Ismail’s son, was appointed Khedive The Rise of Mahdism and the Arab Revolt While Britain and France exercised ‘Dual Control” of Egypt in the affairs of government, they cer- tainly did not contemplate expensive militar intervention. Egypt’s main problem had alway been the Sudan and the Khedive’s government had appointed various outsiders to try to manage it. The title of Governor-General of the Sudan was held by a succession of foreigners, one of whom was General Charles Gordon. By 1880 Egypt had nearly 40,000 troops in garrisons throughout the Sudan, imposing her corrupt rule through the Governor-General in Khartoum. Poverty, oppression and disaffection were rife in the province, which was constantly ravished by slave and ivory traders and plundered by the soldiers and corrupt tax collectors. Gordon, who had restored some form of just rule during his term of office, plainly saw the trouble that was brewing for Egypt. In 1880 he wrote, ‘If the liberation of slaves is to take place in 1884 (in Egypt proper) and the present system of govern- ment goes on there cannot fail to be a revolt of the whole country. But our government will go on sleeping till it comes and then have to act a Pimproviste’ In 1881 the obscure son of a carpenter pro- claimed himself the ‘Mahdi’ or ‘Guided One of the Prophet’, the long-expected Messiah of the Islamic faith, Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Al-Sayid Abdullah could not have chosen a better time. s in financial chaos, and the grip of the yptian army on the Sudan was weakened cign intervention and general apathy. The Governor-General of the Sudan was then Rauof Pasha, an incompetent and corrupt official whom, Gordon had twice dismissed from subordinate positions. The deputation sent by Rauof Pasha to the Mahdi had little effect, and the Governor- General decided to send a punitive expedition to capture the rebel leader. An ill-armed force sailed up the Nile in the steamer Ismailia, reaching it goal at Aba after dark. Instead of waiting until dawn the troops disembarked in chaos in the dark, and stumbling amongst the mud and reeds of the shoreline, fell easy prey to the Mahdi’s ansars. A few Egyptians escaped to the steamer, which hastily fled. Three months later, in December 1881, a force of 1400 Egyptian troops under Rashid Bey, Governor of Fashoda, was ambushed and hacked to pieces by the Mahdi’s In Egypt it forces. The British entry into Cairo, September 1882, Cameron Highlanders ‘passing in review before Lord Wolseley. (Isabel and Aline Scott-Elliot) appeared that the Mahdi in the Sudan was getting out of hand and that the Army seemed incapable of putting down the rebellion. The Mahadi’s forces were swelling daily. Recruits who were eager, after the defeats of the Egyptians, to cast off corrupt and oppressive rule joined in their thousands ready to carry on the Holy War he had proclaimed Egypt had, however, her own internal problems brought about by the ‘Dual Control’ of Britain and France. As in other spheres of Egyptian rule, the key and senior posts were held by foreigners and not Egyptians, The army was run by Turkish- Circassian officers, and Egyptian officers had little say. Ahmed Bey Arabi, son of an Egyptian village chief, felt the time had come to air the grievances of many officers like himself, Army pay had been cut back, foreign domination was on the increase and the corrupt rule of the Turks in 13‘The Military Police in Cairo dressed in scarlet tunics and white helmets with their distinctive arm-bands. The Police wWerearmed with short carbines and the 1879 patternartillery sword-bayonet, They are seen checking papers, keeping order and deterring beggars. (Parker Gallery) power was devastating an already ruined country. Arrested by the Government, Arabi was brought before a Council of Ministers for censure, but troops and officers loyal to his cause burst in, turned out the Council (having emptied inkpots over them) and forced Tewfik to accept Arabi as a minister in the new government. Feeling in Britain and France was acute. The prospect of revolution and the probability of the national debt being refuted stirred Britain into action. There was no joint plan by the two powers, since intense rivalry prevented any agreement or understanding being reached over Egypt. By May 1882 the Admiralty had ordered the Mediterranean Squadron to Alexandria and the French had also despatched some warships. Turkey, however, remained inactive despite de- 14 mands from both Britain and France to intervene Arabi refused to be intimidated and started to reinforce his seaward defences, to man the forts with heavy artillery and to dig emplacements. A British ultimatum to dismantle the forts was ignored, and the Royal Navy was left to intervene alone when the French fleet sailed away because ofa change in government. A bombardment com- menced at 7 a.m. on 11 July 1882, and shelling between ship and shore lasted the entire day, until both parties fell silent through lack of ammunition, After two days of inactivity, watch- ing the Egyptians firing Alexandria, looting the town and killing Christians, a party of ‘Blue- jackets’ and Marines was ordered ashore. Their swift progress through Alexandria and the restora- tion of law and order were vividly described by war correspondents of the leading newspapers. Looters were summarily dealt with, either being shot on sight, or, if caught, tried by a military court and hanged as a warning to othersThe rebellion was far from over, however. With 60,000 men, Arabi was still in control of Cairo and a large part of Egypt. ‘Our only General’, Sir Garnet Wolsely, was despatched to Egypt to deal with the rebellious Egyptian army. In typical Wolseley fashion, he made it known to the press and other officers that he was going to attack Aboukir, but this was purely a diversionary move. Wolseley had himself written in his famous Soldiers Pocket Book (1869) concerning the news- hungry war correspondents that ‘... this very ardour for information a General can turn to account by spreading fake news among the gentlemen of the press and thus use them as a medium by which to deceive the enemy.’ In this case, Wolseley did just that. Even de Lesseps, worried about damage to his Canal, telegraphed Arabi that the British were landing at Aboukir. This was the last message sent, as Wolseley’s troops landed at Suez and closed the telegraph office. Surprised by the unexpected direction of the attack, Arabi reinforced his lines at Tel-cl- Kebir, On 28 August the Egyptian army attacked a force of about 2000 men under General Graham at Mahsama, and despite the fears of Lieutenant- General Willis (who telegraphed to Wolseley Fear Graham has been defeated’) the Egyptian force, which outnumbered the British five to one, was driven off; much of the credit for the victory went to Drury Lowe’s cavalry and their famous so-called ‘moonlight charge’. On 10 September Wolseley’s force was marching to- wards Arabi’s well-positioned lines at Tel-elz Kabir, and the General was worried. In confidence, he wrote to his wife about his anxieties and his weak position. *. .. I have determined to move out from here on Tuesday night to attack the enemy’s fortified position on Wednesday morning a little before daybreak. I am so weak that I cannot afford to indulge in any other plan, and it requires the steadiest and the best troops to attain my object ~ and then I may fail — oh God grant I may not! — I know that I am doing a dangerous thing, but I cannot wait for reinforce- ments; to do so would kill the spirit of my troops, which at present is all I could wish it to be. I hope I may never return home a defeated man: T would sooner leave my old bones here than go home to be jeered at... . Everything depends upon the steadiness of my infantry. If they are steady in the dark — a very crucial trial — I must succeed, Otherwise I might fail altogether, or achieve little,” The Egyptians had done a good job of manning their lines. In addition to the 25,000 troops there were about seventy field guns including some of the latest Krupp breechloaders. The area in front of the fortifications was desert — poor fighting ground for troops attacking against earthworks, For four days Wolseley’s stalf reconnoitred, map- ped and discussed the position, and at last discovered the ‘Achilles heel’ of the Egyptians: they did not man their outposts at night. Wolseley was decided: it would have to be a night attack, or failing that a night march followed by a swift dawn attack. He chose the latter course. Night marches were always risky; in the desert sound carried for miles, troops lost their way in the dark, directions were hard to follow and the sense of direction erratic. Besides these factors, the most important was that soldiers tended to become un- steady when they lost contact with their officers or comrades in the dark, and this could provoke panic or chaos and jeopardise the attack. Progress over the desert would be slow, at about one mile per hour, therefore Wolseley timed his troops’ departure for 1.30 a.m. calculating to reach the enemy’s line just before dawn. Directing poles had been placed in the sand by the Royal Engineers to show the line of march, but these proved of little use. At various points during the advance incidents occurred which might have jeopardised the entire operation. Riders coming with instructions from the staff were mistaken for Arabs, although no shots were fired; and the line was disrupted when a Highland regiment rested. for twenty minutes. Since this regiment was in the centre of the line, and orders were passed by word of mouth, the flanks continued to advance until they also halted, the entire line now forming a crescent with the opposing flanks confronting cach other. In the dark, each could have easily mistaken the other for the enemy and opened fire, but fortunately calm prevailed. Frank Power, The Times war correspondent, summed up the attack in his despatch. ‘There was no moon, and thus almost within cannon shot, the 15two armies were resting peacefully, the one side dreaming probably little of the terrible scene of the awakening, when their rest at length rudely disturbed, they awoke to see swiftly advancing upon every side an endless line of dreaded red- coats, broken by the even more fearful blue of the The Egyptians were totally defeated at 9 casualties among the British force, 243 of which were from the front-line troops of the Highland Brigade. After a forced march the following day the troops entered Cairo and captured Arabi, who surrendered his sword to General Drury Lowe. Arabi was tried in December 1882 and banished to Ceylon, but was pardoned in 101 The Sudan 881-1883 While the Egyptian army had been preoccupied with fighting the British expeditionary force, the Mahdi in the Sudan did very much as he pleased. Britain had been unwillingly drawn into Egypt, Which she now garrisoned, but Gladstone’s firm, 16 ‘The Tokar Expedition, Disembarkation of Parker Pasha’s troops with stores at Trinkieat for the relief of Tokar. The cxpalition wae short-lived and ended fn the disastrous frst blue of El Teb (4 February 1884), Drawing by Melton Prior, war artst for he Hinstrated London News. (National Army Museum Iltestrated London News) opposition to imperialism for whatever reasons drew the line at intervention in the Sudan. The undisputed fact was, however, that Egypt's security rested on keeping the Sudan subdued, and Britain had assumed the responsibility of Egypt. The newly-formed Anglo-Egyptian army under British officers, financed by the Khedive and not the British tax payer, would have to solve the problem. Soldiers under British officers should be able to deal with the ill-armed savages of the Sudan, who, it was thought, possessed mainly spears and a few small-arms. ‘The Mahdi’s troops had already defeated an Egyptian force under Yussif Pasha, who succeeded, Raouf Pasha in March 1882. The Mahdi had also decided to establish his base at El Obeid and by September his troops were ready for the assault. ‘The attack launched on 8 September failed, and the Mahdi was hastily forced to find an excuse for his followers, to whom he had previously declared> a Se ‘The battle of Tamai, by G. D. Giles. During this batde the Dervishes ‘broke’ the British square. Note the fierce hand-to- hand fighting on the left, the medical orderlies attending to wounded in the centre and the reserve ammunition mules to the right. (National Army Museum) bullets could not kill them. Lacking adequate firepower, he settled down to starve out the city, which fell on 19 January 1883, yielding up large supplies of arms and munitions. An Egyptian relief force of 3,000 which set out in September was systematically slaughtered. In February, Cairo learned of the disaster of El Obeid and the ensuing slaughter, and decided that some firmer action must be taken, A retired Indian army officer re-employed as Chief of Staff in the new Egyptian army was chosen to lead an expedition. William Hicks, or ‘Hicks Pasha’ as he was called, had not had a particularly disting- ished career. He had spent most of his career in India, having fought in the Mutiny and taken part in the Abyssinian campaign of 1867. Aided bya few other British officers but hampered by the interference of an eighty-year-old Pasha to whom to instil that the enem he was subordinate, he endeavou some fighting spirit into his gooo men. Tt was a hopeless task. Most of them were recruited from, the army defeated by Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, and their morale was as non-existent as their fighting qualities. ‘This noticeable inferiority of his troops was not echoed by some of his fellow officers. ‘We were all in high spirits,’ wrote Golonel the Hon. J. Colborne, ‘and eagerly look- ing forward to the campaign.’ British aid was out of the question as the force set off towards Khartoum. ‘Whether Hicks falls or conquers,” stated the Pall Mall Gazette, ‘is not our business, not a single British soldier will be ordered to Khartoum if the Mahdi were to rout the whole force under the orders of the Khedive’s officers.” Later Colborne noted ominously in his book, With Hicks Pasha in the Sudan (1884), regarding the quality of the troops: ‘During their passage from Cairo, men and officers had completely forgotten their drill. When the guns were attempted to be brought into action, dire confusion reigned. Men ran against each other; the ground was strewn, with cartridges; hoppers were placed anywhere but where they should have been. No one ap- peared to have the slightest knowledge of how to feed, aim, and discharge the pieces. In the midst of all this, poor Walker ~ not knowing anything of 17Sudan 1884: British troops in tropical dress in camp. Note the shapes of the tents, and the sentries guarding stores on the left, See also the Highland pattern of cutaway tunic, although the man on the left wears the standard infancry pattern. (Isabel and Aline Scott-Elliot) the language beyond the words of command — stood aghast. General Hicks thundered out that he had never seen such a disgraceful scene in his life, and ordered Forestier-Walker to remain for three days perpetually drilling his men in that sandy scorching camp, instead of returning with us {o the comparatively “blest abode” of Khartoum.’ ‘The column moved out from Khartoum and on 26 June scored a minor victory by defeating an attack of Baggara cavalry. Three days later a more determined attack was beaten off. Colborne described with enthusiasm the start of the battle, ‘Onward they came, waving their banners... but, the Khedive’s troops, encouraged by their English officers, had no fear, They had seen the charm- protected enemy bite the dust under their fire . But Nordenfeldts and Remingto spectors of creeds.” On reaching Jebel-Ain, Hicks thought the campaign over as there was no sign of the enemy. The next garrison he visited was that of Ducim 18 are no re- which had been attacked on 23 August but had beaten off the Dervishes, inflicting over 4,000 casualties. Spending almost a month there, Hicks moved south-west on 23 September on his route towards El Obeid. Morale was low, since ex- pected reinforcements had not appeared and the camels and horses were dying at an alarming rate. “The ill-fated army scarcely met a living soul, but flocks of vultures followed them as if waiting for their prey.’ From deserters, the Mahdi knew the disposition of Hicks’s force, its low morale, its lack of water and its depleted numbers owing to death and desertion. He despatched a letter to Hicks inviting him to surrender, but this was naturally ignored. Previous warnings left by the Mahdi in the form of leaflets were used by the Egyptian troops as lavatory paper. On 3 November 1883 the remainder of Hicks’ force, now down to 7,000, reached Kashgeil, twelve miles south of El Obeid. Fighting started on, the grd and lasted until the 5th when the Mahdi’s troops finally killed the last of the Khedive’s force. ‘The Dervishes had attacked Hicks’s square on the grd and the night of the 4th. Desperately short of water, three smaller squares were formed on the morning of the 5th to get to the next waterhole.None reached their goal. According to statements made by the Dervishes, Hicks was one of the last, to die: *... he had emptied his revolver and, holding his sword in his right hand, waited for the rush of the enemy; he was soon surrounded and his horse wounded in the back; he then dis- mounted and fought most gallantly with his sword until he fell, pierced by several spears...” While the Mahdi was finishing off Hicks’s column Osman Digna, an ex-slave trader whom the Mahdi had created an Emir and granted the title of a provincial governor, had defeated an- other Egyptian force. Osman Digna had con- centrated his efforts on the eastern side of the Sudan but mainly around the area east of the Nile and the towns of Tokar and Suakin. Having been repulsed by Tewfik Bey at Suakin, Osman Digna turned his attention to Tokar, which he besieged. A relief force of 500 accom- panied by Commander Moncrieff, R.N., the British Consul, marched from Suakin and fell prey to the Dervishes. Inexperienced and of poor calibre, the Egyptians panicked and fled leaving a third of their number dead. For Osman Digna the death of the Egyptians was unimportant. His victory lay in gaining possession of several hundred rifles and the entire extra ammunition destined for the defenders of Tokar. The effect on recruiting for Osman Digna was stupendous. 1883 had been a year of disaster for the Egyp- tians and 1884 would prove equally so, not only for Egypt but for Britain and imperial prestige. The Sudan 1884 Tt was obvious in Cairo that this situation could not continue, for the Dervishes were now in a position to menace Khartoum itself, An army of 3,600 men with six field guns was assembled under Valentine Baker Pasha. Most of the force con- sisted of the ‘Gendarmerie’, who were described as ‘a rubbishy lot of worthless ex-soldiers’, by Andrew Haggard (a serving officer in the King’s Own Borderers) in Under Crescent and Star, William, Blackwood, 1896. There was a serious attempt at mass desertion when the men were ordered to form part of the expedition. Embarking, the force sailed for Trinkitat on the Red Sea coast of the Sudan, some sixty miles south of Suakin, and well positioned for the relief of Tokar. On 4 February the army reached El-Teb only to be confronted by the Dervish forces. The ensuing action was dis- astrous for the Egyptians. The Standard war correspondent described the engagement: ‘The enemy now gathered thickly and advanced to- wards us, and at nine o'clock showed in consider- able force on some slightly rising ground, near the water springs, while on our left front I could see clumps of spears with bannerets partially con- cealed amidst the hillocks and bushes. Our guns again opened fire; but the shell seemed to pass over the enemy’s heads . / ‘Just before this, I had ridden along by the infantry column, and I saw that it was advancing in the most disorderly manner. There was no sign of discipline or steadiness; it was a mere armed mob tramping along. I was convinced they would break at the first charge. As the cavalry rode wildly in, the order was given for the infantry to form square — a manoeuvre in which they had been daily drilled for weeks. At this crisis, how- ever, the dull, half-disciplined mass failed to ac- complish it, Three sides were formed after a fashion, but on the fourth side two companies of the Alexandria Regiment, seeing the enemy coming on leaping and brandishing their spears, stood like a panic-stricken flock of sheep, and nothing could get them to move into their place. Into the gap thus left in the square the enemy poured, and at once all became panic and con- fusion. The troops fired indeed, but for the most, part straight into the air. The miserable Egyptian soldiers refused even to defend themselves, but throwing away their rifles, flung themselves on the ground and grovelled there, screaming for mercy. No merey was given, the Arab spearmen pouncing upon them and driving their spears through their necks or bodies. Nothing could surpass the wild confusion : camels and guns mixed up together, soldiers firing into the air, with wild Arabs, their long hair streaming behind them, darting among them, hacking and thrusting with their spears. “While the charge had been made by the enemy on the left flank, General Baker with his Staff 19Sudan 1884. The inspection of the and detachment of the Guards Camel Corps at Dongola: General Salute. Note the NCOvlceping camels inline while the soldiers present arma. Sketch by Melton Prior, warartist, Illustrated London News. (National Army Museum) were out with the cavalry in front, Upon riding back they found that the enemy had already got between them and the column ... When the General finally reached the square, the enemy had already broken it up, and it was clear that all was lost.” Any attempt on Baker’s part to rally the troops was hopeless, and the army fled back to their ships leaving a trail of dead — and to the enemy, 3000 rifles, machine guns and Krupp field guns. Four days later Sinkat fell, and only six men and thirty women survived out of 4oo men and numerous women and children who had at- tempted to leave the town. London at last stirred itself into action and a telegram was sent to the Commander of the British Army of Occupation in Egypt, ordering him to detach a portion of his army under Sir Gerald Graham to relieve Tokar. The force, augmented by some troops on their way home from India, consisted of 2,850 infantry, 750 mounted troops, 150 Bluejackets, 100 Royal 20 sel bea fle aha A Artillery, 80 Royal Engineers, six machine guns and eight 7-pounder guns. On their arrival at ‘Trinkitat news was received that Tokar had fallen, but even so Graham decided to push on and engage the enemy if he could. Under a flag of truce he sent a letter to the sheiks calling on them, ‘to disperse your fighting men before daybreak tomorrow, or the consequences will be on your own head.’ The enemy showed no signs of com- plying, and on 29 February the huge square formation, with transport animals in the centre, a squadron of roth Hussars in front to scout, the rest of the cavalry in the rear and artillery and machine guns suitably positioned, moved forward over the barren sandy soil, The line of march was strewn with the remains of Baker’s ill-fated ex- pedition and swarms of carrion crows hovered, over the area. ‘The Dervishes had entrenched themselves well and with the aid of the captured Krupp guns opened fire on the advancing square. Graham ordered his square to advance towards the enemy’s left flank and by noon the formation was halted and the artillery brought into action against the Dervishes. The two field guns pos- sessed by the enemy were silenced but small-armsfire continued to fall on the attackers. The soldiers were becoming impatient at this in- activity but Graham soon ordered the advance. ‘It is not a charge,’ wrote one of the war cor- respondents, ‘but a steady solid movement in the formation which has all along been observed. It looks, however, all the more formidable, for en- thusiasm and discipline are equally marked, as the whole of the troops are cheering, while the square sweeps towards the enemy.’ When the square was within 200 yards of the Dervishes the enemy ceased firing and, grabbing their spears and swords, advanced with fanatical fervour. John Cameron, war correspondent of the Standard, described this advance. ‘So hotly do the Arabs press forward that the troops pause in their steady advance. It becomes a hand-to-hand fight, the soldier meeting the Arab spear with cold steel, their favourite weapon, and beating them at it There is not much shouting, and only a short, sharp exclamation, a brief shout or an oath, as the ngage with their foe. At this critical moment for the enemy, the Gardener guns open fire, and their leaden hail soon decides matters.” Having won the first line, the square was halted and adjusted for the final assault against the trenches and rifle pits the enemy had dug, which with the aid of the cavalry — who had swung wide of the square and engaged the enemy ~ were taken after some bitter fighting. The action had lasted three hours and had cost Graham 34 killed and 155 wounded, with Dervish casualties estimated at over 6,000, Graham’s troops also recaptured the two Krupp guns, some old brass ordnance, one Gatling gun and a vast amount of rifles and ammunition. The victorious force returned to Suakin, taking with them their spoils and the surviving inhabitants of Tokar. The reinforced stronghold of Suakin was to pro- vide an excellent base for actions against Osman soldiers Sudan 1985. Officers and men of the Guards Camel Regiment resting. Notice the NCO serving out water from a skin and the cooks at work, (Parker Gallery)Sudan 1885. The first view of the enemy at Abu Klea, 17 January. Note the dress of the cavalry trooper on left and the various styles worn by the officers. (National Army Museum) Digna, and at the beginning of March 1884 a proclamation was issued calling on the rebel chief to surrender, This was met with a defiant reply by Osman Digna and his chiefs. On 12 March a force left Suakin and marched about ight miles to a zareba (a square position formed with thickets, brush and pallisades). They ad- vanced on Tamai and bivouacked within a mile from the enemy. The troops were harassed throughout the night by a dropping fire and as dawn came up a large body of the enemy ap- proached the square. “This was more than British flesh and blood, however patient, could endure,” and artillery fire was ordered to disperse the Arabs. At last the order for the advance was given and the squares, one behind the other at a distance of a thousand yards, moved over the rough ground intersected with watercourses and boulders. The enemy attacked with remarkable ferocity and soon the whole area was clouded in dense smoke from the rifle fire of both sides. ‘And now, as the pressure increased, the weak points of a square formation became visible. The companies of the 22 Yorks and Lancaster and the Black Watch, form- ing the front face, swept forward against the foe; but the remaining companies of those regiments, which formed the sides of the square, and were also expecting an attack, did not keep up with the rapid movement of those in front, the con- sequence being that many gaps appeared in what should have been a solid wall of men.’ The Dervishes took advantage of this and despite the orders of the officers and the shrill calls of the bugle which were drowned in the din, the ‘Fuzzy Wuzzies’ broke the square. Bennet Burleigh, the famous war correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, was in the square and described the scene as the Dervish swordsmen rushed into the confused mass of troops. ‘The 65th (York and Lancaster) gave way, and fell back on the Marines, throwing them into disorder, though many men disdained to turn their backs, but kept their faces to the foe firing and thrusting with the bayonet. Both regiments were inextricably huddled together, and through the smoke at this dire crisis the dark demon-like figures of the foe could be scen rushing on, un-checked even for a moment by the hailstorm of bullets, and then the fight became hand-to-hand.’ Luckily, there was no panic, and the troops retired in good order, the Naval Brigade staying by their Gatlings to the last moment before locking the breech mechanism, ‘The rear square, however, pressed forward to the right and drove everything before it, taking some of the pressure off the other troops. The ‘broken’ square rallied — some main- tained, through the efforts of Bennet Burleigh, who above the shouting and din was heard ordering ‘Men of the 65th— close up! Give it to the beggars. Let ’em have it boys! Hurrah!” The combined fire of both squares soon decided the outcome, but it was found dangerous to move over the battlefield because of the wounded Dervishes. They accepted no quarter and de- manded none. Many a British soldier to his bitter regret offered water to a wounded Arab, only to be wounded, maimed or killed by the enemy he was trying to help. The victories at El-Teb and Tamai, however, did not prevent the Government’s action in ordering a general evacuation of the Sudan. Sudan 1895. The battle of Abu Klea, 17 January. ‘Our square advancing to the attack under a very heavy fire from the enemy.’ Note the zarebas made of boxes, camel saddles and thorn bush with the wounded in the centr. (National Army {useam) Gordon, Khartoum and the Nile Expedition While the events previously described were hap- pening, there was another more serious occurrence which would thrust the Sudan into the limelight. The War Office and the British Government had decided to send General Charles Gordon to Khartoum, Forced to take action, Gladstone and his Government were given the choice between a costly imperial expedition to the Sudan, distaste- ful to the Prime Minister, or a complete evacua- tion of troops and civilians. To his everlasting shame, Gladstone chose the latter course of action. Although Gordon had been a popular choice at the outset, he soon grew tiresome to the Government with his sheaves of telegrams sug- gesting action and then countermanding the suggestion. Before embarking for the Sudan Gordon had given an interview, the first of its kind, to W. T. Stead, the controversial editor of the Pall Mall Gazette. Gordon’s main criticism of the Government’s publicised intention of evacuat- ing the Sudan was that, ‘The moment it is known, that we have given up the game every man will 23| aes Sudan 1885, The battle of Abu Klea. Dervishes attacking the British square by Coulan, The Dervishes broke a British square for the second time on this occasion. (Parker Gallery) go over to the Mahdi. All men worship the rising sun, The difficulty of evacuation will be enorm- ously increased, if indeed, the withdrawal of our garrison is not rendered impossible.” Itwas a confusing situation in the Sudan, made more so by Gordon’s unpredictable nature and his reluctance to order the evacuation of civilians and troops in Khartoum. Gordon, now Governor- General of the Sudan, announced to the waiting crowds in Khartoum, who had expected more than a single man, ‘I come without soldiers, but h God on my side, to redress the evils of the Sudan.’ He attempted to set up an ex-slave trader named Zebehr as the ruler of the province to be evacuated, but anti-slavery feeling and the Government’s natural reluctance stifled the plan. Gordon was convinced that the Mahdi could be reasoned with and that restoration of order w possible; he offered him the title of Sultan of Kordofan. After the evacuation of several hundred, Egyptians the Mahdi, ignoring all Gordon’s attempts at reconciliation, closed on Khartoum, and on 12 March the siege commenced The siege, however, was Gordon’s steamers continued up and down the Blue and White Niles with no interference from 24 far from total and the Dervishes. Wounded Egyptian soldiers and women and children were transferred to Berber while Gordon set about recruiting native volun- teers, reinforcing the defences and personally supervising the issue of rations. The gravity of the situation had been appreciated in Britain; from Queen Victoria, Sir Garnet Wolseley, the popula- tion and the Press, warnings, pleas, and demands were made to Gladstone and his Government to act. Sir Garnet Wolseley wrote that, “This feeling that something should be done, like a rolling snowball, will go on increasing until the Govern- ment will be forced to adopt measures to save the Khartoum garrison . . . but if nothing is done that, place will be besieged, and we shall be, in my humble opinion, faced with a war on a large scale.’ However, Gladstone did nothing but continue to assure the House and the Queen that interven tion was not necessary. From Cairo the British Agent, Sir Evelyn Baring, telegraphed that ‘Having sent Gordon to Khartoum, it appears to me that it is our boundless duty, both as a matter of humanity and policy, not to abandon him.’ Communication with Khartoum deteriorated, and Parliament and Press were suddenly made1 Private, Black Watch, Egypt 1882 2 Private, Royal Marine Light Infantry, | Egypt 1882 3 Corporal of Horse, Life Guards, Feypt 1882 | ) \ \1 War correspondent, Sudan 1884-85 2 Fellah, roth Sudanese Battalion, Sudan 1897 43 Private, Grenadier Guards, Sudan 1898 / MICHAEL ROFF1 Hademdowah Warrior, 1884-98aware of the worsening situation, when on 1 April The Times published a despatch from Frank Power, their correspondent in Khartoum. Power described the ‘serious reverse’ suffered by a sortie from Khartoum and the continuous fighting, but above all he wrote about the hopes of those in Khartoum. ‘We are daily expecting British troops. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that we are to be abandoned by the Government.’ The Times smugly commented that the Govern- ment was largely dependent on their Khartoum correspondent for information. Wolseley con- tinued to circulate memoranda about a relief force while other political figures tried to pressure the Government. Gladstone refused to be drawn and commented in the House that ‘the debates thus constantly renewed are out of all proportion to the pressure and urgency of the question, and have the effect of offering immense obstruction to important public business.” On 2 May 1884 Berber was captured by the Mahdi’s troops, and little hope was held out for the safety of the smaller garrisons. Khartoum, however, continued to stand, and Gordon to con- fuse the issue with his contradictory messages and demands for troops from Britain and Turkey. The situation was worsened by the time taken for messages to be sent from and to reach Khartoum up to three months in some cases. The plight of the town, where Gordon had imposed rationing, printed his own paper money and awarded his own medals, was described in the last despatch from Frank Power, written on 31 July but not received in London until the end of September. ‘Since March 17 no day has passed without firing, yet our losses in all at the ver not 700 killed. We have had a good many wound- ed, but as a rule the wounds are slight. Since the siege General Gordon has caused biscuit and corn to be distributed to the poor, and up to this time there has been no case of any one seriously wanting outside are food. Everything has gone up about 3000 per cent in price, and meat is, when you can get it, 8s or gs, an ober... When our provisions, which we have ata stretch for two months, are eaten we must fall, nor is ther any chance, with the soldiers we have, Sudan 1885, The fierce hand-to-hand fighting involved in re- pulsing the enemy from the square. On-the-spot drawing by Melton Prior. (National Army Museum)Sudan 1885, After the battle of Abu Kru or Gubat; the army preparing to start for the Nile, arranging the transport of the wounded. Note the wounded carried in litters or sitting on camels at left while war correspondent Bennet Burleigh (centre) watches the wounded being tended. General Stewart, mortally wounded during the battle, lies under a sun shade on the right. (National Army Museum) and the great crowd of women, children, ete. of our being able to cut our way through the Arabs. We have not steamers for all, and it is only from the steamers we can meet the rebels.” The Press continued to pressure the Govern- ment, the Pall Mall Gazette declaring that the Government was prepared to ‘let Gordon be speared with the garrisons he was sent to save!” The dissension within the Government — the bitter controversy that raged between Gladstone and Lord Hartingdon ~ decided the issue. Want- ing to avoid any risk of the Government falling through Hartingdon’s threatened resignation, Gladstone moved a motion in the House on 5 August 1884, proposing that ‘a sum not exceeding £300,000 to be granted to Her Majesty... to undertake operations for the relief of General Gordon should they become necessary, and to make certain preparations in respect thereof.” Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived in Egypt on 9 September to take command of the Expeditionary Force, the same day that Colonel Stewart and Frank Power left Khartoum on a steamer with 26 Gordon’s cypher key and detailed reports of the situation. They were murdered by Arabs some days later, after landing when the steamer grounded. Preparations were put in hand to leave Egypt, but lack of a suitable number of camels and the necessary saddles prevented any forward movement until 5 October. Even so, Wolseley’s preparations were quick and thorough. The main, force assembled at Wadi Halfa, just before the second cataract of the Nile, where the whale boats which Wolseley had ordered began to arrive. ‘There was a certain amount of confusion sorting out the stores for each, and also in the camp itself, Colonel Sir William Butler later described the scene: ‘Horses, camels, steam-engines, heads of departments, piles of food and forage, newspaper correspondents, sick men, Arabs and generals, seemed to be all thrown together as though the goods station of a London terminus, a couple of battalions of infantry, the War Office, and a con- siderable portion of Woolwich Arsenal had all been thoroughly shaken together, and then cast forth upon the desert.’ Wolseley had been prompted to use whalers after his success with them during the Red River Campaign in Canada in 1870, and he even went so far as to hire Canadian boatmen. The Press was not impressed with the boats, and described them as ‘that un-floatable flotilla for the Nile.’ Their use also played havoc with the men’s uniforms, and the rowing blistered many a hand. A correspondent wrote about the soldiers that ‘Their clothes suffered very severely in places, and for want of better material, the men used to sew pieces of tin, commandeered from old commissariat boxes t0 their nether garments, which they very face- tiously said acted as a kind of sliding board.” ‘The route that lay before the force was more than difficult, since much of the Nile was badly charted or completely uncharted. South of Wadi Halfa, at Dongola, General Stewart was posi- tioned with mounted infantry and a single line battalion, Beyond Dongola lay Dervish-infested country, more cataracts, and Berber, before the force came anywhere near being within striking distance of Khartoum. Progress was slow and by December Wolseley had only reached the third cataract; time was running out for Gordon. Tf speed was needed in reaching Khartoum, the only way lay across the desert. At Debbah the Nile swings sharply east to Abu Hamed, then south again to Atbara before turning south-west to Khartoum. This stretch of the Nile included three cataracts and would take considerable time to cover, whereas from Korti to Khartoum over the desert was only 200 miles. By the beginning of 6th, Bes Ran Sudan 1885, After the fall of Khartoum (26 January), ‘General Buller’s column returning from Metemmah to Korti. Gordon. Pasha’s soldiers from the steamers carrying our wounded through a wadi on the road to Abu Klea.’ (National Army Museum) January 1885 the desert column had been formed, consisting of 1,800 men including the Guards Camel Regiment, artillery, cavalry, a battalion of the line and one of rifles, marines and Blue- jackets. The advanced elements moved out on 30 December and were followed at the beginning of January by the main body. On 17 January the column was attacked near the wells of Abu Klea by 10,000 Dervishes. The advancing square was experiencing difficulties in keeping its dressing, a not unusual occurrence with this type of formation but made worse on this occasion by the centre being filled with camels cither carrying ammunition or allocated for use by the wounded. The camels that the soldiers had been cursing ever since their first meeting would on this occasion help to save the situation, Ad- vancing at a sluggish pace under enemy fire, the square halted to redress the rear when *. .. the enemy suddenly started up from behind flags, ad- vanced at a quick run, in a serrated line, headed by horsemen, and charged down with the utmost fury towards the left front corner of the square.’ At a range of eighty yards the withering fire of 27Sudan 1685. The battle of Tofrek, 22 March. A force led by the 1st Bn., the Berkshire Regiment was sent from Suakin to Jblish an advanced depot towards Tamai. The column was halted constructing a zareba when the Dervishes attacked. ‘The left half of the battalion was having dinner while the right half was cutting brushwood. Because of the glare, the cavalry patrols had failed ¢o spot the enemy until they were too close. The ensuing action, which lasted fifteen minutes, was fierce as the illustration by Charles E. Fripp shows. Eventually the enemy were beaten off leaving 2,000 dead. On. 1 October 1885 the regiment was rewarded for its conduct at ‘Tofrek by being awarded the title ‘Royal. (National Army Museum) the Guards and mounted infantry took its deadly toll, but as the enemy halted they took ground to their right with the intention of attacking the rear left corner of the square, where cursing mounted infantrymen were trying to pull the camels inside and close the gap. The retiring skirmishers hinder- ed any firing for the moment and once they were safely inside the square, the enemy was danger- ously close. Sir Charles Bersford rushed his Gatling gun to the gaping corner, while ‘Battling’ Colonel Burnaby of the Royal Horse Guards, who was killed during the battle, wheeled round a company of Heavy Camel Corps and aggravated the situation. The right was now losing contact rapidly with the left, violating the most elementary rules of square formation fighting. The Dervishes, poured through the gap, as Gatlings jammed, 28 cartridges stuck in breeches, and ba sword bent. Had the square been hollow the outcome might well have been different, but with the bunched baggage animals inside the enemy had to fight for every inch, Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as the rear ranks of the front face, endeavouring to save the situation, fired into the crush of friend, foe and animals. At last the Dervishes were driven off and as one correspondent wrote *. .. not one of the Arabs that got inside left the square alive.” Licutenant Douglas Dawson wrote after the battle, ‘I think that all present would never care to see a nearer shave . . . and itis, in my opinion, duc to the fact that the two sides not immediately attacked stood their ground that the enemy re- tired discomfited, Had the Guards moved, none of us would have lived to tell the tale.” On the 19th the column, now only a few miles from the Nile, was once more attacked by the Dervishes at Abu Kru, the whole affair lasting only a few minutes as the enemy was beaten off and the way was opened to the Nile; Stewart had been mortally wounded during the action, and the command now devolved on Colonel Charles, Wilson, a staff officer with little experience of commanding troops in action.On the 2st four of Gordon’s steamers reached Wilson with news that the garrison, though in a sorry state, was still holding out. Wilson, however, waited for three days, as he felt his men needed rest and that defensive works should be built to protect those who were not to be embarked on the steamers for Khartoum. ‘At any rate,’ he later said in his defence, ‘there was nothing to show that a delay of a couple of days would make any difference.’ Two steamers left on the 24th and arrived before Khartoum on the 28th, just those ‘couple of days’ too late. The Mahdi’s hordes had attacked and taken the town on the 25th, after 317 days of siege, and had murdered General Charles Gordon. On 5 February a telegram was received in London stating, ‘Khartoum taken by the Mahdi. General Gordon’s fate uncertain.’ It was received with a profound sense of shock and despair, and the Queen voiced the opinion of her subjects when she wrote in her diary, ‘The Government alone is to blame.’ After Khartoum 1885-1896 While Wolseley with his two forces — the desert and river columns ~ continued planning to crush the Mahdi, Gladstone’s Government decreed otherwise. The troops were ordered back to Egypt; and they seem to have presented a motley sight. Count Gleichen, a lieutenant in the Guards Camel Regiment, recorded that on the return march a long-promised supply of boots was en- countered but they turned out to be of such small sizes that the men could not get into them. ‘They were as hard as bricks, there was no grease to soften them, and the only way of using them was to slit them open at the end, and shove your toes through. As for the officers, no two had the same foot-covering: field boots, lawn-tennis shoes, garters, puttees, and boots in all stages of decay and attempted repair were worn.” While the capture of Khartoum by the Mahdi seemed to be the end of the campaign, British forces still continued to brush with the Dervishes, in the Sudan. The last battle fought by Wolseley’s expeditionary force was that of Kerbekan, where the river column under General William Earle Sudan 1896, The Sirdar, Lord Kitchener, giving orders t= his ADGs, Note the typical dress and equipment of officers of the Anglo-Egyptian army. (Wilkinson-Latham) defeated the Mahdi’s troops on 10 February Earle himself was killed during the engagement. With all British troops safely back in Egypt, the only stronghold held in the Sudan was Suakin Although the Mahdi died in June 1885 the fight was continued by his successor, the Khalifa. Between 1885 and 1896, when the reconquest of the Sudan was undertaken, the following actions were fought: 20 March 1885. Dervishes defeated at Hasheen 2 March 1885. Dervishes defeated at Tofrek 30 December 1885. Dervishes defeated at Ginnis. 20 December 1888. Dervishes defeated near Suakin. 2 July 1889. Dervishes defeated at Argui 3 August 1889. Dervishes defeated at Toski. 19 February 1891. Dervishes defeated at Tokar. The battle of Ginnis was significant in that it was the last engagement fought by British troops in their scarlet tunics. The campaign conducted 29around Suakin in 1885 was also notable for the first use of Colonial troops outside their own country. An Australian force arrived on 29 March wearing ‘,.. the familiar red serge coat, albeit rather strange out here, but they very soon changed into Kharkee like the rest of us.’ Indian troops had been engaged during the Arabi revolt and they also took part in the 1885 Suakin campaign. The ‘Re-conquest of the Sudan 1866-1898 All the previous expeditions since Khartoum had achieved, according to Bennet Burleigh, was to scotch the snake whose slimy trail lies all over the Soudan, marked by the desolation of ruined villages and fields, and the whitened bones of countless human beings . . . From the beginning, Mahdism, as a social movement, has only shown potency for destruction and mischief ... Still, there was, in the zenith of its power, always the risk that, with successful Dervish raids made north of Wady Halfa, the infection of fanaticism might spread to the confines of Lower Egypt, if not to Cairo itself.’ The situation in Eg pt and the Sudan in 1896 was complicated. The Sudan, technically part of the Turkish Empire, had ceased to be ruled by Egypt in 1885 and for over ten years had been left untouched except for the affairs around Suakin. Britain could not help but sce the intentions of other European powers such as France, Italy and Germany with regard to the Sudan. In 1884 she had declared a Protectorate over Somaliland and the Italians and French had swiftly followed suit In 1896, however, the Italians, intent on further expansion, had been disastrously thrashed by the Abyssinians at Adowa, and their outpost in the Sudan, Kassala (held with British concurrence) was pressured by the Dervishes. The Italians asked the British Government to relieve this pressure by a diversionary move elsewhere, where- upon to the surprise of Egypt — who was to finance it — Britain ordered an expedition to reconquer Dongola, 30 Sanat ee earprmeatnaaratee Sstaly worms and ths can he acon onthe tp step fo the left of the soldier. (Wilkinson-Latham/Nevy and Army lilus- trated) The Sirdar of the Egyptian Army was Herbert Kitchener, a Royal Engineer officer like Gordon. With little money at his disposal, and with pain- fully few men (only 18,000) Kitchener planned his move south. His most important ally was to be the railway system which would be built over the desert, doing away with the prime importance of following the Nile and employing boats as Wolseley had done. This masterpiece of engineer- ing, the Sudan Military Railway, was constructed by a French-Canadian Royal Engineer officer, Eduard Girouard. It enabled troops and supplies to be moved quickly and efficiently without total reliance on camels. Railway battalions were con- scripted and, considering all the natural hazards, made remarkable progress in putting down the tracks, The invading forces moved south from Wadi Halfa and at the beginning of June headquarters was established at Akasha. The advance con-