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FINAL REPORT

VOLUME 7
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
 C

A B D

A. Safety assessment personnel at work in the Christchurch Central Business District after
the 22 February 2011 earthquake (source: Applied Technology Council)

B. Barricades erected on Colombo Street after the 4 September 2010 earthquake

C. The Building Act 2004, the Chartered Professional Engineers of New Zealand Act 2002
and a building consent application pack

D. Context for the new Square, the civic heart of central Christchurch (source: Central City
Development Unit/Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority)

ISBN: 978-0-478-39562-
4 (Final Report Microsoft
Word)

ISBN: 978-0-478-39577-8
(Volume 7 Microsoft Word)
Contents

Section 1: Introduction
Section 2: Building management after earthquakes
2.1 Introduction
2.2 New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency management framework
2.3 The building safety evaluation process
2.4 The development and maintenance of the building safety evaluation process
2.5 Delivery of the building safety evaluation process
2.6 Transition from the civil defence response to the recovery phase governed by
territorial authorities
Section 3: Roles and Responsibilities
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Current building control framework
3.3 Quality assurance
3.4 Leadership
3.5 Clarity about roles and responsibilities
Section 4: Training and education of civil engineers and organisation of the civil
engineering profession
4.1 Introduction and overview
4.2 Legislative framework
4.3 The engineering profession
4.4 Education and training of engineers
4.5 Current ethical rules
4.6 Professional and learned societies in civil engineering
Section 5: Canterbury Regional Council and Christchurch City Council –
management of earthquake risk
5.1 Approach under the Terms of Reference
5.2 Introduction
5.3 The Resource Management Act 1991
5.4 Regional and district planning
5.5 Technical information
5.6 Earthquake risk management
5.7 Zoning
5.8 Subdivision consents
5.9 Geotechnical investigations and consenting requirements
5.10 Future measures
5.11 Conclusions
Appendix 1: New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering Guidelines
Appendix 2: The Christchurch City Council placards
Appendix 3: The CPEng Certification Form
Appendix 4: Section 124 notice
Appendix 5: Design features report example
Section 1:
Introduction

The Royal Commission’s Terms of Reference require us to consider “the adequacy

of the current legal and best-practice requirements for the design, construction and
maintenance of buildings in central business districts in New Zealand to address the
known risk of earthquakes”.
The Terms of Reference specifically provide that, in Through the course of our Inquiry we identified
doing so, we must investigate, among other things, systemic issues relating to the regulatory framework
the legal and best-practice requirements for the for buildings. These issues include misunderstandings
assessment of buildings after earthquakes and of any of the framework, a complex and confusing suite of
remedial work carried out on them. In section 2 of this regulatory documents, and quality assurance issues.
Volume, the Royal Commission explores the legal and There was also a fundamental issue raised by some
best-practice requirements underpinning the building submitters about a lack of “leadership” in the
safety evaluation process following a severe regulatory field. Section 3 of this Volume briefly
earthquake. The Canterbury earthquakes have describes the key elements of the current building
provided a very stern test of the existing legal control framework. We then discuss and make
requirements and perceived best-practice in recommendations to address these issues. (Volume 4
assessing buildings after earthquakes. We consider of this Report discusses and makes recommendations
the lessons able to be learned from these events. This about the legal and best-practice requirements for
builds on observations already made in Volume 4, buildings that should be treated by law as earthquake-
where we discussed the approach taken in prone. That subject is not revisited in this Volume.)
Christchurch after the September and Boxing Day
earthquakes to assess individual buildings that failed Recommendations in section 3 include various
in the February earthquake. Our observations also proposals to enhance quality assurance. Examples are
discuss how buildings should be managed after the a proposed requirement for provision of a Structural
transition from civil defence to normal building control Design Features Report with the building consent
arrangements. applications for all commercial and residential
buildings of three or more storeys (provided, in the
Among the recommendations that we make are case of residential buildings, the building will contain
recommendations relating to the manner in which three or more household units) as well as for proposed
buildings are evaluated after significant earthquakes, buildings in importance levels 3–5 as defined in the
the development of evaluation guidelines, and training relevant Standard.1 The structural design features
for building safety evaluators. Other recommendations report would then be used to assess whether the
cover the placarding system used in the rapid building is complex. Complex structures would require
assessment process; we favour in principle changing certification by a recognised structural engineer, a
from green to white the placards currently used to qualification that we address in section 4. We also
indicate that a building has been inspected without make recommendations in section 3 that are designed
significant damage being observed. We also make to enhance the leadership of the sector, by providing
recommendations about the kinds of evaluations to for the position within the Ministry of Business,
which buildings should be subjected to before their Innovation and Employment (MBIE) of Chief Structural
long-term reoccupation after a significant earthquake. Engineer, with a leadership role in relation to complex
buildings; and for the development by MBIE, in
The Terms of Reference also require the Royal
consultation with interested groups, of a policy and
Commission to consider “the roles of central and local
regulatory work programme. This programme would
government, the building and construction industry
identify the priorities for the development, review and
and other elements of the private sector in developing
and enforcing legal and best-practice requirements”.
update of compliance documents and Standards. The failure caused by earthquakes. The Terms of Reference
development and implementation of the Programme refer explicitly to the role of local government in
would be the responsibility of the Chief Structural developing and enforcing legal and best-practice
Engineer. We also recommend that Standards requirements. One way of minimising the failure of
referenced in the Building Code should be available buildings in future earthquakes is to ensure that new
online, free of charge. development occurs on land that is suitable for
development, having regard to its susceptibility to
The Royal Commission also examined current liquefaction, lateral spreading or significant softening of
arrangements for the education and training of soils in earthquakes, and the ability to provide suitably
structural and geotechnical engineers in New Zealand, robust foundations for new buildings. In Volume 1 we
the competence standard used by the Institution of dealt with issues such as subsurface soils investigation,
Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) to register ground improvement techniques and issues of
engineers, and the occupational regulations and ethical foundation design. However, we also thought it
rules that apply to the engineering profession. Section 4 appropriate to consider how the local authorities in the
of this Volume reports our consideration of these Canterbury region had dealt with the issue of
matters. We compare New Zealand practice with that of earthquake risk in exercising their Resource
other countries, and describe how the training of Management Act powers, and we commissioned Mr
engineers here conforms with international best-practice. Gerard Willis of Enfocus Limited to examine the way
that the planning documents of both the Canterbury
We were confirmed in our decision to inquire into these
Regional Council (CRC) and the CCC deal with
matters as a result of evidence that we heard in relation
earthquake risk. The Enfocus report considered the
to the failure in the February earthquake of individual
steps the CRC and the CCC have taken under the
buildings considered as part of the representative
Resource Management Act 1991 to avoid and mitigate
sample of buildings, including the CTV building. While
the effects of natural hazards, one of which is
the failure of the CTV building had tragic consequences
earthquakes. We have taken that report into account as
and can in large part be attributed to the inadequacy of
well as submissions on it.
its design, we discuss other cases as well where the
designers of the buildings had evidently failed to Drawing on the experience in the Canterbury region,
recognise fundamental aspects of structural behaviour. we recommend that sections 6 and 7 of the Resource
A closely linked concern relates to the ability of the Management Act 1991 be amended to ensure that
regulatory system to pick up defective designs in the regional and district plans are prepared in a way that
processing of building consents for complex structures. acknowledges the potential effects of earthquakes
In the case of the CTV hearing, there was evidence and liquefaction, and to ensure that such risks are
from experienced structural engineers that it would not considered in the processing of resource and
have been reasonable for the Christchurch City Council subdivision consents.
(CCC) checking engineer to have identified some
design defects. It is against the background of the
discussion in section 4 that we recommend that
legislation should provide for Recognised Structural
Engineers to be involved in the design or peer review of
complex structures. Such engineers would be
Chartered Professional Engineers but with special
competence in the field of structural engineering, and
who would be well experienced in the design of
complex structures. We propose that a set of
qualifications and competencies for Recognised
Structural Engineers be developed by MBIE in
consultation with the Chartered Professional Engineers
Council, IPENZ and others.

In section 5 of this Volume we examine local

government management of earthquake risk. The Terms
of Reference for the Royal Commission require us to
consider whether or not the legal and best-practice
requirements for building design, construction and
maintenance adequately manage risks of building
References
1. See Table 3.2 in AS/NZS 1170.0:2002. Structural Design Actions Part 0: General Principles ,
Standards Australia/ Standards New Zealand.
Section 2:
Building management after
earthquakes
2.1 Introduction done so, we consider that the current approach is
appropriate and in accordance with international best-
Of the 185 people who lost their lives in the earthquake
practice. However, we recommend making changes to
on 22 February 2011, 175 people died as a result of
improve the delivery of the current system. We have not
building failures. The Royal Commission has
found a viable alternative.
investigated all of the buildings and structures that
failed causing these deaths. We have considered the Section 2.5 records the results of our investigation into
failures of the Canterbury Television (CTV) building, and the delivery of the building safety evaluation operations
the Pyne Gould Corporation (PGC) building, where after the Canterbury earthquakes. In section 2.6, we
respectively 115 people and 18 people died. We have discuss the issues that arose when the responsibility for
also inquired into the failures of other individual the building safety evaluation process transitioned from
buildings or structures that resulted in the deaths of 42 civil defence to normal building management
people. In all but one of these individual buildings, the arrangements. The Royal Commission considers that
deaths were caused when older, unreinforced masonry these issues negatively impacted on the building safety
buildings or brick or block structures failed. evaluation operation after the Canterbury earthquakes,
especially the management of buildings that may be
The Royal Commission has received evidence that
suitable for reoccupation but still in need of repair. We
describes the manner in which these buildings were
review options for a transition mechanism and make
assessed after the 4 September 2010 earthquake
recommendations for change.
and the process for assigning placards to buildings.
This section must be read in the context of earlier
This section considers the framework and assumptions
Volumes of our Report. We note that some of the
that underpin the management of buildings after an
problems that arose with the delivery of the building
earthquake, both during and after a state of emergency.
safety evaluation process and its transition to normal
We briefly outline New Zealand’s civil defence and
building management arrangements demonstrate
emergency management framework and give an
issues with the normal management of buildings: for
overview of the building safety evaluation process used
example, the legislative barriers delaying the repair or
to assess buildings after an earthquake. In section 2.4,
demolition of damaged buildings. We discuss and
we discuss who should be responsible for the
make recommendations about particular issues
development and maintenance of this process. We
raised in this section in Volume 4 of the Report. The
consider whether or not the process needs a specific
recommendations we make in this section regarding
legislative mandate, and what its objectives and scope
the management of unreinforced masonry buildings
should be. The Royal Commission heard evidence
after earthquakes should also be read in the context
that the objectives of the building safety evaluation
of our discussion about these buildings in Volume 4.
process are not well understood by the public and
some building safety evaluators. Skilled evaluators The Royal Commission considers that, overall,
are needed to successfully carry out a building safety New Zealand was very well served by the engineers,
evaluation operation, so we consider the methods, building control officials, and other civil defence
frameworks and assumptions evaluators use when workers who participated in the building safety
they assess buildings. We particularly focus on whether evaluation operations in Canterbury, most of whom
the use of damage-based assessments is appropriate were volunteers who worked to ensure the safety of
and if evaluators need to change the way in which they the wider Christchurch community in very difficult
account for aftershocks. This section also explores circumstances. Some of the volunteers gave valuable
options to ensure that New Zealand has sufficient evidence to the Royal Commission to assist our
numbers of skilled evaluators. The Royal Commission understanding of where improvements can be made.
considered it important to look at whether or not the New Zealand owes them a debt of gratitude.
current system is the right approach or model. Having
2.1.1 Background 2.1.2 The scope of this section of the Report
At 4:35am on 4 September 2010, a 7.1 magnitude and the Royal Commission’s approach
earthquake occurred with an epicentre 40km west of This volume of the Report considers lessons learned
Christchurch, on a previously unknown fault beneath from the building safety evaluation operations carried
the Canterbury Plains. This earthquake damaged out after the earthquake events that occurred between
Christchurch’s older brick and masonry buildings, September 2010 and June 2011.
historic stone buildings and Canterbury homesteads.
It seriously affected the city’s eastern suburbs and The Royal Commission received several reports on
Kaiapoi, both of which experienced liquefaction and the building safety evaluation operations. A report
lateral spreading. Broken water and sewer pipes from the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
caused flooding. A state of local emergency was Management1 sets out the key principles and the
declared. underlying approach behind New Zealand’s civil
defence and emergency management framework.
The magnitude 4.7 aftershock on 26 December 2010, The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
which we will refer to as the Boxing Day aftershock, Management was in the process of preparing an
occurred at 10:30am. It had an epicentre located 1.8km independent review of the civil defence and
north-west of Christ Church Cathedral. Although its emergency management operations after the
effects were localised, this aftershock caused further September earthquake when it was overtaken by
damage to buildings in the Central Business District events following the February earthquake. A draft of
(CBD). No state of emergency was declared. this report2 was made available to the Royal
Commission. In addition, we commissioned a
On 22 February 2011, at 12:51pm, what is now known
review of the building safety evaluation operations
as the Port Hills Fault ruptured. The fault ruptured on a
after the Canterbury earthquakes by the New
northeast-southwest orientated fault at a shallow
Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering3
depth, reaching to within one kilometre of the surface.
(NZSEE). This report was prepared by Mr David
This earthquake had a magnitude of 6.2. Its epicentre
Brunsdon of the Kestrel Group. Further,
was located 6km south-east of Christchurch’s CBD.
Christchurch City Council4 (CCC) provided the
Although this earthquake was of a lesser magnitude
Royal Commission with a report on the building
than the September earthquake, it was the most
safety evaluation operation in the Christchurch
destructive of the Canterbury earthquakes because its
CBD after the September earthquake. At our
resulting ground motions were extremely high. Many
request, CCC also released a draft report focusing
buildings damaged in the September earthquake were
on the processes used after the state of
brought down and many heritage buildings sustained
emergency, by Ms Esther Griffiths (now Ms
major damage. Many modern buildings experienced
higher structural failure and a number of modern Newman) and Mr Dene McNulty5. This report was
not finalised and was not formally “received” by the
buildings were damaged beyond repair. Christchurch
CCC. In the discussion that follows, we refer to
experienced widespread liquefaction. One hundred
these documents as “the reports” received by the
and eighty-five people died from the injuries they
Royal Commission.
received in this earthquake. A national state of
emergency was declared. Failures that resulted in loss
We have also had regard to the draft report by the
of life are reported in Volumes 2, 4 and 6.
Applied Technology Council (ATC)6 on the building
A magnitude 6.0 aftershock occurred on 13 June 2011 safety evaluation operation after the February
at 2.20pm. Its epicentre was located near Sumner. earthquake, prepared by Mr Ronald Gallagher, Mr
This aftershock caused further widespread damage in Jim Barnes and Mr Bret Lizundia. ATC developed
Christchurch and Lyttelton. Once again, Christchurch the Californian building safety evaluation process
experienced widespread liquefaction and there were on which New Zealand’s is based. The authors of
rock falls from cliffs in the Port Hills suburbs. its draft report on the Christchurch operation in
February 2011 are experts in these processes. Mr
There is a detailed discussion of the Canterbury Bret Lizundia gave evidence to the Royal
earthquake sequence and the seismicity of Christchurch Commission as our international peer reviewer on
and the wider Canterbury region in Volume 1 of this this topic.
Report.
On 4 November 2011, the Royal Commission called for
2.2.1 National civil defence arrangements
submissions on the subject of building assessments
after earthquakes; submissions closed on 17 February New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency
2012. We received seven submissions. On 21 June management framework is set out in the Civil Defence
2011, the Royal Commission called for submissions on and Emergency Management Act 2002. Figure 1 sets
our Discussion Paper: Building Management After out the key elements of this system.
Earthquakes. We received 12 submissions on the
discussion paper. Appendix 3 of Volume 5 lists these
submitters.
Local Local Local Local
Plans Plans Plans Plans
The Royal Commission held a hearing on managing
buildings after earthquakes on 3–4 September 2012.
A list of the witnesses who gave evidence at this
hearing can be found in Appendix 3 of Volume 5. The 16 CDEM Group Plans
Royal Commission has also held hearings on the CTV
building, the PGC building, and the failure of many
individual buildings causing death. Evidence from National CDEM Plan/Guide
these hearings, discussed in Volumes 2, 4 and 6 of
this Report, informs the discussion, conclusions and
recommendations we set out in this section.
National CDEM Strategy
To provide context for our discussion, we give below an
overview of New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency
management framework.
CDEM Act 2002

2.2 New Zealand’s civil defence and

emergency management framework Figure 1: Key elements of New Zealand’s civil defence
and emergency management framework (source:
The intent of the civil defence and emergency adapted from the Ministry of Civil Defence and
management framework is to deal with the Emergency Management, 2011)
consequences of a disaster by:
The Civil Defence and Emergency Act 2002 requires
• reducing the risk associated with the disaster; the development of a National Civil Defence and

• building readiness to respond to the disaster; Emergency Management Strategy7 and a National
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan8.
• responding to the disaster; and
The National Civil Defence and Emergency
• setting up recovery processes that reduce the Management Plan is set out in an Order in Council
impacts of future disasters. (the National Civil Defence Emergency Management
Plan Order 2005) and is supported by a Guide9.
These documents identify community goals, set out
how to respond to a national emergency and
describe how to support the local management of
emergencies.

The Minister of Civil Defence can declare a national

state of emergency in all or part of the country. The
Minister and/or local authorities can declare local
emergencies. A state of emergency can last up to seven
days, although it can be extended indefinitely in seven
day increments. Declaring a state of emergency allows
civil defence authorities to exercise a wide range of
statutory powers.
2.2.2 Local civil defence arrangements The earthquake on 22 February 2011 occurred at
12.51pm. CCC declared a local state of emergency at
New Zealand’s civil defence framework is constructed
2.45pm. The immediate response was led by CCC staff,
from elements put in place at the local level. Section 12
who established an Emergency Operations Centre in the
of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act
Christchurch Art Gallery, as the primary emergency
2002 requires local authorities to establish Civil
operations centre in the main council building was
Defence and Emergency Management Groups for each
inaccessible. At 10.30am on the following day, the
region of New Zealand. Each Group is required to
Minister for Civil Defence declared a national state of
develop a Civil Defence and Emergency Management
emergency. At this point, the local state of emergency
Plan. These Groups are a core element in New
ceased to have effect and the National Controller
Zealand’s civil defence and emergency management
became responsible for the response to the earthquake.
framework. New Zealand has 16 Civil Defence and
The state of national emergency was extended 10 times
Emergency Management Groups. The Canterbury
before being terminated on 30 April 2011.
Group is made up of 10 local authorities.
In its report to the Royal Commission, CCC4 refers
Territorial authorities are the first to respond to
to uncertainty about whether to declare a local state of
emergencies in their own areas. They are expected
emergency after the Boxing Day aftershock. In the end,
to take the lead in responding to a disaster such as
it established an Emergency Operations Centre, but
earthquake. Regional and national civil defence and
did not declare a local state of emergency. The Council
emergency management both activate to support
considered the damage observed in the city did not
the territorial authority managing the response to
meet the requirements for declaring a state of
the disaster. Regional or national civil defence and
emergency set out in the Civil Defence and Emergency
emergency management may also take over if the
Management Act 2002. We discuss these requirements
territorial authority is significantly impacted and/or
in section 2.4.2.1 of this Volume.
overwhelmed.

Each local authority must plan and provide for civil The NZSEE3 records that the scale of the rapid
assessment operation carried out after the September
defence and emergency management within its district.
earthquake was large by international standards. The
A fundamental principle in New Zealand’s civil defence
civil defence and emergency management response to
framework is the idea that the amount of detail that a
the February earthquake was on a scale unprecedented
local authority puts in its emergency management plans
should reflect the level of risk a particular disaster in New Zealand. ATC6 states that:
poses to the buildings in the district. The emergency
The extent of liquefaction, the extensive damage to
management plans for larger cities and areas of higher
mid-rise and high-rise buildings, and the challenges
seismicity should therefore be more detailed and posed in the evaluation, repair, and recovery
specific. process were unprecedented.

2.2.3 The civil defence response to the

Canterbury earthquakes 2.3 The building safety evaluation
Within an hour of the earthquake at 4:35am on
process
4 September 2010, the CCC, Waimakariri District Guidelines issued by the NZSEE10 envisage that each
Council and Selwyn District Council each declared territorial authority will develop and implement its own
a local state of emergency for their area. They each building safety evaluation process. In accordance with
established their own Emergency Operations international best-practice, New Zealand’s building
Centre run by a Local Controller. The Canterbury safety evaluation framework uses local reconnaissance
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group teams to assess the damage to buildings caused by a
also set up an Emergency Coordinating Centre at disaster. These teams indicate the results of this
the Environment Canterbury premises in assessment by placing colour-coded placards on
Christchurch. The Local Controllers were in charge individual buildings.
of their district’s response to the earthquake,
including their building safety evaluation operation.
All three local states of emergency ended at
midday on 16 September 2010.
2.3.1 Guidelines for the building safety 2.3.1.1 International best-practice
evaluation process New Zealand looked to international best-practice
Works Consultancy Services (formerly part of the when developing its building safety evaluation process.
Ministry of Works) released New Zealand’s first The NZSEE Guidelines draw heavily on California’s
guidelines for a building safety evaluation process in building safety evaluation process, as set out in the
1991. ATC-20 documents11. A common system of evaluation
facilitates cooperation between trained persons from
In 1998, the NZSEE released guidelines for territorial countries that experience earthquakes. New Zealand
authorities, Building Safety Evaluation During a was supported by overseas specialists during the
State of Emergency: Guidelines for Territorial
Canterbury earthquake sequence.
Authorities10, which we refer to as the NZSEE
Guidelines. Section 6.2.1 of Volume 4 discusses the Although detailed engineering evaluations (DEEs) are
different NZSEE documents for assessing buildings conceptually part of the building safety evaluation
before and after earthquakes: this discussion is process, many countries focus on developing and
summarised in Appendix 1 of this Volume. maintaining the rapid assessment phase of the process;
this is the focus of the NZSEE Guidelines.
The response to the earthquake in Gisborne in
December 2007 was the first time a building safety We now describe the building safety evaluation process.
evaluation operation based on this type of approach
was implemented in New Zealand. In 2009, the former 2.3.2 Overview of the building safety
Department of Building and Housing endorsed the
evaluation process
current version of the NZSEE Guidelines.
As summarised in Table 1, the NZSEE Guidelines10 set
Since 2004, the NZSEE Guidelines have been in a out the three phases of New Zealand’s building safety
constant state of revision. In 2008, the former evaluation process:
Department of Building and Housing established a
reference group to participate in the NZSEE’s review. • the Overall Damage Survey;
This reference group is made up of representatives • rapid assessments; and
from the NZSEE, other engineering technical societies,
government agencies, and several local authorities. • DEEs.
The CCC is a member of this reference group. The
NZSEE published revised Guidelines in 2009, with the
endorsement of the former Department of Building and
Housing.

International best-practice suggests that such

guidelines incorporate the lessons learnt from major
earthquakes and the reference group decided to take
into account the earthquakes in Padang, Indonesia and
L’Aquila, Italy in 2009. In July 2010, members of the
reference group were asked to review a new version of
the Guidelines, but this revised version had not been
officially adopted when the September earthquake
occurred. The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management and the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment are revising the NZSEE Guidelines to
incorporate the lessons learnt from the Canterbury
earthquakes.
 Purpose Timing* Initiated by Task Conducted by Comment

Overall Within hours Civil Defence Assess Emergency No entry of premises, no formal
Damage after event staff, aggregate services, records, emphasis on extent of
Survey emergency damage territorial damage, areas of high impact,
service action and authority staff, identifying areas of priority for
plans, territorial identify Civil Defence rapid assessment, estimating
authority action affected volunteers manpower and skill base
plans areas needs etc

Level 1 Structural and Formal system, typically based

Rapid civil engineers, on exterior inspection only;
Assessment architects and placards posted on buildings,
(Figure 2) other personnel central record maintained, note
from the made of sites needing further
During a period building inspections, unsafe areas
Asertain level
of a state of industry cordoned off
of structural
emergency damage to volunteer
declared individual
Controller; status
under the buildings and
Building Safety
Level 2 Civil Defence note other Structural Formal system based on
Evaluation
Rapid Emergency hazards; engineers, inspection of interior and
Leader
Assessment Management assess building exterior of the building plus
(Figure 3) Act building services and reference to available drawings.
safety and geotechnical Calculations not envisaged.
decide engineers May result in revised placards
appropriate posted on buildings, central
volunteer record updated, unsafe areas
level of
status cordoned off, urgent work
occupancy;
recommend recommendations
security
Typically for priority inspection
and shoring
of critical facilities (for
requirements
situations where facilities
operators do not have
contracted engineers), or
where further information that
raises concerns is received

Detailed Typically Building Ascertain extent Engineers, Meets insurance and restoration
Engineering longer-term, owners, of structural architects and requirements under the Building
Evaluation but may be insurance damage, loss adjusters Act 2004
and Remedial immediate companies, establish losses
Work for critical Territorial for insurance contractual These evaluations are likely to
structures Authorities purposes, and agreement involve review of construction
recommend documentation, and the
remedial work preparation of detailed
to restore engineering reports
functionality
and compliance
with Building
Code

Table 1: Summary of building safety evaluation inspection categories (source: NZSEE Guidelines, 2009)

Note: All timings are indicative estimates only

2.3.2.1 The Overall Damage Survey • the Level 1 Rapid Assessment; and
The Overall Damage Survey is the first step in the • the Level 2 Rapid Assessment.
building safety evaluation process. This survey is
carried out by civil defence workers within hours of Level 1 Rapid Assessments are typically carried out by
the disaster occurring. It is a quick stocktake of the building control officials from territorial authorities,
extent of the damage caused by the disaster. volunteer structural and civil engineers, or other suitably
Decision makers are likely to use the Overall qualified people including architects. Level 1 Rapid
Damage Survey when deciding whether or not to Assessments are typically a 10–20 minute inspection of
declare a state of emergency. It is also used to the structural damage visible from the outside of the
indicate what locations the rapid assessment teams building. Level 1 Rapid Assessments are normally
should focus on. carried out on buildings up to four storeys.

An initial purpose of the Overall Damage Survey is to Level 2 Rapid Assessments should be carried out by
identify the need for urban search and rescue structural, geotechnical or territorial authority engineers.
operations. The rapid assessment phase of the building They are usually carried out on larger, more complex
safety evaluation operation typically takes place after buildings, but will include critical facilities such as
the urban search and rescue efforts are complete. ATC hospitals. They are also carried out on buildings that
has expressed the view that carrying out the Overall have had a Level 1 Rapid Assessment that has resulted
Damage Survey in a step-by-step way, as occurred on in a recommendation that evaluators carry out a Level 2
the first day after the February earthquake, was very assessment. The Level 2 Rapid Assessment is a more
efficient and effective. detailed visual assessment lasting from one to four hours,
examining both the interior and exterior of the building.
2.3.2.2 Rapid assessments
Level 1 and Level 2 Rapid Assessments are
Carrying out rapid assessments is the next step in summarised in the following flow charts.
the building safety evaluation process. The rapid
assessment phase is made up of two assessments:

Figure 2: Level 1 Rapid Assessment Figure 3: Level 2 Rapid Assessment

(source: NZSEE Guidelines, 2009) (source: NZSEE Guidelines, 2009)
Both Level 1 and Level 2 Rapid Assessments are 2.3.3.1 The rapid assessment teams
intended to give a short-term indication of the
CCC’s rapid assessment teams were a mix of building
condition of a building. Rapid assessments give an
control officials and engineers. These rapid assessment
early indication of whether the building is an
teams were typically made up of a minimum of three
immediate danger to the people using it, or to the
people:
public in the vicinity. In this phase of the building
safety evaluation process, evaluators place red,
• a council building control officer or civil defence
yellow or green placards on buildings to indicate
response team member;
their status following assessment. They may limit
entry to buildings and recommend the erection of • a structural engineer; and
cordons to restrict access to the area around the
• an Urban Search and Rescue technician.
building.
Level 2 Rapid Assessment teams had one more
2.3.2.3 Detailed Engineering Evaluations building control officer and/or engineer join these
The third step in the building safety evaluation process teams. These teams were expected to include at least
is to undertake a DEE. This is carried out by structural one engineer.
and/or geotechnical engineers as appropriate. DEEs
involve accessing and considering all of the information 2.3.3.2 Managing the building safety evaluation
available on the building, carrying out thorough exterior operation
and interior inspections and performing calculations if CCC’s civil defence Building Evaluation Manager
required. They can take from one day to one week or organised building control officials and volunteers into
more. Building owners are expected to take informal teams to carry out the Overall Damage Survey
responsibility for obtaining a DEE by engaging their own as they arrived at the Emergency Operations Centre
engineers, and ensuring the safety of the public and from 5:30am on 4 September 2010. Over the course of
occupants. This evaluation is not, normally, undertaken the day, civil defence workers at the Emergency
by local authorities. Operations Centre gradually pieced together an
overview of the level of damage caused by the
2.3.2.4 Sequences of the building safety earthquake.
evaluation process
During a local or national state of emergency, the 2.3.3.2.1 Completing Level 1 Rapid Assessments
Overall Damage Survey and the rapid assessments The reports we received note that CCC sent out 29 rapid
should be carried out under the authority of a civil assessment teams to carry out rapid assessments on
defence Controller. Because DEEs take longer to the morning of 5 September. Level 1 Rapid
complete, they are more likely to be carried out after a Assessments were carried out by 23 of the 29 rapid
state of emergency has ended, and the relevant Civil assessment teams. These teams were assigned to one
Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 powers of 25 CBD grids. The grids were planned out by CCC
are no longer applicable. staff, workers from the former Department of Building
and Housing, and the Urban Search and Rescue
2.3.3 Overview of the building safety Engineering Team Leader. When the rapid assessment
evaluation operations after the Canterbury teams were sent out on the morning of 5 September,
earthquakes six teams were assigned to immediately carry out Level
2 Rapid Assessments on critical facilities and buildings
The reports received by the Royal Commission describe
that the Overall Damage Survey had identified as
how the CCC and the Waimakariri and Selwyn District
needing more detailed assessment than Level 1. The
Councils each implemented their own building safety
CCC had completed most of the Level 1 Rapid
evaluation operation after the September earthquake.
Assessments by the evening of 5 September. This was
These operations were broadly based on the NZSEE
a remarkable effort.
Guidelines. Each territorial authority carried out a rapid
assessment operation, which then transitioned from civil 2.3.3.2.2 Completing Level 2 Rapid Assessments
defence to normal building management arrangements.
The Level 2 Rapid Assessments of Christchurch’s CBD
CCC’s building safety evaluation process also included
buildings began on the morning of 6 September. The
Project East, a rapid assessment operation that
CCC developed a process that established which of the
assessed residential buildings in Christchurch’s eastern
Level 1 assessed buildings would receive a Level 2
suburbs.
Rapid Assessment. It also developed a process for
prioritising when these buildings would be assessed.
As a general rule, green placard buildings that were Following the 13 June 2011 aftershock, the Canterbury
recommended for further assessment were prioritised Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) sent out
above red and yellow placard buildings. This was 12 engineers to carry out rapid assessments in
because red and yellow placard buildings had already Christchurch’s CBD Red Zone. The Red Zone at
been vacated as they were regarded as potentially this time covered about 24 blocks. These engineers
dangerous. The CCC had completed some, but not all, identified buildings that were now dangerous, or more
of the proposed Level 2 Rapid Assessments by the end dangerous, due to the aftershock. No damage was
of the state of emergency on 16 September. The CCC recorded in Waimakariri or Selwyn.
then re-evaluated the buildings that had been assessed
during the state of emergency when the building safety
evaluation process transitioned to normal building
2.4 The development and maintenance
management arrangements. of the building safety evaluation
process
2.3.3.3 The building safety evaluation
The Royal Commission has identified matters that may
operations in later earthquakes and
lead to improvement of the building safety evaluation
aftershocks
process. This section discusses the objectives for the
After the Boxing Day aftershock, the CCC decided on management of buildings after earthquakes and
27 December not to declare a state of emergency. The whether there is a need to establish a legislative
CCC categorised buildings as either red or green, and mandate for the building safety evaluation process. We
placed notices issued under section 124 of the Building discuss who should be responsible for developing and
Act 2004 instead of affixing placards. The Boxing Day maintaining this process, and the methods, frameworks
aftershock did not cause significant damage in and assumptions engineers use when carrying out
Waimakariri or Selwyn districts. assessments. We also consider how New Zealand
mobilises skilled building safety evaluators, what their
The building safety evaluation operation carried out numbers should be and barriers to developing a
in Christchurch after the February earthquake differed sufficient core of skilled evaluators.
from that used after the September earthquake
because of the search and rescue operation. The International approaches to building safety evaluations
immediate response to the February earthquake are not subject to international benchmarking or
focused on locating and rescuing trapped people. codification. Nevertheless, the NZSEE3 has identified
Christchurch’s CBD was locked down while Urban several key indicators of good planning for a building
Search and Rescue operations were in progress. safety evaluation process. These indicators include:
Reports to the Royal Commission from the NZSEE3
• setting out an appropriate legal mandate for
and the CCC4 describe how civil defence workers
the process;
planned the rapid assessment process on 23 and 24
February before sending out teams on 25 February. • identifying a central government focal point to
CCC building control officials led this planning, which the process belongs;
supported by engineers who had taken leadership • making sure that territorial authorities plan
roles after the September earthquake. This group appropriately before the event;
incorporated some of the lessons learned in the
• siting the plans and procedures for the building
response to the September earthquake in their plans.
evaluation process after a disaster within the civil
Between 22 and 25 February, the CCC carried out
defence and emergency management operation;
rapid assessments on suburban commercial buildings
and other premises suitable for welfare centres; this • establishing the criteria and process for the
rapid assessment operation was known as Operation reoccupation of buildings;
Shop. The CCC then began Operation Suburb, which
• developing information management systems to
assessed residential buildings. After an initial check,
record information, produce maps, and transfer
Waimakariri and Selwyn District Councils decided not
the information collected into the wider territorial
to carry out large-scale building safety evaluation
authority information management systems; and
operations after the February earthquake because the
buildings in these areas did not suffer significant • planning how to mobilise trained people at a
damage. national and local level.
2.4.1 Objectives of building management after management response moves into recovery, it may be
earthquakes appropriate to consider other objectives such as the
reoccupation of damaged buildings and recovery of the
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that the
community and local businesses. However, we consider
objectives of the building safety evaluation process are
it important that these objectives remain secondary to
not well understood by the public and building safety
the main objective of life safety.
evaluators.

The rapid assessment operation is designed to identify

the visible structural damage to buildings after an
earthquake or other disaster and to prioritise how to
Recommendation
treat these buildings based on the severity of the
damage to them. Buildings are assessed for damage to We recommend that:
ensure that they do not pose an immediate threat to
111. Life safety should be the overarching
the safety of the people using them. Clarity is required
objective of building management after
regarding the purpose of the building safety evaluation
earthquakes as communities both respond
process in comparison with the subsequent need to
to and recover from the disaster.
manage buildings after a disaster. Getting the city
moving again and deciding when and under what
conditions reoccupation of a building may occur are
2.4.1.1 Scope of the building safety evaluation
not part of the rapid assessment process.
process
Ensuring public safety following a disaster is the main An important issue is whether the building safety
objective of the building safety evaluation process. evaluation process should only be used after
The management of buildings after earthquakes must earthquakes, or whether it can be used after other
deal with the competing objectives of public safety disasters. The NZSEE Guidelines indicate that the
and the economic imperative of reactivating the process is broadly applicable to any disaster that
commercial life of the city. The New Zealand Historic may cause large numbers of buildings to be severely
Places Trust notes that the unnecessary loss of damaged. Likely causes are earthquakes, floods,
heritage due to poorly-informed, rushed decision slips, landslides, coastal hazards, wind and volcanic
making has been observed in other countries after activity.
earthquakes and other disasters. It suggests ensuring
the immediate safety of the public by carrying out In practice the building safety evaluation process is
make-safe works, or shoring and erecting cordons primarily a structural assessment focused on
around the damaged building, and then taking the earthquake damage. The Royal Commission has
time to consider all the factors that affect the decision received evidence that the rapid assessments after
to repair or demolish the building. In its submission, the February earthquake did not adequately cover
the New Zealand Society for Risk Management states geotechnical matters. Structural engineers did not
that adopting one objective to the exclusion of others understand why the geotechnical team had assessed
is overly simplistic and does not reflect reality. It the building as dangerous, and the placard did not
favours setting objectives for each stage of the say it was assessed for geotechnical reasons. This
building safety evaluation process, from the initial meant that evaluators had to revisit and replace
response through to the recovery phase. placards at some dangerous sites.

The Royal Commission confirms that life safety should The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
be the one, overarching objective for the management supports using the building safety evaluation process
of buildings after earthquakes. However, we also for other disasters. If it can be used after a range of
consider it appropriate to have different secondary disasters, particularly floods, it becomes more cost
objectives at different times. In the short-term, the effective to develop and maintain this process; 70 per
Royal Commission considers that life safety should be cent of emergency declarations since 1963 have been
the objective that is most emphasised in the rapid flood-related. The Royal Commission accepts that the
assessment phase of the building safety evaluation building safety evaluation process should be applied to
process. As the civil defence and emergency a range of disasters.
 first building safety evaluation guidelines in 1991,

Recommendation responsibility for any guidelines has been shared

informally between government agencies and the
NZSEE. The NZSEE essentially took responsibility for
developing New Zealand’s building safety evaluation
We recommend that: process in 1998, when it released its Guidelines.
112. The building safety evaluation process should However, in 2008 the former Department of Building
be used following a range of disasters. and Housing also took up a supporting role when it
established the reference group to participate in the
NZSEE’s review. Both the Ministry of Business,
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation framework
Innovation and Employment and the Ministry of Civil
does not have a specific legislative mandate in either
Defence and Emergency Management now have a
the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act
role in the current review of the NZSEE Guidelines.
2002 or the Building Act 2004. However, the general
provisions contained within the Civil Defence and The reports received by the Royal Commission support
Emergency Management Act 2002 allow Controllers the view that current legislation already provides for
to authorise a rapid assessment operation. We now a building safety evaluation process. The NZSEE3
explore whether the current legislative arrangements maintains that the Civil Defence and Emergency
are sufficient. Management Act 2002 provides a legal basis for
the building safety evaluation process despite not
2.4.2 Legislative mandate and responsibility containing a specific legislative mandate. Under the
for the building safety evaluation framework Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002,
Controllers can:
The NZSEE3 contends that setting out an appropriate
legal mandate for a building safety evaluation process • issue and control the use of signs (section 18(2)(c));
that authorises its implementation in a range of
• carry out inspections (section 92);
circumstances is a feature of international best-
practice. The placing, maintaining and removing of • evacuate people and exclude them from any
the placards should also have a clearly defined legal premises or places (section 86); and
basis. Establishing a legal mandate for the process
• prohibit or restrict access to public roads and
should involve specifying the lead agency responsible
places to prevent or limit the extent of the
for it. The NZSEE states that establishing a central
emergency (section 88).
government focal point responsible for the building
safety evaluation process is a feature of international In addition, a Civil Defence and Emergency
best-practice. The central government agency would Management Group may require the securing or
also guide the preparation of territorial authority plans, otherwise making safe of dangerous structures under
and develop and maintain core elements of the building section 85(1)(a)(iii) of the Civil Defence and Emergency
safety evaluation process, together with common tools Management Act 2002.
such as training materials. Having a central government
focal point would give the building safety evaluation The Royal Commission considers that collectively these
process a formal structure and provide resources to provisions authorise a rapid assessment operation
support territorial authority plans. Territorial authority such as those carried out after the September and
plans are another feature of international best-practice February earthquakes during the state of emergency.
for building safety evaluation processes. For these reasons, the Royal Commission does not
consider that there is a need to make further provisions
The NZSEE3 reports that since the introduction of for the building safety evaluation process in legislation.
their Guidelines in 1998, the uptake has been low.
It attributes the low uptake to the lack of specific The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
legislative mandate for the process. Territorial authorities has indicated that it wishes to take on responsibility
have no legislative or regulatory obligations to use the for developing and maintaining New Zealand’s
NZSEE Guidelines and the latter cannot be enforced. building safety evaluation process. It proposes that
new emergency risk management provisions be
In addition, currently it is not clear who is responsible incorporated into the Building Act 2004. The new
for developing New Zealand’s building safety evaluation provisions would establish a mandate for carrying
framework or any associated guidelines. Since Works out a building safety evaluation operation within a
Consultancy Services developed New Zealand’s new emergency management building system. They
would set out the authority and process for placing, in placards being placed on a building cannot take
changing and removing placards; they would also place outside of a state of emergency. We discuss the
establish an appropriate penalty regime for carrying out problems this caused throughout this section.
these activities without authority. This new emergency
management building system would be applicable to a To address these problems, several submitters suggest
range of disasters, not just earthquakes. that territorial authorities should be able to carry out a
building safety evaluation operation and place placards
Although the new emergency management building outside of a state of emergency; they suggest placing
system would be mandated under the Building Act emergency management provisions that provide for this
2004, the response to the disaster as a whole would in the Building Act 2004.
remain coordinated through the Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Act 2002. This means the Sections 4 and 68 of the Civil Defence and Emergency
building safety evaluation system would be designed at Management Act 2002 set out the criteria that civil
a national level, with territorial authorities planning its defence and emergency management use when
execution. To support the development and execution deciding whether or not to declare a state of
of the new emergency management building system, emergency. Section 4 of the Act states that an:
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
would take on a role within New Zealand’s national civil emergency means a situation that—
defence and emergency planning arrangements. The (a) is the result of any happening, whether natural
Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management or otherwise, including, without limitation,
any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami,
and CERA both support these proposals.
land movement, flood, storm, tornado,
cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any
The Royal Commission has concluded that the Civil dangerous gas or substance, technological
Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure
provides for New Zealand’s building safety evaluation of or disruption to an emergency service or a
process. However, in principle, we endorse the Ministry lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or
warlike act; and
of Business, Innovation and Employment’s proposal
(b) causes or may cause loss of life or injury or
that it assume responsibility for the building safety
illness or distress or in any way endangers the
evaluation process and we support the incorporation safety of the public or property in New Zealand
of new provisions in the Building Act 2004 that would or any part of New Zealand; and
establish an emergency building management system. (c) cannot be dealt with by emergency services,
This is because this proposal may address some of or otherwise requires a significant and co-
the problems that occurred when the building safety ordinated response under this Act[.]
evaluation process transitioned from civil defence to the
building control arrangements governed by territorial Section 68(1) of the Act states that an authorised person:
authorities. We note that these proposals would also
specifically mandate New Zealand’s building safety …may declare that a state of local emergency exists
in the area for which the person is appointed if at
evaluation process. Issues with the transition from civil
any time it appears to the person that an emergency
defence to normal building management arrangements has occurred or may occur within the area.
and the options for addressing these issues are
discussed in section 2.6 of this Volume. The Royal
The Royal Commission considers that a building safety
Commission favours undertaking more policy work on
evaluation operation should only be triggered by a state
the merit and detail of these proposals to ensure that
of emergency. This is because the wide-ranging powers
they are robust, flexible, efficient and effective.
Controllers have under the Civil Defence and
Emergency Management Act 2002 significantly reduce
2.4.2.1 Building safety evaluation operations
the rights of property owners. The civil defence and
are confined to a state of emergency
emergency management framework recognises that
A rapid assessment operation is usually only carried this is appropriate when the safety and well-being of
out when a state of emergency is declared. Civil the public is compromised after a disaster. However
defence and emergency management Controllers (leaving aside issues that arise during the transition
can only exercise the wide-ranging powers that from the state of emergency to the normal legislative
allow them to authorise a building safety evaluation framework), removing the rights of property owners
operation during a state of emergency. In practice, this outside of a state of emergency is not appropriate.
means that a rapid assessment operation that results
We consider that if the impact of the event warrants different types of buildings and structures. The Royal
carrying out a building safety evaluation operation, Commission has heard evidence about assumptions
then it is likely to be significant enough to warrant a made as a result of inspections and about when
declaration. For these reasons, the Royal Commission engineers should be expected to:
does not believe that there is a problem with the
existing civil defence and emergency management • examine the interior of the structure;
framework or its empowering legislation that needs to
• consult plans and drawings;
be specifically addressed: it is the local authority’s
decision whether or not to declare a state of emergency. • carry out calculations;

• pull linings off the walls, floors and ceilings to check

the structural elements underneath;
Recommendations • use invasive methods such as boring holes and
taking samples to test; and

We recommend that: • move from a damage-based assessment to one that

indicates the building’s (residual) seismic capacity.
113. Legislation should provide that a building
safety evaluation operation should only be
2.4.3.1 Damage-based assessments
commenced during a state of emergency.
Most countries with comparable building safety
114. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
evaluation systems first assess the visible damage that
Employment should progress its proposals to
an earthquake or other disaster has done to the building.
incorporate new emergency risk management
The purpose of a damage-based assessment is to
provisions into the Building Act 2004 to:
identify those buildings that are obviously unsafe and
• make the Ministry of Business, Innovation therefore at risk of collapse in an aftershock. Rapid
and Employment responsible for the assessments are clearly damage-based assessments
development and maintenance of based on visible damage. DEEs tend to begin as
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation damage-based assessments.
process;
Most countries also assess the danger from the non-
• make territorial authorities responsible for
structural parts of a building; for example, parapets that
delivering a building safety evaluation could fall on passers-by in an aftershock. The building
operation; and safety evaluation processes in some countries look at
• give the Ministry of Business, Innovation the danger a building might pose to its neighbours.
and Employment a formal role within Several countries also consider whether other hazards
national civil defence and emergency like broken utility lines, asbestos or chemicals are
planning arrangements. present. Some researchers suggest that evaluators
use particular models and methods when carrying out
115. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
damage-based assessments: for example, several
Employment should continue working with
propose grading a building and giving it a number
the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
depending on the intensity of the damage described.
Management on the detail of the above
proposals. From October 2010, damage-based assessments in
Christchurch were carried out by evaluating visible
evidence as to whether the earthquake resistance
2.4.3 How evaluators assess buildings in capacity of the building was no worse than it was
rapid assessments and detailed engineering before the September earthquake. This is the approach
evaluations after earthquakes engineers in Japan take when they assess the capacity
of the building to withstand aftershocks through
As well as considering the process of building safety
assessment of observed damage and calculation of
evaluation, the Royal Commission considered the way
residual seismic resistance. Future aftershocks were
in which engineers evaluate buildings when carrying
assumed to be events with an order of magnitude one
out rapid assessments and DEEs after earthquakes.
less than the damaging event. Some local authorities
Consideration of the methods, frameworks and
in California also allow building owners to restore their
assumptions used by engineers is important because
building back to the condition the building was in
different skill sets are needed to assess the damage to
before the earthquake if the observed damage is not
considered substantial.
2.4.3.2 Seismic capacity assessment of wall or floor linings if structural elements have yielded
12
Calvi et al. discuss how seismic vulnerability or lost their structural capacity. We accept that is so.
assessment methodologies have developed over the
In such cases wall linings, floor coverings and ceiling
past 30 years, including how to assess the residual
tiles should be removed to enable examination of the
capacity of buildings after an earthquake. In Turkey, the
damage. There are some cases where damage may not
rapid assessment of reinforced concrete buildings after
be apparent before the collapse condition is reached.
recent earthquakes there has led to some researchers
The PGC and the CTV buildings are examples of this
proposing building safety evaluation methods that
situation, where there was no significant damage evident
define the lateral load resistance systems using
prior to collapse, but because the structures of these
mathematical modelling. The researchers Calvi et al.
buildings did not possess resilience through ductile
suggest in their paper that these methods could help
detailing they subsequently failed in a brittle manner.
civil defence workers’ decision making, such as
prioritising which buildings need a more detailed In assessing the percentage of ULS (we prefer to refer
engineering assessment, and determining when to to the ULS (ultimate limit state) rather than to NBS (new
allow people to reoccupy a building after an earthquake.
building standard) for the reasons explained in
However, Calvi et al. also believe that the potential for
section 6.2.4 of Volume 4), it is essential to consider the
the use of such methods in large-scale seismic risk
capacity of the building to sustain gravity loads under
models is limited because evaluators still need to
seismic shaking. The strength of the building is only
consider buildings individually, for repair and
part of the consideration that is needed: it is essential
reoccupation.
to consider also the deformation capacity and the
rate at which strength will degrade with additional
2.4.3.3 Seismic capacity assessments within
seismic shaking.
a damage-based assessment
Instead of replacing the damage-based assessment, In their evidence to the Royal Commission, Mr David
the building evaluation systems in Greece, California Brunsdon and Mr John Hare illustrated the significance
and Japan all recommend assessing the (residual) of strength degradation with reference to Figure 4.
seismic capacity of buildings damaged in an
earthquake within a damage-based approach. This
is because it is not generally easy to fully identify
ok to occupy
the residual capacity a building has to withstand B
aftershocks quantitatively from quick inspections. Building not acceptable
Engineers would primarily carry out a damage-based
% NBS

Loss of lateral strength

assessment, but include some calculations and other
33
analyses of a building’s (residual) seismic capacity. A
Building
In practice, most methodologies follow a stepped
process, where an engineer would carry out a range
of qualitative and quantitative assessments set on Time
a continuum. The simple, inexpensive qualitative
assessments are at one end of this continuum; more Figure 4: Building status and reoccupation (source:
complex calculations and invasive investigative adapted from evidence to the Royal Commission by
D. Brunsdon, September 2012)
methods (like boring holes into walls) are at the other.
A rapid assessment would be the first qualitative step, The notional building B in the figure may initially have
to locate potential fall hazards and identify buildings a strength in excess of 33 per cent of NBS, but due to
in urgent need of further attention from the point of damage occurring at non-ductile zones its strength can
view of public safety. This should be followed by more degrade in aftershocks of significantly smaller intensity
detailed engineering assessments appropriate to the than the original ground motion. Such a building may
circumstances. We discuss the nature and content of lose its strength in a non-ductile manner due to a
such assessments in section 2.6.2.2.1 of this Volume. critical structural weakness or weaknesses, without
Engineers move from qualitative to quantitative any apparent damage in an initial earthquake. The
methods, and from simpler to more complex analyses, Royal Commission saw examples of such non-ductile
depending on the damage they observe at each step. behaviour in the failure of the PGC and CTV buildings
Evidence to the Royal Commission indicates that there (see the discussions in section 2.8.2.2. of Volume 2
is usually visible evidence of cracking or displacement and Volume 6) and the non-ductile failure of a number
of other structural elements discussed in Volume 2.
The notional building A in Figure 4 may have a low
lateral strength, which may be below 33 per cent of the … it is natural to assume that [a building] is worse off
than if the damage had not occurred. It seems likely
strength of a new building but, due to ductile behaviour
that the maximum displacement in the future, larger
of the potential plastic regions and the lack of damage earthquake would be greater than if it had not been
in other locations, it will continue to perform in a safe damaged. Extensive nonlinear time-history analyses
manner in aftershocks. performed for the project indicated otherwise for
many structures. This was particularly true in cases
Identifying a critical structural weakness that limits in which significant strength degradation did not
occur during the prior, smaller earthquake. Careful
the displacement capacity of the structure is more examination of the results revealed that maximum
important than determining the lateral strength. This displacements in time histories of relatively large
aspect needs to be considered in determining the earthquakes tended to occur after loss of stiffness
and strength would have taken place even in an
percentage ULS.
undamaged structure. In other words, the damage
that occurs in a prior, smaller event would have
2.4.3.4 Accounting for aftershocks occurred early in the subsequent, larger event
anyway.
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that the
rapid assessments in the building safety evaluation
In section 2 of Volume 1 of this Report, we discuss the
process in New Zealand are based upon an assumption
characteristics of the Canterbury earthquakes. It is clear
that a building should be able to withstand an
that the February earthquake had much greater ground
aftershock of one magnitude less than the main shock
accelerations that the main September event though
if it has not been significantly damaged in the main
the aftershock was of a lesser magnitude. As we noted
shock. Building safety evaluation best-practice does
in section 2.7.1.8 of Volume 1, the comparatively high
not plan for the situation seen in Christchurch, where
magnitude of the aftershocks in the Canterbury
increased ground accelerations from a near aftershock
earthquakes sequence is not the norm. The epicentre of
damaged buildings more than the main shock, even
the February event was much closer to the Christchurch
though its magnitude was one order less. This was an
CBD than that of the September earthquake, and more
unforeseen circumstance.
shallow, and this greatly increased the intensity of the
The view that a building should withstand an aftershock shaking in Christchurch’s CBD. Consequently, we do
of one magnitude less than the main shock developed not consider that the theoretical underpinning of the
after researchers in several countries studied the building safety evaluation process should be abandoned
performance of buildings after earthquakes. The as a result of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)13 in
The Royal Commission nevertheless considers that
the United States undertook the seminal research on
building safety evaluators must look at other factors
this topic; this major research project examined how
when considering how a building might perform in an
buildings performed in aftershocks. Researchers found
aftershock. Where the earthquake is generated on a
that if the structural elements in a building had been
distant fault, aftershocks may generally be expected
damaged, but did not suffer strength degradation, then
to be of shorter duration and lower intensity than the
the building generally had the same capacity as it did
main shock. Where the fault is close to the city, there
before the earthquake. FEMA recognises that this may
is a greater likelihood of subsequent aftershocks being
seem counterintuitive, stating that:
closer to the city than the initial earthquake. Such
an event may result in a greater intensity of shaking
and the possibility of the directions of the major
components of shaking being different from those of
the initial earthquake. The result may be to cause major
damage to buildings not severely damaged in the initial
earthquake. Where the earthquake was on a local fault,
a greater level of care in the assessment is required
with more conservative judgements being made due
to the possibility of aftershocks with a greater intensity
and with different principal directions of shaking.
 IPENZ led the mobilisation of volunteer engineers from

Recommendations the rest of the country after the September and February
earthquakes; some engineers also volunteered of their
own accord. Local Government New Zealand mobilised
workers from other territorial authorities to support local
We recommend that: council staff.
116. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment, the Ministry of Civil Defence 2.4.4.2 Availability of building safety evaluators
and Emergency Management, GNS Science, after the Canterbury earthquakes
the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Approximately 250 volunteers carried out rapid
Engineering and other engineering technical assessments in Christchurch during the state of
groups should research how and when emergency declared after the September earthquake.
building safety evaluators should account for About 75 of these volunteers were engineers who
aftershocks. worked in the rapid assessment teams alongside
117. The building safety evaluation process 24 Urban Search and Rescue engineers. Urban Search
should set out the factors evaluators need and Rescue engineers were able to join the rapid
to take into account when considering how assessment teams and carry out other tasks to support
a building will respond in an aftershock, the local civil defence response because there were
including: no casualties and they did not need to carry out a
rescue operation.
• how close the main shock was to an
urban centre that could be affected by After the February earthquake, civil defence planners
an aftershock; identified the need for up to 100 engineers and a
• the direction of the main shock and any further 50 building control officials to make up the
likely aftershocks; and rapid assessment teams going into Christchurch’s CBD.
Approximately 350 engineers were involved in the rapid
• how soil, ground conditions and any other
assessments carried out during the national state of
relevant factors may affect the intensity emergency.
of the ground motions in an aftershock.
2.4.4.3 Constraints caused by the number of
building safety evaluators available after the
2.4.4 Mobilising a sufficient number of skilled Canterbury earthquakes
building safety evaluators After the September earthquake, the number of
The ability to carry out an effective building safety available engineers limited the number of rapid
evaluation operation depends on the number of skilled assessment teams carrying out evaluations in
evaluators available. For this reason, effective plans Christchurch’s CBD to 29. The limited number of
for the mobilisation of trained professionals at national available engineers particularly affected Waimakariri
and local levels, and for events of different magnitudes, District Council, which used its own building control
are important. officials to carry out rapid assessments until structural
engineers and people with more technical expertise
2.4.4.1 Model based on volunteers became available on 7 September.
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation framework
There were significant issues with the availability of
relies on volunteers. The process was developed by
people to carry out building safety evaluations after
the NZSEE, a volunteer organisation. We have heard
the Boxing Day aftershock. Because the aftershock
evidence that CCC building control officials and other
occurred in the holiday season, many local engineers
council staff are required to support the civil defence
and CCC staff were on holiday and had left the
and emergency management response to a disaster as
city. Further problems with mobilising the volunteer
part of their job description. However, other evaluators
engineers arose when the CCC did not declare a state
such as engineers, architects, and members of the
of emergency. This is because there are difficulties
construction industry are generally volunteers.
with utilising volunteer engineers outside of a state
In New Zealand, professional bodies like the Institution of emergency declared under the Civil Defence and
for Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) Emergency Management Act 2002. We discuss these
and the Building Officials Institute of New Zealand issues further in section 2.4.5.1 of this Volume.
encourage their members to assist after a disaster.
The number of available building control officials also number of buildings than a larger group of engineers
constrained the rapid assessment operation after the with less training or experience. CERA contends
February earthquake. Not every rapid assessment team that this group should be supplemented by a pool of
had a warranted officer to support placing the placards evaluators for larger-scale events.
because Operation Suburb, an extensive evaluation of
suburban residences, reduced the number of building The NZSEE3 also favours using a tiered model. It
control officials available. At its peak, Operation Suburb suggests developing three groups of trained evaluators:
deployed up to 1,000 building control officials, welfare
representatives and Earthquake Commission staff • a small group of experts;
each day. This reduced the number of building control • a larger group of trained building safety evaluators;
officials available for the rapid assessment operation in and
Christchurch’s CBD. The CCC therefore decided to give
• the largest group of potential evaluators who have
temporary warrants to the building safety evaluation
received basic training.
team leaders, who were almost exclusively Chartered
Professional Engineers. This model is illustrated below.

The response to the February earthquake incorporated

some of the lessons learnt about staffing issues after
the September earthquake. The reports received by National resource
capable of leading
the Royal Commission note that the building safety a Building Safety
evaluation management team was better resourced Evaluation operation

than its September equivalent. They suggest that this, Drawn from
along with a formal roster to keep staff alert, allowed Senior
Building
the building safety evaluation management team to Officials
and structural
support a wider range of activities conducted in parallel. Chartered
Professional
Engineers
2.4.4.4 Options for mobilising a sufficient
number of building safety evaluators
Drawn from
All Building Officials
The main questions are whether volunteer evaluators and
should be paid or unpaid, and how many evaluators Structural Engineers
and
New Zealand needs to carry out rapid assessments Civil Engineers
after a disaster.

The Royal Commission has heard evidence that the

mobilisation of volunteers after the Canterbury
earthquakes was timely and well-organised. For this
reason, we consider the current arrangements are Figure 5: Building evaluation resource
(source: NZSEE, 2011)
appropriate, provided matters of liability are resolved.

The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Currently, the Urban Search and Rescue engineers and
and CERA suggest establishing a core team of trained, other engineers who have developed expertise by
registered and warranted building safety evaluators. assisting in the response to overseas disaster events,
This team of building safety evaluators would be a form the smallest group. The middle group would be
national resource that could be called in by the Chief drawn from senior building officials and chartered
Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and structural engineers who wish to become building
Employment to carry out building safety evaluation safety evaluators. The largest group is made up of
operations. The Ministry would decide when and where potential building safety evaluators drawn from all
to deploy this team in conjunction with the civil defence building officials, structural engineers and civil engineers.
and emergency management Controller after a state
The building safety evaluators who assessed buildings
of emergency had been declared. CERA supports this
after the Canterbury earthquakes comprised a small
concept. It has observed that a relatively small group
group of experts and volunteers drawn from all building
of experienced, well-trained engineers could be more
officials, structural engineers and civil engineers. The
effective in completing rapid assessments over a
middle group of senior building officials and structural 2.4.5 Barriers to obtaining skilled building
Chartered Professional Engineers who could be called safety evaluators
on to supplement the small group of building safety
evaluation experts did not exist when engineers 2.4.5.1 The liability waiver for building safety
evaluators
mobilised to respond to the Canterbury earthquakes.
The reports received by the Royal Commission record
The Urban Search and Rescue engineers and the that when the NZSEE Guidelines10 were reviewed from
engineers who have significant expertise gained from 2004 to 2009, engineering consultancies made it clear
their participation in the response to overseas disaster that they would not volunteer their workers for a building
events could become the Ministry of Business, safety evaluation operation without a waiver of liability.
Innovation and Employment’s core team. The middle They wanted a waiver to recognise that engineers would
group would supplement this group of experts in larger be volunteering on a “best endeavours” basis in an
building safety evaluation operations. The largest group emergency situation: engineers would normally evaluate
is made up of the potential building safety evaluators buildings more thoroughly.
who would only be brought in for very large operations.
To find a way forward, the NZSEE convened a large
The Royal Commission considers that establishing a group made up of government, industry and technical
core team of building safety evaluators supplemented engineering societies to discuss the liability issues. This
by two larger pools of potential evaluators is group concluded that section 110 of the Civil Defence
conceptually sound. It recognises that, notwithstanding and Emergency Management Act 2002 was the best
the experience of Christchurch, earthquakes in New way to manage engineers’ concerns about liability
Zealand will for building safety evaluations. Section 110 gives civil
not generally significantly impact on major urban defence workers protection from liability for damages or
centres. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and loss during a state of emergency, unless they acted in
Employment’s core team of building safety evaluators bad faith or were grossly negligent. It states:
should be sufficient to respond to a smaller centre,
such as Gisborne. The middle group could be called 110 Protection from liability
in to assist this core team when an event occurs in a
(1) Except as provided in sections 107 to 109, there
larger provincial centre. If a territorial authority needs to is no cause of action against the Crown, or a
carry out a large-scale, urban building safety evaluation Civil Defence Emergency Management Group,
operation, it could call upon all three groups of potential or an officer or employee or member of any of
them, or against any other person, to recover
evaluators. We discuss the training needs of the middle
damages for any loss or damage that is due
group of building safety evaluators in section 2.4.5.2.4 directly or indirectly to a state of emergency.
of this Volume.
(2) Subsection (1) applies whether the loss or
damage is caused by any person taking any
action or failing to take any action, so long as

Recommendations the act or omission occurred in the exercise or

performance of his or her functions, duties, or
powers under this Act.
(3) No person is exempted from liability under
We recommend that: subsection (1) for any act or omission to act that
constitutes bad faith or gross negligence on the
118. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and part of that person.
Employment should progress their proposal
to establish a core team of building safety
evaluators that the Ministry could call on.
119. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should carefully consider the
merits and detail of any proposals about
the size of this group of building safety
evaluators.
120. The ability to supplement this team with more
evaluators who have received basic training
should be maintained.
This liability waiver was carried through into the recovery to address any concerns about liability for work done
phase after the February earthquake. Section 83 of the under special circumstances, such as after a disaster.
Canterbury Earthquakes Recovery Act 2011 sets out a If engineers are not given a liability waiver when they
comparable liability waiver: volunteer as building safety evaluators, they may carry
out more thorough assessments, or alternatively, not
83 Protection from liability provide their services. In either case, the recovery from
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no the disaster is likely to be delayed. It was made clear to
action lies against the Crown, or an officer or the Royal Commission by some of those who suffered
employee or Minister of the Crown, or against
personal loss that they held those involved in the
any other person,—
assessments responsible. Taking these considerations
(a) to recover any damages or other amount for
any loss, damage, or adverse effect that is into account, the Royal Commission considers it is both
due directly or indirectly to any action taken prudent and reasonable to provide a liability waiver for
under this Act; or building safety evaluators.
(b) to require any work to be carried out or
other action to be taken in order to remedy It is important to consider whether a building safety
or mitigate any loss, damage, or adverse evaluation operation can continue outside of a state
effect that results directly or indirectly from of emergency because civil defence and emergency
any action taken under this Act.
management best-practice is to move from response
(2) No person who takes any action under this Act to recovery as soon as possible. A large-scale rapid
is liable under the Resource Management Act
1991 for any fine, costs, or expenses in respect assessment operation may not be complete before a
of that action, except as otherwise provided in state of emergency ends. The Ministry of Business,
this Act. Innovation and Employment suggests aligning the
(3) Subsection (1) applies whether the loss, liability waiver with the building safety evaluation
damage, or adverse effect is caused by any process rather than whether or not a state of emergency
person taking any action or failing to take any
is declared. This would allow territorial authorities
action, so long as the act or omission occurred
in the exercise or performance, or intended and other decision makers to carry out building safety
exercise or intended performance, of his or her evaluation operations in a range of circumstances.
functions, duties, or powers under this Act. It may also remove the need for a mechanism that
(4) No person is exempted from liability under transitions the process from civil defence to normal
subsection (1) for any act or omission to act that building control arrangements governed by territorial
constitutes bad faith or gross negligence on the
part of that person.
authorities: we discuss this transition in section 2.6 of
this Volume. The Royal Commission therefore considers
that the liability waiver for building safety evaluators
Submitters suggest that providing a liability waiver for
should be associated with the process itself, not when
building safety evaluations is necessary and desirable
it takes place.
because it recognises that these evaluations are
carried out in special circumstances. Turner’s14

Recommendations
analysis of the building safety evaluation processes in
several countries indicates that evaluators have liability
protection in California and Japan; evaluators in Italy
and the European Union do not have liability protection.
We recommend that:
The unwillingness of some engineers to carry out
121. Legislation should continue to provide for a
building safety evaluations after the Boxing Day
waiver of liability for building safety
aftershock without the protection of a liability waiver
evaluators carrying out rapid assessments.
clearly illustrates that having a waiver incentivises
individual behaviour. The reports received by the Royal 122. The liability waiver for building safety
Commission describe how some engineers withdrew evaluators should be aligned with the building
as evaluators when the CCC decided not to declare a safety evaluation process instead of being
state of emergency. Griffiths and McNulty5 contend that restricted to an operation carried out in a
this is because the CCC’s contracting management state of emergency.
system could not resolve their concerns about potential
liability outside of a state of emergency. This suggests
that the standard contracting arrangements used by
human resourcing departments may not be sufficient
2.4.5.2 The skills of building safety evaluators NZSEE15 recommends that only Chartered Professional
In addition to constraints caused by the availability of Engineers with experience in earthquake engineering
engineers, the skill sets and abilities of the evaluators determine whether a building is potentially earthquake-
may also affect the efficiency and effectiveness of prone. The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
a building safety evaluation operation. International the number of engineers with this experience before the
literature on building safety evaluations indicates that September earthquake was small.
the quality of assessments produced by evaluators
2.4.5.2.2 Guidance on carrying out DEEs after
can be inconsistent. The Royal Commission has
earthquakes
heard evidence that the quality of both the DEEs and
rapid assessments in Christchurch varied. We have The Royal Commission has received evidence that
also heard evidence that geotechnical engineers engineers carrying out DEEs for building owners were
had to reassess properties in the Port Hills that were expected to use their own knowledge and refer to
incorrectly given a green placard by structural guidance documents produced in New Zealand and
engineers who did not identify the fall hazards from the United States if necessary. We note advice that
the surrounding cliff faces. Some submitters stated some of these overseas guidance documents are not
that, overall, they thought that the poorer-quality directly applicable to New Zealand. Engineers were not
rapid assessments tended to be too conservative. familiar with what needed to be included in a DEE after
International literature on building safety evaluations an earthquake. Some engineers effectively repeated a
also suggests that rapid assessments tend to be Level 2 Rapid Assessment: they did not seek out plans,
conservative. However, the Royal Commission has identify any critical structural weaknesses or adequately
found that this was not the case with evaluations determine the structural load paths in the building.
of unreinforced masonry buildings. In section 4 of Owners confused them with a DEE because they were
Volume 4 we discuss the individual buildings that provided by a Chartered Professional Engineer.
caused the deaths of 42 people when they failed in the
February earthquake. These buildings were nearly all After looking at how engineers carried out DEEs in
unreinforced masonry or brick or block structures. Christchurch following the Canterbury earthquakes,
We note several examples where engineers carried the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment17
out less cautious assessments, such as those on began developing guidelines for engineers to use when
7 Riccarton Road. carrying out DEEs after earthquakes. We consider that
these DEE guidelines should be finalised as soon as
2.4.5.2.1 The skill sets engineers require possible to assist building owners and other decision
International literature indicates that many engineers makers in the rebuild of Christchurch.
may not be skilled enough to carry out good quality
evaluations of buildings damaged in an earthquake.
The NZSEE15 recommendations on how to assess
whether a building is potentially earthquake-prone
Recommendation
also express concerns about the ability of engineers
to assess existing buildings before an earthquake. We recommend that:

This is because the processes used to assess the 123.The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
structural performance of a building in an earthquake Employment should work with the New Zealand
are different from those an engineer would use when Society for Earthquake Engineering, the
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand
designing a building. In addition, Saito and Thakur16
and others with appropriate experience and
note it can be particularly difficult to assess moderate
expertise to finalise guidelines for Detailed
damage to a building; it is easier to identify when
Engineering Evaluations as soon as possible.
a building is severely damaged or hardly damaged at
all. Engineers assessing a building’s structural
performance in an earthquake need to assess the way
in which individual structural elements affect the overall
response of the building. This requires considerable
judgement by the engineer, who needs a thorough
understanding of the underlying theory and its empirical
justifications to adequately identify and assess the
observed condition of the building. For this reason, the
2.4.5.2.3 Guidance for entering dangerous buildings 2.4.5.2.4 Training for building safety evaluators
after earthquakes
The lack of specific training for building safety
In section 4.16.4.2 of Volume 4, we discuss the evaluators and the wider engineering community
circumstances in which workers entered the damaged contributed to the variable quality and inconsistencies
Durham Street Methodist Church and lost their lives in in both rapid assessments and DEEs after the
the February earthquake. We highlight the lack of clear earthquakes, which were reported to the Royal
guidelines for engineers and others in assessing the risk Commission. Many of the Urban Search and Rescue
of entering what was essentially a dangerous building. engineers who carried out rapid assessments after the
September earthquake were familiar with the building
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
safety evaluation process: they had supported overseas
building safety evaluators checking buildings in the
CBD Red Zone in Christchurch were nearly caught operations and had received pilot NZSEE training
in them during the second June 2011 aftershock. In in 2010. However, few of the volunteer engineers
addition, engineers carrying out detailed engineering had received direct training on this process, or had
previously used the NZSEE Guidelines. This meant that
evaluations in red or yellow placard buildings may need
a consistent brief for these engineers on the building
to enter them to assess the building. Urban Search
safety evaluation process was desirable before they
and Rescue engineers receive training on assessing
carried out rapid assessments.
the risks to themselves and their team when entering a
building. For this reason, they accompanied the rapid From 5 September 2010, members of the rapid
assessment teams working in Christchurch’s CBD assessment teams received a briefing of about 30
after the February earthquake, to make sure that these minutes on the NZSEE Guidelines and the process they
teams were carrying out their work in a safe way. were
to follow. However, because of when they arrived and
The Royal Commission considers that guidelines should
were deployed, not everyone received this briefing.
be developed to assist building safety evaluators to
New Zealand has yet to develop a field manual for
assess when and how to enter a damaged building.
building safety evaluators to take out with them.
These guidelines should be based on the Urban Search
and Rescue training. We consider that they should be This does not mean that these engineers received no
attached to the guidelines for carrying out DEEs after support in carrying out building safety evaluations.
earthquakes that the Ministry of Business, Innovation The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
and Employment are currently developing. building safety evaluators would hold informal debriefs
with each other at the end of the day. Participants
commented on how valuable these conversations

Recommendations were, because more experienced evaluators shared

their knowledge about how and why they assessed
damaged buildings the way they did.
We recommend that:
The NZSEE has been developing a training programme
124.Guidelines should be developed that assist for building safety evaluators for some time. In 2005
building safety evaluators to assess when and 2006, the NZSEE developed drafts of the following:
and how to enter a damaged building.
• an Information Sheet,
125. These guidelines should be based on the
Urban Search and Rescue training on • Training Modules;
when and how to assess entry to a • Induction materials; and
damaged building.
• a Field Guide.
126. These guidelines should be attached to the
guidelines the Ministry of Business, However, work on these drafts stalled in 2007. By 2009,
Innovation and Employment is developing work on the development of a field guide had
on the way in which engineers should carry progressed. Pilot training modules had also been
out Detailed Engineering Evaluations after developed to accompany the revised version of the
earthquakes. NZSEE Guidelines10. These pilot training modules focus
on managing the building safety evaluation process,
with participants split into groups to work through case
studies where they assess damaged buildings. This
training was delivered to building control officials and
local council engineers. Only six territorial authorities, Submitters discussed how much training engineers
including the CCC, had received this training in 2009 need before becoming a building safety evaluator, and
and 2010. Most of the CCC engineers and building who should provide this training. The NZSEE3 contends
control officials carrying out building safety evaluations that not all building safety evaluators need the same
after the September earthquake had undergone level of training to successfully carry out rapid
this training. assessments. Using the model set out in Figure 5,
Figure 6 illustrates the level of training each group of
Like the pilot training materials, the NZSEE Guidelines evaluators needs.
focus on how to plan for and manage a building safety
evaluation operation. The guidelines in countries with
similar building safety evaluation processes tell
engineers
and other evaluators what methods, frameworks and
assumptions they should use. Their building safety
evaluation guidelines typically describe the characteristics
and the damage that evaluators are likely to observe in
different types of buildings. These countries usually
develop specific training programmes to supplement
their guidelines.

In section 2.4.5.2.1 of this Volume, we discuss the need

for engineers to have specialised training and
experience in order to successfully evaluate the
performance of an existing building in an earthquake.
For these reasons, the Royal Commission considers
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process
should include guidelines for evaluators about what
methods, approaches and assumptions they should use
when assessing the damage to a building. Although this
will make the guidelines considerably larger, we Figure 6: Building evaluation resource and training
consider that these guidelines should be incorporated capability objectives (source: NZSEE, 2011)
into the main guidance documents, instead of being
The training for each of these groups is what is needed
published separately. This will ensure that they reach all to maintain their ability to carry out rapid assessments
building safety evaluators. of buildings after earthquakes. Each group would
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that receive a different level of training. The smallest group
building safety evaluators would have found it useful is the most highly trained, attending presentations on
to have a field manual summarising the damage to the management of disasters and participating in visits
look for in particular building types. We consider that to disaster scenes overseas. This group of experts
the draft NZSEE field guide should be finalised and would assist with training those in the middle group of
provided to all building safety evaluators. structural Chartered Professional Engineers and senior
building officials who are building safety evaluators
in the methods, frameworks and assumptions they

Recommendations should use when they carry out rapid assessments.

The middle group would maintain their preparedness
through this advanced training, which would be
supplemented by refresher courses. They would keep
We recommend that:
up to date with lessons from disaster events, and the
127. New Zealand’s building safety evaluation structural engineers who wish to become building safety
guidelines should incorporate detailed evaluators could undertake optional training as part of
guidance to engineers about the way they their preparation to become a Chartered Professional
should assess the damage to particular Engineer. The largest group of building safety evaluators
building types. would develop a basic awareness of the building safety
128. The field guide for building safety evaluators evaluation process through engineering conferences
should be finalised. and seminars, such as the “Learning from Earthquakes”
seminars given by the Urban Search and Rescue 2.4.5.3 Indicating that the pool of building
engineers returning from overseas events. safety evaluators has the right skills
The Royal Commission considers that New Zealand’s Several submitters favour developing a way to indicate
building safety evaluation process and guidelines that building safety evaluators have the right skills and
should be supplemented by a training programme. experience. They contend that when building safety
This training should explain what the building safety evaluation managers know what skills and experience
evaluation process is, and show evaluators how to their volunteers have, they are better able to decide
assess the significance of damage to different types of where to send them. Some submitters proposed a
buildings and structures. We consider that the Ministry training and warranting system for building safety
of Business, Innovation and Employment should be evaluators similar to the system used in California.
responsible for developing and delivering this training Several discuss whether or not building safety evaluators
programme. The assessment of damage observed in need to be chartered professionals. Some submitters
a building after an earthquake requires engineering suggest that the pool of available evaluators should be
judgement, and this judgement is usually garnered assigned to assess different types of structures based
through experience. Developing and delivering training on their particular skills and experience.
helps engineers to acquire the skills needed to carry
2.4.5.3.1 A registration and warranting scheme for
out a building safety evaluation process because it
building safety evaluators
provides a forum where engineers can learn from
their more experienced peers. We consider that New In contrast to New Zealand, volunteers in California must
Zealand should develop training for engineers on how be formally registered and warranted as building safety
to assess damaged buildings based on the NZSEE evaluators (with the California Safety Assessment
model illustrated in Figure 6. As well as identifying Program). Their registration as evaluators must be
and assessing the damage to buildings caused by renewed every five years and they must attend training
earthquakes, training on the building safety evaluation to keep it current. The Ministry of Business, Innovation
process could cover how to assess buildings damaged and Employment suggests that the proposed core team
by other disasters. of building safety evaluators should be registered
and warranted.

Recommendations The Royal Commission has received evidence that

the mobilisation of engineers and other building safety
evaluators after the Canterbury earthquakes was fast,
efficient and largely effective. However, the reports
We recommend that: we received recognise that pre-planning for how to
129. The building safety evaluation process should mobilise volunteer evaluators was poor. We understand
incorporate a training programme for all that the efforts of IPENZ and Local Government
building safety evaluators. New Zealand in mobilising volunteer engineers and
building control officials from other councils were
130. Such training should cover:
largely responsible for the successful mobilisation.
• what the building safety evaluation There is no reason to assume that such efforts
process is and how it works; and would not be repeated after another major disaster.
Consequently, we do not consider it necessary to
• how to identify and assess the damage
register and warrant building safety evaluators to
evaluators observe in buildings after an
assist mobilisation.
earthquake.
131. This training programme should be However, it is important that these evaluators keep
developed using the New Zealand Society for their skills current. The Royal Commission therefore
Earthquake Engineering’s building evaluation considers that the training should be compulsory for
resource and training capability objectives the core team of building safety evaluators that forms
framework, in which building safety evaluators a national resource capable of leading a building
are split into three different groups and each safety evaluation operation. We also consider that this
group receives a different level of training. training should be compulsory for those Chartered
Professional Engineers, structural engineers and senior
building officials who wish to be able to carry out rapid
assessments. These building safety evaluators should
regularly attend compulsory refresher courses to keep After the February earthquake, only Chartered
their training up to date. The Royal Commission does Professional Engineers were allowed to join the building
not consider that it is necessary for the largest group safety evaluation teams working in the CBD Red Zone.
of building safety evaluators, drawn from all building Because of their greater experience, civil defence
officials, structural engineers and civil engineers, to management believed that they would be better able
attend compulsory training as they will rarely be called to assess the damage to a building, and therefore the
upon to assist after a disaster. Only trained evaluators risk to their team and ultimately the wider public, from
should participate in a building safety evaluation ongoing aftershocks.
operation, unless the circumstances of a particular
disaster make this impractical and the largest pool However, allowing only Chartered Professional Engineers
of potential evaluators is mobilised. Should the need to to become building safety evaluators would significantly
call upon the largest group of potential evaluators reduce the pool of people available to carry out rapid
arise, we consider that, wherever practicable, these assessments. Further, volunteer building control
evaluators should carry out rapid assessments under officials, architects and members of the construction
the supervision of those evaluators who have attended industry can be valued members of a rapid assessment
the compulsory training and therefore possess a greater team. In addition, the Ministry of Business, Employment
level of preparedness. and Innovation contends that while only Chartered
Professional Engineers should carry out DEEs after
In section 2.4.2 of this Volume, we suggest that building earthquakes, suitably trained building control officials
safety evaluation operations should be delivered by could produce rapid assessments of consistent
territorial authorities. Consequently, we consider it quality. We accept that this is so, and consider that all
particularly important that territorial authority staff with building safety evaluators do not need to be Chartered
civil defence and emergency management responsibilities Professional Engineers.
attend the compulsory training. This should be
considered part of the job training for this group. 2.4.5.3.3 The assignment of specific tasks to
evaluators with specific qualifications and experience
Because the training for the core team that forms a
Another way of indicating that building safety evaluators
national resource capable of leading a building safety
have the right skills and experience is to organise for
evaluation operation and the building safety evaluators
different groups of evaluators to assess particular
who actively maintain their preparedness would be
types of buildings and structures depending on their
compulsory, the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
qualifications, training, and/or experience.
Employment would be able to keep a list of people who
have attended the training. The Ministry of Business, The 199818 version of the NZSEE Guidelines took
Innovation and Employment should make this list this approach. So do the Californian building
available to territorial authorities’ civil defence and safety evaluation guidelines11 on which the NZSEE
emergency management planners. Guidelines are based. These documents suggest that
building control officials, architects and members
2.4.5.3.2 Should building safety evaluators be
of the construction industry carry out Level 1 Rapid
Chartered Professional Engineers?
Assessments. The engineering resource is reserved for
Some submitters suggest that using non-chartered Level 2 Rapid Assessments. This is because Level 2
professional engineers could lead to poorer quality Rapid Assessments are more thorough and therefore
rapid assessments because these engineers are take more time (note, however, that Level 2 Rapid
typically less experienced than their chartered peers. Assessments are still only a basic evaluation of the
condition of the building).
Turner14 outlines who can be building safety evaluators
in California, Greece and Japan. Engineers registering The New Zealand Historic Places Trust expands on
as building safety evaluators in California must be the this idea. It proposes developing a core group of
equivalent of a Chartered Professional Engineer. Civil specialist heritage building safety evaluators because
engineers in Greece carrying out evaluations should considerable experience is needed to assess the
have four to five years’ experience. Building safety damage to heritage buildings, particularly unreinforced
evaluators in Japan must be trained and registered first masonry buildings.
or second class authorised architects; the legislation
governing the authorisation to architects applies to both After the February earthquake, civil defence and
architects and building engineers. In Japan, architects emergency management introduced targeted building
receive substantial training in structural engineering. safety evaluation teams to assess sections of the
city or issues important to the community. As well as
evaluating suburban commercial buildings in Operation 134. If the scale of the emergency requires the
Shop and residential properties in Operation Suburb, mobilisation of the largest group of potential
specialist evaluators assessed shopping malls (so that building safety evaluators, who have not
the public could access food and other necessities), received the compulsory training, these
critical buildings (including those six or more storeys evaluators should work, wherever practicable,
high), the CBD, when and where cordons were needed, under the supervision of those evaluators
and what buildings needed immediate demolition. who have attended the compulsory training.
ATC6 suggests that this approach may have some
135. Territorial authority staff with civil defence
advantages over the block-by-block method usually
used internationally: civil defence and emergency and emergency management responsibilities
management in Christchurch were able to move more should be required to attend the compulsory
rapidly to open up entire segments of the community. building safety evaluator training as part of
their job training.
California19 has therefore added this concept to
the operational plans used by the state agency that 136. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
supports local authority delivery of the building safety Employment should keep a list of the people
evaluation process. who complete the compulsory training for
building safety evaluators and should make
Based on how efficient and effective the building safety this list available to all territorial authorities.
evaluation operations were overall after the Canterbury
137. Where available, only Chartered Professional
earthquakes, the Royal Commission does not believe
Engineers should carry out Level 2 Rapid
that it is necessary to formalise who should carry
Assessments.
out what assessments based on the qualifications,
skills and experience of the evaluator. As Operations
Shop and Suburb proved, it is possible to informally
manage a building safety evaluation operation this 2.4.6 Building safety evaluation models
way if necessary. Nevertheless, we consider that non- The Royal Commission considered it important to
chartered professional engineers and more experienced look at whether or not the current system is the right
evaluators drawn from building control officials, approach or model. Researchers are developing
architects and other suitably qualified people should technology-based building safety evaluation models.
primarily carry out Level 1 Rapid Assessments. Where We also looked at building safety evaluation models
possible, only Chartered Professional Engineers should based on building type, private contracting and
carry out Level 2 Rapid Assessments. the Indicator Building system that developed in
Christchurch after the September earthquake.

Recommendations Option 1: Technology-based building safety

evaluation models
International literature on building safety evaluations
We recommend that: suggests that cities adopt technology-based building
safety evaluation models as the main building safety
132. The core group of building safety evaluators
evaluation process. If adopted widely, these methods
who are a national resource capable of
could develop into a building safety evaluation process
leading a building safety evaluation operation,
that is fully automated. Researchers contend that this will
and those Chartered Professional Engineers,
result in better quality rapid assessments because raw
structural engineers and senior building
data of each building’s performance will be available,
officials who wish to be building safety
and these models reduce the number of evaluators
evaluators, should be required to attend
needed for a building safety evaluation operation.
compulsory training.
133. Only trained building safety evaluators should Vidal et al.20 identifies several technology-based
be authorised to participate in a building building safety evaluation models. Scenario modelling
safety evaluation operation unless the involves looking at the characteristics of the buildings
circumstances of a particular disaster make in an area and modelling what would happen in various
this impractical. disasters before a potential event. Aerial surveying
(increasingly carried out using high-resolution satellite
imagery), laser scanning and damage mapping There are precedents for developing a model based on
determine the extent of the damage caused by the using privately contracted building safety evaluators
earthquake by comparing photographs, laser images in New Zealand. Lifeline utilities typically contract
or information from sensors with baseline images or engineering consultancies to carry out a baseline
data. These sensors are placed throughout locations evaluation of the utility and then check it after a disaster;
and/or in individual buildings. Some of these tools were Telecom has contracted Opus to do so, for example.
used in Christchurch after the Canterbury earthquakes. The Royal Commission has heard evidence that building
A number of buildings were assessed using laser owners also contacted engineers and asked them to
scanning. GNS Science also used laser scanning to check their buildings immediately after the September
monitor movement in the cliff face in the Port Hills. earthquake. However, if this system is adopted building
Building safety evaluators used remote reconnaissance owners and engineers may need to renegotiate the
by a small unmanned aerial vehicle with a camera assessment contract every time the building is sold or
mounted on it and a New Zealand Army robot to assess engineers move on. The Royal Commission therefore
the damage to the Cathedral of the Blessed Sacrament considers that it would not be feasible to rely solely
in Barbadoes Street. on privately-contracted building safety evaluators.
However, we encourage owners to be aware of the
Generally, these methods tend to be less accurate
likely seismic performance of their buildings.
when applied to a single building. Consequently, these
building safety evaluation models tend to work better Option 4: Evaluating buildings based on their
in places where there has been extensive building building type
collapse; aerial surveying and damage mapping
Building safety evaluation literature and some submitters
have been used in Haiti, China and Turkey. In addition,
suggest determining what placard to assign to a building
technology-based building safety evaluation approaches
based on its building type, particularly its age and
rely on high-quality digital information about the area or
construction. This approach involves identifying the key
individual buildings being available before and after a
structural weaknesses associated with each particular
disaster. Although territorial authorities in New Zealand
building type and the key damage patterns it is likely to
may have semi-automated building record systems, the
experience in an earthquake. This idea would require
Royal Commission has received evidence that territorial
certain processes to be followed in relation to particular
authorities may struggle to provide this information in a
kinds of buildings without regard to the extent to which
format that building safety evaluators can use.
they had been damaged by the earthquake. We do not
Option 2: Status quo – local reconnaissance teams favour this approach as it would unnecessarily restrict
access to undamaged buildings.
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation framework
uses local reconnaissance teams to assess the damage 2.4.6.1.1 Conclusions
a disaster causes to an area’s buildings. In section 2.3.2
The Royal Commission considers that improvements
of this Volume, we describe how it is characterised by
should be made to our current process instead of
teams placing colour-coded placards on buildings after
looking for an entirely different model. This is because
assessing the damage to them. This approach was first
New Zealand follows current international best-practice
developed in Europe in the early 1980s. It is used by
and we have not found any viable alternative. Although
the United States, Japan, Indonesia, Greece, Italy, the
some of the semi-automated systems have merit, it may
wider European Union, Colombia and Mexico. be some time before they can be adopted in a systematic
way throughout the country due to the limitations of the
Option 3: Privately contracted building safety
current technology and the base information.
evaluators
Rather than implementing a building safety evaluation On the other hand, the Royal Commission considers
operation managed by public agencies, New Zealand that the management of buildings after earthquakes
could encourage or require building owners to contract should incorporate separate procedures and
their own engineers to check their buildings after a assessments for different kinds of buildings. This issue
disaster. San Francisco developed a building safety is discussed in section 2.6.2 of this Volume.
evaluation model based on this concept; this is the
voluntary Building Occupancy Resumption Program
(BORP).
2.4.6.2 The Indicator Building system
According to the reports we received, the Indicator
Building system was first used after the September
Recommendation
earthquake. After the February earthquake, this model
was expanded and formalised. The Indicator Building We recommend that:
system is designed to assess the effects of aftershocks
138. The Indicator Building model should be
on buildings. The relevant authority identifies examples
incorporated into New Zealand’s building
of different types of buildings whose structural elements
safety evaluation process.
were damaged in the main shock, but are not close
to collapse: these are the Indicator Buildings. It then
monitors the new damage that an aftershock causes
to see if it falls within expected limits. If the Indicator 2.5 Delivery of the building safety
Buildings are sufficiently damaged, or the damage evaluation process
observed in them is greater than expected, the authority
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
may decide to carry out a building safety evaluation
planning for a building safety evaluation process (prior
operation in respect of the class of building that the
to the September earthquake) in Canterbury had only
indicator building represents.
just begun when the earthquake occurred. However, as
our international expert, Mr Bret Lizundia, pointed out
in his evidence to the Royal Commission, New Zealand
overcame this lack of planning with considerable
efficiency and innovation. He discussed how impressed
California’s ATC were with New Zealand’s quick
mobilisation of extra help and resource, and the way
procedures were developed, and that volunteers
came forward and carried out the necessary tasks
efficiently. ATC6 expresses the view that “officials did an
outstanding job” at improvising on an urgent basis after
the February earthquake. Mr Lizundia particularly notes
the creative use of shipping containers for propping
and as barricades, how well temporary utilities were
Figure 7: An Indicator Building in Christchurch organised and that portable sanitary facilities were
after the February earthquake (source: draft ATC provided that allowed people to shelter in place.
Reconnaissance Team report, 2012)
The Royal Commission therefore considers that despite
The NZSEE3 states that this model proved invaluable
for determining how to use the resources available to some problems, overall, the building safety evaluation
carry out building safety evaluations in Christchurch’s operations after the Canterbury earthquakes were well
CBD after significant aftershocks. CERA has also
delivered: for example, the NZSEE3 reports that most
communicated to the Royal Commission that the model
has been an effective tool in their management of of the rapid assessments of 1236 commercial buildings
buildings after aftershocks. In January 2012, and 6686 residential buildings were completed during
California19 amended the operational plans used by the
the first week following the September earthquake. In
state agency that supports local authority delivery of
the building safety evaluation process to incorporate our Report, we make recommendations about how to
New Zealand’s Indicator Building system. This is improve the building safety evaluation process. The
because the Indicator Building system provides a Royal Commission considers that relevant plans should
rational decision making tool for civil defence and be flexible and adaptable, rather than prescriptive rules
emergency management and territorial authority staff. that must be followed. Because they will be applied in
an emergency, they need to be flexible enough to allow
We consider that the Indicator Building system is innovative responses to unusual situations.
particularly useful when an area is experiencing an
earthquake swarm or a prolonged aftershock sequence. We now discuss the more significant issues we have
For this reason, the Royal Commission considers that identified with the delivery of the building safety
the Indicator Building system should be incorporated evaluation operations after the Canterbury earthquakes.
into New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process.
2.5.1 Processes developed at the time 2.5.2 Development of multiple processes
10
The NZSEE Guidelines suggest that territorial After the September earthquake, parallel building safety
authorities need to plan the building safety evaluation evaluation processes developed as engineers engaged
process before the event. This is also international best- by owners carried out evaluations of varying detail
practice; building safety evaluation literature stresses alongside the official operations. Privately contracted
pre-planning the implementation of a building safety engineers are not required to undertake the same
evaluation process. process as official building safety evaluators. There is no
legal requirement to follow the NZSEE Guidelines. The
It is not clear how much CCC, Waimakariri District Royal Commission has heard evidence that these
Council and Selwyn District Council had pre-planned engineers carried out the equivalent of Level 1 and
for carrying out a building safety evaluation operation Level 2 Rapid Assessments, DEEs, or assessments that
before September 2010. All three territorial authorities fell between one or other of these categories. Some
had taken steps to implement the NZSEE Guidelines building owners and engineers changed the official
by this time. On the morning of 4 September, the Urban placard placed on the building, or posted their own
Search and Rescue Engineering Team Leader and a placards on the basis of these evaluations. We consider
civil defence and emergency management consultant the processes used
worked with the CCC to plan and set up the building to change the placards in section 2.5.3.2 and discuss
safety evaluation process used after 5 September. the development of multiple placard systems further in
The Urban Search and Rescue Engineering Team section 2.5.3.1 of this Volume.
Leader suggested using draft revised Guidelines,
developed in 2010, to take advantage of the Building owners and their engineers are not legally
improvements introduced from the lessons learnt in required to share the information in these evaluations
the Indonesian and Italian earthquakes in 2009. with their local authority and there was no system
in place to integrate them into the building’s record.
Time is needed to explain these new arrangements However, these reports sometimes contained information
to people. Even though CCC staff had recently that would have triggered a change in a building’s
received training on the 2009 version of the NZSEE status. For these reasons, CCC introduced procedures
Guidelines, they would have been unfamiliar with the to consider the reports on red and yellow placard
draft 2010 revision. buildings generated by a building owner’s engineer.

The NZSEE3 contends that many territorial authorities Some submitters suggest formalising the parallel
believe that they can pick up the NZSEE Guidelines building safety evaluation process that developed after
on the day and use them to run their building safety the Canterbury earthquakes and integrating it with the
evaluation process. We consider it important that official process. Other submitters note the confusion
local authorities should plan for the process in the parallel building safety evaluation process caused
advance. This should occur as part of their civil and question whether it can be successfully integrated.
defence responsibilities. This requirement should be
set in legislation. The Royal Commission supports building owners, their
property managers and tenants taking the initiative
to check out the condition of their building after an

Recommendations earthquake or other disaster. Nevertheless, we consider

that there should be one rapid assessment process
that is managed and implemented by officials with a
clear mandate and authority. Building owners should
We recommend that:
understand the need for DEEs of their building and
139. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and should engage their own engineers to carry out this
Employment should provide guidance to service. They should also be required to give a copy
territorial authorities to support their plans of this evaluation to the relevant authority. This would
to carry out a building safety evaluation eliminate much of the confusion that arose after the
process. Canterbury earthquakes and ensure that authorities
140. Territorial authorities should be required to have access to all of the information that could affect
plan their building safety evaluation process the status of a building.
as part of their civil defence and emergency
management plans.
 Put simply this means:

Recommendation • there has been a quick visual inspection of your

building;

• no obvious structural problems were found after

We recommend that:
a quick look over your building;
141. Only official building safety evaluators should
• this does not mean that it is not damaged;
be authorised to place, change or remove
placards, and to carry out rapid assessments • this does not mean that it is completely safe;
for this purpose.
• you need to organise for someone to look at it
more thoroughly;

2.5.3 Issues with the placards • if aftershocks cause more damage, the placard
on your building may need to be changed;
We have reproduced the placards used after the
September earthquake in Appendix 2 of this Volume. • tell the council if you find anything that could
The reports we received, international literature on be dangerous; and
building safety evaluations and submitters agree that
• the role owners have in regard to the future safety
the public, and some building safety evaluators, do
of occupants and the public is important.
not understand the meaning of the placards; in the
same way, some do not understand the objectives The Royal Commission considers that the wording of
of building management after earthquakes. These the placard should be changed to a plain English format
sources contend that the wording and the colour of along these lines. This would be easier to read and
the placards is unclear and confusing. A failure to understand in an emergency situation, when people are
understand the wording and meaning of the placards stressed. The messages on the placards could be more
is an issue because the placard is often the main clearly emphasised, so that people notice its text as
way that tenants or the wider public know whether a well as its colour.
building can be entered and used. In particular, green
placards are frequently interpreted as meaning that
the building is “safe” and needs no further inspection.
The development of placard systems in addition to the
Recommendation
official process contributed to this confusion. Issues
also arose when the status of the building and the
We recommend that:
placard on the building needed to be changed.
142. The placards placed as a result of the
The Royal Commission, in the progression from red, to building safety evaluation process should be
yellow, to green, notes that the placards become more rewritten in a plain English format.
wordy and less understandable. We consider the
following sections of the green placard to be less clear
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation process uses
than is desirable:
red, yellow and green colour-coded placards to indicate
This building has received a brief inspection only. the status of the building; this type of system is known
While no apparent structural or other safety hazards as the “traffic light model”. Examples of where it is
have been found, a more comprehensive inspection used include project planning, risk management and
of the exterior and interior may reveal safety
prioritising medical treatment in emergency situations.
hazards…
Owners are encouraged to obtain a detailed Part of the appeal of the traffic light model is that the
structural engineering assessment of the building general public is likely to have a basic understanding of
as soon as possible. Report any unsafe conditions
the meaning of the colours. However, this can also
to the Territorial Authority. Subsequent events
causing damage may change this assessment. become a disadvantage. People associate red with
Re-inspection may be required. Secondary damage “stop”, yellow with “caution” and green with “no issues”,
(partition, windows, fittings and furnishings) may be or “go”. The green placard’s colour may reinforce the
hazardous. Electrical and mechanical equipment,
commonly
gas connections, water supplies and sanitary
facilities have not been inspected. held view that the building is “safe” and does not
need to be checked further. The CCC, the NZSEE,
Mr David Brunsdon and Galloway and Hare21 propose
changing the colour of the green placard to white.
They contend that people are less likely to think that
no further action is needed if the placard is not green.

In principle, the Royal Commission favours changing

the colour of the green placard to white. However, we
have heard evidence that changing the colour of the
green placard to white could make New Zealand’s
building safety evaluation process less compatible with
other countries’ systems. The traffic light system is
international best-practice and this change could result
in confusion when evaluators assist in New Zealand
or our evaluators help overseas. For these reasons, the
Royal Commission considers that any decision to
change the colour of the placards should be made after
Figure 8: Multiple placards on the same building
consulting with the wider international building safety
(source: the Applied Technology Council)
evaluation community.
The large, red “Danger” notice in Figure 8 is an example
of an assessment notice developed by building owners,

Recommendation their engineers, or other groups. Figure 8 also illustrates

the problems that arose because the placards were not
printed onto colourfast materials that faded over time.
We recommend that: It became particularly difficult to tell the difference
between a green and yellow placard as both faded to
143. In principle, the colour of the green placard
a pale yellow colour.
should be changed to white. The Ministry of
Business, Innovation and Employment should Placing several different placards on a building made
consult with the international building safety it difficult for building owners, tenants and the general
evaluation community about the merits and public to know what the status of the building was.
detail of the change before deciding whether The Royal Commission considers that only the relevant
or not to do this. authorities should place, change or remove placards.

2.5.3.2 Changing the placards

2.5.3.1 Multiple placard systems
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that building
Some engineers engaged by building owners developed owners found the processes for changing a building’s
and used their own building safety evaluation forms placard unclear. During the state of emergency after the
and placards during and after the state of emergency. September earthquake, some engineers engaged by
Typically, these were adapted from the templates in building owners filled in the official Level 2 Rapid
the NZSEE Guidelines, or the ones used by the CCC Assessment forms, which they obtained from the
and/or in the civil defence response. This led to the Emergency Operations Centre. Others provided their
growth of multiple placard systems after the Canterbury completed report to the Centre. In both cases, civil
earthquakes. As Figure 8 illustrates, by late November defence and emergency management would arrange
2010, a building could stickered with: for a placard to be placed on the building. The reports
received by the Royal Commission contend that some
• the (red/yellow/green) rapid assessments placards
building owners and their engineers did not realise that
placed under a civil defence warrant;
their evaluation would not automatically result in a
• the placards developed by engineers engaged by change of placard. As well as placing multiple placards
building owners, placed during and/or after the on buildings, some building owners or their engineers
state of emergency; would remove placards without authorisation in both
the response and recovery phases.
• the red section 124 Building Act notice placed
by their territorial authority after the state of After the transition from civil defence to normal building
emergency; management arrangements, the CCC developed
• a variety of general engineering assessment notices; processes to be followed before changing a red or
and/or yellow placard to a green placard.

• notices placed by lifeline utility operators. These processes are set out in Figures 9 and 10.
Figure 9: Process for changing a placard from red to green after the state of emergency in 2010 (source: CCC, 2011)
Figure 10: Process for changing a placard from yellow to green after the state of emergency in 2010 (source: CCC, 2011)

Initially, the CCC requested that building owners submit reports varied. Griffiths and McNulty5 contend that, as
a DEE completed by a Chartered Professional Engineer. a result, the CCC effectively became peer reviewers for
We have heard evidence that the level of detail in these DEEs after earthquakes.
2.5.3.2.1 The CPEng Certification Form
2.5.4 Communication tools
To clarify and facilitate change procedures, the CCC
Civil defence and territorial authorities used a variety
introduced a new certification form that Chartered
of communications tools to let the public know:
Professional Engineers submitted to request a change
of placard. This form, reproduced in Appendix 3 of this • what the building safety evaluation process was;
Volume, is known as the CPEng Certification Form.
• what the placards meant;
This form assured the CCC that the building was safe
• the responsibilities of building owners; and
for occupancy and posed no further hazard to people
or property, before the status of a red or yellow placard • how to deal with their damaged buildings.
could be changed. It specifically recognised the danger
These tools included a mix of print, electronic media
falling hazards posed to public safety and the potential
and public meetings. In addition to using flyers and
danger from damage to adjacent buildings, with the
posters, the CCC also set up a web-based newsletter.
engineer stating that these dangers had been addressed.
People had to register to receive this newsletter,
CCC staff discussed when and how to change a
which reduced its reach. Despite this, the media,
building’s status with the certifying engineer if they
building owners, engineers and the public did not fully
needed to consider additional factors like removing
understand what the building safety evaluation process
cordons.
was or the meaning of its placards.
The CPEng Certification Form contemplated that a
The Royal Commission considers that the Ministry of
building was suitable for reoccupation if the structural
Business, Innovation and Employment should be the
integrity, and performance of the building had been
lead agency responsible for any public communications
restored “to at least the condition that existed prior to
about how to manage buildings after earthquakes
the earthquake of 4 September 2010”. This meant that
and other disasters. It should be responsible for this
the building did not have to be made stronger than it
during and after the state of emergency. The Ministry of
had been prior to the September earthquake, before
Business, Innovation and Employment should develop
reoccupation could occur. Consequently, if a damaged
communications material before it is needed and
building was earthquake-prone before the September
release this information as soon as possible after the
earthquake, then it could be reoccupied even though it
disaster. This material should include information about:
was still earthquake-prone after repair. The statement
assumes that people were happy to take on the same
• the extent of the risk posed by the damage the
risk associated with the building as they had prior
disaster has caused;
to the earthquake. We discuss issues of risk and
understanding in section 7.8 of Volume 4. • the implications of aftershocks; and

• the roles and responsibilities of building owners.

Submitters suggest developing procedures setting out
when and how to change the status of a building and The Royal Commission also considers that GNS Science
its placard. The Royal Commission also considers that should develop protocols and plans to ensure that it
formal procedures for changing the status of a building is ready to advise the Ministry of Business, Innovation
and its placards should be developed as part of the and Employment, other government agencies, local
building safety evaluation process. authorities and the wider public after an earthquake.

Recommendation
We recommend that:
144. Formal procedures should be developed that
set out when and how the status of a building
could be changed. The placard on a building
should only be changed if the formal
procedures are followed.
 2.5.6 Information management
Recommendations Civil defence and emergency management literature
suggests that access to good quality information is a
key component of making initial assessments of the
We recommend that: situation and informing ongoing decision making. The
NZSEE3 recommends developing a database to receive
145. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
and record information gathered in rapid assessments.
Employment should be responsible for
developing and releasing public communication The information management system used after the
materials about building management after September earthquake, based on an Excel
earthquakes and other disasters during and spreadsheet, was developed by the Urban Search and
after the state of emergency. Rescue Engineering Team Leader, CCC and a civil
146. GNS Science should develop protocols and defence and emergency management consultant on 4
plans to ensure that it is ready to advise September. This spreadsheet became the
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and basis of the information management system that
Employment, other government agencies, developed when the building safety evaluation process
local authorities and the wider public after transitioned to the CCC.
an earthquake.
Griffiths and McNulty5 describe how this information
management system designed for the building safety
evaluation process did not interface well with CCC’s
2.5.5 Information sharing
own systems. The Royal Commission has heard
As well as problems with how authorities communicated evidence that there were other problems with how
with the public, the Royal Commission has heard information on damaged buildings was gathered and
evidence of communication problems between people managed after the September earthquake. Inefficient
and organisations after the Canterbury earthquakes. information recording meant that civil defence
People and organisations failed to share information management, territorial authority staff and building
about the damage to a building with others who needed owners had problems knowing the status of a building
to be involved in decisions about its use, repair or at a given point in time. Middleton and Westlake2
demolition. When discussing information sharing within contend that sometimes the only way to find out if
a civil defence context, Doyle and Johnston23 contend the status of a particular building had changed was to
that effective teams under high pressure commonly carry out a visual check. In addition, sometimes official
adopt a communication style characterised by expecting records would note a change to the building’s status,
people to tell them the information they need to know, but a new placard was not placed on the building.
rather than team members specifically asking for it.
Several submitters propose using information
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that after technology tools to collect and analyse data on
the Canterbury earthquakes, networking was a key damaged buildings. They suggest integrating a variety
tool in obtaining and disseminating information about of tools, such as portable personal computers (e.g.,
the damage to a building and its status. This was tablets and notebooks), GPS and cellular telephones.
particularly important for green placard buildings, Shibayama and Hisada24 found that their electronic
as territorial authorities had no way of finding out information management system, which was based on
information about these buildings after the state of these tools, was more efficient than using conventional
emergency ended. paper-based information gathering methods. This is
despite practical issues with obtaining good quality
Several submitters have suggested that mechanisms
digital maps and using portable personal computers;
that allow different people and organisations to share
technological advances should address these issues.
information more easily should be developed. The Royal
Commission discusses and makes recommendations The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
about information sharing in section 7.5.3 of Volume 4. engineers and building owners were not able to access
records as they were held in the CCC’s earthquake-
damaged building. Consequently, several submitters
suggest digitising building records and storing
them offsite. Like technology-based building safety
evaluation approaches, electronically-based information
management systems need to interface with existing the same as the postal address or the street address
electronic records to work effectively. This may not for the building and/or tenancy. The Royal Commission
be possible, even in first world countries. Although has heard evidence that this led to issues with
some territorial authorities in New Zealand have certain identifying buildings.
building control records on microfiche or in digitised
formats, not all records are kept electronically and Some submitters suggested looking at establishing
stored offsite. This means that it may not be possible to a national unique address system. Middleton and
directly download or access existing building records, Westlake2 note that the United States is exploring
even if the technology to do so was available. how to develop a unique address system based on
mapping coordinates.
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission considers that
digitising building control records and storing them Territorial authorities are responsible for allocating
offsite is good business continuity planning and should road names and numbering in New Zealand. When
be encouraged. We have heard evidence that the they name a road, they are required to advise Land
CCC is encouraging other territorial authorities to do Information New Zealand, which keeps an official
so based on their experiences after the Canterbury national record of all properties in New Zealand.
earthquakes and that the Ministry of Business,
Land Information New Zealand has recently introduced
Innovation and Employment proposes establishing
several initiatives to improve how people access
a national database of building records with several
property information via addresses. In 2011, it began
access points. The Royal Commission understands that
work on a Spatial Data Infrastructure project that pulls
this goal may not be achieved for some time because of
together geospatial data; this project incorporates
the cost to territorial authorities to digitise their records.
information on identifying individual properties. It has
However, we consider that the Ministry of Business,
also introduced a new section on “Property Addressing”
Innovation and Employment and territorial authorities
on its website. These webpages provide information on
should progress their plans to achieve this.
why addressing properties properly is important, who is
responsible for allocating road names and numbering in

Recommendations New Zealand, addressing standards and address data.

In addition, Land Information New Zealand now allows
public access to the Authoritative Streets and Places
database. This database provides:
We recommend that:
147. Information management systems should be • up-to-date nationwide listings of street names and
developed as part of planning for New place names that may potentially be used as part
Zealand’s building safety evaluation process. of an address, referenced against the territorial
authorities and their electorates;
148. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should work with territorial • nearby place names to provide locational context;
authorities and other relevant agencies to and
develop a way for territorial authority building • historical records of former names (since late 1992).
records to be electronically recorded and
stored off-site. The Royal Commission considers that a clear system for
identifying individual buildings should be developed and
included in the plans for a building safety evaluation
2.5.6.1 Identifying buildings process. This needs to be set out in the general training
The Royal Commission has also heard evidence of the about the building safety evaluation process, the
problems that arose because records for each building induction evaluators receive before they are assigned to
appear to have been kept according to its postal a rapid assessment team, and the assessment forms, so
address. If a building has several entry points and/or that evaluators know immediately how they are to
multiple tenancies, then the territorial authority may have indicate which building they are assessing. Clear
alternative addresses for the same structure. instructions will avoid some of the inconsistent
Alternatively, territorial authorities could have decided to information recording seen in Christchurch. The Royal
identify a particular building by one particular address, Commission considers that Land Information New
even though different people and organisations may Zealand should continue to develop consistent national
use several addresses. These addresses may not be addressing protocols, working with territorial authorities,
and make this information available to the general
public.
 2.6.1.1 The transition mechanism

Recommendations recommended in the NZSEE Guidelines

The NZSEE Guidelines10 recommend placing a notice
issued by the territorial authority under section 124 of
We recommend that: the Building Act 2004 before the end of the state of
emergency. Section 124 states:
149. A clear system for identifying individual
buildings should be developed and 124 Powers of territorial authorities in respect
included in the plans for a building safety of dangerous, earthquake-prone, or insanitary
evaluation process. buildings

150. Land Information New Zealand should (1) If a territorial authority is satisfied that a building
is dangerous, earthquake prone, or insanitary,
continue to work on initiatives that develop
the territorial authority may—
consistent national addressing protocols
(a) put up a hoarding or fence to prevent
and make this information available to the people from approaching the building nearer
general public. than is safe:
(b) attach in a prominent place on, or adjacent
to, the building a notice that warns people
2.6 Transition from the civil defence not to approach the building:
(c) give written notice required work to be
response to the recovery phase carried out on the building, within a time
governed by territorial authorities stated in the notice (which must not be less
than 10 days after the notice is given under
The reports received by the Royal Commission indicate section 125, to—
that there were significant issues in the transition of (i) reduce or remove the danger; or
responsibility for the building safety evaluation process (ii) prevent the building from remaining
from civil defence to normal building management insanitary.
arrangements governed by territorial authorities after (2) This section does not limit the powers of a
the Canterbury earthquakes. We have heard evidence territorial authority under the Part.
from Mr Bret Lizundia that this is an issue that United (3) A persons commits an offence if the person fails
States engineers have not encountered before: he to comply with a notice under subsection (1)(c).
considered that it negatively impacted on the building (4) A person who commits an offence under
safety evaluation operation after the Canterbury this section is liable to a fine not exceeding
$200,000.
earthquakes. This is also the Royal Commission’s view.
In this context, a section 124 notice requires the building
This section considers the need for a transition
owner to reduce or remove the danger the building
mechanism, the NZSEE Guidelines recommendation,
poses to its occupants or the wider public. Reducing
and the mechanism used after the Canterbury
earthquakes. We examine how territorial authorities or removing the danger associated with a building can
should manage buildings after earthquakes, the roles include removing the part of the building that is
and responsibilities different decision makers have in dangerous, securing or repairing the building, or
this, and the management of cordons. We also consider demolition. An example of a section 124 notice used
the barriers building owners faced when they sought to after the Canterbury earthquakes is attached as
repair or demolish their damaged buildings. Appendix 4 of Volume 7.

2.6.1.2 The transition after the Canterbury

2.6.1 The need for a transition mechanism earthquakes
The initial building safety evaluation operation takes It is unclear what pre-planning had been done to
place during a state of emergency under civil defence manage the transition of the building safety evaluation
and emergency management arrangements. The process from civil defence to normal building
placards placed on buildings in the rapid assessment management arrangements after the September
phase of this operation only have legal status during a earthquake. CCC4 contends, and we accept, that
state of emergency. To be able to manage necessary the large number of buildings damaged after the
building work after the state of emergency ends, there September earthquake meant that it was not possible
needs to be a transition mechanism. to place section 124 notices on all red or yellow
placard buildings before the state of emergency
ended: the large number of damaged buildings meant The team also carried out inspections of dangerous or
that the workload of its Enforcement Team was unstable buildings, maintained cordons and arranged
much greater than the approximately 65 complaints for section 124 notices to be placed on buildings.
a year about buildings alleged to be dangerous that
it usually processes. The CCC developed its policies CCC established the Building Recovery Office on
and procedures about how to treat red and yellow 13 September 2010. The Building Recovery Office was
placard buildings after the state of emergency ended. the main point of contact for building and home owners.
In 2008, Brunsdon25 noted that it would be difficult to It responded to queries about the building evaluation
issue section 124 notices before the end of a state of process, answering questions about the meaning of
emergency in a building safety evaluation operation the placards, what the Building Act notices meant,
larger than Gisborne’s. and what building owners needed to do to change the
status of their building. As the main point of contact
The Canterbury Earthquakes (Building Act) Order 2010, for building owners, the Building Recovery Office was
which extended the status of the red and yellow where owners registered the need for demolition work,
placards for a further 60 days, was intended to respond major repairs or rebuilds, obtained property records,
to this difficulty. Clause 8 deemed them to be section and obtained any consents needed to proceed.
124 notices. It provided that:
From 28 November 2010, a new Building Recovery
(2) A red card is deemed to be a notice issued Office was established that combined the functions
under section 124(1)(b) of the Act that warns of the old Building Recovery Office with those of
people not to approach the building.
the Building Evaluation Transition team. The new
(3) A yellow card is deemed to be a notice issued Building Recovery Office was responsible for the case
under section 124(1)(d) of the Act as modified
management of all remaining dangerous buildings,
by clause 9.
both in the CBD and other areas. It also responded to
(4) Any restrictions on use that are described on a
customer service requests about dangerous buildings.
yellow card are deemed to be requirements of a
notice issued under section 124(1)(d) of the Act
as modified by clause 9. Most building owners had until the end of January 2011
to address the danger associated with their buildings,
unless they were particularly dangerous or impeded
Note that Clause 9 inserts paragraph (d) into section
traffic flow or public access. Evidence the Royal
124(1) of the Building Act 2004.
Commission has heard indicates that work to follow
As well as extending the status of the red and yellow up on the status of these buildings was ongoing when
placards for 60 days, Clause 9 also required that the February earthquake struck. Owners’ actions were
building owners take action within five days of receiving compromised while they waited for insurance company
written notice (or having a notice placed on their building) decisions before committing to costly make-safe or
setting out the need to reduce or remove the danger demolition decisions. This issue and other barriers to
their building posed. Normally under section 124 the repair or demolition of buildings damaged in the
building owners have no less than 10 days before they Canterbury earthquakes are discussed in section 2.6.4
must take action. of this Volume.

Extending the status of the red and yellow placards

gave the CCC time to develop the procedures it needed
2.6.2 Managing buildings after an earthquake
to transition the building safety evaluation process into The need for a transition mechanism is part of a larger
its building control arrangements. The CCC established issue with the management of buildings after
the Building Evaluation Transition team and the Building earthquakes. After a significant earthquake or other
Recovery Office to manage this process. disaster, it is necessary to prioritise how to treat
buildings based on the severity of the damage to
The Building Evaluation Transition team operated from them. However, there is also a need to consider all
20 September 2010 to the end of November 2010. buildings that may have been damaged, even if the
This team audited the placards of approximately 580 damage appears minor. Even if a building has a green
commercial properties in October 2010 to maintain placard, it may be appropriate to assess it further. This
an accurate schedule of building safety evaluations. is important because the rapid assessments are only
It developed a process for incorporating the reports designed to indicate the condition of the building as
generated by engineers engaged by building owners an interim measure until a more detailed evaluation
and for changing the status of placards on a building. can be arranged by the owner. Rapid assessments are
not thorough. They are appropriate for a basic sifting The Royal Commission considers that building owners
method, but a brief assessment of the damage to a have the primary responsibility to ensure that buildings
building is unlikely to identify the capacity it has left are safe to occupy and owners should therefore carry
to withstand damage from further aftershocks or its out the appropriate engineering assessments after
suitability for long-term reoccupation. the rapid assessment phase of the building safety
evaluation process.
Because the process is designed to prioritise which
damaged buildings to focus on, buildings fall out of the Submitters discussed whether or not to require DEEs
system as soon as a green placard is applied. Green after earthquakes, particularly before allowing the
placard buildings were not considered further during short- or long-term reoccupation of the building. There
the rapid assessment phase unless their Level 1 Rapid was some debate among submitters about what level
Assessment form noted the need for a Level 2 Rapid of assessment should be required before people are
Assessment. Because the Canterbury Earthquakes allowed to reoccupy buildings after a disaster.
(Building Act) Order 2010 only dealt with the status They discussed what the appropriate triggers for
of red and yellow placard buildings, green placards the short-term reoccupation and for the long-term
had no status after the state of emergency ended. reoccupation should be.
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that after
the September earthquake civil defence workers The Royal Commission has received evidence that
and building control officials did not have a formal establishes that a full engineering evaluation, using
mechanism for the further assessment of a building that the methods and approaches engineers employ
was able to be used, but remained in need of repair. in normal circumstances, is both costly and time-
consuming. There would be very significant economic
2.6.2.1 Need for further engineering and social impacts if completion of such evaluations
evaluations was required before allowing reoccupation, and the
Royal Commission considers that would be both
The NZSEE Guidelines10 make it clear that New
undesirable and unrealistic.
Zealand’s rapid assessment process is not designed
to provide an engineering assessment service for However, we consider that in many cases a rapid
building owners and insurers. This is because the assessment will not be sufficient for reoccupation
result of rapid assessments are inevitably indicative without a further evaluation of the building, because it is
only. Building owners and other decision makers need a short, coarse inspection. The NZSEE Guidelines also
better information to decide what short-term repairs take this view. In particular, we consider that the Level 1
are needed, when to carry these out, and the long-term Rapid Assessment is not sufficient to ensure the safety
future of the building. For these reasons, the NZSEE of the building’s occupants or the wider public. By
Guidelines envisage that DEEs will be carried out on all contrast, a DEE would confirm that the building is safe
buildings after the state of emergency. These Guidelines for long-term reoccupation. Under section 51 of the
state that building owners are responsible for organising Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority Act 2011,
DEEs for their buildings. Building owners remain CERA can compel building owners to obtain a DEE of
responsible for the safety of their buildings. their building before its reoccupation and provide this
information to CERA.
We have heard evidence that many building owners
did not act on the green placard’s recommendation to In practice, CERA recognised that some buildings only
obtain “a detailed structural engineering assessment” had minor damage after the Canterbury earthquakes
of their building. It is not known how many owners and it might not be appropriate to restrict their
did authorise engineers to carry out full evaluations of reoccupation while their owners arranged for a full
their buildings. Middleton and Westlake2 suggest that DEE. CERA developed a process to determine whether
territorial authorities were able to require DEEs from a building can be occupied before a full engineering
owners after the September earthquake. However, the evaluation is carried out on it; this process is called the
CCC4 states that it could not legally require building Interim Use Evaluation (IUE). Japan’s Post-Earthquake
owners to order a DEE of their building. The Royal Damage Evaluation and Rehabilitation guidelines are an
Commission agrees with this view. international example of a process that is specifically
designed to determine how a building can be used
temporarily after repair but before full, long-term
earthquake strengthening.
In their evidence to the Royal Commission, Mr John Hare
and Mr David Brunsdon discussed the IUE. It involves
examining the structural drawings to identify the
locations of critical structural weaknesses and potential
plastic zones. Having established these locations, the
building is examined with the appropriate wall and
floor linings and ceiling tiles removed to enable the
critical zones to be inspected and the level of damage
assessed. If the damage is seen in other locations the
drawings and foundations should be further assessed
until a satisfactory explanation is obtained for the
observed damage. If the level of damage is acceptable,
the building contains no critical structural weaknesses
and is judged to have an acceptable level of ductility
and redundancy, the building may be opened to the
public for interim use. Figure 11 demonstrates how this
process works in practice:
Figure 11: Simplified building safety evaluation and use decision making framework (source: adapted from email from
John Hare to the Royal Commission, 1 September 201226)
We note that in June 2012, the former Department of The Royal Commission considers that these matters
Building and Housing27 released guidance on how to should be incorporated into the Ministry of Business,
carry out an IUE. Innovation and Employment’s draft guidelines17 on
carrying out detailed engineering evaluations after
2.6.2.2 The Royal Commission’s proposals earthquakes.
As has been seen, the Terms of Reference require us We note that in the following sections we outline the
to examine the legal and best-practice requirements concept of a “Plans-Based Assessment” (PBA), and
for the assessment of buildings after any earthquake, its role in the assessment of buildings after a major
having regard to lessons from the Canterbury earthquake. We observe here that the PBA concept
earthquakes. As a result of considering the performance could also be adapted for use in the assessment of
of buildings in the Canterbury earthquakes, the Royal buildings prior to an earthquake.
Commission has identified a number of factors that
engineers need to consider when deciding how best to 2.6.2.2.2 The post-earthquake assessment system
facilitate the return of a city to an operational state after
The focus of this section of the Report is mainly on the
an earthquake.
overall system that should be adopted following the
2.6.2.2.1 Practical assessment considerations occurrence of a major earthquake that has resulted
in the declaration of a state of emergency. Following
We have already dealt with practical considerations
a significant earthquake, international best-practice
that need to be taken into account in the assessment
is to carry out an Overall Damage Survey to identify
of individual buildings. We set out several factors that
areas where appreciable damage has occurred so that
engineers need to note when assessing buildings that
appropriate steps can be taken to direct assistance to
are not constructed from unreinforced masonry in
locations where help may be required to free people
section 6.2.5 of Volume 4. Examples of these factors
trapped in buildings and provide assistance to those
include:
that have been injured. A decision on whether to
declare a state of emergency is one outcome from
• allowing for the effect of flexural cracking on the
this survey.
stiffness of structural members;

• allowing for accidental torsion; This step should be followed by the rapid assessment of
individual buildings to locate potential fall hazards and
• considering how the inter-storey drifts should identify buildings that are in urgent need of further
be calculated; attention from the point of view of public safety.
• ensuring that there are valid load paths for seismic Subsequent steps should be based on a number of
forces and gravity loads through the building and considerations which include the extent of the damage,
through details such as beam-column joints; and the characteristics of the earthquake, the likely intensity
of subsequent aftershocks (as advised by GNS Science),
• the attachment of floors to lateral force resisting
the manpower available for the assessment of buildings
elements. and the mix of building types and ages in the city.
Volume 2 and section 6.3.8 of Volume 6 of this Report
address the vulnerabilities of different building types we The system that we are proposing envisages that in
observed from buildings in Christchurch (including the the area in which the state of emergency applies all
CTV building). These should also be taken into account. buildings should be assessed prior to reoccupation.
The Royal Commission considers that there is a lack That process would commence with Level 1 and 2
of adequate guidance given in New Zealand Standards Rapid Assessments. Where the rapid assessment
on the design forces required to tie floors on to lateral process has identified the need for further evaluation
force resisting elements. This aspect of the design is of an individual building, the reoccupation of the
of concern where the primary source of lateral force building would then depend on assessments that vary
resistance is provided by structural walls or braced according to the building’s structural type and the
frames located on the perimeter of the building. In such nature of the earthquake event. Assessments after the
cases, we propose that, where practicable, structural rapid assessments would include a PBA or, at the most
drawings should be examined to check that the floors thorough level, a DEE. The concept of a PBA is similar
are adequately tied into the lateral force resisting to that of the IUE discussed above.
elements. This check should be made in the case of all
buildings to which this consideration is applicable.
We envisage that a PBA would involve examining the of the multi-storey buildings, then all buildings of three
structural drawings to identify the locations of plastic or more storeys (provided in the case of residential
zones and other locations where high strain may be buildings that they contain three or more household
induced. In addition it would involve identifying critical units) should be subjected to a DEE in the months
structural weaknesses, including assessing the level following a major earthquake.
of ductile detailing in columns, beams, beam-column
joints, structural walls, braced frames (concentric and 2.6.2.2.3 Categorisation of buildings
eccentric) and the way in which the floors are tied into To allow for the changes that have occurred in design
the lateral force resisting elements. Ideally in a PBA practice over the years, we propose that buildings are
these locations in the building should be examined to divided into four groups, namely:
identify the extent of the damage. This would require
the removal of areas of ceilings and wall and floor Group 1: non-unreinforced masonry buildings that
linings to allow the level of damage to be assessed. do not have a known critical structural weakness,
Where damage is located in other parts of the building, and either:
the drawings and foundations should be re-examined
until the damage can be satisfactorily explained. • in the case of concrete buildings, were designed to
The objective of the PBA is to identify whether the NZS 3101:199528 or later editions of that Standard;
building has any critical structural weaknesses that and
could result in sudden and/or non-ductile behaviour, • in the case of structural steel buildings, were
such as occurred in the CTV and PGC buildings. Any designed to NZS 3404:199229 (informed by
calculations involved in a PBA are envisaged as being the Heavy Engineering Research Association
approximate in nature and sufficient to determine the guidelines30 published in 1994) or later editions of
order of strength or ductility of a detail or structural that Standard;
element. We address below the situations in which
the PBA would be carried out. We recommend that or have been subject to an evaluation that has shown
the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment that the building has 67% ULS or greater (we discuss
further develop the PBA concept, in consultation the term “ULS” in section 6.2.4 of Volume 4);
with the NZSEE and the Structural Engineering
Society New Zealand. Group 2: buildings designed between 1976 and the
mid-1990s, but not included in Group 1;
The following discussion also refers to a DEE, which
Group 3: buildings designed before 1976, but not
should include the calculation of the percentage of
included in Group 1; and
ULS of the damaged structure. The concept of the
DEE is discussed in sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.4.5.2.2 of Group 4: unreinforced masonry buildings.
this Volume.
The extent of post-earthquake assessment of a
Where the initial earthquake is generated by a distant building in each group should depend on the extent
fault, aftershocks may be expected to be of shorter of the damage it has sustained, having regard to the
duration and lower intensity than the main shock. assessment considerations that we have addressed in
Where the fault is close to the city there is the section 2.6.2.1.1 above.
possibility of subsequent aftershocks being closer to
the city than the initial earthquake. In such an event the Buildings used for residential purposes that are three or
ground shaking may be more intense than the initial less storeys in height should be excluded from Groups 2
earthquake and there is also the possibility that the and 3. In the case of those buildings, a pragmatic
directions of the major components of shaking will be approach needs to be taken to assessment and
different from those of the initial earthquake. Both of occupancy, which balances the need for shelter with
these factors can potentially cause damage to buildings safety considerations. In our view other commercial and
not significantly damaged in the initial earthquake. residential buildings should not be occupied until that is
approved in the process outlined below.
We therefore propose that a more conservative
approach is taken to the assessment of buildings The assessment process should also reflect the
when the rupture causing the earthquake is on a local characteristics of the earthquakes, the proximity of the
fault line rather than on a distant fault line. The Royal fault and the nature of the soils in the affected area.
Commission considers that if significant structural We are not able to be precise about these matters
damage has been observed in a significant proportion in advance. The discussion that follows reflects the
understandings that we have developed as a result
of our consideration of the performance of buildings 2.6.2.2.5 Occupation
in the Canterbury earthquakes, which had the
As with the assessment process, the decisions made
characteristics we set out in Volume 1 of our Report.
about the occupation of buildings following a significant
It must be understood that the assessment process
earthquake should reflect the nature of the buildings,
following future earthquakes will inevitably need to
the characteristics of the earthquake, the proximity of
be adapted to the circumstances that then apply.
the fault and the nature of the soils in the affected area.
However, we consider that the assessment process and
The following proposals reflect the experience of the
decisions about occupancy should be informed by an
Canterbury earthquakes.
understanding of the characteristics of the earthquake
and the potential for aftershocks. The civil defence The September earthquake produced shaking in
Controller (and the territorial authority after the state of Christchurch of a level comparable to the design level
emergency has come to an end) should be responsible for the ultimate limit state. However, the duration of
for obtaining authoritative advice about those matters, strong ground shaking was on the low side of what
and making the information available so that those might be expected in other parts of the country.
involved in the assessment process are aware of it. The February earthquake produced shaking with an
intensity that was unusually high and such an event
2.6.2.2.4 Other considerations
is rare. In our opinion, the experience gained from
The Royal Commission considers that the civil defence the September earthquake gives a better guide to
Controller and the Ministry of Business, Innovation what is required for the assessment of buildings for
and Employment (as the agency that deploys the core reoccupation after an earthquake for other locations in
team of building safety evaluators) should decide the New Zealand. Where the geological situation is such
timeframe in which building owners should obtain a that an aftershock may occur on a fault line closer to
PBA and a DEE considering the circumstances and or within the CBD, as occurred in Christchurch with
extent of the disaster. the February earthquake, additional precautions should
be taken.
Given the problems with information sharing, which
we discuss in section 2.5.5 of this Volume, we The Royal Commission considers that, following Level 1
consider that building owners should be required to and Level 2 Rapid Assessments, occupation should be
provide a copy of any PBA and DEE obtained to the based on the outcome of the assessment process set
territorial authority. out below:

In section 7.4.2 of Volume 4, we recommend that a) For Group 1 buildings:

the Building Act 2004 should be amended to
• where no significant structural damage was
require and authorise territorial authorities to ensure
seen, a Level 2 Rapid assessment;
completed assessments of all unreinforced masonry
buildings within their district within two years from • where significant structural damage was seen, a
the enactment of the Amendment, and of all other PBA for a lower levels of structural damage and
potentially earthquake-prone buildings within five a DEE for higher levels of structural damage.
years of enactment. We note that this would require
b) For Group 2 buildings:
each territorial authority to develop a database
listing all of the earthquake-prone buildings in its • where no significant structural damage was
district. We consider that the information gained and seen, a PBA;
recorded in that exercise should be supplemented
• where significant structural damage was seen,
by information classifying buildings of three or more
a DEE.
storeys into the groups that we have discussed
above. The database thereby produced, which can be c) For Group 3 buildings:
prepared in anticipation of a future earthquake, could • for all levels of damage, a DEE.
be used to guide the assessment process that would
be appropriate after the rapid assessment operation
following a major earthquake.
d) For Group 4 buildings:

• where no significant structural damage was ii) Group 2: buildings designed between
seen and the building has been retrofitted to 1976 and the mid-1990s, but not
67% ULS or greater, a PBA; included in Group 1;
iii) Group 3: buildings designed before
• where significant structural damage is apparent
1976, but not included in Group 1; and
and where the building has not been retrofitted
to 67% ULS or greater, a DEE. iv) Group 4: unreinforced masonry
buildings;
Where the earthquake is located on a fault that is
close to the city or where there is a possibility of an c buildings used for residential purposes that
aftershock or new earthquake closer to the CBD, a are three or less storeys in height should be
higher level of assessment should be made. excluded from Groups 2 and 3. In the case
of those buildings, a pragmatic approach
Decisions about the occupancy of buildings should be needs to be taken to assessment and
made once the appropriate level of assessment has occupancy, which balances the need for
been carried out, and forwarded to the Civil Defence shelter with safety considerations. Other
Controller (while the state emergency continues) and commercial and residential buildings should
to the territorial authority when it is completed, for not be occupied unless approved for
their approval. occupancy in accordance with the process
outlined below;

Recommendations d legislation should require territorial

authorities to classify buildings in their
districts in accordance with the preceding
Recommendation within the timeframes
We recommend that:
established under Recommendation 82 in
151. After an earthquake that has given rise to the Volume 4 of our Report (Recommendation
declaration of a state of emergency, buildings 82 requires the assessment of earthquake-
should be assessed in accordance with the prone and potentially earthquake-prone
following process: buildings);
a all buildings should be subject to a rapid e where the rapid assessment process had
assessment process; identified the need for further evaluation of
b for the purposes of subsequent steps, a building in one of these defined Groups,
buildings should be placed in the following the building should not be occupied until
categories: the Civil Defence Controller or the territorial
authority (as appropriate) has approved
i) Group 1: non-unreinforced masonry
the occupancy of the building after the
buildings that do not have a known
following assessments:
critical structural weakness, and either,
i) for Group 1 buildings:
• in the case of concrete buildings,
were designed to NZS 3101:1995 • where no significant structural
or later editions of that Standard; damage was seen, a Level 2 Rapid
Assessment;
• in the case of structural steel
buildings, were designed to NZS • where significant structural damage
3404:1992 (informed by the Heavy was seen, a Plans-Based Assessment
Engineering Research Association for lower levels of structural damage
guidelines published in 1994) or later and a Detailed Engineering Evaluation
editions of that Standard; for higher levels of structural damage;

or have been subject to an evaluation

that has shown that the building has
67% ULS or greater (we discuss the
term “ULS” in section 6.2.4 of Volume 4);
 ii) for Group 2 buildings: 154. The Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
• where no significant structural Engineering Evaluation should confirm that all
damage was seen, a Plans-Based known falling hazards and other vulnerabilities
Assessment; have been assessed and secured or removed.
155. A copy of the Plans-Based Assessment and
• where significant structural damage
the Detailed Engineering Evaluation should be
was seen, a Detailed Engineering
given to the relevant authorities.
Evaluation;
iii) for Group 3 buildings:

• for all levels of damage, a Detailed

Engineering Evaluation;
iv) for Group 4 buildings:

• where no significant structural

damage was seen and the building
has been retrofitted to 67% ULS or
greater, a Plans-Based Assessment;

• where significant structural damage is

apparent and where the building has
not been retrofitted to 67% ULS or
greater, a Detailed Engineering
Evaluation;
f arranging for the Plans-Based Assessments
and Detailed Engineering Evaluations
should be the responsibility of the owner of
the buildings concerned; and
g the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should further develop the
Plans-Based Assessment concept, in
consultation with the New Zealand
Society for Earthquake Engineering and
the Structural Engineering Society
New Zealand, and set out the Plans-Based
Assessment in published guidelines.
152. Plans-Based Assessments and Detailed
Engineering Evaluations should include
checking the vulnerabilities observed after
the Canterbury earthquakes that the Royal
Commission describes in Volume 2, section
6.2.5 of Volume 4, and section 6.3.8 of
Volume 6 of this Report.
153. Any Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
Engineering Evaluation of a building after
an earthquake should begin with a careful
examination of the building’s plans.
2.6.3 Confusion of roles and responsibilities building owner: for example, clearing rubble from major
arterial routes and designing propping to enable the
The NZSEE4 suggests that pre-prepared building cordons around a building to be removed.
evaluation plans should describe the roles
and responsibilities of key personnel responsible 2.6.3.1.1 Cordon management
for delivering the building safety evaluation process. The Royal Commission has heard evidence that it
was not clear who was responsible for setting up
A number of units within CCC worked on building and maintaining cordons after the state of
recovery activities after the September earthquake. emergency ended. Mr Stephen McCarthy of the CCC
For this to be successful, these units had to work told us that normal building practice is for building
together in an integrated way. Griffiths and McNulty5 owners to organise safety fencing around their
suggest that the Building Recovery Office and the properties if they are carrying out works on them.
Building Transition Evaluation Team did not work Building owners must gain permission from their
together in a coordinated way, resulting in some territorial authority to do so, but the owners or their
information sharing problems, owners being told contractors erect and manage these barricades until
incorrect information about their buildings, and a the work on the site is complete. During the state of
number of inaccurate or contradictory messages being emergency in September 2010, civil defence
released to the media and wider public. workers set up a cordon around Christchurch’s CBD.
Civil defence workers then set up cordons around
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that an
particular buildings or areas as they slowly reopened
engineer engaged to evaluate a building became a
access to the wider CBD.
point of contact for many of the people who had an
interest in the building; often, this was not something After the state of emergency ended, the CCC decided
that was clearly articulated or clearly required of the when and where cordons were to be placed, moved or
engineer. Property managers were another group dismantled. However, evidence the Royal Commission
who took on a similar role. These groups could be has heard indicates that building owners may have
encouraged to take up a coordinating role after an been expected to take over some responsibility
earthquake or other disaster. We have also heard for maintaining the cordons around their buildings,
evidence that engineers found it difficult when they had especially when they were carrying out repairs to the
to consider how their advice about the building could building but using council barricades and cordons.
affect the safety of the wider public, a role that they When and how this change over was to occur was not
took on for the good of society, while contracted and clear to the CCC or to building owners.
liable, however, only to the building owner.
We have also heard evidence that indicates that
In addition, the Royal Commission has heard evidence cordons were not wide enough to ensure public safety
that the responsibilities of building owners were not in the February earthquake. We consider that public
clear following the Canterbury earthquakes. Ultimately, pressure to keep access to streets and businesses
building owners are responsible for confirming that open may have contributed to this. There is clearly a
their building is safe after a disaster. We have heard need to balance such considerations with public safety,
evidence that there were issues with the way the which nevertheless should be the main consideration.
responsibility for a damaged building transferred from Best-practice indicates that cordons should be set to
the CCC to building owners. Normally building owners allow for a fall zone of one and a half times the height
are responsible for emergency repairs on a building of the building. The Royal Commission saw examples
and any barricades erected while this work is ongoing. of cordons having been set up around an individual
However, after the September earthquake civil defence building that failed causing death with a fall zone
emergency management and territorial authorities considerably less than this.
organised for assessments of buildings and the setting
up of cordons. We received evidence from Mr Peter Smith, who
analysed the failure of each individual building causing
Some building owners waited for civil defence or death, that even if the cordon was set up to protect the
council workers to evaluate their buildings, assuming public from a particular fall hazard, such as a parapet,
that these authorities would inform them if any when parapets fell in the February earthquake they
problems existed. Griffiths and McNulty also describe often took a considerable part of the exterior wall with
how the Building Evaluation Transition team carried out them. Sometimes, this meant that the cordon was
activities that were normally the responsibility of the inadequate and the building collapsed across the street.
The Royal Commission considers that territorial

Recommendations
authorities should be responsible for placing, moving
and removing cordons. Territorial authorities should
take over the responsibility for maintaining any cordons
set up during the response phase after the transition
to normal building management arrangements. This is We recommend that:
because territorial authorities are responsible for 156. Civil defence and emergency management
ensuring that people are safe in public areas, including, should be responsible for setting up and
of course, streets and footpaths. We recognise that maintaining cordons during the state of
this may place a burden on territorial authorities when emergency.
building owners take time to make a decision about
157. Territorial authorities should be responsible
the repair or demolition of their damaged building.
for maintaining any cordons that are in place
The Royal Commission therefore considers that
at the end of the state of emergency until
territorial authorities should be able to recover the
the public space or building they surround is
costs of maintaining any cordons set up due to the
made safe.
damage to a particular building from the building
owners after a reasonable period, which we would 158. Territorial authorities should be able to recover
assess as three months. the costs of maintaining any necessary
cordons from the building owner after three
The Royal Commission considers that the wider months.
roles and responsibilities of statutory authorities,
159. The roles and responsibilities of decision
other decision makers and building owners should
makers should be described in the building
be set in the plans for the building safety evaluation
safety evaluation process. The roles and
process. These plans should set out their roles and
responsibilities should allow for flexibility of
responsibilities during the response and recovery
operation according to the circumstances
phases. We consider that such plans should keep a
and scale of the event.
degree of flexibility, so that people and organisations
are aware of their responsibilities but can respond to
the disaster as appropriate within the circumstances
and scale of the event. 2.6.4 Barriers to action
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that some
building owners were motivated to address the damage
to their building after the September earthquake, but
were not able to carry out work on their buildings
because of problems finding a contractor, insurance
issues, or legislative barriers.

2.6.4.1 Meeting the requirements of insurers

We have heard evidence that problems settling their
insurance claims caused delays for building owners
attempting to repair their buildings after the September
earthquake. These issues caused the reluctance of
some owners to act in response to a section 124
notice on their building. Griffiths and McNulty5 note
that owners had little control over the time it would
take to repair the buildings while still in negotiation with
their insurers. The NZSEE4 suggests that the level of
insurance claims insurers are willing to meet makes
the decision about the level of repair and strengthening
territorial authorities require for a building after an
earthquake more complex. Brunsdon25 notes that issues
about what work insurance policies covered also arose
after the 2007 Gisborne earthquake. There is little that
can be done to address these issues, since they involve
rights that are under individual contracts of insurance.
2.6.4.2 Legislative barriers discusses and makes recommendations about this
31
Rotimi contends that the Civil Defence and issue in the case of buildings that could cause injury
Emergency Management Act 2002, the Resource or death in section 7.7 of Volume 4.
Management Act 1991 and the Building Act 2004, and
The Canterbury Earthquake (Resource Management
their regulatory guidelines in particular, are a barrier to
Act) Order 2010 let territorial authorities act immediately
coordinated and unhindered recovery from a disaster.
to fix a building without resource consent if they did
He also highlights the lack of cross linking between
the work themselves, by modifying section 129 of the
these statutes, and expresses the opinion that statutory
Building Act 2004. In section 7.5.2.2 of Volume 4 we
powers to coordinate recovery efforts are inadequate.
discuss how the CCC was reluctant to exercise this
Building consents for repairs to buildings damaged power. We discuss and make recommendations there
in the September earthquake would normally trigger for the conferral of a general legislative power to enable
requirements to ensure access to the building for territorial authorities to take action where a building
people with disabilities and for escape from fire. requires immediate demolition or repair as a result
The Royal Commission discusses and makes of an earthquake.
recommendations about this issue in section 7.5.5
2.6.4.2.1 Buildings that act as one structure in an
of Volume 4.
earthquake
The Royal Commission has heard evidence that section The Royal Commission has heard evidence that
124 notices issued under the Canterbury Earthquake problems can arise when buildings are divided into
(Building Act) Order 2010 did not override the need for separate properties with different addresses separated
a resource consent under the Resource Management by party walls, but nevertheless act as a single structure
Act 1991 (for example, to repair or demolish a heritage in an earthquake. The former Austral Buildings in
building). The timeframes for processing these Colombo Street, shown in Figure 12, are an example
consents were sometimes long. The Royal Commission of such a structure.

Figure 12: Former Austral Buildings, 603, 605–613 Colombo Street before the February earthquake
Figure 12 shows how this structure can be one, large
unreinforced masonry building that takes up most
of a block. The party walls that divide each part of
the building, while thicker and more substantial than
other internal walls, are not built to be an external
wall. Structurally, each property acts as a part of one
building in an earthquake. As we saw in Christchurch,
this often resulted in the façades of the entire row of
separate properties collapsing onto the street. Figure 13
shows how first floor façades of the Austral Buildings,
acting as one large façade, collapsed outward onto
the Number 702 Red Bus and pedestrians, tragically
causing death.

Figure 13: Former Austral Buildings, 603, 605–613 Colombo Street after the February earthquake

For this reason, such buildings should be assessed as their mutual benefit. CERA32 advise that it has not
one structure by building safety evaluators. Although implemented this provision because a reluctant owner
the intent was that the whole of one structure be is unlikely to see the action as being to their benefit.
inspected and treated as one, and the placards The owners of a row of properties in New Regent
placed on each tenancy or property accordingly, we Street voluntarily acted together to repair and preserve
have heard evidence of instances when that did not their building.
occur. Having separate properties that act as one
structure also caused problems when attempting to The Royal Commission considers that it is important
repair the building, because each property was treated that these buildings are assessed as one structure by
individually by engineers, building owners, territorial building safety evaluators. In section 7.5.4 of Volume 4,
authorities and other decision makers. To address we discuss and make recommendations about the
this issue, section 52 of the Canterbury Earthquakes need for general legislative provision to ensure that all
Recovery Act 2011 allows CERA to direct the owners portions of such structures are able to be strengthened
of two or more adjacent buildings to act together for contemporaneously.
 Recommendation
We recommend that:
160. The building safety evaluation process should
direct evaluators to assess properties that
act as one structure in an earthquake as one
structure, rather than as separate buildings.

2.6.5 Options for a transition mechanism

Submitters propose developing formal transition
mechanisms that set out the process and procedures
to be used when shifting the building safety evaluation
process from civil defence to the building management
arrangements governed by territorial authorities. The
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
and the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management contend that the new emergency risk
management provisions proposed for the Building Act
2004 would ensure a seamless transition from response
to recovery after a disaster.

Figure 14 describes the Ministry of Business, Innovation

and Employment’s proposed new emergency risk
management provisions for the Building Act 2004.

State of emergency
begins – ends

CDEM Act

Emergency capability
(trigger, powers,
capacity)

Building Act

Pre-event building Response Transition to Building management

management recovery in rebuild

Figure 14: Proposal for Building Act 2004 emergency building evaluation arrangements integrated with normal building
management arrangements (source: submission from the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management)

In contrast to the current legislative arrangements, building management after earthquakes does not shift
the new provisions propose to build in a gradual from the civil defence and emergency management
shift from building management after earthquakes framework into the building regulatory framework.
and other disasters to normal building management Consequently, it is theoretically possible to manage
arrangements. Under these proposals, the responsibility the process end to end within the territorial authority’s
for the building safety evaluation process and wider building management arrangements.
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
Management discusses how placing emergency
management provisions in the Building Act 2004
is consistent with New Zealand’s civil defence and
emergency management framework. It33 encourages
“clusters” of agencies to facilitate routine coordination
of readiness planning on a daily, standard arrangements
basis; these clusters may also be activated to carry out
response and recovery activities. In its submission to
the Royal Commission, it contends that each cluster or
agency continuing to work through its primary mandate
as far as practicable is a key principle that underpins
New Zealand’s civil defence and emergency
management framework. Figure 15 demonstrates how
national civil defence and emergency management
plans are informed by and integrated with other
legislative and planning frameworks.

Local risk CDEM Group Government Non-govt agency

reduction plans and local agency operational operational plans
arrangements plans
e.g. local RMA plans, Lifeline utility, voluntary
river management, Health, MAF, Police, welfare, SPCA, etc
CDEM Groups,
infrastructure design, MetService etc
local authorities
Business Continuity
Planning and LTCCPs

Links between
operational plans

The Guide to the National CDEM Plan

Central government policies
for risk reduction
e.g. Building Code, GeoNet, hazard research, sustainable land National CDEM
management, flood risk management Plan

National CDEM Strategy

Other national strategies

and legislation
e.g. RMA

Civil Defence
Emergency Management Act 2002

Figure 15: Linkage between national, regional and local operational plans and arrangements (source: Guide to the
National Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan, 2009)
The civil defence Controller is still in charge during a

Recommendation
state of emergency. For example, after the February
earthquake the Ministry of Social Development led the
response of the welfare cluster under the authority of
the civil defence Controller.
We recommend that:
Developing a standard Order in Council that transitions
161. The building safety evaluation and wider
the management of buildings from civil defence to
building management after earthquakes
normal building control arrangements could also address
(and other disasters) framework should be
the problems with the legal status of the placards at
developed and provided for in legislation.
the end of a state of emergency. Drafting a standard
Order in Council in advance would allow the detail of
any proposed changes to legislation, such as those
contained in the Canterbury Earthquake (Building Act)
Orders 2010 and 2011, to be carefully considered.
Nevertheless, the Royal Commission considers that it
would be difficult to guarantee many years in advance
of an event that all of the relevant issues had in fact
been covered. In addition, a standard Order in Council
would still need to be authorised by a special
legislative procedure.

The Royal Commission considers that the Ministry of

Business, Innovation and Employment’s proposal to
introduce emergency risk management provisions into
the Building Act 2004 has merit. The transition fully into
standard processes will be less abrupt and is likely to
be better planned than under the current legislative
arrangements. We consider that there could be several
advantages to this proposal once its details are further
explored. For example, does this proposal establish a
cluster, led by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment, that deals specifically with building
management after earthquakes and other disasters?
Given that the clusters are encouraged to make their
own arrangements within New Zealand’s civil defence
and emergency management framework, the Royal
Commission considers that this could be one way to
ensure that central and local government take up a
formal role in developing building safety evaluation
processes.

Regardless of where these mechanisms are placed, or

what format they take, submitters clearly believe that
it is important to develop these transition mechanisms
before they are needed. We agree, and consider that
the building safety evaluation process and wider
building management after earthquakes (and other
disasters) framework should be developed and
provided for in legislation.
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