For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

UV2337

ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION

The company has experienced phenomenal growth, having doubled in size, year after
year, for most of its 13-year history. Founder Lawrence J. Ellison is known for his
almost fanatical aggressiveness and take-no-prisoners attitude regarding
competitors. “It is not sufficient that I succeed; all others must fail,” he once said,
paraphrasing Genghis Khan. But now the picture could be changing.1

Until 1990, Oracle Systems Corporation had logged a nearly unparalleled record of sustained
rapid growth: 118% compound annual sales growth from 1982 to 1989. Competitors, investors, and
customers had searched the financial results of the company for clues to its success. Those searches,
however, tended to generate more questions than answers. Now, in the first half of 1990, the
company had disclosed unsettling news that triggered a 66% drop in the company’s share price. That
event renewed outsiders’ efforts to understand the company: Was the company healthy now in late
September 1990? Had management made the right choices in running the company? Was
management doing a good job? What represented the real source of value in this company? Investors
also wondered what exactly was happening in the company that warranted such a dizzying drop in
share price.

The Company

Oracle Systems Corporation was founded in 1979 by Lawrence J. Ellison to commercialize

an innovative database management system (DBMS) that he had just developed for an American
intelligence agency. The company produced a broad product line of systems, tools, and applications,
which by 1990 were portable across all major computing platforms, from personal computer to
mainframe. Under Ellison’s aggressive leadership, Oracle more than doubled its sales every year
from 1980 to 1989. It became the fastest growing software company in the world, and with sales of
$971 million in the fiscal year (FY) ended May 31, 1990, was the dominant software producer in its
1
Andrew Pollack, “Fast Growth Oracle Systems Confronts the First Downturn,” New York Times, 10 September
1990.

This case was prepared by Robert F. Bruner from public information with assistance of Fadi Mcaelian. This case was
written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative
situation. Copyright  1992 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights
reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to [email protected]. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev.
5/98.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-2- UV2337

specialty. Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 present the firm’s income statements, balance sheets, and financial
ratios for 1985–1990.

An extremely aggressive business strategy distinguished Oracle from its peers. Outside
observers cited four main elements to that strategy:

 Sell aggressively. Oracle distributed its products through a proprietary sales force and had 44
offices in the United States alone. That approach allowed close management and control of
the field sales force. Sales representatives were given ambitious objectives each quarter.
Typically, representatives’ quotas were almost doubled on a yearly basis, while their
territory often was reduced. The firm was particularly generous to representatives who
achieved or exceeded their objectives. Those who fell short of their quotas were summarily
fired. Sales representatives, perceived by some as arrogant and aggressive, often sold Oracle
software that was not yet available in order to achieve their quotas. Outsiders attributed the
company’s marketing style to its founder.
 Maintain technology and product leadership. Oracle’s current technological leadership
benefited from an early lucky decision to use the SQL2 computer language. Eventually
adopted by IBM, this language became the industry standard. Continued development efforts
had widened the use of Oracle’s software to virtually all types and brands of computer
systems. Oracle was the first to offer networking capabilities with its database, and Oracle
had aggressively expanded its range of products.
To maintain its leadership, Oracle recruited aggressively from what it believed were the top
five computer schools in the United States [Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), Stanford, the University of California at Berkeley, and Carnegie
Mellon]. Engineers in research and development (R&D) enjoyed flexible work schedules,
higher salaries than the industry average, sizable bonuses, and stock-purchase plans. In 1990,
the company built a large headquarters complex in Belmont, California, which included the
largest and most modern corporate gymnasium in northern California.
 Diversify into related fields. The company had expanded out of the production of software
and into computer consulting services and then into the area of systems integration. As the
range of Oracle’s product line expanded, those compatible services expanded as well.
 Expand internationally. Oracle had established subsidiaries and close exclusive distributors
in more than 70 countries around the world. It ranked among the top 50 U.S. exporters.

Oracle Systems went public on March 12, 1986, at an issue price of $2.00. Four years later, the share
price peaked at $28.375.

2
SQL is the standardized query language used for requesting information from a database.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-3- UV2337

The Software Industry

Until the 1980s, the broad business sector referred to as computing had been dominated by
equipment manufacturers. With the advent of personal computers and the increasing competition
among hardware vendors, however, the software vendors had become significant players in the
computing sector. In the 1980s, customers increasingly made hardware decisions based on software
availability. This trend drove the hardware manufacturers to integrate forward into software
development, a step with comparatively low capital requirements.

By 1990, the DBMS segment of the software industry included three types of competitors:
(1) hardware producers that had integrated forward (for example: IBM, DEC3); (2) specialized
database vendors (for example: Oracle, Ingres, Informix, Sybase, Ashton Tate, Gupta Technologies)
whose software could work on a variety of hardware platforms; and (3) many small software houses
providing highly specialized DBMS products. One analyst estimated that the market demand for
DBMS exceeded $10 billion.4 The major buying segment of that market consisted of large
corporations that had heterogeneous computing environments. Oracle permitted those firms to link
their machines together and share the data. Exhibit 4 reveals that IBM and Oracle dominated the
DBMS market. Oracle’s revenues grew faster than IBM’s because of Oracle’s multiple-platform
operating ability.

Disclosures in March 1990

On March 20, Oracle reported quarter earnings essentially unchanged from the same quarter
a year earlier. The company attributed the zero growth results to the disallowal by auditors of about
$15 million in sales. Many Oracle software contracts were sold on a trial basis, which raised
questions about when revenue could be recognized.5 For the first time, the auditors opined that some
of those “sales” would never actually be realized. This surprise triggered rumors about declining
product quality, increases in accounts receivable (and doubtful accounts), and reports of sales

3
Digital Equipment Corporation.
4
S. M. Smith et al., “Oracle Systems,” Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, 1991.
5
Accountants acknowledge that when revenue can be recognized is a matter of some judgment. Typically, revenues
represent not only cash sales but also credit sales. The key point of judgment is when revenue has been earned, or
realized. Once it has been realized, it can be recognized in the income statement. Realization depends on: (a)
management’s being able to measure the revenue (i.e., knowing with fair certainty how much revenue has been earned),
and (b) the occurrence of a critical event at which there is fair certainty that the revenue-generating transaction will be
completed. For instance, consider at which moment revenue should be recognized: the “handshake deal”, the receipt of a
formal order, the shipment of the order, or perhaps the receipt of cash. The crucial phrase here is “fair certainty,” and it is
an important focus of the auditor’s work. There are many revenue-recognition methods. Special industries (for example:
consulting, project management, contracting, mining and petroleum, land sales, franchising, and entertainment) have
unique recognition techniques. One prominent accounting textbook states: A misconception about reported numbers is
that they are exact or precise. In spite of the best efforts of managers and internal and external auditors, this is rarely if
ever the case. There are many reasons for the lack of precision in accounting measures; some may be attributed to
necessarily arbitrary cost allocations or alternate reporting procedures, while others may be a function of the intentional
manipulation of reported accounting numbers. [E. R. Brownlee II, K. R. Ferris, and M. E. Haskins, Corporate Financial
Reporting (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1990), 80–81.]

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-4- UV2337

representatives leaving the company. Upon this revelation, the company’s stock price plunged 31%
from its all-time high of $28.375 per share (achieved just days before the announcement). Journalists
reported the following comments by securities analysts:

There is a credibility issue on the part of management… Are these random and
fragmentary items constrained to this one quarter, or are they symbolic of a longer-
term problem? [David Readermann, analyst with Shearson Lehman Hutton]

Management is stretching harder and harder to make their growth objectives. The
disallowal of some sales by auditors tells you that the growth is not sustainable; that
the business is just not there. [Rick Sherlund, analyst with Goldman Sachs]

There is a lot of controversy still swirling around Oracle. Most people would
consider the first bit of bad news a big red flag and stand clear. I’m still a big fan of
the strategy and how well they’ve done to date. [Mark Findlay, analyst with
Soundview Financial Group]6

Following the announcement and price drop, 20 lawsuits were filed against Oracle.
Essentially, those suits alleged fraud and misrepresentation. Investors vented even more outrage
when it was disclosed that six Oracle officers profited by selling 645,000 shares before the March
earnings disclosure. The company denied any wrongdoing.

Announcement in September 1990

On September 25, 1990, Oracle announced its first-ever quarterly loss, $36 million (versus a
profit of $11.7 million for the same quarter a year earlier). Ellison told investors that the loss came
mainly from a $45 million shortfall in U.S. sales plus a $25 million write-down resulting from a
restructuring of the firm. Oracle’s U.S. finance department, which was responsible for the faulty
third and fourth quarter 1990 financial statements, was merged into the corporate finance department
to ensure strict accounting standards. The company also announced that 10% of its domestic work
force (about 400 people) would be laid off. Ellison said:

Oracle is shifting its strategy to emphasize profitability and product quality, instead
of market share and sales growth, to meet demands in the maturing market for
database applications… Implementation of the reorganization just took too long.
Several managers responsible for the restructuring have been fired.7

Oracle also indicated that its revenue growth for the first fiscal quarter would be only 30%, rather
than the 50% that the company had projected. Finally, the company reduced its growth projections
for the rest of the year from 50% to 25%.

6
All quotes are from Lawrence M. Fisher, “Surprise Hurts Oracle Systems,” New York Times, 5 April 1990.
7
Quoted from Reuters' financial report, September 25, 1990.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-5- UV2337

At that September announcement, the company’s stock price dropped to $8.125. One
journalist commented:

…Investors had been becoming increasingly wary of Oracle, if only because it was
inevitable that the company’s breakneck growth would have to slow eventually.
Some analysts have also said the company had angered customers, in part by
promising more product features than it could deliver in its rush for sales… If the
suspicions are correct, it would indicate that the company’s problems run deeper…
But Oracle paints a rosier picture, saying it continues to gain market share. “As we
adjust to a more conventional growth rate, our company will be stronger than ever,”
Ellison said. Some other providers of database software have also seen some
softening of business.8

Conclusion

About $2 billion in Oracle Systems’ market value of equity evaporated between the end of
February and the end of September 1990. Analysts wondered whether this change in value was, in
fact, associated with changes in financial performance in the recent past. The company’s share-price
performance had been outstanding (Exhibit 5). What had changed? What was the rate of change?
Was the company unhealthy? For comparison purposes, Exhibit 6 gives financial ratios for a
portfolio of other software companies, and Exhibit 7 presents comparative financial ratio
information on the 11 leading producers of relational DBMSs.

8
Andrew Pollack, “Fast Growth Oracle Systems Confronts first Downturn,” New York Times, 10 September 1990.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 -6- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 1
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Income Statements, 1984–1990
(in thousands, except per-share amounts)

Fiscal Year Ended May 31 90 Qtr. Ended

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Aug. 3 Feb. 28

Revenues:
Licenses $12,282 $21,902 $44,657 $101,264 $205,435 $417,825 $689,898
Services 433 1,257 10,726 30,007 76,678 165,848 280,946
Total revenues 12,715 23,159 55,383 131,271 282,113 583,673 970,844 $214,799 $245,561

Operating expenses
Sales and marketing 6,431 14,542 27,171 65,651 124,148 272,812 465,074
Cost of services 5,644 18,661 51,241 100,987 160,426
Research and development 2,009 3,886 7,478 9,949 25,708 52,570 88,291 20,615 21,685
General and admin. 1,673 1,989 4,248 8,603 17,121 34,344 67,258 230,187 174,673
Total operating expenses 10,113 20,417 44,541 102,864 218,218 460,713 781,049

Operating income 2,602 2,742 10,842 28,407 63,895 122,960 189,795 (36,003) 49,203
Other income (expense) (305) (157) (367) (509) 1,084 (2,715) (17,135) 7,516 5,342

Income before taxes 2,297 2,585 10,475 27,898 64,979 120,245 172,660
Taxes 908 1,034 4,579 12,275 22,093 38,479 55,250 (14,796) 14,035

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
Net income 1,389 1,551 5,896 15,623 42,886 81,766 117,410 $(28,723) $29,826

Earnings per share $0.11 $0.12 $0.11 $0.12 $0.32 $0.61 $0.86

Number of shares outstanding 12,340 12,770 54,864 125,028 132,950 135,066 136,826

Source: Company annual reports.

For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.
 -7- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 2
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Balance Sheets, 1985–1990
(in thousands)

Fiscal Year Ended May 31

Quarter
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Aug. 31, 1990
Assets
Current assets:
Cash and cash equivalents $ 599 $12,524 $ 37,557 $ 48,610 $ 49,393 $ 49,828 $ 50,198
Trade receivables 9,032 26,554 65,205 129,999 261,989 468,071 394,648
Other current assets 331 2,393 6,376 13,218 25,551 51,358 76,428
Total current assets 9,962 41,471 109,138 191,827 336,933 569,257 521,274

Property, net 4,491 14,152 26,896 47,554 94,455 171,945 203,887

Computer software develop. 0 0 4,818 6,920 13,942 33,396 41,707
Other assets 1,010 1,805 2,940 3,267 14,879 12,649 12,245

Total assets $15,463 $57,428 $143,792 $249,568 $460,209 $787,247 $779,113

Liabilities and stockholders’ equity

Current liabilities:
Notes payable $ 694 $ 3,164 $ 5,196 $ 6,507 $ 23,334 $ 42,501 $ 34,970
Accounts payable 1,432 4,835 10,645 23,502 51,582 64,922 57,281

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
Accrued expenses 3,360 11,301 28,737 62,627 88,014 134,028 82,135
Customer advances 897 2,993 3,847 9,547 15,403 42,121 70,011
Total current liabilities 6,383 22,293 48,425 102,183 178,333 283,572 244,397

Long-term debt 1,373 5,641 9,025 5,363 39,208 94,065 165,643

Deferred income taxes 340 843 3,686 7,379 12,114 22,025 10,397
Stockholders’ equity 7,367 28,651 82,656 134,643 230,554 387,585 358,676
Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $15,463 $57,428 $143,792 $249,568 $460,209 $787,247 $779,113
For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.
 -8- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 2 (continued)

Note: Accounts receivable (A/R) are net of these allowances for doubtful accounts:

% of A/R % of A/R (restated)

1987 $ 6,628,000 10.2
1988 $10,102,000 7.8
1989 $16,829,000 6.4
1990 $28,445,000 6.1 14.2

The 1990 allowance for doubtful accounts was restated to $66,445,000.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
Source: Company annual reports.
For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.
 -9- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 3
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Analytical Financial Ratios, 1985–1990

Fiscal Year Ended May 31

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Current ratio 1.56 1.86 2.25 1.88 1.89 2.01
Quick ratio 1.51 1.75 2.12 1.75 1.75 1.83
Debt/total assets 13.37% 15.33% 9.89% 4.76% 13.59% 17.35%
Days’ sales outstanding 142 175 181 168 164 176
Debt/equity 0.28 0.31 0.17 0.09 0.27 0.35
Times interest earned 17.46 29.54 55.81 58.94 45.29 11.08
Inventory turnover 69.97 23.14 20.59 21.34 22.84 18.90
Asset turnover 1.50 0.96 0.91 1.13 1.27 1.23
Operating profit margin 11.84% 19.58% 21.64% 22.65% 21.07% 19.55%
Net profit margin 6.70% 10.65% 11.90% 15.20% 14.01% 12.09%
Return on total assets 10.03% 10.27% 10.86% 17.18% 17.77% 14.91%
Return on equity 21.05% 20.58% 18.90% 31.85% 35.47% 30.29%

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
Source: Company annual reports.
For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-10- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 4
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Percentage Shares of Market for Database
Management Systems Expected in 1991

Expected Worldwide Market Share in DBMS

In 1991

Gupta (4.0%)
Ingres (3.0%)
Sybase (4.0%)

DEC (5.0%)

Informix (6.0%)
Oracle (40.0%)

Ashton-Tate (6.0%)

Others (5.0%)

IBM (27.0%)

Source of market share estimates: Datamation.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-11- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 5
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Oracle Systems Month-End Share Prices,
adjusted for Stock Splits

Oracle Systems Corp. Stock Prices

24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

6
1 /88 6 /88 1 2/8 8 6 /89 1 2/8 9 6 /90 9 /90
5

Note:This graph presents Oracle share prices at month-ends.

The all-time high share price, $28.375, occurred in mid month March 1990.

Source: Daily Stock Price Record: Over-the-Counter, New York: Standard & Poor’s Corporation, quarterly volumes
from Q1 1998 to Q3 1990.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.

-12- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 6
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Common-Sized Financial Statements of Computer Software
Producers’ Averages, 1986–1990
(in percentages)

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990

Income statement
Sales 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Costs and expenses 80.6 79.9 79.0 78.9 82.3
Operating income 19.4 20.1 21.0 21.1 17.7
Depreciation 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.3 5.2
Interest 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.1
Special items 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income taxes 4.9 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.1
Net income 6.5 8.2 9.1 10.1 7.3
Common dividends 1.6 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.3

Balance sheet: assets

Cash and equivalents 28.8 24.2 20.1 17.2 19.2
Receivables 22.9 26.0 27.9 32.4 31.8
Inventories 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5
Other current assets 6.1 4.3 3.3 3.7 3.5
Total current assets 59.2 56.2 53.0 55.0 55.9
Net property, plant, and equipment 26.8 19.5 20.0 19.1 17.5
Intangibles 9.7 8.5 9.2 10.0 9.1
Other assets 4.3 15.9 17.7 15.8 17.5
Total assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Balance sheet: liabilities and equity

Notes payable 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 3.3
Current long-term debt 1.4 1.4 1.4 0.7 0.9
Accounts payable 3.3 3.8 3.8 4.5 3.9
Taxes payable 6.6 6.2 5.7 5.9 5.7
Accrued expenses 5.1 3.7 3.2 5.0 5.8
Other current liabilities 8.5 9.2 9.8 9.0 9.8
Total current liabilities 25.7 24.6 24.6 26.1 29.4
Long-term debt 18.7 12.2 11.0 11.2 5.8
Deferred taxes 1.4 2.6 3.7 3.4 3.5
Investment tax credit 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other liabilities 2.4 2.3 1.8 1.9 1.7
Common stock 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.1 2.0
Capital surplus 12.0 23.1 22.8 19.4 19.0
Retained earnings 38.6 37.6 41.0 43.9 46.6
Less treasury stock −0.8 −3.3 −5.8 −8.0 −8.1
Total liabilities and equity 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The companies on which this exhibit is based include Autodesk, Automatic Data, Computer Associates, Computer
Sciences, Lotus Development, Novell, Oracle, Shared Medical Systems, and Cullinet.
Source: Industry Surveys, Standard & Poor’s Corporation, Vol. 1, July 1992.

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
 -13- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 7
ORACLE SYSTEMS CORPORATION
Financial Ratios for Competitors in Database Management Software

Ask BMC Borland Computer Informix Lotus Microsoft Oracle Platinum Progress Software Sybase,
Computer Software International Associates Corp. Development Corp. Systems Technol. Software Publish. Inc.
(FY 6/90) (FY 3/90) (FY 3/90) (FY 3/90) (12/89) (12/89) (FY 6/90) (FY (12/89) (11/89) (FY (12/89)
5/90) 9/90)

Business focus DBMS DBMS Broad Line Broad Line DBMS Broad Line Broad DBMS DBMS DBMS Broad DBMS
Line Line

Previous four
quarters’ sales $112 mm $110 mm $262 mm $1.25 bn $14.9 $652 mm $1.3 bn $980 $11.1 $26.9 $140 mm $89 mm
mm mm mm mm

Liquidity ratios
Quick ratio 1.88 2.97 2.54 2.13 2.68 3.39 3.37 1.51 1.99 1.54 3.64 2.00
Current ratio 2.01 3.26 2.92 2.20 2.94 3.73 3.85 1.75 1.99 1.67 3.95 2.07
Sales/Cash 0.35 1.66 8.79 11.32 5.76 2.02 2.63 18.39 12.93 3.61 1.78 3.43

Activity ratios
Receiv. turnover 3.42 9.53 27.20 2.11 2.00 5.69 6.54 2.18 2.57 4.24 7.38 2.23
Days’ sales out. 105 38 13.23 170 180 63 55 165 140 85 48.8 161
Inventory turn. 53.6 NA 290 49.16 27.46 24 21.3 NA NA 46.23 73.4 NA
Days’ inv. out. 6.67 NA 1.24 7.32 13.11 15 16.9 NA NA 7.8 4.9 NA
Sales/Net working
capital 40.5 1.86 8.87 3.14 2.05 1.85 2.22 3.90 4.32 4.5 1.77 2.54
Sales/Plant and

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
equipment 20.18 4.64 18.63 3.90 6.68 3.55 3.64 5.33 37.7 9.62 11.83 4.79
Sales/Curr. assets 2.03 1.29 5.78 1.72 1.35 1.36 1.64 1.68 2.15 1.80 1.32 1.31
Sales/Assets 1.25 1.00 4.36 0.86 1.01 0.92 1.07 1.20 2.03 1.48 1.17 1.01
Sales/Employees 220,028 205,396 649,407 180,348 122,570 198,583 210,017 134,546 NA NA 214,033 105,385
For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.
 -14- UVA-F-1031

Exhibit 7 (continued)

Ask BMC Borland Computer Informix Lotus Microsoft Oracle Platinum Progress Software Sybase,
Computer Software International Associates Corp. Development Corp. Systems Technol. Software Publish. Inc.
(FY 6/90) (FY 3/90) (FY 3/90) (FY 3/90) (12/89) (12/89) (FY 6/90) (FY (12/89) (11/89) (FY (12/89)
5/90) 9/90)

Leverage ratios
Liabilities/Assets 0.32 0.34 0.38 0.32 0.48 0.54 0.17 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.25 0.49
Liabilities/Capital 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.46 0.86 0.68 0.20 1.00 0.90 1.08 0.34 0.97
Liabilities/Equity 0.47 0.52 0.61 0.47 0.93 1.17 0.20 1.27 33.47 1.15 0.34 0.97
Times int. earned 37.8 NA NA NA NA NA NA 10.77 NA 31.66 NA 7.76
Total debt/Equity 0.01 NA 0.19 0.03 NA 0.73 NA 0.30 NA 0.11 NA NA
Assets/Equity 1.47 1.52 1.61 1.47 1.93 2.17 1.20 2.27 1.90 2.15 1.34 1.97

Profitability ratios
Net income/Sales 0.02 0.19 −0.04 0.10 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.06
Net income/Assets 0.03 0.19 −0.19 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.06
Net income/Capital 0.04 0.29 −0.26 0.12 0.08 0.14 0.30 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.12
Net income/Equity 0.04 0.29 −0.31 0.12 0.09 0.24 0.30 0.24 8.66 0.27 0.22 0.12

This document is authorized for use only by UTOMO SARJONO PUTRO in 2021.
Source: Disclosure Database (Bethesda, MD: Disclosure Incorporated).
For the exclusive use of U. PUTRO, 2021.