Ferry free E39 –Fjord crossings Bjørnafjorden 304624

01 07.12.20 JHLN PLI ODOL

00 30.11.20 First edition JHLN PLI ODOL
Rev. Publish Description Made Checked Project Client
date by by appro. appro.
Client

Contractor Contract no.:

18/91094

Document name:

Bjørnafjorden floating bridge (K12) – Operation,

maintenance and rehabilitation strategy
Document no.: Rev.: Pages:
01 93
SBJ -32-C5-COW-23-RE-011-0
DECEMBER 2020
STATENS VEGVESEN

Bjørnafjorden floating
bridge (K12) – Operation,
maintenance and
rehabilitation strategy
 ADRESSE COWI A/S
Parallelvej 2
2800 Kongens Lyngby
Denmark

TLF +45 56 40 00 00
FAKS +45 56 40 99 99
WWW cowi.com

DECEMBER 2020
STATENS VEGVESEN

Bjørnafjorden floating
bridge (K12) – Operation,
maintenance and
rehabilitation strategy

PROJECT NO. DOCUMENT NO.

A205696-002 A205696-002-D&V001

VERSJON DATE OF ISSUE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED

2.0 07.12.2020 PLI/JHLN HPE/PLI/JHLN ODOL

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

CONTENTS
1 Introduction 1-1
1.1 Abbreviations 1-2

2 Overall O&M strategy 2-4

2.1 Purpose and contents 2-4
2.2 Personnel 2-5
2.3 O&M equipment 2-5
2.4 Special material requirements 2-7
2.5 Main activities 2-8
2.6 Operation plan 2-8
2.7 Spare part strategy 2-9

3 O&M organisation 3-11

3.1 Overall considerations 3-11
3.2 Organisation 3-11

4 Operation and maintenance plan 4-13

4.1 Operation plan 4-13
4.2 Maintenance plan 4-16

5 Emergency preparedness 5-18

6 Risk-based inspection and maintenance analysis 6-19

6.1 Criticality and vulnerability classes 6-19

7 Steel pontoons and steel columns 7-23

7.1 Materials for pontoons and columns 7-23
7.2 Operation and maintenance 7-34
7.3 Accessibility 7-35
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLYTEBRU (K12) - OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

8 Optional tools for corrective maintenance 8-38

8.1 Concept for dry dock 8-38
8.2 Operation and maintenance 8-40
8.3 Cofferdam 8-41

9 Mooring of pontoons 9-44

9.1 Concept 9-44
9.2 Materials 9-45
9.3 Operation and maintenance 9-45
9.4 Spare parts 9-46
9.5 Access facilities 9-47

10 Access strategy 10-48

11 Risk-based inspection and maintenance 11-50

11.1 Introduction 11-50
11.2 RBI 11-50
11.3 RCM 11-51
11.4 Method 11-51

12 Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS) 12-52

12.1 Introduction 12-52
12.2 SHMS for elements and systems above and
below water 12-53

13 References 13-55
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 1-1

1 Introduction
This document concerns the operation, maintenance and rehabilitation (in the
following named O&M) strategy for the Bjørnafjorden floating bridge concept
K12. Figure 1-1 provides an overview of the bridge. This document is based
upon phase 5 project documents as delivered to the Norwegian Public Road
Administration (Statens Vegvesen – SVV) in august 2019.

The O&M strategy is developed in a phase wise workflow. Phase 1, O&M system
description, is part of the VegRAMS process phase 1 - activity 1.4: operation,
maintenance and rehabilitation. The activity is detailed in /1/ section 5.5. Phase
2, O&M model, is part of the VegRAMS process phase 2 - activity 2.2: operation,
maintenance and rehabilitation model. The activity is detailed in /1/ section 5.9,
which has been adjusted to accommodate SVV's focus areas as expressed at
meetings 27.09.2020, 03.10.2020 and 23.10.2020.

The workflow is reflected in this document, where items 1-4 are established in
phase 1 and items 5-9 are established in phase 2. All items are listed below incl.
chapter reference:

1 Overall O&M strategy (incl. spare part strategy), ref. chapter 2

2 Organisation for O&M, ref. chapter 3

3 Operation and maintenance plan, ref. chapter 4

4 Emergency and evacuation plan, ref. chapter 5

5 Risk-based inspection and maintenance analysis, ref. chapter 6

6 Supplementary analyses for 'non-standard' elements

› Steel pontoons and steel columns, ref. chapter 7

› Drydock and cofferdam – both being elements for non-scheduled

corrective maintenance in case of an incident, ref. chapter 8
1-2 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

› Pontoon mooring lines, ref. chapter 9

7 Access strategy for personnel, equipment and materials, ref. chapter 10

8 Risk-based inspection and maintenance, ref. chapter 11

9 Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS), ref. chapter 12

According to /1/ the following object boundaries apply:

› From abutment incl. foundation to abutment incl. foundation

The model is based on provided information at project kick-off as well as

supplementary information provided by SVV during the work. In addition, the
object model developed as part of the VegRAMS process serves as basis for the
O&M strategy on element and system level, which then feed O&M information
back to the object model.

Figure 1-1 Overview of K12.

1.1 Abbreviations
AUV: Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
CA: Corrosion Allowance
CRA: Corrosion Resistant Alloy
CP: Cathodic Protection
O&M: Operation and Maintenance
ICCP: Impressed Current Cathodic Protection
SDSS: Super Duplex Stainless Steel
SHMS: Structural Health Monitoring System
SVV: Statens Vegvesen (Norwegian Public Road Administration)
RBI: Risk-based Inspection
RCM: Reliability Centered Maintenance
RC-VAT: Remotely Controlled – Vertical Access Tool
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 1-3

ROV: Remotely Operated Vehicle

TSZ: Thermally Sprayed Zink
WIM: Weigh-In-Motion
SUP: Shared Use Path
2-4 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

2 Overall O&M strategy

2.1 Purpose and contents

The Bjørnafjorden floating bridge shall be designed, constructed and maintained
so that its function is established and maintained with minimal life cycle costs
(LCC).

The main purpose of the O&M strategy is to specify and implement requirements
for:

› how to achieve the design service life at minimal costs (LCC)

› how to ensure maximised user availability (overpass traffic,

underpass/maritime traffic and O&M personnel)

In order to ensure the above, the requirements are also needed for the following
items:

› access facilities and equipment

› staffing (number and qualifications)

In general, all surfaces of all parts shall be easily accessible for inspection
(within arm's length) and maintenance (except completely closed steel
members). Submerged surfaces shall be inspected using Remotely Operated
underwater Vehicle (ROV). Special consideration shall be given to components
exposed to water during a possible drainage malfunction. All drainage systems
shall be easy to inspect, clean, maintain and replace.

For deformation, fatigue and wear prone details identified during detailed
design, the visual inspection shall be assisted by the outcome of a structural
health monitoring system (SHMS). Design of the SHMS shall be part of the
bridge design.

O&M planning for a bridge like the Bjørnafjorden floating bridge is associated
with a large degree of uncertainty. Therefore Statens Vegvesen (SVV) has
introduced risk-based methods for O&M analysis. The risk-based approach shall
benchmark existing practice (SVV handbooks etc.) and enhance the basis for
decision-making during establishment of an O&M strategy. Focus should be on
critical and vulnerable elements and systems and where savings in LCC and/or
increase in user availability are possible.

Based on the general level of detail of the conceptual design from phase 5, the
risk-based approach must be qualitative. Gradually, as the level of detail
increases, the risk-based analysis can become quantitative and detailed on a
case-by-case basis.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 2-5

The design service life of the bridge is 100 years, ref. /3/. Elements and systems
that expectedly require replacement during the service life of the bridge, shall
be replaceable with minimal disturbance of road traffic as well as maritime
traffic, ref. /3/ on required uptime. Procedures for replacement of elements and
systems shall be planned, described and facilitated as part of the design
process, ref. /3/.

This O&M strategy comprise general descriptions and requirements. The O&M
strategy can be used as basis for formulation of requirements for the coming
project phases, in order to ensure minimal LCC and minimal traffic restrictions
during operation.

In parallel with the design and development of a BIM model, an O&M manual
should also be established with a description of the bridge, instructions,
inspection procedures, maintenance procedures, spare part management etc.

2.2 Personnel
The main tasks for an O&M organisation are:

› management incl. planning and evaluation of all procedures

› administration, incl. IT-management and outsourcing

› traffic management (physical work like clearing of roadway, cleaning,

establish traffic restrictions, emergency service etc.)

› inspections

› maintenance

In connection with the establishment of the O&M organisation, the ratio between
in-house staffing and outsourcing, primarily to consultants and contractors, shall
be decided. This subject has not been detailed any further.

Reference is made to chapter 3, where staffing of O&M personnel is detailed.

2.3 O&M equipment

Equipment to be provided for performance of O&M activities comprise:

› fixed equipment:
- permanent installed equipment (fixed ladders, platforms, sensors,
surveillance cameras, fixation points for "rope access" etc.)
- in stock stored equipment – transported to the bridge when needed
(scaffolding etc.)

› moveable equipment:
- service vehicles for road patrol (clearing and cleaning, replacement of
2-6 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

smaller objects etc.)

- emergency vehicles (can be provided by the emergency response
contractor)
- boat
- lifts, hoists, sky-climbers etc.

Further considerations related to O&M equipment will be provided in the

following chapters.

A major part of all special equipment is access facilities.

Access facilities shall ensure:

› Easy and safe access for inspection and maintenance

› Easy and safe access (incl. evacuation)

› Easy and safe access for regular maintenance with minor consequence for
availability

› Easy and safe replacement of elements and systems with a design service
life less than 100 years

› Easy and safe maintenance of all pontoon elements and systems

› Easy and safe access to pontoon interior

Access routes, work platforms and other equipment shall be selected and
arranged so that restrictions for traffic (vehicles, bikes, pedestrians and
maritime traffic) is kept to a minimum. The length of the bridge is decisive for
the design of access facilities (e.g. vehicle transport of personnel, materials and
equipment in the bridge interior between abutments and use of lift in the tower).

In general doors and stairs are preferred compared to hatches and ladders,
which are only to be used when geometry do not allow for doors and stairs.

In case of an emergency, permanent access facilities shall provide for a safe

evacuation route and make access for rescue personnel. Permanent facilities,
like clearly marked and safe access and evacuation routes and equipment
(stretcher, hoists, etc.) shall allow for evacuation in case of an emergency. In
addition to an O&M manual, an operation and emergency (O&E) manual should
be established.

Detailing of access routes shall be performed as part of the design process. The
level of detail shall match design maturity, i.e. handling of materials and
equipment that match current design and O&M strategies shall be accounted for.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 2-7

2.4 Special material requirements

There are several factors that affect the service life of the bridge. Some are
design detail-oriented choices and others are material-related choices. The latter
in particular is detailed for selected elements in the following chapters with due
consideration of the exposure.

It is highlighted that material specifications are treated by the Design Basis, see
/3/. The material specific requirements in the O&M strategy shall be included in
Design Basis requirements.

Detailing of the following above water objects could be performed, e.g. with due
reference to /6/:

› Primary steel structures (steel grade, assembly/jointing methods,

monitoring, etc.)

› Coating of steel surfaces

› Bearings

› Cable system (stay cables incl. possible dampers)

› Surfacing

› Secondary steel structures

› Concrete structures

› Mechanical and electrical systems

Detailing of the following submerged objects could be performed:

› Prestressed pontoon mooring lines (fairleads, mooring lines that each

consists of 50m top-chain, steel wire / fibre rope, 100m bottom chain and
suction anchor ref. /6/)

› Primary steel structures incl. coating and sacrificial anodes (incl. use of
super duplex SDSS in a 6.5 m high splash zone, ref. /6/)

› Concrete structures

› Secondary steel structures (platforms, fixed ladders etc.)

› Marine systems (ventilation and dehumidification systems)

Detailing of material specifications require strategic considerations, e.g. the

following principle of surface protection is recommended (in combination with
cathodic protection):
2-8 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

› outside surfaces (external) to be painted

› inside surfaces (internal) to be painted and dehumidified

It means that the outside surfaces shall be without any stiffeners, openings for
installation, bolted connections or other protruding elements so that coating can
be performed mechanically (e.g. using robots) and with top quality. In addition,
all external surfaces shall be "smooth", i.e. without joints where accumulation of
water, dirt and eventually corrosion may happen.

Surfaces that are dehumidified do not require repainting after the structure has
been erected and the dehumidification system is operating.

2.5 Main activities

Table 2-1 summarises the main O&M activities with intervals according to SVV
handbook R411. In general, inspection and maintenance intervals could be
optimised based on a qualitative risk-based approach. A final O&M plan could be
optimised based on a more quantitative evaluation.

Table 2-1 Main O&M activities according to SVV Handbook R411.

Activity Interval
Routine (løpende) inspection and non- Dependant on element/system (ref.
scheduled maintenance chapter 4)
Handover inspection Only once. Before handover.
Only once. Before end of guarantee
Warranty inspection
period
Yearly inspection Yearly
Principal inspection Every 5 years
When needed for a component or a
Special inspection
group of components
Individual component frequencies.
Scheduled maintenance
According to actual needs.
Repair When needed.
Individual component frequencies.
Replacement
According to actual needs.

2.6 Operation plan

The operation plan shall comprise the following activities:

› Clearing (debris etc.) and cleaning

› Snow removal

› Inspections
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 2-9

› Measurements and surveys

› Material tests

› Structural monitoring

The operation plan has an interface to the object model of Bjørnafjorden K12 as
well as integration interface to SVV Bridge Management System 'BRUTUS' and
the financial system 'Økosys'.

The operation plan is further detailed in section 4.1.

The maintenance plan comprises routine maintenance (day to day activities) and
scheduled maintenance and/or replacement.

The maintenance plan is further detailed in section 4.2.

2.7 Spare part strategy

The spare part strategy shall support efficient, safe and cost-optimal operation,
which at the same time minimise traffic restrictions for vehicles, bikes,
pedestrians and maritime traffic.

Spare part requirements shall be part of the O&M manual. Requirements shall
be based on:

› O&M strategy

› Differentiated needs across elements/systems based on their criticality

(risk), vulnerability and the economic impact of having/not having the spare
part available. If economic feasible, Reliability Centered Maintenance
analyses can be appropriate for spare part requirements especially for
mechanical and electrical elements and systems.

› Flexible process considering work orders

› Are spare parts off the shelf or a specialised product (with long delivery
time)?

› Is it possible to store the spare parts? – with due consideration of storage

space and possible deterioration during storage

A spare part example may be pontoons and their moorings, which both are
critical and vulnerable when considering ship impact. Therefor it shall be
considered to have a complete mooring line in stock, emergency contract with
ROV and AHTS (Anchor Handling Tug Supply vessel) contractor and possibly
establishment of a local drydock so that downtime in case of a ship impact with
a pontoon or anchor is minimised.
2-10 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Other spare parts which would be beneficial, if economic feasible, are:

› Pumps and other equipment for ballast water

› Moveable ladders

› Scissor lift

› Hoists

› Truck Mounted Attenuator (TMA)

› Bearings

› Lighting equipment

› Equipment for traffic restrictions

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 3-11

3 O&M organisation

3.1 Overall considerations

Statens Vegvesen (SVV) will handle management (primarily) of the
Bjørnafjorden floating bridge and outsource inspection, maintenance and
rehabilitation of elements and systems to contractors. The same principle is
used on the Hålogaland bridge and internationally on bridges such as the Great
Belt Bridge in Denmark, the Øresund Bridge between Denmark and Sweden and
many others where no concession agreement is established. On this basis, it is
assumed that the same principle is also valid for the Bjørnafjorden floating
bridge.

3.2 Organisation
Requirements for the O&M-organisation, number and qualifications, are
described in Table 3-1. The structure of the organisation is based on similar
organisations that manage other international bridges of similar size (without a
toll station that increases the operational setup). It is recommended that the
organisation is adjusted according to SVV's needs and plans.

It is noted that certification of special components like lifts, "rope access"

systems, UAV's and mechanical inspection equipment shall be performed
according to their own provisions.

It is assumed that external consultants and contractors design and execute

maintenance and rehabilitation projects.
 3-12 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Table 3-1: O&M-organisation. *)Part time/full time depends on whether or not an O&M-
organisation for several fjord-bridges is established.

Number Title Task Qualification Comments*) Outsourcing?

Management of
Management
1 Manager bridge Part time No
Administration maintenance
Maintenance of BIM, Experienced in use
1 IT-manager BRUTUS database, of BIM, BRUTUS, Part time No
GIS systems and Økosys. GIS and Økosys
Experienced in
inspection,
Bridge Patrol, 2 Routine maintenance of cleaning and
2 Part time Yes
persons roadway and structures remedy of simple
defects, incl.
coating repair
Experienced in
Periodic maintenance of
1 Electrical technician maintenance of Part time Yes
electrical systems
electrical systems
Periodic maintenance of
mechanical systems, incl. Experienced in
ballast (water) systems, maintenance of
1 Mechanical technician Part time Yes
possibly firefighting mechanical
systems, lifts and other systems
access facilities
Periodic Experienced in
inspection/verification of control and
Maritime
1 status/stability of inspection of Part time Yes
supervision/technician
pontoons incl. mooring ballast systems
lines and mooring lines
Experienced in
Test, maintenance and
1 SHMS specialist maintenance and Part time Yes
use of SHMS
use of SHMS
Experienced in
structural
Activities according to
1 Structural engineer assessments Part time Yes
the results of the SHMS
initiated by the
SHMS
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 4-13

4 Operation and maintenance plan

4.1 Operation plan

Operation of elements and systems above water is performed according to the
plan in Table 4-1.
4-14 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Table 4-1 Operation plan for elements and systems. Frequencies based on international
best practice and SVV handbooks.

Derived
Inspection type Description Frequency First time
actions
Before taking
Clearing (debris etc.) and cleaning Daily bridge in
operation
Snow removal As needed
Before taking
Primary steel and coating Yearly bridge in *)
operation
Roadway and footway/bicycle Before taking
track. Incl. drainage and Weekly bridge in *)
barriers/railings operation
Before taking
Cable system Weekly bridge in *)
operation
Before taking
Overhead sign structures and signs Monthly bridge in *)
operation
Before taking
Routine inspection (løpende inspeksjon) Mechanical installations Weekly bridge in *)
operation
Before taking
Service roads Daily bridge in *)
operation
Before taking
Critical electrical system incl.
Daily bridge in *)
lighting
operation
Before taking
Non-critical electrical system incl.
Weekly bridge in *)
lighting
operation
Before taking
Dehumidification system Monitoring bridge in *)
operation
Before taking
Access facilities incl. inspection and
Weekly bridge in *)
maintenance equipment
operation
Before taking
Structural Health Monitoring
Test as appropriate bridge in *)
System (SHMS)
operation
Hand-over inspection (Ferdigbefaring) Visual inspection. Registration of Before handover
One time **)
Entire bridge defects and deficiencies of project
Guarantee inspection Before end of
Visual inspection related to remedy
(Reklamasjonsinspeksjon) One time agreed guarantee **)
of defects and deficiencies
Entire bridge period
General inspection
Within 1 year
(Enkel inspeksjon) Visual inspection Yearly **)
after handover
Entire bridge
Principal inspection
Within 5 year
(Hovedinspeksjon) Visual inspection 5-year interval **)
after handover
Objects above water
Principal inspection Visual inspection using special
(Hovedinspeksjon) methods and equipment (see the As needed As needed **)
Objects below water following text)
As needed As needed
Special inspection according to according to
Extended visual inspection, surveys
(special inspeksjon) outcome of SHMS outcome of SHMS **)
and material tests
On selected bridge parts/components and/or visual and/or visual
inspection inspection
*)
- instantly remedy of some of the observed defects
- description of needed inspection and maintenance actions
**)
Preparation of inspection and maintenance action list
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 4-15

The strategy for inspections below water is:

› Inspections of external surfaces to be carried out by ROV from a certain

depth specified by the contractor (not splash zone). Divers are only allowed
to a certain depth. Special splash zone inspection tools to be applied.

› Replacement of sacrificial anodes to be carried out by ROV (requires

manufacturing of special equipment/tools).

› As much as possible of the under-water equipment shall be monitored.

› To facilitate inspection of internal surfaces it shall be possible to empty all

ballast tanks. In addition, platforms and ladders shall be installed.

› In case of an incident (e.g. ship impact) the manager shall rely on the
results of the risk analysis (that specify any operational measures) and
qualified inspections and assessments in order to minimise downtime.

There is normally no need for detailed inspections of external surfaces of

pontoons. Leakage control of tanks are carried out from inside during regular
tank inspection.

The inspection program of the O&M manual should (in line with SVV current
steps towards a risk-based inspection approach) be based on a risk-based
approach. This should lead to considerable savings on operation, when
compared to handbook-based inspection approach, especially when considering
inspection of surfaces not readily accessible.

The structural health monitoring system (SHMS) shall be used, among others,
for monitoring on non-visible load response from deformations, fatigue and
wear. SHMS can be divided in two main parts:

› Monitoring part (sensors etc.)

› Evaluation part (analyses which provide relevant information – including

information for O&M)

Figure 4-1 presents an overview of a SHMS. The SHMS can be used, among
others, for verification of bridge design during the first years of operation. In
addition, it can be assessed whether it should be used in connection with special
elements and systems where the remaining service life needs to be evaluated
(e.g. fatigue or wear). It is expected that the mooring line prestress shall be
monitored continuously.
4-16 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Figure 4-1: SHMS concept. Abbreviations are WIM: Weigh In Motion, ITS: Intelligent
Traffic System, DAU: Data Acquisition Unit.

The O&M-strategy can detail which components that needs monitoring.

4.2 Maintenance plan

A maintenance plan shall consist of:

› Routine (løpende) maintenance

› Periodic maintenance/replacements

Routine (løpende) maintenance is carried out according to standard procedures

– as based on routines. Routine maintenance is normally carried out by the in-
house contractor (operation contractor) along with routine inspections. Routine
maintenance comprises, but not limited to:

› vehicle damage repair

› lighting check and maintenance (bulb exchange etc.)

› graffiti removal

› pothole repair

› check and maintain functionality of doors, hatches, locks, sensors, signs,

lifts, weather stations, drainage etc.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 4-17

› ballast system in pontoons

Periodic maintenance/replacement of components with a service life less than

100 years is drafted in Table 4-2. It is based on the Design Basis /3/ and
recommended materials for the floating suspension bridge anno 2017, see /4/
and /5/. Non-periodic maintenance can always be expected. Periodic
maintenance shall be described in a LCC model. A LCC model shall be based on
the object model of the project.

Table 4-2: Periodic maintenance/replacement of elements and systems with a service life
less than 100 years. *) Further detailing if the surface is exposed to de-icing
salt spray.

Element/system Service life Maintenance Replacement

Coating of primary steel 50 After 25 and 40 years 50 years (total
structures, superstructure *) replacement)
above water
Waterproofing of bridge 40 None 40 years
deck (isolation)
Wearing course 40 As needed 40 years
Safety barriers and railings 50 As needed 50 years
Permanently installed 50-100 As needed 50-100 years
access equipment
Drainage 50 As needed 50 years
>100 years As needed > 100 years (total
Stay cables
replacement)
Dehumidification systems 30 As needed 30 years
100 After 30 years (wear 50 years
Bearings
parts) (coating)
Systems: 30 As needed 30 years
- Electrical
- Mechanical
10-20 (sensors: 10, As needed 10-20 years
SHMS
infrastructure: 20)
Lifts 30 see LCC 30 years
Coating of primary steel 40 After 30 years (spot 40 years
structures, substructure repair)
above splash zone
Coating of primary steel 15 - 15 years
structures, interior surfaces
in permanent ballast tanks
Mooring lines (50m top 50 As needed 50 years
chain, 124mm steel wire)
Mooring lines (other 100 As needed 100 years
components)
Cathodic protection system 30-40 None 30-40 years
5-18 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

5 Emergency preparedness
An emergency preparedness plan shall be prepared in parallel with the design of
the Bjørnafjorden floating bridge. Among others, risk analyses shall form basis
for development of the plan. It shall be updated as the design matures. This
process shall ensure the involvement of the relevant authorities, so that the final
design is optimal considering the input from the authorities.

The overall purpose of the emergency preparedness plan is, among others:

› ensure a fast and efficient warning of relevant authorities

› ensure a clear and distinct division of tasks and responsibilities between the
emergency preparedness stakeholders

› ensure clear and unambiguous communication between the parties and

between the emergency response organizations and public bodies

› ensure a fast and safe recovery of the normal traffic situation

The contents of the emergency preparedness plan can be:

› Introduction (purpose and boundaries, basic principles, authors, revision

log)

› System description and access conditions (incl. evacuation routes,

possibility of crossing traffic, 'marching areas', traffic restrictions, any
possible permissions for special events)

› Emergency preparedness stakeholders

› Incident management (alerting, verification and disposition, effort, clean-up

and termination of effort)

› Safety for rescue personnel

› Communication and information

› Significant risk scenarios (wind, ice, fire, ship impact, terror)

› Education, drills and evacuations

› List of contacts
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 6-19

6 Risk-based inspection and maintenance

analysis
As part of the operation, maintenance and rehabilitation model a risk-based
inspection and maintenance analysis has been performed. The analysis concern
bridge elements and systems that are described by the Bjørnafjorden phase 5
project. The applied methodology is detailed in Appendix A. The result is
enclosed in Appendix B. Based on the risk-based inspection and maintenance
analysis and the focus areas of SVV, certain elements have been selected for a
further O&M-based study, including attention towards:

› design and execution

› inspections

› maintenance and rehabilitation

6.1 Criticality and vulnerability classes

An components criticality class is a measure related to the risk of failure of the
component developed in the operation period of the bridge.

The risk is in principle a summation of all risks related to all (identified) possible
failures that may occur for the component in the operation period. A risk is
defined as the product of the likelihood of the failure to occur and the
consequences of the failure.

An components vulnerability class is a measure of the time period that is

expected for the failure to develop after the failure has been observed to initiate.
The vulnerability class is determined by considering all failures as identified for
the component.

As part of the Bjørnafjorden floating bridge, critical and vulnerable elements and
systems have an impact on service life and maintenance requirements. For each
element/system a criticality class and a vulnerability class are evaluated.

Evaluated classes are shown in Appendix B. In Table 6-1 elements and systems
with non-acceptable (C3, C4, R3, R4) criticalities and/or vulnerabilities are
summarised. It is expected that all non-acceptable criticalities and vulnerabilities
will be mitigated during design incl. establishment of operation and maintenance
procedures.
6-20 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Table 6-1 Elements with non-acceptable criticalities/vulnerabilities.

Element/System Detailed as part of Detailed in a later

Criticality Vulnerability
this report phase
2.04 Steel girder
C4 R2 x
- weldings
3.01 Concrete
column – reinf. C3 R1 x
concrete
4.01 Steel
columns, interior C3 R1 x
surfaces
4.03 Steel
Columns, exterior C3 R1 x
surfaces
4.04 Steel
columns, C4 R2 x
weldings
5.01 Concrete
towers – reinf. C3 R1 x
concrete
5.02
Posttensioning C3 R1 x
elements
6.01 Tower
foundation – C3 R1 x
reinf. concrete
7.01 Abutment,
concrete – reinf. C3 R1 x
concrete
8.01 Stay cables,
C3 R1 x
cables
8.06 Stay cables,
C3 R1 x
anchors
8.07 Stay cables,
C3 R1 x
damping system
9.01 Steel
pontoons, interior C3 R1 x
surfaces
9.03 Steel
pontoons, C3 R1 x
exterior surfaces
9.04 Steel
pontoons, C4 R2 x
weldings
9.05 Steel
pontoons, coating C3 R1 x
system
9.06 Steel
pontoons, top C3 R1 x
coat
11.01 Roadway,
C4 R4 x
surfacing, friction
11.02 Roadway
C3 R1 x
surfacing, protec.
13.01 Lighting,
C3 R4 x
critical
14.01 Lighting,
C2 R3 x
non critical
17.01 Drainage
C3 R4 x
system
18.01 SHMS
C2 R3 x
system

In Table 6-2 the maximum criticality class and the maximum vulnerability class
are shown for every element/system class. According to the RBI/RCM approach,
an analysis of design requirements (e.g. reliability, durability/service life and
resilience) and O&M (inspection, maintenance and rehabilitation) shall be
performed for elements/systems that have an estimated value 3 or 4 (C3, C4,
R3, R4). In many cases the optimal solution is known. In other cases, an
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 6-21

analysis shall be performed as part of the design process incl. preparation of

O&M procedures.

In agreement with SVV focus areas, the following element groups are analysed
in the following chapters:

› Steel pontoons and steel columns

› Mooring lines

In addition, SVV has requested an O&M analysis of drydock and cofferdam

facilities as a 'third element group' – both being elements for non-scheduled
corrective maintenance in case of an incident.

The above 3 element groups are all unusual elements for major cable supported
bridges.
6-22 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Table 6-2 Criticalities and vulnerabilities of elements and systems classes.

Class Element/system Maximum Comments

no. criticality / vulnerability
1.00 Concrete girder High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
2.00 Steel girder Very high (C4) / semi Known challenges
robust (R2)
3.00 Concrete column High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
4.00 Steel column Very high (C4) / semi To be analysed
robust (R2)
5.00 Concrete tower High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
6.00 Tower foundation High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
7.00 Abutment High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
8.00 Cable system High (C3) / Robust (R1) Known challenges
9.00 Steel pontoons Very high (C4) / semi To be analysed
robust (R2)
10.00 Moring Medium (C2) / Robust To be analysed
(R1)
11.00 Surfacing Very high (C4) / Very Known challenges
vulnerable (R4)
12.00 Road sign Medium (C2) / Known challenges
Vulnerable (R3)
13.00 Electrical systems - High (C3) / Very Known challenges
critical vulnerable (R4)
14.00 Electrical systems – non- Medium (C2) / Known challenges
critical Vulnerable (R3)
15.00 Railings Inconsiderable (C1) / Known challenges
Very robust (R0)
16.00 Bearings Medium (C2) / Robust Known challenges
(R1)
17.00 Drainage system High (C3) / Very Known challenges
vulnerable (R4)
18.00 SHMS Medium (C2) / Known challenges
Vulnerable (R3)
19.00 Permanent access Medium (C2) / Robust Known challenges
facilities (R1)
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-23

7 Steel pontoons and steel columns

The pontoons are situated in a particular aggressive environment that has been
investigated intensively in previous stages of the project Bjørnafjorden floating
bridge. This section is based on the previous analyses e.g. ref. /2/ "Preferred
solution K12" and /8/ SINTEF, "Material selection, surfaces treatment and
corrosion protection for floating bridge Bjørnafjorden".

7.1 Materials for pontoons and columns

In the K12-concept the pontoon steel is a combination of carbon steel S420
N/NL and super duplex stainless steel (SDSS).

In the splash zone the pontoons are made of SDSS in full material thickness.
The top and bottom plate as well as the side plates below the splash zone
(equivalent to 6,5 m from the top plate), are constructed in carbon steel S420.
Bulkhead, diaphragm, stiffeners etc. inside the pontoons as well as the columns
are also constructed in carbon steel S420.

Figure 7-1 Pontoon and column

Several transitions and joints between different steel types will occur, which
require special handling to guarantee a sufficiently high quality, see /8/. The
same issues will apply for different types of surface treatments in different
zones.

Reference /8/ describes a number of recommendations for material and

fabrication requirements as well as recommended requirements for corrosion
protection of the steel structures.
7-24 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

7.1.1 Welds
The documents /2/ "Preferred solution, K12 – Appendix O" and /8/ "Material
selection, surface treatment and corrosion protection for floating bridge
Bjørnafjorden", describe amongst other requirements for welding of SDSS and
carbon steel. It is concluded in /8/ that the welding of the different steel types is
manageable if sound qualified welding procedures are established and
restrictions on critical material parameters are introduced. In /8/ the possibility
of a pre-treatment of the carbon steel by buttering in order to avoid hot or cold
cracking is described. An example of buttering before welding is shown in Figure
7-2.

Figure 7-2 Pre-treatment of welds in form of buttering

In the Design Basis, it should be maintained that the design of welds must take
the greatest possible account of execution and future maintenance.

Now, possible critical areas and details that are not considered in the documents
/2/ and /8/ are assessed, where there may be special requirements for the
execution of welding joints or the execution can have special effect on durability
and hence on the extent of O&M.

Figure 7-3 Typical type of corrosion on welding

Figure 7-3 shows a typical example of a corrosion damage to a weld seam.

Corrosion as shown can occur due to several reasons, but often the reason is a
combination of roughness and unevenness of the surface. The weld seam is
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-25

difficult to clean adequately and to apply the surface treatment in correct layer
thickness. Even on a relatively easily accessible area and on a simple rectilinear
weld seam, corrosion can occur if adverse conditions are present.

Figure 7-4 Proposed surface treatment on pontoon according to /8/

A proposal for the design of a surface treatment on the pontoons is shown in

Figure 7-4, which is described in document /8/.

In the figure a buttweld is shown with the root of the weld facing the interior
surfaces of the pontoon. The exposed surface of the weld root is much smaller
than the opposite side of the buttweld and the surface of the root side is also
much more even than the opposite side (especially with an x-shaped weld
seam). Since the environment inside the pontoon is expected to be less
aggressive than the outside, it should be investigated whether welding seams
can be turned so that the root is situated on the outside of the pontoon. It
7-26 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

should be clarified which environment (internal or external surfaces) will be the

most aggressive before the design of the welds are finally determined. In that
way, the most vulnerable parts of the welds will be exposed to a less aggressive
environment. It is probably not possible to turn all buttwelds for production
reasons (safe and healthy working environment etc.), but there should be focus
on the continuous horizontal and vertical welds.

At joints between top and side plates on pontoons, there will occur a transition
between stainless steel (upper side plates) and carbon steel (lower side and top
plates). The joint between horizontal and vertical plates is marked with a red
circle in Figure 7-5.

Figure 7-5 Joint between top and side plates

Consideration must be given to how the joints of horizontal and vertical plates
are to be designed. Some principal assembly types are shown in Figure 7-6 and
assessed for maintenance and service life issues, but not from a structural
capacity or execution point of view.

Figure 7-6 Examples of weld types between top and side plates

The top plates must have a slope towards the sides, which shall ensure
drainages of the surface. The recommended slope for a self-draining surface
should be no less than 25‰. At the joint detail shown in Figure 7-6-A, it is
likely that the weld will form an edge (groove or dent) that prevents free
drainage of water from the pontoon surfaces.

At the weld shown in Figure 7-6-B the risk for forming a groove or dent along
the edge will be less. However, the surface area of the weld will become much
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-27

larger and require extensive finishing work in order to ensure a smooth surface
that does not collect debris and ensures good drainage from the top of the
pontoon.

At the joint in Figure 7-6-C the weld is placed on the side plate, whereby water
from the top of the pontoon has a free flow to the outside of the vertical side
plate.

For all three variants shown in Figure 7-6 the water and with this is debris from
the surface of the top plates will run directly down the side plates. It is good
practice to design a drip mould at the edge of the surface that is drained so that
underlying surfaces are not unnecessarily contaminated, see Figure 7-7. The
Design Basis should require that vulnerable details must be designed with
respect for good drainage conditions. Horizontal surfaces should be fabricated
with a slope no less than 25‰.

Figure 7-7 Example of a drip mould

If the top plate is designed as shown in Figure 7-7 the overhang will act as a
drip mould and the weld is located in a less exposed zone.
7-28 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Figure 7-8 Weld between top and side plates designed with an overhang.

Type and location of welds along with a possible drip mould should be designed
with focus on the production.

The joint between the bottom and side plates are below the waterline and are
therefore outside the splash zone. The plates are therefore all designed in the
same type of carbon steel S420, but the problems with regard to surface
treatment and location of welds are to a certain extent similar, however a drip
mould is not relevant.

Figure 7-9 Joint between bottom and side plates

Joints between columns and pontoons are also located outside the splash zone,
so the materials will presumably be designed as carbon steel S420 with a
surface treatment. The same recommendations apply to the design as described
in the previous section.

Figure 7-10 Weld between column and top plate (pontoon)

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-29

The joints between columns and pontoons should be detailed in a future phase
with special focus on drainage and cleaning of the joints.

7.1.2 Corrosion protection

In order to achieve the desired service life of the steel elements in different
environments, the carbon steel must be protected against corrosion. Based on
ref. /8/ where different surface protection systems were evaluated, various
transition zones on the structure are subsequently examined, which must be in
focus during the detailed design, including specification of requirements for the
execution.

In ref. /2/ and /8/ a number of topics are described that must be in focus when
the surface treatments are applied, emphasising on good workmanship and best
practice:

› Layer thickness
› Rounding of edges
› Cleanliness of surfaces
› Surface roughness
› Chloride contamination on surfaces
› Conditions during application: temperature, dew point, relative humidity
› Workmanship: Operator knowledge and experience, equipment and QC
inspection

In addition to the above listed topics the design shall emphasize that all surfaces
shall be easy to paint and clean. This means that during the design e.g. it must
be taken into account that water can easily run off surfaces and that edges and
chambers are created so that no water and debris can accumulate.
7-30 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Figure 7-11 Unpractical details where debris accumulates.

According to the recommendations in /8/ all components above the splash zone
must be fabricated in carbon steel S420 with a coating type SVV System 2
(standard surface treatment system in accordance with SVV Handbook R762).

Figure 7-12 shows the recommended build-up of the surface protection system
over a weld on a flat SDSS-surface from ref. /8/.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-31

Figure 7-12 Example of corrosion protection build-up over a weld in accordance with /8/

Submerged elements shall be fabricated in carbon steel S420 with a coating

type NORSOK System 7B together with cathodic protection.

Figure 7-13 Transition between different materials and coating systems.

In principle it is more complex to perform a good coating in transition zones on

non-plane surfaces. First the joint details/welding are more difficult to perform
7-32 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

and secondly the pre-treatment is more difficult to produce. Hence these are
items that require special attention during design and fabrication.

Interior surfaces in columns and all inactive ballast tanks are protected against
corrosion by dehumidification. Interior surfaces in active ballast tanks of the
pontoons are protected from corrosion by a combination of coating and cathodic
protection. Recommended coating systems and cathodic protection are
described more detailed in ref. /8/.

7.1.3 Cathodic protection

According to the Design Basis /3/ all submerged steel elements must be
protected against corrosion by a cathodic protection system. That also applies to
interior surfaces in active ballast tanks inside pontoons if seawater is used as
ballast. The use of seawater or other chloride-containing materials as ballast in
the active ballast tanks is currently not planned. In the splash zone cathodic
protection cannot be expected to be fully efficient, therefore selection of material
and coating systems must be robust, especially in critical areas like the splash
zone.

Cathodic protection is a recognized and well proven method of corrosion

protection of steel members and the degree of efficiency can be measured and
monitored. The size, numbers and location of the sacrificial anodes must be
designed on a principle that takes into account the frequency of inspections and
replacements, as well as access conditions.

As a part of the cathodic protection systems, sensors are installed to monitor the
potential differences in the steel between anodes and sensors. If the potential
difference is below a threshold value, the corrosion protection in the area is no
longer fully ensured and therefore indicate that replacement of anodes is due.
The number of sensors to be installed should be chosen to cover a
representative section of the structural parts to be cathodic protected without
necessarily monitoring the entire pontoon. It must also be considered whether
all pontoons should be monitored, or a representative selection would be
sufficient.

If the anodes are designed for an expected service life of 30-40 years, anodes
should typically be inspected the first time after 15-20 years. The intervals of
the inspection can be based on the monitoring in a combination with inputs from
inspections. The extent of inspections can be adjusted according to experience
with the system.

The OceanTech document "Methodology for dry access to pontoons of floating

bridge Bjørnafjorden" /10/ describes a concept for dry access that may be used
for inspection, cleaning, maintenance and replacement of anodes on the outside
of pontoons.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-33

Figure 7-14 Access equipment for CP, copied from /10/

In Figure 7-14 the anodes are shown installed on bespoke plates in a rail device,
in which the anodes can be pulled up to the upper side of the pontoon and
handled. A remote-controlled tool, attached to a rail on top of the pontoon, can
be used to clean and/or replace anodes on the pontoon exterior.

There are several items concerning the access equipment tool shown that could
be problematic and should be investigated further as detailed below.

The anodes are arranged in a rail device which is connected to the pontoon. The
rail thereby passes over zones with stainless steel SDSS and carbon steel S420.
It is assessed that there will be a very high risk of corrosion problems in the
form of galvanic corrosion when different materials are connected. The rail
device is also located in the splash zone, which increases the risk of developing
corrosion around the connections (welds, bolts or similar), as shown in Figure
7-15.
7-34 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

Figure 7-15 Typical example of corrosion between different materials. The dark colour
indicates corrosion

Furthermore, it is desirable to have as few penetrations of the steel surface and

coating as possible, which will be compromised by the connection of a rail
device.

There is a high risk that marine growth will build-up on and around rails and
spread out on adjacent surfaces. In order to ensure full functionality of the rail
devices cleaning and maintenance of the system will be required to some extent.
That could become extensive before the system comes into use after
approximately 15 years.

Anodes on the underside of the pontoons are likely to be required. These anodes
cannot be reached by the proposed rail devices and therefore a different form of
access will be required.

Based on the concerns described above the advantages of a permanently

installed equipment for maintenance of anodes are estimated to be less than the
disadvantages that comes with the system in terms of general maintenance of
the system.

7.2 Operation and maintenance

There will be a number of general operation and maintenance tasks that must
be performed for columns and pontoons. Subsequently four of the probably
most frequently occurring tasks with different intervals and character are
described.

- General cleaning
General cleaning must be performed on the outside of the column exterior and
on the top of pontoons. General cleaning means removal of debris and
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-35

contamination, that over time could lead to damages of the coating. General
cleaning is considered a part of the normal operation that is organised and
performed by the operation organisation.

- Removal of marine growth

Elements submerged and in the splash zone are subject to marine growth to a
degree that over time can damage the coating and eventually the steel. In
accordance with the Design Basis /3/ marine growth must be taken into account
during the design. However, removal of the marine growth can be required for
instance during inspection and maintenance. To the largest extent possible the
cleaning must be performed by a remote-controlled or autonomous ROV robot,
although in the upper parts of the splash zone it may be necessary to
supplement with manually operated equipment. The cleaning requires special
equipment and trained personnel for the operation and is considered to be a
maintenance task. During inspections marine growth must be removed in the
area under examination.

-Spot repairs on coating

Minor damages to the coating on columns and top side of pontoons are repaired
in appropriate intervals, in order to diminish the development of corrosion on
the steel and deterioration of the coating. Spot repairs of the coating is a typical
maintenance task and must be performed by skilled workers.

- Replacement of sacrificial anodes for the cathodic protection

The time for replacement of sacrificial anodes for cathodic protection on the
pontoons is determined from the results of inspection and cathodic potential
differences monitored. The replacement of anodes is a task for specialists,
whether performed by ROV robots or professional divers.

7.3 Accessibility
The operation and maintenance tasks described in section 7.2 require access
facilities that suit the frequency and duration of the individual tasks. In section
10 an access strategy is described.

As described in section 10 there should be access from the columns to the top
side of the pontoons. From the pontoons, inspections, cleaning and spot repairs
of coating on columns and top side of pontoons are performed. Safe access on
the upper side of the pontoons can be guaranteed by the use of harnesses in
combination with fall protection equipment or by installing permanent guard rails
at the perimeter of the pontoon. The extent of maintenance on guard rails is
considered to become unacceptably large in relation to the benefits of
restriction-free access on the pontoons. Hence rails should come in use when all
other solutions are exhausted. Permanent anchor points for rope access require
to some extent maintenance and with the number of inspections and other tasks
to be performed from the top of the pontoons a permanent safety guardrail in
combination with rope access/fall protection equipment should be considered in
special situations. Access from the column to the edge of the pontoon can be
established by guardrails, which create a more easily accessible evacuation
7-36 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

route on the pontoons. The guardrail should be placed at a suitable distance

from the edge, so that a safe platform is established from which access on and
off a mooring boat can be created. In addition, bollards for mooring of vessels
can be installed in the space between the railing and pontoon edge. Access to
the pontoons from the waterside is still under evaluation and a solution without
guard rails is preferred.

Access to the external surfaces on the columns can be established using ladders,
lift, scaffold or rope access. Visual routine inspection and general cleaning can
primarily be performed from the top of the pontoons. Access by ladder is limited
to low heights and cannot fully cover the access to the columns. Lifts or
scaffolding must be lifted from the bridge deck to the top of the pontoon, which
can cause interference with traffic to a certain extent. Alternatively, equipment
could be transported by boat to the pontoons. This will require more planning
and mobilisation. Rope access would not disturb the traffic on the bridge and can
be mobilised at short notice, however it requires access in form of hatches from
the bridge girder at the columns. Alternatively rope access could be created
from a self-propelled inspection gantry. The gantry will in that case be parked
adjacent to a column and be occupied during the inspection periods and
therefore not available for other tasks. The access strategy to the external
surfaces of the column should preferably be a combination of measures.
Inspections and cleaning of columns are in general performed from the pontoon
top and only in special cases or on high columns inspections must be performed
by rope access from the inspection gantry. Spot repairs of the coating are
preformed from scaffolding that can be transported inside column and bridge
girder. It requires equipment for transportation inside the bridge and all hatches
must be designed for general access. Sizes of hatches for access must be
specified in the Design Basis.

The bridge girder inspection gantry must be opened in the middle when passing
the columns. The open gantry must be stabilized during the column passage e.g.
on gantry beams as shown in Figure 7-16. From the open gantry there will be
surfaces on the bridge girder that are inaccessible for inspection or maintenance
works. Therefor access to these surfaces must be established in another way
(e.g. by a lift) when maintenance or inspection is required.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 7-37

Figure 7-16 Gantry rail for inspection gantry

Access to the sides of the pontoons above water must primarily be performed
from boat or barge. The sides of the pontoon are fabricated in SDSS in the
splash zone and any spot repairs on the coating are primary for esthetic
reasons. Should the pontoon be completed with a drip mould as shown in Figure
7-8 spot repairs may be required. The works could be accomplished from the top
of the pontoons. Inspection and removal of marine growth can be performed
form a boat or barge.

Inspection and removing marine growth below water should preferably be

carried out using ROV equipment.
8-38 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

8 Optional tools for corrective

maintenance
In this section concepts for dry access to the pontoons for O&M tasks are
reviewed. The reviews are based on OceanTech´s documents for dry dock and
cofferdam /9/ and /10/ regarding concepts and economic considerations.

A floating dry dock could come into use if a large very extensive repair is
required on a pontoon e.g. after a ship collision. The dry dock will create dry
access to all exterior surfaces of the pontoon and form an enclosed space in
which the climate can be controlled for optimal working conditions, minimizing
downtime due to weather. A cofferdam is used to establish dry access to the
outside of the pontoon in the event of more local damages that require repairs.

A dry dock or a cofferdam are not needed in the construction period of the
bridge and would not be fabricated until a requirement occur in the operation
period of the bridge.

The use of a dry dock is expected to be primarily a safety tool in relation to a

major ship collision. Damages in relation to a minor ship collision and local
repair requirements in the splash zone are expected to be remedied more
economically using a cofferdam (shown in Figure 8-4).

8.1 Concept for dry dock

OceanTech have developed two primary concepts for access to the surfaces of
the pontoons from the dry dock construction:

› Grillage
› Gantry

The concepts have been developed with the aim of creating fully access of the
submerged surfaces of the pontoon so that inspection and maintenance can be
performed.

Dry dock with grillage is shown in Figure 8-1.

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 8-39

Figure 8-1 Drydock with grillage (yellow) and scaffold (green)

Dry dock with a gantry is shown in Figure 8-2.

Figure 8-2 Dry dock with gantry

OceanTech recommends that consoles are installed at the side of the column
underneath the bridge girder as shown in Figure 8-3.

Figure 8-3 Consoles at column for dry dock

8-40 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

As the consoles will restrict the passage of the inspection gantry and therefor
also restrict access to the soffit of the bridge girder, the size and location of the
consoles should be assessed in more detail.

OceanTech states that there is no suitable dry dock on the market and therefore
it must be manufactured from scratch if required. OceanTech estimates that a
dry dock can be acquired for approx. NOK 99 million and approx. NOK 6 million
for mobilisation, 20 days operation and demobilisation.

In ref. /10/ OceanTech describes the required temporary relocation of mooring

lines when a dry dock comes into use. This operation must be performed before
the dry dock arrives at the pontoon. Different locations for the mooring lines
have been analyzed. One with the anchor of mooring lines situated central on
the pontoon and another where the anchorages are positioned at the side of the
pontoon.

For safety reasons the mooring lines cannot be anchored to the dry dock.
Therefore, mooring lines must temporary be anchored to buoys or the adjacent
pontoon. On the basis of the technical and economic analysis in ref. /10/ this
work must be performed using tugboats and anchor vessels.

Before the mooring lines can be relocated to buoys or an adjacent pontoon it

must be prepared for the anchoring of the mooring lines with fairlead chain
stopper etc. The mooring lines must be returned to the original pontoons when
repair works has been completed and the dry dock is removed.

8.2 Operation and maintenance

The Bjørnafjord project has in servals documents (e.g. /2/ and /8/) analyzed
and recommended the best combination of materials and corrosion protection
(cathodic protection and coating) which should not require maintenance for the
required 100 years of service life for the bridge. Corrosion protection by
dehumidification is in operation in all interior chambers that are not in use as
active ballast tanks. Removal of marine growth and inspection of submerged
elements should be done using ROV robots. Inspection of submerged elements
are further described in ref. /11/.

Recommendations regarding fabrication of a dry dock (as a spare part) must be

motivated by a quantitative risk analysis which analyses safe requirements for
downtime and economic aspects. From an O&M aspect there should be no need
for a dry dock for the first 100 years and it will only be used in the event of an
unusual and special event. This should be evaluated in detail when the risk
analyses for ship collision are completed. Ref. /16/ RAM-analysis refers to an
earlier risk analysis that concluded the risk for a ship collision to be very low,
which also is accepted to be the outcome of the pending risk analysis.

From an O&M aspect it will be a technical and economic advantage to include

preparation of the structure for a dry dock concept for maintenance as well as
the design of the dry dock itself. This should be a part of the bridge design from
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 8-41

an early stage. Experience from other major bridge projects shows that
technically and economic optimal access facilities will be ensured by involvement
early in the design.

8.3 Cofferdam
OceanTech have worked with a technical and economic concept for a cofferdam
to provide dry access to the side of pontoons. This concept is illustrated in
Figure 8-4.

Figure 8-4 Cofferdam as shown in ref. /9/.

OceanTech estimates that a cofferdam can be acquired for approx. NOK 7 million
and mobilization is estimated to approx. NOK 6 million for operation in 10 days
and subsequently demobilization.

The cofferdam will be an appropriate tool for repairing minor but significant
damages in the submerged and splash zone of the pontoons.

From an O&M aspect it will be a technical and economic advantage to include

preparation of the pontoons for a cofferdam for maintenance tasks. The design
for a cofferdam should be included in the bridge design and commence in an
early staged of the design. Experience from other major bridge projects shows
that technical and economic optimal access facilities will be ensured by
involvement early in the design. The design of a cofferdam should be a flexible
solution that can be operated in as many locations on the pontoons as possible.

The size of the cofferdam is not only given by O&M considerations, but the
layout must in coming stages also be analyzed based on a quantitative risk
analysis which amongst other describes the consequences of a ship collision. The
8-42 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

frequency of a ship collision is expected to be very low, however this should be

evaluated when the pending risk analysis is finalized.

OceanTech consider that it is possible to design a single type of cofferdam to

operate on the complete set of pontoons as they are sufficiently monotonous,
whether they are fabricated with or without anchorages for mooring lines.
OceanTech recommend that the cofferdam is designed to cover an entire ballast
tank on the inside of a pontoon and the pontoon frame must be situated so that
horizontal loads are led directly into the bulkheads and stiffener of the pontoon.

It is assumed that the cofferdam is only fabricated when an incident or damage

arises, so that the design and layout of the cofferdam can be adjusted to best
suit the given location on the pontoon in question. Fabrication cost of a
cofferdam will to some extend depend on the required delivery time. This should
be evaluated when the final risk analysis is completed.

In the transverse direction of the pontoons, bulkheads, diaphragms and

stiffeners are situated with a uniform distance of 2.5 m. In the longitudinal
direction the bulkheads etc. are in the center arranged with a spacing of 800
mm and 862 mm towards the edges.

Figure 8-5 Section of pontoon, plan view

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 8-43

The size of the ballast tanks varies in width (ballast tank A and B) and shape
(ballast tank C) as shown in Figure 8-6. In particular the rounded sections
(ballast tank C) at the ends of the pontoons require a robust concept for the
cofferdam if it should be able to cover all types of ballast tanks and all shapes of
the pontoon.

Figure 8-6 The cofferdam situated at different locations on the pontoon.

When a cofferdam is installed on the pontoon, according to /9/ there must be a

working space inside the cofferdam of minimum 2.0 m to create sufficient space
for a self-moving scissor lift or platform. The working space cannot be
established if a cofferdam designed for installation on the plane surface of the
pontoon is installed on the rounded section of the pontoon, as shown in Figure
8-6.

In the cofferdam design an extent of flexibility should be incorporated e.g. in

form of modules that can take the rounded sections of the pontoon and the
variable sizes of ballast tanks into account.

In ref. /9/ a brief description on how to seal the joint between pontoon and
cofferdam is include. However, it is not described how the cofferdam is attached
to the pontoon. This should be investigated further including a procedure for
reestablishment of the coating on the pontoon after the cofferdam is
demobilized.
9-44 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

9 Mooring of pontoons

9.1 Concept
The two consortia that in the conceptual stage 5 have worked with a floating
cable stay bridge solution over Bjørnafjorden, have described two concepts for
anchoring the mooring lines to the pontoons:

› Anchoring to the sides on the pontoons (AMC concept)

› Anchoring to the centre of the pontoons in mooring pools (OON concept)

Anchoring at the side of pontoons (described in ref. /7/ App. A, drawing 701) is
shown in Figure 9-1.

Figure 9-1 Concept of mooring system (ref. /7/ appendix A, drawing 701)

Anchoring to the centre of the pontoons in mooring pools (ref. /15/) is shown in
Figure 9-2.

Figure 9-2 Anchoring to the centre of the pontoons in mooring pools

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 9-45

9.2 Materials
SINTEF recommends in a preliminary conclusion after comparing AMC and OON
design that the following material, corrosion protection and other protection
systems are used (see ref. /8/):

It is noted that the two consortia estimate different service lives for top and
bottom chains. Top chain materials and dimensions are similar in the two
consortia, whereas there is a difference in the dimensions for bottom chains. The
latter obviously gives a different lifespan. From an O&M perspective a solution
with a longer service lifespan is recommended.

9.3 Operation and maintenance

The central anchoring of mooring lines to the pontoons could probably result in a
material reduction and thus an economic saving. Whether the savings can
compensate for the extra costs due to mooring pools should be assessed
separately. The mooring pool solution will be an advantage if there is a need for
the installation of a cofferdam, where a side anchoring of mooring lines would
otherwise be situated.

From an operation and maintenance aspect mooring pools will cause a number
of challenges. The solution with the central anchoring of the mooring lines
creates several surfaces and transitions zones on the pontoons which must be
inspected and possibly maintained. Furthermore, considerations must be given
to provide safe access to the mooring pools during inspection and maintenance.
From the cathodic protection hydrogen gases can develop and accumulate in the
9-46 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

mooring pools and they must therefore be ventilated before workers can access
the cavity safely.

On the top of the pontoons, mooring pools must be secured so that there is no
danger of falling into the hole. If a railing would be installed around the mooring
pools, it must be assessed whether access to the columns will be restricted.

In the side anchoring solution, the chain stopper and fairled will to an extent be
protected by the cathodic protection installed on the pontoons. In the mooring
pools chain stopper and fairled cannot benefit from the cathodic protection and
the elements therefore require a separate corrosion protection.

Further analyzes must be performed to determine whether sheated steel wire

rope or fiber rope should be used on the central parts of the mooring lines
between top and bottom anchor chains.

As pointed out above there are a number of O&M disadvantages to the current
OON concept, but it should be further investigated whether the concept can
bring savings that outweigh the disadvantages.

The top and bottom chains are recommended in ref. /8/ to be designed with a
corrosion allowance of 0.8mm/year in the splash zone and 0.2 mm/year for fully
submerged items. Should the corrosion rate turn out to be higher than expected
or service lifespan of the element is to be extended, the possibility of
implementing a cathodic protection system should be considered. Since cathodic
protection using sacrificial anodes are likely to have only a limited effect on
chains, it could be considered to use impressed current cathodic protection
(ICCP).

9.4 Spare parts

In order to minimise downtime of the bridge service due to unforeseen events,
there should be components for the mooring system in stock if these items are
not standard components or have an unacceptably long delivery time. It is
assumed that documentation of downtime will remain part of the future design
process. The design of mooring lines and related components are still in a phase
where component are not designed and therefor delivery times cannot be
estimated.

The failure of one or two mooring lines and the acceptable replacement times
are assessed in the AMC document ref. /12/. The design is considered to be a
relatively robust concept.

Replacement of mooring lines could be performed in accordance with the

principles shown and described in ref. /9/ and /13/.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 9-47

9.5 Access facilities

Access facilities are described in the OceanTech document ref. /10/. Tugboats
and anchor handling vessels should be used. ROV robots must also be taken into
use during the replacement.
10-48 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

10 Access strategy
This chapter outlines the access strategy for execution of O&M activities on the
bridge. This includes access for personnel, equipment and materials.

Access facilities shall ensure, technical and economic optimal, performance of

inspection, maintenance and rehabilitation of elements and systems. It shall be
possible to perform these activities with minimal disturbance to road traffic, as
well as maritime traffic. In addition, it shall be possible to comply with all
occupational health and safety requirements as specified by the Norwegian
legislation.

In case of an accident, permanent access facilities shall facilitate a safe

evacuation route and safe access for rescue personnel.

The following design phases shall detail, how access facilities facilitate optimal
O&M (e.g. based on material choice and dimensions). The project Design Basis
shall detail robust requirements for access facilities that balances technical (incl.
safety for personnel) and economic consequences.

Permanent access facilities comprise:

› Shared use path (SUP) which also shall provide access for an Under-Bridge
Inspection Unit

› Roadway incl. shoulder

› Service roads, i.e. roads other than the above that also provide access to,
or close to, the bridge

Non-moveable equipment comprises:

› Catwalk in bridge interior from abutment to abutment (passage by foot or

using electrical vehicles. The latter require that turnaround areas are
established at certain locations).

› Interior and exterior stairs, platforms, doors and hatches. Exterior doors
and hatches shall be equipped with a locking system. Doors and hatches
shall be watertight. Passage from roadway level to the bottom of the
pontoons shall be possible. Passage from roadway level to tower top and
bottom and between tower legs beneath the roadway girder. Passage 'from
A to B' includes transport of personnel, materials and equipment.
Verification shall be performed as part of the design. At certain locations,
e.g. in piers, a shaft for hoisting of materials and equipment will be
beneficial. This also needs to be verified as part of the design. In addition, it
shall be possible to inspect, maintain and replace bearings from permanent
access facilities. As a secondary access and evacuation route passage from
pier interior to pontoon exterior shall be possible. This allow for entering or
exiting the bridge by boat.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 10-49

› Interior and exterior railings

› Anchor points for rope access (tower, piers and pontoons)

› Anchor points for a Sky Climber (tower)

› Bollards on pontoons (for boats)

Permanent moveable equipment comprises:

› Elevator in tower leg (from the bottom to the top with the possibility to stop
and exit in between, incl. stop and exit at crossbeam and at roadway level

› Self-propelled inspection gantry beneath the bridge girder (preferably one

that travels on both types of bridge girders – concrete and steel)

Portable access equipment comprises:

› Bucket truck

› Underbridge inspection unit (travel along the shared use path in one side of
the bridge girder and along the shoulder / slow lane on the other side of the
bridge)

› Sky Climber for tower*

› Moveable ladders/scaffolding, e.g. in the bridge girder interior*

› Electrical vehicles for the bridge girder interior*

› Possibly small vehicles for travel on the shared use path

› Boat or barge

› Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) and Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

(AUV)

› Divers equipment

› Rescue equipment (moveable tripod with hoist, etc.)

*Should be delivered as part of the bridge. Remaining objects shall be standard

equipment, which is readily available on the market, and accommodated for
during design of the bridge.
11-50 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

11 Risk-based inspection and maintenance

11.1 Introduction
The purpose of risk-based1 inspection (RBI) and reliability centred maintenance
(RCM) planning is to ensure that inspections and scheduled replacements are
performed before compromising safety as well as minimising life cycle costs. The
latter has been a goal for O&M planning during the past decades, where
sampling/theme-wise inspections are common.

Deterioration and failure of elements and systems are associated with a large
degree of uncertainty. Risk- and reliability-based methods are excellent methods
when dealing with uncertain processes.

When infrastructure managers introduce RBI, they often seek to optimise

current practise (e.g. SVV in Norway and Rijkswaterstaat in the Netherlands)
and often targeted towards major infrastructure assets, like a major bride or a
major tunnel that is staffed daily. Similar considerations have been applied
during inspection planning for other major bridges, incl. Queen Elisabeth II in
UK, the future Messina bridge in Italy etc.

In many countries (as in Norway) handbooks specify rules for inspection and
maintenance which are robust, when dealing with a portfolio of structures of
different age, geometry, material etc. Often these structures undergo principal
inspection every 5-6 years. Handbook-based inspection and maintenance rules
may not be economic optimal when considering major bridges with many similar
details, difficult access and with an almost daily staffing. RBI and RCM methods
can be used for economic optimisation of inspection and maintenance with due
consideration of reliability, safety and any other constraints.

RBI has been applied in the oil and gas industry (incl. offshore) during the latest
decades.

11.2 RBI
RBI comprise elements and systems for which the failure pattern is predictable
and for which the remaining, acceptable deterioration can be determined based
on the result of a condition evaluation. One example is corrosion of a steel girder
as failure mode, where coating constitutes the protection system. RBI shall
contain a description of inspection type, location and interval. The inspection
program shall be optimised according to a vulnerability criterion (vulnerability,
see Appendix A) for every element/system.

1
In some projects the evaluation of consequences is omitted. Then the
expression 'reliability-based inspection' is used.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 11-51

11.3 RCM
RCM comprise elements and systems for which the failure pattern is predictable
but for which the remaining, acceptable deterioration cannot be determined
based on the result of a condition evaluation. Such elements and systems are
often mechanical, hydraulic and/or electrical. RCM shall contain inspection
interval (if possible), mitigation measures, maintenance interval and needed
spare parts in order to maintain a acceptable level of safety.

11.4 Method
The use of RBI and RCM methods shall ensure that:

› Correct individual inspection and maintenance strategy is proposed for

every element and system with special attention towards critical and/or
vulnerable elements and systems.

› Inspection plans are evaluated and optimised during the operational phase
based on inspection results in order to prolong service life, optimize
inspection frequency and prevent escalation of damages.

› The bridge elements and systems operate as intended and according to

specified reliability levels.

› Identified risks are managed through inspection and maintenance according

to acceptance criteria related to fatalities, environmental damage, economy
and availability.

› Operation and maintenance costs are at optimum.

During RBI and RCM planning each element and system is analysed and the
optimal individual strategy is established. These individual strategies are then
combined and adjusted in order to establish an optimal inspection plan for the
entire bridge (the results of this report shall contribute to an increased and
systematic detailing of O&M during the next phases of the project).
12-52 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

12 Structural Health Monitoring System

(SHMS)

12.1 Introduction
The purpose of a Structural Health Monitoring System (SHMS) is to provide data
for:

› verification of design

› basis for maintenance decision-making (e.g. estimation of remaining service

life)

› basis for operational decision-making (e.g. traffic restrictions related to

incidents)

SVV wants a lean SHMS that collects, processes and presents 'need to know' and
not 'nice to know' data. The reasons are listed below:

› a SHMS comprise elements and systems with a short service life / become
obsolete quite fast, i.e. O&M related costs are significant

› collection and interpretation of data (calculations etc.) may come with a

significant cost

It should therefore be carefully considered which monitoring systems should be

permanent (monitoring of mooring prestress) and which can be removed after
design verification of structural response and which can be launched as
campaigns subsequently (fatigue in orthotropic steel girder). That is, an SHMS
should be designed as consisting of sub-modules that can be established, used,
and shut down as needed.

A Structural Health Monitoring System is needed, see e.g. /12/, comprising a

monitoring part (sensor system and data acquisition) and a data evaluation part.

The data evaluation module may, if needed, comprise the following modules:

› interpretation of data (detection of abnormal response that exceeds specific

thresholds)

› estimation of remaining service life

› notification of extreme events

› notification of alerts and warnings (e.g. notification of the bridge operator in

case of ship impact)
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 12-53

The data evaluation module for elements and systems above and below water is
described in the following section.

12.2 SHMS for elements and systems above and

below water
As part of the data interpretation module and related response activities, the
following shall be included:

› Comparison of anemometer readings (weather data, e.g. wind speed) with

relevant design values

› To assess wind load response of the structure in case of extreme wind

loads

› To warn users in case of reduced comfort due to high wind speeds

› Correlation of GPS and tilt-meter readings with results obtained from the
finite element analyses used to design the bridges

› To assess the combined load effects of wind, wave, tidal currents and
traffic loads in order to update service life models

› To warn users in case of visual deformations of bridge girder, tower

and piers

› Stay cable monitoring (visual comfort and fatigue, possibly launched as a

campaign)

› Weigh-In-Motion (WIM) data (traffic load assessment, possibly launched as

a campaign)

› Permanent monitoring of mooring lines. Comparison of such data with

exposure and structural response data (ref. above) shall be performed. As
part of the SHMS design, it should be considered if draught sensors could
provide need to know data.

› Cathodic protection monitoring, se section 7.1.3.

As part of the remaining service life module, the following shall be included
(possibly as a campaign):

› Fatigue in welded joints of the orthotropic steel deck. To this aim, strain
and external exposure data (traffic and temperature) shall be combined into
appropriate fatigue accumulation models to determine the remaining fatigue
life.

As part of the extreme event notification (e.g. ship impact), the following shall
be included:
12-54 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

› Provide data that informs decision-making regarding the launch of a special

inspection. In particular, following a ship impact event, acceleration data
and tilt-meter data shall be analysed to characterize the intensity of the
event and shall also be compared with the corresponding design data.
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 13-55

13 References
/1/ Bjørnafjorden, VegRAMS: Mandat og føring for arbeidet
2020-17-04

/2/ Preferred solution, K12 – Appendix O,

Material technology and steel in marine environment,
Ferry free E39 – Fjord crossings Bjørnafjorden: 2020-04-17

/3/ Design Basis Bjørnafjorden, Side- and anchored floating bridge, rev. C,
2014-03-07

/4/ Bjørnafjorden Suspension Bridge, K1 & K2 Life Cycle Cost Study, doc.
no. SBJ-20-C3-AAS-40-RE-001 Rev 0, 02.06.2017

/5/ Bjørnafjorden Suspension Bridge, K1 & K2 Management, Operation and

Maintenance, doc. no. SBJ-20-C3-AAS-40-RE-002 Rev 0, 02.06.2017

/6/ Concept development, Floating bridge E39 Bjørnafjorden, Preferred

solution, K12 – main report, doc. no. SBJ-33-C5-AMC-90-RE-100, Rev.
0, 15.08.2019

/7/ Concept evaluation Appendix A, Floating bridge E39 Bjørnafjorden,

Drawings binder, doc. no. SBJ-32-C5-AMC-90-RE-101 Rev 1,
31.08.2019

/8/ Material selection, surface treatment and corrosion protection for

floating bridge Bjørnafjorden, SINTEF Report no. 2020:00852, Rev 0.2
2020-09-07

/9/ Cost Estimate – Cofferdam on Pontoons, OceanTech dok. no. 20008-Z-

RA-002, Rev 01, 2020-09-10

/10/ Methodology for dry access to pontoons of floating bridge

Bjørnafjorden, OceanTech dok. no. 19008-Z-RA-001, Rev 03, 2019-07-
19.

/11/ Inspection philosophy and scope estimates for the marine componnets,
Bjørnafjorden, ferry free E39, Statens Vegvesen.

/12/ Preferred solution, K12 – Appendix M,

Mooring System,
Ferry free E39 – Fjord crossings Bjørnafjorden: 2019-08-15

/13/ Preferred solution, K12 – Appendix N,

Construction and marine operations,
Ferry free E39 – Fjord crossings Bjørnafjorden: 2019-08-15

/14/ Design Basis, E39 Bjørnafjorden – Rev A, 2020-10-08

13-56 BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY

/15/ K12 - Design of mooring and anchoring, Rev. 0, 2019-10-15

/16/ K12 – RAM-analysis Rev 1.0, 2020-11-13

BJØRNAFJORDEN FLOATING BRIDGE (K12) – OPERATION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION STRATEGY 13-57

Bilag A Risk Based Inspection,

Maintenance and Rehabilitation
(Methodology)
BJØRNAFJORDEN FLYTEBRU (K12) – APPENDIX A RISK BASED INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION (METHODOLOGY) 1-1

1 Concept for Reliability-based

Inspection, Maintenance and
Rehabilitation

1.1 Basic terms

Component:

A component can either be an element (e.g. stay cable, bolt) or a system (e.g.
dehumidification system, structural health moniroting system). A system may
also comprise one or more elements.

Criticality:

An components criticality class is a measure related to the risk of failure of the

component developed in the operation period of the bridge.

The risk is in principle a summation of all risks related to all (identified) possible
failures that may occur for the component in the operation period. A risk is
defined as the product of the likelihood of the failure to occur and the
consequences of the failure.

Vulnerability:

An components vulnerability class is a measure of the time period that is

expected for the failure to develop after the failure has been observed to initiate.
The vulnerability class is determined by considering all failures as identified for
the component.

For each component is determined the values for:

1 Criticality Class

2 Vulnerability Class

by considering all (identified) possible failures of the component.

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It is important that an adequate component hierarchy is used with proper

relation to as well design properties and inspection, maintenance and
rehabilitation methodology.

1.2 Introduction to RBI and RCM

Risk based Inspection, Maintenance and Rehabilitation (I, M and R) planning
may be performed using the concepts of Reliability Based Inspection (RBI) and
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM).

RBI and RCM methods ensure that:

› Correct maintenance strategy is proposed for all elements and systems with
adequate attention towards critical and/or vulnerable elements and
systems.

› Inspection plans are optimised, evaluated and updated during the

operational phase based on inspection results in order to prolong service
life, optimise inspection frequency and prevent escalation of damages, i.e.
also decreasing maintenance costs.

› The bridge elements and systems operate at specified availability and

reliability levels.

› Identified risks are either eliminated through design, or otherwise managed

through I, M and R and reduced to levels where fatalities, environmental
damage, and operational risks meet the predefined acceptance criteria.

› Operation and maintenance costs are at optimum and benchmarked against

the life cycle cost analysis.

The method consists of two main parts:

› Reliability Based Inspections (RBI):

Inspections to be carried out on components for which the failure pattern is
known and for which the remaining, acceptable deterioration can be
determined based on the result of a condition evaluation (which may
include an estimate of remaining structural capacity).
Meaning: components that are maintained condition based.
Example: concrete or steel pylon leg

› Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

Maintenance to be carried out on components for which the failure pattern
is known but for which the remaining, acceptable deterioration cannot be
foreseen based on the result of a condition evaluation.
Meaning: components that are maintained/replaced either:
- when a failure has occurred (non-critical components)
Example: bulb in lighting
- in due time before a failure is expected to occur (critical components).

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BJØRNAFJORDEN FLYTEBRU (K12) – APPENDIX A RISK BASED INSPECTION, MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION (METHODOLOGY) 1-3

Expected time for failure is estimated according to empirical model

Example: racon (a type of radar transponder commonly used to mark
maritime navigational hazards)

The method has been used in its full extent, as far as bridges are concerned, in
Detailed Design of the Messina Strait Bridge in Italy as well as several existing
bridges such as Queen Elisabeth II crossing in UK. Ref. /1/ describe a semi-
quantitative use of the method.

The method is especially valid for unique structures, as the Bjørnafjord cable-
stayed bridge, for which the complexity and the number of components of
certain types call for theme-wise I, M and R plans. Further, it is for such project
appropriate to benchmark design towards Operation and Maintenance and
thereby ensure that O&M concerns are integrated in the design.

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2 Risk Based I, M and R methods for

Bjørnafjorden cable-stayed bridge
The risk-based methods are used in the three main O&M related tasks in the
current stage of the VegRAMS process:

› assessing of criticality and vulnerability for elements and systems

› highlighting O&M aspects before next design phase

› establishment of an initial Inspection, Maintenance and Replacement

Program (I, M and R Program)

Above items are treated separately in the following sections.

2.1 Assessing Criticality and Vulnerability for

elements and systems
The initial conceptual design for a component, which may be determined rather
generic, is reviewed regarding its criticality and its vulnerability, all according to
the actual exposure zone and according to the other impacts (wear and tear,
static and dynamic loading etc).

The analysis will for each component define if the component is related to RBI or
to RCM.

The criticality and vulnerability assessment comprise three steps:

1 Each type of component of the bridge is rated with a criticality based on

general experience with the performance of this type of component. The
criticality is rated inconsiderable, low, medium, high or very high. The
criticality is derived from a criticality matrix as shown in Table 2.2.

E.g. a component type is rated highly critical, if failure by experience is

likely, and if consequences of its failure at the same time also is known to
be severe.

2 Each type of component of the bridge is rated with a vulnerability based on

an estimate of the criticality in relation to the expected time period ("time
to failure") in which a failure development can be observed. The
vulnerability is rated very robust, robust, semi-robust, vulnerable or very
vulnerable. The vulnerability is derived from a vulnerability matrix as shown
in Table 2.3.

E.g. a component type is rated very vulnerable, if criticality is very high and
by experience time for failure development is short - days or hours.

3 The design is carried out (not part of the current stage of the VegRAMS
process). The designs of all RCM components rated high or very high are

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adjusted until their criticalities can be reduced to either low or medium. The
designs of all RBI components rated vulnerable or very vulnerable are
adjusted until their vulnerabilities can be reduced to either robust or semi-
robust.

Consequence of failure

To apply this approach, rating of the consequences and probabilities are needed
for each component. Table 2.1 shows a semi-quantitative allocation of
consequence which serve as basis for the criticality analysis. A factor of 4 has
been applied between the different consequence classes, 1-4, so a proper
differentiation between functional failure consequences can be made. The
considered ratings of consequences comprise four types of consequences:

› Unavailability

› Costs

› Fatalities (risk to humans)

› Environmental damage

Definition of the four consequences and the interrelation between the different
consequence categories are described in the following.

Unavailability is a measure that reflects the expected amount of time during

which partial or total bridge closure for road users would be required, if a
functional failure was to occur. Unavailability relates to the societal impact and
the cost of operation interruption, and is measured and categorised as shown in
Table 2.1. It is assumed that users in mean will have a 25 km detour if BSB will
be completely closed. The detour takes approximately 17 minutes extra (90
km/hour assumed). According to ref. /3/ the annual daily traffic between
Stavanger n. and Hordaland gr. is between 3400 and 9000 vehicles/day, i.e.
6200 vehicles/day in mean. According to SVV at meeting 19.04.2016 an annual
daily traffic of 12.000 vehicles/day in 2045 may be used as reference. 10%
heavy vehicles have been assumed. According to ref. /4/ costs associated with
time delay may be taken as 211 NOK/hour for light vehicles (taken as a mean
value of business, commuter and leisure travel) and 676 NOK/hour for heavy
vehicles (trucks). According to ref. /4/ costs associated with the actual travel
(detour) may be taken as 1.74 NOK/km for light vehicles and 5.05 NOK/km for
heavy vehicles (trucks). Level of detailing of assessment of costs is considered
sufficient at the present stage of the project. User cost due to traffic disturbance
has been estimates as (2016 values used directly)

12000 x [ 0.9 x (1.74 x 25 + 211 x 17/60) + 0.1 x (5.05 x 25 + 676 x 17/60) ]

= 1.5 million NOK per day (approximately 0.14 million EUR per day).

Furthermore, it is foreseen that closure of one lane or one side of the bridge will
cause minimal congestion if nothing at all, i.e. cost of possible congestion will

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not be considered. Because of this, the relation between costs and unavailability
measured in closure of a single lane is a guestimate.

Cost (Economic consequence) is a measure that reflects the additional expected

costs, if a functional failure was to occur. Costs are related to the additional
maintenance cost that would be required to bring the system back to a state,
where it can meet expected life targets, including spare parts, inspection, and
repair. In addition, if additional maintenance and repair was not carried out, the
cost category includes any costs associated with reduction in life span, due to
loss of reliability or structural integrity.

Fatalities is a measure that reflects the expected impact on health measured in

injuries or fatalities, if a functional failure was to occur. Fatalities (Risk to
humans) is estimated based on recent studies for another European major
bridge, ref. 1, where the cost of 1 fatality is approximately 3 million Euro and
serious injuries are 1/10 of a fatality – 0.3 million Euro. These numbers are
used for the present assessment also.

Environmental damage, is a measure that reflects the expected impact on the

environment and the extent to which government environmental regulations or
standards have been breached, if a functional failure mode was to occur, is
treated in a more qualitative way, hence, there is no strict relationship to cost.

Table 2.1 provides ratings for each type of consequence with four levels of
ratings. For the failure of a given type of component, it will be the most severe
consequence rating, which determines the overall rating.

Table 2.1 Consequence ratings for failure of a given type of component. *'Disastrous'
consequences are handled as a part of ULS verification. (1 EUR is
approximately 10.5 NOK)

Consequence Unavailability Costs Fatalities Environmental

Class (days/year) (Euro) (Risk to damage
humans)
Insignificant None <0.04 None None
million
Marginal 1 Roadway 0.04 Psychological None or
lane, 15 hours million temporary
minor damage
Serious 1 Roadway 0.18 2 First Aid Temporary
lane, 5 days million Injuries severe damage
Severe Complete 0.71 2-3 Serious Long-term
disruption of million Injuries effects
the bridge, 5
days
Very severe Complete > 0.71 More than 3 Permanent
disruption of million Serious minor damage
the bridge more Injuries
than 5 days
Disastrous* > 1½ year > 75 > 23 Permanent
million fatalities severe damage

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Likelihood of occurrence

Probability of failure, which may cover a large range of events, may in the
conceptual design phase be rated qualitatively into five levels. The probabilities
are defined based on the likelihood of failure to occur during the service life for
the population of each type of component:

› Very unlikely

› Unlikely

› Occasional

› Likely

› Very likely

Criticality

Based on the range of consequences and probabilities for a failure, Table 2.2
provides the criticality rating of a given component. The table shows the
criticality matrix with a rating into very high, high, medium, low and
inconsiderable. A colour coding of red, yellow and green has been applied to
indicate the criticality rating. Moreover is for convenience below the matrix
inserted a value for the criticality classes.

The matrix shall be used qualitatively in the current stage of the VegRAMS
process. Later in the design stage a quantitative approach can be used for some
components.

If a failure risk (likelihood times consequence) is unacceptable (too high), it

must be lowered, for instance by either:

› strengthening the design and / or

› add protection measures and / or

› remove/reduce impacts

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Table 2.2 Criticality matrix. *System or element failures that could result in 'disastrous'
consequences are handled as a part of the ULS design.

Criticality classes, C0: Inconsiderable, C1: Low, C2: Medium, C3: High, C4: Very High

The criticality is subsequently used as input to the vulnerability evaluation, see

next section, and directly as input for assessment of the maintenance strategy
for components where degradations cannot effectively be measured before
failure (RCM-components).

Vulnerability

The time to failure for a certain degradation mechanism is the time over which
the progress of failure can be observed by inspection, monitoring or by other
means based on normal best practice. For example, an overload failure of a
lamella in an expansion joint will happen immediately (classified as hours),
whereas a failure of topcoat on towers will happen over several years. The
same holds for gradual deformation versus a brittle failure mode.

Table 2.3 shows a set of vulnerability rates, depending on criticality class and
time to failure:

› Very Robust (R0)

› Robust (R1)

› Semi Robust (R2)

› Vulnerable (R3)

› Very Vulnerable (R4)

Table 2.3 Vulnerability matrix.

Vulnerability classes, R0: Very Robust, R1: Robust, R2: Semi-Robust, R3: Vulnerable, R4:
Very Vulnerable

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The rated vulnerability is used to define the required inspection and

maintenance program for RBI components. If any type of component is
considered very vulnerable, the design and the I, M and R program shall be
adjusted until the vulnerability of the designed component is reduced to robust
or semi-robust. The vulnerability may be decreased by selection of other
materials, increase of inspection regime or by installation of adequate sensors
connected to a Structural Health Monitoring System.

2.2 Highlighting O&M aspects before next design

phase
A relatively small group of components consume 80 to 90 percent of the total
LCC costs. Coating of steel structures, roadway wearing course, mechanical and
electrical installations are normally among these components in an ordinary
cable-supported bridge.

For each of these components the relevant alternative designs may be analysed
in future stages of the project. The set of solutions giving minimum LCC for the
total assemblage shall be selected.

The analysis includes implementation/incorporation of access facilities and

access equipment in the design.

2.3 Establishment of an Initial Inspection and

Maintenance Analysis (IMAA)
Some basic parameters for the specific element/system have to be assessed
before an initial I, M and R program can be generated. The parameters are:

› Time for failure development, Tf , is an estimation of the period of time it

takes the failure mode to evolve from "detected for the first time" to a
predefined failure limit.

› Time for damage tolerance, Td , is an estimation of the period of time a

predefined failure of the element/system can be tolerated.

The appropriate methodology, RCM or RBI, will be determined by comparing the

time for failure development with the selected inspection interval. If time for
failure development is higher than selected inspection frequency, then the
element/system is a RBI element/system, i.e. failure will not happen before next
inspection. Otherwise the element/system is a RCM element/system, i.e. failure
may happen before next inspection.

It should be noted that time for damage tolerance has not been accounted for in
the above framework for categorisation into RBI or RCM elements/systems.

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An initial inspection and maintenance strategy is formulated based on criticality

ratings for RCM elements and systems and on vulnerability ratings for RBI
elements and systems.

A default inspection interval for RCM elements/systems is proposed

automatically using the criticality analysis result, see Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Assessment of default inspection interval based on criticality.

Default
Criticality Criticality class principal
inspection interval
Inconsiderable C0 5 years or more
Low C1 5 years
Medium C2 2 years
High C3 1 year
Very High C4 6 months or less

For some RCM systems and elements with continuous monitoring there is no
need for inspections at all, because it is known at all time, whether the system
or element is working or not and may not need maintenance. However, for
many systems there is a need for service inspections in order to have the
system running at all times (and in order to ensure an optimal maintenance
plan), and in those cases the default inspection interval is nice to know.

A default inspection interval for RBI elements/systems is proposed automatically

using the vulnerability analysis result, see Table 2.5.

Table 2.5 Assessment of default inspection interval based on vulnerability.

Default
Vulnerability Vulnerability class principal
inspection interval
Very Robust R0 5 years or more
Robust R1 5 years
Semi-Robust R2 2 years
Vulnerable R3 1 years
Very Vulnerable R4 6 months or less

The proposed default inspection interval may be optimized during further RBI
analyses.

In addition to the recommended/default principal inspection interval the initial

I&M-plan will recommend a maintenance strategy. If time for failure
development is less than the selected inspection frequency, the proposed
maintenance strategy will be "Immediately plan or perform corrective/periodic
preventive maintenance". In other words, you need to have spare parts in
stock/on-site when performing inspections. If the component is "failed" it is
named "corrective maintenance" and if the component is not failed it is named

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"periodic preventative maintenance". For RCM elements and systems, the

inspection interval may be interpreted as a maintenance interval. On the other
hand, if time for failure development is larger than the selected inspection
frequency, the proposed maintenance strategy will be "Periodic
corrective/preventive maintenance". In other words, if not cost optimal (could
be other objectives also) you do not need to correct a possible failure during the
inspection where failure is first identified. Instead, it is to be evaluated if
"preventive maintenance" is cost optimal (could be other objectives also) or you
can simply wait until failure happens "corrective maintenance". For RCM
elements and systems, the maintenance interval is probably between 1 or 2
times the inspection interval preferably set by an Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) estimate.

Circuitization is an analysis that determines bridge elements and systems that

are exposed to the same deterioration mechanism/rate, which are then grouped
as circuit.

When selecting reference areas within an component it is important to include

vulnerable areas, or areas where the degradation rate is highest, which in
bridges terminology may include:

› Areas where the protective system is applied during construction phase.

› Areas where design changes during construction phase have been made.

› Most difficult areas from a workmanship point of view.

› Prone areas identified during warranty inspection (e.g. concrete repairs).

› Areas subjected to mechanical wear from e.g. inspection gantries.

› Those areas that are most vulnerable towards deterioration, weather,

fatigue, vibration etc.

If it is identified that the above areas degrade differently, they may be treated
separately in the I&M-plan, if it is beneficial from an economical point of view.

Inspection and maintenance planning utilises the results of the initial Inspection
and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA) and has the objective of creating an
overall optimal inspection and maintenance programme. This is achieved by
performing similar works at the same time. The main relations to be considered
are:

› Type of activity

› Activity intervals

› Needed competences

› Cost

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› Geographic location

› Use of traffic regulation

› Access facilities

› Consumption of man-hours

› Consumption of spare parts

› Robustness/redundancy

› Failure impact on other elements/systems

› Acceptance criteria

Using a Bridge Management System (BMS), where inspection and maintenance

results together with economy is gathered, and the I&M Manual, and the IMAA
framework and the LCC framework as reference, an overall optimal inspection
plan may be established and maintained/updated.

At the present stage such an optimized plan has not been elaborated as:

› Design needs to mature.

› Details on the actual O&M organisation are being developed.

› Actual supplier information is an important input and needed.

› Important changes during the construction phase are important input and
needed.

› Specificatins of the SHMS system is not completed

In the operation phase, I, M and R tasks will be executed as outlined in previous

phases, and feedback will be provided to adjust the risk based I, M and R
program based on inspection and maintenance results. It is expected that a
Bridge Management System (BMS) will serve as a proper platform for this work.

Updating of risk based I, M and R programme includes establishment, review

and/or adjustment of the following items:

› Acceptance criteria’s

› Condition thresholds (RBI elements and systems)

› Failure probability percentiles (RCM and RBI elements and systems)

› Time for failure development which lead to an adjusted vulnerability level

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› Time for damage tolerance

› Failure detection method

› Mitigation measures

› Inspection interval

› Maintenance type

› Maintenance interval

› Repair time

› Spare part requirements in order to minimize repair time if critical

› Spare part stock

› Key parameters to monitor

› Inspection result

› Degree of uncertainty related to the degradation process (RBI elements and

systems) or probability of failure density function (RCM elements and
systems)

› Verification that the inspected areas/items are good representatives.

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3 References
/1/ Messina Bridge – Reliability Based Inspection and Reliability Centered
Maintenance – The Challenge, Poul Linneberg et al., IABMAS 2012

/2/ Statens Vegvesen: Håndbok R411, Bruforvaltning, 2018

/3/ Statens Vegvesen: Ferjefri E39, Hovedrapport, 2012

http://www.vegvesen.no/_attachment/415285/binary/711216

/4/ Statens Vegvesen: Håndbok V712, Konsekvensanalyser, 2018

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Bilag B Risk Based Inspection and

Maintenance analysis
 1/1
Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
How to fill in the Risk based Inspection and Maintenance sheets

1) Define the system/elements

2) Failure mode: Identify for each element the set of functional failures

3) Criticality Matrix: Fill in for each functional failure

3a) Assess the consequences for the bridge regarding unavailability, cost, fatalities and environmental damage given a function failure
3b) Assess qualitatively the probability of the worst consequence happening, given the functional failure has occurred

Consequence of failure Criticality

Default principal
Likelihood Insignificant Marginal Serious Severe Very Severe Disastrous*
inspection interval
Class Criticality
(years)
Very unlikely 0 0 0 1 1 3 C0 Inconsiderable (5 or more)
Unlikely 0 0 1 2 2 3 C1 Low (5)
Occasional 0 1 2 2 3 4 C2 Medium (2)
Likely 0 1 2 3 4 4 C3 High (1)
Very likely 0 2 3 4 4 4 C4 Very High (0.5)

4) Vulnerability Matrix: Fill in for each functional failure

4a) Assess the Time for failure development. How long time does it take for the failure to evolve from "first time detected"
to a predefined failure threshold limit (Hours, days, weeks, months, quarters, years)?
Time for Failure Development Vulnerability
Criticallity Years Quarters Months Weeks Days Hours Default principal
inspection interval
Class Vulnerability
(years)
Inconsiderable 0 0 0 0 0 0 R0 Very robust (5 or more)
Low 0 1 1 2 2 2 R1 Robust (5)
Medium 1 2 2 2 3 3 R2 Semi-Robust (2)
High 1 2 2 3 3 4 R3 Vulnerable (1)
Very High 2 2 3 3 4 4 R4 Very vulnerable (0.5)

5) Fill out failure and detection analysis

6) Initial Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

6a) Assess the time for damage tolerance. How long time can a predefined failure of the element/system be tolerated?
6b) Assess initial inspection interval based on proposed default inspection interval or experience.
6c) Asess the Mean Time Between Failure (if RCM element).
6d) Assess spare parts and key parameters to monitor.

Remarks:
All default parameters should be verified by supplier information or other relevant reference.
This is an initial IMAA analysis and results should be benchmarked against LCC and further I&M studies related to eg. supplier information.
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Sheet: Basis (Print)
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
62 62
Concequence of failure

Element Name Functional Failure Consequence comment

Cost
Criticality

Likelihood

Fatalities

Element no.
Vulnerability

Unavalibality
Environment

handbook V441
max(consequence)
Time for failure development

Element no. according to SVV

(Hours, Days, Quarters, Years)

1.00 D3 Concrete Girder

Consequences of fatalities are severe, however
1.01 Concrete girder - Reinforced Concrete Degradation of concrete and reinforcement 5 3 5 0 5 1 3 10 Years 1
considered very unlikely.

Consequences of fatalities are severe and 1:1

1.02 Prestressing tendons Degradation of tendons elements 5 4 5 0 5 2 3 10 Years 1
replacement not possible, however considered unlikely.

2.00 D3 Steel Girder

Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
2.01 Steel girder - Structural Steel, internal surfaces Corrosion, internal: Bridge girders are subject to internal corrosion. 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
be disastrous, however considered very unlikely.

Malfunction of dehumidification system happens before

2.02 Steel girder - Dehumidification System System malfunction 2 2 2 0 2 degration of steel. No consequences if system is 1 0 1 Months 0
reastablised within a few month.
Corrosion, external:
Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
2.03 Steel girder - Structural steel, external surfaces Bridge girders are subject to external corrosion from weather 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
be disastrous, however considered very unlikely.
variations.
Cracks in weldings caused by fatigue: Consequences of weld failure caused by fatigue could be
2.04 Steel girder - Weldings 5 5 5 3 5 3 4 2 Years 2
Bridge girders are subject to fatigue from traffic, wind, etc.. disastrous, and could happen occasionally.
Economical consequences of failing coating system could
Degradation of coating, due to weather conditions and material
2.05 Steel girder - Coating System 0 4 1 0 4 be severe in terms of extra costs to sandblasting and 1 1 10 Years 0
durability
preparing of surface.
Economical consequences of failing coating system could
Degradation of material, due to weather conditions and material
2.06 Steel girder - Top coating 0 4 1 0 4 be severe in terms of loss of ability to renew topcoat -> 2 2 10 Years 1
durability
full coating system is necessary.
3.00 C2 Concrete column
Consequences of fatalities are severe, however
3.01 Reinforced Concrete Degradation of concrete and reinforcement 5 3 5 0 5 1 3 10 Years 1
considered very unlikely.
4.00 C3 Steel column
Corrosion, internal: Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
4.01 Steel columns - interior surfaces 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
Columns are subject to corrosion in indoor environment be disastrous, however considered very unlikely.

Malfunction of dehumidification system happens before

4.02 Steel columns - Dehumidification System System malfunction 2 2 2 0 2 degration of steel. No consequences if system is 1 0 1 Quarters 0
reastablised within a few month.

Corrosion, external: Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could

4.03 Steel columns - exterior surfaces 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
Columns are subject to corrocion due to weather variations. be disastrous, however considered very unlikely.

Fatigue in welds: Consequences of weld failure caused by fatigue could be

4.04 Steel columns - Weldings 5 5 5 3 5 3 4 2 Years 2
Columns are subject to fatigue from traffic, wind, etc.. disastrous, and could happen occasionally.
Economical consequences of failing coating system could
Degradation of coating due to weather conditions and material
4.05 Steel columns - Coating system 0 4 1 0 4 be severe in terms of extra costs to sandblasting and 1 1 10 Years 0
durability
preparing of surface.
Economical consequences of failing coating system could
Degradation of top cating due to weather conditions and material
4.06 Steel columns - Top coat 0 4 1 0 4 be severe in terms of loss of ability to renew topcoat -> 2 2 10 Years 1
durability
full coating system is necessary.
5.00 C3 Concrete Towers
Consequences of fatalities are severe, however
5.01 Concrete towers - Reinforced Concrete Degradation of concrete and reinforcement 5 3 5 0 5 1 3 10 Years 1
considered very unlikely.

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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Concequence of failure

Element Name Functional Failure Consequence comment

Cost
Criticality

Likelihood

Fatalities

Element no.
Vulnerability

Unavalibality
Environment

handbook V441
max(consequence)
Time for failure development

Element no. according to SVV

(Hours, Days, Quarters, Years)

Consequences of fatalities are severe and replacement

5.02 Posttensioning elements Degradation of tensioning elements 5 4 5 0 5 2 3 10 Years 1
not possible, however considered unlikely.
Corrosion, internal: Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
5.03 Steel anchor box - internal surfaces 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 10 Years 0
Anchor boxes are subject to corrosion in indoor environment be disastrous, however considered unlikely.
Malfunction of dehumidification system happens before
5.04 Steel anchor box - Dehumidification System System malfunction 1 1 1 0 1 degration of steel. No consequences if system is re- 2 0 1 Quarters 0
established within a few month.
Economical consequences of failing coating system could
5.05 Steel anchor box - Coating system Degradation of coating due to indoor environment 0 2 1 0 2 be severe in terms of extra costs to sandblasting and 1 0 10 Years 0
preparing of surface.
6.00 C31 Tower foundation
Consequences of fatalities are severe, however
6.01 Reinforced Concrete Degradation of concrete and reinforcement 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
considered very unlikely.
7.00 C8 Abutment
Consequences of fatalities are severe, however
7.01 Reinforced Concrete Degradation of concrete and reinforcement 5 3 5 0 5 1 3 10 Years 1
considered very unlikely.
8.00 G4 Cable system

Loss of stay cable is disastrous, however considered very

unlikely. Failure development period, assuming there is
8.01 Stay cables Material loss in wires 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 10 Years 1
no prot. systems available, (from corrosion starts to
critical) is assumed to be more than 10 years.

Loss of galv. happens before corrosion and therefore only

relates to extra costs due to extra analyses and
8.02 Galvanisation of wires in cable Degradation of galvanisation. 0 3 0 0 3 2 2 10 Years 1
inspections. If primary prot. system function 100% correct
galv. will not degrade.

Loss of grease happens before corrosion and not subject

8.03 Grease (fedt) Loss of material 0 3 0 0 3 to replacement if lost completely. If primary prot. system 2 2 10 Years 1
function 100% correct grease will not degrade.

Secondary corrosion protection of wires. Consequences

8.04 PE sheet Degradation of PE sheet 2 4 1 0 4 2 2 10 Years 1
of fatalities are severe, however considered unlikely.

Economical consequences could be serious in terms of

8.05 HDPE Degradation of material. Caused by weather impact 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 10 Years 0
extra analyses and inspections.
Corrosion anchouage: Anchorages in deck and tower are subjected to Consequences of anchorage failure caused by corrosion
8.06 Stay cabel anchors 5 4 4 3 5 2 3 10 Years 1
corrision from weather variations could be disastrous, however considered unlikely.

Wear and tear: Economical consequences could be serious in terms of

8.07 Stay cable damping system 0 4 1 0 4 3 3 5 Years 1
Damping systems are subject to wear and tear. extra analyses, inspections or replacement.
9.00 C7 Steel pontoons
Corrosion, internal: Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
9.01 Steel pontoons - interior surfaces 5 5 5 3 5 1 3 5 Years 1
Pontoons are subject to corrosion in indoor environment be disastrous, however considered very unlikely.

Malfunction of dehumidification system happens before

9.02 Steel pontoons - Dehumidification System System malfunction 1 1 1 0 1 degration of steel. No consequences if system is 1 0 1 Quarters 0
reastablised within a few month.

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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Concequence of failure

Element Name Functional Failure Consequence comment

Cost
Criticality

Likelihood

Fatalities

Element no.
Vulnerability

Unavalibality
Environment

handbook V441
max(consequence)
Time for failure development

Element no. according to SVV

(Hours, Days, Quarters, Years)

Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could

Corrosion, external:
9.03 Steel pontoons - exterior surfaces 5 5 5 3 5 be disastrous, however considered very unlikely due to 1 3 10 Years 1
Pontoons are subject to corrocion due to weather variations.
the use of SDSS in splash zone.
Fatigue in welds: Consequences of weld failure caused by fatigue could be
9.04 Steel pontoons - Weldings 5 5 5 3 5 3 4 2 Years 2
Pontoons are subject to fatigue from traffic, waves, etc. disastrous, and could happen occasionally.

Economical consequences of failing coating system could

Degradation of coating due to weather conditions and material
9.05 Steel pontoons - Coating system 3 4 4 3 4 be severe in terms of extra costs to sandblasting and 3 3 5 Years 1
durability
preparing of surface.

Economical consequences of failing coating system could

Degradation of top cating due to weather conditions and material
9.06 Steel pontoons - Top coat 3 4 4 3 4 be severe in terms of loss of ability to renew topcoat -> 3 3 5 Years 1
durability
full coating system is necessary.
Cathodic protection are designed to be detoriated.
Steel pontoons - interior cathodic protection (if Degradation of cathotic protection if they detach or bad connection However premature failure/quicker detoriation or bad
9.07 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 10 Years 0
any) with steel connection with steel can result in quicker degradation of
coating and steel.
Cathodic protection are designed to be detoriated.
Degradation of cathotic protection if they detach or bad connection However premature failure/quicker detoriation or bad
9.08 Steel pontoons - extorior cathodic protection 0 3 0 0 3 2 2 10 Years 1
with steel connection with steel can result in quicker degradation of
coating and steel.
9.09 Steel pontoons - Watertight openings Failure of seal in inspection hatches and manholes. 0 2 0 0 2 Seals must be changed due to detoriations of materials. 2 1 5 Years 0
A failure of the water detection system is not serious as
9.10 Steel pontoons - Water detection system System malfunction 0 2 0 0 2 3 2 1 Years 1
the interior surfaces are coated.
10.00 C43 B7 Mooring
Degradation of material. Caused by weather impact and marine Consequences of chain stopper failure is severe, however
10.01 Pontoon conection, chain stopper/fairlead 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 5 Years 1
growth. considered unlikely.
Consequences of chain stopper failure is severe, however
10.02 Pontoon conection, chain stopper/fairlead Fatigue in conections 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 5 Years 1
considered unlikely.
Degradation of material. Caused by weather impact and marine Consequences of chain failure could be severe, however
10.03 Top chain 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 5 Years 1
growth. considered unlikely.
Consequences of chain failure could be severe, however
10.04 Top chain Damage from ship impact 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 5 Years 0
considered very unlikely.
Consequences of chain failure could be severe, however
10.05 Mooring wire Material loss in wires. 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 5 Years 1
considered unlikely.
Consequences of chain failure could be severe, however
10.06 Mooring wire Damage from ship impact 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 5 Years 0
considered very very unlikely.
Consequences of anchorage failure could be severe,
10.07 Bottom chain Degradation of material. 4 4 1 1 4 2 2 5 Years 1
however considered unlikely.
Consequences of anchorage failure could be severe,
10.08 Suction anchor Degradation of material. 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 10 Years 0
however considered very unlikely.
Cathodic protection are designed to be detoriated.
Degradation of cathotic protection if they detach or bad connection However premature failure/quicker detoriation or bad
10.09 Cathodic proction (if any) 0 3 0 0 3 2 2 10 Years 1
with steel connection with steel can result in quicker degradation of
coating and steel.
11.00 E Surfacing
Consequences of fatalities are severe and loss of integrity
11.01 Roadway - Surfacing Loss of integrity (friction) 1 1 4 0 4 are likely to occur. Failure development caused by i.e. 4 4 1 Days 4
freeze-thaw could be within 1 day.

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Sheet: C_V
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Concequence of failure

Element Name Functional Failure Consequence comment

Cost
Criticality

Likelihood

Fatalities

Element no.
Vulnerability

Unavalibality
Environment

handbook V441
max(consequence)
Time for failure development

Element no. according to SVV

(Hours, Days, Quarters, Years)

Loss of protection to steel or concrete structures. Permeability of Consequences of steel failure caused by corrosion could
11.02 Roadway - Surfacing surfacing causing corrosion of steel box girder or degradation of 5 5 5 3 5 be disastrous, however considered very unlikely. 1 3 10 Years 1
concrete box girder.
12.00 H2 Road sign
12.01 Road signs - analog Rodent bites, Wear and tear. 1 1 1 1 1 Defects have effect on road safety 3 1 1 Days 2
12.02 Road signs - LED display Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear and tear. 1 2 1 1 2 Defects have effect on road safety 3 2 1 Days 3
13.00 H2 B9.2 Electrical systems - Critical
Failure may impose a severe risk for ships, flights and
Eg. trafic light, navigation ligthing for ships and
13.01 Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear and tear. 5 5 5 3 5 other vehicles. Impact may leed to serious damage to the 2 3 1 Hours 4
flights , essential monitoring systems
bridge
14.00 H2 B9.2 Electrical system - Non-critical
Eg. internal navigation lighting in box girder, non-
14.01 Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear and tear. 1 1 3 1 3 Failure may impose a risk to O&M personel 2 2 1 Hours 3
essential monitoring systems
15.00 H15 Railings (Crash barriers and other railing)

Material loss due to corrosion: Consequences of fatalities are severe, however

15.01 Railings - Structural Steel 2 1 4 0 4 1 1 10 Years 0
Railings are subject to external corrosion from weather variations. considered very unlikely.

There are no speakable consequences given that

15.02 Railings - Galvanisation Degradation of galvanisation. 1 2 1 0 2 galvanisation is reestablished within few years. Costs of 2 1 10 Years 0
renewal would slightly increase.
16.00 H11 Bearings
Wear and tear: Lack of maintenance of sliding parts could have costful
16.01 Bearings 1 4 0 0 4 2 2 4 Years 1
Bearings are subject to wear and tear. results. This is however considered unlikely.
17.00 H16 Drainage System
A failure of the drainage system could have fatal
17.01 Drainage System Malfunction. Constipation due to insufficient cleaning 1 1 4 1 4 3 3 12 Hours 4
consequences. This could happen occasionally.
18.00 H51 SHMS (Structural Health Monitoring System)

18.01 SHMS Malfunction & Wear and tear & Rodent bites 3 2 1 0 3 On a long term failure may impose a risk for the structure 2 2 1 Hours 3

19.00 H3 Permanent access facilities (foreseen)

Access facilities could occasionally fail, however this has
19.01 Permanent access facilities - Structural Steel Material loss due to corrosion 1 2 3 0 3 very little consequence. Galvanisation has to fail before 2 2 6 Years 1
this will happen.
There are no speakable consequences given that
19.02 Permanent access facilities - Galvanisation Degradation of galvanisation. 1 1 1 0 1 galvanisation is reestablished within few years. Costs of 2 0 10 Years 0
renewal would slightly increase.
19.03 Permanent access facilities - Escalator Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear and tear. 1 1 1 0 1 - 2 0 10 Years 0

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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance

Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
1.00 Concrete Girder
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Concrete girder - Degradation of concrete and
1.01 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive - - -
Reinforced Concrete reinforcement
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)

Corrosion is a consequence
Periodic
of a failing protection
Periodic corrective/prev
system. Time for damage
1.02 Prestressing tendons Degradation of tendons elements 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
tolerance is therefore set to
5 years maintenance
5 years, which is the same as
(PIBM)
the protection system.

2.00 Steel Girder

Corrosion is a consequence
Periodic
of a failing protection
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev Relative
Steel girder - Structural Corrosion, internal: Bridge girders - Dehumidification system. Time for damage
2.01 3 1 Yes Inspection however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None humidity inside
Steel, internal surfaces are subject to internal corrosion. system tolerance is therefore set to
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance girder.
5 years, which is the same as
(PIBM)
the protection system.

Continuos
Installation of two monitoring of
Periodic
smaller humidity and air
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval should be
Steel girder - dehumidification units (5 or flow inside the
2.02 System malfunction 0 0 Yes Inspection None 2 2 RCM - Inspection every entive provided by the supplier of Filters
Dehumidification System rather than one large more) Steel Box Girder
2 years maintenance the system
in each dehumidified should give a
(PIBM)
bridge girder section. warning if the
system is failing

Corrosion is a consequence Visual

Periodic
Corrosion, external: of a failing protection inspection and
Periodic corrective/prev
Steel girder - Structural Bridge girders are subject to system. Time for damage assessment of
2.03 3 1 Yes Inspection -Coating system 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
steel, external surfaces external corrosion from weather tolerance is therefore set to Coating
5 years maintenance
variations. 5 years, which is the same as Condition
(PIBM)
the protection system. Indicator, CC.

Hot spots (i.e.

Periodic
Cracks in weldings caused by Monitoring should be areas under
- SHMS, measuring Periodic corrective/prev
fatigue: installed, however this can wheel)
2.04 Steel girder - Weldings 4 2 Yes Inspection loads on bridge (fatigue 5 2 RBI (2) - Inspection every entive None
Bridge girders are subject to fatigue only be carried out at identified
levels and cycles) 2 years maintenance
from traffic, wind, etc.. selected spots. during design.
(PIBM)
Cracklength.

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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
X amount of
Degradation of coating, due to Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Steel girder - Coating (5 or Coating Adhesion and
2.05 weather conditions and material 1 0 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive None
System more) system for Cross-cut test.
durability cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
spot repairs.
(PIBM)
Visual
Periodic
inspection and
Degradation of material, due to Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev X amount of
assessment of
2.06 Steel girder - Top coating weather conditions and material 2 1 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None Coating system
Coating
durability cost optimal. 5 years maintenance for spot repairs.
Condition
(PIBM)
Indicator, CC.
3.00 Concrete column
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Degradation of concrete and
3.01 Reinforced Concrete 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
reinforcement
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
4.00 Steel column

Corrosion is a consequence
Periodic
of a failing protection
Corrosion, internal: - Dehumidification Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev Relative
Steel columns - interior system. Time for damage
4.01 Columns are subject to corrosion in 3 1 Yes Inspection system however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None humidity inside
surfaces tolerance is therefore set to
indoor environment - EMC System cost optimal. 5 years maintenance columns.
5 years, which is the same as
(PIBM)
the protection system.

Continuos
monitoring of
Periodic
humidity and air
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval should be
Steel columns - (5 or flow inside the
4.02 System malfunction 0 0 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RCM - Inspection every entive provided by the supplier of Filters
Dehumidification System more) columns should
5 years maintenance the system
give a warning if
(PIBM)
the system is
failing

Corrosion is a consequence Visual

Periodic
of a failing protection inspection and
Corrosion, external: Periodic corrective/prev
Steel columns - exterior system. Time for damage assessment of
4.03 Columns are subject to corrocion 3 1 Yes Inspection -Coating system 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
surfaces tolerance is therefore set to Coating
due to weather variations. 5 years maintenance
5 years, which is the same as Condition
(PIBM)
the protection system. Indicator, CC.

Periodic
Monitoring should be
Fatigue in welds: - SHMS, measuring Periodic corrective/prev Hot spots
installed, however this can
4.04 Steel columns - Weldings Columns are subject to fatigue from 4 2 Yes Inspection loads on bridge (fatigue 5 2 RBI (2) - Inspection every entive identified
only be carried out at
traffic, wind, etc.. levels and cycles) 2 years maintenance during design.
selected spots.
(PIBM)

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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
A proper
Degradation of coating due to Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Steel columns - Coating (5 or amount of
4.05 weather conditions and material 1 0 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
system more) Coating system
durability cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
for spot repairs.
(PIBM)
Visual
Periodic
A proper inspection and
Degradation of top cating due to Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
amount of assessment of
4.06 Steel columns - Top coat weather conditions and material 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
Coating system Coating
durability cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
for spot repairs. Condition
(PIBM)
Indicator, CC.
5.00 Concrete Towers
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Concrete towers - Degradation of concrete and
5.01 3 1 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
Reinforced Concrete reinforcement
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Visual
5.02 Posttensioning elements Degradation of tensioning elements 3 1 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
inspection.
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)

Visual
Periodic
inspection and
Corrosion, internal: - Dehumidification Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev X amount of
Steel anchor box - internal (5 or assessment of
5.03 Anchor boxes are subject to 0 0 Yes Inspection system however this is not 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive None Coating system
surfaces more) Coating
corrosion in indoor environment - EMC System cost optimal. 5 years maintenance for spot repairs.
Condition
(PIBM)
Indicator, CC.

Continuos
monitoring of
Periodic
humidity and air
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval should be
Steel anchor box - (5 or flow inside the
5.04 System malfunction 0 0 Yes Inspection 5 5 RCM - Inspection every entive provided by the supplier of Filters
Dehumidification System more) anchor box
5 years maintenance the system
should give a
(PIBM)
warning if the
system is failing

Visual
Periodic
inspection and
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev X amount of
Steel anchor box - Coating Degradation of coating due to (5 or assessment of
5.05 0 0 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive Coating system
system indoor environment more) Coating
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance for spot repairs.
Condition
(PIBM)
Indicator, CC.
6.00 Tower foundation
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Degradation of concrete and
6.01 Reinforced Concrete 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
reinforcement
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
7.00 Abutment
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Degradation of concrete and
7.01 Reinforced Concrete 3 1 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
reinforcement
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
8.00 Cable system

Corrosion is a consequence
of a failing protection
- Galv wires.
Periodic system. Time for damage
- PE-coating Design
Periodic corrective/prev tolerance is therefore set to
- HDPE coating anchorages in a
8.01 Stay cables Material loss in wires 3 1 Yes Inspection 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive 5 years, which is the same as None
- Structural Health way to make
5 years maintenance the protection system. Due
Monitoring System easy inspection.
(PIBM) to the number and nature of
(SHMS)
protection systems this
interval may be increased.

Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Galvanisation of wires in Special
8.02 Degradation of galvanisation. 2 1 Yes None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
cable inspection
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)

Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Special
8.03 Grease (fedt) Loss of material 2 1 Yes None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
inspection
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Special
8.04 PE sheet Degradation of PE sheet 2 1 Yes None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
inspection
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
A proper
Periodic corrective/prev
Degradation of material. Caused by (5 or amount of HDPE-
8.05 HDPE 0 0 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive None
weather impact more) repair kit for
5 years maintenance
spot repairs.
(PIBM)
Periodic
A proper
Corrosion anchouage: Anchorages Periodic corrective/prev
Dehumidification of amount of Visual
8.06 Stay cabel anchors in deck and tower are subjected to 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None
anchorages Coating system inspection
corrision from weather variations 5 years maintenance
for spot repairs.
(PIBM)

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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
Wear and tear: Periodic corrective/prev
- SHMS.
8.07 Stay cable damping system Damping systems are subject to 3 1 Yes Inspection 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None Monitoring
- EMC System
wear and tear. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
9.00 Steel pontoons

Corrosion is a consequence
Periodic
of a failing protection
Corrosion, internal: - Dehumidification Periodic corrective/prev Relative
Steel pontoons - interior system. Time for damage
9.01 Pontoons are subject to corrosion 3 1 Yes Inspection system. 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive None humidity inside
surfaces tolerance is therefore set to
in indoor environment - Cathodic protection 5 years maintenance pontoons.
5 years, which is the same as
(PIBM)
the protection system.

Continuos
monitoring of
Periodic
humidity and air
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval should be
Steel pontoons - (5 or flow inside the
9.02 System malfunction 0 0 Yes Inspection Monitoring 5 5 RCM - Inspection every entive provided by the supplier of Filters
Dehumidification System more) pontoons
5 years maintenance the system
should give a
(PIBM)
warning if the
system is failing

Periodic
Corrosion, external: Periodic corrective/prev Splash zone elements are
Steel pontoons - exterior
9.03 Pontoons are subject to corrocion 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive produced in a corrosion
surfaces
due to weather variations. 5 years maintenance resistant alloy SDSS
(PIBM)
Periodic
Fatigue in welds: Periodic corrective/prev
Splash zone elements are in a
9.04 Steel pontoons - Weldings Pontoons are subject to fatigue 4 2 Yes Inspection None 5 2 RBI (2) - Inspection every entive
corrosion resistant alloy SDSS
from traffic, waves, etc. 2 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Aproper amount
Degradation of coating due to Periodic corrective/prev
Steel pontoons - Coating Cathodic protection of Coating
9.05 weather conditions and material 3 1 Yes Inspection 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
system outside splash zone system for spot
durability 5 years maintenance
repairs.
(PIBM)
Visual
Periodic
A proper inspection and
Degradation of top cating due to Periodic corrective/prev
amount of assessment of
9.06 Steel pontoons - Top coat weather conditions and material 3 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
Coating system Coating
durability 5 years maintenance
for spot repairs. Condition
(PIBM)
Indicator, CC.
Periodic
Degradation of cathotic protection Evaluate to use Fresh Periodic corrective/prev Monitoring
Steel pontoons - interior (5 or
9.07 if they detach or bad connection 0 0 Yes Inspection waterdue to less 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive Extra anodes current flow
cathodic protection (if any) more)
with steel corrosion 5 years maintenance from anode
(PIBM)

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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
Degradation of cathotic protection Periodic corrective/prev Monitoring
Steel pontoons - extorior
9.08 if they detach or bad connection 2 1 Yes Inspection 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive Extra anodes current flow
cathodic protection
with steel 5 years maintenance from anode
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Steel pontoons - Watertight Failure of seal in inspection hatches (5 or Extra sealing
9.09 1 0 Yes Inspection 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
openings and manholes. more) parts
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Steel pontoons - Water
9.10 System malfunction 2 1 Yes Inspection 5 5 RCM (2) - Inspection every entive Extra sensors
detection system
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
10.00 B7 Mooring
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Pontoon conection, chain Degradation of material. Caused by Tension in
10.01 2 1 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
stopper/fairlead weather impact and marine growth. mooring line
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Pontoon conection, chain Tension in
10.02 Fatigue in conections 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
stopper/fairlead mooring line
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Degradation of material. Caused by Tension in
10.03 Top chain 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
weather impact and marine growth. mooring line
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
(5 or Tension in
10.04 Top chain Damage from ship impact 1 0 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
more) mooring line
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Use of fibre rope or Tension in
10.05 Mooring wire Material loss in wires. 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
polyester rope mooring line
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
(5 or Tension in
10.06 Mooring wire Damage from ship impact 1 0 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
more) mooring line
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Tension in
10.07 Bottom chain Degradation of material. 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring however this is not 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
mooring line
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
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Sheet: IMAA
 7/9
Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
(5 or Tension in
10.08 Suction anchor Degradation of material. 1 0 Yes ROV Inspection - Monitoring however this is not 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
more) mooring line
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Degradation of cathotic protection Use of impressed Periodic corrective/prev Monitoring
10.09 Cathodic proction (if any) if they detach or bad connection 2 1 Yes ROV Inspection Monitoring current cathodic 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive current flow
with steel protection for chains. 5 years maintenance from anode
(PIBM)
11.00 Surfacing
Periodic
To be designed easy for Periodic corrective/prev
0,003 year = 1 day
11.01 Roadway - Surfacing Loss of integrity (friction) 4 4 Yes Inspection winter maintenance 0,003 0,003 RBI (0.5) - Inspection every entive Friction
(Roadpatrol daily)
tasks. 0,003 years maintenance
(PIBM)

Corrosion is a consequence
Loss of protection to steel or Periodic
of a failing protection
concrete structures. Permeability of To be designed easy for Periodic corrective/prev
system. Time for damage
11.02 Roadway - Surfacing surfacing causing corrosion of steel 3 1 Yes Inspection winter maintenance 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
tolerance is therefore set to
box girder or degradation of tasks. 5 years maintenance
5 years, which is the same as
concrete box girder. (PIBM)
the protection system.

12.00 Road sign

Periodic
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
12.01 Road signs - analog Rodent bites, Wear and tear. 1 2 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RCM (5) - Inspection every entive (Roadpatrol daily)
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Spare parts
Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev
Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear Essential electrical part should be Alarm if not
12.02 Road signs - LED display 2 3 Yes Inspection None however this is not 5 5 RCM (2) - Inspection every entive
and tear. should be checked daily stored at site for working correct
cost optimal. 5 years maintenance
a quick fix
(PIBM)
B9.2 Electrical systems -
13.00
Critical

Immediately
Eg. trafic light, navigation plan or perform Spare parts
Periodic
ligthing for ships and flights Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear corrective/perio Essential electrical part should be Alarm if not
13.01 3 4 Yes Inspection Back up system 0,001 2 RCM (1) - Inspection every
, essential monitoring and tear. dic preventive should be checked daily stored at site for working correct
2 years
systems maintenance a quick fix
(CBM)

B9.2 Electrical system - Non-

14.00
critical

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Sheet: IMAA
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Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Immediately
Eg. internal navigation plan or perform
Periodic
lighting in box girder, non- Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear corrective/perio non-essential electrical part Alarm if not
14.01 2 3 Yes Inspection None 0,02 2 RCM (2) - Inspection every
essential monitoring and tear. dic preventive should be checked weekly working correct
2 years
systems maintenance
(CBM)

Railings (Crash barriers and

15.00
other railing)
Periodic Continuous monitoring
- Bolts/nuts
Material loss due to corrosion: Stainless steel, Periodic corrective/prev means, in this case -> drive
(5 or - Crash barrier Thickness of
15.01 Railings - Structural Steel Railings are subject to external 1 0 Yes Inspection however this is not 0,003 0,003 RBI - Inspection every entive by every day to see if
more) segments all galvanisation
corrosion from weather variations. cost optimal. 0,003 years maintenance everything looks fine.
included.
(PIBM) 0,003 year = 1 day
Periodic Correct
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval is set to 5 behaviour/mov
(5 or A few nos of
15.02 Railings - Galvanisation Degradation of galvanisation. 1 0 Yes Inspection + NDT None 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive years, which is the same as ements.
more) each type
5 years maintenance damage tolerance period. Thickness of
(PIBM) sliding material
16.00 Bearings
Periodic Correct
Wear and tear: Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval is set to 2 behaviour/mov
A few nos of
16.01 Bearings Bearings are subject to wear and 2 1 Yes Inspection None 2 2 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive years, which is the same as ements.
each type
tear. 2 years maintenance damage tolerance period. Thickness of
(PIBM) sliding material
17.00 Drainage System

Immediately Continuous monitoring

plan or perform means, in this case -> keep
Periodic
Malfunction. Constipation due to - System check. corrective/perio road clean daily/weekly and
17.01 Drainage System 3 4 Yes Inspection 0 1 RCM (1) - Inspection every
insufficient cleaning - Full scale test dic preventive drive by whenever heavy rain
1 years
maintenance appears and see if drainage
(CBM) system works.

SHMS (Structural Health

18.00
Monitoring System)

Immediately
Failing sensors can be
plan or perform
Redundancy for Periodic detected by missing output Essential spare
Malfunction & Wear and tear & corrective/perio Alarm if not
18.01 SHMS 2 3 Yes Inspection System Check essential sensors 0,003 2 RCM (2) - Inspection every or deviating output. Periodic part should be
Rodent bites dic preventive working correct
should be established 2 years inspections deals with the stored
maintenance
overall health of the system
(CBM)

Permanent access facilities

19.00
(foreseen)

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Sheet: IMAA
 9/9
Risk based Inspection and Maintenance
E39 Bjørnafjorden Bridge - Operation and Maintenance
Failure and detection analysis Inspection and Maintenance Activity Analysis (IMAA)

Key parameter
Recommendations - to monitor
Spare part
Can failure be Recommended (Usual signs of
Mitigation measures Recommended Comments to requirement in
Element Name Functional Failure Detection eliminated or principal degredation
other than Maintenance Inspection/maintenance order to
method managed in ways inspection related to

Criticality
[Years]

Element no.
maintenance stategy strategy minimize repair

Vulnerability
RCM or RBI

[∆tI] (Years)
other than strategy concrete and
time (if critical)
maintenance? steel is not
listed)

Failure detection Yes/No

Time for Damage Tolerance [∆td] (Years)
on criticality (RCM) or vulnerability (RBI)
Mean time between failure, MTBF [Years]

Initial selected pricipal inspection interval

Default principal inspection interval, based
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Permanent access facilities -
19.01 Material loss due to corrosion 2 1 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI (5) - Inspection every entive
Structural Steel
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev
Permanent access facilities - (5 or Thickness of
19.02 Degradation of galvanisation. 0 0 Yes Inspection + NDT None 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive
Galvanisation more) galvanization
5 years maintenance
(PIBM)
Periodic
Periodic corrective/prev Inspection interval should be
Permanent access facilities - Malfunction, rodent bites, Wear (5 or
19.03 0 0 Yes Inspection None 5 5 RBI - Inspection every entive provided by the supplier of
Escalator and tear. more)
5 years maintenance the system
(PIBM)

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Sheet: IMAA