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Conceptualizing emotions. A revised cognitive linguistic perspective

Article in Poznan Studies in Contemporary Linguistics · March 2014

DOI: 10.1515/psicl-2014-0002

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 Poznań Studies in Contemporary Linguistics 50(1), 2014, pp. 15–28
© Faculty of English, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland
doi:10.1515/psicl-2014-0002

CONCEPTUALIZING EMOTIONS.
A REVISED COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVE

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ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, and Heidelberg University

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[email protected]

ABSTRACT
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'S
Based on my earlier work on the conceptualization of emotions, I wish to emphasize a
number of points in this paper. First, I suggest that emotion concepts are largely meta-
phorical and metonymic in nature. Second, I propose that several of the conceptual met-
aphors and metonymies are tightly connected. Third, in line with a large body of recent
R

result, I maintain that many of our emotion concepts have a bodily basis, i.e. that they
are embodied. Fourth, I concur with many others that our emotion concepts can be seen
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to have a frame-like structure, i.e. that they can be represented as cognitive-cultural

models in the mind. Fifth, and on the methodology side, I claim that the description and
analysis of emotion concepts requires both a qualitative and a quantitative methodology.
H

Though most of these suggestions have been accepted and embraced by a number of
scholars working on the emotions, several other scholars have challenged the sugges-
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tions. As a response to such challenges, I have revised and modified the ideas above in
the past 25 years. The present paper is concerned with these more recent developments.
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KEYWORDS: Emotion concepts; metaphor–metonymy relationship; embodiment in emo-

tion concepts; domain matrix in emotion concepts; corpus linguistics.
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1. Introduction

In a number of studies in the 1980s and ’90s, I attempted to offer a detailed de-
scription of emotion concepts from a cognitive linguistic perspective (see, e.g.,
Lakoff and Kövecses 1987; and Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991a, b, 1995,
1998, 2000). The emotion concepts I investigated included anger, love, pride,
fear, happiness, friendship, and respect. Following these studies, several schol-
16 Z. Kövecses

ars have analyzed the same and additional emotions in a fashion similar to the
one that I employed. The product of all this work is a large body of knowledge
concerning the potential or hypothetical cognitive structure of emotion concepts
within the larger framework of our conceptual system as envisaged by cognitive
linguists.
Aspects of this work were the result of my dissatisfaction with the way
emotion concepts were handled in the literature (see Kövecses 1990), especially

Y
with how various authors saw the role of metaphor and metonymy in emotion
concepts. I take up this issue and summarize my views in the next section. Other

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aspects of my earlier work have been challenged, and the challenges have
prompted me to respond to several of them. My reaction has often been to modi-

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fy the early proposals. Later sections of this paper focus on these more recent
developments in how I approach emotion concepts more recently from a cogni-
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tive linguistic perspective.
'S
2. Proposal 1: The metaphoric and metonymic character of emotion
concepts
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My main suggestion here was, and still is, that emotion concepts are largely
metaphorically and metonymically constituted and defined. In previous research
O

on emotion concepts, I found that emotion concepts are composed of four dis-
tinct conceptual ingredients: conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, re-
H

lated concepts, and cognitive models (see Kövecses 1986, 1988, 1990, 2000/
2003). The suggestion in all this work was that conceptual metaphors, concep-
T

tual metonymies, and related concepts constitute cognitive models. It is cogni-

tive models, or conceptual frames, that we assume to be the mental representa-
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tion of particular emotions, such as happiness, anger, love, fear, and many oth-
ers.
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By conceptual metaphor, I mean a set of correspondences between a more

physical source domain and a more abstract target domain (e.g., Lakoff and
Johnson 1980; Kövecses 2002/2010). Some of the most typical conceptual met-
aphors that characterize emotions include the following:

EMOTION IS A FLUID IN A CONTAINER (filled with emotion)

EMOTION IS HEAT/FIRE (burn with emotion)
EMOTION IS A NATURAL FORCE (be overwhelmed by an emotion)
EMOTION IS A PHYSICAL FORCE (be struck by an emotion)
EMOTION IS A SOCIAL SUPERIOR (be governed/ruled by an emotion)
 Conceptualizing emotions 17

EMOTION IS A OPPONENT (be overcome by an emotion)

EMOTION IS A CAPTIVE ANIMAL (let go of an emotion)
EMOTION IS A FORCE DISLOCATING THE SELF (be beside oneself with an emo-
tion)
EMOTION IS BURDEN (be weighed down by an emotion)

The overall claim concerning such conceptual metaphors was that they are in-

Y
stantiations of a general force-dynamic pattern (see Kövecses 2000), in the
sense in which this was first discussed by Leonard Talmy (1988). In that pattern,

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a forceful entity (a cause or an emotion) affects another forceful entity (the ra-
tional self) with a certain outcome. Given the force-dynamic character of these

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conceptual metaphors and given that they can be said to make up a large part of
the conceptual structure associated with emotions, it can be suggested that emo-
C
tion concepts are largely force-dynamically constituted (Kövecses 2000/2003).
In the domain of emotions, conceptual metonymies can be of two general
types: CAUSE OF EMOTION FOR THE EMOTIONS, and EFFECT OF EMOTION FOR THE
'S
EMOTION, with the latter being much more common than the former. (For a cog-
nitive linguistic viewpoint on metonymy, see Kövecses and Radden 1998; Pan-
ther and Radden 1999; Barcelona 2000). Below are some specific representative
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cases of the general metonymy EFFECT OF EMOTION FOR THE EMOTION:

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BODY HEAT FOR ANGER (being a hothead)

DROP IN BODY TEMPERATURE FOR FEAR (getting cold feet)
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CHEST OUT FOR PRIDE (puffing one’s chest out with pride)
RUNNING AWAY FOR FEAR (fleeing the scene)
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WAYS OF LOOKING FOR LOVE (looking at someone amorously)

FACIAL EXPRESSION FOR SADNESS (having a sad face)
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These specific types of conceptual metonymies correspond to physiological, be-

A

havioral, and expressive responses associated with particular emotions. Thus,

body heat for anger and drop in body temperature for fear are conceptual repre-
sentations of physiological responses; chest out for pride and running away for
fear are those of behavioral responses; and ways of looking for love and facial
expression for sadness are those of expressive responses.
What I call “related concepts” are emotions or attitudes that the subject of
an emotion (i.e. the person feeling an emotion) has in relation to the object or
cause of the emotion. For example, friendship is an emotion or emotional atti-
tude (though, according to studies, a nonprototypical one) that the subject of
love prototypically has toward the beloved. If someone says that he or she is in
18 Z. Kövecses

love with someone, we can legitimately expect the subject of love to also exhib-
it the emotional attitude of friendship toward the beloved (at least in the proto-
typical cases of romantic love). In this sense, friendship is a concept inherent in
the concept of romantic love (again, at least in the prototypical cases of roman-
tic love). (Related concepts display different degrees of relatedness – inherent
concepts are most closely related to a particular concept.)
It can be suggested that such inherent concepts function as conceptual me-

Y
tonymies. After all, by mentioning one such inherent concept I may refer to the
whole concept of which it is a part. In the example, friendship may indicate ro-

P
mantic love. This explains why the words girlfriend and boyfriend can be used
to talk about people who are in a romantic love relationship. (If there were no

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such inherent relationship between romantic love and friendship, the use of the
terms would be entirely unmotivated to designate people who are in love.) Such
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uses of related concepts can be taken to be part for whole metonymies.
In sum, I proposed in an extensive body of work that emotion concepts are
largely constituted by such metaphors and metonymies as mentioned above.
'S
This is a response to claims that emotion concepts can be simply seen (and rep-
resented) as literal concepts. This was perhaps the least controversial claim of
the five given above.
R
O

3. Proposal 2: Several of the metaphors and metonymies are tightly

connected conceptually
H

I pointed out in several publications (first with George Lakoff 1987) that there
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are important conceptual and bodily connections between some of the emotional
responses that people produce and the emotion concepts they characterize. Con-
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sider the following responses and emotion concepts, as revealed by the early
work:
A

BODY HEAT and ANGER,

LACK OF BODY HEAT and FEAR,
PHYSICAL CLOSENESS and LOVE,
UPWARD MOTION and HAPPINESS,
CHEST OUT and PRIDE,
BLUSHING and SHAME.

The general claim that was made concerning such connections was that several
conceptual metaphors of emotions are based on the metonymic connections be-
 Conceptualizing emotions 19

tween the elements above. Thus, for example, the metaphor ANGER IS HEAT is
based on the BODY HEAT FOR ANGER metonymy, FEAR IS COLDNESS on the LACK
OF BODY HEAT FOR FEAR metonymy, LOVE IS CLOSENESS on PHYSICAL (BODILY)
CLOSENESS FOR LOVE, and so on.
This kind of conceptual link was rejected (or at least ignored) by later work
on what became known as “primary metaphor” (see Grady 1997a, b). (Interest-
ingly, Lakoff and Johnson [1999] also gave up the idea of a conceptual link be-

Y
tween the metaphors and metonymies when they adopted Grady’s findings con-
cerning primary metaphors.) Grady and Johnson (2002: 540) define primary

P
metaphors as follows:

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[...] primary metaphors are motivated by tight correlations between
distinguishable dimensions of recurring, locally defined experience
C
types. We refer to these dimensions, which unfold dynamically over
very brief time spans, as subscenes.
'S
And in the same paragraph they continue:

Note that because subscenes are co-occurring aspects of simple sce-

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narios, our account might be taken to suggest that primary metaphors

arise from metonymies; it is important to consider, however, that a
O

metonymic relationship concerns conceptual and referential associa-

tion, whereas our proposal refers to correlations at the level of experi-
ence, and to truly metaphoric patterns of conceptualisation which
H

arise from these correlations.

T

Unlike the claim I make that conceptual metaphors and metonymies can be
tightly connected such that the metaphors are based on the metonymies, here
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Grady and Johnson explicitly deny the possibility that primary metaphors arise
from metonymies.
A

Is there a systematic way of showing the conceptual connection between

such emotion metaphors and metonymies as above? Let me take the example of
sadness and the downward bodily orientation that goes with it on the basis of
my recent work (Kövecses 2013). (Sadness was first analyzed by Barcelona
1986.) We have certain behavioral responses associated with sadness. For example,
they include drooping body posture, mouth turned down, etc. These responses can
be generalized into the concept of “downward bodily orientation”. Given the gen-
eral EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy (on schematic metonymies, see Ruiz de Men-
doza and Mairal 2007) and given that behavioral responses function as metony-
mies in emotion concepts (Kövecses 1986, 1990, 2000, 2008; Lakoff and Kövecses
20 Z. Kövecses

1987), we get the specific metonymy DOWNWARD BODILY ORIENTATION FOR SAD-
NESS. The metonymy functions inside the SADNESS frame, since DOWNWARD BOD-
ILY ORIENTATION is one of the behavioral responses associated with sadness.
Downward bodily orientation can lead to metaphoric conceptualization in two,
possibly successive, ways. The first is that “downward bodily orientation” can be
generalized to the concept of DOWN(WARD). DOWN is a spatial concept that, in vir-
tue of the process of generalization (or schematization) from behavioral responses

Y
characterized by a downward spatial (bodily) orientation in sadness, is divorced
and distinct from the actual behavioral responses associated with sadness inside the

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SADNESS frame. As a result of the generalization, it (DOWN) can now be seen as a
(source domain of a) metaphor for sadness: hence the conceptual metaphor SAD IS

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DOWN.
Thus, given such examples as the above, it can be suggested that many (emo-
C
tion) metaphors appear to be based on and derive from metonymy (as also suggest-
ed by Lakoff and Kövecses for anger and by several other authors, e.g. Barcelona
2000; Radden, 2002). Kövecses and Radden (1998) make a similar argument for
'S
the source domain of HEAT in relation to anger in the conceptual metaphor ANGER
IS HEAT (Lakoff and Kövecses 1987). More generally, I view such cases as instanc-
es of how an initial frame (e.g. of sadness, anger) that becomes the metaphorical
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target gives rise to the source in the metaphor through the prior existence of a
metonymy (e.g., DOWNWARD BODILY ORIENTATION FOR SADNESS, INCREASE IN
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BODY TEMPERATURE FOR ANGER).

H

4. Proposal 3: (Basic) Emotion concepts have a bodily basis, i.e. they are
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embodied
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Given the tight connection proposed between the emotion metaphors and me-
tonymies, it follows that emotion concepts are embodied. (For a recent general
A

account of embodiment in general, see Gibbs 2006.) A major advantage of this

assumption is that it can explain why many emotion metaphors are shared by
various languages and cultures. This is, briefly, because shared embodiment can
lead to universality in metaphorical conceptualization (see Kövecses 2005, for
details).
Various authors, and for various reasons, expressed their doubts about the
cognitive linguistic view of embodiment. Rakova (2002), for example, suggests
that embodiment can be problematic if the theory tries to account simultaneous-
ly for universality and cultural specificity. She emphasizes that a theory that
builds on image schemas and, in general, on the universality of essential physi-
 Conceptualizing emotions 21

cal experiences cannot in the same breath be a theory of cultural variation—

especially not if embodiment is conceived naturalistically. Undoubtedly, the ex-
amples that Lakoff and Johnson (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987) provide (like the
CONTAINER schema) may sometimes give the impression that Lakoff and John-
son regard image schemas and embodiment as universal experiences that make
things (including language) meaningful “in a natural way”, that is, in a way that
suggests that the universality of embodiment mechanically produces universal

Y
meanings.
To remedy the felt contradiction between universality as based on embodi-

P
ment and culture-specificity as based on context, I offered the notion “differen-
tial experiential focus” (Kövecses 2005). In brief, we should not see embodi-

O
ment as a homogeneous, monolithic factor that is conceived mechanically. This
is made possible by the idea that embodiment consists of several components
C
and that any of these can be singled out and emphasized by different cultures
(or, as a matter of fact, even by individuals within cultures).
With the help of this idea, we can meet another challenge that comes from
'S
the historical study of emotion language. Gevaert (2001, 2005) suggests that in
historical corpora of the English language the conceptualization of anger as
HEAT was prominent between 850 and 950. (This can be established on the basis
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of the number of heat related anger metaphors in the various historical periods.)
Later, however, anger was conceptualized mostly as PRESSURE, and, beginning
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with the 14th century, HEAT and PRESSURE jointly characterized the conceptual-
ization of anger in English. The well-known metaphor ANGER IS A HOT FLUID IN
H

A CONTAINER (Kövecses 1986; Lakoff and Kövecses 1987) is the end product of
the process. Gevaert justifiably asks in this connection whether the Lakoff-
T

Johnson view of embodiment can be maintained in light of such findings. After

all, it would be unreasonable to propose that the physiological responses associ-
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ated with anger change from one century to the next.

The idea of differential experiential focus can serve us in responding to this
A

criticism (Kövecses 2005). The embodiment of anger is complex and consists of

several components (body heat, internal pressure, agitation, etc.). Of these, as a
result of certain cultural influences over the ages, different components may oc-
cupy central position in the metaphorical conceptualization of anger. In other
words, the criticism formulated by Gevaert would only be valid if we thought
about embodiment as a homogeneous and unchanging factor in how humans
conceptualize various abstract concepts. But if we think of embodiment as a
complex set of factors to which speakers can apply differential experiential foci
in different historical periods and contexts, we can resolve the dilemma raised
by Gevaert and others.
22 Z. Kövecses

5. Proposal 4: Emotion concepts have a frame-like structure, i.e. they are

best represented as cognitive-cultural models in the mind

In various publications I argued that emotion concepts are not best defined as
sets of essential features (see, Kövecses 1986, 1990). This was a response to the
claim that emotion concepts are simple feature-based conceptual structures. Fol-
lowing Lakoff (1987), we can think of a category as constituted by a large num-

Y
ber of members, with some members being central. The mental representation
of such central members can be given in the form of prototypical cognitive

P
models. Emotions are conceptually represented in the mind as cognitive or, ra-
ther, cognitive-cultural models. A particular emotion can be represented by

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means of one or several cognitive-cultural models that are prototypical of that
emotion. This emerges from the Roschean idea that categories have a large
C
number of members, one or some of which being prototypical and many of
which being nonprototypical (see, for example, Rosch 1978). Prototypical
members of emotion categories are represented by prototypical cognitive mod-
'S
els, whereas nonprototypical members are represented as nonprototypical mod-
els; that is, as deviations from the prototypical model (or models).
Conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, and related concepts all
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converge on such a prototypical model (or models) for particular emotions.

Such convergence can occur in at least three different ways. In one, the concep-
O

tual ingredients jointly constitute a cognitive model. In the other, they are based
on a previously existing cognitive model. And in the third, some of them consti-
H

tute parts of a model and some of them are based on a prototypical cognitive
model. Prototypical cognitive-cultural models can be thought of as folk theories
T

(as opposed to expert theories) of particular emotions (Kövecses 1990). As I

have suggested previously (Kövecses 2000), the most schematic folk theory of
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emotions at a generic level can be given as follows:

A

cause of emotion → emotion → (controlling emotion) → response

In other words, we have a very general idea of what emotions are like: There are
certain causes that lead to emotions, and the emotions we have make us (i.e. the
self) produce certain responses. Commonly, there are certain social constraints
on which responses are socially acceptable. Societies may impose different sets
of control mechanisms on emotions.
In line with section 1, this general folk theory of emotions derives from the
application of the generic-level conceptual metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES. The
metaphor applies to both the first part and the second part of the model. In the
 Conceptualizing emotions 23

model, whatever leads to an emotion is conceptualized as a cause that has

enough “force” to effect a change of state in the self (i.e., to become emotional),
and the emotion itself is also seen as a cause that has a “force” to effect some
kind of response (physiological, behavioral, and/or expressive). As a matter of
fact, it is the presence and double application of this generic-level metaphor that
enables a force-dynamic interpretation of emotional experience.
In several more recent publications (see especially Kövecses 2013), I have

Y
developed the emotion-as-cognitive-cultural-model idea further by making use
of Langacker’s notion of “domain matrix” (Langacker 1986). In the prototypical

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cognitive-cultural model, a situation is conceptualized as a forceful entity that
leads to the emotion and the emotion itself is conceptualized as another forceful

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entity that produces some kind of action or set of actions. Thus, we conceptual-
ize the emotions as one of our most fundamental image schemas: the FORCE
C
schema, in which two forceful entities are in interaction. My claim has been that
the most fundamental component of our understanding of emotion is this force-
dynamic pattern that derives from our early preconceptual experience and that is
'S
constantly reinforced in our everyday living.
However, the schema is much too general and it underlies many domains of
experience, not only emotion. It therefore needs to be made more specific. This
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is exactly the function of the more specific EMOTION frame. Given the more
specific frame, emotion can be defined as a set of feelings and responses caused
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by a particular situation or, alternatively, as a set of feelings and responses pro-

ducing some actions by a person who is in a state characterized by such feelings
H

and responses. In other words, the concept of EMOTION can only be defined rela-
tive to the frame and the other elements that the frame contains. Each and every
T

element in the frame can be profiled (focused on) and defined in a similar way
by making use of the other elements in the frame.
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At the same time, the concept of EMOTION so defined evokes a large number
of additional concepts in the conceptual system, constituting a domain matrix.
A

Because emotions often arise in social situations, it evokes the notions of SOCI-
ETY itself, SOCIAL RELATIONS, and SOCIAL NORMS. Because emotions are com-
monly displayed through bodily behavior, it evokes the HUMAN BODY and ITS
FUNCTIONING. Because emotions are commonly based on moral ideas, it evokes
notions of RIGHT or WRONG, APPROPRIATENESS OF RESPONSE and the APPROPRI-
ATE MEASURE OF FEELING, and MUTUALITY or a lack of it. Because emotions can
be pretended, it can evoke the concepts of TRUTH, SINCERITY (of feeling), and
GENUINENESS. Some of these are more easily and commonly evoked, or activat-
ed, than others when people conceptualize and discuss their emotional experi-
ences. For example, the body, including bodily responses, and the appropriate-
24 Z. Kövecses

ness of responses seem to be more closely tied with the concept of EMOTION
than, say, issues of truth and sincerity in emotion. It thus appears that concepts
in the domain matrix of emotion can be more or less central, but at the same
time contextual influence may override any statistically valid association be-
tween emotion-related concepts, and can explain individual and broader differ-
ences in the use of emotion concepts.

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6. Proposal 5: Corpus linguistics is a great tool in the study of (emotion)

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concepts, but its methods must be refined and refocused.

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One objection that is commonly raised against the traditional (Lakoffian) meth-
odology of conceptual metaphor theory is that researchers use not only intuitive-
C
ly arrived-at metaphors but also impoverished collections of them. The sugges-
tion is that our overall goal should be to find each and every linguistic and con-
ceptual metaphor relating to a target in a given corpus. The claim is especially
'S
characteristic of practitioners of corpus linguistics (see e.g. Stefanowitsch
2007). While I agree with much of this, I feel there is a deeper issue involved.
(In the argument presented here, I closely follow Kövecses 2011.) The real issue
R

is to see how and to what extent the metaphors contribute to the conceptualiza-
tion of abstract concepts, in our case, emotion concepts.
O

To find the full list of metaphors is necessary and useful, but this list does
not tell us much about how emotion concepts are constituted by the metaphors
H

we find. In order to arrive at the emotion concepts (represented as cultural mod-

els), as in Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) for anger and Kövecses (1991 and
T

2010a) for happiness, one needs to make intuitive judgments concerning the
structure and content of such concepts. Corpus studies of particular target (emo-
U

tion) concepts should pay more attention to the analysis of those conceptual
metaphors that can be considered “central” with regard to target concepts. Does
A

corpus linguistics have the method with which such models can be identified in
an objective way? Until such a method is found, we have to rely on our intui-
tions in constructing such models.
Moreover, our intuitions concerning emotion concepts may be in clash with
the findings of corpus linguistic studies, such as Stefanowitsch’s (2007). One of
our intuitions concerning intense forms of emotion is that somehow the subject
of emotions is passive in relation to what happens to him/her. This notion of
passivity is typically captured by the NATURAL FORCE metaphor (see Kövecses
2000). Similarly, other intuitions, like the attempt for control over emotion and
the ultimate lack of control in intense emotion, are typically captured by the
 Conceptualizing emotions 25

metaphors of OPPONENT (IN A STRUGGLE) and INSANITY, respectively. Now,

Stefanowitsch found that these metaphorical source domains are not frequent in
a statistically significant way for anger, fear, joy, sadness, and disgust. In
Stefanowitsch’s words:

This confirms the central place that these metaphorical systems [i.e.,
HEATED LIQUID and FIERCE/CAPTIVE ANIMAL] have been accorded in

Y
the literature on ANGER; note that both metaphors are found with the
other four emotion concepts too, but not significantly frequently; their

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special status with respect to ANGER only becomes apparent through a
statistical evaluation of their distribution across emotion oncepts.

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Is there a problem with native speaker judgments concerning emotion concepts
or is there something wrong with the methodology to find the most frequent
C
metaphors? While native speaker intuitions concerning emotion concepts may
be wrong, it is also the case that the methodologies used by corpus linguists are
not entirely reliable concerning this issue. For example, in a study of anger,
'S
Kövecses et al. (in press) found that the third most salient conceptual metaphor
in American English is OPPONENT – a result which would probably make it a
significantly frequent one for anger. It appears that more work is needed in this
R

area before confident judgments may be made on either side.

Finally, in the same study Stefanowitsch suggests that most of the metaphor-
O

ical source domains for the emotions studied come from extremely generic met-
aphors, such as CONTAINERS, OBJECTS, FORCES, and MOTION. Since these apply
H

to any state, cause or change, their usefulness for capturing the specific content
of emotion concepts is rather limited. For example, Stefanowitsch points out
T

that one of the statistically significant anger metaphors is ANGER IS A POSSESSED

OBJECT. Again, this conceptual metaphor is so general that its contribution to the
U

concept of anger is negligible. Anger or any other state can be characterized by

it (my anger, your headache, etc.). Clearly, raw frequency is not sufficient to
A

eliminate such useless generic conceptual metaphors from the relevant data if
our larger goal is to construct cultural models of emotion concepts on the basis
of the metaphors that are applied to them. (Interestingly, Kövecses et al. [in
press] also run into this problem in connection with the POSSESSED OBJECT met-
aphor, and they try to make a suggestion concerning its elimination from the
relevant data.)
Overall, then, it appears that the identification of linguistic and conceptual
metaphors should be as complete as possible, but quantitative metaphor analysis
must be supplemented by intuitive qualitative analysis.
26 Z. Kövecses

7. Conclusions

Emotion concepts are constituted by four major conceptual ingredients, or com-

ponents: conceptual metaphors, conceptual metonymies, related concepts, and
cognitive-cultural models, or frames. In the paper, I argued for an updated ver-
sion of a cognitive linguistic view of emotion concepts.
First, returning to some original early ideas, I argued that there is a tight

Y
conceptual connection between some of the metonymies associated with an
emotion and some of the metaphors characterizing that emotion. In particular, I

P
suggested that emotion metonymies serve as the basis for some emotion meta-
phors; that is, the metaphors emerge through a metonymic stage.

O
Second, I proposed that by means of a modification in how we think about
the bodily basis of some emotion metaphors, we can account for both the uni-
C
versality and the culture-specificity of emotion metaphors. The new view builds
on the notion of “differential experiential focus,” which assumes that the bodily
responses in emotion involve several components and that context plays a role
'S
in which of these is primarily relied on in a given culture.
Third, I suggested that emotion concepts are best viewed as forming, what
Langacker calls, a “domain matrix”. Emotion concepts are linked to a large
R

number of concepts in the conceptual system, but it is not likely that all of them
are activated or are activated to the same degree each time an emotion concept
O

is used. On the contrary, the emotion domain matrix that is activated varies ac-
cording to the context in which it is used.
H

Fourth, as regards the study of emotion metaphors, I offered a complemen-

tary view in which the corpus linguistic study of emotion concepts is supple-
T

mented by the “traditional” intuitive methodology of conceptual metaphor theo-

ry. This seems necessary because the goals of the two methodologies are differ-
U

ent. By combining them, however, we can have a powerful instrument for both
the quantitative and qualitative study of emotion concepts.
A

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Address correspondence to:

Zoltán Kövecses
A

Eötvös Loránd University

Rákoczi út. 5
Budapest, 1088
Hungary
[email protected]

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