ARHEOLOGIJA I

PRIRODNE NAUKE

ARCHAEOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
 Center for New Technology
Institute of Archaeology
Belgrade

ARCHAEOLOGY
AND SCIENCE
11
2015

Belgrade 2016
 Centar za nove tehnologije
Arheološki institut Beograd

ARHEOLOGIJA I
PRIRODNE NAUKE
11
2015

Beograd 2016.
 Published:
Center for New Technology
Viminacium Institute of Archaeology
Belgrade Kneza Mihaila 35/IV
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: [email protected]
Tel. +381 11 2637191

For the publishers:

Miomir Korać
Vladimir Miletić

Editor-in-chief:
Miomir Korać

Editorial Board:
Roksana Chowaniec, University of Warsaw, Institute of Archaeology, Warsaw
Gianfranco Cicognani, Central European Initiative (CEI-ES), Trieste
Rosemarie Cordie, Archäologiepark Belginum
Eric De Sena, John Cabot University, Rome
Snežana Golubović, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Natalia Goncharova, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow
Gisela Grupe, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München
Michaela Harbeck, Staatssammlung für Anthropologie und Paläoanatomie, München
Lanfranco Masotti, Universita’ di Bologna, Bologna
Žarko Mijailović, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mathematics, Belgrade
Živko Mikić, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade
Milan Milosavljević, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Belgrade
Dragan Milovanović, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mining and Geology, Belgrade
Zoran Obradović, Temple University, Philadelphia
Zoran Ognjanović, Mathematical Institute, Belgrade
Marco Pacetti, Universita’ Politecnico delle Marche, Ancona
Slaviša Perić, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Milica Tapavički-Ilić, Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade
Dejan Vučković, University of Belgrade, Faculty of Mining and Geology, Belgrade
Zsolt Zolnai, University of Wisconsin - Madison, Madison
Olivera Ilić (secretary), Institute of Archaeology, Belgrade

Translation:
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Lecturer:
Dave Calcutt

Graphic design:
Nemanja Mrđić

Print:
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Printed in:
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ISSN 1452-7448
 Izdavači:
Centar za nove tehnologije Viminacium
Arheološki institut Beograd
Kneza Mihaila 35/IV
11000 Beograd, Srbija
e-mail: [email protected]
Tel. +381 11 2637191

Za izdavače:
Miomir Korać
Slaviša Perić

Urednik:
Miomir Korać

Uređivački odbor:
Đanfranko Čikonjani, Centralnoevropska inicijativa (CEI-ES), Trst
Roksana Hovanjec, Univerzitet u Varšavi, Arheološki institut,
Varšava Erik De Sena, Džon Kabot Univerzitet, Rim
Snežana Golubović, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Natalija Gončarova, Moskovski Državni Univerzitet Lomonosov, Moskva
Gizela Grupe, Ludvig-Maksimilians-Univerzitet, Minhen
Mihaela Harbek, Zbirka za antropologiju i paleoanatomiju, Minhen
Rozmari Kordi, Arheološki park Belginum
Lanfranko Masoti, Univerzitet u Bolonji, Bolonja
Žarko Mijailović, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Matematički fakultet, Beograd
Živko Mikić, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Filozofski fakultet, Beograd
Milan Milosavljević, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Elektrotehnički fakultet, Beograd
Dragan Milovanović, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Rudarsko-geološki fakultet,
Beograd Zoran Obradović, Univerzitet Templ, Filadelfija
Zoran Ognjanović, Matematički institut, Beograd
Marko Paćeti, Politehnički univerzitet Marke,
Ankona Slaviša Perić, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Milica Tapavički-Ilić, Arheološki institut, Beograd
Dejan Vučković, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Rudarsko-geološki fakultet, Beograd
Zolt Zolnaj, Univerzitet u Viskonsinu - Medison, Medison
Olivera Ilić (sekretar), Arheološki institut, Beograd

Prevod:
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Lektor:
Dejv Kalkat

Dizajn i tehničko uređenje:

Nemanja Mrđić

Štampa:
Digital Art Company Beograd

Tiraž:
500 primeraka

ISSN 1452-7448
 CONTENTS / SADRŽAJ

Rasprave i članci
Treatises and
Articles

Bebina Milovanović
Milica Marjanović
Ivana Kosanović Ilija Mikić Ricardo Ortega-Ruiz

Radmila Zotović

Olivera Ilić

Mirjana Vojvoda

Mirjana Vojvoda

Jelena Anđelković Grašar

Richard Vallance Janke

Miomir Korać
Emilija Nikolić
Milica Tapavički-Ilić

Manousos
Kambouris
George
Hliopoulos Spyros
Bakas

Manousos
Kambouris
George
Hliopoulos Spyros
Bakas

Snežana Golubović
Živko Mikić

C. Scott Speal

8
A New Find of Lead Mirror Community with Culturral Heritage..........................................109-126
Frames from Rit
(Viminacium)..................................................
Thermopylae Revisited..............................................................127-144

Jupiter’s Cult at the

Territory of Viminacium. Greco-Macedonian Influences in the Manipular Legion System. 145-154
......................................................................

Finds of Roman
Agricultural Tools Results of Archaeological-Anthropological Studies of Mass Burials in
on the Danubian Viminacium – Grave G-769/ the Pećine Necropolis..................155-166
Limes in Upper
Moesia as A Paleodemographic/Mortuary Study of Graves from the Eastern
Indicators of Necropolis at Roman Viminacium............................................167-186
Agricultural
Development in the Biomechanical Changes in the Neck Joints in Individuals withArtificially
Area of Military Deformed Skulls from Mediana.................................................187-198
Camps............................................................

Signis Receptis as a
Reverse Motive on Roman
Imperial Coins...............................................

Concept of
Providentia
Deorum Within the
Imperial Cult and
Propa- ganda on
Roman Imperial
Coins During the
Principate.......................................................

Female Power that

Protects: Who is
the Woman who
Takes Care of the
City? Goddess
Protectresses on the
Territory of the
Central Balkans in
Late Antiquity................................................

The Decipherment of
Supersyllabograms in
Linear B.......................................................

Archaeological
Park of
Viminacium:
Beautifying a

7
 Ilija Mikić Paleopathological Analysis of the Individual 1226-D from the
Ricardo Ortega-Ruiz Necropolis of Više Grobalja: Osteomyelitis Along with Greenstick
Fractures and Surgical Antemortem Activities...........................199-206

Natalija Greek Faces. Anthropological Analysis of Ancient

Gončarova Greek Sculpture..........................................................................207-220
Anton Belikov
Ransomware Threat to Information Systems..............................221-230
Vanja
Korać Zoran
Davidovac
Dragan Prlja Privacy Control on Windows 10................................................231-242

Vanja
Korać Milan
Todorović Prikazi
Dragan Prlja Reviews

Mirjana Vojvoda, Nemanja Mrđić, NALAZI NOVCA SA

VIMINACI- JUMSKE NEKROPOLE VIŠE GROBALJA I NJIHOVA
ULOGA U POGREBNOM RITUALU / COIN FINDS FROM THE
Nikola Crnobrnja VIMINACI- UM NECROPOLIS OF VIŠE GROBALJA AND
THEIR ROLE IN
FUNERARY RITUAL. Arheološki institut, Beograd 2016..............243

Guidelines for Submitting Manuscripts for the Periodical Arheologija i

prirodne nauke (Archaeology and Science).......................................247

8
Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

MANOUSOS KAMBOURIS 355.48(38:355)”-0480”

The Association of Historical Studies COBISS.SR-ID 228051724
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece Original research article
[email protected] Received: May 8th 2016
Accepted: June 20th 2016
GEORGE HLIOPOULOS
The Association of Historical Studies
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece

SPYROS BAKAS
The Association of Historical Studies
KORYVANTES,
Athens, Greece

THERMOPYLAE REVISITED

ABSTRACT

The battle which defined our understanding of the Greco-Persian wars and classical warfare has
numerous hidden or obscure issues, which escape standard scholarship and may be enlightened by
careful observation, reading and deduction. Who really were Leonidas’ 300? The Phocian wall is
usually thought to cut the passage of Thermopylae. However, this would have cut the best commercial
road. Most probably it was nearby, an open circuit stemming from the rock, not cutting off the traffic
but allowing control and perhaps interdiction by missiles.
The Persians, after being victorious, never passed through the pass but chose another route
making the reason of the battle obscure; it was more a show of prowess than a real operational need.
The Greek tactics mentioned by Herodotus imply both a universal drill in hoplite armies of passing
units through each other’s lines and also a Spartan darting tactic, more or less similar to Ekdromi
attested later by Xenophon (Hellenika Book IV.5), although executed in inversed spatial terms. Last,
but not least, Herodotus’ day politics most probably do not allow neither the Spartans to speak of the
night raiding in the Persian camp, mentioned by Diodorus, nor himself to state that the true reason of
the Phocian contingent failure to keep their position was that once caught unawares they preferred to
cover the passage to Phocis, their homeland, than the rear of Leonidas.

KEYWORDS: THERMOPYLAE, LEONIDAS, SPARTA, ANCIENT GREEK TACTICS, SPECIAL

OPERATIONS.

INTRODUCTION line infantry. Up to that point, the 2 only Greek

land victories, had been the result of surprise.
Thermopylae is the battle of redefinition of The first was an ambush near Pedasa at c 496 BC
the Greek-Persian military balance, as its by the Carian rebel forces of the Ionian Revolu-
outcome defined the subsequent Persian moves. tion; there, a Persian army was annihilated at a
The Greek hoplite infantry was pitted for the first night action (Her V.121). The second was in an
time suc- cessfully against a royal Persian unorthodox, though open combat: a more or less
army-or even

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

Fig. 1 The wall of the Phocians- standard view. The Diateichismos cuts the traffic. At the narrowest, only one
cartwagon can be accommodated, thus the gate must be that wide at least, to allow peacetime traffic, travel and
commerce, leaving little room for actual wall. In less narrow positions, the whole idea becomes nullified.

sudden (maybe not surprise) attack, and the tacti- a vast royal army, definitely twice or thrice the
cal novelty of a storming charge combined with size of the Greeks united. The numbers of the
differential pressure to isolate and then encircle/ latter must not be dismissed with only three score
flank Persian line infantry. This victory, scored city- states rallying to defend the motherland, in
at Marathon, in 490 BC (Her VΙ.112-115) was Pla- taea, in 479 BC more than 30.000 hoplites
most decisive but also indicative of tactical flair were present, and a total of 100.000 battle-ready
from the more robust mainlanders, where the troops (Her IX.30).MedisingGreeks were not to
Persian threat had been expected for the last 30 be ex- cluded, as potential enemies, since Greeks
years and basic measures taken in the form of had a name for untrustworthiness towards the
athletic train- ing and tactical dispositions. In a Persian throne (Athenians 510 BC, Ionians 500
pitched format, without imaginative tactics and BC etc).
surprise, a draw was the best result, scored at This royal army moves in mainland routes-
Malene, 493 BC, till the Persian cavalry tipped one or more- leaving the coastal areas to the
the scales (Her VΙ.29). amphib- ious component of the royal fleet. From
Therme it advances through the mountains,
circumventing the first Greek defense in Tempe,
MAIN UNSETTLED ISSUES: then follows the easy coastal road from Thessaly
to Malis (Her VII.196-201).
I) Opposing armies
The Greek contingent comprised two ele-
ments: the local and neighboring communities
A crushing show of force, combined with the
sending their entire forces -more or less- and the
ambition to conquer Europe (Her VII.8,3), implies
expeditionary forces sent as reinforcements for

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

Fig. 2 The wall of the Phocians: open circuit. The wall stems from the sheer rock, allows control of the road by
missiles from its top and sallies from the gates. Peacetime traffic is unhindered.

the projection of advanced defense by distant have been the entire hoplite levy.1 The Phocians
southern Greek states. The latter were more or sent an expeditionary force of 1000 Hoplites, the
less token forces, according to politics. A strong Locrians their whole army (Her VII.203), which
commitment implied tactical levies, a half-heart- was a meager 1000 hoplites (Diod XI.4, 7).
ed one was obvious by sending small, standing The Spartans were in the middle. Herodotus
units (brotherhoods-in-arms) of the respective mentions only the 300 crack Spartan troops (Her
poleis, similar to the 300 Spartan Hippeis. Thus, VII.202). These are easily identified as the Hippeis/
instead of some thousands, the medizing Thebans Knights (Thuc V.72,4), drafted in a yearly basis
dispatched 400 (Her VII.202), possibly a special by three appointed officers, the Hippagretae, also
unit ancestral to the Sacred Band (Plut Pelopidas of yearly commission (Xen Lak Polit IV.3), each
XVIII.1). This is very likely as their command- Hippagretas drafting 100 adolescents, obviously
ing officer is the father of the commander of an- from each of the 3 Dorian tribes. But Herodotus
other 400-strong Theban unit which, in 431BC, also mentions Lakedaimonians when narrating
infiltrated in pure Special Operations mission to the battle (i.e. Her VII.208, 211), a far wider
occupy Plataea (Her VII.233). term historically encompassing Spartans and
The stout Thespians, of the very few Boeo- Perie- koi. He also makes clear that the Spartans,
tians not to medize, sent 700 troops (Her not, stayed to die with the King (Her VII.220); so
VII.202), which might have been their entire the survivors of the rest of the Lakedaimonians
hoplite army (perhaps at 2/3, expeditionary were
strength). Still, in later action, in Plataea, 479 BC
1 Herodotus in IX.30 counts them as combat troops, not
the city is men- tioned as having no hoplites due logistics personnel and explicitly states they had no
to their annihi- lation at Thermopylae (Her hopla, thus making obvious the origin of the word
Hoplite, con- trary to the beliefs of many modern
IX.30), so 700 must
scholars as Lazanby- and Whitehead, 1996.

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

Fig, 3 The routes for a Special Operations squadron sent to assassinate Xerxes. The sea-river route is longer and takes
the party in front of the whole camp. The mountain route allows better cover and access near the Royal Tent.

sent back, probably as the only Laconian IV.5), but consis-

troopers with live experience of the Persian war
making. Diodorus directly enumerates a
thousand Lake- daimonians and 300 Spartans
(Diod XI.4, 5), but the Greek is unclear and may
be translated as both “and” or “including”. The
latter is preferable; a bit previously (Diod XI.4,
2)the full strength of the force, has been set to
1000, as correctly no- ticed by Flower, 1998.
Should 1000 be the total, the 700 missing in
Herodotus’ account might have been another
Laconian unit mobilized and deployed, most
probably not comprised (entire- ly) of Peers. This
leads to a division-size (Mora) unit of 1000,
standard in most of Greece. A Mora situated or
stationed north of Sparta, mobilized at short
notice and manned to 2/3, the standard
expeditionary strength as Thucidydes says of the
Peloponnesian armies invading Attica (II.10,2)
fills the bill. This 1000-man total strength is
much more than for Morae in the age of
Xenophon and as described by him (Xen Hell

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)
tent with Greek practice and Spartan population
abundance before the catastrophic earthquake of 464
BC. As Plutarch points out, the strength of Morae is
mentioned as anything between 600 and 1000 men
(Pelopidas, XVII) and such differenc- es might stem
from different manning /mobiliza- tion levels or
different ceilings in different times/ generations. A
1000-strong territorial division is perfectly compatible
with the Spartan army of the period. This line of
thought can be expanded to identify this Mora as the
Skiritae, renown to later military authors for their
prowess in security, ir- regular warfare, and
reconnaissance (Xen Lac Pol XII.3 & XIII.6). If such
practice can be retro-pro- jected, Skiritae, who are
Lakedaimonians but not Spartans, nimble and good
on mountain warfare were an excellent choice both
for the terrain in Thermopylae and for the Special
Operations un- dertaken (see below).
On the other hand for such a forced march and in
view of the terrain and the nature of the fight-

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 Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

Fig. 4-5 Feigned flight, standard execution.

All phalanx troops turn on their heels where they stand (A) and flee in full face and proximity of the enemy (B) with
the rear ranks –usually veterans-slowing down the front ones, usually faster and younger in age. Even if they make
good their escape, they have the enemy at their heels (C) and about-facing, regrouping and dressing the line (D)
almost simultaneously, to shove the enemy off is extremely difficult

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

ing, Leonidas might have taken with him a unit force (ThucII.10, 2). Multiple expeditions
of 1,000 young troops from the whole realm. were
These troops may be the ones sent as
advance-guard to Megara in 479 BC while the
rest of the Spar- tan-and Allied- Army were
stationed in Isthmus (Her IX.14), and the ones
executing the bait-re- treat plan in the battle of
Platea (Her IX.57, IX.85). They should have been
the youngest, and Plutarch (Apoph. 225e)
mentions unmarried youngsters sent home by
Leonidas as couriers to the Ephors. Althoughfor
this campaign Leonidas had enrolled fathers of
male kids to ensure the survival of the bloodlines
(Her VII.205), Spartans married young and were
encouraged, if not pushed, to sire just as young
(Xenophon Lac Pol I.6) but exceptions would
always present, especially in a territorial division
and/or a young age-class.
Practically, the usual Greek expeditionary
drafting practice seems to fall under three
possible mobilization quota:
1. The dispatch of the standing armies, elite
groups of different stock and origin in each city-
state, usually called “Logades” by Herodotus
(IX.21), to indicate they were under oath. Such
groups were of standard strength for each city-
state, but standardization did not occur among
different states. This corresponds well with the
re- nowned “Sacred Band” of Thebes (Plut
Pelopidas XVIII.1) through the expanded similar
corps of late 5th-early 4th centuries (“Logades” of
Argos in Thuc V.67,2;“Epilektoi” (Elites of
Phliousin Xen Hellenica VII.2,10; “Epilektoi” of
Arcadia Diod XV.67,2 & XV.62,2); it also links
with the past, as the Trojan War was possible due
to the suitors’ oath before Helen’s choice of
Menelaus.
2. The mobilization of their whole levy (Pan-
demei) for short duration and, preferably, with
the opponent nearby (Her VII. 206, Diod XI. 4,
4).Thespiae clearly implemented this quotum, as
did other states as the Locrians (Her VII. 203).
3. The draft of the majority of the full levy,
by age criteria (Her IX. 12). This most probably
was following a 2/3 ratio for the expeditionary

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 Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)
not very common at the era, and thus we cannot
deduce if the sum of the expeditionary forces was
following the 2/3 rule or other arrangements were
made, as in imperial Athens (Thuc I.105, 3-4) and 4th
century Sparta (Xen Hellenica VI.4).
Herodotus never mentions the 2/3 rule -but he
also fails to mention that the 300 Spartans are
Knights/Hippeis; arguably, this rule seems valid: the
Spartan Peers are 8000 according to Demara- tos (Her
VII. 234) and at Plataea the expeditionary force has a
core of 5.000 Peers (Her VIII. 10), a
0.62 compared to the 0.66 which equals the 2/3.
It is possible that the implementation of case 1
instead of 3 by the Spartan state was causing con-
sternation to allies and allowed to Thebes to recip-
rocate by sending 400 men. Spartans served from 20
to 60 years of age, and the ones from 20 to 30 were
permanently on alert, sleeping in barracks (Plut
Lycurgus XV. 4 & XXV. 1). Their number adjusted
for the total levy is 2000, coincidental- ly the number
of the expedited reinforcements to Marathon in 490
BC (Her VI.120). By compari- son, the Athenian
naval contingent in Artemisium was 120 triremes (Her
VIII.1) with no less than 170 sailors, oarsmen and
marines for a total of al- most 20000, a 2/3 rate at the
very least.

II) Battlefield-fortifications

The straight of Thermopylae is one of a sys- tem of

3 straights leading from Malis to southern Greece
proper. The position taken by Leonidas cuts the
coastal road along the Euboan Gulf, a route ill suited
for a massive army as far as pro- visions are
concerned, but rather smooth. After a distance and
deep in Epiknemidian Lokrian terri- tory, the road
branched to the coastal way proper and to a SE-
direction, the main route into Boeo- tia through
Elateia, and, along the Kephisusriver, to Thebes. It
was a logical choice. Moreover, it was useful for
combined army-navy operations, and if followed
throughout its length by coast (the Persians used
parallel routes of advance) allowed

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)

6-7-8. Feigned flight, executed as

Reverse Ekdromi.
Slower, veteran troops of the
rear ranks turn in their heels (A)
and retire (B) as fast as possible
unnoticed by the enemy as the front
ranks, with the youngest and
fleetest troops stand fast and
obstruct the view. Having thus
gained a distance, the veterans turn
and reform while the front ranks
suddenly break and run at full
speed, unhindered by rear ranks
(C). After a moment’s startle, the
enemy follow hot at their heels,
without making visual contact with
the regrouped veterans. The fleeing
youngsters retire among the
veterans’ files (D). With the
breathless youngsters to their rear,
the veterans close ranks (E) to face
the pursuing, disorganized enemy
with dressed line and compact,
dense formation. Having caught
their breath (F) the younger hoplites
regroup and join the files of the
veterans to reinforce the phalanx
and add momentum to the shove.

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Archaeology and Science 11 (2015) Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144)

to support the fleet from ambushes with missile The Phocian fortification repaired,
weapons in a steadily narrowing environment, rebuilt,
near the straits of Eurippus, as Xerxes guides
would have let him know.
The second approach was the Asopos gorge
following the Anopaia pathway and branching to
Phocis and back at the coastal road, behind Ther-
mopylae and Leonidas’ rear, a very steep road
and utterly unsuitable for alarge army and its
trans- ports (Her VII.216). The third road, starts
again from the Asopos gorge near Trachis, but
cuts south through Doris and then offers three
choic- es: Phocis to Boeotia (Her VII.199 and
VIII.31- 33), the way Xerxes did select to move,
or west to Delphi, or South to Amphisa in
Ozolian Lokris and at the north coast of the Gulf
of Korinth. It was at first steep road through
ravines, possibly unsuitable for a large army’s
transports, but lead- ing promptly to friendly and
well-provisioned, hospitable Boeotia, after a
brief incursion to the heart of Greece-
orultimately to the north of the Gulf of Korinth.
The same network was used later by the warring
factions ofGreek civil wars (Xen- HellenikaVI.4;
Paus Boeotika XV.2) and by the Romans (Paus
Achaika XV.3) in their expeditions between
Southern and central Greece.
The area Leonidas occupied was something
of a tourist attraction (Her VII.176). It is difficult
to envisage the terrain: the narrowest (only
onecar- wagons wide: Her VII.200), even if as
narrow as Herodotus states, is unclear in nature.
One side is a steep rock face of the mountain.
What is there from the other side? Most probably
the sea. This might be non-negotiable for
commercial traf- fic, but assault infantry would
have negotiated a detour by plunging up to the
chest in the sea to outflank an enemy, as
happened some months lat- er in Potidaea (Her
VIII.129). No such issue, no similar action has
been described. Thus one has to understand that
at the time the road is consider- ably higher than
the sea level, so as not to permit flanking, and
rather precipitous: troops fallen to the sea are
mentioned as fatalities (Her VII.223).

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Kambouris et al. - Thermopylae Revisited...(127-144) Archaeology and Science 11 (2015)
reconditioned and used (Her VII.176) is usually
thought of as a vertical wall sealing off the road,
something very like the doors or Mordor in The Lord
of the Rings. Indeed such works were used by the
Greeks to cut off enemy forts and cities sit- uated on
promontories and were called Diateichis- moi. The
fortification in Isthmus, progressing in the earnest at
the same time (Her.VIII.71 & IX.8- 9) and performed
both before, by the Mycene- ansunder Atreus, and
after, during Epameinondas’ incursions (Diod
XV.68,3) had been such cases. But there is absolutely
no need toenvision it thus, as there would have been
very little room for pil- lars and a door capacious
enough to allow a laden chart to pass (for peaceful
times), plus parapets for an adequate defense force. It
may very well have been an open circuit, both
edgesattached on the sheer rock of the mountain,
allowing the sta- tioning of a friendly garrison. This
garrison may attempt pitched battle cutting off the
road in the face of the enemy, then fall back through
the gates of the circuit, and continue to gravely harass
the enemy by missiles from the wall. Both Xerxes’
and ancient Thessalians’ cavalry and any trans-
portation using draught animals would have been
unable to pass, even if competent infantry might do
using skillfully their shields.
Herodotus writes-and presents in ominous times,
when Athens and Sparta are already at log- gerheads,
although not in the deadly entanglement of the Great
Peloponnesian War. Phocians are al- lies to Athens
(Thuc I. 107,2), and Thessalians are traitorous
enemies (Thuc I. 107,7). Thus he remains very
considerate towards the former. The little plateau
entrusted to them, more than any way to the rear of
Leonidas, offers an inroad to Pho- cis. By being at
that point the Phocian contingent protects both the
rear of the defenders of Thermo- pylae and the
approach to the motherland. Once taken by surprise
they do not take a last stand po- sition under panic,
but form their phalanx at the point which allows
interdiction to any move to- wards Phocis. Only
under this light is understand- able the absurd notion
of the Persian task force

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not engaging them and they being steady at their straight south (Her VIII.31). So, why had he not done
position (Her VII.217): the Phocians do not en- it
danger their primary mission, the defense of their
territory by engaging away from their command-
ing position (the hill they assembled on, after
two or more days of inspecting the surroundings,
had they to do so. And the Persians, seeing them
out of position and defending another branch of
the crossroads, simply bypass to their mission as
well.

THE UNEASY QUESTIONS

The Persian army emerged from east-north

east having skirted the west coast of the Pagasitic
gulf southwards, a rather easy landscape, and
then turned westwards to skirt the Malaic gulf to
the plain and valley of Spercheios. This area is
Hellas proper (in Homeric geography – Iliad II.
681-5). Since Leonidas had been there first, so as
to repair the fortification and establish acenter of
support operations (Her VII. 176), an incursion
to the Ma- lian Plain, in order to deprive the
invader of food, shelter and fodder was the most
logical thing to do (Green, 1970), and easily
doable by an army only marginally short of
10,000 (Her VII. 202-3). The mention of
Polyaenus (I.32, 3) of an incur- sion carried out
with extreme efficiency and skill by Leonidas
most probably refers to this operation in the eve
of the Battle of Thermopylae.
The questions start from the moment Xerxes
arrives and encamps. Why waiting for some four
days (Her VII. 210) and does not engage at once,
to startle opponents up to this point elusive and
otherwise unwilling to engage, as demonstrated
in the thessalian-macedonian border at Tempe
where they promptly retreated before any action
had started (Her VII.173)? Moreover, why to en-
gage them and not bypass them through the other
straight, to Doris as he eventually did? After all,
once the battle was done and he emerged victori-
ous, he never led his army through the conquered
pass. He went through the gorges to Doris

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inthe first place and engaged in a stupidly boxing the Persian Army away from the
bloody action? Additionally why did he supplies of the fleet to wear it down, if not to
not do it after the first two days, when stop it altogether. It was a different plan from the
direct assault seemed a com- plete failure purely interceptive campaign at Tempe, a land
and a thrust to this direction would have campaign were the Greek fleet was a mere means
broken the deadlock? It would have been of transportation (Her VII. 173). In Thermopylae
bad for his army’s morale, but there was
no rea- son to get despaired-or even
frustrated- as Hero- dotus says (and has
been told by the Greeks of his court, or
rather their descendants, interviewed by
him). Could there be a strong and
determined gar- rison at this point also,
which Herodotus knows/ says nothing
about, and most probably coming from a
native population not very friendly to
the Athenians in Herodotus’ days? May
it be the Malians, prominent as 1000
troops in Diodorus (Diod XI.4,7) but
missing in Herodotus account (Her
VII.203), either for the above reasons or
be- cause they were posted far from the
Thermopylae position? Both Green, 1970
and Bradford, 1980 support such an
eventuality.

OPPOSING MOTIVES-PLANS

The Greek plan should have been a

war of at- trition. Killing enough
opponents would not have been a viable
option, but straining the logistics and
draining the supplies of a vast army
boxed among mountains was another
thing altogether. The Troizen-decree
(Jameson, 1960- EM 13330,
Epigraphical Museum, Athens) reveals
that the real intension of the
abandonment of Athens, a meticulously
preplanned massive operation was to
entrap the huge Persian army in Attica
and de- stroy its fleet, thus aggravating a
supply problem forecasted months before
by Artabanos (Her VII. 49). In this light
the campaign at Thermopylae aimed at

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9. Territorial map of the area of operations in Thermopylae by Map_greek_sanctuaries-en.svg: Marsyas, available

at: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ancient_Regions_Mainland_Greece.png.

it was a predominantly naval campaign 2, as the Some bloody failures and their fragile morale,
expeditionary land force was a mere 4,000 (Her rooted on idolizing the King of Kings’ power,
VII. 202 & Diod. XI. 4,5) compared to 10,000 at mil- itary prowess and diplomatic efficiency
Tempe (Her VII.173). (Polyaen VII. 15,1) would be undermined, and
The same is true for sapping the morale of the the same goes with the authority of the King of
enemy, especially the non-Persian subject troops. Kings fig- ure, an almost divine one.
2 The Spartan reservations, due to the danger of both Still, given enough time the positions may be
oper- ational (by secondary routes and alternate passes)
and stra- tegic (by deep sea raids at the rear) flanking breached, either by sheer exchange rate of casu-
dictated the commitment of limited forces, and this alties, or by flanking, thus three successive ones
agreed with The- mistocles’ wish, and need to use the were selected: Tempe, Thermopylae and
navy he created (Her VII.144) as the primary arm against
the Persians, commit- ting thus most of the full Isthmus. After all, despite at some points being a
manpower of Athens (38,000 out of perhaps 40-42,000) one-sid- ed carnage, the battle, fought
against the enemy, instead of the 20-25% which were the
undermost favor-
Hoplites (10,000).

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10. Perhaps the best geophysical map of the Central Greece comes from
P. Connolly’s “Greece and Rome at War” London: Greenhill.

able terms for the Greeks, had a 5:1 exchange to the extreme rear, to guard against insurrections
rate, with some 20000 Persian versus 4000-odd and also flanking, as the bitter lesson in Tempe
Greek fatalities (Her VIII.24-5); such rate was had shown the Persians capable of. At this stage
unsustainable for the long haul and far below the the main arm was the navy. If the imperial navy
30:1 in Marathon (Her VI.117). But time was of could be kept out of reach of the army resupply
essence. Leonidas’ was really a holding force, to would be a vital issue. The navy had no unlim-
be reinforced as required but the main forces kept ited supplies, it was vulnerable to storms and to

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surprise attacks in unknown coastlines. Practi-

More impressive is the “feigned flight”of the
cally, the Greeks had to intercept one of the two
Spartans (Her VII. 211). Contrary to the Hero-
branches of the Persian War machine to win. If
dotus account, it should have been, more or less,
the Greek fleet kept its own, the Persian could
similar to Ekdromi attested much later by Xeno-
not outflank Thermopylae. If Thermopylae held,
phon (Hellenika Book IV.5), although executed
the royal army could not threaten Euboea and
in inversed spatial terms. The engaged line can-
the mooring base of the Greek fleet. Moreover,
not retreat in the face of the enemy-especially
the Greek fleet of some 270 vessels (Her VIII.2)
of a more numerous and lightly clad enemy- en
could easily embark the whole of Leonidas’
bloc without suffering casualties. Thus the less
army of 7000 (Her VII. 202-3) by adding 25 men
fleet portion, the veterans, posted in the rear
in each vessel, and land them near the Persian
ranks, retreat first, at a double, unnoticed by the
moor- ing, thus eliminating the fleet at the beach,
enemy and reform at a distance but promptly. In
before the Persians establish communication
such cases the original battle order cannot be rec-
between army and navy. This is why Xerxes
reated and one should fight next to any random
attacked. He simply did not want the Greeks
comrade, something that “only troops drilled un-
there. The passage was of little consequence. The
der Lycurgus’ laws can do” (Xen Lac Polit IX.7).
comparative posi- tions and forces though made
Subsequently, the fleetest troops, who must have
the mix extremely flammable. Waiting for 4 days
remained engaged with the enemy, must brake at
(Her VII. 210) was not just to muster his
once and gain some strides-four to six- while
lumbering, gigantic army, which took days to
their opponents are startled. After that, since they
concentrate to a position. He was also waiting for
were not facing missile troops but shock infantry,
his fleet. Not seeing it rang a bell and the assault
they must keep and even open the distance and
to eliminate the land element of the Greek
cover their back with the shield for fear of the
resistance was a reflex reaction from the Persian
occasion- al javelin or stone. Bringing on the
High Command. Still, their instincts were true.
enemy hot on their heels, they cannot instantly
With Leonidas gone, the whole defense plan was
regroup and turn, even if perfectly trained. It is
shattered: the Greek navy with drew, the Persian
much more likely to retire through the files of a
navy made contact with the army normal- izing
line formed by the ones who retired first and are
supplies and the pass to Doris was free.
unnoticed by the pursu- ers. After they pass
through the spaces between files, the line will be
sealed in less than 3 seconds, the running troops
TACTICS
regroup and catch a breath be- hind the last rank
of the line and then join the files to reinforce it.
The Greek tactics mentioned by Herodo-
Herodotus has no idea of Special Opera-
tus imply a universal drill in hoplite armies of
tion sand cannot even imagine them. He is nar-
passing units through each other’s lines in order
row-minded. Speaking of the diver Skyllias, he
to rotate them in combat (Her VII. 212). This is
disapproves of the lore of him swimming a great
easily done in exercise and is the logical solution
distance without coming to surface as impossible
for such problems since the invention of trained
(Her VIII.8). He never wonders if a very human
infantry. But it establishes that the Hoplite infan-
device, like a combination of straw (as snorkel)
try of many Greek states, not only Sparta, had
and stones (as weights) might make him stay un-
the ability of drilling -and under pressure at that.
dersea, without being seen, which was the mean-
Not only they were able to execute under
ing of the lore: nobody counted his breaths. They
pressure, but paired to other similar troops, with
simply had not been able to spot him on the sur-
whom they had never trained before.

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face. In such a set of mind, the notion of night raid.

Skyllias- cutting the anchor ropes of the Persian
fleet and thus maximizing the disastrous effect of
the storm (Paus Phocika XIX. 2), is unthinkable.
It is no great wonder then that he says nothing
on the assassination attempt mentioned by other
historians (i.e. Diodorus XI.10). It was very
Spar- tan, and very possible to try such an act; it
was also Spartan not to talk about it (Thuc
V.68,2), es- pecially at a time when previous
friends became mortal enemies and any detailed
account for past battles might be used to deduce
their current oper- ating procedures and modus
operandi. Assassina- tions and Special
Operations were an integral part of ancient Greek
politics. Trained professionals were available,
although not in abundance. Espe- cially the
Spartans had a name for such attempts and skills
due to Krypteia (Plutarch Lycurgus XX- VIII.1),
in some cases even involving the kings
themselves as operators (Paus Messeniaka IV.3).
Flower, 1998 noticed the Krypteia connection
but fails to mention that the 300 Knights in this
season are older, more experienced and perhaps
selected with this chapter of their CV in mind, as
well. But the story of Diodorus (XI.10) is not
satisfactory. The tent of the king would have
been as far as possible from the line of access of
the enemy. The two armies were distant enough
for the sentries to detect a massive approach,
even as clandestine as Diodorus tries to make it
(Diod XI.10, 1). The version of the crack unit
sent, not led, by Leoni- das, is a much better bet-
and here Diodorus (in XI. 9,2) might have had it
right, concerning the num- ber of raiders
involved: 500. The lore3wants it to swim from
the Greek position, from someplace with smooth
shoreline so as to enter with the nec- essary gear,
walk-swim the distance to the river, then upriver
to the tent of the King. Still, although clandestine
enough, the distance and time start to become an
uneasy factor, and the task force has to move
upriver throughout the Persian camp, as the

3 P. Green in Xerxes at Salamis 1970; but previously, the

movie “The 300 Spartans” of 1962 shows a seaborne

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king’s tent is always upriver, to water Persians, in case the King had been
with clear and pure water. incapacitated, and once that failed, he fell back.
As it is a clandestine operation and But this is hard- ly believable: in such a case he
the instiga- tor perished, we may never would have cov- ered his rear with the rest of the
learn the exact facts, but it is very army guarding the narrowest part inversed, to pin
conceivable that the lore is some- what the flanking force, and he would have thrust his
distorted. A just as clandestine and faster meager force in deep and compact formation to
ap- proach, straight to the tent of the pierce as deep as possi- ble into the Persian
king, would have been by marching the camp and lines. But Herodo-
opposite way than that of the flanking
force of the Persians (Her VII.215-21). In
the dead of night the two groups might
have lost each other easily-or rather the
Persians the sneaky Greeks, especially if
the latter are acknowledged “Special
Operators”, as Skiritai might have al-
ready been (Xen XII.3 & XIII.6; Thuc V.
67,1) or members or Krypteia surely
were (Plut Lycur- gus XXVIII.1). This
version explains very well why Leonidas
did not try to intercept the flank- ing
force, although he was informed early
enough (Her VII. 219). He did not want
to have any noise or commotion in that
area, so as to keep the guard of the
Persian camp down. The attempt was
made and had some Persian officials
killed, such as the two brothers of Xerxes
(HerVII.224), who cannot be explained
as casualties in any other way. Nei- ther
the attrition approachnor the assault
attempts of the Persian army included
risking higher offi- cials, much less
princes. The late time of the as- sault of
Xerxes at the pass (Her VII.223) the third
day implies that the camp was in an
uproar which delayed the usual early
dawn onset of hostilities by the Persians.
Otherwise he would have at- tacked as
early as possible to pin the Greeks and
make retreat impossible, and also to take
their attention away from the flanking
force. Leonidas advance in the open (Her
VII.223), might thus be explained as
trying to give a final blow to the

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tus, explicitly states that he had his line extended difference to the Persian establishment and
(Her VII. 223) and sent the rest of the army away the well provided, guarded, conditioned ad
(Her VII. 222). The latter might have been deser- even
tion. The key factor, though, that weighs against
desertion is the deployment to an extended line.
This serves one purpose only, to expose as many
troops to enemy contact so as to maximize
enemy engagement and casualties in shock
action. This assassination attempt, along with the
carnage and consternation of the two previous
days, the loss of his relatives and the old case of
murder of the Per- sian embassy (Her VII.133)
allowed, or imposed to Xerxes the ill-treatment
to the corps of Leo- nidas (Her VII.238),
considered at the same time sacrilegious,
criminal and blasphemer to Gods and Humans.
There is also another issue, little noticed but
of paramount importance: the method of
command. It is often discussed but rarely, if ever,
well under- stood in technicality and detail and
compared to later and modern practice. The
Greek way was to lead, and the commander,
once the order was set and the missions
delegated (if any) took his posi- tion in the line to
fight. In some cases, as in Mara- thon and
Plataea, a degree of overview and control was
secured by the Commander-in-Chief in order to
intervene and orchestrate more elaborate actions,
and in Thermopylae the exchange of
detachments (Her VII. 212) show such a
Command and Control function properly
exercised by Leonidas.
But what about the Persians? They are often
ridiculed for ERECTING, manning and
operating a lavish observation platform, at a
proper, com- manding feature of the landscape,
for Xerxes (the Commander-in Chief), with
every possible com- fort and luxury as
mentioned for both Thermopy- lae and Salamis
(Her VII. 212 and VIII. 90 respec- tively). There
are royal scribes, taking notes (Her VIII. 90).
Really, one can wonder what difference is there
between Xerxes establishment and 19th century
observation position for commanders and staff,
or even 20th century. Is there a concep- tual

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cozy American Headquarters (especially General
Headquarters, like of Eisenhower)? Moreover, no
such establishments are mentioned for any sub-
ordinate commanders, who also take part in the battle;
Datis and Artaphrenes are shown in Poi- kileStoa in
Athens engaged in Combat, Mardo- nios was Killed-
in-Action in Plataea (Her IX. 64) as were other
Persian commanders in Mycale (Her IX.102) and
Admirals in Salamis (Her VIII. 89). Thus there
simply was one more level of Com- mand in the
Persian structure, reserved for the King-of-Kings.
This might be the true meaning of Xerxes thinking
that his troops in Artemisium fared ill due to the lack
of his presence (Her VIII. 69). It may have been not
just the watchful eye of the King, to deal rewards and
punishments (Diod XI. 8,1), but also of the High-
Command, to direct the battle against a sneaky
enemy. This of course meant that the Greeks did not
need to fool the Per- sians; it was enough to fool
Xerxes, as supposedly happened in Salamis (Her
VIII. 75).
In Thermopylae, this concept is obvious: The
Persian High Command, despite the dismal bat-
tlefield performance, never lose control of their troops
and the battle. Always at the ready, reserves lined up
and sent as required (Diod XI.7,2), retreat allowed
(Diod XI. 7,4) or denied (Diod XI. 8,3), panic waves
contained (Her VII.212) and, most of all, adaptability:
from the decision to attack with the elite troops in the
first day (Her VII. 211), to take defenders unawares,
to the change of meth- od. The storm tactics of the
first day (more than one- Her VII. 211) to the attrition
attempt of the second day (Her VII. 212) to the
holding action and flanking of the third (Her VII.213
& 223).
Xerxes throne and observation post in Ther-
mopylae should have combined view of the pro-
spective battlefield with security and safety. One
could thus deduce that it should have been posted
over the first gate, high up for better view but not on
the main ridge; should the main ridge were at-
tainable by that position, his troops would have
flanked the position of the Greeks.

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OPERATIONS to put this numerical superiority, and the high mor-

The Persian army was able to divide and fol-

low parallel routes. After crossing at Europe in
the Hellespont, but definitively from the muster
and inventory count at Doriskos all the way to
the Chalcidian peninsula,it is explicitly stated
that it advanced in three routes (Her VII.121),
although there is enough uncertainty as to these
itinerar- ies, as Herodotus is not very clear. From
Therme, present day Thessaloniki the army
follows, up to Thermopylae, one route and this
route is always away from the sea (Her VII.131
and VII. 196- 198). The army is not moving
along the coast for mutual support with the fleet,
a fact unforeseen by the Greek army of 10.000
who tried to intercept it before it enters into
Thessaly, at Tempe (Her VII.173). Very
probably it enjoys fleet transporta- tion for
replenishing provisions.
The expeditionary Standard Operating Proce-
dure is for the fleet to subdue the coastal areas by
landing infantry and cavalry parties (Her VIII.23)
and the army to strike inland. Rendez-vous
points are established for provisioning, in a way
very similar to the operation planning of
Alexander the great 1.5 centuries later in which
case two pos- sible meeting areas are obvious
from special and remporal parameters, Alos in
Pagasetic Gulf and the Maliac Gulf. Thus the
Persians did not follow the coastal routes neither
to enter Thessaly from Northern Greece, nor after
Thermopylae to enter southern Greece (Her
VIII.31). These areas, along with the island of
Euboea and the east and south coastline of Attica
were delegated to the fleet which carried a
landing force of more than 40.000 troops (1200
capital vessels with 40 marines per ship –Her
VII.184- as this was the number en- countered
and impressing the Persians in the na- val battle
of Lade in 494 BC in the Chiantriremes – Her
VI.15).
After Thermopylae, the Persian army was re-
ally vast for the mission at hand. It was a waste
of resources and a bad practice logistics-wise not

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al after the victory, to good effect and two parts were unequal, but not vastly. It is not a
expand the occupation footprint. The group or some units dispatched, it is a hefty part
western Greece, west of Pindus, was not of the army. This, according to previous practice
into the operational planning of the means following two itineraries, with two
Persians, although it was important separate objectives. The second force, moving
enough a front in the Peloponnesian War. westwards through, and not to, Delphi, intended
It is plausible that operations in that area to crossto Peloponnesus in Achaia, thus outman
were meant to take place after the oeuvring the Greek army
subjugation of Peloponnesus, with the
fleet moving northwards into the Ionian
Sea. The Persian high command knew
the geography of Greece due to the
expatriates, and most of all due to
Demaratos of Sparta (Her VII.209). This
one must surely have informed Xerxes
that his own ancestors, the Dorians,
failed to invade Pelopon- nesus through
the heavily fortified Isthmus (Her IX.26),
but succeeded by emerging at the north
of the Gulf of Patras and crossing at Rio,
by ships built in Naupaktos, nearby (Paus
Phocika XL- VIII.10). Given that this
area, NW Peloponnesus (Achaea) was
medizing heavily (Paus Achaika VI.3), it
was natural to attempt a crossing there,
es- pecially after the varnage at
Thermopylae, which could get worse at
Isthmus. Thus, the Persian army once in
Boeotia should have sent a division of
some strength south-westto subjugate
western Phocis and Aetolia and cross
into Peloponnesus with ships to friendly
territory, thus flanking the defenses at
Isthmus. The rest of the army could
advance to Athens to deliver punishment.
Although we do not fully appreciate
it, this is exactly what happened! The
abortive Persian raid to Delphimight
have not been a plundering oper- ation,
as Herodotus thought. Plunder was
within the scope, but not really the
objective: Herodo- tus states that at
Panopeus, a crossroad, the army divided
in two, and the larger part continued to
Boeotia and Attica, and the lesser part
towards Delphi (Her VIII.35). Thus the

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at Isthmus, as had happened in Tempe and even- royal person to Persia (Her VIII.115), to
tually at Thermopylae.This course of action may prepare for possible retaliatory inva-
have been decided after Thermopylae, at the staff
meeting (Her VII.234-235) where Demaratus
pro- posed landing at Kythera. So, a change of
plans is possible after Thermopylae: south
through Asopos gorge to Doris and Phocis, with
the main body turning SE to Boeotia and Attica
and anoth- er body dispatched to a western
campaign. Other combinations of itineraries were
possible, but the route chosen offered the best
combination of secu- rity for the whole army, the
least warning for the Greek high command and
an easy access to Attica for the main body of the
Army.
Themiracles at Delphi (Herod VIII. 38),
which demoralized and pushed back this force to
the rest of the army, did not just save the
temple, but actually won the campaign. This
corps after Delphi would have emerged to the
north shore of the gulf of Korinth, easily
occupying the coast- al towns and
commandeering vessels to cross to Peloponnesus
in Rio, a replay of the invasion of the Dorians,
with no Greek fleet to counter, nor any hostile
coastal state to resista disembarkation as in
Marathon.
This prospect coming to null, Xerxes had to
opt either for an assault in Isthmus, or for a na-
val victory to be able to cross by sea to Eastern
Peloponnesus, where Argos, bitterly hostile to
Sparta, offered a safe bridgehead (Her VII.149).
The terrible carnage in Thermopylae took a toll
in Xerxes’ psyche and decided not to seek land
battle in straights, especially if augmented by
defensive works, against massive Greek hoplite
infantry. Thus he played the naval card at Sala-
mis, at an inopportune moment: the time for
naval operations in Greek waters was running
thin and autumn gales might at any time exact
even heavi- er casualties from his fleet than
before, off Pelion (Her. VII.190) and destroy
amphibious attempts. Once this card was burnt,
he never contemplated that a ground assault in
Isthmus would turn the tide and retreated his

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sions, leaving a much decreased, but fully capa- ble
occupation army way back, in Thessaly (Her
VIII.113), north of Thermopylae, to re-establish the
imperium to the areas he had retreated from. The
invasion of Peloponnesus was not forthcom- ing-and
history proved him right. Thermopylae and Delphi
won the war for the Greeks long be- fore rams and
oars got blooded in Salamis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient Sources
Diodorus Sicilus Bibliothiki Historiki Herodotus
Muses
Homer Iliad
Pausanias ElladosPeriegesis/ Achaika Pausanias
ElladosPeriegesis/ Boeotica Pausanias
ElladosPeriegesis/ Korinthiaka Pausanias
ElladosPeriegesis/Messeniaka Pausanias
ElladosPeriegesis/ Phocika Plutarch Bioi/
Pelopidas
Plutarch Bioi/Lycurgus
Plutarch Apophthegmata Laconica
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REZIME Persijanci nakon pobede nikad više nisu

PONOVO O TERMOPILIMA
prošli ovim klancem, već su birali druge pravce,
što se kosi sa logikom izbora za mesto bitke;
KLJUČNE REČI: TERMOPILI, LEONIDA,
izgleda da je ona pre bila demonstracija moći,
SPARTA, STARA GRČKA, RATNA TAKTIKA,
nego istinska potreba u sastavu ratne operacije.
SPECIJALNE OPERACIJE.
Grčka taktika, o kojoj piše Herodot, ukazuje
kako na uobičaje- nu vežbu hoplitskih jedinica, a
Bitka koja je presudno uticala na naše poima-
koja se sastojala od njihovog jedinica kroz bojne
nje grčko-persijskih ratova i antičkog vojevanja
redove, kao i na spartanski taktiku bacanja
još uvek sa sobom nosi brojne skrivene ili nera-
projektila, manje ili više sličnu Ekdromiju, o
zjašnjene podatke. Oni se ne uklapaju u domen
kojem je kasnije pisao Ksenofon (Hellenika, knj.
uobičajenih tumačenja, a mogu se objasniti samo
IV, 5), doduše izvedenu obrnutim redosledom.
nakon pažljivog posmatranja, čitanja i zaklju-
Na kraju, politika iz vreme- na Herodota svakako
čivanja. Ko su zaista bili Leonidini vojnici, njih
nije dopuštala da se govori o noćnom napadu
300? Uobičajeno je mišljenje da je Fokidski zid
Spartanaca na persijski logor, o kojem je kasnije
pregrađivao Termopilski klanac. Međutim, on bi
pisao Diodor, niti o pravim razlo- zima zbog
ujedno presecao i najbolju moguću saobraćajnu
kojih fokidske jedinice nisu uspele da zadrže
komunikaciju. Najverovatnije je da se nalazio u
svoje položaje. Zatečeni, oni su radije bi- rali da
blizini, otvoren kružni put koji se spušta sa ste-
prepreče Persijancima put ka Fokidi, njiho- voj
na, ne ometa saobraćaj, ali omogućava kontrolu i
domovini, nego ka Leonidi i njegovoj vojsci.
možda presretanje projektila.

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