STATE DISASTER

MANAGEMENT PLAN
ON
COMMUNAL RIOTS
SUBMITTED TO

UP ACADEMY OF ADMINISTRATION & MANAGEMENT

DRAFT

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT GROUP

B-1/19, Vivek Khand, Lucknow 226 010
 Preface

State Disaster Management Plan for Communal Riots has been developed on the basis of
the secondary sources notably reports, recommendations, and guidelines as mentioned
below:
 National Integration Council Guidelines
 Raghubar Dayal Commission
 Prasad Commission
 Jaganmohan Reddy Commission
 D. P. Madon Commission
 NHRC Reports
 National Police Commission Reports and
 Ministry of Home Affairs Guidelines on Communal Riots.
The draft report is, thus, largely conceptual in tenor, content, and approach.

A more focussed and matter-of-fact DMP on Communal Riots is definitely possible.

However, to hone up the draft plan into a more grounded document would call for a
very specific set of data inputs on various aspects of state government policies on
communal harmony; available resource base for riot control and mitigation;
intelligence mechanisms for real-time alerts; and the strategies that are in place to
prevent the occurrence of riots, and minimize the spread and damage, if they do occur
despite the best administrative measures.

In fact, we at IMG started to work on the plan on the assumption that the critical inputs
on prevailing riot control mechanisms would be made available to us by the Home
Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh. We contacted Sri Vikas Gothalwal, IAS,
Special Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh, the designated
Nodal Officer with a set of questions (Annexure) on the matter. He expressed his
inability to share the information with us on the grounds of confidentiality and
sensitivity. However, he directed us to meet Sri A.P. Maheshwari, IPS, Inspector
General (Law & Order). He too expressed similar constraints in sharing the
information and suggested that a brainstorming session should be organized officially
at UPAAM with a group of police officers. We requested UPAAM to this effect,
however, they expressed their inability organise such a session. Our quest was brought
to a halt on August 4th 2009 by Sri Mahesh Gupta, IAS, Home Secretary, Government
of U.P. during the presentation of Disaster Management Plan before the officials of
Home department. We were advised in no uncertain terms that the government could
not share classified / sensitive data on this subject with the consultants.

It is against this backdrop, that the plan has been developed. We now present the Draft
Disaster Management Plan on Communal Riots with a sincere hope that the document
will be critically examined and commented upon by the experts committee. The
valuable suggestions from experts shall enhance greatly the value and usefulness of the
final document.
 Executive Summary

The objectives of a Riot DMP would be: to maintain law and order., to provide
information on time, to the people about the danger, to shift those at risk to safer places.,
to ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people, to protect
vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services, to provide
protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to the government, and
to minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are undertaken
immediately.

However, details of these activities would form part of the District Riot Plans. At the State
level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate the resource requirements and
logistic supports needed by the districts in their response actions. State Plan should also
aim at preventing the riots, and to this end should explore the reasons behind frequent
occurrences of communal riots and what can be done to counter the socio-economic and
historical forces that tend to encourage communal violence.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Acts, guidelines and
executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions on the subject by GOI and
GoUP. The Plan aims at five strategic goals: 1) Professionalising the disaster management
process; 2) Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal
processes by concerned departments / organizations; 3) Strengthening institutional
mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of coordination; 4) Strengthening emergency
response systems to ensure that responses are prompt and effective; and 5) Strengthening
rehabilitation and recovery structure.

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives: Identification of risk reduction /
mitigation activities for communal riots; Classification of necessary activities for effective
preparedness for different Departments / Organizations; Identifying emergency responses
for different stages of communal riots; Situation analysis to understand and identify
factors encouraging communal violence and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for
curbing such factors; Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and
humanitarian assistance; Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and
capacity building for risk mitigation, prevention and response; and Creating heightened
awareness among the community-members by education and communication activities

What is a communal riot: A riot is "a violent disturbance of the peace by an assembly or
body of persons". It becomes a communal riot if disturbance of peace is caused by distinct
community(ies) and is aimed at other distinct community(ies). Usually, in the Indian
context a communal riot implies violent behaviour of the two major communities –
Hindus and Muslims. A communal riot often flares up with a seemingly insignificant
incidence. However, once started, the speed at which the violence spreads suggests that
the violent activities were pre-planned. Thus even if the incidence that triggered the
violence were spontaneous the subsequent follow up behaviour is rarely so. The cause of
riot, then, lies beyond the incidences that trigger it – perhaps in some deep underlying
forces that have kept the communal riots alive for centuries.

Agencies involved in managing a communal riot: Police is the primary agency for
communal situations. Other agencies that have major role in planning and execution of
response operations are intelligence agencies, armed police (PAC) and army. These are
support agencies. There are other support agencies viz. Department of Health,
Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public Relations, and
Department of Revenue (Scarcity).

Why do riots occur: Determining the true cause can be a very involved issue as different
causes may surface at different levels of enquiry. It is useful to examine the causality at
three levels. The first constitute the incidences that trigger violence, referred to as the
primary cause. Such incidences can be spontaneous like teasing a girl of another community
or could be planned like playing music in front of a masjid during prayers. Often the
motive is sending a message to the opposition community for a local leadership issue,
asserting rights over some local resource such as a river ghat, or consolidating own
community (in the wake of a communal clash) for an upcoming election and so on. The
leadership issue, local resource or the upcoming election manifest the secondary cause.
Primary and secondary causes, jointly, can be taken as immediate or proximate causes. The
third level of enquiry into why riots occur seeks causality in social structure and historical
forces. This would perhaps fall beyond the scope of a DMP. It still needs to understood
by those managing riots as it often provides the perspective to see patterns in sporadic
events occurring at distant places at different points in time.

For example, a riot can be seen to arise out of (justified?) majority resentment against a
minority's alleged disloyalty to or betrayal of the country; or a riot can be seen as a
consequence of provocation of a harassed minority by militant Hindu nationalists. In both
cases the remedial measures will perhaps fall well within the domain of the police, the
Primary Agency for managing communal riots.

At this stage, it should be noted that such analysis of underlying causes may give rise to
another complexity. If a riot is interpreted as a result of the outrage felt by one community
on, say, disloyalty / betrayal revealed by another then this very interpretation would contribute
to the failure to prosecute the perpetrators of violence even when their identities are well
known.

Theories of Ethnic Violence: There are three major theories to explain presence or
absence of ethnic violence in mixed communities are based on a) inter-ethnic associational
ties, b) political incentives and c) intra-ethnic self policing. First theory argues that
associational ties between Hindus and Muslims prevent communal riots. According to the
second theory electoral incentives are the best predictor of whether or not a riot will
occur. The third model holds that riots can be prevented through a mechanism in which
community leaders punish community members guilty in inter-ethnic disputes.

Hazard Risk Assessment: Risks is product of likely loss in case of the occurrence of the
hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event itself. Communal riots
cause loss of human lives and destruction of properties. It is not possible to accurately
estimate the losses arising from a potential riot at any place. Three indicators provide
measures for a rough assessment of likely loss: population density, existence of isolated
dwellings – isolated geographically or socially, and existence of properties.

Probability of occurrence of a riot: Studies of past riots have revealed some pointers.
There appears a clear correlation between occurrence of a riot and demographic profile,
existence of a dispute between two communities, and religious conversion (or re-
conversions) at a centre.
Against this backdrop, the Plan has mapped vulnerability risk of the State. The parameters
considered are the population size, its demographic profile and the history of communal
violence observed over the past few decades. The table in Section 3.4.2 of the Plan, on
page 32 shows relative risk hazard assessment.

Extent of damage also depends on the level of violence observed in a riot. Historically
riots in Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi, Kanpur and Aligarh have been very violent.
Communal violence at these centres tends to get spilled over at nearby (satellite) centres.
This symbiotic linkage between some centres has been shown in a table on page 34 of the
report.

Probable causes: Proximate causes for the riots can be broadly classified under four
heads: Religious, Personal, Reactive and Ritual. Religious causes include playing of music
near a mosque during prayers, both communities claiming ownership of a place of
worship, desecration of a place of worship, killing of cows or pigs, etc. Personal causes
include molestation of a woman of one community by a member of another community;
quarrel between landlord and tenant or between employer and employee of different
communities, dispute between neighbours, forcible acquisition of properties by builders
etc. A riot can be in reaction to a situation which happens elsewhere in the country; or
even in the world hurting the sensibilities of a community. Ritual causes include throwing
of gulala etc during Holi and relate to problems associated with taking out religious
processions through localities inhabited by other community and raising of slogans on
such occasions.

Dynamics of communal riots: A riot may start with any cause. It affects public order.
Intra-ethnic communication stops altogether. Motivated parties spread out rumours and
public start believing them. Even the sane community leaders who disparage the anti-
social elements in normal times grudgingly accept them and even give sanction to their
activities. The chaotic situation offers opportunities to petty criminals to indulge in arson
and looting. With utter breakdown of public order and wild rumours floating around
communities become hysterical and take leave of their senses. Even law abiding citizens
may actively take part in looting or at least in sheltering criminals and offering support.
Emerging Concerns: Growing urbanization, changes in organized sector employment
profiles and the change in the political discourse of the country have impacted the riots
situation. Living in slums produces frustration–aggression syndrome facilitating ethnic
violence. Even outside slums, many families occupy one room tenements, with
concentration of minority communities in distinct pockets, leading exclusivist tendency
among members, creating the potential for communal mobilization. Economic
liberalization has seen many employers moving elsewhere for economic incentives. New
employment opportunities require a different skill set and the newly unemployed move to
the informal sector that thrives on exploitation of workers. These workers are likely to be
among the first victims of communal aggression and, also easily susceptible to be drawn
into perpetrating communal violence. The political fabric has changed over the decades.
Issues like terrorist incursions from Pakistan, and alleged appeasement of Muslims for
electoral gains have helped the rise of a militant form of Hindutva. The Muslims feel
driven more and more to assert their identity, further contributing to the Hindutva idiom
gaining grounds. Political factors often aggravate the cleavages between the ethnic groups.

Failures in handling communal riots: Analysis of the administration’s failure in

anticipating riots, and apprehending offenders can be traced to indiscriminate transfers /
postings of officers, not always posted on objective considerations; inadequate resources;
inadequate training; lack of coordination and a tendency to hide the true facts with long
term adverse effects – also adversely affecting the trust of public in government.

Prevention: Prevention is better than cure. Standard precautionary measures and sound
intelligence are the two pillars of preventing riots. Riot Scheme or the District Riot Plan is
at the heart of riot specific precautionary measures. A riot scheme details the course of
action of the police in a riot situation. More importantly it contains various data relating to
the area covered by it detailing the historical forces at work and identifying the likely
principal actors of both communities. Many a time riot plans are prepared ain routive
manner and the administration forfeits the use of the most potent tool for managing riots.
A riot scheme must, at least, have:
a. Complete background information of the area covered by it
b. List of bad characters with their addresses and with the names of policemen who will be
able to identify them
c. List of locations where trouble could erupt, in order of their importance
d. More vulnerable localities where minority communities and weaker sections
normally reside in sizeable numbers
 e. Maximum and minimum scheme of static deployment of the police.
f. Placement of reserves and the maximum and minimum reserves requirements
g. Information on hospitals, fire brigades, and availability of other civic services

The scheme must be carefully and constantly updated. Item (b) would require particular
attention in this regard.

Some precautionary measures: First precautionary measure is regulation of trouble

prone areas. Police Stations/Posts should be set up in all sensitive / trouble-prone areas
with realistically assessed manpower requirements and provided with trained personnel,
adequate weaponry, communication links, vehicles, and equipment for videography. Other
precautionary measure is restraining anti-social elements at the slightest hint of trouble.
Peace Committees play a useful role in quelling sentiments and the administration should
maintain constant touch with peace loving influential members ob both communities. In
sensitive areas with a history of communal riots peace committees should be constituted on a permanent
basis and the membership of such committees should be constantly reviewed.

Often rumours are set afloat as a preparation for riots. The administration should be alive
to rumour mongering and disseminate correct information to the public through all
available means. In such disseminations the emphasis should be on concrete steps taken for
correcting the situation and not on plaintive demands on the people for cooperation.

Intelligence: Intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention of communal riots.
Police & administration have for long maintained records of various physical data. If
updated regularly, a scrutiny of these records, particularly of the fluctuations therein, can
reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly maintained at the districts
and police stations and regularly fed to the State agencies. State level agency should
interpret this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice
of the State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and
would enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in
advance.
Control Room: A control room can have value in a riot situation only if it functions
effectively during normal times. Control room should be manned by polite and competent
offices who can assess the information received. If control rooms inspire confidence in
the public mind during normal times then they would receive a mass of valuable
information during crisis situations.

Mock drill: Riot schemes should be rehearsed so that those including, the para military
forces and the Army, who have to implement them would know their roles during a crisis.
These exercises would give an idea of the pattern of mobilisation of forces, which would
leave no gaps, and which would leave no community unprotected. They would also reveal
the need of drawing alternative routes and sitting of reserves at easily accessible points.
Rehearsing the riot schemes needs to be a compulsory annual activity.

Transfer and Posting: Only specially selected experienced officers with an image of
impartiality should be posted to the communally sensitive districts. They should not normally
be transferred before the completion of their tenure and in any case all district and police officers should not
be transferred at the same time.

Hardships caused by curfews: There is no special agency to help citizens in a curfew

bound area if they need to go out, for example, to the hospital. Often the procedure for
obtaining curfew passes is not known to public. These should be widely publicised
through and there should be centres within easy reach of citizens from where these passes
can be issued.

Offences during riots- registering, investigations and prosecution: Often victims

would rarely risk their lives to go to the police station report a crime during riots. Police,
therefore, should open several reporting centres at different points in a riot torn area. The
very fact that an aggrieved party is provided a facility to report its grievance would increase
its confidence in the rule of law, and will help towards restoring normalcy. Special
investigation teams (SIT) should be set up to investigate crimes committed during riots.
Such teams should be set up under a State agency and should function under the supervision of a
fairly senior officer. Investigations should be conducted competently, quickly and
impartially. At present a large number of cases related to crimes reported during riots end
in final reports; convicted cases are usually simple cases in which the accused are caught
red handed on the spot. Finally, courts often take very long to dispose these cases. Even
setting up of special courts for expeditious trials, has not solved the problem. Perhaps some
special provisions in the law and procedure are required in the investigation and prosecution of offences
committed during communal riots.

Communal representation in Police: Often police is accused of partiality. Police should

be fully representative of the society in which they function and there is a strong case for
encouraging the recruitment of members of the minority community and other weaker
sections in the police force.

Role of Home Guards: Home Guards are organised with proper command structure,
they are local people and can play a useful role during riot situations. However, they need
additional training and compensation when pressed into such difficult tasks. In an
emergent situation the local authorities should be empowered to requisition the services of
Home Guards. Appropriate rules need to be framed for this purpose.

Training: Policemen are overworked and the State is, like the rest of the country rather
under-policed. Training of policemen is a big casualty of this state of affairs. For Police to
remain an effective force, each policeman should be given at least one week’s refresher
course every year in combat practice, weaponry, videography and communication
methods. Station level police officers should be given periodic training in preparation of
riot schemes, intelligence gathering, force deployment and formation, and weaponry. Sub-
division and District level police officers need to go to regular course on preparation of
riot schemes, intelligence analysis, force deployment & formation and tactics. All training
programmes, at all levels must have a motivational content as well. Even senior police
officers need to attend programmes on leadership and crisis management.

As a large number of junior officers of other civil departments are invested with
magisterial authority during riots, there should be special programmes for them covering
riot control, legal provisions, and powers and duties of a magistrate. Finally, the armed
police (PAC) must be trained annually with an entire company in one programme.

Alert mechanism: Warnings come from the intelligence wing or from a police station in
whose area some spontaneous act like stabbing that can assume communal overtone. The
information must be passed on to the District administration, who in turn would inform
the SCR. Thus the alert mechanism may entail information flow from State to district or
from district to State. District will activate the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR
informed. If the situation is not diffused and violence erupts, the SCR will define the level

Threat to communal harmony discerned by

State / Central District Intelligence Station House

Intelligence Agencies Agencies Officer

Districts SCR District Administration

Level declaration by SDMA  Closer regulation of vulnerable localities

 Closer monitoring of anti social
elements’ movements
L1: Monitor the situation  Informal meetings with members of
peace committees
L2: Activate SDMP  Strengthened, wide spread police
presence

L3: Activate SDMP,

Seek central assistance Situation diffused Violence flares up

of the disaster keeping in view the report of the intelligence wing and of the violence
eruption(s). The chart depicts the flow of information and activities. If the violence can be
brought under the control by the district administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale
of violence would warrant intervention from the State level, it would be and L2 situation
and in L3 situations Central government’s intervention becomes necessary. In case of L1,
SCR will merely monitor the situation. In case of L2/L3 the SDMP will be activated.

Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from
district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level
interventions should be considered as L2.

Required measures will depend on the level of the situation and have been described
under different situations.
 Contents
Page
List of Abbreviations 1
1 Chapter 1: Introduction 3
1.1 Vision Statement 3
1.2 Evolution of this Plan 4
1.3 Themes & underlying currents 7
1.4 Objectives of the State Plan 9
2 Overview of the State 11
3 Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis 29
3.1 What is a Communal Riot 29
3.2 Why do Riots occur 29
3.3 Theories of Ethnic Violence 31
3.4 Hazard Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Mapping 31
3.4.1 Extent of likely loss 31
3.4.2 Probability of occurrence 32
3.5 Probable causes 34
3.6 Dynamics of Communal Riots 35
3.7 Emerging Concerns 36
3.7.1 Increasing population density 36
3.7.2 Changing profile of organised sector employment 37
3.7.3 Changing political fabric 37
3.8 Failures in handling Communal Riots 38
4 Preventive Measures 40
4.1 General 40
4.2 Agencies involved in managing riots 41
4.3 Prevention 42
4.3.1 Precautionary measures 42
4.3.1.a Regulation 42
4.3.1.b Riot Scheme 42
4.3.1.c Regulating vulnerable locations 43
4.3.1.d Preventive arrests 44
4.3.1.e Peace committees 44
4.3.1.f Countering rumours and monitoring media 45
4.3.2 Intelligence 45
4.3.3 Control room 46
4.4 Structural measures 46
4.4.1 Mock drills 46
4.4.2 Operational difficulties in preventive arrests 47
4.4.3 Transfer and Postings 47
4.4.4 Prosecution for violating curfews 48
4.4.5 Hardships caused by curfews 48

4.4.6 Registering offences during riots 48

 4.4.7 Investigation of offences reported during riots 48
4.4.8 Communal representation in police 49
4.4.9 Role of Home Guards 50
4.5 Training needs 50
5 Response 51
5.1 Alert mechanism 51
5.2 Criteria for level definition 52
5.3 Recommended measures 52
5.4 L0 Activities 53
5.4.1 Promoting communal harmony 53
5.4.2 Intelligence 53
5.4.3 Manpower planning 53
5.4.4 Logistic planning 54
5.4.5 Contingency planning & drills 56
5.4.6 Monitoring developments and preparedness 56
5.5 Responses 58
5.5.1 Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure 58
5.5.2 Different sections of the command 59
5.5.3 Major tasks of the command 60
5.5.4 Initial command meeting 61
5.5.4.1 Setting priorities & objectives 61
5.5.4.2 Developing tactical objectives 62
5.5.4.3 Adopting overall strategy 62
5.6 L3 Responses 62
5.7 Schematic of the Process Flow 63
5.7.1 Threat perceived 63
5.7.2 Violence flares up 64
6 Preparedness Measures 66
6.1 Preparations for predetermined responses 66
6.1.1 Resource availability 66
6.1.2 Attending special needs of weaker sections 67
6.2 Capacity building 67
6.2.1 Incident command system 68
6.2.2 Strengthening fire services 68
6.3 Use of Media 69
7 Partnerships with other stakeholders 70
7.1 Communities 70
7.2 Academic institutions 70
7.3 Armed forces 71
7.4 NGOs 71

7.5 PSUs and Private Sector 71

8 Financial arrangements 73
9 Review and Updation 75
9.1 Schedule of riot drill 75
 9.2 Action taken report 76
9.2.1 Approval & Review Process 76
9.3 Mainstreaming DM concerns with development plans 77
Annexure 1: Questionnaire for Home Department, GoUP 78
List of Abbreviations
CBDM Community Based Disaster Management
CBO Community Based Organizations
CMG Crisis Management Group
CRF Calamity Relief Fund
CSC Community Service Centre
DCMO District Chief Medical Officer
DM Disaster Management
DMC Disaster Management Cell
DMF Disaster Mitigation Fund
DRM Disaster Risk Management
EOC Emergency Operations Centre
ESF Emergency Support Function
GoI Government of India
GoUP Government of Uttar Pradesh
HPC High Powered Committee
IDDR International Decade for Disaster Reduction
IDRN India Disaster Resource Network
IMG Integrated Management Group
LSG Local Self Government
MO Medical Officer
NAC Notified Area Committee
NCC National Cadet Corps
NCCF National Calamity Contingency Fund
NCDM National Centre for Disaster Management
NDMA National Disaster Management Authority
NDMF National Disaster Mitigation Fund
NDMRC National Disaster Mitigation Resource Centre
NDRF National Disaster Response Force
NSS National Service Scheme
NYK Nehru Yuva Kendra
PM Prime Minister
RC Relief Commissioner
SDMA State Disaster Management Authority
SDMP State Disaster Management Plan
SHO Station House Officer
SIT Special Investigation Team
SOP Standard operating procedures
ULB Urban Local Bodies
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UPAAM UP Academy of Administration & Management
UPSDMA UP State Disaster Management Authority
WPR Work Participation Rate

PART I

GENERAL
 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Vision Statement

To create a Disaster Management Plan that will provide all information required to
understand, prevent and mitigate the threats it covers while complying with the provisions
of all Acts, executive orders, guidelines; and will be the most authentic and useful resource
for ensuring the state of preparedness to meet those threats and for effectively managing
any disaster situation arising from those threats.
1.2 Evolution of This Plan

This Plan has been prepared as a deliverable under UPAAM letter no…. dated ….. The
terms of reference require, inter alia, the plan to be in line with statutory provisions of the
Central and UP State Disaster Management Acts, and also to incorporate the guidelines
and executive orders issued by Ministry of Home Affairs GoI, and other instructions on
the subject by GoI and GoUP. The mandate also gives specific details of some major
issues to be covered under this Plan.

The Plan has evolved around the provisions, directives and objectives of related
legislations, executive orders, and international development initiatives. The Plan
incorporates the guidelines suggested by the two statutes – Disaster Management Act and
Uttar Pradesh Disaster Management Act, Report of the High Powered Committee set up
by GoI in 1999, NDMA, and UNDP.

While the objectives of a disaster management plan should remain the same whichever
source it may originate from; the stance of a plan and its underlying thematic currents will
tend to reflect the concerns of the originator; and the plans so drawn would acquire
different hues reflecting the differences in those concerns. Such differences would not
merely consist of variations in details but would. They would go much deeper, in as much
as they would espouse different approaches and would assign different importance to
various sub-goals.

For developing this Plan as correctly reflecting the current concerns, suggested plan
contents and recommended guidelines by different sources were carefully examined. Any
such plan is essentially in response to the prevailing needs of the community. It is based
on the prevalent socio-economic-political situation in general and the availability of
resources in particular. It would, thus, require modifications with changes in those needs
or in the societal perspective or in the resource-availability situation. It is, therefore,
considered appropriate to clearly articulate those needs and perspectives which form the
backdrop of disaster management initiatives undertaken in the country so far. The next
few paragraphs provide a brief summary of such initiatives and of the frameworks
suggested by the aforesaid Acts / Authorities / Organisation to sketch the setting for this
Plan.
In 1999 GoI set up an HPC under the Chairmanship of Shri J.C. Pant to formulate a
comprehensive, systematic and holistic approach to disaster management. The HPC
emphasized shifting the focus of disaster management from relief centric reactive
approach to a proactive approach based on the culture of preparedness, quick response,
strategic thinking and prevention. It prepared comprehensive model plans for DM at the
national level and provided detailed guidelines for drawing up such plans at state and
district levels. It also emphasized vulnerability based planning and graded disasters at three
levels: L1, L2 and L3, while denoting L0 as a “no-disaster situation”. It introduced the
concept of “Trigger Mechanism” to spontaneously set in motion the process of disaster
response.

The disaster management planning received a new orientation with the passage of the
Disaster Management Act, 2005. This Act created NDMA and stipulated preparation of a
National Plan on Disaster Management in consultation with the State Governments and
expert bodies. It also stipulated that every Ministry and Department of the Government of India should
make provisions, in its annual plan budgets, for carrying out activities and programmes set out in the
disaster management plans. It appears that similar stipulation has not been made in the
UPSDM Act, which entered the statute-book before the enactment of the Central Act.
Further, S40 of the Act stipulates that the DMP of every department of State Government
shall lay down, inter alia, “the roles and responsibilities of the department of the State in
the event of any threatening disaster situation or disaster and emergency support function it is
required to perform” as also the “present status of its preparedness to perform such roles
or responsibilities or emergency support function”.

In 2006 the Planning Commission, while formulating the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-
2012) examined the manner in which measures for disaster mitigation, preparedness and
capacity building should be enhanced and integrated into the development plans of the
Centre and the States and how to ensure that appropriate financial provisions for disaster
management are built into the cost estimates.

Meanwhile in 2002, a Disaster Risk Management Programme was taken up in 169 districts
in 17 multi-hazard prone States with the assistance from UNDP, USAID and European
Union. Under this project, the States were assisted to draw up State, District and Block
level disaster risk management plans; village disaster risk management plans in conjunction
with the Panchayati Raj Institutions. This programme also helped create disaster
management teams at village levels onward, of volunteers trained in preparedness and
response functions such as search & rescue, first aid, relief coordination, shelter
management etc.

In addition to these, an all parties National Disaster Management Committee was

constituted in 2001 with the PM as its chair in the aftermath of the Gujarat earthquake.
The Committee invigorated the political will and various states, notably Orissa and
Gujarat, created their SDMAs.

As may be seen, a lot of measures were being taken, suggested under different initiatives
by different organizations. This has, occasionally, introduced variant terminologies. For
instance UPAAM’s work order ….. refers to Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) at
District / Block levels but the same body is referred to as Disaster Management
Committee (DMC) in the UNDP Project on DRM.

The UNDP Project and NDMA’s initiatives led to creation of India Disaster Resource
Network (IDRN), a powerful tool for prompt response to disaster situations.

As mentioned earlier the HPC report classified situations based on non-existence or

severity of disaster as L0, L1, L2, and L3. Situations may arise in a number of cases where
a disaster of unknown severity may appear impending without actually taking place.
Examples would be formation of a cyclone heading towards Indian shores, swarms of
locusts flying across international boundaries, intelligence reports on simmering civil
disorder or communal tension etc. Naturally such information would be quickly shared, at
appropriate levels, with the communities likely to be affected giving rise to “alert”
situations. Such cases, L0 with “alert”, it was found, were so very different from L0
without “alert” that they merited a different category for themselves. (L0 with alert could
be called “Warning Phase” of L1/L2 etc and the situation after occurrence of the disaster
could be described as the “Impact Phase”.) However, as we already have a plethora of
nomenclature, without actually naming such situations separately, this Plan emphasizes the
changed roles of everyone concerned with disaster management when an “alert” is received.
The Plan is focused on the specific deliverables in the work order of UPAAM.

1.3 Themes and Underlying Currents

There are three essential themes running through the Plan: preparedness, development
and equity. Preparedness implies a proactive approach, which emphasizes prevention and
mitigation rather than reactive responses to an event; development underscores the
inverse correlation between human sufferings during disaster and development status of a
community; and equity ensures that the weak and helpless sections, which usually suffer
worst during any disaster situation, are never lost sight of.

The HPC report defined a disaster as “an occurrence of a severity and magnitude that
normally results in deaths, injuries, and property damage, and that cannot be managed through
the routine procedures resources of government. It usually develops suddenly and unexpectedly and
requires immediate, coordinated and effective response by multiple government, voluntary
and private sector organizations to meet human needs and speed recovery”. DMA (the
Act), on the other hand defines disaster as “a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave
occurrence in any area, arising from natural or man made causes, or by accident or
negligence which results in substantial loss of life or human suffering or damage to, and
destruction of, property, or damage to, or degradation of, environment, and is of such a
nature or magnitude as to be beyond the coping capacity of the community of the affected area”.
Clearly, a situation becomes a disaster if the community is unable to cope with it in the
normal course. Thus, the same situation may be a disaster for one community (of less
coping capability) and a non-disaster situation for another. Accordingly, this Plan is first
aimed at improving the “coping capacity” of the community, which if inadequate may turn
even a relatively tame occurrence into a disaster. Thus the measures to be adopted for
prevention and mitigation of disasters, that would improve the coping capacity of the
society, constitute the first major theme of the Plan

The second theme weaves around the manner in which mitigation measures are to be
integrated with development plans and projects of State. It is driven by two concerns;
firstly the well established link between higher development level and lesser damage to
human lives in disasters; secondly to ensure availability of funds for disaster mitigation
activities on a regular basis. The Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing
the risk, impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously
resources from Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities.
Though there has been some thinking on Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) for sometime,
and DMF is a statutory requirement for all States, still there seems to be no unanimity on
what should constitute DMF.

One approach is that it may comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under
the Act. Another is that it may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be
spent only on such mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan
scheme. Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each
Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF. The third approach, favoured most by
cash strapped states is that DMF may only consist of a small token amount to be utilized
for unforeseen mitigation measures. This Plan is driven by the realism that disaster
management and development must move in tandem else decades of development gains
may get lost in a few minutes of disaster. This realization calls for total internalization of
DM processes in the planning processes making it the second major theme underlying this
Plan.

The third theme of this Plan, “equity”, is borne out of the repeated observations that
weaker sections continue to remain more exposed to sufferings from disaster risks than
others. The powerless need more support from the community to cope with the hazards
of disaster. To ensure that the special needs of pregnant ladies, lactating mothers, other
women, children, aged and disabled are not lost in the flurry of operations the Plan has
consciously kept them always in focus. A more effective way of ensuring it is to
affirmatively seek their participation during preparedness and mitigation processes as well.
As it is not practicable to seek participation of pregnant ladies in mock drills etc the Plan
envisages participation of such sections of the community who are more acutely alive to
their needs – hospitals, maternity homes, sanitaria and asylum (where existing) staff etc.

Other basic issues underlying the Plan are those raised by NDMA, namely, emphasis on
Community Based Disaster Management (CBDM), awareness generation, training needs
analysis, knowledge management, development of a state Human Resources (HR) plan,
and early warning and forecasting system. As stipulated in the Act, the Plan also sets down
standards for relief, rehabilitation etc.
1.4 Objectives of the State Plan

The only plausible objective for a Disaster Management Plan can be to ensure least human
sufferings and least damage to properties form disastrous situations, and quickest recovery
and reconstruction in post-disaster period. Viewed from this angle, the objectives of a Riot
DMP would be:
1. To maintain law and order.
2. To provide information on time, to the people about the danger
3. To shift those at risk to safer places.
4. To ensure arrangement for food, shelter, and medicines for the affected people.
5. To protect vital installations and ensure smooth functioning of essential services.
6. To provide protection to properties belonging to members of public as well as to
the government
7. To minimize effective response time so that relief and rescue operations are
undertaken immediately.

However, details of these activities and their tactical ramifications would form part of the
District Riot Plans. At the State level the plan needs to be strategic – it should anticipate
the resource requirements and logistic supports needed by the districts in their response
actions. It should also aim at preventing the riots, and to this end an SDMP on communal
riots should explore the reasons behind frequent occurrences of communal riots and what
can be done to counter the socio-economic and political forces that tend to encourage
communal violence.

This Plan sets out a roadmap in line with statutory provisions of the Act, UPSDM Act,
also with the guidelines and executive orders issued by MHA, GoI, and other instructions
on the subject by GOI and GoUP to achieve the final objective by setting some strategic
goals, and identifies intermediate objectives as major milestones. The Plan aims at the
following five strategic goals:

1. Professionalising the disaster management process

2. Making preparedness, risk reduction / mitigation parts of their normal processes
by concerned departments / organizations
3. Strengthening institutional mechanisms to achieve the highest degree of
coordination
 4. Strengthening emergency response systems to ensure that responses are prompt
and effective
5. Strengthening rehabilitation and recovery structure

The Plan sets out the following intermediate objectives:

1. Identification of risk reduction / mitigation activities for communal riots

2. Classification of necessary activities for effective preparedness for different
Departments / Organizations
3. Identifying emergency responses for different stages of communal riots
4. Situation analysis to understand and identify factors encouraging communal
violence and to set in place an institutional mechanisms for curbing such factors
5. Creating appropriate structure for seamlessly providing relief and humanitarian
assistance
6. Creating system and infrastructure for effective training and capacity building for
risk mitigation, prevention and response
7. Creating heightened awareness among the community-members by education and
communication activities
 CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW OF THE STATE

Uttar Pradesh is the largest state of India in terms of population and the fifth largest in
terms of area. The state is divided in four economic regions i.e., Western, Central,
Bundelkhand and Eastern. Lying largely in the Gangetic plains (except the
Bundelkhand region), the economy of the state is still largely based on agriculture.
This location in the Himalayan foothills and dependency on agriculture give rise to
their own potential calamities. A scanty rainy season can lead to near drought
conditions with drinking water scarcity; and a heavy rainfall can cause a flurry of
floods destroying cultivation, damaging property, disrupting road transportation, water
supply, electricity supply systems etc.

2.1 Topography
Uttar Pradesh is bounded by Nepal and Uttaranchal on the North, Haryana and
Rajasthan on the west, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh on the south and Bihar and
Jharkhand on the east. Situated between 23 o 52' N and 31o 28’ N latitudes and 77o 3'
and 84o 39' E longitudes, Uttar Pradesh can be divided into two distinct geographical
regions:
 The Gangetic plain in the North, West, Centre and East.
 The Vindhyan hills and plateau in the south
The state has 71 districts, grouped in 17 divisions, again grouped in 4 regions, based on
physiographic characteristics and varied social and economic conditions: the Eastern,
Central, Western and Bundelkhand regions. The broad characteristics of these regions are;

Eastern region: Wide alluvial plains with dense rural population (776 persons
per sq km), higher proportion of cultivated land.

Central region: Level riverine plane characterized by fertile alluvial soil, dense
population (658 persons per sq km), lower rural density
compared to Eastern region.

Western region: Varies from riverine alluvial plain to generally uniform and level
with slight undulations towards south, slopes from north to
south or south to east with reference to alignment of major
rivers, economically developed and has larger urban centres;
population density of 765 persons per sq km.

Bundelkhand region: Northern part is plain, southern part has gentle undulating
surface, due to undulating and rugged surface, Bundelkhand
plateau has lower population concentration (280 persons per sq
km) compared to other regions.

A map of UP showing the districts in each region is presented below:

Economic Regions,
Western
Uttar Pradesh
Region
Central Region
Eastern
Region
Bundelkhand
2.2 Area and administrative divisions
The state of Uttar Pradesh is spread over 240,928 sq. km. comprising 71 districts 300
tehsils, 809 CD Blocks and 107,452 villages (including forest villages). The number of
towns in the state is 694 of which 638 are statutory towns and 66 census towns.

2.3 Physical regions

Uttar Pradesh forms a major area of the Northern fertile plain known as the Indo-
Gangetic plain. As already mentioned the Eastern, Western and Central regions lie in
fertile alluvial plains, and the Bundelkhand region lies in the Vindhyan plateau. Its vast
area, big and small rivers, varieties of climatic conditions, and different kinds of soils
have bestowed a diversity of flora and fauna, which is hard to find elsewhere.

2.4 Climate
The climate of Uttar Pradesh is tropical monsoon in character. The standard temperature
varies in the plains from 3-4ºC in January to 43-45ºC in May and June. Uttar Pradesh
mainly experiences three distinct seasons - winter from October to February, summer
from March to Mid June and the rainy season from mid June to September. The
Himalayan region gets about 100-200cm of rain fall. The rainfall in the plains is heaviest in
the east and decreases as one proceeds towards the north-west. Floods are a chronic
problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property. Flood water during the
rainy season becomes a major hindrance for tourists traveling to Uttar Pradesh. There are
occasional cloud-bursts adding to the misery of the people. The most severe floods were
in 1971, when 51 of the then 54 districts of the state were affected across nearly 52 lakh
hectares.

The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat
less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district's proneness to floods is
attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil
water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the
western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways,
canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging over large areas. The major flood-
prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna, Gomati, Ghaghra, Rapti, Sarda and Ramganga. The
insufficient drainage capacity of the smaller western rivers Sirsa, Kali and the Aligarh drain
is also a cause of floods.
2.5 Temperature and Rainfall
The seasons in Uttar Pradesh can be divided into Summer, Monsoon and Winter. The
temperature varies with the change of seasons. Summer season, which is very hot and dry,
continues from March to June. The temperatures during this season rise to 45ºC,
sometimes 47-48ºC. There is low relative humidity of about (20%) and dust laden winds
flow throughout the season. Monsoon season runs from June-September. The state
receives 85% of average annual rainfall of 990 mm. during the season. The temperature is
around 35-42°C on during the season. Winter season starts from October-February. The
minimum temperature is around 3-4ºC and sometimes goes below -1ºC. The maximum
temperature remains around 15 ºC to 25 ºC.

2.6 River systems and Dams

The state has a large network of rivers consisting of Ganga, Yamuna, Ghaghra, Saryu,
Ramganga, Sharda, Rapti, Gandak, Gomti etc. These constitute perennial sources of water
for the state. However, these rivers also cause serious floods during the months of August
and September in most of the districts in the state. The major dams in the state are listed
below:

1. Matatila Dam is constructed on Betwa River in Lalitpur District

2. Parichha Dam is also built on the Betwa River near Parichha town, which is
about 25 km from Jhansi. Its reservoir - a placid stretch of water that runs to
Notghat Bridge, 34 km away from Jhansi - is ideal for water sports.

3. Rihand Dam is built on Rihand River, a tributary of River Sone,

at Pipri in Sonbhadra District, near the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh. It also produces power with its 6 units, each of 50 M.W. Many other
seasonal and perennial rivers join the Rihand reservoir such as River Kanchan,
Mayar and Azir.
4. Jamini Dam is constructed on Jamini River in Lalitpur District.
5. Rohini Dam is constructed on Rohini River in Lalitpur District.
6. Shahzad Dam is located on the outskirts of Lalitpur. It is built across the
Shahzad River, a tributary of the Jamini River. It is a major source for irrigation
in Lalitpur District and a major tourist attraction in the region.
7. Govind Sagar Dam too is constructed on Shahzad River in Lalitpur District.
8. Sajnam Dam, is constructed across the River Sajnam, a tributary of the Jamini
near Chandawali in Lalitpur District. It is a major irrigation source and also a
tourist attraction.
9. Sukma-Dukma Dam is constructed on Betwa River near Jhansi District.
10. Arjun Dam is an earthen type dam on Arjun river at Charkhari, about 20 km
from Mahoba.
11. Lakheri Dam, in Jhansi district, provides irrigation facilities to the villages in the
region and is a major source of water in Garautha tehsil.
12. Maudaha Dam, situated in Rath tehsil of Hamirpur district, is constructed across
the Birma River, a tributary of the Betwa River. Apart from irrigation, Maudaha
Dam provides drinking water to the larger parts of the region.
13. Obra Dam, situated in the outskirts of Sonbhadra, across the Rihand River,
supplies water to the Obra Thermal Power House. The dam also has hydel power
generation capacity of 99 MW.
 14. Rajghat Dam, constructed on the Betwa River at 22 kms from Lalitpur, is a joint
venture of the Governments of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.

2.6 Demography
2.6.1 Population
The total population of Uttar Pradesh, as per 2001 Census is 166,197,921 comprising of
87,565,369 males and 78,632,552 females. 79.21 percent resides in the rural areas. The
total number of households comes to 25,757,640. The average size of households in the
state is 6. The proportion of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe population to the total
population in the state comes to 21.1 and 0.1 respectively. The density of the state stands
at 690 persons per sq. kms. A map showing density by districts in the state is given below:

Population Density by Districts

2.6.2 Religious Communities

Major religious communities are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist and Jain. As
much as 80.61% are Hindus followed by 18.50% Muslims. The population of other
religious communities is negligible. There are 24 districts with a higher population of
Muslims than the state average. The top five such districts are: Rampur (49.14%),
Moradabad (45.54%), Bijnor (41.71%), Jyotiba Phule Nagar (39.38%) and Saharanpur
(39.11%). Other districts with more than state average of Muslim population are
Muzaffarnagar, Balrampur, Bahraich, Bareilly, Meerut, Siddharthnagar, Shrawasti, Baghpat,
Sant Kabir Nagar, Ghaziabad, Pilibhit, Barabanki, Budaun, Bulandshahr, Lucknow,
Gonda, Sitapur, Kheri and Mau.
2.6.3 Sex Ratio
It is the number of females per 1000 males in a given area and is indicative of the
condition of females in the society. The Indian Census also provides the sex ratio in the
age group 0-6 so as to gauge the discrimination between the boy and the girl child. The
sex ratio of the state is 898 while that in the age group 0-6 is 916. There is a difference of
18 points in the sex ratio of two age groups. It indicates that more care is taken in
upbringing of male child than that of a female child. The four districts in UP with a female
dominated sex ratio are Azamgarh (1020), Jaunpur (1014), Pratapgarh (1004) and Deoria
(1002). The lowest sex ratios have been recorded in Shahjahanpur (842), Budaun (842),
Gautam Buddha Nagar (841) and Mathura (840).

2.6.4 Literacy and Education

The literacy rate of the state is quite low at 56.3%. Uttar Pradesh ranks 17th in literacy rate
among 19 major states. The state has an identical female literacy rank among the major
states with 42.20%. Among districts, Kanpur Nagar (74.37%), Auraiya (70.50%) and
Ghaziabad (69.74%) have the highest overall literacy rate. The lowest ranked are Bahraich
(35.16%), Balrampur (34.60%) and Shrawasti (33.82%). In female literacy, the top three
districts are Kanpur Nagar (67.46%), Lucknow (60.47%) and Auraiya (59.13%), while the
lowest three are Bahraich (22.78), Balrampur (21.79%) and Shrawasti (18.58%). A map
showing female literacy is given below:

50 District Wise Female

47.8
46.1
Literacy Rate
49.2 53.1
58 34.6 33 27.9
35.1
18.6-28.0 53.7 42.5 35.2
25.1 35.4
43 36.3
28.1-35.0 43.4 46.3 39.3
22.8 18.6
34.6 21.8
48.6 36.8 27.1 27.9
35.1-40.0 50.9 51.4 27.2
48.3 49.2 34.3 29.6
57.4 60.5 36.9 34.9
59.1 41.6 42.3 42.9
40.1-50 54.6 67.5 45.3 42.5
39.3 40.9
49.2 43.4 48.7
41.9 41.5 43.2
50.1-67.5 40.1 44.1
44
50.2 36.8 29.8
53
36.4 46.4 38.4
50.3 44.1
39.3
33
33.7

2.6.5 Educational Level

4.3% of all literates in the State are without any formal education level. These persons
have not achieved any educational level but can read and write with understanding as per
the 2001 Census. It means they have not attended any formal school. 25.4% of the
literates are educated up to below primary and 24.7% up to primary levels. Thus, over half
of the literates have not completed school education beyond primary level. Those
achieving middle and Matric / Secondary level of education are 18.9 and 12.0%. It may be
seen that 56.3% are literate and of those as many as 85.4 % have either achieved a level
below matriculation or none at all. Thus only about 8% of the total population has
received education beyond secondary level. Among the two major religious communities,
Hindus appear to be marginally better educated. The table given below presents full
details.

8.28%
6.76%

10.64%
43.70%
Illiterates
No formal education level
Below primary level
13.91% Primary level
Middle level
Secondary level
Beyond secondary level
14.30% 2.42%

Educational Level in the Two major Religious Communities in UP

All Religions Hindus Muslims
Educational Level
P M F P M F P M F
Literates to total population 56.3 68.8 42.2 58.0 71.2 43.1 47.8 57.3 37.4
Literate with no education 4.3 4.0 4.9 3.7 3.5 4.1 7.7 6.8 9.1
Below primary 25.4 23.1 29.6 24.2 21.9 28.5 32.5 30.2 36.5
Primary 24.7 23.2 27.3 24.1 22.4 27.3 28.1 28.3 27.9
Middle 18.9 20.1 16.8 19.8 20.8 17.8 14.6 16.2 11.8
Matric/Secondary 12.0 13.4 9.5 12.6 14.1 9.9 8.6 9.4 7.2
HS / Inter / Pre-U / SS 7.9 8.6 6.5 8.4 9.2 6.9 4.6 4.8 4.3
Others not equal to Degree 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.2
Graduate & above 6.6 7.3 5.1 7.0 7.9 5.4 3.6 4.0 3.0

2.6.6 Socio-economic profile

With population of 16.6 million in 2001, the State has 16.17% of the country’s population
living on 240,928 sq. kms, which is 7.3 % of the country’s area. The population density as
is 689 per sq. km while the national average is 324 per sq. km. Largest sector is agriculture,
it employs 72 % of the labour force and accounts for 46 percent of the state income.
Although predominantly an agriculture driven state and the largest producer of food
grains, UP is the third poorest in terms of per capita production of food grains as well as in
terms of growth rate in the production of food grains.

Uttar Pradesh ranks low on most of the social development indicator in spite of being the
most populous state in the country. The state domestic product increased @ 3% during
1997-2002 against national average of 5.3% during same period. The state’s contribution
in National Income according to quick estimates for 2002-2003 was 8.3%, placing UP
among poorest states in the country.

In 1973-74, the number of persons below the poverty line was 53.5 million, which were
about 57 percent of the states’ population. It was about 16.7 % of the total number of
persons living below poverty line in the entire country. The number of persons living
below poverty line is 31.15 % in 1999-2000 compared to all India 26.10%. Out of this the
poverty ratio in rural areas is 31.22 % and that is the urban areas 30.89 %. It is revealed
that though there is a significant declining trend, yet the number of persons living below
poverty line in the state remains above 50 millions within a span of 27 years. About 41
million population below poverty line lives in rural area.

2.7 Economic Activity

The work participation rate or WPR (work population rate is arrived at by dividing the
number of workers with 28.2

33.1 Work Participation Rate

total population) in the 32.7 29.9
28.2

28.5 31.9 31 28.3

state is 32.5 percent as per

28
30.3 40.3 30.3

30 31.4
30.6 28.6
35.5 41.4

the results of 2001 Census. 27.2-29.9 37.2 29.3 28.8

29.5
31.1 42.4
32.3 38.1 39.1
27.2 27.5 34
27.2 32.9 36.8 34.2
30.0-32.3 29.8 35.3 34.4
The male WPR is 46.8 27.5
32.9
32.8 29.9
34.3 39.4

32.1
33.4
30.1
28.5

32.4-36.0 36
35.6
30.5 32.3

percent while that for 33.5 28.8

37.7
39.2 31.1
31.4
37 40.3 39.2
36.1-43.2 42.3
42.3
33.9 28.7 31.3
32.1
females is only 16.5. The 43.2
33.8

36.8

economy in Uttar Pradesh

is basically agricultural. Thus, the proportion of workers engaged in cultivation, whether as
cultivators or agricultural labourers, is as high as 65.9%. The proportion of Household
Industry workers is 5.6%. Rest 28.5 % is engaged in the category of other workers which
includes the secondary and tertiary sectors. A map showing Work Participation Rate by
district is presented in the graphic on this page.

2.7.1 Agriculture
Uttar Pradesh economy is primarily agrarian in nature. Agriculture contributes about 40
percent to the state gross domestic production as against 25 percent at the national level.
This sector engages over 70 percent of the population and 65 percent work force in the
state. State has a geographical area 24.2 million hectares and out of this 16.8 million
hectares area is actually cultivated. The un-irrigated area is 3.98 million hectare. The state is
geographically located in the most fertile tract of indo-gangetic plains. The state has good
soils and water availability through rainfall and river flow.

Uttar Pradesh is largest producer of wheat in the country contributing about 36 percent of
the all India production whereas UP is second largest producer of rice, contributing about
15 percent to the national production. The area under these crops is predominantly less
than the contribution in terms of production. UP is the second largest pulses producing
state in India, contributing to about 45 percent of national production; but its production
falls short of what is needed to feed its population. Similarly, in oilseed crops, state is
contributing about 18 percent production of rapeseed / mustard. State also contributes
about 45 percent sugarcane production in the country. The state is largest producer of
potato with about 40 percent of national production while its contribution of mango and
guava are about 40 and 46 percent respectively. In all, the state produces about 10 million
tonnes of fruits and 17 million tonnes of vegetables.

2.7.2 Industry
Uttar Pradesh ranks fifth in the country both in terms of number of factories and of
invested capital. In 2003-04 it had 9,237 factories, comprising 7.2% of total 129,074
factories in India. Growth of industry in UP is not keeping pace with the national growth
rate. During 2003-06 UP received only 5 approvals of total 213 industry parks approved in
the country.
Uttar Pradesh has 65,538 SSI units i.e., 11.3% of all SSI units in India and ranks fourth in
the country in number of SSIs. It has one operational special economic zone at Noida and
three approved and under establishment SEZs, one for textiles at Moradabad, and two
multi-product SEZs at Bhadohi and Kanpur.

The industrial growth of Uttar Pradesh has been primarily driven by four factors, namely,
the traditional skills of local artisans (carpets, brassware, bangles etc), availability of
agriculture produce as industrial inputs (sugar, alcohol, other downstream chemicals), its
proximity to national capital and huge population and large tracts of agricultural land that
offer a big market for many manufactured produce. The first three growth drivers have
contributed to concentrated pockets of industrialization.

Terai region has a number of sugar mills and a few chemical units that use molasses as
feed. Kanpur / Agra have well developed leather industry, Eastern UP has weaving –
textiles and carpets, Moradabad has brassware, Shikohabad has bangles and Khurja has
ceramic potteries. Ghaziabad, a district adjoining the national capital has a large number of
manufacturing units and newly developed NOIDA has forged ahead in services sector.
UP State Industrial Development Corporation (UPIDC) has created a number of
industrial states, which have attracted many prestigious industries. UP also has Hindalco,
one of the major aluminium manufacturers of the country at Renukoot and an atomic
power plant at Narora.

Manufacturing however is the last in contribution to the State Gross Domestic Product.
In 2004-05 secondary sector (manufacturing) accounted for 24% of SGDP, primary sector
(mostly agriculture) contributed 33% and, tertiary sector comprising transportation,
communication, banking, real estate and other services, contributed maximum at 43%.
The growth rate of the States SGDP, in line with the trend in national income, had risen
from a 1% in 2000-01 to 5.8% in 2002-03. It stood at 4.8% during the year 2004-05. Over
the five-year period (2000-05), tertiary sector posted a compounded annual growth rate of
5.5%; secondary sector at 4.4%, and primary sector grew at just 1.8%. Per Capita Income
of the state, at 2004-2005 prices, stands at Rs.11477.

2.7.3 Mines
Uttar Pradesh has limestone in Mirzapur and Sonebhadra districts; dolomite in Mirzapur,
Sonebhadra and Banda districts, glass-sand in Allahabad Banda and Mau districts;
marble in Mirzapur and Sonebhadra districts; bauxite in Banda; non-plastic fireclay in
Mirzapur; and Uranium in Lalitpur district. Besides, Barytes and Edalusite are found in
the districts of Mirzapur and Sonbhadra. Southern parts of Sonbhadra district also have
sizeable coal deposits mined by Northern Coalfields Limited, a public sector company
with headquarters in Chhattisgarh. Sand-stone, pebbles, reh, salt punter, morang, sand
and other minor minerals are also found in the State. Mirzapur – Sonbhadra area can be
considered as the most significant mining belt of the state.

2.8 Health Infrastructure

Health infrastructure in the State is far from adequate, as would be evident from this table:

Particulars Required In place Shortfall

Sub-Centres (SCs) 26344 20521 5823
Primary Health Centres (PHCs) 4390 3660 730
Community Health Centres (CHCs) 1097 386 711
MPW (Female)/ANM at SCs & PHCs 24181 21900 2281
Health Worker (Male) MPW(M) at SCs 20521 5732 14789
Health Assistant (Female)/LHV at PHCs 3660 2128 1532
Health Assistant (Male) at PHCs 3660 4061 -
Doctor at PHCs 3660 NA NA
Obstetricians & Gynaecologists at CHCs 386 123 263
Physicians at CHCs 386 123 263
Paediatricians at CHCs 386 13 373
Total specialists at CHCs 1544 413 1131
Radiographers 386 NA NA

2.9 Transport and communication

2.9.1 Roads
The state has the largest road network in the country after Maharashtra. There are 31
National Highways (NH), with a total length of 4,942 km (8.5% of total NH length in
India). Total road length in the state is 248,481 km (2002), of which 67% (166,659 km) is
surfaced and has the largest surfaced urban road network in the country i.e. 50,721 km, as
on 2002. Besides total road length of PWD in the state is 118946 km. This includes 3869
km of national highways, 9097 km of state highways, 105980 of other district roads and
72,931 km of rural roads.

2.9.2 Railway
The state has the largest railway network in India with a total length of 8546 kms. Almost
all the major as well as small cities in Uttar Pradesh are linked through railways. Cargo
carried within the northern and north-eastern zone of the railways is approximately 133
million tonnes. Lucknow is the main junction of the northern network. Other important
railway junctions are Agra, Kanpur, Allahabad, Mughalsarai, Jhansi, Moradabad, Varanasi,
Tundla, Gorakhpur, Gonda, Faizabad, Bareilly and Sitapur.

2.9.3
Airports
Uttar Pradesh
is well
connected to
Delhi and
other cities in
India. Uttar
Pradesh has
various
medium and
small sized
airports that have the facility to operate and host flights. Some of the major cities that are
connected through Air-service are Lucknow, Kanpur, Varanasi, Jhansi, Allahabad, Agra,
Bareilly, Hindon (Ghaziabad), Gorakhpur, Sarsawa (Saharanpur) and Fursatganj
(Raebareli). All these cities have airports, some (notably Lucknow, Varanasi, Agra, Jhansi)
host flights from major cities in India. Varanasi and Lucknow have International Airports.
Among the domestic airports, Lucknow is the best in terms of connection and
infrastructure. The city is well connected to almost all the major destinations in India such
as Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Agra, Jaipur, Varanasi and
Patna among others.

2.10 Disaster Vulnerability of Uttar Pradesh

The physiographic profile of the state, described in details in this Chapter, bring to fore
the following issues regarding its disaster vulnerability and challenges it may face in
managing a disaster:

Natural disasters: Among the natural disasters, many are caused by weather factors –
floods, storms, tsunami, hurricanes etc. UP, not being a coastal state is not exposed to
tsunamis or seasonal hurricanes that form over seas. State is however exposed to the
following natural disasters:
 Lying in close proximity to the Himalayan Range exposes UP to earthquake risks
 Dependence on rain fed agriculture over vast areas exposes the state to droughts
 Its riparian system exposes it to floods
 Western agricultural districts of the state are also exposed to locusts

Man made disasters: Population mix, concentration of industries, international borders,

dams over rivers – all aggravate the potential threats from man made disasters.
 The population mix of the state gives rise to occasional communal clashes
 Long and porous international border makes it an easy target for anti national
elements
 An atomic power plant in the state keeps the risks of a Cherbonyl type disaster
looming over the horizon
 The number of large and medium sized dams / reservoirs expose UP to the
disasters arising from dam-bursts
 Concentration of industries in certain areas (and consequent mobility of
population) may assist and promote simmering dissatisfaction among large
number of peoples and lead to civil disturbance

The socio economic features of the state – low literacy level in certain districts and huge
gaps in health infrastructure pose challenges in managing a disaster situation. It is not
improbable that in certain villages of Eastern districts there might not be any person
capable of understanding leaflets containing instructions on dealing with a disaster
situation. Moreover, low education levels make a population more susceptible to
machinations of anti national elements.
Inadequacies in health care system – both of trained persons and infrastructure – make it
necessary to move casualties over large distances for proper treatment. This can be a big
challenge during floods when roads may get submerged and large tracts get cut off.
Concentration of industries and changes in the level of industrialization across the state
have impacted the dynamics of labour migration with consequent effects on the social
fabric that need to be kept in view while formulating any disaster management plans.

Against this background, three major causes of potential disasters in the state are
described briefly.

2.10.1 Earthquakes
An earthquake is a series of vibrations on the earth’s surface. It occurs without warning. It
can cause grave damage to life and wreck the economy with long lasting adverse effects.
Thus years of development gains may be lost in just a few seconds of a high intensity
earthquake.

Earthquakes are caused due to the moving plates below the surface of the earth. Major
earthquakes often occur around the edges of the moving plates and at other weak places in
the crust called faults. Based on these faults the whole country is divided into Seismic
Zones; Zone V being the highest risk zone. UP does not have any area falling under Zone
V. The districts falling under Zones II, III and IV are noted below. The entire Himalayan
Region is considered to be vulnerable to high intensity earthquakes

Zone IV : Entire districts of Saharanpur, Muzaffarnagar, Bagpat, Bijnor, Meerut,

Ghaziabad, Gautambuddh Nagar, JP Nagar, Rampur, Moradabad, Bulandshar,
Shravasti, Balrampur, Siddharthnagar, Maharajganj, Kushinagar, and parts Of Pilibhit,
Shajahanpur, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Mathura, Aligarh, Budaun, Bareilly, Basti, Sant
Kabir Nagar, Deoria and Ballia.

Zone III: Entire districts of Sonbhadra, Chandauli, Ghazipur, Varanasi, Jaunpur,

Azamgarh, Gorakhpur, Sultanpur, Raebareli, Faizabad, Unnao, Lucknow, Barabanki,
Sitapur, Hardoi, Kannauj, Mainpuri, Firozabad, Etah, Mahamayanagar, Farukkabad,
and parts of Mirzapur, Pratapgarh, Kanpurnagar, Auraiya, Etawah, Agra, Mathura,
 Aligarh, Badaun, Bareilly, Pilibhit, Kheri, Baharaich, Gonda, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar,
Deoria and Ballia.

Zone II : Entire districts of Lalitpur, Jbansi, Mahoba, Jalaun, Banda, Kausambi,

Seismic Zones in Uttar Pradesh

Zone IV

Zone III

Zone II

Overlapping
Z IV & Z III

Overlapping
Z III & Z II

Allahabad and parts of Agra, Etawah, Auraiya, Kanpur Nagar, Fatehpur, Pratapgarh
and Mirzapur.
(The overlapping zones showed in the map above indicate that the whole district does not
fall into a single zone.)

2.10.2 Flood Prone Areas

Floods are a chronic problem of the state, causing damage to crops, life and property.
Flood waters during the rainy season often disrupt transport systems. The most severe
floods were in 1971, when 51 of the 54 districts of the state were affected.
The eastern districts are the most susceptible to floods, the western districts somewhat
less and the central region markedly less. The eastern district's proneness to floods is
attributed, among other things, to heavy rainfall, low and flat topography, high subsoil
water level and the silting of beds which causes river levels to rise. The problem in the
western districts is mainly poor drainage caused by the obstruction of roads, railways,
canals, new built-up areas etc. There is water logging in the large areas. The major flood-
prone rivers are the Ganga, Jamuna,Gomati ,Ghaghra ,Rapti, Sarda, Gandak and
Ramganga. (Source: NDMA Guidelines)
 Area vulnerable to floods

The Ganga River basin of U.P. experiences normal rainfall in the region from 60 cm to
190 cm of which more than 80% occur during the southwest monsoon. The rainfall
increases from west to east and from south to north. Similar is the pattern of floods, the
problem increases from west to east and south to north. Out of the 240.93 lakh hectares
geographical area of the State about 73.06 lakh hectares is flood prone. As per the
Irrigation Department’s estimate, only 58.72 lakh can actually be protected. Up to March
2004, only 16.01 lakh hectares has been protected. The eastern districts as well as those
situated in the Terai region bordering Nepal are the most affected. Due to floods, an
average of 26.89 lakh hectares is affected annually, and the estimated loss to crops, houses
and livestock is to the tune of Rs.432 crore annually. Apart from these, loss of human life
also occurs.

2.10.3 Drought Prone Areas

Drought is generally considered to be occurring when the principal monsoons fail or are
deficient or scanty. Monsoon failure results in crop failure, shortage of drinking water as
well as undue hardship to the rural and urban community. Drought is declared for each
state or part(s) of a state by the State Government under the Relief Manuals or similar
documents of the State Government. Declaration of drought is primarily based on the
quantum of rainfall, damage to kharif crops and lesser availability of drinking water and
less moisture in the soil. It may be mentioned that there is no universally accepted
definition of drought.

The identified drought prone districts of UP are Allahabad, Banda, Hamirpur, Jalaun,
Mirzapur and Varanasi, Hathras, Mainpuri, Bareilly, Hardoi, Unnao, Rae Bareli,
Farrukhabad, Kannauj, Kanpur Dehat, Fatehpur, Sultanpur, Basti, Sant Kabir Nagar,
Kushinagar, Deoria, Mau, Ballia, Jaunpur and Ghazipur.

PART II: DISASTER SPECIFIC

COMMUNAL RIOTS

Chapter 3
Vulnerability Assessment and Risk Analysis
3.1 What is a Communal Riot?
A riot is "a violent disturbance of the peace by an assembly or body of persons". It
becomes a communal riot if disturbance of peace is caused by distinct community(ies) and
is aimed at other distinct community(ies). A group of persons stopping traffic and burning
vehicles will be described as riotous behaviour, it will assume communal overtone only if
the rioting group belongs to a distinct community and its fury is aimed at properties
belonging to members of another distinct community.

Usually, in the Indian context a communal riot implies violent behaviour of the two major
communities – Hindus and Muslims. In past few decades, however, on several occasions
Sikh and Christian communities too have faced the ire of Hindu mobs.

A communal riot often flares up with a seemingly insignificant incidence. However, once
started, the speed at which the violence spreads suggests that the violent activities were
pre-planned with logistic support already put in place. Thus even if the insignificant
incidence that triggered the violence were spontaneous the subsequent follow up
behaviour was not so. The cause of riot, then, cannot be the minor incidence that
triggered it but some deep underlying forces that had kept the communities in
preparedness for violence.

3.2 Why do riots occur?

An SDMP on communal riots, if it is to be based on the cultures of prevention and

preparedness, must look into the causes of communal riots. A lot of works in this field has
been done by academics, journalists and at times politicians. Their findings are rarely same.
However, it is almost universally agreed that the immediate / proximate causes of riots
often hide the true causes that emanate from the social structure and historical forces.
Determining the true cause can be a very involved issue as different causes may surface at
different levels of enquiry.

It is useful to examine the causality at three levels. The first constitute the incidences that
trigger violence, referred to as the primary cause. Such incidences can be spontaneous or
can be outcome of some planning. Teasing a girl of another community would perhaps be
a spontaneous act; in many cases no more than a youthful excess. Playing music in front
of a masjid during prayers can perhaps never be a spontaneous act of vandalism. Some
careful planning usually precedes such acts. Perpetrators anticipate reactions and plan
countermoves. Very often the motive is visible - a message to the opposition community
for a local leadership issue, asserting rights over some local resource such as a river ghat,
consolidating own community (in the wake of a communal clash) for an upcoming
election and so on. The leadership issue, local resource or the upcoming election manifest
the secondary cause. Primary and secondary causes, jointly, can be taken as immediate or
proximate causes. These proximate causes must be covered in an SDMP on Communal
Riots.

The third level of enquiry into why riots occur seeks causality in social structure and
historical forces. This would perhaps fall beyond the scope of a DMP. It still needs to
understood by those managing riots as it often provides the perspective to see patterns in
sporadic events occurring at distant places at different points in time. Removing such
forces or even diminishing their intensities belongs to the realm of polity. Still, police the
PA for controlling riots may have a crucial role.

For example, a riot can be seen to arise out of (justified?) majority resentment against a
minority's alleged disloyalty to or betrayal of the country. Then measures to curb the
minority’s demands and to put its disloyal members in their place would be the required
response. Another example, if riots are seen as a consequence of provocation of a
harassed minority by militant Hindu nationalists, then measures to be taken would be to
protect the minority and constrain militant Hindu groups. In both cases the remedial
measures fall well within the domain of the police.

At this stage, it should be noted that such analysis of underlying causes may give rise to
another complexity. If a riot is interpreted as a result of the outrage felt by one community
on, say, disloyalty / betrayal revealed by another then this very interpretation would contribute
to the failure to prosecute the perpetrators of violence even when their identities are well
known.

3.3 Theories of Ethnic Violence

There are three major theories to explain presence or absence of ethnic violence in mixed
communities. The theories are based on a) inter-ethnic associational ties, b) political
incentives and c) intra-ethnic self policing.
First theory argues that associational ties between Hindus and Muslims prevent communal
riots. Proponents of this theory have found evidences that cities with strong inter-ethnic
associational activities have remained peaceful during periods of Hindu-Muslim tension
though the smallest incidents exploded into major riots in cities that lacked such inter-
ethnic civic life.

According to the second theory electoral incentives are the best predictor of whether or
not a riot will occur. Politicians, who control the police and security forces, give clear
orders to prevent them, only when it suits them. It depends on how important the
minority vote is for the incumbent parties / coalition partners in power.

The third model holds that riots can be prevented with intra-ethnic self policing; i.e.
through a mechanism in which community leaders punish community members guilty in
inter-ethnic disputes. This often fails because inter-ethnic information links are weaker
than the intra-ethnic ones.

3.4 Hazard risk assessment and vulnerability mapping

HPC report defines hazard as “a rare event that threatens to adversely affect human life
property of activity to the extent of causing disaster’ and risk as “the expected loss
(casualties, damage to property, and disruption of economic activity or livelihood) caused
by a particular phenomenon”. Risk, naturally, is product of likely loss in case of the
occurrence of the hazardous event and the probability of the occurrence of the event
itself. The two aspects – extent of likely loss and the probability of the occurrence of risk
events are considered separately.

3.4.1 Extent of likely loss: Communal riots invariably cause loss of human lives and
destruction of properties. A riot may thus take away the gains of several decades of
development and put the community back. While it is not possible to accurately estimate
the losses arising from a potential riot at any place, a rough assessment of likely loss can be
made with the following indicators:
a. Loss of human lives will usually vary with the density of people living in the
locality. More crowded areas are likely to suffer higher loss of human lives. An
 attack by a riotous mob on cinema halls, places of worship during festivals, railway
stations, educational institutions etc may take very high tolls of human lives.
b. Isolated, unprotected dwellings are easier to be broken into by rioters. Existence
of such isolated dwellings – isolation could be geographical (with no houses
nearby) or social - a house belonging to a member of one community surrounded
by houses belonging to the members of another community, increase the hazard
risk.
c. Finally, loss of human lives can be significantly higher in an area which becomes
inaccessible due to any reason or in an area with inadequate medical facilities.
d. Extent of loss of properties will first depend on existence of properties. This
increases the hazard risk of cities compared to that of towns and so on.

3.4.2 Probability of occurrence of a riot: Notwithstanding the pan-national social

structure and historical forces that have kept communal violence alive for centuries, study
of past riots have revealed some pointers. Analysis of these pointers may help assess the
probability of a riot at different centres.
a. The first is the demographic profile of the centre. Mobs do not form if they feel
threatened by an overwhelming opposition. Such opposition can come from large
population of the opposite community. Accordingly, communal riots rarely take
place at a centre overwhelmingly populated by any one community. On the other
hand, such centres where one community forms more than, 25-30% of the
population (but less than 70%) are far more vulnerable than centres that have over
80% population belonging to one community.
b. Another major cause is existence of a dispute between two communities. The
dispute may be due to economic reasons – sharing of a natural resource, owning
some property etc. It can also be over some place of worship, or perceived rights
etc. The underlying dispute mutates into communal violence from time to time.
Thus some centres have history of communal violence and are know as riot prone
centres.
c. In recent times communal violence is seen to be erupting over religious
conversion or re-conversions; thus wherever conversions are seen to be going up
unusually, communal tension should be expected to rise.
Against this backdrop, vulnerability risk mapping of the State has been done. The
parameters considered are the population size, its demographic profile and the history of
communal violence observed over the past few decades. (Economic significance of a city
/ urban agglomerate is captured in its population size.) History of riots has been
considered on a scale of 1 to 5 and risk on a scale of 1 to 10.

Towns/Urban Population Hindu Muslim History Assessed

agglomerates in lacs (%) (%) risk hazard
1 Kanpur 27.16 77.4 20.4 5 10
2 Varanasi 12.04 69.5 29.8 5 9
3 Meerut 11.62 62.5 34.6 5 8
4 Moradabad 6.42 50.1 48.5 5 8
5 Saharanpur 4.56 51.9 44.2 5 8
6 Firozabad 4.33 57.5 39.1 5 8
7 Maunath Bhanjan 2.13 42.2 57.5 5 8
8 Lucknow 22.46 72.7 25.5 3 7
9 Aligarh 6.69 57.4 41.0 4 7
10 Muzaffarnagar 3.32 59.1 37.9 4 6
11 Sambhal 1.82 22.8 76.9 4 6
12 Bareilly 7.48 59.6 38.1 3 5
13 Gorakhpur 6.23 78.0 20.6 3 5
14 Farrukhabad-
cum-Fatehgarh 2.43 75.3 23.2 3 5
15 Hapur 2.12 68.2 30.0 3 5
16 Faizabad 2.08 78.8 19.8 3 5
17 Bahraich 1.68 43.1 55.8 3 5
18 Amroha 1.65 26.8 72.6 3 5
19 Jaunpur 1.60 66.0 33.3 3 5
20 Modinagar 1.40 91.8 6.4 3 5
21 Mughalsarai 1.16 82.1 16.0 3 5
22 Chandausi 1.04 74.8 24.4 3 5

Extent of damage also depends on the level of violence observed in a riot. Historically
riots in Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi, Kanpur and Aligarh have been very violent.
Further, with eruption of riots in these centres, communal tension gets built in nearby
centres which unless promptly resolved may take an ugly turn. Most of these smaller
centres do not have much of a history of independent riots, their vulnerability mainly
arises from their proximity (both geographical and socio-economical) to major riot prone
centres . The following table lists centres where communal tension gets spilled over:

Major Riot Prone Centre Satellite centres

 Varanasi Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Azamgarh, Mughalsarai
Meerut Bulandshahr, Modinagar, Saharanpur
Aligarh Hathras,
Moradabad Chandausi, Amroha, Muzaffarnagar, Sambhal,
Saharanpur

In past communal tensions at Meerut and Moradabad have been known to feed on each other; however,
since 1990 Meerut has not witnessed communal riots as seen earlier.
3.5 The probable causes

The National Police Commission in its 6th Report has covered Communal Riots in details
and has numerated some of the proximate causes for the riots, classified under the
following broad heads:

1. Religious
a. Playing of music before mosques and other places of Muslim worship either
during prayer or afterwards ;
b. Claiming of a place, as a place of worship, by both the communities ;
c. Desecration of a place of worship of the Muslim by the Hindu or vice versa ;
d. Killing or alleged killing of a cow or an animal held sacred by Hindus, by a
member of the Muslim community ; and
e. Desecration of a religious congregation by some loitering animals abhorred by a
community.
2. Personal
a. Alleged molestation or rape of a woman of one community by a member of the
other community;
b. Assault on a member of one community by a member of the other community,
though the assault might itself be due to some private quarrel;
c. Quarrel between a tenant of one community with a landlord of the other
community;
d. Dispute between two neighbours belonging to different communities over some
minor matter; and
e. In some of the recent incidents, buying of property in urban areas for
commercial exploitation had created serious tensions. Properties have to be sold
at a price below the market price, because they carry some legal encumbrances.
Efforts to remove these encumbrances particularly of those caused by the
 members of the opposite community rouse communal passions which may lead
to communal riots

3. Reactive
a. A reaction to a situation which happens elsewhere in the country; and
b. A reaction generally by Muslims to some incidents taking place outside the
country; this reaction normally manifests in large processions by the Muslims
which creates a sense of insecurity and fear in the minds of the opposite
community (for example, reaction or the Muslims to the desecration of the A1
Aqua mosque in Jerusalem).

4. Ritual
a. Taking out of customary processions by the Hindus during Durga Puja, Ganapati
and other festivals, and by the Muslims on the occasion of Moharram ;
b. Disputes over the routes to be taken by the processions, the concept of
traditional routes and the insistence by the Muslims that such processions should
not go through their localities;
c. Throwing of Gulal, coloured water and other coloured substances on the
Muslims in and around their places of worship during such processions; and
d. Raising of slogans by both communities on such occasions which are considered
provocative and abusive by the opposite community.

3.6 Dynamics of communal riots

A communal riot may start with an insignificant incident of eve teasing etc. but if the
conditions are conducive it can soon flare up into wide-spread violence. Violence offers
opportunities to the petty criminals to indulge in arson and looting. Anti-social elements
stoke the fire and eventually even the sane community leaders who disparage the anti-
social elements in normal times grudgingly accept them and even give sanction to their
activities.
 DISPUTE

CONFLICT
CONFLICT DIVIDES
ORDINARY
PEOPLE

DIVISION
SUSTAINS
CONFLICT

Rumours constitute another critical factor. With no inter-ethnic communication the

communities accept whatever rumours they hear as truth. This is exploited by the anti-
social elements or their political bosses on both sides. With utter breakdown of public
order and wild rumours floating around communities become hysterical and take leave of
their senses. Even law abiding citizens may actively take part in looting or at least in
sheltering criminals and offering support.

3.7 Emerging Concerns

Growing urbanization, changes in organized sector employment profiles and the change in
the political discourse of the country have clear impacts on riots situation.

3.7.1 Increasing Population Density

There has been a sharp rise in the slum population all across the country. Though not
necessarily under the poverty line, life under such conditions involves misery and lack of
civic amenities. This is likely to produce in them frustration–aggression syndrome
facilitating ethnic violence.
Apart from slum dwellers, a large number of families occupy one room tenements.
Historical prejudices lead to concentration of minority communities in distinct pockets
and often to withdrawal and exclusivist tendency among their members. Given a city’s
historical antecedents and economic and political situation, such demographical changes
created the potential for communal mobilization. All over the world such tendencies draw
the ire of the majority community.

3.7.2 Changing Profile in Organized Sector Employment

Employment in organised sector provides stable jobs. In the wake of economic
liberalization, many established employers have shut down uneconomic manufacturing
facilities and set up new facilities elsewhere driven by the economic incentives offered by
those places. Though new employment opportunities have come up, these opportunities
require a different skill set not usually possessed by the retrenched workers. This causes
hardships to families and generates frustrations among unemployed and poorer sections.
The informal sector, in such times, gains prominence as employer. Often employers in this
sector have no legal existence and are not accountable to any one. The informal sector is
lawless, cruel and harsh. It usually thrives on rank exploitation of workers., who have
neither protection of any labour laws, nor any job security. Workers of this sector are
likely to be among the first victims of communal aggression and, conversely, it is also
probable that they are easily susceptible to be drawn into communal violence.

3.7.3 Changing Political Fabric: The political fabric has changed over the decades. The
earlier themes of parliamentary democracy, respective merits of public versus private
sectors have been replaced by a communal discourse. Originally confined to the
mercantile communities and some forward caste, Hindutva has recently gained currency
and fashionableness and its appeal now cuts across economic strata and caste divisions.
Issues like terrorist incursions from Pakistan, and the alleged appeasement of Muslims for
electoral gains have increasingly helped the acceptance of a militant form of Hindutva
among the Hindus. The Muslims on their part have been driven more and more to assert
their identity. This again has contributed to the Hindutva idiom gaining ground. Thus,
over the years various social, political, economic and demographic factors have prepared
the ground for more communal violence. Often the political factors aggravate the
cleavages between the ethnic groups, functioning as proximate contributory cause for riots
and violence.
3.8 Failures in handling communal riots

The factors encouraging communal violence are multiplying. It cannot be said that the
police has been able to effectively handle the situation. The National Police Commission
has identified a pattern in the failures of police to deal effectively with riot situations.
 Indiscriminate transfer, postings of officers
o Not always posted on objective considerations – officers are known to
hesitate in taking quick and firm decisions and rather seek directions from
higher quarters
o Officers not suitable for field postings have been known to develop
differences with colleagues – there is one reported incidence of a
commissioner rebuking his DM in a police station and another of an SP
being disowned by his sub-ordinates and accused of communal bias
o Posting at times are for too short tenures for adequate assessment of
situation and to notice the minor incidents that precede communal
subsequent tension
o In one riot case, “every one from the SHO onward in the police and the
magistracy were new to the city and had little local knowledge.”
 Inadequate resources
o Many a time police forces get grossly out-numbered
o At times the miscreants have superior fire power
 Unimaginative deployment
o Deployment without adequate briefing
o Dispersed in too small numbers to be an effective force
o Not taking into account the vulnerable areas
o Not keeping sufficient reserve
o Frittering away the resources on unauthorized duties
 Inadequate training
o In one riot case “the force ran away from the scene and locked themselves
in the nearest building. In another incident the police force ran to the
police station and locked themselves there”.
o Junior functionaries of civil departments are often invested with
magisterial authority during riots. They rarely have full knowledge of law,
 or of their powers, duties and responsibilities or any understanding of the
nature of communal riots
 General tendency to hide the true facts – lowering the casualty data has the
opposite effect, it gives rise to rumours and people start believing those rumours.
 Chapter 4

Preventive Measures

4.1 General

Maintenance of law and order is perhaps the first duty, if not the raison d’etre, of State.
Communal violence resembles a law and order problem but is far more insidious. First
signs of communal trouble require the most stringent action to be taken because adopting
lukewarm measures at the early stages often pushes the situation beyond a point of no
return. Preventing a communal riot is far more important than containing it, because if
violence is allowed to erupt it is difficult to suppress without counter-violence and without
the attendant threat to lives and properties of law abiding citizens.

Analyses of past riots give us enough clues on what to expect and how to thwart
communal violence. Existing laws of the land are mostly capable of dealing with
communal situations. The standard procedures already in place are adequate for the
administration to anticipate communal trouble in almost all cases for taking required
measures. Riot scheme of riot plan forms the foundation of such procedures.

Senior functionaries in Home Department and Police Directorate have confirmed that all
the districts in the State prepare District Riot Plans (DRP). DRP being a sensitive
document can be shared only on need to know basis. Officials have confirmed that DRPs
are comprehensive documents covering preparedness activities and response measures.
DRPs, reportedly, contain full particulars of demography, existing disputes between
communities, list of anti-social elements, opinion leaders, list of vulnerable locations, and
also list of safe places where a population group, felt at risk, can be shifted temporarily.
DRPs also have details of hospitals / other providers of medical facilities where wounded
can be taken immediately. It is not known if DRPs provide for riot rehearsals i.e. mock drills
or whether such drills are being carried out.

However, resources are understood to be woefully inadequate, and as described in the

previous chapter, are often deployed unimaginatively and even frittered away on
unauthorized duties. Institutional mechanisms for transfer, posting of officers and for
training of police and magistracy seem to have fallen into disuse (abuse). Thus, in spite of
the procedural environment the culture of prevention and preparedness perhaps falls
short for effectively managing a communal situation.

This being a State Disaster Management Plan, it should mainly concern with the strategic
steps required from State headquarters for anticipating and countering communal
violence. These steps necessarily entail reviewing what is done at the district level. That
necessitates describing the district level procedures in some detail. The next few sections
deal with the district level procedures, drawn largely from MHA Guideline on Communal
Harmony and the report of the 6th National Police Commission. These are followed with
the structural measures needed for giving the desired direction to counter communal
violence.

It may be added that the “administrative problem of handling the communal riots cannot
be separated from the general health of the administration, especially the health of the
police force based on an objective policy of recruitment, promotions, postings and
transfers etc.”

4.2 Agencies involved in managing a communal riot:

Police is the primary agency for communal situations. District administration, magistracy
in particular, also has a key role in managing response operations. Other agencies that
have major role in planning and execution of response operations are intelligence agencies,
armed police (PAC) and army. For this Plan, all agencies other than police (i.e. even the
magistracy) are support agencies. There are other support agencies viz. Department of
Health, Department of Food & Civil Supplies, Directorate of Information & Public
Relations (DIRP), and Department of Revenue (Scarcity), PHED and Fire Service.

Primary Agency’s (PA’s) role encompasses anticipation, preparedness, preventions,

response and finally assistance in recovery. Support agency’s roles are varied. Intelligence
plays a key role in anticipation, district administration (with police) in prevention, PAC
and Army in response, Fire Service in rescue, Health in providing medical care to victims
and responders and F&CS, PHED and Revenue (Scarcity) in relief and DIRP in managing
the information environment.
4.3 Prevention
Prevention is better than cure. Prevention is least costly and most painless if it is achieved
at the earliest stage. Many untoward developments can be detected merely by observing
standard precautionary measures, many more by effective use of the intelligence gathering
machineries. Precautionary measures and intelligence can prevent most of the proximate
causes of riots. But in many cases the proximate cause can be spontaneous such as a
quarrel between a tenant and a landlord of different communities or eve teasing. Even in
such cases there is a lead time before violence erupts. Other preventive measures can
make effective use of this lead time and stop the insignificant incidences from acquiring
threatening proportions.

4.3.1 Precautionary measures

4.3.1.a Regulation: Precautionary measures essentially consist of regulation and restraint.
Regulation measures are normal times procedures. The routine procedures of normal
times such as a well dispersed police-presence in crowds, beat patrols, normal traffic
control etc create a climate that helps in maintaining normalcy; and “normalcy always acts
as an antidote to tension” and prevents the situation from growing beyond breaking point.
State’s capability of protecting the citizens must be visible. If a citizen doubts it, he may
seek protection elsewhere. Thus the strategy should be to strengthen police presence
judiciously to inspire confidence in those who are afraid, and fear in those daring to
challenge the law.

4.3.1.b Riot Scheme

A riot scheme details the course of action of the police in a riot situation. It is prepared
during normal times. It contains various data relating to the area covered by it also
deployment strategies to deal with a riot. Several riot schemes, reportedly, have been
prepared in a routine manner without visualizing the different conditions that may emerge
in a crisis. Many (most) schemes are said to be impracticable. Some of the reasons are:
b. They are designed for an isolated area, not taking into accounts the surroundings.
Communal riots tend to spread quickly. Unless this factor is recognised a riot
scheme may fail in its purpose.
c. Contemplated manpower is not worked out on a realistic basis.
While it may not be possible to conceive of a model riot scheme to cover all possible
situations, the scheme should incorporate at least the following features:
a. Complete background information of the area covered by it
b. List of bad characters with their addresses and with the names of policemen who
will be able to identify them
c. List of locations where trouble could erupt, in order of their importance
d. More vulnerable localities where minority communities and weaker sections
normally reside in sizeable numbers
e. Maximum and minimum scheme of static deployment of the police.
f. Placement of reserves and the maximum and minimum reserves requirements
g. Information on hospitals, fire brigades, and availability of other civic services

The scheme should be carefully and constantly updated. Item (b) would require particular
attention in this regard.

4.3.1.c Regulating vulnerable locations

DRP’s contain, rather start with, profiles of districts. The profile must identify areas prone
to communal sensitivities and tensions and identify them as sensitive or hyper-sensitive.
Each police station should systematically maintain the list of such locations in its
jurisdiction and senior officials at the police station level should periodically visit them for
promoting public contact with the population and meeting community leaders. Police
Stations/Posts should be set up in all such sensitive/trouble-prone areas. Their manpower
requirements should be realistically assessed and no vacancies should be allowed to remain
unfulfilled. These stations / posts should be provided with trained personnel, adequate
weaponry, communication links, vehicles, and equipment for videography.

District Administration should review the situation to anticipate possible developments in

these sensitive areas, and prepare detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and
contingency plans to deal with them to preempt communal situation from turning violent.

4.3.1.d Preventive arrests: Other precautionary measure is restraining such elements as

may be likely to create panic and confusion. This can be brought about by arresting those
who are likely to indulge in acts against public order. But if applied indiscriminately, this
measure can prove counterproductive. District Riot Plans (DRPs) invariably contain the
list of anti-social elements. But the records are not always current. Keeping this list up-to-
date and correct is of critical importance. Equally important is that the police should be
able to identify and arrest them when required. To ensure it, the policemen who would be able to
identify these anti-social elements quickly must be on record.

This list must be prepared very carefully and reviewed regularly to ensure that law-abiding
persons are not included. At many places such lists include names of petty criminals, this
is of little value. The list should contain details of such persons who either by their own
acts or by instigations can create insecurity amongst large sections of a community. There
should be constant vigilance against such persons, even during normal times and on
slightest hint of communal trouble the persons in this list should be taken into preventive
custody. A person, whose antecedents warrant that he should be in the list and under
preventive custody, is found participating in a riot, it can only mean either the police
officers had prepared a defective list or they had failed to take action in time. The
circumstances should be examined and those responsible for this should be punished.

4.3.1.e Peace Committees: Prevention does not stop with increasing police presence or
with arresting anti-social elements. A developing situation can be defused by enlisting
public cooperation. The role of Peace Committees in this regard has been stressed by
several Commissions in the past. The committee should consist of important public men
with considerable local influence, and who are acceptable to both the communities because of their
proven impartiality. The administration should give these committees all assistance so that
they can go round in the area and prevail upon the people to refrain from violent
activities. In sensitive areas with a history of communal riots such peace committees should be constituted
on a permanent basis and the membership of such committees should be constantly reviewed.

4.3.1.f Countering rumours and monitoring media: In a riot situation rumours are set
afloat by interested parties. The administration should, therefore, disseminate correct and
proper information to the public through all available means. Frequent broadcasts of
correct and frank reports of the incidents occurring and of the steps taken by the
administration boost the morale of the people and allay feelings of fear and insecurity in
the population. Unless rumours are checked promptly and effectively the administration
may loose the public’s trust and forfeit its cooperation. The emphasis should be on concrete steps
taken for correcting the situation and not on authoritative demands on the people for cooperation. The
administration must establish its credibility, if it is to get public cooperation in tackling the
situation

The law makes imputations, assertions etc., prejudicial to national integration a punishable
offence. Still, very little action is taken by State Government and local administrations.
Though freedom of the press must be upheld in a democracy, the Government must not
allow mischievous reporting in the press to lead to a breach of peace. Legal provisions
already exist for the control of prejudicial publications. The State Governments and local
administrations need to act impartially and take all legal steps in this sensitive matter.

4.3.2 Intelligence
Clearly, intelligence plays the most crucial role in prevention of communal riots. In far too
many cases post riot analyses have noted total lack of workable intelligence and have
dubbed intelligence failure as one of the causes for eruption of violence.

Intelligence agencies operate both at State and district levels. There is a well established
system of plainclothesmen gathering intelligence. Perhaps, more stress is required on
intelligence gathering / data analysis by uniformed personnel. Many of the failures in the
recent riots were largely due to the negligence of the uniformed staff to monitor
intelligence.

At present the intelligence advices received from State level are often reported to be too
general in nature to be of much practical use. Here too, it is seen that the old system has
fallen in disuse. Police & administration have for long maintained records of various
physical data. If updated regularly, a critical scrutiny of these records, particularly of the
fluctuations therein, can reveal a number of pointers. Such records should be properly
maintained by the police officers in-charge of the districts and police stations. Intelligence
agencies at the district and the State level should look for significant data indicating an
imbalance in any particular area. The district level agency should constantly feed the State
level agency updated data relating to its district. The State level agency should interpret
this data on an aggregate basis for the whole State. With such analysis, the advice of the
State intelligence agencies to the district units would be more precise and useful and would
enable the district administration and police to develop well chalked out plans in advance.
4.3.3 Control Room
A control room is an on-going facility available to the public for communicating with
police authorities. Often the members of public are diffident about contacting the control
room because they feel they would be subjected to annoying interrogation. A control
room can have value in a riot situation only if it functions effectively during normal times.
In addition to equipment, the persons in charge should be polite and competent enough
to assess the information received. If control rooms inspire confidence in the public mind
during normal times then they would receive a vast mass of valuable information during
crisis situations. Control room should have an adequate team of well briefed police
officers who can be expeditiously despatched to a scene of trouble and who can be
expected to deal with it effectively. Briefing of these teams by senior officers in the control
room is an extremely important exercise which should not be neglected.

4.4 Structural measures

4.4.1 Mock Drill: Riot schemes should be rehearsed from time to time so that those
including the para military forces and the Army who have to implement them would know
their roles during a crisis. National Police Commission has recommended the use of "sand
model" exercises, which provide a clear view of the effect the concentration of force in
one area may have upon the adjacent pockets. These exercises would give an idea of the
pattern of mobilisation of forces, which would leave no gaps, and which would leave no
community unprotected. They would also reveal the need of drawing alternative routes
and sitting of reserves at easily accessible points that can be incorporated into the riot
scheme. Such a scheme, properly exercised and updated, could be of great value during a
real crisis situation.

Rehearsing the riot schemes needs to be a compulsory annual activity. This will of course
demand time and financial resources but over all balance lies squarely in favour of the
drills that would bring to fore the impracticalities and shortcomings, if any, in the schemes
and would also institutionalize periodic updating of the scheme.

4.4.2 Operational Difficulty in Preventive Arrests

S 151 of CrPC authorizes a police officer to arrest a person without orders of a magistrate
and without a warrant if the person is known to be designing to commit a cognizable
offence, if the commission of the offence cannot be otherwise prevented. This section is
often invoked to arrest anti-social elements during riot situations. However, operational
difficulty arises, particularly in a riot situation, because of the constitutional requirement
that the person so arrested cannot be held in custody for a period exceeding 24 hours
unless further detention is authorised under any other provisions law. An amendment to
S151 of CrPC may be sought to enable the police to hold a person arrested as above for a
period up to 15 days under orders from a Magistrate.

4.4.3 Transfer and Posting

The efficiency of Administration in handling communal situation cannot be separated
from the general health of the administration. Reportedly officers are transferred and
posted on political pressures. This shakes the faith of the people in the Administration and
the police. Loss of credibility in the government has serious repercussions. As without
active public cooperation, it is just not possible to control communal riots. Therefore, only
specially selected experienced officers with an image of impartiality should be posted to
the communally sensitive districts. They should not normally be transferred before the completion of
their tenure and in any case all district and police officers should not be transferred at the same time.
Sensitive district postings (or any field postings) should be given to only such officers who
have displayed ability to read public behaviour correctly and who possess mature
judgment.

4.4.4 Prosecution for violating curfew

Prosecution for violating a curfew is not easy under the existing law nor does it carry a
deterrent punishment. This encourages anti social elements to break curfew with impunity.
In many cases curfew seems to be a restriction only on laws abiding citizens while
mischief mongers roam about freely. Structural measures are required to remedy it

4.4.5Hardships caused by curfews

Curfew causes considerable hardship to the common citizen because there is no special
agency which can help them if they need to go out, for example, to the hospital. The beat
policeman may not be of help because his mandate is to enforce the curfew and going
away to the hospital may lead to miscreants coming out. There need to be explicit
instructions regarding the procedure for obtaining curfew passes. These should be widely
publicised through radio and other media. There should be many centres, within easy
reach of citizens from where these passes can be issued. Exceptions should be made in
respect of people, going for medical assistance, going to railway station / bus stand to go
out of station, or for some other urgent work. It is also important from riot management
point of view as it would win over a majority of the citizens and enforcement of the
curfew itself would become easier.

4.4.6 Registering offences during riots

Registration of offences is difficult in the chaotic situation that prevails during a riot.
Victims would rarely risk their lives and go to the police station report a crime. Even if a
crime is reported, the police in their preoccupation seldom register the reported offence.
This practice must be corrected. A higher priority to restoration of order should not be
done to the exclusion of other legal functions of the police. Police, therefore, should open
several reporting centres at different points in a riot torn area, under the charge of
competent officers instructed to record all crimes reported to them. The very fact that an
aggrieved party is provided a facility to approach an agent of the law to report its
grievance would increase its confidence in the rule of law, and will help towards restoring
normalcy.
4.4.7 Investigations of offences reported during riots
Investigations of crimes cannot be undertaken during riots. Special investigation teams
(SIT) should be set up to investigate crimes committed in the course of riots. Such teams
should be set up under a State agency. SIT’s should consist of officers of high ability who
could be expected to act without fear or prejudice. These teams should function under the
supervision of a fairly senior officer.

Once a riot comes under control several forces try to interfere in the registration and
investigation of crimes. Many influential people try to prevent initiation of action against
anti-social elements. Non-initiation of action against such offenders destroys the trust of
the local population and emboldens them (anti social elements) to act with more audacity
in future. Investigations should be conducted competently, quickly and impartially.

Often a large number of cases related to crimes reported during riots end in final reports;
convicted cases are usually simple cases in which the accused are caught red handed on the
spot. In most of the complaints, the police are not successful in apprehending the
offenders. Finally, courts often take more than a year for disposal of these cases. Even
setting up of special courts for expeditious trials, has not solved the problem. Perhaps
some special provisions in the law and procedure are required in the investigation and
prosecution of offences committed during communal riots.

4.4.8 Communal representation in Police

In many riot situations, police is said to have played a partisan role. It has been said that to
make police fully representative of the society in which it functions, reservation of
vacancies in the police should be made for minorities and other weaker sections, on the
basis of their share in the population. It is also held by some that doing so would go
against the basic police philosophy that the police as an organ of State have to function
impartially and cannot have any caste or communal approach to a problem. Nevertheless,
there is a strong case for encouraging the recruitment of members of the minority
community and other weaker sections at various levels in the police force. Educational
and other standards, however, must not be diluted for such recruitments. Any inhibition
on the part of the authorities in recruiting members of the minority community in the
police merely because they belong to a particular community should be strongly
discouraged. Police force should truly represent the social structure but such a situation
should be brought about by a competitive, fair, impartial recruitment and training process
and not by a protective process like the reservation of vacancies.
4.4.9 Role of Home Guards
Home Guards are efficiently organised with proper command structure. Home Guards are
generally local people and can play a useful role during riot situations. However, they need
additional training and compensation when they are pressed into such difficult tasks.
Availability and capability of Home Guards in districts should be fully made use of by the
police. In an emergent situation the local authorities themselves should be empowered to
requisition the services of Home Guards by framing appropriate rules for this purpose.

4.5 Training needs

 Policemen
o Combat training
o Weaponry
o Videography and communication
o Motivational programmes
 Station level police officers
o Preparation of riot schemes
o Intelligence gathering
o Force deployment and formation
o Weaponry
o Motivational programmes

 Sub-division and District level police officers

o Preparation of riot schemes
o Intelligence analysis
o Force deployment and formation tactics
o Motivational programmes

 Police Directorate Level

o Intelligence analysis
o Leadership
o Crisis management

 Junior Officers of other civil departments

o Special programme on riot control covering legal provisions, powers and
duties of a magistrate

 PAC
o Annual training for an entire company in one programme.
o Search & rescue in collapsed structures

 Doctors / para-medics with Police / PAC

o Emergency health management
 Chapter 5

Response
5.1 Alert mechanism
In most cases the alert should come from the intelligence wing, unless communal tension
builds up from spontaneous incidences such as eve teasing or stabbing. In such cases if
beat patrolling is practiced the policeman on beat would be among the first to know. If the
culture of communication between public and police is established through control room,
the control room would be the first to know. However, at this stage the beat policeman
or the control room in charge may not be able to fathom the communal overtones the
incidence may acquire.

Such spontaneous acts lead to communal tension only if there exist seeds of discord in the
society. The Station House Officer (SHO), with his well drawn riot scheme showing all
potential trouble spot and constant surveillance of the area analysing the small incidences
reported from there, should be in a position to foresee the coming communal tension. In
any case full blown communal situation will not arise immediately. It takes time, albeit
short, for a crowd to collect.

Threat discerned by

State / Central District Intelligence Station House

Intelligence Agencies Agencies Officer

Districts SCR District Administration

Level declaration by SDMA  Closer regulation of vulnerable localities

 Closer monitoring of anti social
elements’ movements
L1: Monitor the situation  Informal meetings with members of
peace committees
L2: Activate SDMP  Strengthened, wide spread police
presence

L3: Activate SDMP,

Seek central assistance Situation diffused Violence flares up
Immediately the information must be passed on to the District administration, who in
turn would inform the State Control Room in Lucknow. Thus the alert mechanism may
entail information flow from State to district or from district to State. District will activate
the warning phase of its DRP and keep SCR controlled. If the situation is not diffused and
violence erupts, the SCR will define the level of the disaster keeping in view the report of
the intelligence wing and of eh violence eruption(s). The chart depicts the flow of
information and activities. In case of L1, SCR will merely monitor the situation. In case of
L2/L3 the SDMP will be activated.

5.2 Criteria for level definition

If the violence and its ramifications can be brought under the control by the district
administration, it is an L1 situation. If the scale of violence is such as would warrant
intervention from the State level, it would be and L2 situation and in L3 situations Central
government’s intervention becomes necessary. On threat perception, SCR will evaluate
the situation based on inputs from the intelligence agencies and the district and apprise the
SDMA. At the early stages level assessment exercise is necessarily prospective in nature.

In case the threat to communal harmony is caused by a stray spontaneous incidence the
administration must be able to diffuse the situation by firm decisive action even while
being alive to the sensibilities of the two communities. In other case, where threat is
discerned from intelligence reports and some signs of tension are seen in one or more districts
but no response is required from the State level it is still recommended that the situation
be considered as the warning phase of L2 if more than one district report tension and of
L1 if tension is reported by only one district.

Reports of large scale violence will almost always be accompanied with requests from
district administration for units of PAC. Such situations, as they require State level
interventions should be considered as L2.

5.3 Recommended measures

Required measures will depend on the level of the situation and have been described
under different situations. Whereas L1/L2/L3 situations require response measures, L0
situations require normal times activities to be taken up with greater vigil. This being an
SDMP, only State level activities/ measures are described in the following sections.
5.4 L0 Activities
5.4.1 Promoting communal harmony: Meetings of the State level Integration
Committee, under the Chairmanship of the Chief Minister, may be held at least once in a
quarter to review the communal situation in the State.

5.4.2 Intelligence: The old practice of data collection at police station (and even village)
level, which has fallen into disuse should be revived and the State level intelligence
agencies would collect details of physical data every month from all the districts. State
level intelligence agency should interpret the data on a total basis for the whole State. They
would look for significant fluctuations which would indicate an imbalance in any particular
area. This way, the State intelligence agencies’ advices to the districts regarding the
possibilities of tension in their respective areas would be more precise and workable.

5.4.3 Manpower planning: MHA Guidelines on Communal Harmony have reiterated

many recommendations made earlier. In particular the following steps need to be taken on
a continuous basis:

PA:
 All vacancies in police stations / districts in sensitive areas must be filled at all
times
 Composition of the armed police (PAC) battalions should reflect the population
mix of the State. It is all the more important as the impartiality of PAC has often
been questioned.
 Police forces- district police, district reserve police and PAC units- should be sent
for regular trainings. Training programmes must include sessions on motivation,
aimed at inculcating in them the spirit of secularism and communal harmony.
 Joint training programmes of State police forces may be explored with Army and /
or para military forces to ensure better understanding of their respective roles and
stronger coordination during operations.

SA: Health Directorate

  Medical relief teams should be constituted in such a manner that, as far as
possible, members of various communities are represented in it.

5.4.4 Logistic planning

Logistics planning would largely consist of anticipating and fulfilling the required number
and quality of weapon and adequacy of transport facilities. Transport needs would be for
bringing in forces to the site of violence and also for removing casualties. Logistic
planning would also consider ambulances, fire tenders, rescue equipment, tentage for
persons who may be required to be displaced, food and other supplies including drinking
water and sanitation facilities
PA:
 Increased use of firearms has been a recent trend in communal riots. Anti social
elements are now known to possess sophisticated weapons. Police headquarter
should regularly review the weaponry of the sensitive police stations and districts
to see if they match those expected from the miscreants.
 Wireless equipped vehicles are widely in use for patrolling duties. The number of
such vehicles should keep pace with requirements – particularly for police stations
in outskirts whose jurisdiction may not be fully covered with cellular phone
network.
 Fire engines are critical equipment during riot management as riots are always
marked with widespread arson. All district centres have fire brigades. Many
congested towns (some with sensitive demographic profile) still do not have fire
engines. Further, many high rise buildings are coming up in districts which
challenge existing fire fighting capability. In light of this development the fire
fighting ability needs to be augmented

SA-Department of Revenue (Scarcity)

 Many a time policemen combating riot situations receive grievous injuries and may
need to be shifted to larger hospitals at divisional headquarters or at Lucknow.
Department of Revenue (Scarcity) which is also looking after Disaster
Management may look into feasibility of acquiring helicopters earmarked for use
during disaster management operations. (the financial aspects of this acquisition
have not been considered in this Plan)
SA-Health Directorate
 A large number of ambulances are not properly equipped. A riot situation may
often demand cardiac care ambulances. Directorate to ensure that each district has
at least two fully functional cardiac care ambulances. Directorate may even tie up
with local private hospitals that may have better maintained ambulances for
immediate availability during riots and such emergencies. If needed, this may be
made one of the pre-conditions for grant of the license.
 Blood transfusion is most frequently required in riot situations. Directorate may
enter into agreement with all the local blood banks for ensuring availability of
blood during riot management – both for victims and for those engaged in
managing riots.
 Special care may be required for the weak, aged, lactating mothers and pregnant
ladies as also for treatment of shock and trauma. Directorate may make necessary
arrangements based on the scenarios created in DRPs.

SA-Food & Civil Supplies

 People may need to be shifted from vulnerable sites during a riot situation till the
conditions calm down. These displaced persons may be forced to leave all their
belongings, many of them may be small shop keepers and daily wage workers who
would have no store of food. Food and other essentials will need to be supplied to
them till normalcy returns and they can resume their livelihood. Department of
Food & Civil Supplies may get into pre-purchase agreements for supply of food
grains, tents, blankets, plastic sheets, and firewood etc with reputed suppliers for
urgent purchases during riots

SA-PHED
 DRPs will have sites earmarked for relocating people from vulnerable areas. Such
sites may not have adequate sanitation facilities. Further, concentration of
population will give rise to huge waste which will need proper disposal. It may well
be beyond the capacities of the municipal authorities to arrange for sanitation and
waste disposal. As the sites will be known beforehand from the DRPs,
Department may make arrangements for such facilities, including water for
drinking and sanitation purposes to be available when needed.
5.4.5 Contingency Planning & Drills:
PA
 PA may check the workability of riot plans by organisisng drills from time to time.
Since policemen are over-worked it is unlikely that drills will be taken up by
districts unless closely followed up by PA. PA may send personnel from
headquarters to ensure that the drills are taken in earnest and not merely for
namesake. These drills must also include units of PAC and of Army so that all
agencies get fully aware of their roles during a crisis. PA may maintain a record of
the drills at different centres.
 Home Guard units may be deployed for many of the routine policing functions
during riots so that more policemen are available for managing riots. This will
require more frequent trainings of Home Guards in sensitive districts – which will
in turn require resources. PA may consider getting approval at appropriate level
for such trainings.
 In L2/L3 situation an initial meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs
takes place immediately on establishment of the command structure. The purpose
of this meeting is to seek consensus on priorities, tactical objectives, and an overall
strategy to riot management. This meeting must be pre-planned as part of
contingency planning for different degrees of riotous behaviour in different
centres. Planning would entail strategic locations in each city that must be
protected, (recovered from the mob), locations from where population must be
shifted, typical requirement of striking forces to free the city from rioting mobs –
different scenarios etc.

5.4.6 Monitoring developments and preparedness: MHA Guidelines on Communal

Harmony recommend creation of a nodal cell, which would maintain a database on
various communal incidents, details of the damage caused, lists of cases registered and
progress of prosecution, etc. It would study the patterns of communal disturbances in the
State and prepare appropriate preventive plans. It would also coordinate with other
departments/agencies on issues relating to compensation, relief and rehabilitation, etc.
The nodal cell would constantly review the communal situations in districts in the light of
intelligence reports and would also monitor the observance of the standard preparatory
measures undertaken by the field staff. An illustrative checklist for monitoring
preparedness measures follows:
PA
 Communal harmony measures
o Have all districts and all sensitive areas formed their Peace Committees?
o Is the membership of Peace Committees being reviewed to take into
account the changing social dynamics?
o Do the Peace Committees meet at desired frequency during normal times?
 District Riot Plan (DRP)
o Are the lists of anti-social elements being updated regularly? Does this list
also contain names of petty criminals?
o Does the DRP incorporate the names of the policemen who can identify
these elements when required?
o Does the DRP take into account the impact of communal situation in
neighbouring districts?
o Is the DRP based on the area wise riot schemes of different police stations
of the district?
o Is the man-power assessed realistically?
o Are all positions in sensitive districts / police stations fulfilled with no
vacant slot?
o Is the control room at the district adequately equipped?
o Do the sensitive police stations have videography equipment with trained
personnel?
o Does the district have adequate number of fire-tenders with trained
firemen?
o Does the DRP incorporate the details of deployment of force under
different scenarios with minimum and maximum reserve requirements?
o Have the district police tried out the DRP in a mock drill?
o Does the DRP mention the places where the PAC units will be housed
when called for assistance during a communal situation? (Often they are
housed in temples / dharmashalas that adds to their partisan image)
 Armed police (PAC)
o Are the PAC personnel regularly undergoing their annual training
programmes with an entire company together?
 o Do the PAC units have adequate (and in working condition) tentage and
other equipment?
o Do the PAC units have their own transport?
 Preparing lists of suitable officers
o The Cell in consultation with the Home Deaprtment, maintain a list of
such officers who have proven record of lawfully handling complex
situations while in charge of districts. The list will contain officers from
both administration and police wings. These officers should be known for
firm decisive actions, and impartial conduct. In case of need State may
decide to depute such officers to assist / guide / replace those in charge of
the district.
o The Cell will also identify, in consultation with Home Department, senior
officers who are capable of taking the position of Incident Commander in
L2 / L3 situations.

5.5 L2 Responses
At State level responses would be strategic. It will essentially be monitoring the situation and
making men and material available for operations.

5.5.1 Up-gradation of SCR to EOC and Command Structure

Immediately on declaration of L2 /L3 the State Control Room will be upgraded into
Emergency Operation Centre and SDMA will appoint an Incident Commander. An
L2/L3 level communal situation may often call for deployment of central government
resources – army or para military forces units and this may require the incident command
system to be expanded into a Unified Command (UC) structure as a UC brings together
the "Incident Commanders" of all major organizations involved in managing the incident
in order to coordinate an effective response.

Expansion of ICS into UC will depend on the extent of deployment of central resources.
If 3 or more companies of Army are deployed it may be more efficient to go for a UC
structure.
Whether a unified command is created or not, the essential command structure of EOC
will remain the same, as depicted in the graphic.

S D M A

COMMAND STAFF
Dir of Health Incident Commander / UC
PHED Dir of Inf & PR
Safety
F&CS
Information
Electricity
Liaison Interlocutors
Revenue (Scarcity)

Operations Planning Logistics Finance & Administration

Tactical experts Intelligence CRPF / Army Deptt of Revenue (Scarcity)

5.5.2 Different Sections of the Command

IC/UC will have two types of staff, to borrow military phraseology, General Staff and
Command Staff. General Staff Sections will be directly involved with containment of riot
and restoration of order. Command Staff Sections will assist the IC/UC in other necessary
functions. The General Staff Sections are:
 Operations Section: It is responsible for all operations directly applicable to the
primary mission of containing the riot and restoring order. It will be headed by a
tactical expert with in depth knowledge of the affected area who will direct the
operations, once the action plan is approved by the IC/UC.
 Planning Section: It will be headed by a representative of State intelligence agency.
This section is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating the tactical
information related to the riot and subsequent developments. It will also prepare
and document Action Plans for approval by IC/UC and after approval execution
by the Operations Section.
 Logistics Section: It is responsible for providing facilities, services, and materials
for the operations as envisaged in the action plan.
 Finance and Administrative Section: It is responsible for all financial,
administrative, and cost analysis aspects of the management operation. It will be
 headed by a representative of the Revenue (Scarcity) Department, which also looks
after disaster management in the State.

The Command Staff is responsible for most effective use of the information environment,
health and safety of people affected and of those engaged in response operations, and
liaison activities. The sections are:
 Liaison Section: Liaison activities are of two types: first within command structure,
among the various agencies involved this will be undertaken by a representative of
the Revenue (Scarcity) Department. Other equally important liaison activity is
establishing contacts with the opinion leaders of the two communities at State
level. This is a highly skilled job and needs persons with credibility and contacts.
Home Department will suggest the names of such interlocutor(s).
 Information Section: It will consist of representatives of the Directorate of
Information and Public Relations. It will develop and release information about
the riot management operations, indeed about everything related with the riots, to
the news media as also to those engaged in operations. It will also arrange for
media’s interface with incident commander or other senior decision makers in
operations. It will also media visits if considered desirable. It will also monitor
what media is reporting and wherever needed put forward the correct picture.
 Safety Section: It will be headed by a representative of the Directorate of Health
and will have representatives of PHED, Food & Civil Supplies, Electricity and
other such departments that may be of use in providing safety, security and relief
to affected population. It will also recommend measures to the IC/UC for
assuring personnel health and safety and to assess and/or anticipate hazardous and
unsafe situations.

5.5.3 Major tasks of the Command

 Containment of communal trouble to the centres where it has already erupted
 Ensuring preventive measures at other vulnerable centres – particularly to those
nearby centres that have close economic / social ties with the affected centre (a
partial list is provided in Section 3.4.2 of this Plan), intelligence agencies would
give their assessment of threat potential at other centres
  Ensuring firm decisive action with overwhelming force to bring the situation
under control as soon as possible
 Ensuring as much relief to citizens of affected area as is possible under the trying
situation
 Initiating dialogues with influential opinion leaders of both communities at State
level
 Keeping the media apprised of the development
 Galvanizing rescue and relief operations commensurate with the size of calamity
and extent / degree of human sufferings

5.5.4 Initial command meeting

The establishment of a command structure should immediately be followed by an initial
meeting of the incident commanders and their staffs. During this meeting the incident
commanders must come to consensus on priorities, a collective set of tactical objectives,
and an overall strategy to carry out the response. This meeting may take too long unless it
is pre-planned. The responsibilities discussed above should be pre-planned to the greatest extent possible.
In this meeting the members may (must) share openly and honestly their priorities,
considerations, and concerns. However, once they leave this meeting, they must speak
with one voice.

5.5.4.1 Setting Priorities and Objectives

Different agencies will have different objectives to fulfill in riot management operations.
However, some objectives would be common to all, in addition to their own set
objectives. The common objectives are:
 Preserve the safety of human life;
 Stabilize the situation to prevent the event from worsening;
 Use all necessary containment tactics in a coordinated manner to ensure a timely,
effective response; and
 Address all three of these priorities concurrently.

Each Section will certainly have other significant priorities requiring consideration.
Understanding all the issues is important because consensus must be reached for response
to be effective.
5.5.4.2 Developing a collective set of tactical objectives
At the onset of the initial meeting, UC members have an obligation to raise and discuss
honestly what each response organization can provide in terms of authorities, equipment,
skills, and experience, including their response capabilities. All incident commanders
(police, armed police, para-military forces and army) must be free to speak openly about
their constraints or limitations, whether practical or political in nature, because these
constraints may have an impact on how the objectives can best be achieved.

Each agency will bring its own set of objectives and considerations to the response, the
UC must decide upon a collective set of objectives — to identify what needs to be
accomplished — before an overall response strategy can be developed. To be effective,
these objectives should be specific, measurable, assignable, reasonable, and time-related. The UC
must come to consensus on a set of general objectives that can then provide focus for the
response planning.

5.5.4.3 Adopting overall strategy

Strategy is the development of policies and plans to achieve the objectives. If the UC
knows exactly how to accomplish an objective, it should specify the strategy. Because
there are frequently multiple possible strategies that would accomplish the same objective,
the Planning Section will recommend strategies for UC approval. This allows for better
input and discussion from the responders, and also reduces meeting time for the incident
commanders. The overall strategy will cover deployment of forces – both striking force
and policing arms, tactical objectives and the time schedule for achieving those objectives,
responders’ and affected population’s health and safety; and media management.

5.6 L3 Responses
In L3 situation the command structure and response mechanism shall remain the same as
in L2, except that the UC may have a representative from MHA. L3 situations may have
implications transcending state borders and many critical decisions may come from centre.

5.7 Schematic of the process flow

The process flow has been depicted under two situations:
 a. Perception of threat to communal harmony – either by district intelligence or by
State level intelligence agaencies
b. Flaring up of violence

5.7.1 Threat perceived by state level intelligence or by district level intelligence

1. Inform State Control Room
a. Decide about briefing DIPR to be ready to respond to if any news stories
that may appear in media at this stage
b. Decide about initiating talks with the community leaders
2. Inform district(s) concerned
a. Closer regulation of areas prone to riots, closer vigil on vulnerable
population – isolated residents in midst of the other community
b. Locate the policemen who can identify the anti-social elements for
preventive arrest on short notice
c. Monitor the movements of known anti-social elements

Threat perceived

SCR District

Closer regulation of areas prone

to communal tension
Alert PAC
Alert the policemen who can
Alert identified identify the anti social elements
Inform Initiate Incident
No Commanders
DIRP action talks Close monitoring of movements
of known anti social elements

Ready to respond Mobilize

to media reports interlocutors

5.7.2 Communal valence flares up

 Communal riot flares up SCR

Is it an
L2 situation?
SCR evaluates with
Intelligence
reports

Strategic support functions SDMA declares L2 Control functions

1. Monitoring media & Assembling tactical experts
information SCR elevated to EOC
dissemination: DIPR
Creation of Command Structure
2. Involving community
leaders – SDMA level Alerts: Situation assessment
initiative – in consultation Dep’t of Revenue
with incidence command (Scarcity); Deciding on priorities
PAC; Army; Dep’t of
F&CS; Finalisation of strategy
Dir of Health; DIPR; Resource mobilization
Power;
Telecommunication
Assessment of reserve requirement
Support functions
Alert reserve forces / commanders
1. Search & rescue- Fire services Indent resource requirements on Dir
2. Temporary shelter: Revenue (Scarcity), F&CS, of Health and Dep’t of F & CS,
Power and Telecommunications
PHED
3. Medical aid: Dir of Health, Voluntary agencies
4. Temp free kitchen: Revenue (Scarcity),
Voluntary agencies
5. Essential services: Power, Telecommunication

Control Functions:
 SCR gets elevated to EOC;
 Headed by pre-identified (alerted) Incident Commander;
 Other commanders from Army / PAC join in and command structure is created;
 Command assesses the situation;
 Decides on priorities;
 Identifies objectives;
 Adopts a strategy to achieve objectives;
 Assesses the operational resources for the strategy; and
  Mobilises resources

Strategic support functions:

Monitoring rumours and information dissemination – DIPR
Involving the community leaders – SDMA level initiative

Support functions:
Search & rescue – Fire services
Medical aid – Health, Voluntary agencies
Temporary shelter – Revenue (Scarcity), Food & Civil Supplies, PHED
Feeding the displaced persons – Revenue (Scarcity), Voluntary agencies
Essential service: Power, Telecommunication

Chapter 6
Preparedness measures
6.1 Preparations for pre-determined responses
As mentioned earlier State level responses are strategic – deploying suitable commanders,
enough men and adequate hardware. Performance of the deployed forces will be
constantly monitored and tactical experts will be deputed to assist / guide or even replace
the local commanders. The necessary normal time preparations for se have been detailed
in Section 5.4 of the previous chapter.

6.1.1 Resource availability

PA may prepare the list of National and State resources that will be available during a riot
situation. The resources may come from - government, private, and civil society: It is
important to track the resources available from corporate sector during emergencies –
these can range from vehicles, men trained in first aid, safe premises for sheltering
vulnerable people from affected areas, hospital beds, pharmacies etc.

Inventory of human and material resources should be included in IDRN/SDRN and a

system of quarterly stock taking and updating the database may be put in place. In particular
the availability of the following at different centres;
 Tear gas
 Rubber bullets
 Water canons
 Snifter dogs
 Search and rescue teams
 Bomb diffusers
 Loud speakers
 Armed police force
 Communication equipment
 Videographic equipment
 Transport
 Tentage
 Civil supplies
 Drinking waters
 Ambulances
 Mobile hospitals
 Life saving drugs including intra venous drips
 Blood - plasma/ platelets
 Doctors / paramedics available with police / PAC units
 Doctors / paramedics available at Government hospitals in sensitive districts
Civil Society Organisations, particularly Red Cross can augment available resources. The
details of resources available from them can be obtained from the Department of Revenue
(Scarcity) who are the Primary Agency for ESF Donations.

6.1.2 Attending the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating mothers,
pregnant ladies etc- during communal situations
Sensitization programmes on the special needs of the weaker sections- aged, lactating
mothers, pregnant ladies should be held for medial and para medical staff. While shifting
populations from vulnerable areas to safer locations, these needs must be kept in
consideration. In curfew bound areas, the system for passes for pregnant ladies going to
hospitals must be streamlined.
State needs more women para-medics in every district.

6.2 Capacity building

Capacity building has many aspects:
 Training the manpower increases their fighting capacity and morale;
 Acquisition of proper equipment increases the capacity of the State to cope with
different situations; and
 Changes in legal environment increases the capacity of the regulatory framework
to deal with communal situations.

Training has been covered in Section 5.4.3. Equipment too has been covered in Section
5.4.4. The need for strengthening the regulatory environment particularly for post riot
investigation into offences reported during the course of riots and prosecution of
offenders have been referred to in Sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7. Many offences committed
during riots are not registered. Many of those registered are poorly investigated and not
brought up for prosecution and finally prosecution takes years because of delays in courts.
This emboldens anti social elements and also petty criminals in indulging in arson and
looting during riots.

Any improvement in this area will go a long way in discouraging miscreants and will at
least reduce the intensity of violence in riots if not eliminate the threat of riots. MHA
guidelines suggest that all police stations in sensitive areas must have Videographic
equipment. Policemen posted there must be trained in using the equipment for collecting
videographic evidences. And the institutional mechanisms for investigation and
prosecution must be strengthened.

Often SITs are constituted to investigate into reported crimes, and many a time special
courts are established for expeditious disposal of prosecutions. The results have been far
short of expectations. SITs themselves have been accused, at times, of partisan behaviour
and even special courts take too long to dispose cases. A more serious issue is withdrawal
of many charges heets later under pressure from people wielding influence. There is a
resolution by the National Integration Council against the withdrawal of such cases.

PA may examine how it can be put into practice - that a prosecution once launched in a
court of law in respect of an offence committed in the course of a communal riot should
not be withdrawn.

6.2.1 Incident Command System

This Plan envisages an ICS or UC structure for management of an L2 or L3 communal
situation. Incident Command System is being used increasingly all over the world in order
to professionalize emergency response management. This system provides for specialist
incident command teams with an Incident Commander or a Unified Command with
officers trained in different aspects of incident management – logistics, operations,
planning, safety, media management etc. The LBSNAA Mussoorrie has been designated as
the nodal training institution. At state level, UPAAM has been organizing programmes
related with disaster management. Senior officers from police and administration should
be exposed to such programmes at UPAAM or at LBSNAA.

6.2.2 Strengthening of Fire Services

Fire services play a major role in rescue operations in collapsed structures. Widespread
arson is a common phenomenon during communal riots. Fire services’ capacity needs to
be strengthened. They should be developed into multi hazard response units. Each fire station
in sensitive areas should be provided with rescue tenders in addition to fire tenders. At larger
centres such as Kanpur and Lucknow fire services should be provided with hazmat vans.
There is a need for recruitment of more firemen as and intensive training should be given
to them so that they can function as multi hazard response units.
6.3 Use of media
Powerful reach of media needs to be used more imaginatively during normal times to
foster the feeling of communal harmony. There is a role for the Directorate of
Information and Public Relations here. DIPR should prepare write ups on inspiring
instances from the State’s rich history and lives of great evangelist religious leaders of the
past, who had followers from booth communities and who are still held in reverence by
both the communities. Such write ups should be regularly published through print media
and programmes based on their lives may be aired by television channels.
Instead of inserting such write ups / programmes as paid adverts, DIPR can encourage
writers / producers of repute and produce imaginative programmes with mass appeal that
the established commercial media would be willing to participate in this endeavour.
 Chapter 7
Partnership with Other Stakeholders

7.1 Communities

Partnering with communities entails not only maintaining contacts with the influential
opinion leaders but institutionalising an arrangement whereby an ordinary community
member – a man on the street - feels comfortable in coming up to authorities with his /
her difficulties. Senior officers at district levels must find time to attend functions held by
different forums of both the major communities. They may like to attend functions held at
smaller, not fashionable schools where the students do not come from privileged
backgrounds.

MHA Guidelines on Communal Harmony observe that “in a communally-sensitive area,

small shopkeepers, entrepreneurs and daily-wagers are most prone to loss and damage to
life and property, if the situation goes out of control, leading to arson or violence. They
are most likely to face economic burden, due to loss of income or property, most of which
is not covered under any type of insurance. They can thus be the most willing partners in
maintaining peace and communal harmony in the area. Similarly, women who are the
worst sufferers in such situations may also be keen to ensure communal harmony. The
district administration can tap the resources and energy of these people/groups in
ensuring peace”.

7.2 Academic institutions

Academic institutes often conduct research / studies in riots. Just as peace studies scholars
began studying war in order to understand how to avoid it in the future, researches in riots
may help us better understand their causes in order to devise ways of avoiding them in
future. Researches with more rigour are required to understand how a city becomes riot-
prone or another which was historically riot prone has become markedly less so - Meerut
since 1987. The lessons learnt from such researches may explain how violent cities can be
made peaceful.
Another important field of research is quantitative study in occurrence of riots – seeking
the relationship between the known causative factors of riots and the probability of its
occurrence at any centre. Such studies (not for communal riots) have been done assuming
a linear relationship between the causative factors (they are assigned numerical values –
based on their intensities) and occurrence of a riot. Linear regression models, so arrived,
have some predictive ability. Primary Agency may consider commissioning such research
with reputed institutes working in the field of public administration and/ or social
behaviour.

7.3 Armed forces

Armed forces play a crucial role in all disasters by providing or augmenting the rescue and
relief operations. In riots and civil disorder situations they often play the most important
role in managing the situation. Partnering with armed forces does not require any special
initiatives as they are state organs. But closer ties are required to get most from their
involvement is riot management. Riot scheme rehearsals are the best way of achieving
such ties. The drills will document the how best the tactical objectives and the command
structure can be shared between police, armed police and armed forces.

7.4 NGOs

There are many voluntary organisations working in the field of promoting peace, national
integration and communal harmony. Such organisations usually have committed and well-
intentioned volunteers and workers. The district administration should maintain
comprehensive data base on such organisations, and should mobilize support of, and
encourage, such organisations, in their efforts to maintain communal harmony, and
diffusing tension if a communal situation arises.

7.5 Public sector units and Private sector organizations

Large commercial organisation, whether in public sector or in private sector, have

transport, hospitals, doctors, trained staff and protected space. On different occasions
district administrations do seek their cooperation in managing situations. The resources
available with all such units in a district / sub-division should be recorded. Relative
strengths of the different units, where there are more than one, should be discussed in a
joint meeting in order to decide which unit will be expected to give what type of support
to riot management operations. With their roles defined, the PSUs / PSOs may be asked
to prepare their own standard procedures so as to minimise the response time.
 Chapter 8

Financial arrangements

Disaster Management Act defines “mitigation” as “measures aimed at reducing the risk,
impact or effects of a disaster or threatening disaster situation”. Obviously resources from
Calamity Relief Fund (CRF) are not available for mitigation activities. It has, however,
been provided that 10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search
and rescue (SAR) equipment and communication equipment. This provision can be utilized to
acquire rescue tenders for fire services, to begin with, at sensitive centres.

HPC had recommended that at least 10 per cent of plan funds at the national, state and
district levels be earmarked and apportioned for schemes which specifically address areas
such as prevention, reduction, preparedness and mitigation of disasters. The Eleventh
Finance Commission has paid detailed attention to the issue of disaster management and
Disaster Mitigation Fund (DMF) is now a statutory requirement for all States. However
there is no unanimity on what should constitute DMF. One approach is that it may
comprise all Plan schemes which qualify as ‘mitigation’ under the Act. Another is that it
may consist of a fixed percentage of total plan allocation to be spent only on such
mitigation activities that are not covered under any of the existing plan scheme.

Planning Commission has suggested that 0.5% of the total plan allocation of each
Ministry/ Department be earmarked for NDMF.

At present all capital expenditure on mitigation, except when covered under SAR
equipment, will have to be met from plan funds. Primary agency should implement
standard procedure of estimating riot mitigation expenditure in plan budgets.
PART III: CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
 Chapter 9

Review and Updation

9.1 Schedule of riots drill and review of the Plan

PA may consider holding riot drills at all centres considered vulnerable in view of
demography and past history. The following agencies shall participate in the drill:
 District police
 PAC
 Army
 Fire service
 Intelligence agencies
 Health
 Civil supplies
 Power
 Telecommunication
 Red cross
 PSUs & Private Sector Organisations
 NGOs active in communal harmony

The drills will take place after creating a detailed scenario, which will not be fully disclosed
at the beginning. The scenario will be disclosed to participants in a phased manner,
mimicking the way a real communal situation unfolds. Objectives of the drill would be to
assess:
 At command level:
o Time taken for activation of SDMP
o Time taken for creation of a the command structure
o Time taken for agreeing on the common tactical objectives
o Time taken for finalising the strategy to achieve the tactical objectives
 At field level
o Immediate availability of forces with the district police
o Immediate availability of physical resources for operations – tear gas,
water canons, rubber bullets, arms & ammunitions,
o Characteristics of force deployment by district police
o Time taken for arrival of reinforcements from PAC and / or Army
o Characteristics of force deployment under UC
o Availability of doctors, paramedics, life saving drugs, secured places
where vulnerable population can be shifted,
o Availability of volunteers from NGOs and time taken for their
reporting

PA may consider undertaking three / four drills every years so that the following centres
are covered at least once in two years:
Aligarh, Azamgarh, Bulandshahr, Chandausi, Kanpur, Meerut, Moradabad, Varanasi,
Saharanpur,
The Plan should be reviewed after each drill

9.2 Action Taken Reports and Review of this Plan

Once the Plan is approved, to determine preparedness level the PA and the SAs will need
to take some actions or confirm that no particular actions are required and they are
capable of discharging all responsibilities arising from this Plan.

The purpose a review is to determine at regular intervals whether the planning documents
continue to be adequate. The need for review arises from changes in the environment for
which the document is prepared. A structured arrangement for review expedites the plan
review process. This Section contains the procedure for ensuring that the agencies named
herein are prepared and for expediting the review process.

The Department of Revenue (Scarcity) (DRS) is in charge of disaster management.

Therefore it may need to coordinate the approval / review process. DRS may like to
ensure that concerned agencies determine whether the issues related to them are adequately
addressed on a continuing basis by reviewing the relevant parts (related to them).

DRS may also like use the issues that are not addressed in the document, i.e. such issues
which are noted as requiring structural measures, as institutional goals to be achieved.
Once they are achieved, the resultant measures are incorporated in this document in
future.

9.2.1 Approval & Review Process

Once approved, the Plan must provide proof that the Head of DRS or the officer in
charge of disaster management, has approved the document with a dated signature page,
every second year or whenever the incumbency changes.

 Head of the PA or an officer made in charge of managing this disaster must put
his signature in proof of the approval of the document every two years or
whenever the incumbency changes.
  Head of Home Department or any officer made in charge of this disaster, must
confirm that officers for taking over as Incident Commander and tactical experts
are being identified and groomed on a continuous basis with the location where
the current list of such officers is maintained, every two years or whenever the
incumbency changes.

 The Head of PAC or an officer delegated by him for this purpose must confirm
every year that the annual training programmes (of one company at full strength at
one time) are being conducted regularly.

 The Head of Fire Services or an officer delegated for this purpose must confirm
every two year on the as multi-hazard rescue training of firemen.

 Health Director or an officer delegated for this purpose must confirm that the list
of hospitals, available doctors, paramedics , life saving medicines etc are updated
for every sensitive centre every year.

9.3 Mainstreaming DM concerns with Development Plans

A number of mandi towns do not have fire service. All towns in sensitive zones need well
equipped fire brigades. This will require- building, equipment and trained firemen. District
administration may encourage such small towns to explore:
 Getting the building constructed on the outskirts by entering into an agreement
with nearby Panchayat under NREGA.
 Buying equipment with funds from CRF, as mentioned in the previous chapter
10% of the annual inflows into the CRF can be used for the procurement of search and rescue
(SAR) equipment and communication equipment.
 Training local youth to work as volunteers under district disaster management
initiatives by contacting the District Coordinator. Such volunteers will assist a
core team that must be appointed by State Fire Service for each such centre.
 ANNEXURE I

Questionnaire given to the Home Department, Government of UP

1. What are the various factors or undercurrents that heighten the probability of
communal disturbances or riots?

2. Do riots have any correlation with trade or economic cycle?

3. What measures can lead to stability other than routine measures of arrest, curfew
and peace committee meetings?

4. Is police impartial in its handling of riots?

5. What can be done to change the orientation of the police force?

6. Are riots spontaneous or borne out of conspiracy?

7. Why do rumours spread? Why do some rumours take longer to die?

8. Can we say with some degree of assurance about the types of people who take part
in riots – who actually take part in riotous activities, who finance such active
elements, who encourage their fervour and who help cool frayed tempers?

9. Development of a situation in a riot is understandably a complex process rife with

vendetta and other such “balancing acts”. Under such circumstances can we
identify actual perpetrators of riots?

10. To what extent the administration can prevent riots from taking place?

11. Is there any action plan aimed at preventing riots in the State?

12. How necessary it is for the State to resort to violence to counter communal
violence?

13. Is tactful handling of a situation at variance with its lawful handling?

14. History of Communal riots in U.P.? Is there any city / district wise record?????

15. Has the State Government / Home Department undertaken Vulnerability

Assessment on Communal Riots? Is there any such system in place??

16. Does the Home Department have a Graded list of Communally Sensitive Districts
in the State? Is it reviewed and updated periodically?
17. If yes, what is Grading Methodology for vulnerability of Districts exposed to
Communal Riots? Does it include tangible factors / and impending causes for
grading the vulnerability of respective cities/ districts?

18. Are there any new Towns / districts added to this list (other than that have long
history of communal rioting)? What is the basis?

19. Is there any official analysis of:

a. Categories of Communal riots in the state

b. Classification of causes leading to Communal riots
c. Occasions / situations that flare up communal tension
d. Factors that increase the vulnerability
e. Socio-economic & religious profile of persons instigating / participating in
Riots
20. Are SOPs in place for:

a. Prevention & Peace time pro-activity

b. Preparedness
c. Early Warning and Response mechanism
d. Damage Control
e. Recover and rehabilitation
f. Post Riot promotion of Communal harmony
21. Lessons learnt from 92’ riots?

22. Best Practices in preventing and controlling Communal Riots?

23. Major administrative “failures” in assessing / preventing and controlling

communal riots?

24. External forces contributing to communal tension? How can they be controlled?

25. Is it failure of intelligence or administrative failure to response to intelligence

reports?

26. Unresolved issues (location wise) in the state that can fuel Communal Tension?