Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996)

Summary
Multilateral agreement signed by the US, CIS, UK, and 90 non-nuclear-weapon states would ban
any and all nuclear tests, big or small, above and below the Earth's surface. It established a
worldwide monitoring system - including 170 seismic stations - to check air, water and soil for
signals that someone set off a nuclear explosion.
The 44 nations, each possessing various degrees of nuclear capability, that must ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty for it to take effect:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, United States and Vietnam.
The 26 nations among the 44 that have ratified the treaty:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.
The 15 nations among the 44 that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty:
Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Russia,
Turkey, Ukraine, and Vietnam.
The United States signed the treaty but failed to ratify the treaty.
The three nations among the 44 that have neither signed nor ratified the treaty:
India, Pakistan, North Korea

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New

START) (2010)
Summary
Bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Russia. Under the Treaty, the U.S. and Russia will be
limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the Treaty enters
into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces
within the aggregate limits of the Treaty.
Aggregate limits
 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this
limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one
warhead toward this limit. This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START
Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow
Treaty.
 A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers,
and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
  A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments. This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic
nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty.
Verification and Transparency
The Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START
Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty. Measures under the Treaty
include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic
offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of
national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the
Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.
Treaty Terms
The Treaty's duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement.The Parties
may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a
withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty
terminates upon entry into force of the New START Treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian
legislature must approve the Treaty before it can enter into force.
No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike
The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or
planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range
conventional strike capabilities.

reaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Summary
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) includes a comprehensive set
of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities. These include
undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons
on national territory and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of
prohibited activities. States parties will be obliged to prevent and suppress any activity
prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction
or control. The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to
individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take
necessary and appropriate measure of environmental remediation in areas under its
jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use
of nuclear weapons.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the Conference (by a
vote of 122 States in favour ( with one vote against and one abstention) at the United
Nations on 7 July 2017, and opened for signature by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on 20 September 2017. It will enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
As of August 9, 2020, 43 nations has ratified the treaty
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Recognized nuclear-weapon state Acceder which announced its
ratifiers withdrawal (North Korea)
Recognized nuclear-weapon state Non-parties
acceders (India, Israel, Pakistan, South
Other ratifiers Sudan)
Other acceders or succeeders Partially recognized state which
ratified (Taiwan)
 Signed 1 July 1968[1]

Location Moscow, Russia;

London, United Kingdom;

Washington D.C., United States[1]

Effective 5 March 1970[1]

Condition Ratification by the Soviet Union, the United

Kingdom, the United States, and 40 other signatory

states.

Parties 190 (complete list)[1][2]

non-parties: India, Israel, North

Korea, Pakistan and South Sudan

Depositary Governments of the United States, the United

Kingdom, and the Russian Federation (successor

to the Soviet Union)

Languages English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese

Full text

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at Wikisource

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament.[3] Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation
Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva,
Switzerland.
Opened for signature in 1968, the treaty entered into force in 1970. As required by the text, after
twenty-five years, NPT Parties met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. [4] More
countries are parties to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a
testament to the treaty's significance.[3] As of August 2016, 191 states have become parties to the
treaty, though North Korea, which acceded in 1985 but never came into compliance, announced its
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, following detonation of nuclear devices in violation of core
obligations.[5] Four UN member states have never accepted the NPT, three of which possess or are
thought to possess nuclear weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan. In addition, South Sudan, founded
in 2011, has not joined.
The treaty defines nuclear-weapon states as those that have built and tested a nuclear explosive
device before 1 January 1967; these are the United States (1945), Russia (1949), the United
Kingdom (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Four other states are known or believed to
possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested and declared that
they possess nuclear weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons
status.
The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain:
the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-
weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue
nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. [6]
The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences. Even though the
treaty was originally conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by
consensus, to unconditionally extend the treaty indefinitely during the Review Conference in New
York City on 11 May 1995, in the culmination of U.S. government efforts led by Ambassador Thomas
Graham Jr.
At the time the NPT was proposed, there were predictions of 25–30 nuclear weapon states within 20
years. Instead, over forty years later, five states are not parties to the NPT, and they include the only
four additional states believed to possess nuclear weapons.[6] Several additional measures have
been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime and make it
difficult for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons, including the export controls
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification measures of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.
Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to
acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament,
where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 13,400 warheads in their combined
stockpile. Several high-ranking officials within the United Nations have said that they can do little to
stop states using nuclear reactors to produce nuclear weapons.[7][8]

Treaty structure[edit]
The NPT consists of a preamble and eleven articles. Although the concept of "pillars" is not
expressed anywhere in the NPT, the treaty is nevertheless sometimes interpreted as a three-
pillar system,[9] with an implicit balance among them:
1. non-proliferation,
2. disarmament, and
3. the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.[10]
These pillars are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. An effective nonproliferation regime whose
members comply with their obligations provides an essential foundation for progress on
disarmament and makes possible greater cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. With
the right to access the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology comes the responsibility of
nonproliferation. Progress on disarmament reinforces efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation
regime and to enforce compliance with obligations, thereby also facilitating peaceful nuclear
cooperation.[11] The "pillars" concept has been questioned by some who believe that the NPT is, as
its name suggests, principally about nonproliferation, and who worry that "three pillars" language
misleadingly implies that the three elements have equivalent importance.[12]
What Is the Iran Nuclear
Deal?
Diplomacy to revive this arms control agreement has faced multiple stumbling
blocks, including Iran’s nuclear advances and geopolitics related to the war in
Ukrain
 Signed in 2015 by Iran and several world powers, including the United
States, the JCPOA placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear
program in exchange for sanctions relief.

 President Trump withdrew the United States from the deal in 2018,
claiming it failed to curtail Iran’s missile program and regional influence.
Iran began ignoring limitations on its nuclear program a year later.

 Washington and Tehran have both said they would return to the original
deal but they disagree on the steps to get there.

Introduction
The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and
several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its
terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its
facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for
billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

Proponents of the deal said that it would help prevent a revival of Iran’s
nuclear weapons program and thereby reduce the prospects for conflict
between Iran and its regional rivals, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald Trump
withdrew the United States from it in 2018. In retaliation for the U.S.
departure and for deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including
one by the United States, Iran has resumed its nuclear activities. UN
inspectors reported in early 2023 that Iran had enriched trace amounts of
uranium to nearly weapons-grade levels, sparking international alarm.

President Joe Biden said the United States would return to the deal if Iran
came back into compliance, and after two years of stop-and-go talks, the
countries appear to be nearing an informal, interim agreement.

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Who are the participants?

Daily News Brief
A summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your
inbox each morning. Most weekdays.
 Email Address
View all newsletters >
The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions
on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program. At the heart of negotiations
with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and
Germany—collectively known as the P5+1. The European Union also took
part.

Some Middle Eastern powers, such as Saudi Arabia, said they should have
been consulted or included in the talks because they would be most
affected by a nuclear-armed Iran. Israel explicitly opposed the agreement,
calling it too lenient.

What were the goals?

The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran’s nuclear program to the point that if
Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one
year , giving world powers time to respond. Heading into the JCPOA
negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an
agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a
few months. Negotiating nations feared that Iran’s moves to become a
nuclear weapons state risked thrusting the region into a new crisis. One
concern was that Israel would take preemptive military action against
suspected nuclear facilities in Iran, as it had in Iraq and Syria, perhaps
triggering reprisals by Lebanon-based Hezbollah or disruptions to the
transport of oil in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, Saudi Arabia has since
signaled a willingness to obtain a nuclear weapon if Iran successfully
detonates one.

Iran had previously agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons

as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has been in
force since 1970. However, after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in
1979, Iranian leaders secretly pursued this technology. (In 2007, U.S.
intelligence analysts concluded that Iran halted its work on nuclear
weapons in 2003 but continued to acquire nuclear technology and
expertise.)

Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years,
offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment.
After the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, who was viewed as
a reformer, the parties came to a preliminary agreement to guide
negotiations for a comprehensive deal.

For its part, Iran sought the JCPOA for relief from international sanctions,
which starved its economy [PDF] of more than $100 billion in revenues in
2012–14 alone.

Does it prevent Iran from getting nuclear

weapons?
Many experts say that if all parties adhered to their pledges, the deal
almost certainly could have achieved that goal for longer than a decade.
Many of the JCPOA’s restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program have
expiration dates. For example, after ten years (from January 2016),
centrifuge restrictions would be lifted, and after fifteen years, so too
would limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess.
Some of the deal’s opponents faulted these so-called sunset provisions,
saying they would only delay Iran building a bomb while sanctions relief
would allow it to underwrite terrorism in the region.

What did Iran agree to?

Nuclear restrictions. Iran agreed not to produce either the highly enriched
uranium or the plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It also
took steps to ensure that its Fordow, Natanz, and Arak facilities pursued
only civilian work, including medical and industrial research.

The accord limited the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate,
the level of its enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched
uranium. (Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235
isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope’s
concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power
plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical
purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear
weapons.)
Monitoring and verification. Iran agreed to eventually implement a
protocol that would allow inspectors from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, unfettered
access to its nuclear facilities and potentially to undeclared sites.
Inspections are intended to guard against the possibility that Iran develops
nuclear arms in secret, as it has allegedly attempted before . The IAEA
has issued quarterly reports to its board of governors and the UN Security
Council on Iran’s implementation of its nuclear commitments.

A body known as the Joint Commission, which includes representatives of

all the negotiating parties, monitors implementation of the agreement and
resolves any disputes that arise. A majority vote by its members can gain
IAEA inspectors access to suspicious, undeclared sites. The body also
oversees the transfer of nuclear-related or dual-use materials.

What did the other signatories agree to?

Sanctions relief. The EU, United Nations, and United States all committed
to lifting their nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, many other
U.S. sanctions on Iran, some dating back to the 1979 hostage crisis,
remained in effect. They cover matters such as Iran’s ballistic missile
program, support for terrorist groups, and human rights abuses. Though
the United States committed to lifting its sanctions on oil exports, it
kept restrictions on financial transactions , which have deterred
international trade with Iran.
Weapons embargo. The parties agreed to lift an existing UN ban [PDF] on
Iran’s transfer of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles after five
years if the IAEA certified that Iran only engaged in civilian nuclear
activity.

How is the Iran deal enforced?

If any signatory suspects Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security
Council can vote on whether to continue sanctions relief. This “snapback”
mechanism remains in effect for ten years, after which the UN sanctions
are set to be permanently removed.

In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to snap back
sanctions. The other P5 members objected to the move , saying the United
States could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the
nuclear deal in 2018.

Did Iran comply initially?

The agreement got off to a fairly smooth start. The IAEA certified in early
2016 that Iran had met its preliminary pledges; and the United States, EU,
and United Nations responded by repealing or suspending their sanctions .
Most significantly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration
dropped secondary sanctions on the oil sector, which allowed Iran to ramp
up its oil exports to nearly the level it reached prior to sanctions. The
United States and many European nations also unfroze about $100 billion
worth of frozen Iranian assets.

However, the deal has been near collapse since President Trump withdrew
the United States from it in 2018 and reinstated devastating banking and
oil sanctions. Trump said the agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic
missile program and its proxy warfare in the region, and he claimed that
the sunset provisions would enable Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in the
future.

Explore the Timeline

U.S. Relations With Iran

Iran accused the United States of reneging on its commitments, and

faulted Europe for submitting to U.S. unilateralism. In a bid to keep the
agreement alive, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched a
barter system known as INSTEX to facilitate transactions with Iran
outside of the U.S. banking system. INSTEX was used only once before
France and Germany announced its dissolution in 2023, citing Iranian
obstruction .

Following the U.S. withdrawal, several countries—U.S. allies among them

—continued to import Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump
administration, and Iran continued to abide by its commitments. But a year
later, the United States ended the waivers with the aim of halting Iran’s oil
exports completely.
What is Iran’s current nuclear activity?
In response to the other parties’ actions, which Tehran claimed amounted
to breaches of the deal, Iran started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its
stockpile of low-enriched uranium in 2019, and began enriching uranium
to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for
weapons). It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium
enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility;
and enriching uranium [PDF] at Fordow, which rendered the isotopes
produced there unusable for medical purposes.

Iran’s Major Nuclear Facilities

 TURKMENISTAN
CASPIAN
SEA
Arak
Tehran
Research and heavy water production
Research
Fordow
Uranium enrichment and research
AFGHANISTAN
Natanz
IRAQ
Uranium enrichment and research
Isfahan
Research and uranium conversion and manufacturing
IRAN
Bushehr
Nuclear energy production
0
100 mi
PERSIAN
GULF
SAUDI ARABIA
0
250 km
Note: Locations are approximate, as some facilities are located outside of cities.
Sources: International Atomic Energy Agency; Nuclear Threat Initiative.

In 2020, Iran took more steps away from its nuclear pledges, following a
series of attacks on its interests. In January, after the United States’
targeted killing of top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, Iran announced
that it would no longer limit its uranium enrichment. In October, it began
constructing a centrifuge production center at Natanz to replace one that
was destroyed months earlier in an attack it blamed on Israel . And in
November, in response to the assassination of a prominent nuclear
scientist, which it also attributed to Israel, Iran’s parliament passed a law
that led to a substantial boost in uranium enrichment at Fordow.

Tehran has increasingly limited the IAEA’s ability to inspect its facilities
since Washington withdrew from the nuclear deal, though it pledged in
March 2023 to boost cooperation with the agency. The commitment came
months after IAEA inspectors detected uranium particles enriched to 83.7
percent at Fordow, prompting international concern.

How has the deal affected Iran’s

economy?
Prior to the JCPOA, Iran’s economy suffered years of recession, currency
depreciation, and inflation, largely because of sanctions on its energy
sector. With the sanctions lifted, inflation slowed, exchange rates
stabilized, and exports—especially of oil, agricultural goods, and luxury
items—skyrocketed as Iran regained trading partners, particularly in the
EU. After the JCPOA took effect, Iran began exporting more than 2.1
million barrels per day (approaching pre-2012 levels, when the oil
sanctions were originally put in place). However, these improvements did
not translate to a significant increase in the average Iranian household’s
budget.

The end of sanctions waivers on oil exports and the restoration of U.S.
sanctions in 2018 cut deeply into a vital source of national revenue: that
year, oil and petroleum products accounted for 80 percent [PDF] of Iran’s
exports. By 2020, exports of Iranian crude had fallen as low as one
hundred thousand barrels per day . Since then, sales to China have helped
boost crude exports, which averaged 1.1–1.2 million barrels per day by the
end of 2022. Additionally, in October of that year, the United States
imposed sanctions on eighteen major Iranian banks, causing the Iranian
rial to fall further against the U.S. dollar.

Meanwhile, the wide range of U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear

program have added to the damage. Multinational firms fear being
punished by the United States for transacting with sanctioned Iranian
entities associated with, for example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) , which holds sway over many industries. With sanctions
deterring international trade, black markets have boomed, enriching the
IRGC at the expense of the regular economy.

What is the outlook for the agreement?

The fate of the nuclear deal remains uncertain. JCPOA signatories began
talks to bring Washington and Tehran back into the agreement in April
2021, but they’ve since been off and on , complicated by Iran’s election of
conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president and Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, among other developments. Moreover, Tehran and Washington
still disagree on several issues, including the IRGC’s designation as a
terrorist organization. U.S. officials have warned against more delays,
saying further nuclear advances by Iran could make returning to the
original deal impossible. An interim deal could be more likely: in June
2023, reports emerged that Washington and Tehran are nearing an
informal agreement that would have Iran limit uranium enrichment to 60
percent and release several American prisoners. In return, the United
States would free some frozen Iranian assets and refrain from pushing for
new sanctions or UN resolutions against Iran.