CONFIDENTIAL

Response of the Committee for Public Counsel Services

to the Draft Report by the Office of The Child Advocate
Regarding Harmony Montgomery
April 1, 2022

The Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) has prepared this response to the
March 2022 draft report of Office of the Child Advocate (OCA) regarding its investigation of the
case of Harmony Montgomery.1 While we agree with some aspects of the report, the report as a
whole reflects a misunderstanding of the constitutional rights of children and parents, the
responsibilities of children’s and parents’ attorneys under the Rules of Professional Conduct, and
the scope of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. In discounting judicial
determinations of parental fitness, the report also ignores the harms that children suffer while in
foster or congregate care, and its concerns about permanency look in the wrong direction to
address delays in resolving cases. In addition, we are deeply concerned that the report ignores
other significant defects in how Massachusetts treats children and families who become involved
with the Department of Children and Families (DCF).

1. Various aspects of the report, including its first recommendation, are based on a
misinterpretation of parents’ and children’s constitutional right to family integrity and a
misreading of G.L. c. 119, §26.

Convening a leadership forum to discuss the “standard of current unfitness and the
interplay with custody” (Recommendation 1) is an inappropriate response to what happened in
the Harmony Montgomery case. This recommendation ignores or misinterprets G.L. c. 119 and
decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
regarding the constitutional right to family integrity.

All parents and children have a constitutional right to family integrity. Unless parental
unfitness is established by clear and convincing proof, parents and children share a fundamental
right to the integrity of their family. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). A long line of
Supreme Court cases beginning in 1923 recognizes that the fundamental liberty guaranteed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the private sphere of family life
from government interference. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Likewise, the burden and
standard of proof in care and protection proceedings are based on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. As the Supreme Court has stated in the seminal case of Stanley v. Illinois:

The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential,
. . . basic civil rights of man, . . . and rights far more precious . . . than property
rights[.] It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents[.]

1
More precisely, this document responds only to those portions of the report that CPCS has been provided.
405 U.S. at 651 (quotations omitted); see also Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 379 Mass. 1, 3
(1979). Similarly, children have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in being raised and
nurtured by their parents. See Suboh v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 298 F. 3d 81, 91 (1st Cir. 2002);
Care and Protection of Manuel, 428 Mass. 527, 535 (1998) (holding that children, like parents,
are entitled to due process in care and protection cases); Care and Protection of Robert, 408
Mass. 52, 61 (1990) (acknowledging that children have an interest in familial integrity).

This fundamental constitutional right is rooted in what is in the best interests of children.
At common law, it was presumed that “a child’s welfare is best served in the care and custody of
its parents.” Petition of Dep’t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass.
573, 587 (1981) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Judicial Court has held that before
adjudicating a child in need of care and protection, the petitioner – usually the Department of
Children and Families – must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are not
“currently fit to further the welfare and best interests of the child.” See Custody of a Minor, 389
Mass. 755, 766 (1983) (quoting Petition of Dep’t of Pub. Welfare to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 383 Mass. at 589).

Chapter 119 reflects these core constitutional principles. The Juvenile Court is not
permitted to impose conditions on parental custody if it has found that DCF has failed to meet its
burden of proof at trial under G.L. c. 119, § 26(c). Section 26 of Chapter 119 permits the court to
impose conditions on a parent’s custody only when DCF has met its burden – i.e., only if the
court first adjudicates the child to be in need of care and protection. G.L. c. 119, § 26(b). That
adjudication requires the court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is
currently unfit. See Adoption of Yetta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 691, 695 (2014) (citation omitted). The
same is true at a review and redetermination hearing; conditions may be imposed only if the
revisited adjudication remains in place and DCF meets its burden to show that the parent remains
unfit. G.L. c. 119, § 23(c). See Care and Protection of Erin, 443 Mass. 567 (2005).

Juvenile Court Standing Order 5-21 does not provide otherwise. It governs orders
returning temporary custody to a parent after trial. It cannot apply, both as a matter of due
process and under chapter 119, to situations where DCF has not met its burden of proof. Where
the agency has not met its burden of proof, either at trial or at review and redetermination, orders
conditioning custody do not apply, the child must be returned home, and the case dismissed. See
G.L. c. 119, § 26 (permitting orders conditioning parental custody only where court adjudicates
child to be in need of care and protection); see also Adoption of Yetta, 84 Mass. App. Ct. at 695
n.8, 698 (orders conditioning parental custody vacated where adjudication that children in need
of care and protection vacated for lack of clear and convincing proof of parental unfitness).
Chapter 119 and case law are clear that unless a child is adjudicated to be in need of care and
protection, a court does not have the authority to interfere with the family’s right to be free from
the state oversight.

To be sure, there are parents and children who can benefit from post-reunification services.
DCF can and must make those services available. For out-of-state parents, DCF’s obligation
includes the duty to work with agencies in other states. But the fact that a family might benefit
from such services does not mean they are unfit. In fact, the first section of chapter 119

2
acknowledges that a parent is fit if they can parent with appropriate services.2 Requiring a fit parent
to be further monitored by DCF and the Juvenile Court would disregard the parent and child’s
well-established constitutional rights.

2. The report fails to acknowledge the hazards that foster care pose to children in
DCF’s custody.

One topic that is missing from the OCA report is the harm caused to children by
placement in DCF custody. The failure to include this information creates a false dichotomy
between the risk of returning a child to their parent and the supposed safety and security of
governmental custody, when in fact the prospect of harm in foster and congregate care in
Massachusetts is far more certain.

• Multiple placements. Research demonstrates that children who experience multiple foster
care placements are at higher risk of behavioral difficulties, delayed permanency, poorer
educational achievement, and difficulty developing meaningful attachments.3 Yet rates of
placement instability in Massachusetts are significantly higher than the national average.4
In 2021, for children in care less than 12 months, over 20% had been in three or more
placements.5 Although DCF’s most recent annual report does not include rates of
placement stability for children in care for 12-24 months, data from 2019 reveals over
50% of those children had been in three or more placements.6 Less than a handful of
states reported higher rates of placement instability.7
• Limited parent-child contact. Research shows that children who have more frequent,
regular contact with their parents exhibit more positive outcomes. Having a parent take
their child to medical appointments, participate in educational meetings, or help with
their homework also provide opportunities for parents to demonstrate their abilities and
provide teaching moments if guidance is needed.8 By contrast, inadequate parenting time
can inhibit healthy parent-child bonding, disrupt and damage relationships, delay

2
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct its efforts, first, to the strengthening and
encouragement of family life for the care and protection of children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of
all available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care of children only when the family itself or the
resources available to the family are unable to provide the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any
child to sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development.”
3
See “What Impacts Placement Stability?” Casey Family Programs (2018) (citing research) at
https://www.casey.org/placement-stability-impacts/.
4
See DCF Annual Reports FY19, FY20, and FY21; U.S. Children’s Bureau Outcome Reports Data at
https://cwoutcomes.acf.hhs.gov/cwodatasite/.
5
DCF Annual Report FY21.
6
This missing data on placement stability for children in custody over 12 months is troubling because the average
length of stay for children in DCF custody at the end of fiscal year 2021 was 781 days. The FY21 Annual Report
does include placement moves per 1,000 days for children who entered DCF custody in that fiscal year. Those rates
are also over the national average. Shockingly, the rate of placement moves per 1,000 days is 50% higher for Black
children than White children.
7
U.S. Children’s Bureau Outcome Reports Data.
8
Protection of the parent-child bond through meaningful parenting time is “essential” to reunification. Care and
Protection of Walt, 478 Mass. 212, 229-230 (2017).

3
 permanency, and perpetuate trauma.9 Yet the typical parenting time schedule is one hour,
once per week, or once every two weeks. There is little if any clinical judgment involved
in developing those schedules, and little attempt to develop parenting time plans that
meet the particular needs of the child based on their age, level of development, disability,
or other needs. In most cases, a one-hour visit with a parent in a DCF office with a
caseworker observing and taking notes is woefully inadequate to meet a child’s needs.
• Low rates of placement with kin. Research shows that children in kinship care generally
have better mental and physical health, fewer behavior problems, higher levels of
competence, higher levels of placement satisfaction, and better outcomes as adults.10 Yet
DCF rates of placement with kin are below the national average.11 Black children are less
likely to be placed with kin than their white counterparts.12
• Separation of siblings. Sibling connections are particularly important to children placed
in foster care. Research shows that maintaining sibling connections is associated with
improved mental and behavioral health, educational outcomes, and overall well-being.13
Yet data from FY21 shows that in only 63% of cases involving siblings in placement
were all siblings placed together, and in 21% of cases none of the siblings were placed
together.14
• High rates of placement in group care. Research shows that youth placed in group care
have worse educational outcomes, are more likely to become involved with the
delinquency system, are at greater risk of physical abuse in their placements, and are less
likely to maintain connections with their siblings and community.15 In addition, a 2017
study by the federal government revealed that many of the group homes in Massachusetts
that it inspected failed to comply with safety requirements regarding the physical
premises, care of residents, and employee background checks.16 Yet in FY2021, DCF
placed 15% of all children in group care, as compared to the national average of only

9
See “Family Time and Visitation for Children and Youth in Out-of-Home Care,” (US Children’s Bureau IM-20-
02, February 5, 2020) at https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/policy-guidance/im-20-02; “How can frequent, quality family
time promote relationships and permanency?” Casey Family Services at https://www.casey.org/family-time/.
10
“Benefits of Kinship Placement,” American Bar Association Litigation Section (January 2022) at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/child_law/atj22-materials/benefits-of-kinship-
placement-tool.pdf.
11
Child Trends at https://www.childtrends.org/publications/state-level-data-for-understanding-child-welfare-in-the-
united-states?utm_source=MA+Child+Welfare+Coalition&utm_campaign=36749e3202-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_06_05_03_59_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_00593226dc-
36749e3202-101595396
12
Child Trends; DCF Annual Report FY21 at 14.
13
Sibling Issues in Foster Care and Adoption, U.S. Children’s Bureau (June 2019) at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/siblingissues.pdf.
14
DCF Annual Report FY21 at p.15.
15
“What are the outcomes for youth placed in congregate care settings?” Casey Family Programs (2018) at
https://www.casey.org/what-are-the-outcomes-for-youth-placed-in-congregate-care-settings/.
16
“Some Massachusetts Group Homes for Children in Foster Care Did Not Always Comply with State Health and
Safety Requirements,” U.S. Dept. of HHS (2017) at https://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region1/11602500.pdf.

4
 10%.17 In addition, DCF places more young children (i.e., under age 12) in group or
institutional settings than all but two other states.18
• Poor Educational Outcomes. Children in foster care in Massachusetts have poor
educational outcomes.19 They are more likely to have lower proficiency levels and repeat
grades, have higher absentee rates, are more than three times more likely to be
disciplined, and are significantly less likely to graduate from high school.20
• Provision of medical and mental health treatment. During the years FY18-FY21, roughly
20% of all children entering foster care did not receive the required initial screening and
comprehensive evaluation, with less than half of children receiving a timely medical
evaluation.21 The last federal Child and Family Services Review found that “children’s
needs related to physical, dental, and mental/behavioral health were not met in a
significant number of cases.”22
• Treatment of LGBTQ+ Children. Last August, the Massachusetts LGBTQ Youth
Commission issued a report on LGBTQ+ children in DCF custody, describing the current
situation as a “state of emergency.”23 Among its finding were: (1) “failure to protect them
from violence, abuse, and risks associated with intimate partner violence and
exploitation, particularly for youth in congregate care,” (2) “significant threats to
wellbeing for LGBTQ foster youth, including long delays in accessing medically
necessary care, barriers to education, and invalidation of LGBTQ identities,” and (3)
“poor permanency outcomes for LGBTQ youth, linked to inappropriate placements,
frequent moves, and challenging transitions to adulthood.”24

3. The report’s assessments of the work done by attorneys for Harmony and her
mother mischaracterize the role of children’s and parents’ attorneys and disregard the
governing Rules of Professional Conduct.

17
DCF FY21 Annual Report; Child Trends. Note that national data is not available for FY21. But Child Trends
reveals that in FY20, Massachusetts rates of group care were 16%, as compared to the national average of 10%. It is
expected that the national average will continue to fall with the implementation of the congregate care provisions in
the federal Families First law around the country, something that Massachusetts has thus far declined to adopt.
18
U.S. Children’s Bureau Outcome Reports Data.
19
See Educational Services for Students in Foster Care and State Care (Massachusetts Office of the State Auditor
2019)
20
See Stable Placement, Stable School: Improving Education Outcomes of Children in Foster Care in Massachusetts
(Massachusetts Court Improvement Program 2019) available at www.mass.gov/orgs/massachusetts-court-
improvement-program. Note that although DESE and DCF routinely exchange data about the school performance of
children in foster care, DCF only publishes graduation rates. According to its FY21 Annual Report, in the school
year 2019, 56.8% of youth graduated in 4 years and 68.2% in five years, compared to the statewide rates of 88% (4
years) and 90% (5 years) for all students, and 78.5% (4 years) and 82% (5 years) for students classified as
economically disadvantaged.
21
DCF FY21 Annual Report.
22
Mass 2015 CFSR Final Report at p. 7, available at
https://www.masslegalservices.org/system/files/library/round%203%20MA%202016-2017.pdf.
23
8/3/2021 Press Release, Massachusetts LGBTQ Youth Commission at https://www.mass.gov/news/state-of-
emergency-for-lgbtq-youth-in-the-ma-child-welfare-system.
24
LGBTQ Youth in the Massachusetts Child Welfare System: A Report on Pervasive Threats to Safety, Wellbeing,
and Permanency, Massachusetts Commission on LGBTQ Youth (2021) at https://www.mass.gov/doc/commission-
report-on-dcf/download.

5
 The report “express[es] substantial concerns about the legal representation of children.”
OCA Report, p. 48. It does so despite acknowledging that the child in this matter wanted to
return to her father, that child’s counsel may have been acting in accordance with the child’s
wishes and sound legal strategy, and that child’s counsel succeeded in her argument to the trial
court. OCA Report, pp. 20-23, 31-32. The report’s “finding” that Harmony’s individual point of
view was not presented to the Juvenile Court by her attorney is simply wrong.

The OCA’s concerns about child representation, in reviewing the actions of an attorney
who appears to have done her job successfully, suggest less a concern about the quality of the
attorney’s work or CPCS’s legal training or oversight and more a tacit25 critique of the
underlying model of child representation mandated not just by CPCS (see CAFL Performance
Standards for Trial Attorneys, section 1.6) but by the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves
(see Rule 1.14 and Comments). The OCA report fails to mention the Rules of Professional
Conduct at all, even though the Rules govern the actions of lawyers for children. The OCA also
does not mention that the CPCS performance standards for children track the Rules of
Professional Conduct (as they must).

Rule 1.14 of the Rules of Professional Conduct mandates that lawyers for children treat
their clients as much like adult clients as possible26 and that they follow the wishes of very young
clients like Harmony, unless those wishes would subject the child to substantial harm.27 And
while the OCA speculates that the child did not have full information about her father (and
suggests that this is a failure on the part of child’s counsel), the Rule is the same even for
children who are not fully informed or cannot grasp all of the facts.28 The child’s wishes still
guide the lawyer’s position. Thus, the child’s attorney was bound to advocate as she did under
penalty of professional discipline. This was not a failure of training or oversight, and events that
transpired two years later do not alter this fact. Accordingly, the OCA’s displeasure with the
attorney’s performance, CPCS’s representation model, CPCS’s training, and CPCS’s oversight is
misplaced.

Ignoring the governing Rules of Professional Conduct, the report instead relies on
assertions that children’s attorneys are “required to take a holistic view of their client’s position
and advocate for them as legal experts.” OCA report, p. 35. It also relies upon recommendations
of the National Association of Counsel for Children that encourage the development of a “360”
understanding of the child and the child’s context. OCA report, p. 35. However, the “360”
understanding that is developed informs client counseling and the case plan. What an attorney
learns from a holistic understanding of a child cannot alter the litigation and advocacy in the way

25
We appreciate the report’s statements supporting a client-directed model of representation, but much of the
discussion of the representation provided to Harmony by her attorney seems to undermine those statements.
26
A child’s attorney “shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client.” Rule 1.14(a). The Comments to the Rules note that “children as young as five or six years of age, and
certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings
concerning their custody.” Rule 1.14, Comment [1].
27
Rule 1.14, Comment [7] (“Counsel should follow the client’s expressed preference if it does not pose a risk of
substantial harm to the client, even if the lawyer reasonably determines that the client has not made an adequately
considered decision in the matter.”).
28
Id.

6
that the OCA is suggesting because, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, the client’s
expressed wish is determinative.

The OCA’s disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct and its misunderstanding of
the role of the child’s attorney leads to problematic observations and findings. The report asserts
that “Harmony’s … individual needs were not presented to the Juvenile Court via her attorney.”
OCA report, pp. 34, 35-36, 42. But, as noted above, it was not the job of child’s counsel to
present information to the judge in a disinterested way. It was her counsel’s job to try to achieve
the child’s stated goal of returning to her fit father. Similarly, the report expresses surprise that
the child’s attorney did not advocate for the ICPC to be followed or advocate for a transition
plan. OCA report, pp. 34-35. But the child wanted to return to her fit father, and the ICPC
homestudy process and a transition plan29 would have delayed the reunification. If Harmony
wanted to live with her father as soon as she could, it was her counsel’s job to advocate precisely
as she did. Any advocacy to the contrary would have undermined the child’s position in violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct.30

In its conclusion, the report suggests that children be reunified with a parent only when
the family is safe and supported. OCA report, p. 43. Throughout the report, the OCA suggests
that the lawyers failed by not investigating, litigating, and proving such safety and support. But
as noted in section 1 of this response, that is not what the law mandates. Parents and children do
not need to prove that the parents are safe and supported. That is improper burden-shifting; DCF
must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents are unfit. See Care and Protection
of Erin, 443 Mass. 567, 571 (2005). DCF did not do so, and parents’ and child’s counsel, as a
matter of due process, did not have to disprove what the State failed or declined to prove.

Finally, and disturbingly, the report relies extensively on speculation in its criticisms of
both Harmony’s attorney and Ms. Sorey’s attorney. The report states:

The OCA has no way of knowing the scope of client counseling in this case, this
is by nature a confidential aspect of the work and as the OCA does not oversee
CPCS (sic) the OCA is not privy to any documentation that would speak to this
issue. Client counseling is necessarily protected from disclosure by attorney-client
privilege. This privilege is the cornerstone of legal representation and creates a
safe space for attorneys and clients to speak honestly with each other.

Report at 32. But the report later disregards this appropriate caution when discussing the
attorneys’ work with their clients. For example, with respect to Harmony’s attorney, the OCA

29
Oddly, the report places all of the burden for transition planning in this case on Harmony’s attorney. DCF,
however, knew when the review and redetermination hearing would take place and knew that it was unable to meet
its burden, yet it did nothing to plan for a transition.
30
The report describes the advocacy by Mr. Montgomery’s attorney as zealous, compelling, and “clearly well
thought out.” The report further states that his attorney “expertly represented him in court.” Independent of the
report, the OCA has expressed concern that Harmony’s attorney merely indicated that Harmony’s position was
aligned with her father’s. But if Mr. Montgomery’s attorney skillfully and successfully refuted any suggestion that
he was unfit to achieve his goal of reunification, the approach of Harmony’s attorney could have been completely
appropriate, given that her goal was the same as her father’s.

7
suggests that it does not believe that Harmony’s attorney engaged in appropriate counseling.
Report at 33. The speculation regarding Ms. Sorey is less subtle:

The OCA is concerned that Ms. Sorey, while in another location and waiting
another court appearance, was not given the type of client counseling that would
be expected in this situation.

Report at 36. In a report regarding the tragic and highly publicized disappearance of a young girl,
such speculation is inappropriate.

4. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not and should not apply
when a fit parent obtains custody of a child who has been in foster care.

The OCA’s criticisms of the lawyers (as well as the court) in this matter rely heavily on
the premise that the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC) applies to out-of-
state parents. But that premise is fundamentally flawed, because the ICPC does not, in fact, apply
to custodial orders to fit out-of-state parents. Although the first judge on the case ruled that the
ICPC applied, the second judge properly recognized that the ICPC does not apply to a fit out-of-
state parent and that the inordinate delays in the homestudy process impinged too greatly on the
parties’ due process rights. After the judge ruled that the ICPC did not apply – a ruling that no
party appealed – the parties and their counsel had no obligation to follow the ICPC or address its
concerns.31 This was not a “failure” by the lawyers; this is the way the law works and the way
lawyers work when they follow (as they must) the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding
zealous advocacy.

As a matter of basic statutory construction and regulatory jurisprudence, the ICPC statute
does not govern custodial placements with parents. Article I of the ICPC statute, G.L. c. 119
App., explains that the ICPC is a vehicle to ensure that the “party states [] co-operate with each
other in the interstate placement of children” (emphasis added). Article § II(d) defines a
“placement” as “the arrangement for the care of a child in a family free or boarding home or in a
child-caring agency or institution.” Placement with a parent is none of those things. The statute
itself explains and limits what kinds of “placements” it is regulating. Article III(a) says that “[n]o
sending agency shall send, bring or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state any
child for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the sending
agency [complies with the ICPC and the laws of the receiving state].” A custodial award to a
parent (particularly a fit parent) is not for purposes of foster care or adoption. The statutory
language is clear and unambiguous. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has agreed. In In re
Alexis O., 959 A.2d 176, 183 (N.H. 2008), it held that the plain language of Article III(a) is
determinative: “a placement pertains only to substitutes for parental care. It does not apply to
care for a child by his or her natural parent.” Id. at 182 (emphasis in original). The Court then
delved deeper into the legislative history of the ICPC and reached the same conclusion: “The

31
The OCA, at page 20, states: “The OCA finds it concerning that the Juvenile Court did not honor its own order for
an ICPC by continuing the Care and Protection case until a time when sufficient information could be obtained for
New Hampshire to make their determination on the safety of the placement of Harmony.” But courts are always free
to revisit their prior orders, especially when faced with new facts or rulings, such a subsequent finding of parental
fitness. See Commonwealth v. Charles, 466 Mass. 63, 83-84 (2013).

8
detailed draftsman’s notes, supplied by the Council of State Governments, reinforce the notion
that the [ICPC] does not apply to parental placements.” Id. at 183.

DCF has promulgated regulations that purport to apply the ICPC to parents, and this has
led to some confusion. In 110 CMR § 7.501, DCF adopts the statutory definition of “placement”
(as it must). But DCF substantially changes and contravenes the statute when it states, in §
7.503(1), that a placement is not just arrangement for the care of a child in a foster home, group
home, or residential facility or for adoptive placement but also “for placement in a relative’s
home.” It then purports in § 7.507 to apply the ICPC to various types of placements with, or
custodial grants to, parents. Regulations that exceed the scope of the authorizing statute are
invalid. See Massachusetts Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Med. Sec., 412 Mass. 340, 342 (1992)
(stating that agencies may not “promulgate rules or regulations that conflict with the statutes or
exceed the authority conferred by the statutes[.]”). Accordingly, DCF’s regulations purporting to
apply the ICPC statute to parents are void. That argument was adopted by the New Hampshire
Supreme Court in Alexis O. at 153-155, and it has carried the day in about at least a dozen other
states, including Connecticut. See In re Emoni W., 305 Conn. 723, 48 A.3d 1, 6-11 (2012). The
OCA, at page 22, quotes a few state appellate courts and notes that there are different views on
the legitimacy of this regulation. But the vast majority of states that have addressed this issue
recently similarly hold that regulations purporting to apply the ICPC to parents are invalid as
contrary to the statute.32

The ICPC homestudy process has many other problems that interfere with family
integrity rights. Fit parents have substantive due process rights to the care and custody of their
children, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.57, 65-66 (2000); J.K.B. v. Dep’t of Public Welfare,
379 Mass. 1, 4 (1979), and they do not lose those rights just because they live over state lines.

32
Those courts include, but are not limited to, In re B.H., 398 Mont. 275, 302, 456 P.3d 233, 247 (2020) (“We reject
use of [ICPC regulations] to thwart a fit, safe, custodial parent from being the placement for his/her child” because
that “would impermissibly expand the scope of the ICPC beyond the language of our statute and violate the non-
custodial parent’s fundamental rights.”); In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 235 A.3d 914, 928 (2020) (“Based on the plain,
unambiguous language of the relevant statutory provisions, we hold that the ICPC does not apply to interstate
placements with non-custodial biological parents.”); In re Emmanuel B., 175 A.D.3d 49, 57, 106 N.Y.S.3d 58
(2019) (“Regulation 3 [purporting to cover placements with parents] is inconsistent with the stated purpose of the
ICPC and improperly expands the statutory language to apply to situations not within the intended scope of the
statute.”); In Interest of C.R.-A.A., 521 S.W.3d 893, 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) (adopting the reasoning of states that
“have rejected application of the ICPC to interstate placement of a child with a natural parent” based on plain
language of Art. III); In re S.R.C.-Q., 52 Kan. App. 2d 454, 464, 367 P.3d 1276 (2016) (“[W]e hold that the ICPC
applies only to out-of-state placements of children with foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption, not to
out-of-state placements with a parent.”); In re D.B., 43 N.E.3d 599, 604 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“[T]he plain language
of the statute makes clear that the ICPC only applies to the placement of a child in foster care or as a preliminary to
a possible adoption[ ]” and “[a] biological parent is neither[.]”); In re C.B., 188 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1026 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) (“California cases have consistently held that the ICPC does not apply to an out-of-state placement with
a parent.”); In re Dependency of D.F.-M., 236 P.3d 961, 965 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (“[The regulation] cannot
control because it impermissibly expands the scope of the ICPC beyond that established in article III.”); Ark. Dept.
of Human Servs. v. Huff, 65 S.W.3d 880, 888 (Ark. 2002) (holding that the Compact was not intended to apply to
placements with parents, and therefore regulations to the contrary were invalid); State, Div. of Youth and Family
Serv. v. K.F., 803 A.2d 721, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (agreeing with McComb – below – that the
regulations are contrary to the statute’s plain meaning); see also McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474, 480 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding the ICPC inapplicable to parents and noting that “[t]he most significant and, to our minds,
determinative language is found in Article III(a)[.]”).

9
Children, too, have concomitant rights to family integrity with fit parents. See Care and
Protection of Robert, 408 Mass. 52, 61-62 (1990). The judge in this matter found the father fit,
so he had a constitutional right to the custody of his child, and Harmony had a constitutional
right to be with her father. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Stanley v. Illinois,

The rights to conceive and to raise one’s children have been deemed essential,
basic civil rights of man, and rights far more precious . . . than property rights[.] It
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the
parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder.

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (quotations and citations omitted).

While a brief delay in transferring the child to a fit father might be constitutionally
permissible, the ICPC homestudy process is rarely brief (as this case makes clear). As a result,
children linger in care, permanency is delayed, and the constitutional rights of both children and
parents are abridged. Problems with the ICPC homestudy process include:

• Homestudies, even when timely requested by DCF, may not be started by the receiving
state or completed for weeks, even months.
• The court in Massachusetts has no control over how long the receiving state’s social
services agency takes to begin or conclude the homestudy process. The OCA admits on
pages 19-20 that DCF has no power to require any other state to accelerate the process.
• Under the OCA’s interpretation, the ICPC would vest in the receiving state’s caseworker
– not the Massachusetts judge who knows the family and has heard the evidence – the
decision on whether to allow the child to live with the parent. This violates long-standing
rules regarding separation of powers, by essentially giving the executive branch of
another state the powers that lie inherently with this state’s judicial branch.
• A parent having an older, minor criminal record that does not sway the Massachusetts
judge regarding parental fitness could lead the receiving state to deny the homestudy.
Similarly, the receiving state could deny the homestudy if it believes the father’s home is
too small, has lead paint, or has inadequate smoke detectors. While these are
understandable concerns, they do not render a parent unfit.
• The court, DCF, the parents, and the child have no meaningful right to review a denied
homestudy. An aggrieved party in Massachusetts would have to appeal through the
administrative processes of the receiving state, assuming the receiving state has such
processes. And while children and indigent parents have a right to counsel who might
help them in Massachusetts, their court-appointed lawyers will almost never be licensed
to practice law in the receiving state. This renders any right to appeal in the receiving
state meaningless.

See Vivek Sankaran, “Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents
under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children,” 25 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 63, 80-87
(2006) (noting that “[d]espite the Supreme Court’s repeated emphasis on the sanctity of the
parent-child relationship, in the case of an out-of-state parent, that relationship can be
permanently severed based solely on the subjective, potentially nonreviewable determination of a

10
single caseworker”); C. Nneka Nzekwu, “The Lost Ones of the Interstate Compact on the
Placement of Children,” 44 Hofstra L. Rev. 1001, 1020-1029 (2016) (discussing, among other
problems, the delays children suffer in foster care while waiting for homestudies to be
completed).

The Maryland Supreme Court, which has very recently addressed this issue, summed up
why a fit parent and the fit parent’s child should not be subject to the ICPC: “Subjecting a
biological parent – who has not relinquished his parental rights, had those rights been
extinguished by a juvenile court, or has otherwise been determined to be unfit as a parent – to the
procedural hurdles and delays associated with an ICPC investigation unnecessarily deprives the
individual of the fundamental right to parent.” In re R.S., 470 Md. 380, 414, 235 A.3d 914, 934
(2020).

For these reasons, the parents and child in this matter – like all similarly situated parents
and children in the child welfare/family regulation system – had powerful statutory, regulatory,
constitutional, and permanency arguments that the ICPC cannot and did not apply to a custodial
award to a fit out-of-state parent. After the trial judge agreed with them, any claims that they
“failed” to follow the ICPC are specious. Indeed, had the lawyers, after the judge’s ruling,
nevertheless suggested that custody be delayed in order to follow the inapplicable ICPC, they
would have undermined their clients’ position and thereby violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Any suggestion to the contrary is meritless.33

5. The systemic review of permanency efforts called for by the OCA must account for
the lack of available services and DCF’s consistent failure to engage with families and must
involve affected communities.

DCF and the Juvenile Court should indeed engage in self-reflection regarding barriers to
timely case resolution and permanency, as recommended by the OCA’s report. No meaningful
progress on this issue can take place, however, without DCF timely providing appropriate family
preservation and reunification services for children and families and real engagement by DCF
with families (both of which are discussed in section 7 of this response). Moreover, any such

33
The OCA recommends (Recommendation #4 at page 56) that the Legislature adopt the “new ICPC,” an amended
compact released by a task force of the American Public Human Services Administration (APHSA) in 2006 that will
become law once 35 states pass it. Despite 16 years of efforts by the APHSA, only 12 states have passed it. See
https://aphsa.org/AAICPC/AAICPC/ICPC.aspx. In the entire northeast, only Maine has passed it. The OCA
suggests that the Massachusetts Legislature pass it as a matter of “best practice,” presumably in order to ensure child
safety and permanency.
However, the “new ICPC” has stalled precisely because it retains many of the worst problems of the current
ICPC. Although the new ICPC states that it is directed to accelerating the placement process, it fails to meaningfully
address lengthy delays; it fails to address flawed decision-making by receiving-state caseworkers; it fails to
recognize sending-state judges’ oversight authority; and it fails to address the lack of meaningful review (in some
states, any review) of the receiving state’s decisions. In other words, it identifies some of the problems in the current
ICPC but it fails to fix any of them. See Vivek Sankaran, “Perpetuating the Impermanence of Foster Children: A
Critical Analysis of Efforts to Reform the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.” 40(3) Fam. L. Q. 435,
453-457 (2006).
Accordingly, adopting the “new ICPC” is not best practices. It does not “fix” the current ICPC. And it does not
significantly advance the ball in terms of child safety, speedy permanency, or the protection of rights.

11
assessment must include participation and reflection by affected communities. Otherwise,
accelerating case timeframes is oppressive and unfair.

6. The Governor’s guardian ad litem proposal will cause a wide array of problems and
ignores the fact that DCF, which receives more than $1 billion per year in appropriations,
already has the responsibility for promoting what is in the best interests of children.

In Recommendation #3, the OCA recommends that the Legislature adopt the Governor’s
proposal calling for the appointment of a GAL in every care and protection case. For a number of
reasons, this is both unnecessary and counterproductive.

First, the proposal ignores the fact that DCF is already statutorily responsible for advocating
what is in children’s best interests.34 The agency’s own policies make clear that it should focus
on “each child’s need for safety, permanency, and well-being.”35 The report concludes that
DCF’s legal team failed to do so in this case. As the report states, the DCF attorney could have
examined Mr. Montgomery about his plans for the child, presented documentary evidence, and
called any number of people as witnesses, including foster parents and service providers, to
present the “full picture” of Harmony to the court. It seems likely that the OCA has reached a
similar conclusion regarding DCF’s clinical team.

Appointing another person in a duplicative role allows DCF to avoid accountability. Appointing
a GAL, however, would not hold DCF accountable for such mistakes. The report states that “the
Court and all parties in Care and Protections will benefit from an on the record statement about
what is in a child’s best interest at all junctures of a case.” While that may be true, that is
precisely DCF’s job. Appointing someone else to do DCF’s job is an unacceptable failure to hold
the agency accountable, and holding the agency accountable is the OCA’s job. If the OCA
believes that, despite the enormous amount of money appropriated to DCF, the agency is not
making the child’s best interest a “paramount concern” and not exercising appropriate clinical
judgment, the solution is to change how DCF does its job – not to apply a $50 million per year
GAL bandage.36

Second, besides being redundant to DCF, GALs would be redundant to other resources available
to, and commonly used by, the court. Juvenile Court judges appoint court investigators in every
care and protection case under G.L. c. 119, § 24 “to investigate the conditions affecting the child
and to make a report under oath to the court, which shall be attached to the petition and be a part
of the record.”37 Court investigators focus on the child’s best interests, and the court often asks
them to update their reports as the child’s needs change. Juvenile Court probation officers are
involved in most cases, and they, too, report on the child’s best interests. And Juvenile Court
judges already can and do appoint investigative, evaluative, and medical GALs to report on the

34
G.L. c. 119, § 1.
35
Department of Children and Families Permanency Planning Policy (2021) at 2, available at
https://www.mass.gov/doc/permanency-planning-policy-1/download. See also Department of Children and Families
Family Assessment and Action Planning Policy (2021), available at https://www.mass.gov/doc/family-assessment-
action-planning-policy-1/download.
36
Given how much time children and parents have to wait for much-needed services (see discussion below), it is
clear that this money could be better spent elsewhere.
37
G.L. c. 119, § 24.

12
child’s best interests and address other concerns based on the circumstances of the case and the
needs of the child.

Third, the GAL proposal ignores important practical considerations. In the six years leading up
to the pandemic, DCF filed more than 3,000 care and protection petitions every year, involving
more than 5,000 children. While some cases are resolved within one year, others remain pending
in Juvenile Court for many years. Thousands and thousands of care and protection cases, often
involving many siblings, will require innumerable GALs. Where will they come from? Under the
Governor’s proposal, only child welfare attorneys, nurses, and social workers are eligible to
serve as GALs.

In Worcester, Franklin, Hampshire, Hampden, and Berkshire Counties, there is a well-known

counsel shortage, which is holding up hearings, depriving parents and children of their due
process rights, and causing terrible delays in permanency. The late SJC Chief Justice Ralph
Gants referred to the counsel shortage as a “horrendous situation” and a “constitutional crisis.”38
There is also a well-known shortage in nurses, social workers, and pediatric mental health
providers throughout the State. This proposal will only deepen the counsel crisis, and it will
presumably worsen shortages in the other professions. Draining the pool of available and
essential providers ill-serves children.

Fourth, if adopted, the GAL proposal will exacerbate other problems. Black, Hispanic, and
Native American children are currently 2.4, 2.6 and 2.8 times, respectively, more likely than
their white peers to be removed from their homes and placed with strangers in foster homes,
group homes, and institutions. Many of these children are removed from their homes for reasons
closely linked to poverty. Without any supporting evidence, the OCA’s report speculates that a
GAL program could somehow reduce racial and ethnic disparities. GALs, however, often do not
reflect the racial and socioeconomic diversity of the families in care and protection proceedings
and are likely to evaluate homes based on white, middle-class norms.39 Given the severity of
existing racial and ethnic disparities, it is irresponsible to promote a program that seems
reasonably likely to exacerbate them.40

Finally, this duplicative, expensive GAL program would disserve children themselves in at least
two ways. It would force children to regularly provide yet another person with information about

38
“SJC Chief Justice Ralph Gants: Western Massachusetts lawyer shortage puts children in ‘horrendous situation,’”
(Dec. 30, 2018), available at: https://www.masslive.com/news/2018/12/sjc-chief-justice-ralph-gants-western-
massachusetts-lawyer-shortage-puts-children-in-horrendous-situation.html.
39
Even if implicit or explicit biases among GALs can be reduced through training, GALs are permitted to rely upon,
and submit as evidence, statements made by others. Thus, the GAL could serve as a conduit for implicit and explicit
biases borne by others. The quality of evidence would also suffer in other ways, since the GAL will be able to
present unreliable, multi-level hearsay. That approach also puts the burden on parents and children to call those
sources to challenge the incompetent evidence.
40
Line item 4800-0038 in FY22 General Appropriations budget requires DCF to pay close attention to racial justice
issues whenever it adopts reforms to “improve foster care and placement stability and to ensure positive permanency
outcomes.” Specifically, “not less than 30 days prior to making each such reform, the department shall provide an
assessment of the racial impact of such reform, including whether it is likely to have a disproportionate or unique
impact on racial and ethnic minorities….” This line item may not technically apply to the creation of a new GAL
program outside of DCF; but it clearly shows the Legislature’s concern that changes in the child welfare system be
driven by racial justice – and by more than speculation about it.

13
the most intimate aspects of their lives. This may compound the trauma to children caused by
their involvement with DCF. Even if GAL involvement is not traumatic, having yet another
person involved in their life with DCF will confuse many children. They may have difficulty
understanding who has what role, thereby making it more difficult for the child’s attorney, and
perhaps others, to develop a trusting relationship with them. In addition, adding a GAL who
“speaks for the child” would muffle the actual voice of children, the central figures in each care
and protection case. Depriving children of their actual voice undermines their perceptions of
legitimacy of the judicial process, and it also deprives them of a sense of agency. Young people
who age out of foster care in other jurisdictions often criticize systems that minimize their voices
and deny them client-directed advocacy; “nothing about us without us” is their rallying cry.
States throughout the country have heard that message and have been moving towards more, not
less, client-directed advocacy. The Governor’s GAL bill, far from elevating a child’s voice about
their needs and desires to the same level as other voices, instead would serve to drown out their
voice and minimize the importance of their wishes.

7. The report leaves unaddressed a wide range of systemic problems that result in
children’s needs not being met in countless cases every year.

Without having the full OCA draft report, it is impossible for CPCS to address all aspects
of Harmony Montgomery’s case. We anticipate that the complete report will contain more
discussion regarding transition planning, and we anticipate that there will be lessons to learn
regarding how DCF plans for reunifications. But at the same time that we are learning from this
case, there are a number of other problems that we should be addressing. Those problems may
not be front and center in this case, but they demonstrate a lack of real commitment on the part of
the state to meeting the needs of children. These include DCF’s failure to facilitate the timely
delivery of services, its failure to engage with families, its failure to provide timely
accommodations for people with disabilities, and its failure to provide access in languages other
than English. The portions of the Montgomery report that we have seen also do not address how
little oversight the Juvenile Court exercises over DCF’s failings. All of these problems make it
far more difficult to promote safety, permanency and well-being for children. Everyone involved
in the family regulation/child welfare system should commit to addressing them.

DCF’s failure to provide appropriate services – In practice, DCF does not facilitate the timely
delivery of appropriate services. DCF is tasked with “provid[ing] and administer[ing]” “family
services intended to prevent the need for foster care.” 41 Instead, through “Action Plans,” DCF
tasks the family with a list of assignments that they must complete. DCF rarely provides
meaningful support for parents to access or complete these tasks. The family is left to navigate
the systems on their own. Furthermore, when DCF offers a service, they often place hurdles
which a parent must overcome before receiving it. DCF will require a parent who needs housing
to participate in an unrelated evaluation or engage in another service prior to helping the parent
access housing. DCF will not refer a parent to the Institute for Health and Recovery (IHR)42

41
M.G.L. c. 18B § 2.
42
“IHR clients residing in homeless shelters with their families have shown: a decrease in substance use and a
decrease in trauma symptoms after six months of working with IHR staff. Clients also report improved parent–child
relationships. Our programs demonstrate that recovery is within reach when clients can make positive, trusting

14
unless they demonstrate a period of sobriety, but the period of sobriety renders them ineligible
for the IHR by the time DCF makes the referral.

Beyond the failure to facilitate the delivery of services, the state simply does not provide enough
of them for families in need. While DCF is not the only entity responsible for the provision of
family preservation and reunification services, it plays a leading role – but not in a good way.
The DCF budget reveals that it spends $296 million on congregate care and $306 million on
other services, while only spending $67 million on family preservation and unification services.
This 9-1 spending ratio, even accounting for the overlap of certain services and the high cost of
particular placement types, suggests that DCF could better prioritize its spending. A better
allocation of funding for family stabilization and unification services would also help to alleviate
the current dearth of available out-of-home placements for children.

DCF’s failure to engage with families – Children, youth, parents, and extended family members
should be included in planning and decision-making to empower the family for success.43 DCF’s
Family Assessment and Action Planning Policy requires family engagement throughout the
assessment and action planning process. The policy specifically states that this process
“…centers on engaging family members…in an integrated and dynamic process of exploring
their unique strengths and needs…jointly developing a plan to support the family in
strengthening their capacity to meet the safety, permanency, and well-being of each child.”44 The
Action Plan is to be “developed in partnership with the family.”45 In practice, this does not occur.
The Action Plan is not a collaborative, working document but one drafted by a DCF caseworker,
approved by a DCF supervisor, and then presented to the family with little to no room for
negotiation. Parents are not asked what it is they need or believe would be helpful. This delays
resolution of cases and, in some cases, makes reunification so difficult that it is unattainable for
some families.

DCF does not provide timely accommodations for parents or children with disabilities – In order
to comply with the ADA and Section 50446, the Department must individualize the assessment
and service planning process.47 In its assessment, DCF must individually evaluate the parent with
a disability to determine what services and supports are appropriate to prevent the need for the

relationships with their clinicians and case managers.” See https://www.healthrecovery.org/page/program-

development.
43
See “National Blueprint for Excellence in Child Welfare,” (Child Welfare League of America) at
https://www.cwla.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BlueprintExecutiveSummary1.pdf
44
DCF Family Assessment and Action Planning Policy, p. 2, https://www.mass.gov/doc/family-assessment-action-
planning-policy-1/download Sadly, and ironically, DCF’s “policy” regarding engaging with families was itself
adopted without the input of citizens of the Commonwealth. Under the Administrative Procedures Act, before
adopting or modifying a “rule, regulation, standard or other requirement of general application and future effect,”
G.L. c. 30A, § 1(5), a state agency must “give notice and afford interested persons an opportunity to present data,
views, or arguments.” G.L. c. 30A, § 3. DCF failed to provide citizens that notice and opportunity to be heard – just
as it has done with policy after policy in recent years.
45
DCF Family Assessment and Action Planning Policy, p. 13, https://www.mass.gov/doc/family-assessment-action-
planning-policy-1/download
46
See Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(“Section 504).
47
PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001); Adoption of Gregory, 434 Mass. 117, 122 (2001).

15
child’s placement, or continued placement, outside the parent’s home.48 Under the ADA and
Section 504, DCF is legally required to take a parent’s disability into account in its service
planning and provision of services and design and implement services that will enable the parent
to reunify with [his/her] child. In 2020, DCF was required to implement new practices for
parents with disabilities after reaching an agreement with United States Department of Justice.49
Even with new protocols in place, parents with disabilities continue to face problems when
accessing the accommodations, and often find the burden shifted back onto them to prove their
disability and the need for accommodations.

DCF does not provide families with access to language services – Despite acknowledging,
within the DCF Language Access Plan,50 the importance of providing meaningful access to DCF
services, programs, and activities on the part of consumers with Limited English Proficiency
(LEP), DCF regularly fails to implement the services needed to accomplish this goal. DCF’s
systemic violations of the civil rights of LEP clients has been detailed in the report by
Massachusetts Appleseed, “Families Torn Apart: Language Based Discrimination at the
Massachusetts Department of Children and Families” (January 2021).51 Children of LEP parents
lose their native language when placed in foster homes where the caregivers speak only English.
This happens when DCF arrives for a home visit with a mother who requires an ASL interpreter,
without any such interpreter, and relies on the grandmother to help the mother understand what is
being said. It happens when Spanish-speaking parents take time from work and arrive for a foster
care review only to find out that DCF failed to obtain an interpreter for the meeting. Problems
like these alienate families who do not speak English and make it more difficult for them to
access services, work with DCF, and meet their goals for their families. Given that the majority
of non-English speakers are people of color, it also exacerbates racial and ethnic disparities.

48
42 U.S.C. § 12132; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); G.L. c. 18B, § 3(b)(2); 110 C.M.R. § 1.08, 1.09, 5.01(1), 6.01, 6.03.
49
Justice Department Reaches Landmark Agreement with Massachusetts Department of Children and Families to
Address Discrimination Against Parents with Disabilities, Department of Justice, Nov. 19, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-landmark-agreement-massachusetts-department-
children-and-families.
50
DCF Language Access Plan 2019-2021, Mass.gov, https://www.mass.gov/doc/dcf-language-access-plan-2019-
2021/download.
51
Accessed on March 31, 2022, at https://massappleseed.org/reports/families-torn-apart/.

16