Case Laws

Unit 2:

1. S. Nagalingam v. Sivagami: (Importance of satpadi, Section 7 of HMA):

Facts: A criminal complaint was being lodged before the Metropolitan Magistrate by the
appellant, contending that the appellant had contracted the second marriage with a woman
named, Kasturi and their marriage was solemnised in accordance with the Hindu rites on
18th June 1984 within the state of Tamil Nadu. In order to support this contention, detailed
evidences were provided regarding the manner in which the marriage was being performed on
18th of June.

Issue:

• Whether the second marriage entered by appellant with the second accused, Kasturi on
18.6.1984 constitute a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 ?

• Whether “Saptapadi” is an essential ritual to be performed for the solemnisation of a

marriage?

• Whether the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 494 are complied in the
present case?

Decision: It was testified by the witness that the bridegroom brought the “Thirumangalam” and
tied it around the neck of the bride and thereafter the garlands were exchanged and the father
of the bride stated that he was giving his daughter to “Kanniyathan” on behalf of and in the
witness of “Agnidevi” and the acceptance of the same by the father of the bridegroom clearly
shows that the marriage was being performed under the custom applicable to the parties.

Thus, regarding question (1), it could be concluded that the marriage between the accused and
the alleged second wife was valid under Section 7A of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

Regarding question (2), they have contended that “Homa” and “Saptapadi” are the two
essential ceremonies to be performed in order to constitute a valid marriage under Hindu law.

Saptapadi was held to be an essential ceremony for a valid marriage only in cases it was
admitted by the parties that, as per the form of marriage applicable to them, that was an essential
ceremony.
Since, in the instant case, the appellant had no such case that the “Saptapadi” was an essential
one among the members of the community to which they belong, the marriage between the
appellant and the second accused, Kasturi is to be considered valid as per the personal law
applicable to them.

In light of the above discussions, it was held that the parties are governed by Section 7-A of
the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, as the parties are Hindus residing within the State of Tamil
Nadu.

Therefore, the Learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant had committed the
offence of bigamy under Section 494 of IPC as it was done during the subsistence of his earlier
marriage held on 06.09.1970. Accordingly, the matter was correctly remanded to the trial court
for awarding the appropriate sentence and the appeal was dismissed.
Unit 3:

2. Lily Thomas v Union of India (Bigamy, Converting to islam only to remarry,

void):

Facts: Mr. Ghosh (husband) asked the petitioner for divorce by mutual consent while stating
that he had converted to Islam with an intention of contracting a second marriage with Miss
Vanita Gupta, a divorcee with two children in the second week of July 1992.

The respondent also produced the certificate before the concerned court, certifying that he
had embraced Islam. It was further contended that the petitioner and her family made several
attempts to convince the respondent not to end their marital ties, but all in vain. Instead, he
insisted the petitioner should divorce, otherwise, she will have to put up with the second wife.

Thus, it was amply clear from the above-stated facts that the Respondent has converted to Islam
solely to remarry and had actually no faith in Islam.

Issue:

• Whether a non-Muslim gets converted to the ‘Muslim’ faith with no actual change
or belief and merely with a view to avoid an earlier marriage or to enter a second
marriage, whether the marriage entered by him after such conversion would be void?

• Whether the Respondent would be liable for bigamy under Section 494 of IPC?

• Whether it was desirable to have a Uniform Civil Code?

Decision: Considering the above-mentioned facts and circumstances, it was held that the
conversion or apostasy does not automatically dissolve a marriage already solemnized under
the Hindu Marriage Act but only provides a ground for divorce under Section 18. Till a decree
of divorce is passed, the marriage subsists. Any other marriage, during the subsistence of the
first marriage would constitute an offence under Section 494 read with Section 17 of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 and the person, despite his conversion to some other religion, would be
liable to be prosecuted for the offence of bigamy.
Unit 6:

3. Seema v Ashwani Kumar: (Registration of Marriage within India)

Facts: During the hearing of the petition, it was observed by the bench that in various cases
many people are refuting the existence of marriage as there is no evidence to substantiate the
same, therefore, the Amicus Curiae assisted the court in laying down some guidelines to avoid
such situations.

Discussion:

• By analysing the women commission report, it was observed that registration of

marriages would be the right step.
• List III of Schedule VII, entry 30 of the Indian Constitution, deals with “Vital Statistics”
which related to registration of birth and death and its scope is extended to the
registration of marriages.
• Most of the states have existing rules and procedures relating to the registration of
marriages but not making registration mandatory. Four States, i.e. Maharashtra,
Gujarat, Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh have made registration of
marriages mandatory.
• Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, also specifies that registration of marriage
would act as proof of the existence of marriage.

Judgement:

• The registration of marriage would serve as the presumption of marriage, and non-
registered marriages would not have the benefit of the presumption.

• Therefore, all the citizen of all religions must register their marriage in the state where
the marriage was solemnized.

• The court also directed the state and central government –

o To create rules/regulation/ procedure for registration of marriages

o To appoint an officer who should be authorized to register the marriage, the age
and marital status of the parties.
Unit 9:

4. Savitri Pandey v Prem Chand Pandey: (Cruelty, Desertion)

Facts: The wife claimed to be subjected to cruelty for not fulfilling husbands dowry demands
and also claimed that he was having an illicit relationship with another woman.

Judgement: When this was put forward before the family court, it led that there was no issue
with regard to alleged desertion to be framed. It was therefore proved that the respondent had
deserted the appellant and he is entitled to get divorce. Aggrieved by the decision the case
moved to the High Court where in the court held that there was no evidence of cruelty was
found of wife being treated with cruelty by her husband. The High Court relied on the judgment
made by the family court and stated that no evidence was found for stating that petitioner has
been deserted.

Discussion: Treating the petitioner with cruelty is a ground for divorce under Section
13(1)(ia) of the Act. Cruelty has not been defined under the Act but in relation to matrimonial
matters it is contemplated as a conduct of such type which endangers the living of the petitioner
with the respondent. Cruelty consists of acts which are dangerous to life, limb or health. Cruelty
for the purpose of the Act means where one spouse has so treated the other and manifested such
feelings towards her or him as to have inflicted bodily injury, or to have caused reasonable
apprehension of bodily injury, suffering or to have injured health. Cruelty may be physical or
mental. No decree of divorce could be granted on the ground of desertion in the absence of
pleading and proof.
Unit 11:

5. Smt. Saroj Rani vs Sudarshan Kumar Chadha: (Restitution of Conjugal Rights)

Facts:

• The appellant, i.e. the wife, was treated badly by the respondent, i.e. the husband after
the two years of marriage and after the birth of second daughter.

• Thereafter, the appellant sued for the restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Sub-judge and the decree was passed with the
consent of both parties.

• After the passing of decree, the appellant claimed that she briefly cohabited with
respondent, i.e. the husband.

• After the lapse of one year, the respondent sued for divorce under section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, before the District Judge on the grounds that there had been
no cohabitation taken place since the decree under section 9 was passed.

• The District Judge dismissed the Divorce petition by giving reasons that the decree
under section 9 was a consent decree.

• Another appeal filed by the respondent to the High Court and the same, which was
referred to the Chief Justice.

• The appellant also preferred an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.

Legal Issues:

• Whether the decree passed under section 9 of HMA, 1955 violates the Article 13, 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950?

• Whether the Court should grant the petition for divorce in favor of respondent against
the consent decree passed under section 9 of HMA, 1955?

Judgement: The apex court dismissed the appeal of the appellant wife by considering the above
facts and upheld the judgment which was passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana of
a decree of divorce in favor of the respondent, i.e. the husband.

The apex court also considered their relationship of husband and wife by stating that which
was noncooperative and therefore appeals of the wife easily dismissed and stand to affirm the
decision. In addition, the apex court directed the respondent, i.e. the husband, to pay the
maintenance of Rs. 200 per month to the wife and Rs. 300 per month to her daughter until she
remarries and maintains the one living daughter until his marriage.

Unit 12:

6. Hitesh Bhatnagar v Deepa Bhatnagar: (Divorce by mutual consent)

Facts: The appellant and the respondent got married in 1994. On August 17th, 2001, the parties
filed a petition under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the District Court,
Gurgaon, for dissolution of marriage by grant of a decree of divorce by mutual consent. The
respondent withdrew her consent by filing an application dated March 22nd, 1993 and
subsequently the petition came to be dismissed. The appeal made to the High Court of Punjab
was dismissed too.

Legal Issue:

1. Whether the consent once given in a petition for divorce by mutual consent can be
subsequently withdrawn by one of the parties after the expiry of eighteen months from
the date of filing of the petition?

2. Whether the Court can grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent when the consent
has been withdrawn by one of the parties, and if so, under what circumstances?

Judgement: It was the respondent’s contention that she had given initial consent under mental
stress and duress. She also stated that she never wanted divorce and was willing to live with
the appellant as his wife. The Court found the appellant’s submission that the Additional
District Judge was bound to grant divorce as the consent was not withdrawn within the period
of eighteen months to be without merit. The Court set down three necessary conditions for the
Court to be bound to pass a decree of divorce. First, a second motion is made not before six
months from the date of the filing of petition and not later than eighteen months. Second, after
hearing the parties and making appropriate inquiry, the Court is satisfied that the averments
made in the petition are true. Third, the petition is not withdrawn by any party at any time
before passing the decree.
Unit 14:

7. Rameshwari Chandra Daga v Rameshwari Daga: (Maintenance)

Facts: The appellant’s (Husband) first marriage was formalized with late smt. Usha, he had
three children which were born out of this marriage. The respondent (wife) was also married
to another man named Girdhari Lal Lakhotia. According to the wife, the standard ceremonies of
marriage were not finished as her previous in laws squabble about dowry. She had recorded a Divorce
Petition in Matrimonial Court at Amravati, however it was not indicted and no pronouncement of
separation was passed. In that situation, as per the pervasive custom in Maheshwari people group a
Chhor Chithhi or a report of disintegration of marriage was executed between the wife and her past
husband, this fact was also disclosed by the wife as she also gave a photocopy of the document to the
appellant.

Later they got married and from this marriage they had a child whose name was pooja. She
was becoming the victim of domestic violence by her husband as her father did not fulfill all
his demands. After getting upset with all this, she left her husband’s house with her daughter
and started living with her father. After that, she filed a complaint against her husband in the
Family Court of Bombay, where she asked for the decree of judicial separation for cruelty and
claimed maintenance of rupees three thousand per month for herself and daughter.

Husband also filed a cross petition stating that at the time of his second marriage, the wife’s
first marriage was not completely dissolved and was pending in the court. So as per the
provision of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 the marriage should be considered as invalid and void
under Section 11 of the act. He also questioned the legitimacy of the child pooja as her daughter.

The Bombay family court dismissed the husband’s petition and granted a decree of judicial
separation and awarded one thousand rupees per month in the favor of the wife. Further the
husband challenged this decision in the high court and the counter petition was also filed by
the wife. The high court upheld the decision of the family court but granted maintenance to the
wife. In order to not agree with this decision, both the parties filed a cross appeal against each
other in the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issue:

• The first issue was put up in front of court that whether or not the marriage solemnized
between respondent and appellant is considered to be null and void.
• If the above issue is resolved so whether or not the wife is entitled to maintenance as
per section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955, if yes so, this section is applicable on those
marriages which are null and void in the eyes of law.

Judgement: In this case the supreme court held that the marriage solemnized between
respondent and appellant is considered as null and void because it is against the provision of
section 5(i) of the act, the court did not give validity to the Chhor Chithhi as a complete decree
of divorce.

In Spite of that the court granted the permanent maintenance to the wife as gave the wide
interpretation of the section 25 of the act and stated that section 25 enables the court to award
maintenance at the time of passing any type of decree resulting in breach in marriage
relationship and says that any type of decree issued by the court comes under the ambit of Any
type of Decree. It is an enabling provision as it empowers the Court in a matrimonial case to
consider facts and circumstances of the spouse applying and decide whether or not to grant
permanent maintenance. (referred Chand Dhawan v/s Jawaharlal Dhawan SC0538 1993).
 8. Badshah v Sou Urmila Badshah Godse and Another: (Maintenance)

Facts:

• The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent took place on February 10th,
2005 according to Hindu Marriage customary rites at Devgad Temple in Hivargav-
Pavsa, following which the respondent resided and cohabitated with the petitioner.
While the respondent was pregnant with the petitioner’s child, a lady named Shobha
came to their house and claimed to be the petitioner’s wife.

• The respondent claims that the petitioner told her that if she wanted to live with him, she
should cohabit with Shobha and live quietly and peacefully with them or return to her
parent’s house. Since she was pregnant, she decided to live with the petitioner and Shobha
in the same house.
• The respondent had to undergo a lot of physical and mental torture on a regular basis at the
hands of her inebriated husband. The petitioner mistreated the respondent as he believed
that the baby in her womb was not his and accused her of having relations with someone
else.
• He also insisted that the respondent must have an abortion. As the petitioner’s mistreatment
and abuse became unbearable, the respondent returned to her parent’s residence. The
respondent’s daughter, Shivanjali (Respondent No. 2) was born on November 28th, 2005.
The respondents applied for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC), based on the abovementioned averments.
• The Trial Court issued an award of maintenance to respondent No. 1 at the rate of Rs.1000/-
per month and to respondent No. 2 at the rate of Rs.500/- per month, which was affirmed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
• The petitioner appealed before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, wherein the
decision of the lower court was upheld and an order dated 28th February 2013 was passed.
The petitioner filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India to appeal against
the judgement and order of the Bombay High Court.

Legal Issue:

• Whether the marriage between the respondent and the petitioner was legally valid and
whether she was the wife of the petitioner?
• Whether the respondent entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC?
Judgement: The Supreme Court observed that the marriage between the parties had been proved
but the petitioner was already married but he deceived the respondent by withholding the fact of
the alleged first marriage.

The Court held that for Section 125 CrPC, respondent would be treated as the wife of the petitioner
and opined that the petitioner cannot be allowed to deny the respondent the benefit of maintenance
by exploiting his own mistake. The apex court denied the leave to the petitioner and dismissed the
special leave petition.
Unit 15:

9. Brijendra Singh v State of MP: (Right to adopt)

Facts:

• Mishri Bai had returned to her parent’s house after being abandoned by her husband, Padam
Singh, a day after their marriage, because of her physical disability. She never returned to
her in-laws’ house.
• Her parents had granted her a 32-acre plot of land from their agricultural holdings for her
subsistence. In 1970, after almost 22 years of her marriage, Mishri Bai claimed to have
adopted the appellant, Brijendra Singh. Her estranged husband, Padam Singh, passed away
in 1974.
• Mishri Bai was served a notice by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Vidisha, under Section 10
of the Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, showing that her
holdings of agricultural land exceeded the prescribed limit.
• Mishri Bai filed a reply, claiming that Brijendra Singh is her adopted son and that the two
of them formed a joint family, giving them the right to keep 54 acres of land. In December
1981, the Sub-Divisional officer dismissed the adoption argument, citing that the adoptive
father’s name was not registered in educational institution records.
• Mishri Bai filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that Brijendra Singh is her adopted son
and the court ruled in her favour. She executed a registered will on July 19, 1989,
bequeathing all of her assets to Brijendra Singh. Mishri Bai passed away in 1989.
• The State of Madhya Pradesh challenged the order in the High Court. The first appellate
court rejected the appeal and upheld the trial court’s judgement and decree. It was decided,
under the trial court’s findings, that Mishri Bai had adopted Brijendra Singh and that the
fact of adoption was stated in Mishri Bai’s will.
• The High Court heard the Respondents’ Second Appeal and overturned the trial court’s
decision. It was observed that the Court would deem the adoption invalid in the absence of
consent of Mishri Bai’s husband. The adoption was deemed invalid in the absence of
Mishri Bai’s husband’s consent, according to one argument.
• The High Court upheld the appeal, noting that Section 8(c) of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956 stipulated that only those who fit into the enumerated categories
would adopt a son as a female Hindu.
 • The High Court stated that there is a significant difference between a divorced Hindu
woman and one who lives her life as a divorced woman.
• As a result, the High Court ruled that the alleged adoption was not adoption and lacked
legal sanctity. Brijendra Singh appealed against the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issue: Was the adoption of Brijendra Singh by Mishri Bai legally valid?

Judgement: The Supreme Court ruled that a married Hindu woman cannot adopt a child without
her husband’s consent, even if the couple is separated.

The division bench stated that if the couple was divorced, consent for adoption was not required. It
was observed that any adoption made by a female Hindu who lacks the capacity or right to adopt
is void.

The Court while dismissing the appeal permitted the appellant to remain in possession of the land
for six months before the state government took action.
Unit 17:

10. Ms. Githa Hariharan & Anr vs Reserve Bank of India: (Guardianship)

Facts:

• The petitioner and Dr. Mohan Ram tied a nuptial knot in 1982 and from the wedlock their
son (Riahab Bailey) was born in 1984.
• The petitioner by an application requested the Reserve Bank of India for a 9% relief bond
in favor of her son with a proclamation, that being the mother she would act as a natural
guardian and supervise all the investments.
• However, the application was returned, and the Court instructed the petitioner to present
the application signed by the father of the minor son and additionally furnish the certificate
of guardianship by a competent authority in her favor.
• Second, there was a divorce proceeding pending between the petitioner and her husband in
which the husband prayed for the custody of the child.
• In association with this, he had written many letters to the petitioner asserting that he is the
natural guardian of the minor child and they could take no decision without his approval,
which has resulted in the present case.

Legal Issue: Whether the Constitution of India violates section 6 of the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act?

Judgement:

• Gender equality is a critical element in constitutional law consequently when the term
“after” characterizes as disqualification of the mother as a natural guardian during the
lifetime of the father will be considered a contravention to constitutional law.
• “father being a dominant personality cannot be given preferential rights over mother”
therefore, the term “after” in section 6 of the act, should not be interpreted in a narrow sense
as “after the lifetime” on the contrary it should be characterized as “in absence of father”
i.e. be it temporary or otherwise or total apathy by father because of any sickness or
otherwise the mother would be considered as the natural guardian of the child.

11. ABC vs The State (NCT Of Delhi): (Guardianship)

Facts The Appellant was a well-educated and financially self-sufficient single Christian mother.
Under Section 7 of the G&W Act, she had applied to be the sole guardian of her son. Before a
guardian is appointed, a notification must be provided to the child’s parents under Section 11 of
the G&W Act. The Appellant gave public notice of the petition for guardianship but refused to
reveal the child’s father’s identity. The Appellant also submitted an affidavit stating that her
guardianship rights might be canceled, altered, or amended at any moment if the child’s father
objected to them. The guardian court, on the other hand, refused to accept her application until she
provided the name and contact information of the child’s father. Her appeal was dismissed by the
Delhi High Court, which ruled that guardianship could not be awarded without notifying and
making the natural father a party to the case. She then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

Legal Issue: Whether it was imperative for an unwed mother to specifically notify the putative
father of the child of an application to become the legal guardian of the child.

Judgement: The Supreme Court, in a progressive decision, has permitted an unmarried mother to
file for guardianship of her child without having to submit a mandatory notice to the child’s father,
who had no ties with the child after its birth. The father’s name may not be made public and is not
required for acquiring the child’s birth certificate, passport, or for school purposes, according to the
court.