PRELIMINARIES

I. JURISDICTION

1. Lim vs. Dumlao – March 31, 2005 -

FACTS:

Lim charged Judge Dumlao of MTC Isabela w/ gross Ignorance of the law and Grave
Abuse of Authority. 2 crim case was filed by Lim against Medina for carnapping and theft w/
RTC of Isabela. Medina was detained by virtue of a warrant issued by Judge Madrid.

On the ff day of arrest, Judge Dumlao issued 3 orders for the release of Medina on the ground
that he posted bail.

Lim alleged that Dumlao frequently approves bail bonds for cases filed outside the territorial
jurisdiction and also issues warrants outside his court’s jurisdiction which, resultantly, are
often quashed and the corresponding cases dismissed because the articles seized were
inadmissible as evidence. Lim attached copies of proofs.

Judge Dumlao failed to file the required comment despite receipt or order.

Issue: WON Judge Dumlao has the authority to grant Medina’s bail despite being outside of his
court’s (MTC) jurisdiction? NO.

Ruling: It is elementary that a MTC judge has no authority to grant bail to an accused arrested
outside of his territorial jurisdiction.

Rules of Criminal Procedure provides,

“Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where
the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial court judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
in the province, city or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of
said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.”
In the case at bar, the case was pending before the RTC in Isabela with a warrant issued by the
presiding Judge, Madrid. Hence, the order of release must be issued by that court. In the
absence of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC. However, there was no showing that
Judge Madrid was absent at the time of bailbond posting. In fact, the concerned judge Madrid
was present at that time.

The requirements of the quoted provision must be complied with before a judge may grant bail.
Wherefore, premises considered, Judge Dumlao is guilty of Gross Ingonace of the Law and
Grave abuse of Discretion.

2. People vs. Olermo – July 17, 2003 -

FACTS:

· Marlene Olermo AKA Marlene Tolentino was found guilty of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large scale and five counts of estafa. Complaining witnesses have satisfactorily
established that appellant promised them employment and assured them of placement
overseas; appellant did not have license to recruit persons for overseas work; and appellant
undertook the recruitment of not less than three workers, albeit individually. The fact that no
receipts therefore were issued is not material.

· Marlene Olermo argues that she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale
because the alleged prohibited acts against complainants were committed beyond the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. She points out that in complainant
Villanueva's affidavit, he stated that he first met appellant in her residence in Quezon City.
However, during complainant Villanueva's testimony in court, he stated that he first met
appellant in her office in Valenzuela.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela has jurisdiction?

RULING:

· Yes, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela has jurisdiction.

· The Rules of Court provide that in all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted
and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

· In the case at bar, the prosecution proved that the element of offering, promising, and
advertising overseas employment to the complainants took place in the appellant's office in
Valenzuela. Furthermore, it is elementary that jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by
the allegations in the information. In this case, the information filed against appellant for illegal
recruitment in large scale clearly placed the locus criminis in Valenzuela. As stated earlier, it
was in Valenzuela where the complainants were offered or promised overseas employment by
appellant. Furthermore, based on the prosecution's evidence, the Court is sufficiently convinced
that at least one element of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale took place in
Valenzuela. Where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province or city and some in another, the court of either province or
city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the court first taking cognizance of
the case will exclude the others.

B. Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

C. Jurisdiction Over the Person of the Accused

1. De Joya vs. Marquez – January 31, 2006 –

FACT:

Chester De Joya a petitioner asserts that the respondent judge Placido C. Marquez erred
in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of warrant of arrest against
him and his co accused.

Thus, the petitioner filed an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition to the court
that seeks to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest that was issued by the respondent judge
against the petitioner. He continuously refuses to submit to the court jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to obtain relief from the court without
submitting to its jurisdiction?

RULING:
 There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow the petitioner to obtain relief from the
courts without submitting to its jurisdiction as his continued refusal to submit to the court’s
jurisdiction should give this court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge.
His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process. It
should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its
jurisdiction

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

2. Tabao vs. Barataman – April 11, 2002

FACTS:

Complainant Rasmia Tabao is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 9106 entitled
"People v. Samsodin M. Tabao" for abandonment of minor. It appears that on July 16, 1998,
respondent judge issued an Order granting the motion for bail on recognizance filed by the
father of the accused pursuant to R.A. No. 6036.

Complainant avers that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion
for bail on recognizance because (1) it was filed not by the accused but by his father, Hadji
Yusoph Tabao; (2) the prosecutor was not furnished a copy of the motion and there was no
hearing conducted; (3) it lacked the sworn statement of the accused signed in the presence of
two witnesses; and (4) the motion and its supporting affidavit were signed by the father of the
accused.

In his comment, respondent judge alleges that the crime of abandonment of a minor is covered
by the Rules on Summary Procedure and hence bail on recognizance is not required as the court
can immediately arraign and try the accused, pursuant to Section 13 of the Rules; that if he were
the acting judge when the criminal case was filed, he would not issue a warrant of arrest but
order the immediate arraignment and trial of the case and there would be no need to discuss the
matter of bail; and, that the court can appoint as custodian of the accused his father, a former
City Councilor of Marawi City, who qualifies as a responsible person under Section 15, Rule 144
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge acquired a jurisdiction over the accused in
granting the motion for bail on recognizance?

RULING:
Sir additional: Judge made a mistake by granting bail even though he (Barataman) was still not
detained. Just because you applied bail and the judge approved it, doesn't mean that you are
….. Xxx sorry i forgot xxxX T_Tacquired the jurisdiction

No. Respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for releasing the accused on
recognizance before it could acquire jurisdiction over his person. The accused was still at large
when the motion for bail was filed. In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn
statement supporting the motion for bail filed before the respondent judge was signed, not by
the accused but by his father. The failure of the accused to sign the sworn statement is in clear
contravention of the express mandate of the law that the person charged shall sign a sworn
statement binding himself to report to the Clerk of Court.

Respondent judge does not deny that the accused in Criminal Case No. 9106 was at large when
the motion for bail on recognizance was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Section 15, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that the court may release a person in custody on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. It is a basic principle that bail is intended to obtain
provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities by his arrest or voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court cannot
grant provisional liberty to one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty for it would be
incongruous to give freedom to one who is free. Thus, we have held that it is premature to file a
motion for bail for someone whose liberty has yet to be curtailed.

3. Talag vs. Judge Reyes – June 3, 2004 - ALBIOS

Facts:

The instant case arose when a complaint was filed against Wilfredo Talag, Leticia Talag, and
Kenneth Bautista for BP Blg. 22 and Estafa. During the preliminary investigation, they
submitted their counter-affidavits.

On Dec. 15, 2011, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution and the information was
filed with the RTC of Manila. Ex

On May 31, 2022, the complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to defer the issuance of a warrant
of arrest and/or to remand the case to the office of the City Prosecutor.

On June 11, 2002, he requested his counsel to determine whether the hearing for the pending
motions had already been set. To his consternation, he was told by his counsel that the judge
had ordered the issuance of the warrant without resolving the motions.

The complainant immediately filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
challenged the issuance of the warrant of arrest. However, the petition was dismissed.
On May 12, 2003, the complainant filed a verified complaint before the office of the Court
Administrator, charging the respondent Judge with partiality and grave abuse of authority.

Issue:

WON the Court acquired jurisdiction over the accused after the omnibus motion was filed?

Ruling:

No, during the scrutinizing of arguments the charges filed against respondent is baseless.

In this case, the Information was filed on May 7, 2002 while the warrant of arrest was issued
May 23, 2003. When the complainant filed the omnibus motion on May 7, 2002, the court had
not yet acquired jurisdiction over his person. With the filing of Information, the trial court could
then issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused as provided for by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The issuance of the warrant was not only procedurally
sound but it was even required considering that respondent had yet to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of complainant. Consequently, complainant's charge that respondent Judge failed to
act on the omnibus motion before issuing the arrest warrant is untenable. Whether the
respondent correctly disregarded the omnibus motion in view of the alleged fatal defects is a
judicial matter, which is not a proper subject in an administrative proceeding. It bears noting
that the respondent court immediately deferred the execution of the warrant of arrest upon
issuance by the Court of Appeals of the Temporary Restraining Order. Incidentally, although
the Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, it eventually sustained the issuance
by respondent of the arrest warrant and dismissed the petition for certiorari.

4. Miranda, et al., v. Tuliao – March 31, 2006 -

Facts:

On March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later
identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent
Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.

Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the
RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted
the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who
was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the
accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the
petitioners as the ones responsible for the death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal
complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion,
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order denying the
urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons,
the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

Issues: Whether or not an accused can seek judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

Held. No, one who seeks affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the Jurisdiction of
the Court. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.

Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the Court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by the
dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person accused.

D. Supreme Court

1. People vs. Mateo – G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004 –

Facts:

The ten (10) informations of the crime rape allegedly committed on ten different dates
were filed against appellant Efren Garcia Mateo filed before Regional Trial Court of Tarlac
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9351 to 9360.

That appellee Imelda Mateo was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban
and Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong. At the age of two (2) years old, Imelda stayed
with her mother Rosemarie Capulong who was living together with Efren G. Mateo without the
benefit of marriage at Buenavista, Tarlac and adopted the surname of the appellant when she
started schooling.

That Imelda testified that during rape incidents happened her mother was not at home
and Imelda would try toward off his advances by kicking him but he proved to be too strong
for her and Appellant had covered her mouth with a handkerchief to prevent her from
shouting.

Later on, she gave different versions on whether the appellant covered her mouth with
his hand or with a handkerchief. In due course, she repudiated or denied her earlier testimony
and also quite telling some discrepancies regarding the whereabouts of her mother Rosemarie
Capulong on the dates of the incident.

Regional Trial Court of Tarlac found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
ten (10) counts of rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has the rule-making power in adding an
intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

Ruling:

Yes. The 1987 constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Article VIII section 5 – The
Supreme Court shall have the following powers : 2 Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
higher.

E. Court of Appeals

F. Regional Trial Court

1. Dayap vs. Sendiong – January 29, 2009 -

FACTS:The Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charged Jeffrey Reso
Dayap with Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property.

The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental granted the demurrer to evidence
filed by Dayap and acquitted him of the crime of reckless imprudence.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging that MTC’s dismissal of
the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Moreover, the
respondents added that MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed
under Sec. 11, Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused.
On 23 August 2005, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the acquittal of Dayap but ordered
the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.

The respondents filed a petition to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as Ca-G.R. SP.
No. 01179.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling jurisdiction over the offense charged
pertained to the RTC?

RULING:

1. Yes. The respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the
prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts
diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

2. Yes. A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on
the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and
that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil
liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically
stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed
and that the accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to
establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never
identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident.
Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear
portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the
cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that
petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand
the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s
acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

2. Garcia vs. Miro – March 20, 2009 -

Facts:
November 12, 2002, at around 5:15o ‘ clock in the afternoon, Rodolfo B. Garcia, public officer
and presiding judge of MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental was driving a Land
Cruiser Toyota along the road of Sitio Tunga, Brgy. Bantayanon, Calatrava, Negros Occidental,
suddenly hit and bumbep the motorcycle of Fransisco Ortega Jr., husband of respondent Julieta
Ortgea, which caused physical injuries resulting to his death.

January 31, 2003, Julieta Ortega, wife of the deceased filed 2 complaints before the Ombudsman,
Vizayas, Cebu City, under Primo Miro. Docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B (criminal case) and
OMB-V-A-03-0051 (Administrative case).

February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a joint evaluation report with Graft
Investigation Officer Antonio B. Yap dated February 12, 2003, which GIO Yap found that the
complaint was sufficient. The criminal case was then subject for permiemniary investigation
and the Administrative case be endorsed to the Officer of Court of Administration (OCA).

After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found probable cause for the crime of Reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and was then filed to MCTC under Judge Franklin Cobbol.
Afterwhich the petitioner filed a motion to quash in the ground that MCTC court has no
jurisdiction over the case.

Issue:

Whether MCTC court has jurisdiction over the criminal case of Rodolfo B. Garcia.

Ruling: NO, Filing of the criminal charges before the MCTC was warranted by the mentioned
circumstances.

Article 365 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods ranging from 2yrs 4mo & 1day to
6yrs. Section 32 of BP. 129, as amended by Sec 2 llof RA No. 7691, which provides that:
“Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:

…(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding 6 years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in
offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof…

In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the
performance of his duties as a judge.

As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation

3. People vs. Judge Yadao – November 3, 2012 - DIANGA

FACTS:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force
Habagat, then headed by then Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in
Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation
Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the
police and those who were slain.

Upon respondents' motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the RTC of
Quezon City on the ground that none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher. Pending the resolution the Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) 8249
that expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. As a result of this new law, the Sandiganbayan
opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder cases.
The court ordered the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City
since the amended information contained no allegations that respondents committed the
offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their official functions. On March 29, 1999
the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable
cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants. The case was reopened in
March 27, 2001 (2 years later) but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the
ground of double jeopardy. On appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case.

It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Parents of two of the victims submitted
birth certificates showing that they were minors. Reacting to this, the prosecution amended the
information to show such a minority and asked respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad
M. Dizon to recall the assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court.
The request for recall was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took cognizance of
Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the prosecution’s view that such cases fell under the
jurisdiction of family courts.

RULING:

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family
courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in turn covers murder cases where the
victim is a minor.

Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which
in turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor. In vesting in family courts exclusive
original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their
welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not
compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule.

Here the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a
family court, are dead. As respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder
cases that require the special attention and protection of a family court. In fact, no minor would
appear as a party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their
parents who had become the real private offended parties.

In this case, the Court AFFIRMED the November 12, 2003 RTC decision denying the
prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369
applied only to living minors.

G. Dangerous Drugs Court

H. Intellectual Property Court

I. Sandiganbayan

Llorente Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan – January 19, 2000 - ONTAL

FACTS: lib

On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the Sandiganbayan an
information against Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, P/Sgt. Juanito Caboverde and Jose Dy for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No.
3019.

On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan another
information against petitioner for violation of Section 3 (f), Republic Act No. 3019.

On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a motion to dismiss
or transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan,
Zamboanga.chanrobles.com : law library

On the same date, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, First Division, a motion to refer
Criminal Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, against municipal mayors.

Ruling:
YES.

"SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in cases

involving:jgc:cha

bles.com.ph"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense.obles.com.ph

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director or higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) including

"(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads….”

To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
therefore, reference should be yaomade to Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. An official’s grade is not a matter of proof, but a
matter of law which the court must take judicial notice."

Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that "the municipal mayor shall receive
a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto." Additionally, both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under Salary Grade 27.
Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

2. Geduspan vs. People – February 11, 2005 - MONDIA

FACTS: Marilyn Geduspan, Regional Manager/Director of the government-owned and

controlled corporation Philhealth, together with Dr. Evangeline Farahmand, Chairman of the
Tiong Bi Medical Center Board of Directors, were charged for the violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019, as amended. They both filed a joint motion to quash averring that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over them as Geduspan’s position with Philhealth was that which was classified
under SG 26, thus, outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as provided for under R.A.
8249 (Act further defining the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan) Sec. 4a par. (1) and (5).
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has qajurisdiction over a regional director/manager
of a government-owned and controlled corporation for purposes of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act).

Ruling:Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. The position of manager in a government-owned

or controlled corporation, as in the case of Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It is the position that petitioner holds, not her salary grade, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as expressly stated in Sec. 4a, Par. 1(g) of R.A. 8249. Hence,
the person of Geduspan, being a department manager of Philhealth, and the subject matter or
that offense charged against her is well within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

3. People vs. Montejo – 108 Phil. 652 - MENDRANO

Facts:

Counsel for respondent, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez, did in his thorough and exhaustive
memorandum, stress anew that the first and decisive question is whether a Court of First
Instance possesses authority in a criminal case "to compel by subpoena the attendance of the...
witness who, as in this case, resides hundreds of miles away from the place of trial." According
to him, "an examination of the placement of Section 9 of Rule 23 discloses to us, that it is found
under topic Procedure in Courts of First Instance which unquestionably would... include both
criminal and civil cases. It will be noted further that the provision of Section 9, Rule 23 above
quoted makes no distinction between a criminal or civil case and it is a fundamental rule or
statutory construction that where the law makes no... distinction it is not proper for the
interpreter to make any such distinction.

Issues:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction, the novel question
presented is whether respondent Judge, in denying a motion for the arrest of a material witness,
in a criminal case, or in the alternative, to cite him for contempt, relying on

Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court to the effect that a witness is not bound to attend as
such before any court, judge or other officer out of the province in which he resides unless the
distance be less than 50 kilometers from his place of residence the... place of trial by the usual
course, acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:
It is loathe to clip what undoubtedly is the inherent power of the Court to compel the
attendance of persons to testify in... a case pending therein

4. Sanchez vs. Demetriou – 207 SCRA 627 - ALBOFERA

ALBOFERA, JOSEPH JAY S.

Sanchez vs. Demetriou – 207 SCRA 627

>FACTS:

a. Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan was “invited” by a high ranking military officer to
appear for an investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. There, he was
positively identified by Aurelio Centeno and Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions stating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez, he
was put into an “arrest status”.

b. A warrant of arrest was filed with seven informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis
Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama
with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.

C. Sanchez questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC that since he is an incumbent mayor at
the time of the alleged commission of the crime, his case should be tried at the Sandiganbayan.

d. The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU/ the court is asked for a comment/reply ;

>ISSUES: (SANDIGANBAYAN)

1. MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not he can only be tried for the offense in the Sandiganbayan.

>RULING

MAIN RULING: 1. No, the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan exercises all cases involving: (1)
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code: (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by
law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00…..
The crime of rape with homicide does not fall under paragraph (1) that deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is It covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed
in relation to the office of the petitioner.
5. Lacson vs. Executive Secretary – 301 SCRA 298 (1999)

PRESORES, JOHN MART C.

Lacson vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1996

Facts

On the early hours of May 18, 1995, eleven persons believed to be members of the
crime syndicate Kuratong Baleleng who is involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila,
where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by the Anti-bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Acting on the media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes
one of the members of the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) transpired that a summary
execution (or rub out) and not a shootout happen. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a
panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor to investigate the incident. The panel absolved the PNP officers and personnel on the
alleged involvement in May 18, 1995 with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate
police operation.

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa

modified the Blancaflor panel’s finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder
against the twenty-six respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The
recommendation was then approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon. On November 2, 1995, Panfilo Lacson was among
those charged as principal in eleven for murder before the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division.

Issues

Whether or not does the Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction over the case of those PNP
officers? (No)

Ruling

It is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to the public office does not
appear in the information which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the
information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused’s
official duties and the commission of the offense charged in order to qualify the crime have
been committed in relation to public office. For the failure to show in the amended information
that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charges in the subject criminal case is plain murder and
there within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the
Sandiganbayan. That the Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer the Criminal Cases Nos.
23047 to 23057 for multiple murder to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the said cases.

6. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan – October 1, 1999 - ALLARSE

Binay v. Sandiganbayan G.R. Nos. 120681-83, October 1, 1999

JURISDICTION - SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486 created
an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan has undergone various changes, the most recent of which were effected through
Republic Act Nos. 7975 and 8249. Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises
exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code is the central
issue in these consolidated petitions.

In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.

In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in
Criminal Case No 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay
cases.1âwphi

G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (Binay vs Sandiganbayan)

On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three
separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay (as Municipal Mayor), one for violation
of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code “Illegal Use of Public Funds”, and two for violation of
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 “Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” under
Presidential Decree No. 1606.

 Without a salary grade being necessary, he was then under Sandiganbayan.

 Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect
on May 16, 1995. On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
refer his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the two
Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already
lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4,
1995, denied petitioner's motion

 Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because:

(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors
were not classified as Grade 27.

(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by R.A. No. 7975.

(3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

 Even if the Municipal Mayor was not listed, Sandiganbayan jurisdiction would still
apply; the statute is not exclusive.

 Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter:

The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary
Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines
issued pursuant thereto.

 Therefore, he is still under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The case was filed on
September 7, .1994 in Sandiganbayan and the law took effect on May 16, 1995.

 On September 1994, complaints were filed in the Sandiganbayan by the Ombudsman

against Makati Mayor Binay for the “Illegal Use of Public Funds” (RPC, A220) and for
violation the “Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” (RA 3019). Based on
 the information provided, the petitioner committed the offenses while he was in office in
1987.

 After RA 7975, which redefined the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, took effect on May 16,
1995, the petitioner filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan, claiming that the
Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction over his matters and should refer them to the RTC
Makati.

G.R. No. 128136 (Magsaysay vs Sandiganbayan)

According to Magsaysay, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over him because:

 He is salary Grade 27

 (1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal
mayors were not classified as Grade 27.

 (2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.

 (3) Congressional records reveal that the law did not intend municipal mayors to come
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

But before RA 8249 went into effect, 7there was a salary grade. In addition to Local Government
Code,, there is an Index of Occupational Services of a Municipal Mayor is Grade 27. Therefore
under 7975 he is under the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.

HELD:

Yes. Pursuant to Presidential Decree 1606, the documentation against Binay was submitted to
Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994. RA 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995. Binay had not yet
been charged by the Sandiganbayan at this time. While the cases were still being heard before
the Supreme Court, the Congress had enacted RA 8249 against redefining jurisdiction. On
February 23, 1997, the law took into effect. The action was already brought before the
Sandiganbayan, hence the idea of adherence to jurisdiction should not be used.

The Supreme Court stated that the statute's clear provisions constitute the exception to the rule.

 Since RA 7975 is an exception and the clause is only temporary in nature, it is now
applicable.

 However, the Supreme Court said, the Sandiganbayan is still the right court because
Binay was a Grade 27 official.

As to Section 7 on moving the case to the proper court. It does not apply if the trial case before
the Sandiganbayan has already started as of the adoption of RA 7975. If trial in matters before
the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of RA 7975's adoption, then the following applies:

 The Sandiganbayan should be referred to if it has jurisdiction under Section 4 of PD 1606

as amended by Section 2 of RA 7975.

 If the Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction, the case should be sent to proper courts.

In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:

Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the exception rather than the rule. The
provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature's intention to apply its provisions
on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this
extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.

As long as the case's trial has not yet started, they function as an exception to the Doctrine of
Adherence of Jurisdiction and are applicable retroactively.

For Magsayay vs Sandiganbayan, unlike in Binay (1994) this was filed in Sept. 1995, since his grade 27,
the RTC definitely had no jurisdiction.

7. People vs. Magallanes, et. Al. – October 17, 1995 - APA

FACTS:
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with
the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the PNP,
namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis, Jose
Pahayupan, and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations, later
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court, are similarly
worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first case and
Danilo Lumangyao in the second.

Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from
further hearing both cases, which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein
public respondent Judge Demosthenes L. Magallanes.

On 24 June 1994, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to
the Sandiganbayan on the ground that, pursuant to our decision of 11 March 1994 in Republic of
the Philippines vs. Asuncion, the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses
charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. In his
Manifestation with Urgent Motion to Transmit Records, the State Prosecutor adopted the
motion of the private prosecutors.

In its order of 15 August 1994, the trial court, thru the respondent Judge, ruled that the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do
not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.
Citing People vs. Montilla, it held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP
officers took advantage of their office in the commission of the offense charged is merely an
allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public office is not a
constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately
connected with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the
Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of the case should continue.

The respondent Judge then resumed the reception of the evidence for the other accused.
Accused Gargallano, Fernandez, Lamis, Delgado, and Geroche, as well as his three witnesses,
had already completed their respective testimonies when, upon motion of the prosecution, the
respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were then re-
raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.

ISSUE:

- Whether it is the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City or the Sandiganbayan that
has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein
some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP).

RULING:
Deliberating on the arguments adduced by the parties, the supreme court is convinced that
public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that it
is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the two cases for kidnapping
for ransom with murder.

At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan was Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which
pertinently provides as follows:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by Law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in
this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by Law does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional
Trial Courts in cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, in their respective jurisdiction.

Applying this section, the supreme court held in Aguinaldo vs. Dornagas that for the
Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by
public officers or employees under Section 4(a)(2) above, it is not enough that the penalty
prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in relation to their
office. The Supreme Court reiterated this pronouncement in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, Natividad vs.
Felix, and Republic vs. Asuncion. In Sanchez, Supreme Court restated the principle laid down in
Montilla vs. Hilario that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office if it
cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as defined in
the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code. The Supreme Court also reiterated the principle in People vs.
Montejo that the offense must be intimately connected with the office of the offender, and the
Supreme Court further intimated that the fact that the offense was committed in relation to the
office must be alleged in the information.

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or

information, and not by the result of evidence after trial.

Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the
discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.

8. Corpuz vs. Tanodbayan – April 15, 1987 - BACOLOD

Facts: Mangaser, an independent vice mayor candidate in Caba, La Union, wrote a letter to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos charging Natividad and party with electioneering, a violation of
the 1978 Election Code, specifically for campaigning inside the voting centers during the
election. Mangaser also filed a complaint against the same party in the Tanodbayan (now Office
of the Ombudsman). On September 29, 1981, the Regional Election Director of La Union
submitted a report to dismiss the complaint for lack of evidence. Mangaser officially withdrew
his complaint with the intent to refile it with the Tanodbayan. The COMELEC dismissed the
case, but the Tanodbayan asserted that if the COMELEC lawyer is not deputized by the
Tanodbayan as prosecutor, COMELEC has no authority to conduct investigations or prosecute
offenses by its officials.

Issues: WON Tanodbayan (now Office of the Ombudsman) has the jurisdiction over election
offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office?

Ruling: No. As long as the offense is an election offense, jurisdiction over the same rests
exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its all-embracing power over the conduct of
elections. The Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in
the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed
by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter
instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not.

9. Bondoc vs. Sandiganbayan – November 9, 1990 - BANUELOS

Facts: This case involves kiting operations between Central Bank employees allegedly in
connivance with Carlito Bondoc, an assistant manager of a private bank. Now, two Central
Bank employees were charged with several counts of estafa through falsification of public
documents because of their manipulations of checks. The cases were assigned to the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Subsequently after further Investigation, another information was filed against Bondoc as
principal being indispensable to the operation and he was also in conspiracy, so his case was
filed to the Sandiganbayan, then raffled to third Division. When the Third Division learned that
this was related to the case against the two Central Bank employees, it was also passed in the
Second Division for consolidation. However, the case was already done and Bondoc’s case
returned to the Third Division.

Now, he questions the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Saying that he should be tried jointly
with the two Central Bank employees and now that their case was done, his case should be tried
in the Regional Trial Court.

Issues: WON it is mandatory for Bondoc to be tried jointly with the two Central bank
employees?

Ruling: No, It ruled that (a) the joint trial of private individuals and public employees charged
as co-principals, dealt with in the cited provision of law, is not a jurisdictional requirement; (b)
Bondoc's theory would practically make the Court's "jurisdiction over a private individual
charged as co-principal, accomplice or accessory with a public officer or employee dependent
upon such private individual" (as by evading service of legal processes until "joint trial is no
longer feasible"); and (c) it is the intention of the law, manifested in the same Section 4, "to avert
split jurisdiction (and) thus avoid multiplicity of suits."
10. Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan – 260 SCRA 747, February 26, 1997 - CAMASURA

Facts: Petitioner filed a petition for Review on the Decisions issued by the respondent
Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner of Malversation of Public Funds and Property as well
as resolution denying Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

All arose by the time that the warrant of distraint of personal property was issued by the BIR’s
main office commanding Butuan City’s Regional Director or his representative to distraint
Azarcon’s subcontractor, Mr. Ancla's property. Mr. Azarcon received a warrant of garnishment
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit or remit to BIR the property in his possession
owned by taxpayer Ancla. Petitioner signed the receipt for Goods , Articles,and Things Seized
under Authority of the National Internal Revenue. Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter to BIR’s
Regional Director stating that he desires to relinquish whatever responsibilities he have over the
garnished dump track and informed that the property was taken secretly by Ancla out of his
custody.

Later on, BIR charged Azarcon before the Sandiganbayan with Malversation of Public Funds or
Property. Petitioner files a Motion for Reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan alleging that,
(1) the petitioner never appeared in the preliminary investigation and (2) the petitioner was not
a public officer with which the sandiganbayan grant. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for
Dismissal on the ground that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person since
he was not a public officer but it was denied.

The Sandiganbayan's decision finds Alfredo Azarcon guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of Malversation of Public funds. Hence, results to this petition.

Issue: WON Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over private individuals designated as depository
of distraint property.

Ruling: No, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy. Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606 provides that Sandiganbayan only has jurisdiction to private individuals who are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees. However, In the Information, it does not charge the petitioner of
being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense. Hence,
the sandiganbayan h

ad no jurisdiction over this controversy.

11. Inding vs. Sandiganbayan – July 14, 2004 - CANDIA

G.R. No. 143047, July 14, 2004

RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

FACTS:

On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion
for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the
alternative, for the referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial
Court for appropriate proceedings. The petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative
Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991, he is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary
Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential
Decree No.1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes
committed by officials of local government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG
27 or higher, based on Rep. Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989." He contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over
the crime charged against him. The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of
Adm. Order No. 270.

The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed, he was
already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence,
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the
Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that under
Adm. Order No. 270, Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG 25.
Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and
retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.

On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, contend that
Section 4a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly
provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019,
as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification
and regardless of salary grade.

I SSUE:

Whether or NOT the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RULING: YES.

Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606," took effect on
May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249,
entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." The amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and section 4 thereof
enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was
committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable law,
therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code,19 where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

Clearly, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan’s original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there
would have been no need for such enumeration.

12. Judge Esteban vs. People – March 11, 2005 - CARREON

Facts: A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
was filed, assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (1st Division) and Order in Criminal
Cases Nos. 24703-04.

The instant petition stemmed from the sworn complaint of Ana May V. Simbajon against Judge
Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City.

In two alleged instances sometime in 1997, in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Judge Rogelio M.
Esteban, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room
daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court. Two Informations, and subsequent amended and re-amended
Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal
Cases 24703-04.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations which were subsequently
admitted by the Sandiganbayan, holding that "the act of approving or indorsing the permanent
appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that
his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his office."

Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, with the contention that the alleged acts of
lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his office as a judge. Said petition was denied
by the Sandiganbayan in its Order dated January 11, 2001. Hence, the instant petition for
certiorari.

Issue: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of
lasciviousness filed against petitioner? YES

Ruling: The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of
lasciviousness filed against petitioner.

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, states that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving crime
committed by the public officials and employees (including members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution) in relation to their office.

In People v. Montejo, it was ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the
offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information.

Further, under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, petitioner, as presiding
judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend the
appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. She was constrained to approach the
petitioner as she needed his recommendation. However, he imposed a condition before
extending such recommendation- she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office
for a kiss. Thus, petitioner undoubtedly used his official position in committing the acts
complained of. He could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as
the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to
recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly
committed are intimately connected with his office.

The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. The
Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations showing that the
acts of lasciviousness were committed by the petitioner in relation to his official function.

13. Barriga vs. Sandiganbayan – April 26, 2005 - CASTILLO

Barriga, a Municipal Accountant, was charged together with the Municipal Mayor of the same
place before the Sandiganbayan for Malversation of Funds. They were both indicted as to have
worked together, helped each other, and/or conspired to commit a derogation of public funds
to their personal benefits.

Barriga petitioned the Supreme Court to render void and/or nullify the Resolution by the
Sandiganbayan which denied her Motion to Quash (the same as a Motion to Dismiss) the
information filed specifically against her. The same Resolution also denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Barriga.

Barriga’s ground for her petition was the fact that she is only holding the position of a Salary
Grade 24 employee, while the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan covers public officers and
employees, among others, holding positions with Salary Grade 27 and up.

Issue:

Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against the
petitioner when she only holds a Salary Grade 24 position, together with the Municipal Mayor
who is classified under a Salary Grade 27 position.

Ruling:

Yes. Sandiganbayan has the original jurisdiction to hear the criminal case filed against the
petitioner and co-accused. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249, which amended Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and
felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the
five categories enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes. To wit: Section 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department
heads;

Xxxxx………”

In the instant case, even if the petitioner, holding the position of Municipal Accountant of
Carmen, Cebu, is only under the salary grade of 24, her case is rightfully lodged with the
Sandiganbayan given the fact that she has been accused of conniving with the MunicipalMayor,
classified under Salary Grade 27, in committing the felony. The Sandiganbayan has the original
jurisdiction over the case thereby giving the said court an authority to hear and try the
information filed against the petitioner.

14. Alzaga vs. Sandiganbayan – October 27, 2006 - COLE

G.R. No. 169328 I October 27, 2006

FACTS:

Sandiganbayan filed four (4) separate Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 against Alzaga, et al relative to alleged irregularities which attended the
purchase of four lots in Tanauan, Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga and Bello were both Vice Presidents of
AFP-RSBS while Satuito was the Vice President.

Petitioners filed Motions to Quash and/or Dismiss the informations alleging that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them and their alleged offenses because the AFP-RSBS
is a private entity created for the benefit of its members and that their positions and salary
grade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 (1978), as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (1997).
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over them since their positions as vice
presidents and assistant vice president are not covered nor embraced by the term “managers”
under section 4 of R.A. No. 8249.

RULING:

Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over them.

The Supreme Court held that Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 8249,
grants jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan over:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and Assistant Vice
President are even higher than that of “managers” mentioned in R.A. No. 8249.

In sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners who were Vice
Presidents and Assistant Vice President when the charges against them were allegedly
committed.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Resolution denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

15. Balaba vs. People – July 17, 2009 - ENCINAS

FACTS: Accused Irenorio Balaba, was the assistant Municipal Treasurer of Guidulman, Bohol.
He was charged with Malversation of Funds and found guilty by the Regional Trial Court of
Loay, Bohol on Dec.9, 2002. Then, opn Jan.14, 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal to the
Court of Appeals. However, dismissed the appeal and declared that it had no jurisdiction to act
on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

 Whether the Sadiganbayan has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.

 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the
case to the proper court.

RULING:

 YES. The Sandiganbayan has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case. Republic
Act 8249, section 4(c) Paragraph 3 states that: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions, or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. Hence, there is nothing in said paragraph
which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction
to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.

 NO. As mentioned in the case of Melencion vs. Sandiganbayan, An error in designating

the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
 proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed
even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: "An appeal erroneously
taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall
be dismissed outright." In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the
appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its
Decision on 9 December 2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The
Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December
2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day
period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did
not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.

16. People vs. Sandiganbayan – August 25, 2009 - DELA CRUZ B.

FACTS:

Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash
advance in the amount of ₱71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of
December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao
issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash
advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on
Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be
further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6,
2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
SEVENTY-ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (₱71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which
she received by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within
the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of ₱71,095.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid
amount.

ISSUES:

whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan?

RULING:

NO, the law enumerated that under Section 4(a) (1) (b). Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti- Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:

“ (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

“(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary
grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g) of
P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with violation
of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under Section
4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the principle
declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge must involve
a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of those
enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of an
offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be a
public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court
could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with sal2ary
grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated.

17. Magno vs. People – April 6, 2011 - DELA VICTORIA

GR No. 171542, April 6, 2011

FACTS:

On May 14,2003, The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder against several accused, including
MAGNO, who were public officers working under the National Bureau of Investigation.

Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was
there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

On September 25, 2003, The RTC issued an Order, ruling that “the Ombudsman is the proper,
legal and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person
other than those authorized under R.A. 6770”. This prompted the respondents to file a petition
for certiorari before the CA.

On February 16, 2005, CA original decision: Declared that the private prosecutor may appear
for the petitioner in the case, but only to the extent as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the
case is concerned.

CA AMENDED decision: Ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in
Criminal Case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with
any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case. This amended CA decision
in turn made Magno file for a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Procedure
before the SC.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS

CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the power to hear
and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan

The private prosecutor cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents. Section 31 of RA No.
6770 does not allow the Ombudsman to deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for
and on behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The Ombudsman did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has
appellate jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.

The Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted
in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the
prosecution of the offense.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has the appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’s
decision in not allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman

DECISION/HELD:

NO,The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC's decision not to
allow Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman.

The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, as well as its Resolution is NULL AND VOID
for having been issued without jurisdiction

REASON:

> PD No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction:

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complex with other crimes committed by the
public officials

and employees mentioned in subsections of this section in relation to their office.”

>In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari. The
OMBUDSMAN SHOULD HAVE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, which has EXCLUSIVE APPELLATE JURISDICTION over the RTC since
the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators
of the NBI.

>JURISDICTION IS CONFERRED BY LAW, and the CA’s judgment, issued without

jurisdiction, is VOID. There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction
is conferred by law and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void and cannot
be given any effect. This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first
time on appeal or even after final judgment

18. Ambil vs. Sandiganbyabn – July 6, 2011 DIAMLA, HUSSAIN P.

Ruperto Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

Ponente: Villarama, Jr. J.

Facts:

In January 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of
criminal charges against petitioner Ruperto Ambil, Jr. (“Ambil”) for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”.

The NBI acted upon a letter complaint by the President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an
investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim (“Adalim”) who was an
accused in a criminal case for murder.

Allegedly, the petitioner caused the illegal transfer of the accused Adalim from the
Eastern Samar provincial jail to the petitioner’s residence, who was then the provincial governor
of Eastern Samar when the act was committed.

Despite withdrawal by the IBP of the case against petitioners, an Information was filed
in January 2000 against petitioner Ambil, among others, in violated of Section 3€ of RA 3019.
The Information stated that petitioner Ambil, in the performance of his official functions, had
given unwarranted benefits and advantage to Adalim to the prejudice of the government by
allowing the latter to stay at petitioner’s residence for a period of 85 days, more or less, which
act was done without any court order.

The petitioners pleaded not guilty on arraignment.

During the pre-trial, the petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information on the
ground that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person
and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail.

The Sandiganbayan First Division promulgated a Decision finding petitioner guilty of

the crime charged.

Petitioner argues that he acted in good faith in taking the custody of the mayor pursuant
to his duty as a “Provincial Jailer” under the Administrative Code of 1917.

Issue:
1. Does a provincial governor have the power to order the release or transfer of a person
under detention by legal process?

2. Is petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged?

Ruling:

1. No. The Court held that under Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail. Clearly, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor.
Petitioner’s argument that he acted in good faith as a “provincial jailer” based on the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not hold water as it is clear from the cited provision that the
provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration of the jail and the
procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners only.

2. Yes. The Court ruled that petitioner’s usurpation of the court’s authority, not to mention
his open and willful defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party
mate, betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.

Thus, for giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence to Adalim by transferring the latter to petitioner’s residence despite the
absence of a court order, the Court affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan and found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.

19. People vs. Bello – August 29, 2012 - PITOGO

II. RULE 110 – PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

A. Section 1 – Institution of Criminal Actions

1. Brillantes vs. Court of Appeals – 440 SCRA 541, October 18, 2004 - EREDIANO

ROBERTO BRILLANTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts

Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councilor in Makati City held a
press conference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a candidate for mayoralty in Makati, and
Nemesio Prudente of plotting an assassination plot against Augusto Syjuco, another mayoral
candidate in Makati. Several journalists wrote articles regarding the same and an open letter
was published as well.

Later, Binay and Prudente both filed libel charges against Brillante. The trial court found
Brillante guilty of four counts of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.

Issue

WON the act of libel charged against petitioner has prescribed when the Information was
filed before the trial court

Ruling

No. Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel shall be prescribed
within one year. In determining when the one year prescriptive period should be
reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which sets forth the
rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses which states that period of
prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. In the
case, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.
2. Clemente vs. Bautista – April 27, 2007 - CABAÑA

People of the Philippines vs Clemente Bautista

Facts:

On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista
versus private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr. The complainant filed a Complaint to the Office
of the barangay of Malate, Manila but there was no settlement resolved.

On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed a Complaint for slight physical injuries against
herein respondent and his co-accused to the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP). After
conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint
Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein
respondent but such filing cannot be found in the records upon the approval of
recommendation by the City Prosecutor which represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor
Eufrocino A. Sulla. However, the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.

Thereafter, the respondent sought for a dismissal of the case against him on the grounds that
such information filed had already elapsed from the 60-day period of prescription since the
commission of the crime. However, MeTC ruled that offense had not yet been prescribed.

The Respondent then filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals. Thus, it was ruled as
interrupted from the 60-day period of prescription when the offended party filed a Complaint
on Aug 16, 1999. Furthermore, the CA concluded that the offense had been prescribed by the
time Information was filed with the court.

Not long afterwards, Petitioner Goyena comes before the Court seeking for reversal of the CA’s
Decision. The court then finds merit in the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s
recommendation to file the information against the respondent was approved by the CPO.

Ruling:

No, it is a well-settled rule that the filing of the Complaint with the CPO suspends the running
of the prescriptive period. Thus, the offense charged had already been prescribed when filed
with the court June 20, 2000.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

However, the Petitioner comes in before the court seeking for reversal of the CA’s decision as it
is granted and considered upon the circumstances. Under the circumstance, the court found out
that the CPO miserably incurred some delay in filing when in such negligence should not
unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. As ruled in People vs Olarte,
it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays
that are not under his control. Therefore, the Petition is hereby granted and the Decision of CA
is hereby reversed and set aside and the Decision of the RTC is hereby reinstated.

3. Sanrio vs. Lim – February 19, 2008 - ESTIOSO

Sanrio vs. Lim

FACTS:

Petitioner Sanrio Company Limited, a Japanese corporation, o,wns the copyright of various
animated characters such as "Hello Kitty," "Little Twin Stars," "My Melody," "Tuxedo Sam" and
"Zashikibuta" among others. While it is not engaged in business in the Philippines, its products
are sold locally by its exclusive distributor, Gift Gate Incorporated (GGI).

The GGI entered into licensing agreements with JC LUcas Creative Products, Inc. Paper LIne
Graphics, Inc. and Melawares Manufacturing Corporation. They are allowed to manufacture
certain products for the local market.

A lot of counterfeit products emerged in the market in 2001 which encouraged GGI to ask IP
Manila to conduct market research to help them identify factories, department stores and retail
outlets manufacturing and/or selling fake Sanrio items.

On May 30, 2000, NBI searched Orignamura Trading and was able to seize various Sanrio
Products.
April 4, 2002, petitioner through its attorney-in-fact Teodoro Y. Kalaw IV of the Quisumbing
Torres law firm, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Task-Force on Anti-Intellectual Property
Piracy (TAPP) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) against respondent for violation of Section
217.

Respondent asserted in his counter affidavit that he committed no violation of the provisions of
the IPC because he was only a retailer. Respondent neither reproduced nor manufactured any
of petitioner's copyrighted item; thus, he did not transgress the economic rights of petitioner.
Moreover, he obtained his merchandise from authorized manufacturers of petitioner's products.

TAPP found that the respondent bought the merchandise from legitimate sources.

September 25, 2002, complaint dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. On may 3, 2005, the appellate court dismissed
the petition on the ground of prescription based on act 3326.

The CA agreed with the DOJ that petitioner failed to prove that respondent knew that the
merchandise he sold was counterfeit. Respondent, on the other hand, was able to show that he
obtained these goods from legitimate sources.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in concluding that the alleged violation of the IPC had been prescribed.

Held:

Filing Of The Complaint In the DOJ Tolled The Prescriptive Period

Section 2 of Act 3326 provides that the prescriptive period for violation of special laws starts on
the day such offense was committed and is interrupted by the institution of proceedings against
respondent (i.e., the accused).

Petitioner in this instance filed its complaint-affidavit on April 4, 2002 or one year, ten months
and four days after the NBI searched

*Frustrated Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5036);

*Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5038);

*Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of Republic
Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392); and

*Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case No. 94-5037).

Petitioner plPinas City dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037 (Frustrated
Homicide and Illegaeaded not guilty to all the charges and trial followed. On March 20, 2001,
Judge Florentino of RTC of Las l Possession of Firearms Cases). Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038
and 24392 were set for further trial.

On July 5, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Correction of Clerical Error, alleging that
due to a typographical error in the dispositive portion, Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms) was dismissed instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide).
Motion was denied by respondent judge, holding that alleged error was substantial in nature
which affected the very merit of the case.

On August 21, 2002, petitioner sought to set aside with the Court of Appeals the orders
of the respondent judge which denied his petition. CA dismissed the petition for failure to
submit a clear copy of the assailed order, and failure to indicate his current receipt number and
date of payment of the current IBP membership dues as per SC BM No. 287. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration, which the CA granted. Petitioner was directed to implead the People of the
Philippines as respondent, but failed to do so, which resulted in the dismissal of his petition
once more.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the dismissal of Cobarrubias’ petition on grounds of technicality, despite

subsequent compliance, was valid
2. Whether or not the clerical error in the dispositive portion of decision by judge respondent
was substantial in natur

Ruling:

#1: No. Although petitioner’s failure to impede the Republic of the Philippines may fall under
Sec. 8, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provided that manifest delay is a ground for
dismissal, Sec. 6 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court also provided that rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective in securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding.

In this case, the Court finds the petitioner’s failure to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent not so grave as to warrant dismissal of the petition. After all, petitioner rectified his
error by moving for reconsideration and filing an Amended Petition, impleading the People of
the Philippines as respondent.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals should have granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
and given due course to the petition in view of petitioner’s subsequent compliance by filing an
Amended Petition, impleading the People of the Philippines as respondent. Technicalities may
be set aside when the strict and rigid application of the rules will frustrate rather than promote
justice

#2: No. The trial court inadvertently designated the wrong criminal case numbers when they
were cited in the decision. In the dispositive portion, the trial court erroneously dismissed
Criminal Case No. 94-5037 which refers to the charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866, while Criminal Case No. 94-5038 which refers to the charge for
Homicide was set for further trial.

The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and
the body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails on the theory that the fallo is the final order
and becomes the subject of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the
reasons or conclusions of the court ordering nothing.

However, where one can clearly and unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision
that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail, as is in
this case. The body discussed the prosecution’s failure to prove the accused's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crimes of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide. Hence, it is only just
and proper to correct the dispositive portion to reflect the exact findings of the lower court.
C. Sections 3 and 4 - Complaint or Information, definitions

1. Estudillo vs. Baluma – March 23, 2004 - Camasura

FACTS:

In a verified complaint, Jovelyn Estudillo assisted by her mother, Visitacion L. Estodillo, charges
Judge Teofilo D. Baluma with Gross and Inexcusable Ignorance of the Law. Complainant alleges
that her administrative complaint arose from the dismissal of Criminal Case for Other Acts of
Child Abuse by respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, Branch 1, a Family
Court. The criminal case was originally filed for preliminary investigation with the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Bohol. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, Judge Himalaloan found that there was sufficient ground to hold the herein
accused for trial for the offense of Other Acts of Child Abuse defined in Sec. 10 (1), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 7610.

The record of the case was transmitted to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor where, after a
review by Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Delusa, he filed an Information. Respondent
dismissed the Information. The prosecution through Prosecutor Delusa filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Revival alleging that there was no necessity for the Information to be
under oath since he merely concurred with the resolution of the investigating judge and that he
"has properly subscribed and signed the Information with the approval of the Provincial
Prosecutor". Respondent issued an Order granting the motion for reconsideration, reinstating
and reviving the case but at the same time requiring the public prosecutor to file a new
information "incorporating the formalities called for under Rule 112, Section 4 and the circular
of its department implementing the pertinent laws on the matter, within ten (10) days from
notice hereof."

ISSUE:

Whether or not an Information needs to be under oath. (NO)

RULING:

Section 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides

Sec. 4. Information defined. – An information is an accusation in writing charging a person

with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court.

There is no requirement that the information be sworn to. Otherwise, the rules would have so
provided as it does in a complaint which is defined as a "sworn written statement charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public
officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated". In a case, we ruled that the
information need not be under oath, the reason therefore being principally that the prosecuting
officer filing it is charged with the special duty in regard thereto and is acting under the special
responsibility of his oath of office. Clearly, the respondent had confused information from a
complaint.

A perusal of the subject Information shows that it was subscribed or signed by Prosecutor
Delusa. It is thus clear that respondent erred in dismissing the subject Information on the
ground that it was not under oath.

2. Miaque vs. Patag – January 30, 2009 - JEREZ

 FACTS:

Five Informations for libel were filed in the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 26, against petitioner
Bernie G. Miaque and three others. These Informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction
over the offenses charged. Specifically, said Informations failed to allege either that private
respondent, Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the
offenses or that the alleged libelous remarks were printed or first published in Iloilo City.

The new Informations were similarly worded as those previously quashed but with these
added allegations: (1) Aragona, Regional State Prosecutor VI of the Department of Justice, held
office at the Hall of Justice, IloiloCity or (2) the alleged libelous remarks were written, printed
and published in Iloilo City (on the pertinent dates thereof). Said Informations were likewise
signed and filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marañon.

Petitioner challenges orders of respondent judge for being contrary to law and for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. He contends that the Informations were filed without the
mandatory preliminary investigatio0n. Moreover, the new Informations were filed by one who
had no authority to do so because these were filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
and not the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office. Jurisdiction over the subject matter supposedly
belonged to the latter. Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of respondent judge to recall the
warrants of arrest issued against him.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office had jurisdiction to file information for
libel committed in Iloilo City.

(2) Whether or not the information for libel had to be quashed

RULING:
1) No. It is the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office which has jurisdiction to do so.

2) Yes, the information filed should be quashed.

The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor, shall also have charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanor and violations of city ordinances, in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in
the Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge all the duties in respect to criminal
prosecutions enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals to sign and file the new Informations is
properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s Office.

The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was clearly bereft of authority to file the new
Informations against petitioner. An Information, when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. The court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because there is a defect in the Information.

3. Leviste vs. Alameda – August 3, 2010 - LINA

Leviste vs. Alameda – August 3, 2010 - LINA

G.R. No. 182677

Facts:

Rafael de las Alas died on January 12, 2007, and on January 16, 2007, Jose Antonio Leviste was
charged with homicide before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). The private
complainants, who are the de las Alas heirs, submitted an urgent Omnibus Motion asking for
the proceedings to be postponed so the public prosecutor could review the material already
submitted or carry out a reinvestigation to identify the correct charge. Following that, the
Regional Trial Court issued the order granting the complainants' motion, enabling the
prosecution to reopen its investigation. Later, the trial court issued the other decision that
authorized the issuance of an arrest warrant and directed the admission of the amended
information for murder. Before the appellate court, the petitioner contested these two orders.

The petitioner declined to enter a plea after being arraigned. He submitted a "not guilty" plea on
his behalf before the trial court. Prior to this, the petitioner submitted an urgent application for
admission to Bail

, which the trial court approved on the grounds that there is insufficient proof of the petitioner's
culpability for the murderous crime. The petitioner was then tried by the trial court using the
updated Information. The trial court subsequently declared the petitioner guilty of murder. The
petitioner appealed the trial court's judgment to the Court of Appeals (CA). The appellate court
upheld the trial court's judgment. The motion for reconsideration from the petitioner was
turned down. A Supreme Court (SC) appeal was made by the petitioner.
Issue:

Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a
substantial amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to
ask for a preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

Yes, the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a
preliminary investigation. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are
merely of form. A change to an information that does not alter the nature of the crime that is
being charged therein does not change the essence of the offense or deny the accused the chance
to refute the new allegation, each of which has been deemed to be a matter of form rather than
substance. A preliminary inquiry and a reinvestigation are not materially different from one
another because both are the same way and with the same goal of deciding whether there is
enough justification to create a solid suspicion that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is likely responsible for it, must be detained pending trial.

It was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is "one of
substance with very serious consequences." The amendment involved in the present case
consists of additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and
cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It being a new and
material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the chance to adduce evidence on the
matter. Not being merely clarificatory, the amendment essentially varies the prosecution’s
original theory of the case and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be
mustered by petitioner.

D. Section 5 – Who must prosecute criminal actions

1. People vs. Ramos – 207 SCRA 144 - LOVITOS

G.R. No. 95370 March 10, 1992

Facts:

Petitioners question the order of Judge Efren Ramos of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
dismissing the petition against two orders of Judge Francisco Ranches of the MCTC of Caoayan-
Sta. Catalina. Ilocos Sur, requiring Alejandrino Cabebe - Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur to
personally attend the trial of seven criminal cases pending before the latter court. The judge
declared petitioner Alejandro Cabebe in contempt of court as the fiscal was not around when
the cases were called for trial.

Petitioner claims that all the cases were commenced by the offended parties or the
corresponding peace officers without the intervention of the Provincial Prosecutor. He claims
that Assistant Fiscal Ramon Versoza participated in only one of the cases before he died and no
public prosecutor was assigned to replace him because Cabebe’s office was undermanned.
Cabebe informed Judge Ranches that his office was understaffed, the reason why he could not
come to court personally and requested him to allow the offended parties or peace officers to
handle the prosecution of the cases (in reference to Sec 5, Rule 110). Judge Ranches rejected the
request.

It was examined that the petitioners’ allegations were inaccurate. Judge Ranches pointed
out that not all the seven cases were commenced by complaint, one of them was filed by State
Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano. Certified true copies of the minutes also showed that Fiscal
Versoza actually participated in 6 of the cases until his death, while Fiscal Panem attended the
7th. Respondent judge also challenged petitioner’s claim of being understaffed and implied that
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilocos Sur was not overworked.

Issue:

WON the public prosecutor or any of the persons mentioned in Section 5, Rule 110
should prosecute the case

Ruling:

It is the public prosecutor who should prosecute the case. General rule is that the fiscal
himself should handle the criminal case since he already knew about the case. To allow the
offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer to prosecute where no fiscals are
available is only an EXCEPTION.

Sec. 5. — Who must prosecute criminal actions? — All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.
However, in the Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when there is no fiscal
available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement
of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention of the
fiscal or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court.

The Court feels that in those cases where the prosecutors themselves have filed the criminal
charges, there is all the more reason for them to actively intervene in their prosecution. Having
presumably made the necessary investigation of these cases before filing the corresponding
information, they are in the best position to handle their prosecution on the basis of their initial
findings. If the prosecutor had not determined the prima facie guilt of the accused, he should
not have filed the information in the first place. At any rate, there is something not quite correct
in the prosecutor filling the information himself and then leaving the offended party in the
lurch, as it were, by asking him to fend for himself in prosecuting the case.

Because the public prosecutor has the power abd discretion to a)determine whether the a prima
facie exists

B.) decide which the conflicting testimonies should be blelieve free from the interference

2. Chua vs. Padillo – April 24, 2007 - LUAYON

G.R. No. 163797,April 24, 2007

Facts:

Rodrigo Padillo and Marietta Padillo, respondents, are the owners of Padillo Lending
Investor engaged in the money lending business in Lucena City. Their niece, Marissa Padillo-
Chua, served as the firm’s manager. Marissa is married to Wilson Chua, brother of Renita Chua,
herein petitioners.One of Marissa’s functions was to evaluate and recommend loan applications
for approval by respondents. Sometime in September 1999, a post-audit was conducted. It was
found that Marissa was engaged in illegal activities. Sps. Padillo filed complaints against
Marissa, Wilson, and Renita Chua before the City Prosecutor to which they filed a prima facie
case of Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents. Believing that a more serious
offense should have been charged against petitioners, respondents interposed an appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who issued a Resolution to file the Information of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents against Marissa but dismissed the
information of estafa against Wilson and Renita Chua. Respondents filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to whicho they prayed that the Court of Appeals order the
Lucena City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-182 and instead,
file several Informations against petitioners. The Court of Appeals granted the respondent’s
motion. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in compelling the Secretary of
Justice to include in the Information Wilson and Renita.
Issue:

Whether or not the prosecutor’s control over its prosecution is absolute and not appealable

Ruling:

No. The public prosecutor’s exercise of his discretionary powers is not absolute. The resolution
of the investigating prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as amended, exercises control and supervision over the
investigating prosecutor. Thus, the Secretary of Justice may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify
the ruling of said prosecutor. In special cases, the public prosecutor’s decision may even be
reversed or modified by the Office of the President.

The Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, on the ground that he
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Not even the
Supreme Court can order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not
find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The only possible exception to this
rule is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor, as in this case.

3. Go vs. Looyuko – October 26, 2007 - MAMAC

Jimmy T. Go vs. Alberto Looyuko

October 26, 2007

FACTS:

Jimmy Go, the petitioner, and Alberto Looyuko, the respondent, were business
associates. Respondent is the registered owner, while petitioner is the business manager or chief
operating officer of the Noah’s Ark Group of Companies.

The business associates had a falling out that spawned numerous civil lawsuits which
include Civil Case No. 67921, an action for specific performance, accounting, inventory of
assets, and Criminal Case No. 98-1643, estafa case.

The criminal case was dismissed due to respondent’s death, but without prejudice to the
filing of separate civil action.
 The CA explained that the petition was initiated solely by petitioner and was dismissible
for it did not implead nor have the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the two petitions could be dismissed outright because the petition was
initiated solely by the petitioner.

RULING:

Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states that, “All criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of a public prosecutor”. The two petitions do not reflect the conformity of
the trial prosecutor assigned to said criminal case. Thus, a breach of the abovementioned Rule.
Although in rare occasions, the office fended party as a “person aggrieved” was allowed to file
a petition to the CA without the intervention of the Solicitor General, under Rule 65, the instant
petitions before the CA, as a general rule, should be filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of
the state and not solely by the offended party. The two petitions could have been rejected
outright for non-compliance with the rules. However, due to respondent’s death, these
procedural matters are now mooted and rendered insignificant.

(added note: pag ma appeal ang kaso to court of appeals, si Solicitor General ang mo defend sa
judgment of the lower court)

4. People vs. Duca – October 30, 2009 - MARTINEZ

G.R. No. 171175 October 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner

VS

ARTURO F. DUCA , respondent

FACTS

Arturo Duca, together with his mother Cecilia Duca were charged with the crime of
Falsification of Documents defined and penalized under article 172, in relation to Article 171,
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. On or about December 10, 2001 the said accused
confederating together and mutually abiding each other, with the intent to cause damage, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation of the Decleration of
Real Property over a bungalow type residential house by making it appear that the signature on
the sworn statement of owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when in fact it was the accused Arturo F.
Duca who affix his own signature thereon to the damage and prejudice of the undersigned
private complainant Pedro Calanayan. Sometime in 1999, Pedro Calanayan filed an action for
ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca et al.

The case was decided in favour of Calanayan the said decision became final and executor. On
October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration of Nullity of Execution and
Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV
Vinez Hortaleza . When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect that the
house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca In
support of such claim she presented. a sworn statement showing that the current and fair
market value of the property, which is a bungalow, is P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on
top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante
Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on December 10, 2001. The
signature on top of the typewritten name Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca. According to
the prosecution, Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of his brother Aldrin who was
out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in the Philippines only on Decemb 12, 2001, as
evidenced by a certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even made it
appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is
that of his brother Aldrin. By that misrepresentation Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the
RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering
them to stop from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question. Both accused denied
that they falsified the signature of Aldrin Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in
the execution as she was in Manila at that time. On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San
Jacinto rendered a decision that the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years, four
months and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of P2,000.00. Accused
Cecilia is acquitted for lack of evidence. Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated
the case to the CA via a petition for review. The CA reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44 acquitting Duca of the crime charged. Petitioner
argues that the prosecution was denied due process when the CA resolved the respondent’s
appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General without
requiring to file his comment. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and had acted
without jurisdiction when it resolved private respondent Arturo F. Duca’s appeal without
giving the people of the Philippines through the office of the Solicitor General the opportunity
to be heard.

ISSUES
Whether or not CA abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction without giving the
people of the Philippines through the office of the solicitor general the opportunity to be heard.

RULING

Yes, The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the
Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General.

The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to represent the Government or
the People of the Philippines before us and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings, or before any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or
proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the welfare of the people as the
ends of justice may require.

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the instant petition for
certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is justified.

5. Punzalan vs. Plata – September 2, 2013 - MATARANAS

G.R. No. 160316, September 2, 2013

FACTS:

The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong City.
At around 11:00 p.m. of August 13, 1997, Dencio dela Peña, a house boarder of the Platas, was
in front of a store near their house when the group of Rainier Punzalan, Randall Punzalan,
Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex "Toto" Ofrin, and several others arrived. Ricky Eugenio
shouted at Dela Peña, "Hoy, kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo?" Dela Peña replied, "Kalbo
nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako." Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dela
Peña while Rainier punched him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on him. Thereafter,
Alex "Toto" Ofrin kicked Dela Peña and tried to stab him with a balisong but missed because he
was able to run. The group chased him.

While Dela Peña was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was
carrying a gun. He grabbed the gun from Cagara and pointed it to the group chasing him in
order to scare them. Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun
away from Dela Peña. The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalan on the thigh.
Shocked, Dela Peña, Cagara and Plata ran towards the latter’s house and locked themselves in.
The group ran after them and when they got to the Platas’ house. Dela Peña, Cagara, and Plata
left the house through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance

Rainier Punzalan filed a criminal complaint against Michael Plata for Attempted
Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearms. In turn, Plata, Cagara
and Dela Peña filed several counter-charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, robbery,
malicious mischief and slight physical injuries against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier,
and several individuals before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City.

The latter filed a motion for reconsideration,9 dated April 28, 2000. Upon review , the
DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its Resolution,
dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the Office of the
City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations. Not in conformity, the complainants moved for a
reconsideration of the June 6, 2000 Resolution but the DOJ denied the motion in its Resolution,
dated October 11, 2000. On January 11, 2001, the complainants elevated the matter to the CA by
way of certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which
ordered the withdrawal of the separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Other Light
Threats, Attempted Homicide, Malicious Mischief and Theft.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals made a mistake in annulling Department of Justice
Resolutions

RULING:

YES, The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, as amended,provides:

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedules of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of
public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval
of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall
continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.

the function this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it does not generally
do, and if at all, only exceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action where the penalty of life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or death has been imposed by a lower court (after due trial,
of course), or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as regards a particular factual
conclusion in the judgment of such lower court.

Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ Secretary on the
insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause unless it is shown that the
questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment evidencing a
clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse
of discretion, thus "means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction." The party seeking the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ
Secretary exercised his executive power in an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as would
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law.

In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998 Resolution
of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint for
attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other
complaints, the Court agrees with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately shupported
by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutor’s discretion by its own.

6. People vs. Ilarde – 125 SCRA 11 - ZAMORA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge, CFI of Iloilo, Br. V, CECILE SANTIBANEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA

Facts:

Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Iloilo, Branch V, presided by the respondent Judge Ricardo M. Ilarde, granting
the motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 13086, entitled, "People of the
Philippines, plaintiff versus Cecile Santibañez and Avelino T. Javellana accused.".

The undersigned City Fiscal upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party
Efraim Santibañez, copies of which are thereto attached as Annexes "A" and "B" hereby accused
CECILE SANTIBAÑEZ and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA of the crime of adultery, committed as
follows:.

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1980, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused Cecile Santibañez being lawfully married to Efraim
Santibañez, which marriage at that time has not been legally dissolved, with deliberate intent,
did then and there wilfully, maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her
coaccused Avelino T. Javellana, a man not his husband and who in turn knowing fully well that
his co-accused was then lawfully married to Efraim Santibañez, did then and there wilfully,
maliciously and criminally have sexual intercourse with her.

Annex "A" referred to in the information is the sworn complaint for adultery filed by Efraim
Santibañez against herein private respondents, Cecile Santibanez and Avelino T. Javellana, with
the Integrated National Police, Iloilo Metro Police District, Iloilo City, on November 4, 1980,
which complaint was immediately forwarded to the Office of the City Fiscal for preliminary
investigation.

Issue:

whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement of Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling:

Yes, Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibañez contains all the elements of a
valid complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the designation of the offense by the
statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense
was committed.

ART. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of
lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Section 4. Information defined. — An information is an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court

7. People vs. Yparraguire – July 4, 2005 - MENDOZA (LAST KIS)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ELMER YPPARAGUIRE Y SEPE, G.R. NO. 124391, JULY 5,
2000

Facts: The complaint against accused-appellant Elmer Sepe Yppaguire reads:

"That on the 24th day of March 1994, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at
Carrascal Public Market, Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Charmelita Ruina,
an invalid and mentally retarded girl, against the will of the latter, to the damage and prejudice
of the victim."

On December 5, 1995, RTC Branch 27, Tandag, Surigao rendered its Decision, finding accused
Elmer Yparraguirre y Sepe guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to suffer the accessory
penalties provided by law; to pay private complainant Charmelita I. Ruina the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages; and to pay the cost.

On appeal, he raised the issue that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case
because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the complainant.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the Chief of Police may prosecute the criminal action for rape.
 2. Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the instant case.

Ruling:1. Yes. The Chief of Police may prosecute the criminal action for rape.

It is worthy to note that the crime in this case was committed in 1994, before the passage of RA
8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997), which elevated rape to a crime against person which may be
prosecuted de officio. During this time, rape was treated as a private crime.

(Provision not included in the case: ART. 344 OLD RPC. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. xxx

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.)

Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

"The offense of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian,
nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as
the case may be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file
the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the
criminal action in her behalf.

The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the
above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is
incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the
offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian
may file the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardian
shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein
provided, except as stated in the immediately preceding paragraph."
The phrase “shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,"
mentioned in Art. 344 of the RPC and Rule 5, Rule 110, is satisfied when the violation of the law
becomes known through a direct original participation of the victim.

In this case, it was the complainant herself who reported the incident to her mother. In doing so,
the requirement of “shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party
or her parents," has already been complied with. The complaint required in Article 344 is but a
condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties.

2. Yes the court acquired jurisdiction over the instant case. As already mentioned, the
complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper
authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The complaint simply starts the
prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the case. When it is
said that the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the offended party
or her relatives) is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the
case. The court’s jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape is AFFIRMED. Further,
appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the complainant fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity in ADDITION to the fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) moral damages.

E. Section 6 – Sufficiency of complaint or information

1. People vs. Cutamora, et. al. – October 6, 2000 - MOLKY

FACTS:

1. Accused-brothers Roselindo and Allan Cutamora were each charged with three (3)
counts of rape committed against their nieces Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz
Cutamora Tampos.
2. In criminal case nos.: 646,647,648 the Prosecutor III, as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Provincial Prosecution, Agusan del Sur, upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended
party, accuses ROSELINDO CUTAMORA of the crime of RAPE committed around 1990 to 1993
against his nieces Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Cutamora Tampos, inside the
house of Uldarico Cutamora, at Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines , against their
will.

3. In criminal case nos.: 649, 650, 651 Prosecutor III, as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Provincial Prosecution, Agusan del Sur, upon sworn complaint originally filed by the offended
party, accuses ALLAN CUTAMORA of the crime of RAPE committed around 1990 to 1993
against his nieces Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Cutamora Tampos, inside the
house of Uldarico Cutamora, at Kalaitan, Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, Philippines , against their
will.

4. The accused brothers plead “NOT GUILTY” to all the charges.

5. After an exhaustive assessment of the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court
found the two accused guilty as charged and accordingly sentenced them, thus:

A. In Crim. Cases Nos. 646, 647 and 648, Accused Roselindo Cutamora is sentenced to:

· Three separate penalties of reclusion perpetua;

· Indemnify Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos the amount of
P50,000.00 each;

· Pay Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos P20,000.00 each representing
moral damages; and

· Indemnify Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos P30,000.00 each for
exemplary damages.

B. In Crim. Cases Nos. 649, 650 and 651, Accused Allan Cutamora is sentenced to:

· Three separate penalties of Reclusion Perpetua;

· Indemnify victims Gina Cutamora, Virginia Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos the sum of
P50,000.00 each;

· Pay Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos P20,000.00 each for moral
damages; and
· Indemnify Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos P30,000.00 each
representing exemplary damages.

6. Accused-appellants submit that the date and time of the alleged commission of the rape
incidents as were "vague and ambiguous" and "too indefinite to give herein appellants an
opportunity to prepare their defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the information presented by the complainant are sufficient
enough to convict the accused on

the crimes committed.

RULING:

1. SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

2. When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in
the complaint or information.

3. The allegations in the information filed in the instant case against all the accused are
sufficient and complete. The names of accused Roselindo and Allan Cutamora were mentioned.
The crime of rape was specially designated. The acts constituting the crime of rape were
enumerated. Virginia Cutamora, Gina Cutamora and Beatriz Tampos y Cutamora were named
as the offended parties. The approximate time of the commission of the offense was stated to be
sometime "in the year 1990 up to 1993." The offense was committed at Kalaitan, Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur.

4. Therefore,the trial court correctly sentenced each of the accused-appellants to three (3)
separate penalties of reclusion perpetua considering that at the time of the commission of the
offense, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death.

5. Also, the trial court was correct in ordering each of the accused-appellants to pay
Virginia, Gina and Beatriz P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 19 However, the award of P20,000.00 to
each of the victims representing moral damages should be increased to P50,000.00 in line with
recent jurisprudence.
2. People vs. Malto – September 21, 2007 - NEIL SOLD

Fact:

An information was filed against Michael John Z. Malto, a philosophy professor, for an offense
designated as child prostitution under Sec. 5 (a) of R.A. 7610. However, the information alleged
that Malto “did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage and exert
influence, relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or seduce his student at
Assumption College, complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge in sexual
intercourse and lascivious conduct for several times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge,” which properly falls under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

Issue:

Whether Malto may be convicted in spite of the wrong designation of the offense in the
information

Ruling:

Yes. The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him to avoid surprises on the accused and to allow him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly. Hence, a complaint or information is sufficient only if it contains the
designation of the offense, as given by the statue, or at least refer to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.

However, what determines the crime charged in the information is not really the title of
the information or the designation of the offense, but the actual facts as recited therein. In this
case, even if the trial and appellate courts followed the wrong designation of the offense, Malto
could be convicted of the offense on the basis of the facts recited in the information and duly
proven during trial.

3. Firaza vs. People – September 18, 2009 - OBISO

Facts:
Eugene Firaza,petitioner, was a confidential agent of the National Bureau of Investigation and
was issued a firearm and a mission to gather and report to the NBI such information as may be
relevant to investigations undertaken by it. He also, in his private capacity, served as manager
for RF Communications in connection with which he dealt with Christopher Rivas, Provincial
Auditor of Surigao del Sur, for the establishment of a Public Calling Office.

On August 11, 2000, a meeting between petitioner and Rivas regarding the delivery of a
defective machine for the Public Calling Office, a heated exchange ensued during which
petitioner is alleged to have pointed a gun at Rivas. Petitioner was thereupon accosted by Police
Officers who discovered that his permit to carry firearm outside residence had expired more
than a month earlier or on July 5, 2000

a criminal complaint was filed against petitioner for "with expired license or permit to carry
outside residence renewed from the government authority concerned.,"

Petitioner, denying that any argument occurred between him and Rivas, P1w/Insp. Mullaneda
and PO2 Ronquillo apprehended him and seized his firearm tucked inside his shirt, even as he
identified himself as an NBI agent; and that he was prevented from presenting a Mission Order
dated July 26, 2000 issued to him by the NBI,

MCTC, RTC, and CA upheld conviction of the petitioner of "Unauthorized Carrying of Licensed
Firearm Outside Residence," penalized under Section 1 of Republic Act 8294.

Issue:

WON Petitioner can be convicted of an offense different from that charged in the Complaint.

Ruling:

Yes, Petitioner can be convicted.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or
information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

The allegations in a Complaint or Information determine what offense is charged. The alleged
acts or omissions complained of constituting the offense need not be in the terms of the statute
determining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

In this case, Complaint alleged that the "accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
one (1) unit Pistol Cal. 45 with serial number 670320 [and] entered the residence of Christopher
Rivas at Lianga, Surigao del Sur with expired license or permit to carry outside residence.

Therefore, the petitioner can be convicted. The words used to indicate or describe the offense
charged, that petitioner unlawfully carried his firearm outside his residence because he had no
permit for the purpose,are clear. They are self explanatory.

4. Cristobal vs. People – February 23, 2011 - OREVILLO

Facts:

Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu received a call on his mobile phone
from a certain "Tess" or "Juliet Villar" (later identified as Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent,
who offered a Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Enticed by the offer, private
complainant invited Rochelle Bagaporo to go to his office in Quezon City. While in his office,
Rochelle Bagaporo indorsed private complainant to her immediate boss, a certain "Arthur"
[later identified as petitioner]. In their telephone conversation, [petitioner] told private
complainant to submit documents to a certain "Carlo" (later identified as Ronald Gobenchiong).
Private complainant submitted various documents, such as his Globe handyphone original
platinum gold card, identification cards and statements of accounts. Subsequently, private
complainant followed up his loan status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or
Ronald Gobenchiong.

During the first week of August 2004, private complainant received his Globe handyphone
statement of account wherein he was charged for two (2) mobile phone numbers which were
not his. Upon verification with the phone company, private complainant learned that he had
additional five (5) mobile numbers in his name, and the application for said cellular phone lines
bore the picture of [petitioner] and his forged signature. Private complainant also checked with
credit card companies and learned that his Citibank Credit Card database information was
altered and he had a credit card application with Metrobank Card Corporation (Metrobank).

Thereafter, private complainant and Metrobank's junior assistant manager Jefferson Devilleres
lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted an
entrapment operation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations against
him;

Whether or not petitioner was legally in "possession" of the credit card subject of the case.

RULING:

No, It is clear that the Petitioner assails the validity of the Information and claims that he was
not informed of the accusation against him. He explains that though he was charged with
"possession of an access device fraudulently applied for," the act of "possession," which is the
gravamen of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the guidelines in determining
the sufficiency of a complaint or information. It states:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

No, in the instance that The Information sheet must be considered, not by sections or parts, but
as one whole document serving one purpose, to inform the accused why the full panoply of
state authority is being marshaled against him. Our task is not to determine whether allegations
in an indictment could have been more artfully and exactly written, but solely to ensure that the
constitutional requirement of notice has been fulfilled.

Petitioner avers that he was never in possession of the subject credit card because he was
arrested immediately after signing the acknowledgement receipt. Thus, he did not yet know the
contents of the envelope delivered and had no control over the subject credit card. The law,
however, does not define the word "possession." Thus, we use the term as defined in Article 523
of the Civil Code, that is, "possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right."

Again, we find no value in petitioner's argument.

Lastly, we find no reason to alter the penalty imposed by the RTC as modified by the CA.
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8484 prescribes the penalty of imprisonment for not less than six (6) years
and not more than ten (10) years, and a fine of P10,000.00 or twice the value of the access device
obtained, whichever is greater. Thus, the CA aptly affirmed the imposition of the indeterminate
penalty of six years to not more than ten years imprisonment, and a fine of P10,000.00.

5. People vs. Asilan – April 11, 2012 - OSORNO

FACTS:

Joseph Asilan attacked and stabbed PO1 Randy Adovas at the back, while the latter was
handcuffing a still unknown person. Asilan took the police’s service gun and fired shots at him.
Both the stab wounds and gun shots were the cause of death of PO1 Adovas. This event was
witnessed by Binosa, a barker in Teresa Sta. Mesa, and a student Pol San Diego, who both
identified Asilan as the suspect.

Asilan was tried and RTC found him guilty of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery in
attacking the police officer from behind, depriving him of a chance to defend himself. Asilan
was sentenced with reclusion perpetua and payment of damages. However, he was acquitted in
the allegations of direct assault as the RTC found no evidence that the police was effecting an
arrest, or if he was indeed in the performance of his duty. CA affirmed the decision in toto.

Asilan claims that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him was infringed when he was convicted for Murder, since the manner by which he
carried out the killing with the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not alleged in the
information against him. Thus, he asserts, he was effectively only charged with Homicide.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not there is insufficiency of Information on the ground that there was a failure
to specifically allege treachery in the Information.

RULING:

No. The Information is not insufficient.

The Court does not find merit in Asilan’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder
because his acts of treachery were not alleged with specificity in the Information. Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. The Information complied with these conditions. Contrary to Asilan’s
contention, the qualifying circumstance of “treachery” was specifically alleged in the
information. “The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accused’s constitutional right to be properly informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.” Asilan never claimed that he was deprived
of his right to be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiency
of the information.

The Supreme Court completely agrees with the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement that “since
treachery was correctly alleged in the Information and duly established by the prosecution.
Asilan’s conviction for the crime of murder is proper.
In any case, it is now too late for Asilan to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the
ground that there was failure to specifically allege therein how treachery was carried out.
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to move quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of the said Rule.

Moreover, in People vs. Candaza, the Supreme Court held that “an information which lacks
essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its
sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence presented
therein. In this case, Asilan not only failed to question the sufficiency of Information during at
any time during pendency of his case before the RTC, he also allowed the prosecution to
present evidence, proving the elements of treachery in the commission of the offense. Asilan is
thus deemed to have waived any objections against the sufficiency of the Information.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated February 25, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 02686 is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it found accused-appellant Joseph Asilan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with MODIFICATION as to the damages. xxx

F. Sections 8 and 9 – Designation of the offense and Cause of the Accusation

1. Sombilon vs. People – September 30, 2009 - PREGLO

Facts:

The facts found during the trial reveal that on or about August 15, 1998 (AAA)a fifteen (15)-year
old minor, was investigated by Appellant at the Calinan Police Station, Davao City in
connection with a complvvaint for Theft filed by a certain Aileen Dagoc.

AAA alleged that Appellant, in conducting the investigation, took her inside a room and locked
it. She testified that the room had no window but had a cot, a table, and a clothesline where
some clothes were hanged. She claimed that Appellant pointed a gun at her, with the end of the
barrel touching her forehead and pushed her with it, causing her head to violently bang against
the wall, and asked her: "Did you steal the necklace?" She answered that she did not. Appellant
then took an electric wire from a drawer and inserted its male plug to a socket. She was ordered
to place her two hands on top of the table where her fingers were electrocuted with the end of
the wire. She was again asked the same question, which she kept answering in the negative.
Subsequently, she was asked: "Dalaga ka na ba?' (Are you a woman now?), and was told: "I am
single too." Simultaneously, she was touched all over her body including her breasts, her belly,
and her private parts. She was also kissed on her cheek. She struggled to resist the sexual
advances but Appellant prevailed. She claimed that they were inside the room for more than
one (1) hour.

Thereafter, they went out of the room where Appellant announced to P03 Danilo Mendez and
Aileen Dagoc that she had already admitted having stolen the necklace. Pale, AAA was
trembling and crying; her hair disheveled, her dress wet. She also had bruises on her forehead.
The police officers allowed AAA and her mother to go home on the condition that they would
pay the value of the necklace. Because of AAA's condition, AAA's mother brought her daughter
to the Medical Clinic of St. Luke where AAA was examined by Dr. Manuel Garcia, Sr. the
Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Garcia disclosed the following injuries:Slight contusion over
occiput region. 2. Slight contusion over center area of forehead. 3. Multiple slight contusions of
fingers of bilateral hands. 4. Multiple slight contusions of bilateral breast areas. 5. Slight body
tremors.

On May 13, 2003, after trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty
of acts of lasciviousness with the aggravating circumstance of petitioner's taking advantage of
his public position and sentenced him to six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to five
(5) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum.

From the above decision, petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA, which was docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 40419.

On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered the herein challenged Decision affirming with modification
the RTC's judgment of conviction. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of public position which was adequately established during the trial, the CA
increased the maximum penalty imposed against petitioner to its maximum period of six years
of prision correccional. Thus, petitioner filed the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the appreciation of the
aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of his public position for failure to allege in the
information

Held:

Yes, clearly, it is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances
be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even if they are subsequently proved during trial.
A reading of the Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance.

Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, provide:
8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it (People v. Buayaban). Sec.
9. Cause of the accusations. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment (People v.
Nerio Suela). Here, the crime was committed in 1998; the generic aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position was not alleged in the information. As such, it cannot be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

2. U.S. vs. Ticzon – 25 Phil. 67 - RESIMILLA

FACTS:

Appeal by the defendant from the judgment of December 15, 1911, by the Honorable
George N. Hurd, judge, sentencing him to the penalty of two months and one day of arresto
mayor, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty in case of insolvency, and the costs.The proper preliminary investigation was
made and the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Surigao,
charging Basilio Ticson with the crime of forcible entry of a dwelling. This case being thus
initiated, the court, upon the evidence adduced, rendered the judgment aforementioned.

It was proved at trial that the defendant, Basilio Ticson, early in the morning of October 6, 1911,
entered the house of Braulio Calang, situated in the barrio of Sison, of the pueblo of Surigao, by
taking advantage of an occasion when the latter was away from home and his wife, Epifania
Cupo, and brother-in-law, Sinforoso Dinulus, were asleep; that the latter, at the husband's
request, had, since the previous evening, remained in the house to sleep there in order to
accompany the offended party who was alone; that the defendant cut the fastenings which held
the door closed, entered the room where the said Epifania was asleep, raised the skirt she was
wearing, undoubtedly with the purpose of lying with her; that the re upon the woman awoke,
immediately resisted the assault and called for help, for which reason the defendant left the
house, through the same door by which he had entered, pursued by the offended party and her
companion, Dinulus, who had been awakened by the noise; that both the latter recognized the
defendant, for there was bright moonlight and they had known him previously, as he had
visited at the house the night before; and that for these reasons the offended party recognized
the defendant, although he was running, and even threw a piece of wood at him when he
passed by the house near one of the windows.

On the fourth day after the assault, when the husband returned home and was informed of
what had occurred, he immediately reported the matter to the justice of the peace, Eusebio
Tiongko. This official testified that at the preliminary investigation the defendant confessed his
guilt, and, in the presence of the justice, begged the offended spouses' pardon, but that the
woman refused, saying that he might attempt to repeat the act.

ISSUE: Whether or not it is correct to charge only the crime of forcible entry.

RULING:

The criminal purpose of the defendant was to lie with the offended party, a married woman,
even though he had to use violence, yet, on account of her resistance, the crime did not exceed
an attempt; but, in view of the fact that in the information he was only charged with the crime
of forcible entry of a dwelling, for which he was afterwards tried and convicted, we must abide
by that denomination of the crime.

So, on this theory, since the defendant, in entering the house of the offended parties, had to cut
the fastenings which held its door closed, he undeniably committed the crime of forcible entry,
with violence and against the will of the inmates of the dwelling, inasmuch as it was not proved
that he entered the place at their invitation or with their consent, it being presumed that he did
so against their will, for, to gain entry, he had to cut the fastenings that held the door of the
house. Defendant convicted of forcible entry.

3. People vs. Manhuyod, Jr. – May 20, 1998 - SIMBAJON

FACTS

A complaint for rape was filed by Yolanda Manhuyod, accused's wife and mother of the
offended party, Relanne S. Manhuyod against Restitutio Manhuyod Jr. The victim was 17 years
old at that time and she was subjected to medical examination, which confirms that the crime
was indeed consummated. Accused, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Relanne and
Yolanda had executed a Joint Affidavit Desistance, declaring that they lost interest in the
further prosecution of the case as the case arose out of a family conflict which was already
patched up; thus the prosecution declared that without the testimonies of the complainants, the
prosecution cannot prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court denied his Motion to Dismiss since the affidavit of desistance was made after the
filing of the information. Both Yolanda and Relanne failed to appear both in the Pre Trial and
the Trial proper. Relanne and Yolanda had left for Cebu probably to elude arrest after having
learned from both the print and broadcast media that the court had ordered their arrest for
being cited in contempt.
The following exhibits were offered: (1) A, the complaint sheet

accomplished and filed by Yolanda with the NBI, CEVRO; (2) B, the sworn statement of
Yolanda given before Atty. Tomarong and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8
June 1995; (3) C, the sworn statement of Relanne given before Atty. Icao, Jr. on 8 June 1995; and
(4) D, the medical certificate issued by Dr. Refe. Accused objected to the admission of Exhibits
A, B and C on the ground that they were hearsay, and to Exhibit D on the ground that the
medical certificate was not conclusive as to the commission of rape. Court ruled that the
evidence constitute[d] part of the res gestae, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Court ruled
that Restituto Manhuyod Jr. is guilty of rape.

ISSUE

WON the presented evidence constituted part of res gestae and is sufficient basis for his
conviction.

RULING

The trial court brushed aside accused's invocation of the hearsay rule on the ground that the
sworn statements could be considered as part of the res gestae, thus constituting admissible
hearsay pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying
an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part
of the res gestae. there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res

gestae:

(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;

(2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood; and

(3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediate attending circumstances. The elements of spontaneity is critical. The following
factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the
res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., the time that lapsed between the occurrence of
the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was
made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;(4) the presence or absence
of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the
nature and circumstances of the statement itself. As to the first factor, the following proves
instructive:

The rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made before there had been
time or opportunity to devise or contrive anything

contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law altogether distrusts is not after speech but
afterthought.

4. People vs. Elpedes – January 31, 2001 - SULTAN

FACTS:

On the basis of two (2) sworn criminal complaints executed by the offended party,
accused Jose Elpedes y Sunas was charged with the crime of Rape in two (2) Informations.

The Information in Criminal Case No. Ir-46883 alleges that on or about the 11th day of February
1997, at Brgy. Bacolod, Municipality of Bato, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter ALMA S. ELPEDES, a minor against her will and consent, to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party.

On the other hand, the Information in Criminal Case No. Ir-46894 avers that sometime in the
year 1991, at Barangay Bacolod, Municipality of Bato, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge with his own daughter ALMA S. ELPEDES, a 9 year old girl, against her will and
consent, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party.
 After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of one count of rape, while acquitting him of the other charge.

Accused-appellant assails his conviction on the grounds that the lower court made a mistake in
imposing the penalty of death due to the failure of specificying in the information that the
victim was under 18 at the time of the commission of the rape.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the information filed is sufficient for the accused to be penalized of death
penalty?

RULING:

No, the accused can not be penalized of death penalty as imposed by the judgement of
the court because the age of minorty of the victim was not stated in the information filed. The
failure to allege accurately the minority of the victim in the information bars accused-appellant's
conviction for rape in its qualified form which is punishable by death.

Addressing the issue on the propriety of the punishment imposed, the trial court meted out the
death penalty on accused-appellant pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, whose pertinent portions state that:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances.

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x.

The trial court imposed the penalty of death after taking into consideration the age of Alma who
was then fourteen (14) years old and the fact that accused-appellant is her father. A reading of
the accusatory portion of the information, however, reveals that while the qualifying
circumstance of relationship has been alleged therein, the averment on private complainant's
minority has not been accurately pleaded in the indictment. The Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, now specifically require both qualifying and
aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the information.

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable
a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

5. Rugas vs. People – January 14, 2004 - TATAD

RUGAS VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 147789, January 14, 2004

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:

On December 11, 1997, the petitioner Alexander P. Rugas was charged with Frustrated
Homicide in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of September 1997, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, in
barangay Taclobo, municipality of San Fernando, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a deadly weapon one
GERBERTO RAFOL, inflicting upon the latter critical injuries in different parts of his body,
which ordinarily would cause the death of said Gerberto D. Rafol, thus performing all the acts
of execution which should have produced the felony of homicide, as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused and
that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the victim which prevented his
death.
Alexander Rugas invoked self-defense. He was duly arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered
a plea of not guilty. The trial court, thereafter, rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of
the crime charged and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty, appreciating against him the
generic aggravating circumstance of treachery.

The trial court declared that the petitioner failed to prove that he acted in self-defense. The
petitioner likewise failed to surrender to the police authorities and give a statement stating that
he stabbed the victim in self-defense, and account for the knife he used in stabbing the victim.
Thereby declaring that the ppetitioner’s testimony and those of his witnesses contradicted each
other.

The petitioner asserts that contrary to the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, he
proved that he acted in complete self-defense when he stabbed Rafol.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court and Court of Appeals incorrectly charged the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide when he just acted in complete self-defense
when he stabbed Rafol.

RULING:

No, there is no mistake on the part of the trial court and Court of Appeals in ruling out the case.

First, the determination of the unlawful aggressor’s identity, as between the appellant or the
victim, is a factual issue. The accused interposed, in effect, self-defense. There is no showing,
however, that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities even on the barangay level. Neither
did he inform any such authorities that he acted in self-defense.

Second, like an alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense that can be easily fabricated.
When the accused interposes in self-defense, he hereby admits to having caused the injuries of
the victim. The burden of proof then shifts on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
the confluence of the essential requisites for such a defense, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed and to prevent or repel it;
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Third. The petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in People v. Sabio, citing the ruling of the Supreme
Court of Spain on January 20, 1904, is misplaced. The claim that the petitioner intended to
defend his honor, is inconsistent with his testimony that he stabbed the victim to defend himself
from an imminent physical assault when the latter pulled out a knife. There is no evidence that
the victim slapped the petitioner.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission
of the crime and that it was merely a generic aggravating and not a qualifying circumstance. As
found by the trial court, the attack on the victim was so sudden and unexpected that the victim
had no time to prepare and defend himself.

6. People vs. Moreno – January 25, 2002 -(VILLARIN) - OSORNO

FACTS:

On the 8th day of January 1999, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, the accused-
appellant, Mr. Rogelio Moreno, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to gain and by means
of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully rob, take and divest
Marites Felix y Tacadena of one (1) gold ring, black bag containing one (1)ATM card, one (1)
white Burger Machine T-shirt, 30 copies of Burger Machine coupons, one (1) pocket book, a
bible, toothbrush, toothpaste and cash money in the amount of P200.00, all belonging to
Marites, to the latter’s damage and prejudice and on the occasion of the said robbery and by
using force and intimidation, accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will and consent.

After evaluating the evidence offered by the parties, the trial court gave full faith and credit to
the version of the prosecution, convicted ROGELIO of robbery with rape and appreciated
against him the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity. It disregarded ROGELIO’s defenses of
denial and alibi in view of his positive identification by MARITES as her assailant.

In his Appellants Brief, ROGELIO claims that the trial court committed THREE errors, one of
which is:

I. XXX

II. XXX

III. IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF NOCTURNITY IN

THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.

On the third assigned error, ROGELIO maintains that the trial court erred in appreciating
against him the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity because the place where the rape took
place was not covered with darkness, and there is no evidence that nighttime was deliberately
sought after by him to carry out a criminal intent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity.

RULING: YES. The Trial Court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
or nighttime.

For nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of
the crime and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. By and of itself, nighttime is
not an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove
that ROGELIO deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In
fact, the victim testified that there were streetlights and lights from the ABC Commercial
Complex. That the crime scene was dark is negated by the victim’s testimony that he was able
to see the face of the accused and even the marking NFC and the nos. 555 in his dark shirt.

Moreover, the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was not alleged in the information.

Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on 1
December 2000, requires that the complaint or information must specify the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime charged. The provision being
favorable to the accused may be given retroactive effect.

7. People vs. Mauricio – February 28, 2001 - YUMANG

FACTS:

The accused in this case sexually assaulted his 11 years old daughter, Jonalyn Mauricio for
several times from 1995 until August 1997. Jonalyn kept quiet about the abuse her father was
inflicting on her during those times, not even to her grandparents who shared a home with
them. However, on August 16, 1997, when she tried, although unsuccessfully, to escape from
her father who later on returned to his senses and apologized, Jonalyn finally broke her silence
and told a neighbor, who subsequently phoned Bantay Bata 163 for help.
The trial court found Daniel Mauricio guilty of rape and sentenced him to death based on the
statements of Jonalyn and the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, including the findings
on the medico-legal of victim that Jonalyn was in a non- virgin state. In the other case, he was
likewise found guilty of attempted rape.

However, Daniel Mauricio's defense attorney pleaded for his conviction to be overturned and
the death sentence he received to be lowered to Reclusion Perpetua. Similar recommendations
were made by the Solicitor General in his Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Brief.

Because of a simple but crucial omission in the two Information filed by the City Prosecutor's
Office accusing Mauricio with rape, two issues emerge.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Daniel Mauricio be sentenced of death penalty for having found guilty of
rape.

2. Whether or not Daniel Mauricio be acquitted for attempted rape.

RULING:

We see no reason to overturn or reject Daniel Mauricio's conviction for rape. His barefaced,
uncorroborated denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the victim. When a rape
victim's testimony is clear and honest, isn't swayed by tough cross-examination, and doesn't
have any major inconsistencies or contradictions, it must be given full faith and credit. We
cannot, however, sustain the imposition of the death penalty. In this case, the information was
correct when it said that the complainant was a minor, but it didn't say what the relationship
was between the complainant and the accused-appellant. Even though the relationship was
later proven in court, that is not enough. For a crime to be punishable by death, the Information
must say that it is both a relationship crime and a crime against a minority. If you didn't agree
with this, it would be against the accused-constitutional appellant's right to know what he is
being accused of and why. So, because of this mistake, the accused-appellant can only be found
guilty of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

In the other case, we concur with the Solicitor General that the evidence cannot support a
conviction for attempted rape. To interpret Daniel's conduct of tossing Jonalyn into her bed as
an overt act that would "logically and unavoidably develop" into rape would be a stretch of the
imagination. The external conduct must have a necessary and direct relationship to the offense
the accused planned to commit. Whether Daniel meant to commit the crime of rape cannot be
determined from this conduct alone. Therefore, Daniel should be acquitted of the attempted
rape accusation.
8. People vs. Suela – 373 SCRA 163, January 15, 2002 - SOLANO

Facts:

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple robbery.

1. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela
y Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

2. In Crim. Case No. Q-96-64618, the Court finds the accused Edgar Suela y Hembra GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Robbery.

3. In Crim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64617 and Q-96-65072, the Court finds the accused Nerio Suela y
Hembra, Edgar Suela y Hembra and Edgardo Batocan NOT GUILTY of the Crime of
Carnapping. ACQUITS them for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.

When arraigned appellants, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty."6 In due course,
they were tried and found guilty by the court a quo.

The Decision dated January 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95),
finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple
robbery.

The court a quo ruled that appellants had been assisted by competent and independent counsel
during the execution of their extrajudicial confessions. It gave credence to the testimonies of
Atty. Sansano and the police officers and thus admitted in evidence the said confessions.

The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to John Doe (not his real name) asking for forgiveness, as well
as the discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the former's house, further convinced the trial
court of appellants' guilt. Finding the presence of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with
no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the trial court sentenced them to death

Issue:
1.) Whether or not the wristwatch and the letter (of Nerio Suela) are admissible in evidence?

2.) Whether or not appellants can be convicted of robbery with homicide?

Ruling:

Yes. The letter was properly identified. Nerio Suela was no longer under custodial investigation
when he wrote it. In open court, he admitted having written it. Thus, contrary to his contention,
the fact that he was not assisted by counsel when he wrote it will not make the letter
inadmissible in evidence. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities. Hence, the letter is
admissible in evidence.

No. The current Rules on Criminal Procedure require that even generic aggravating
circumstances must be alleged in the Information. Thus, Section 9 of new Rule 110.

In People v. Mauricio, the Court elucidated:

"The use of the word 'must' indicates that the requirement is mandatory, therefore failure to
comply with Sec. 9, Rule 110, means that generic aggravating circumstances, although proven at
the trial, cannot be appreciated against the accused if such circumstances are not stated in the
information. It is a cardinal rule that rules of criminal procedure are given retroactive
application insofar as they benefit the accused."

In this case, the aggravating circumstance of disguise which was appreciated by the court a
quo was not alleged in the Information against appellants. Following new rule and current
jurisprudence, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of disguise against
appellants. The special complex crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no appreciable aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to
be imposed is reclusion perpetua.

Based on the case of People v. Catubig, The court held that while a non-alleged but proven
aggravating circumstance cannot be used to increase the penalty, nonetheless it can be the
source of civil awards. Hence, we retain the trial court's civil grants in this regard.

The court approves the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed Decision
MODIFIED. The judgment of Court insofar as it refers to Criminal Case to REDUCE the penalty
to reclusion perpetua, for simple robbery, Edgar Suela y Hembra is ACQUITTED.

9. People vs. Agudez – 482 SCRA 692, May 20, 2004 - DE CASTILLA
FACTS:

Adoracion Castro, together with her husband Dominador Castro and nephew, Mamerto
Nalangan, headed to their church to hear the mass. As they were crossing the river, Adoracion
suddenly heard gunshots and saw both Dominador and Mamerto fall into the water. Adoracion
looked up and saw the five accused with their bodies, protruding from fox holes dug in the
ground. They were about 10 arms length away from Adoracion and Dominador and were all
armed with shotguns locally known as pugakhang. The accused appellants immediately ran to
different directions.

After finishing the investigation, the police authorities retrieved the bodies of the victims and
were examined. Adoracion was later on asked to identify a person who was earlier
apprehended by the police. She identified appellant Ricardo Agudez as one of the persons who
shot her husband and nephew. Adoracion testified that the 5 accused shot the victims because
they believe that it was her son who had earlier killed a sob of appellant Eufrocino. Appellants
Eufrocino Agudez, together with his 2 sons, Ronilo and Ricardo Agudez were apprehended by
police authorities and were charged with murder in 2 separate informations qtogether with
Fernando Agudez and Paquito Katimpo wherein both of Fernando and Paquito are still at
large. the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
while armed with long shotguns, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, treachery and
use of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot the nephew, Mamerto Nalangan.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder

2. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in appreciating treachery and evident premeditation
against the accused

3. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in appreciating band and uninhabited place against the
accused

RULING:

1. No. The Trial court lent credence to the testimony of Adoracion since she is the lone
eyewitness to the crime. Adoracion Castro testified in a straightforward, sincere, and natural
manner and that her emotional reactions in particular, were candid and spontaneous revealing
inter alia that she was telling the truth. It is sufficient to support a conviction.
2. No. The conditions for treachery to be appreciated were met which are:

1. The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offenders
safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party

2. The offenders deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method or manner of execution.

According to the testimony of Adoracion, there is no amount of warning that could have
prepared the victims against the impending danger that befell upon them. The victims were
also crossing the river about thigh deep which decreased the victims’ mobility giving them less
opportunity to seek cover and at the same time ensured the safety of appellants and their
cohorts from any retaliatory act that the victims might have made and the deadly nature of the
weapons used and the number and location of the wounds inflicted upon the victims
demonstrate a treacherous, deliberate and determined assault with intent to kill. Although it
may be noted that the 2 informations failed to specifically alleged treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength as qualifying circumstances, such specification,
enumeration or allegation sufficiently satisfies the requirements of Section 8 and 9, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The qualifying circumstance of treachery having been
alleged and proved by competent evidence, the trial court correctly found appellants guilty of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.

3. No. The Trial Court is correct in appreciating the band and uninhabited place against the
accused. The presence of the aggravating circumstances of the band and uninhabited place were
proven in the present case. Even though it could not aggravate the crime because they were not
specifically alleged in the Informations in violation of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as far as civil aspect of the case is concerned, the civil aspect of the case is
concerned, the presence of these aggravating circumstances entitles the heirs of Dominador and
Mamerto to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with Article 2230 of
the Civil Code and with prevailing jurisprudence.

[WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 2, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellants Eufrocino Agudez y Asiong, Ronilo Agudez y
Cocoy and Ricardo Agudez y Cocoy are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in
Criminal Cases Nos. 5176 and 5177 and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for each crime. Appellants are directed to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Dominador
Castro the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P80,000.00
for loss of earning capacity, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to the heirs of Mamerto Nalangan the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.]
10. People vs. Lab-eo – January 16, 2002 - AMPIS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILSON LAB-EO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: Appellant Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, that on or about October 21, 1996 accused with intent
to kill and with the use of a sharp knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina Cay-no with a well-honed and pointed knife and
thereby inflicting a mortal stab wound upon the victim as reflected in that medico-legal
certificate. The appellant faults the lower court for finding him guilty of murder even when the
Information, as written, could only have charged him with the crime of homicide. The appellant
points out that although the Information is captioned as murder, the allegations in the body of
the Information are constitutive only of the elements of the crime of homicide.

ISSUE:

WON the lower court mistakenly found him guilty of murder

RULING: No. The arguments of the appellant find no basis in law, the fact that the qualifying
circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and not in the first paragraph of the
Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form or style for which the prosecution should
not be faulted.

The Information included the specific allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of the
offense. With the allegation of these aggravating circumstances, the first three of which qualify
the killing to murder, the Information correctly used murder as the proper designation given by
law pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

11. People vs. Alba – January 29, 2002 - SANOY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GARIO ALBA alias "MARIO ALBA",

Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 130523

FACTS:
On February 9, 1993, an Information was filed against Alba, charging him with murder
allegedly committed as follows:

That at about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon of January 31, 1993, at sitio Pananlaya-an,
barangay Datagon, municipality of Pamplona, province of Negros Oriental, Philippines the
above-named accused with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and provided thereby inflicting upon the body
of the victim, the hereunder injuries:

Stab wound, 2 cm., 6th intercostal space, anterior, axillary line, right

Stab wound, 6 cm., level of the 1st and 2nd lumbar vertebra which injuries
caused the instantaneous death of

victim, Ricky Aguilar

During the arraignment, counsel for appellant manifested that this client was willing to enter a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense of homicide and was rejected by the prosecution so he pleaded
not guilty to the offense charged.

Dr. Quintin Basco testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the
victim, Ricky Aguilar which showed that the cause of death of the victim was massive bleeding
due to the injury to the artery supplying the right kidney and injury to the right lung causing it
to collapse as well as the bleeding at the right thoracic region that were inflicted by a shard
bladed instrument.

ESTERLITO ANIÑON and ROLAND YBASAN essentially corroborate their testimonies. They
testified that they saw the appellant stab the victim once "at the right side of his back and the
weapon penetrated the right side of the front chest.

Appellant Gario Alba, Ricardo Imbo, a laborer; and Wilfredo Jabar Rodriguez, a barangay
councilman, were presented as witnesses for the defense. The defense version of the incident
showed that appellant killed the victim allegedly in self-defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused was charged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide despite
his claims of self-defense?
RULING:

Yes. The Trial Court erred in finding the accused-appellant Gario Alba guilty despite clear and
convincing evidence that treachery was not present in the commission of the crime. Appellant
essentially shows up to the killing of the victim but claims that he did so in self-defense. He says
that he stabbed the victim twice when the latter boxed him. He adds that he was in front of the
victim when he stabbed him. I

To exculpate an accused from any criminal liability on the ground of self-defense, the burden of
proof shifts to the accused. He must prove the following elements of self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part
of the person defending himself.

After careful consideration of the evidence on record, we are convinced that unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim has not been shown. Appellant failed to overcome the
evidence of the prosecution that appellant stabbed the victim, Ricky Aguilar, from behind
without any provocation at all. His claim that he had a frontal encounter with the victim was
belied by witnesses Aniñon and Ybasan, who testified that they saw appellant suddenly stab
the victim from behind, with the knife penetrating from the back to the victim’s front chest, on
the right side. We note that although Ricardo Imbo, a bystander at the scene of the crime, tried
to corroborate Alba’s story, the trial court was unimpressed. Instead, the court gave credence to
the testimony of prosecution witnesses Aniñon and Ybasan. The assessment of the trial court is
generally received with great respect and is conclusive on appeal, barring any showing of any
arbitrariness or oversight of material facts that could change the result. For it is the trial judge
who directly observed the witnesses on the stand and could detect from their conduct "the
furtive lie that will expose the hidden truth."

As observed by the trial court with alacrity, Imbo in his first testimony declared that the
appellant was alone when he saw him at the time the incident happened. In the succeeding
direct examination, Imbo changed his account and declared that Alba had companions. But,
upon further questioning, Imbo retracted his statement, saying that the appellant had arrived
alone walking but was caught in the rain. Equally incredulous was Imbo’s testimony that
appellant was on the other side of the road, some 50 meters away from where he was standing,
when he saw someone punch appellant at the base of his right arm. From his vantage point 50
meters away from the appellant, it is doubtful if he could clearly see the victim hit at the base of
his right arm. Significantly, this version by Imbo runs counter to appellant’s own testimony that
he was hit at the lower jaw.

Imbo’s declaration that he saw appellant stab the victim on the chest and on the side is
contradicted by the autopsy report revealing two wounds. The autopsy result revealed one at
the back as the entrance wound, and the other in front of the victim’s chest as the exit wound,
both caused by one knife thrust. The report of Dr. Bascos did not support the testimony of Imbo
that appellant stabbed the victim twice while face to face, and not from behind.
These findings are consistent with the testimony of Aniñon that appellant stabbed the victim
from behind at the right side, with the knife piercing "through and through" until the tip of the
knife exited in the frontal right side of the victim. This also explains why the wound at the front
(exit wound) is much smaller (2 cms.) than the entry wound, which is 6 centimeters wide found
at the victim’s back, corresponding to the bigger blade near the handle of the knife.

In sum, the crime committed by appellant is homicide and not murder. The penalty for
homicide under Article 249 37 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. There being one
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and one aggravating circumstance of treachery,
the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, appellant’s sentence should be within the range of prision mayor as minimum, and
reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is set aside and a new one entered finding
appellant Gario Alba guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of nine (9) years of prision mayor as minimum and fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum, to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000 as death indemnity,
P50,000 as moral damages and P20,000 as exemplary damages.

12. People vs. Aquino – August 6, 2002 - AYAP

12. PEOPLE v. JUANITO Q. AQUINO, GR No. 87084, 1990-06-27

Facts:

Appellant Juanito Q. Aquino was charged with rape with homicide before the Regional Trial
Court, First Judicial Region, Branch 57 in San Carlos City, Pangasinan, under the following
information, to wit:

"That on or about the 13th day of February, 1987, in the evening in barangay Poblacion,*
province of Pangasinan, New Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force... and intimidation, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Carmelita Morado
alias 'Carmen', against her will, and on the occasion thereof the said accused did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike her with... the use of stone which directly cause (sic)
the death of Carmelita Morado alias 'Carmen' to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.

Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' and put up the defense of insanity.

"To prove insanity, appellant presented Dr. Nicanor L. Echavez, a psychiatrist at the National
Center for Mental Health who was in charge of the pavilion where appellant was committed.
After Juanito Aquino was admitted to the mental hospital in

July 1987, he conducted physical, mental and psychological examinations and found him to be
suffering from mental disorder classified under organic mental disorder with psychosis (TSN,
pp. 4-5, 7, May 23, 1988). Dr. Echavez was of the opinion that when... appellant Juanito Aquino
committed the heinous act, the latter was totally deprived of mind

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its verdict convicting appellant of the crime of
rape with homicide and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P35,000.00 as... damages.

Issues:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT INSANE AT

THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE CR33IME;

Ruling:

Insanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may proceed in the
first instance upon the presumption that the defendant was sane and responsible when the act
was committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the burden... of proof of
insanity is on the defense

It will readily be observed that the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant clearly reveals
how the crime charged against him was perpetrated. This confession is, however, being
assailed as inadmissible in evidence on the ground that it was executed... without the assistance
of counsel engaged by appellant himself, and that he did not understand nor was he informed
of his constitutional rights.

We do not agree with this submission. The extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.

Atty. Liliosa Rosario, a lawyer from the then Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), assisted
appellant when he was placed under... custodial investigation. The same lawyer represented
him during the early part of the trial. In People vs. Layuso,[14] we strongly denounced the
widespread... misconception that the presence of a lawyer under the right to counsel provision
of the Constitution is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him. The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would...
lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or
testimony in open court, the purpose is always the... ascertainment of truth

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least
discernment because there is complete absence of the power to discern, or there is total...
deprivation of the freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not
exclude imputability. The onus probandi rests upon whoever invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance and must prove it by clear and... positive evidence.

The records indubitably disclose that appellant sexually abused the victim. After
consummating his lustful desire, he violently struck the victim on the head with a stone for fear
that the victim would report him, and thereafter he left her in the belief... that she was already
dead. The victim did not immediately die. In the clinic of Dr. Serafin Padlan in the poblacion,
Pat. Armando Frias saw the victim with her head bleeding.

He took the statement of the victim in the local dialect. Thereafter, he translated the statement to
English and reduced it into writing

She died the following morning.

The evidence adduced for appellant that he was insane immediately before or at the very
moment the crime was committed is too nebulous and conjectural to be convincing. While Dr.
Nicanor L. Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health described the... mental illness of
the accused as "organic mental disorder with psychosis,"[28] he admitted that a person suffering
from insanity may know that what he is doing is wrong.[29] The same... witness also testified
that there is no possibility of appellant having lucid intervals,[30] but he, however, also
observed that the mental illness of appellant came on and off.

13. People vs. Tigle – January 21, 2004 - CABUNGCAL

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee v. RESTY TIGLE, appellant

G.R. No. 147667, January 21, 2004

FACTS:

On December 17, 1997, an information was filed against Resty Tigle for a crime of
murder,alleged as follows:

That on the evening of December 17, 1997, at Brgy. Capucao, Ozamis City, the appellant
took the life of Luisa Lapera with malice afterthought, evident premeditation and deliberate
intent. Done willfully, feloniously and suddenly attacks the appellee with a bolo inflicting upon
her mortal wounds that leads to her death.
Three witnesses were called during the trial:

1. Catalina Clarin, appellant’s mother-in-law, (2) Dr. Daniel T. Medina, attending Physician,
and (3) Saturnino Lapera, victim’s son

Catalina Clarin’s statement..

Catalina heard the sound of a falling object and went outside to check. Then she saw Resty with
his face bloodied. Catalina asked what’s going on and Resty responded that there’s no need to
worry and instructed Catalina to just turn off the light. Catalina then roused her husband.

Dr. Daniel T. Medina’s statement..

He testified that the victim sustained (6) wounds, stabbed by a sharp object and (1) wound
parasternal area penetrating the heart. He stated that the cause of the death of Luisa was
hypovolemic shock secondary to stab wounds, meaning loss of blood.

Saturnino Lapera’s statement….

He saw appellant getting coconuts from the pile then ran after seeing Saturnino.

Afterwhich the appellant warned Saturnino to not testify in court for the case on qualified theft
or else he would kill his family.

January 06, 1998, the appellant was committed to the City Jail of Ozamiz City and on February
26, 1998, the appellant pleaded not guilty and withdrew with his plea to turn it to guilty as to
mitigate his crime to homicide which the court rejected.

January 17, 2001, he was sentenced to suffer death penalty and pay the heirs of the victim
₱50,000 as civil indemnity, ₱30,000 as moral damages, as well pay the costs.

Three witnesses were also called in defense of the appellant:

1. Resty Tigle, appellant, (2) Wilfredo Flores, appellant’s friend, and (3) Allan Roa, appellant’s
friendo
Resty Tigle’s statement…

He admitted the crime and said that it was done for incomplete self-defense. He said that Luisa
struck his face with an empty bottle. He saw a bolo under the bench, there he got the chance to
stab Luisa and she fell on the stairway. Then he showed his scar on his left eyebrow to the court.

Wilfredo Flores’ statement…

He testified that they were drinking beer when Luisa saw appellant out from the kitchen, she
suddenly struck the appellant with an empty bottle hitting his left eyebrow. The appellant saw
the bolo under the bench and then stabbed Luisa. Then they fled.

Allan Roa’s sa\tatement…

He corroborated Wilfredo’s statement. They were drinking beer and Luisa suddenly struck
Resty.. The appellant saw a bolo under the bench then stabbed Luisa and she fell down the
stairs. Then he and Wilfredo fled from the scene in fear of the appellant.

Still the court find the accused guilty of murder as the court appreciated treachery and the spirit
of lawlessness, anger and revenge motivated the appellant.

ISSUES:

Whether the court erred in finding Resty guilty of the crime of murder and face death penalty.
NO

RULING:

The court first find the accused guilty of murder but without proper evidence to support the
claims on evident premiditation and treachery, for as define in the Section (1) and (5) Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code:
1.With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

Treachery is deceptive in nature and the reason why Resty stabbed Luisa was because of
provocation. Luisa suddenly struck Resty with an empty bottle hitting his left eyebrow. In fact
the attack was not preconceived but the causation of Resty was just triggered by the sudden
attack of Luisa. This was corroborated by Wilfredo, Allan and Resty in his own witness.

5. With evident premeditation;

Evident Premeditation must be carefully planned before committing the act and the testimony of
Saturnino was in question. For if Resty really planned on killing Luisa it would be that time
when Saturnino alleged him of warning the family that he would kill them if Saturnino would
testify on his case on qualified theft. That was in May 1994 and the incident happened
December 1997, there were already almost three years of delay on the said threat.

These were the circumstances to Prove a Qualifying and Aggravating circumstances for the
crime of murder that the court failed to prove.

The court after careful review, find the accused Resty Tigle guilty of homicide and his crime of
murder was modified. The appellant was sentenced to suffer a penalty ranging from eight years
a2nd one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ₱50,000 as
civil indemnity, and ₱30,000 on moral damages is deleted. SO ORDERED.

14. People vs. Abuyen – G.R. No. 77285, September 4, 1992. - GUILLERMO

The accused entered the premises and robbed Chua. They stabbed Irvin and Tiffany Chua,
who were then minors, inflicting serious and mortal stab wounds which caused their deaths.
Abuyen is currently at large.

Issue: WON the conviction should be Robbery w/ homicide? No.

Ruling: Abuyen should be convicted of Murder. The robbery itself must be proven first
otherwise, the killing of the victims would be simple homicide or murder.
In addition, the victims were then minors which clearly constitutes TREACHERY and qualifies
the killing to murder. The killing of minor children who, by reason of their tender years, could
not be expected to put up a defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of
attack was not shown.

15. People vs. Quitlong – 292 SCRA 260 - LUAYON

https://www.scribd.com/document/211084887/People-v-Quitlong-Digest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Vs.

RONNIE QUITLONG

VITUG,

.:

Facts:

Jonathan Capito (19 yr. old student of Med.Tech in Baguio) and others while on their way home

buy fish balls.When Calpito counted the change for his 100-peso bill, he saw that he had only
been

handed back thirty five pesos. Confronted by Calpito, the fishball vendor did not admit that he
had short-

changed. Commotions between group of Capito and group of Fish ball vendors happened.
Capito was

stabbed and died.

Police officers caught the accused on the act of stabbing Capito. Emelio Senoto, Salvador

Quitlong, and Ronnie Quitlong was charge for murder. But in the original charge it was not
alledge that
there was conspiracy.

Issue:

Whether or not conspiracy can be considered even if it is not alleged in the original complaint.

Held:

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is

not enough for an accused to bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is
equally essential

that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with prevailing
substantive

and procedural requirements.

No. An information, in order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed

of the nature and cause of his accusation is not violated, must state the name of the accused; the

designation given to the offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so
complained of as

constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the
commission

of the offense; and the place where the offense has been committed

In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the

facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that
the

accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint

against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary

recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or
supplied by

competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal
liability to an
accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person,
regardless of the

nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the
commission of the

crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the

felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.i[21]
Verily, an

accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for
his acts

but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.

Appellant Ronnie Quitlong was a principal by his own act of stabbing Calpito that caused the

latter's death. Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr., were holding the hands of
Calpito at

the precise time that Ronnie Quitlong was in the act of executing his criminal intent.
Simultaneity,

however, would not itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and
purpose that

could be a basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals; indeed, from all
indications, tjhe

incident would appear to have occurred at the spur of moment. Appellants Salvador Quitlong
and Emilio

Senoto, Jr., shall therefore be held to be mere accomplices conformably with Article 18 of the
Revised

Penal Code.

WHEREFORE

, appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty of the crime of murder

16. People vs. Venus – 63 Phil. 435 - DELA VICTORIA

FACTS:

Prosecuting atty. of the Court of First Instance in Manila filed a case of robbery against
Buenvinido Venus which such crime occurred in an inhabited house. It was alleged that the
defendant entered the house occupied by Zoila de Talaban. Once inside took and carried away,
with the intent of gain and without the consent of the owner, personal properties belonging to
Zoila de Talaban of the total value of one hundred and eighty-eight and fifty centavos. It was
also alleged that the said accused is a habitual delinquent, having previously been convicted by
final judgment rendered by a competent court, once for the crime of attempted robbery in an
inhabited house and once for theft, the date of his last conviction being November 14, 1934.

The accused pleaded guilty to the information and trial court rendered judgment imposing
upon him an indeterminate prison sentence ranging from four months and one day of arresto
mayor to three years, three months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the complaint Zoila de Talaban in the
amount of P97.50, which represents the value of the personal properties not recovered from the
accused, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, The articles
recovered from the accused were ordered returned to the complainant. From this decision, the
defendant has appealed to this court. The trial court, in imposing the prison sentence upon the
defendant-appellant, took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism instead of
what was alleged in the information. On the contrary, the Solicitor-General, however,
recommends that the defendant-appellant be also adjudged a habitual delinquent.

ISSUE:

WON the contention of the Solicitor General is correct?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court Decided, the defendant and appellant in the case at bar can not be
considered a habitual delinquent but only a recidivist.The circumstance of multi- recidivism,
known in our law as habitual delinquency, cannot be taken into account in the present case
because of the insufficiency of the allegation on this point in the city fiscal’s information. As the
plea of guilty offsets the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the penalty provided for in
article 299 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of robbery in an inhabited house by means of
unlawful entry where the criminal is not armed and the value of the property stolen does not
exceed 250 pesos, should be imposed in the medium degree in accordance with the provisions
of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
17. U.S. vs. Pompeya – 31 Phil. 245 - BANUELOS

Facts: The municipal government passed an ordinance which requires all able-bodied male
residence which requires all-bodied male residence of the municipality between ages of 18 and
35 to assist in peace and order campaign in the municipality by rendering services. The accused
violated the ordinance. So he was charged. The information says he is a resident of the
municipality, he is male, he is able-bodied and he refuses to render service to the government.
According to the accused, the information is deffective, it does not state how old he was. But
according to the prosecutor, “No! I do not have to allege your age. It is for you to prove that you
are below 18 or more than 35!”

Issue: Whether or not the clause in the ordinance pertaining to the age range of 18-35 is part of
the crime, because if it is part of the crime, then it must be alleged.

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme court ruled that the age requirement is an element of the crime and
therefore must be alleged. Failure to allege it is fatal because he may belong to the exempt age in
which case the prosecution may not prosper.

18. U.S. vs. Yao Sim – 31 Phil. 301 - CARREON

Facts: The accused was charged with unlawful possession of 8 grams of opium under the
Opium Law, prohibiting the use, smoking and possession of opium without the prescription of
a practicing physician. The counsel for the accused claimed that the conviction of the accused by
the trial court should not be sustained because the prosecution failed to negate the contention
that the accused was lawfully entitled to have the opium for use as medicine upon the
prescription of a practicing physician. However, the prosecution contended that it is for the
accused to prove that he actually has a prescription. The element of the crime under Opium
Law is only smoking opium.

Issue: WON the prosecution is correct in holding that having prescription is a matter of defense
and not part of the crime and thus should be proved by the accused.

Ruling: YES. The Court held that the prosecution did not err in its judgment. Having a
prescription to legally possess and use opium is a matter of defense and is not part of the crime.
Also, no evidence was offered by the accused in court to support such a claim that he was
indeed lawfully entitled to have the opium in his possession. Thus the judgment for conviction
was affirmed.
19. People vs. Badajos – January 15, 2004 - CABAÑA

FACTS: On September 8, 1997, an Information was filed charging Jessielito Badajos and
Fretchie Sanchez y Amparo of murder. The accusatory portion reads:

That at more or less 12:00 oclock in the evening of July 21, 1997 at P-12, Brgy. Los Angeles,
Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, taking
advantage of their superior strength and with treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot one Alfredo Donque hitting the
latter on his neck, right hand and right shoulder which caused his instantaneous death.

The court find Jessilito Badajos guilty beyond reasonable doubt with a crime of murder. He fled
from the scene after the killing and finally voluntarily surrendered on September 22, 1997.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender.

NOT CONSIDERED BECAUSE NOT ALLEGED

HELD:

Under Republic Act 8294, the use of an unlicensed gun to commit homicide is a. The
culprit’s lack of a license for the gun is an essential element of such circumstance, which must
be alleged in the information as mandated by Section 8, rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. However, there is no allegation in the information that the appellant had
no license to possess the firearm he used to kill Donque. Thus, the appellant’s use of an
unlicensed firearm cannot be considered against him. On record, the appellant voluntarily
surrendered to the Butuan City police station. Hence, he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, that instead of murder, Badajos was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
HOMICIDE.

20. People vs. Orilla – February 13, 2004 - OKAN

FACTS:

Remilyn Orilla, the 15-year old sister of appellant Joseph Orilla accused the latter of raping her
twice (Criminal Cases Nos. 3219-A and 3220-A). The trial court found appellant guilty of only
one crime of qualified rape and imposed oni him the death penalty in the first case (Criminal
Case No. 3219-A) and instead of dismissing the second case (Criminal Case No. 3220-A), the
trial court considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty in the first case. The Solicitor General concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the
death penalty based on the twin circumstances of relationship and minority, pointing out that
relationship in this case is an aggravating circumstance based on Article 15 of the Revised Penal
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance for

the purpose of imposing the death penalty.

RULING:

The SC has held in several cases that the allegation “armed with a knife” is sufficient to inform
the accused of the nature of the accusation against him. The prosecution also proved during the
trial appellant’s use of a deadly weapon. Remilyn testified that she was not able to shout
because the appellant pointed an eight-in
ch kitchen knife at her throat.

Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance as relationship is an

alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code and that the list of
aggravating circumstances in Article 14 is exclusive for the purpose of raising a crime to its
qualified form. Moreover,

alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions attending its
commission, hence, on a strict interpretation, alternative circumstances are not aggravating
circumstances per se.

Furthermore, Article 63 states that the aggravating circumstance that is sufficient to warrant the
imposition of the graver penalty of death must be that specifically
enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. When the penalty to be imposed on the
accused is teetering between reclusion perpetua and death, the term "aggravating circumstance"
in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code must be

understood in the strictest sense. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this
case, and it is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

21. People vs. Capt. Llanto – January 20, 2003 - CAMASURA

Facts:

On February 29, 2000, an information for rape was filed against the accused Llanto, viz:

That on or about (the) twelfth day of November, 1999 at Pasay City and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust, with use of a knife,
through force, violence and intimidation, and by taking advantage of his moral ascendancy
over his twelve (12) year old minor niece MARIA CRISTY T. BALISI, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Ma. Cristy T. Balisi against her
will and consent, to her damage and prejudice in whatever amounts may be awarded to her
under provisions of the Civil Code. The accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.On November
12, 1999, only Cristy and the accused were home. The accused's wife was then in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, while one of their two sons was in Laguna and the other was in Cebu. At about 9:00
p.m., while Cristy was studying downstairs, the accused told her that it was already time to go
to bed. The accused pulled her to his room upstairs, removed her shirt, bra and panty. Cristy
cried. He tied her hands, mashed her breasts, kissed her private part, and inserted his two
fingers into her vagina, causing her pain. He inserted his organ into her private part. The whole
time, she could not fight the accused as he tied her hands and held a knife. After satiating his
lust, he threatened her not to tell on him, then untied her hands. That was not the first time the
accused ravished her. When they lived in Cebu, the accused violated her about three times a
week when only the two of them were left in the house.The next day, November 13, 1999, Cristy
told the accused that she would go to school, but instead proceeded to her aunt, Dolores Balisi,
the sister of the accused's wife. She divulged to Dolores her ordeal in the hands of the accused.
Dolores brought her to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where Cristy executed a
sworn statement and filled out a complaint sheet.Dr. Annabelle Soliman examined her and
made a medico-genital report.

Issue:
 WON there is a need for both the qualifying and aggravating circumstances to be
alleged in the information?

Ruling:

While the rape in the case at bar was committed on November 12, 1999, we shall give
retroactive application to Secs. 8 and 9, supra, as they are favorable to the accused.

In a catena of cases, we have ruled that the allegation that the accused is the uncle of the victim
and the latter is his niece is not specific enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of
relationship under Art. 266-B, supra. In People v. Lachica we held:

If the offender is merely a relation not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common
law spouse of the mother of the victim it must be alleged in the Information that he is a relative
by consanguinity or affinity [as the case may be] within the third civil degree.Moreover, even if
the relationship by consanguinity or affinity is alleged in the Information, it is still necessary to
allege further that such relationship is within the third civil degree. In the case at bar, the
prosecution failed to corroborate Cristys testimony that the accused is her uncle, being the
husband of her fathers sister. The accused himself admitted that his wife, Felicitas, is the sister
of Cristys father, Raul. Felicitas and her sister, Dolores, confirmed the accuseds testimony.
However, we cannot consider their testimonies corroborative of Cristys testimony. Well-settled
is the doctrine that the prosecution bears the burden of proving all the elements of a crime,
including the qualifying circumstances, thus the testimonies of the defense witnesses cannot be
used to benefit the prosecution, to the disadvantage of the accused

Consequently, because of the defect in the information, the accused can only be held liable for
simple rape.

It must be

22. People vs. Villanueva – October 15, 2003 - DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Reseilleta Villanueva is the eldest of the daughters in a brood of nine (9) children. Her parents,
the spouses Rogelio Villanueva, appellant herein, and Estelita Villanueva, could hardly afford
to send their children to school due to extreme poverty. As a fisherman, appellant’s meager
income was insufficient to even provide for the basic necessities of life. To help support the
family, Estelita left the family home in Talisay, Malusing, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, to work as a
laundry woman-househelper in Camp Catitipan, Davao City.
Reseilleta was dragged by her father from the kitchen to the living room. Gripped in fear, she
asked him what he was going to do to her. Without answering, appellant told her simply to
remove her panty. When she refused, he poked a knife at her and forced her to lie
down.Reseilleta resisted and tried to free herself from her father’s hold, but he grabbed an iron
bar and struck her at the back twice, then punched her in the abdomen. As a result of the blows,
she fainted.

Appellant vented his satiric desires on another daughter Mary Joy, younger sister of Reseilleta.
After he attempted to sexually abuse her twice, Mary Joy ran away from home and went to her
Aunt Adela Benzillo where she sought refuge. Mary Joy recounted her ordeal to Aunt Adela
who immediately accompanied her to her mother Estelita in Davao City.

On 17 February 1997, accompanied by her mother Estelita and sister Mary Joy, Reseilleta went
to the Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Station in Davao del Sur and reported the sexual assault on
her by her father. Reseilleta and Estelita likewise executed sworn statements at the police
station. They then proceeded to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur, where
Reseilleta formally lodged her complaint for rape against appellant.

Appellant denied the accusations against him.

On 12 January 1999 the trial court convicted appellant Rogelio Villanueva of rape qualified by
the minority of the victim and her relationship with appellant as father and daughter, and
sentenced him to death under Sec. 11, RA 7659, amending Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code.

Appellant posits that in the event he is found guilty he should be convicted only of simple rape,
and not qualified rape. He argues that the Information against him failed to allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship between him and Reseilleta.

Issue: WON the information is substantial pursuant to Section 6 & 8 of Rule 110 of Criminal
Procedure?

RULING:

YES! The qualifying circumstance of the relationship of the accused to the victim being father
and daughter is so alleged in the Information.

For a better perspective, we reproduce the Information subject of the instant case –

The Undersigned Prosecutor, at the instance of the offended party, Reseilleta C. Villanueva, accuses
Rogelio Villanueva, her father, of the crime of Rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Republic Act No. 7659, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December 1996 at Sitio Malusing Talisay, Barangay Zone I, Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
designs armed with an iron bar, struck for several times and boxed Reseilleta C. Villanueva, hitting her at
the back portion of her body and abdomen causing her to lose her consciousness did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the offended party, a minor, against her
will, and to her damage and prejudice (underscoring supplied).

There is no law or rule prescribing a specific location in the Information where the qualifying
circumstances must "exclusively" be alleged before they could be appreciated against the
accused. Section 6, Rule 110, of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires, without
more –

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint of information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.

While Sec. 8, Rule 110, of the same Rule states –

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the facts of omissions constituting the offense, and specify
its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference
shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it (underscoring supplied).

Nothing in Secs. 6 and 8 of Rule 110 mandates the material allegations should be stated in the
body and not in the preamble or caption of the Information. Instead, both sections state that as
long as the pertinent and significant allegations are enumerated in the Information it would be
deemed sufficient in form and substance. We hold that it is irrelevant and immaterial whether
the qualifying circumstance of relationship is mentioned in the opening paragraph of the
Information or in the second paragraph which alleges the acts constituting the crime charged
since either paragraph is an integral part of the Information.

23. People vs. Rodas – 538.1 SCRA 554, August 28, 2007 - DIANGA

FACTS:

On 9 August 1996, Titing Asenda, a resident of Boyos, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was
at Milaub, Denoyan, Zamboanga del Norte, to help his brother, Danilo Asenda, in
the harvesting of the latter’s corn. On the same day, at around 8:00 in the evening, a benefit
dance at Milaub, which was sponsored by Boboy Raquilme, was being held. Among those
roaming in the vicinity of the dance hall were Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot. They stopped
and hung out near the fence to watch the affair. Titing Asenda was standing near them.
They saw Charlito Rodas, Armando Rodas, Jose Rodas, Jr., and Jose Rodas, Sr. surround
Titing Asenda. Suddenly, without a word, Charlito Rodas, armed with a hunting knife, stabbed
Titing at the back. Armando Rodas then clubbed Titing with a chako hitting him at the left side
of the nape causing him to fall.

Thereafter, Jose Rodas, Sr. handed to Jose Rodas, Jr. a bolo which the latter used in hacking
Titing, hitting him on the left elbow. Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot tried to help Titing but
Armando Rodas prevented them by pointing a gun at them and firing it towards the sky. The
prosecution dappresented five witnesses to include Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot.
However, before the prosecution could rest its case, accused Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas,
Jr. withdrew their previous pleas of "NOT GUILTY" and entered their respective pleas
of "GUILTY" for the lesser crime of Homicide. On 9 July 1998, the trial court promulgated
its decision finding accused-appellants Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. guilty of the
crime of Murder. It found accused-appellants and the other two accused conspired in the
killing of the victim and that treachery attended the same. With a Notice of Appeal filed by
accused-appellants, the trial court forwarded the entire records of the case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not treachery is considered to be a qualifying circumstance even if the same
is not alleged in the information.

RULING:

Yes, treachery can be considered to be a qualifying circumstance even if the same is not alleged
in the information. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when
two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is hornbook doctrine
that conspiracy must be proved by positive and convincing evidence, the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. Indeed, proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to
commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy. In this case, conspiracy was
convincingly proven beyond reasonable doubt. All the accused had the same purpose and acted
in unison when they assaulted the victim.

In People v. Aquino, we have held that even after the recent amendments to the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by descriptive words such
as "qualifying" or "qualified by" to properly qualify an offense. The Court further held that
Section 8 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the Information shall "state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the
offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances." Section 8 merely requires the
Information to specify the circumstances.

Section 8 does not require the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" to refer to the
circumstances which raise the category of an offense. It is not the use of the words qualifying"
or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but the specific allegation of an
attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime to a higher category.

G. Section 11 – Date of Commission of Offense

1. People vs. Lizada – January 24, 2003 - MAMAC

Facts:

Freddie Lizada, accused-appellant, was charged with 4 counts of qualified rape under four
separate information which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-171390, 99-171391,
99171392 and 99-171393. During the period 1996 to 1998, accused-appellant sexually abused
Analia, private complainant, two times a week: Sometime in August 1998, on or about
November 5, 1998, on or about October 22, 1998, and on or about September 15, 1998. On
November 10, 1998, Analia, together with her mother, filed her Affidavit-Complaint at Western
Police District. She submitted herself to genitalia examination by a medico-legal officer of the
NBI. On November 15, 1998, Analia executed a Dagdag na Salaysay ng Paghahabla and charged
accused-appellant with rape. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 4 counts of rape anmad meted on him the death penalty for
each count. Accused-appellant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he raped private
complainant in August 1998.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-171390 is defective because the date of
the offense on or about August 1998 alleged therein is too indefinite.

Ruling:

Rule 110, Section 11 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure reads:

Sec.11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission.
The Court does not agree with accused-appellant. It bears stressing that the precise date of the
commission of the crime of rape is not an essential element of the crime. Failure to specify the
exact date when the rape was committed does not render the Information defective. The reason
for this is that the gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of the private complainant
under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Significantly, accused-appellant did not even bother to file a motion for a bill of
particulars under Rule 116, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure before he was
arraigned. Indeed, accused-appellant was duly arraigned under the Information and entered a
plea of not guilty to the charge without any plain on the sufficiency of the Information.
Accused-appellant even adduced his

evidence after the prosecution had rested its case. It was only on appeal to this Court that
accused-appellant questioned for the first time of the sufficiency of the Information filed against
him.

InCriminal Case No. 99-171390, accused-appellant is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of simple rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.

2. People vs. Jalbuena – July 4, 2007 - JEREZ

Facts

In the morning of August 1996, AAA a minor, was raped by her father Jalbuena. The incident
happened on two other occasions, the last was in the morning and witnessed by her uncle CCC
while Jalbuena was on top of her. AAA thereafter, told her two classmates about the incident
which reported the same to their teacher, who in turned reported and brought her to the school
principal. Dr. Salumbides then examined AAA, the findings was that the hymen was intact and
there are no spermatozoa in the vaginal smear. In contrast to this accusation, Jalbuena’s alibi is
that he could not rape AAA for his job as a canvasser of plastic wares required him to be out of
the house most of the time, except on Saturdays, but he would return home in the afternoon or
evening, which was corroborated by his wife BBB. The RTC found AAA’s testimony as clear,
consistent, direct, and without hesitation when confronted by the presence of her own abuser.
Jalbuena’s alibi was not credited there being no proof that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the place, date, and time of the commission of the offense. Thus, Jalbuena was convicted
and was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Whether or not the failure to allege the date and time of the commission of the offense is
violative of Jalbuena’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
Ruling:

No, it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the
offense was committed except when the time is a material ingredient of the offense (Sec 11 of
Rule 110, Rules of Court). In rape, what is necessary is the carnal knowledge of a woman, the
date is not an essential element. Jalbuena should have filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars
before he entered his plea when he found such information defective.

3. Zapanta vs. People – March 30, 2013 - EDEM

Facts:

An April 26, 2002 Information filed with the RTC charged the petitioner, together with
Concordia 0. Loyao, Jr., with the crime of qualified theft, committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of October, 2001, in the City of Baguio, Philippines , and
within the jurisdiction of [the] Honorable Court, xxx accused ANTHONY V. ZAPANTA, being
then the Project Manager of the Porta Vaga Building Construction, a project being undertaken
then by the Construction Firm, ANMAR, Inc. under sub-contract with A. Mojica Construction
and General Services, with the duty to manage and implement the fabrication and erection of
the structural steel framing of the Porta Varga building including the receipt, audit and
checking of all construction materials delivered at the job site a position of full trust and
confidence, and CONCORDIO O. LOYAO, JR., alias "JUN", a telescopic crane operator of
ANMAR, Inc., conspiring, confederating, and mutually aiding one another, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away from the Porta Vaga project site along Session road, Baguio City,
wide flange steel beams of different sizes with a total value of P2,269,731.69 without the
knowledge and consent of the owner ANMAR, Inc., represented by its General Manager
LORNA LEVA MARIGONDON, to the damage and prejudice of ANMAR, Inc., in the
aforementioned sum of P2,269,731.69, Philippine Currency.

Arraigned on November 12, 2002, the petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Loyao remains at-
large.

In the ensuing trial, the prosecution offered in evidence the oral testimonies of Danilo Bernardo,
Edgardo Cano, Roberto Buen, Efren Marcelo, private complainant Engr. Lorna Marigondon,
and Apolinaria de Jesus, as well as documentary evidence consisting of a security logbook
entry, delivery receipts, photographs, letters, and sworn affidavits. The prosecution's pieces of
evidence, taken together, established the facts recited below.

In 2001, A. Mojica Construction and General Services (AMCGS) undertook the Porta Vaga
building construction in Session Road, Baguio City. AMCGS subcontracted the fabrication and
erection of the building's structural and steel framing to Anmar, owned by the Marigondon
family. Anmar ordered its construction materials from Linton Commercial in Pasig City. It
hired Junio Trucking to deliver the construction materials to its project site in Baguio City. It
assigned the petitioner as project manager with general managerial duties, including the
receiving, custody, and checking of all building construction materials.

On two occasions in October 2001, the petitioner instructed Bernardo, Junio Trucking's truck
driver, and about 10 Anmar welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 10 to 15 pieces
of 20 feet long wide flange steel beams at Anmar's alleged new contract project along Marcos
Highway, Baguio City. Sometime in November 2001, the petitioner again instructed Bernardo
and several welders, including Cano and Buen, to unload about 5 to 16 pieces of 5 meters and
40 feet long wide flange steel beams along Marcos Highway, as well as on Mabini Street, Baguio
City.

Sometime in January 2002, Engr. Nella Aquino, AMCGS' project manager, informed Engr.
Marigondon that several wide flange steel beams had been returned to Anmar's warehouse on
October 12, 19, and 26, 2001, as reflected in the security guard's logbook. Engr. Marigondon
contacted the petitioner to explain the return, but the latter simply denied that the reported
return took place. Engr. Marigondon requested Marcelo, her warehouseman, to conduct an
inventory of the construction materials at the project site. Marcelo learned from Cano that
several wide flange steel beams had been unloaded along Marcos Highway. There, Marcelo
found and took pictures of some of the missing steel beams. He reported the matter to the
Baguio City police headquarters and contacted Anmar to send a truck to retrieve the steel
beams, but the truck came weeks later and, by then, the steel beams could no longer be found.
The stolen steel beams amounted to P2,269,731.69.

In his defense, the petitioner vehemently denied the charge against him. He claimed that
AMCGS, not Anmar, employed him, and his plan to build his own company had been Engr.
Marigondon's motive in falsely accusing him of stealing construction materials.

Issues: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTC's decision
convicting the petitioner of the crime of qualified theft.

Issue: Is the information sufficient? Yes.

Ruling:

Sufficiency of the allegation of date of the commission of the crime

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which lays down the guidelines in
determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information, provides:
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information. (italics supplied; emphasis ours)

As to the sufficiency of the allegation of the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure adds:

Section 11. Date of commission of the offense. - It is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient
of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible
to the actual date of its commission. [italics supplied; emphasis ours]

Conformably with these provisions, when the date given in the complaint is not of the essence
of the offense, it need not be proven as alleged; thus, the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any date within the period of the statute of limitations
and before the commencement of the action.

In this case, the petitioner had been fully apprised of the charge of qualified theft since the
information stated the approximate date of the commission of the offense through the words
"sometime in the month of October, 2001." The petitioner could reasonably deduce the nature of
the criminal act with which he was charged from a reading of the contents of the information, as
well as gather by such reading whatever he needed to know about the charge to enable him to
prepare his defense.

We stress that the information did not have to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, as to be inclusive of the month of "November 2001" since the date was not a material
element of the offense. As such, the offense of qualified theft could be alleged to be committed
on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.. Clearly, the month of
November is the month right after October.

The crime of qualified theft was committed with grave abuse of discretion

The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation to Articles 308 and 309
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property
belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.[18]
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecution's evidence proved, through the
prosecution's eyewitnesses, that upon the petitioner's instruction, several pieces of wide flange
steel beams had been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001, along
Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction materials
from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of the
construction materials.

Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime

The petitioner argues that his conviction was improper because the alleged stolen beams or
corpus delicti had not been established. He asserts that the failure to present the alleged stolen
beams in court was fatal to the prosecution's cause.

The petitioner's argument fails to persuade us.

"Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body or
substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person murdered" or, in this case, to the stolen steel
beams. "Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness' uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to prove it and
warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be established by circumstantial
evidence."[19] "[I]n theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by
the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking."[20]

In this case, the testimonial and documentary evidence on record fully established the corpus
delicti. The positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Bernardo, Cano and
Buen, stating that the petitioner directed them to unload the steel beams along Marcos Highway
and Mabini Street on the pretext of a new Anmar project, were crucial to the petitioner's
conviction. The security logbook entry, delivery receipts and photographs proved the existence
and the unloading of the steel beams to a different location other than the project site.

Proper Penalty

The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, sentenced the petitioner to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
from 10 years and three months, as minimum, to 20 years, as maximum, and to indemnify
Anmar P2,269,731.69, with legal interest from November 2001 until full payment. Apparently,
the RTC erred in failing to specify the appropriate name of the penalty imposed on the
petitioner.

We reiterate the rule that it is necessary for the courts to employ the proper legal terminology in
the imposition of penalties because of the substantial difference in their corresponding legal
effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified as under
the scheme of penalties in the RPC, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific
duration and corresponding accessory penalties.[21] Thus, the courts must employ the proper
nomenclature specified in the RPC, such as "reclusion perpetua" not "life imprisonment," or "ten
days of arresto menor" not "ten days of imprisonment." In qualified theft, the appropriate penalty
is reclusion perpetua based on Article 310 of the RPC which provides that "[t]he crime of
[qualified] theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in [Article 309]."[22]

To compute the penalty, we begin with the value of the stolen steel beams, which is
P2,269,731.69. Based on Article 309 of the RPC, since the value of the items exceeds P22,000.00,
the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, to be imposed in the
maximum period, which is eight years, eight months and one day to 10 years of prision mayor.

To determine the additional years of imprisonment, we deduct P22,000.00 from P2,269,731.69,

which gives us P2,247,731.69. This resulting figure should then be divided by PlO,OOO.OO,
disregarding any amount less than PlO,OOO.OO. We now have 224 years that should be added
to the basic penalty. However, the imposable penalty for simple theft should not exceed a total
of 20 years. Therefore, had petitioner committed simple theft, the penalty would be 20 years of
reclusion temporal. As the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher, the correct imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua.

The petitioner should thus be convicted of qualified theft with the corresponding penalty of
reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The June 27. 2005 decision and the November 24,
2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28369 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner Engr. Anthony V. Zapanta is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

H. Section 12 – Name of the offended party

1. People vs. CFI of Quezon – 209 SCRA 704 - BENEMERITO

Facts

The private respondents were charged with the crime of qualified theft of logs, defined and
punished under Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines. They entered the privately-owned land of one Felicitacion
Pujalte, then illegally cut, gather, take, steal and carry away therefrom, without the consent of
the said owner and without any authority under a license agreement, lease license or permit
from the government.

The only offended party is the government. But the information does not mention that the
offended party is the State. The trial court dismissed the information.

Issue: Whether the information charged an offense when the is defective

People of the ph is actually the state or the offended party

Ruling

Yes, the failure of the information to allege that the logs taken were owned by the state is not
fatal. It should be noted that the logs subject of the complaint were taken not from a public
forest but from a private woodland registered in the name of complainant’s deceased father,
Macario Prudente. The fact that only the state can grant a license agreement, license or lease
does not make the state the owner of all the logs and timber products produced in the
Philippines including those produced in private woodlands.

Ownership is not an essential element of the offense as defined in Section 60 of P.D. No. 705.
Thus, the failure of the information to allege the true owner of the forest products is not
material; it was sufficient that it alleged that the taking was without any authority or license
from the government.

2. - RESIMILLA

People vs. Uba – 99 Phil 134

Facts:

On August 1, 1952 Demetria Somod-ong filed a complaint charging the accused Juliana and
Calixta Uba with having uttered in public against the complainant certain defamatory words
and expressions. So Demetria Somod-ong is the victim of serious oral defamation. However,
instead of mentioning the complainant Demetria Somod-ong as the offended party, the
information named Pastora Somod-ong as the person offended. But everything is the same – the
date and place of the commission, the defamatory words. Only, there was an erroneous
designation of the offended party.

ISSUE:

Can the court convict Juliana and Calixta uba for the crime of serious oral defamation?

RULING:
While it is probably true that the fiscal or his clerk made a clerical error in putting in the
information the name of Pastora Somod-ong instead of that of Demetria Somod-ong, as the
offended party, the mistake thus committed was on a very material matter in the case, such that
it necessarily affected the identification of the act charged. The act of insulting X is distinct from
a similar act of insult against Y, even if the insult is preferred by the same person, in the same
language and at about the same time. Note that the pleading that give the court jurisdiction to
try the offense is not the complaint of the offended party, but the information by the fiscal,
because the charge is the utterance of insulting or defamatory language, not the imputation of
an offense which can be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party.The court
dismissed the case for variance between allegations of the information and the proof.

3. U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy – 38 Phil 330, July 15, 1918 - ESTIOSO

FACTS:

Complaint charging the crime of robbery and multiple homicide was filed againsts Pedro
Lahoy Lahoy and Marcos Madanlog.

In 1912, in a small island called Sicogon where around a dozen of people were living in this
island the crime took place. The victims were an old couple, Francisco Seran and his wife Juana,
and another couple were Roman Estriba and his wife Rosa.

Roman and Rosa had two children, Miguela and Bartoleme, aged 14 and 9 years of age. Upon
the night of the commission of the crime charged in the complaint, the two children was with
their Grandmother Juana in their home a distance from where Roman and Rosa is residing.
Francisco had gone to the beach as was his custom to watch the turtle.

The two accused came to Juana while the three of them were resting. The accused demanded
P100 from juana. Juana gave them 100 in response to the demand and the accused required the
three to leave the house and go to the direction of the sea.
When they arrived at the beach, the accused demanded more money but Juana was unable to
comply. Lahoylahoy struck Juana with a bolo below the breast which instantly killed them. The
two children ran and hide in the bushes.

The next morning, the children went to their grandparents house but they havent seen the two
so they decided to go to their parents house but had a stop at their sisters house, the wife of
defendant Madanlog. When they arrived at their parents house, they discovered that their
grandfather Francisco and parents, Roman and Rosa were also killed.

The bodies were buried by the two accused, assisted by Eugenio Tenedero, Son-in-law of
Lahoylahoy. The children were threatened by the accused if they make a complaint.

The children stayed with their sister for sometime then transferred to another sister named
Dionisia Estriba wherein they revealed what happened. Their sister Dionisia filed the complaint
against the two accused.

Two children gave a consistent account of robbery and of the murder of their grandmother but
the boy cant remember that madanlog was present when lahoylahoy killed their grandmother.
Eugenio tenedoro also testified that the defendants killed the four deceased person. Eugenio
tenedoro also stated that the next morning, he saw madanlog carried away some palay, dawa,
three pigs, and a trunk of wearing apparel from the house of the deceased, Francisco.

On the trial, it is stated in the complaint that the accused robbed Juana and Francisco with 100
peso, 5 bayones of palay, 3 pigs, and a trunk of apparels. The accused did not object with the
complaint even if the fact should be that Juana was robbed with 100 and Francisco was the
owner of palay, pigs, and trunk of apparels.

ISSUE:

WON the accused should be convicted with a complex crime of robbery and homicide.

AGAINST BOTH ACCUSED LAHOYLAHOY AND MADANLOG

KAY WALA SILA NAG OBJECT SA GIHATAG NA ALLEGATION SA ILA

LAHOY LAHOY 100 peso from juana
MADANLOG- ITEMS

RULING:

Now a complaint charging the commission of the complex offense of robbery with homicide
must necessarily charge each of the component offensesd with the same precision that would
be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. It is well recognized in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the charge
as to one of the component offenses the defendant can be convicted of the other. The mere
circumstance that the two crimes are so related as to constitute one transaction in no way affects
the principles of pleading involved in the case. To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a
charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that he robbed an entirely different person,
when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles of pleading; and in
addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed in a position where he
could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal. If
we should convict or acquit these defendants to-day of the robbery which is alleged to have
been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be
prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former
jeopardy would be of no avail.

4. Borjal, Soliven vs. Court of Appeals – January 14, 1999 - PITOGO

Facts:

Arturo Borjal was the president of PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., and Maximo Soliven was the publisher
and chairman of its editorial board. Borjal was among the regular writers of The Philippien Star
who runs the column Jaywalker. The case stems from the articles written in Jaywalker, which
called a certain organizer of a conference a self-proclaimed hero.

Around that time, the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) was
organized. Its objective was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference was estimated to cost around
Php1,815,000, which would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected as Executive Director of the FNCLT. As such, he
wrote numerous solicitation letters to the business committee to support the conference.
The Jaywalker contained articles allegedly referring to these solicitation letters and other
defamatory statements. However, none of these articles named the organizer nor the conference
referred to. Wenceslao, thinking he was the one talked about in the article, filed a case of libel
against Borjal, Soliven, and others. The trial court as well as the appellate court found the
accused guilty of libel.

Issue:

Were the courts a quo correct in convicting the accused of libel?

Ruling:

No. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is
not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized
himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person
could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. In the case at bar, these requisites
were not complied with.

Even Wenceslao admitted that he had doubts whether he was really the organizer referred to in
the articles. In fact, he admitted that there were several organizers and that he spoke to Borjal to
inquire if he was the one talked about in the articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when
even the victim is unsure that he was the object of the attack.

The other errors revolve around the issue of whether the articles constitute privileged
communications. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Article 354 of the RPC
provides the cases of privileged communication, to wit:

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and,

2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.

The Supreme Court agrees that the articles are not within the exceptions of Article 354, but this
does not necessarily mean that they are not privileged. The enumeration under Article 354 is
not exclusive. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The
conference is one imbued with public interest, and Wenceslao is a public figure. The rule is that
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, but it must be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. Honest criticisms on the conduct of public
officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments.

5. People vs. Puzon – August 29, 2000 - COLE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO PUZON y JUQUIANA,

accused-appellant.

[G.R. Nos. 123156-59. August 29, 2000.]

FACTS:

Renato Puzon was charged statutory rape, for raping his own daughters, Maria Cristina, eleven
years old, and Maria Consuelo, ten years old at the time when the crimes perpetrated.

The accused assailed the credibility of the complainants and claimed that his penis was not able
to penetrate his their sex organ based on their testimonies. The medical examination results
indicates that they sustained lacerations in their sex organ contradicted to his claims.

The trial Court convicted appellant of the crime of statutory rape, defined by paragraph 3 of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the complainants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the name of the offended party must be alleged in the information.

RULING:

Yes, the name of the offended must be alleged in the information.

Under Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, when a crime has indemnity ex delicto
awarded to the victims, the name of the offended party must be alleged in the information so
we will know to whom the court will award the civil liability.

Note: (Court’s decision in this case)

The trial court erred in not awarding indemnity ex delicto to the victims, in accordance with Articles 100
31 and 104 32 of the Revised Penal Code. As regards the award of P30,000.00 for moral damages and
P20,000.00 for exemplary damages, the same should be increased to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00,
respectively, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. 33

WHEREFORE the decision of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court, Bauang, La Union finding appellant
Renato Puzon y Juquiana guilty of rape under paragraph one (1) of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua is AFFIRMED, and appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the complainant, Maria Consuelo Puzon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1708-BG and 1709-BG,
and Maria Cristina Puzon, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1710-BG and 1711-BG, the amount of P50,000.00
each, as indemnity ex delicto. The amount of moral damages awarded below is increased to P50,000.00
but the award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of any basis. Costs against the appellant.

6. People vs. CFI of Quezon City – G.R. No. L-41903, June 10, 1992 - ERIKKA JUNE D,
FOROSUELO

HIRD DIVISION G.R. No. L-41903, June 10, 1992 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BR. V, MAUBAN, QUEZON;
RAMON S. REYES ALIAS "CAPING", GUILLERMO UNTALAN, NATALIO ALVAREZ AND
WILFREDO SALIENDRA, RESPONDENTS.

(People vs. Cfi G.R. No. L-41903 June 10, 1992)

Facts:

That on or about the 16th day of April 1974, at Barrio San Jose, in the Municipality of Mauban,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Ramon Reyes alias "Caping", Guillermo Untalan, Natalio Alvarez and Wilfredo
Saliendra, with intent to gain, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter a public forest zone
under lease to the ALUK LOGGING CORPORATION and once inside, illegally cut, take, steal
and carry away two (2) Lauan trees consisting of 1,200 board feet, without the consent of the
latter, valued at ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY (P1,920.00) PESOS, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Aluk Logging Corporation in the aforesaid sum

Issue:

whether or not the information for qualified theft properly charges an offense due to its failure
to allege the proper offended party therein

Ruling:

In the present case, the above rule was complied with when the criminal action for
qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was instituted by the provincial fiscal in the
name of the People of the Philippines. Despite such compliance with the rules, the lower court
found the information to be defective in form and substance because "nowhere in the
information is cited any damage or prejudice caused to the State." The lower court reasoned
out that since the fiscal admitted that it is the State which is the actual offended party and not
Aluk Logging Corporation (or Operation) as alleged in the information, the evidence of the
prosecution would be at variance with the allegations in the information.

Appellate Court:

We rule that it was an error for the lower court to dismiss the information. The information was
already sufficient in form and substance. The argument that it was fatal for the prosecution not
to have alleged the State as the offended party is without merit for in the case of Sayson v.
People, 17 in construing Sec. 11 of Rule 110 (now Sec. 12, Rules of Court of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure), we have clearly held that in offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable as long as the criminal act
charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified.

Indeed, the crime of qualified theft under Presidential Decree No. 330 was described with
particularity in the information as to properly identify the offense charged. Hence, the
erroneous allegation as to the person injured is deemed immaterial as the same is a mere
formal defect which does not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant.
7. Sayson vs. People – October 28, 1988 - YUMANG

FACTS:

The petitioner, Ramon F. Sayson, was charged with the crime of Estafa through Falsification of
a Commercial Document before the CFI of Manila. The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment and after several postponements, the prosecution rested its case. On the day of
presentation of evidence by defense, the petitioner’s counsel was absent and later sent a
telegram requesting for the cancellation of the hearing due to him being sick. The court denied
the request for postponement and considered the case submitted for decision without evidence
from the petitioner. Petitioner was rendered guilty by the court which was later affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, but imposed a lower penalty. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision
finding him guilty of attempted estafa; he alleges that such decision was rendered depriving
him of his right to due process and it was the duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio in
his behalf in the absence of his own counsel.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his right to present evidence.

RULING:

No. The court did not deprive the petitioner of his right to present evidence in denying the
motion for postponement of the hearing. The court held that there was no denial of due process
since no right can be successfully invoked where it was validly waived. In this case, the
petitioner alleged that his counsel had another case at a different court as the reason for his
absence before the court received the telegram alleging that the such counsel was sick. Also, the
petitioner’s motion was not filed properly since the 3-day notice required in accordance with
procedure was not followed and there was no medical certificate nor affidavit to support the
alleged illness of counsel.

The petitioner’s plea that the court should have appointed a counsel de oficio in his behalf is
without legal basis. The appointment of counsel de officio is only mandatory at the time of
arraignment in accordance with Rule 116, Sec. 6 of the Revised Rules of Court. It is no longer
applicable during the hearing of the trial such as the situation of the petitioner. The appeal is
denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

>The issue here should be Sec 12 :(

8. Ricarze vs. Court of Appeals – February 9, 2007 - ABDULMAGUID

Facts:

 Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze, the petitioner, was employed as a collector-messenger by

City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He
was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His
primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He
also delivered invoices to Caltex’s customers

 Through Caltex Banking and Insurance Department Manager Ramon Romano, a

complaint against the petitioner was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents.

 Romano alleged that the unknown company, checks had been issued which were
cleared through the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa,
Makati Branch; with Dante Gutierrez and Victor Goquinco as their signatories.

 The checks were not issued by Caltex, and the signatures appearing thereon had been
forged.

 Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001 and 72922 were deposited at
the Banco de Oro’s SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A 2004-0047245-7,
in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.

 Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings accou nont as well as his signatures on the
dorsal portions thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from the said
savings account. Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually
been opened by the petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him
under Gutierrez’s name. A bank teller from the Banco de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela
Cruz, positively identified the petitioner as the person who opened the savings account
using Gutierrez’s name.

 PCIB credited the amount of ₱581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the City
Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63.
  Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.
Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. From Caltex, the private complainant
had been changed to PCIB, which the petitioner argued to be prejudicial to his defense.

 PCIB contended that it had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the
indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as
private complainant. Also, that PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity. The re-
credited amount was brought out in cross-examination by Romano who testified for the
Prosecution.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner was prejudiced by the amendment of the Information
substituting PCIB for Caltex as the offended party, even if the accused has already been
arraigned.

Ruling:

No. The amendment of the Information substituting PCIB instead of Caltex as the offended
party is not prejudicial to the defense of the petitioner.

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under
the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and
whether any evidence the defendant might have would be equally applicable to the
information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not
change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held
to be one of form and not of substance.

In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as the private complaint is not a
substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both
Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to the petitioner. The documentary evidence
in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to the
petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
In Sayson v. People, the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of
the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act
charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:

The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation or
nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying him, he
must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court; now Rule 110,
Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against property, the designation
of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in
the complaint or information can be properly identified.

Thus, the petition is denied. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were
affirmed. The case was REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for
further proceedings

I. Section 13 – Duplicity of the offense

1. People vs. De los Santos – March 27, 2001 - SULTAN

FACTS:

GLENN was then charged with the crimes of Multiple Murder, Multiple Frustrated Murder,
and Multiple Attempted Murder in an information filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cagayan de Oro City.

In the early morning of Oct 1995 at Maitum Highway, CDO, while the members of the PNP
Special training course was having their endurance run, an Isuzu elf which was driven by the
accused-appellant bumped them from behind thereby killing 13 who were situated in the rear
echelon of the group while the others sustained serious and minor wounds as a result. The
accused thereafter escaped the scene of the incident, leaving the victims helpless.

Accused-appellant Glenn de los Santos immediately surrendered to local authorities.

In its decision, the trial court convicted GLENN of the complex crime of multiple murder,
multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as
the qualifying circumstance.
ISSUE:

WON a single information can charge an accused of multiple offenses?

RULING:

NO, Sec 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that a complaint or information must charge
but one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

It must be noted that only one information (for multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder
and multiple attempted murder) was filed with the trial court. However, nothing appears in the
record that GLENN objected to the multiplicity of the information in a motion to quash before
his arraignment. Hence, he is deemed to have waived such defect. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many
offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, is
hereby SET ASIDE, and another one is rendered holding herein accused-appellant GLENN DE
LOS SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries,
and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and (2) ten (10) counts of reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and sentencing him, for each count, to the
penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor. Furthermore, the awards of death indemnity for each
group of heirs of the trainees killed are reduced to P50,000; and the awards in favor of the other
victims are deleted. Costs against accused-appellant.

2. People vs. Lopez – November 15, 2000 - AMPIS

Facts: The victim, Gina, was taking a bath when the appellant suddenly forced himself inside
and repeatedly stabbed Gina. Even as she was able to free herself from the appellant, the latter
caught up with her and stabbed the beaten up 9-month pregnant woman. Appellant was
convicted of murder complexed with abortion and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should be convicted for murder with abortion(which is a
compound crime)

Ruling: Yes, simply because what happened was obvious murder, since there is treachery, and
the unintentional abortion for the death of the baby inside the victim. Murder and abortion
happened due to a single criminal intent which is to kill Gina regardless of the mitigating
circumstance of the grave offense committed by the victim against appellant’s daughter.

The Supreme Court upheld the appellant's conviction on appeal, ruling; that the stabbing of
Gina, almost dead on the ground and considering her physical condition at that time, was
treacherous and qualified the killing to murder; that vindication of a grave offense cannot be a
mitigating circumstance because the provocation was not proportionate to the act of slaying the
victim and it did not immediately precede the commission of the offense, and that death is the
proper penalty in this complex crime of murder with abortion committed by the appellant.

(for extra info - WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant
Bonifacio Lopez guilty of Murder with Abortion and sentencing him to suffer the severest
penalty of death, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Gerarda "Gina" Ramirez Abdullah as civil
indemnity the amount of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED. We also hold that the heirs of the victim are
entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00 for their mental anguish and pains suffered based on
testimonial evidence during the trial.)

3. Santiago vs Garchitorena-228 SCRA 214 , Dec. 2, 1993 - GRAN

Facts:

Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring “unqualified” aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Petitioner filed this case to enjoin Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the case, on the ground that it was intended solely to harass her as she
was then a presidential candidate. After her petition was dismissed, she then filed a motion for
inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau
of Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of “qualified aliens” even though they had arrived in the Philippines
after December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations.
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the
Information. Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that: 1) sihe was a
public officer; 2) she approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; 3) those aliens were disqualified; 4) she was cognizant
of such fact; and 5) she acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her
official functions; thereby constituting the elements of the offense defined in Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019.

It bears noting that the public prosecutors filed a total of 32 Informations against the petitioner
for the violation of such law.

Issue:

Whether or not the filing of 32 Amended Informations against petitioner was proper.

Ruling

NO. Only one crime was committed in petitioner’s case, and hence, there should only be one
Information to be filed against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or “continued crime”
and sometimes referred to as “continuous crime.” A delito continuado consists of several crimes
but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator. See full text for the discussion
and examples of delito continuado as discussed by SC.

In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single
criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal
act : (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was
done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations
reproduced in verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the
word “aliens” in the original information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of
the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the public
prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the Government
suffered a single harm or injury.

SC ordered the Ombudsman to consolidated the 32 Amended Informations into one Information charging
only one offense.
4. People vs. Ducay – 225 SCRA 1, August 2, 1993 - SOLANO

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/aug1993/gr_86939_1993.html

Facts:

The accused-apellants, father and son Santos and Edgardo Ducay, were charged with the
complex crime of double murder and multiple frustrated murder. Upon arraignment, both
accused entered a plea of not guilty. In due course, the trial on the merits proceeded. Lina and
Edwin Labos, both seriously injured in the incident, were among the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Lina testified that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 12 October 1986, Santos
Ducay and his son, Edgardo entered her home armed with a shotgun and a .45 caliber pistol
respectively. They then began shooting at Manuel, Lina’s husband, and Pacita, her mother-in-
law. Both were killed. The accused also shot at her, Edwin, and Ma. Cristina, her six month old
daughter. They three would have been killed as well if not for medical assistance. Lina was able
to identify the two accused. Edwin corroborated Lina’s testimony. Erwin Labos, brother of
Edwin, also made a statement, duly subscribed and sworn to, positively identifying appellant
[Santos] as the shooter. However, two days after the shooting, he executed a supplemental
statement alleging that the second assailant was a tall man with curly hair and mestizo features.
The trial court found Santos Ducay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged but
acquitted Edgardo Ducay on the ground of reasonable doubt. The trial court expressed that two
murders and three frustrated murders were committed but did not impose the corresponding
penalties because the information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder. Santos Ducay then filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration/Or New Trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence in the form of the
lab result of a paraffin test. The motion was denied for lack of merit. He then filed a Notice of
Appeal, thus, the present case.

Issue:

WON there is duplicity of crime in the case at bar

Ruling:

.
Yes. accused-appellants did not file Motion to quash. The accused did not object during
arraignment with Separate information filed, It was proven in the court. The crimes committed
by the appellant and his companion, which were proven beyond reasonable doubt are: (1) two
counts of murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack on the victims
was so sudden and at a time when the victims were barely awake, thus giving them no chance
whatsoever to defend themselves; and (2) three counts of frustrated murder. Conspiracy
between the assailants was duly proven. Together they came to the house of the victims,
simultaneously attacked them, and then, together again, they fled. Before fleeing, one of them
even exclaimed "Ubos ang lahi." These acts sufficiently established a common plan or design to
commit the crimes charged and a concerted action to effectively pursue it. Hence, the act of one
is the act of all.

The trial court expressed the view that two murders and three frustrated murders were
committed, or that there are as many crimes as there are victims in this case because "the trigger
of the gun used in committing the acts complained of was pressed in several instances and not
in one single act. However, it did not impose the corresponding penalties therefor "because the
information to which the accused pleaded is only one crime of double murder and multiple
frustrated murder

5. People vs. Tabaco – 270 SCRA 32, March 19, 1997 - (MAUSWAGON) - OSORNO

FACTS:

In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for
shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor
Jorge Arreola (Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat.
Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317).

In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the information with the complex crime of
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of
Sgt. Benito Raquepo.

The prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor
Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the
prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer,
and three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt.
Raquepo. So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC
Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational
cases/incidents.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit
in the shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan
and Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito
Raquepo.

The dispositive part of the decision of Trial Court reads:

WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial
conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the
crimes charged against him:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but
declared to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay the heirs of the deceased victims xxx.

2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario
Tabaco is

sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one (1) day
Prision Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months, one (1) day of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban
xxx.

3. Xxx, 4. Xxx, 5. xxx

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar
Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been
prosecuted under only one Information, as the same being a complex crime.

RULING:

No. The killings of the 4 victims which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime.

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48,
Revised Penal Code).

Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of crimes where a single penalty is to
be imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (delito
complejo) and/or complex proper.

We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua
for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the
evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous does not hold water.

The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet which
killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a
specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more
grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by
the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution
show that Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. He fired the
weapon, which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was
recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were
recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be
applied.

To each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate
shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting
from every single act that produced the same. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. (People
vs. Disierto)

The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire,
constitutes several acts. Each p9[person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime
of murder. There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four
victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from the other.

In People vs. Pardo the Supreme Court held that:

Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots,
two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed.

Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable
for each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with Frustrated
Homicide, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.

6. People vs. Buenaviaje – 47 Phil. 536 - CABAÑA

FACTS:

The defendant is accused of the violation of the Medical Act, the information alleging "that on
or about the first day of June, 1923, and for some time prior to said date, the said accused
without having obtained from the Board of Medical Examiners the corresponding certificate of
registration for the practice of medicine in the Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally and for compensation, practiced medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
assisting, treating and manipulating the head and body of Regino Noble for the purpose of
curing him of the ailments, diseases, pains and physical defects from which he pretended to
suffer, and advertising and offering her services as a physician, by means of cards which she
distributed and by letterheads and signs which she exposed on the door of her office, situated at
No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which are published and circulated in the City of
Manila, in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising she added and prefixed to her name
the letters `Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the word `doctor,' for the purpose of causing the
public to believe that she, the said defendant, had received the corresponding title of doctor."

ISSUES: To this information the defendant demurred in the court below on the grounds: (1)
That it stated more than one offense, and (2) that it was not drawn in accordance with the form
prescribed by law. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant pleaded not guilty

RULING:

We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that the Medical Law itself, as it appears in the
Administrative Code, does not declare any of the therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The
penal provisions relating thereto are contained in section 2678 of the Code, which reads as
follows:

SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. - A person violating any provision of the Medical Law
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The offense here penalized is "violation of the Medical Law." The statute makes no distinction
between illegal practice of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in
violation of the Medical Law and carry the same penalty. They are merely different ways or
means of committing the same offense and both of these means are closely related to each
other and usually employed together.

7. Gallego vs. Sandiganbayan – July 30, 1982 - MARTINEZ

FACTS

An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Mariflor

Punzalan-Castillo against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita and Felix
Agoncillo, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019, as amended, otherwise known
as the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act|.That on or about the period from May to
September, 1979, in Metro Manila, Philippines. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the following accused: RAMON DESEO, Chairman of the Board for Marine Engine
Officers in the May 28-30, 1979 examinations, in checking Test Paper No. 839 in the subject
Steam Boiler, Engines, Turbines, Internal Combustion and Machine Shop, gave a rating of 18%
out of a total of 20% to Test II thereof, the answer of the examinee being a recital of the prayer
'Hail Mary' and in Test III of the same Test Paper, gave a rating of 18% out of 20%, the answer of
the examinee being the prayer 'Our Father', BERNARDO GALLEGO, Member of the Board for
Marine Engine Officers, acting as Second Corrector to Ramon Deseo, affirmed the ratings given
by the latter to Test Paper No. 839; FELIX AGONCILLO, Member of the Board for Marine Deck
Officers in the May 28-30, 1979 examinations, in checking Test Paper No. 144, in the subject
Meteorology and Electronics, gave a rating of 19% out of 20% to Test I A and B thereof, the
answer of the examinee to Test I A being a long love letter; and HERMINIO ERORITA, Member
of the Board for Marine Deck Officers, acting as Second Corrector to Felix Agoncillo, affirmed
the ratings given by the latter to Test Paper No. 144, the above acts of all the accused resulting
in the passing of Examinee No. 839 in the Board for Marine Engine Officers and Examinee No.
144 in the Board for Marine Deck Officers, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the said
examinees in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
Petitioners Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo filed a motion to quash the information
against them on the following grounds:

1. the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or, in the alternative,

2. The information charges more than one offense.

Petitioners allege that the term "unwarranted" is a "highly imprecise and elastic term which has
no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents";
that for its vagueness, said Section 3(e) violates due process in that it does not give fair warning
or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize

Respondent Sandiganbayan sustained the prosecution and denied the motion to quash.

ISSUES

Whether or not the information charges multiple offenses

RULING

No, the information is not defective as held in case of people vs bueniavaje where the defendant
was charged with violation of the medical law and the information charged both illegal practice
of medicine and illegally advertising oneself as a doctor it was held that “the information was
not bad for duplicity in as much as the acts charged were merely different means of
committing the same offense notwithstanding the fact that they are prohibited by separate
section of the statute

8. People v. Manalili y Bolisay G.R. No. 121671, 14 August 1998 - Pitogo

Facts :

Three Informations against the two appellants were simultaneously filed in the RTC of Ilagan,
Isabela, Branch 16.

The first case, charged the two with attempted robbery.

The second case, charged them with killing three persons.

The third Information charged them with the shooting and wounding, but not the killing, of
three other persons.

Upon arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty to each of the offenses charged.
The Trial Court finds the Accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
robbery with homicide and was sentenced each of them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue :

Whether or not the accused can be held liable for an offense notwithstanding the absence of the
proper information.

Held :

No. As the trial court itself observed, “the prosecution filed three separate informations, one for
attempted robbery, the other for multiple frustrated murder and the third qualified illegal
possession of firearms used in multiple murder.” There was no information charging the
special complex crime of attempted robbery with multiple homicide.

The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense,
unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an
offense of murder other than charged in then complaint or information would be violative of
this constitutional right.

9. Soriano vs. People – June 30, 2009 - GRUMO

Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan were the President and General Manager,
respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan) Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997
and August 21, 1997, during their incumbency as president and manager of the bank,
petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They falsified the loan applications and other
bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J, Malang and Rogelio Mañaol obtained loans of
P15,000,000.00each, when in fact they did not. Accordingly, on May 4, 2000,

State Prosecutor charged Soriano with Violation of Violation of the Director, Officer,
Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules.

On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was also
filed against Soriano and Ilagan, viz.

Petitioners moved to quash Information on the grounds that:

(i) more than one offense is charged; and

(ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

RTC Branch 77 and Branch 14 both denied the motion to quash filed by the petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the informations were duplicitous.

Ruling: No, the informations were not duplicitous. The Court held that duplicity of offenses in a
single Information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3 (e), Rule 117 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to avoid
confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By duplicity of charges is meant a single
complaint or information that charges more than one offense.

Section 13 of Rules 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states that “ A
complaint or information must charged but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses”. Otherwise, stated, there is
duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single information charges more than one offense.

In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one
offense, but with more than one information, each charging a different offense – violation of
DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in the other.
Ilagan on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial documents in
separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to
quash the informations.

10. Guiterrez vs. House – February 15, 2011 - PRESORES

On July 26, 2010 or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim,
and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint
against petitioner.

On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo
Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint against petitioner.

On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of the
Committee on Rules,9 instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa, Jr., Deputy Secretary General for
Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja, Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department,
to include the two complaints in the Order of Business,10 which was complied with by their
inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.

A resolution of September 7, 2010, found the two complaints, which both allege culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,12 sufficient in substance. The
determination of the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which
assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid
judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7,
2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.

Issues: Whether or not the case of impeachment initiated in the Senate can embody multiple
inconveniences on the part of any impeachable public official?

Ruling: No. The initiation of an impeachment case by the House of course follows a process: the
filing of the complaint, the referral to the Justice Committee, the hearing by such committee, the
committee voting over its resolution, the submission of the committee report to the plenary, and
the vote to initiate an impeachment case. But this process should be correctly characterized as
the House "initiation proceeding," not the "impeachment proceeding" itself. Besides, one needs
to be guided only by the purpose of this constitutional provision. The initiation of the
impeachment proceeding in the House is intended to be a preliminary step for the
determination of the sufficiency of the allegations against the impeachable public official. It is
akin to a preliminary investigation in a criminal case where probable cause is determined
against the accused. If there is probable cause to indict the impeachable public official, then the
Articles of Impeachment is transmitted to the Senate. In a criminal case, a criminal complaint or
information is then filed in court against the accused.

Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: "No impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."

Section 14 - Amendment or Substitution

1. Crespo vs. Mogul? —missing digest 🙁

2. Gabionza vs. CA – March 30, 2001 - ALBOFERA

On December 7, 1993,petitioner was arraigned. After four years, the public prosecutor filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Amend Information, to change the material dates stated in the
Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to January 1991 to May 1992." Petitioner opposed
the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature, hence to allow
the same would be a violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the
accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that were otherwise available
to him. The RTC granted the motion and allowed amendment of the Information, ruling that
the amendment pertained only to matters of form. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied. Petitioner brought the issue before the Court of Appeals . CA upheld the
amendment and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:

Whether or not an information can be amended to change the material dates of the
commission of the offense after the arraignment of the accused.

RULING: After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to
when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or Information
is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as amended. On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at any time.

Jurisprudence allows amendments to information so long as:

(a) it does not deprive the accused of the right to invoke prescription;

(b) it does not affect or alter the nature of the offense originally charged;

(c) it does not involve a change in the basic theory of the prosecution so as to require the
accused to undergo any material change or modification in his defense;

(d) it does not expose the accused to a charge which would call for a higher penalty; and,

(e) it does not cause surprise nor deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new
averment.

In the case at bar, it is clear that the questioned amendment is one of form and not of substance.
The allegation of time when an offense is committed is a matter of form, unless time is a
material ingredient of the offense. It is not even necessary to state in the Information the precise
time the offense was committed unless time is a material factor. It is sufficient that the act is
alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the Complaint or Information will permit.

3. Vega vs. Paniz – 117 SCRA 267, September 30, 1982 - PREGLO
FACTS: Felicitas Vargas filed a complaint for Attempted Rape against Leopoldo Lazo

After the preliminary investigation, Judge Cesar B. Villanueva found that "only the crime of
Acts of Lasciviousness has been proven to have been committed and that there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Assistant City Fiscal Purita H. Cortes filed an information with the court charging Leopoldo
Lazo with the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness

Cortes filed a motion to admit an Amended Information to include an allegation that the offense
was committed with the aggravating circumstances of "dwelling" and "night time." The accused
opposed the admission of the amended information upon the ground that he had already
entered a plea and the amendment is prejudicial to his rights, but the court admitted the
amended information.

ISSUE: WON, the amended information to include the allegation that the crime was committed
with the aggravating circumstances of "dwelling" and "night time", prejudice the rights of the
accused.

RULING: No. Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, information may be amended
even after arraignment at the sound discretion of the court and when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the accused. The said section reads, as follows:

Sec. 14. Amendment.—The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,

without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the
trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in
double jeopardy.

The amendment of the information to include the allegation that the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of "dwelling" and "night time" is an amendment as to a matter of
form, and, hence, may be allowed

The new allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in case
of conviction. The additional allegations do not also alter the prosecution's theory of the case so
as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume.

4. People vs. Hipol – July 22, 2003 - CABUNGCAL

Hipol was employed as Cash Clerk II at the City Treasurer’s office in Baguio.
Whenever Hipol was absent, it was Lerma Roque who was ordered to deposit money. Thus,
one day, Roque was instructed to gather all deposit slips covering all deposits of funds of the
City Treasurer’s Office with PNB. Roque then opened the unlocked desk drawer of Hipol as
was her practice. She inadvertently stumbled upon 3PNB deposit slips inside Hipol’s drawer
which did not appear to have been actually deposited. It was later on verified that indeed they
were not verified.

Upon further inspection, more slips that were not deposited were found.

The COA conducted an audit and it was found that around P2M+ collections were made but
not deposited.

Hipol denies the accusation of malversation of public funds.

TC: Guilty. Reclusion perpetua as penalty among others.

Issue: Whether aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office should be

appreciated? No.

Held: Formal Amendment only.

The court said the amendment only referred to the amount involved and not to the crime
charged. Conviction for malversation of public funds or property require proof that:

1) the offender is a public officer;

2) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

3) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

4) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented, or through abandonment

or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of such funds or property.

The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public office cannot be appreciated in this
case. The element of taking advantage of public office is inherent in the crime of malversation
of public funds or property. Said crime cannot be committed without the abuse of public
office.

It did not cause a change in the basic theory of the prosecution which would require the
appellant to prepare his defense anew. Neither did it expose appellant to a charge that called for
a higher penalty beyond that stated in the law. The defense available to appellant under the
original Information as it originally stood was still available to him after it was amended.
Hence, such amendment was only in form and not in substance, to which no double jeopardy
can 9obe said to have attache
5. Galvez vs. Court of Appeals – October 24, 1994 - Simbajon

Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego
were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of frustrated
homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to

Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge and the
cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms.

Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by
petitioners. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners, Judge Pornillos issued an
order denying the motion to quash.

prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issuedby
Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the
reinstatement of the original informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein
for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the
meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge
Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new informations. As earlier
stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994,
hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the
ground that (a) there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court; and (b) the appropriate remedy which should have been adopted by the
prosecution was to amend the informations by charging the proper offenses pursuant to Section
14 of Rule 110;

RULING

.No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not
yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted
before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing
thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original
three informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver
offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there
would obviously have been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about
the supposed procedural lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real
position.

Petitioner's contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing
of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an
argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended
so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their
right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be
better off with amended informations than with the subsequent ones. It really made no
difference considering that where a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong,
bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an

amended or a new information.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial
court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that -"The order of the
court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of
jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion.
The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the
irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the
dismissal and not certiorari."

6. Buhat vs. Court of Appeals – 265 SCRA 701, December 17, 1996 - ALBIOS

Information for Homicide was filed against Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The
information alleged the petitioner, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed the
victim Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms which was the
cause of the death of the victim.

Before the arraignment, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the latter on the ground
that the private complainant moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City
Prosecutor.

Then, the Secretary of Justice granting the reconsideration and ordered the City Prosecutor to
amend the information by upgrading the offense charged to Murder and implead therein
additional accused.

Hence this petition.

Issue:Whether not the upgrading of crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of
murder is s substantial amendment that it is proscribed if made after the accused had pleaded
not guilty to the crime of homicide?

Ruling:In the case at bar, petitioner in having already pleaded “not guilty” to the crime of
homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder is a
substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him. However, the original information did allege that the petitioner stabbed his victim
“using superior strength”. And this particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder,
regardless of how much such a killing is technically designated in the information.

7. People vs. Reyes – October 23, 1981 - CANDIA

FACTS: Petitioner, by way of certiorari, with prayer for preliminary injunction,

questions as alleged grave abuse of discretion, the order dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent
Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan
City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, entitled "The People of the Philippines versus
Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal motion for the amendment of the
information in said case, by deleting the year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to
put the year "1964 ".

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court abused its discretion when it refused an
amendment to the information filed in this Criminal Case?

RULING: NO. An amendment to the information filed in this case particularly on

the dates stated above, would constitute an impairment of the substantial rights of the accused
as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Under Section 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court, the complaint or information in a criminal case
where the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded, as in this case, may be amended only
as to all matters of form when the same can be done without prejudice to the substantial rights
of the accused.

As to whether or not a sought for amendment of an information to change the time of the
alleged commission of crime from 1969 to 1964 (period of five years) would prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused after his arraignment and plea, this Court ruled in the case of
People vs. Placido Opemia, et al.

What happened in this case is that the petitioner committed a mistake in the placing of the date
of the alleged crime in the information filed. During the arraignment and plea of private
respondent Francisco Estrella on January 28, 1970, the prosecution had all the chances to realize
and rectify its mistake. It did not do so. The trial of the accused was set for May 21, 1970.
Petitioner therefore, had more than three months to take steps. Again, it failed to do so. Finally,
petitioner verbally moved to amend the information only at the start of the trial. To permit
petitioner to do so would surprise the accused and prejudice his substantial rights.

8. Teehanke Jr. vs. Madayag – 207 SCRA 134 - APA

FACTS:

Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated
murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for
leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, the
offended party, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A.
Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information and to admit
said amended information. The amended information, filed on October 31, 1991 alleged a crime
of murder.

At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the
amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal,
respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.

Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information constitutes a
substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is,
from frustrated to consummated murder. He further argues that there being a substantial
amendment, the same may no longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.

Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder
charges an entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death
whose cause has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the
new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended information in this case constitutes a substantial
amendment.

RULING:NO. The amended information is only a formal amendment since there is an identity
of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is
not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder.

According to the Supreme Court, a substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does
not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one
offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration
of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information,
constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those
constituting the latter.

It is evident that frustrated murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of murder, hence
the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation, be
alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder, thereby meaning and
proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the informations
filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein petitioner
for the offense of frustrated murder.

1. NO. The Supreme Court repeated that after arraignment and during the trial,
amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice
is caused to the rights of the accused.
The test of whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any
evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance.

Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein
petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually
changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the
victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be
the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may
adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended
information for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the
amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even
during the trial of the case.

2. YES. Since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary
investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious
and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of
a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended
information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple
and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the
original information. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has heretofore held, if the
crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one
would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a
new preliminary investigation is not necessary.

9. Pacoy vs. Afable – September 28, 2007 - TATAD

FACTS:

On July 4, 2022, an information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against Petitioner Jose M.
Pacoy. Upon arraignment, petitoner, duly assisted by a counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to
the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent
judge issued another Order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information
to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered aas having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word -
Homicide and instead wrote the word - Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of
the Information.

The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for
Homicide. Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his
Motion to Inhibit, he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary,
capricious and partial manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to
Murder in disregard of the provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.

The respondent judge denied the Motion to inhibit and granted the Motion for Reconsideration,
respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code shows
that - disregard of rank is merely a generic mitigating circumstance which should not elevate
the classification of the crime of homicide to murder.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction
in ordering the amendment of the information from homicide to murder.

RULING:

The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder
is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. Under
Section 14, Rule 110 Amendment or substitution:

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at

any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal
amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the
only change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of
the Information, with the crossing out of word - Homicide and its replacement by the word -
Murder. There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of th jurisdiction of the court. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the
caption and preamble from- Homicide to - Murder as purely formal.

Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of
the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to
the complaint or information. Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the amended
Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide, there could not
be any effect on the prosecution’s theory of the case, neither would there be any possible
prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.

While the respondent judge erroneously thought that - disrespect on account of rank qualified
the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, we do not find
that the committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information
after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment
made was only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed
by respondent Judge.

10. Ramon Albert vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 164015, February 26, 2009 - LOVITOS

Facts:

On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado,
before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231.
On September 24, 2003, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the
prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The
amendment consisted of changing “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence”.
Petitioner contends that such amendment of information is substantial which is prejudicial to
his rights. He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he
did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under
the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes substantial
amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one
originally intended."

Issues:

WON the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.

Ruling:

NO. The amendment is only in form and could be made even after arraignment.

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or

in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the
plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when
it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" (willful) with "gross inexcusable
negligence. (not willful)" Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA
3019—specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable
negligence" is under Section 3(e) of the statute—the question remains whether or not the
amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner.
The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or
information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would
no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might
have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an
amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.

In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the
Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable
even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused. As a replacement, "gross
inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission
of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form.

Only provides for modality in the commission of the offense

11. Baltazar vs. Chua – February 27, 2009 - PASCUA

FACTS:

Jaime Chua (Jaime) and Jovito Armas, Jr. (Jovito) were charged before the RTC with the crimes
of homicide and frustrated homicide for the death of Ildefonso Baltazar and the wounding of
Edison Baltazar.

The petitioners Lourdes Baltazar (Lourdes) and Edison Baltazar (Edison), through counsel, filed
a motion for reinvestigation of the cases, praying that Jaime and Jovito be charged with the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder, instead of homicide and frustrated homicide.

The City Prosecutor’s Office, upon reinvestigation, found that the appropriate charges against
Jaime and Jovito were murder and frustrated murder. With this, the City Prosecutor filed a
motion for admission of amended Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder.

However, upon review, the Secretary of Justice downgraded the charges to homicide and
frustrated homicide. The Secretary also dropped Jaime from the charges. The resolution
prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Manifestation and Motion for the Withdrawal of the
Informations for Murder and Frustrated Murder and for the Admission of New Informations
for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide against Jovito only, which was granted by the judge.
ISSUE:

Whether the amended information for murder and frustrated murder are considered
withdrawn.

RULING:

Yes, the court held that the amended information for murder and frustrated murder are
considered withdrawn.

Under SEC. 14, Rule 110 of Rules of Court:

A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court and when it
can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished to all parties, especially the
offended party. (n) If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall
not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial. (14a)

Here, having been presented prior to arraignment, the motion for withdrawal of the
information for murder and frustrated murder is granted pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Consequently, the amended information for murder and frustrated
murder in criminal cases are considered withdrawn.

The trial courts must make an independent assessment of the merits of the recommendation of
the prosecution dismissing or continuing a case.

Also, if there is probable cause for indicting both accused for the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder, the appropriate motion, say, amendment of the information, should be filed
in Criminal Cases for homicide and frustrated homicide, not in these cases. To rule otherwise
would sanction multiple charges (murder and homicide; and frustrated murder and frustrated
homicide) for a single offense, thereby placing accused in double jeopardy.

12. Diño vs. Olivarez – June 23, 2009 - MARJONI

FACTS:

The Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo
Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by

Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city

prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with
Violation of Omnibus Election Code.

On 11 October 2004, the Law Department of the

COMELEC directed the city prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records of the

case and to suspend further the implementation of the Joint Resolution dated 20

September 2004 until final resolution of the said appeal before the COMELEC En Banc.

On the same day, respondent filed a Motion to Quash the two criminal informations on

the ground that more than one offense was charged therein, in violation of Section 3(f),

Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

This caused the resetting of the scheduled arraignment on 18 October 2004 to 13

December 2004. Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash, Assistant

Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor, filed on 28 October

2004 its "Opposition to the Motion to Quash and Motion to Admit Amended Informations.

" The Amended Informations sought to be admitted charged respondent with violation of

only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus

Election Code. On 2004, Judge Madrona issued an Order resetting the hearing. On 1

February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning

that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay, unless the Supreme Court

would issue an injunctive writ. On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear in the

arraignment before the RTC . Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in open court, denied the

Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and admitting the
Amended Informations, and ordered the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the

cash bond. On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of the COMELEC filed before the RTC

a Manifestation and Motion20 wherein it alleged that pursuant to the COMELEC’s

powers to investigate and prosecute election offense cases, it had the power to revoke

the delegation of its authority to the city prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7457 dated 4 April 2005. Thus, the Law

Department of the COMELEC moved (1) that the RTC hold in abeyance further

proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105 until the COMELEC has

acted on respondent’s appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority of the city prosecutor of

Parañaque to prosecute the case, designating therein the lawyers from the Law

Department of the COMELEC to prosecute Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-

1105. On 8 April 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the

Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the appeal in a Decision dated 28

September 2005 declaring that the COMELEC had the authority to conduct the

preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same. As such, the

COMELEC may delegate such authority to the Chief State Prosecutor, provincial

prosecutors, and city prosecutors. The COMELEC, however, has the corresponding

power, too, to revoke such authority to delegate. Thus, the categorical order of the

COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of the case before the RTC effectively deprived

the city prosecutor of the authority to amend the two informations. The appellate court

also pronounced that Judge Madrona erred in admitting the amended informations,

since they were made in excess of the delegated authority of the public prosecutor, and

his orders to arrest the respondent and to confiscate the latter’s cash bond were devoid

of legal basis. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the Amended Informations of the Prosecutor is in defiance of
the instructions by the COMELEC.

HELD:

No, the filing of the Amended Informations was not made in defiance of these

instructions by the COMELEC; rather it was an act necessitated by the developments of

the case. Respondent filed a Motion to Quash on 11 October 2004 on the ground that

more than one offense was charged therein. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on

Criminal Procedure, provides that “A complaint or information may be amended, in form

or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.

After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of

court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.”

Since the Rules of Court provided for a remedy that would avert the dismissal of the

complaints on the ground that more than one offense was charged, the public8

prosecutor filed the Amended Informations.

By filing the Amended Informations, the

public prosecutor had avoided such an undesirable situation, which would have forced

the COMELEC to re-file the cases, waste government resources, and delay the

administration of justice. Thus, the precautionary measure taken by the public

prosecutor was clearly not intended to disobey the COMELEC, or to flout its authority o

diminish its powers to review the appealed Joint Resolution. As such, the filing of the

Amended Informations cannot in any way be considered improper. Consequently, Judgei

Madrona acted in accordance with law when he admitted these Informations and

dismissed the respondent’s Motion to Quash, as the ground stated therein—the

informations charged more than one offense—could no longer be sustained.

DECISION:

The instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED.

The Supreme Court orders the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Cases No.
04-1104 and No. 04-1105 before the RTC, the prosecution of which shall be under the

direction of the Law Department of the COMELEC.

13. Saludaga vs. Sandiganbayan – April 23, 2010 - DE CASTILLA

FACTS:

Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused
damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
R.A 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure
to prove the actual damage; hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
R.A 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new
preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is a substitution and/or
substantial amendment of the first information.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information would
warrant a new preliminary investigation.

RULING:

No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information would warrant a
new preliminary investigation. Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as
alleged in the first information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in second
information, are 2 distinct violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A 3019. The shift from giving undue
injury to conferring unwarranted benefit do not constitute a substantial amendment. It should
be noted that the information is founded on the same transaction as the first information, which
pertains to the plan of entering into a pakyaw contract for the construction of day care centers for
barangays Mac-Arthur, Urdaneta, and Lavezares, Northern Samar. These 2 different modes of
committing the offense may be charged under either mode or under both. Considering the case
at bar, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same, hence, a
new preliminary investigation is unnecessary.

14. Kummer vs. People – Septembthe witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the
contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies are
minor

lapses and are therefore not substantial. The petitioner’s positive identification by the
eyewitnesses

as one of the assailants remained unrefuted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s petition is meritorious.

HELD:

The petitioner’s argument is founded on the flawed understanding of the rules on amendment

and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in every case. Thus, we do not see any merit
in

this claim. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint

even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done
without

causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

K. Section 15 – Place where action is to be institute

d

Section 15. Place where action is to be instituted. —

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred.
(b) Where an offense is committed in a train, aircraft, or other public or private vehicle while in
the course of its trip, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such its trip,
including the place of its departure and arrival.

(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or
territory where the vessel passed during such voyage, subject to the generally accepted
principles of international law.

(d) Crimes committed outside the Philippines but punishable under Article 2 of the Revised
Penal Code shall be cognizable by the court where the criminal action is first filed. (15a)

1. People vs. De Guzman – G.R. No. 77368, October 5, 1993 - MENDOZAÏ

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 93, AND SPOUSES DANILO A. ALCANTARA AND ISABELITA
ESGUERRA-ALCANTARA, respondents.

FACTS:

On 09 September 1985, robbery was committed in Quezon City in the house of Jose L. Obillos,
Sr., where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were taken.
An information, dated 30 September 1985, was instituted against the perpetrators in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed there at asCriminal Case No. G.R.
No. 42078. 3

Subsequently, an information, dated 22 October 1985, for violation of Presidential Decree No.
1612, otherwise known as the "Anti-Fencing Law," was also filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 93, docketed as Criminal Case No. 42433, against herein respondent
spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara, from whose possession the
jewelries stolen were recovered in Antipolo, Rizal. 4

A Motion to Quash was filed by the accused Alcantara and Esguerra-Alcantara praying that the
information filed against both accused be quashed, on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction to try the offense charged. Among others, the motion alleges, that as per police
investigation, the crime took place in Antipolo, Rizal. Trail Court thereafter quashed the
Information and also denied Private Prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration.
A Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed by the People of the Philippines, praying for the
reversal, annulment and setting aside of the Order of 28 February 1986 1 of the respondent
Judge, who has ruled in the negative, as well as his Order, dated 21 March 1986, 2 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

WON the court has jurisdiction over the offense of fencing where the property unlawfully taken
was acquired outside of its territorial jurisdiction?

Ruling:

No. In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
Municipality or Province where the offense was committed, or anyone of the essential
ingredients thereof took place. "Fencing", is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or
shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated
in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the
crime of robbery or theft. The crime of robbery is not an essential element of fencing. Fencing
is an independent crime, separate and distinct from that of Robbery. In this case, the offense
of fencing shall therefore be tried in place were the property unlawfully taken was acquired -
Antipolo Rizal.

Furthermore, the court did not see any compelling circumstance to warrant a change of venue
in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED, and the orders
appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED.

2. People vs. Grospe – January 20, 1988 - MATARANAS

FACTS:

Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of petitioner San

Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.

In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was charged with
Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having issued a check on 13 June 1983
for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which was dishonored for having been drawn against
'insufficient funds and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make
good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.

In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was charged with Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18
June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but
which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands,
for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC.

From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced that the two checks
involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in connection with the beer purchases
made by him on various occasions at the Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan
and which checks he handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
who holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to believe the claim and
testimony of the accused that these checks which he admittedly signed and which he delivered
to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled up without his knowledge particularly the amounts
appearing therein which in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted
to P86,071.20, and, in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2813, amounted to
P11,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for some time involving amounts that
are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe that he would agree to this kind of arrangement
which placed or exposed him to too much risks and uncertainties.

As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by the accused at
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San
Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the representative of the company holding office in that
municipality where the transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before
Supervisor Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the accused that
the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient funds in his bank, the Planters
Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan, only to turn out later on that this was not so.

Respondent Judge then decreed: WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in
the two cases.

RULING:

YES,Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in
Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:

SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —

(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.

In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing
offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its
consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case
will exclude the others. However, if the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of
its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that municipality or
territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case.

In sum, the Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject criminal case, venue
having been properly laid.

The crime continues up to the delivery of the check in pampanga

WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is hereby set aside and he
is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court
and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence
already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
ADD UPS IF THERE ARE FOLLOW UP QUESTIONS:

The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by the Respondent Judge, predicated on his lack of
jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an
error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional
matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of
discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case appears to be transitory or
continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan
City, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore,
be entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the subject checks were
written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not completely made or drawn there, but
in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and
residence of the payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance
is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its
consummation as an obligation.

In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is
true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that the Bouncing
Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or
drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in
Bulacan. As held in Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987
"the determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check".
However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of
the insufficiency ofì his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a
continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly,
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

3. Uy, Rosa vs. Court of Appeals – July 28, 1997 ZAMORA

Facts:
An appeal by certiorari from the decision of respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed into
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 32, finding the accused Rosa Uy guilty of
violating B.P Blg 22 in Crim. Cases Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32334.

Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the
husband of complaining witness Consolacion Leong.

On December 10, 1984 an information for estafa and several other information for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against the petitioner. The offenses were subsequently consolidated and
tried jointly.

After a joint trial, the Manila Regional Trial Court acquitted petitioner of estafa but convicted
her of the charges under B.P Blg. 22. On appeal, the respondent appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

Issues:

-whether the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law

Rulings:

NO. The Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction over Criminal Case Nos. 84-32335 to
84-32340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision
of the trial court dated September 24, 1991 is reversed and set aside, without prejudice to the
filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when
warranted.

4. Rigor vs. People – November 17, 2004 - MORAN

FACTS:

Alfredo Rigor was charged of a violation of BP 22 for issuing a postdated check in the
Municipality of Rural Bank, San Juan, knowing that at the time of the issue, the account has
already insufficient funds with the drawee bank. The information was filed in the RTC of Pasig.
Petitioner was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. RTC ruled against petitioner, finding him
guilty of violation of BP 22. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA, which affirmed the
RTC decision.

On appeal, petitioner argues that the Pasig Court had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case
for violation of BP 22, because no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered,
dishonored or that the insufficiency of funds OCCURRED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN
JUAN.zz

ISSUE: Whether the RTC Pasig has jurisdiction over the criminal case, despite none of the
material facts of BP 22 occurring in Pasig, YES, RTC PASIG STILL HAS JURISDICTION.

RULING:

1 Violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes.

a. In such crimes, some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the
court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case excludes the other

b. Hence, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed

2. The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural
Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated
February 16, 1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan
Branch, Metro Manila.

3. The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing.

a. The jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint
or information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its
Tarlac Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan.

b. The place of issue and delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the
offense, was overtly manifested In San Juan. Both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently
vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City

5. People vs. Olermo – July 17, 2003 - SANOY

FACTS:
In separate information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Branch 172, Marlene Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino was accused of illegal
recruitment on a large scale and five counts of estafa.

In Criminal Case No. 2860-V-93, a prosecution for illegal recruitment in large scale, the
information reads:

 That during the period of February to June 1993, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment
abroad, did... then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement in a large scale to ARISTON B. VILLANUEVA, MARY
JANE AQUINO-VILLANUEVA, ALFRED BRYANT BERADOR, FRENNIE
MAJARUCON and WILFREDO TUBALE, without said accused having secured first
the... necessary license or authority to engage in recĺruitment activity from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in violation of the
aforementioned provision of Law.

The five informations for estafa, on the other hand, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2861-V-93,
2862-V-93, 2863-V-93, 2864-V-93, and 2865-V-93, alleged that the appellant violated paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code

In Criminal Case No. 2861-V-93:... the above-named accused, defrauded and deceived one
NAPOLEON APARICIO y CLEMENTE in the following manner to wit: said accused,... by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation made to the said complainant to
the effect that she has the capacity and power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and
facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing said... manifestations
and representation to be false and fraudulent and made only to induce said complainant to
give, as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused cash money amounting to P40,000,
but said accused, once in possession of the same, with intent to defraud... and deceive the herein
complainant, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate
and convert [the same] to her own personal use and benefit, [and] despite demands made upon
her to return the said amount of P40,000, said accused failed and... refused and still fails and
refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount
of P40,000.

In Criminal Case No. 2862-V-93:

MARY JANE AQUINO-VILLANUEVA

P35,000

In Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93:

ARISTON B. VILLANUEVA
In Criminal Case No. 2864-V-93:

FRENNIE MAJARUCON y BACO

P20,000

In Criminal Case No. 2865-V-93:

ALFRED BRYANT BERADOR y OCHOA

P25,350

ISSUE:

The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of estafa.

RULING:

Five separate informations were filed against appellant charging her of violating subdivision
2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

Except in Criminal Case No. 2862-V093, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the appellant's guilt in the cases of estafa.

Subdivision 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code lists ways by which estafa may be
committed:

By means of any of the following pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar
deceits.

There are three ways of committing estafa under this provision: (1) by using a fictitious name;
(2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under... in this
class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. Such deceit consists of the false statement
or fraudulent representation of the appellant, which was made prior to, or at least
simultaneously with, the delivery of the thing by the complainant, it being essential... that such
false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. If there is no prior or simultaneous
false statement or fraudulent representation, any subsequent act of appellant,... however
fraudulent and suspicious it may appear, cannot serve as a basis for prosecution for this class of
estafa.

The Solicitor General, correctly states in the appellee's brief, that all the elements of the
abovementioned crime have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant represented
herself, personally and by way of the advertisement in the newspaper, that she can provide...
complainants with work abroad. Hence, relying on her representations, complainants parted
with their money and delivered the same to appellant. The truth, however, was that the
appellant never had the license from the POEA to recruit persons for overseas employment.
Complainants... were never given any employment abroad and thus they suffered damage by
reason of appellant's illegal acts.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. The judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 2860-V-93 finding appellant Marlene
Olermo a.k.a. Marlene Tolentino guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and sentencing her
to life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) is

AFFIRMED.

II. The judgments in Criminal Cases Nos. 2861-V-93, 2864-V-93 and 2865-V-93, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four separate offenses of estafa are AFFIRMED in toto.

III. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 2863-V-93 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of estafa is MODIFIED, insofar as appellant is hereby sentenced to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS of prision... mayor
as maximum and that appellant is further ordered to pay complainant Ariston B. Villanueva the
amount of P51,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus costs of suit.

IV. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 2862-V-93 is REVERSED and appellant is ACQUITTED
from the charge of estafa.

6. Trenas vs. People – January 25, 2012 - CHUNG/estioso

Facts:

A complaint of estafa filed by Elizabeth Luciaja against Atty. Trenas was filed in the RTC of
Makati City.
Elizabeth is the niece of Margarita Alocilja who wanted to purchase a house and lot in Ilo-ilo
city. Elizabeth became an authorized agent for margarita. The complainant was referred by the
bank manager of maybank, Joselito Palma, to Atty. Hector Trenas.

Hector Trenas enumerated the fees. Elizabeth paid the amount to Trenas. Trenas issued a BIR
receipt but later was discovered it was a fake receipt. Trenas did not use the money to process
for the fees but instead used the money for personal expense.

Elizabeth demanded the money from Trenas. Trenas issued a check. Elizabeth tried depositing
the check at PCI bank of Makati but was not able to since the bank istated that the account is
closed.

Elizabeth filed an information at RTC makati against Trenas.

Trenas pleaded not guilty and was not able to attend pre-trial and trial due to health condition
and also he resides at Ilo-ilo city.

January 8,2007, the RTC rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty of estafa.

Trenas petitioned for MFR which was denied.

Trenas filed a petition for Review on Certiorari before this court with the following assignment
of errors:

1.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT AN ACCUSED HAS TO PRESENT

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION EVEN IF SUCH
LACK OF JURISDICTION APPEARS IN THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT DEMAND MADE BY A PERSON
OTHER THAN THE AGGRIEVED PARTY SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT OF DEMAND TO
CONSTITUTE THE OFFENSE OF ESTAFA;

ISSUE: WON RTC makati failed to acquire jurisdiction of the case

RULING:

YES. It is a fundamental principle that for a jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal

cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court in a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And
once it is to show the court may validy take cognizance of the case. However the evidence
adduced during the trial shoes that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court
should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.

7. Union bank vs. People – February 28, 2012 - LINA

FACTS: Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. The Information
against her reads:

That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful statements under oath upon a
material matter before a competent person authorized to administer oath which the law
requires to wit: said accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as Civil Case No. 342-
00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or
agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false thereby making a willful
and deliberate assertion of falsehood.

The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank’s two (2) complaints for sum of money
with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John
Doe. The first complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the RTC, Branch
109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000,
was filed on March 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints
showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping.
Accordingly, she was charged with deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely
declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that
she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another
tribunal or agency.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash,3 citing two grounds. First, she argued that the venue was
improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Second, she argued that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense.

ISSUE: Where should the venue be? Pasay City where the certificate was used and submitted or
Makati City where the certificat0e was subscribed to?

HELD: MTC MAKATI. Sec.15 (a) Rule 110. The crime was consummated in Makati City as all
the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury occurs there. If in lieu of or as
supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a
written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn
statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission
are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall
be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

8. People v.s Zafra – October 19, 1994 - MONDIA

Facts: On November 21, 1991 at 10:30 in the evening, accused-appellant Francisco Zafra, with
accused-appellants Feliciano Braganza, Cresencio Velasco and three (3) other unidentified male
companions on board, was driving a passenger jeep (with Plate No. DHK-382 and owned by
Efren Cardinal) along Turbina, Calamba going in the direction of Batangas. Police officers
flagged down the jeepney and it was later revealed that accused-appellants had stolen said
jeepney and killed its driver at Alabang, Muntinlupa. They were charged:

That on or about November 21, 1991 at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, the accused above-
named conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, take, steal and drive away an Isuzu Passenger type jitney with Plate No.
DHK-382-UV-90 valued at P250,000.00 owned by Efren Cardinal and then driven by Candido
Diongco towards Calamba, Laguna, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court and
thereafter in pursuance of the commission of the crime, to ensure success and gain absolute
control of the said vehicle accused with intent to kill, attack, assault, shot and stab Candido
Diongco which directly caused his death and that accused while driving, in control and on
board the said jitney were apprehended, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Candido
Diongco and Efren Cardinal, the owner of the said jitney.

Accused-Appellants were convicted by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: Paragraph (b), Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which reads: “Where an
offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or in any other public or private vehicle
while in the course of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any
municipality or province through which such train, aircraft or other vehicle passed during such
trip”

Although the killing took place in Alabang, Muntinlupa, as accused-appellants were

apprehended in Calamba while they were in the carnapped jeepney, the information was
validly filed in Calamba.

9. Calme vs. Court of Appeals – August 30, 1996 - FERENAL

Facts:

An inter island passenger ship, M/V “Cebu City”, was sailing from Ozamis City to Cebu City
on the night of May 12 1991, where a crime charged against the petitioner, Wenefredo Calme,
and four other persons took place which resulted to the death of Edgardo Bernal by allegedly
throwing him overboard the said vessel.

With an intent to impugn the Oroquieta Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction over the offense, the
petitioner filed a motion to quash but was denied by Judge Celso Conol of RTC, Branch 12,
Oroquieta City on December 10 1993. Further, the petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition
but was also denied by the Court of Appeal’s on a resolution dated July 14 1994. Hence, the
present appeal by Wenefredo Calme to review the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 10 1993 and its resolution on July 14 1994 upholding the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 12, Oroquieta City over the information for murder filed against him.

In petitioner’s contention, the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City has no jurisdiction over
the case despite being governed by the provision of paragraph (c) Section 15 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Court by relying on Act No. 400, for which he claimed to be the spirit of the
aforementioned provision that specifically provides “among other things, that for crimes
committed within the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water
craft of Philippine registry, jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province in which the vessel shall come after the commission of the crime.”
Issue:

Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Branch 12, Oroquieta City has jurisdiction over the
offense charged against the petitioner, Wenefredo Calme.

Rulings:

Yes, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Oroquieta City has jurisdiction over the offense
charged against Wenefredo Calme. Pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 15 (now Section 14),
Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court which stated “Where an offense is committed on board a
vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the proper court of the
first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.”

The provision debunks the petitioner's reliance on Act No. 400 for it is erroneous. The provision
of Act No. 400 vesting jurisdiction where the vessel shall come after the commission of the
crime is not carried in the present Rule which specifically provided that “in the proper court of the
first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.”

As the basic rule of statutory construction, where the provision of the law or rule is clear and
unequivocal, its meaning must be determined from the language employed. It must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

With the words employed in the paragraph (c) of Section 15 (now Section 14) Rule 110 of the
Revised Rule of Court being clear, there is no reason to rely on Act No. 400 to determine its true
meaning.

Hence, the Court held that the petition for review by Wenefredo Calme was denied.

L. Section 16 – Intervention of the offended party in criminal action

1. Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr. – G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987 - ONTAL

Facts: It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against
respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to
Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself. The cases were re-raffled and consequently
assigned on to Branch 105 presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina. In the meantime Judge
Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty.
Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence,
"it is not a crime against property but public order."

Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.

Ruling:

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law
that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable"

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having
been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not
only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice mandated by the Constitution. A separate civil action for the purpose
would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED

2. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan – December 13, 2004 - ALLARSE

FACTS:

On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives
representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a "Complaint-Affidavit"
with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate
transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments
of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained between certain parties.
She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate Ramiscal, Jr. (President of the AFP-RSBS),
together with twenty-seven (27) other persons for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS
funds and in defrauding the government of millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary
stamp taxes.

On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C.
Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations witih the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. Meanwhile, pending resolution of the
aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice of Appearance" as
private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag
Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made
conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen.
Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof. In its comment, the law firm contended that its
clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and
contributors of AFP-RSBS.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI) as represented by
Albano & Associates are private injured parties entitled to intervene as the private prosecutor in
the subject cases.

RULING:

NO. The court held in this case that a violation of RA 3019, the offended party is the
government which was allegedly deprived of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.
stamp taxes.

( Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or
directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused, or that corporate entity
which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who
has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to
recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the
legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil
liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The
interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the
constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. )

Even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the
respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and
solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members to have access to the
records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because
the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest
of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental.
Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent
of its members/beneficiaries.

As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived
by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based
on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS.
The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was
it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for
said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said cases.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of
the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

3. Rodriguez vs. Ponferrada – July 29, 2005 - OSORNO

FACTS:

"On 10 December 2001, the Honorable Assistant City Prosecutor Rossana S. Morales-Montojo of
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued her Resolution in I.S. No. 01-15902, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

"Premises considered, there being PROBABLE CAUSE to charge respondent for ESTAFA under
Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as amended by PD 818 and for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
it is respectfully recommended that the attached Information be approved and filed in Court.

As a consequence thereof, separate informations were separately filed against petitioner Mary
Ann Rodriguez before proper courts, for Estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.”

Upon payment of the assessed and required docket fees by the private complainant, the
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against petitioner were filed and raffled to
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 42, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
0108033 to 36. On the other hand, the informations for estafa cases against herein petitioner
were likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-106256 to 59.

"On 17 June 2002, petitioner through counsel filed in open court before the public respondent an
'Opposition to the Formal Entry of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor' dated 14 June 2002.
The public respondent court during the said hearing noted the Formal Entry of Appearance of
Atty. Felix R. Solomon as private prosecutor as well as the Opposition filed thereto by petitioner
Rodriguez. x x x.

"As ordered by the Court, private complainant through counsel filed her Comment to the
Opposition of herein petitioner.

"On 27 June 2002, the public respondent court issued the first assailed Order allowing the
appearance of the private prosecutor in the above-entitled criminal cases upon payment of the
legal fees pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

"On 31 July 2002, accused through counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 26 July
2002. On 16 August 2002, the public respondent court issued the second assailed Order denying
the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner.
ISSUES:

Whether or not a private prosecutor can be allowed to intervene and participate in the
proceedings of the above-entitled estafa cases for the purpose of prosecuting the attached civil
liability arising from the issuance of the checks involved which is also subject matter of the
pending B.P. 22 cases.

RULING:

YES.

Rules 110 and 111 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. -- Where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense."

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -- (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Based on the foregoing rules, an offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a crime,
except in the following instances: (1) when, from the nature of the crime and the law defining
and punishing it, no civil liability arises in favor of a private offended party; and (2) when, from
the nature of the offense, the offended parties are entitled to civil indemnity, but (a) they waive
the right to institute a civil action, (b) expressly reserve the right to do so or (c) the suit has
already been instituted. In any of these instances, the private complainant's interest in the case
disappears and criminal prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. None
of these exceptions apply to the instant case. Hence, the private prosecutor cannot be barred
from intervening in the estafa suit.

The possible single civil liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the
subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the BP 22 violation
prosecution. In the crimes of both estafa and violation of BP 22, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
expressly allows, even automatically in the present case, the institution of a civil action without
need of election by the offended party. As both remedies are simultaneously available to this
party, there can be no forum shopping.

The present cases before us, the institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the
inclusion of another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or
inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary inclusion of a civil
action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law precludes the institution in
an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the
same check.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that the private prosecutor may intervene
before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa, despite the necessary inclusion of the
corresponding civil action in the proceedings for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC. A
recovery by the offended party under one remedy, however, necessarily bars that under the
other. Obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment, this is in
essence the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or
omission.

4. Magno vs. People – April 2, 2011- ENCINAS

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated murder an
double attempted murder against several accused including Magno, who were public officers
working under the NBI. Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance and authority
of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on behalf of the
Office of the Ombudsman.

The RTC issued an order, ruling that “The Ombudsman is the proper, legal and authorized
entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other than those
authorized under RA 6770. This prompted the respondents to file a petition for certiorari before
the CA. Court of Appeals original decision: Declared that the private prosecutor may appear for
the petitioner in the case but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the case is
concerned.

CA’s amended decision: Ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner in
criminal case to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in collaboration with any
lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case. This amended Court of Appeals
decision in turn made Magno file for a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Procedure before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman is correct in allowing Atty. Sitoy to prosecute this case
pursuant to Sec.16 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

8h

RULING: The Supreme Court ordered that the Respondents to seek recourse from the
Sandiganbayan and declared the Court of Appeals amended decision null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged with
committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the NBI.

III. RULE 111 – PROSECUTION OF CIVIL OFFENSES

A. Section 1 – Institution of criminal and civil actions

1. Casupanan vs. Laroya – August 26, 2002 - Cabaña

===

Facts

That a two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven
by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result,
two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.

When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.

On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied
the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal
Issues

Whether or not that the Criminal case filed against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and Civil Case filed against Laroya instituted only one case in
court?

Ruling

No. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99)
are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED SO ORDERED.

That on Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the
criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless
the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly
instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.

That, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring sucjh action. Otherwise,
such civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. A waiver of any of the civil
actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others. The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation. In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused.
2. Cancio vs. Isip – November 12, 2002 - PITOGO

Facts:

The accused, Emerencia Isip, was charged with 3 counts of violation of B.P. 22, also known as
the Bouncing Checks Law and 3 cases of Estafa. One of the B.P. 22 cases was dismissed due to it
being deposited before 90 days from the date written on the check. The other two cases of B.P.
22 were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga and were then dismissed due
to the failure of the prosecution to prosecute the crime. Meanwhile the three cases of Estafa
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. After failing to present its second
witness, the prosecution dismissed the Estafa case. The prosecution reserved its right to file a
separate civil action from the said criminal cases. The court granted the reservation. The
criminal case of Estafa was then dismissed without prejudice to the civil action. On December
15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for the collection of the sum of money, seeking to
recover the amount of the check subject to the Estafa cases. Respondent then filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint contending that the petition is already barred by the doctrine of Res
Judicata.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondents can file a separate civil action regardless of the dismissal of the
criminal case of estafa.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the civil action can prosper. The reservation for civil action was
made by the prosecution on time. According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal case unless there is a
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action. In the case at bar, the complaint is clearly
based on culpa contractual. The cause of action was the breach of the respondent’s breach of the
contractual obligation. Evidently, the petitioner was seeking to make good the value written on
the checks in exchange for cash. The case was not anchored the criminal aspect of estafa but on
the civil aspect of culpa contractual. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa case
filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceeding

3. Cruz vs. Mina – G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007 - OSORNO

FACTS:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the
Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior
courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his
appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC. After hearing the prayer for preliminary
injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved
to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of
Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.

Petitioner argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Trial Court erroneously held that no civil liability may flow
from the crime of Grave Threats, and that for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.

RULING:

Yes. The Trial Court erroneously held that no civil liability may flow from the crime of Grave
Threats.

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation. The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution
of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from
Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor
may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.

4. Yakult vs. Court of Appeals – G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990 - ABDULMAGUID

Facts:

 On December 24, 1982, the five-year-old Roy Camaso was sideswiped by a Yamaha
motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines, which was driven by its employee, Larry
Salvado.

 Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983 with the then City Court of
Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 027184.

 Then, on October 19, 1984, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso against
Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila docketed as
Civil Case No. 84-27317. A decision was rendered in the civil case on May 26, 1989
ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the sum of P13,006.30 for
actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills; P3,000.00 attorney's fees and the
costs of the suit.
  The defendants appealed the judgment; and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case. According to
them, the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of
Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed will prosper even if
there was no reservation to file a separate civil action?

Ruling:

Yes. In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to
institute it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the
criminal action. However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation
of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the
criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages
was awarded.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless, since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the
actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents
its evidence.

Thus, the petition was DENIED; and the decision of the Court of Appeals on November 3, 1989
and its resolution on January 30, 1990 were AFFIRMED.

5. Gosiaco vs. Ching – April 16, 2009- ALBIOS

Facts:

Petitioner Jaime Gosiaco invested with ASB Holdings, Inc by way of loan. The money loaned to
ASB for a period of 48 days with interest. In exchange, ASB through its Business Development
Operation Group manager Ching, issued two checks signed by the latter.

Upon maturity of ASB checks, the petitioner went to DBS Bank San Juan Branch to deposit the
checks. However, upon presentment, the checks were dishonored and payments were refused
because of the stop payment order and for insufficiency of funds. The petitioner informed
respondents through a letter about the dishonor checks and demanded replacement checks or
the return of the money placement but to no avail.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a corporate officer who signed a bouncing check is civilly liable under B.P. Blg.
22?

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that when the check is drawn by a corporation, company or
entity, the person or persons, who actually signed the check on behalf of such a drawer shall be
liable under this act. The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate
check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted.

However, the records clearly show that ASB is civilly obligated to petitioner. Petitioner has been
proceeding from the premise that he is unable to pursue a separate civil action against ASB
itself for the recovery of the amounts due from the subject checks. From this premises,
petitioner sought to implead ASB as a defendant to the B.P. Blg, 22 case, even if such case is
criminal in nature.

Note: May the BP22 and Civil action proceed simultaneously? This is important. :)

. Spouses Yap vs. First e-Bank – September 29, 2009 - ALBOFERA

FACTS: Sammy Yap obtained a ₱2 million loan from PDCP. As security, Sammy’s parents,
petitioners, executed a third-party mortgage on their land and warehouse standing on it. The
mortgage agreement provided that PDCP may extrajudicially foreclose the property in case
Sammy failed to pay the loan. Sammy issued a promissory note and six postdated checks in
favor of PDCP as additional securities for the loan. When Sammy defaulted on the payment,
PDCP presented the six checks to the drawee bank but the said checks were dishonore6d. This
prompted PDCP to file a complaint against Sammy for six counts of violation of BP 22. PDCP
filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage on the property of petitioners
which served as principal security for Sammy’s loan. On motion of Sammy and without
objection from the public prosecutor and PDCP, the BP 22 cases were provisionally dismissed.
Pursuant to the petition of PDCP for extrajudicial foreclosure, the extrajudicial sale was set.
Copies of the notice of extrajudicial sale were sent by registered mail. The notice was also
published in a newspaper of general circulation in Pangasinan. Later on, petitioners filed in the
RTC a complaint for injunction (with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction), damages and accounting of payments against PDCP. The
complaint sought to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground that PDCP waived its right to
foreclose the mortgage on their property when it filed the BP 22 cases against Sammy. The RTC
ruled in favor of petitioners. PDCP appealed to the CA which reversed the RTC ruling. It
opined that PDCP was not barred from exercising its right to foreclose on the property of
petitioners despite suing Sammy for violation of BP 22. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether PDCP should have been deemed to have simultaneously filed for collection of
the amount represented by the checks when Sammy was sued for six counts of violation of BP
22.

HELD: If the debtor fails (or unjustly refuses) to pay his debt when it falls due and the debt is
secured by a mortgage and by a check, the creditor has three options against the debtor and the
exercise of one will bar the exercise of the others. He may pursue either of the three but not all
or a combination of them. First, the creditor may file a collection suit against the debtor. This
will open up all the properties of the debtor to attachment and execution, even the mortgaged
property itself, second, the creditor may opt to foreclose on the mortgaged property. In case the
debt is not fully satisfied, he may sue the debtor for deficiency judgment (not a collection case
for the whole indebtedness), in which case, all the properties of the debtor, other than the
mortgaged property, are again opened up for the satisfaction of the deficiency. Lastly, the
creditor may opt to sue the debtor for violation of BP 22 if the checks securing the obligation
bounce. Circular 57-97 and Section 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court both provide that the
criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding
civil action, i.e., a collection suit. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be
allowed or recognized.
7. Ching vs. Nicdao and CA – April 27, 2007 - ALLARSE

G.R. No. 141181. April 27, 2007

FACTS:

Clarita Nicdao, owner of Vignette Superstore, contracted a loan from Emma Nuguid and
Samson Ching in 1995. Due to a lack of funds, checks that had been issued as payment were
later denied. On October 21, 1997, petitioner Ching, a Chinese national, instituted criminal
complaints for eleven (11) counts of violation of BP 22 (The Bouncing Check Law) against
respondent Nicdao. Consequently, eleven (11) Informations were filed with the First Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan. The MCTC convicted
Nicdao stating that the following elements are present in the case of respondent Nicdao’s
issuance of checks: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or
for value; (2) the issuer, maker or drawer has knowledge that dais checking account has
insufficient funds; (3) subsequent dishonor of the checks of the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds. And as such elements are explained in the violation of BP 22, the RTC also affirmed the
said decision.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals acquitted Nicdao after the factual findings showed that
Nicdao had already paid her debt in the total of Php5,780,000 to Nuguid. Also, Ching failed to
adduce evidence to prove the existence of a previous transaction between him and the
respondent. In addition, with regard to the 20 million pesos check, the CA characterized the
claim of Ching as incredible and contrary to human experience since no one would deliver the
said amount to respondent Nicdao without any documentary proof thereof.

Petitioner Ching contends that notwithstanding the acquittal of respondent, the SC has
jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability and that said liability in the
amount of Php 20,950,000. On the other hand, respondent Nicdao asserts that under Section
2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except in the case provided
for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has
been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case may be instituted against Clarita Nicdao after her
acquittal.
RULING:

The general rule as provided in Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court is that an acquittal does
not necessarily carry with it the extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Judgements
of acquittal are required to state whether the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or the act of omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may
appeal the civil aspect of the criminal case notwithstanding the respondent Nicdao’s acquittal.
However, the painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is
simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civil liable to petitioner Ching. First, the acquittal of
the respondent is based on the findings that she did not commit the act penalized under BP22.
Second, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. And third, while
petitioner Ching attempts to show that respondent Nicdao’s liability did not arise from or was
not based upon the criminal act which she was acquitted but from her loan obligations to him,
however, petitioner Ching miserably failed to proved by preponderant evidence the existence of
these unpaid loans.

Hence, the petition is denied for lack or merit.

||

8. Cheng vs. Spouses Sy – July 7, 2009 - AMPIS

Facts: Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two estafa cases against spouses William and Tessie Sy for
issuing her two checks for 300,00.00 pesos as payment for their loan which were dishonored
upon presentation for having been drawn from a closed account. With the same facts, Anita
Cheng also filed two cases for violation of Batasang Pambansa Bilang 22 .a

The estafa cases were dismissed due to failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the
crime while the BP blg 22 cases were dismissed also on account of failure of petitioner to
identify the accused respondents in open court. With that, the petitioner lodged against
respondents a civil case for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same
loaned amount of 600,000,00 pesos covered by the two bouncing checks.
The civil case was also dismissed on the ground that the civil liability was already impliedly
instituted in the BP bg 22 cases in light of Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Thus the issue, whether or not the petitioner can no longer recover the amount loaned to the
respondents because of that.

The Supreme Court finds the petitioner's contention that she was not assisted by a private
prosecutor during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical thus indirectly protests that the public
prosecutor failed to protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to have her establish the
identities of the accused during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil action deemed
impliedly instituted with the BP Blg. 22 cases. On this ground, SC agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner's recourse pursuant to the prevailing
rules of procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to
respondents corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal
within the reglementary period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover
the civil liability of respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP
Blg. 22 cases, we are constrained to digress from this rule.

It is true that clients are bound by the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. But
this rule admits of exceptions - (1) where the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that the
client is prejudiced and denied his day in court, or (2) where the counsel is guilty of gross
negligence resulting in the client's deprivation of liberty or property without due process of
law. Tested against these guidelines, the SC up hold that petitioner's lot falls within the
exceptions and so, the civil case must be reinstated.

9. Heirs of Burgos vs. Court of Appeals – February 8, 2010 - APA

FACTS:

On January 7, 1992 a number of assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma Burgos
while all were asleep, killing Sarah and her uncle Erasmo Palma (Erasmo).

Four months after the incident, the police arrested Cresencio Aman (Aman) and Romeo Martin
(Martin) who executed confessions, allegedly admitting their part in the attack. They pointed to
two others who helped them, namely, Artemio "Pong" Bergonia and Danilo Say, and to
respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing.

After 10 years or on September 5, 2002 respondent Co surrendered to the National Bureau of

Investigation.

On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail. After hearing or on
April 14, 2004, the RTC granted bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt of respondent Co
was not strong.

Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the RTC, now presided over by another
judge, denied the same in its Order of May 18, 2005. This prompted the victim's heirs to file a
special civil action of certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA dismissed the petition, however, for having been filed without involving the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35,
Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.

Petitioner heirs of Sarah moved for reconsideration but the CA denied it for lack of merit in its
Resolution of September 16, 2005, hence, the heirs' recourse to this Court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the granting of bail could prevent the proceeding of the civil liability of
the accused.

2. Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the special civil action of certiorari, which
questioned the RTC's grant of bail to respondent Co, for having been filed in the name of
the offended parties and without the OSG's intervention.

RULING

1. NO.

Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal. The civil aspect is borne of
the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.

The civil action, in which the offended party is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant, is
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action or
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The law allows the merger of the criminal and the civil actions to avoid multiplicity of suits.
Thus, when the state succeeds in prosecuting the offense, the offended party benefits from such
result and is able to collect the damages awarded to him.

But, when the trial court acquits the accused or dismisses the case on the ground of lack of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the civil action is not
automatically extinguished since liability under such an action can be determined based on
mere preponderance of evidence. The offended party may peel off from the terminated criminal
action and appeal from the implied dismissal of his claim for civil liability.

Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action,
preventing him from eluding punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its
denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on conviction by final
judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for
civil liability when warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

2. YES, actions essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor
General, are, as a rule, summarily dismissed.

The purpose of a criminal action, in its purest sense, is to determine the penal liability of the
accused for having outraged the state with his crime and, if he be found guilty, to punish him
for it. In this sense, the parties to the action are the People of the Philippines and the accused.
The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Also in this wise, only the
state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has the sole right and authority to institute
proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court.

As a general rule, the mandate or authority to represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus-- It
is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor
General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal
proceedings. Spread out in the laws creating the office is the discernible intent which may be
gathered from the term "shall" x x x. x x x x The Court is firmly convinced that considering the
spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to "represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.

10. ABS-CBN vs. Ombudsman – April 23, 2010 - AYAP

Facts:
FACTS:

Petitioners, all surnamed Lopez, as officers and on behalf of ABS-CBN, executed separate
complaint affidavits charging private respondents Roberto S. Benedicto, Exequiel B. Garcia,
Miguel V. Gonzalez, and Salvador (Buddy) Tan with the following crimes penalized under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC): (a) Article 298 - Execution of Deeds by Means of Violence or
Intimidation; (b) Article 315 paragraphs 1[b], 2[a], 3[a] - Estafa; (c) Article 308 - Theft; (d) Article
302 - Robbery; (e) Article 312 - Occupation of Real Property or Usurpation of Real Rights in
Property; and (f) Article 318 - Other Deceits. Before anything else, we note that on April 5, 1999
and June 13, 2000, the respective counsel for respondents Tan and Benedicto, in compliance
with Section 16,11 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, filed pleadings informing the Court of their
clients' demise. Benedicto's counsel filed a Notice of Death (With Prayer for Dismissal)12
moving that Benedicto be dropped as respondent in the instant case for the reason "that the
pending criminal cases subject of this appeal are actions which do not survive the death of the
party accused." Petitioners opposed the move to drop Benedicto as respondent, citing Torrijos v.
Court of Appeals13 which held that "civil liability of the accused survives his death; because
death is not a valid cause for the extinguishment of civil obligations.

ISSUE: Whether the civil liability of an accused, upon death, is extinguished together with his
criminal liability.

RULING: In the case of People v. Bayotas,

1. Death of an accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."9

2.Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a
result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) x x x e) Quasi-
delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. The separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action.
In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible [de]privation of right by prescription.
Applying the foregoing rules, ABS-CBN's insistence that the case at bench survives because the
civil liability of the respondents subsists is stripped of merit. To begin with, there is no criminal
case as yet against the respondents. The Ombudsman did not find probable cause to prosecute
respondents for various felonies in the RPC. As such, the rule that a civil action is deemed
instituted along with the criminal action unless the offended party: (a) waives the civil action,
(b) reserves the right to institute it separately, or (c) institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action,16 is not applicable. In any event, consistent with People v. Bayotas,17 the death
of the accused necessarily calls for the dismissal of the criminal case against him, regardless of
the institution of the civil case with it. The civil action which survives the death of the accused
must hinge on other sources of obligation provided in Article 1157 of the Civil Code. In such a
case, a surviving civil action against the accused founded on other sources of obligation must be
prosecuted in a separate civil action. In other words, civil liability based solely on the criminal
action is extinguished, and a different civil action cannot be continued and prosecuted in the
same criminal action.

11. Heirs of Simon vs. Elvin Chan – February 23, 2011 - BANUELOS

FACTS: In 1997, the city Prosecutor of Manila filed an information charging the later Eduardo
Simon with the violation of BP22 for issuing a bouncing check valued at 336K to Elvin Chan.

Three years later, in 2000, Chan commenced in the MeTC of Pasay a civil action for the
collection of 336K, this time allegedly based on a fraud failing under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chan can institute the separate civil casea

RULING: No. There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the
issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP
22). This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, Effective December 1, 2000. Section 1b of
the said rule clearly states:
“The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.”

The aforeqouted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is not
axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is
simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws.

B. Section 2 – When separate civil action is suspended

1. Caños vs. Peralta – G.R. No. L-38352, August 19, 1982 - BENEMERITO

FACTS: The case of Caños was decided before the 1985 Rules. Here, there was a reservation.
There were two (2) cases arising out of the same incident. At that time, there was still no specific
rule on consolidation. Judge Peralta ordered the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases
and that was questioned.

ISSUE: Was the consolidation proper? If so, how do you reconcile these cases because the
degree of proof in the criminal case is not the same in the civil case?

HELD: The consolidation was proper under Rule 31 because there is a common question of fact
and law. They can be consolidated but for purposes of decision, the court will now apply two
(2) different criteria: Proof beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal case and preponderance of
evidence in the civil case. So there is no incompatibility.

2. Naguiat vs. IAC – G.R. No. 73836 August 18, 1988 - CAMASURA

Facts:

Petitioner Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four (4) lots from Timog Silangan
Development Corporation. He then paid the downpayment and was given receipt by the
TSDC .The Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-year period in
which one of the lot was paid by the petitioner TSDC caused to be issued in the name of the
petitioner the title to said lot.petitioner paid TSDC which was allegedly his full payment for the
remaining three (3) Lots,. A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to
the petitioner. The petitioner demanded from TSDC the issuance in his favor of the certificates
of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin)
refused on the ground that the petitioner had not fully paid for said three (3) lots. Private
respondent contends that the conditions for the sale are not met. Petitioner filed a complaint for
specific performance with damages, with the Regional Trial Court. Before the civil action was
filed, petitioner also filed with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against
herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically
Section 25.

(REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING

PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF)

SEC. 25. Issuance of Title.

On the basis of Rule 111, Section 3(a) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the petitioner filed a
motion to consolidate Civil Case and Criminal Case. Despite the objection and opposition of the
private respondents, in an Order ,the trial court granted the motion and ordered consolidation
of the two (2) cases. private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
respondent appellate court, seeking the annulment of the orders of the trial court and was
granted. Thus this petition.

Issue: Is the motion to consolidate criminal and civil cases proper?

Ruling:

No, the consolidation is not proper. The civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal
action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In
the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with
damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to
the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell
between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner
was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu and not one for
the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is
inapplicable.But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil
action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the express authority of Section 1,
Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
 A Court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they
arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely
or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to
be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice
the substantial rights of any of the parties.

They should have consolidated under Rule 31 and NOT in Rule 111.

3. Sapiera vs. Court of Appeals – GR No. 128927, September 14, 1999 - CANDIA

FACTS: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from
Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by
one Arturo de Guzman. These checks were signed at the back by the petitioner.

When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawer’s account was
already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner about the
dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were
filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the
court a quo did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed
to private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private
respondent the remaining P210,150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter
as civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Can petitioner be required to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after trial court
had acquitted her of criminal charges?

RULING: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by De Guzman were signed
by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and,
therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL clearly provides – Sec. 17.
Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where the language of the instrument is
ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x (f)
Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the
person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the
dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that
the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may
nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The
accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of
the complainant.

4. Salao vs. Court of Appeals – 284 SCRA 493, January 22, 1998 - CARREON

FACTS: Jowie Apolonio filed a complaint for damages against petitioner, Espero Salao for head
injuries inflicted on him. He alleged that he was hit on the head with a gun and threatened with
further harm, after petitioner drove him away for being a drug addict upon his attempt to join
the petitioner and a common friend who were drinking at that time.

On the other hand, Salao claimed that it was Apolonio who tried to assault him and he only
acted in self defense by hitting Apolonio with his gun.

The trial court found Apolonio’s version of the incident to be more convincing than that of
Salao’s which it found to be "uncorroborated and self-serving." Accordingly, it rendered
judgment against the petitioner. The trial court also denied petitioner’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration and new trial.

Petitioner filed an appeal questioning the award of damages and attorney’s fees to Apolonio.
He further raised that in the criminal case for serious physical injuries and grave threats based
on the same incident, the Municipal Trial Court of Obando, Bulacan found him "not guilty" and
accordingly dismissed the case against him.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s acquittal in the criminal action for serious physical injuries constitutes
a definitive finding that he has no civil liability to the private respondent (Apolonio).

RULING: No. Rule 111, §2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the “extinction of
the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
The civil liability being referred to is that arising from crime (ex delicto) and not the civil
liability for quasi delict which is allowed to be brought "separately and independently" of the
criminal action by Art. 33 of the Civil Code. The civil liability based on such cause of action is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused.

5. Rufo Mauricio Construction vs. IAC – November 27, 1987 - CHUNG

FACTS: Ilustre Cabiliza was convicted of the crime of homicide and damage to property
through reckless imprudence before the RTC of Legaspi City. Cabiliza filed a Notice of Appeal
but died before pursuing said appeal. Rufo Mauricio, employer of Cabiliza, proceeded with the
case on appeal pursuant to his right as employer who is subsidiarily liable. The heirs of
Cabiliza substituted him with respect to the civil aspect of the case. A writ of execution was
issued upon motion of the heirs of the victim but was returned unsatisfied because Cabiliza was
found insolvent. The victim's widow filed a motion for issuance of a subsidiary writ of
execution against Rufo Maurcio and/or Rufo Mauricio Construction Co., which was granted.
The IAC affirmed the decision of the RTC. Petitioner now contends that dismissal of the
criminal case against Cabiliza (due to his death) wipes out not only his primary civil liability,
but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before
judgment of conviction became final extinguished his civil liability?

RULING: No. The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability, meaning
his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed. However, it does not extinguish his civil
liability should the liability arise not from a crime but from a quasi-delict as in this case. Here,
no crime was committed for the accused was not yet convicted by final judgment and is still
regarded as innocent. Therefore, the liability of the employer would not be subsidiary but
solidary with his driver, unless said employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at
all by proving due diligence in the selection and supervision of his driver. The case was
remanded to the trial court to grant petitioner his day in court since he was not a party in the
criminal case

DOCTRINE: The death of an accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction became final and executory extinguishes his criminal liability, but not his civil
liability should the liability or obligation arise from a quasi-delict.
6. Chieng vs. Santos – August 31, 2007 - COLE

Chieng vs. Spouses Santos,

GR 169647, August 21, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Chieng extended a loan in favor of respondent spouses Eulogio and Teresita
Santos. As security for such loan, the respondents executed in favor of petitioner a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over a piece of land.

Thereafter, respondent Eulogio issued several checks in favor of petitioner as payment for the
loan. Some of these checks were dishonored, prompting the petitioner to file a criminal case
against respondent Eulogio for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Olongapo City
RTC. During the pre-trial conference of these cases, petitioner and respondent Eulogio entered
into a compromise agreement, but failed to comply with his obligation.

On 17 June 1993, petitioner filed with the Olongapo City RTCan action for foreclosure of
mortgage. On 9 July 1997, the aforementioned rendered a Decision ordering the respondents to
pay petitioner their loan obligation amounting to 600,000.00, plus interests and attorney’s fees.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 6 October 1997, the court issued an Order
setting aside its earlier decision dated 9 July 1997. Instead of foreclosing the mortgage on their
property, petitioner chose to institute criminal cases against respondent Eulogio for issuing
bouncing checks in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He bared that the 200,000.00 which he
was directed to pay petitioner by the Olongapo City RTC, Branch 72 in its Order dated 15 July
1991 in Criminal Cases was the same subject of Civil Case pending with the Olongapo City
RTC, Branch 74.

On 23 October 2001, the Olongapo City RTC, Branch 74 rendered a Decision directing the
respondents to pay petitioner the sum of 377,000.00 and other costs..
Unsatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. It pronounced that the issue
of the payment of the loan, having been the subject of the Order dated 15 July 1991 of the
Olongapo City RTC, Branch 72, in the Criminal Cases cannot be re-litigated and that the proper
course of action for petitioner was to seek the execution of the said order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner, by filing Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90 for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent Eulogio, was already barred or precluded from
availing himself of the other civil remedy of the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage.

RULING:

No. A mortgage-creditor may, in the recovery of a debt secured by a real estate mortgage,
institute against the mortgage-debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. These remedies available to the mortgage-creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. An election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.

When petitioner filed Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent Eulogio, petitioner's civil
action for the recovery of the amount of the dishonored checks was impliedly instituted therein
pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The impliedly
instituted civil action of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was, in effect, a collection suit or suit for the
recovery of the mortgage-debt since the dishonored checks involved in the said criminal cases
were issued by respondent Eulogio to petitioner for the payment of the same loan secured by
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage.

Consequently, when petitioner filed Criminal Cases No. 612-90 to No. 615-90, he was deemed to
have already availed himself of the remedy of collection suit. Following the rule on the
alternative remedies of a mortgage-creditor, petitioner is barred from subsequently resorting to
an action for foreclosure.

However, it should be stressed that respondents have not yet fully paid the loan. In fact,
respondents themselves admitted that they still owe petitioner the balance of the loan.
In the exercise of our mandate as a court of justice and equity, The Supreme Court held, pro hac
vice, that respondents are still liable to pay the remaining balance of the loan.

7. Romero vs. People – July 17, 2009 - CUEVAS-PRESORES

Facts

On April 1, 19992 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose
Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for
Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision
resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr., Arnaldo Breis, Gerardo Breis, Jr., Rene Montes, Erwin
Breis and Jimmy Padua. Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund Breis survived although
they sustained serious injuries.

As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.

After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged in a decision
dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the
heirs of the victims the total amount of ₱3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for
death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.

Issues

Whether or not that the separate civil action is suspended in this case?

Ruling

NO. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of
an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil liability, unless the
court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist. Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil
damages in the same case. It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted. The
rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal liability will give rise to
civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is
the direct and proximate cause thereof. Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the
punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses. However, the reverse is not always true. In this
connection, the relevant portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court provide:

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.-The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.-In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

8. Domingo vs. Colina – GR No. 173330, June 17, 2013 - DE CASTILLA

Facts: Domingo was charged before the MTC with the violation of BP 22. Subsequently the case
was dismissed upon granting of the court granting the demurrer to evidence. A motion for
reconsideration was filed arguing among others that even assuming that petitioner did not
receive valuable consideration for her bounced check, she is nonetheless liable to respondent for
the face value of the check as an accommodation party and, that petitioner's knowledge of the
insufficiency of her funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the dishonor of her
check. The motion for reconsideration however was denied. The case was then brought before
the RTC which modified the decision ordering the defendant to pay 17000 plus interest.

Issues:

1. Does the RTC have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal regarding the civil liability when
the court ruled that the act from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Rulings:

1. YES. In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.In the case at bar the MTC has no mention about the
same. Even though the MTC subsequently held that the act from which the civil liability of the
accused in favor of the private complainant may arise does not exist, that is because the MTC
has failed to cite evidence ,factual circumstances or any discussion in its decision. Instead it
simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime then
the act from which the liability might arise did not exist.
9. Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan – July 15, 2013 - DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

Rafael Coscolluela was the governor of Negros Occidental for three terms. At the end of the
term pd Coscolluela in 2001, a complaint was investigated by the Office of the Ombudsman
which involved an anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment, to which they
gave a final evaluation report upgrading the complaint to a criminal case. However, it was only
in 2009 that the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner then filed a
motion to quash on the ground that his right to speedy disposition of the case was filed. The
Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to quash hence the case was elevated to Supreme Court for
review.

ISSUES:

1.Whether or not the petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was violated?

2. If such right was violated, would the dismissal of the case also extinguish the petitioner's
Civil liabilities?

RULING:

1. YES. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s right was violated due to the following
grounds:

a. The preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete

b. The delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case largely remains unjustified

C. Petitioner cannot be faulted for their alleged failure to assert their right to speedy disposition
of cases

d. The prejudice caused to the petitioners by the lengthy delay in proceedings against them

2. NO. It was ruled that although the pronouncement resulted in the acquittal of the
petitioners, it did not necessarily mean that they would be entirely exculpated from any civil
liability, assuming that the same is proven in a subsequent case which the Province may opt to
pursue.

According to Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, an acquittal in a criminal case does not
bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent civil case based on the delict, unless
the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission from the civil liability may
arise did not exist. In the case at bar, the criminal case is dismissed even before any evidence of
the prosecution was presented. Hence, the Court cannot make a definite pronouncement as to
whether the petitioners indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on
their part might arise.

C. Section 3 – When civil action may proceed independently

1. Cojuanco, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals - G.R. No. 37404, November 18, 1991 - DELA
VICTORIA

FACTS:

In the 14 June 1972 issue of the GRAPHIC, a weekly magazine of general circulation in
the Philippines, under the column Social Climbing by one "Conde de Makati," later identified as
George F. Sison, the following item appeared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ONCE UPON A time a beautiful Blue Lady (GOC) used to frequent the office of the Honorable
Sir.

Because of her well-known beauty and charm, the frequency of her visits did not pass
unnoticed by our Lady of the House by the Pasig. An investigation by her battery of personal
‘spies’ revealed that the beautiful Blue Lady was ‘following up’ her three-million-peso loan
from one of our leading government-lending institutions.

Claiming that the publication alludes to petitioners-spouses, and that it is false, malicious and
constitutes a vicious attack on petitioner-wife’s virtue, honor and character as it imputes to her
not only the corrupt and immoral act of "following up" an alleged loan, but also the commission
of corrupt and immoral acts of adultery and/or prostitution.

The petitioners filed on 11 July 1972 with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) of Quezon City a civil action for Damages based on Libel against the Graphic Publishing
Co., Inc., as owner; J. Antonio Araneta, as publisher; Luis R. Mauricio, as general manager and
editor; and Conde de Makati, as writer, of the GRAPHIC magazine.

On 29 December 1972, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed with the above court a criminal case
for libel against defendants Sison, Mauricio and Araneta. 5 The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-2713 and was raffled to Branch V thereof.
On 7 March 1973, after issues in Civil Case No. Q-16725 were joined and the accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-2713 were arraigned, petitioners filed therein separate motions to
consolidate the criminal case with the civil case in Branch XVI alleging that the evidence to be
presented in both would be the same; much valuable time and effort of the court as well as that
of the parties would be saved by such consolidation.

Only defendants Mauricio and Araneta, now private respondents, filed their opposition to the
motions. They claim that petitioners, having filed a separate civil action, have no legal standing
to intervene in the criminal case; there is no provision in the Rules of Court authorizing the
consolidation of the criminal case with the separate civil action.

On 13 October 1973, then Judge Pacifico de Castro of Branch V of the above court handed down
an Order in Criminal Case No. Q-2713 overruling the opposition, granting the motion to
consolidate, and ordering the transfer of the records of said case to Branch XVI for consolidation
with Civil Case No. Q-16725.

Mauricio filed a motion to reconsider the Order, which Sison adopted. In the order of 10 April
1973, the trial court denied the motion. Mauricio and Sison went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to seek
annulment of the aforesaid Orders of 13 March and 10 April 1973.

Issue:

WON the CA ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ARTICLE 33 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND
SECTION 2, RULE 111 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT PROHIBIT THE CONSOLIDATION,
FOR JOINT TRIAL, OR (SIC) THESE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES.

Ruling:

Yes. From the provisions of Secs. 1 and 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, it is clear that the
Civil action for the recovery of damages arising from a crime, or ex delicto, may be filed
separately from the criminal case either before the institution of the latter, which may be done
without reservation, or after such institution, provided, however, that a reservation to that
effect has been made. If in the meantime the criminal action is instituted, the civil action which
has been reserved cannot be commenced until final judgment has been rendered in the former.
This restriction does not, however, apply to the cases provided for in Section 3 of said rule.
Thus, in the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33 (as in the instant case), 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the civil action may be filed even after the institution of the criminal case, provided that
prior proper reservation had been made.

Authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code, filed before the institution of the
criminal case, may be consolidated with the latter, subject to the condition that no final
judgment has been rendered in the criminal case.

SECTION 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action
which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

2. Neplum vs. Orbeso – July 11, 2002 - DIAMLA di ko sure ani ha tabang mo pls

FACTS:

On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting the accused of the
crime of estafa on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused and her counsel as well as the public and private
prosecutors were present during such promulgation.

On 12 November 1999, the petitioner, through the private prosecutor, received its copy of the
Judgment. Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration on 29 November 1999, a Monday

On 28 January 2000, a Friday, petitioner received its copy of the 24 January 2000 Order of the
Trial Court denying for lack of merit petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. On 31 January
2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal from the Judgment. On the
same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of Appeal.

The RTC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of
Appeal. It accepted respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was
being taken had become final, because the Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal
were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day period was counted by the trial court
from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.

ISSUE: awa mali jud paste mog lain pls ang issue pls di mao basha noel naay gi paste si menchi
help

Whether or not the period from which a private offended party may appeal from the civil
aspect of a judgment in a civil action should be reckoned from the date of receipt of a written
notice of judgment

WON reservation should have been made?

YES

Deemed instituted ..

HELD:

YES.

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the
requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately
from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code shall remain "separate, distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on
the same act.

No. Had it been the accused who appealed, the Court could have easily ruled that the reckoning
period for filing an appeal be counted from the promulgation of the judgment. In In People v.
Tamani, the Court held that the reglementary period should start from the time the offended
party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its
promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

However, this ruling does not find application in this case, because it is the offended party
which appealed only the civil aspect of the case.

The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil
actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 32,27 33,28 3429 and 217630 of the Civil Code shall remain "separate,
distinct and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on the same act.
Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime
or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to protect such remaining civil
interest therein.

And this is precisely what herein petitioner wanted to do: to appeal the civil liability arising
from the crime -- the civil liability ex delicto.

Being in the nature of a civil case, the present intended appeal involves proceedings brought to
the Court of Appeals from a decision of the RTC in the exercise of the latter’s original
jurisdiction. Thus, it should be properly done by filing a notice of appeal. An appeal by virtue of
such notice shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed
from. For the private offended party, this rule then forecloses the counting of the period to
appeal from the "promulgation" of the judgment to the accused.

Petitioner posits that it can make an appeal only after receiving a written copy of the Judgment,
for "the parties would always need a written reference or a copy [thereof which] they can
review or refer to from time to time."

If petitioner or its counsel had never been notified of the Judgment, then the period for appeal
would never have run. True, no law requires the offended party to attend the promulgation,
much less to secure a copy of the decision on that date. But fiction must yield to reality. By mere
presence, the offended party was already actually notified of the Decision of acquittal and
should have taken the necessary steps to ensure that a timely appeal be filed.

Besides, all that petitioner had to do was to file a simple notice of appeal -- a brief statement of
its intention to elevate the trial court’s Decision to the CA. There was no reason why it could not
have done so within 15 days after actually knowing the adverse Judgment during the
promulgation. Parties and their counsels are presumed to be vigilant in protecting their
interests and must take the necessary remedies without delay and without resort to
technicalities.

-hellpppp find case pls t-t i-help mo ha basi di ni mao oi

3. DMPI vs. Velez – November 29, 2001 - DIANGA -same ruling with neplum vs orbeso
based on Article 33 on fraud

Facts:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney led with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged
failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent
Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-
ECCI, for deposit with the teller of the petitioner.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint 33 against Carmen Mandawe and
petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising
out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the
following grounds: (1) that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the
same facts, and (2) that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum
shopping as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91

Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa
without having reserved the filing of the civil action.

Ruling:

YES. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This is the law governing
the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his
right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the CivilCode of the Philippines.

Rules of Court refer only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation. (See Rule 111, Section 3)

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions
which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be
given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There
are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Thus, the Civil Case, an independent civil action
for damages on account of the fraud commited against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
4. Consing vs. People – July 15, 2013 - EDEM

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING v. PEOPLE, GR No. 161075, 2013-07-15

Facts:

Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599

In accordance with its option to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to
purchase one-half of the... property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was
effected by off-setting the amounts due to Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz
and Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50.

The other half of the... property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint
venture partner of Unicapital

Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to the
property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng

On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of April 19,
1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored the
demands

On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
(Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief... on the ground that he had acted as... a mere agent of his
mother
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor's Office. Where
separate civil case from criminal case

On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418)
for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of preliminary
attachment (Makati civil case).

On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case on
the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and Makati
civil cases criminal case filed by Plus Builders

On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was
filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite

Issue:

Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question on the arraignment of the criminal case while
the civil case is pending?

Ruling:

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independentlyinstituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.In the instant case, Civil
Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the allegedfraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civilaction under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of the criminal case at bar.independent case

In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the Manila
civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother
are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed
lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving
the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or
any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document.

Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for
even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid
the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the
criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other
evidence.

D. Section 4 – Effect of death on civil actions

1. People vs. Abungan – September 28, 2000 - ENCINAS

FACTS:

Pedro Abungan was convicted of murder of Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, sentenced to
reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.

Abungan pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment and through his counsel, filed the Notice of
Appeal.

Assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant Abungan
had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of Pedro Abungan during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his
criminal as well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex delicto)? YES.

RULING:

The death of the appellant extinguished his criminal liability because he died during the
pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability
arising from the crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished.

It must be added, though, that his civil liability may be based on OTHER sources of obligation
other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate civil action against his estate,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.

Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the
dismissal of the criminal case against him. Necessarily, the lower court's Decision — finding
him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased — becomes ineffectual.

2. Go vs. Looyuko – 537 SCRA 445, October 26, 2007 - ESTIOSO

Facts:

Petitioner Go and respondent Looyuko were business partners. They had a misunderstanding
due to the mismanagement of business. It resulted to filing of complaint against the respondent
which is docketed under Civil Case no. 67921. Go stated that looyuko misappropriated and
converted in his name the 41,376 China banking Corporation shares of stock of Go. Go
entrusted those shares of stock to Looyuko for the latter to sell.The criminal case was dismissed
due to Looyuko’s Death.

Issue:

Whether or not civil liability is extinguished upon the death of the accused.
Ruling: NO

The death of the accused pending final adjudication of the criminal case extinguishes the
accused’s criminal liability. If the civil liability directly arose from and is based solely on the
offense committed, then the civil liability is also extinguished.

But in this case, the civil liability did not arise from the crime of estafa. The recovery of the
CBC stock certificates does not result from or based solely on the crime of estafa but on an
agreement or arrangement between the parties that petitioner Go would endorse in blank said
stock certificates and give said certificates to respondent Looyuko in trust for petitioner for said
respondent to seill the stocks covered by the certificates. In such case, the civil liability survives
and an action for recovery therefor in a separate civil action can be instituted either against the
executor or administrator or the estate of the accused.

3. Asilo vs. People – March 9, 2011 - FERENAL

Facts:

At bench are appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the Fourth Division of the
Sandiganbayan; (1) finding Demetrio T

The factual antecedents of the cases are:

The late mother of Visitacion, “Marciana Vda. De Coronado” entered into a lease contract with
the then Municipal Mayor Manalang of the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna on March 15,
1978. The said contract allowed Marciana for:

1. the use and enjoyment of property of a lot and a store for a period of 20 years beginning
on March 15, 1978 until March 15, 1998, extendible for another 20 years, and also
 2. allowed for the building of a firewall on the rented property of at least as high as the
store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir(s) would be given
preferential rights. de la cruz

Marciana died sometime in 1984, hence, Visitacion took over the store and secured the yearly
Mayor's permit from then up to January 1993.

A fire razed in the public market of Nagcarlan sometime in 1986, upon Visitacion's request for
inspection, Engineer Gorospe found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood
strong but this finding was contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution which authorized Mayor
Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion under the supervision of Asilo
and Angeles.

Visitacion then filed for damages and filed a criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador,
Asilo, and Angeles for violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 known as the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act"...

The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding that the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of the said RA 3019.

During the pendency of the case, Alberto S. Angeles died on November 16, 1997 which led to
the dismissal of the case against him for there was no objection on the part of the Public
Prosecutor.

Later on, the death of Mayor Comendador followed on September 17, 2002. The counsel for the
late Mayor Comendador filed its Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the death of the late
mayor had extinguished both his criminal and civil liability. The Sandiganbayan granted the
extinction of the criminal liability but denied the same for the civil liability.

Hence, these Petitions.

Issue:

Whether or not the death of the late Mayor Comendador extinguishes his civil liability? NO.

Ruling:

We note, first off, that the death of Angeles and of Mayor Comendador during the pendency
of the case extinguished their criminal liabilities.

Pursuant to Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides that:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are as follows: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited
acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3)
that they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR
that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to the other
party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.

The Court sustained the Sandiganbayan in its finding of criminal and civil liabilities against
petitioner Mayor Comendador, as hereby represented by his widow Victoria Bueta, on the
grounds that it was indisputable that the first two requisites of the criminal offense were
present at the time of the commission of the complained acts and that, with respect to the
remaining elements, there was a sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an
undue injury suffered on the part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials
concerned acted with evident bad faith during the demolition of the market stall.

The demolition of the store owned by Visitacion Bombasi was carried out without a court order
and was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there was nothing in the two
resolutions which gave the herein accused to demolish the plaintiff's store on the grounds that
there was no merit in the contention that the store was a public nuisance, with respect to the the
findings of Engineer Gorospe, the store was "intact" and "stood strong", and that the
Sangguniang Bayan resolutions are not enough to justify demolition.

On the other note, the death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could
have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed.
However, in the case at bar, the civil liability filed against the late Mayor Comendador was
based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations as provided by Article 31
and 32(6) of the Civil Code.

When Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him which
resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor Comendador’s counsel, the
prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the ground that the civil liability did not arise
from delict, hence, survived the death of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal was DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court
affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T. Comendador
guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the finality of the dismissal
of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as the same was not appealed. In
view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial, his criminal liability is
extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and
Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta Vda. De Comendador, are hereby
declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for temperate damages in the amount of
₱200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Costs against the petitioners-appellants.

4. People vs. Paniterce – August 5, 2010 - FOROSUELO

Facts: Paniterce was charged with 4 counts of rape of his daughter and 2 counts of rape also of
his other daughter.

Paniterce filed an appeal and the CA affirmed the decision.

Paniterce filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA dated August 22, 2008.

On September 23, 2008, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. However, in a letter dated
October 12, 2009, the Director of Prisons and Security of the Bureau of Corrections informed
the Court that Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009.

Issue: Will the criminal and civil liabilities of Paniterce be extinguished due to his death before
a final judgment has been rendered? YES

Ruling: The court ruled that Paniterce’s criminal liabilities would be totally extinguished by his
death.

His civil liabilities, being civil liabilities ex delicto, would likewise also be extinguished by his
death.

The court said that according to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary liabilities, they are extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment.

In the guidelines laid down People v. Bayotas, it was stated that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability as well as civil liability
based solely thereon.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA -Gelvez, Jenefer

FACTS: Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Masbate City with the rape of his daughter, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the
incident.He was charged with statutory rape under Article 266-A.

On march 23, 2006 he was found guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision5 dated August 25, 2011, affirmed
Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with
Republic Act No. 93466 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages.

Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

without eligibility for parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00, he is
ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.7Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to this Court. In its Decision8 dated
January 9, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against
Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded.

In view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca is DENIED. The
Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04012 is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further ORDERED to pay interest on all
damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision.9

However, in a letter10 dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque), Officer-in-Charge,

Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court
that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa
City.

Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), Officer-in-Charge,

Maximum Security Compound, NBP, wrote another letter12 dated February 12, 2013, likewise
informing the Court of Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012. PIS Lansangan appended to his
letter a mere photocopy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate.13 The Court received PIS Lansangan’s
letter on February 18, 2013.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso
and which was apparently also unaware of its client’s demise, still filed a Motion for
Reconsideration14 of the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013.

In a Resolution15 dated March 20, 2013, the Court required Roque to submit a certified true copy
of Amistoso’s Death Certificate within 10 days from notice and deferred action on the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Court’s former directive.

In a letter16 dated on June 25, 2013, PIS Lansangan finally provided the Court with a certified
true copy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate.17
ISSUE:Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.YEP

RULING: Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the
criminal action is extinguished in asmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19

Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court
of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still
pending and unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not
immediately informed of his death.

Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013,
even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said
Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

E. Sections 6 and 7 – Prejudicial Question

1. People vs. Aragon – 94 Phil. 357 - GRAN

Facts:

Abelo Aragon was charged with the crime of bigamy for having contracted a second marriage
with a certain Efigenia C. Palomer on September 21, 1947, while his previous valid marriage
with Martina Godinez had not been dissolved and was still existing.

While the case was pending trial, Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil against Aragon, alleging
that the latter "by means of force, threats and intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to
marry him", and praying that their marriage on September 21, 1947 be annulled.

Thereupon, defendant-appellant filed a motion in the criminal case for bigamy, praying that the
criminal charge be provisionally dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for annulment of
the second marriage is a prejudicial question.

The court denied this motion on the ground that the validity of the second marriage may be
determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. Against this order this appeal has been
presented to this court.

Issue:

Whether or not prejudicial question exists between the annulment case filed by Efigenia C.
Palomer and the criminal case for bigamy against Abelo Aragon? NO.
Ruling:

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
(question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal.

The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is first element.

Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element.

In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and
void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for
nullity must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the
first marriage is a prejudicial question.

Should Palomer’s allegations regarding Aragon’s use of force be true, it is no doubt illegal and
void, however, this does not bar him from prosecution against the crime of bigamy.

The pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Palomer, is
absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-appellant. It does not
determine the existence of any of the elements of the charge of bigamy. A decision thereon is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question

2. Bobis vs. Bobis – July 31, 2001 - GRUMO

Facts:

Isagani Bobis was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage with Imelda
Marbella-Bobis, and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez, while his
first marriage with Maria Dulce Javier was still subsisting.

Thereafter, Isagani Bobis initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. He then filed
a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case, to which the
trial judge granted said motion.
Imelda Marbella-Bobis, in her petition, argues that respondent should have first obtained a
judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage,
inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no
longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.

Issue:

WON the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.? NO.

Ruling:

As ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and
in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity.

The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As
respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second
marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If
he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when
he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.

It should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a
prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore,
erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for
bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was
only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted
to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying
his criminal prosecution.

In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man
at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is
not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial
question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat
the criminal action against him.

Ans:

3. Torres vs. Garchitorena – December 27, 2002 - GUILLERMO

Susan Realty, Inc. (SRI) is the owner of 2 lots in Cavite. These are adjacent to the sea and
overtime, portions thereof were submerged by sea water. Fernandez is the caretaker of the
property.

Mayor Torres caused the leveling and reclamation of the said submerged portion for the
relocation of squatters. Fernandez protested, informing the Mayor that his employer owned the
property. However, the mayor ignored him.

Later, SRI went to Torres presenting the titles over the property. They even had it surveyed to
confirm the portions within the perimeter of the title.

In their conference, Torres informed SRI that he had already spent 1m and offered to help SRI in
connection w/ its projects in Cavite provided that they will no longer file the suit. So, SRI
requested the deferment of the reclamation to enable them to study the offer. However, SRI
learned that 5 families of squatters had already occupied portions of the reclaimed area and
more were due to arrive.

SRI filed a criminal complaint for violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices)

8mo later, the republic filed a civil case for the reversion of the property issued in favor of SRI.
It alleged that said property had been ascertained by the DENR as part of the inalienable
public domain.

Torres filed for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question in Civil Case which was denied.

Issue: WON the reversion filed by the state in the civil case constitutes a prejudicial question to
the proceedings in the criminal case because the civil case?

YES. However, it does not obliterate the fact that SRI was thereby injured by their acts.

HELD: Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:

Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests. (6a)

Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question.

— The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
(5a)

The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action. In this case, the
criminal case was filed ahead of the Civil Case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.

4. People vs. Consing – January 16, 2003 - JEREZ

FACTS:

Respondent Raphael Jose Consing Jr and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz, represented to Plus
Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in Imus,
Cavite, and acquired it from Juanito Tan Teng (Juanito) and Po Willie Yu (Po). Relying on the
representations, PBI purchased the questioned lot. Later, PBI discovered that respondent and
his mother did not have a valid title over the subject lot, and it was never sold to them by
Juanito and Po. As a result thereof PBI was ousted from the possession of the disputed lot. PBI
demanded from respondent and his mother to return the amount of P 13,369,641.79 alleged to
have been initially paid but to no avail. Respondent filed an action for Injunctive Relief
against PBI and other defendants and sought a declaration that he was merely an agent of his
mother and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI and other defendants on the various
transactions. Later, PBI filed against respondent and his mother a complaint for Damages and
Attachment. However, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping
and the pendency of the action for Injunctive Relief. A criminal case for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against respondent and his mother. Respondent,
however, filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pendency of Civil Case for Injunctive Relief and for Damages and
Attachment, is a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document, filed against the Respondent.

RULING:

No, a prejudicial question does not exist if the civil action is an independent civil action,
there is no prejudicial question for it can proceed independently from the criminal action.

In the case at bar, the court find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in
Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and
his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction
involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An
agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document.

Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action.

In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.

5. Ching vs. Court of Appeals – April 27, 2000 - LOVITOS

Facts:
Ching was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, with four counts of estafa
punishable under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Presidential
Decree 115, otherwise known as the "Trust Receipts Law”.

On 05 March 1992, Ching, together with Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a case
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC-Manila), for declaration of nullity of
documents and for damages entitled "Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. et. al. vs. Allied Banking
Corporation.”

On 07 August 1992, Ching filed a petition for the suspension of the criminal proceedings on
the ground of prejudicial question in a civil action.

RTC denied the petition for suspension and scheduled the arraignment and pre-trial of the
criminal cases. As a result, petitioner moved to reconsider the order to which the prosecution
filed an opposition. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied and the criminal cases
was then set for arraignment and pre-trial.

Aggrieved, petitioner brought before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition which
sought to declare the nullity of the aforementioned orders and to prohibit the RTC-Makati from
conducting further proceedings in the criminal cases.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition.

Consequently, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision which the appellate
court denied for lack of merit

Issue:

WON a prejudicial question exists

Ruling:

No. The court agrees with the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
that no prejudicial question exists.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try
and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal

Under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming that the court hearing the civil aspect
of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust
receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his
culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence.

To put it differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not
follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution
and liability.

6. Omictin vs. Court of Appeals – January 22, 2007 - MAMAC

FACTS:

Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a
complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati against
private respondent George I. Lagos. He alleged that the private respondent, despite repeated
demands, refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted to him when he was still the
president of Saag Phils., Inc..
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.

It appears that on January 7, 1999, private respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the
declaration of nullity of the respective appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as
President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of
dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment of a
receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a temporary restraining order and
injunction against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo, Tan and petitioner.

The trial court denied respondent’s motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed with the CA the petition
for certiorari assailing the aforesaid orders.

The CA ruled that it is clear that a prejudicial question exists which calls for the suspension
of the criminal proceedings before the lower court.

Incidentally, on January 18, the SEC case was transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong pursuant
to A.M. No. 00- 11-03-SC implementing the Securities and Regulation Code vesting in the RTCs
jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes.

Meanwhile, on March 5, 2001, the CA, addressing petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
aforementioned decision, issued a resolution stating that the petition for review filed by private
respondent has already Terminated on November 20, 2000 and a corresponding entry entry of
judgment has already been issued by the High Court, that the same is final and executory, the
private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision 30 June 2000 before this Court is
NOTED for being moot and academic.

CRIM CASE: ESTAFA

CIVIL ACTION: ?? declaration of nullity of the respective appointments, declaration

of dividends, recovery of share in the profits, involuntary dissolution and the appointment
of a receiver, recovery of damages and an application for a temporary restraining order and
injunction

ISSUE:
Whether or not a prejudicial question exists? YES.

RULING:

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.

Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now pending before the
RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts that are intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based.

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra corporate dispute will determine the
guilt or innocence of the private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by petitioner
before the RTC of Makati.

*The return of the vehicle will determine the prejudicial question.

7. Dreamwork vs. Janiola – June 30, 2009 - MARTINEZ

Petitioner filed a petitioner filed BP 22 against private respondent...

private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner by
filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement
between the parties, as well as for damages.

Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration
of the construction agreement.

private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in Criminal Case alleging that the
civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the...
resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined. In other words, private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings... on the grounds that:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as... the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial
question is... that "the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action"; thus, this element is missing in this
case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.

MTC grants the Motion to Suspend Proceedings

RTC denied the petition.

Incidentally, no clear evidence of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The...
criminal proceedings are still in their initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the
fact that the civil action was filed after the criminal action was instituted does not render the
issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in character.

Issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THERE EXISTS A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION (PQ)? waley

Ruling:

petition must be granted.

Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated
June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Sec. 5, which states:

SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. -- The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue... determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the
above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:

The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the... resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

We cannot agree with private respondent.

it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment of a
provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that
it originally had."

In the instant case, the... phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the nature of the
civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term
criminal action.

There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.

Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede
the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the
criminal action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must... be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously instituted
civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not... susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed"
in Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend
the criminal action may be filed during the preliminary... investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the
case.

This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the
situations when the motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary
investigation... or during the trial may be filed.

EC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.--A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary... investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend
the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere
afterthought and instituted to delay... the criminal proceedings.

even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial
question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.

the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:

(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;oba

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank
to stop payment... the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance
of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the
elements of the crime.

the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on
dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution... for violation of
BP 22

The fact of the matter is that private respondent... indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under
BP 22.

We GRANT this petition.

8. Magestrado vs. People – July 10, 2007 - MATARANAS

FACTS:

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which was docketed as I.S. No. 98-3900.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the
City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus,
Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against
petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.

Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question.

Petitioner alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money
pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case
No. Q-98- 34308, a case for Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages,
pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, must be resolved first before Criminal
Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately
related to the issues raised in the criminal action.

ISSUE/S:
Whether Judge Estrella T. Estrada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Quezon City, had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of her jurisdiction in
denying the Petition for Certiorari and petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration on the
ground of a prejudicial question pursuant to the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the
prevailing jurisprudence.

RULING:

No,

A perusal of the allegations in the complaints show that Civil Cases are principally for the
determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and
whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by TCT No.
N173163. On the other hand, Criminal Case , involves the determination of whether petitioner
committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new
owners duplicate copy of TCT No. N-173163.

It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each
other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or
guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land
or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether
petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163.

MeTC-Branch 43, therefore, did not err in ruling that the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-34308
for cancellation of mortgage before the RTC-Branch 77; and Civil Case No. Q-98-34349 for
collection of a sum of money before RTC-Branch 84, do not pose a prejudicial question in the
determination of whether petitioner is guilty of perjury in Criminal Case No. 90721. RTC-
Branch 83, likewise, did not err in ruling that MeTC-Branch 43 did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No.
90721.

9. Spouses Jose vs. Spouses Suarez – June 30, 2008 - MENDOZA

FACTS: Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of petitioner Carolina
Jose's (Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina
and her husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose, later on increased the interest to 5% per day, which
respondents were forced to accept because they allegedly had no other option left. It then
became a practice that petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the latter would
deposit the same in her and her husband's account to cover the maturing postdated checks they
had previously issued in payment of their other loans. Purita would then issue checks in favor
of petitioners in payment of the amount borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.
Thereafter, the spouses Jose filed cases of Violation of BP22 against spouses Suarez, where the
latter filed a motions to suspend the criminal proceeding on the ground of prejudicial
question.

ISSUE: WON a prejudicial question exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case.? NO.

RULLING. A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action
and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in
the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance
of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under BP Blg.22. In several
instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not
the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that
the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the
offense are properly proved.

Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for
being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg.22 cases because what will
ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question
posed before the court hearing the BP Blg.22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is,
if a bouncing check has been issued.

10. De Zuzuarregui vs. Villarosa – April 5, 2010 - MONDIA (nag-BarOps)

Procedural History:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 on the ground of that
the certification of non-forum shopping was not sign by the petitioner and July 14, 2008 denied
the motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals.

Statement of Facts:

Krizia Katrina Ty-De Zuzuarregui and Rosemary Torres Ty-Rasekhi filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of her mother Bella Torres before the
RTC of Pasig City. The initially petitioner opposed for the said petition and ended up in a
compromise agreement that they were the only heirs of Bella.

Subsequently, two (2) of Rosemary‘s alleged siblings, Peter Torres Ty and Catherine
Torres Ty-Chavez , filed a Petition to Annul Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement.
Claiming that they are also biological children of the late Bella, and are entitled to participate in
the settlement of the latter‘s estate. Later, private respondent Fannie Torres-Ty, who likewise
claimed to be a biological child of the late Bella and therefore also entitled to inherit from her,
filed a petition-in-intervention in the action for annulment of judgment. The latter filed a
complaint for falsification and perjury against the petitioner and Rosemary.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the civil action for annulment of judgment and
the criminal action for falsification of public documents? YES.

Answer: It is evident that the result of the civil case will determine the innocence or guilt of the
petitioner in the criminal cases for falsification of public documents.

Reasoning:

The criminal cases arose out of the claim of Peter, Catherine, and Fannie that they are also the
legal heirs of Bella. If it is finally adjudged in the civil case that they are not biological children
of the late Bella and consequently not entitled to a share in her estate as heirs, there is no more
basis to proceed with the criminal cases against petitioner who could not have committed
falsification in her pleadings filed before the RTC of Pasig City, the truth of her statements
regarding the filiation of Peter, Catherine and Fannie having been judicially settled.i

Holding:

The petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated August 23, 2007 and July 14, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal proceedings against
petitioner are hereby ordered SUSPENDED until the final resolution of civil action.

11. Pimentel vs. Pimentel – September 13, 2010 - MORAN

FACTS: On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap(private respondent) filed an action for
frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a
prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the
victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The RTC Quezon City held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court of Appeals ruled that even
if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be
immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts
constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

RULING: NO. Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the case at bar, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide, which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.”
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim
is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts
of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals that “the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a
second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability
for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the Court declared in
that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned.”

12. Argovan vs. SMC – July 24, 2013 - OBISO

Facts:

A criminal case for violation of BP 22 and estafa was filed by SMC against Spouses Gaditano.
petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust Bank,
Guevarra, SMC and Fatima, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42386. Petitioners alleged that
AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their bank accounts; that their
obligation to SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima issued a forged check.

Issue: WON a PQ exists.

Ruling:

No.

The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being
conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of
another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to
its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners' savings account. The source of the
funds of petitioners' savings account is no longer SMC's concern. The matter is between
petitioners and AsiaTrust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is
whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products.

IV. RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

A. Section 1 – Preliminary investigation defined; when required

Section 1. Preliminary investigation defined; when required. — Preliminary investigation is an

inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.

Except as provided in section 7 of this Rule, a preliminary investigation is required to be

conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the
fine. (1

1. People vs. Court of Appeals – January 21, 1999; 301 SCRA 475 - ONTAL
Facts: The case below arose from the fatal shooting of Petitioner Dys mother, Rosalinda Dy, in
which the primary suspect was Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo, son of Private Respondent
Billy Cerbo.

On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a Motion for leave of court to
reinvestigate the case (Annex I. Rollo, pp43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in
an order dated April 28, 1994 (Annex J, Rollo, p. 45).

Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder
case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued on May 27, 1994

Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the
same was issued without probable cause. On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first
assailed order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest

Issue: WON The trial court erred in dismissing the Information filed against the private
respondent.

Ruling: Yes.

The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function that

belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function,9 the correctness of the exercise of
which is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure
the conviction of the accused upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason is
found in the nature and the objective of a preliminary investigation. Here, the public
prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime x x x has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.15 Evidentiary matters must be presented and heard during
the trial.16 Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest
error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, the trial court
should respect such determination.

Thus for crimes cognizable by RTC preliminary investigations are usally conducted. The
primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience,
expenses, ignonimy and stress of defending himself in hte course of a formal trial until the
reasonable probability of his guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office
designated by law for that purpose. Such summary proceeding also protects the state from the
burden of the unnecessary expenses an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.

2. Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 101978, April 7, 1993 - OREVILLO

Facts

Petitioner is the Congressman of the 3rd District of Camarines Sur who received in behalf of the
municipality of Tigaon, Camarines Sur an ambulance donated by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office. However, he did not deliver the ambulance to said municipality.

On January 25, 1989, Justice Garchitorena sent Deputy Ombudsman Jose C. Colayco a letter-
complaint against petitioner regarding said ambulance which was referred by Ombudsman
Conrado M. Vasquez to the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, Manuel C. Domingo.

On December 5, 1990, Ombudsman Investigator Isaac D. Tolentino issued a resolution finding

no probable cause for malversation and recommended that the Case No. OMB-1-89-0168 for
"Malversation of Public Property under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code” be dismissed
which was approved by Deputy Ombudsman Domingo.

On April 1, 1991, Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez issued a resolution sustaining the finding of
Ombudsman Investigator Tolentino that there is no malversation but found in the same
resolution, a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the
dispositive part of which states:

On April 3, 1991, an information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 16672, against petitioner was filed.

On May 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to quash which was denied by the respondent court.
The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
On October 12, 1991 petition filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, seeking to annul the
resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16672, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Eduardo P. Pilapil" dated June 27, 1991 denying his motion to quash the
information for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. as well as the
resolution dated September 5, 1991 denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
predicated his motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person because the
same was filed without probable cause. In addition thereto, petitioner cites the fact that the
information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was filed although the complaint upon which
the preliminary investigation was conducted is for malversation.

Issue

Whether or not the information for violation of RA 3019 that the preliminary investigation
conducted for the accused was for the malversation?

Ruling

The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.
Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective, but, if there
were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the
attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the Information, should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court
so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.

Petitioner loses sight of the fact that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is
often the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime,
to enable the prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. The preliminary designation
of the offense in the directive to file a counter-affidavit and affidavits of one's witnesses is not
conclusive. Such designation is only a conclusion of law of Deputy Ombudsman Domingo. The
Ombudsman is not bound by the said qualification of the crime. Rather, he is guided by the
evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on the basis of which, he
may formulate and designate the offense and direct the filing of the corresponding information.
In fact, even, the designation of the offense by the prosecutor in the information itself has been
held inconclusive, to wit:

". . . the real nature of the criminal charge isy determined not from the caption or preamble of
the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information . . . it is not the technical name given by the Fiscal appearing in the title of the
information that determines the character of the crime but the facts alleged in the body of the
Information."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.

3. Domalanta vs. COMELEC – June 29, 2000 - OSORNO

FACTS: Members of the staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Isabela, including
Petitioners Dr. Domalonta and Dr. Francisco, were charged by respondent Pimentel in a
complaint for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code with the COMELEC. It was
alleged that they participated in the padding of votes in (nine) 9 municipalities in Isabela in
favor of senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile (27,755), Gregorio Honasan (10,000) and Ramon
Mitra (7,000).

Petitioners, in their counter affidavits, categorically denied the charges, and declared that they
faithfully recorded the votes obtained by the candidates. Petitioners were part of the support or
technical staff of the PBC of the Province of Isabela.

COMELEC issued a resolution for the filing of the information against respondents for
violation of Section 27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646. It ruled that petitioners acted in
conspiracy with the rest of respondents in the unauthorized addition of votes for the said
senatorial candidates. Discovered in the anomaly was a pattern of distribution of votes —
retaining the last 3 digits of the number of votes in the padded Provincial certificate of canvass.
The COMELEC held that the padded votes gave a presumption that the act done was
intentionally and deliberately.
SECTION 27. Election offenses — In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated
in Section 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an
election offense:

(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers with, increases or
decreases votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Petitioners insist on their innocence in any wrongdoing in the preparation of the Statement of
Votes per Municipality, arguing that there is no evidence on record to show a hint of probable
cause against them for the commission of an election offense under Section 27 of R.A. No. 6646
with regard to the padding of votes during the May 8, 1995 elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence showing probable cause for the commission
of the petitioners of an election offense under Section 27 of RA No. 6646.

RULING: Yes.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term does not
mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial
for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

It needs be stressed that for the May 8, 1995 elections, petitioners were part of the support or
technical staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of the Province of Isabela that was
tasked with the canvassing of the Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass (CoC), the
preparation of the Provincial Certificates of Canvass and the supporting Statement of Votes
(SoV) per Municipality/City which entries in said documents were certified to as correct by the
PBC. It is upon a comparison between the Municipal/City CoC submitted to the PBC and the
SoV per Municipality/City as prepared by the members of the PBC and their support staff,
including herein petitioners, that one would readily see the neatly padded vote totals for the
three (3) senatorial candidates, namely, Enrile, Honasan and Mitra, viz:

City/Municipality: Candidate Votes Canvassed Votes based on Discrepancy

PBC

Santiago City: Enrile 5,454 16,454 1,000

Angadanan Municipality:

Enrile 5,996 7,996 2,000

Mitra 3,888 4,888 1,000

Cauayan:

Enrile 13,710 19,710 6,000

Honasan 11,205 21,205 10,000

Cordon: Enrile 6,794 9,794 3,000

Delfin Albano: Enrile 3,972 4,972 1,000

Echague: Enrile 10,552 15,552 5,000

San Mariano: Enrile 5,683 8,253 2,570

San Pablo: Enrile 2,418 3,438 1,020

Ilagan: Mitra 14,457 20,457 6,000

San Mateo: Enrile 9,424 15,589 6,615

TOTAL 103,553 148,308 44,755

*Candidates Unauthorized Additional Votes: Enrile – 27,755; Honasan – 10,000; Mitra – 7,000

As can be gleaned from the figures shown, save in the municipalities of San Mariano, San Pablo
and San Mateo, the last three digits of the number of votes in the Municipal Certificate of
Canvass of the other municipalities were retained in the padded votes which will give rise to
the presumption that the act was done intentionally and deliberately. The discrepancies are
too substantial and rounded off to be categorized as a mere ‘computation error’ or a result of
fatigue. There is a limit to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight in the
performance of official duty. — Suffice it to state that the magnitude of the error as reflected
in the discrepancies itemized above renders unacceptable the defense of ‘computer error’ or
honest mistake.
The peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case hardly paints a picture of manifest
human error or fatigue in the tabulation of the votes of the senatorial candidates in Isabela. It, in
fact, discloses a pernicious scheme which would not have been successfully perpetrated without
the indispensable cooperation of all members of the PBC and their support staff which included
herein petitioners. The latter’s protestations in the counter-affidavits that they only tabulated
the vote totals of senatorial candidates Tillah and Tolentino are at best convenient and self-
serving explanations to justify their exculpation from any wrong-doing. Their claims are,
moreover, not substantiated by any of the PBC members. Indeed, as this Court pointedly
observed in Velayo v. COMELEC 20 the "self-serving nature of said Affidavits cannot be
discounted. As this Court has pronounced, reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits."

Be that as it may, petitioners’ claims are a matter of defense and as pointed out by the Court
recently in Pimentel, Jr. v. COMELEC, 21 — the merit of defenses such as honest mistake,
simple error, good faith, and the mere performance of ministerial duties, as interposed by
persons charged with the election offense of tampering, increasing or decreasing votes received
by a candidate in any election, are best ventilated in the trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation.

The circumstances in themselves constitute probable cause that justifies the belief that more
likely than not, the election offense was committed and was committed by private
respondents. Probable cause is based neither on clear and convincing evidence of guilt nor
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief, and so it is enough that there exists such state of facts as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so.
Considering that private petitioners in invoking the defenses of honest mistake, oversight due
to fatigue and performance of ministerial duties virtually admitted the existence of the
discrepancies in the total number of votes garnered by the senatorial candidates, which
discrepancies by no stretch of imagination could be dismissed as negligible or inconsequential,
there is not merely a strong suspicion that they actually committed the election offense which
they are charged. The burden of proof appears to have shifted to them to prove that the said
discrepancies cannot be considered illegal and criminal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

4. De Chavez vs. Ombudsman – February 6, 2007 - PASCUA

Petitioners:

ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ
PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA

ROLANDO L. LONTOK, SR.

ROLANDO M. LONTOK, JR.

GLORIA G. MENDOZA

Respondents:

NORA L. MAGNAYE (private respondent)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (public respondent)

FACTS:

 The respondents filed two complaints against petitioners:

1. An administrative case involving grave misconduct, oppression, conduct prejudicial to

the best interest of the service, dishonesty, gross neglect of duty and violation of Section
5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713.

2. A criminal case involving violations of Section 3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
falsification of official documents and estafa.

 The petitioners alleged that the public respondent's Supplemental Resolution dated 12
July 2005 categorically stated that petitioners are liable for the criminal acts complained
of; that the public respondent did not even discuss the matter of probable cause but
instead immediately ruled on their guilt; that the said resolution did not state or instruct
the filing of the appropriate criminal informations against them before the courts of
justice. Hence, the public respondent's instantaneous finding of criminal liability on their
part renders any trial against them an "exercise in futility" which "inevitably clashes with
Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution which grants to the accused, inter alia, the right to
have a speedy, impartial and public trial." Therefore, the public respondent had
exceeded its jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
 "Ombudsman Act of 1989," since there is nothing in the said statute which grants to it
the power to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent office of the ombudsman com

mitted grave abuse of discretion and acted without jurisdiction in finding petitioners already
liable for criminal offenses.

RULING:

NO. The respondent office of the ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion and did
not act without jurisdiction in finding petitioners already liable for criminal offenses.

A review of the specific powers of the Ombudsman under the Constitution, the laws and
jurisprudential pronouncements is in order. Both the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6770) empower the public respondent to investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official
or employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper
or inefficient. By virtue of this power, it may conduct a preliminary investigation for the mere
purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial.

The presumption that the Ombudsman knows whereof he speaks forcefully applies. We must
then presume that he is well aware of the extent and limitations of his powers. Thus, when
Ombudsman Marcelo used the words "liable for" in his Supplemental Resolution of 12 July
2005, he is presumed to have used these within the sense of the limited power vested in him by
our laws and jurisprudence- the finding of probable cause.

The SC conclude that the words "liable for" employed by the Ombudsman in the challenged
resolution really alluded only to the probability of guilt. They simply imply that the
Ombudsman had found probable cause to hold petitioners liable for the crimes imputed and,
thus, should be held liable for trial in the courts of law. It is not a declaration of guilt.

Probable cause, as used in preliminary investigations, has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted.

5. Ricaforte vs. Jurado – 532 SCRA 317, September 5, 2007 - PITOGO

ALICIA F. RICAFORTE v. LEON L. JURADO, GR No. 154438, 2007-09-05

Facts:

respondent filed a Complaint[3] for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
Alicia F. Ricaforte (petitioner) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. He alleged that he
operates and manages a rice... mill in Bulacan; that sometime in June 1996, Ruby Aguilar
(Aguilar) procured rice from him and in payment thereof gave him two Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC) checks, to wit: FEBTC Check No. 08A096028P dated July 25, 1996 and Check
No. 08A096029P dated August 25, 1996,... in the amount of P431,555.00 each, which were both
issued by petitioner and when presented for payment were dishonored.

Assistant City Prosecutor Luis Zenon Q. Maceren dismissed the complaint for estafa and B.P.
Blg. 22 for insufficiency of evidence.

Respondent appealed the dismissal of his complaint to the Department of Justice. The Secretary
of Justice issued a Resolution[7] dated September 21, 2000 modifying the Resolution of the City
Prosecutor and directing him to file an information against... petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg.
22.

Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

The CA found no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Justice Secretary in his assailed
Resolutions. It ruled that trial on the merits must ensue since it is on said... occasion that
petitioner is granted opportunity for a full and exhaustive presentation of her evidence and not
during the preliminary investigation phase where the investigating officer acts upon probable
cause and reasonable belief

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED WHEN
THE QUEZON CITY PROSECUTION OFFICE HAD FOUND?

Ruling:

Petitioner contends that the CA misappreciated the importance of a preliminary investigation

when it ruled that the trial on the merits must ensue, and it is on said occasion when petitioner
is granted the opportunity for a full and exhaustive display of her evidence

We are not persuaded.

The validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.

it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or... information.

it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof

In fine, the CA did not commit any error in upholding the findings of the Secretary of Justice
that probable cause exists that the crime of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has been committed by
petitioner.

Principles:

A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence.

preliminary investigation stage which is merely inquisitorial

It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty.

It... is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence

6. Sanchez vs. Demetriou – November 9, 1993 - PREGLO

On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a
preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex
Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp
Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993,
and he was immediately taken to the said camp.

At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent prosecutors
immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.

The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of
the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial
court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the
seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.

1) Issue: WON, petitioner was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation;

No. During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit

Q. So far, there are no other statements

A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we believe there is
nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements.

Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?

A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon.

The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his
behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now
question his representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot
be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating officer
shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant

Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation, so
may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.

At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.

If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of
the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal
case in abeyance. In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for
such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.

7. Tehankee Jr. vs. Madayag – March 6 1992 - RESIMILLA

Facts:

On july 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against Claudio
Teehankee Jr. allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman. After the prosecution had
rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence, but before the
motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave
of court to file the amended information. The amended information filed on October 31, 1991
charges Teehankee of murder. The trial court admitted the amended information. During the
arraignment, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information contending the
lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered the plea of not guilty be
entered for petitioner. The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The petitioner’s
counsel manifested that he did not want to take part in the proceeding because of the legal issue
raised. So, the trial court appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

Petitioner alleged that there being a substantial amendment, the same may no longer be allowed
after arraignment and during the trial. He said there is a need to establish that the same mortal
wounds which were initially frustrated by timely medical assistance ultimately caused the
death of the victim, because as for him, this death could have been caused by a supervening act
which is not imputable to petitioner since the amended information for murder charges an
entirely different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is, the fact of death whose cause
has to be established, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be
conducted before the new information can be admitted. Hence, petitioner now seeks among
other things for the SC to nullify the respondent judge’s admittance of the amended information
and to compel the judge to order preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the amended
information.

Issue:

Whether an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary

investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and
validly be admitted.

Ruling:

Yes, in determining if there should be an amendment or a substitution of information the rule is

that where the second information involves in the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is
sufficient. Otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and
different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

In this case, it is evident that frustrated murder is a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the latter. It is indispensable that the
essential element of intent to kill as well as qualifying circumstances such as treachery or
evident premeditation be alleged in both an information for frustrated murder and for murder,
thereby meaning and proving that the same material allegations are essential to the sufficiency
of the information filed for both. This is because, except for the death of the victim, the essential
elements of consummated murder likewise constitute the essential ingredients to convict herein
petitioner for the offense of frustrated murder. In this case, therefore, there is an identity of
offense charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not
a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we
hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and consequent thereto, the
filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

B. Section 2 – Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations

Section 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations. —

The following may conduct preliminary investigations:

(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;

(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and

(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.

Their authority to conduct preliminary investigations shall include all crimes cognizable by the
proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions. (2a)

1. Cudia vs. Court of Appeals – G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998 -

;( wala?

2. Natividad vs. Felix – February 14, 1994 - SIMBAJON

FACTS:

Mrs. Lourdes Aquino wrote a letter to the PNP requesting them to investigate the Municipal
Mayor of Tarlac for the death of her husband Severino Aquino. The PNP then requested the
Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor to investigate the petitioner for the death of the victim. Petitioner
wrote to the secretary of justice requesting the preliminary investigation be done in Manila, but
this was denied. The petitioner then moved to remand his case for preliminary investigation
contending that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the case because it was the
Ombudsman and not the provincial prosecutor who has jurisdiction to conduct the
investigation. Respondent judge denied the petition.

ISSUE

whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
amended information filed by the provincial fiscal and in directing petitioner's arrest.

RULING

YES. Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), petitioner contends
that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation over his case for the alleged murder of Severino Aquino. Section 15
states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:chanrobles virtual law library

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage,
from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. (Emphasis ours)

3. Schroeder vs. Saldevar – April 27, 2007 -CABUNGCAL

Facts:

Marina B. Schroeder, petitioner, was an owner of a liquor store in Robinsons Galleria, Pasig
City. Respondents Mario A. Saldewvar and Erwin C. Macalino are the Legal Division Chief and
Attorney II of BIR, Revenue District Office No. 7, Quezon City. Respondents were arrested in an
entrapment operation conducted by NBI. After the inquest, DOJ then filed an information for
“direct bribery” against respondents at RTC Quezon, Branch 77. The case was remanded to the
DOJ for preliminary investigation.Finding probable cause, DOJ issued a Resolution which the
respondents argued and petitioned for review. The DOJ however, endorsed the petition to the
Ombudsman.

Issues:

Whether or not the Ombudsman has the right to conduct preliminary investigation

Ruling:

YES. The petitioner contends that finding probable cause is an executive function lodged in the
prosecutorial arm of the Government and not in the judiciary. In the criminal justice system,
prosecutors were given wide latitude of discretion in determining probable cause that a case
should be filed in court or not. However, as a rule, Ombudsman discretion prevails over
judiciary in which therefore the court cannot interfere.

The respondents also contend that DOJ cannot endorse the matter to the Ombudsman when in
fact, the respondents were public officials. In which, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to
investigate illegal or unjust acts of public officials. Therefore, indicting Mario A. Saldevar and
Erwin C. Macalino for direct bribery is AFFIRMED.

4. Turingan vs. Judge Garfin – April 17, 2007 - SOLDEVILLA

FACTS

In June 2001, Serafin Saballegue was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8282,
otherwise known as the Social Security Act. The Information, signed by State Prosecutor
Romulo SJ. Tolentino, contained the allegation that Sabellegue, while being the proprietor of
Saballegue Printing Press in Naga City, failed and refused to remit the premiums due for his
employee to the SSS.

In September 2001, Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge. Three days later, he filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Information was filed without the prior written
authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

RTC• Action: Motion to Dismiss (filed by Saballegue)

People: By his plea, Saballegue waived all objections to the Information. Prosecutor Tolentino
also contends that having been duly designated to assist the City Prosecutor in the investigation
and prosecution of all SSS cases by the Regional State prosecutor as alter ego of the Secretary of
Justice in Region V, then that authority may be given to him without the approval of the City
Prosecutor.• Saballegue: The Information failed to comply with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 as
it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. In effect, the court did not obtain jurisdiction
over the case and must therefore be immediately dismissed.

RTC Ruling: Motion to Dismiss granted. Judge Garfin held that: (1) The information has not
been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure: "No complaint or Information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy." (2) Saballegue's plea to the
Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of lack
of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
People: Additional argument: As a special prosecutor designated by the regional state
prosecutor to handle SSS cases within Region V, State Prosecutor Tolentino is authorized to file
the information involving violations of the SSS law without need of prior approval from the city
prosecutor. Letters of commendation from Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo and Secretary
Hernando Perez were offered as proof to show that State Prosecutor Tolentino's authority to file
the information was recognized.

Saballegue: The motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing, hence it is pro forma or a
mere scrap of paper.

RTC Ruling: Motion denied. Failure to comply with the requirement of notice prescribed in
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court means the MR is a mere scrap of paper.

RULING

Petition denied. Criminal case against Saballegue is dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether the prior written authority and approval of the city or provincial prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor is necessary in filing the information at bar. – YES.

State Prosecutor Tolentino contends that, pursuant to Regional State Prosecutor Santiago M.
Turingan's orders, he was assigned as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V. As such, he
argues that the city prosecutor no longer needs to participate in the filing and prosecution of the
Information in the case at bar.

However, the Court held that Regional State Prosecutor Turingan's orders are questionable,
especially since under P.D. 1275, a regional state prosecutor only has immediate administrative
supervision over all provincial and city fiscals and other prosecuting officers of provinces and
cities comprised within his region. This means he can only oversee the operations of such
agencies and not control their functions. Turingan's orders for city prosecutors to inhibit from
handling SSS cases are therefore not valid.

Neither is Turingan a special prosecutor/counsel. In fact, while a letter from DOJ Secretary
Perez commends the efforts of Turingan in successfully prosecuting SSS cases, the same letter
states that all important cases of the SSS should be referred to the Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel.

In the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor
Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases, he cannot discharge of the duties normally
rendered by provincial or city prosecutors.• The foregoing items inevitably lead to the
conclusion that in the case at bar, the prior authority and approval of the city, provincial or chief
state prosecutor should have been obtained first.

Whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of
an Information is a defect in the Information that is waived if not raised as an objection before
arraignment. – NO.

An infirmity in the information cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express

consent. Granted, Saballegue's plea is neither a waiver nor consent. Saballegue is therefore
entitled to question the court's lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.

The lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor is an incurable infirmity in the Information that prevented the court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case.

Villa v. Ibaez, et al. (1951) remains the leading case law in situations where the Information is
filed by an unauthorized officer, as in the case at bar. In Villa, the Court held that a court's lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged (due to, among others, the lack of written approval of
the city prosecutor in the filing of the Information) is one of the exceptions to the waiver of all
objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.
This means that even if the accused had already made his plea, he can still file a motion to
quash. The 1940 Rules of Court, the 1964 Rules of Court, the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure have all adopted the Court's ruling in Villa.

DOCTRINE

An infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be
cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.

5. Tilendo vs. Ombudsman – September 13, 2007 - SULTAN

FACTS:

In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College
(CCSPC). The CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the construction of its Agriculture
Building and Science Academic Building. The "Concerned Faculty Members" of the CCSPC filed
before the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.

The complaint basically alleged that Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was
President of the CCSPC, using government funds for personal purposes. The complaint
likewise accused Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for the construction of
the CCSPC Agriculture Building.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao)

forwarded the anonymous complaint to the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports
(Ministry of Education) for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.

The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.

The NBI filed a Report on the investigation confirming that, despite the P10,080,000 three-year
allocation for the construction of the Agriculture Building, only P300,000 was actually used for
this construction project.

ISSUE/S:

WON THE NBI IS AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION?

RULING:

NO

The Court held in Raro v. Sandiganbayan, that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the
Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case
to the NBI. What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the
preliminary investigation still to be conducted by the Ombudsman.

If we consider the fact-finding investigation conducted by the NBI as part of the preliminary
investigation stage, then the NBI served a conflicting role. The NBI acted as the investigating
body on the charges against Tilendo, and thereafter, acted as the complainant against Tilendo.

What the NBI clearly did, in accordance with Section 2(d) of Rule II of AO 7, was to analyze the
facts and gather evidence which could either exonerate or further implicate Tilendo in the
offenses charged.

Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct
preliminary investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman, to wit:

1) Ombudsman Investigators;

2) Special Prosecuting Officers;

3) Deputized Prosecutors;

4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or

5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.

6. Castro vs. Deloria – June 27, 2009 - TATAD MANAYAAY

FACTS:

haron Castro, a Revenue Officer of BIR Buenavista, Guimaras, was charged before the
Ombudsman with Malversation of Public Funds. Shewas accused of misappropriating public
funds worth P556,681.53despite notice and demand upon her account for the funds.Castro filed
a Motion to Quash, stating that the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction. She said that the
Information failed to allege her salary grade — a material fact in the crime charged. Citing Uy
vs.Sandiganbayan, since she had a salary grade of 27, her case should be within the jurisdiction
of the RTC. She also added that the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman are limited to the
cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan. RTC denied the Motion to Quash, recognizing the
authority of theOmbudsman in the case. RTC cited the Resolution of Uy vs.Sandiganbayan in
2001 which reversed the original decision in Uy vs. Sanidganbayan 1999 and expressly
recognizing the prosecutorial and investigatory authority of the Ombudsman in cases
cognizable by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ombudsman can prosecute cases cognizable by the RTC.

HELD:

Yes, the case is still within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman’s
prosecutorial powers are PLENARY and UNQUALIFIED. Time and time again, the Court
has held that the Ombudsman has power to prosecute not only graft cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also cases within the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts. The powers of the Ombudsman are plenary and unqualified.

The clause “any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough to embrace the
any crime committed by a public officer or employee is within the Ombudsman’s
jurisdiction to prosecute. Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction to “take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases” cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority
of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision
and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.

7. Spouses Chua vs. Ang – September 4, 2009 - YUMANG

FACTS: Chua and Fil-Estate Properties, Inc (FEPI) executed a Contract to Sell a condominium
unit. FEPI failed to construct and deliver the contracted condo despite lapse of three (3) years.

Chua filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of Pasig City accusing FEPI’s directors and
officers of violating Section 17 and 20 of PD 957 in relation to Section 39 thereof. One of the
respondents filed a Counter-Affidavit contending that the City Prosecutor has no jurisdiction
over the case since it falls under the jurisdiction of Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). The prosecutor dismissed the complaint ruling that it is the HLURB which has
jurisdiction.

Chua then filed the petition alleging that it is the Prosecutor’s office which has jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigation and file corresponding information in Court for criminal
violation of PD 957, and not the HLURB because the latter’s jurisdiction is limited only to the
enforcement of contractual rights, and not the investigation of criminal cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HLURB has authority to investigate or impose criminal penalties

RULING: NO. P.D. No. 1344 clarifies and spells out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant
of jurisdiction to the HLURB in the following specific terms:

Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

a. Unsound real estate business practices;

b. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and

c. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by

buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.

The extent of its quasi-judicial authority, on the other hand, is defined by the terms of P.D. No.
957 whose Section 3 provides:

x x x National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. - The National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this Decree.
Significantly, nothing in P.D. No. 957 vests the HLURB with jurisdiction to impose the Section
39 criminal penalties. What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to impose
administrative fines under Section 38, as implemented by the Rules Implementing the
Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protective Decree. This Section of the Decree provides:

Sec. 38. Administrative Fines. – The Authority may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding
ten thousand pesos for violations of the provisions of this Decree or of any rule or regulation
thereunder. Fines shall be payable to the Authority and enforceable through writs of execution
in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

Further, the Implementing Rules expressly acknowledge that two separate remedies with
differing consequences may be sought under the Decree, specifically, the administrative remedy
and criminal prosecution. In the present case, the Chua have expressly chosen to pursue one
remedy, that is criminal prosecution.

The provisions of PD 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and
condominiums. The intention was to provide for an appropriate government agency, the
HLURB, to which all parties buyers and sellers of subdivision and condominium units may
seek remedial recourse.

The law recognized too, that subdivision and condominium development involves public
interest and welfare and should be brought to a body, like the HLURB, that has technical
expertise. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB, is empowered to interpret and apply
contracts, and determine the rights of private of parties under these contracts. This ancillary
power, generally judicial is now no longer with the regular courts to the extent that the
pertinent HLURB laws provide.

Finally, the public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaints for violation of P.D. No. 957 on the ground that jurisdiction lies with the HLURB.
The complaint is hereby ordered returned to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City for
the determination of probable cause.

C. Section 3 – Procedure

1. Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan – March 21, 1988 - ZAMORA

2.Santiago vs. Garchitorena – December 2, 1993 - ABDULMAGUID

Facts:

 Petitioner was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019,
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring
“unqualified” aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Petitioner filed
this case to enjoin Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case, on the ground that it
was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. After her
petition was dismissed, she then filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. Moreover, after, petitioner also complained that her constitutional rights
to due process were violated by reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation. According to her, while the offense was allegedly committed "on or before
October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991 and the amended
informations on December 8, 1992.

Issue:

WON the alleged delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation in this case
constituted a violation of due process?

Ruling:

No. Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by
reason of the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. In the case at bench,
there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because of the complexity
of the issues involved.

The act complained of in the original information came to the attention of the Ombudsman only
when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the Manila Standard. Immediately
thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The investigation was first assigned to
Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of the petitioner herself, the
investigation was reassigned to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was
handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft resolution for the filing of the
charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the hierarchy of review, normal
for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the Ombudsman in March 1991.
Furthermore, it was noted that the petitioner had previously filed two petitions before the court
involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). However, the
petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue of delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in those petitions.

3 Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan – February 20, 1996

Facts:

Petitioner Socrates filed two consolidated actions for certiorari and prohibition. He seeks the
annulment of the Resolution ordering the preventive suspension as Governor of Palawan.

A complaint charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) and Sections 3(a) and (g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 was filed in the office of the city fiscal; however, the preliminary
investigation was hold in abeyance on account of the motion filed by the accused. The
preliminary investigation was again interrupted when private complainant Rodriguez filed a
letter-manifestation. The latter was stated only on June 25, 1990, when respondents were
required to submit counter-affidavits.

Issue:

Whether or not the preliminary investigation in this case may render the information invalid?

Ruling:

No.

Here, petitioner unsuccessful attempt to counter the foregoing factual findings of respondent
court, could only raise the defense that the motion to suspend the preliminary investigation did
not affect the proceedings therein; that the preliminary investigation really started on February
18, 1987 when the Tanodbayan issued subpoenas to the respondents; that the motion to
dismiss/quash the complaints was purposely for the early termination of the preliminary
investigation; that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated, as may be gleaned from
the affidavit of complainant Rodriguez; and that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the case should have been resolved within ten (10) days from the time the investigation
was concluded.

Clearly, the facts of the case at bar are completely opposed to the factual situation in Tatad
because the obviously delaying tactics resorted to by the petitioner were not present in the latter
case. Furthermore, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does
not serve to justify the nullification of the information where the existence of such motive has
not been sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof.
In addition, there is also nothing in the records from which it can be conclusively inferred,
expressly or impliedly, that the investigating prosecutors were politically motivated or even
coerced into filing these criminal charges against the petitioner.

4.Binay vs. Sandiganbayan – October 1, 1999

5.Servantes vs. Sandiganbayan – May 18, 1999 - ALLARSE

FACTS:

On March 6, 1986, private respondent Pedro Almendras filed a sworn complaint with the Office
of the Tanodbayan (predecessor of the Ombudsman) against a certain Alejandro Tapang for
falsification of Almendra's “salaysay” alleging that Tapang made him sign a piece of paper in
blank on which paper a “salaysay” was later inscribed stating that Almendras had been paid his
claim in the amount of P17,594.00, which was not true. Almendras mentioned in the complaint
that he sought the help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as analyst in the office of
labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz. Tapang in a counter-affidavit denied the accusation of
Almendras. Cervantes also denied the accusation against him.

On May 18, 1992, more than 6 years after the filing of the initiatory complaint, the Tanodbayan
filed with the Sandiganbayan an information charging Cervantes, together with Ruiz and
Tapang, with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.

On October 2, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash and motion to recall warrant of arrest on
the ground that the case against him had already been prescribed due to unreasonable delay in
the resolution of the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan in a minute resolution dated
December 24, 1992 denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of the accused's right to speedy trial. YES
RULING:

The Court ruled that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case,
a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The Court did not accept the Special Prosecutor's
ratiocination that the petitioner was insensitive to the implications and contingencies thereof by
not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter. The Court
emphasized that it is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated
by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly attributable to
him.

NOTE: The Tatad ruling was applied in this case.

Special prosecutor tried to justify the delay in the resolution of the complaint by stating that no
political motivation appears in the prosecution of the case in apparent reference to the case of
Tatad because in the case of Tatad there was political motivation.

6.People vs. SPO4 Anonas – January 31, 2007 - Ampis

Facts:

On November 19, 1996, SPO4 Emiliano Anonas, respondent, assigned at the Western Police
District, was apprehended by his colleagues during a raid in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The
apprehending police officers claimed that he and four other persons were sniffing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug; and that
he was in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver. Two separate Informations against
respondent, one for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-154398, and another for illegal possession of firearm, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 96-154399
On December 18, 1996, respondent filed with the trial court a motion for reinvestigation on
grounds that he was apprehended without a warrant of arrest and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted. And on On January 4, 2001, respondent filed with the trial court a
motion to dismiss the Informations, contending that the delay in the reinvestigation violated his
right to due process.

The Court of Appeals ruled that having been made to wait for the resolution of his motion for
reinvestigation for almost five years while being detained, violated his right to due process. The
Court of Appeals then ordered that respondent be released from custody.

Issue: whether or not respondent's right to due process has been violated

Ruling: The SC affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution is reinforced by Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which requires that "the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10)
days from the conclusion of the investigation." The preliminary investigation of the respondent
for the offenses charged took more than four years. He was apprehended for the offenses
charged on November 19, 1996. Having been arrested without a warrant of arrest and not
having been afforded a formal investigation, he prayed for reinvestigation of the cases. The trial
court, in an Order dated January 28, 1997 ordered a reinvestigation which was terminated only
on February 16, 2001. In fact, even the Solicitor General admitted "it took some time for the City
Prosecutor to terminate and resolve the reinvestigation.

There can be no question that respondent was prejudiced by the delay, having to be confined
for more than four oppressive years for failure of the investigating prosecutors to comply with
the law on preliminary investigation.

7. Benjamin Martinez vs. Court of Appeals – April 13, 2007 - APA

FACTS:

Dean Dongui-is was a teacher at the Tubao National High School, La Union. Petitioner
Benjamin Martinez was the husband of Dean’s co-teacher, Lilibeth Martinez. Petitioner eked out
a living as a tricycle driver.

An incident happened one day where the petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged
from behind Dean and stabbed him. Dean managed to escape.
On February 7, 1999, Dean gave a sworn statement to SPO1 Sulatre. However, he deferred
swearing to the truth of his statement before the Public Prosecution because SPO1 Sulatre was
waiting for the permanent medical certificate to be issued by the hospital. SPO1 Sulatre deferred
the execution and submission of an arrest report also pending the issuance of the medical
certificate. Instead of issuing a permanent medical certificate, the IRH issued on February 8,
1999 a Temporary Certificate.

On March 10, 1999, SPO1 Sulatre filed a criminal complaint for frustrated murder against
petitioner in the MCTC. The MCTC opted not to act on the crime pending the arrest report and
SPO1 Sulatre’s submission of Dean’s sworn statement.

The IRH issued a medical certificate on February 28, 1999. Barangay Captain Oller and SPO1
Sulatre executed an affidavit on petitioner’s arrest. Dean had his affidavit sworn before the
Public Prosecutor on March 30, 1999.

On September 13, 2000 the Provincial Prosecutor of La Union indicted Benjamin for frustrated
murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, of the same province.

On October 13, 2000, the accused, assisted by counsel, was arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty.

On April 30, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of frustrated
homicide.

On February 21, 2005, the CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed decision of the RTC
with modification.

Petitioner insists that the criminal complaint filed by SPO1 Sulatre was a fabrication because the
latter never conducted a formal investigation of the stabbing incident or of any witness to the
incident.

In its comment on the petition, respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
avers that the issues raised by petitioner are factual, hence, inappropriate in a petition for
review on certiorari in this Court. The OSG maintains that the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not require that the affidavit of the offended party or the witnesses to the crime
charged be appended to the criminal complaint filed in court. Moreover, the issue of the
validity of the criminal complaint in the MCTC had became moot and academic after the
Information was filed in the trial court, and when petitioner was arraigned, assisted by counsel,
and entered a plea of not guilty.

It insists that Dean’s testimony, by itself, is sufficient to warrant the conviction of petitioner for
frustrated homicide. Petitioner’s conviction may be anchored on Dean’s testimony since the trial
court found it credible and entitled to full probative weight. Petitioner failed to prove his plea of
self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the criminal complaint filed by SPO1 Sulatre with the MCTC on March 10,
1999 was defective.

2. Whether or not MCTC validly acted on the complaint.

3. Whether or not petitioner should be acquitted because the criminal complaint against him
was not supported by the victim’s sworn statement or by an affidavit of any witness.

RULING:

1. YES.

The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioner that the criminal complaint filed by SPO1 Sulatre
with the MCTC on March 10, 1999 was defective. As gleaned from the RTC records, the criminal
complaint was not accompanied by any medical certificate showing the nature and number of
wounds sustained by the victim, the affidavits of any of the witnesses listed at the bottom of the
criminal complaint (particularly the victim himself), and the arrest report of SPO1 Sulatre, Brgy.
Capt. Rodolfo Oller, and his son Nicky.

Section 3(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Sec. 3. Procedure. – The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to
establish probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus
two (2) copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom must certify that he personally examined
the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either
dismiss it if he finds no ground to continue with the investigation, or issue a subpoena to the
respondent attaching to it a copy of the complaint and its supporting affidavits and documents.

2. YES.

The MCTC had the option not to act one way or the other on the criminal complaint of SPO1
Sulatre because the latter failed to comply with Section 3(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure; or to order SPO1 Sulatre to comply with the aforequoted rule; or
to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to its refiling with the requisite documents.
However, the MCTC opted not to act on the complaint until after SPO1 Sulatre shall have
submitted the requisite affidavits/medical certificate/arrest report. When SPO1 Sulatre filed
with the MCTC, on March 10, 1999, the permanent medical certificate issued by the IRH, the
affidavit of Dean and and Brgy. Capt. Oller’s affidavit of arrest of petitioner, the MCTC
forthwith issued a subpoena to petitioner appending thereto the said medical certificate,
affidavit of Dean and the affidavit of arrest of SPO1 Sulatre. Hence, SPO1 Sulatre had complied
with Section 3(a) and (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Moreover, petitioner submitted his counter-affidavit without any protest. Neither did he assail
the validity of the criminal complaint or the tardy submission by SPO1 Sulatre of the medical
certificate, the affidavit of Dean and the affidavit of arrest of SPO1 Sulatre. Aside from this,
petitioner was arraigned in the RTC, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty.

3. NO.

Petitioner’s argument that he should be acquitted because the criminal complaint against him
was not supported by the victim’s sworn statement or by an affidavit of any witness is totally
untenable. This issue should have been raised during the preliminary investigation. It is much
too late in the day to complain about this issue after a judgment of conviction has been rendered
against him.

8.Soriano vs. People – February 1, 2010 AYAP

FACTS:

State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the
General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director,
Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest(DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules)

An information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed against
Soriano and Ilagan. The information’s were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and
1720-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against
Soriano, this time, covering the P15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for
obtaining said loan. The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively,
and were raffled to Branch 77, presided by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

Petitioners Soriano and Ilagan filed an MQ before both salas. Petitioners argued that the
prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with violation
of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing
fictitious loans. They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute
an offense.

Both salas of RTC denied the MQs

Petitioners filed a Rule 65 before the CA but it iwas dismissed.

Petitioners filed a Rule 45 before the SC

ISSUE/S:

Whether the 2 judges correctly denied the Motion to Quash

RULING:

YES.

Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than
one (1) offense is charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules
and with estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from
RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed.

Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information

under Section3(e), Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the
filing of a duplicitous information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. By
duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one
offense.15Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. 3

Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information
charges more than one offense.

9. Mercado vs. Court of Appeals – July 5, 1995

10.Ladlad vs. Velasco – June 1, 2007 - Benemerito

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, PGMA signed Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a
“State of National Emergency.” Following that, police officers arrested Crispin Beltran on while
he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame.
 Beltran was arrested without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of
the crime for which he was arrested.

Petitioners all face charges for Rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code in two criminal cases pending with the RTC Makati.

Based on Yolanda Tanigue and Rodolfo Mendoza's unsubscribed letters, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) sent subpoenas to petitioners requiring them to appear at the DOJ Office to get
copies of the complaint and its attachment. During the preliminary investigation, the counsel
for the CIDG presented a masked man, later identified as Jaime Fuentes, who claimed to be an
eyewitness against petitioners. Fuentes subscribed to his affidavit before respondent prosecutor
Emmanuel Velasco who then gave copies of the affidavit to media members present during the
proceedings. The panel of prosecutors gave petitioners 10 days within which to file their
counter-affidavits but the petitioners were furnished the complete copies of documents
supporting the CIDG's letters much later.

Petitioners moved for the inhibition of the members of the prosecution panel for lack of
impartiality and independence, considering the political milieu under which petitioners were
investigated, the statements that the President and the Secretary of Justice made to the media
regarding petitioners' case, and the manner in which the prosecution panel conducted the
preliminary investigation. The DOJ panel of prosecutors denied petitioners' motion. In his
separate Comment to the Maza petition, the Solicitor General submits that the preliminary
investigation of petitioners was not tainted with irregularities.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent prosecutors should be enjoined from continuing with the
prosecution of the criminal case because the preliminary investigation was tainted with
irregularities

Ruling:

Yes. Instead of following scrupulously the procedure for preliminary investigation of

offenses punishable by at least four years, two months, and one day outlined in Section 3, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as what the Court had mandated so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,
respondent prosecutors nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent proecutors failed to comply
with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides that the complaint (which, with its attachment,
must be of such number as there are respondents) be accompanied by the affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a notary
public. Respondent prosecutors treated the unsubscribed letters of Tanigue and Mendoza of the
CIDG, PNP as complaints and accepted the affidavits attached to the letters even though some
of them were notarized by a notary public without any showing that a prosecutor or qualified
government official was unavailable as required by Section 3(a) of Rule 112.

D. Section 4 – Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review

1. Crespo vs. Mogul – June 30, 1987 CABAÑA

FACTS

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal
filed information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena
City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set
for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a
pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the
presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for
reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was
deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was
filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an
order of August 17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with
the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed
by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15,
1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually
restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the
case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the
petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the
fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion
to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978
with the trial court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an
order of August 2, 1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto.

ISSUES

Whether or not the evidence in this opinion or the information, is sufficient or not to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING

NO. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused
rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from
the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.
The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

2. Schroeder vs. Saldevar – April 27, 2007

3. Dr. Amanda T. Cruz vs. Wilfredo Cruz – February 8, 2007- CAMASURA

FACTS: Respondent Wilfredo Cruz filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City a
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against petitioner, Amanda Cruz.
Respondent alleged that petitioner issued to him an undated check. On January 5, 1996, he sent
the notice of dishonor to the petitioner. Without his knowledge, the petitioner deposited it in his
savings account. The Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City recommended the dismissal of
respondent's complaint on the ground that payment for the check has already been satisfied.
Therefore, under the circumstances, there is no offense to be charged. Respondent filed with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) a Petition for Review contending that petitioner is still criminally
liable although she had paid the amount of the check in full. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito
R. Zuño dismissed respondent's petition. Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals granted respondent's petition and directed the
Secretary of Justice to file the proper information against petitioner.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in directing the Secretary of Justice to file an
information for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against petitioner.

Ruling: Yes.

Under Section 4 of the same Rule, the investigating prosecutor is vested with the duty
of (a) preparing a resolution holding the respondent for trial and filing the corresponding
information, or (b) dismissing the case should he find that no probable cause exists against
respondent.

The investigating Assistant City Prosecutor found no probable cause to charge petitioner
with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Hence, she recommended the dismissal of the case. The City
Prosecutor, the Chief State Prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice sustained the
recommendation. They all found that when respondent filed his complaint with the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor, he knew that petitioner had paid the amount of the check. In fact,
in his pleading, he admitted such payment. Thus, the prosecutors were one in concluding that
petitioner did not commit the offense charged.

While indeed the gravamen of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of issuing worthless
checks, nonetheless, courts should not apply the law strictly or harshly. Its spirit and purpose
must be considered.

Considering that petitioner had paid the amount of the check even before respondent
filed his complaint, we believe and so hold that no injury was caused to the public interests or
the banking system, or specifically to herein respondent.

4. Adasa vs. Abalos – February 19, 2007 - CANDIA

FACTS: Respondent Cecille Abalos alleged in the complaints and affidavits that petitioner
Bernadette Adasa encashed two checks issued in the name of the respondent through deceit
without knowledge of respondent Abalos. Adasa failed to pay the proceeds of the checks
despite demands of Abalos. Adasa filed a counteraffidavit admitting that she received and
encashed the checks and alleged further in a supplemental affidavit that Bebie Correa instead
received the 2 checks and that she left the country. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Iligan City issued a resolution finding probable cause against Adasa and ordered for filing of
two separate informations for Estafa through falsification of commercial document by a private
individual. This petition only concerns one of the two (Criminal Case #8782) criminal cases
(8781 & 8782) that were docketed. Petitioner Adasa filed a motion upon the trial court in order
for the OCP to conduct a reinvestigation, in which the OCP has reaffirmed its finding of
probable cause. Adasa has entered a not guilty plea during her arraignment on October 1, 2001
and later filed a petition for review before the DOJ where it reversed and set aside the
resolution of the OCP and ordering it to withdraw the information for estafa.

Respondent Abalos filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the DOJ should have
dismissed the petition for review outright contending that Sec 7 of DOJ Circular no 70 mandates
that “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution the petition
shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned” the aggrieved party
cannot file a petition for review and the Secretary of Justice shall deny it outright.

The trial court has granted the petitioner’s “motion to withdraw information” and dismissed
the criminal case, on February 2003. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on
the DOJ resolution and it reversed the said resolution. The appellate court emphasized that DOJ
Circular 70 Sec 7 used the phrase “shall not.” Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
contending that section 12 of the same DOJ Circular used the word “may” that would give
discretion to the Secretary of Justice to entertain an appeal, thus this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Justice is given discretion through the DOJ
Circular to entertain an appeal even if the accused has been arraigned.

RULING: No. the Supreme Court held that CA is correct, the DOJ cannot give an
appeal/petition for review due course and must dismiss such actions if the accused has already
been arraigned. Therefore in Sec 12 if the ground for the dismissal is the arraignment of the
accused, it must go back and act upon through Section 7. If Sec 12 is given a directory
application it would render earlier mandatory provisions invalid/negligible and would
undermine the main objectives of the said circular which is “for the expeditious and efficient
administration of justice.”

The settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the
right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.
This precept is also applicable in cases of reinvestigation as well as in cases of review of such
reinvestigation. In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she
effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the prosecutor as well as the right to appeal
the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary. Thus, with the arraignment of the petitioner, the DOJ
Secretary can no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because petitioner had
already waived or abandoned the same.

Lastly, while there is authority permitting the Court to make its own determination of probable
cause, such, however, cannot be made applicable in the instant case. As earlier stated, the
arraignment of petitioner constitutes a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or
reinvestigation. Such waiver is tantamount to a finding of probable cause. For this reason, there
is no need for the Court to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause.

5. Redulla vs. Sandiganbayan – February 28, 2000

Facts:

Pursuant to an audit conducted by the Commission on Audit on several reforestation contracts,

5 complaints were filed against Teotimo M. Redulla and several others with the Office of the
Ombudsman for violation of RA No. 3019. After an investigation conducted by Prosecutor
Florita S. Linco, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 3 Informations
for violation of RA No. 3019 Section 3(e). In one of the Informations, Redulla, along with six
others, was indicted.

Following the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No. 26035, Redulla filed before the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) an Expanded Motion for Reinvestigation. The said
motion was granted and reinvestigation was conducted. After reinvestigation, then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the OSP's finding that there was no probable cause and
accordingly approved the recommendation to withdraw the Information.

A Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Information In Criminal Case No. 26035 was thus
filed by the Office of the Ombudsman with the Sandiganbayan which was subsequently
granted.

In June 2003, then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo (Ombudsman Marcelo) ordered the review
of the original complaints against petitioner, et al. which the COA filed with his Office. Acting
on the order, Prosecutor Jovito A. Coresis, Jr. reviewed the complaints and found sufficient
evidence to conclude that a crime for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e), as amended, had
been committed and Redulla and his co-accused are probably guilty thereof.

The Office of the Ombudsman thus filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 27853, against Redulla, et al.. Redulla thereafter filed before the
Sandiganbayan a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was
subsequently denied.

Issue:

WON the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion to re-review Prosecutor Linco’s
Memorandum.
Ruling:

NO.There was nothing irregular in Ombudsman Marcelo's order to re-review Prosecutor

Linco's memorandum, as R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 places the OSP under
the control and supervision of the Ombudsman. Further, as declared in Cruz, Jr. v. People:

Verily, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of
the investigating prosecutor in making a review of the latter's report and recommendation, as
the Ombudsman can very well make his own findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him
from acting one way or the other.

As a matter of fact, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the
investigating assistant fiscal recommends the dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed
by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor on the ground that a probable cause
exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information against the respondent or
direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting another
preliminary investigation."

With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from
that of the investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the
Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the
prosecutor that, under the facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that
herein petitioner is guilty of the offense charged.

6. Tolentino vs. Judge Paqueo – June 7, 2007 - CHUNG

Petitioner, State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino filed an information charging private
respondent, Benedict Tecklo for violation of Sec 22 (a) in relation to Sec 28 (e) of R.A. No. 8282,
for failing to remit SSS premiums due to his employee despite demand.

Accused, private respondent through his counsel filed a motion to quash the information of the
ground that Petitioner, Prosecutor Tolentino has no legal personality and authority to
commence such prosecution without the approval of the City Prosecutor of Naga City, the situs
of the crime.
Petitioner contends that he was given authority and designated as Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases by the Regional State Prosecutor to comply with the request for SSS which authority was
confirmed by the Chief Sate prosecutor. He claims, approval of the City Prosecutor in filing the
information is no longer necessary by virtue of the Regional order which designated him as
Special Prosecutor.

Respondent, Judge Paque granted the motion to quash based on the lack of legal personality of
State Prosecutor Tolentino, not legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution in
violation of Sec 4 (3) of Rule 112 which requires the approva of the City Prosecutor prior to
filing an information and Sec 3 (c) of Rule 117 which provides the grounds for granting a
motion to quash. He then denied the objection and motion of the petitioner.

A petition for certiorari and mandamus was then filed by the petitioner alleging that
respondent Jugde Paqueo acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing orders granting the motion to quash of private respondent in the case
People vs Tecklo.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor petioner State Prosecutor Tolentino is duly authorized to file the subject
Information without the approval of the City Prosecutor?

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that the decision of the respondent Judge to grant the motion to quash is
proper.

Petitioner alleged that he was designated as a Special Prosecutor by the Regional State
Prosecutor in relation with the regional order, however Regional State Prosecutor is not
included among the law officers authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the
Information in compliance with Sec 4, Rule 112.

In the case at bar, Petitioner did not comply with such requirements. Consequently, the non-
compliance was a ground to quash the information under Sec 3 (2) of Rule 117.

Therefore, the Court finds that Respondent, Judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in
dismissing the information for failure to the petitioner, State prosecutor to comply with Sec 4 (3)
of Rule 112, as such failure tantamounts to an invalid information filed for the officer who filed
it had no authority to do so.
7. AAA vs. Judge Carbonell – June 8, 2007 - Cole

FACTS:

AAA, a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center, file a complaint for rape
againts Jaime O. Arzadon.

Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of an information for rape.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing, AAA testified before
the investigating prosecutor. However, she failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was
provisionally dismissed.

AAA filed another Affidavit-Complaint with a comprehensive account of the alleged rape
incident. During the preliminary investigation, AAA appeared for clarificatory questioning.
On June 11, 2003,the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding that a prima facie
case of rape exists and recommending the filing of the information.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be constituted to
review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the clarificatory questioning,
the panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution finding probable cause and denying
Arzadon's motion for reconsideration.

Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause
for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest. In an Order, Judge Carbonell granted the
motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand.

Instead of taking the witness stand, AAA filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the
documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause. Pending
resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition with this Court for the transfer of venue of
Criminal Case.
Respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed Order dismissing Criminal Case for lack of
probable cause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Carbonell committed a grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the
criminal case on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to
take the witness stand.

RULING:

Yes, Judge Carbonell committed a grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the criminal case on
the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to take the witness
stand.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.

True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judge's personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to
show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed that
the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and
his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of
the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses be conducted.

In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case without taking into
consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Georgina
Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005
Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which sustain a finding of probable cause against
Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the evidence in support thereof. Respondent judge's
finding of lack of probable cause was premised only on the complainant's and her witnesses'
absence during the hearing scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of
probable cause.

It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing
evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction.

8. Gonzales vs. HSBC – October 19, 2007 Cuevas-Presores

Facts

At the time of the incident subject of the case at bar, petitioner Gonzalez was the Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corporation (MLRC). MLRC is the
owner, developer and operator of Mimosa Leisure Estate located at the Clark Special Economic
Zone (CSEZ), Clark Field, and Pampanga. On 1 August 1997, petitioner Gonzalez, for and in
behalf of MLRC, acknowledged receipt of various golfing equipment’s and assorted Walt
Disney items, and signed the corresponding two Trust Receipt agreements that is the Trust
Receipt No. 001-016310-205,9 covering the various golfing equipment, and Trust Receipt No.
001-016310-206,10 covering the assorted Walt Disney items, both in favor of respondent HSBC.
The due date for Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-205, for the value of Hong Kong Dollar 85,540.00,
was on 1 September 1997, while that of Trust Receipt No. 001-016310-206, for the value of
HK$143,993.90, was on 28 January 1998.

When the due dates of subject Trust Receipts came and went without word from MLRC,
respondent HSBC, through Paula L. Felipe (Felipe), Vice-President of respondent HSBC’s Credit
Control Department, in a letter dated 28 March 2000, demanded from MLRC the turnover of the
proceeds of the sale of the assorted goods covered by the Trust Receipts or the return of said
goods. Despite demand, however, MLRC failed to return the assorted goods or their value.
Consequently, Felipe, for respondent HSBC, filed a criminal complaint for estafa that is for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 115, the "Trust Receipts Law," in relation to Art. No. 315(1)
(b) of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Gonzalez before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati, docketed as I.S. No. 00-G-24734-35. The complaint-affidavit contained the
following allegations

Issues

Whether or not the requisite of the preliminary investigation found probable cause to hold the
petitioner Gonzalez liable for two counts of Estafa?

Ruling

YES, the Petitioner Gonzalez’s allegation that the Best Price PX, Inc. is the real party in the trust
receipt transaction and his assertion that the real transaction between respondent HSBC and
MLRC is a loan agreement, are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and
contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case.

To reiterate, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of

probable cause is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense
has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed January 13, 2004 Decision and 6 August 2004 Resolution, both of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 75469 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

9. Dumlao vs. Judge Ponferrada – November 29, 2006 - DE CASTILLA

FACTS:

On the night of May 8, 1995, just after the local elections, seven of petitioners' relatives1 were
murdered in Brgy. Pattao, Buguey, Cagayan. Two witnesses, Ernesto Mendoza and Mario
Gascon, executed affidavits stating that they were riding in a jeepney with the victims when
armed men in fatigue uniforms flagged them down. On instruction of ex-Army Major Romulo
Langcay (one of the passengers), the jeepney did not stop. The armed men, however, fired at the
jeepney, forcing it to stop. The witnesses later identified three of these men to be private
respondents Roy Flores, Godofredo Flores and Quirino Cabeza.

After the preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco issued a resolution
stating that there was probable cause to hold private respondents liable for multiple murder. He
then recommended the filing of the necessary Informations in court and private respondents
were subsequently charged for multiple murder in the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6.

In the interim, private respondents filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Then acting DOJ Secretary Ricardo G. Nepomuceno, Jr. issued an order reversing the
findings of State Prosecutor Velasco and directing the withdrawal of the criminal charges
against private respondents.

Public respondent Judge Rodolfo Ponferrada, presiding judge of the trial court, granted the
motion and dismissed the cases filed against private respondents. The order read:

Affter Its own assessment and evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution, the Court is
inclined to grant the motion as it finds'the sworn statements of Mario Gascon and Ernesto
Mendoza' to be incredible and tainted with bias and prejudice.

ISSUE:

Could the Secretary of Justice review the resolution of the public prosecutor after the cases has
been filed in court?

RULING::

Yes. Under RA 5180,8 in connection with Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court,9 and as
further implemented by Department Circular No. 70 (otherwise known as the "2000 National
Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal"),10 the Justice Secretary is vested with the power to review
resolutions of the provincial, city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. He has the power to re-
evaluate the position taken by his subordinates in a case. Corollary to this power, he may also
direct the public prosecutor to dismiss or cause the dismissal of the complaint or information.11

Contrary to the theory of petitioners, the filing of a complaint or information in court does not
prevent the Justice Secretary from exercising his review power. Neither can such complaint or
information deter him from ordering the withdrawal of the case. As a matter of fact, in Crespo,
we declared that the public prosecutor (as the Justice Secretary's subordinate) may still opt to
withdraw the Information either upon instruction of the Justice Secretary or for purposes of
reinvestigation.

Furthermore, Crespo merely laid down the rule that, while the Secretary of Justice has the power
to alter or modify the resolution of his subordinate and thereafter direct the withdrawal of a
case, he cannot, however, impose his will on the court. Thus, the rule is'
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests [on] the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court[,] he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The determination of
the case is within [the court's] exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the
case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the sound discretion of the Court [that] has the
option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Petitioners likewise claim that public respondent Judge Ponferrada committed grave abuse of
discretion when, in blind obeisance to the Justice Secretary's order, he granted the state
prosecutor's motion to withdraw the charges against private respondents. The claim is belied by
the records.

The records without doubt reveal that before the motion was granted, Judge Ponferrada
required petitioners and private respondents to file their respective memoranda or comments.
He made his own assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record.12 Thus, it is not correct
to say that Judge Ponferrada had absolutely nothing before him or that he blindly adopted the
position of the Justice Secretary.

10.Summerville vs. Eugenio Jr. – August 7, 2007- DELA CRUZ

FACTS:

The instant petition originated from a complaint for unfair competition filed by petitioner
against private respondents Elidad Kho, Violeta Kho, and Roger Kho, before the City
Prosecutor’s Office of Manila. After due investigation, the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila
came out with its May 31, 2000 Resolution recommending the prosecution of private
respondents for unfair competition and dismissing private respondents’ counterclaim against
petitioner.

Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000; however, on June 22 of the same year, private
respondents filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), assailing the May
31, 2000 Resolution of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.

The arraignment pushed through on October 11, 2000. Since the accused refused to plea to the
charge, a plea of not guilty was entered for each of them.
On October 23, 2001, the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion to Withdraw
Information on the basis of the September 28, 2001 Resolution issued by Secretary Perez.

The Information against the accused is hereby ordered withdrawn.

This order likewise renders the Motion to Dismiss filed by the accused through counsel dated
October 9, 2001, moot and academic.

Judge Fremo Admitted the complainant's allegation that the court stenographer examined
complainant and his witnesses during the preliminary investigation of the grave threats
complaint against him with the use of a prepared written set of questions.

Issue:

WON the respondent judge violated the rules on preliminary investigation.

Ruling:

Yes. Respondent should not have allowed her stenographer to handle the latter part of the
proceedings even if she only wanted to expedite the proceedings and it was more convenient.
Respondent judge should have personally taken charge of the entire proceedings since the
power to conduct preliminary investigations vested only on her and not on the stenographer.

Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M.
No. 05-8-26-SC, Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by
Removing the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of
municipal trial courts were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they
exercised discretion in determining whether there was probable cause to hale the respondent
into court. Such being the case, they could not delegate the discretion to another.

An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption

being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment
and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he
cannot delegate his duties to another.

Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es
was required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its
amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown
by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses

By respondent's delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats

case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the [written]
question[s]" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers [thereto]" upon respondent's
justification that the scheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, respondent betrayed
her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in
the judicial system.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent, Judge Aurea G. Peñalosa-Fermo of the Municipal
Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure. She is
FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos and warned that a commission of
another infraction which is tantamount to the same charge shall be dealt with more severely.

12.First Women’s Credit vs. Baybay – January 31, 2007

13.Soriano vs. Marcelo – July 13, 2009

E. Section 5 – When warrant of arrest may issue

1. Castillo vs. Villaluz – March 8, 1989

2.Lim, Sr. vs. Felix – 194 SCRA 292, February 19, 1991-ENCINAS

FACTS:

The petitioners were alleged to be behind the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder
of Masbate Congressman Moises Espinosa Sr. and his escorts. The Court issued an order for
probable cause as to the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the petitioners after conducting the
preliminary investigation.Fiscal Alfante who was designated to review the case affirmed the
prima facie case against the petitioners but altered the designation of crime from multiple
murder with frustrated murder charged to all of the accused. The petitioners in response filed a
petition for change of venue from Masbate to Makati RTC and was granted for the purpose of
preventing miscarriage of justice. The petitioners questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest
on the ground that it was not personally determined by the respondent Judge Nemesio Felix.
The petition was dismissed and the validity of the warrant was upheld.

ISSUE:

May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying
solely on the certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a
warrant of arrest?

HELD:

NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable
cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make
his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge
denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is
sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Hence, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer
the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
3. Roberts vs. Court of Appeals – March 5, 1996

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products Phils.,
Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number Fever” promotion by handlers of
the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the petitioners,
probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not
for the other alleged offenses.

On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything accompanying
it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was forwarded to and received by
the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents
submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.

On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of
Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor.
They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to
defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to
the Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the
basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the
public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest “after June 1993” and
setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since
the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court. To
justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the
action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The
matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge had not the
slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of warrants
of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint Resolution had in fact been
forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied petitioners’
application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution “was
sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself that
probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest”
and that the “mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration” in the
questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for
the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
official duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the
finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the
petition for mootness.

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo vs.
Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have
been resolved?

2. Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants
of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation?

3. May the Supreme Court determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of probable cause
either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their prosecution for
the crime of estafa?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, in a 7-5-2 vote, GRANTED the petition. It SET ASIDE the decision and resolution of the
CA, the resolutions of the DOJ 349 Committee, and the order of the respondent judge.]

1. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the basis of Crespo
vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance the issuance of warrants
of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for review filed with the DOJ shall
have been resolved.

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance of an appeal, by
way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an unfavorable ruling of the
investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court.”

Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a matter of
guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to deny the motions
to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following grounds:

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court.
This Court is still capable of administering justice.

The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the
aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to
defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the
information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution
of the investigating prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary
of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.

2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of
warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the proposition that the
investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his resolution which is made the
basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice in the judicial determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In Webb, this Court assumed that since the
respondent Judges had before them not only the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel
but also the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the
respondents, they (judges) made personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.

In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993 with the trial
court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the trial court only on
22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent judge’s clerk of court, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in
the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when respondent Judge Asuncion issued the
assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest,
he had only the information, amended information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He
did not have the records or evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
And strangely enough, he made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the
issuance of warrants of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the
directive presupposes a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional
requirement for the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture,
or even convincing logic.

3. NO, the Supreme Court MAY NOT determine in this [sic] proceedings the existence of
probable cause either for the issuance of warrants of arrest against the petitioners or for their
prosecution for the crime of estafa.

Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an
appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as
the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. This is consistent with the general rule
that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final.

There are, however, exceptions to the foregoing rule. But the Court refused to reevaluate the
evidence to determine if indeed there is probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest in
this case. For the respondent judge did not, in fact, find that probable cause exists, and if he did
he did not have the basis therefore. Moreover, the records of the preliminary investigation in
this case are not with the Court. They were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to the DOJ in compliance with the latter's 1st Indorsement of 21 April 1993. The
trial court and the DOJ must be required to perform their duty.

4. Ho vs. People of the Philippines – 280 SCRA 365, October 9, 1997

In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be
too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting,
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which
is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.
The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. 24 Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and
the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their distinct objectives.

Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the report of the
prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously
and understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion
that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the
judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the
prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or
nonexistence) of probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining
personally and independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him
by no less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the
burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the
information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and
the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding
on whether to issue a warrant of arrest. 25

5. Amarga vs. Fiscal – 98 Phil. 739-FOROSUELO

FACTS:

Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a

complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent
the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed,
he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case
against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground
that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be
required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless,
Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a Warrant of Arrest of the accused
in view of his finding, after conducting a Pliminary Investigation, that there exists prima facie
evidence that the accused commited the crime charged.

RULING:

THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE

ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. Under Rule 112 of the
1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is
sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine whether a WA should issue, the
investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be satisfied that a probable cause
exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating
judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. The fiscal
should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for
the arrest of the accused.

6. Ong vs. Genio – December 23, 2009

7. Carandang vs. base – March 28, 2008

8. De Joya vs. Marquez – G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006 -MENDOZA.
FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside the
warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner Mina Tan Hao Ma. Gracia Tan
Hao and Victor Ngo y Tan in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a)
of the Revised Penal Code ( syndicated estafa) in relation to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689

ISSUE: WON the respondent judge erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused.

RULLING: NO. The court held that the documents presented sufficiently established the
existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Probable cause where facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested without resorting to the calibrations of technical rules of evidence of
which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance which is less stringent than that used for establishing the
guilt of the accused. As long as the evidence presented shows a prima facie case against the
accused, the trial court judge has sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest In the same
manner, the accused continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction gives the Court more
reason to uphold the action of the respondent judge .The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to
place the accused under the custody of the law to hold him for trial. His evasive stance shows
an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal process.

De Joya vs. Marquez – G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006 - GRUMO

Facts:

Petitioner Chester De Joya asserts that respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez erred in finding
the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and
his co-accused. The documents found in the records and examined by respondent Judge Placido
C. Marquez tend to show that therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of
money in State Resources Development Management Corporation. That he issued several
checks amounting to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation.That the corporation, in turn,
issued several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his
investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed account.
That petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the corporation, had
knowledge of its activities and transactions. Despite seeking relief through a petition, the
defendant refuses to surrender and submit to the lower court’s jurisdiction in the belief of lack
of probable and improper issuance of a warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in issuing a warrant of arrest

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952
documents to support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It
finds that the documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It need not be shown that the
accused are indeed guilty of the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should
be emphasized that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. Hence, judges do not conduct
a Denovo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the Rules allow the
judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it is notable
that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases for
his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315,
par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.

The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which
include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in
exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial
judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of
the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining
in this case do not warrant the application of the exception.

9. Tabujara vs. People – October 29, 2008 - GUILLERMO

Afable was a former employee of the petitioners in a jewelry shop who was then
administratively investigated in connection with missing jewelries.

Afable simultaneously filed 2 criminal charges against the petitioners for:

a. grave coercion; and

b. trespass to dwelling

Petitioners denied and reasoned out that they merely thresh out matters re: the missing
jewelries.
The case was dismissed for lack of probable cause and that it was merely a leverage to the estafa
case against Afable.

Afable contended that when she filed the case, the estafa case was not yet filed. However,
petitioners aver that she was already in a preventive suspension.

The MTC reversed the order finding probable cause in consideration of the sworn statement of
a witness which was overlooked in the forst order. Here, the witness saw Afable being forcibly
taken by 3 persons which included the petitioners.

The MTC ordered a warrant of arrest against the petitioners.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that the sworn statement was merely a
hearsay because the witness was not personally examined by the investigating judge during
preliminary investigation. However, the motion was denied.

WON the judge violated the rule on the issuance of a warrant of arrest?

HELD: YES. Section 6 Rule 112 (Currently Section 5 Rule 112) mandates that in the issuance by
inferior courts of warrants of arrest, it is necessary that the judge be satisfied that probable
cause exists:

1) through an examination under oath and in writing of the complainant and his witnesses;
which examination should be

2) in the form of searching questions and answers.

This rule is not merely a procedural but a substantive rule because it gives flesh to two of the
most sacrosanct guarantees found in the fundamental law:

I. the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures and

Ii. the due process requirement.

In the present case, the judge ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest even without
examining the complainants and their witnesses. This is a clear violation of the rules in
issuance of warrant of arrest and our Constitution which requires all members of the judges
to personally examine the complainant and the witness in writing and under oath before
issuing a warrant of arrest

10.Español vs. Toledo-Mupas – February 11, 2010

Section 5, Rule 1123 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states that within ten (10) days
after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, an investigating judge shall transmit to the
provincial or city prosecutor for appropriate action her resolution of the case together with the
records thereof.

Hence, an investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary investigation, shall perform her
ministerial duty which is to transmit within ten days after the conclusion thereof, the resolution
of the case together with the entire records to the Provincial Prosecutor, regardless of her belief
or opinion that the crime committed, after conducting the preliminary investigation, falls within
the original jurisdiction of her court.

F. Section 6 – When accused lawfully arrested without warrant

8u

1. Ladlad vs. Senior State Prosecutor – G.R. No. 175013, June 1, 2007 -LINA

Facts:

The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was
subjected to a second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for
Rebellion.

On 27 February 2006, the DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause
to indict Beltran and San Juan as "leaders/promoters" of Rebellion. The panel then filed an
Information with the RTC Makati. The Information alleged that Beltran, San Juan, and other...
individuals "conspiring and confederating with each other, x x x, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously form a tactical alliance between the CPP/NPA, renamed as
Partidong Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and its armed regular members as Katipunan ng Anak
ng Bayan

(KAB) with the Makabayang Kawal ng Pilipinas (MKP) and thereby rise publicly and take up
arms against the duly constituted government, x x x."

Issues:

(a) whether the inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion was valid and (b) whether
there is probable cause to indict Beltran for Rebellion; and

Ruling:

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without
warrant.[14] Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the
instances when such warrantless arrest may be effected, thus:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

The Inquest Proceeding against

Beltran for Rebellion is Void.

The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers[15] states that the officers arrested Beltran,
without a warrant,[16] for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest
prosecutor could only have conducted as he did... conduct an inquest for Inciting to Sedition
and no other. Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second
inquest proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second
inquest void. None of Beltran's arresting officers saw

Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of Rebellion. Nor did they have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had just committed Rebellion, sufficient to
form probable cause to believe that he had committed Rebellion. What these arresting officers...
alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech
on 24 February 2006.

Probable cause is the "existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."[20]
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this
Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause for
otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the prosecutor's... findings in
such investigations.[21] However, in the few exceptional cases where the prosecutor abused his
discretion by ignoring a clear insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause,
thus denying the accused his right to substantive and... procedural due process, we have not
hesitated to intervene and exercise our review power under Rule 65 to overturn the prosecutor's
findings.

Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action
done in furtherance of a political end.[24]

The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for
Rebellion consisted of the affidavits and other documents[25] attached to the CIDG letters. We
have gone over these documents and find merit in Beltran's contention that... the same are
insufficient to show probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents
consists of affidavits, some of which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members
of the military and some civilians. Except for two affidavits, executed by a... certain Ruel Escala
(Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,[26] and Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,[27]
none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.[28] In his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the...
afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo, Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and
other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia,
Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by another individual who
looked... like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former member of the CPP
and that (1) he attended the CPP's "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran; (2) he took part
in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used... were purchased
partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list
groups affiliated with the CPP.

The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part
in an armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is
that Beltran was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years...
earlier, he was present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran
committed specific acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ
Resolution of 27 February 2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of... a
rebellion. Beltran's alleged presence during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make
him a leader of a rebellion.

There is No Probable Cause to Indict

2. Brion vs. Ruiz – February 7, 2005 - LOVITOS

Facts:

Verified-Complaint was filed by Brion charging Judge Ruiz with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Bias and Partiality, Grave Abuse of Discretion and Incompetence. Complainant alleges that the
administrative charge arose from the issuance of warrant for his arrest without respondent
having conducted the necessary preliminary investigation.

Complainant narrates that a criminal complaint for grave threats was filed against him on
February 5, 2004. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination on the case on
February 12, 2004 after which he immediately issued a warrant for the arrest without the benefit
of the required preliminary investigation.

Complainant avers that he never received a notice of any preliminary investigation to be

conducted by respondent judge and neither was a complaint served with a notification for him
to submit his counter-affidavit.

Issue:

Was the issuance of the warrant of arrest lawful?

Ruling:

YES.

Complainant, in this case, questions the issuance of the warrant of arrest for his arrest on
February 12, 2004 even before the issuance of the subpoena on February 17, 2004 for the conduct
of the required preliminary investigation. Clearly, respondent is confused with the terms
preliminary investigation for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest and preliminary
investigation.
While it may be true that respondent judge may have not yet conducted the preliminary
investigation when he issued the arrest warrant, such is allowed under the Rules of Court. It is
not required that the preliminary investigation be first concluded before the investigating judge
can issue a warrant of arrest. Section 6, Subparagraph B of Rule 112 provides that without
waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant of arrest if he
finds, after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a
necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends
of justice.

Do not read na here for follow up question lng ni atty, in case:

In fact, under Section 6, Subparagraph (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, it is provided that:

SEC. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - When required pursuant to the second paragraph of section
(sic) of this Rule, the preliminary investigation of cases falling under the original jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, may be conducted by either the judge or the prosecutor. When
conducted by the prosecutor, the procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest by the judge
shall be governed by paragraph (a) of this section. When the investigation is conducted by the
judge himself, he shall follow the procedure provided in section 3 of this Rule. If his findings
and recommendations are affirmed by the provincial or city prosecutor, or by the Ombudsman
or his deputy, and the corresponding information is filed, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
However, without waiting for the conclusion of the investigation, the judge may issue a warrant
of arrest if he finds, after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that
there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.

In the case of Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Judge Efren F. Albano:

"A preliminary investigation is conducted to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It is an executive, not a judicial function. It
falls under the authority of the prosecutor who is given, by law, the power to direct and control
all criminal actions. However, since there are not enough fiscals and prosecutors to investigate
the crimes committed in all the municipalities all over the country, the government was
constrained to assign this function to judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.

It is true that the determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the reviewing power of the prosecutor. However,
distinction should be made between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to ascertain
whether or not a person should be held for trial. The first is a judicial function while the second
is an executive function. Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a
warrant of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city
prosecutor. The prosecutor's reviewing power shall affect only his conclusion as to whether or
not a criminal complaint or information should be filed against the respondent, but not his
conclusion as to the propriety of issuing a warrant of arrest."

3. Gutierrez vs. Hernandez – June 8, 2007 - MAMAC

FACTS:

An administrative case was filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by
complainants P/Supt. Alejandro Guttierez, PCI Antonio Ricafort, SPO4 Ricardo G. Ong, and
SPO1 Arnulfo Medenilla, all of the Criminal Investigation and Detective Division (CIDD) of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), against then (now retired) Judge Godofredo G. Hernandez,
Sr. of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro charging the latter
with: Gross Ignorance of the Law; Impropriety; Grave Misconduct; Conduct unbecoming of a
judge; and Lack of integrity to continue as a member of the judiciary.

On August 9, 2004, Gus Abelgas accompanied one Ernesto Cruz to Camp Crame, Quezon City
to file a complaint involving Cruz’s minor daughter who was allegedly recruited in Malabon,
Metro Manila to work in a KTV bar in Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
On August 10, 2004, CIDD officers and agents conducted a rescue operation accompanied by
Ernesto Cruz, Gus Abelgas and other ABS CBN TV crew members who took footage of the
operation. They were able to rescue 5 young girls, which included the daughter of Ernesto Cruz,
from the house of a certain Salvador Napolitani, who claimed that PO2 Jose Ringor brought the
woman to him for safekeeping.

As a result, a complaint for violation of RA 9208 in relation to RA 7610 was subsequently filed
before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Malabon against PO2 Ringor, his recruiter wife Imelda
and certain Bebang. However, after several weeks, the rescued girls except Cruz’s daughter,
filed cases for grave coercion and qualified trespass to dwelling before the sala of the
respondent judge against the complainants.

It was in connection with said charges, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6149 to 6156, that the
instant administrative complaint arose. Complainants sought to hold the respondent judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law in –

1. Issuing warrants of arrest in inordinate haste, forgoing the mandatory conduct of

preliminary examination and personal determination of probable cause in contravention of the
provisions of the Rules of Court and in denial of complainants’ constitutional rights to due
process; and

2. Setting the said criminal cases for arraignment without the requisite information having
yet been filed in court.

WON Judge Hernandez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure? YES

RULING:Indubitably, there was no preliminary investigation conducted as required by the

rules since no subpoena was issued to herein complainants for them to file counter-affidavits.
Furthermore, the inordinate haste attending the issuance of the warrants of arrest against
complainants, Ernesto Cruz, and Gus Abelgas belies the conduct of preliminary examination
and personal determination of probable cause, in contravention of the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and constituting denial of due process.

Sec. 6 Par. (b) of Rule 112 provides when a warrant of arrest may issue which stated 3
conditions that must concur for its issuance by the municipal judge during preliminary
investigation. The investigating judge must:
1. Have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching
questions and answers;

2. Be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and

3. That there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.

In the case at bar, the issuance of the warrant of arrest was clearly irregular, not only did it lack
a preliminary investigation, but the order granting such issuance did not show any finding of a
need to place complainants under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice.

The respondent set Criminal Case Nos. 6149 to 6156 for arraignment and hearing knowing fully
well that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and no information had yet been
filed by court. It violates complainants’ right, as accused in those cases, to due process, to be
informed of the accusation against them and to have a copy of the Information before
arraignment. As record shows, complainants, as accused in those cases, had already received
subpoenas way back on February 11, 2005, commanding them to appear before the court on
March 4, 2005, for arraignment without corresponding Informations having as yet been filed.
This is a clear display of gross ignorance of the law and procedure.

(SUMMARY – IN CASE IASK)

April 18, 2005 – administrative case was filed

August 9, 2004 – Ernesto Cruz filed a complaint (illegal recruitment)

August 10, 2004 – CIDD officers and agents conducted a rescue operation

August 17, 2004 – 4 rescued girls, Judge Hernandez, PO2 Ringor, SPO2 Bacalana, Atty.
Cabugoy – La taberna beach resort

August 23, 2004 – complaints for qualified trespass to dwelling and grave coercion
were filed

August 24, 2004 – motion for issuance of warrant of arrest against Ernesto Cruz was
filed

August 24, 2004 – Respondent granted the motion for issuance of warrant of arrest
September 8, 2004 – Motion to Amend Criminal Complaint filed identifying the names of the
members of the CIDD rescue team and warrants of arrest were hastily issued

4. Ong vs Genio – December 23, 2009

It bears stressing that the judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to

establish probable cause.34 This, the RTC judge clearly complied with in this case.

5. De Castro vs. Judge Fernandez – February 14, 2007 - Mataranas

FACTS:

On the evening of 11 June 2002, barangay tanods invited Reynaldo De Castro to the barangay
hall in connection with a complaint for sexual assault filed by (Unnamed), on behalf of her
daughter (Unnamed). Petitioner accepted the invitation without any resistance.

On 18 June 2002, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod filed an Information against petitioner
for the crime of rape. The Information reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor II accuses REYNALDO DE CASTRO y AVELLANA of the

crime of Rape (Art. 266-A, par. 2 in relation to Art. 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7659) and in relation with R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of June 2002 or prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commits act[s] of sexual
assault with one (Unnamed), a seven (7) years old minor, by touching and inserting his finger
into her vagina against her will and consent.

On 1 July 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation praying that the trial court issue an
order directing the Office of the Prosecutor of Las Piñas City to conduct a preliminary
investigation in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also asked that the
charge filed against him be amended to acts of lasciviousness instead of rape since "fingering" is
not covered under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353).In the Order
dated 5 August 2002, the trial court denied petitioner’s Motion for Reinvestigation.

ISSUE/S:

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN FULL

ACCORD WITH RULE 112 OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.

RULING:

No, petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation. Under Section
7 of Rule 112, if an information is filed in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused
may, within five days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation. The accused’s failure to request for a preliminary investigation within the
specified period is deemed a waiver of his right to a preliminary investigation.

6. Chester De Joya vs. Judge Marquez – January 31, 2006

7. Manolo Adriano vs. Judge Bercades – April 17, 2006 - MONDIA, IZBOY IZBOY

Facts: An administrative case was filed against respondent Judge Renato Bercades for issuing a
warrant of arrest against the complainants Manolo Adriano and Reynaldo Austral for cutting
down 223 coconut trees without permit (violation of Republic Act 8048). In their letter-
complaint, complainants averred that the warrant issued by Judge Bercades was based on a
“defective” complaint because of the inconsistency in the dates of its filing vis-à-vis the alleged
crime. It would show that the crime was committed almost a month after the complaint was
filed. Further, the warrant was issued without the necessity of placing complainants under
custody so as not to frustrate the ends of justice. Complainants also pointed out that they were
arrested on Palm Sunday, in violation of Ministry of Justice Memorandum No. 3, and had only
two and a half days to secure their release since it was Holy Week. Finally, complainants
claimed that "the capricious and whimsical issuance of the warrant of arrest and its arbitrary
implementation is a clear case of malicious harassment."
Issue: WON an investigating Judge may order the issuance of warrant of arrest in a preliminary
investigation without the necessity of placing the respondent under custody

Ruling: In issuing warrants of arrest in preliminary investigations, the investigating judge must:

(1) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching
questions and answers;

(2) be satisfied that probable cause exists; and

(3) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.

In this case, respondent judge justified the issuance of a warrant of arrest after (1) conducting a
summary examination under oath of the prosecution witnesses, and (2) finding that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the offense of VIOLATION OF RA [8048] cognizable by the
trial court, has been committed and that the accused (herein complainants), MANOLO
ADRIANO & REYNALDO AUSTRAL are probably guilty thereof. Respondent judge however
failed to consider the third requirement: (3) there must be the need to place the accused
under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.

G. Section 7 – Records

1.De Castro vs. Judge Fernandez – February 14, 2007 - MORAN

FACTS:

On the evening of 11 June 2002, barangay tanods invited petitioner to the barangay hall in
connection with a complaint for sexual assault filed by AAA, on behalf of her daughter BBB.
Petitioner accepted the invitation without any resistance.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ

On 12 June 2002, the barangay officials turned over petitioner to the Las Piñas City Police
Station.

On 13 June 2002, the police endorsed the complaint to the city prosecutor of Las Piñas City for
inquest proceedings. Later, the state prosecutor issued a commitment order for the petitioner's
detention.

On 18 June 2002, State Prosecutor Napoleon A. Monsod filed an Information against petitioner
for the crime of rape. The Information reads:

The undersigned State Prosecutor II accuses REYNALDO DE CASTRO y AVELLANA of the

crime of Rape (Art. 266-A, par. 2 in relation to Art. 266-B, Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 8353 and R.A. No. 7659) and in relation with R.A. No. 7610, committed as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of June 2002 or prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commits [sic] act[s] of sexual
assault with one [BBB], a seven (7) years [sic] old minor, by touching and inserting his finger
into her vagina against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

On 1 July 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation praying that the trial court issue an
order directing the Office of the Prosecutor of Las Piñas City to conduct a preliminary
investigation in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also asked that the
charge filed against him be amended to acts of lasciviousness instead of rape since "fingering" is
not covered under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8353 (RA 8353). In the Order
dated 5 August 2002, the trial court denied petitioner's Motion for Reinvestigation.

On 22 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In the Order dated 28 August
2002, the trial court denied the motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

IN FULL ACCORD WITH RULE 112 ON THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? nay!

RULING:

On the merits, petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to a preliminary investigation.
Under Section 7 of Rule 112, if an information is filed in court without a preliminary
investigation, the accused may, within five days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a
preliminary investigation. The accused's failure to request for a preliminary investigation
within the specified period is deemed a waiver of his right to a preliminary investigation.

In this case, the information against the petitioner was filed with the trial court on 18 June 2002.
On 20 June 2002, one Glenn Russel L. Apura, on behalf of Atty. Eduardo S. Villena (Atty.
Villena), requested for copies of the pertinent documents on petitioner's case. On 25 June 2002,
Atty. Villena entered his appearance as counsel for the petitioner. Yet, petitioner only asked for
a reinvestigation on 1 July 2002 or more than five days from the time petitioner learned of the
filing of the information. Therefore, petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to ask for a
preliminary investigation.

H.Revised Rules on Summary Procedure

1. People vs. Navarro – March 25, 1997 - OBISO

2. Brocka vs. Enrile - G.R. No. 69863-65, December 10, 1990- ONTAL

Facts: Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 following the forcible and violent dispersal
of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of
Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal
Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788.

Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which
daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.

However, despite service of the order of release Brocka, et al. remained in detention,
respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action allegedly issued against them.
Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to
them.

Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged with Inciting to Sedition without prior notice to their
counsel.
Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient
bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of
inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and
participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex
crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into
two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double
jeopardy.

Issue: WON the detention of Brocka, et. al. violates their right?

Ruling:the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty
preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al.
in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified
without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.

Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy.
These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.

Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also
from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution: nad

We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal
charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release
until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily
conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.

V. RULE 113 – ARREST

A. Section 1 – Definition of Arrest - Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
1. Pangandaman vs. Casar – G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988 Orevillo

Pangandaman vs Casar G.R. No. 71782 April 14, 1988

Facts:

On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at
least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear.
According to one version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both
attackers and defenders suffering casualties. Another version has it that a group that was on its
way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed.

Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a
letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary
investigation" of the incident. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement"
to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that
may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be
forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases."

However, presented to the respondent Judge until Saturday, August 10, 1985, when a criminal
complaint for multiple murder was filed before him by P.C. Sgt. Jose L. Laruan, which was
docketed as Case No. 1748. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint and issued the
corresponding warrant of arrest" against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the
witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does."

An "ex-parte" motion for reconsideration was filed on August 14, 1985 by Atty. Batuampar
(joined by Atty. Pama L. Muti), seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of
a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty
and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The
respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;” hence the present petition.

The respondent Judge to conduct a preliminary investigation of the offenses involved, which
are cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, the petitioners and the Solicitor General argue that the
Judge in the case at bar failed to conduct the investigation in accordance with the procedure
prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court ; 13 and that that failure constituted a
denial to petitioners of due process which nullified the proceedings leading to the issuance of
the warrant for the petitioners' arrest.

Issue: Is the warrant of arrest Valid?

Ruling: No. The warrant of arrest is not valid.

Because it is the nature of a general warrant, that one of a class of writs long prescribed was
unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of that subject.
Which clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrant of arrest should particularly
describe the persons to be seized. The was as against unidentified subjects will be considered as
null and void.

Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the
witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one
of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally
subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that
warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant
must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

WHEREFORE, the warrant complained of is upheld and declared valid insofar as it orders the
arrest of the petitioners. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50)
"John Does." The respondent Judge is directed to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del
Sur the record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 1728 of his
court for further appropriate action. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO, ORDERED.

2. People vs. Salvatierra – July 24, 1997 - OSORNO

FACTS:

On November 19, 1990, accused-appellant David Salvatierra was charged with murder in an
information which reads as follows:

That on or about August 17, 1990 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with three others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown
and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill and
with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one CHARLIE
FERNANDEZ Y DE GUZMAN, by then and there stabbing the latter twice with a bladed weapon on
the chest, thereby inflicting upon him mortal stab wounds which were direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter. Contrary to law.
At his arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charge. He put up the
defense of alibi alleging that at 4:30 in the afternoon of August 17, 1990, he was having a
merienda with his wife and children at their home in 459 Miguelin Street, Sampaloc, Manila and
could not possibly be near the Trabajo Market.

Appellant further testified that in the afternoon of November 15, 1990, he had an altercation
with a woman in their neighborhood who caused his arrest for the crime of malicious mischief.
He was detained for a few hours at Police Station No. 4. Later, police from WPD arrived and
picked him up and brought him to the Homicide Section where he was investigated,
interrogated and detained for the stabbing of one Charlie Fernandez on August 17, 1990. After
two (2) days, he was brought out of his cell where a man and two (2) women were made" to
view" him. One of the women was the mother of the victim while the other one was someone he
was not acquainted with. The latter was the witness against him who pointed to him as the
killer of Charlie in the police line-up. Two days later, he was made to sign a document the
contents of which he was not allowed to read. When he insisted on reading the document, his
head was hit with a key and he was forced to sign it. The document was the booking and
information sheet.

The appellant claimed that the Court a Quo gravely erred in not finding that his arrest,
investigation and detention for the offense charged in the instant case was violative of his
constitutional rights esp against warrantless arrests as "there is nothing on record to show that
his arrest for the minor offense of malicious mischief was effected by virtue of a warrant.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case filed against the appellant should be dismissed for violation of his
constitutional rights against warrantless arrest?

RULING:

No.
Indeed, appellant’s arrest on suspicion that he was involved in the killing of Charlie Fernandez
was made almost three (3) months after the commission of the crime on August 17, 1990 and
only after he had been taken in police custody for a minor offense. As such, because no warrant
had been obtained during the 3-month intervening period between the commission of the crime
and his apprehension, his arrest would huuave ordinarily been rendered unconstitutional and
illegal inasmuch as even warrantless arrests made within shorter periods like ten (10) days are
illegal. The element of immediacy between the time of the commission of the offense and the
time of the arrest had not been complied with. It should be stressed that Section 5(b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court has excluded situations under the old rule which allowed a warrantless
arrest provided that the offense "has in fact been committed."

But while these argument’s may be valid, appellant’s claim that the case against him should be
dismissed for violation of his constitutional rights, must fail. Appellant is estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this before entering his
plea. Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of
jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived. This is the first time that appellant is raising this issue as he
did not even move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on the ground of
illegal arrest. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, had been cured by
his voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court when he entered his plea and
participated during the trial. Verily, the illegal arrest of appellant is not a sufficient cause for
setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and where the trial was
free from error.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant David Salvatierra of the crime
of murder for the killing of Charlie Fernandez is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

3.People vs. Zaspa – September 21, 2000 - PASCUA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES- plaintiff-appellee

ROLANDO ZASPA and JULIUS GALVAN-accused-appellants

G.R. No. 136396. September 21, 2000.

FACTS:

An information was filed before the RTC where appellants were charged with unlawfully
possessing and owning illegal drugs.

At about two o'clock in the morning of 29 April 1994, Chief of Police received a tip from a police
informer that Rolando Zaspa and a companion were bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for
Mati, Davao Oriental. The police chief promptly organized and dispatched to the area a team.
The group immediately proceeded to location and there, the team saw Zaspa and his
companion standing by the side of the road with a big black "loalde" bag in front of them. Just
as the police officers in uniform, proceeded to approach the two men, Zaspa tried to flee. He
was intercepted by the policemen. Zaspa claimed that the contents of the bag did not belong to
them. When the bag was opened, Zaspa told the policemen that the dried marijuana leaves
were owned by one Bito Mangandan. Zaspa and his companion, who turned out to be Julius
Galvan, were arrested and brought to the police station for investigation.

Upon arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge.

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision finding the appellants guilty.

Appellants appealed their conviction to the CA and the CA elevated it to the SC for review.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless arrest of Zaspa and Galvan was valid.

RULING:

YES, the warrantless arrest of Zaspa and Galvan was valid.

The peace officers may pursue and arrest without a warrant any person under circumstances
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed or is about to commit any crime or
breach of the peace (People vs. Bautista, 227 SCRA 152).

In the case at bench, the facts and circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused at dawn of
April 29, 1994 would show that the arresting officers have proper and justifiable reasons to
arrest the two (2) suspects.

First, they received confidential information from a police informer that a certain Rolando
Zaspa with a companion were bringing dried marijuana leaves bound for Mati.

Second, when the police arrived at the crime scene, the two (2) suspects were suspiciously at the
side of the road with a big black bag in front of them.

Third, there were no other people in sight and it is therefore safe to conclude that the bag
containing the contraband belonged to no one else but the suspects.

Lastly, when the police officers were approaching, the appellant Zaspa attempted to escape.

Moreover, on the validity of the warrantless arrest, along with the corresponding search and
seizure, suffice it to say that any objection regarding the regularity of an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea; otherwise, the defect shall be deemed cured by the voluntary
submission by the accused to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

B. Section 3 – Duty of arresting officer; Section 4 – Execution of warrant

1. Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals – G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994 - PITOGO
FACTS:

1. CAPCOM filed with RTC-Caloocan an application for search warrant, in connection with an
alleged violation of PD1866 (illegal possession of firearms) perpetrated at QC. Hon. Fineza
issued the warrant.

2. A labor seminar of the Ecimenical Inst. For Labor Education (EILER) was taking place at the
time of the search, and 61 members were found and brought to Camp Karingal in QC. Most of
them were eventually let go except for herein Petitioners who were EILERInstructors. They
were then charged with violation of PD1866 before RTC QC presided by Hon. Velasco.3.

Petitioners filed a motion before RTC QC for consolidation and quashal of search warrant and
suppression of illegally acquired evidence. RTC QC granted consolidation and denied the
quashal. CA upheld RTC4.

Hence, this petition

ISSUE: W/N a court may grant a search warrant for offenses committed outside its territorial
jurisdiction

HELD: (YES, Petition is DENIED)

Petitioners argue that the application for the search warrant was filed in a court of improper
venue and since venue in criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such
warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction.SC disagrees. A warrant
such as a warrant of arrest and a search warrant is only a special criminal process, the power to
issue which is inherent in all courts. As opposed to criminal action, jurisdiction of which is in
specific courts. Here, the action is instituted at RTC QC where the offense was committed. SC
notes that it would be difficult to impose upon the law enforcement authorities to unerringly
determine where they should apply for a search warrant considering the uncertainties and
possibilities as to the ultimate venue of the case. Looking at Rule 110 Section15, only criminal
actions were given the restriction of territorial jurisdiction. The omission of the same restriction
on special criminal processes is deliberate and intended. If the case has already been filed before
a court, then it is that court who must issue the warrant, subject to certain exceptions such as
when no judge is present

Issue is on expiration of the warrant… :(

2.People vs. Givera – January 18, 2001 - PREGLO

FACTS: That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused CESAR GIVERA, conspiring together, confederating with EPEFANIO GAYON y
GERALDE and ARTURO GAYON y GERALDE, and mutually helping one another who were
charged with the same offense at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength,
with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, and employ personal violence upon
the person of EUSEBIO GARDON y ARRIVAS, by then and there stabbing him with a knife
hitting him on the different parts of his body, and striking him with a piece of stone on the
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of EUSEBIO
GARDON y ARRIVAS.

Accused-appellant said he was going to help the victim get up, but he saw the victim's son,
Ronilo Gardon, coming with a bolo. He, therefore, ran away and left the victim behind. He
added, that he did not see if his three companions did anything more than box
the victim. Accused-appellant said he learned that the victim had died only two days after the
incident

Accused-appellant was arrested on May 4, 1996 at the East Avenue Medical Center. He stated
that the children of the victim implicated him in the killing of Eusebio Gardon only because he
was present when the incident happened.

ISSUE: WON the arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996 without a warrant
is valid.

RULING: Yes. The claim of the accused is not true. He was arrested by virtue of a warrant
issued by the court on April 27, 1995. However, as the records show, the warrant of arrest
was returned unserved by the arresting officer on June 7, 1995 (more than 10 days from
issuance) as accused-appellant could not be found. He was finally found only on May 4, 1996.
Now, no alias warrant of arrest is needed to make the arrest. Unless specifically provided in
the warrant, the same remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled or quashed.

The ten-day period provided in Rule 113, Sec. 4 is only a directive to the officer executing the
warrant to make a return to the court.

At any rate, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object thereto
because he failed to move for the quashal of the information before the trial court, entered a
plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. As this Court has held, any objection involving
a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived.

3.Viudez vs. Court of Appeals – June 5, 2009 - Resimilla

Facts:

On June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged murder of the said victims was filed by the 303rd
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Division (PNP CID) Team with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor against petitioner, et. al. The Investigating State Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict the petitioner and others for the crime of murder, thus, 2
Informations for murder were filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, which then issued
warrants of arrest.

On September 21, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the
Implementation of the Warrant of Arrest, arguing that all the accused in the said criminal
cases had filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to
Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest against
petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said petition for
review.

In an Order dated September 28, 2001, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion stating that, insofar
as the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was concerned, said warrant
had already been issued for his apprehension. The court also added that there was no way for
it to recall the same in the absence of any compelling reason, and that jurisdiction over his
person had not yet been acquired by it; hence, petitioner had no personality to file any
pleading in court relative to the case until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to
the court. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order, but was denied
in an Order dated October 10, 2001.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction claiming that the
Order of September 28, 2001 and the Order of October 10, 2001 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On December 19, 2001, the CA promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
for lack of merit and found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the respondent
Judge's discretion in issuing the challenged Orders. The court added that, since the premise of
petitioner's conclusion was erroneous for said circular and the cases cited did not make it
obligatory for respondent Judge to grant petitioner's motion petitioner's cause was lost. It also
stated that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or in any circular of this Court,
even in any of its decision was it ever pronounced that when a petition for review of the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor -- finding probable cause to indict a respondent -- is
filed with the Office of the Secretary of Justice, the court which earlier issued warrants of arrest,
should suspend their enforcement.

Issue:

Whether a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
concerning a finding of probable cause will suspend the proceedings in the trial court,
including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.

Ruling:

Petitioner cites DOJ Department Circular No. 70, specifically paragraph 2 of Section 9 thereof,
which provides that the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution
of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. Somehow, petitioner is of the
opinion that the suspension of proceedings in court, as provided in the said circular, includes
the suspension of the implementation of warrants of arrest issued by the court.

Petitioner's contention is wrong. It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry, which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest;
and the preliminary investigation proper, which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of
arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of
the investigating prosecutor.

As enunciated in Baltazar v. People, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is
filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the
Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs the facts and circumstances
without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less than
evidence that would justify conviction. The purpose of the mandate of the judge to first
determine probable cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start those
falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The
function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is
exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred
pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of
probable cause, a function that is executive in nature.

To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the

exclusive prerogative of the judge It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial
court a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of the warrant of
arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest
questioning the issuance thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of
the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely wanted the trial court to defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of
the petition for review that he filed citing the following directive contained in Section 9 of
DOJ Department Circular:

The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance. The above provision of the Department Circular is
directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing a
remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the
said provision does it state that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the
discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the implementation of the
warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered.
This is in consonance with the earlier ruling of this Court that once a complaint or information
is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of
the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely
exercised his judicial discretion when he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the
implementation of the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the CA was correct when it found no
whimsicality or oppressiveness in the exercise of the trial judge's discretion in issuing the
challenged orders.

Hatag ug digest sa ruling pls 🙁

NO. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause is
exclusive; thus,the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the
resolution of a petition for review of the secretary of justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function
that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an
encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.

C. Section 5 – Arrest without warrant; when lawful

1. People vs. Molina – February 19, 2001 SANOY

Facts:

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. He was with his informer who pointed to a
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. SP01 Paguidopon has not seen
accused-appellant Molina before the arrest. Moreover, he only knew the names of the accused-
appellants after the arrest. In the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that an alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City. At that
occurrence, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. The team
boarded their vehicle, overtook the “trisikad” and ordered it to stop. Mula was holding a black
bag and handed it to Molina. SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
Molina to open the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-
appellants were handcuffed by the police officers.

Accused-appellants filed a Demurer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly

seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by
the trial court. The RTC found accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong"
and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement resulting in the admissibility of the seized
marijuana as evidence.
Ruling:

The marijuana seized is inadmissible as evidence. The court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules for warrantless arrests. The
fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of
a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The foregoing constitutional
proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible. However, the Court holds
that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules.
Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.

Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence
against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus left with no choice but to find in favor of
accused-appellants and reverse and set aside the decision of the RTC. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina and Gregorio
Mula were acquitted and ordered released from confinement unless they are validly detained
for other offenses.

2. Umil vs. Ramos – G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 SIMBAJON / ZAMORA

Facts

The Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command received confidential information
about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St.
Agnes Hospital, QC. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, is actually
Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
wno was positively Identimed as

one who is responsible for the killing of two (2) soldiers. Dural was

transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. As a
consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double
Murder with Assault Upon Agents

of Persons in Authority."

Issue

WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD: YES

YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being
a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized
and for subversion which, like rebellion is, a continuing offense.

3. People vs. Evaristo – G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992 SOLANO

Facts:

Peace officers while patrol, heard burst of gunfire and proceeded to investigate in the house of
appellant where they were given permission to enter accidentally discovering the firearms in
the latter’s possession. Accused-appellant found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
contends that the seizure of the evidence is inadmissible because it was not authorized by a
valid warrant.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in an accidental discovery of the
evidence is admissible.

Held:

Yes, the firearms seized was valid and lawful for being incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense
was committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant.

4. People vs. Alunday – June 1, 2007 SOLDEVILLA

FACTS:

Sometime in May 2000, the Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of Mountain
Province received a report from a confidential informant of an existing marijuana plantation
within the vicinity of Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province. Acting on the confidential
information, Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad, engaged the services of another
confidential informant to validate said report. After a series of validations, the confidential
informant confirmed the existence of the subject plantation. A group of policemen, one of
whom was SPO1 George Saipen of the Bontoc PNP, was dispatched to scout the area ahead of
the others. At a distance of 30 meters, Saipen, together with the members of his group, saw
Ricardo Alunday herein accused-appellant, cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1
Saipen and others approached Alunday and introduced themselves as members of the PNP.
SPO1 Saipen, together with the other policemen, brought said accused-appellant to a nearby
hut. Inside the hut, the operatives saw an old woman, an M16 rifle and some dried marijuana
leaves. The other members of the raiding team uprooted and thereafter burned the marijuana
plants, while the team from the Provincial Headquarters got some samples of the marijuana
plants and brought the same to their headquarters. The trial court found the accused guilty of
violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA affirmed the trial court decision.

ISSUE:

Was the arrest of the accused valid?

RULING:
YES.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to
arrest in flagrante delicto.In flagrante delicto means caught in the act of committing a crime.
This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without warrant,

requires that the person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is about to
commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the arresting officer.

SPO1 Saipen saw the accused-appellant personally cutting and gathering marijuanaplants.
Thus, the accused-appellant's arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because he was caught in
flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were committing a crime in the presence of the
arresting officers. The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We
have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he
fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since
the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction
of the accused.

5. People vs. Doria – January 22, 1999 - SULTAN

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of Section
4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Members of PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two civilian
informants (CI) that one “Jun” who was later identified to be Florencio Doria was engaged in
illegal drug activities and decided to entrap and arrest “Jun” in a buy-bust operation. During
the buy-bust operation”Jun” took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to
PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested “Jun” as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the
arrest. They frisked “Jun” but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, “Jun”
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named “Neneth” (Violeta Gaddao)
“Jun” led the police team to “Neneth’s” house.

The team found the door of “Neneth’s” house open and a woman inside. “Jun” identified the
woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked “Neneth” about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over “Neneth’s” house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under
the dining table. He saw that one of the box’s flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana
earlier “sold” to him by “Jun.” His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered “Neneth’s” house
and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of
what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants.

Gaddao testified that inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons.
They asked her about a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box
was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its
contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.

She denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in
her person.

The RTC convicted the accused-appellants.

ISSUES:

(1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of accused-appellant Doria;

(2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person
and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid

RULING:

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are
allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

x x x.”

apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only
authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances:(1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in vio lation of customs laws; (4) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested.

A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.

necessary because the arrest was made in “hot pursuit” and the search was an incident to her
lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted.

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to
flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in “hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her
daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113.
“Personal knowledge” of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must
be based upon “probable cause” which means an “actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion.” The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made
by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant
Doria named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked
money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug
business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,

with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant
Doria’s word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in
drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in
his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.

2.

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot
be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless
seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

The “plain view” doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside
a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents
are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao’s house because they were led
there by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on
appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named her and led them to her. Standing by the door of
appellant Gaddao’s house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a
half meters away was the dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was
partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its
contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was
marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and
should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of
accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime
charged.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of
proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the
presentation of the drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.The prosecution has clearly
established the fact that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant
Doria sold and delivered nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the
poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao
conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.

Naa pay mas taas ani nga digest? Haha mangayo digest sa ruling pwees 🙁

6. People vs. Escordial – January 16, 2002- TATAD

FACTS:

The complainant, Michelle Darunday, was living with Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver.

- On the night of the incident, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his
head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long
and asked where the money was. Erma Blanca and Michelle Darunday gave the money because
they were threatened by the man to be killed.

- The assailant then blindfolded Michelle and began to rape her. After satisfying his lust, the
assailant conversed for a while with complainants. The accused, threatening to call his
companions, then, again, raped the complainant in the other orifice of the complainant’s nether
regions.

- Accused then warned the women not to report or else they would be killed.

- After 30 mins. The complainants told their neighbor of what happened. Then they told the
owner of the boarding house what happened who then told the police.

- Physical description of the assailant was given by the complainant at the police station.

- Police found that the descriptions given by the complainant fit that of a worker in the Coffee
Break Corner, where the accused was employed. Heading there, the police asked of the accused
whereabouts which was, as they were told, watching a basketball game.

- The police arrested the accused (w/o warrant) and proceeded to the police station where he
saw the complainant and inadvertently blushed.

- Complainant then identified him based on the marks on the neck and matched other physical
descriptions.

- Court of first instance ruled that accused is found guilty of robbery and rape with no
mitigating circumstances and is hereby sentenced with maximum penalty of death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused is legal

HELD: The accused-appellant was watching a basketball game when he was seized therefore he
was not 1.) In flagrante delicto 2.) He was not an escaped convict 3) the arrest was not after
direct consummation of the crime. However, in question of the “Personal Knowledge” the
police were not at the scene of the crime when it happened therefore “Personal Knowledge”
does not apply. Furthermore, there was ample time for police to procure a warrant and no
reason for them not to obtain one.This deficiency is, however, cured once accused-appellant
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and not questioning the invalidity of the arrest.

7. People vs. Burgos – G.R. No. L-68955; September 4, 1986 - YUMANG

Facts: Ruben Burgos was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of subversion. According to police, Cesar Masamlok claimed Burgos
threatened him with a gun and forcibly recruited him to be part of the New People’s Army. The
next day, 15 policemen located and arrested Burgos without a warrant. They asked him
about his firearm, and after denying possession of the firearm, his wife pointed to a place
where the gun was buried. Burgos also pointed the policemen to a stockpile of cogon where
documents relating to the NPA were recovered. Masamlok also claimed that Burgos urged
NPA members to overthrow the government in a seminar he was made to attend.
Burgos was then assisted by an attorney in making an extra-judicial confession of
guilt. Burgos denied the confession and claimed that he was tortured and forced to
sign the confession against his will. His wife also testified that the firearm had actually been
left in their house by Masamlok 3 days before the arrest, when Burgos was not at home.

Issues:

(1) Whether Ruben Burgos was arrested lawfully

(2) Whether the search and seizure of the subversive documents was lawful

(3) Whether Ruben Burgos is guilty of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of subversion

Ruling:

(1) No. The arresting officers had no personal knowledge of any offense apart from information
offered by Cesar Masamlok. Ruben Burgos was not in possession of the firearm or any
subversive document when he was arrested. Reasonable ground refers to the identification
of the perpetrator, not belief that an offense was committed, so it cannot be the basis for the
arrest. Thus, there was no valid arrest without a warrant.
(2) No. There was no valid arrest, and there was no waiver or consent given. Failure to object to
the search does not constitute a waiver or consent to be searched. Thus, the firearm and
subversive documents were obtained against the constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and are inadmissible as evidence. Further, since Burgos was not
informed of his constitutional rights upon his arrest, his alleged admission of ownership of the
gun and surrender of subversive documents violated his right against self-incrimination.

(3) No. The only remaining proof was the testimony of Masamlok, which was uncorroborated.
He is also an interested witness as his fate depended on his cooperation with the authorities.
Burgos is acquitted due to insufficient proof of guilt.

8. People vs. Ramos – G.R. No. 85401-02 June 4, 1990 - SIMBAJON

FACTS

On 29 November 1982, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics Command Office in Olongapo
City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of "Mama Rose" (Rosalinda Ramos)
was selling marijuana. The Narcotics Command (NARCOM) team proceeded to the place
where appellant was selling cigarettes, and arrested the latter for illegal peddling of
marijuana. Ramos was requested to take out the contents of her wallet. The four marked
fivepeso bills used in the test buys were found among her possessions and were confiscated
after the serial numbers were confirmed. Search of Ramos’ stall yielded 20 sticks of marijuana
cigarettes in a trash can placed under the small table where Ramos displayed the wares she was
selling. Ramos was thereafter brought to the station. At the station, Ramos executed a statement
confessing to her crimes which she swore to before Assistant City Fiscal.

The defense contends however that she assented to the invitation of the NARCOM operatives
for investigation, after search of her buri bags (which she stores the fruits that she sells) were
fruitless.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ramos waived her right against the warrantless search of the trash can, where
illegal drugs were found, under her control
RULING- YES.

The trash can (where the contraband were found) was found under the table where her
legitimate wares were being sold. Ramos was the only person who had access to the trash
can. The same was under her immediate physical control. She had complete charge of the
contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion of all other persons. In law, actual
possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and control of the party. But
this is not to say that the law requires actual possession.

In criminal law, possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of

controlled substances with intent to distribute may be constructive as well as actual. It is
only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband.
These requirements are present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs were
found inside the trash can placed under the stall owned by Ramos. In fact, the NARCOM agents
who conducted the search testified that they had to ask Ramos to stand so that they could look
inside the trash can under Ramos' papag. The trash can was positioned in such a way that it was
difficult for anotherperson to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her
customers. Therefore, the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial
court's finding that Ramos is guilty of possession is correct.

With respect to Criminal Case No. 5990, however, this Court upholds the lower court’s finding
that the appellant is guilty of possession of marijuana.

Rule 113 Section 6 (b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant. — when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

9. Nazareno vs. Station Commander – 187 SCRA 312

Facts:

 On 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner
of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

 One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the police on
28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his
companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II.

 In view thereof, the police officers, without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and
brought him to the police headquarters for questioning.

 On 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two
(2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

 On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989

Issue:

WON the arrest of Nazareno was illegal?

Ruling:

No. The arrest, even though without a warrant, was lawful.

On 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is
in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had,
in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the
strength of the evidence against him).

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based
upon the facts and the law. The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant
pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-
accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the police
authorities.

As held in People vs. Ancheta:

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a
crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the
person sought to be detained participated therein.

Thus, with the arrest being lawful, the petition was dismissed.

Hot pursuit under (b). Kaperfect buh… <3

10. People vs. Cendaña – G.R. No. 84715 October 17, 1990 ALBIOS

Facts:

The police Station of Pangasinan received a report that there was a man found dead. Upon
investigation the victim was identified, lying prostrate on the ground with one shot on the
head.

Accused-appellant was apprehended and later charged with the crime of murder.

During the arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.

After the merits, the trial judge convicted the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused even without proof beyond
reasonable doubt?

WON warrantless arrest was valid NO

Ruling:

Yes.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the instances when a
peace officer or a private person may arrest a person without a warrant:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The facts of the case do not warrant the applicability of paragraphs (a) and (c). Moreover, in
paragraph (b), the only instance under which the accused-appellant's case could possibly fall,
what is essential is that the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the arrestee is responsible for an offense which has just been committed.
Accused-appellant was arrested one day after the killing of the victim and only on the basis
of information obtained by the police officers from unnamed sources. These above
mentioned circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest.

Kaperfect albios <3

(Ang naka red na portion basaha lang kung iask ni Atty. ang narrative events)

From the foregoing narration of events, we note the following:

(1) That there was no eye witness to the killing of the victim Dominador Manongdo;

(2) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police investigators on the basis of
information obtained from unidentified persons that accused-appellant was seen carrying a gun
before the incident.

(3) That the accused-appellant was apprehended by the police officers without any warrant of
arrest;

(4) That the shotgun was recovered without a search warrant from the house where accused-
appellant was arrested; and

(5) That the alleged statement made by the accused-appellant to the police officers admitting to
the commission of the offense and made after his arrest, was used as the main basis for his
conviction.

11. People vs. Alvarez – G.R. No. 88451 September 5, 1991 ALBOFERA

FACTS: A cadaver was found in Palasan Cemetery in Valenzuela, MM. It was believed that a
group of addicts killed the unidentifed person. The following day. while Ronald Alvarez, and
two of his friends, were having their conversation. Alvarez was bragging about how he killed
the victim The father of Alvarez, a retired policeman, overheard them and went to the police
station and told the police: * i think you better arrest my son!* On the basis of his information,
the policemen went to the house of the accused and without a warrant arrested the young
Alvarez.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was personal knowledge so as to make the warranties arrest
lawful.

HELD: Warrantless arrest was VALID. "Under Rule 113, Section 6 of the 1964 Criminal
Procedure, a warrantless arrest can be effected by a peace officer or private person when an
offense has, in fact, been committed and said peace officer or private person has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it.

*In the instant case, it was the elder Alvarez who initiated the arrest a day after the crime was
committed.

Having been once a policeman, he may be said to have been equipped with knowledge of
crime detection. And having had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the three accused,
who were at his house the whole day following the commission, it is logical to infer that his
act of going to the police, informing them that three accused were the perpetrators of the
crime and even fetching them to make the arrest sprang from a well-grounded belief that a
crime had been committed and that accused had committed it. In this regard, the arrests
without a warrant were validly effected."

12. People vs. Briones – G.R. No. 90319 October 15, 1991 - ALLARSE

FACTS:55

The accused-appellants are questioning their conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga of robbery with double homicide. They
contend that the trial court erred in holding that the crime committed is robbery with double
homicide despite insufficiency of evidence, in not holding that the evidence obtained against
them is inadmissible for violation of their constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and
against self-incrimination during custodial investigation, and in not holding that their guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. They likewise argue that their arrest was illegal for
having been made without a warrant. And since their warrantless arrest is void, all the other
proceedings, including their conviction, are also void.

(antecedent fact)

In the evening of April 23, 1988, Francisco was tendering his sari-sari store. At about 11:30
p.mJavier and Allied came to his store and ordered four bottles of beer. Accused Briones arrived
and was offered beer, but he declined and left. After about 30 minutes, Javier and Allied also
left the store.

About 8 meters away from Francisco’s store was the house of spouses Felicismo and Gutierrez, at the
ground floor of which was also a store. On the street near the store was a 100-electric bulb.

When all his customers had left, Francisco closed his store. Not long after, he heard the barking
of dogs from the Gutieerez residence. Feeling that something untoward was taking place, he
went out of his store, and from there, he saw Briones, Javier and Allied mauling Gutierrez who
was lying prostrate on the ground. The three later dragged Mrs. Gutierrez inside her house and closed
the door.

In the morning of April 24, 1988, Francisco went to the house of Gutierrez. He found it in
disarray, with the spouses sprawled dead on the first floor. He then informed the Chief of Police of
the incident and a team of investigators proceeded to the scene of the crime. Subsequently, the culprits
were apprehended on separate occasions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest made is valid? NO.

RULING:
The arrest was unlawful originally but it was cured.

On appellants' claim that since their warrantless arrest is void, all the other proceedings,
including their conviction, are also void, The court finds such claim undeserving of merit. It is
unequivocally clear that no valid arrest was made on the accused, the arrest having been made
without any warrant at all. Neither can the appellant's arrest qualify as a lawful arrest without a
warrant under Sec. 5 (b) Rule 113 because the police officer who effected the arrest
indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed the crime. It is eyewitness Francisco who has such personal knowledge. In sum,
therefore, the warrantless arrest of the appellant is illegal.

Nevertheless, such unavailing technicality cannot render all the other proceedings, including
the conviction of the accused, void. It cannot deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to their culpability.

Immediately after their arrest, accused Briones and Javier could have objected to the legality
thereof due to the failure of the police officer to secure first a warrant for their arrest. Not
only that, without having questioned the legality of their arrest, they even pleaded, on
arraignment to the information filed against them. Accused acts constitute a clear waiver of
their right against unlawful restraint of liberty. Besides, it would be impractical, if not
ridiculous to order the court to set the appellants free then issue a warrant for their arrest, and
try them all over again when appellants themselves have waived their right to object to such
irregularity and when their conviction is truly based on overwhelming evidence.

To the constitutional rights of the appellants to remain silent and to counsel, the same cannot be held to
have been violated. It is not disputed that the appellants were investigated by the police. However, it is
important to note that the confession, admission or evidence obtained from the appellants was never
offered in evidence by the prosecution. Their conviction was not based on said confession or admission but
on the strength of the testimony of the lone eyewitness. Furthermore, appellants' claim of police brutality
cannot be given weight as their allegation of torture was neither formally complained to the police nor
confirmed by any medical report.

13. People vs. Tonog, Jr. – G.R. No. 94533 February 4, 1992 AMPIS
Facts: Dumaguete City Police Station received a report that a lifeless body was found who was
later identified as Efren Flores. Based on the investigation, a motorcab stopped near the place
where the deceased was found. It was also revealed that Ignacio Tonog, Jr. was the one who
was responsible for his death and that prior to the incident, there were grudges between the
two.

Without warrant, police officers went to Bacong, Negros Oriental, and upon being invited for
questioning, voluntarily went with the law enforcers unaccompanied by a counsel. While
they were on their way to the police station, it was noticed that there were blood stains on the
accused’s pants and when asked about it, he said that it was from a pig. He was then
requested to take off his pants for examination.At the station, he confessed his guilt but was
not recorded. After a month, the pants and the knife found were brought to the Cebu crime lab
and found that the blood was the same as the victim’s.One of the witnesses, Liberato Solamillo,
testified that while drinking with the accused and a certain Allan. The accused left with certain
Biyok. At around 11 pm, Liberato and Allanrode a motorcab to look for the accused. They then
saw the victim and requested to convey himto Dumaguete. Allan left and when it failed to
return, Liberato decided to ride a pedicab. Onhis way, he saw the motorcab, and when he
proceeded to the motorcab, he saw Tonog withinside and noticed the blood stains on his
pants.All the facts were denied by the accused and that he only confessed because he was toldto
do so. Charged with three others, Ignacio Tonog was convicted of murder.

Issue: Whether the trial court was at fault for admitting the pants and knife as evidences since
they were taken during a warrantless arrest?

Rule: The "acid-washed maong" pants were admissible in evidence, They were taken from
Accused Appellant as an incident of his arrest. It may be that the police officers were not armed
with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-Appellant. The warrantless arrest,
however,was justified under Section 5(b), Rule 133 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of
the Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of
his investigation indicating that the Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.

The "maong" pants having been taken from Accused-appellant as an incident to a lawful
arrest,no infirmity may be attributed to their seizure without a warrant. Section 12 of Rule 126
of theRules of Court explicitly states, "A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense."

14. Go vs. Court of Appeals – G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992 APA

FACTS:

An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional
Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two
lawyers to the Police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he
was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he
executes and signs a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon
omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary
investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary
investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights,
the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's
warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner
was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner

ISSUE: Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been affected by the San Juan Police in
respect of petitioner Go.

RULING:

NO.

The Supreme Court did not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting
be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed"
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements
made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute
"personal knowledge."

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

Indeed, the petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police
authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the
implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of
a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7
of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
15. People vs. Madriaga – G.R. No. 82293 July 23, 1992 AYAP

(no case submitted)

Im posting this on the spot (not ayap)

a civilian informant appeared at the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Caloocan City Police
Station, and informed Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong and his men that a certain "Olan" whose
description was given by the informant, is engaged in the illegal traffice (sic) of marijuana
somewhere at Elisa Street, Marcela, Maypajo, Caloocan City.

Tamondong gathered his men for a buy-bust operation.

Lechido got the marked money from the man who gave his name as Rolando Pangilinan. The
team brought both accused to the office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit

WON arrest was valid? YES. Hot pursuit.

HELD: The warrantless arrest of the other appellant Rolando Pangilinan falls under paragraph
(b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. Pat. Lechido, as the poseur buyer in the
buy bust operation, had personal knowledge that an offense — the sale to him by Madriaga of
the marijuana — had in fact been committed. He also had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Pangilinan was the source of the prohibited drug by virtue of the information
given to him by Madriaga to this effect. Thus the arrest of appellant Pangilinan was likewise
valid. Consequently, the search of Pangilinan's body incident to his valid arrest was also valid.
The evidence obtained from the search is, therefore, admissable in evidence.

16. People vs. Monda, Jr. – G.R. Nos. 105000-01 November 22, 1993 BANUELOS

Facts:
For the killing of eight government personnel and a civilian in an ambuscade on April 9, 1987 at
Sitio Tastas, Bgy. Labawon, Buhi, Camarines Sur, accused-appellants Jose Monda, Jr. and
Nestor Balbalosa, supposedly in conspiracy with one Avelino Carusa and sixty others who were
identified with fictitious names under the surname of "Doe," allegedly armed with high-
powered firearms and acting with treachery and evident premeditation, were charged with
multiple murder in an information dated August 4, 1987 and filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36, at Iriga City.

issues: WON the warrantless arrest is valid

Ruling:

warrantless arrest NOT valid. the appellants were arrested without a warrant despite the fact
that three days had elapsed from the date of the ambush to their arrest. their apprehension may
accordingly not be considered as justified by sec 5(b) 0f rule 113. if it were true that the
witnesses were able to identify appellants during the ambush due to their distinguishing marks
as they claimed, It would have been easy for them to secure a john doe warrant using appellants
alleged "distinguishing marks" as their discriptio personnae which would enable the arresting
officer to serve the same infallibly.

17. People vs. Rayray – February 1, 1995 BENEMERITO

(no case submitted)

Im posting this on the spot (not BENEMERITO)

Ramon Ancheta was at the Friendly Shop located at Ortega St., San Fernando, La Union, when
accused-appellant Jose Rayray y Areola approached him offering to sell marijuana. Making the
latter believe that he was interested in buying, Lt. Ancheta asked where the merchandise was
and accused-appellant responded by taking marijuana wrapped in komiks from his pocket.
Catching sight of the marijuana fruiting tops and marijuana cigarette being offered him, Lt.
Ancheta immediately identified himself as a police officer, arrested accused-appellant and
brought him to the San Fernando Police Station where he was turned-over to the desk officer,
Sgt. Carmelito Leyga, who entered the details of the arrest in the police blotter.
A policeman cannot callously set aside his essential duty of apprehending criminal offenders
and of keeping peace and order on the shallow excuse that he is not in his place of assignment.
His responsibility to protect the public by apprehending violators of the law, especially one
caught in flagrante delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It follows him wherever he
goes.

Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorities a
warrantless arrest, otherwise called a citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Thus, although
officially assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Ancheta's act of arresting accused-appellant (after the
latter offered to sell him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified not only by his duty
as a law enforcer but also by Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of warrantless or
citizens' arrests.

18. People vs. Manlulu – G.R. No. 102140 April 22, 1994 CABAÑA

FACTS

GERARDO ALFARO, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot with his service pistol in a
drinking spree. He died in the hospital the following day. His drinking partners, Rolando
Manlulu and Dante Samson, were haled to court for his violent death.

The prosecution charges that Manlulu and Samson conspired in the murder of Agent Alfaro.
The accused on the other hand invoke self-defense. They also insist that the non-issuance of
a search warrant and warrant of arrest should nullify their arrest and consequently exclude
from judicial consideration the evidence thus obtained.

But the trial court was not convinced. It found accused Dante Samson and Rolando Manlulu
"guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of Murder defined and penalized
under Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender on the part of Dante Samson and no mitigating circumstance modifying the
commission of the offense on the part of Rolando Manlulu." 1 As a result, Accused Dante
Samson was sentenced to a prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, while accused Rolando Manlulu, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven
(11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion perpetua as maximum. They were also sentenced jointly to indemnify the
offended party P30,000.00 as compensatory damages and P10,410.00 for hospitalization and
funeral expenses, and to pay the costs.
ISSUES

Whether or not the warrantless arrest made by Patrolman Perez against Manlulu is lawful?

RULING

NO. In this instance cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest.
Paragraph (b), Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
arresting officer must have "personal knowledge" of an offense which "has in fact just been
committed."

In the instant case, neither did Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the offense "in
fact just been committed." While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information
which led to the arrest of Manlulu that is not enough. The law requires "personal knowledge."
Obviously, "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal knowledge." The rule
requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen
hours later. This is not any different from People v. Cendana where the accused was arrested
one day after the killing of the victim, and only on the basis of information obtained by the
police officers. There we said that the "circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest.

19. People vs. Agustin – G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995 CABUNGCAL

Facts: In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R
and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2)
counts of murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of
the criminal cases aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death, there
being two aggravating circumstances.

He was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him. Atty. Cajucom knew, as
admitted on cross-examination, that the appellant was picked up on 10 February 1987 by
military men in Pangasinan without a warrant for his arrest. Since the crimes with which the
appellant was charged were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five
months earlier, no arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected.

Issue: WON the arrest was valid

Rule: No. None of the exceptional circumstances under Rule 113 Sec 5 were present at the time
the appellant was arrested on 10 February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the
crimes were committed in the presence of the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have
arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or that the appellant was a prisoner who had
escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes had just been committed for they were in
fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or ought to have known that
the arrest was unlawful. Appropriate measures for the immediate release of the appellant must
have been acted instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him.

20. People vs. Montilla – G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998 CAMASURA

(no case submitted)

Im posting this on the spot (not CAMASURA)

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for
violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from
appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around
4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 by members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command.
Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of
28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day
before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could
recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio City
with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the
arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the
aforestated day, hour, and place.4

WON Arrest is valid? YES

On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under the provision, a peace
officers or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting

police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.19 On the
other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting
an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests
set out in Section 5(a).20 These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons
caught in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a
relative term the determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case,
is understood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an
offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.21

21. David vs. Arroyo – G.R. No. 171396 CANDIA

Pls add digest here <3

22. Vicente Ladlad vs. Velasco – June 1, 200 - CARREON

Facts:

Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No.

1017 on February 24, 2006 declaring a State of National Emergency, Crispin Beltran was arrested
without warrant on February 25, 2006 while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan and was
detained in Camp Crame, Quezon City. The arresting officers did not inform him of the crime
for which he was arrested.
On the same day, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for
Inciting Sedition under Article 142 of the RPC based on a speech that he allegedly gave during a
rally in in Quezon City on February 24, 2006 (20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution). The
inquest was based on the joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers who claimed to have been
present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding
Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.

Beltran was brought back to Camp Crame on February 27, 2006 where he was subjected to a
second inquest, together with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan, for Rebellion. A panel of State
prosecutors from the DOJ conducted the second inquest. The inquest was based on two letters,
both dated February 27, 2006, of Yolanda Tanigue, and Rodolfo Mendoza, of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group, PNP. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action
on the results of the CIDG’s investigation implicating Beltran, San Juan and several others as
“leaders and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government.

The DOJ panel of prosecutors issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict Beltran and
San Juan as “leaders and promoters of Rebellion. The panel then filed an Information with the
RTC Makati.

Beltran moved that a judicial determination of probable cause be made against him. This was,
however, denied.

Issue: WON the inquest proceeding against Beltran for rebellion was valid.

Ruling: NO.

The inquest proceeding against Beltran for Rebellion is void. Inquest proceedings are proper
only when the accused has been lawfully arrested without warrant.

The joint affidavit of Beltran's arresting officers states that the officers arrested Beltran, without
a warrant, for Inciting to Sedition, and not for Rebellion. Thus, the inquest prosecutor could
only have conducted — as he did conduct — an inquest for Inciting to Sedition and no other.
Consequently, when another group of prosecutors subjected Beltran to a second inquest
proceeding for Rebellion, they overstepped their authority rendering the second inquest void.
None of Beltran's arresting officers saw Beltran commit, in their presence, the crime of
Rebellion. Nor did they have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that Beltran had
just committed Rebellion, sufficient to form probable cause to believe that he had committed
Rebellion. What these arresting officers alleged in their affidavit is that they saw and heard
Beltran make an allegedly seditious speech on 24 February 2006.

Under DOJ Circular No. 61, dated 21 September 1993, the initial duty of the inquest officer is to
determine if the arrest of the detained person was made "in accordance with the provisions of
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113." If the arrest was not properly effected, the inquest
officer should proceed under Section 9 of Circular No. 61 which provides:

Where Arrest Not Properly Effected. — Should the Inquest Officer find that the arrest was not
made in accordance with the Rules, he shall:

a) recommend the release of the person arrested or detained;

b) note down the disposition on the referral document;

c) prepare a brief memorandum indicating the reasons for the action taken; and

d) forward the same, together with the record of the case, to the City or Provincial Prosecutor
for appropriate action.

Where the recommendation for the release of the detained person is approved by the City or
Provincial Prosecutor but the evidence on hand warrant the conduct of a regular preliminary
investigation, the order of release shall be served on the officer having custody of said detainee
and shall direct the said officer to serve upon the detainee the subpoena or notice of preliminary
investigation, together with the copies of the charge sheet or complaint, affidavit or sworn
statements of the complainant and his witnesses and other supporting evidence.

For the failure of Beltran's panel of inquest prosecutors to comply with Section 7, Rule 112 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 113 and DOJ Circular No. 61, the Court declared Beltran's inquest
void. Beltran would have been entitled to a preliminary investigation had he not asked the trial
court to make a judicial determination of probable cause, which effectively took the place of
such proceeding.
23. People vs. Dela Cruz – November 20, - CHUNG

FACTS: .morning of October 20, 2002,

an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that
wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San
Mateo, Rizal.

Accused-appellant was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun
when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu,
a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table.

The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy
Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of
drugs,

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid.

issue : WON the arrest done by the accussed-appellant is lawful.

rulling: The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution's evidence, that accused-
appellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy
Bicol's nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing.
He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a room
with shabu, not as the room's owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a
firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that
accused-appellant supposedly used.

The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a
showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.
Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa hut, his
subsequent arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on
warrantless arrest provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;

b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and

c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by
accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it
unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz
is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 6518 of the RTC,
Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.

D. Section 7 – Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant

1. Mallari vs. Court of Appeals – December 9, 1996 - Cole

FACTS:

Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then assigned at the Capas Police Station,
received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of
arrest in connection with Criminal Case for Homicide in 1989, was seen at Sitio 14, Sta. Rita,
Capas, Tarlac.

'Immediately upon receipt of such information, Pfc. Manipon, accompanied by Pat. Esguerra
and Pat. Narciso Simbulan proceeded to Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac and the arresting
officers surrounded the house of Mallari, arrested him and told him to remain stationary.

Mallari questions the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that at the time of his arrest, there
was a standing warrant against him in Criminal Case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a police officer may effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the
time of the arrest.

RULING:

Yes, a police officer may effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the
arrest.

Under Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:

"Sec. 7. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an arrest by virtue of
a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact
that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the
officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after
the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as
practicable."

E. Section 8 – Method of arrest by officer without warrant

1. People vs. Mahinay – February 1, 1999 Cuevas-Presores

FACTS

Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1993.
His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old
residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters
away from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's
neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside
the compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. While they were
playing, appellant was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a
septic tank.

On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around
10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked
permission from Isip to go out with his friends

Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the
compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip's
unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters
away from Rivera's store.

On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house
between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip of President Fidel V.
Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On his way to his in-law's house,
Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he
saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house

Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy
lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that
appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk
and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not
answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound. Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that
her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white
shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady
sando and blue rubber slippers. Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that
night. On the following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a
passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of
the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared

ISSUES
 Whether or not the method of arrest made/apprehended by police officers in Ibaan,
Batangas is lawful without a warrant of arrest to the accused and let the accused under their
custody?

RULING

NO. Considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence
against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights
of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining,
inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making
an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438. It is high-time to educate our law-
enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda
rights (the Court held that a defendant cannot be questioned by police in the context of a
custodial interrogation until the defendant is made aware of the right to remain silent, the right
to consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning, and the right to
have an attorney appointed..) which had become insufficient and which the Court must update
in the light of new legal developments WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby
AFFIRMED except for the award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED
to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

F. Section 10 – Officer may summon assistance

1. U.S. vs. Pompeya – August 6, 1915 DE CASTILLA

Facts:

1. Acting prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo charges Silvestre Pompeya with
violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo, on the subject of patrol duty, Executive
Order No. 1, series of 1914, based on section 40

(m)

of the Municipal Code. (fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed in violation of
the law)

2 .Upon arraignment the defendant presented a demurrer on the ground that the acts
charged therein do not constitute a crime. The municipal ordinance alleged to be violated is
unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees
the liberty of the citizens."
 3. Honorable J. s .Powell, sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of said
complaint.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the ordinance upon which said complaint was based (paragraph "m" of
section 40 of the Municipal Code) which was adopted in accordance with the provisions
of Act No. 1309 is constitutional

Ruling:

1. Yes. The right or power conferred upon the municipalities by Act No. 1309 falls within
the police power of the state. police power is defined as "the defenses, regulations, and
domestic order of the country, whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of a
well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behaviour to the rules of
propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be decent, industrious, and
inoffensive in their respective stations." The police power of the state includes not only
the public health and safety, but also the public welfare, protection against impositions,
and generally the public's best best interest. It so extensive and all pervading, that the
courts refuse to lay down a general rule defining it, but decide each specific case on its
merits. The police power of the state has been exercised in controlling and regulating
private business, even to the extent of the destruction of the property of private persons,
when the use of such property became a nuisance to the public health and convenience.
The power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power
of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of
said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the
persons affected thereby. It will also be noted that the law authorizing the president of
the municipality to call upon persons, imposes certain conditions as prerequisites: (1)
The person called upon to render such services must be an able-bodied male resident of
the municipality; (2) he must be between the ages of 18 and 55 [50], and (3) certain
conditions must exist requiring the services of such persons. Moreover, the persons
liable for the service mentioned in the law cannot be called upon at the mere whim or
caprice of the president. There must be some just and reasonable ground, at least
sufficient in the mind of a reasonable man, before the president can call upon the the
persons for the service mentioned in the law. The law does not appddly to all persons.
The law does not apply to every condition. The law applies to special persons and
special conditions.
 This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order
of his community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus"
(power of the county, poder del condado). (Book 1 Cooley's Blackstone's Commentaries, 343; Book
4, 122.) Under this power, those persons in the state, county, or town who were charged with
the maintenance of peace and good order were bound, ex oficio, to pursue and to take all
persons who had violated the law. For that purpose they might command all the male
inhabitants of a certain age to assist them. This power is called "posse comitatus" (power of the
county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory
recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the
method when and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to render
assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and order.

- End of First Exam Coverage -

MIDTERMS

VI. RULE 114 – BAIL

A. Section 1 – Bail defined- Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law, furnished by him, or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as
required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate
surety, property bond, cash deposit or recognizance.

1. Paderanga vs. CA – 247 SCRA 741 (1995)- DELA CRUZ BENAMER

FACTS:

Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of

multiple murder in the Regional Trial Court for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for petitioner’s
apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel, a motion for
admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing.

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital, his counsel
manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter
president of 6the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his
bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law.

The prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they
were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge.

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution, the trial court admitted
petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00.

ISSUE:

Is the accused already in custody?

Can the court entertain his petition for bail even if he was not arrested, and the lawyer said he
was in the hospital and the court never bothered to ask a policeman to go there, check, verify,
and guard the hospital until he gets well?

HELD:

Yes. he is already in the custody of the law. “It may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically place under arrest. He may,
However, at that point and in the factual ambience thereof, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances which
attended the filling of his bail application with the trial court, this purpose of hearing thereof he
should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. The
undeniable fact is that Panderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law.

2. Delos Santos-Reyes vs. Judge Montesa – August 7, 1995 DELA VICTORIA

Facts:

In her complaint filed on 23 March 1993, Guillerma de los Santos-Reyes charges the respondent
judge with gross ignorance of law and evident dishonesty in the performance of his work in
that he granted bail to the accused without the required petition for bail

On November 4, 1990, Patrolman Celso Reyes, Bgy. Captain Pedro Panganiban and Armando
Vitug were ambushed at San Juan del Monte, Bulacan, resulting in the untimely death of Reyes
and Panganiban. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an inquisition of the incident
and after which charged petitioners Estelita Hipolito and Alfredo Bolsico, together with Romeo
Adviento, Romeo Permejo, Rolando Gozum and four (4) John Does with the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder.

Judge Pagarogon conducted a preliminary investigation of the witnesses and on November 14,
1990 issued an order admitting the complaint and ordering the detention of all the accused after
finding that the crimes charged have been committed and there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused are probably guilty thereof. No bail was recommended.

On March 21, 1991, the accused, who were not yet arrested or placed under the jurisdiction of
the trial court (after their precipitate release earlier), filed a "Petition to Grant Bail"

On March 25, 1991, the trial court issued an order denying the petitions since the accused had
not yet surrendered and/or apprehended and, therefore, the court has not acquired jurisdiction
over their persons.

On the same day, the accused filed another petition entitled "Reinstatement of the Petition to
Grant Bail in the above entitled cases and Motion to Reduce Bail Bond and Motion to Set
Petition for Hearing with Manifestation to Surrender the Accused on the Hearing of this
Petition.

On April 4, 1991, the trial court, apparently with a change of heart, issued an order
consolidating the petitions for bail, set them for hearing on April 6, 1991, and directed the DOJ
and/or the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to forward to it the records of the preliminary
investigation of the cases within ten (10) days from notice.chanrob

On August 23, 1991, the prosecution filed an omnibus motion praying for the cancellation of the
bail bonds as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest on the fundamental ground that the trial
court could not legally grant bail in a capital offense without the prosecution being accorded the
right to show that the evidence of guilt is strong.
Issue: WON the respondent judge erred in granting bail? YES.

Ruling:

Since the accused unilaterally withdrew their petition for bail, there was then nothing to be
heard or acted upon in respect thereof. Even if they did not withdraw their petition, they
have no right to invoke the processes of the court since they have not been placed in the
custody of the law or otherwise deprived of their liberty by reason or as a consequence of the
filing of the information. For the same reason, the court had no authority to act on the petition.

This judicial function does not carry with it a motu proprio review of the recommendation of the
prosecutor in a capital offense that no bail shall be granted. Such a recommendation is the
exclusive prerogative of the prosecutor in the exercise of his quasi-judicial function during the
preliminary investigation, which is executive in nature. In such cases, once the court determines
that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the warrant of arrest shall
forthwith be issued and it is only after the accused is taken into the custody of the law and
deprived of his liberty that, upon proper application for bail, the court on the basis of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution at the hearing called for the purpose may, upon
determination that such evidence is not strong, admit the accused to bail.

Even if it be conceded for the sake of argument that the application for bail was regularly
filed, the respondent judge wantonly ignored the due process requirement of hearing to
afford the prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the
applicants is strong. To grant an application for bail and fix the amount thereof without such
hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong
constitutes ignorance or incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good
faith or excusable negligence or constitutes inexcusable conduct which reflects either gross
ignorance of the law or cavalier disregard of its requirements.

3. Government of HongKong vs. Olalia – April 19, 2007

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same
in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he
will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused
fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so
desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest
before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this
Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be
forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted
therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail? YES.

Ruling:

Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the
Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez,
a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail
does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on
one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

B. Section 2 – Condition of the bail; requirements

1. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan – 247 SCRA 127 (1995)

The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3019 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction
she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostic tests and treatment by
practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of "a serious and life
threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was
denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Permission to Travel Abroad" to
undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was supported by several medical reports that
were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.

Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europe for treatment of
several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.

The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the
Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners motion to leave and denied
all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summary and to
Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and letters of Vice
President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of
twenty four members of the House of Representatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to
travel abroad. This was also denied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the
involvement of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or
orders or any judicial action of respondent court.

Issue: Whether or not the granting of motion to travel abroad is a matter of right of the accused
or a matter of discretion by the court? discretion of the court.

Held: The court ruled that the findings and recommendations of petitioner's physicians,
petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that
considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts in several cases, in two of
which she was convicted although the decision is still pending reconsideration,
petitioner did not have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was on her to
prove that because of danger to health if not to her life there was necessity to seek medical
treatment in foreign countries.

In summary, the evidence submitted do not confirm the allegation that Mrs. Marcos
is in the high risk group for sudden cardiac death.

Considering the foregoing ,the court said that respondent court trifled with petitioner's
constitutionally guaranteed right to life, health and liberty. What petitioner denounces as
the "unusual and unorthodox conduct of the trial" by the court's Presiding Justice owed more, it
would seem, from the latter's robust and rather active personality rather than to any ill
motive or hostility he entertained toward petitioner, the latter's counsel or her witnesses.
It is a matter of record that on three different occasions, petitioners had been
permitted to travel abroad. But her later conviction in two cases dictated the need for
greater caution. To be sure, conv=iction is not yet the final view of a motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner. But a person's right to travel is subject to the usual
constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such
cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian
reasons is a matter of the court's sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filling of another
motion for leave to travel abroad, should the petitioner still desire, based on her heart
condition. In such an event the determination of her medical condition should be made by a
joint panel of medical specialists recommended by both the accused and the prosecution.

Answer:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is
a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.

C. Section 3 – Release only upon court order or bail

1. Obre vs. Digandang – September 3, 2009

On February 14, 2008, the operatives of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency-Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (PDEA-ARMM) arrested Abdulsalam Indag and Baida
Manabilang for alleged violation of Sections 5, 11 and 15 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and were thus committed to the provincial jail.

On February 15, 2008, the accused were released from the custody of the Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) Provincial Warden, Laman P. Malikol, on the basis of the Custody Receipt signed by the
respondent.

In his complaint, Police Superintendent Rene Macaling Orbe, Acting Regional Director of
PDEA-ARMM, alleges that the release was illegal because the accused were charged with a
non-bailable offense. ‰ lιbrÎ

Respondent admits in his Comment that the accused were his relatives and that he
interceded for their release because they allegedly needed medical attention. After their
medical check up, they were immediately brought back to their detention cell. He also claims
that he did not file a motion for temporary release, since he could not secure the services of a
lawyer, it being a Friday and it was already past 3:00 p.m.
Laman P. Malikol, the OIC-Provincial Warden, likewise admitted that he temporarily
relinquished custody over the accused to herein respondent for humanitarian reasons.

In its Report dated September 19, 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found
respondent guilty as charged and recommended his dismissal from service effective
immediately with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to his re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government -
owned or controlled corporation. The case against the OIC Provincial Warden was
recommended to be forwarded to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.

Issue:

1. WON whether respondent Marcos U. Digandang, Process Server of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 of Cotabato City, is guilty of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service for illegally releasing the accused in the case of People of the
Philippines v. Ombudsman Indag.

Held:

It is undisputed that accused were charged with a non-bailable offense; that they were released
from detention on the basis merely of the Custody Receipt signed by the respondent, which was
a clear violation of Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court which explicitly provides that "no
person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of
the court or when he is admitted to bail." As a court employee, respondent is cognizant of this
requirement as in fact he admitted in his Comment that a motion for temporary release should
have been filed in court.

We cannot lend credence to respondent's allegation that he was unable to file the motion
because he could not immediately avail of the services of a lawyer as it was a Friday and
already past 3:00 p.m. Assuming that he could not immediately hire the services of a private
lawyer, he could always go to the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) for legal assistance. At 3:00
p.m., it is inconceivable that no PAO lawyer would be available.

The contention that respondent interceded for the release of his accused-relatives for
humanitarian reasons is self-serving and deserves no consideration. As correctly noted by the
OCA, no medical certificate was presented to substantiate the claim that the accused needed
immediate medical attention. Moreover, the fact that the accused were returned to their
detention cell soon after the medical check-up does not justify respondent's culpability or
mitigate his liability. Neither could it be considered a badge of good faith. An infraction had
been committed and the accused's return to incarceration does not extinguish the violation.

As a court employee, the respondent is expected to follow the law and the rules and
procedures prescribed by the Court. The facts in this case clearly indicate that respondent
deliberately circumvented the law to favor his accused-relatives. This is a grave misconduct
which merits the penalty of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Marcos U. Digandang, Process Server, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Cotabato City, GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DISMISSAL from service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except accrued
leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The case against Laman
P. Malikol, OIC-Provincial Warden, Maguindanao Provincial Jail, is FORWARDED to the
Department of Justice for appropriate action.

2. Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan – July 6, 2011 - pitogo

FACTS:

two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and
petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr. The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty.
David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of
then Mayor Francisco Adalim for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the
residence of the governor. National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of
criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) [7] of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, The new
President of the IBP informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer interested in pursuing
the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
petitioners. Nonetheless, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged
with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Office of
the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint and the amendment of the Information to include the
charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the
allegations in the Information. They reason, however, that Adalims transfer was justified
considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his detention at the
provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalims sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent
numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held. Consequently, the
prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after the admission of its
documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence with
Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial but the same was denied. Sandiganbayan
founds petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in
moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him unwarranted
benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and other privileges
that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by
legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is
admitted to bail.
ISSUE: Whether a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention
prisoner

RULING: NO. Petitions denied.

RATIONALE: First, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. In this case, we
find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in transferring the
detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. There is no merit to petitioner
Ambil, Jr.s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by virtue of his
power as the Provincial Jailer of Eastern Samar. Besides, the only reference to a transfer of
prisoners in said article is found in Section 1737under which prisoners may be turned over to
the jail of the neighboring province in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to
accommodate all provincial prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by Section
3, Rule 114 of the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114. In the
case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted benefits
and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his release
from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr.
negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section
3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides that the
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions and he is not such government officer or
employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but
to a public officer. However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr.
has obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan[42] where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-
Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Following is an excerpt of what we said in
Mejorada, Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place
other than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television.
Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers
that the mayors life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail. As the Sandiganbayan
ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalims safety.
To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if
we treat Akyatans gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same
would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant Adalims detention outside
the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which
could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell
was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that Adalim
stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could have proven the
presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court order was still indispensable
for his transfer.

D. Section 4 – Bail as a matter of right

1. People vs. Donato – 198 SCRA 130

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that:

(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense;

(b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;

(c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and

(d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied.

May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is
not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and
1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees.

-DEATH

-discretion

Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition
that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every
period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the
court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the
"inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It
was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)

2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;

3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented
a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;

4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;

5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a
capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to
change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua
to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that
they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed.
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a
waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law.

It is a matter of discretion by the court. They found out that the evidence of guilt is not strong.
Naging no. 2- became a matter of right, which became a matter of right. That’s why

2. San Miguel vs. Judge Maceda – April 4, 2007

CASE please T.T…

https://www.scribd.com/document/364050441/San-Miguel-v-Maceda-Case-Digest

Where the bail is the matter of right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from
such right, bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstances.

E. Section 5 – Bail as a matter of discretion

1. Omosa vs. Court of Appeals – January 16, 1997 FOROSUELO

Facts:

The court convicted the accused for homicide. The accused said: “Your honor, we intend
to appeal this case, but may we be asked to post bail while the appeal is going on. The court
said, “Granted. We will fix your bail at P50,000”. Two days before, the accused filed a notice of
appeal. After filing the notice of appeal, he applied for bail which was approved by the court.

Issue: Whether or not the court should approve the bail?

-matter of right / discretion?

Ruling:
 NO, because when the accused filed his notice of appeal, from that very moment the
court has lost jurisdiction over the case. The bail should have been approved first before filing a
notice of approval. When the court fixed the bail, he must has not yet filed his notice of appeal,
so the court has the power to fix the bail. The trouble is he immediately filed a notice of appeal
before posting bail. So, the court has no more jurisdiction to approve the bail. It should have
been approved by the Court of Appeals.

The circumstances mentioned in paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1994 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure - the presence of any of which could preclude the grant of bail - are as
follows:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may
commit another crime.

It will be readily noted that, pursuant to the foregoing amendments, not only does the
conviction of petitioner for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail
as a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court, but
more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e above, which are
present in petitioner's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail, except
that a retroactive application of the said circular in the instant case is barred as it would
obviously be unfavorable to petitioner.

We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution
required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction
in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's
previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.

2. Rufina Cua vs. CA and Chiok – April 12, 2007-Gelvez, Jenefer N.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/apr2007/gr_140842_2007.html

Facts: In 1989, Rufina Chua, petitioner, met Wilfred Chiok, respondent, who represented
himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. He encouraged petitioner to
invest her money in stocks and designate him as her stockbroker.

For several years, respondent acted as petitioner’s stockbroker. She made profits out of their
transactions, prompting her to trust respondent in handling her stock investments.

In 1995, respondent encouraged petitioner to purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her
earnings. Hence, in June 1995, she entrusted to him the amount of ₱9,563,900.00 for the purpose
of buying shares of stocks in bulk. Petitioner deposited ₱7,100,000.00 in respondent’s account
and personally gave him the remaining ₱2,463,900.00. Thereupon, he told petitioner to wait for
one week. A week elapsed and respondent advised her to wait for another week. Then, there
was no more news from respondent. Finally, when petitioner was able to contact him,
respondent admitted that he spent the money. At any rate, he issued two checks as payment but
when petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficient
funds.

In a letter dated October 25, 1995, petitioner demanded payment from respondent, but this
remained unheeded.

Petitioner then came to know that respondent was not a licensed stockbroker but only a
telephone clerk at Bernard Securities, Inc. Immediately, she caused the filing of an information
for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 109927.

During the arraignment, respondent, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued.

Respondent denied the charge against him.

February 1, 1999, the prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that
respondent might flee or commit another crime.

The trial court set the promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999 however, respondent and
his counsel failed to appear.

Issue: WON the bail bond of the accused should be cancelled?

Ruling:

Yes. Accused has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial court’s
judgment since he has been sentenced to imprisonment exceeding 6 years which justifies the
cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Sec. 5 (b), (d) and (e) of Rule 114.
Also his inexcusable non-appearance during the promulgation of judgment violated the
condition of his bail and showed the probability that he might flee or commit another crime
while released on bail.

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the
filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate
court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of
the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and
resolved by the appellate court,

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.1awphi1.nét

Since respondent has not shown any right to be protected, the second requisite for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is obviously absent. As such, the Court of
Appeals clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Resolution of
September 20, 1999 granting the writ of preliminary injunction. We held that the grant of the
writ of preliminary injunction despite the absence of a clear legal right on the part of the
applicant constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.12

The assailed Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Wilfred N. Chiok’s petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 53340 is DISMISSED. The Omnibus Order dated May 28, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 109927
canceling respondent’s bail is AFFIRMED.
3. People vs. SB and Estrada – August 10, 2007

FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of herein respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558,
granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for
brevity). Jinggoy was among the respondents in the crime of Plunder filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of
his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea
for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus
Application for Bail against which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail
hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda. Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to escape, thus a flight risk.
But in a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for Bail.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground that he is no longer
considered a flight risk?

RULING: YES, the grant of bail is proper.

To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since
the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does
not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what
the graft court wrote in this regard:

It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently
respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown, by word or by deed,
that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing in
mind his conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his
escape in this case seems remote if not nil.

The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his
election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock
of the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their
reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as theyì can flee from the retribution of justice.
On the other hand, those with a reputation and a respectable name to protect and preserve are
very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone
who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat
in exchange for becoming a fugitive from justice.

4. OCA vs. Judge Lorenzo – December 23, 2008 - Grumo

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/dec2008/am_rtj_08_1911_2008.html

FACTS:

These consolidated administrative cases involve the release on bail of three Filipinos caught
while in the act of sniffing methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and five Chinese
nationals arrested while manufacturing shabu. The apprehension was effected on November
6, 2001 during a raid in a makeshift illegal drugs laboratory in Barangay Capitolyo, Pasig City.

The Court, reacting to news items appearing on page 12 of The Philippine Star in its April 18,
2002 issue and the editorial in its April 21, 2002 issue entitled Sino 'shabu makers' freed on bail,
issued a resolution referring the published articles to Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Remedios Salazar-Fernando for investigation, report, and recommendation as to the extent of
the liability of Judge Rodrigo B. Lorenzo, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266 in Pasig
City, who granted the petition for bail of the accused.The articles stated that Judge Lorenzo
ordered the release of the Chinese nationals after each posted a PhP 700,000 bail and
insinuated Judge Lorenzo's involvement in the PhP 12 million pay-off for the speedy release
of the Chinese nationals.

Judge Lorenzo also averred that, contrary to the prosecution's claim, the prosecutors were
given reasonable time and opportunity to oppose the petition for bail, State Prosecutor
Velasco having personally been furnished a copy of the petition on December 3, 2001, or 30 days
before the scheduled arraignment date. Even Prosecutor Conrado Tolentino, per Judge Lorenzo,
did not file any written opposition to the petition for bail and did not attend the January 9, 2002
hearing. Prosecutor Marcelino Deza who attended for Prosecutor Tolentino did not also
interpose any opposition or objection.

ISSUE:

WON the release was valid?

RULING:

No. should have paid attention to the factors why the prosecution was not able to establish
the strong evidence of guilt. Judge should have looked into the reasons for the
nonappearance of the witness.
5. People vs. Plaza – October 2, 2009 - GUILLERMO

The evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused for the
crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. The respondent thus prayed that the bail
bond be fixed at ₱40k.

In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, the prosecution contended that the case
being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death;

The victim’s brother, Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail
having been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine
whether or not the prosecution’s evidence is strong.

WON a summary proceeding is needed to determine if the accused is entitled to bail? YES.

HELD: Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is discretionary. …

The law clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a judgment of
conviction handed down by the trial court. In the case at bar, the accused was proven guilty for
homicide. Thus, may apply for bail.

Moreover, the exercise of the court’s discretionary power depends on whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. Thus, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court,
should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it to enable
the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.

A summary hearing is defined as "such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering
the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail." Here, the court may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary examination and cross examination."

In this case, holding a summary hearing would have been unnecessary as the evidence in
chief was already presented by the prosecution.

Take away:

6. Leviste vs. CA – March 17, 2010 - JEREZ

Facts:

Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for
the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an
application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.The CA
denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of
appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That Bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.

On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present.That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail
of Leviste.? NO.

Ruling:

No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty imposed is more than 6 years the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail be canceled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other circumstances:

1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime

aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that
CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption
of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on
the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion
7. Dipatuan vs. Judge Mangotara – Aprile 23, 2010 - A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190 April 23,
2010

NO CASE SUBMITTED. POSTING ON THE SPOT…

On December 28, 2007, Mangotara issued the disputed Decision3 in Criminal Case No. 3620-
01 and found both accused Abdul and Dipatuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder and sentenced them to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. The trial court ruled
that the prosecution was able to establish that Abdul and co-accused Dipatuan acted in
conspiracy in shooting and killing the victim Elias Ali Taher. The court, likewise, increased
the accused’s bail bond from ₱75,000.00 to ₱200,000.00.

WON the judge acted w/ gross ignorance of the law in so far as his act of increasing the bail
bond of the accused instead of cancelling it? A patent disregard of well-known rules.

HELD: Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear on the issue. It
provides:

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a
notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the
offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is discretionary on the part of the
respondent Judge. It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and
possessed sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death,
the accused has no right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong.12 Thus, as the accused in
Criminal Case No. 3620-01 had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the bail should have been
cancelled, instead of increasing it as respondent Judge did.

While a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous order
that he renders, it is also axiomatic that when the legal principle involved is sufficiently basic,
lack of conversance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, even though a judge
may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. It does not mean that a judge need not observe
propriety, discreetness and due care in the performance of his official functions. This is because
if judges wantonly misuse the powers vested on them by the law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.13

Clearly, in the instant case, the act of Mangotara in increasing the bail bond of the accused
instead of cancelling it is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment on the
part of respondent Judge, but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so
gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law.14 It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law
and changes therein, as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek
refuge in a mere cursory acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the
law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS
QUOD QUISQUE SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.15

F. Section 7 – Bail on capital offense

SECTION 7. Capital Offense or an Offense Punishable by Reclusion Perpetua or Life

Imprisonment, not Bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence
of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

1. Yap, Jr. vs. CA – June 6, 2001 - LOVITOS

Murag dili man section 7 ang applicable ani. Estafa man ang crime, dili capital offense.

SECTION 4. Bail, a Matter of Right and SECTION 5. Bail, When Discretionary ang applicable

Facts:

Petitioner, Francisco Yap, Jr. was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
and was sentenced to four years and two months of Prision correctional, as minimum, to eight
years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to 1 year for each additional P10,000.00 in
excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years.

He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond
he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial court in an order
dated February 17, 1999.

The CA granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail in the amount of P5,500,000 on
condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court and private complainant.”

He sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied. Hence, he appealed to the SC. He
contended that the CA, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him his
right to bail. He also contests the condition imposed by the CA that he secure a
certification/guaranty, claiming that the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.

Issue:

WON the grant of bail is proper. YES

Ruling:

The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court.

Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital offenses is
discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years and
circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused
must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. In the same vein, the
Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in
fact convicted by the trial court.

In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's disquisition on why bail
should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise discretion; thus:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which
may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to
show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the
probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.

Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (7a)

*flight risk?

Set the bail at 5.5m (1.2m above afflictive na?)

The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution.8 The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail.

2. Valerio vs. Dela Torre-Yadao – October 10, 2007 - MAMAC

FACTS:

An information for murder was filed among three persons, arising from the death of Jun Valerio
who was shot and killed in front of his house. An information for parricide was also filed
against the wife, Milagros. Milagros filed an application for bail claiming that evidence of
guilt against her was not strong, which RTC granted. Petitioners assert that the killer’s plea of
guilty to the charge of conspiring with Milagros in the murder of Jun indicated strong
evidence of guilt against Milagros.

ISSUE: WON Milagros is entitled to bail? NO.

RULING: Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, “No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of
the stage of the criminal action.”

In this case, the trial court has disregarded the glaring fact that the killer himself has
confessed to the crime and has implicated Milagrosa as the mastermind. When taken in
conjunction with the other evidence on record, these facts show very strongly that Milagros
may have participated as principal by inducement in the murder of Jun Valer\o. It was thus a
grave error or a grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court to grant her application
for bail. The appellate court clearly committed a reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision granting bail to Milagros Valerio.

3. Atty. Gacal vs. Judge Infante – October 5, 2011 pitogo

Article 114, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, states, “No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action.”

Relying on the recommendation of the Fiscal, respondent judge granted the Application for
Bail of the accused. The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death (Art. 248, RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is
considered a capital offense and, grant of bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised
only by respondent judge after the evidence is submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the
application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether
the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489).

G. Section 8 – Burden of proof in bail

Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail filed
by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt
is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify. (8a)

1. Tucay vs. Judge Domagas – March 2, 1995 - MATARANAS

FACTS:

Ludovico, Bernardo and Melchor Ellamil are accused of murder. Bernardo filed a petition for
bail with the prayer that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P50,000.00. The petition
contained the notation "No objection" of the provincial prosecutor. Without holding a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong, Judge Domagas issued an
order on the same day, in which he granted bail and directed the release of Bernardo from
detention.

Tucay, wife of the victim, filed a complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
against Judge Domagas charging him with ignorance of the law, serious misconduct and
grave abuse of discretion. Tucay protested the grant of bail without hearing and without
notice to trial fiscal.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the letter-complaint was sent, finds the
respondent judge grossly ignorant of the law in granting bail without a hearing in a criminal
case involving a capital offense and recommends that he be fined and given a stern warning.
The OCA stresses that respondent judge ought to know that a hearing to show that the
evidence of guilt is not strong was indispensable to the grant of bail to the accused. It
likewise points out that, in his order releasing the accused on bail, the judge did not state
that he was granting the petition for bail but simply ordered him released.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross of ignorance of law in granting bail
without a hearing in a criminal case involving a capital offense? YES
RULING: Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for
bail filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall be considered
automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party, the court may recall any
witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or
otherwise unable to testify (MANDATORY).

Although the Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the
accused, respondent judge should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and
diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the
bail application.

He should have called a hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines
in Rule 114, sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in fixing the amount of the
bail. He should have called a hearing for the additional reason of taking into account the
guidelines in Rule 114, sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in fixing the
amount of the bail.

He should have called a hearing for the additional reason of taking into accoufent the
guidelines in Rule 114, sec. 6 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, in fixing the
amount of the bail.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Roger A. Domagas is hereby ordered to pay a fine of

P20,000.00 and is sternly warned that the commission of a similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

2. Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr. – January 18, 1995 MENDOZA

Guillermo vs. Reyes AM No. RTJ-93-1088January 18, 1995

Facts: Complainant, Teresita Guillermo, filed an administrative complaint against herein

respondent judge, Judge Jose Reyes, for allegedly rendering unjust judgment, for gross
incompetence, misconduct and ignorance of the law. Herein complainant was the offended
party in a criminal case of serious illegal detention filed against Aurora "lot de la Cruz and her
sister Annie Ilott-Orgeta. According to herein complainant, when & both sisters filed a joint
application for bail, respondent judge denied the same in an order dated July 15,1992 on the
ground that it was premature since the accused were yet to yet to be apprehended. However,
after the accused surrendered, without conducting any further hearing an order dated August
24, 1992, respondent judge granted the petition for bail of the accused, thereby denying the
prosecution an opportunity to be heard and to oppose the said petition.

Subsequently, respondent judge rendered judgment absolving the accused of the crime
charged.

Issue: Whether or not the judge erred in granting the petition of bail?

Ruling: The grant of bail to an accused charged with an offense that carries with the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, as in the case of serious illegal detention, is discretionary and not a matter
of right on the part of the accused. Furthermore, when evidence of guilt is strong, accused shall
not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the prosecution. But in such cases, the
prosecution has the burden of showing proof of guilt. Bail is also unavailing with respect to an
accused who has not voluntarily surrendered, or to one who has not yet been placed under
legal custody. In the case at bar, where the accused voluntarily appears, after an earlier hearing,
where his motion was dismissed by the fact that he was still at large, the judge should have
required another motion for bail and set the same for hearing, and should not grant bail based
on the evidence presented in the earlier hearing. Judge remanded with stern warning.

Contention of the complainant:

Judgment was unjust and shows respondent s gross ignorance of the law since the established
facts clearly made out a case of serious illegal detention.

That the respondent judge, even after finding that the detention was illegal, nonetheless, the
respondent held that the offender had no intention to deprive them of their liberty but acted by
mere anger and annoyance because of their earlier arguments.

Contention of the respondent:

Since the petition had been initially been denied, not on the merits nor based on the evidence,
he could act thereon upon the surrender of the accused

3. Aurillo vs. Francisco – 235 SCRA 283

FACTS:
 Ludovico, Bernardo and Melchor Ellamil are accused of murder. Bernardo filed a petition for
bail with the prayer that he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P50,000.00. The petition
contained the notation "No objection" of Provincial Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo.

Without holding a hearing to determine whether the evidence of the prosecution was strong,
respondent judge issued an order on the same day, in which he granted bail and directed the
release of accused Bernardo from detention.

Teresita Q. Tucay, wife of the victim, filed a complaint against Judge Roger A. Domagas of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 46), Urdaneta, Pangasinan, charging him with ignorance of the
law, serious misconduct and grave abuse of discretion. Tucay protested the grant of bail
without hearing and without notice to trial fiscal.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), to which the letter-complaint was sent, finds the
respondent judge grossly ignorant of the law in granting bail without a hearing in a criminal
case involving a capital offense and recommends that he be fined and given a stern warning. It
likewise points out that, in his order releasing the accused on bail, the judge did not state that
he was granting the petition for bail but simply ordered him released.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross of ignorance of law in granting bail
without a hearing in a criminal case involving a capital offense

HELD:

It is indeed regrettable how respondent Judge Francisco ignored the clear import in People vs.
Dacudao where we clearly stated that "a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong. Hence, a denial of the
prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to
which it is equally entitled as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for
determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Sec. 6." 2

In the Dacudao case, the respondent judge therein concluded that the evidence of the
prosecution against the accused who was charged with murder was weak. The determination
was made by simply reviewing the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses who were allegedly
not eyewitnesses to the crime. In the same vein, respondent Judge Francisco peremptorily
concluded from his reading of the affidavits of the witnesses that the evidence against the
accused in the said criminal cases was weak because it appeared to him that the evidence was
merely circumstantial in character.

Verily, it was patent error for him to base his order granting bail merely on the supporting
affidavits attached to the information since those were merely intended to establish probable
cause as basis for the issuance of an arrest warrant, and not to control his discretion to deny or
grant bail in all situations — i.e., with or without a motion from the accused and even without
conducting a hearing on the matter. Such error cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in
prudence, discretion and judgment, but a patent disregard of well-known rules and, therefore,
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.

It is a pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and changes therein, as well
as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory
acquaintance with the statute and procedural rules. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is
bound to know, excuses no one — not even judges. IGNORANTIA JURIS QUOD QUISQUE
SCIRE TENETUR NON EXCUSAT.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby imposes on Judge Getulio Francisco a
fine of P20,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the same or similar acts in the future will be
DEALT with more severely.

Judge Pedro S. Espina is hereby ordered to issue new warrants of arrest for all the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39 who had taken undue advantage of the questioned
orders releasing them on bail and to immediately conduct a hearing to determine the propriety
of granting bail.

4. Aguirre vs. Judge Belmonte – October 27, 1994 - MORAN

FACTS:

Enrica B. Aguirre and Nenita A. dela Cruz were the offended parties in two criminal cases for
murder docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 1024-M-91 and 1025-M-91. The latter case was
raffled to RTC of Malolos Branch 22, presided over by Judge Candido R. Belmonte. In his order
of June 18, 1991 respondent judge directed the issuance of warrants of arrest against the
accused. At the same time and on his own motion, he also authorized their provisional release
on bail, which he set at P100,000.00 for every accused in each criminal charge. Pursuant thereto,
the accused posted their bail bonds, were then arraigned, and thereafter went to trial. Enrica
and Nenita filed an administrative case against Judge for gross ignorance of the law, evident
partiality and dishonesty in the performance of his duties. Respondent contends that he granted
bail to the accused based on the Court’s

Decision in the case of Lim, Sr., et al. vs. Felix, et al., (G.R. Nos. 94054-57, February 19, 1991),
requiring and empowering the Judge to study the evidence before him before issuing a warrant
of arrest." From this he argues "that the obligation to go over the evidence necessarily carries
with it the right to refuse to issue the warrant where he disagrees with the finding of the
prosecutor who filed the information." Under that premise, he concluded "that if he can legally
refuse to issue a warrant, he must necessarily have the power to reduce or give bail, even
without hearing and even without any motion for bail being filed. This is on the theory that the
whole is bigger than its parts. The whole here is to refuse to issue the warrant, the parts being to
grant or reduce bail. "He submits that any error on his part in interpreting this Court's ruling in
the Lim case was deemed corrected when the prosecution did not file any motion to cancel the
bail he had granted, nor any motion for clarification if, indeed, his aforesaid order granting bail
was improper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the respondent judge in granting of bail motu propio to the accused
is proper. NO

HELD:

Anent the issue on the sua sponte grant of bail, without any motion or application therefore by
any of the accused and without any notice to the prosecution or any hearing conducted therein,
complainants have valid cause to complain. The fundamental law on bail as found in Section 13,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. . .

“Even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail of an
accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in order to ascertain not only the
strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the amount of bail.”

I. The court ruled that the accused have valid cause to complain. In the case at hand,
the accused’s were charged with murder, a capital offense, thus whether or not they
should be granted to bail lies in the strength of the prosecution’s evidence.

II. SC: “In Libarios vs. Dabalos, Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos granted provisional liberty to
two of the accused on a bail ofP50,000.00 each on the ground that they were not charged as co-
principals by cooperation or inducement, and that the evidence of guilt them was merely
circumstantial. It was argued there in that Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which requires a hearing of an application for admission to bail is applicable
only to cases where the accused is already in custody.”

III. SC: “Whether wittingly or unwittingly, respondent's reliance on the Lim case is sorely
misplaced. He could not have failed to apprehend that what was involved therein was the
appreciation of evidence initially presented by the prosecution for the determination
by the trial court as to whether the filing of an information was justified. What is involved
in such a situation is the commencement of criminal action. The quantum of evidence required
therefore is only such evidence as suffices to engender a well-founded belief as to the fact of the
commission of a crime and the therein respondent's probable thereof.”

IV. SC: “Respondent postulated that any error he committed in granting bail was deemed
corrected by the failure of the prosecution to file in either of the two criminal cases any
motion for the cancellation thereof or a clarification of his order. This is a strained and illogical
theory. It has long been held that even if the prosecution fails to adduce evidence in opposition
to an application for bail of an accused, the court may still require that it answer questions in
order to ascertain not only the strength of the state's evidence but also the adequacy of the
amount of bail. 21 The same rationale for that doctrine applies to and refutes that aforesaid
proposition of respondent.”

V. SC: “Clearly, therefore, respondent's act of granting bail to the accused, under the
circumstances earlier catalogued and ramified, indubitably amounts to such a whimsical and
arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction which calls for this Court's exercise of its disciplinary
power. Respondent should be aware that since he is to administer the law and apply it to the
facts, he should endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law. A judge owes
it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a
given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the
statutes and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be
a belief on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused
of a deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.” and the applicable law. A judge owes it to the
public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given
controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief
on the part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles.”

5. Basco vs. Rapatalo – March 5, 1997

6. Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz – March 17, 2000 - Ontal

Facts: After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-
Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City
recommended and thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso

On August 3, 1992, accused filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail". The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was
granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00.

On August 14, 1992, the private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta.
Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order
Allowing Accused To Post Bail".

Not obtaining any resolution on her "Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail",
private complainant filed this petition [before the CA]. As earlier mentioned, the Court of
Appeals granted private respondent's Petition for Certiorari.

Issue: The Respondent Court of Appeals has erroneously decided questions of substance, when
it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which granted the
petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of
his guilt

Ruling: NO.

Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and
speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for
the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein
offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may
confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross examination." If a party is denied the
opportunity to be heard, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for doubt as to
the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and fundamental is it to
conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper cases that it would amount
to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness
thereof."

7. Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja – 134 SCRA 466

8. People vs. Calo – 186 SCRA 620 - OSORNO

FACTS:

On March 10, 1988, Mariano Corvera, Sr. was gunned down inside the courtroom of the RTC of
Butuan City, Br. II. An information for murder was eventually filed in connection with the
death of Mariano Corvera, Sr. on November 29, 1988, before the Regional Trial Court, Butuan
City, Branch IV, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3464 recommending "no bail" for the accused-
respondents. On December 6, 1988, private petitioner moved for a re-raffle of the case. On
December 8, 1988. Executive Judge Rosarito Dabalos issued an order directing a re-raffle, and at
the same time, fixing the amount of bail for private respondents at P50,000.00 each.

On December 19, 1988, private petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
restraining order in the Court of Appeals, assailing the December 8, 1988 order of Judge
Dabalos granting bail to the accused without hearing. In a resolution dated January 31, 1989,
the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed order and directed the trial court: "(a) to immediately
issue and serve new warrants of arrest against private respondents as well as the accused at-
large Pablo Macapas; (b) to determine without delay by conducting the requisite hearing
whether the evidence of guilt is strong: and thereafter (c) to resolve whether or not bail should
be granted, and in the affirmative, to fix the same in accordance with law."

On remand of the case, Judge Dabalos inhibited himself from hearing the said case and referred
it to Judge Jose C. Adao. Marathon hearings were held on February 10, 14 and 15, 1989 to
determine whether the evidence of guilt was strong. On February 24, 1989, Judge Adao issued
an order, pertinent portions of which read:

"The court honestly believes that the quantum of evidence presented during the summary hearing is not
yet sufficient to deny bail as to the accused Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and Bellarmino Allocod. The accused
Pablo Macapas should not be granted bail since the evidence so far presented points to him as
the killer.

In view of the foregoing, pursuant to the bail bond guidelines as provided for in Sec. 6 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, the Court fixes the amount of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Tranquilino
Calo, Jr., and Sixty Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) as bail for the provisional liberty of the accused
Bellarmino Allocod.

On March 8, 1989, private petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with restraining order before
this Court, seeking to annul the February 24, 1989 order of Judge Adao granting bail to accused-
respondents. The Court further referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. On May 16, 1989,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, this petition for
certiorari with prayer for a restraining order.

One of the grounds relied upon in support of the petition is:

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL JUDGE GRANTING BAIL TO
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS NOT TAINTED WITH SERIOUS ARBITRARINESS."

Private petitioner maintains that there was gross disregard of overwhelming evidence of guilt
and that private respondents did not present even a single witness to rebut the facts established
by the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is merit in the petition that the grant of the trial judge of bail to the
private respondents is tainted with serious arbitrariness and denial of due process due to the
disregard of strong evidence of guilt.

RULING:
Yes. The Court finds merit in the petition.

The mere fact that formal hearings were conducted does not preclude a finding of arbitrariness
and denial of due process. As pointed out by private petitioner, the evidence submitted by the
prosecution to the effect that private respondent Tranquilino Calo, Jr., slipped the fatal gun to
the alleged assailant, Pablo Macapas, and that private respondent Bellarmino Allocod was the
driver of the get-away vehicle used by Macapas was not considered by the appellate court. This
is regrettable because, as alleged by private petitioner, private respondents did not deny such
evidence by their failure to present any witness to controvert it and that such evidence
established conspiracy among private respondents and Macapas.

Be that as it may, the prosecution was scheduled to present nine (9) witnesses, whose names
were duly submitted to the trial court, at the hearings held to determine whether the evidence
of guilt against private respondents was strong, but after hearing the fifth witness, Judge Adao
insisted on terminating the proceedings. In view thereof, private petitioner contends that Judge
Adao's order granting bail to private respondents "smacked of grave and patent abuse of
discretion."

The order dated February 24, 1989 granting bail to accused-respondents should have been
declared null and void and in violation of procedural due process. The prosecution in the
instant case was not given adequate opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of
guilt and to present within a reasonable time all the evidence it desired to present.

“Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.' This norm which is of the very
essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution be given the opportunity
to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt." (People vs. Sola) The failure of Judge Adao to
observe the concept of fairness which is the essence of due process in the case at bar should not
have been lost sight of.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is Granted. The decision dated May 16, 1989 of the Court of
Appeals is Set Aside and the temporary restraining order issued on July 6, 1989 is hereby made
permanent.

9. Go vs. Judge Bongolan – July 26, 1999- PASCUA

FACTS:

A petition for bail was filed by several accused for the crime of kidnapping with ransom. The
prosecution in its opposition alleged that the petition is prematurely filed since they are still in
the process of presenting further evidence to prove that the crime had been committed by the
accused. Nonetheless, Judge Bongolan decided the petition, favoring the accused, based on the
evidence presented presuming that the prosecution already adopted the evidence it had
adduced in the regular trial when they declined to present additional evidence against a
previous motion of the accused seeking to amend the information against them. Moreover, the
Judge, in his comment, contended that it is not necessary for the prosecution to present all its
witnesses before a motion for bail could be resolved. Thus, he deemed that it was unnecessary
to have further hearings. Prosecution alleged that the Judge must be administratively charged
for its failure to conduct hearings on the application for bail.

ISSUE:

Whether the Judge can decide on a petition for bail without a bail hearing.

RULING:

No, the Judge should not decide on a petition for bail without a bail hearing.

The law states that it is mandatory for a Judge to conduct a bail hearing before deciding a
petition for bail to give the prosecution a reasonable time to present its evidence to show that
the evidence of guilt is strong against the applicants. If the prosecution is denied such an
opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.

Here, the decision is prematurely resolved when it was decided in ignorance of the supposed
presentation of witnesses by the prosecution. Thus, respondent's act of resolving the motion
clearly violated the prosecution's right to procedural due process.

In a bail application, the right of the accused for the application for a temporary liberty and the
right of the State to protect the people from danger must be balanced. Such balance is observed
when hearings are conducted to guide the discretion of the magistrate.
H. Section 9 – Amount of bail

1. Victory Liner vs. Bellosillo – March 10, 2004 - PITOGO

FACTS

Mar. 2, 2000 – a Victory Liner bus accidentally hit Marciana Bautista Morales who died the
following day in Dinalupihan, Bataan. VLI shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of the
deceased;

An undertaking was entered into by the VLI and the heirs of the victim. A “Release of Claim”
and “Affidavit of Desistance” were executed in favor of VLI and its erring driver Reino dela
Cruz;

However, a “Pinagsamang Salaysay” of certain heirs (who were also signatories in the
undertaking) were earlier filed against the driver dela Cruz. Based on the Salaysay a criminal
complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide;

A warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Bellosillo against dela Cruz, and fixed his bail at
P50,000 cash;

He also directed the Chief of Police to immediately impound the bus which could be released
only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,000;

Mar. 30, 2000 – VLI filed a Manifestation that it, under protest, deposited with the court P50,000
for the release of its bus and thereafter immediately sought its release;

Apr. 4, 2000 - VLI filed with the respondent Judge Bellosillio’s court a petition to declare null
and void the order directing it to post bond for the release of its bus. This was denied;

Further, Judge Bellosillo had the bus reimpounded by the police;

Apr. 18, 2000 – Judge Bellosillo acted on VLI’s Manifestation and released the bus;

VLI filed a verified complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against
Bellosillo claiming, among others, that the judge was guilty of gross ignorance of the law in
impounding its bus and requiring it to post a cash bond for its release;

Judge Bellosillo denied the allegations, averring that posting of bail for release of vehicles
involve in reckless imprudence cases was practiced by other Judges;

The OCA Consultant retired Justice Narciso T. Atienza sided with VLI and found that
impounding and requirement of P50,000 cash bail for release of bus erroneous;

Other allegations (not relevant to the topic but for purposes of reference), and their
corresponding SC findings, include:
o grave abuse of authority when it revoked the surety bond of one of VLI’s driver Edwin
Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373 – GUILTY

o knowingly rendered an unjust and oppressive order when he increased the bond to P350,000
and required that it be posted in cash – GUILTY

o gravely abused his authority when he ordered the police authorities of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
to file a case against Reino de la Cruz – NOT GUILTY

o inaction or dereliction of duty in failing to resolve, despite the lapse of two months – NOT
GUILTY

ISSUE:

W/N the administrative case filed before OCA is proper remedy to determine the propriety of
posting bail for the release of VLI’s bus

RULING:

NO. Citing Lacadin v. Mangino and Cañas v. Castigador, this administrative case is not the right
forum to determine the issue of the legality of respondent's order requiring VLI to post a cash
bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have raised that issue in the proper
courts and not directly to SC and much less by way of an administrative case. There is after
all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said in Santiago v. Vasquez, the propensity of litigants
and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling
directly from us must be put to a halt.

The Court also cited that the VLI’s counsel failed to appear on the set hearing dates, and
reportedly refused to accept or receive from court personnel notices of hearing and court
orders. And, according to respondent Judge, he (VLI's counsel) never appeared and continued
not to appear before the respondent for reasons known only to him. VLI cannot, therefore,
resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less through a mere verified administrative
complaint or motion to resolve.

To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us
through an administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules
of procedure and of the hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with
the requirements inherent in the ling of a proper petition, including the payment of docket fees.
Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this case.

I. Section 17 – Where to file bail

1. Jose Simbulan vs. Judge Bartolome – June 5, 2009 - PREGLO

FACTS: A letter complaint was filed by complainant Judge Divina Luz P. AquinoSimbulan
with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), alleging that respondents Judge Nicasio V.
Bartolome, together with Romana Pascual, Milagros Lerey, and Amor dela Cruz, Acting Clerk
of Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket Clerk, respectively, all of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, committed grave errors and discrepancies in processing the
surety bond for the accused Rosalina Mercado above case was originally raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga, where complainant Judge
presides.

On September 18, 2003, said branch of the RTC received an Indorsement from
Warrant/Subpoena Officer PO3 Edwin Villacentino stating that the accused Mercado
voluntarily surrendered before the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail bond
through Summit Guaranty & Insurance Co., Inc., which was duly approved by respondent
Judge Bartolome on August 21, 2003.

Dated October 29, 2003, directing respondent Lerey, then Clerk of Court of the MTC, to transmit
to the RTC within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of said Order, the bond which the former
court approved. Then, on February 12, 2004, the RTC received a written explanation from
Lerey stating that she had misplaced and overlooked the subject surety bond, which resulted
in the delay of its transmission to the RTC. Upon perusal of the documents, complainant Judge
discovered that the subject surety bond bore some erasures, and its attachments Findings
during investigation: 1.That respondent Judge issued an Order of Release dated August 21,
2003 WITHOUT a Certificate of Detention and Warrant of Arrest attached to the documents
presented to him; 2. Order of Release was dated August 21, 2003, the Undertaking and
Certification from the bonding company were dated November 22, 2003 and October 29, 2003,
respectively; In approving the surety bond of the accused, respondent Judge violated Section 17,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON, the filing of surety bond with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, was proper.

HELD:

IN THE CASE AT BAR, the accused must have filed the bond w/in the province of
Pampanga or City of San Fernando. Instead, accused Mercado filed her bond in the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where respondent Judge presides, who approved the same
and ordered her release from custody. Respondent judge did not require accused to submit the
supporting documents pertinent to the application for a bond. Hence, there was no legal
justification for him to issue the Order of Release and process the bond since the accused was
not detained within his jurisdiction.

Sec. 17: “ bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.”
The proper procedure, according to the above-cited rules, would have been to file her bail bond
with the RTC Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga where her case was pending. Had
complainant Judge been absent or was unavailable at that time, the accused could have filed
for bail with another branch of the RTC in Pampanga or in San Fernando City. However, the
accused filed her surety bond with the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, where it was approved
by respondent Judge.

“Whenever bail is filed with a court other than where the case is pending, the judge
accepting the bail shall forward the bail, the order of release and other supporting papers to
the court where the case is pending, which may, for good reason, require a different one to be
filed.”

There was no Certificate of Detention or Warrant of Arrest attached to the bond transmitted
by the MTC to the complainant Judge. Moreover, the other supporting documents were
belatedly filed.

2. Lim vs. Dumlao – March 31, 2005

3. Savella vs. Judge Ines – April 19, 2007 - SANOY

VIRGINIA B. SAVELLA, Complainant, v. JUDGE ILUMINADA M. INES

FACTS:

A verified Letter-Complaint1 was filed by Virginia B. Savella (complainant) charging Iluminada

M. Ines (respondent judge), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sinait, Ilocos Sur
(MTC-Sinait) with Serious Misconduct of criminal complaint for Falsification of Public
Document filed by complainant against Isabel Ibanez (accused), before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities of Vigan, Ilocos Sur (MTCC-Vigan). A warrant of arrest was not immediately
served on the accused because she was residing in the United States of America at that time. On
18 April 2006, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) operatives tried to serve an alias warrant
of arrest on the accused, who reportedly returned to the Philippines to visit her hometown in
Sinait, Ilocos Sur. The accused, however, was not found at her residence. Instead, her daughter
produced a copy of the Order2 dated 13 April 2006 issued by respondent judge directing the
provisional release of the accused upon posting of a P12,000.00 bail bond.

Complainant claims that the Clerk of Court of MTC-Sinait did not forward the bail bond papers
to the court where the case was pending.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the bail was filed properly and its bond was submitted on time.

RULING:

NO. In a Resolution7 dated 15 January 2007, the Court required the parties to manifest whether
or not they are willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed.
Complainant, in her manifestation, responded in the affirmative.8 Respondent, however, did not
submit any manifestation despite receipt of a copy of the Resolution9 on 16 February 2007.
Therefore, she is deemed to have submitted the case for resolution.

The Respondent judge failed to properly apply the rule regarding the bail bond application.
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that "(b)ail in the amount fixed
may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge of the province or city or municipality." The instant falsification
case against accused was filed before the MTCC-Vigan, presided by Judge Ante. There was no
showing of the unavailability of Judge Ante at that time. Following the said rule, respondent
judge clearly erred in entertaining the bail application despite knowledge of the pendency of
the falsification case before the MTCC of Vigan.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Iluminada M. Ines administratively liable for
gross ignorance of the law and accordingly imposes on her a fine in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS with a stern warning that a repetition of a similar act will be
dealt with more severely.

4. Re: Anonymous Letter – April 7, 2010-SIMBAJON

FACTS

An anonymous "Concerned Filipino Citizen" sent to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a
letter requesting the investigation of Judge Marilou D. Runes-Tamang, Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Pateros and Acting Presiding Judge of the MeTC in San
Juan, Metro Manila. The letter-sender complained that Judge Tamang, through the connivance
of the arresting officer and court employees of MeTC at San Juan, had been indiscriminately
approving fake bonds for a fee of P1,000.00 "per count ng kaso." The investigation revealed that
Judge tamang approved not only the bail bonds issued by Covenant, a blacklisted bonding
company, but also the bail bonds in some instances for accused persons charged in criminal
cases pending outside her territorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE

Whether or not judge Tamang can approve bail bonds outside her territorial jurisdiction.

RULING-YES

The court ruled that under the provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where
the case is pending, or with any RTC of the place of arrest, or if no RTC Judge is available, with
any MeTC or MTC of the place of arrest. As a judge then on detail in San Juan, Judge Tamang
was correct in approving the applications for bail of the accused who had voluntarily
surrendered and been detained in San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig City, because Section 7(a), Rule
114, supra, granted her the authority to approve applications for bail of accused detained within
her territorial jurisdiction, in the event of the unavailability of any RTC Judge in the area. It is
worth noting that at the time of the subject bail applications, there was still no RTC Judge
stationed in San Juan and Pateros .However, Judge lamang did not substantiate her explanation
that she had approved the bail applications of the accused detained in Pasig City and had
issued the corresponding release orders after office hours on Fridas because no RTC Judges had
been available in Pasia Citv Aside from the affidavits attesting that she had stayed and worked
in her office until 9 p.m. and

that the orders of release had been immediately served on the jail warden concerned, she
offered no proof to justify her approval of the questioned bonds. Thus, her explanation did no
exculpate her, for, truly, her approvals of the bail bonds constituted an irregularity arising from
her lack of the authority to do so.

Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal
cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction, viz:

Section 17. Bail, where filed.- (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional trial
judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the
province, city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality
other than where the case is pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial Court of
said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

J. Section 21 – Forfeiture of bail

1. Mendoza vs. Alarma – May 3, 2008 - Solano

Fact:

The Accused in criminal case failed to appear in person before the court. The trial court
declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen a 30-.day period to produce the
accused or a reasonable explanation for their non-production.

Two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had
been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, another execution was
issued and the property was issued and the property was put to sale and was awarded to the
highest bidders of good faith.

Issue:

Whether or not the bondsmen still go after the property, on the ground that the trial court did
not render a judgment against them?

Whether or not the bail is forfeited?

Ruling:

Yes. Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

SEC. 21. - Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these
Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time.
If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be declared forfeited and the
bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause
why no judgment should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said
period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and

(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and
severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise mitigate the
liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted.

The provision clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be
forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety. In Reliance Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Amante, Jr. The two occasions upon which the trial court judge may rule
adversely against the bondsmen in cases when the accused fails to appear in court. First, the
non-appearance by the accused is cause for the judge to summarily declare the bond as
forfeited. Second, the bondsmen, after the summary forfeiture of the bond, are given 30 days
within which to produce the principal and to show cause why a judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount of the bond. It is only after this 30-day period, during
which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial
court may render a judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the
bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of forfeiture and an
opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for
their inability to do so.

In the present case, it is undisputed that the accused failed to appear in person before the court
and that the trial court declared his bail forfeited. The trial court gave the bondsmen,
respondents in this case, a 30-day period to produce the accused or a reasonable explanation for
their non-production. However, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the
forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the bondsmen for the amount of the
bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and
awarded to petitioners, the highest bidders.

K. Section 22 – Cancellation of bail

1. Bongcac vs. Sandiganbayan – May 21, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Panfilo Bongcac (Bongcac) was designated by the Mayor of Tagbilaran City
Consultant and Coordinator on market matters. Respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim (Lim) and
Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City
and were referred to by Bongcac. Bongcac informed Lim and Bon the government cannot afford
to construct a new market and if the two were interested, they should give Bongcac money for
the construction. Lim and Bon thereafter gave Bongcac a check amounting to 62, 000 and 40, 000
respectively. Thereafter, Lim and Bon learned from a newspaper that Bongcac was sacked as
market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and
demanded that he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or
tiendas already constructed. Bongcac failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with Estafa by
respondents before Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan found Bongcac as guilty of Estafa. Bongcac
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by Sandiganbayan. He then filed a certiorari
before SC seeking reversal but was likewise denied through resolution. No motion for
reconsideration was filed and the resolution became final and executory. Sandiganbayan issued
notice to Bongcac directing him to be present for the execution of judgement. An extraordinary
relief was sought by him in SC. Meanwhile, he filed a motion to suspend the execution in the
Sandiganbayan but was denied and the cash bond posted by petitioner for his temporary liberty
was ordered cancelled. Hence, this case. Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order praying that the Resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan be set aside and that
the warrant of arrest and the order cancelling the bail bond pending resolution of the Very
Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief be recalled. Respondent on the other hand in their
comment asserts Petitioners bail bond was deemed automatically cancelled upon execution of
the judgment of conviction.

Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in cancelling Bongcacs cash bail bond.

Ruling: No. the cancellation of the bailbond was due to the execution of the final judgment of
conviction.

Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides:SEC.
22.Cancellation of bail.- Upon application of the bondsmen, with due notice to the prosecutor,
the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, orexecution of the judgment of conviction.
In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

From this provision, it is clear that the cancellation of bail is automatic upon execution of the
judgment of conviction. The Sandiganbayan did not err in cancelling petitioners cash bailbond
after the judgment of conviction became final and executory and its execution became
ministerial.

2. People vs. Cawaling – April 17, 2009

G.R. No. 157147 April 17, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WILFREDO CAWALING, Accused -Appellant.

Facts: Cawaling was charged with murder. The case against him was dismissed [in] Feb 1991
because the complainant, the wife of the victim, executed an affidavit of waiver. After
the dismissal of the case, accused went to Papua, New Guinea and upon his return in
1992 her an and was elected as barangay captain of Busay, San Jose, Romblon. In 1995
he ran for mayor but lost the election. He then filed an election protest in this Court. On the
scheduled hearing of his protest, he was arrested and upon inquiry with the arresting
officer he was told that the dismissed case was refiled, by the same prosecutor who
dismissed the original case. On Dec 15, 1999, RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as an accomplice to the offense of homicide. RTC stated that accused, in case of appeal of
the Decision, may apply for bail pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule114. Cawaling took exception to the
portion of the RTC decision that convicted him as accomplice to homicide, and
appealed to the CA. But the CA reversed the RTC decision, convicted Cawaling of
murder, and sentenced him to reclusion Perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not with the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent
failure to execute the judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight is sufficient ground to
cancel the Bond of Cawaling.

Ruling:

NO, the motion must be denied

Lastly, we dispose of a corollary incident – the Manifestation with Motion to withdraw property
bond and post cash bond in lieu thereof – filed by bondsperson Margarita Cruz. In this
connection, Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is explicit:

SEC. 22. Cancellation of bail.— Upon application of the bondsmen with due notice to the
prosecutor, the bail may be cancelled upon surrender of the accused or proof of his death.

The bail shall be deemed automatically cancelled upon acquittal of the accused, dismissal of the
case, or execution of the judgment of conviction.

In all instances, the cancellation shall be without prejudice to any liability on the bail.

With the conviction of Cawaling for murder, and the Court’s consequent failure to execute the
judgment of conviction because of Cawaling’s flight, the motion must be denied. The posted
property bond cannot be cancelled, much less withdrawn and replaced with a cash bond by
movant Cruz, unless Cawaling is surrendered to the Court, or adequate proof of his death is
presented.

We are not unmindful that Cruz posted the property bond simply to accommodate Cawaling, a
relative, obtain provisional liberty. However, under Section 124 of Rule 114, Cruz, as a
bondsman, guarantees the appearance of the accused before any court as required under
specified conditions.

It is beyond cavil that, with the property bond posted by Cruz, Cawaling was allowed
temporary liberty, which made it possible, quite easily, to flee and evade punishment. As it
stands now, Cawaling, a convicted felon, is beyond reach of the law, and the property bond
cannot be released.1avvp

L. Section 23 – Arrest of accused out on bail

1. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals – 142 SCRA 149

Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial
courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then
Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon
and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts
which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction
over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated.

Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were
allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach
of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication
that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.

2. Silverio vs. Court of Appeals – April 8, 1991

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act.
Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order.
The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel the petitioner's passport, based on the finding that the
petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the
country without the knowledge and the permission of the court.

Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Held: YES. The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been
issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the
right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court
requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A.,
1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without
the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers
or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They
can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as
may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the
phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed
under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates
of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso &
Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal
proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions
should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes

3. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan – August 9, 1995

4. Cojuangco vs. Sandiganbayan – 300 SCRA 367

The respondents were charged "for having conspired and confederated together and taking
undue advantage of their public positions and/or using their powers; authority, influence,
connections or relationship with the former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and former First
Lady, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos without authority, granted a donation in the amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) to the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation (COCOFED), a
private entity, using PCA special fund, thereby giving COCOFED unwarranted benefits,
advantage and preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable
negligence to the grave (sic) and prejudice of the Filipino people and to the Republic of the
Philippines.

In a Resolution dated June 2, 1992, the panel of investigators recommended the filling of an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against herein petitioner
and five other respondent.

On February 17, 1995, an order for the arrest of petitioner was issued by the respondent
Sandiganbayan. In a Resolution dated February 20, 1995, the respondent Sandiganbayan barred
petitioner from leaving the country except upon approval of the court.

On February 22, 1995, petitioner posted bail. Moreso, petitioner asserts that quite often, it
becomes necessary for him to attend meetings and conferences abroad where attendance must
be confirmed promptly. Considering that he must first secure the permission of respondent
Sandiganbayan before he can travel abroad and abide by the conditions imposed by said court
upon the grant of such permission, petitioner contends that it becomes impossible for him to
immediately attend to the aforecited tasks.
Issue:

Whether or not the ban on foreign travel imposed on petitioner per Order of February 20, 1995
should be vacated to enable petitioner to go abroad without prior permission of, and other
restrictions imposed by the respondent Sandiganbayan?

Ruling:

Yes. The travel ban should be lifted.

The rule laid down by the Court was that… a person facing a criminal indictment and
provisionally released on bail is restricted to travel, the reason is that a person's right to travel is
subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. But, significantly, the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation dated
November 20, 1998 indicated that it is not interposing any objection to petitioner's prayer that
he be allowed to travel abroad based on the following considerations:

. . . (1) that it is well within the power of this Court to suspend its own rules, including the
second paragraph, Section 23, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court; (2) that it has been shown in the
past that the petitioner has always returned to the Philippines after the expiration of the period
of his allowed travel; and (3) that petitioner, now Chairman of the Board of San Miguel
Corporation, may be constrained to leave the country for business purposes, more often than he
had done in the past, . . . .

It however recommended that the period of travel should be reduced to three (3) months
instead of six (6) months as requested by petitioner and that the latter should be required to
post an additional cash bond equivalent to the present cash bond posted by him.

Admittedly, all of petitioner's previous requests to travel abroad have been granted and that, as
confirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that petitioner has always returned to the
Philippines and complied with the restrictions imposed on him. The necessity of further
denying petitioner's right to travel abroad, with attendant restrictions, appears less than clear.
The risk of flights is further diminished in view of petitioner's recent reinstatement as Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of San Miguel Corporation, though he now has more justification to
travel so as to oversee the entire operations of that company. In this regard, it has to be
conceded that this assumption of such vital post has come at a time when the current economic
crisis has adversely affected the international operations of many companies, including San
Miguel. The need to travel abroad frequently on the part of petitioner, to formulate and
implement the necessary corporate strategies and decisions, could not be forestalled. These
considerations affecting the petitioner's duties to a publicly held company, militate against
imposing further restrictions on petitioner's right to travel abroad.
5. Mondejar vs. Buban – July 12, 2001

Facts:

Complainant Mondejar filed a complaint against respondent judge alleged that respondent
issued a hold departure order which was in violation of OCA Circular NO. 39- 97. In his
comment, respondent admitted the issuance of the order because he was not aware of the
Supreme Court Circular issuance.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of the hold departure order is valid?

Ruling:

No.

Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said circular specifically provides
that "hold-departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the regional trial court." Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive
jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on
the part of the respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.

M. Section 26 – Bail not a bar to objection on illegal arrest/ lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation

1. Borlongan vs. Pena – May 5, 2010- ALBOFERA

FACTS:

Atty. Magdaleno Pena filed a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation against Urban
Bank and petitioners. Petitioners moved to dismiss and presented documents to show that Pena
was not appointed by Urban Bank or the petitioners as their agent. Pena filed then a complaint-
affidavit claiming that the documents were falsified. The petitioners were charged with four
counts of introducing falsified documents. The MTCC judge issued the warrants for their arrest.
Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants and/or for reinvestigation.
They argued that they were not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit and that the
judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the Pena in issuing the
warrants of arrest. The MTCC denied the Omnibus motion andupheld the validity of the
warrant of arrest saying that petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant
since they already posted bail. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, but
the same was dismissed. Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.
Pena contended that the issues raised by the petitioners had already become moot and
academic when the latter posted bail and were already arraigned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not posting bail is a waiver of the right to assail the validity of the warrants of
arrest. (NO)

RULING:

The ruling of the Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest has already been superseded by Sec. 26, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the
legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and
participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.

Petitioners filed their omnibus motion on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds
likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the
validity of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea
due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. When
the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to
preclude them from raising the same with the CA or the Court. The posting of bail bond was a
matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration.

VII. RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

A. Section 1- Rights of the accused at trial

1. People vs. Sequerra – October 12, 1987 - ALLARSE

FACTS:

In barangay Calaba in Bangued, Abra, at about ten o'clock in the morning of March 31, 1980,
Renato Bonete was shot in the back while driving his tricycle. Rushed to the hospital, he died
shortly upon arrival, of severe bleeding from the wounds he had sustained. In the afternoon of
the same day, Danilo Sequerra was picked up at his residence and thereafter investigated for
the killing.He was subsequently charged with the murder of Bonete and convicted after trial.

Four witnesses were presented by the prosecution to prove Sequerra's guilt. Rowena Bonete, a
15-year old girl, who was the victim's passenger when he was shot that fatal morning.
According to her, the tricycle had just passed by the accused, who was standing along the
barangay road, when he fired at the victim and then immediately ran towards the fields, still
carrying his gun. Carolina Bonete, her stepmother, testified that from where she was standing,
about 30 meters from the tricycle, she saw the accused running toward the fields after
apparently having shot Bonete. Concepcion Barsuela, another prosecution witness,testifies that
Bonete was still able to walk after he was shot for she found him in her front yard lying face
down. She immediately went to give him assistance and asked him who had shot him.
According to her, he thrice identified his assailant as "Danny Sequerra." And Carmelita Bonete,
the victim's wife, testified about the civil damages. She also declared there was bad blood
between her husband and the accused because the latter resented Renato Bonete's acquittal of
the murder of a relative of Sequerra; her husband had discovered Sequerra stealing chickens;
and Sequerra had stoned their house.

Sequerra claimed that he was not Calaba, Abra at that time of the killing and presented some 3
witnesses in support to his alibi.

The Court finds that the trial judge did not err in giving credence to the witnesses for the
prosecution and in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Against his positive
identification, all he offered was the feeble defense of alibi, which he and his witnesses failed to
substantiate. He is condemned, of course, not because he failed to prove that he was in Tarlac
but because the prosecution succeeded in proving that he was in Abra.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can rely on the presumption of innocence. NO

RULING: RULE 115, Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:

(a)To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Confronted by the full panoply of state authority, the accused is accorded the presumption of
innocence to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against him. Mere accusation is not
enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his defense. The evidence for the
prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, he is entitled to be freed.

But as solicitous as the Bill of Rights is of the accused, the presumption of innocence is not an
automatic or blanket exoneration. It is at best only an initial protection. If the prosecution
succeeds in refuting the presumption, it then becomes the outlook of the accused to adduce
evidence that will at least raise that inkling of doubt that he is guilty. Once the armor of the
presumption is pierced, so to speak, it is for the accused to take the offense and ward off the
attack.

The accused cannot rely forever on the presumption of innocence. This is a disputable
presumption. The prosecution destroyed that presumption by presenting evidence of the
accused's guilt.

2. People vs. Benemerito – 264 SCRA 677 Ampis

An appeal by accused-appellant Alexander "Alex" Benemerito from the Joint Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 91, convicting him of illegal recruitment and three
counts of estafa, the evidence overwhelmingly established the fact that both the accused
appellant and his sister Precy Benemerito were engaged in the business of illegal recruitment. In
their testimonies, Bernando Arcal and Carlito Gumarang were positive, categorical and firm,
even under grueling cross examination, that the accused-appellant actively participated in the
recruitment process. The latter was present when each complainant was offered a job in Japan,
and the accused appellant even made representations as to the existence of such jobs and
accompanied the complainants for their medical examinations. The accused-appellant likewise
received installment payments from the complainants.

The accused-appellant asserts that he should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule" in view of
the doubts as to his guilt as shown in his arguments and that the evidence points in fact to his
sister Precy Benemerito as the recruiter who received the money from the complainants.

Issue: WON he should be acquitted under the "equipoise rule"

Ruling: No. The accused appellant’s plea for the application of the "equipoise rule" must
likewise fail. This rule provides that where the evidence of the parties in a criminal case is
evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of
the accused. 30 There is, therefore, no equipoise if the evidence is not ‘’evenly balanced." Not
even a semblance of parity is present in this case. Against the direct, positive and convincing
evidence for the prosecution, the accused-appellant could only offer a mere denial and the
incredible claim that he was an unwitting victim of his sister Precy Benemerito. He miserably
failed to overcome the prosecution’s evidence, hence the rule is unavailable to him.

3. People vs. Calayca – 301 SCRA 192 - APA

FACTS:

A rape charge was initiated by Neddy Calayca through a sworn complaint and filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Balingasag, Misamis Oriental on January 9, 1995. MCTC Judge
Alfredo Cain found sufficient ground to prosecute the appellant for the crime of rape.
Consequently, on March 21, 1995, the corresponding Information was filed with the Regional
Trial Court reading as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor II, upon sworn complaint of the offended
party, Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime of RAPE, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less,
at Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her(sic) own daughter, Neddy Calayca,
against her will and consent.

When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered a plea of "Not
guilty" to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

A judgment convicting the appellant of the crime charged and imposing upon him the penalty
of death was rendered by the trial court in a Decision dated June 13, 1995

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant’s conviction of qualified rape violates his constitutional
right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

RULING:

YES.

There being no allegation of the minority of the victim in the Information under which the
appellant was arraigned, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly
informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. Appellant's conviction of qualified rape
violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the
crime charged must be alleged in the Information. The main purpose of this constitutional
requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

A reading of the Information for rape filed against appellant in the present case reveals that he
is merely charged with the crime of simple rape which warrants the imposition of the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. This is so because the fact of the minority of the victim, is not stated in the
Information. What was alleged therein was only the relationship of the offender as the parent
of the victim. Again, as the Supreme Court have emphasized in People v. Ramos, the
elements of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. As such,
the charge of rape in the Information is not in its qualified form so as to fall under the special
qualifying circumstances stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659. Thus, the penalty of death prescribed
in R.A. 7659 should not have been imposed against appellant.

In the aforecited case of People v. Garcia, the Supreme Court ruled: . . ., it has long been the
rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same
are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances, since
the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable
with death, although the attendant circumstances qualifying the offense and resulting in the
capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.

4. People vs. Bermas – 306 SCRA 135

5. Carredo vs. People – 183 SCRA 273 BANUELOS

FACTS:
A motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, petitioner Carredo elevated the
matter to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City through a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
In an order dated January 28, 1987, the said trial court denied the same. Hence, the herein
petition for review on certiorari questioning the dismissal of the petition by the trial court and
submitting for determination the issue of whether or not petitioner can be compelled, on pain of
being arrested and his cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the trial for purposes
of his identification by the prosecution witnesses in a complaint for malicious mischief despite
his written waiver of appearance. The issue is not new.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the
trial can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for
purposes of identification.

RULING:

YES. Waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is
thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification
by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the
accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in
court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to
the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED without pronouncement as to costs.

6. People vs. Continente – 339 SCRA 1 (2000)

FACTS:

Donato B. Continente and Juanito T. were charged for two (2) separate amended Informations
for murder and frustrated murder in connection with shooting incident on April 21, 1989 at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City which caused the death of
U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya.It appears that
the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a certain Meriam Zlueta.
Zulueta recognized Continente whom she had encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a
carinderia outside the JUSMAG Compound.

Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his own statements which are
respectively dated August 29, 1989 AND August 30, 1989, insofar as the same establish his
participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 198. Appelllant Itaas
testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors on August 27 and 28, 1989 in Davao City;
that he was blindfolded and a masking tape was placed on his mouth; and that subsequently,
he was hit and mauled while a cellophane was placed on his head thus, causing him to loss
consciousness.

Donato Continente testified and CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he knew something
about it; that appellant Continente was alone with Investigator Pablico during the investigation;
that he signed his sworn statement in the presence of Pablico and swore to the truth thereof
before the administering fiscal for fear that something might happen to him while he was alone;
that he signed the last page of his sworn statement first before signing the waiver of his
constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal service was
engaged by the CIS Investigators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not herein Petiotioner’s rights during custodial investigation were violated as they
have no counsel of their own choice.

RULING:

No.

Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them
legal assistance during their respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be
emphasized that both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own
choice. In any case, it has been ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a
person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged
in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's
appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to
the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.

If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to give their
statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely complying with their oaths to
abide by the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily
telling the truth. Whether it is an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose
is always the ascertainment of truth. What is sought to be protected with the constitutional right
to counsel is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to
provide him with the best defense.

7. People vs. Crispin – 327 SCRA 167 Cabaña

FACTS

That this is a statement of facts, On August 12, 1993, around 11:30 p.m., spouses Crisanto
and Evelyn Saul were in the house of the Jamias couple (Aniceto and Angelita) located at Block
29, Lot 28, Kabisig Floodway, Cainta, and Rizal. With them were Honoria Ontanillas and Nestor
Jamias. The group was talking animatedly concerning the deployment abroad of Honorio
Ontanillas as well as Crisanto’s deployment in the last week of that month of August. In the
course of their conversation, two (2) masked intruders suddenly appeared from the door. One
of the intruders pointed a gun at the temple of Crisanto – then a shot rang out. Crisanto
slumped on the floor. Evelyn was shoved inside a room by Aniceto Jamias and a scuffle ensued
between the second intruder and the rest of the group of the Jamiases. The second intruder was
subdued. Evelyn vividly recalled that the gunman who shot her husband had the letter ‘M’
tattooed between his thumb and forefinger.

ISSUE

Whether or not the rights of the accused in this case are deprived?

RULING

YES. In our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is whether the court
reasonably doubts, not the innocence, but the guilt of the accused. Unless the identity of the
culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt to the exclusion of all others, the charge must be
dismissed on the ground that the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been
overcome. While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty, it connotes
that degree of proof which, after an investigation of the whole record, produces in an
unprejudiced mind the moral certainty that the accused is culpable.

In every criminal prosecution, the prosecution must prove two things: (1) the commission of the
crime and (2) the identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Upon the
investigation over the accused the prosecution’s basis for identifying the assailant was belatedly
established, unsubstantiated, uncorroborated and therefore unreliable.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal (Branch 74) in Criminal
Case No. 93-9911 is hereby REVERSED. Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is
ordered RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith
and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was
actually released from confinement, or of the reasons why he could not be freed therefrom.
Costs de oficio.

An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the witness
stand to testify on it.21 Being hearsay evidence, it is inadmissible because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to
whom the statement or writing is attributed.22 The right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him23 is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily
done away with. Another reason why the right to confrontation is so essential is because the
trial judge’s duty to observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by his being
brought to the witness stand.24 That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary
investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary
investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.25 Such record must be
introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of
the same.26 The prosecution having failed to present Cesar Delima as a witness, his sworn
statement was patently inadmissible and deserves no consideration at all.

8. Beltran vs. Samson and Jose – 53 Phil. 570

RIGHT TO SELF INCRIMINATION

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in
the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier.

(Posted by Dawn Guillermo)

9. People vs. Gallarde – February 17, 2000

murder

10. Binay vs. Sandiganbayan – October 1, 1999 -

VIII. Rule 116 – ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

A. Section 1 – Arraignment and Plea; how made

1. People vs. Mechor Estomaca – April 22, 1996

Facts:

Melchor Estomaca, an illiterate laborer, was charged with rape committed on five separate
occasions against his own daughter.

There is some inconsistency in the statements on record as to what actually took place on June
14, 1994 during the arraignment. When he was arraigned, he pleaded guilty to all of the
complaints against him. However, he eventually informed the court that he was only guilty of
two counts of rape, and a plea of not guilty to the other three, alleging that those may have been
committed by the victim’s boyfriend.

Since he was charged for a heinous crime, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which
found the arraignment process of the accused to be questionable.

Issue:

WON the arraignment was valid.

Ruling:

No. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court by the
judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the same in the language
or dialect that is known to him, and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused understands and
knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly
followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-
important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be
able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process
clause under the Constitution.
In the case at hand, the arraignment appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of
the five complaints, synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript. There is also no
showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was furnished a copy of each
complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order that the latter may duly prepare and
comply with his responsibilities. Moreover, the court found out that the complaint or
information was not read to the accused in the language known to him, as his local dialect
was kinaray-a and the lower court conducted the arraignment in Ilonggo.

The Supreme Court remanded the two criminal cases where the accused pleaded guilty back to
the lower court for further and appropriate proceedings.

2. People vs. Dea Asis – December 7, 1993 - CHUNG

3. People vs. Cabale – May 8, 1990- COLE

FACTS:

Demetrio Cabale, Bonifacio Cualteros, Florencio Daniel, and Benito Terante alias Bodoy were
charged in two (2) separate informations before the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Southern
Leyte, with the crimes of Robbery in Band with Less Serious Physical Injuries for the crime
committed against Ricarido Fernando and Robbery in Band with Homicide, for the crime
committed against Rufina Rosello.

After joint trial of the two (2) cases, the accused Demetrio Cabale, Florencio Daniel, and Benito
Terante were found guilty in both cases and sentenced in Criminal Case No. R-2895 for the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, to suffer the Death penalty and to indemnify, jointly, the heirs
of the deceased Rufina Rosello.
In view of the death penalty imposed upon each of the accused Demetrio Cabale, Florencio
Daniel, and Benito Terante the records of both Criminal Cases were forwarded to this Court
pursuant to law for the review of the decision * rendered therein. However, upon the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution under which the death penalty is no longer imposable, the

accused, Florencio Daniel, informed the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing an
appeal and that he was willing to serve the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Since the judgment against the accused Demetrio Cabale has also become final due to his escape
from detention, only the appeal of the accused Benito Terante alias Bodoy is left for
consideration. Earlier, said accused manifested his desire to continue and pursue his appeal.

Benito Terante alias Bodoy, denied having participated in the commission of the offenses
charged in the information, and interposed the defense of alibi. He also claims that there was an
irregularity in his arraignment since it was done after the cases had been submitted for decision,
so that he was not afforded the chance to prepare properly for his defense; and that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses Vicente Mangaring, Rosita Makiling, and Ricarido Fernando are not
credible in view of the inconsistencies and improbabilities in such testimonies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arraignment of Terante was valid.

RULING:

Yes.

The Supreme Court held that while the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after the
cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured.

The counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client, the appellant
herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-
examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried after the
appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the
prosecution, adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment of the appellant. There
was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.

B. Section 2 – Plea of guilty to a lesser offense

1. People vs. Villarama Jr. – 210 SCRA 226 Cuevas-Presores

FACTS

On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment
ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to
twelve thousand pesos. The information against him reads:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin
Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulate

During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On
November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for the private
respondent verbally manifested in open court that the private respondent was willing to
change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of
Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six hundred to four
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian,
manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of
the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug.

On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on November
21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged
was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the
court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, private
respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser
Offense alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not
fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense drug.

ISSUE
 Whether or not the plea of guilty to a lesser offense by the accused through its counsel
will be granted?

RULING

YES. Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge
of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who also represents the offended party that is the state. More importantly, the trial court's
approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work
out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves
the defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-
count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid).
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings.
However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter.
Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:

Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent of the offended party
and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of the Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and March 13,
1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D (People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial
on the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case is made permanent. No costs.

C. Section 3 – Plea of guilty to capital offense

1. People vs. Albert – 251 SCRA 136

2.People vs. Alicando – 251 SCRA 293

3. People vs. Estomaca – 256 SCRA 421

4. People vs. Besonia – February 24, 2004

5. People vs. Rogelio Gumimba – February 27, 2007

6. People vs. Mendoza – 231 SCRA 264

D. Section 6 – Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel

1. People vs. Serzo, Jr. – June 20, 1997- ENCINAS, CM

FACTS: The right to counsel of an accused is guaranteed by our Constitution, our laws and our
Rules of Court. During custodial investigation, arraignment, trial and even on appeal, the
accused is given the option to be represented by a counsel of his choice. But when he neglects or
refuses to exercise this option during arraignment and trial, the court shall appoint one for him.
While the right to be represented by counsel is absolute, the accused’s option to hire one of his
own choice is limited. Such an option cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory (slow to
act) tactics, to trifle with the Rules or to prejudice the equally important rights of the state and
the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

This will be amplified in this appeal seeking the reversal of the August 23, 1994 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 72, 1 in Criminal Case in convicting Serzo, Jr. of
murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant was charged with murder in an Information dated September 4, 1990 filed by Rizal
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata, worded as follows: "That on or about
the 22nd day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
bladed weapon, with intent to kill, with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab one Alfredo Alcantara y Casabal at the back, thereby
inflicting upon him stab wounds which directly caused his de²ath."cy

ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to counsel.

HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all
stages of the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction
reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of
the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.
The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the
adversarial system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of
the state. It is also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a
tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on
appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation
shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

The right is however not absolute and is waivable;

a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally important
right to speedy and adequate justice, and

b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

E. Section 9 – Bill of Particulars

1. Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan – 202 SCRA 726

F. Section 10 – Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution

1. Webb vs. De Leon – August 23, 1995

G. Section 11 – Suspension of arraignment

1. Dino vs. Olivares – June 23, 2009-FOROSUELO

Facts:

Accused Olivares was charged with vote buying. Prosecutor found probable cause and
filed information in the RTC. Accused appealed the resolution of the prosecutor finding
probable cause to the COMELEC, with motion to revoke continuing authority. According to the
accused, the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the COMELEC should
prevent the filing of the information before the RTC as there could be no final finding of
probable cause until the COMELEC has resolved the appeal. Judge Madrona set the
arraignment with a warning that the arraignment would proceed without any more delay,
unless the Supreme Court would issue an injunctive writ.
Issue: Should the arraignment be suspended in view of the appeal by the accused to the
COMELEC on the finding of the prosecutor of probable cause?

Ruling:

NO, the arraignment of the accused is not indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an
appeal before the Department of Justice or, in this case, Law Department of the COMELEC;
rather, the reviewing authority is allowed 60 days within which to decide the appeal. Five
months, which far exceeded the sixty days provided by the rules, was ample time for the
respondent to obtain from COMELEC a reversal of the Joint Resolution. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be
filed in court, once the case has been brought to court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel
is proper in the case should be addressed to the consideration of the trial court.

IX. Rule 117 – MOTION QUASH

A. Section 2 – Form and contents

1. People vs. Nitafan – February 1, 1999

B. Section 3 – Grounds

1. Lopez vs. Sandiganbayan – October 13, 1995

2. Cudia vs. Court of Appeals – January 16, 1998 - Grumo

Facts:

Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver.
He was brought to Angeles City, where he was detained. The City Prosecutor of Angeles City
filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The
Information states that he committed the crime in Angeles City. The case was raffled to RTC
Branch 60, Angeles City. Cudia pleaded not guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial,
the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to the information,
petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there
was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would
handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-
raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of
the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
However, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information charging petitioner
with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The case was likewise
raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in the first criminal
case to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, it appearing that the apprehension
of the accused was made in Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga. The trial court granted the motion.

Cudia then filed a Motion to Quash the second criminal case on the ground that his continued
prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he had
been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his opposition
would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The
trial court denied the motion to quash. CA affirmed that there was no double jeopardy on the
ground that the petitioner could not have been convicted under the first information as the
same was defective.

Issue:

Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was acquitted in the criminal
charges against her

Ruling:

It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first
information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is
beyond his jurisdiction.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An
information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by
another. It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized
by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor
in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a
waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by
clear implication, if not by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform
decisions, questions relating to want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a competent officer which, among other
requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the accused (herein petitioner)
and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the
information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its
dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority
to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioners
subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a
defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.

3. Tolentino vs. Hon. Paquero – June 7, 2007 - GUILLERMO

Case: Violation of Sec. 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 28 (e) of Republic Act No. 82821 for failing to
remit the premiums due for his employee to the Social Security System despite demand.

FACTS: Accused moves to quash the Information x x x upon the sole ground that State
Prosecutor not being the City Prosecutor nor the Provincial Prosecutor, has no legal personality
nor is he legally clothed with the authority to commence prosecution by the filing of the
Information and thus prosecute the case.

ISSUE: WON the information should be quashed? YES.

HELD: Rule 112. Sec 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.— x x x

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without

the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

In relation to…

Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information
on any of the following grounds: x x x

(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; x x x
In this case, Since the Regional State Prosecutor is not included among the law officers
authorized to approve the filing or dismissal of the Information of the investigating prosecutor,
the Information filed by petitioner State Prosecutor Tolentino did not comply with the
requirement of Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the
non-compliance was a ground to quash the Information under Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

4. Danguilan-Vitug vs. Court of Appeals – 232 SCRA 460

5. Sasot vs. People – June 29, 2005

C. Section 6 – Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution

1. Gonzales vs. Hon. Salvador and Glen Dale – December 5, 2006 - LOVITOS

Facts:

Petitioner Rafael Gonzales filed a complaint against respondent Glen Dale arising from the
publication in the January 7, 1999 issue of “Today” of his article entitled “Glad Tidings for
Manila Polo Club members” in the “Bizz „N‟ Fizz” column, under the nom de plume Rene
Martel in which the Prosecutor‟s Office found probable cause for libel. Respondent filed
petition for review but was dismissed by the DOJ and when respondent was arraigned he
pleaded “not guilty”. Respondent later on filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, since the Information does not state that the offended
party-herein petitioner actually resides in Makati or that the allegedly libelous article was
printed or 1st published in Makati. Such Motion to Quash was granted. 26 days after receiving
order, petitioner filed a motion to amend the Information and argued that the motion was
timely filed since the Rules allow the filing of new information “within such further time as the
court may allow for good cause” and that it is not subject to reglementary period.

Issue:

WON amendment can still be made after an order granting the motion to quash
Ruling:

NO. Once the court issues an order granting the motion to quash, the info. & such order
becomes final & executory, however there is nothing more to amend.

Section 4 covers the amendment of an information. Section 5 deals with the filing of a new
information.

The amendment of an information under Section 4 of Rule 117 applies if the trial court finds
that there is a defect in the information and the defect can be cured by amendment, in which
case the court shall order the prosecution to amend the information. Once the court issues an
order granting the motion to quash the information and such order becomes final and
executory, however, there is nothing more to amend.

In cases falling under Section 5 of Rule 117, where the motion to quash is sustained on grounds
other than those stated in Section 6 of the same Rule, the trial court has the discretion to order
the filing of another information within a specified period which is extendible to such further
time as the court may allow for good cause. The order to file another information, if determined
to be warranted by the circumstances of the case, must be contained in the same order granting
the motion to quash. If the order sustaining the motion to quash does not order the filing of
another information, and said order becomes final and executory, then the court may no longer
direct the filing of another information.

D. Section 7 – Double jeopardy

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been convicted
or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which
necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the
following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission
constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after a plea was
entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor and of the
offended party except as provided in section 1 (f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or in part the judgment, he
shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. (7a)

1. People vs. Relova – 146 SCRA 292 - MAMAC

FACTS:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the
orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr.
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are
designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the
plant’s electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint
was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the
act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case
was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a
Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a
motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscal’s claim is that it is not
double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized
installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from the City
Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as
opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second
offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas. YES

RULING:

Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as
tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights gives two instances or kinds
of double jeopardy.

1. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the

2. second sentence states that “If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar another prosecution for the same act”.

In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on
the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge
was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one
and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy.

The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint
against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against
Mr.Opulencia.

2. Mallari vs. People – 168 SCRA 422

3. People vs. Bocar – 138 SCRA 166 - MATARANAS

FACTS:

On March 28, 1967, the assistant fiscal for Manila filed before the respondent Court the
following information:

The undersigned accuses CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and SERAPION CLAUDIO of
the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring
and confederating together with three others whose true names. Identities and whereabouts are
still unknown, and helping one another did then and there willfully. unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof,
take, steal and carry away the following property, to wit

Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at -P7,104.62 all valued at
P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner
in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency.

Contrary to law.

On May 3, 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty."

Proceedings were had on July 7, 1967. On said date, the respondent Judge conducted a
"summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the
end of the "investigation," the respondent Judge issued the order under review.

Upon a summary investigation of this case the Court is of the opinion that the same is more
civil than criminal. The issue is who is the owner of the logs. Both parties claim ownership and
both claim that they can prove ownership. During the summary investigation the accused
acknowledged to have taken the logs from the compound in the pier in good faith, without any
intention to steal them from anybody.

In view thereof, the Court orders the case dismissed, cost de oficio and the cancellation of the
bond filed by the accused.

Private prosecutors together with the Fiscal's office in the case filed a "motion for
reconsideration" but was denied by the respondent Court. Before the Supreme Court, the
petitioners filed a special civil action seeking the annulment of the said dismissal order dated
July 7, 1967.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order dated July 7, 1967.

RULING:

Yes. Respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical
and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit. Moreover, it is
clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a chance to introduce and offer its
evidence formally in accordance with the Rules of Court. Verily, the prosecution was denied
due process.

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. To
raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:

(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and

(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy,
and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

4. Binay vs. Sandiganbayabn – October 1, 1999 - MENDOZA

Facts:
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate information’s against
petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,6 and two
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.7 The information’s, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were
committed in 1987 during petitioner's incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of
Metro Manila. Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because at the alleged time of the commission of the crimes
charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27 and that Municipal
mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 7975..

Issue:

W/N Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the
same facts with the Regional Trial Court.

W/N Respondents are stopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan
considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the
Regional Trial Court.

Held:

This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC,
R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to
the Sandiganbayan. Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is
determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel. As a
consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals that: It follows
that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does
not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The
plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of
the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss
the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to
divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in
derogation of the law.

It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases that estoppel prevents a party from
questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel,
however ,remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by
law

.Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently
invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning
such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After
discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly
asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a
motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC's
jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the
motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve
the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse
to petitioners. Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not
themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the
commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in
court is required to be brought in the name of the "People of the Philippines." Even then, the
doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions. Violations of
the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act, like attempted murder, is a public offense. Social and
public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public
offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.The filing of
the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though
they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first
jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction.
There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no
jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the
information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy. Their remedy
was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED

5. People vs. Vergara – 221 SCRA 960

6. People vs. Mogol – 131 SCRA 296 MORAN

FACTS: The accused was charged with physical injuries. After trial in the MTC, the court
discovered that it should not have been physical injuries, rather it should have been
frustrated murder because there was intent to kill. The MTC dismissed the case of physical
injuries and told the fiscal to file information for frustrated murder. The accused claimed that he
was charged for the same act. Thus, he moved for the dismissal of the frustrated murder case.

ISSUE: Is there double jeopardy?

HELD: NONE. There was no double jeopardy because the order of the trial court dismissing the
physical injury case is wrong. It was a void order because what the judge should have done is to
continue trying the case (amend) even if there was an error in the offense charged. So, if the
accused would be convicted, it is for physical injuries. In other words, you cannot order
dismissal and then re-file the case for frustrated murder. Because the order dismissal is void,
there is no double jeopardy.

However, there was one dissenting justice in the case of Mogol – former Justice Makasiar. He
said that “there is double jeopardy as the case had already been tried and submitted for decision
where the MTC judge ordered the physical injury to be dismissed and ordered the filing of a
new case for frustrated murder in the RTC. Frustrated murder includes physical injuries.
Therefore, dismissal of the latter resulted in double jeopardy.”

If you look at it, all the elements are there. But the trouble is, the SC said, the order of dismissal
is void, there was no valid dismissal. The charge for physical injury was reinstated.

7. Gorreon vs. RTC of Cebu – 213 SCRA 138

8. Benares vs. Lim – December 13, 2006 - ONTAL

faCTS: Petitioner Oscar Beñares was accused of estafa arising from two contracts of sale
executed in 1976 where he sold two parcels of land to respondent. Records show that after
respondent had fully paid the amortizations and after the deed of absolute sale was issued,
petitioner mortgaged the same parcels of land to the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thus, when
respondent demanded delivery of the properties, petitioner failed to comply, thus respondent
was compelled to file a case for estafa against petitioner.

Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution presented its last witness, it was given 15 days to
formally offer its evidence.8 However, the prosecution did not make any formal offer of
evidence, hence petitioner filed a motion praying that the prosecution's submission of formal
offer of evidence be deemed waived and the case dismissed for lack of evidence.9 Despite
receipt of notice of petitioner's motion, respondent and her counsel failed to attend the hearing
on the motion set on December 4, 2001.

On January 28, 2002, the MeTC issued an Order10 giving the prosecution another 15 days within
which to formally offer its evidence which petitioner opposed.11 On February 27, 2002, the
MeTC issued the following Order:

In view of the oral manifestation of counsel for the accused, showing that the private prosecutor
received the Order of this Court dated January 28, 2002 on February 7, 2002 giving them an
extension of another fifteen days to file their formal offer of evidence, yet failed to do so; the
court finds reason to deny the submission of formal offer of evidence.

Acting on the Motion of the accused for the dismissal of this case, for failure of the prosecution
to prosecute this case, the motion is granted. This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

Respondent moved to reconsider the order of dismissal and prayed for the admission of
Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits,13 claiming that she had difficulty securing documents
from the court which were marked during trial. Petitioner opposed the motion invoking his
right against double jeopardy.

Effectively, the Order of the Court dated January 28, 200215 is set aside and the case is reinstated
in the dockets of the Court.

iSSUE: whether the MeTC's Order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute amounted to an
acquittal which gave petitioner the right to invoke double jeopardy.

Ruling: NO.

Double jeopardy attaches only

(1) upon a valid indictment,

(2) before a competent court,

(3) after arraignment,

(4) when a valid plea has been entered, and

(5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused

In the instant case, there is no question as to the presence of the first four elements. As to the last element,
there was yet no conviction, nor an acquittal on the ground that petitioner's guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt,23 but the dismissal of the case was based on failure to prosecute.

A dismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not result in double
jeopardy, except in two instances, to wit:

(1) the dismissal is based on insufficiency of evidence or

(2) the case is dismissed for violation of the accused's right to speedy trial.24
The prosecution's delay in the filing of its formal offer of evidence in this case cannot be considered vexatious, capricious, and oppressive. It appears that there was justifiable reason for

the prosecution's failure to formally offer its evidence on time, i.e., the documents which were previously marked in court were misplaced.
9. Cerezo vs. people – June 1, 2011

10. Tan vs. People – April 21, 2009 - OSORNO

Facts:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of

the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases
No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."

Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises
in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal
Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of
BW shares. In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan
and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock.
These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.

On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a
Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832
be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court
granted.

Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the
parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal
Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor
would the trial court disapprove it.

Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On 18
September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by
the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days. After being granted extensions to
its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to file said formal offer for
Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the
People's alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner
faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and
without giving any excuse or justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was
persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly done on several
instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an attached double jeopardy in this case due to the violation against the
petitioner’s right to speedy trial

Ruling:

No.

Petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said RTC order was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; andc

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused
Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or
acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case
resulting in acquittal, made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion,
will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule, however, admits of two exceptions,
namely:

insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.

While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No.
119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which
would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. Petitioner's
situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without
basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to
support the initial order of dismissal.

Following this Court's ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals, as petitioner's right to speedy trial
was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy - that the
defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused - was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was
allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of dismissal and does not involve double
jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal;
such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.

11. People vs. Nazareno – August 5, 2009- PASCUA

G.R. No. 168982. August 5, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. DIR. GEN. CESAR P. NAZARENO, DIR.
EVERLINO NARTATEZ, DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, and THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION) , respondents.
FACTS:

The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an information against the respondents with the
Sandiganbayan on allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounded the procurement of
three (3) separate but related contracts between the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Beltra
Industries, for the purchase and delivery of pistols.

The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The Sandiganbayan agreed with the respondents' submissions and acquitted the respondents
after trial.

ISSUE:

Whether double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus proscribes the
resolution of the issues raised by petitioner.

RULING:

Yes, double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents and thus proscribes the
resolution of the issues raised by petitioner. The Court dismissed the petition on the basis of the
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution.

Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that

"no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense".

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right,
reads:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present:

(1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second;

(2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and

(3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.

A first jeopardy attaches only

(a) after a valid indictment;

(b) before a competent court;

(c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and

(e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.

Here, the judgment of acquittal by the Sandiganbayan is final and is no longer reviewable. It is
also immediately executory and the State may not seek its review without placing the accused
in double jeopardy.

Therefore, double jeopardy has already attached to herein respondents shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged in the resolution of the issues raised by petitioner.
12. Perez vs. Court of Appeals – 168 SCRA 236

13. Nierras vs. Dacuycuy – 181 SCRA 1 PREGLO

Facts:

September 17, 1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras"

for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to
quash. Said motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these
offenses were already included in Criminal Cases Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123,
4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for violation of the
Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22

Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter delivered to him
simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.

Issue:

whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa against petitioner under the
Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the
same offenses.

Ruling:

No. Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 which provides that:

"Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason ordered the bank
to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court."

Second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

"Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned herein below . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;

xxx xxx xxx

"(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check."

Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption
of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and
hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a
pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in each
of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire
banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while
those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.

a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or
differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as in the case at bar
there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to
identity of elements in the two (2) offenses

What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets
of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy.

14. Suero vs. People – January 31, 2005

15. Mallari vs. People – 168 SCRA 422

16. Enrile vs. Amin – September 13, 1990-SIMBAJON

FACTS:

An information was filed against Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion "complexed"
with murder and charging him of violation of PD No. 1829.

It was alleged that Ponce Enrile entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him
food and comfort in his house. Kwowing that Col. Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile
allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such
failure of the petitioner that prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction was allegedly a
violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

On March 2, 1990, Sen. Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion but was denied. Then, Sen. Filed a
Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information but then again was denied.

In return, Sen. Enrile filed for certiorari on the SC imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the respondent court on the following
grounds:

a. the facts do not constitute an offense;

b. the alleged harboring and concealing of Col. Honasan is absorbed in complexed rebellion;

c. that justice requires only one prosecution for all the components of rebellion;

d. no probable cause for the violation of PD No. 1829; and

e. no preliminary investigation was conducted for the alleged violation of PD No. 1829.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sen. Enrile be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 not withstanding
the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
HELD: NO- The violation of PD 1829 is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

The Supreme Court granted the petition of Sen. Enrile and quashed the information.

The SC reiterated the long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses of
rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions. It is Hernandez case that remains
binding doctrine to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as means necessary to its commission or as an intended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.

Petitioner's act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in furtherance of the
crime of rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. All crimes, whether punishable under
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in the
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and
charged as separate crimes. It is the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by application of Art. 48 of the RPC.

17. Santiago vs. Garchitorena – 226 SCRA 214

E. Section 8 – Provisional Dismissal

1. Los Baños vs. Pedro – April 22, 2009

FACTS;

Joel Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded firearm without authorization from the
COMELEC a day before the elections. Pedro, then filed a Motion to Quash after his Motion for
Preliminary Investigation did not materialize. The RTC granted the quashal

The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings in which Pedro objected to citing Rule 117,
Sec. 8 on provisional dismissal, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent.
The public prosecutor manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen the case
saying that the provision used applies where both the prosecution and the accused mutually
consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party failed to
object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was quashed
upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus, set
Pedro’s arraignment date.

Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTC’s mandated
reopening.

The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for
Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order,
the CA's decision was reversed.

Petitioner now argues using the same argument of the public prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

RULING:

The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two
separate concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional
Dismissal, the Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results
in a provisional dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground
that there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures
of a motion to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still
stands, on the basis of which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

F. Section 9 – Failure to Move to quash

1. People vs. Rafon – September 5, 2007

X. RULE 118 – PRE-TRIAL

A. Section 1 – Mandatory Pre-Trial

1. Abubakar vs. Abubakar – October 22, 1999

(DKGG)

-complaint against AMININ for "Divorce with Prayer for Support and Damages." the complaint was
mainly premised on the alleged failure of AMININ to secure AURORA's consent before contracting a
subsequent marriage, in violation of Articles 27 and 162 of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise
known as the "Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines."

At the heart of this action lies the time-tested policy of this Court regarding a litigant's voluntary
limitation of issues vis a vis the court's exercise of its judicial prerogative. Specifically, the petition seeks
confirmation regarding the effects of a pre-trial order and the finality of matters not appealed by an
appellant.

That a pre-trial is indispensable in any civil or criminal action in this jurisdiction is clearly laid out in
Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court. It is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled
and proved at the trial. A less cluttered case environment means that there will be fewer points of
contention for the trial court to resolve. This would be in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution
according every person the right to a speedy disposition of their cases. 11 If the parties can agree on
certain facts prior to trial — hence, the prefix "pre" — the court can later concentrate on those which are
seemingly irreconcilable. The purpose of pre-trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the
trial, if not indeed its dispensation. 12 The stipulations are perpetuated in a pre-trial order which legally
binds the parties to honor the same. 13
In the case at bar, AMININ and AURORA "agreed" on the divorce, and the limitation of partition of
assets to the PROPERTIES. The pre-trial order of 21 March 1997 — whose content and validity were
never questioned by either party — stated the sole issue to be determined at the trial in this wise: "What
are the rights or the respective shares of the herein plaintiff and defendant with respect to the property
subject of partition after divorce?" This is precisely the question answered by the CIRCUIT COURT in
its order of 29 August 1997. The marriage was dissolved, the PROPERTIES awarded and evenly
distributed to the parties as co-owners, and support in the nominal amount of P10,000 during the three-
month 'idda or waiting period was awarded to AURORA. Such final order was, therefore, consistent
with the pre-trial order.

Since the size of the award is an issue which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject
matter, nor a plain or clerical error, respondent appellate court did not have the power to resolve it.

B. Section 2 – Pre-trial Agreement

Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. — All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in
section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.

1. Fule vs. Court of Appeals – 162 SCRA 446

The stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August 8, 1985 was not signed by the petitioner, nor
by his counsel.

The omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules,
renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence

2. People vs. Hernandez – 260 SCRA 25 (July 30, 1996)

3. Bayas vs. Sandiganbayan – November 12, 2002

4. Chua-Burce vs. CA – April 27, 2000

5. People vs. Ancheta – January 14, 2004

C. Pre-trial Order

1. People vs. Guzman – January 26, 2007

In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000, the defense named only four
witnesses, to wit: Antonio, Lizardo Dedase, Eduardo Bidia, and accused himself. In the same
order, the RTC stated the following:

All parties are informed that witnesses and documents which were not mentioned in this pre-
trial order shall not be entertained during the trial on the merits.

During the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able to testify. When the two other witnesses
in the pre-trial order, namely, Lizardo Dedase and Eduardo Bidia, failed to appear and testify in
court several times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them explaining that they were hesitant to
testify, and, that one of them went home to his province.

The RTC was correct in denying the defense counsel’s motion for substitution of witnesses
since Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the
matters agreed upon in the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial order shall bind
the parties, to wit:

SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. – After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court
to prevent manifest injustice.

The pre-trial order of the RTC dated 29 February 2000 clearly shows that the defense named
only four witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that witnesses who were not
mentioned in the pre-trial order will not be entertained during the trial on the merits. Thus,
pursuant to the afore-stated provision and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the
disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial, the denial of the defense counsel’s motion
for substitution of witnesses is justified. Moreover, if appellant’s motion for substitution of
witnesses is given due course, it will amount to an unreasonable disregard of solemn
agreements submitted to and approved by the court of justice and would make a mockery of
the judicial process.

This is not to say, however, that such provision is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater
interest of justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in favor of appellant as the RTC
had observed that his motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a "fishing expedition"
of evidence which is clearly unfair to the case of the prosecution. Moreover, as aptly stated by
the Solicitor General, if the two other witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant to
testify, he should have moved the RTC to subpoena the said witnesses to testify in court
pursuant to his constitutional right to compulsory process to secure the attendance of his
witnesses. Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself of this remedy.

XI. KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY

- As mandated by Sections 399 to 422 of R.A. 7160

- Administrative Circular No. 14-93

- Bañares vs. Balising – March 31, 2000

SECTION 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa. –

(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong tagapamayapa, hereinafter referred to as
the lupon, composed of the:

1. punong barangay, as chairman and

2. ten (10) to twenty (20) members.

The lupon shall be constituted every three (3) years in the manner provided herein…..x x x

SECTION 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance
of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

-accused under detention;

-habeas corpus proceeding;

-preliminary injunction;

-statutes of limitation;

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned
for amicable settlement.

XII. RULE 119 – TRIAL

Read: A.M. No. 15-06-10-SC – Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases

A. Section 1 – Trial

1. Mari vs. Judge Gonzales – September 12, 2011 AMPIS

Facts: On 11 June 2008, an Information for Rape was filed in RTC Sogod stating that petitioner
AAA was raped by the respondent on 10 October 2004 at her boarding house in Sogod, Leyte.
On 27 June 2008, the respondent was committed to detention through voluntary surrender. On
30 June 2008, the RTC set the arraignment to 31 July 2008 but was canceled and reset to 20
August 2008. On that date, nobody appeared for the prosecution. Hence, the RTC reset the
arraignment to 31 October 2008 with an order that the case will be dismissed if the public
prosecutor or assistant fails to prosecute on that date. On 28 October 2008, the petitioner moved
for cancellation of the hearing manifesting that a private prosecutor had been granted authority
to prosecute by the Provincial Prosecutor, and praying that the arraignment is canceled due to
the pendency of the petitioner’s petition for transfer of venue in SC. The private prosecutor did
not appear on the said hearing date.

The 31 October 2008, the hearing proceeded and the respondent was arraigned in the presence
of the Provincial Prosecutor designated by the RTC. Pre-trial was set for 24 November 2008. On
that date, the private prosecutor moved for cancellation of the hearing on the ground of the
pendency of the petition for transfer of venue. Thus, the respondent moved to dismiss on the
ground of failure to prosecute but was denied. On said date, the RTC terminated the pre-trial
and set the trial to 12 December 2008. On that date, no one appeared for the prosecution. Thus,
the hearing was reset to 16 January 2009.

Again, on that date, the private prosecutor urgently moved for cancellation of the hearing
stating that it was only on 14 January 2009 that he was notified of the 16 January 2009 hearing.
Thus, the RTC on 16 January 2009 dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute.
Petitioners moved to reconsider but were denied on 16 March 2009.

Issue: Whether the delay brought about by the petitioner’s pending petition for transfer of
venue in the Supreme Court can be excluded in the computation of time within which the trial
must commence

Ruling: No.

First, petitioners failed to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court is
a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functionsassigned
to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.

The policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
knownas "The Speedy Trial Act of 1998," were enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the
trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of
court dockets, the Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-
98,which has been incorporated in the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule
119.Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.

The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such a right is not susceptible to
precise qualification.The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily
be a flexible concept.It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures the
rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne
in mind that the rightsgiven to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are
shields, not weapons; hence,courts are to give meaning to that intent. In this case, it must be
emphasized that the privaterespondent had already been deprived of his liberty on two
occasions. First, during the preliminary investigation before the MCTC, when he was
incarcerated from November 18, 2004, to March 16, 2005, or a period of almost four months;
then again, when the Information had already been issued and since rape is a non-bailable
offense, he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008, until the case was dismissed on January 16,
2009, or a period of over 6 months. Verily, there can be no cavil that deprivation of liberty for
any duration of time is quite oppressive.
B. Section 6 – Time Limit

1. Olbes vs. Buemio – G.R. No. 173319 (December 4, 2009) - APA

FACTS:

On a complaint, Federico Miguel Olbes (petitioner) was indicted for Grave Coercion before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by Information dated June 28, 2002 which was
raffled to Branch 22 thereof. On October 28, 2002, petitioner posted bail and was released.

Petitioner draws attention to the time gap of 105 days from his arraignment on February 12,
2003 up to the first pre-trial setting on May 28, 2003, and another gap of 148 days from the latter
date up to the second pre-trial setting on October 23, 2003 or for a total of 253 days — a clear
contravention, according to petitioner, of the 80-day time limit from arraignment to trial.

ISSUE: Whether the accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of his case.

RULING:

NO.

It bears noting, however, that on his arraignment on February 12, 2003, petitioner interposed no
objection to the setting of the pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated, later
declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date
was beyond the control of the trial court.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, and SCC No. 38-98 have held that the right is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, which
did not obtain in the present case, petitioner himself having been instrumental in the delay in
the prosecution of the case.

In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view that the concept
of "speedy trial" is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
Reiterating the Court's pronouncement in Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. that "speedy trial" is a
relative and flexible term, Lumanlaw v. Peralta, Jr. summons the courts to maintain a delicate
balance between the demands of due process and the strictures of speedy trial on the one hand,
and the right of the State to prosecute crimes and rid society of criminals on the other.

Applying the balancing test for determining whether an accused has been denied his
constitutional right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of his case, taking into account
several factors such as the length and reason of the delay, the accused's assertion or non-
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the accused resulting from the delay, the Court does
not find petitioner to have been unduly and excessively prejudiced by the "delay" in the
proceedings, especially given that he had posted bail.

C. Section 11 – Order of Trial

1. People vs. SPO1 Marcial – September 27, 2006

*The SC finds that the RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a
reverse order of trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court.

*Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 3(e):

When the accused admits the act/omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.

*RA No. 8493, Sec. 7 as well as Circular No. 38-98, Sec. 3 provided:

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state whether he/she interposes a
negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and
require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence.
D. Section 13 – Examination of Defense Witness

1. Vda. De Manguerrra vs. Risos – August 28, 2008

E. Section 17 – Discharge of Accused to be State Witness

1. People vs. Ocimar – August 17, 1992

2. People vs. CA and Inspector Joe Pring – 223 SCRA 475 Cabaña

FACTS

Pring was involved in kidnapping and one policeman testified against him-Nonilo
Arilie. There was a motion to discharge Nonilo Arilie to testify against Pring. Then the
prosecution gave the defense the affidavit of Arilie. The court ordered the discharge of Arilie.
Pring questioned the procedure. This is the first case where the Supreme Court applied this rule
on hearing on the discharge of an accused. Pring asked for the hearing while the prosecution is
on the motion to discharge.

ISSUES

Whether or not Nonilo Arile challenged by private respondent in this case in his
Opposition to Discharge and become State Witness against the accused Jose Pring be granted?

RULING

NO. Hence, in resolving this case in this petition, the proper question we should address is:
Was there a failure to observe the spirit and intent of Section 17, Rule 119 in the case at Bar. The
ruling in this case is negative. The prosecution has submitted the sworn statement of accused
Nonilo Arilie and its evidence showing that the conditions for discharge have been met. It can
be denied that the defense was able to oppose the motion to discharge Nonilo Arilie. With both
litigants able to present their side, the lack of actual hearing was not fatal enough to undermine
the courts’ ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed under Section 17, Rule 119
were satisfied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. No. 28933 rendered on October 23, 1992 is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Order of
Discharge of Nonilo Arile issued by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 94159 on September 8,
1992 is thus REINSTATED. The temporary restraining order of March 30, 1993 issued by the
Court En Banc is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED
3. Rosales vs. Court of Appeals – 215 SCRA 102

4. Bogo-Medellin Co. vs. Judge Pedro Son – May 27, 1992

5. Webb vs. De Leon – August 23, 1995

6. Monge vs. People – March 7, 20008 -CARREON

Facts:

Galo Monge and Edgar Potencio were found in possession of transporting mahogany lumber
without permit and authority from the DENR. Monge fled the scene whereas Potencio was
brought to the police station and to the DENR-CENRO for interrogation. Monge and Potencio
were then charged with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705 as amended by EO No. 277, s.
1997.

Upon arraignment, Monge entered a negative plea. Trial then ensued. Potencio was discharged
to be used as a state witness on motion of the prosecutor. Accordingly, he testified on the
circumstances of the arrest but claimed that for a promised fee he was merely requested by
Monge, the owner of the log, to assist him in hauling the same down from the mountain.
Potencio's testimony was materially corroborated by Molina. Monge did not contest the
allegations, except that it was not he but Potencio who owned the lumber, and that contrary to
what Potencio had stated in court, it was the latter who hired him to bring the log from the site
to the sawmill where the same was to be sawn into pieces. The court found Monge guilty as
charged.

Monge raised the case to the Court of Appeals challenging the discharge of Potencio as a state
witness on the ground that the latter was not the least guilty of the offense and that there was
no absolute necessity for his testimony. The appellate court dismissed the challenge, hence this
petition.

Issue:

WON Potencio’s discharge as state witness was erroneous.

Ruling:

No.
The direct and affirmative testimony of Molina and Potencio as a state witness on the
circumstances surrounding the apprehension well establishes the petitioner's liability. Petitioner
cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber found in his possession
nor in his claim that his help was merely solicited by Potencio to provide the latter assistance in
transporting the said lumber. P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute that punishes acts
essentially malum prohibitum. It would therefore make no difference at all whether it was the
petitioner himself or Potencio who owned the subject pieces of lumber.

Further, not a few cases established the doctrine that the discharge of an accused so he may turn
state witness is left to the exercise of the trial court's sound discretion limited only by the
requirements set forth in Section 17, 24 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. Thus, whether the
accused offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty and whether there is objectively
an absolute necessity for his testimony are questions that lie within the domain of the trial court,
it being competent to resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of the trial court with
respect to this highly factual issue is not to be interfered with by the appellate courts except in
case of grave abuse of discretion. No such grave abuse is present in this case. Issues relative to
the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court as they cannot be addressed for the
first time on appeal.

7. People vs. De La Cruz – June 25, 2008 -CHUNG

FACTS:

Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.FACTS:

Jaime Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Petitioner was required to
submit his urine for drug testing to which a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs
was found.

Petitioner claimed that when he was in the NBI Office, he was required to extract urine for
drug examination, but he refused saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI and such request was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether the drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right to privacy and right against self-
incrimination.

RULING:

Yes. The drug test is not covered by allowable non-testimonial compulsion. The
constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak of his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is
testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial
act. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they held that the extraction of
petitioner’s urine for purposes of drug testing was merely a mechanical act, hence, falling
outside the concept of a custodial investigation. In the present case, though, the petitioner
was arrested for extortion; he resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine
sample was the only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use
of illegal drugs.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for which the arrest is being made. Law
enforcement agents, must, however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their
authority, because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its lawless
elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the protected rights of its
citizens including even members of its own police force

8. Salvanera vs. People and Parane – May 21, 2007- Cole

FACTS:

The alleged mastermind, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin,
Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane.

The prosecution, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix,
to serve as state witnesses however, denied by the trial court.
Salvarena contends that the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state
witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be
discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal
case. Salvanera argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do
not have personal knowledge of the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to
corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that the petitioner is the mastermind.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to discharge accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix to
become state witnesses.

RULING:

Yes.

In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions
must be present, namely:

(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;

(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;

(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;

(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and

(5) The trial court is satisfied that:

a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;

c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,

e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious.
To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and
Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be
no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of the state witness.” The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not
have to consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses.
We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by
any other method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other
evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only
applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some other
witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records that the
testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each other's
testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest.

F. Section 23 – Demurrer to Evidence

1.People vs. Turingan – 282 SCRA 424 Cuevas-Presores

FACTS

Accused-appellant Rex Turingan and his co-accused, Efren Turingan, were charged with
murder before the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in an information dated
January 12, 1988, the accusatory portion of which alleges.

That on or about August 2, 1987, in the municipality of Enrile, province of Cagayan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Rex Turingan y Babaran and Efren
Turingan y Maraggun, armed with a gun, conspiring together and helping each other with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Benjamin C. Cortez inflicting upon
him several gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death.

ISSUES

Whether or not the presentation of the evidence made by the accused Rex Turingan y
Babalan will move to the demurrer of evidence?

RULING

NO. Appellants’ alternative plea that he is allowed to present evidence must also be
rejected. He cannot claim denial of due process since he was given full opportunity to be heard.
It was the appellant's own counsel who insisted on filing a demurrer to evidence even without
leave of court. Said counsel even argued that the filing of such demurrer to evidence without
leave of court would shorten the proceedings and, in case of denial thereof, appellant expressly
waived his right to present evidence. Hence, it was made very clear in the order of the trial
court dated April 5, 1994 that the filing of the demurrer to evidence under such circumstances
precludes appellant from presenting his evidence. The filing of a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to present evidence for the accused. There is
no need for the court to act on said demurrer separately and distinctly from the judgment in the
main case. Appellant, by insisting on the filing of the demurrer to evidence without leave of
court, waives his right to present evidence to substantiate his defense and, in effect, submits the
case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. He cannot now claim denial
of his right to adduce his own evidence.

The rationale for the rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal on the ground of
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said evidence is
insufficient to convict and, therefore, any need for him to present any evidence is negated. It is
said that an accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by
espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The purpose behind the
rule is also to avoid the dilatory practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer to the
evidence of the prosecution and, after denial thereof, the defense would then claim the right to
present its evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of the court a quo
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Rex Turingan y Babalan. SO
ORDERED.

2. People vs. Cachola – January 21, 2004- DE CASTILLA

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

3. Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals – 278 SCRA 782

4. Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi – February 12, 2007

5. People vs. Cristobal – GR. No. 159450 (March 31, 2011)

6. Nicholas vs. Sandiganbayan – February 11-2008

7. Cabrador vs. People – G.R. No. 186001 (October 2, 2009)

G. Section 24 – Reopening

1. Cabarles vs. Hon. Maceda – February 20, 2007

2. Alegre vs. Reyes – 161 SCRA 226

- End of Second Exam Coverage -

FINALS

XIII. RULE 120 – TRIAL

NO DIGESTS YET

XIII. RULE 120 – TRIAL

A. Section 1 and 2 – Judgment

LUAYON 1. People vs. Cayago – 312 SCRA 623 (1999)

DELA
VICTORIA 2. People vs. Bugarin – 273 SCRA 284 (1997)

CARREON 3. Kwan vs. Court of Appeals – November 23, 2000

ESPERANZA 4. Madrid vs. CA – May 31, 2000

OKAN 5. People vs. Nadera – February 2, 2000

JEREZ 8. People vs. Orlando De Leon – G.R. No. 126287 (April 16, 2001)
CASTILLO 9. D’aigle vs. People – G.R. No. 174181 (June 27, 2012)

B. Section 4 – Rule on Variance

SULTAN 1. Navarrete vs. People – January 31, 2007

GRAN 2. Consulta vs. People – February 12, 2009

C. Section 5 – Offense Includes or is Included in Another

CABANA 1. Vino vs. People of the Philippines – 178 SCRA 626

PRESORES 3.Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan – 238 SCRA 116

CABUNGCAL 5. People vs. Carmen, Et. Al. – G.R. No. 137268 (March 26, 2001)

SIMBAJON 6. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan – March 28, 2008

D. Section 6 – Promulgation of Judgment

LOVITOS 3. People vs. Prades – July 30, 1998

MARJONI 5. Chua vs. CA and Wilfred N. Chiok – April 12, 2007

SOLDEVILLA 6. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan – January 25, 2012

E. Section 7 – Modification of Judgment

MORAN 1. Tamayo vs. People – July 28, 2008

XIV. RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

B. Section 2 – Grounds for a New Trial

SOLANO 1. Gomez vs. IAC – April 9, 1985

ERIKKA 2. People vs. Garcia – 288 SCRA 382 (1998)

MAUSWAGON 3. Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan – 453 SCRA 24 (2005)

ALBIOS 4. Dinglasan vs. CA – September 19, 2006

 XV. RULE 122 – APPEAL

A. Section 1 – Who May Appeal

MENDOZA 1. People vs. Mendoza – 74 Phil. 119

MATARANAS 2. People vs. Balisacan – August 31, 1966

BAUTISTA 4. People vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 164577 (July 5, 2010)

B. Section 3 – How Appeal Taken

LUAYON 1. Garcia vs. People – 318 SCRA 434 (1999)

DELA
VICTORIA 2. People vs. Panganiban – 125 SCRA 595

C. Section 6 – When Appeal to be Taken

CARREON 1. Obugan vs. People – May 22, 1995

ESPERANZA 2. Bernardo vs. People – G.R. No. 166980 (April 4, 2007)

OKAN 3. Yu vs. Judge Tatad – G.R. No. 170979 (February 9, 2011)

D. Section 11 – Effect of Appeal by any of Several Accused

JEREZ 4. People vs. Tuniaco – January 19, 2010

CASTILLO 5. Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals – 190 SCRA 63

E. Section 12 – Withdrawal of Appeal

SULTAN 1. Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals – 258 SCRA 643

F. Section 13 – Appointment of Counsel De Officio for Accused on Appeal

GRAN 1. People vs. Rio – 201 SCRA 702

XVI. RULE 123 – PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

A. Revised Rules on Summary Procedure

CABANA 1. Riño vs. Judge Cawaling – June 7, 2004

3. Enriquez vs. Judge Vallarta – February 27, 2002

XVII. RULE 124 – PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

A. Section 5 – Extension of Time for Filing Briefs

B. Section 8 – Abandonment or Failure to Prosecute

PRESORES 1. Foralan vs. Court of Appeals – February 7, 1995

XIX. RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. Section 2 – Where Application Shall be Filed

1. Re: Request of Police Director General Avelino I. Razon – A.M. No. 08-4-4-
SIMBAJON SC (July 7, 2009)

C. Section 5 – Examination of complaint

LOVITOS 2. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff – December 26, 1984

PASCUA 3. Olaes vs. People – 155 SCRA 486 (1987)

MARJONI 4. People vs. Dichoso – 223 SCRA 174

SOLDEVILLA 5. Prudente vs. Dayrit – 180 SCRA 69 (1989)

MORAN 6. Twentieth Century Fox vs. CA – 164 SCRA 655

COLE 7. People vs. CA, Hon. Dayrit and Siao – November 27, 1992

D. Section 8 – Search to be Made in the Presence of Two Witnesses

SOLANO 1. Quintero vs. NBI – 162 SCRA 467

2. Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. vs. Bright Future Technologies, Inc. –

ERIKKA 516 SCRA 62 (February 15, 2007)

E. Section 10 – Validity of Search Warrant

MAUSWAGON 1. Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. CA – 257 SCRA 430 (1996)

 G. Section 13 – Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

ALBIOS 2. People vs. Cendaña – October 17, 1990

MENDOZA 4. People vs. Gerente – 219 SCRA 756

MATARANAS 5. People vs. Quizon – 256 SCRA 325 (1996)

BAUTISTA 7. People vs. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174

LUAYON 8. People vs. Bagista – 214 SCRA 53

DELA
VICTORIA 10. People vs. Musa – 217 SCRA 597 (1995)

CARREON 11. People vs. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1

ESPERANZA 12. Veroy vs. Layague – 210 SCRA 97

H. Section 14 – Motion to Quash a Search Warrant

OKAN 1. Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC – November 23, 2001

A. Section 1 and 2 – Judgment

1. People vs. Cayago – 312 SCRA 623 (1999)

2. People vs. Bugarin – 273 SCRA 284 (1997)

3. Kwan vs. Court of Appeals – November 23, 2000

4. Madrid vs. CA – May 31, 2000

5. People vs. Nadera – February 2, 2000

6. People vs. Ferrer – July 18, 2003 - GUILLERMO

Appellant Jerry Ferrer guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against
Mary Grace Belonio and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.

Appellant assails the decision of the trial court as res ipsa loquitor violative of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution. He argues that the decision failed to distinctly point out the
applicable law on which it is based and that there is nothing in the decision that would show
how the trial court arrived at its conclusion convicting him of the crime charged.

WON there is a violation of Sec 1 Rule 120? Yes.

HELD: The Constitution requires that

"[N]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based."

The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure Section 1. Judgment definition and form., as amended,
provides that

"[T]he judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts
proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based."

Case Remanded to RTC.

7. Abay, Sr. vs. Garcia – 162 SCRA 665 - MAMAC

FACTS:

On the day of trial, the accused was there with his lawyer. The offended party was not in court.
The judge asked the fiscal what action he wanted to proceed with. The fiscal said, “We will look
at the records, whether the offended party was properly informed.” Finding that the offended
party was properly informed, the fiscal said oral motion, “In that case your honor, we are
moving for the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of evidence now upon us.” The judge
dictated in open court, “Alright, the case is dismissed for failure to prosecute.” With the accused
went home happy.

After the accused left and shortly thereafter, the offended party arrived with his lawyer. After
they learned of the dismissal, they explained that they had to travel far, had a flat tire and got
caught in traffic. The judge found their earlier non-appearance as justified and ordered the
revocation or reconsidered the earlier decision of dismissal, consequently resetting the trial.
The accused learned of the succeeding events and protested that this was a case of double
jeopardy. He contends that all the necessary elements of double jeopardy are present: valid
complaint, valid information filed in a competent court; had an arraignment; and the case was
dismissed without his express consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is double jeopardy.

RULING:

The order of dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal but a judgment of acquittal under Rule 120
must be in writing. The order dismissing the case was not in writing but was dictated in open
court. It was never reduced into writing. What was reduced to writing was the second order
that revoked the first order. Since it was never in writing, there was no judgment of acquittal.
Therefore, there is no double jeopardy.

However, this order of dismissal must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him conformably with the provisions of Rule 120,
section 2 of the Rules of Court. In the instant case, it is very clear that the order was merely
dictated in open court by the trial judge. There is no showing that this verbal order of dismissal
was ever reduced to writing and duly signed by him. Thus, it did not yet attain the effect of a
judgment of acquittal, so that it was still within the powers of the judge to set it aside and enter
another order, now in writing and duly signed by him, reinstating the case.

8. People vs. Orlando De Leon – G.R. No. 126287 (April 16, 2001)

9. D’aigle vs. People – G.R. No. 174181 (June 27, 2012)

B. Section 4 – Rule on Variance

1. Navarrete vs. People – January 31, 2007

2. Consulta vs. People – February 12, 2009

C. Section 5 – Offense Includes or is Included in Another

1. Vino vs. People of the Philippines – 178 SCRA 626

2. Parungao vs. Sandiganbayan -197 SCRA 173 - GRUMO

Facts:

OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of Porac, Pampanga, hence a public officer take,
appropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit the amount of ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P185,250.00)

The prosecution presented six witnesses and tried to establish that the petitioner
misappropriated the fund for his personal use because while the fund was already completely
exhausted, the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road remained unfinished.

In his defense, the petitioner accounted for the P185,250 fund

Issue:

Does the crime of malversation of public funds include the crime of illegal use of public funds,
or is the former included in the latter?

Ruling:

ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. - Presumption of malversation. - Any

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

(a) the offender is a public officer; (b) by reason of his duties he is accountable for public funds
and property; and (c) he appropriates, takes, or misappropriates, or permits other persons to
take such public funds or property, or otherwise is guilty of misappropriation... or malversation
of such funds or property.

ART. 220. Illegal use of public funds or property. - Any public officer who shall apply any
public fund or property under his administration to any public use other than that for which
such fund or property were appropriated by law or ordinance shall suffer... the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from one-half to the total of the
sum misapplied, if by reason of such misapplication, any damage or embarrassment shall have
resulted to the public service. In either case, the offender shall also... suffer the penalty of
temporary special disqualification."

(a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he applies public funds or property under
his administration to some public use; and (c) the public use for which the public funds or
property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were originally...
appropriated by law or ordinance.

In malversation of public funds, the offender misappropriates public funds for his own personal
use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the... latter's personal use.

In technical malversation, the public officer applies public funds under his administration not
for his or another's personal use, but to a public use other than that for which the fund was
appropriated by law or ordinance.

Technical malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation of public funds charged in the information.

Since the acts constituting the crime of technical malversation were not alleged in the
information, and since technical malversation does not include, or is not included in the crime
of malversation of public funds, he cannot resultantly be convicted of technical... malversation.

The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of technical malversation.

However, Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code provides that for technical malversation to exist
it is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public use other than
that provided for by law or ordinance.

Lacsamana's testimony shows that the CRBI fund is a general fund, and the utilization of this
fund specifically for the concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road was merely an internal
arrangement between the Department of Public Works and Highways and the barangay captain
and was... not particularly provided for by law or ordinance.

In the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of the
Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of
public funds.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is

REVERSED. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of illegal use of public funds.

3.Pecho vs. Sandiganbayan – 238 SCRA 116 PRESORES

Facts

A criminal case no. 14844 of the Sandiganbayan, the petitioner and one Jose Catre was
charged with information with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. That the
allegation on March 16, 1989 and or sometime prior thereto at Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ODON PECHO, a public
officer being then the Customs Guard, Miscellaneous Bonded Warehouse Division, Bureau of
Customs, South Harbor, Manila, with the indispensable cooperation and assistance of the
accused JOSE CATRE, whose position, whether public or private, and address are unknown but
representing himself to be a representative of Eversun Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a
corporation, firm or partnership which turned-out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious as it is
not registered in the Department of Trade and Industry nor in the Securities and Exchange
Commission and with a fake, spurious or fictitious Tax Account No. as it was not issued by the
Revenue Information Systems, Inc., Bureau of Internal Revenue, acting in the capacities
aforesaid, with the former taking advantage of his official position and both accused, motivated
and impelled by personal gain, financial and pecuniary interest, with deliberate intent to cause
damage and undue injury to the Government, through manifest partiality and evident bad
faith, conspiring, confabulating, conniving, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act, pretend and feign to be agents or
representatives of Eversun Commercial Trading in the importation of 5 x 20 foot containers STC
agricultural disc blades and irrigation water pumps, and engage, solicit and contract the
services of one Constantino Calica of Labatique, a CPA Customs Broker for the release of said
shipment and/or preparation of the necessary import entry with the two (2) accused,
furnishing, presenting and producing the necessary shipping documents such as packing list,
commercial invoice, bill of lading and import entry declaration, which led and prompted said
Customs Broker to file BOC Import Entry No. 14081-89 with the computed taxes and duties
amounting to P53,164.00 declaring the shipment as five (5) containers STC agricultural disc
blades and irrigation water pumps.

Issues

Whether or not the offense includes or is included in another in this particular case?

Ruling

NO. The foregoing disquisitions clearly suggest that those in charge of investigating
criminal complaints against public officials and employees and of filing the corresponding
information in court must carefully determine under what law the offenders should be
prosecuted. They should note that the offenses enumerated in Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Republic Act No. 3019, as amended are but in addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law. Thus, to attain the very purpose of said law
and further enhance the constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust and all
public officers and employees "must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency," prosecutors should not limit their
action to the additional offenses. To be more logical, they should initially consider if the
questioned acts are already penalized by the Revised Penal Code and should the rule on double
jeopardy be inapplicable, to exhaust all the available remedies of the State against the offender.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED; however, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 14844 is modified, and, as modified, the petitioner is hereby declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
official and commercial documents and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional medium as minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor maximum as maximum, with the accessories thereof and to
pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)

4. People vs. Verzosa – 294 SCRA 466 (1998) PREGLO

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the 11 November 1994 Decision in Criminal Case No. 14940 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 72, finding appellants Romulo Verzosa y Garcia and
Jerry Avendaño y Mendoza, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of highway robbery with homicide
as defined and penalized under Presidential Decree No. 532

The Information dated 5 May 1994 charged:

That on or about the 21st day of April 1994, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to gain and by means of
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away the passengers wristwatches with an unestimated amount while aboard a passenger
jeepney with Plate No. NYZ-655, along NBB South, Navotas, Metro Manila and in the course
thereof said accused with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shoot passenger
ALBERTO APLAON, hitting the latter on the back of his head, thereby inflicting upon the
victim gunshot wound which cause (sic) his immediate death. p

||| This case was spawned by an incident that occurred at around 9:00 in the morning of 21
April 1994. According to eyewitness Arthur Dojenas, he left his house at Sawata, Dagat-
dagatan, Caloocan City

He boarded a passenger jeepney with plate no. NYZ-655, en route to Divisoria. At around 9:00
a.m., while the passenger jeepney was cruising along the C-3 Road, North Bay Boulevard,
Navotas, Metro Manila one of the passengers, who was later identified as Romulo Verzosa,
suddenly cried out: ''Hold-up ito. Walang papalag,"

Verzosa grabbed the necklace of one of the passengers who was later identified as Alberto
Aplaon. Aplaon immediately reacted and shouted, "Anong hold-up?" as he simultaneously
grabbed the firearm of Verzosa. When Aplaon successfully wrested the firearm from Verzosa,
someone seated at the rear of the jeepney, who was later identified as Jerry Avendaño, pulled
out a gun and shot Aplaon, hitting his head just above the nape. Aplaon fell to the floor of the
jeepney. Before alighting from the jeepney along North Bay Boulevard, one of the three
perpetrators snatched the wristwatch of a passenger seated in front of the jeepney. Verzosa,
Avendaño and their unnamed associate ran towards the squatters' area in front of the Sulpicio
Lines Compound along North Bay Boulevard.

ISSUE: WON, accused appellants originally charged with a violation of special law be found guilty for a
crime of robbery with homicide under the RPC?

HELD: Yes. What appellants committed is the crime of robbery with homicide, which is distinct
from the offense covered by P.D. 532 which punishes, among others, indiscriminate highway
robbery.|||

In other words, a conviction for highway robbery requires proof that several accused were
organized for the purpose of committing highway robbery indiscriminately. There is no such
proof in this case. Neither is there proof that appellants previously attempted to commit similar
robberies to show the "indiscriminate" perpetration thereof.

Nonetheless, the designation of the crime in the information as "highway robbery with
homicide (Violation of PD 532)" does not preclude conviction of the appellants of the crime of
robbery with homicide. In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the
designation but the description of the offense charged. The crime of robbery with homicide is
clearly alleged in the information notwithstanding its erroneous caption. It is an offense
necessarily included in that with which they were charged. Accordingly, appellants should be
liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Said crime is committed when,
on the occasion of the robbery, homicide resulted. Consequently. all those who took part in the
robbery are liable as principals therein although they did not actually take part in the homicide.

5. People vs. Carmen, Et. Al. – G.R. No. 137268 (March 26, 2001)

On January 27, 1997 in the afternoon, Honey Fe Abella, 10, and Frances Rivera, 7 were playing
takyan at the house of Bebing Lastimoso in Cebu City when suddenly they heard a child shout,
tabang ma (Help mother!). The cry came from the house of accused-appellant Carmen, who is
known in their neighborhood as Mother Perpetuala.

Honey Fe saw and testified to the court that she saw a boy named Randy Luntayao being
immersed head first in a drum of water. Accused Alexander Sibonga was holding the waist of
the body while accused Reynario Nuez held the hands of the boy at the back. Accused Eutiquia
Carmen, Alexander Sibonga, and Celedonia Fabie were pushing the head of the boy inside the
drum. Afterwards, Reynario or Rey Nuez tie the boy on the bench with a green rope. They
forced the boy to drink gallons of water. Even bangs the head of the boy to the bench to force
him to drink and punches the chest of the boy with their fist. They further tortured the boy.
Then much later they saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia Sibonga,
Celedonia Fabie, and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy in the house.

Eddie Luntayayo, Father, testified that, Randy was his eldest boy and that on November 20,
1996, had a nervous breakdown, and would occasionally talk to himself and laugh. Upon the
suggestion of Reynaraio Nuez (accused) they went to Cebu, and stayed in Nuezs house. The
following day they went to the house of Carmen, wherein all of the accused – appellant were
present. Eddie talks with Carmen that the boy is being overtaken by a bad spirit, and wanted it
exorcised, fearing that the bad spirit might transfer to him. Later on, he heard his son shout
twice asking for help. Eddie tried to get out of the room but it was locked. After an hour, they
were transferred to the praying room. The accused – appellant brought the body of Randy, and
it was clearly dead, but told them that the boy will be resurrected at 7:00 pm.

Knowing that the body wouldn’t be resurrected, accused-appellant Carmen called for a coffin,
and arranged the body be put in the house of Accused – appellant Nuez. Later on, Nuez
instructed Eddie to go with him to the Municipal heal office to Report of the death, and told
him to be quiet or else he wouldn’t be able to get the papers for burial. The accused overseer
burial in Tange Talisay, but Eddie protested that they want the body be buried to Sikatuna,
Isabela, Negros occidental, but that would not be possible for it they might get arrested

Eddie, filed a complaint for Murder

1. The NBI investigated the case

Findings of the investigation was:

Cause of death: internal effects of a traumatic head injury or chest injury

The trial court found them guilty of murder arguing that killing a person with treachery is
murder. It cited a court decision stating that even if there is no intent to kill, in inflicting
physical injuries with treachery, the accused in that case was convicted of murder. Intent is
presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. In the case at bar, there is enough evidence
that the accused confederated with each other in inflicting physical harm to the victim (illegal
act). These acts were intentional and thus they should be liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of their unlawful act.

Issue: WON the accused was guilty of the crime of murder

Judgement:

NO.
Rule 120, Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of
the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

In the information, the accused were charged of murder in the form of treachery. There was no
criminal intent on the part of the accused to kill the boy. It was shown that the accused are
members of a cult and the bizarre ritual was consented by the parent of the boy. Their liability
arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought to know their actions would not bring
about the cure. They are guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not murder.

· Reckless imprudence that there is lack of skill. There was lack of skill to cure the boy,
hence death resulted from their recklessness.

6. Daan vs. Sandiganbayan – March 28, 2008

D. Section 6 – Promulgation of Judgment

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the

presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the
conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel
or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may
be promulgated by the clerk of court.

If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be
promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the
place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The
court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to
approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for
bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.

The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman
or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the
accused tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall
be served at his last known address.

In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite
notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and
serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen
(15) days from notice.

1. People vs. CFI of Quezon Branch 10 – 227 SCRA 457 - APA

FACTS:

Decision of Judge Juan B. Montecillo, Presiding Judge of Branch III designated pro tempore to
take over Branch, was promulgated after the Judge Conrado R. Antona was appointed
Presiding Judge of Branch X. This prompted Provincial Fiscal Dante H. Diamante, with
authority from the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the present petition contending in
essence that the decision of Judge Montecillo was null and void since he was no longer judge
designate of Branch X when his decision was promulgated as Judge Antona had already been
appointed and qualified.

ISSUE: Whether the decision of a pro tempore judge promulgated after a qualified judge has
been appointed was null and void.

RULING: NO.

The judgment of acquittal penned by Judge Montecillo must be declared valid. It is not
necessary that he be the presiding judge of Branch X at the time his decision was promulgated
since even after the expiration of his temporary designation at Branch X he continued to be an
incumbent of Branch III. After all, where a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) is
divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and separate from the
others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or
information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch of the
judge alone, to the exclusion of the others

2. Cruz vs. Judge Pascual – May 12, 1995 - OSORNO

Facts:

Yolanda Cruz, in a letter-complaint dated March 8, 1993, charged Judge Filomeno S. Pascual of
MTC Angat, Bulacan, with abuse of authority, incompetence, partiality and lack of
professionalism, as well as ignorance of the law, relative to Crim. Case No. 2139, for trespass to
dwelling.

Complainant, the offended party in the aforesaid criminal case, avers that trial of the case was
completed on October 13, 1992. Subsequently, on December 21, 1992 a notice was issued by
respondent Judge setting the promulgation of judgment on January 6, 1993. On the date set for
promulgation, both the accused and his counsel failed to appear. Nonetheless, the accused was
read.

Complainant asserts that respondent Judge violated Sec. 17 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure when he failed to decide the issue within thirty (30) days from 23 October 1992.
Complainant further questions the procedure taken by respondent Judge in promulgating the decision
without the presence of accused.

Issue:

WoN the respondent Judge administratively erred in promulgating the decision without the
presence of the accused.

Ruling:
No. The respondent Judge did not administratively err in proceeding with the promulgation.

In a verdict of acquittal, the presence of the accused is not indispensable since no appeal is
necessary and the judgment become final and executory immediately after promulgation. The
reading of the sentence in open court to counsel for the accused or giving a copy of the decision
to the accused or his counsel is sufficient promulgation. It must be recalled that the parties in
this case were duly notified of the date of promulgation of the judgment is therefore of no
moment. It must also be pointed out that even in the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction, the presence of the accused is not necessary if the conviction is for a light offense
inasmuch as the judgment may be read to his counsel or representative, or if the accused is tried
in absentia or fails to appear and the promulgation is done in absentia, the promulgation shall
consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof served upon
the accused or his counsel. In the latter case, if the accused did not have a justifiable cause for
his non-appearance, he may be ordered arrested by the court. But he may appeal within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel.

3. People vs. Prades – July 30, 1998

4. Paredes vs. Manalo – May 10, 1995- PASCUA

FACTS:

That on 15 December 1986 three (3) separate criminal complaints were filed by a certain Roger
Maron for less serious physical injuries and by Roberta Maglasang and Josephine Gargar for
unjust vexation, against the Paredes sisters with the Municipal Trial Court of Culion, Palawan,
where respondent judge was then Acting Municipal Judge. On the same day, respondent Judge
issued warrants of arrest against all of the accused which the Paredes sisters now denounce as
improper and irregular under the Rule on Summary Procedure.

On 24 December 1986 the warrants of arrest were served upon complainants who were unable
to post the required bonds so that, to secure their temporary release, Lt. Policarpio took them
into his custody on recognizance until 26 December 1986. On that date, complainants went to
Coron escorted by Navy personnel to post a cash bond of P1,000.00 with the Municipal
Treasurer. However, they were informed by Clerk of Court that they could not file their cash
bond because respondents Judge was in Manila and no one would sign to release order.
Nonetheless, complainants proceeded to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer bringing with
them their warrants of arrest. But the Municipal Treasurer refused to accept their money for
want of instruction from respondents Judge to accept cash bonds in his absence. On 29
December 1986 they tried once more to post their cash bonds with the Municipal Treasurer but
to no vail. Hence, they were detained until 7 January 1987.

Complainants contend that respondent Judge immediately issued the warrants of arrest
without the subpoenas first being issued; that considering that the penalty for unjust vexation is
less than six (6) months they should not have been required to post a bond under the Rule on
Summary Procedure; that they were surprised over the non-acceptance of their cash bonds since
they had previously deposited a cash bond of P50.00 each in an earlier case. The Deposit
Acceptance Order to be secured from the court addressed to the Municipal Treasurer was an
unusual and new requirement of respondent Judge, which was not imposed on other accused
residing in Culion who merely deposited their cash bonds on the basis of their warrants of
arrest; that the absence of instruction to the Municipal Treasurer was a probable deliberate
intent of respondent to detain them in order to satisfy the offended party in the criminal cases.

In the resolution of 15 December 1993 we referred the case at bench to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation. On 1 February 1994 the OCA
submitted a Memorandum recommending the dismissal of this case "with a reminder to
respondent to adhere to procedures provided for in the Rules".

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presence of an accused is necessary if the judgement is for acquittal?

RULING:

NO, respondent Judge justifies his action by showing the difficulty encountered by his court in
locating the whereabouts of accused who were earlier charged with slander in Crim. Case No.
1603. He blames the delayed promulgation of the decision in that case to the non-appearance of
complainants whose whereabouts could not be ascertained even by their own lawyers. He also
cites the numerous postponements asked by counsel for complainants in submitting their
counter-affidavits due to the fact that not all of these accused were present at one time.

The delay in the promulgation of the decision in Crim. Case No. 1603 was ironically caused by
respondent Judge. We find that he acquitted complainants in the case. Such being the case, the
presence of accused was not necessary as the judgment was one of acquittal. Moreover, Sec. 6,
Rule 120, of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that if the accused fails to appear, the
promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy
thereof served upon his counsel.

Respondent Judge must also be reminded that the court is not helpless with regard to numerous
postponements requested by counsel for complainants. Judges should be vigilant in avoiding
unreasonable delay in the resolution of cases. If the need arises, the court motu propio could use
its coercive power to direct compliance by the parties. Besides, we find no cause for respondent
Judge to be anxious over the possible non-appearance of complainants. The records show that
the policemen were able to keep track of complainants’ whereabouts. There was therefore no
basis for his fears.

Under the foregoing circumstances, we find no valid reason for respondent’s departure from
the procedure laid down by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Shortcuts in judicial processes are
to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice.
However, respondents Judge’s administrative culpability is mitigated by his intention to resolve
the criminal cases with the least delay by ensuring the presence of accused whose availability
for trial in a prior case posed problems in its early resolution.

5. Chua vs. CA and Wilfred N. Chiok – April 12, 2007

6. Icdang vs. Sandiganbayan – January 25, 2012

E. Section 7 – Modification of Judgment

1. Tamayo vs. People – July 28, 2008

XIV. RULE 121 – NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

A. Section 1 – New Trial or Reconsideration

1. Magapay vs. People – August 19, 2009 - Cole

FACTS:

MeTC rendered a Decision finding Erlinda Mapagay guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and was sentenced to one-year imprisonment and was ordered to pay private complainant
P40,000.00.

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on 10 June 2004 and submitted her "Appellant's Brief" with
the RTC. The RTC promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the MeTC Decision. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC for being filed beyond the
reglementary period.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing petitioner's appeal. It sustained the
RTC's ruling that petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the RTC was filed out of time.
Hence, it held that the RTC Decision had become final and unalterable. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' Decision, but this was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying due course to her appeal.

RULING:

No. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment or
from notice of the final order appealed from. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration within
the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and executory.

Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the court rendering it or by this Court. 34 Decisions that have long become final and
executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to
alter the trial court's final judgment.

Evidence on record shows that petitioner's counsel of record, Atty. Antonio J. Ballena (Atty.
Ballena), received on 21 September 2004 a copy of the RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004,
which affirms petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Hence, petitioner
may file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from such date of receipt, which must be
on or before 6 October 2004. However, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration only on 3
November 2004, or on the 43rd day which was obviously way beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. Consequently, the RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004 has become final and
executory.

B. Section 2 – Grounds for a New Trial

1. Gomez vs. IAC – April 9, 1985

2. People vs. Garcia – 288 SCRA 382 (1998)

3. Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan – 453 SCRA 24 (2005)

4. Dinglasan vs. CA – Spetember 19, 2006

C. Section 6 – Effects of Granting New Trial or Reconsideration

Section 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken
anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (6a)
1. Luther Custodio vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. Nos. 96027-28 (March 8, 2005) - OSORNO

Facts:

A motion to re-open case with leave of Court was filed by petitioners who were convicted and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in criminal cases nos. 10010 and 10011
for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-
10011 acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus
nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the
cases.

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the
Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the petitioners guilty as principals of
the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. It sentenced them to reclusion
perpetua in each case.

Petitioners assert that the September 28, 1990 decision of the Sandiganbayan should be voided
as it was based on false forensic evidence. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic
group of the physical evidence in the double murder case constitutes newly discovered
evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure

Issue:

WoN the petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of Crim Pro because of the newly
discovered evidence

Ruling:

NO.
The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction

becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have
been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment.

xxx

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new trial
or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed
during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken
anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence
already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court
may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together
with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall
be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly.

Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are
generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence for it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his
case carefully and to secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated
with great caution due to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to
allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment.
Hence, the moving party is often required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct
and that there has been a lack of due diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant
the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the
Courts. (Berry vs. State of Georgia). The Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may
be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have
been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same
cannot be considered newly discovered.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have
been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has
two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e.,
when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due
diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be
properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the
time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the
knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.

The concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The
movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of
the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well.

Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as
newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a
third trial.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as
petitioners failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic
study of the physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their
report that the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred
during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. The report
of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the
trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently
sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.

Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted. Also, new trial will not be granted if the new
evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

XV. RULE 122 – APPEAL

A. Section 1 – Who May Appeal

1. People vs. Mendoza – 74 Phil. 119

2. People vs. Balisacan – August 31, 1966

3. People vs. Madali – January 16, 2001 - ONTAL

FACTS: On December 1, 1995, three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica, this case was
filed, after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated accused-appellants
in the death of Reynaldo. The information against accused-appellants alleged

That in or about the early morning of February 5, 1992, in Romblon, Romblon, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
with each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict mortal wounds upon the person of one
Reynaldo M. Abrenica thereby causing the latters death.

On May 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, convicting the accused, (1) SR. POLICE
OFFICER II ELEAZAR M. MADALI, (2) SR. POLICE OFFICER II EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO
and (3) SR. POLICE OFFICER I RANDY M. RUBIO GUILTY 1995, and sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Who can appeal in this case?

Ruling: Rule 122, 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that (a)ny party may
appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It
has been held that the word party in the provision in question includes not only the
government and the accused but other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be
affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an interest
in the civil liability arising from the crime, unless of course he has reserved to bring a separate
civil action to recover the civil liability. 20 Hence, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainants role is that of a witness for the prosecution. 21 Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal
cases involves as parties only the accused, as appellants, and the State, represented by the Office
of the Solicitor General, as the appellee. The participation of the private offended party would
be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to seek the affirmation of a judgment of
conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General takes a contrary position and
recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the complainants right to be heard on
the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the interest of justice and equity and
to provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby allows in this case the
memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of the records of this
appeal
4. People vs. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 164577 (July 5, 2010)

B. Section 3 – How Appeal Taken

1. Garcia vs. People – 318 SCRA 434 (1999)

2. People vs. Panganiban – 125 SCRA 595

C. Section 6 – When Appeal to be Taken

1. Obugan vs. People – May 22, 1995

2. Bernardo vs. People – G.R. No. 166980 (April 4, 2007)

3. Yu vs. Judge Tatad – G.R. No. 170979 (February 9, 2011)

D. Section 11 – Effect of Appeal by any of Several Accused

1. People vs. Fernandez – 186 SCRA 830 - GUILLERMO

The People of the Philippines vs. Melquiades Fernandez, alias 'Moding' and Federico Conrado"
convicting him and the other accused of the crime of rape and sentencing them each to suffer
inter alia two (2) death penalties.

In the light, however, of the 1987 Constitution, specifically, Section 19(1), Article III thereof,
under which a death penalty already imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, Fernandez
withdrew his appeal. The lone appellant therefore is Conrado who insists on his appeal,
notwithstanding the advice of his counsel de officio to discontinue the appeal allegedly on the
ground that "it has become moot and academic."

WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING EACH OF THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS TO SUFFER TWO (2) PENALTIES OF DEATH? No.

HELD: Lastly, the original death sentence was correctly imposed pursuant to the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, namely, Article 335 which states that when the crime of rape is
committed by two (2) or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death, and
Article 63, which provides that when the penalty prescribed is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties (as in this case) and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the
greater penalty shall be applied.

However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable
under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant
Federico Conrado has to be reduced to two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity
he has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.

2. Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan – 533 SCRA 205 (September 13, 2007) Cabaña

Facts

In an Information dated July 31, 2996, Constantino, in his capacity as mayor of

Malungon, Sarangani Province, together with his co-accused Lindong, was charged with the
violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan.

That on or about February 28, 1996 in Davao City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused Felipe K. Constantino, a public officer, being a then
the Mayor of Municipality of Malungon Sarangani Province, committing the crime herein
charge in relation to while performance and taking of his official functions with evident bad
faith, manifest partiality or through gross inexcusable negligence, conspiring and confederating
with accused Norberto N. Lindong, President and Chairman of the Board of Norlovanian
Corporation, Davao City then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Lease
Agreement for the rental of various heavy equipments for a period of six (6) years for and in
consideration of the sum of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
ELEVEN AND 11/100 (Php 257, 111.11) PESOS per month or a total consideration of
EIGHTEEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED NINETY-
NINE and 92/100 (Php 18, 511, 999.92) PESOS and a guaranty deposit of ONE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (Php 1, 780,000.00) PESOS contrary to the express
mandate of Resolution No. 2 Series of 1995 of the Municipal Planning and Development
Council Implementing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2 series of 1995 and Sangguniang
Bayan Resolution No. 21 dated February 22, 1996 authorizing the Municipal Mayor of
Malungon to enter into an agreement for the purchase of heavy equipments on a five-year term
basis for and in consideration of the amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 2, 200,000.00) per year or a total consideration of ELEVEN MILLION
(Php 11, 000,000.00) PESOS thus giving Norlovanian Corporation which was fully paid for the
Guarranty Deposit and was actually paid heavy equipment rentals for the period March 5 to
May 6. 1996 in the aggregate sum of PESOS: TWO MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-
SEVEN THOUSAND NINETY and 91/100 (P2,177,090.91), unwarranted benefits and advantage
and causing undue injury to the government.
Issues

Whether or not the effect of Appeal by any Several Accused (Mayor Felipe K.
Constantino and Norberto N. Lindong) will be granted?

Ruling

YES. The Rule 122, Section 11(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure operates in
his favor. The Rule provides: SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Although the rule states that a favorable judgment shall benefit those who did not appeal, we
have held that a literal interpretation of the phrase "did not appeal" will not give justice to the
purpose of the provision. It should be read in its entirety and should not be myopically
construed so as to defeat its reason, i.e., to benefit an accused who did not join in the appeal of
his co-accused in case where the appellate judgment is favorable.58

In fact, the Court has at various times applied the foregoing provision without regard to the
filing or non-filing of an appeal by a co-accused, so long as the judgment was favorable to him.
In such cases, the co-accused already withdrew his appeal,59 failed to file an appellant’s brief,60
or filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but eventually withdrew the same.61 Even more,
in these cases, all the accused appealed from the judgment of conviction but for one reason or
another, their conviction had already become final and executory. Nevertheless, the Court still
applied to them the favorable judgment in favor of their co-accused.62 Therefore, we cannot
find a reason to treat Lindong differently, especially so in this case where the public officer
accused of violating the anti-graft law has been acquitted, and the appeal by Lindong was
dismissed on a technicality.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 140656, although meritorious, is DENIED on the ground
of mootness. The petition in G.R. No. 154482 is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23433 are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is permanently enjoined from executing said orders.

SO ORDERED.

3. Lubrica vs. People – 516 SCRA 674 (February 26, 2007) - MAMAC

FACTS:
Sandiganbayan found Lubrica, along with two other persons, guilty of seven counts of direct
bribery and RA 3019. After motion for reconsideration was denied, all the accused, except
Lubrica, individually appealed their convictions. The decision and resolution of the
Sandiganbayan became final and executory with respect to Lubricas upon the lapse of the
period to appeal. Thereafter, Lubrica, through his counsel, received the notice of resolution
scheduling execution of the judgment against him. Lubrica insists that, despite his failure to file
an appeal, his service of sentence should be suspended in view of the appeals interposed by co-
accused.

RULING:

The benefit of stay of execution afforded to a co-accused who timely files an appeal cannot be
extended to those who fail to file the same. Thus, the period to appeal continued to run against
petitioner notwithstanding the petitions for review filed by his co-accused. Lubrica cannot
invoke the exception contained in the second clause of Section 11 (a) because it speaks of a
judgment rendered by the appellate court which is favorable to accused-appellant. It is too
strained to construe the exception in Section 11, Rule 122 – extending the favorable effects of a
judgment to those who did not appeal – as including procedural consequences of a pending
appeal although it may be beneficial to the accused.

4. People vs. Tuniaco – January 19, 2010

5. Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals – 190 SCRA 63

E. Section 12 – Withdrawal of Appeal

1. Teodoro vs. Court of Appeals – 258 SCRA 643

F. Section 13 – Appointment of Counsel De Officio for Accused on Appeal

1. People vs. Rio – 201 SCRA 702

XVI. RULE 123 – PROCEDURE IN THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

A. Revised Rules on Summary Procedure

1. Riño vs. Judge Cawaling – June 7, 2004

2. Tan vs. Judge Tabin – January 20, 2009 Cuevas-Presores

Facts

The complainant Noryn S. Tan filed a complaint dated April 2, 2007 against Judge Maria
Clarita Casuga-Tabin of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 4, Baguio City for
denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628. That on November 9, 2006, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police District (QCPD) served her a warrant of
arrest dated October 13, 2006, issued by the MTCC Baguio City, Branch 4 on the violation of the
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.

That was then she learned for the first time on the criminal case filed against her before
the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her
temporary release. Upon verification, she learned that the respondent issued on August 8, 2006
directing her to appear before the Court on October 10, 2006 for arraignment and it was sent by
mail to PNP Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive any copy of the Order
and up to the present has not seen the same; hence she was not able to attend her arraignment
and there was no proof of service of the Order or any notice of arraignment.

That the complainant was aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant of arrest
despite the fact that she was never notified of her arraignment. And the complainant prayed on
the appropriate investigation to be conducted as to the undue issuance of warrant for her arrest.

Issues

Whether or not the Summary Procedure on the discretion by Judge Maria Clarita
Casugba-Tabin is valid.

Ruling

NO. The Court held that a Judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily
issues a warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of –affidavits and countervailing
evidence.

Wherefore, Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Baguio City is hereby found guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined the sum of Php
10,000.00.

Section 12 of the 1983 Rule on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991
Revised Rule of Summary Procedure, while Section 10 was revised and portions thereof
reproduced in Sections 12 and 16 of the 1991 Rules of Summary Procedure. Granting that
sections 10 and 12 of 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases were not repealed by
the 1991 Revised Rules, still it does not justify the warrant of arrest issued in this case. Section
12 talks of instances when bails are required, one of which is when the accused does not reside
in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. It does not state that a
warrant of arrest shall immediately be issued even without actual notice to the accused.
Respondent’s interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated therein
and unduly expands their meaning.

3. Enriquez vs. Judge Vallarta – February 27, 2002

XVII. RULE 124 – PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

A. Section 5 – Extension of Time for Filing Briefs

1. Bernardo vs. People – 520 SCRA 332 (April 3, 2007) - GRUMO

FACTS:

Carmelo Bernardo (Bernardo) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila with six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), for issuing six postdated
checks in equal amounts of P22,500 to F.T. YLANG-YLANG MARKETING, CORP.(Ylang Ylang
Mktg). The MeTc rendered judgment finding Bernardo guilty of the offense charged. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the MeTC judgment.Bernardo elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). He filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for review within
30 days from June 1, 2004, the 15th day from his counsel‘s receipt of the RTC Order denying his
Motion Partial Reconsideration.

The CA granted the motion for extension of time but only for 15 days. Apparently unaware of
the CA order, he used up the 30-day extension sought and filed his petition. Hence, the
appellate court denied his petition having been filed 15 days later and for failure to attach the
MeTC Decision and other pertinent and material documents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellate court erred in granting only 15 days extension

RULING:
Section 1 of Rule 42 is clear. The Court of Appeals may grant an “additional period of 15 days
only” within which to file the petition for review. Albeit under the same section, a “further
extension” not to exceed 15 days may be granted “for the most compelling reason,” petitioner
had no basis to assume that his request for a 30-day extension is meritorious and would be
granted.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the
court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement
would be granted or that they would be granted the length of time they pray for.

The wording of the rule with respect to further extension is couched in restrictive terms. Section
1 of Rule 42 provides that “[n]o further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.”

B. Section 8 – Abandonment or Failure to Prosecute

1. Foralan vs. Court of Appeals – February 7, 1995 Presores

FACTS

On August 14, 1990, petitioner was charged with qualified theft in an information filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Catarman, Northern Samar. Petitioner assisted by
counsel de officio, Atty. Jose Falcatelo, entered a plea of not guilty. As the trial ensued, Atty.
Falcatelo was substituted by Atty. Arturo S. Diaz of the Public Attorney's Office of Northern
Samar.

On September 29, 1990, petitioner was convicted by the trial court. Maintaining his innocence,
petitioner, by himself, without assistance of counsel filed his notice of appeal before the Court
of Appeals. Though the notice of appeal was signed by petitioner alone, the Special and
Appealed Cases Division (SAC Division) of the Public Attorney's Office in Padre Faura, Manila
nevertheless, received a Notice to File Brief from respondent court dated August 31, 1992,
requiring it to file the appellant's brief within 30 days from receipt of said notice or until
October 5, 1992. However, it was only on October 5, 1992 that the SAC Division received from
Atty. Diaz the complete records of the case. On October 6, 1992, therefore, the SAC Division
filed before respondent court a Notice of Appearance with Motion for a Fresh Period of thirty
days within which to file appellant's brief.

ISSUES
 Whether or not the dismissal upon the respondent court’s own motion of appeal was in
accordance with the Sec. 8, Rule 124, Rules on Criminal Procedure?

RULING

YES. We proceed to rule on the lone issue earlier stated. We find that the motu proprio
dismissal by respondent court of petitioner's appeal is not proper. It is clear that under Sec. 8,
Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, the failure to file the appellant's
brief on time may cause the dismissal of the appeal, upon either the motion of the appellee or
on the own motion of the appellate court, provided that notice must be furnished to the
appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.

But the exception to this rule has been clearly stated — i.e. when the appellant is represented by
a counsel de officio which beyond doubt, is the case herein. Respondent court in dismissing the
appeal insisted that petitioner was represented by a de parte counsel, but the facts strongly
indicate otherwise. It should be emphasized that petitioner, at the very inception of the trial
before the lower court, was already represented by a counsel de oficio, Atty. Jose Falcatelo, later
on substituted by Atty. Daiz of the Public Attorney's Office in Catarman, Samar. On appeal
before respondent court, petitioner was represented by the Public Attorney's Office in
Catarman, Samar. On appeal before respondent court, petitioner was represented by the Public
Attorney's Office in Padre Faura, Manila, but not at his instance but upon that respondent court
itself, having required said office to file appellant's brief. Since the notice of appeal was filed
and signed by petitioner alone, without assistance of counsel, the act of respondent in requiring
the Public Attorney's Office in Padre Faura to file the appellant's brief amounts to an
appointment by the court itself of a counsel de oficio to represent petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to

REINSTATE petitioner's appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 11466, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Fernando Foralan", and the temporary restraining order issued on May 3, 1993 is made
permanent.

2. People vs. Zarate - February 28, 2005 PREGLO

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Failure to Return a Minor, for allegedly failing
to restore minor Jason Demogena to her mother Merly Demogena. Accordingly, said accused is
ordered immediately committed to the Correctional Institute for Women and the Property Bond
posted for her provisional liberty is canceled.

On 19 November 2003, accused-appellant, thru counsel, filed a notice of appeal[3]cralaw of the

decision of the trial court, thereby giving notice that she is appealing the case to the Court of
Appeals.
On 20 December 2004, the Presiding Judge of said court submitted her explanation[7]cralaw
dated 30 November 2004, stating, among other things, that accused-appellant failed to appear
during the promulgation of judgment despite due notice, thus, the property bail was
confiscated and forfeited by the Court and a warrant of arrest was issued. To date, she has no
information as to the whereabouts of the accused.

On 06 January 2005, accused-appellant, thru counsel, filed the aforementioned motion for new
trial with prayer to suspend the period for filing appellant's brief and to use the property bond
as her bailbond during the pendency of this appeal.

Issue: Won, the motion should be granted

Held: No. Corollary to this rule is the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 124 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which says:

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal.

The rationale for Section 8, Rule 124, is that once an accused escapes from imprisonment, or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders
or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief
from the court.This doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal,
but also to one who does so during the trial. As illuminated by Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

. . . When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the
trial in absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his
counsel appealed, since he nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by
analogy with the aforesaid provision of this Rule (Rule 124, section 8 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure).

The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the
jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment
against them.While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have
waived the appeal.

XVIII. RULE 125 – PROCEDURE IN THE SUPREME COURT

1. Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals – 250 SCRA 485

Rule 125

PROCEDURE IN THE

SUPREME COURT

SECTION 1. Uniform Procedure. – Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,

the procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in
the Court of Appeals. (1a)

SEC. 2. Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. – The procedure for the review by the
Supreme Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by the Court of Appeals shall be the
same as in civil cases. (2a)

SEC. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. – When the Supreme Court en banc is equally
divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the
appellant, the case shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-
deliberation, the judgment of conviction of lower court shall be reversed and the accused
acquitted. (3a)

Q: When the penalty imposed by the RTC is perpetua for example, and since the appeal is direct
to the Supreme Court, then what procedure will the SC follow? Or when the case was decided
by the CA and you appeal to the SC, what procedure will the SC follow?

A: Under Section 1, “Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the procedure in the
Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals.” So there
is no problem, you can apply the previous rule – filing of brief, how many copies – the same.

Now, let’s go to one interesting ISSUE: Can you file a motion for new trial of a criminal case
before the SC on the ground of newly discovered evidence?

In the past, there seems to be conflicting rulings on that issue. Like for example, if you go to the
1965 case of GODUCO VS. CA (14 SCRA 282), the SC ruled that the SC is not authorized to
entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence because of the doctrine that the SC is not a trier of facts – only questions of law are
supposed to be raised before the SC.

However, the Goduco ruling seems to be relaxed in other cases subsequently to the case of
Goduco. In the case of HELMUTH, JR. VS. PEOPLE (112 SCRA 573 [1982]), and in PEOPLE VS.
AMPARADO (156 SCRA 712 [1987]), the SC allowed the motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.

In 1995, that issue came out again in the case of

CUENCA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

250 SCRA 485

HELD: Although in “Goduco vs. CA” (14 SCRA 282 [1965]), this Court ruled that it is not
authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly
newly discovered evidence, the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in
subsequent cases like “Helmuth, Jr. vs. People” and “People vs. Amparado.”

“In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and
probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction.”

So we follow the later ruling – relaxed. And I think that is fair enough for the accused. All the
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.

FACTS

- Petitioner Edilberto Cuenca (Edilberto) was convicted for violation of “Trust Receipts Law.”
The CA affirmed the conviction. The petition for review of the CA decision was denied by SC in
Resolution dated Feb 9, 1994.

- He then filed a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL" setting forth, in relation to the motion for new
trial:
 “6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and
excusable (sic) negligence, and shall be supported by affidavits of;

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the
Corporation that employed petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of
Ultra; and

(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was
unable to do so earlier."

- The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, 4 among other things, granted the substitution but
denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition having been already
denied on February 9, 1994.

- Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT"
on August 17, 1994. The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said
motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a Resolution dated September 7,
1994.

- The SolGen in his comment recommended that Edilberto be entitled to a new trial because the
sworn statement of his brother Rodolfo Cuenca is an admission against interest which may
ultimately exonerate petitioner from criminal liability. (See original for the full text.) Among the
things he said were that Edilberto had no power to cause the payment of the Trust Receipts and
that Edilberto was no longer president of Ultra by the time the final demand to pay was served.
Rodolfo further said that he accepts personal liability for the receipts and that he will pay the
civil obligations arising from the trust receipts.

ISSUES

WON Edilberto should be granted a new trial

HELD

YES.

- Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this
Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has
no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
for only questions of fact are involved therein."

the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth,
Jr. v. People" and "People v. Amparado".

- In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the
Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed
testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and
probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly
circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same
benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People"
does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be
specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The
Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

Disposition Petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be RE-
OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.

XIX. RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

A. Section 2 – Where Application Shall be Filed

1. Re: Request of Police Director General Avelino I. Razon – A.M. No. 08-4-4-SC (July 7, 2009)

B. Section 4 – Requisites for Issuing Search Warrant

1. Andy Quelnan vs. People – G.R. No. 166061 (July 6, 2007) - APA

FACTS:

ISSUE:
1. Whether Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where a search warrant is issued for the
search of specifically described premises and not of a person, the omission of the name of the
owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate the same

2. whether the search warrant was properly enforced and whether petitioner was validly
arrested without warrant

RULING:

1. YES.

Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for
the issuance of search warrant, to wit:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it
required that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises. In
Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Court has definitively ruled that where the search
warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of
a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search
warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises
sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the
legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left
to the officer making the search as to the place to be searched.

2. YES
In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must
be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that
the said drug is a regulated drug.

More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the
drug. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and
dominion, as well as the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence
and character of the drug in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal
act, the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place
over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of controlled substances may be actual or constructive:

Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom of
the subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the only person in
said premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the subject premises,
appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court correctly concluded, only
"indicates extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises, of
which he was the registered owner.

In sum, petitioner's unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion over the
shabu found on top of the table, was duly established by the following evidence: his presence in
Unit 615 at the time of his arrest; 40 his representation to the police that he was the owner of the
unit; his half-naked state when he opened the door, strongly implying that he had stayed in the
house longer than he claimed to be; and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on top of a
table beside the bed which appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider
between the sala and bedroom.
Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives are obligated to apprehend
him even without a warrant of arrest.

C. Section 5 – Examination of complaint

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. (4a)

1. Uy vs. BIR – October 20, 2000 - OSORNO

On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of Unifish Packaging Corporation
(UPC) reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank
Uy, manager of UPC, were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993, the BIR requested and successfully secured, before
RTC of Cebu, a search warrant. On the same day, a second warrant was issued with contents
almost identical to that of the first warrant but consisted of only one page. These warrants were
issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Section 253. A third warrant, however, was issued on
that same day for Uy’s alleged violation of Section 238 in relation to Section 263. On the strength
of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the PNP searched the
premises of the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on the said warrant. A
return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. Uy and UOC filed a
motion to quash the warrants before the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.

Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1
and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same
crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the
existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally, they claim that the
things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners,
render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence

Issue:

WoN there was probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue subject search warrants

Ruling:

Yes.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance
of a valid search warrant.

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on
mere suspicion or belief.

It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish.
Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during examination that he only
known Unifish Packing Corporation by hearing it thru the affidavit of their informer, Mr. Abos.
The deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the
issuance of the search warrants.

The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was
apparently obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the
schemes employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the
place where the documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located.

Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records,
and even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the
deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.

The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the
judge were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to
be sufficiently probing.

(Other issues Discussed relative to Search Warrants in the Case of Uy vs BIR):

Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched

The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of the
place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or description
known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the
officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement.

In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in
Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the
premises of petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified
the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants
invalidation in this case.

Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own
Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to name the person who occupies the
described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises
only and not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such property in the
affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the
premises sought to be searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the
legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the
officer making the search as to the place to be searched.

Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or
occupying the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could
not be declared unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of
the premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names.

Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place

Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that
Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the
warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be
more precise in the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the
description of the place to be searched.

Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57
Phil, 384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos,
J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense
for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).

We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to
be seized. The issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents
from said photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a
generic term or a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific
description of the things to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity
available will invalidate a general description in a warrant. The use by the issuing judge of the
terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books,
sales books or records, provisional & official receipts, production record books/inventory lists,
stock cards, sales records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank statements/cancelled
checks is therefore unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.

As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase & sales invoices,
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of
these documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered. Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue.

The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant.

2. Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff – December 26, 1984

3. Olaes vs. People – 155 SCRA 486 (1987)

4. People vs. Dichoso – 223 SCRA 174

5. Prudente vs. Dayrit – 180 SCRA 69 (1989)

6. Twentieth Century Fox vs. CA – 164 SCRA 655

7. People vs. CA, Hon. Dayrit and Siao – November 27, 1992 - GUILLERMO
D. Section 8 – Search to be Made in the Presence of Two Witnesses

1. Quintero vs. NBI – 162 SCRA 467

2. Sony Computer Entertainment Inc. vs. Bright Future Technologies, Inc. – 516 SCRA 62
(February 15, 2007)

E. Section 10 – Validity of Search Warrant

1. Mustang Lumber, Inc. vs. CA – 257 SCRA 430 (1996)

F. Section 12 – Delivery of Property and Inventory

1. Washington Distillers Inc. vs. CA – 260 SCRA 821 (1996) - MAMAC

FACTS:

This involves a controversy between Washington Distillers and La Tondena Distillers.

Obviously, their products are spirits and wine. According to La Tondena Distillers, the bottles
that Washington Distillers uses for their products are actually La Tondena bottles. They buy
empty bottles, they will clean it, and they use them to serve their products. La Tondena then
filed a complaint because those are their bottles.

La Tondena decided to apply for a search warrant to raid the premises of Washington Distillers
to recover all these bottles. And there was really a raid and so many bottles were taken from the
premises of Washington Distillers. All those bottles were turned over to La Tondena.

Washington Distillers secured the services of Estelito Mendoza on this issue. Mendoza
questioned the action of La Tondena in trying to get the bottles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not you can still claim the bottles despite them being paid for already.

RULING:
Estelito Mendoza was sustained in the SC because if we are quarreling about the issue of
ownership of the bottles, then there should be another case of replevin. Or, if the bottles are in
the possession of the government, the La Tondena should file action for interpleader to
determine who really owns the bottles. But you cannot use a mere search warrant to resolve the
issue of ownership. A search warrant is only to get the property, but it does not have the same
effect as a writ of replevin.

G. Section 13 – Search Incidental to a Lawful Arrest

Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.

1. Uy Khey Teng vs. Villareal – 42 Phil 886 - MATARANAS

FACTS:

This is a very old case, already asked in the bar. There was a search warrant issued by the court
to search a building somewhere in chinatown in Binondo, Manila on the ground that there was
opium or other drugs in that house. So the raiding party went to the house and announced to
the owner that they have a search warrant. So the owner had no choice but to allow the search.
They searched the premises, they did not find any opium. Wala! But, instead, what they found
were firearms – unlicensed firearms. And because they discovered the presence of these
firearms, they arrested the accused for illegal possession of firearms and seized all his firearms.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the peace officers can seize the firearms by virtue of the search warrant?

2. Whether or not the seizure of the firearms is illegal?

RULING:

RULING TO ISSUE #1: NO, Because a search warrant can only issue for one offense. The
offense was possession of opium or drugs. It cannot be used to seize firearms. So the firearms
cannot be seized by virtue of the warrant.
RULING TO ISSUE # 2: NO. It is valid because in the course of their search for opium, they
discovered another crime – illegal possession of firearms. And since they discovered the
commission of another crime, they have the authority THEN AND THERE to arrest the owner
because the crime is being committed in their presence. So there is a valid warrantless arrest.
And since there is a valid warrantless arrest, automatically there is also a valid warrantless
seizure. What gives the peace officers the authority is not the search warrant, but the fact that it
becomes merely incidental to the arrest of the accused.

2. People vs. Cendaña – October 17, 1990

3. People vs. Catan – 205 SCRA 235 - OSORNO

Facts:

On 8 April 1989, the Special Action Team, NARCOM, headed by Lt. Maximo Valiente, decided
to conduct a "buy-bust" operation at No. 49-A Madrigal Compound, Bgy. Corazon de Jesus, San
Juan, Metro Manila. A team of operatives was dispatched to the place at around 10:30 to 11:45
a.m. on said date. Two (2) members of the team, C2C Crisostomo and C2C Bascuna, acting as
poseur-buyers, sought out Appellant at the said address. Inside the latter's house, they
negotiated for the purchase of 300 grams of marijuana worth P450.00. In the meantime, the
other members of the team positioned themselves outside. Crisostomo and Bascuna gave the
amount of P500.00 to Appellant consisting of five (5) marked P100.00 bills. Appellant then gave
them the change of P50.00 and the 300 grams of marijuana.

Soon after receiving the marijuana from Appellant, Crisostomo and Bascuna went out of the
house and gave a pre-arranged signal to their companions who were waiting outside. The other
team members rushed inside the house and arrested Appellant. Appellant, however, was able
to pass the marked bills to a companion inside the house who was able to escape during the
commotion that ensued. The marked bills were never recovered.

Immediately thereafter, the NARCOM team conducted a search of the premises in the presence
of barangay official, Jess Abundo, a certain Mrs. Catan, the house owner, and Appellant.The
search yielded the following: a) 3.6287 kilos of dried marijuana fruiting tops in four separate bundles
wrapped in newspaper and transparent plastic all placed in a carton box marked "Windmill Wrappers;"
b) 0.9407 kilos of dried marijuana flowering tops inside a plastic bag marked "5 & Up Textile Mart;" c)
one (1) stick of marijuana cigarette; d) 23.49 grams of dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in
newspaper with markings and placed in a transparent plastic bag; and e) 189.71 grams of marijuana
seeds wrapped in a pink plastic bag and placed inside another plastic bag marked "Bakers Fair." All the
above were confirmed as marijuana after a laboratory examination.
For his part, Appellant denies both charges although he admits that he was inside the house on
8 April 1989. He claims, though, that he was sick at the time. He testified that Crisostomo and
Bascuna arrested him without a warrant and conducted a search of the premises without any
search warrant. He denied that a buy-bust operation took place, much less having received
P450.00 as payment for marijuana. He further alleged that the search yielded nothing and that
he saw the marijuana, which was presented in Court, for the first time inside a box in a van in
which he rode when he was taken by the operatives to Camp Karingal.

The Trial Court, finding no reason to doubt the veracity of the buy-bust operation conducted by
the NARCOM operatives, found Appellant guilty as charged. Challenging the adjudication,
Appellant is before us on appeal.

Issue:

WoN the appellant was illegally arrested and that the search of his premises was likewise illegal

Ruling:

No. The warrantless arrest was valid and not illegal.

Appellant was arrested in flagrante delicto in the act of selling and delivering marijuana to the
poseur-buyers. His case therefore falls under the category of a valid warrantless arrest (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The subsequent search of his house which
immediately followed yielding other incriminating evidence, and which became the basis of his
conviction for possession of a prohibited drug, was a search contemporaneously made and as
an incident to a valid warrantless arrest in the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made
(Nolasco v. Paño, G. R. 69803, 30 January 1987, 147 SCRA 509). That is a recognized exception to
the general rule that any search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant (Manipon v.
Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 58889, 31 July 1986, 143 SCRA 267). The inclusion of the seized items,
therefore, as evidence for the prosecution, was in conformity with the provision on lawful
searches (People vs. Castiller, G. R. No. 87783, 6 August 1990, 188 SCRA 376).

4. People vs. Gerente – 219 SCRA 756

5. People vs. Quizon – 256 SCRA 325 (1996)

6. Posadas vs. Court of Appeals – 180 SCRA 283- ONTAL

FACTS: On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat.
Umbra Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao
Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along
Magallanes Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial
Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting
suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (tear gas)
grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the
police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to
show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the
prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty.
He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was
rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense

ISSUE: WON the search without warrant is valid.

HELD: YES it is valid.

RATIO: There are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a
search warrant at military or police checkpoints. Thus, as between a warrantless search and
seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar,
there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause
that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
7. People vs. Mengote – 210 SCRA 174

8. People vs. Bagista – 214 SCRA 53

9. People vs. Aminudin – 163 SCRA 402 - OSORNO

Facts:

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked like marijuana leaves took
him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated
from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as
marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on
the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant,
who was eventually convicted.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. He
also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified
and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters.

Issue:
Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Aminnudin is valid

Ruling:

No.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of
the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, for example. And the present case presented no
such urgency.

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113
was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of
selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was
the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and
the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

10. People vs. Musa – 217 SCRA 597 (1995)

11. People vs. Burgos – 144 SCRA 1

12. Veroy vs. Layague – 210 SCRA 97

H. Section 14 – Motion to Quash a Search Warrant

1. Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. The Sheriff of RTC QC – November 23, 2001

XX. RULE 127 – PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES

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