CASE 6:

(BARRA, RAIKHA D.)

Chiok vs. People, 776 SCRA 120, December 07, 2015

It is only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf

of the State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings
before the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).

FACTS:

Chiok was charged with estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information. Chiok
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial ensued, with
both parties presenting their evidence in support of their respective
claims and defenses.

Petitioner Rufina Chua (Chua) met Chiok in mid-1989, during which he

offered to be her investment adviser. Convinced by Chiok’s
representations and the fact that he is Chinese, Chua made an initial
investment of ₱200,000.00, allegedly to buy Meralco and PLDT shares.
She rolled over the original investment and profits, and this went on
until 1994. For each of their transactions, Chua claimed she was not
given any document evidencing every stock transaction and that she
only relied on the assurances of Chiok. In mid-1995, she accepted his
proposal to buy shares in bulk in the amount of ₱9,563,900.00. Chua
alleged that she deposited ₱7,100,000.00 to Chiok’s Far East Bank,
Annapolis account on June 9, 1995 and delivered to him ₱2,463,900.00
in cash later that same date at the Han Court Restaurant in Annapolis,
Greenhills. As proof, she presented a deposit slip dated June 9, 1995 of
Chiok’s Far East Bank Annapolis account. There was no receipt or
memorandum for the cash delivery.

Chua narrated that she became suspicious when Chiok later on avoided
her calls and when he failed to show any document of the sale. He
reassured her by giving her two interbank checks. The interbank checks
were given with the request to deposit the first check only after 60-75
days to enable him to generate funds from the sale of a property in Hong
Kong. Both interbank checks were ultimately dishonored upon
presentment for payment due to garnishment and insufficiency of
funds. Despite Chua’s pleas, Chiok did not return her money. Hence,
she referred the matter to her counsel who wrote a demand letter dated
October 25, 1995. Chiok sent her a letter-reply stating that the money
was Chua’s investment in their unregistered partnership, and was duly
invested with Yu Que Ngo. In the end, Chua decided to file her
complaint-affidavit against him in the Pasig Prosecutor’s Office.
In his defense, Chiok denied that he enticed Chua to invest in the stock
market, or offered her the prospect of buying shares of stocks in bulk.
Chiok maintained that from the time he met her in 1991 and until 1995,
he previously only had dollar transactions with Chua. It was in 1995
when both of them decided to form an unregistered partnership. He
admitted that the ₱7,963,900.00 she gave him before she left for the
United States was her investment in this unregistered partnership.
Chua allegedly instructed him to invest according to his best judgment
and asked him to issue a check in her name for her peace of mind. Chiok
denied having received the ₱2,463,900.00 in cash from her.

In a Decision dated December 3, 1998, the RTC convicted Chiok of the

crime of estafa. The RTC, in an omnibus order dated May 28, 1999
(omnibus order), denied Chiok’s motion for reconsideration, and also
cancelled his bail pursuant to Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.

The CA issued a TRO on the implementation of the omnibus order until

further orders. It also issued a writ of preliminary injunction28
enjoining the arrest of Chiok. The CA ruled that Chiok should not be
deprived of liberty pending the resolution of his appeal because the
offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense, and that the
probability of flight during the pendency of his appeal is merely
conjectural. On November 3, 1999, the OSG representing the People of
the Philippines, and Chua, filed separate petitions for certiorari before
us seeking review of the CA
Resolutions dated September 20, 1999 and November 16, 1999. We
granted the OSG’s and Chua’s petitions and reversed the CA’s
injunction on the arrest of Chiok. Our decisions (SC bail decisions)
became final on December 6, 2006 and June 20, 2007, respectively.

On July 19, 2007, the CA in a Special Division of Five (Former Fourth

Division) rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the Decision
dated December 3, 1998 of the trial court, and acquitted Chiok for
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
(CA acquittal).

The CA found that the RTC conviction did not contain findings of fact
on the prosecution’s evidence but merely recited the evidence of the
prosecution as if such evidence was already proof of the ultimate facts
constituting estafa. Instead of relying on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence, the trial court relied on the weakness of the
defense. The prosecution was not able to prove the element of
misappropriation. As to the civil aspect, the CA found Chiok liable to
Chua for the amount of ₱9,500,000.00, the amount he admitted on
record.
In a Resolution dated October 3, 2007, the CA denied Chua’s motion for
reconsideration and its supplement on the ground that acquittal is
immediately final and the re-examination of the record of the case
would violate the guarantee against double jeopardy. It also denied the
motions for reconsideration of both parties on the civil aspect of the
case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Chua has a legal personality to file and prosecute this
petition.

RULING:

NO. Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA

Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the State, which can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA.

(a) In Villareal v. Aliga, we upheld the doctrine that it is only the OSG,
as representative of the State, which may question the acquittal of the
accused via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, viz: x x x The
authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed
by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or
dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

(b) The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party
affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the
private complainant. The interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited only to the civil liability. In the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a
witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is dismissed
by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
Solicitor General. The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case.
 CASE 39:
(BARRA, RAIKHA D.)
People vs. Jugueta, 788 SCRA 331, April 05, 2016

FACTS:

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, IRENEO JUGUETA, together with

Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with Multiple
Attempted Murder. Roger San Miguel, however, moved for
reinvestigation of the case against them. Thus, upon motion of the
prosecution, the case for Attempted Murder against Gilbert Estores and
Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to
appellant.

Norberto, the witness, testified that the appellant and two other men,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, stripped the wall of his family's
nipa hut in the evening of June 6, 2002. When the men entered the hut,
Norberto saw their faces in the light of a gas lamp. The men ordered
Norberto to come down, but he refused and begged for mercy, but the
men fired shots, causing Norberto to protect his family. As a result of
the attack, Norberto's two young daughters were wounded and his
daughter Mary Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine
died in the hospital. Norberto explained that the attack was prompted
by a previous altercation with the appellant over a molestation case that
Norberto filed against the appellant's two brothers.

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as
his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores,
Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he
(appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel,
where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting
incident occurred. However, he and the other witnesses admitted that
said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.

Finding appellant’s defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to

the testimony of Norberto, the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly
established that appellant, together with two other assailants, conspired
to shoot and kill the family of Norberto.

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA,

but the latter affirmed the trial's court decision.

ISSUE:

(2) Whether or not the appellant can be held liable for all the crimes
alleged in the Information in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G,
i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively;

HELD:

YES.

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
Information in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of
murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven
during trial.

Section 13 of Rule 110 explains that a complaint or

information must charge but one offense, except when the
law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.

However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during

arraignment and failed to file motion to quash the Information, he is
deemed to have waived his right to question the same.

It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a

single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each
offense.

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the
Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts
of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively, and proven
during trial.

Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a

complex crime as defined in Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code,
thus:

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed,

however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender
they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There
are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as a complex crime proper, or when
an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic
example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of
two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that
appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate
shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended
to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen,
as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people,
it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are
committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts
committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in
People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to
a complex crime."