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FINAL REPORT
VOLUME 7
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
C
A B D
A. Safety assessment personnel at work in the Christchurch Central Business District after
the 22 February 2011 earthquake (source: Applied Technology Council)
C. The Building Act 2004, the Chartered Professional Engineers of New Zealand Act 2002
and a building consent application pack
D. Context for the new Square, the civic heart of central Christchurch (source: Central City
Development Unit/Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority)
ISBN: 978-0-478-39562-
4 (Final Report Microsoft
Word)
ISBN: 978-0-478-39577-8
(Volume 7 Microsoft Word)
Contents
Section 1: Introduction
Section 2: Building management after earthquakes
2.1 Introduction
2.2 New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency management framework
2.3 The building safety evaluation process
2.4 The development and maintenance of the building safety evaluation process
2.5 Delivery of the building safety evaluation process
2.6 Transition from the civil defence response to the recovery phase governed by
territorial authorities
Section 3: Roles and Responsibilities
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Current building control framework
3.3 Quality assurance
3.4 Leadership
3.5 Clarity about roles and responsibilities
Section 4: Training and education of civil engineers and organisation of the civil
engineering profession
4.1 Introduction and overview
4.2 Legislative framework
4.3 The engineering profession
4.4 Education and training of engineers
4.5 Current ethical rules
4.6 Professional and learned societies in civil engineering
Section 5: Canterbury Regional Council and Christchurch City Council –
management of earthquake risk
5.1 Approach under the Terms of Reference
5.2 Introduction
5.3 The Resource Management Act 1991
5.4 Regional and district planning
5.5 Technical information
5.6 Earthquake risk management
5.7 Zoning
5.8 Subdivision consents
5.9 Geotechnical investigations and consenting requirements
5.10 Future measures
5.11 Conclusions
Appendix 1: New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Guidelines
Appendix 2: The Christchurch City Council placards
Appendix 3: The CPEng Certification Form
Appendix 4: Section 124 notice
Appendix 5: Design features report example
Section 1:
Introduction
• building readiness to respond to the disaster; Emergency Management Strategy7 and a National
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan8.
• responding to the disaster; and
The National Civil Defence and Emergency
• setting up recovery processes that reduce the Management Plan is set out in an Order in Council
impacts of future disasters. (the National Civil Defence Emergency Management
Plan Order 2005) and is supported by a Guide9.
These documents identify community goals, set out
how to respond to a national emergency and
describe how to support the local management of
emergencies.
Each local authority must plan and provide for civil The NZSEE3 records that the scale of the rapid
assessment operation carried out after the September
defence and emergency management within its district.
earthquake was large by international standards. The
A fundamental principle in New Zealand’s civil defence
civil defence and emergency management response to
framework is the idea that the amount of detail that a
the February earthquake was on a scale unprecedented
local authority puts in its emergency management plans
should reflect the level of risk a particular disaster in New Zealand. ATC6 states that:
poses to the buildings in the district. The emergency
The extent of liquefaction, the extensive damage to
management plans for larger cities and areas of higher
mid-rise and high-rise buildings, and the challenges
seismicity should therefore be more detailed and posed in the evaluation, repair, and recovery
specific. process were unprecedented.
Overall Within hours Civil Defence Assess Emergency No entry of premises, no formal
Damage after event staff, aggregate services, records, emphasis on extent of
Survey emergency damage territorial damage, areas of high impact,
service action and authority staff, identifying areas of priority for
plans, territorial identify Civil Defence rapid assessment, estimating
authority action affected volunteers manpower and skill base
plans areas needs etc
Detailed Typically Building Ascertain extent Engineers, Meets insurance and restoration
Engineering longer-term, owners, of structural architects and requirements under the Building
Evaluation but may be insurance damage, loss adjusters Act 2004
and Remedial immediate companies, establish losses
Work for critical Territorial for insurance contractual These evaluations are likely to
structures Authorities purposes, and agreement involve review of construction
recommend documentation, and the
remedial work preparation of detailed
to restore engineering reports
functionality
and compliance
with Building
Code
Table 1: Summary of building safety evaluation inspection categories (source: NZSEE Guidelines, 2009)
An initial purpose of the Overall Damage Survey is to Level 2 Rapid Assessments should be carried out by
identify the need for urban search and rescue structural, geotechnical or territorial authority engineers.
operations. The rapid assessment phase of the building They are usually carried out on larger, more complex
safety evaluation operation typically takes place after buildings, but will include critical facilities such as
the urban search and rescue efforts are complete. ATC hospitals. They are also carried out on buildings that
has expressed the view that carrying out the Overall have had a Level 1 Rapid Assessment that has resulted
Damage Survey in a step-by-step way, as occurred on in a recommendation that evaluators carry out a Level 2
the first day after the February earthquake, was very assessment. The Level 2 Rapid Assessment is a more
efficient and effective. detailed visual assessment lasting from one to four hours,
examining both the interior and exterior of the building.
2.3.2.2 Rapid assessments
Level 1 and Level 2 Rapid Assessments are
Carrying out rapid assessments is the next step in summarised in the following flow charts.
the building safety evaluation process. The rapid
assessment phase is made up of two assessments:
The Royal Commission confirms that life safety should The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
be the one, overarching objective for the management supports using the building safety evaluation process
of buildings after earthquakes. However, we also for other disasters. If it can be used after a range of
consider it appropriate to have different secondary disasters, particularly floods, it becomes more cost
objectives at different times. In the short-term, the effective to develop and maintain this process; 70 per
Royal Commission considers that life safety should be cent of emergency declarations since 1963 have been
the objective that is most emphasised in the rapid flood-related. The Royal Commission accepts that the
assessment phase of the building safety evaluation building safety evaluation process should be applied to
process. As the civil defence and emergency a range of disasters.
first building safety evaluation guidelines in 1991,
Recommendations the rest of the country after the September and February
earthquakes; some engineers also volunteered of their
own accord. Local Government New Zealand mobilised
workers from other territorial authorities to support local
We recommend that: council staff.
116. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment, the Ministry of Civil Defence 2.4.4.2 Availability of building safety evaluators
and Emergency Management, GNS Science, after the Canterbury earthquakes
the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Approximately 250 volunteers carried out rapid
Engineering and other engineering technical assessments in Christchurch during the state of
groups should research how and when emergency declared after the September earthquake.
building safety evaluators should account for About 75 of these volunteers were engineers who
aftershocks. worked in the rapid assessment teams alongside
117. The building safety evaluation process 24 Urban Search and Rescue engineers. Urban Search
should set out the factors evaluators need and Rescue engineers were able to join the rapid
to take into account when considering how assessment teams and carry out other tasks to support
a building will respond in an aftershock, the local civil defence response because there were
including: no casualties and they did not need to carry out a
rescue operation.
• how close the main shock was to an
urban centre that could be affected by After the February earthquake, civil defence planners
an aftershock; identified the need for up to 100 engineers and a
• the direction of the main shock and any further 50 building control officials to make up the
likely aftershocks; and rapid assessment teams going into Christchurch’s CBD.
Approximately 350 engineers were involved in the rapid
• how soil, ground conditions and any other
assessments carried out during the national state of
relevant factors may affect the intensity emergency.
of the ground motions in an aftershock.
2.4.4.3 Constraints caused by the number of
building safety evaluators available after the
2.4.4 Mobilising a sufficient number of skilled Canterbury earthquakes
building safety evaluators After the September earthquake, the number of
The ability to carry out an effective building safety available engineers limited the number of rapid
evaluation operation depends on the number of skilled assessment teams carrying out evaluations in
evaluators available. For this reason, effective plans Christchurch’s CBD to 29. The limited number of
for the mobilisation of trained professionals at national available engineers particularly affected Waimakariri
and local levels, and for events of different magnitudes, District Council, which used its own building control
are important. officials to carry out rapid assessments until structural
engineers and people with more technical expertise
2.4.4.1 Model based on volunteers became available on 7 September.
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation framework
There were significant issues with the availability of
relies on volunteers. The process was developed by
people to carry out building safety evaluations after
the NZSEE, a volunteer organisation. We have heard
the Boxing Day aftershock. Because the aftershock
evidence that CCC building control officials and other
occurred in the holiday season, many local engineers
council staff are required to support the civil defence
and CCC staff were on holiday and had left the
and emergency management response to a disaster as
city. Further problems with mobilising the volunteer
part of their job description. However, other evaluators
engineers arose when the CCC did not declare a state
such as engineers, architects, and members of the
of emergency. This is because there are difficulties
construction industry are generally volunteers.
with utilising volunteer engineers outside of a state
In New Zealand, professional bodies like the Institution of emergency declared under the Civil Defence and
for Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) Emergency Management Act 2002. We discuss these
and the Building Officials Institute of New Zealand issues further in section 2.4.5.1 of this Volume.
encourage their members to assist after a disaster.
The number of available building control officials also number of buildings than a larger group of engineers
constrained the rapid assessment operation after the with less training or experience. CERA contends
February earthquake. Not every rapid assessment team that this group should be supplemented by a pool of
had a warranted officer to support placing the placards evaluators for larger-scale events.
because Operation Suburb, an extensive evaluation of
suburban residences, reduced the number of building The NZSEE3 also favours using a tiered model. It
control officials available. At its peak, Operation Suburb suggests developing three groups of trained evaluators:
deployed up to 1,000 building control officials, welfare
representatives and Earthquake Commission staff • a small group of experts;
each day. This reduced the number of building control • a larger group of trained building safety evaluators;
officials available for the rapid assessment operation in and
Christchurch’s CBD. The CCC therefore decided to give
• the largest group of potential evaluators who have
temporary warrants to the building safety evaluation
received basic training.
team leaders, who were almost exclusively Chartered
Professional Engineers. This model is illustrated below.
than its September equivalent. They suggest that this, Drawn from
along with a formal roster to keep staff alert, allowed Senior
Building
the building safety evaluation management team to Officials
and structural
support a wider range of activities conducted in parallel. Chartered
Professional
Engineers
2.4.4.4 Options for mobilising a sufficient
number of building safety evaluators
Drawn from
All Building Officials
The main questions are whether volunteer evaluators and
should be paid or unpaid, and how many evaluators Structural Engineers
and
New Zealand needs to carry out rapid assessments Civil Engineers
after a disaster.
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Currently, the Urban Search and Rescue engineers and
and CERA suggest establishing a core team of trained, other engineers who have developed expertise by
registered and warranted building safety evaluators. assisting in the response to overseas disaster events,
This team of building safety evaluators would be a form the smallest group. The middle group would be
national resource that could be called in by the Chief drawn from senior building officials and chartered
Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and structural engineers who wish to become building
Employment to carry out building safety evaluation safety evaluators. The largest group is made up of
operations. The Ministry would decide when and where potential building safety evaluators drawn from all
to deploy this team in conjunction with the civil defence building officials, structural engineers and civil engineers.
and emergency management Controller after a state
The building safety evaluators who assessed buildings
of emergency had been declared. CERA supports this
after the Canterbury earthquakes comprised a small
concept. It has observed that a relatively small group
group of experts and volunteers drawn from all building
of experienced, well-trained engineers could be more
officials, structural engineers and civil engineers. The
effective in completing rapid assessments over a
middle group of senior building officials and structural 2.4.5 Barriers to obtaining skilled building
Chartered Professional Engineers who could be called safety evaluators
on to supplement the small group of building safety
evaluation experts did not exist when engineers 2.4.5.1 The liability waiver for building safety
evaluators
mobilised to respond to the Canterbury earthquakes.
The reports received by the Royal Commission record
The Urban Search and Rescue engineers and the that when the NZSEE Guidelines10 were reviewed from
engineers who have significant expertise gained from 2004 to 2009, engineering consultancies made it clear
their participation in the response to overseas disaster that they would not volunteer their workers for a building
events could become the Ministry of Business, safety evaluation operation without a waiver of liability.
Innovation and Employment’s core team. The middle They wanted a waiver to recognise that engineers would
group would supplement this group of experts in larger be volunteering on a “best endeavours” basis in an
building safety evaluation operations. The largest group emergency situation: engineers would normally evaluate
is made up of the potential building safety evaluators buildings more thoroughly.
who would only be brought in for very large operations.
To find a way forward, the NZSEE convened a large
The Royal Commission considers that establishing a group made up of government, industry and technical
core team of building safety evaluators supplemented engineering societies to discuss the liability issues. This
by two larger pools of potential evaluators is group concluded that section 110 of the Civil Defence
conceptually sound. It recognises that, notwithstanding and Emergency Management Act 2002 was the best
the experience of Christchurch, earthquakes in New way to manage engineers’ concerns about liability
Zealand will for building safety evaluations. Section 110 gives civil
not generally significantly impact on major urban defence workers protection from liability for damages or
centres. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and loss during a state of emergency, unless they acted in
Employment’s core team of building safety evaluators bad faith or were grossly negligent. It states:
should be sufficient to respond to a smaller centre,
such as Gisborne. The middle group could be called 110 Protection from liability
in to assist this core team when an event occurs in a
(1) Except as provided in sections 107 to 109, there
larger provincial centre. If a territorial authority needs to is no cause of action against the Crown, or a
carry out a large-scale, urban building safety evaluation Civil Defence Emergency Management Group,
operation, it could call upon all three groups of potential or an officer or employee or member of any of
them, or against any other person, to recover
evaluators. We discuss the training needs of the middle
damages for any loss or damage that is due
group of building safety evaluators in section 2.4.5.2.4 directly or indirectly to a state of emergency.
of this Volume.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether the loss or
damage is caused by any person taking any
action or failing to take any action, so long as
Recommendations
analysis of the building safety evaluation processes in
several countries indicates that evaluators have liability
protection in California and Japan; evaluators in Italy
and the European Union do not have liability protection.
We recommend that:
The unwillingness of some engineers to carry out
121. Legislation should continue to provide for a
building safety evaluations after the Boxing Day
waiver of liability for building safety
aftershock without the protection of a liability waiver
evaluators carrying out rapid assessments.
clearly illustrates that having a waiver incentivises
individual behaviour. The reports received by the Royal 122. The liability waiver for building safety
Commission describe how some engineers withdrew evaluators should be aligned with the building
as evaluators when the CCC decided not to declare a safety evaluation process instead of being
state of emergency. Griffiths and McNulty5 contend that restricted to an operation carried out in a
this is because the CCC’s contracting management state of emergency.
system could not resolve their concerns about potential
liability outside of a state of emergency. This suggests
that the standard contracting arrangements used by
human resourcing departments may not be sufficient
2.4.5.2 The skills of building safety evaluators NZSEE15 recommends that only Chartered Professional
In addition to constraints caused by the availability of Engineers with experience in earthquake engineering
engineers, the skill sets and abilities of the evaluators determine whether a building is potentially earthquake-
may also affect the efficiency and effectiveness of prone. The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
a building safety evaluation operation. International the number of engineers with this experience before the
literature on building safety evaluations indicates that September earthquake was small.
the quality of assessments produced by evaluators
2.4.5.2.2 Guidance on carrying out DEEs after
can be inconsistent. The Royal Commission has
earthquakes
heard evidence that the quality of both the DEEs and
rapid assessments in Christchurch varied. We have The Royal Commission has received evidence that
also heard evidence that geotechnical engineers engineers carrying out DEEs for building owners were
had to reassess properties in the Port Hills that were expected to use their own knowledge and refer to
incorrectly given a green placard by structural guidance documents produced in New Zealand and
engineers who did not identify the fall hazards from the United States if necessary. We note advice that
the surrounding cliff faces. Some submitters stated some of these overseas guidance documents are not
that, overall, they thought that the poorer-quality directly applicable to New Zealand. Engineers were not
rapid assessments tended to be too conservative. familiar with what needed to be included in a DEE after
International literature on building safety evaluations an earthquake. Some engineers effectively repeated a
also suggests that rapid assessments tend to be Level 2 Rapid Assessment: they did not seek out plans,
conservative. However, the Royal Commission has identify any critical structural weaknesses or adequately
found that this was not the case with evaluations determine the structural load paths in the building.
of unreinforced masonry buildings. In section 4 of Owners confused them with a DEE because they were
Volume 4 we discuss the individual buildings that provided by a Chartered Professional Engineer.
caused the deaths of 42 people when they failed in the
February earthquake. These buildings were nearly all After looking at how engineers carried out DEEs in
unreinforced masonry or brick or block structures. Christchurch following the Canterbury earthquakes,
We note several examples where engineers carried the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment17
out less cautious assessments, such as those on began developing guidelines for engineers to use when
7 Riccarton Road. carrying out DEEs after earthquakes. We consider that
these DEE guidelines should be finalised as soon as
2.4.5.2.1 The skill sets engineers require possible to assist building owners and other decision
International literature indicates that many engineers makers in the rebuild of Christchurch.
may not be skilled enough to carry out good quality
evaluations of buildings damaged in an earthquake.
The NZSEE15 recommendations on how to assess
whether a building is potentially earthquake-prone
Recommendation
also express concerns about the ability of engineers
to assess existing buildings before an earthquake. We recommend that:
This is because the processes used to assess the 123.The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
structural performance of a building in an earthquake Employment should work with the New Zealand
are different from those an engineer would use when Society for Earthquake Engineering, the
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
designing a building. In addition, Saito and Thakur16
and others with appropriate experience and
note it can be particularly difficult to assess moderate
expertise to finalise guidelines for Detailed
damage to a building; it is easier to identify when
Engineering Evaluations as soon as possible.
a building is severely damaged or hardly damaged at
all. Engineers assessing a building’s structural
performance in an earthquake need to assess the way
in which individual structural elements affect the overall
response of the building. This requires considerable
judgement by the engineer, who needs a thorough
understanding of the underlying theory and its empirical
justifications to adequately identify and assess the
observed condition of the building. For this reason, the
2.4.5.2.3 Guidance for entering dangerous buildings 2.4.5.2.4 Training for building safety evaluators
after earthquakes
The lack of specific training for building safety
In section 4.16.4.2 of Volume 4, we discuss the evaluators and the wider engineering community
circumstances in which workers entered the damaged contributed to the variable quality and inconsistencies
Durham Street Methodist Church and lost their lives in in both rapid assessments and DEEs after the
the February earthquake. We highlight the lack of clear earthquakes, which were reported to the Royal
guidelines for engineers and others in assessing the risk Commission. Many of the Urban Search and Rescue
of entering what was essentially a dangerous building. engineers who carried out rapid assessments after the
September earthquake were familiar with the building
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
safety evaluation process: they had supported overseas
building safety evaluators checking buildings in the
CBD Red Zone in Christchurch were nearly caught operations and had received pilot NZSEE training
in them during the second June 2011 aftershock. In in 2010. However, few of the volunteer engineers
addition, engineers carrying out detailed engineering had received direct training on this process, or had
previously used the NZSEE Guidelines. This meant that
evaluations in red or yellow placard buildings may need
a consistent brief for these engineers on the building
to enter them to assess the building. Urban Search
safety evaluation process was desirable before they
and Rescue engineers receive training on assessing
carried out rapid assessments.
the risks to themselves and their team when entering a
building. For this reason, they accompanied the rapid From 5 September 2010, members of the rapid
assessment teams working in Christchurch’s CBD assessment teams received a briefing of about 30
after the February earthquake, to make sure that these minutes on the NZSEE Guidelines and the process they
teams were carrying out their work in a safe way. were
to follow. However, because of when they arrived and
The Royal Commission considers that guidelines should
were deployed, not everyone received this briefing.
be developed to assist building safety evaluators to
New Zealand has yet to develop a field manual for
assess when and how to enter a damaged building.
building safety evaluators to take out with them.
These guidelines should be based on the Urban Search
and Rescue training. We consider that they should be This does not mean that these engineers received no
attached to the guidelines for carrying out DEEs after support in carrying out building safety evaluations.
earthquakes that the Ministry of Business, Innovation The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
and Employment are currently developing. building safety evaluators would hold informal debriefs
with each other at the end of the day. Participants
commented on how valuable these conversations
The NZSEE3 contends that many territorial authorities Some submitters suggest formalising the parallel
believe that they can pick up the NZSEE Guidelines building safety evaluation process that developed after
on the day and use them to run their building safety the Canterbury earthquakes and integrating it with the
evaluation process. We consider it important that official process. Other submitters note the confusion
local authorities should plan for the process in the parallel building safety evaluation process caused
advance. This should occur as part of their civil and question whether it can be successfully integrated.
defence responsibilities. This requirement should be
set in legislation. The Royal Commission supports building owners, their
property managers and tenants taking the initiative
to check out the condition of their building after an
2.5.3 Issues with the placards • if aftershocks cause more damage, the placard
on your building may need to be changed;
We have reproduced the placards used after the
September earthquake in Appendix 2 of this Volume. • tell the council if you find anything that could
The reports we received, international literature on be dangerous; and
building safety evaluations and submitters agree that
• the role owners have in regard to the future safety
the public, and some building safety evaluators, do
of occupants and the public is important.
not understand the meaning of the placards; in the
same way, some do not understand the objectives The Royal Commission considers that the wording of
of building management after earthquakes. These the placard should be changed to a plain English format
sources contend that the wording and the colour of along these lines. This would be easier to read and
the placards is unclear and confusing. A failure to understand in an emergency situation, when people are
understand the wording and meaning of the placards stressed. The messages on the placards could be more
is an issue because the placard is often the main clearly emphasised, so that people notice its text as
way that tenants or the wider public know whether a well as its colour.
building can be entered and used. In particular, green
placards are frequently interpreted as meaning that
the building is “safe” and needs no further inspection.
The development of placard systems in addition to the
Recommendation
official process contributed to this confusion. Issues
also arose when the status of the building and the
We recommend that:
placard on the building needed to be changed.
142. The placards placed as a result of the
The Royal Commission, in the progression from red, to building safety evaluation process should be
yellow, to green, notes that the placards become more rewritten in a plain English format.
wordy and less understandable. We consider the
following sections of the green placard to be less clear
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process uses
than is desirable:
red, yellow and green colour-coded placards to indicate
This building has received a brief inspection only. the status of the building; this type of system is known
While no apparent structural or other safety hazards as the “traffic light model”. Examples of where it is
have been found, a more comprehensive inspection used include project planning, risk management and
of the exterior and interior may reveal safety
prioritising medical treatment in emergency situations.
hazards…
Owners are encouraged to obtain a detailed Part of the appeal of the traffic light model is that the
structural engineering assessment of the building general public is likely to have a basic understanding of
as soon as possible. Report any unsafe conditions
the meaning of the colours. However, this can also
to the Territorial Authority. Subsequent events
causing damage may change this assessment. become a disadvantage. People associate red with
Re-inspection may be required. Secondary damage “stop”, yellow with “caution” and green with “no issues”,
(partition, windows, fittings and furnishings) may be or “go”. The green placard’s colour may reinforce the
hazardous. Electrical and mechanical equipment,
commonly
gas connections, water supplies and sanitary
facilities have not been inspected. held view that the building is “safe” and does not
need to be checked further. The CCC, the NZSEE,
Mr David Brunsdon and Galloway and Hare21 propose
changing the colour of the green placard to white.
They contend that people are less likely to think that
no further action is needed if the placard is not green.
• notices placed by lifeline utility operators. These processes are set out in Figures 9 and 10.
Figure 9: Process for changing a placard from red to green after the state of emergency in 2010 (source: CCC, 2011)
Figure 10: Process for changing a placard from yellow to green after the state of emergency in 2010 (source: CCC, 2011)
Initially, the CCC requested that building owners submit reports varied. Griffiths and McNulty5 contend that, as
a DEE completed by a Chartered Professional Engineer. a result, the CCC effectively became peer reviewers for
We have heard evidence that the level of detail in these DEEs after earthquakes.
2.5.3.2.1 The CPEng Certification Form
2.5.4 Communication tools
To clarify and facilitate change procedures, the CCC
Civil defence and territorial authorities used a variety
introduced a new certification form that Chartered
of communications tools to let the public know:
Professional Engineers submitted to request a change
of placard. This form, reproduced in Appendix 3 of this • what the building safety evaluation process was;
Volume, is known as the CPEng Certification Form.
• what the placards meant;
This form assured the CCC that the building was safe
• the responsibilities of building owners; and
for occupancy and posed no further hazard to people
or property, before the status of a red or yellow placard • how to deal with their damaged buildings.
could be changed. It specifically recognised the danger
These tools included a mix of print, electronic media
falling hazards posed to public safety and the potential
and public meetings. In addition to using flyers and
danger from damage to adjacent buildings, with the
posters, the CCC also set up a web-based newsletter.
engineer stating that these dangers had been addressed.
People had to register to receive this newsletter,
CCC staff discussed when and how to change a
which reduced its reach. Despite this, the media,
building’s status with the certifying engineer if they
building owners, engineers and the public did not fully
needed to consider additional factors like removing
understand what the building safety evaluation process
cordons.
was or the meaning of its placards.
The CPEng Certification Form contemplated that a
The Royal Commission considers that the Ministry of
building was suitable for reoccupation if the structural
Business, Innovation and Employment should be the
integrity, and performance of the building had been
lead agency responsible for any public communications
restored “to at least the condition that existed prior to
about how to manage buildings after earthquakes
the earthquake of 4 September 2010”. This meant that
and other disasters. It should be responsible for this
the building did not have to be made stronger than it
during and after the state of emergency. The Ministry of
had been prior to the September earthquake, before
Business, Innovation and Employment should develop
reoccupation could occur. Consequently, if a damaged
communications material before it is needed and
building was earthquake-prone before the September
release this information as soon as possible after the
earthquake, then it could be reoccupied even though it
disaster. This material should include information about:
was still earthquake-prone after repair. The statement
assumes that people were happy to take on the same
• the extent of the risk posed by the damage the
risk associated with the building as they had prior
disaster has caused;
to the earthquake. We discuss issues of risk and
understanding in section 7.8 of Volume 4. • the implications of aftershocks; and
Recommendation
We recommend that:
144. Formal procedures should be developed that
set out when and how the status of a building
could be changed. The placard on a building
should only be changed if the formal
procedures are followed.
2.5.6 Information management
Recommendations Civil defence and emergency management literature
suggests that access to good quality information is a
key component of making initial assessments of the
We recommend that: situation and informing ongoing decision making. The
NZSEE3 recommends developing a database to receive
145. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
and record information gathered in rapid assessments.
Employment should be responsible for
developing and releasing public communication The information management system used after the
materials about building management after September earthquake, based on an Excel
earthquakes and other disasters during and spreadsheet, was developed by the Urban Search and
after the state of emergency. Rescue Engineering Team Leader, CCC and a civil
146. GNS Science should develop protocols and defence and emergency management consultant on 4
plans to ensure that it is ready to advise September. This spreadsheet became the
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and basis of the information management system that
Employment, other government agencies, developed when the building safety evaluation process
local authorities and the wider public after transitioned to the CCC.
an earthquake.
Griffiths and McNulty5 describe how this information
management system designed for the building safety
evaluation process did not interface well with CCC’s
2.5.5 Information sharing
own systems. The Royal Commission has heard
As well as problems with how authorities communicated evidence that there were other problems with how
with the public, the Royal Commission has heard information on damaged buildings was gathered and
evidence of communication problems between people managed after the September earthquake. Inefficient
and organisations after the Canterbury earthquakes. information recording meant that civil defence
People and organisations failed to share information management, territorial authority staff and building
about the damage to a building with others who needed owners had problems knowing the status of a building
to be involved in decisions about its use, repair or at a given point in time. Middleton and Westlake2
demolition. When discussing information sharing within contend that sometimes the only way to find out if
a civil defence context, Doyle and Johnston23 contend the status of a particular building had changed was to
that effective teams under high pressure commonly carry out a visual check. In addition, sometimes official
adopt a communication style characterised by expecting records would note a change to the building’s status,
people to tell them the information they need to know, but a new placard was not placed on the building.
rather than team members specifically asking for it.
Several submitters propose using information
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that after technology tools to collect and analyse data on
the Canterbury earthquakes, networking was a key damaged buildings. They suggest integrating a variety
tool in obtaining and disseminating information about of tools, such as portable personal computers (e.g.,
the damage to a building and its status. This was tablets and notebooks), GPS and cellular telephones.
particularly important for green placard buildings, Shibayama and Hisada24 found that their electronic
as territorial authorities had no way of finding out information management system, which was based on
information about these buildings after the state of these tools, was more efficient than using conventional
emergency ended. paper-based information gathering methods. This is
despite practical issues with obtaining good quality
Several submitters have suggested that mechanisms
digital maps and using portable personal computers;
that allow different people and organisations to share
technological advances should address these issues.
information more easily should be developed. The Royal
Commission discusses and makes recommendations The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
about information sharing in section 7.5.3 of Volume 4. engineers and building owners were not able to access
records as they were held in the CCC’s earthquake-
damaged building. Consequently, several submitters
suggest digitising building records and storing
them offsite. Like technology-based building safety
evaluation approaches, electronically-based information
management systems need to interface with existing the same as the postal address or the street address
electronic records to work effectively. This may not for the building and/or tenancy. The Royal Commission
be possible, even in first world countries. Although has heard evidence that this led to issues with
some territorial authorities in New Zealand have certain identifying buildings.
building control records on microfiche or in digitised
formats, not all records are kept electronically and Some submitters suggested looking at establishing
stored offsite. This means that it may not be possible to a national unique address system. Middleton and
directly download or access existing building records, Westlake2 note that the United States is exploring
even if the technology to do so was available. how to develop a unique address system based on
mapping coordinates.
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission considers that
digitising building control records and storing them Territorial authorities are responsible for allocating
offsite is good business continuity planning and should road names and numbering in New Zealand. When
be encouraged. We have heard evidence that the they name a road, they are required to advise Land
CCC is encouraging other territorial authorities to do Information New Zealand, which keeps an official
so based on their experiences after the Canterbury national record of all properties in New Zealand.
earthquakes and that the Ministry of Business,
Land Information New Zealand has recently introduced
Innovation and Employment proposes establishing
several initiatives to improve how people access
a national database of building records with several
property information via addresses. In 2011, it began
access points. The Royal Commission understands that
work on a Spatial Data Infrastructure project that pulls
this goal may not be achieved for some time because of
together geospatial data; this project incorporates
the cost to territorial authorities to digitise their records.
information on identifying individual properties. It has
However, we consider that the Ministry of Business,
also introduced a new section on “Property Addressing”
Innovation and Employment and territorial authorities
on its website. These webpages provide information on
should progress their plans to achieve this.
why addressing properties properly is important, who is
responsible for allocating road names and numbering in
150. Land Information New Zealand should (1) If a territorial authority is satisfied that a building
is dangerous, earthquake prone, or insanitary,
continue to work on initiatives that develop
the territorial authority may—
consistent national addressing protocols
(a) put up a hoarding or fence to prevent
and make this information available to the people from approaching the building nearer
general public. than is safe:
(b) attach in a prominent place on, or adjacent
to, the building a notice that warns people
2.6 Transition from the civil defence not to approach the building:
(c) give written notice required work to be
response to the recovery phase carried out on the building, within a time
governed by territorial authorities stated in the notice (which must not be less
than 10 days after the notice is given under
The reports received by the Royal Commission indicate section 125, to—
that there were significant issues in the transition of (i) reduce or remove the danger; or
responsibility for the building safety evaluation process (ii) prevent the building from remaining
from civil defence to normal building management insanitary.
arrangements governed by territorial authorities after (2) This section does not limit the powers of a
the Canterbury earthquakes. We have heard evidence territorial authority under the Part.
from Mr Bret Lizundia that this is an issue that United (3) A persons commits an offence if the person fails
States engineers have not encountered before: he to comply with a notice under subsection (1)(c).
considered that it negatively impacted on the building (4) A person who commits an offence under
safety evaluation operation after the Canterbury this section is liable to a fine not exceeding
$200,000.
earthquakes. This is also the Royal Commission’s view.
In this context, a section 124 notice requires the building
This section considers the need for a transition
owner to reduce or remove the danger the building
mechanism, the NZSEE Guidelines recommendation,
poses to its occupants or the wider public. Reducing
and the mechanism used after the Canterbury
earthquakes. We examine how territorial authorities or removing the danger associated with a building can
should manage buildings after earthquakes, the roles include removing the part of the building that is
and responsibilities different decision makers have in dangerous, securing or repairing the building, or
this, and the management of cordons. We also consider demolition. An example of a section 124 notice used
the barriers building owners faced when they sought to after the Canterbury earthquakes is attached as
repair or demolish their damaged buildings. Appendix 4 of Volume 7.
• allowing for accidental torsion; This step should be followed by the rapid assessment of
individual buildings to locate potential fall hazards and
• considering how the inter-storey drifts should identify buildings that are in urgent need of further
be calculated; attention from the point of view of public safety.
• ensuring that there are valid load paths for seismic Subsequent steps should be based on a number of
forces and gravity loads through the building and considerations which include the extent of the damage,
through details such as beam-column joints; and the characteristics of the earthquake, the likely intensity
of subsequent aftershocks (as advised by GNS Science),
• the attachment of floors to lateral force resisting
the manpower available for the assessment of buildings
elements. and the mix of building types and ages in the city.
Volume 2 and section 6.3.8 of Volume 6 of this Report
address the vulnerabilities of different building types we The system that we are proposing envisages that in
observed from buildings in Christchurch (including the the area in which the state of emergency applies all
CTV building). These should also be taken into account. buildings should be assessed prior to reoccupation.
The Royal Commission considers that there is a lack That process would commence with Level 1 and 2
of adequate guidance given in New Zealand Standards Rapid Assessments. Where the rapid assessment
on the design forces required to tie floors on to lateral process has identified the need for further evaluation
force resisting elements. This aspect of the design is of an individual building, the reoccupation of the
of concern where the primary source of lateral force building would then depend on assessments that vary
resistance is provided by structural walls or braced according to the building’s structural type and the
frames located on the perimeter of the building. In such nature of the earthquake event. Assessments after the
cases, we propose that, where practicable, structural rapid assessments would include a PBA or, at the most
drawings should be examined to check that the floors thorough level, a DEE. The concept of a PBA is similar
are adequately tied into the lateral force resisting to that of the IUE discussed above.
elements. This check should be made in the case of all
buildings to which this consideration is applicable.
We envisage that a PBA would involve examining the of the multi-storey buildings, then all buildings of three
structural drawings to identify the locations of plastic or more storeys (provided in the case of residential
zones and other locations where high strain may be buildings that they contain three or more household
induced. In addition it would involve identifying critical units) should be subjected to a DEE in the months
structural weaknesses, including assessing the level following a major earthquake.
of ductile detailing in columns, beams, beam-column
joints, structural walls, braced frames (concentric and 2.6.2.2.3 Categorisation of buildings
eccentric) and the way in which the floors are tied into To allow for the changes that have occurred in design
the lateral force resisting elements. Ideally in a PBA practice over the years, we propose that buildings are
these locations in the building should be examined to divided into four groups, namely:
identify the extent of the damage. This would require
the removal of areas of ceilings and wall and floor Group 1: non-unreinforced masonry buildings that
linings to allow the level of damage to be assessed. do not have a known critical structural weakness,
Where damage is located in other parts of the building, and either:
the drawings and foundations should be re-examined
until the damage can be satisfactorily explained. • in the case of concrete buildings, were designed to
The objective of the PBA is to identify whether the NZS 3101:199528 or later editions of that Standard;
building has any critical structural weaknesses that and
could result in sudden and/or non-ductile behaviour, • in the case of structural steel buildings, were
such as occurred in the CTV and PGC buildings. Any designed to NZS 3404:199229 (informed by
calculations involved in a PBA are envisaged as being the Heavy Engineering Research Association
approximate in nature and sufficient to determine the guidelines30 published in 1994) or later editions of
order of strength or ductility of a detail or structural that Standard;
element. We address below the situations in which
the PBA would be carried out. We recommend that or have been subject to an evaluation that has shown
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment that the building has 67% ULS or greater (we discuss
further develop the PBA concept, in consultation the term “ULS” in section 6.2.4 of Volume 4);
with the NZSEE and the Structural Engineering
Society New Zealand. Group 2: buildings designed between 1976 and the
mid-1990s, but not included in Group 1;
The following discussion also refers to a DEE, which
Group 3: buildings designed before 1976, but not
should include the calculation of the percentage of
included in Group 1; and
ULS of the damaged structure. The concept of the
DEE is discussed in sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.4.5.2.2 of Group 4: unreinforced masonry buildings.
this Volume.
The extent of post-earthquake assessment of a
Where the initial earthquake is generated by a distant building in each group should depend on the extent
fault, aftershocks may be expected to be of shorter of the damage it has sustained, having regard to the
duration and lower intensity than the main shock. assessment considerations that we have addressed in
Where the fault is close to the city there is the section 2.6.2.1.1 above.
possibility of subsequent aftershocks being closer to
the city than the initial earthquake. In such an event the Buildings used for residential purposes that are three or
ground shaking may be more intense than the initial less storeys in height should be excluded from Groups 2
earthquake and there is also the possibility that the and 3. In the case of those buildings, a pragmatic
directions of the major components of shaking will be approach needs to be taken to assessment and
different from those of the initial earthquake. Both of occupancy, which balances the need for shelter with
these factors can potentially cause damage to buildings safety considerations. In our view other commercial and
not significantly damaged in the initial earthquake. residential buildings should not be occupied until that is
approved in the process outlined below.
We therefore propose that a more conservative
approach is taken to the assessment of buildings The assessment process should also reflect the
when the rupture causing the earthquake is on a local characteristics of the earthquakes, the proximity of the
fault line rather than on a distant fault line. The Royal fault and the nature of the soils in the affected area.
Commission considers that if significant structural We are not able to be precise about these matters
damage has been observed in a significant proportion in advance. The discussion that follows reflects the
understandings that we have developed as a result
of our consideration of the performance of buildings 2.6.2.2.5 Occupation
in the Canterbury earthquakes, which had the
As with the assessment process, the decisions made
characteristics we set out in Volume 1 of our Report.
about the occupation of buildings following a significant
It must be understood that the assessment process
earthquake should reflect the nature of the buildings,
following future earthquakes will inevitably need to
the characteristics of the earthquake, the proximity of
be adapted to the circumstances that then apply.
the fault and the nature of the soils in the affected area.
However, we consider that the assessment process and
The following proposals reflect the experience of the
decisions about occupancy should be informed by an
Canterbury earthquakes.
understanding of the characteristics of the earthquake
and the potential for aftershocks. The civil defence The September earthquake produced shaking in
Controller (and the territorial authority after the state of Christchurch of a level comparable to the design level
emergency has come to an end) should be responsible for the ultimate limit state. However, the duration of
for obtaining authoritative advice about those matters, strong ground shaking was on the low side of what
and making the information available so that those might be expected in other parts of the country.
involved in the assessment process are aware of it. The February earthquake produced shaking with an
intensity that was unusually high and such an event
2.6.2.2.4 Other considerations
is rare. In our opinion, the experience gained from
The Royal Commission considers that the civil defence the September earthquake gives a better guide to
Controller and the Ministry of Business, Innovation what is required for the assessment of buildings for
and Employment (as the agency that deploys the core reoccupation after an earthquake for other locations in
team of building safety evaluators) should decide the New Zealand. Where the geological situation is such
timeframe in which building owners should obtain a that an aftershock may occur on a fault line closer to
PBA and a DEE considering the circumstances and or within the CBD, as occurred in Christchurch with
extent of the disaster. the February earthquake, additional precautions should
be taken.
Given the problems with information sharing, which
we discuss in section 2.5.5 of this Volume, we The Royal Commission considers that, following Level 1
consider that building owners should be required to and Level 2 Rapid Assessments, occupation should be
provide a copy of any PBA and DEE obtained to the based on the outcome of the assessment process set
territorial authority. out below:
• where no significant structural damage was ii) Group 2: buildings designed between
seen and the building has been retrofitted to 1976 and the mid-1990s, but not
67% ULS or greater, a PBA; included in Group 1;
iii) Group 3: buildings designed before
• where significant structural damage is apparent
1976, but not included in Group 1; and
and where the building has not been retrofitted
to 67% ULS or greater, a DEE. iv) Group 4: unreinforced masonry
buildings;
Where the earthquake is located on a fault that is
close to the city or where there is a possibility of an c buildings used for residential purposes that
aftershock or new earthquake closer to the CBD, a are three or less storeys in height should be
higher level of assessment should be made. excluded from Groups 2 and 3. In the case
of those buildings, a pragmatic approach
Decisions about the occupancy of buildings should be needs to be taken to assessment and
made once the appropriate level of assessment has occupancy, which balances the need for
been carried out, and forwarded to the Civil Defence shelter with safety considerations. Other
Controller (while the state emergency continues) and commercial and residential buildings should
to the territorial authority when it is completed, for not be occupied unless approved for
their approval. occupancy in accordance with the process
outlined below;
Recommendations
authorities should be responsible for placing, moving
and removing cordons. Territorial authorities should
take over the responsibility for maintaining any cordons
set up during the response phase after the transition
to normal building management arrangements. This is We recommend that:
because territorial authorities are responsible for 156. Civil defence and emergency management
ensuring that people are safe in public areas, including, should be responsible for setting up and
of course, streets and footpaths. We recognise that maintaining cordons during the state of
this may place a burden on territorial authorities when emergency.
building owners take time to make a decision about
157. Territorial authorities should be responsible
the repair or demolition of their damaged building.
for maintaining any cordons that are in place
The Royal Commission therefore considers that
at the end of the state of emergency until
territorial authorities should be able to recover the
the public space or building they surround is
costs of maintaining any cordons set up due to the
made safe.
damage to a particular building from the building
owners after a reasonable period, which we would 158. Territorial authorities should be able to recover
assess as three months. the costs of maintaining any necessary
cordons from the building owner after three
The Royal Commission considers that the wider months.
roles and responsibilities of statutory authorities,
159. The roles and responsibilities of decision
other decision makers and building owners should
makers should be described in the building
be set in the plans for the building safety evaluation
safety evaluation process. The roles and
process. These plans should set out their roles and
responsibilities should allow for flexibility of
responsibilities during the response and recovery
operation according to the circumstances
phases. We consider that such plans should keep a
and scale of the event.
degree of flexibility, so that people and organisations
are aware of their responsibilities but can respond to
the disaster as appropriate within the circumstances
and scale of the event. 2.6.4 Barriers to action
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that some
building owners were motivated to address the damage
to their building after the September earthquake, but
were not able to carry out work on their buildings
because of problems finding a contractor, insurance
issues, or legislative barriers.
Figure 12: Former Austral Buildings, 603, 605–613 Colombo Street before the February earthquake
Figure 12 shows how this structure can be one, large
unreinforced masonry building that takes up most
of a block. The party walls that divide each part of
the building, while thicker and more substantial than
other internal walls, are not built to be an external
wall. Structurally, each property acts as a part of one
building in an earthquake. As we saw in Christchurch,
this often resulted in the façades of the entire row of
separate properties collapsing onto the street. Figure 13
shows how first floor façades of the Austral Buildings,
acting as one large façade, collapsed outward onto
the Number 702 Red Bus and pedestrians, tragically
causing death.
Figure 13: Former Austral Buildings, 603, 605–613 Colombo Street after the February earthquake
For this reason, such buildings should be assessed as their mutual benefit. CERA32 advise that it has not
one structure by building safety evaluators. Although implemented this provision because a reluctant owner
the intent was that the whole of one structure be is unlikely to see the action as being to their benefit.
inspected and treated as one, and the placards The owners of a row of properties in New Regent
placed on each tenancy or property accordingly, we Street voluntarily acted together to repair and preserve
have heard evidence of instances when that did not their building.
occur. Having separate properties that act as one
structure also caused problems when attempting to The Royal Commission considers that it is important
repair the building, because each property was treated that these buildings are assessed as one structure by
individually by engineers, building owners, territorial building safety evaluators. In section 7.5.4 of Volume 4,
authorities and other decision makers. To address we discuss and make recommendations about the
this issue, section 52 of the Canterbury Earthquakes need for general legislative provision to ensure that all
Recovery Act 2011 allows CERA to direct the owners portions of such structures are able to be strengthened
of two or more adjacent buildings to act together for contemporaneously.
Recommendation
We recommend that:
160. The building safety evaluation process should
direct evaluators to assess properties that
act as one structure in an earthquake as one
structure, rather than as separate buildings.
State of emergency
begins – ends
CDEM Act
Emergency capability
(trigger, powers,
capacity)
Building Act
Figure 14: Proposal for Building Act 2004 emergency building evaluation arrangements integrated with normal building
management arrangements (source: submission from the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management)
In contrast to the current legislative arrangements, building management after earthquakes does not shift
the new provisions propose to build in a gradual from the civil defence and emergency management
shift from building management after earthquakes framework into the building regulatory framework.
and other disasters to normal building management Consequently, it is theoretically possible to manage
arrangements. Under these proposals, the responsibility the process end to end within the territorial authority’s
for the building safety evaluation process and wider building management arrangements.
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management discusses how placing emergency
management provisions in the Building Act 2004
is consistent with New Zealand’s civil defence and
emergency management framework. It33 encourages
“clusters” of agencies to facilitate routine coordination
of readiness planning on a daily, standard arrangements
basis; these clusters may also be activated to carry out
response and recovery activities. In its submission to
the Royal Commission, it contends that each cluster or
agency continuing to work through its primary mandate
as far as practicable is a key principle that underpins
New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency
management framework. Figure 15 demonstrates how
national civil defence and emergency management
plans are informed by and integrated with other
legislative and planning frameworks.
Links between
operational plans
Civil Defence
Emergency Management Act 2002
Figure 15: Linkage between national, regional and local operational plans and arrangements (source: Guide to the
National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan, 2009)
The civil defence Controller is still in charge during a
Recommendation
state of emergency. For example, after the February
earthquake the Ministry of Social Development led the
response of the welfare cluster under the authority of
the civil defence Controller.
We recommend that:
Developing a standard Order in Council that transitions
161. The building safety evaluation and wider
the management of buildings from civil defence to
building management after earthquakes
normal building control arrangements could also address
(and other disasters) framework should be
the problems with the legal status of the placards at
developed and provided for in legislation.
the end of a state of emergency. Drafting a standard
Order in Council in advance would allow the detail of
any proposed changes to legislation, such as those
contained in the Canterbury Earthquake (Building Act)
Orders 2010 and 2011, to be carefully considered.
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission considers that it
would be difficult to guarantee many years in advance
of an event that all of the relevant issues had in fact
been covered. In addition, a standard Order in Council
would still need to be authorised by a special
legislative procedure.
2. Middleton, D., and Westlake, R. (2011). Independent Review of the Response to the Canterbury Earthquake,
4 September 2010. Draft report prepared for the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission.
3. New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (2011). Building Safety Evaluation Following the Canterbury
Earthquakes: Report to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Building Failure Caused by the Canterbury
Earthquakes. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission.
4. Christchurch City Council. (2011). Report into Building Safety Evaluation Processes in the Central Business
District Following the 4 September 2010 Earthquake. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission.
5. Griffiths, E., and McNulty, D. (2011). Building Evaluation Transition Team: Processes Used and Lessons Learnt
following the Darfield Earthquake of 4 September 2010. Draft report prepared for the Christchurch City Council
Inspection and Enforcement Unit. Christchurch, New Zealand: Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission.
6. Applied Technology Council. (2012). Building safety evaluation after the February 22, 2011 Christchurch, New
Zealand earthquake: Observations by the ATC Reconnaissance Team. Draft, as at 13 August 2012. Redwood
City, California, United States of America: Applied Technology Council.
7. The Department of Internal Affairs. (2008). National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Strategy.
Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
8. The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan was made by Order in Council on 14 November 2005,
and became operational on 1 July 2006, in conjunction with the Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency
Management Plan. Section 46 of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 requires that this Plan
be reviewed every five years. The Plan expired in June 2011 and it is currently under review. More information
on the Plan and its review can be found at http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.nsf/wpg_URL/For-the-
CDEM-Sector-Publications-National-Civil-Defence-Emergency-Management-Plan?OpenDocument
9. Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. (2009). The Guide to the National Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Plan 2006 (Rev. ed.). Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
10. New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (2009). Building Safety Evaluation During a State of
Emergency: Guidelines for Territorial Authorities. Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
11. Applied Technology Council. (1989). Procedures for postearthquake safety evaluation of buildings (ATC 20).
Redwood City, California, United States of America: Office of Emergency Services, State of California; Office
of Statewide Health Planning and Development, State of California; Federal Emergency Management Agency.
12. Calvi, G.M., Pinho, R., Magenes, G., Bommer, J.J., Restrepo-Vélez, L.F., and Crowley, H. (2006). Development
of seismic vulnerability assessment methodologies over the past 30 years. ISET Journal of Earthquake
Technology, Paper No. 472, 43(3), 75-104. Retrieved from http://home.iitk.ac.in/~vinaykg/Iset472.pdf
13. Applied Technology Council. (1998). Evaluation of Earthquake Damaged Concrete and Masonry Wall Buildings:
Basic Procedures Manual (FEMA 306). Redwood City, California, United States of America: The Partnership for
Response and Recovery.
14. F. Turner, Staff Structural Engineer, Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission. Email to the Canterbury
Earthquakes Royal Commission, 27 July 2012. The Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission is a public
policy advisory agency of the California State Government. Mr Fred Turner, the Staff Engineer at the Alfred
E. Alquist Seismic Safety Commission, acted as an international peer reviewer of the reports by Professors
Jason Ingham and Michael Griffith on the performance of unreinforced masonry buildings in the Canterbury
earthquakes. We discuss these reports and Mr Turner’s analysis in Volume 4 of this Report.
15. New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (2006). Assessment and Improvement of the Structural
Performance of Buildings in Earthquakes: including Corregendum No 1. Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
16. Saito, T., and Thakur, S.K. (2009). Post-earthquake risk inspection system for buildings. Paper presented at the
International Symposium on Disasters Management, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from hppt://ipac.kacst.
edu.sa/eDoc/2009/182355_1.pdf
17. Various authors. Guidance on Detailed Engineering Evaluation of Earthquake Affected Non-residential Buildings
in Canterbury, Part 2, Evaluation Procedure. Draft, Revision 7 as at June 2012. Retrieved from http://sesoc.org.
nz/images/Detailed-Engineering-Evaluation-Procedure.pdf
18. New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. (1998). Post-earthquake building safety evaluation
procedures; Preparedness checklist and response plan for territorial authorities. Wellington, New Zealand:
Author.
19. California Emergency Management Agency. (2012). Safety Assessment Program Coordinator Student Manual:
January 2012: Version 5. Mather, California, United States: Author. Retrieved from http://www.calema.ca.gov/
recovery/Pages/Safety-Assessment.aspx
20. Vidal, F., Feriche, M., and Ontiveros, A. (2009). Basic Techniques for Quick and Rapid Post-Earthquake
Assessments of Building Safety. Paper presented at the 8th International Workshop on Seismic Microzoning
and Risk Reduction, Almeria, Spain. Retrieved from http://www.narpimed.org/wp-content/uploads/
Paper-3-post-EQ.pdf
21. Galloway, B.D., and Hare, H.J. (2012). A review of post-earthquake building control policies with respect to the
recovery of the Christchurch CBD. Paper presented at the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering
Conference, Christchurch, New Zealand. Retrieved from http://www.nzsee.org.nz/db/2012/Paper036.pdf
22. C. Rojahn, Executive Director, Applied Technology Council. Email to J. Hobbs, Analyst, Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission, 10 October 2010.
23. Doyle, E.E., and Johnston, D.M. (2011). Science advice for critical decision making. In Paton, D. and Volanti,
J.M. (Eds.) Working in High Risk Environments: Developing Sustained Resilience. Springfield, United States:
Charles C. Thomas Publisher.
24. Shibayama, A., and Hisada, Y. (2004). An efficient system for acquiring earthquake damage information in
damage area. Paper presented at the 13th World Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Vancouver,
Canada. Retrieved from http://kouzou.cc.kogakuin.ac.jp/Member/Boss/Paper/2004/001121.pdf
25. Brunsdon, D.R. (2008). Rapid Evaluation of Building Safety: Learnings from the December 2007 Gisborne
Earthquake. Keynote presentation delivered at the Australian Earthquake Engineering Society conference.
Retrieved from http://www.resorgs.org.nz/pubs/Dave%20Brunsdon%20Final%20Paper%20AEES%202008.pdf
26. J. Hare. Email to Justine Hobbs, Analyst, Canterbury Earthquakes Royal Commission, 1 September 2012.
27. Department of Building and Housing. (2012). Guidance for engineers assessing the seismic performance of
non-residential and multi-unit residential buildings in greater Christchurch. Wellington, New Zealand: Author.
31. Rotimi, J. (2010). An examination of improvements required to legislative provisions for post disaster
reconstruction in New Zealand. (Doctoral thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand).
Retrieved from http://www.resorgs.org.nz/pubs/James%20Rotimi%20final%20thesis.pdf
32. J. Dowse, Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority. Email to J. Hobbs, Analyst, Canterbury Earthquakes
Royal Commission, 5 October 2012.
33. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management. (No date). A Cluster Approach for Civil Defence and
Emergency Management: Enhancing multi-agency relationships. Wellington, New Zealand: Author. Retrieved
from http://www.civildefence.govt.nz/memwebsite.NSF/Files/Cluster%20Fact%20Sheet/$file/Cluster%20
Fact%20Sheet.pd