When does Statutory Construction come in?

Floresca v. Philex Mining

that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself, pursuant to
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which decrees those judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. It argues that the
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court
argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that “No
judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
laws.” Thus, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court “do and must
legislate” to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite
and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.

Apply as it is or Literal Translation

Salvatierra v. CA
When the terms of the agreement are clear and unequivocal, the literal and
plain meaning thereof should be observed, pursuant to Article 1370 of the Civil
Code (“If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
control.”) Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties,
should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their
terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory, no matter what their forms
maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity are present.
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila Railroad Company
Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts
to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its
operation, must be obeyed. The express provisions of the New Civil Code,
Articles 2241, 2242 and 2244 show the legislative intent on preference of
credits. In the present case, the applicable provision of Republic Act 2023
speaks for itself; there being no ambiguity, it is to be applied. If the legislative
intent in enacting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section 62 of RA 2023 were to give
first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of employees in favor
of their credit unions, then, the law would have so expressly declared.
When not favored

Abellana v. Marava
A statute must not be construed in a manner giving rise to a constitutional doubt A court is to avoid
construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. The
grant of power to the Court, both in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charter, does not
extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive right.

Paras vs. Comelec

No. Construction of a statute must take into account its context and the intention in enacting the statute.
In the present case, the SC held that regular local election should be construed as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be
filled by the electorate. This definition conforms more to the intent of the Local Government Code (LGC).

When Executive Construction is not given weight

Basic rule on Executive Construction

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations

“the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing
the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”
IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong

.” Even if contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive

officers whose duty is to enforce it is given great weight by the courts, still if
such construction is so erroneous, the same must be declared as null and void.

Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople

When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or
withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and
explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit.

What is the difference between a rule and an opinion

There is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an

administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and
regulations, it “makes” a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while
when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a
pre-existing law Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the
procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law,
partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually
couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives,
remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the
manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency
entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so
long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is
within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are
not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom On the
other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory,
for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

While it is true that terms or words are to be interpreted in accordance with

their well-accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when such term or word is
specifically defined in a particular law, such interpretation must be adopted in
enforcing that particular law, for it can not be gainsaid that a particular phrase
or term may have one meaning for one purpose and another meaning for some
other purpose. RA 1161 specifically defined what “compensation” should mean
“For the purposes of this Act”. RA1792 amended such definition by deleting
some exceptions authorized in the original Act. By virtue of this express
substantial change in the phraseology of the law, whatever prior executive or
judicial construction may have been given to the phrase in question should
give way to the clear mandate of the new law.

IV. Subjects of Construction

• The Constitution
De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council
Yes. The prohibition under Sec. 15, Article VII in the Constitution does notapply to appointments to fll
a vacancy in the Supreme Court.

Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of
Members of the Supreme Court, among others.

How should the constitution be construed

Samriento

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the

intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The
intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed
in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez)
The Court will thus construe the applicable constitutional provisions, not in
accordance with how the executive or the legislative department may want
them construed, but in accordance with what they say and provide.
 Express enumeration excludes others not enumerated
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an
express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the
case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of
the Commission on Appointments.

Perfecto
the Constitution provides that judges shall hold their offices during good
behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation
which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office
Endencia v. David
The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his
salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. The
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in
enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be
interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition,
thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said
statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute
runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest
court of the land.
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
: The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers
May the preamble be referred to in the construction of Constitutional Provisions?

Aglipay v. Ruiz

When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the
aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the
general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy,” they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere.

Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director
of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of course, the
phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of
the Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property
for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar,
the issuance of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations.
Are the provisions of the Constitution self-executing?
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article
II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which
the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a
constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that
they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to
be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement
and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express
provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-
executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the
constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more
available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against
constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted
upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of
laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are
self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
Tanada v. Tuvera 1
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date — for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication — but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 however, considered in
the light of other statutes applicable to the issue does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non
excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby. In the present case, Presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect
Tanada v. Tuvera 2

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided,” in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which
cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication The legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publication
requirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or directly conferred by the Constitution; (3)
Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or
implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a
city notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board
circulars to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately
upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in
the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with
Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Ordinances
rule on Construction of ordinances vis-a-vis Statute
The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The ordinance’s
validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother statute” (not Act
3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought against
Primicias

Interpretation of specific types of statutes

How are tax refunds construed?
La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez
the rule is that the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in favor of
the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from tax liability, the result
being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes are strictly construed in
favor of the State and against the taxpayer.

Who has the burden of proof in tax cases?

CIR v. CA
The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be
construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and
unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for
that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter
in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the
provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.” In case of
doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly against the government
and in favor of the subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed
nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly and clearly
import.

Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) v. Marcos

Tax statutes are construed strictly against the government and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. But since taxes are paid for civilized society, or are the
lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and
statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law
too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption
therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of the exemption is a
political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not
apply because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce the
amount of money that has to be handled by the government in the course of its
operations. Further, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the
exception, the exemption may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing
authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted
to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which
then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution.

Tax Sales construed

Serfino v. CA
Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is imperative not only for
the protection of the tax payers, but also to allay any possible suspicion of
collusion between the buyer and the public officials called upon to enforce
such laws. Notice of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in
general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law, the non-
fulfillment of which vitiates the sale.
Labor Laws

Manahan v. ECC
In any case, and case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social
legislations — like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Labor Code — should be liberally
construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the
event that the former should die or sustain an injury. Pursuant to such doctrine and applying now the
provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in this case, the presumption of compensability subsists
in favor of the claimant.

Villavert v. ECC
Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, provides that “all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.”
Del Rosario & Sons v. NLRC

Article 221 of the Labor Code “in any proceeding before the Commission or any
of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in Courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code that the
Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.

Further, Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that “in the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable
with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the
work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is
liable to employees directly employed by him,” and Article 107 provides that
“the provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project.”

Insurance
Rule in the interpretation of insurance provisions

Ty v. First National Surety

As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation
of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that
would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by
the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the
clarity of the stipulation, distinction between “temporary disability” and “total
disability” need not be made in relation to one’s occupation means that the
condition of the insurance is such that common prudence requires him to
desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable of working.
While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose
benefit the policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear and express
conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability as loss
of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist.” There was no
such amputation in the case at bar.
De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance
The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common
acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously,
without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or
expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual
effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no accident when
a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent,
and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of
injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result
of the insured’s voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from
accident. In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the
boxing contest is voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the
deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would
not have died. Further, death or disablement resulting from engagement in
boxing contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance
contract (What was included was death or disablement consequent upon the
Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing,
racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant
insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other
sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did
not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.
Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer
Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance

The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer speaks of “oils
(animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid products having a
flash point below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly ambiguous and uncertain;
for in ordinary parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not gasoline or kerosene.
By reason of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms
and phraseology of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture.
There is no reason why the prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises
could not be expressed clearly and unmistakably, in the language and terms
that the general public can readily understand, without resort to obscure
esoteric expression. If the company intended to rely upon a condition of that
character, it ought to have been plainly expressed in the policy. Still, it is well
settled that the keeping of inflammable oils on the premises, though prohibited
by the policy, does not void it if such keeping is incidental to the business and
according to the weight of authority, even though there are printed prohibitions
against keeping certain articles on the insured premises the policy will not be
avoided by a violation of these prohibitions, if the prohibited articles are
necessary or in customary use in carrying on the trade or business conducted
on the premises. In the present case, no gasoline was stored in the burned
bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which was not burned and where the
gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured bodegas.

Corporate Law

Rule on the interpretation of Corporate Law provisions?

Home Insurance v. Eastern Shipping Lines

The objective of the law was to subject the foreign corporation to the
jurisdiction of our courts. The Corporation Law must be given a reasonable,
not an unduly harsh, interpretation which does not hamper the development of
trade relations and which fosters friendly commercial intercourse among
countries. A harsh interpretation would disastrously embarrass trade, unlike if
the law is given a reasonable interpretation, it would markedly help in the
development of trade. The law simply means that no foreign corporation shall
be permitted ‘to transact business in the Philippine Islands,’ as this phrase is
known in corporation law, unless it shall have the license required by law, and,
until it complies with the law, shall not be permitted to maintain any suit in
the local courts. A contrary holding would bring the law to the verge of
unconstitutionality, a result which should be and can be easily avoided. In the
present case, the lack of capacity at the time of the execution of the contracts
was cured by the subsequent registration.
Naturalization Laws
Rule on the construction of Naturalization Laws
Co v. Republic
The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily
include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it
cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law
requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in
which he is living. In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in
our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our
constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a
democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement
of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution.
Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. Republic
The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order
that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present
case, the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a
Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the
Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and
secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the
government.
Agrarian Reform Laws
Rule on the construction of Agrarian Reform Laws
Guerrero v. CA
Longstanding possession is an essential distinction between a mere
agricultural laborer and a real tenant within the meaning of the tenancy law, a
tenant being one who has the temporary use and occupation of land or
tenements belonging to another for the purpose of production. A hired laborer
who built his own house at his expense at the risk of losing the same upon his
dismissal or termination any time, is more consistent with that of an
agricultural tenant who enjoys security of tenure under the law. Cultivation is
another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy relationships.
Cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land
but also includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or
husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry
Rules of Court
Rule on the construction of the provisions of the Rules of Court
Bello v. CA

The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting

a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of
judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of
injustice or absurdity” and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it
would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own
Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to
avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void by
holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the higher courts
not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the
proper appellate court.

Expropriation Laws
City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the
rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of
property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by
the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation,

and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power
upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only
find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and,
second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither
of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be
contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law

Election Laws
Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)
Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates
in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of
the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day
for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For
all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as
having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by
the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the
electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through the
invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been
properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance
therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate
before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result
of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn
to his certificate or candidacy.
Rule on the interpretation of wills
Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are
very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the
statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.