Battle of Kursk

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Battle of Kursk

Part of the Eastern Front of World War II

Disabled Soviet T-34 being towed by a

turretless armored recovery tank, under enemy
fire.

Date German Kursk :July 4 – July 20,

1943
Soviet Kursk : July 4 – August
23, 1943
Location 51°30′4″N
36°3′5″ECoordinates:
51°30′4″N 36°3′5″E
Kursk, USSR
Result Decisive Soviet strategic victory

Belligerents

Nazi Germany

Soviet
UnionCommanders

Erich von Manstein

Günther von Kluge
Hermann Hoth
Walther Model
Hans Seidemann
Robert Ritter von Greim

Georgiy Zhukov
Konstantin
Rokossovskiy
Nikolay Vatutin
Ivan KonyevStrength

2,700 tanks
800,000 infantry
2,109 aircraft[1]

3,600 tanks
20,000 guns[2]
1,300,000 infantry and
supporting troops
2,792
aircraft[3]Casualties and
losses

German Kursk[4] :
50,000 dead, wounded, or captured
300 tanks
200 aircraft ,
Soviet Kursk[5] :
500,000 dead, wounded, or captured
900 tanks
200 aircraft

German Kursk[4] :
180,000 dead, wounded,
or captured
1,600 tanks
1,000 aircraft ,
Soviet Kursk[5] :
607,737 dead, wounded,
or captured
1,500 tanks
1,000 aircraft
[show]
v•d•e
Eastern Front
[show]Battle of Kursk
The eastern front at the time of the Battle of Kursk. Orange areas show the destruction of an earlier
Soviet breakthrough that ended with the Third Battle of Kharkov. Green areas show German
advances on Kursk.
The Battle of Kursk (Russian: Курская битва) or Kursk Campaign (July 4 – July 20, 1943),
also called Operation Citadel (German: Unternehmen Zitadelle) by the German Army, was a
major battle on the Eastern Front of World War II and the last German blitzkrieg offensive in the
east as well as the last German offensive of such scale in the war. The exact definition of the battle
varies: the Germans saw it as comprising Operation Citadel only, while the Soviets considered (and
Russians today consider) it to include Citadel and the subsequent Soviet counter-offensives,
Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Overall, the campaign, which included
the famous sub-battle at Prokhorovka, remains both the largest armored engagement and the most
costly single day of aerial warfare to date.

Kursk is further notable for the deliberately defensive battle strategy on the Soviets' part. Having
good intelligence on Hitler's intentions, the Soviets established and managed to conceal elaborate
layered defense works, mine fields, and stage and disguise large reserve forces poised for a tactical
and strategic counter-attack typical of defensive battle plans. Though the Germans planned and
initiated an offensive strike, the well-planned defense not only frustrated their ambitions, but also
enabled the Soviets to follow up with counter-offensives and exhausted the German abilities in the
theater, thereby seizing the initiative for the remainder of the war. In that sense it may be seen as the
second phase of the turning point that began with the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad,
whose aftermath set the scene by establishing the Kursk Salient (also known as the "Kursk Bulge"),
the reduction of which was the objective of the German armies entering in July. The subsequent
counter-attacks retook Orel and Belgorod on August 5, and Kharkov on August 23, pushing back
the Germans across a broad front. This was the first successful major Soviet summer offensive of
the war.
Kursk was a further demonstration that the conflict in the East contained the largest scale of warfare
in history, in terms of manpower involved. So well designed was the Soviet defensive planning, that
when entering the archetypal counter-attack phase, the Soviets were able to attack along four
separate axes of advance, and execute a planned stop at a phase line, thus avoiding the pitfalls of
overextending during the counter-attack and earning this battle's deserved place as a model
campaign in war college curricula.[6] Keegan comments Although often thought of as a tank battle,
Kursk as a whole arguably demonstrated the triumph of artillery, infantry and engineers over
armour. The Soviet plan was to soak up the German assault in a colossal web of defensive
positions, and only then launch their armoured counter-attack. It was also an important air battle,
in which the balance now shifted in the favour of the Soviets. [7]

Contents
[hide]

1 Background
1.1 German plans
1.2 Soviet plans
2 Operation Citadel
2.1 Preliminary Actions
2.2 Main Battle
← 2.2.1 The Northern Face
← 2.2.2 Southern Face
 2.2.2.1 Prokhorovka
 2.2.2.2 The End in the South
3 Hitler cancels the operation
4 Soviet counteroffensives
5 Battle ends
6 Notes
7 Bibliography

8 External links
[edit] Background

In the winter of 1942–1943 the Soviets conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. One complete
German army had been lost, along with about 800,000 German and Axis troops, seriously depleting
Axis strength in the east. With an Allied invasion of Europe clearly looming, Hitler realized an
outright defeat of the Soviets before the Western Allies arrived had become unlikely, and he
decided to force the Soviets to a draw.[citation needed]
In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their
lines and thereby increasing their defensive strength. They planned on repeating this strategy in
Russia and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan
line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own
forces recuperated.

In February and March of 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had completed an
offensive during the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad
in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200km (120mi) wide and 150km
(90mi) deep Soviet-held salient (bulge) in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in
the north, and Von Manstein's recently captured Kharkov in the south.

[edit] German plans

Von Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had just successfully pursued at
Kharkov, when he cut off an overextended Soviet offensive. He suggested tricking the Soviets into
attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets
Basin in the eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the
Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of
Azov.

OKH did not approve von Manstein's plan, and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in
the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Three Soviet armies occupied the ground in and around the
salient, and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also
result in a much straighter and shorter line, and capture the strategically useful railway town of
Kursk located on the main north-south railway line running from Rostov to Moscow.

In March the plans crystallized. Walter Model's Ninth Army would attack southwards from Orel
while Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" under the overall
command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk,
but if the offensive went well they would have permission to continue forward on their own
initiative, with a general plan to create a new line at the Don River far to the east.

Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control over the planning
of the battle. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to
the front, stripping the entire German line of practically anything remotely useful for deployment in
the upcoming battle. They first set the attack for May 4, but then delayed it until June 12, and
finally until July 4 in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially
the new Panther tanks.

The basic concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and, for the Germans, hitherto
usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army
had long favored such a Cannae-style method, and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics
even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat
him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a major
pitched battle.

However, such breakthroughs were easier to achieve if they hit an unexpected location, as the
Germans had achieved attacking through the Ardennes in 1940, and towards Stalingrad and the
Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated
the principle of surprise: anyone who could read a map could confidently predict the obvious point
of attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked
Hitler:

Was it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east that year at all? Do you think anyone
even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the
reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front? Perhaps
more surprisingly Hitler replied: I know. The thought of it turns my stomach.

The interview ended inconclusively; Operation Citadel was postponed until mid-June.[verification needed]

The German force numbered 50 divisions, including 17 panzer and panzergrenadier, among them
the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division, and the Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS Panzer
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS Panzer Das Reich, and 3rd SS Panzer Totenkopf grouped into
the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new
Panther tanks, and the new Elefant tank destroyer, being used as assault guns. They also massed a
high proportion of their available air units and artillery, and despite the problems of the German
plan it was a formidable concentration of armor.

[edit] Soviet plans

To the West! calls this Soviet poster, while a Soviet soldier destroys the German To the East! sign
The Red Army had also begun planning for their own upcoming summer offensives, and had settled
on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten out
the line, and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. However, Soviet commanders
had considerable concerns over the German plans.

The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Soviets by surprise, but in this case
Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy
spy ring in Switzerland. This was almost unnecessary, since Marshal Zhukov had already correctly
predicted the site of the German attack as early as April 8, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka
(the Soviet General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the
Red Army.

Stalin and a handful of Stavka officers wanted to strike first[citation needed]. The pattern of the war up
until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all
opposing armies, including the Soviets'. None had succeeded in stopping a German breakthrough.
On the other hand, Soviet offensive actions during both winters showed their own offensives now
worked well. However, the overwhelming majority of Stavka members, most notably Zhukov
himself, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves, first. Zhukov's opinion swayed the
argument.
The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Soviets four months in which to prepare,
and with every passing day they turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended points on
earth. Two Fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines, and the Steppe Front was
available to act as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land
mines and dug about 5000km (3000mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175km (95mi). In addition, they
massed a huge army of their own, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery
pieces and 2,400 aircraft. The Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month
they pulled further ahead in men and material.

Many of the troops assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Stalingrad
battle, but the Red Army also added over one million new men to its ranks in the first half of 1943.
Thus, the Soviet Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay
between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive
gave the new units an unusually long time to train.

The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient
than infantry regiments. The Soviets were determined to grind down attacking German units with a
combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German
infantry, while direct fire from 45mm (1.7"), 57mm (2.24"), and 85mm (3.3") towed anti-tank guns
and 76.2mm (3") divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the
German Ninth Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns
per kilometer of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south, the density
was lower at about 10 guns per kilometer.

At Kursk, the Red Army committed more than a million men, more than 3,275 tanks and 25,000
guns and mortars. Soviet riflemen like these had to hold off "tank fists" and German assault infantry
supported by dive-bombers and heavy artillery fire. Soviet losses at Kursk amounted to 177,847
men killed, missing or wounded.
The preparation of the battlefield by Soviet military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate
503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On
average, 1,500 antitank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometer of front. In the
sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometer and sometimes
reached as high as 2,000 per kilometer. Soviet engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid
barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions.
Dummy positions were built to attract German artillery fire. Camouflaging of these positions and
minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units would have of the presence of Soviet
minefields or dug-in guns would be their own vehicles exploding.

Set in the larger vista of the war on the Eastern Front, Kursk is significant because it demonstrated
the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than OKH—largely due to Stalin
finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while
Hitler was systematically ignoring his[citation needed]. This was evidenced by the defeat of the Blitzkrieg
in summer campaigning weather (albeit at a very high price) and the ability of the Soviet forces to
move from defensive to offensive operations due to better staff work, larger reserves and better
planning. In these senses Kursk, and not Stalingrad, can be viewed as the turning point in the war:
certainly the initiative passed decisively from the Germans to Soviets.

[edit] Operation Citadel

Both sides had collected large forces to be committed for what was a strategically significant sector
of the Eastern Front.

Main article: Battle of Kursk order of battle

[edit] Preliminary Actions
It took four months before the Germans felt ready, by which time they had collected 200 of the
new Panther tanks (only 40 were available at the beginning of the battle due to technical
problems with the new type), 90 Elefant Panzerjägers and every flyable Henschel Hs 129
ground attack aircraft, as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number
of captured T-34s[citation needed]. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800
aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting
power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.

By this time, Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on
German military strength. Although actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Soviets'
longed-for second front, the battle there did begin to tell on the Germans, and in the last
quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, 40% of Luftwaffe losses occurred in the battles over
Malta and Tunisia. German air superiority was no longer guaranteed. The Soviet Air Forces far
outnumbered the Luftwaffe, and were quickly gaining in technology as well. Both Air Forces
possessed very effective series of ground-attack aircraft capable of decimating armour; the
Soviet Ilyushin Il-2 Shturmovik and the German Junkers Ju 87G (Initially Ju 87D-3/5 with a
pair of added Bordkanone 37mm gunpods).[8]

Waffen-SS panzergrenadiers and Wehrmacht Tiger tanks during the start of Operation Citadel
The start date for the offensive had been moved repeatedly as delays in preparation had forced
the Germans to postpone the attack. Finally, on July 1 the orders to attack on July 5 were
issued. The following day, Marshal Vasilyevskiy warned the Front commanders (N. F.
Vatutin, K. K. Rokossovskiy and I. S. Konyev) that the long-awaited German offensive would
begin sometime between July 3 and July 6. For months, the Soviets had been receiving
detailed information on the planning of the offensive from their Red Orchestra (German: Rote
Kapelle) espionage organization, whose sources included officers in the Nazi administration,
among others in Hermann Göring’s aviation ministry.

Preliminary fighting started on 4 July 1943 in the south, as Fourth Panzer Army had elected to
try to take the Soviet outposts prior to the main assault on July 5. Thus they deliberately
sacrificed tactical surprise. However, the Soviet forward positions were on small hills
overlooking German assembly areas, so it is likely surprise would have been lost in any case.

In the afternoon, Stuka dive bombers blew a two-mile-wide gap in the front lines on the north
in a short period of 10 minutes, and then turned for home while the German artillery opened up
to continue the pounding. Hoth's armored spearhead, the III Panzer Corps, then advanced on
the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time, the Großdeutschland Division
attacked Butovo in torrential rain, and the 11th Panzer Division took the high ground around
Butovo. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for Großdeutschland and the 3rd
Panzer Division, which met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until
midnight. The II SS Panzer Corps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts,
and again met with stiff resistance until assault troops equipped with flamethrowers cleared the
bunkers and outposts.

At 22:30, the Soviets hit back with an artillery bombardment in the north and south. This
barrage, by over 3,000 guns and mortars, expended up to one-half of the artillery supply for the
entire operation. The goal was to delay and disorganize the German attack. In the northern
face, the Central Front artillery fired mostly against German artillery positions and managed to
suppress 50 of the 100 German batteries they targeted. The result was much weaker German
artillery fire on the opening day of the attack. Also, German units attacked at staggered times
on July 5 due to the disruption caused by this bombardment. In the south, the Soviets chose to
fire largely against the German infantry and tanks in their assembly areas. This was partially
successful in delaying the German attack, but caused few casualties.

[edit] Main Battle

[edit] The Northern Face
The real battle opened on 5 July 1943. The Soviets, now aware even of the exact time of the
planned German offensive, launched a massive attack by the Soviet Air Force on the Luftwaffe
airbases in the area, in an attempt to counter the classic German tactic of eliminating local air
support within the first hour of battle. The next few hours turned into possibly the largest air
battle ever fought.

The Soviet co-ordination of the attack had failed. Soviet fighters were dispatched too soon,
arriving over German airbases before the arrival of the Soviet bomber forces, eventually
retiring due to lack of fuel. The German fighters had nothing to prevent them from taking off
and engaging the approaching attackers.[9].The Soviets suffered the loss of 120 aircraft.[10]

At Kursk, the Red Army constructed an elaborate defensive system. The core of each Soviet
defensive position was its anti-tank defenses, organized into a network covered by the
interlocking fires of multiple anti-tank guns.
The Luftwaffe directed an all out effort against Soviet positions on the northern flank during
first day of the battle, while Soviet deployment errors granted the Luftwaffe initial air-
superiority. General-Leytenant Rudenko, unsure whether this was the major German attack,
ordered only one-third of his fighter strength to engage the masses of German aircraft, while
the rest stood down. The out-numbered Soviet units were engaged over their own rear-areas
and suffered heavily. The German fighters had flown ahead of the bomber and Stuka units to
prevent Soviet intervention over the battle field. The unprotected Stuka and Kampfgruppen
then began their assault on the Soviet positions unhindered. The Soviets fed their aerial
strength in piecemeal and it suffered heavy losses.[11] In the first three days of fighting over the
northern flank Luftflotte 6 lost a total of 39 aircraft against Soviet losses of 386.[12]

The Ninth Army attack in the north fell far short of its objectives on July 5. The attack sector
had been correctly anticipated by the Soviet Central Front. Attacking on a 45-kilometer-wide
front, the Germans found themselves trapped in the huge defensive minefields, and needed
engineering units to come up and clear them under artillery fire. Although a few Goliath and
Borgward remote-control engineering vehicles were available to clear lanes in the minefields,
they were not generally successful. Even when the vehicles cleared mines, they had no on-
board marking system to show following tanks where the cleared lanes were. Soviet units
covered the minefields with small arms and artillery fire, delaying and inflicting losses on
German engineers clearing mines manually. Thus German losses in the Soviet minefields were
high. For example, the German 653rd Heavy Panzerjäger Battalion began the attack with 49
Ferdinand self-propelled guns; 37 of them had been lost in the minefields before 17:00 on July
5. Although most of the lost vehicles were mobility kills rather than permanent losses, they
were out of action until they could be repaired. While idle they added nothing to German
combat power and were easier for Soviet artillery to knock out permanently. Since the
Germans were advancing, any repairable vehicles could be fixed and put back into action.

There are a number of factors that explain Ninth Army’s lack of progress. The combination of
Soviet defensive planning and, on the German side, the lack of concentration of force were the
main factors. German armor was committed piecemeal rather than in strength and often
without sufficient infantry support.[13] Soviet defensive preparation was also a major factor.
The Central Front under Marshal Rokossovskiy had correctly anticipated the likely areas of
German attack and had fortified those areas very heavily, holding other areas more thinly. The
13th Army, which bore the brunt of the German attack, was far stronger in men and anti-tank
guns than the other Central Front units, and indeed held the strongest defensive positions in the
entire salient. A major planning error by the Soviet Supreme High Command and the General
Staff was their expectation that the main weight of the German attack would come in the north
on the Central Front. Thus they concentrated more strength there. Also, the Central front chose
to defend the tactical zone (to a depth of 20 km) very heavily, leaving far fewer units in the
depths of the defense. Model's army had fewer tanks than Manstein had in the south, and the
Ninth Army also committed major units piecemeal due to some disruption caused by the
Soviet pre-emptive artillery barrage. Finally, Ninth Army led with reinforced infantry divisions
that were already in the line facing the Soviets, rather than attacking with uncommitted units.
Review of attack frontages and depth of German penetration shows clearly that the Soviet
defensive tactics were succeeding. Beginning with a 45-kilometer-wide attack frontage on July
5, on the 6th, Ninth Army attacked on a 40-kilometer front. This dropped to 15 kilometers
wide by July 7, and only 2 kilometers each on July 8-9. Each day, the depth of the German
advance slowed: 5 kilometers on the first day, 4 on the second, never more than 2 km each
succeeding day. By the 10th, Ninth Army was stopped in its tracks.

After a week, the Wehrmacht had moved only 12 km forward, and on the 12th the Soviets
launched their own offensive against the Second Panzer Army and the German Ninth Army at
Orel. The situation became critical for the German forces, the 11th Guards Army could cut off
both German Armies. The Luftwaffe was called upon to halt the offensive, and its actions
proved decisive to saving the German armies from encirclement. The Luftwaffe organised a
massive aerial offensive to blunt the threat. On 16 July the Luftwaffe flew 1,595 sorties, double
that of the previous days.[14] In daylight hours the Sturzkampfgeschwader and
Schlachtgeschwader attacked Soviet armoured units while the Kampfgruppen targeted the rear-
supply lines. Another 1,100 sorties were flown on 18 July. The Junkers Ju 87G units took a
heavy toll of Soviet Armour. So heavy were Soviet losses, the air attacks forced a Soviet
retreat. The Soviet tanks that had managed to reach German positions had been quickly routed.
The 1st Tank Corps had only 33 tanks remaining on 20 July.[15].[16] Model sent a message to
von Greim thanking him, "the Luftwaffe's intervention was absolutely decisive to prevent a
second, more disastrous Stalingrad".[17]

Ninth Army had to withdraw, their part in the offensive over. Because the German armor was
not concentrated and used with the same intensity as in the South, the German armor losses
were comparatively light - 143 armored vehicles were total losses in the period July 5 -14
1943.[18] However, this failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and matériel for
the Red Army. Few Soviet guns were captured, and those Soviet units that did retreat did so on
orders. The German attack failed to penetrate beyond the Soviet tactical zone.

[edit] Southern Face

German advance in the South
In the south, the Voronezh Front fared less well against the Fourth Panzer Army with its LII
Corps, XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps. The II SS Panzer Corps attacked on a
narrower frontage against two Soviet rifle regiments. The armored spearhead of Hoth's Fourth
Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by the 6th had reached some 15 km past the lines.
Again, Soviet planning played a big role. In the south the Soviets had not been able to pinpoint
the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly. For
example, three of the four Armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per
kilometer of front; this contrasts sharply with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which
was twice as heavy in the active sectors. Also, the Voronezh Front made the decision to hold
the tactical zone much more thinly, leaving a much higher proportion of units in deeper
positions compared to the Central Front. Finally, the Voronezh Front was weaker than the
Central Front, yet it faced much stronger German forces.

The German forces made steady progress against the Soviet defenses, but, as in the north,
attack frontages (width) and penetration depth tended to drop as the attack proceeded. The
trend was not as marked as in the north, however. Beginning with a 30-kilometer-wide attack
frontage on July 5, this dropped to 20-kilometers wide by July 7 and 15 km by July 9.
Likewise, the depth of the penetration dropped from 9 km on July 5 to 5 km on July 8 and 2-3
km each day thereafter until the attack was cancelled.

Soviet minefields and artillery were again successful in delaying the German attack and
inflicting losses. The ability of dug-in Red Army units to delay the Germans was vital to allow
their own reserves to be brought up into threatened sectors. Over 90,000 additional mines were
laid during the battle by small mobile groups of engineers, generally working at night
immediately in front of the expected German attack areas. There were no large-scale captures
of prisoners nor any great loss of artillery, again indicating that Soviet units were giving
ground in good order.

German losses can be seen in the example of the Großdeutschland Division, which began the
battle with 118 tanks. On July 10, after five days of fighting, the division reported it had 3
Tigers, 6 Panthers, and 11 Pzkw-III and Pzkw-IV tanks operational. XLVIII Panzer Corps
reported, overall, 38 Panthers operational with 131 awaiting repair, out of the 200 it started
with on July 5.

Nevertheless, it was obvious that the threat of a German breakthrough in the south had to be
reckoned with. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the battle as a central
reserve for such an eventuality. Units of the Steppe Front began movement to the south as
early as July 9. This included the 5th Guards Tank Army and other combined-arms armies.

The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Soviet 7th Guards Army stalled Kempf's
divisions, aided by heavy rain, after the Germans had crossed the Donets River. The Fifth
Guards Tank Army, reinforced with two additional Tank Corps, moved into positions to the
east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when II SS Panzer
Corps arrived and an intense struggle ensued. The Soviets managed to halt the SS—but only
just. Little now stood in the way of the Fourth Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough
looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets therefore decided to deploy the rest of 5th
Guards Tank Army.

[edit] Prokhorovka
Main article: Battle of Prokhorovka

Memorial on Prokhorovka Field

On the morning of July 12, II SS Panzer Corps advanced on Prokhorovka at the same
time that 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front
counteroffensive scheduled for July 12 and in an attempt to catch the Germans off
balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country
punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with
the release of new information from archives.

The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss but an operational draw for
the Soviets. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished
their missions that day. Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Soviet
losses have been claimed as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks, but the loss records now
show that they were probably from 150 to 300 complete losses, with a similar number
damaged. Likewise, German loss claims have reached as low as 80 or into the hundreds,
including "dozens" of Tigers. This number is impossible to establish because of the
German philosophy in counting lost tanks. The number of complete losses for the period
10 July-13 July for the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions was three. Additional to that is an
unknown number of damaged tanks, many of which would have been lost in repair depots
during the subsequent retreat as a consequence of the Soviet post-Kursk counteroffensive
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Nipe puts the number of operational tank reductions
in the whole Corps at 70-80, but it is unclear how many of these would have been in
short-term or long-term repair. In any event, the losses for both the II SS Panzer Corps
and the 5th Guards Tank Army in the “greatest tank battle of all time,” fell short of the
mythic proportions sometimes attributed to the Prokhorovka engagement.

[edit] The End in the South

Significantly, earlier in the battle the attacking German units had been squeezed into ever-
narrowing frontages by the defenders. Elite Soviet Guards Airborne units were holding
firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not
squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen
the penetration. Thus as the attacking Corps moved forward, they continually lost strength
due to the need to hold their own flanks.

While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by July 10, in the south the
overall battle (of Kursk) still hung in the balance, even after July 12. German forces on
the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, nevertheless had breached the first
two defensive belts and believed (wrongly) that they were about to break through the last
belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as
strong as the initial belts (and some of them did not have troops deployed). Soviet
defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been
committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the
few available German reserves.

[edit] Hitler cancels the operation

On the night of July 9/10, the Western Allies mounted an amphibious invasion of Sicily.
Three days later, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze
headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to "temporarily" call off Operation
Zitadelle. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that Zitadelle was on the
brink of victory. Hitler gave von Manstein a few more days to continue the offensive, but
 on 17 July he cancelled the operation and ordered the entire SS Panzer Korps to be
transferred to Italy.

Hitler's decision to call off the operation at the height of the battle has since been strongly
criticized by German generals in their memoirs, and also by some historians. For
example, it has been pointed out that the SS Panzer Korps would have taken three months
to be transferred to Sicily, and thus could not possibly have affected the outcome there,
while its contribution to the Kursk operation was vital.[19] Other scholars, however, are of
the opinion that Zitadelle had already clearly failed and that Hitler was right in canceling
the operation, if not for the right reasons.[citation needed]

In any event, only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,
departed for Italy without their equipment, the others remaining behind in the USSR to try
and stem the Soviet counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German
offensive.

[edit] Soviet counteroffensives

Main articles: Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev

Operation Kutuzov, the Soviet counteroffensive at Orel, decisively changed the
situation. German Ninth Army units had to be redeployed to resist this attack instead
of continuing their own offensive; units from the southern pincer were given warning
orders on July 15 to withdraw back to the start lines held on July 4. The purpose of
the withdrawal was to shorten the front, enabling the Germans to re-form a reserve.

To the south the Red Army needed more time to re-group after the losses sustained
in July, and could not launch their counteroffensive again until 3 August when
Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced. Aided by diversionary attacks on
the Mius river further south, they took von Manstein's hard-won Belgorod.
Fireworks in Moscow marked the capture of Belgorod and Orel, a celebration that
henceforward became an institution with the recapture of each Soviet city. On 11
August the Red Army reached Kharkov, a city Hitler had sworn to defend at all
costs. The German units had reduced manpower and shortages of equipment.

[edit] Battle ends

A cathedral on the Field of Prokhorovka. It commemorates the Soviet victory in the
Battle of Kursk.
Field Marshal von Manstein believed the outcome of the offensive phase of Kursk to
be much more grey than black and white. For although the Germans were forced to
withdraw, the Germans “managed to, at least, partly destroy the mobile units of the
enemy’s operational reserves.” However, despite the losses it suffered in the
defensive phase of the battle of Kursk, the Red Army managed to go over to a very
successful offensive within two weeks, pushing the Germans back to the Dnieper
and towards western Ukraine, and Manstein saw the overall campaign as a disaster
for the Germans.

By 22 August, utter exhaustion had affected both sides and the battle of Kursk
ended. It was followed by a series of successful Red Army operations that led to the
crossing of the Dnieper, and the liberation of Kiev during the autumn of 1943.

The campaign was a decisive Soviet success. For the first time, a major German
offensive had been stopped prior to achieving a breakthrough. The Germans, despite
using more technologically advanced armor than previous years, were unable to
break through the in-depth defenses of the Red Army, and were surprised by the
significant operational reserves available to the Soviets in this battle. This was an
outcome that few confidently predicted, and it changed the pattern of operation on
the eastern front. The victory had not been cheap however. The Red Army, although
preventing the Germans from achieving the goals of Citadel, lost considerably more
men and matériel than the Wehrmacht.

German casualties listed in German sources during the battle proper (as opposed to
the following Soviet counter-offensives north and south of the salient) in the period 5
to 20 July 1943 were between 50,000[20] and 57,000.[21] German tank write-offs were
between 278[22] and 323.[23] Yet the numbers of destroyed tanks alone does not tell
the entire story. For example, Zetterling and Frankson list only 33 tanks destroyed
for the three divisions of the SS Panzer Corps as of 17 July, but the number of
operational tanks on 17 July as of 19:15 had dropped by 139, leading one to assume
that 106 tanks were damaged and not able to take part in the battle, at least
temporarily.[24] Soviet casualties were 177,847 as listed in Krivosheev.[25] However,
Restayn and Moller point out[26] that Krivosheev's figures for Central Front strength
show a decline in strength during the period 5 to 11 July 1943 of approximately
92,700, of which only 33,897 are accounted for as dead or wounded with no
explanation given for the further 58,893 losses. Restayn and Moller consider that the
missing 58,893 should be accounted for as casualties, in which case total Soviet
casualties in this period would be approximately 235,000 (ie 177,847 plus 58,893).
Soviet armor losses, again according to Krivosheev, were 1,614 tanks and assault
guns destroyed.[27]

From this point on, a new pattern emerged. The initiative had firmly passed to the
Soviets, while the Germans spent the rest of the war reacting to their moves. A new
front had opened in Italy, diverting some of Germany's resources and attention. Both
sides had their losses, but only the Soviets had the manpower and the industrial
production to recover fully. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk
and never again launched a major offensive in the East.

Moreover, the loss further convinced Hitler of the incompetence of his General Staff.
He continued his interference in military matters progressively, so that by war's end
he was involved in tactical decisions. The opposite applied to Stalin, however. After
seeing Stavka's planning justified on the battlefield, he trusted his advisors more, and
stepped back from operational planning, only rarely overruling military decisions.

Predictable results ensued for both sides: the German Army went from loss to loss as
Hitler attempted personally to micromanage the day-to-day operations of what soon
became a three-front war, while the Soviet Army gained more freedom and became
more and more fluid as the war continued.

[edit] Notes
1. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 123-125;figures from German archives. Bundesarchiv-
Militararchiv, Frieburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt
Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin
2. ^ There are variant numbers given depending on the stage of the operations
which took place, and how they were calculated. Soviet sources include all
guns, mortars, rocket and anti-aircraft artillery employed from the start of the
Operation Citadel to the end of the Soviet counter-offensives. German
sources also add tanks deployed in static dug-in positions.
3. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 127-128;figures from Russian archives; Russian
aviation trust; Russian Central Military Archive TsAMO, Podolsk; Russian
State Military Archive RGVA, Moscow; Monino Air Force Museum,
Moscow
4. ^ a b Using the German dates of battle
5. ^ a b Using the Soviet dates of battle
6. ^ When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived
infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of the
German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east. Kursk announced to
the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one
available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop
it.Glantz, Colonel David M.. "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943".
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Soviet Army Studies
Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report No.
11).
7. ^ Atlas of World War II edited by John Keegan (2006, Collins, London)
ISBN 10:0-00-721465-0
8. ^ Hans-Ulrich Rudel of StG 2 Immelmann had used the Ju 87 equppied with
two 37 mm cannon over the Kuban front in the Spring of 1943. The
Geschwaders Stukas were equipped with them on the very first day of the
Kursk offensive. Rudel destroyed 12 Soviet tanks on 5 July. Bergstrom 2007
p. 79-81; 102; 106; 114; 118.
9. ^ The air battle is misunderstood in most accounts. The Freya radar stations
established in Belgorod and Kharkov in 1943 had only picked up Soviet
formations approaching from Belgorod and were not responsible for sealing
the failure of the strike; Bergström 2007, p.26.
10. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 27.
11. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 38.
12. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 120.
 13. ^ Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North, by Restayn and Moller, page 333
14. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 102.
15. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 109.
16. ^ Figures from Grigoriy Koltunov and Boris Solovyev: Kurskaya bitva,
1970. Bergström p. 109
17. ^ Bergström 2007, p. 109.
18. ^ Operation Citadel, Volume 2: The North, by Restayn and Moller, pages
333-336
19. ^ Carell, Paul - Hitler Moves East, Volume 2 Scorched Earth.
20. ^ Glantz & House,page 275
21. ^ Zetterling & Frankson, page 112
22. ^ Zetterling & Frankson, adding tables 8.8 and 8.10 on pages 121-122
23. ^ Glantz & House, page 276
24. ^ Zetterling & Frankson, pp. 187-188
25. ^ quoted in Glantz & House at 275 and Restayn & Moller, Volume II, at
page 341
26. ^ page 341 of Vol II
27. ^ cited in both Glantz & House at 275 and Mawdsely, at page 267

[edit] Bibliography

← Bergström, Christer (2007). Kursk - The Air Battle: July 1943. Chervron/Ian
Allen. ISBN 978-1-903223-88-8..
← Glantz, David M.; Jonathan M. House (2004). The Battle of Kursk. University
Press of Kansas. ISBN 0700613358.
← Glantz, David M.; Harold S. Orenstein (1999). The Battle for Kursk 1943: The
Soviet General Staff Study. Frank Cass. ISBN 0714649333.
← Krivosheev, Grigoriy (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the
twentieth century. London: Greenhill Books. ISBN 1853672807.
← Manstein, Erich von (2000). Verlorene Siege (in German). Monch. ISBN
3763752536.
← Mawdsley, Evan (2007). Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War, 1941-1945.
A Hodder Arnold Publication. ISBN 0340613920.
← Mulligan, Timothy P. (1987). "Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle': Intelligence and the
Battle of Kursk, 1943" (pdf). Journal of Contemporary History 22 (2): 235-260.
doi:10.1177/002200948702200203.
← Newton, Stephen H. (2003). Kursk: The German View. Westview Press. ISBN
0306811502.
← Nipe, George (1996). Decision In the Ukraine, Summer 1943, II. SS and III.
Panzerkorps. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.. ISBN 0921991355.
← Restayn, J.; N. Moller (2002). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album,
Volume 1: The South. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.. ISBN 0921991703.
← Restayn, J.; N. Moller (2006). Operation "Citadel", A Text and Photo Album,
Volume 2: The North. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc.. ISBN 092199172X.
← Robbins, David L. (2004). Last Citadel. Orion mass market paperback. ISBN
0752859250.
← Zetterling, Niklas; Anders Frankson (2000). Kursk 1943: A statistical analysis.
Routledge. ISBN 0714650528.

[edit] External links

← Battle of Kursk in Images

← Battle of Kursk
← (Russian) Battle of Kursk, a lot of information on the official website of the
Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation.
← Remson, Andrew and Anderson, Debbie. "Mine and Countermine Operations in
the Battle of Kursk", 25 April 2000 (Prepared for the U.S. Army
Communications-Electronics Command)
← A Review Essay: Books on the Battle of Kursk
← The Battle of Kursk: Myths and Reality
← Kursk battle map
← Pictures of the battle - a Soviet view
← Battle of Kursk on the Web (directory)
← "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943" by Col. David M. Glantz for the
Combat Studies Institute (1986)
← Russia and the USSR in wars of the XX century by G. F. Krivosheev (in Russian)
← Kursk - Raw Data to Download Information from the US Army KOSAVE II
study on the southern face battle.
← German newsreels showing the Battle of Kursk
← Kursk from a website on Zhukov