ARCHETYPES &

ARCHITECTURE
Through the Eyes of
Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz

Paolo Barış
Scrivano Kavraroğlu
Archetypes & Architecture
Through the Eyes of Aldo Rossi &
Christian Norberg-Schulz

A dissertation submitted to the Politecnico di Milano, Milan for the degree of Laurea Ma-
gistrale (Master of Science).

Presented by
Barış Kavraroğlu
Architect, Mimar Sinan University of Fine Arts, Istanbul, Turkey
born in Tarsus, Turkey
July 27, 1994

Supervised by
Prof. Dr. Paolo Scrivano

Milan
2023
Cogito,
ergo sum.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The following dissertation has been developed within Architecture
and Urban Design master program, at Politecnico di Milano in Milan
between 2022 and 2023.
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Paolo Scrivano, who
had been a supportive and patient supervisor. Thanks to his kind, re-
spectful and understanding attitude, I’ve found the opportunity to ex-
press my intentions and ideas freely and comfortably.
A special thanks to my friends, specifically Dipon Bose, Zeki Eneshan
Kavaklı and Nijat Mahamaliyev, who critically went throught the writ-
ings at different stages of the process and assisted me to clarify the
main points of the dissertation.
Finally, I would like to thank my family, my father Hakan Kavraroğlu,
my mother Semiha Kavraroğlu, and my brother and colleague Burak
Kavraroğlu, for their unconditional support.

I
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the understanding of the
concept of Archetype in the field of architectural theory. Even though the
use of the term type by architectural theorists is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, which can be traced back to Plato, the idea of Archetype,
as opposed to the explicit use of this term by theorists, has pervaded
much of architectural theory ever since Vitruvius. In fact, many theorists
have been concerned with issues that convey a notion of Archetype,
like the origins of architectural form, the systematization of architectural
knowledge, and the understanding of the process of creativity.
The fundamental premise of this work is that in order to comprehend
the true significance of the concept of Archetype in architecture, it is
necessary to get past some long-held misconceptions that link Arche-
type to the works of particular authors at a certain time. The concept
of the archetype is fundamentally nebulous and challenging to pre-
cisely define, as Quatremère de Quincy notes, “Everything is precise
and given in the model; everything is more or less vague in the type.”
Due to the vagueness of the concept, only a comparative study of the
most relevant ideas formulated in the field of architectural theory can
reveal the essential understanding, or understandings, of Archetype.
This work attempts to provide such a comparative study.
In this regard, our starting point was a comparative study of the writ-
ings of several architectural theorists. By comparing and contrasting
the ideas of these authors, a reference framework for “archetypes”
was developed with the intention of identifying specific informational
patterns. Aldo Rossi and Christian Norberg-Schulz were the two au-
thors whose works we chose to research for this project.
This research’s other goal was to investigate the connection between
the concept of Archetype and the historical development of archi-
tectural form. This work aims to demonstrate how the evolution of ar-
chitectural form and the various understandings that Archetype has
taken on throughout history are inextricably linked. Because of this,
this work is both an investigation into the nature of architectural form
while also serving as a study of the concept of Archetype.

III
CONTENT
01 INTRODUCTION 000
02 ARCHETYPES 008
Archetypes in Architecture 014
03 TWO AUTHORS 038
Biography of Aldo Rossi 040
Biography of Christian Norberg-Schulz 043
Understanding Aldo Rossi 046
Understanding Christian Norberg-Schulz 072
04 RESEMBLANCE & DIVERGENCE 116
Psychology & Phenomenology 124
Meaning: Image, Memory, Locus 134
Physical Elements and Types 158
Living and Rituals 174
05 CONCLUSION 186
V
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Italian honeybee (Apis mellifera Ligustica) comb cell at (a) ‘birth’, and at (b) 2-days old, scale
bar is 2 mm.
Figure 1.2: Alpine Vernacular Architecture.
Figure 1.3: Diagram of Process of Formation of Archetype

Figure 2.1: A Photograph of Carl Gustav Jung.

Figure 2.2: The Fresco of “The School of Athens” by Italian Renaissance artist Raphael, 1509-1511. Pla-
to(left) and Aristotle(right) are in the center of the painting creating the symmetry to underline the duality in
the intellectual world.
Figure 2.3: A diagram of Carl Jung’s model of psyche.
Figure 2.4: Jung’s diagram of the psyche for one of his private seminars given in English in 1925 for the
Psychological Club Zurich.
Figure 2.5: Classification of Grammars, Noam Chomsky.
Figure 2.6: Frontispiece of Marc-Antoine Laugier: Essai sur l’architecture 2nd ed. 1755 by Charles Eisen
(1720–1778). Allegorical engraving of the Vitruvian primitive hut.
Figure 2.7: Archetypical modes of organization: centrality, axiality and network, Norberg-Schulz, Exis-
tence; Space & Architecture.
Figure 2.8: The Architecture Volume of “Encyclopédie méthodique” and “Dictionnaire historique d’archi-
tecture” by Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de Quincy.
Figure 2.9: The drawing of “Ensembles D’Edifices” by Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand.
Figure 2.10: Caribbean Hut (The Great Exhibition), Gottfried Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture, 1851
Figure 2.11: Drawings of “Primitive Hut”.
Figure 2.12: The square archetypes based on Zucker: a) the closed squore, b) the nuceor squore, c) the
dominoted square and d) the grouped square. In addition, there is the amorphous square (not shown),
Paul Zucker, Town and Square.
Figure 2.13: Volumetric archetypes, project for a school, Leon Krier.
Figure 2.14: Volumetric archetypes volumes, Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture.
Figure 2.15: The Site plan of the Cemetery of San Cataldo, Modena, Italy, Aldo Rossi.
Figure 2.16: Roosevelt Island Housing Competition, Oswald Mathias Ungers.
Figure 2.17: , Worm’s eye axonometric of Museum in Merida, Rafael Moneo, Hand drawn by Stan Allen,1984.

Figure 3.1: “The Temple of Juno at Agrigentum”, Caspar David Friedrich, 1830. From the article “Heideg-
ger’s Thinking on Architecture”, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 3.2: The Collage of Analogous City, Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.3: Drawings of “Teatro del Mundo”, Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.4: Drawings of Monument to the Resistance, Cuneo, Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.5: School-Cemetery [montage] Left: Fagnano Olona School, Right San Cataldo Cemetery, Both
drawings by Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.6: Façade and Plan Drawings of “Colonnades de la Place Louis XV”, Paris, Quatremère de Quincy

VII
Figure 3.7: Doric Order, “Principi di architettura civile”, Francesco Milizia.
Figure 3.8: A Drawing of Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.9: Untitled Architectural Drawing, Aldo Rossi.
Figure 3.10: Application of écorché to architectural drawings, examples from the Dictionnaire, Vio-
llet-le-Duc,1875.
Figure 3.11: A Child’s Grave, Hale County, Alabama, 1936, Photo by Walker Evans.
Figure 3.12: Diagrams of “Space cells. Closure, guiding walls”, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 3.13: Bruder Klaus Field Chapel, Peter Zumthor.
Figure 3.14: The difference between vertical and horiztonal dimension can be observed on a Renais-
sance façade. Palazzo Medici Riccardi, Michelozzo di Bartolomeo, 1396-1472.
Figure 3.15: An example given by Norberg-Schulz, Palomba Sabina, Lazio.
Figure 3.16: Ancient Greek Temple at Paestum, Mahaffy John Pentland,1890.
Figure 3.17: The Roman division in quarters, The Concept of Dwelling, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 3.18: A photo of Casa Baldi, Paolo Portoghesi.
Figure 3.19: A photo of “Les Espaces d’Abraxas”, Ricardo Bofill.
Figure 3.20: Engravings, “In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?”, Heinrich Hübsch.
Figure 3.21: Drawings of Ancient Egyptian Architecture, “De l’architecture égyptienne”, Quatremère de Quincy.
Figure 3.22: Drawing of Ancient Greek Homes, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand,1800.
Figure 3.23: Ancient Roman House, Georg Rehlender, 1894.
Figure 3.24: A photo of Ronchamp chapel, Le Corbusier.
Figure 3.25: Drawings of Trenton Bathhouse, Louis I. Kahn.
Figure 3.26: Plans of “Unité d’Habitation”, Marseille, France, Le Corbusier.
Figure 3.27: Models of sign and symbols, Charles Jencks.
Figure 3.28: Sections (Area I, A–C, 11–7) of the Great Naquane rock. This shows a number of houses
raised on pile foundations (nos. 175, 207, 255) as well as the great maze (no. 270), The Idea of a Town,
Joseph Rykwert.
Figure 3.29: A Diagram of Heidegger’s Concept of Dwelling.
Figure 3.30: Longitudinal section of the old basilica, Rome, Il Tempio Vaticano, Carlo Fontana, 1694.
Figure 3.31: “İki”, Bursa, Turkey, Yıldız Moran, 1955.

Figure 4.1: Drawing of San Cataldo Cemetery, Aldo Rossi.

Figure 4.2: Diagrams of Space, Intentions in Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.3: Diagram of Resemblences & Divergences of Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.4: The Map of Psyche, Carl Gustav Jung.
Figure 4.5: Principles of Gestalt Psychology.
Figure 4.6: Aerial photo of Göbeklitepe, oldest permanent human settlements, Şanlı Urfa, Turkey.
Figure 4.7: Interference leads to what Egon Brunswik has called ‘intermediary objects’. The phenomena
perceived are intermediary objects, while science aims at the abstraction of ‘pure’ objects. Christian
Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.8: Diagram of “The Theory of Evolution”, Charles Jencks.
Figure 4.9: A Manifest Drawing and Writing on “The Room”, Louis I. Kahn.
Figure 4.10: Urban Scene: Scena Per il Teatrino, Aldo Rossi, 1978. Magic marker and paint on board,
730 × 1073 mm.
Figure 4.11: A Drawing of a Building Block from IBA 84, Aldo Rossi. Watercolor and ink on paper, 36.6
x 50.5 cm.

VIII
Figure 4.12: Life in a Norwegian, “tun” at the end of the nineteenth century, The Concept of Dwelling,
Christian Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.13: The Duck and the Decorated Shed Diagrams, Robert Venturi.
Figure 4.14: The Egyptian grid towns.
Figure 4.15: “On the way to figurative architecture”, Michael Graves. From The Concept of Dwelling,
Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.16: A View of Walton Bridge, Canaletto, 1753–1755
Figure 4.17: Therme Vals, Peter Zumthor, Photo by Fernando Guerra.
Figure 4.18: Ayub National Hospital, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Louis I. Kahn, 1962. Photo by Cemal Emden.
Figure 4.19: The simplest model of man’s existential space, Existence, Space and Architecture, Christian
Norberg-Schulz.
Figure 4.20: Aphrodisias, Ara Güler, 1958.
Figure 4.21: Monument to Sandro Pertini, Milan, Aldo Rossi, 1988-90.
Figure 4.22: Stonehenge, Wiltshire, England.
Figure 4.23: In Morning on the River, Jonas Lie,1911-12.
Figure 4.24: The Repetitive images of the German Tudor facades.
Figure 4.25: “The Ideal City”, Fra Carnevale, 1480–1484.
Figure 4.26: Ancient Greek Orders.
Figure 4.27: ”Road to Power” , Serge Najjar, 2011.
Figure 4.28: Sukhala Houses, Gurunsi Villages, Tiebele, Burkina Faso.
Figure 4.29: “A possible beginning for contacts at other levels”, From “Life Between Buildings”, Jan Gehl.
Figure 4.30: House on an island, Ellidaey, Iceland.
Figure 4.31: “Tour de France”, Robert Capa, 1939.
Figure 4.32: Nebelivka Hypothesis, David Wengrow, 18th International Architecture Exhibition of the
Biennale di Venezia.

Figure 5.1: Drawings of Gallaratese Housing Complex, Aldo Rossi.

Figure 5.2: A Drawing of Ancient Roman City.
Figure 5.3: “The Tower of Babel”, Pieter Bruegel, 1563.
Figure 5.4: “The Persistence of Memory”, Salvador Dali, 1931.

IX
INTRODUCTION

“The creation of architecture is not

an end in itself, but a means.”
Louis I. Kahn
Throughout the history of humankind, sheltering has taken an essential
place in the context of survival and living. Architecture responds to
this need for shelter in various shapes and forms in different frames of
time. Among these numerous forms, certain forms and certain shapes
reoccur at various times and in various places. This gives us a sense
that there may be a fundamental “grammar” in the way we build. We
can call the fragments of this grammar “archetypes”. Understanding
this kind of grammar of architecture can be helpful in our journey in
architecture. It can assist us as a reference point to solve problems of
the present and even the future. Thus, understanding what an “arche-
type” is and how it comes into being are quite important questions.

The 18th-century was a transformative period in the history of archi-

tecture, influenced by various historical events and cultural shifts.
The Enlightenment, an intellectual and philosophical movement that
reached its peak during the 18th-century, encouraged a rational and
scientific approach to knowledge. Meanwhile, advancements in
technology and the rise of the Industrial Revolution, starting around
the mid-18th-century, brought about new materials and construction
techniques, reshaping the built environment. The Industrial Revolution
led to increased standardization and mass production, with the de-
velopment of standardized components and prefabricated elements.
This standardization not only facilitated efficient construction process-
es but also changed the way of thinking in architecture and led to the
studies of the classification and categorization of architectural types.
Architects and theorists sought to establish typological studies as a
means to understand and systematize the standardized elements of
architecture, aiming for both functional and aesthetic coherence. In
1753, the publication of “Essai sur l’Architecture” by Marc-Antoine
Laugier proposed a simplified architectural language based on nat-
ural forms, contributing to the emergence of typological studies. His
studies were developed and systematized by Quatremère de Quin-
cy and Durand. These historical contexts, combined with the need
for standardization, propelled the studies on “type” and “typology”
in architecture, establishing a foundation for architectural theory and
practice that would endure in the centuries to come.

Quatremère de Quincy says “Everything is precise and given in the

model; everything is more or less vague in the type.”. This notion of

1
vagueness makes it quite hard to define what an “archetype” is. There
are various studies to achieve such a definition. However, it almost
always ends up with a subjective or arguable conclusion. Needless
to say, although the conclusions are arguable, these studies help us
to get closer to an answer. They pave the way for future research to
better understand the concept of “archetypes” and their relation with
architecture. Thus, a comparative approach to these studies can give
us an idea about different understandings of this vague concept.

Undoubtedly, there are many aspects of archetypes we can examine

to understand. The concept of “archetype” touches many fundamen-
tal notions of architecture. However, for a deeper understanding of
the concept, examining the major relations that lead to the formation
of an “archetype” can be one of the fundamental requirements.

In this respect, I believe there is an important nuance I would like to

underline in order to give a clear framework for this study. This no-
tion emerged in the process of my previous research “Archetypes and
Timelessness in Architecture: A Reading over Aldo Rossi and Louis I.
Kahn”. In the process of this study, my advisor came up with a ques-
tion: “Are archetypes a priori?”. This question leads me to do a thought
experiment. I started to think of an example of the possible process
of formation of a common archetypal form: a gable roof. As we all
know, the archetypal form of “house” always comes with a gable
roof. If we consider an alternative timeline of the civilization in which
the problem of the waterproofing cover of the buildings was solved or
never occurred, would “gable roof” still be an archetypal form?

For now, we do not answer this question and investigate another

case. We can take another example with different conditions and
features into consideration. In this case, I believe a common example
from nature can be bees and beehives. As we all know, the most
common image of bees is related to the hexagonally shaped hon-
eycombs. In a way, we can consider this hexagonal pattern as an
archetypal form of bees. As an image, this hexagonal pattern goes
beyond the existence of bees and turns into a symbolic marker with
the values which we associate with bees, such as order, collective-
ness, and integrity. In the context of the reasoning of occurrence be-
hind such a structure, we can estimate possible reasons. The shape
may be serving a functional purpose. “Efficient use of space” can be
one of the first concepts that comes to mind. “Using less wax” can be
another. However, these do not help us to understand the process of
production of such complex structures with precise geometry. A com-
mon thought about this process is that it is a built-in knowledge that
bees have biologically. However, recent studies show that this is not

2
 exactly the case. A study on “Honeybee Combs” in 2013 showed
that actually bees form “circular” cells at first, but in a short time, they
turn into “rounded hexagonal” shapes due to the flow of melting wax.
The excess wax melts due to the body heat of honeybees and the rest
of the wax naturally forms a structurally optimized form in the context
of mechanical integrity.1 Thus, the information we previously related
to the “creative act” of the honeybee turned out to be a combination
of “creative act” and “physical conditions”.

Now, we can analyze the situation here for a better understanding.

Firstly, there is the “creating subject” which is in this case, the bee. “Cre-
ating subject” takes a “creative act” in order to respond to a need or
function. In this act, there is an operational and organizational opti-
mization to a certain degree, due to the repetitive production of the
“form” through time and space. We can consider this optimization as
a biological heritage of evolutionary processes in the case of bees.
However, such optimization can occur with the help of alternative
Figure 1.1: Italian honeybee (Apis mellif- ways, such as cultural heritage. “Creative act” creates the “form” that
era Ligustica) comb cell at (a) ‘birth’, and emerges as the application of an idea that is not tested by recent con-
at (b) 2-days old, scale bar is 2 mm.
ditions. Thus, as a next step, the “form” faces the “physical conditions”
and gets tested. In the case of failure, it needs an upgrade which can
be part of the “act” for future generations. This way, the “form” goes
through another process of optimization and turns into the final form.
According to the dissertation of Leandro Madrazo, this notion have
been mentioned by Quatremère as well:

“Quatremère was well aware that there were styles in archi-

tecture that did not evolve from the Greco-Roman model, like
Egyptian or Chinese. He considered though that every style
began with a first model whose form had been the result of
necessity (besoin), meaning that the form of those models had
been determined by the conditions of the place, like climate,
productions of the country, and the lifestyle of the inhabitants.”2

However, to be able to become an “archetype”, it also should be

perceived by another subject. In this case, it is humans. Humans as
the “deriving subject” give the honeycomb a “meaning” through its
“image”. Now, the shape of the hexagon is the “symbol” of order,
1. B. L. Karihaloo,K. Zhang & J. Wang, collectiveness, and integrity.
“Honeybee combs: how the circular cells
transform into rounded hexagons,” Jour-
nal of the Royal Society, Interface, 10: This analysis can assist us to better understand the previous example
20130299, (2013). as well. In this case, the situation is the relations are different, but the
elements are the same. Human as “creating subject” builds a shelter
2. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu- as a “creative act” for the need for an enclosure. This “act” can be
rich, 1995), 181. instinctive to a degree. The house as the “form” faces the “physical

3
Figure 1.2: Alpine Vernacular Architecture.

condition” of precipitation of rain and snow and gets tested. In the

case of failure, it needs an upgrade which can be part of the “act” for
future generations. At a certain point in time, the gable roof becomes
part of the house and solves the problem of precipitation. The “form”
gets optimized through this process of upgrade. The information is
transferred through the culture and the physical markers of the past.
After a while, with the practice of numerous generations, the form of
a gable roof turns into an archetypal form. As an “image”, this roof
form goes beyond the existence of necessities and turns into a sym-
bolic marker with the values which we associate with “house”, such
as ease, comfort, safety, and belonging.

Obviously, the generational transfer of information plays a crucial

role in the formation of archetypes. There are two important notions
in this respect. One of which is the acceptance of the form. This notion
can be related to the fulfillment of necessity. In the book “Necessity
of Artifice”, Joseph Rykwert points out this notion with these words:

“An individual may clear or mark out a path in a wilderness: but

3. Joseph Rykwert, The Necessity of Ar-
unless he is followed by others, his path never becomes a road or tifice: Ideas in Architecture, (London:
street, because the road and the street are social institutions and it Academy Editions, 1982), 105.

4
 Physical Conditions

Creating Creative Act Derivative Act Deriving

Form
Subject Subject

Necessity & Essential Act Meaning

Utility Image
Place
Figure 1.3: Diagram of Process of Formation of Archetype

is their acceptance by the community which gives them the name

and the function with which I am here concerned.”3

Here, we can observe that Rykwert underlines the necessity of ac-

ceptance of the form. Without this kind of acceptance, the form never
turns out to be an “archetype”.

The other important notion is the generational transformation of the

form. As the information of “archetype” gets transferred from gen-
eration to generation, it gets reduced to its essential features. In the
article “On the Typology of Architecture”, Giulio C. Argan mentions
this notion with these words:

“The “type” therefore, is formed through a process of reduc-

ing a complex of formal variants to a common root form.”4

4. Giulio C. Argan, “On the Typology of Here, we can observe Argan underlines the reduction of the form from
Architecture,” translated by J. Rykwert, in a “complex of formal variants” to a “common root form”. This process
Theorizing a New Agenda for Architec- of reduction is directly related to the cognitive abilities of the “perceiv-
ture: An Anthology of Architectural Theo-
ry, ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton ing subject”. Thus, the transformation of the information of “archetypes”
Architectural Press, 1996), 246. is deeply connected to the cognitive processes of human beings.

5
These examples show that there are various aspects of the formation
of archetypes. As we observed in them, the “creative act” and “phys-
ical conditions” are the major elements that shape the archetype.
However, there is another element that should be taken into consid-
eration. This is the “essential act” that leads the subject to a necessity
to take a “creative act” in the first place. “Essential acts” are the rituals
of living in a space that creates the necessity to build. It is the main el-
ement that needs enclosure from the negative “physical conditions”.
On one hand, “essential acts” are related to “creative acts” in the
context of the formation of the “form”. On the other hand, “deriving
subject” mainly builds the “image” of the “form” based on “essential
acts”. Rossi calls these acts “human events”. Norberg-Schulz calls
these acts “human actions”. Kahn calls the space which is specified
for these acts “served spaces”. Semper calls the element that gathers
these acts the “hearth”. These are the acts that create the necessity
to build. Thus, they play an essential role in the formation of “arche-
types”. In this research, we will examine the relation between archi-
tecture, archetypes, and essential acts.

In order to achieve this, we started by determining a suitable method-

ology. As we mentioned before, the vagueness of the “archetypes”
leads us to a comparative approach. In this respect, a comparative
work among the writings of different architectural theorists was our
starting point. The aim was to create a reference framework about
“archetypes” through similarities and differences among the thoughts
of these authors and deduce certain patterns of information from this
framework. For this purpose, we decided to study the writings of three
authors: Aldo Rossi, Christian Norberg-Schulz, and Joseph Rykwert.
However, after a fair amount of reading, although Rossi’s and Nor-
berg-Schulz’s writings were manifesting their ideas over similar issues,
Rykwert’s writings did not coincide with the other two authors in the
context of a comparative study. Thus, we decided to continue our
study with Rossi and Norberg-Schulz. However, we will certainly
benefit from these readings of Rykwert in various points of study.

After this introduction, we can try to understand the deeper levels of

the concepts. This research especially aims to understand archetypes
in the context of architecture. This is not a simple task to achieve due to
the vagueness of the concept. Thus, to be able to dive into this subject
we need to understand other aspects of this research. First of all, we
need to understand the relation between architecture and archetypes.
This way, we can acknowledge in what range the archetypes exist.
Therefore, we can better understand the function, structure, and mean-
ing of the archetypes inhere. After that, we need to gain knowledge
about the importance of three main acts of its formation -creative act,

6
derivative act, and essential act- in architecture. It is an important part
of this research to understand how the rituals shaped the architecture
we know today. Also, another important part is to understand the role
of “physical conditions” in the existence of archetypes.

Archetypes can be understood in various aspects which is not prefer-

able in a certain manner from one to another. Since it is an abstract
concept that is deeply related to the experiences of the individuals
and collective subconscious, it is also hard to talk about this topic
with tangible examples on a concrete plane.

In light of these conclusions, we need to determine a method that

should be suitable for our purposes mentioned here. In this case, we
decided to work with a parallel reading and comparison.

7
ARCHETYPES

“You’ll understand when you’ve forgotten

what you understood before.”
Italo Calvino
 Archetypes take an important place in architecture. They are the main
pathways of how we design and build in a timeless manner. Undoubt-
edly, having a better understanding of archetypes can serve as a way
to understand how humanity creates space that responds to various
aspects of its existence. Thus, although its vague nature, it is a necessary
approach to study and have a better understanding of archetypes.
However, archetypes have much deeper roots in the history of human-
kind beyond the boundaries of architecture. To be able to have a bet-
ter understanding of archetypes, it is necessary to examine these roots.

Archetypes can be considered universal patterns or themes that are

present in the collective unconscious of human beings. These pat-
terns can manifest in literature, art, architecture, and mythology, and
are believed to shape human behavior and understanding. They are
often represented by characters, symbols, or motifs that are recogniz-
able across cultures and time periods. Norwegian Architect Thomas
Thiis-Evensen explains the concept with these words: “… behind the
plurality of the many forms in history lies a simple set of archetypes
which we can call the grammar of architecture.”.5

As we mentioned before, it is quite hard to precisely define the term

“archetype”. However, going through the etymological roots of the
word can give us a starting point. According to the Britannica dic-
tionary, the word “archetype” means “a primordial image, charac-
ter, or pattern of circumstances that recurs throughout literature and
thought consistently enough to be considered a universal concept
5. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in or situation”.6 It is also mentioned that the word originates from the
Architecture, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: Ancient Greek word “archetypos”. According to Online Etymology
Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17.
Dictionary, the Ancient Greek word “archetypos” means “first-mould-
6. “archetype,” Britannica, Accessed ed”.7 It is also mentioned in Oxford English Dictionary that the word
June 10, 2023, https://www.britannica. “archetype” originates from the Ancient Greek word “archetypos”
com/topic/archetype.
which is a combination of two words. One of which is “arkhē” which
7. “Etymology of archetype,” Online Et- means “beginning, first”.8 The word “arkhē” can be related to the
ymology Dictionary, Accessed June 10, verbal noun “árkhō” which means “to begin, to lead, rule”. The other
2023, https://www.etymonline.com/
word/archetype. word is the word “typos” which means “blow, pressing; sort, type”.
As you can presume, this is also the word which the English word
8. “archetype, n.”, OED Online, Ox- “type” originate from. Thus, the word “archetype” is directly related to
ford University Press, Accessed June 10,
2023, https://www.oed.com/view/ the word “type”. It is also obvious that on all of the various roots, the
Entry/10344. word refers to the notion of primordiality.

9
Figure 2.1: A Photograph of Carl Gustav Jung.

The word “archetype” was adopted by Swiss psychologist and

founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung, and for the first
time, used in its modern meaning in psychology. Jung’s concept of
archetypes was influenced by the theories of Immanuel Kant, Plato,
and Arthur Schopenhauer. The influence of Plato can be directly ob-
served in Jung’s writings. In the book “Four Archetypes”, Jung directly
mentions the relation between his concept of “archetype” and Plato’s
concept of “Idea” with these words:

“‘Archetype,’ far from being a modern term, was already in

use before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous
with ‘Idea’ in the Platonic usage.”9

Here, we can observe that Jung considers the term “archetype” as

synonymous with Plato’s “idea”. Therefore, we can take a deeper look
into Plato’s “idea” for a better understanding of Jung’s “archetype”.

As Jung said, what Plato meant by the concept of “idea” is quite close
to the modern term “archetype”. In his famous allegory of the cave,
9. Carl G. Jung, Four Archetypes, trans.
Plato pointed out that the physical world we perceive is a shadow or R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003),
imitation of the true reality. He names these two different sides of exis- 7-8.

10
Figure 2.2: The Fresco of “The School of
Athens” by Italian Renaissance artist Ra-
phael, 1509-1511. Plato(left) and Aristo-
tle(right) are in the center of the painting tence as the world of Forms which is the domain of imitations and the
creating the symmetry to underline the
duality in the intellectual world.
world of Ideas which is the domain of reality. In the article, British his-
torian of philosophy David Sedley explains this notion in this passage:

“Consequently, Plato is often and I think correctly credited

with a ‘two world’ thesis. There are two worlds: the intelligi-
ble world, populated by Forms, and the sensible world, pop-
ulated by sensible particulars. Inquiry about Forms is pure
intellectual inquiry, which must minimize or eliminate the use
of the senses. And since knowledge is in its nature perma-
nently true and not subject to revision, the unchanging world
of Forms constitutes a suitable object for knowledge. By con-
trast, the familiar world of sensible particulars is suitable only
for opinion: opinion, being in its very nature capable of fluc-
tuating between true and false, is the appropriate mode of
cognition for inherently unstable objects.”10

As we can observe here, for Plato, Forms are fundamentally various

imperfect reflections of Ideas. In Plato’s understanding, Ideas are un-
10. David Sedley, “An Introduction to Pla-
to’s Theory of Forms,” Royal Institute of Phi- changeable, eternal, intelligible, divine causes of being.11
losophy Supplements 78 (2016): 3–22.

11
Figure 2.3: A diagram of Carl Jung’s model of psyche.

Figure 2.4: Jung’s diagram of the psyche for one of his private seminars given in English in 1925 for the Psychological Club Zurich.

12
 Although Jung directly relates the term “archetype” to Plato’s “Idea”,
his interpretation of the subject is quite different. First and foremost,
Jung considers “archetypes” not as unchangeable and eternal be-
ings, but as derived beings. He explains this point in this passage:

“Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the

nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and
the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change
was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree
caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of
which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time
the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary
and derived.”12

Here, we can see that Jung considers “archetype” as not a priori,

but as secondary and derived. This fundamental difference opens the
possibility of an extensive understanding of “archetype”. Therefore,
Jung can consider the formation of an “archetype” as a result of pro-
gressive progress. Jung also states that “archetypes” are fundamental-
ly related to the unconscious rather than the conscious in this passage:

“The archetype is essentially an unconscious content that is

altered by becoming conscious and by being perceived,
and it takes its colour from the individual consciousness in
which it happens to appear.”13

Here, we can directly observe that Jung considers “archetype” as

an element of unconsciousness rather than consciousness. Jung also
states that “archetypes” are an element of the human psyche rather
than physical facts with these words:

“The archetype does not proceed from physical facts, but de-
scribes how the psyche experiences the physical fact, and in so
11. Plato, “78B–80C: Third Argument. The doing the psyche often behaves so autocratically that it denies
Kinship of Souls and Forms,” Chapter, In
Plato: Phaedo, edited by R. Hackforth, tangible reality or makes statements that fly in the face of it.”14
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1972), 81–86. As we can observe here, Jung considers “archetypes” as an experi-
12. Carl G. Jung, Four Archetypes, trans. ence of reality rather than reality itself. Thus, the existence of “arche-
R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8. type” deeply relates to our cognitive abilities.
13. Ibid, 4.
Influenced by Jung’s work on the human psyche, American psycho-
14. Gerhard Adler, R. F. C. Hull, Barbara linguist Noam Chomsky creates the concept of “deep structure” and
Forryan, and Janet M. Glover, eds. Col- “surface structure” to differentiate this new concept from grammar.
lected Works of C.G. Jung, Volume 20:
General Index, (Princeton: Princeton Uni- He introduces these concepts with these words:
versity Press, 1979), 151.

13
 “Consequently, the syntactic component of a grammar must
specify, for each sentence, a deep structure that determines
its semantic interpretation and a surface structure- that deter-
mines its phonetic interpretation.”15

To Chomsky, all languages share a deeper system of information that

goes beyond their grammar rules. He calls this shared structure “uni- Figure 2.5: Classification of Grammars,
versal grammar”. Chomsky explains this notion of “universal gram- Noam Chomsky.
mar” in detail in this passage:

“Within traditional linguistic theory, furthermore, it was clearly

understood that one of the qualities that all languages have
in common is their “creative” aspect. Thus an essential prop-
erty of language is that it provides the means for expressing
indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately
in an indefinite range of new situations (for references, cf.
Chomsky, 1964, forthcoming). The grammar of a particular
language, then, is to be supplemented by a universal gram-
mar that accommodates the creative aspect of language
use and expresses the deep-seated regularities which, being
universal, are omitted from the grammar itself. Therefore it is
quite proper for a grammar to discuss only exceptions and
irregularities in any detail. It is only when supplemented by a
universal grammar that the grammar of a language provides
a full account of the speaker-hearer’s competence.”16

Here, we can observe Chomsky pointing out the relation between

“grammar” and “universal grammar”. To him, “grammar” discusses only
“exceptions and irregularities”. On the other hand, “universal grammar”
provides the fundamental reference system. In this manner, the bilateral
relation between Chomsky’s “grammar” and “universal grammar” can
be associated with the relation between “type” and “archetype”.

In conclusion, the term “archetype” has quite old roots in the history
of humankind. Nonetheless, the popularity and use of the term have
increased in the Modern era. It has been a part of various disciplines.
In the meanwhile, the complexity of the discourse about the term has
evolved as well as its popularity.

15. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the The-

ory of Syntax, 50th ed. (New York: The
MIT Press, 1965), 16.

16. Ibid, 6.

14
 ARCHETYPES IN ARCHITECTURE

The concept of “archetype” had a considerably deeper connection

with architecture, even though it was introduced later, due to the stud-
ies on “type” and “typology” since the 19th-century. Although “type”
is a different concept, since it is etymologically connected to “arche-
type”, it gives a deeper understanding of the concept. Thus, we can
start by examining the history of the progress of “type” for a better
understanding of “archetype”.

The word “type” appears in the stage of history when Johann Guten-
berg invented the modern printing press in 1445. According to Bri-
tannica, this version of the word means “small metal blocks that are
used for printing letters and numbers on paper”.17 In the dissertation
“The Reasoning of Architecture”, Sam Jacoby mentions this notion
with these words: “‘Type’, as Johann Gutenberg’s invention of the
modern printing press with movable types around 1445 demon-
strates, is a medium of non-imitative reproduction.”.18 Thus, the main
feature of the first meaning of the word consists of being “a medium
of non-imitative reproduction”. Jacoby also mentions the background
of the word “typology” in this passage:

“Similarly, “typology” first denoted in the study of scriptures

reasoning by analogy in order to interpret the Old Testament
as prefiguring the events and ideas of the New Testament:
typology was the symbolic correlating of meanings. The au-
thority and use of types by Jesus Christ implied ‘that we do
not fully understand reality unless we perceive it typological-
ly’. Until the eighteenth century, this religious meaning was
upheld, as Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alem-
bert’s entry of ‘Type’ in the Encyclopédie proves.”19

In this passage, we can understand that the word “typology” had

roots in the New Testament. The word “typology” had a religious
17. “Type”, Britannica, Accessed June 11, meaning until the 18th-century.
2023, https://www.britannica.com/dic-
tionary/type. The concept of “type” in architecture today, however, has a differ-
18. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi- ent meaning. According to Cambridge Dictionary, the word “type”
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University of means “the characteristics of a group of people or things that set
Berlin, 2013), 8. them apart from other people or things, or people, things, or groups
19. Ibid. that share particular characteristics”.20 On the other hand, today “ty-
pology” has a different meaning as well. Jacoby explains this with a
20. “type”, Cambridge Dictionary, Ac- quotation from Paul-Alan Johnson:
cessed June 11, 2023, https://dictionary.
cambridge.org/dictionary/english/
type. “‘Typology’ in turn denotes the study of types and the analysis

15
 of their characteristics. Paul-Alan Johnson states, ‘strictly, “typol-
ogy” is the knowledge (-logy, Greek logos) and study of types,
their succession and their meaning or symbolism, the systemics
of types, or the categorical overview of types. […] To say, for
example, that the temple is a “typology” if what is meant is that
it is one type of shrine, or to use “typological” as the adjectival
form instead of “typical” or “typal”, merely confuses.’. He distin-
guishes between type as the general (classifying) term and its
specific meanings as archetype, the original (ideational) pat-
tern for subsequent copies, prototype, the first (material) rep-
resentation of the archetype, and stereotype, the conventional
and continued reproduction of a (proto)type when it becomes
a norm, the average and typical model in use.”21

Here, we can understand that the new meaning of “typology” is the

“study of types”. In the meanwhile, through Johnson’s statement, Jacoby
also underlines the variety of new terminology in the area of “typology”.
Figure 2.6: Frontispiece of Marc-Antoine
Laugier: Essai sur l’architecture 2nd ed.
Before the words “type” and “typology” became a part of architec- 1755 by Charles Eisen (1720–1778).
tural terminology, there were several works and studies in this direc- Allegorical engraving of the Vitruvian
primitive hut.
tion, mostly in the 17th-century and 18th-century century French Archi-
tecture. One of the first studies in this direction belonged to French
theorist Roland Fréart de Chambray. Jacoby mentions his contribution
with these words:

“Roland Fréart de Chambray in his survey of the orders in

Parallèle de l’architecture antique avec la moderne of 1650
captures changing sentiments by denouncing Roman orders
as corrupt and declaring a return to three ‘authentic’ Greek
modes of building: Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian.”22

Here, Jacoby points out that the study of Fréart de Chambray intend-
ed a return to the “authentic” architecture of Greek. Later, Jacoby
mentions two other theorist in this manner:

“With both F. Blondel and Perrault as much scientist as archi-

tect, they see the idealistic notions of the classical doctrine at
odds with the rational empiricism prevalent in the sciences.”23

Jacoby underlines the fact that Blondel and Perrault, which were both
21. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
scientists and architects, were criticizing the classical understanding chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
of the architecture of the era as being unscientific. Jacoby mentions Of Berlin, 2013), 8.
Blondel’s stance in this passage:
22. Ibid, 34.

“Whereas Fréart de Chambray’s thesis largely depended on 23. Ibid, 34.

16
 studies of buildings, François Blondel (1618–1686), the first
professor of architecture in the first state-sponsored school
in France, the Académie Royale d’Architecture, but also a
mathematician and member of the Académie des Sciences,
is predominantly interested in theory. His arguments derive
from the study of texts, especially the Ten Books on Architec-
ture (De architectura, c. 25 BC) by Marcus Vitruvius Pollio,
which he, despite acknowledging a deflection by a Roman
taste, considers as truthful transmission of the Greek orders.”24
Figure 2.7: Archetypical modes of orga-
nization: centrality, axiality and network, For Jacoby, Blondel majorly shapes his stance around the texts of
Norberg-Schulz, Existence; Space & Vitrivius. On the other hand, Perrault takes another stance:
Architecture.
“In contrast to F. Blondel, Claude Perrault (1613–1688), hav-
ing translated Vitruvius’s Ten Books of Architecture into French
in 1673, is impelled to question the authority of the ancients.”25

As we can understand here, unlike Blondel, Perrault criticizes the

classical understanding of architecture. Through the criticism of the
authority of the ancients, Perrault creates a new path for architecture.
Jacoby mentions this notion in this passage:

“Perrault’s Ordonnance refutes the custom to alter propor-

tions for optical reasons as unscientific and without prece-
dent in antiquity. Encompassing a mathematical and con-
ceptual but also experiential and perceptual understanding
of proportion, his scientific distinction between conception
and perception lastingly destabilises classical authority, ar-
guing that an a priori and unconditional standard of beauty
is untenable, as beauty is only verifiable as an aesthetic form
of custom and convention.”26

As we can understand, Perrault refuses the unconditional standards of

antiquity and proposes a scientific and also perceptual approach to
the issue. Later, Jacoby mentions another aspect of the era.

“The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reforms brought

about by the French normative discourse, were motivated by
the desire to institute a national canon and problematised the
concept of history.”27
24. Ibid, 34.

25. Ibid, 35. On the other hand, Jacoby also mentions that “rationalization” and “stan-
dardization” creates new problems yet to resolve in the architecture:
26. Ibid, 36.

27. Ibid, 42. “Yet the deep ideological divides emerging with the eigh-

17
 teenth-century normative debate would remain unresolved
and caused a loss of disciplinary unity. By the early nine-
teenth century the quest for a cohesive French canon waned,
partly due to the impossibility of the ambition itself but also
increasingly displaced by the problems arising from techno-
logical rationalisation and stylistic standardization.”28

After the studies of Perrault, 18th-century French architect Julien-David

Le Roy was one of the important figures in the discourse. Le Roy sup-
ported the stance of Perrault in the context of criticism of the authority
of antiquity. Jacoby mentions Le Roy with these words:

“A decisive contributor to a historicist reassessment of Greek

antiquity and the first to substantiate that Vitruvius’s interpreta-
tions of the Greek orders were influenced by changing Ro-
man tastes, was Julien-David Le Roy (1724–1803). Having
visited Greece in winter 1754–55, Le Roy published The Ru-
ins of the Most Beautiful Monuments of Greece (Les Ruines
des plus beaux monuments de la Grèce) in 1758, the first in
a series of significant archaeological, antiquarian, and aes-
thetic studies of antiquity, especially focussed on Greece.”29

As we can see here, Le Roy takes a stance against the Vitruvian un-
derstanding of Greek antiquity. Therefore, he studies Greek antiquity
himself. Similarly to Perrault, Le Roy also mentions the perceptional
aspect of the architecture as well:

“Familiar with scientific studies confirming the human percep-

tion of spatial environments as conditioned by physiology but
ultimately a learned understanding, Le Roy argues that the
comprehension of architecture similarly depends on visual
and haptic perception—which changes with the movement
of an observer and is attributable to the reception of light in
relation to form, proportion, and detail—and on an acquired
knowledge of conventions through which perceived phenom-
ena are comprehended. Experience as a physiological and
cultural phenomenon, therefore, is a central argument of the
Histoire and Observations, and indebted to empiricist writings
of its time positing sensory stimulation as the primary means to
understanding, knowledge, and aesthetic judgement.”30
28. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
Here, we can understand that Le Roy values the perceptional and of Berlin, 2013), 42-43.
experiential aspects of architecture in the context of visual and haptic
29. Ibid, 43.
perception. Le Roy also studies the “temple” in a quite similar ap-
proach to a “typological study”: 30. Ibid, 46.

18
Figure 2.8: The Architecture Volume
of “Encyclopédie méthodique” and
“Dictionnaire historique d’architecture”
by Antoine Chrysostôme Quatremère de “Examining the historical changes of the temple, Le Roy in-
Quincy.
troduces once more an important diagrammatic plate. Or-
ganised by three columns, he compares the progressive
transformation of the Egyptian and Phoenician, Greek and
Roman, and Christian hut into temples with increasing scale,
complexity, and detail, accompanied by a text explaining
the relation of each example to its evolutionary and typolog-
ical predecessor. The graphical comparison is presented as
objective, ordered by typological and morphological differ-
ences or similarities as they occur relative to each other.”31

As we can understand here, the methodology of Le Roy coincides

with Durand’s approach which we will examine further in the follow-
ing parts of our chapter. However, the outcome of the study remains
the domain of visuals rather than an abstract principle. Le Roy also
mentions “primitive” ideas of architecture:

“The synchronised historical and theoretical-architectural en-

quiries represent to Le Roy the complementary psychological
and physiological facets of ‘primitive original ideas’. Histor-
31. Ibid, 49. ical conditions and context affect the formal and evolving

19
Figure 2.9: The drawing of “Ensembles D’Edifices” by Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand.

adaptation of architecture, with its transformation diagram-

matically representable by drawings that abstract and clarify
architecture’s changing internal and external relations. With
this, a common reasoning for a consistent aesthetic judge-
ment of architecture is given, one based on principled and
rational phenomena. At the same time, Le Roy insists on the
importance of a subjective experience of architecture, af-
fected by emotional and psychological sensations that ar-
chitecture arouses within a particular situation.”32

With these statements, Le Roy’s approach can be related to the Laug-

ier’s idea of “cabane”. In the dissertation “The Concept of Type in Ar-
chitecture”, Leandro Madrazo mentions this notion with this passage:

“In the culture of the eighteenth century, speculations on the

origins of human creations were commonplace. In the field of
architecture, the theories of Marc Antoine Laugier epitomize
this concern with origins. Laugier attributed to the cabane, or
primitive hut, the character of a fundamental principle of archi-
32. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
tecture. He endowed his cabane with a normative character: chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
it was the model after which new architecture should be cre- Of Berlin, 2013), 50-51.

20
 ated. But, apart from the question of the origins, Laugier’s the-
ory of the primitive hut participates in the preoccupation with
perception that dominated the thought of British empiricists in
the preceding century. From this point of view, the cabane can
be understood as the idea that the architect abstracts from the
realm of sensible forms. Laugier’s cabane is, in this regard, a
conceptual construct rather than a sensible one.”33

Madrazo also mentions Marc-Antoine Laugier‘s work was built as a

reaction to Baroque and Rococo with these words:

“Laugier’s theories were born as a reaction against the formal

excesses in the architecture of his time, exemplified in the Ba-
roque and Rococo. In order to correct those excesses, Laugier
found necessary to return to the origins to find the fundamental
principles of architecture, that is to say, the ‘primitive hut.’”34

Madrazo adds to the previous statement: “The primitive hut of Laugier

is the direct antecedent of the concept of Type later formulated by
Quatremere de Quincy.”.35 As we can observe here, this change
in the meaning starts with the dictionary entry dedicated to “Type”
by Antoine‐Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy (1755-1849) in his
Encyclopédie méthodique: Architecture (1825). With this entry, Qua-
tremère secularizes and formally introduces this term to architecture.36
Thus, we can understand, even in the first moments of its emergence,
the concept of “type” was deeply connected to the concept of “ar-
chetype” via an allegory of “primitive hut”. According to Madrazo,
Quatremère also mentions that “type” is formed around necessities
and physical conditions of the environment:

“Unlike Laugier, Quatremère admits that there cannot be only

one model from which all architecture is derived. Quatremère
was well aware that there were styles in architecture that did
not evolve from the Greco-Roman model, like Egyptian or
33. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu- Chinese. He considered though that every style began with
rich, 1995), 171. a first model whose form had been the result of necessity (be-
soin), meaning that the form of those models had been deter-
34. Ibid, 172.
mined by the conditions of the place, like climate, productions
35. Ibid. of the country, and the lifestyle of the inhabitants.”37
36. Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de
Quincy, ‘Type’, Encyclopédie méthodique: As we can observe here, Mandazo points out the role of necessities
Architecture, III, 543–45. and conditions of the place, like climate, production, and lifestyle.
Jacoby mentions this notion of Quatremère in this passage:
37. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu-
rich, 1995), 181. “Although De l’architecture égyptienne develops arguments of

21
 the Mémoire, it redefines the architecture by framing the con-
ditions of invention not as a historical inevitability of progress
but a social effort and achievement. This proclaims a social
thesis very different from the predominantly formal argument of
the Mémoire. De l’architecture égyptienne postulates that form
is essentially metaphysical and unspecific but possesses cultur-
al and social values, thus architecture is a social language.”38

Here, we can observe Jacoby underlines Quatremère’s concept of

“invention”, and he relates it to “cultural and social values”. Quatre-
mère also introduces the concept of “imitation” to the discourse of
“type”. Madrazo mentions this with these words:

“A fundamental premise of Quatremère theory is that ar-

chitecture is an imitative art. In the course of his writings, he
strove to demonstrate the validity of this theory by reformulat-
ing, paradoxically, Plato’s doctrine of imitation.”39

Later, using this notion of “imitation” and Plato’s philosophical base,

Quatremère introduces a similar binary conceptual system between
“type” and “model”:

“As an alternative to the dualism Idea-Image of the Platonic sys-

tem, Quatremere proposes his own pair of terms, type-mod-
ele. After establishing the existence of two objects of imitation,
one abstract, the type, the other sensible, the modele, Quatre-
mere is in the condition to assert that architecture is an imitative
art whose object of imitation is an abstract form, the type.”40

Later, a contemporary of Quatremère, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand

(1760–1834) worked on the concept of “type” and carried it a step
further. Jacoby mentions Durand’s work with these words:

“Contrary to Quatremère’s emphasis of architecture and

invention as expressions of socio-cultural form, Jean-Nico-
las-Louis Durand (1760–1834) understood invention in terms 38. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
of the formal arrangement of parts: as disposition.”41 chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
Of Berlin, 2013), 63.

As we can see here, Jacoby points out that the fundamental difference 39. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
between Quatremère and Durand is how they approach the notion of Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu-
rich, 1995), 201.
“invention”. In another article, Jacoby explains this notion with these words:
40. Ibid, 202.
“With history in the natural sciences defined as rational, as
41. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
directly linked to verifiable structural development, Durand chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
considered the effects of style and character on buildings Of Berlin, 2013), 63.

22
Figure 2.10: Caribbean Hut (The Great Exhibition), Gottfried Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture, 1851

as secondary and mere cultural phenomena. In their place,

structural relations and, implicitly, formal complexity became
a material verification of historical progress.”42

Here, Jacoby points out that Durand prioritizes the “structural rela-
tions” and “material verification of historical progress” over “style”
and “character”. Madrazo mentions this notion in this passage:

“Durand assumed that a generic principle could be abstract-

ed from the analytical study of past architectural works, and
that based on that principle, new works could be created.
This principle was the Type.

For Durand, type was a link between analysis and synthesis.

In this regard, Durand -but not Quatremère- is the most direct
42. Sam Jacoby, “Typal and typological precursor of architects like Aymonino or Rossi, for who Type
reasoning: a diagrammatic practice of
architecture”, The Journal of Architecture, was the link between scientific analysis and artistic synthesis.”43
20:6, 2015, 949.
After Quatremère and Durand, German architect Gottfried Semper
43. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu- was the one who took the theory of “type” a step further. Unlike Qua-
rich, 1995), 224. tremère and Durand, Semper was a practitioner as well as an ed-

23
Figure 2.11: Drawings of “Primitive Hut”.

ucator of architecture. Jacoby introduces Semper with these words:

“Semper recognised a problematic nature of design research

and was conscious that questions of history, theory, represen-
tation, and modalities of practice increasingly corresponded.
In his intellectual effort to define an ‘empirical theory’ of build-
ing that is practical and material, as well as symbolic and cul-
tural, he returned once again to the question of origins.”44

As we can understand here, Semper’s intention was to create an “empir-

ical theory” of architecture with practical, material, symbolic, and cultural
aspects. Semper is known for his book “The Four Elements of Architecture”
published in 1851, which mentions that the buildings consist of four ele-
ments in his work. These are “the hearth, the roof, the enclosure, and the
mound”. Madrazo mentions this theory of Semper with these words:

“The hearth (Herd), therefore, was the “erste und wichtigste,

das moralische Element der Baukunst”; and around it the oth-
er three elements were formed: the roof (Dach), the enclo-
44. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Ar-
sure (Umfriedung) and the mound or terrace (Erdaufwurf); chitecture” (PhD diss., Technical University
elements whose initial purpose was to protect the hearth.”45 Of Berlin, 2013), 140.

24
 Madrazo noted the translation of the German quotation: “lt is the
first and most important, the moral element of architecture.”. Thus, for
Semper, fundamentally the most important point of architecture is “the
hearth” which gathers the living around itself. The “hearth” is simply the
social aspect of architecture, its true connection to the human being. It
is the center of living, while other elements are surrounding the living
around the “hearth”. In this manner, “hearth” can be considered as an
essential element of architecture among others. Later, Madrazo sums
up the important notions of Semper’s work in this passage:

“The Separation of inner principle (e .g. abstract form or

type) from visual appearance (e.g. sensible form) was con-
summated in Semper’s theory. He contended that the funda-
mental principle did not have to resemble the architectural
forms that derive from it. Thus, he dismissed the idea of a prim-
itive form as a concrete model or image, suggested in Vitruvi-
us’ theory, and proposed instead four formless principles -the
four elements- as the primitive causes of architectural form.”46

Here, Madrazo underlines the important notion of how the search

for origins has changed its focus from visual examples, like Laugi-
er’s primitive hut, to abstract and formless principles with the work of
Semper. Undoubtedly, Quatremère and Durand have a massive role
in this change, but it is Semper’s work that we directly observe this
change clearly. Jacoby sums up this journey of “type” in this passage:

“Quatremère, Durand, and Semper’s theories are consistent

with the principles of transformative composition in rhetoric.
Quatremère’s theory of type articulates the first and indis-
pensable canon of ‘invention’ (inventio) by establishing a
systematic architectural theory of invention that defines the
disciplinary means and principles through which coherent
arguments are generated in practice. Durand’s method of
design in turn is based on the second canon of ‘arrange-
ment’ (dispositio or taxis), which follows once an argument
or idea is strategised by invention. Arrangement manages
the relative and iterative ordering of the part to the whole
45. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of and organizes arguments into an effective discourse stating,
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu- outlining, and providing proof for a given case or problem.
rich, 1995), 240. Finally, Semper’s doctrine relates to the canon of ‘style’ (elo-
46. Ibid, 266. cutio) by discussing the appropriate and effective modes to
express ideas. Whereas invention determines what is articu-
47. Sam Jacoby, “Typal and typological lated, style articulates how it is communicated.”47
reasoning: a diagrammatic practice of
architecture”, The Journal of Architecture,
20:6, 2015, 956. As we can understand here, the works of Quatremère, Durand, and

25
Semper create the basis of modern typology. In the nineteenth centu-
ry, the paradigm of typology shifts from a visual reference to an ab-
stract understanding of “type”. Madrazo mentions this in this passage:

“The most prominent theorists of the nineteenth century, like

Hübsch, Bötticher, Semper and Viollet-le-Duc, rejected the
previous theories of the origins of architectural forms, partic-
ularly the theory of the primitive constructions of Vitruvius. For
those writers, the visual similarity between the form of the hut
and the form of the Greek temple was not enough reason
to maintain that the last derived from the former. In that time,
the notion of form as a pair made up of ‘form’ plus ‘context’,
made popular by biology, became the prevalent ‘form par-
adigm’ in architectural theory as well.”48

Here, Madrazo points out this shift of theories about the origins of archi-
tectural forms, from the visual similarity, like “primitive hut” and “Greek tem-
ple”, to a contextual approach. In this respect, the works of Viollet-le-Duc
are worth mentioning. Madrazo refers his works with these words:

“This attempt to ‘rationalize’ the processes by which architectural

form comes to being is a distinctive mark of the theory of the nine-
teenth century, particularly, of the theories of Viollet-le-Duc.”49

Here, we can understand that the studies of Viollet-le-Duc intend to “ra-

tionalize” the processes of architecture. Madrazo underlines the similarity
of approaches between Semper and Viollet-le-Duc in this passage:

“The theories of Semper and Viollet-le-Duc can be seen as

an attempt to provide an abstract model of the process by
which architectural form comes to being. In the case of Sem-
per, this abstract model or ‘system’ is based on the combi-
nations of the four elements. For Viollet-le-Duc, the system is
based on the relation form function, according to which a
form would be the direct response to functional demands.”50

Even though the words “type” and “typology” existed in architectur-

al literature, the word “archetype” is used in a systematical manner
within architectural theory for the first time by German architect Paul
Zucker in the book “Town and Square” (1959). Thiis-Evensen, in his
48. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
book “Archetypes in Architecture”, mentions about him, “On the basis Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu-
of a description of five square archetypes, he uses specific examples rich, 1995), 227.
to show how history chooses that form which is appropriate and how
49. Ibid, 228.
these typologies, owing to dissimilar functional characteristics, vary
from antiquity up to present day.”.51 50. Ibid, 265.

26
Figure 2.12: The square archetypes
based on Zucker: a) the closed squore,
b) the nuceor squore, c) the dominoted
square and d) the grouped square. In Although Zucker was the first one to mention the “archetype” in archi-
addition, there is the amorphous square
(not shown), Paul Zucker, Town and
tecture, the theory and the discourse expanded among Italian theo-
Square. rists in the 1960s. A typological debate has started and it expanded
the hinterland of typology in architecture. Jacoby mentions this notion
in this passage:

“The typological debate in the 1960s was provoked by a

questioning of the Modernist functionalist doctrine and a re-
turn to a historical understanding of the city by Ernesto Na-
than Rogers, Saverio Muratori, and Giulio Carlo Argan in
Italy. Although arguably only shifting the balance between
functionalism and typology, with an intrinsic relationship ex-
isting at least since the eighteenth century, their contentions
created a new dialogue concerned with the nature of the
historical object and architectural project.”52
51. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in
Architecture, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: As we can understand, the starting point of the debate was ques-
Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17. tioning the “Modernist functionalist doctrine” and searching for a
historical approach. Ernesto Nathan Rogers, Saverio Muratori, and
52. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi-
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of Giulio Carlo Argan participated in this debate with their writings. It is
Berlin, 2013), 217. important to note that Rogers was the editor of the architectural mag-

27
Figure 2.13: Volumetric archetypes, project for a school, Leon Krier.

Figure 2.14: Volumetric archetypes volumes, Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture.

28
 azine Casabella Continuità by the time Aldo Rossi started writing.
Before we move further on, with Rossi’s contributions to the discourse,
examining Argan’s perspective would be an appropriate approach
since Rossi was fundamentally influenced by his ideas. .”. In the article
“That Obscure Object of Desire”, Mary Louise Lobsinger underlines
the influence of Quatremère and Argan on Rossi with these words:

“Following Quatremère, Argan contended that type was not

a preset image or a model to be copied and thus relevant to
the practical making of objects. In contrast to a model, type
was notional, a schema carrying the residue of all previously
made forms. Type was an “interior structure” where all specif-
ic value, character, and quality had been sublimated. Type
contained infinite formal possibilities and thus when put into
practice by an architect would always produce different re-
sults or architectures with “no obvious resemblance to each
other.” The influence of Argan on Rossi is clear when Rossi
writes in the Autobiography: “Nothing can yield more unfore-
seen results than a repetitive mechanism. And no mechanisms
seem more repetitive in their typological aspects than the
house, public buildings and the theater.”53

Here, it is important to mention Italian art critic Giulio Carlo Argan as

well. Argan departs from Quatremère’s insistence on deriving princi-
ples from nature as an ideal. For Argan, “type” is derived from vari-
ous building in a timeline. He mentions this with these words:

“The birth of a “type”, therefore dependent on the existence

of a series of buildings having between them an obvious for-
mal and functional analogy.”54

Argan also mentions the “vagueness” of type with a quotation from

Quatremère. Then, he comments on this notion with these words:

“The notion of the vagueness or generality of the “type”

53. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure Ob- -which cannot therefore directly affect the design of build-
ject of Desire: Autobiography and Rep- ings or their formal quality, also explains its generation, the
etition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey
Room, no. 8 (2002): 46. way in which a “type” is formed. It is never formulated a pri-
ori but always deduced from a series of instances.”55
54. Giulio C. Argan, “On the Typology of
Architecture,” translated by J. Rykwert, in
Theorizing a New Agenda for Architec- Here, we can understand that Argan considers “type” as a vague
ture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory, and derived concept which is developed from a “series of instances”.
ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Ar- He also mentions “type” as a “reduced” concept:
chitectural Press, 1996), 246.

55. Ibid. “The “type” therefore, is formed through a process of reduc-

29
 ing a complex of formal variants to a common root form.”56

For Argan, “type” reduces “complex” variants of history to a specific

“form”. Lobsinger also gives us details about Argan’s understanding
of “type” in this passage:

“Argan argued for a positive conception of type as an ab-

straction but not merely as such. Type was useful to architects
because it had the capacity to bring together the sociohistor-
ical moment and the absolute past. Since architectural types
had been passed down through centuries by means of trea-
tises, it was “legitimate to postulate the question of typology
as a function of both the historical process of architecture and
also of the thinking and working processes of the individual
architect.”. In other words, type displayed both the arc of to-
tal history and the specificity of the historical moment. Argan
argued that type presented and synthesized social-historical
and individual experience in the concrete present.”57

Understanding Argan’s perspective via his statements, we can now

start examining Rossi’s understanding of “archetype”. We can easily
state that Rossi is one of the most important figures in the context of
“type” and “archetype” in the twentieth century. Madrazo sums up
the situation in the century with these words:

“Whereas the notion of form-type had been condemned by

the Modern Movement, an opposite reaction took place as
soon as modern architecture entered in crisis in the 1960’s.
At that time, a renewed interest in the architectural tradi-
tion brought with it a revitalization of Quatremère’s notion
of Type. Architects like Aldo Rossi understood Type as an
epistemological category with which it would be possible
to build a scientific basis for the discipline of architecture.
For the advocates of typology, Type was the link between
56. Giulio C. Argan, “On the Typology of
tradition and modernity: it was an abstraction derived from Architecture,” translated by J. Rykwert, in
existing architectural works which, in turn, would serve as Theorizing a New Agenda for Architec-
generative principle for new ones.”58 ture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory,
ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Ar-
chitectural Press, 1996), 246.
As we can understand here, Type was considered a “bridge” be-
tween tradition and modernity which also has generative features. 57. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure Ob-
ject of Desire: Autobiography and Rep-
Madrazo also mentions Rossi’s attempt to use “type” to build a sci- etition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey
entific base for architectural design. Jacoby explains Rossi’s stance in Room, no. 8 (2002): 46.
comparison with the Modern Movement in this passage:
58. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of
Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu-
“The Architecture of the City is to begin with a critique of the rich, 1995), 303.

30
Figure 2.15: The Site plan of the Cemetery of San Cataldo, Modena, Italy, Aldo Rossi.

Modern Movement, especially its functionalist abstraction.

However, it is also a revision of a rationalist doctrine that
understands rationality as a relational structure, as this limits
formal invention and forces a dependence on social content
to explain and justify form.”59

As we can understand here, although Rossi opposes the functional-

ist position of the Modern Movement, he structures his book on the
basis of a rationalist doctrine by revisioning the rationalist approach.
Jacoby, later, underlines this notion with these words:

“Rossi finds this general framework in neo-Enlightenment hu-

manism. He declares that a ‘rational’ analysis of the city is
possible and formulates a different notion of modernity.”60

Examining Rossi’s approach to architecture, in general, gives us an

idea of his understanding. In the context of “type”, Rossi makes several
clear statements. Madrazo mentions these statements in this passage:

“Quatremère’s definition of Type was indeed one the pillars

of the theoretical work that Aldo Rossi summed up in his L’
59. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi- Architettura della citta. Rossi’s interpretation of Quatremère’s
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of type, however, was both literal and idiosyncratic. His distinc-
Berlin, 2013), 226.

60. Ibid, 227.

31
Figure 2.16: Roosevelt Island Housing Competition, Oswald Mathias Ungers.

tion between type and form is not fundamentally different

from the previous distinction between type and modèle
formulated by Quatremère (e.g. “nessun tipo si identifica
con una forma anche se tutte le forme architettonische sono
riconducibili a dei tipi”). For Rossi, type is something that
precedes the form; it is the principle that remains unaltered
in spite of the changes of the form. In this regard, type is
seen as an objective, logical principle: “Io penso quindi al
concetto di tipo come a qualcosa di permanente e di com-
pleso, un enunciato logico che sta prima della forma e che
la costituisce.”. And he goes as far as to identifying type
with the idea of architecture itself: “Infino potremo dire che
il tipo è l’idea stessa dell’ architettura; ciò che sta più vicino
alla sua essenza.”.”61

Here, we can understand several points. One of which is the par-

61. Leandro Madrazo, “The Concept of

Type in Architecture” (PhD diss., ETH Zu-
rich, 1995), 325.

32
 allelism between Quatremère’s and Rossi’s understanding of “type” at the fun-
damental level. We also understand Rossi considers “type” as a “logical
principle” rather than a particular form. Rossi also states that “type” is the
idea of architecture itself. However, Madrazo also mentions a funda-
mental difference between Quatremère and Rossi:

“Still, there is one fundamental difference between Quatre-

mère’s type and the interpretation that architects like Rossi
made of it. Quatremère’s type needs to be understood within
the context of his concern with the dassie doctrine of art as
imitation. In this regard, type was for Quatremère a principle
underlying both natural and artistic forms. But for architects
like Rossi, mimesis and nature are no longer a significant is-
sue in the architectural debate. For them, the interest of the
idea of Type lies in the possibility of building a scientific basis
for the discipline of architecture.”62

Madrazo points out the fact that although they share a similar ap-
proach to “type”, the fundamental intention of Rossi is completely dif-
ferent from that of Quatremère.

In the 1970s, the concept of archetype was used in numerous works

and studies, especially in the Postmodern discourse. Thiis-Evensen
mentions this notion with these words:

“During the 1970’s the theory of archetypes has increasingly

utilized as a basis of architectural practice, through the work
of, among others, Michael Graves, Rob and Leon Krier and
Mario Botta.”63

Later, Jacoby mentions another important debate starting outside Italy

in the discourse of “type” in architecture in this passage:

“Rossi’s thesis of type in The Architecture of the City as the irre-

ducible ‘apparatus’ of architecture proposed historical con-
tinuity and rediscovery of forms in place of invention, a thesis
shared by his contemporary Oswald Mathias Ungers. With
the Italian debate on typology spreading in the late 1960s
62. Ibid, 326. in continental Europe, similar dialogues emerged elsewhere,
equally preoccupied with the nature of the architectural and
63. Thomas Thiis-Evensen, Archetypes in
Architecture, trans. Ruth Waaler (Oslo: historical object in the city. Unlike the Italian debate, how-
Scandinavian University Press, 1987), 17. ever, which took recourse to Enlightenment theories, these
discussions focused on a re-examination and critique of the
64. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi-
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of Modern Movement’s technical abstraction and break with
Berlin, 2013), 267. history. The belated Anglo-Saxon discussion was largely due

33
 to an ‘anti-intellectual bias’, which lacked a ‘strong tradition
in Modernism’ and belief in ‘the unity of theory and practice
for architectural design’, and when it finally occurred, was
largely dominated by formal research.”64

Here, we can understand that another criticism of the Modern Move-

ment’s technical abstraction and break with history was starting in
the Anglo-Saxon geography. Jacoby mentions Ungers’ stance in this
respect with these words:

“An important contributor to the debate on architecture’s re-

lationship to the city after Modernism was Oswald Mathias
Ungers (1926–2007), a prolific German architect and edu-
cator. His close exchange with such figures as the Smithson’s,
Rossi, and Rowe influenced his theories and pedagogy that
shared the concerns of Team 10 and Neorationalism, and
sought an anti-technocratic and autonomous language of
architecture. Ungers saw architecture as a synthesis of art
and techné, and therefore emerging from art and utility as a
problem of composition in relation to the traditional concepts
of rhythm, symmetry, proportion, axis, and contrast.”65

What Jacoby underlines here is the fact that Ungers understand ar-
chitecture as a concept emerging from art and utility rather than the
traditional visual and compositional values. Later, Jacoby explains
Ungers’ stance further in this passage:

“He once again finds the autonomy of architecture in geo-

metric order, which he believes rational and conceptual.
And in a final shift in his thinking and allegiances, Ungers
prescribes no longer to images or a morphological meta-
morphosis but elementary archetypes, the fiction of timeless-
ness of form. Ungers seeks no longer diagrams of abstraction
but formal diagrams themselves. As he admits: ‘The designer
does not invent, he discovers.’”66

Here, we can understand that Ungers considers “type” as not a “mor-

phological metamorphosis” but as “elementary archetypes” or “the
fiction of timelessness of form”. Jacoby mentions Ungers’ perspective
toward “typology” as well:
65. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi-
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of
“Typological thought connotes more to Ungers than just types Berlin, 2013), 275.
as patterns or concepts, and is part of a necessary interim
66. Ibid, 293.
process of structuring and classification without reduction to a
limited number of types and meanings as stereotypes. Typo- 67. Ibid, 286.

34
Figure 2.17: , Worm’s eye axonometric
of Museum in Merida, Rafael Moneo,
Hand drawn by Stan Allen,1984. logical reasoning signifies to him a creative process that relies
on analogies, images, and metaphors, and is a means of rec-
ognising, in a Goethean sense of morphology, transformable
types and archetypes and ‘defines a way of thinking in basic
all-encompassing contingencies, of having a universal view
of the world of ideas, as well as that of reality’.”67

Jacoby points out the fact that Ungers considers “type” in a much more
dynamic and rich sense rather than stable and reduced stereotypes.

In the contemporary context, the discourse is still developing. In this

respect, one of the important writers is the Spanish architect Rafael
Moneo. Jacoby mentions Moneo’s stance with these words:

“Rafael Moneo in ‘On Typology’ (1978) posited that typolo-

gy raises the contradictory questions of the architectural ob-
ject in its singularity and repeatability. In the latter sense, the
work of architecture is typified, relying on a type that classes
objects with the ‘same formal structure’.”68

Here, we can understand that Moneo mainly focuses on the “singu-

larity” and “repeatability” of the architectural object in this context.
68. Ibid, 294. Jacoby, later, explains further:

35
 “For type to remain relevant, the architectural object must be
considered beyond its singularity through what it has in com-
mon with others, and requires the renewal of its relation to a
formal structure: ‘the old definitions must be modified to ac-
commodate an idea of type that can incorporate even the
present state, where, in fact, subtle mechanisms of relationships
are observable and suggest typological explanations’.”69

Another important figure in the contemporary context of the discourse

is Antione Picon. He often mentions archetypes in his writings. One
of which is the article “Dom-ino: Archetype and Fiction”. In it, Picon
compares Laugier’s “primitive hut” and Le Corbusier’s “Dom-ino” with
these words:

“Laugier’s primitive hut and Le Corbusier’s Dom-ino share this

mix of matter-of-factness and fiction, which may underlie their
common ambition to propose a new architectural archetype
- namely, a configuration that appears both foundational
and generic to the point that it may even be considered as
situated on the threshold that separates mere construction
from architecture and, more generally, the non- architectural
from the architectural, whether the nonarchitectural be struc-
tural, urban, or even related to landscape.”70

As we can understand here, Picon considers there are several simi-

larities between the two examples. However, later, Picon also points
out an important notion:

“An archetype is not a type. As a generic condition, as a limit,

it can inspire very different types of buildings. In this respect,
Dom-ino is even more archetypal than the 18th-cen- tury
primitive hut, which was translated mainly to churches that
share the same basic features: freestanding columns carrying
barrel vaults, with the occasional presence of flying buttress-
es borrowed from the Gothic tradition.”71

Here, Picon explains his understanding by considering Dom-ino as

a more archetypal example. Thus, he states the fact that the crucial
feature of “archetype” is not its relation with the “primitive” anymore.
69. Sam Jacoby, “The Reasoning in Archi-
tecture” (PhD diss., Technical University Of
Berlin, 2013), 294-295.

70. Antoine Picon, “Dom-ino: Archetype

and Fiction,” Log, no. 30 (2014), 171.

71. Ibid, 172.

36
37
TWO AUTHORS

“Science has its place in man’s

search for understanding, but sci-
ence and the imagination have tend-
ed to bifurcate in the modern world;
only the true poetic intellect can end
this long-established dualism.”
Edgar Allan Poe
 There are several people who either directly write about archetypes
or have works that are relatable to archetypes. However, in this case,
since we will examine the precise intellectual positions regarding ar-
chetypes, we will need two theorists who described their thoughts in
a quite clear and detailed way. Also, since there will be a dialogue,
they should be people who lived in a similar timeframe. In light of these
principles, we can say that a dialogue between Aldo Rossi and Chris-
tian Norberg-Schulz would create a meaningful outcome on this topic.

Aldo Rossi was an architectural theorist and a practitioner of architec-

ture, who was specifically interested in archetypes. He defined archi-
tecture as “a creation inseparable from civilized life and the society
in which it is manifested” in the first chapter of his book, “Architecture
of the City”.72 He also said that “Architecture came into being along
with the first traces of the city; it is deeply rooted in the formation of
civilization and is a permanent, universal, and necessary artifact.”.73
As we understand from these statements, “city” is at the center of his
understanding of architecture, which is deeply related to the living
around it. We can also observe in his writings that he understands the
city as a “man-made object” which is made of “urban artifacts”. He
asks the question, “Where does the singularity of an urban artifact
begin?” and later he answers it while he was talking about “locus”
and “primary elements”, “it begins in the event and the sign that has
marked the event.”.74 This concept can be understood as the “collec-
tive memory” of the city. Another point we can get from his writings,
as we can also observe in the statement we mentioned, is that he
defines architecture as a “permanent” and “universal” artifact. In fact,
he periodically mentions “permanences/persistences” in his book,
which we can directly relate directly to the archetypes.

Christian Norberg-Schulz was an architectural theorist and author.

72. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi- Comparing Rossi’s “urban artifact”, he named the architectural ob-
nal: 1966), 21. ject as an “architectural thing” which can be related to Kant’s “Ding
an Sich which means “the thing-in-itself” in German. In his writings,
73. Ibid.
he underlined the problem of “meaning” in architecture. In this case,
74. Ibid, 106. he gave a great role in monuments and monumentality. He quoted
from S. Giedion and said “… meanings are expressed by means of
75. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, symbols.”.75 And later, he explained the need for a “language of
1988), 153. images”. Last but not least, Heidegger’s thoughts on architecture play

39
 Figure 3.1: “The Temple of Juno at Agri-
an important part in the roots of Norberg-Schulz’s world of ideas. gentum”, Caspar David Friedrich, 1830.
In his writings, he quoted him frequently. In terms of our research, From the article “Heidegger’s Thinking on
Architecture”, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
two main concepts of Heidegger was quite important. One of which
was “nearness”. Nearness was one of the fundamental elements of
his thought world. He explained, depending on the changes, how a
subject experience a spatial relation in terms of practical and per-
ceptional aspects. “Nearness” is what the subject experiences when
these two aspects come together. Thus, it can be related to the role
of rituals in our research. Another important concept of Heidegger
was “dwelling” which can be defined in a very simplified manner as
“living that constantly redefined the environment as a continuation of
the design process”. Thus, the concept of “dwelling” had immense
importance and a deep connection with the subject of our research.

BIOGRAPHY OF ALDO ROSSI

Aldo Rossi, an Italian architect, designer, and theorist, achieved in-

ternational recognition and acclaim in three distinct fields: theory,
drawing, and architecture. Born on May 3, 1931, in Milan, Italy,
Rossi’s contributions to the architectural discourse of the second half

40
 of the 20th-century earned him widespread fame and admiration.
Graduating from Politecnico di Milano in 1959, Rossi embarked on
a career that encompassed both practice and academia, leaving an
indelible mark on the world of architecture. He was the first Italian to
receive the Pritzker Prize for architecture. Tragically, his life was cut
short on September 4, 1997, in Milan, Italy, but his legacy continues
to inspire generations of architects and designers.76

Rossi’s early engagement with architectural criticism unfolded within

the pages of the renowned magazine “Casabella-Continuità”. He
not only wrote critical essays but also assumed the role of editor for
the magazine from 1959 to 1964, further establishing his voice and
influence within the architectural community. Throughout his career,
Rossi authored two notable books that provided profound insights into
his architectural philosophy. The first, published in 1966, is titled “L’Ar-
chitettura della città” or “The Architecture of the City”. In this seminal
work, Rossi challenges the prevailing architectural conventions of the
early 20th-century, particularly the Modernist approach, and offers a
critical examination of the concept of “function” as it relates to archi-
tectural artifacts. The book explores the relationship between archi-
tecture, the city, and human experience, solidifying Rossi’s position as
a visionary thinker and theorist. The second book, “Autobiografia sci-
entifica” or “A Scientific Autobiography,” published in 1981, provides
personal and professional insights into Rossi’s journey, shedding light
on the formative experiences that shaped his architectural vision.77

Rossi’s educational journey began within the Somascan Religious Or-

der. He then pursued studies at Alessandro Volta College in Lecco,
fostering a multidisciplinary approach that would later manifest in his
architectural practice. In 1949, Rossi embarked on his architectural
studies at Politecnico di Milano, immersing himself in the rich archi-
tectural heritage of Italy. In 1959, under the guidance of his thesis
advisor Piero Portaluppi, Rossi graduated from the institution, armed
with a strong theoretical foundation and a deep understanding of
architectural principles. During this time, in 1955, he received an invi-
76. “Biography: Aldo Rossi,” The Pritzker tation from Ernesto Nathan Rogers to collaborate with the magazine
Architecture Prize, Accessed June 24, “Casabella-Continuità,” where he would contribute until 1964, fur-
2023, https://www.pritzkerprize.com/
biography-aldo-rossi. ther shaping his perspective on architecture.78

77. “Aldo Rossi,” Architectuul, Accessed Rossi’s professional career began to take shape even during his stud-
June 24, 2023, https://architectuul.com/
architect/aldo-rossi. ies. From 1956 to 1957, he had the opportunity to work at the studios
of influential architects and furniture designers Ignazio Gardella and
78. “Aldo Rossi Biography, architecture & Marco Zanuso, gaining practical experience and insights into design
drawings,” Casati Gallery, Accessed June
24, 2023, https://www.casatigallery. and craftsmanship. His early academic engagement came in 1963
com/designers/aldo-rossi/. when he assumed a position as an assistant professor under Ludovico

41
Quaroni at the School of Urban Planning in Arezzo. This marked the
beginning of Rossi’s dual role as both a practitioner and an educator.
In 1965, he became an assistant professor under Carlo Aymonino at
the Institute of Architecture in Venice, further honing his teaching skills
and sharing his architectural vision with a new generation of students.79

In 1966, Rossi’s academic career reached a new milestone as he be-

came a lecturer at Politecnico di Milano, a role he would fulfill while
simultaneously making significant contributions to architectural theory
and practice. It was during this period that he published his ground-
breaking book “The Architecture of the City”, which soon became
one of the classic works in the field. Rossi’s ability to articulate his ideas
and theories through both his writings and his architectural projects so-
lidified his position as a leading figure in the architectural community.80

Rossi’s academic pursuits extended beyond Italy, with teaching en-

gagements at prestigious institutions such as Harvard, Yale, Cooper
Union, and Cornell, allowing him to share his knowledge and per-
spectives with a global audience. From 1972 to 1975, he chaired the
Architectural Design department at ETH Zurich, where he continued to
shape the minds of aspiring architects. Additionally, in 1973, he served
as the director of the International Architectural Section of the “Trien-
nale Milano,” further showcasing his leadership and curatorial skills.81

Throughout his career, Rossi undertook various architectural projects

that exemplified his design philosophy and theoretical approach. His
first major project, the Monte Amiata Housing complex in Milan’s
Gallaratese quarter, designed in collaboration with Carlo Aymonino
in 1970, marked a turning point in Rossi’s career from theory to prac-
tice. This ambitious project allowed Rossi and Aymonino to implement
their urban ideologies and realize their utopian vision for an ideal 79. “Aldo Rossi Biography, architecture &
drawings,” Casati Gallery, Accessed June
micro-community within the city. The resulting complex consisted of 24, 2023, https://www.casatigallery.
five buildings, one of which Rossi designed himself, showcasing his com/designers/aldo-rossi/.
ability to blend functionalism and poetic sensibilities.82
80. “BIOGRAPHY,” 20th Century Archi-
tecture, Accessed June 24, 2023, http://
Another significant work in Rossi’s portfolio is the San Cataldo Cem- architecture-history.org/architects/archi-
etery in Modena, Italy, constructed between 1971 and 1984. This tects/ROSSI/biography.html.
cemetery is considered one of the most important works of Rossi, ex- 81. “Biography - Aldo Rossi,” Aldo Ros-
emplifying his mastery of large-scale projects and his ability to imbue si Foundation, Accessed July 03, 2023,
architecture with profound emotional and symbolic resonance. The https://www.fondazionealdorossi.org/
biografia/.
cemetery’s design reflects Rossi’s exploration of the relationship be-
tween architecture and memory, creating a space that pays homage 82. “Aldo Rossi,” Architectuul, Accessed
to the deceased while evoking a sense of timelessness.83 June 24, 2023, https://architectuul.com/
architect/aldo-rossi.

In 1979, Rossi was commissioned to design the Teatro del Mondo 83. Ibid.

42
 for the Venice Biennale, further solidifying his reputation as a vision-
ary architect. This floating theater, with its enigmatic geometric form,
served as a testament to Rossi’s ability to merge art, architecture, and
theatricality into a single, captivating experience.84

Rossi’s theoretical and urban works had a profound impact on the

architectural approach of the “Internationale Bauausstellung 1984-
1987” in West Berlin. He praised Berlin for its fragmented, multi-lo-
ci, and multi-fabric urban typology, presenting it as a counterpoint
to the totalitarian master planning of the Modernists that preceded
him. Rossi’s ideas resonated with the concept of smaller urban zones,
urban artifacts, and a more organic approach to urban renewal.
Through his built projects for IBA in Kochstrasse, Wilhelmstrasse, and
Rauchstrasse, Rossi had the opportunity to put his theories into prac-
tice within the complex and layered urban fabric that forms the col-
lective memory of Berlin. These projects became a testament to his
ability to blend historical context with innovative design solutions.85

Aldo Rossi’s lasting legacy lies in his significant contributions to archi-

tectural theory, his iconic built works, and his visionary approach to
urban design. His ability to excel in theory, drawing, and architecture
propelled him to global recognition and established him as a key fig-
ure in the architectural field. Rossi’s critical insights continue to shape
the discourse of architecture, inspiring new generations of architects
to consider the relationship between the built environment, human
experience, and the collective memory of cities. Though his life was
tragically cut short, his visionary ideas and profound contributions
ensure that his influence will be felt for generations to come.

BIOGRAPHY OF CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ

Christian Norberg-Schulz was a prominent Norwegian architect, au-

thor, educator, and architectural theorist, known for his profound con-
tributions to the field of architecture. Born on May 23, 1926, in Oslo,
Norway, Norberg-Schulz developed a passion for architecture at an
early age and went on to leave a lasting impact on the profession
through his extensive body of work and influential writings.86

After completing his education under the renowned architectural his-

84. Ibid. torian Sigfried Giedion at ETH Zurich, Norberg-Schulz graduated in
85. Ibid. 1949 and returned to his hometown of Oslo. He began his profes-
sional career by working with esteemed architects Dagfinn Morseth
86. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Large and Mads Wiel Gedde in Oslo. It was during this time that he had
Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June
10, 2023, https://snl.no/Christian_Nor- the opportunity to collaborate with the celebrated architect Arne
berg-Schulz/. Korsmo on the Planetveien 10-12-14 housing project in Oslo, which

43
showcased Norberg-Schulz’s early talent and innovative design ap-
proach.87

In 1950, Norberg-Schulz, together with Korsmo and other notable

architects such as Sverne Fehn and Jørn Utzon, founded PAGON,
the Norwegian Delegation at CIAM (International Congresses of
Modern Architecture). This platform allowed him to engage with oth-
er visionary architects and explore emerging ideas and philosophies
in architecture. The following year, he became a member of CIAM
in England, further expanding his network and knowledge within the
architectural community.88

In 1952, Norberg-Schulz was awarded a prestigious Fulbright schol-

arship, which enabled him to pursue advanced studies at Harvard Uni-
versity in the United States. His time at Harvard broadened his horizons
and exposed him to diverse architectural approaches and theories.
Additionally, in the early 1960s, he embarked on an internship in Rome,
immersing himself in the rich architectural heritage of the city and deep-
ening his understanding of classical Italian architecture.89

Norberg-Schulz’s career took a significant turn in 1963 when he

commenced his teaching journey at the School of Architecture in
Oslo. Simultaneously, he assumed the role of director at the Oslo
Architects’ Association, solidifying his presence in the architectural
community. That same year, he also embarked on his role as the ed-
itor of the architectural magazine Byggekunst, a position he held for 87. “Norberg-Schulz’s House,” architec-
fifteen years until 1978. During this time, Norberg-Schulz contributed ture norway, Accessed June 10, 2023,
extensively to the magazine, sharing his thoughts, research, and in- https://www.architecturenorway.no/
questions/histories/otero-pailos-planet-
sights on architecture with a broader audience.90 veien/.

In 1964, Norberg-Schulz obtained his Ph.D. from the Norwegian 88. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Large
Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June
Institute of Architecture and Design. His doctoral dissertation, titled 10, 2023, https://snl.no/Christian_Nor-
“Intentions in Architecture,” aimed to establish an open theory of ar- berg-Schulz/.
chitecture adaptable to various contexts. Drawing inspiration from
89. “Norberg-Schulz’s House,” architec-
Gestalt psychology, he emphasized the significance of visual per- ture norway, Accessed June 10, 2023,
ception in architectural design. Norberg-Schulz’s book, published https://www.architecturenorway.no/
the same year, garnered international recognition, establishing him questions/histories/otero-pailos-planet-
veien/.
as an esteemed architectural theorist.91
90. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Large
In 1965, Norberg-Schulz ventured into academia as a professor at Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June
10, 2023, https://snl.no/Christian_Nor-
Yale University, where he shared his wealth of knowledge and men- berg-Schulz/.
tored countless aspiring architects. He continued to expand his aca-
demic endeavors by accepting a visiting professorship at Cambridge 91. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Architec-
tuul, Accessed June 10, 2023, https://
University in the United States in 1966. Ultimately, he returned to his architectuul.com/architect/christian-nor-
alma mater, the Oslo School of Architecture and Design, where he berg-schulz/.

44
 held a professorship from 1966 until his retirement in 1994, leaving
an indelible mark on generations of students.92

One of Norberg-Schulz’s most notable contributions to architectural

theory was his 1980 book, “Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenol-
ogy of Architecture”. In this seminal work, he introduced a method
of phenomenological analysis of cities, exploring the essence and
character of different places. Norberg-Schulz drew heavily from the
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, pioneering the fields of “phenom-
enology of place” and “architectural phenomenology.” His writings
sparked debates and played a crucial role in the development of
post-modern architectural theories.93

Throughout his career, Norberg-Schulz also made significant contribu-

tions to the study of Baroque architecture and classical Italian architec-
ture, earning recognition for his meticulous research and insightful anal-
ysis. His expertise and nuanced understanding of architectural history
allowed him to shed new light on these architectural styles, enriching
the scholarly discourse and inspiring fellow architects and researchers.94

While Norberg-Schulz embraced the possibilities of expression

offered by the postmodern movement, particularly influenced by
Charles Jencks’s book “The Language of Postmodern Architecture”,
he later became disillusioned with its growing isolation and loss of
original values in the 1990s. In response, he embarked on a profound
study of the theoretical foundations of modernity, resulting in his book
“Principles of Modern Architecture”. This work aimed to reestablish the
fundamental principles that underpin modern architecture, providing a
renewed framework for architectural thought and practice.95

Despite his numerous achievements and international acclaim, Nor-

berg-Schulz remained grounded and dedicated to the pursuit of ar-
chitectural excellence. His passion for the field extended beyond his
academic and professional endeavors, as he continually sought to
enrich the experience of architecture, making it more profound and
92. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Large meaningful for both practitioners and the general public.
Norwegian Encyclopedia, Accessed June
10, 2023, https://snl.no/Christian_Nor-
berg-Schulz/. Tragically, Christian Norberg-Schulz’s life was cut short by cancer,
and he passed away in 2000 in Oslo, leaving behind a remarkable
93. Ibid. legacy in the world of architecture. His writings, teachings, and ideas
94. Ibid. continue to inspire architects, shaping the discourse and practice of ar-
chitecture, and his contributions will forever be cherished as a testament
95. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Architec- to his remarkable intellect, vision, and dedication to the field he loved.
tuul, Accessed June 10, 2023, https://
architectuul.com/architect/christian-nor-
berg-schulz/.

45
 UNDERSTANDING ALDO ROSSI

Aldo Rossi is one of the first theorists that popularized the term “arche-
type” in the architecture of modern times. Rossi was a multidirectional
architect who expressed and explained himself in different mediums,
such as drawing, writing, and architectural practice.

Despite the fact that these are not all his written works, Rossi has written
two books: “The Architecture of the City” in 1966 and “A Scientific
Autobiography” in 1981. However, Rossi’s life in literature started way
before these books in the late 1950s with Casabella Continuità. Italian
architect Robin M. Graziadei says “Paradoxically, Rossi believed that
through this disassociation of techniques he would be able to get clos-
er to an identification of the creative process with the project in question
than if he were to write purely physical descriptions of projects.”.96

As Rossi writes in The Architecture of the City, “I use the term archi-
tecture in a positive and pragmatic sense, as a creation inseparable
from civilized life and the society in which it is manifested. By nature,
it is collective.”.97 Therefore, for Rossi, collectiveness is a fundamental
element of, not only archetypes as we mentioned before but archi-
tecture as well. Graziadei says “What art and architecture have in
common, says Rossi, is that they are both born in unconscious life.
By reaching into a deep well of personal memories, he describes
his projects not simply as objects, but as labours of love rooted in
his personal history.”.98 Here, we can understand, for Rossi, another
definitive element of architecture is memory.

Rossi was influenced by numerous authors and architects. In her arti-

cle in 1981, Micha Bandini sums the main influences by a reference
from Vittorio Gregotti by writing:

“Vittorio Gregotti, then a staff editor at the magazine, de-

scribed its ideological perspective as coming under the influ-
ence of three separate sources: first, there was G.C. Argan’s 96. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal
historicist-Marxist book Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus, is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra-
the second, the critique by T.W. Adorno of the Consumer phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 63.
Society and the third was the reading of Marx by the phe- 97. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
nomenological school of Enzo Pace. While Rossi’s writings (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
do not directly comment on this source material, its influence nal: 1966), 21.
can be found in most of the 31 articles he wrote for Casabel- 98. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal
la-Continuità during this period.”99 is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra-
phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 60.
Another important influence was by Ludovico Quaroni. Rossi had 99. Micha Bandini, “Aldo Rossi,” AA Files,
taught architecture as his assistant at the University of Arezzo in 1963. no. 1 (1981): 106.

46
 Bandini says “Ludovico Quaroni had a special part to play in Rossi’s
thinking.”.100 However, despite the influence, Rossi’s perspective differ-
entiates from Quaroni’s. Bandini points this out and says “So for Rossi,
to be an architect meant to think about architecture as a field in which
only precise theoretical constructions were permissible, and by saying
this he reduces the lyrical quality of Quaroni’s writing to a few principles
which can hardly capture Quaroni’s rich thought on a human flexible
architecture and its place in the life of a city, an ancient “more beau-
tiful” city” Whose memory should help us to design for the present.”.101

Rossi was also influenced by Carl G. Jung, a Swiss psychologist and

founder of analytical psychology, who also brought the term “arche-
type” to modern use. Bandini mentions this influence of Jung on Rossi
as well and uses this example about “Analogous City”, a collage
signifies the idea that cities are analogues of collective thought and
that each city is connected to one another in a discursive chain by
Rossi, as a reference:

“Rossi himself had quoted Jung’s definition in his ‘Analogical

Architecture’ article in which he discussed, amongst others,
those two projects. Jung had said, in defining analogy:

I have explained that “logical” thought is what is ex-

pressed in words directed from the outside world in
the form of discourse. ‘Analogical’ thought is sensed
yet unreal, imagined yet silent; it is not a discourse
but rather a meditation on themes of the past, an
interior monologue. Logical thought is ‘thinking in
words’. Analogical thought is archaic, unexpressed,
and practically inexpressible in words.

The ending words of this quote must be seen as particularly

appropriate for the design phase Rossi was experiencing.
The clarity of the Analogous City collage measured against
the written explanations of it would have reflected this ‘prac-
tically inexpressible in words’ quality.”102

100. Ibid. Later in the book, Rossi also says “Generally, the most difficult histor-
ical problems of the city are resolved by dividing history into peri-
101. Micha Bandini, “Aldo Rossi,” AA Files, ods and hence ignoring or misunderstanding the universal and per-
no. 1 (1981): 106.
manent character of the forces of the urban dynamic; and here the
102. Ibid, 109. importance of a comparative method becomes evident.”.103 Firstly,
he mentions two other main characteristics of archetypes here: uni-
103. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; versality and permanency. However, more importantly, he points out
Original: 1966), 27. that there is a methodological disparity in our approach to under-

47
standing the history of architecture. One of our most efficient tools to
understand a particular era or place is to atomize and categorize
the subject. This kind of practice is mostly focused on the difference
between things. However, since we are looking for similarities and
permanences of differently categorized as we try to understand ar-
chetypes, our mainstream approach doesn’t give proper outcomes
and even creates a perception that all the information comes from this
differentiation ignoring the information that is inherent in the subject.

One of the most important elements of Rossi’s literature is “city” since

his definition of architecture depends on the concept of “city”. In the
introduction of his book, he mentions the relationship between the
city and architecture. He says, “Architecture came into being along
with the first traces of the city; it is deeply rooted in the formation
of civilization and is a permanent, universal, and necessary artifact.
With time, the city grows upon itself; it acquires consciousness and
memory.”.104 In this description, he gives us the most important key-
words of his architectural theory: permanency, universality, necessity,
consciousness, and memory. All these words are the cornerstones of
his world of thought. Seungkoo Jo refers to this notion in his article
“Aldo Rossi: Architecture and Memory”, and says “As a diverse total-
ity, the city is haunted by meaning which the collective memory ex-
tracts from the traces. These traces are called permanence by Rossi,
the urban artifacts that preserve the history of the city as built form.”.105
Later in the same article, Jo also says “Rossi(1982) defined the city:
By architecture I mean not only the visible image of the city and the
sum of its different architectures, but architecture as a construction, the
construction of the city over time.”.106

Rossi considers “city” as a synthesis of two opposing philosophical

perspectives which are Aristotelian and Platonic stances. Rossi men- 104. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
tions these with these words: Original: 1966), 21.

“In the beginning of a study of the city, we find ourselves con- 105. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec-
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi-
fronted with two very different positions. These are best ex- tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1,
emplified in the Greek city, where the Aristotelian analysis of (2003): 232.
urban reality is counterposed to that of Plato’s Republic.”.107
106. Ibid, 234.

Later in the book, Rossi while explaining the relationship between urban 107. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
artifacts and the individual, says “All these experiences, their sum, consti- (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
nal: 1966), 23.
tute the city.”.108 Graziedei mentions this idea of Rossi and says “For Rossi,
it is the event that takes place in a building that is architecture, not the inert 108. Ibid 29.
object.”.109 We can understand that he considers the city, not as a phys-
109. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal
ical object, but as a perceptional result of physical experiences, which is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra-
gives us a hint about how he understands the architecture and the city. phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 63.

48
Figure 3.2: The Collage of Analogous City, Aldo Rossi.

49
As we can see Rossi’s understanding of architecture can be related
to social life and human activity as well as archetypes. He underlines
the relation by saying “I believe that the importance of ritual in its col-
lective nature and its essential character as an element for preserving
myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of monuments
and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the city and of the
transmission of ideas in an urban context.”.110 Rossi implies the simi-
larity between myths and architecture by saying that “Myths come
and go, passing slowly from one place to another; every generation
recounts them differently and adds new elements to the patrimony
received from the past; but behind this changing reality, there is a
permanent reality that in some way manages to elude the action
of time.”.111 Therefore, he says, “For if the ritual is the permanent and
conserving element of myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the
very moment that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible.”,112
and describes the similar role of rituals and monument in the context
of collective memory of a community.

Memory is another significant element of Rossi’s literature. He says,

“The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these problems
and invests all of man’s inhabited and constructed realm with value.
It arises inevitably because it is so deeply rooted in the human con-
dition.”.113 Jo mentions this notion and says “Rossi argues the city is the
locus of collective memory, and by this means that the city acts as a
wax tablet that gathers up the traces of lived experience in order to
create its monuments.”.114 Jo also says “Rossi employed memory as
a valuable means, a starting point for creating architectonic struc-
ture rich with meaning and rich with potential which exploits thinking, 110. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
reading, and responding.”.115 About this notion, Jo gives the example nal: 1966), 24.
of Rossi’s famous collage:
111. Ibid.
“The drawing of the Analogous City(1976) by Rossi shows 112. Ibid.
how the city can be depicted, using the meaning that resided
within the identifiable or referenced forms. For Rossi’s Analo- 113. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
gous City, there is no real site existing. Michel Foucault’s(1974) nal: 1966), 27.
type of history throws light on the analogous city: for he de-
fines a history of ruptures, interruptions, and discontinuities, a 114. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec-
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi-
history that searched among the strata and layers of time for tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1,
the points where concepts were displaced and transformed, (2003): 234.
or the moments where history was moved.”116
115. Ibid, 236.

Rossi also mentions about the memory as “an inseparable whole” 116. Ibid, 234.
and says “This inseparable whole is at once the natural and the ar-
117. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
tificial homeland of man, and suggests a definition of natural which (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
also applies to architecture.”.117 Later in the same chapter, he quotes nal: 1966), 27.

50
 from Francesco Milizia: “Although architecture in reality lacks a mod-
el in nature, it has another model derived from man’s natural labor in
constructing his first house.”.118 Especially, here in the last quotation,
we can observe how he relates the concept of “memory” and “ar-
chetype”.

Here, it is important to mention the role of “teatro” and its relation with
memory in Rossi’s understanding of architecture. Jo says “Rossi(1982)
sees the city as the theater of human events, …”.119 He also says “The
locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space, time, form, and site of
a succession of both ancient and more modern events.”.120 We can
see that the allegory of theater has a significant role in Rossi’s under-
standing of architecture. This notion becomes clear with this passage
from Jo’s article:

“Rossi argues in his book, A Scientific Autobiography (1981),

that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespear’s Globe Theater,
revealing the similarity even in the common names of The-
aters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespear’s dictum, All the
World’s stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the
world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would
have searched for a way to express the space of theater.”121

Here, we can see, much more clearly, Rossi perceives the world as a
theater and considers a deep relation between city and theater since
they are both “locus” of the collective memory. This notion underlines
the importance of a work of Rossi, Teatro del Mundo, which was a
temporary theater building built in 1979 for 1980 Venice Biennale.
Jo says “In the Venice of modern times, Aldo Rossi tried to grasp the
highest reality through a magically activated imagination in his proj-
ect, Teatro del Mundo(1979), where the mind and memory of man
118. Ibid. was considered divine.”.122

119. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architecture Rossi often points out connections between architecture and psychol-
and Memory,” Journal of Asian Architec-
ture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1, ogy. Jo says “Rossi stated, the idea of analogy can never be fully
(2003): 233. possessed by the conscious and rational mind, this is what makes it
real to the human psyche.”.123 Rossi mentions about “collective mem-
120. Ibid.
ory” as “the deepest structure of urban artifacts”:
121. Ibid.
“With these considerations we approach the deepest struc-
122. Ibid.
ture of urban artifacts and thus their form -the architecture of
123. Ibid, 234. the city. “The soul of the city” becomes the city’s history, the
sign on the walls of the municipium, the city’s distinctive and
124. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; definitive character, its memory.”124
Original: 1966), 130.

51
Here, we can see a direct connection with the term “deep-structure” in
Jungian psychology, which is defined as the fundamental information
of the Jungian archetypes by Carl Gustav Jung. In the first chapter of the
book “Four Archetypes”, Jung refers to Plato’s “idea” as a similar con-
cept to this “deep structure”. As between Plato’s world of ideas and the
world of forms, the “collective memory” and the “city” can be confused
in Rossi’s work. Rossi responds this confusion with this passage:

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of
its people, and like memory it is associated with object and
places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This re-
lationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the
city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of land-
scape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory,
new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas
flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.

Thus we consider locus the characteristic principle of urban

artifacts; the concepts of locus, architecture, permanences,
and history together help us to understand the complexity of
urban artifacts. The collective memory participates in the ac-
tual transformation of space in the works of the collective, a
transformation that is always conditioned by whatever mate-
rial realities oppose it.”125

Rossi recognizes the value of individuality as well as collectiveness in the

context of “urban artifacts”. He says “Within this idea exist the actions of
individuals, and in this sense not everything in urban artifacts is collective;
yet the collective and the individual nature of urban artifacts in the end
constitutes the same urban structure. Memory, within the structure, is the
consciousness of the city; it is a rational operation whose development
demonstrates with maximum clarity, economy, and harmony that which
has already come to be accepted.”.126 He also relates this notion with the
concepts of “event” and “sign”, which we will examine later.

“This individuality ultimately is connected to an original arti-

fact -in the sense of Cattaneo’s principle; it is an event and a
form. Thus, the union between the past and the future exists in
the very idea of the city that it flows through in the same way
that memory flows through the life of a person; and always,
125. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
in order to be realized, this idea must not only shape but be City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
shaped by reality. This shaping is a permanent aspect of a Original: 1966), 130.
city’s unique artifacts, monuments, and the idea we have of
126. Ibid, 131.
it. It also explains why in antiquity the founding of a city be-
came part of the city’s mythology.”127 127. Ibid, 131.

52
Figure 3.3: Drawings of “Teatro del Mundo”, Aldo Rossi.

It is important to understand Carlo Cattaneo’s principle here. Car-

lo Cattaneo, a prominent figure of the 19th-century, was an Italian
philosopher, writer, and political thinker whose profound influence
extended beyond his homeland. Carlo Cattaneo’s principle about
event and form is rooted in his historical and philosophical thinking.
He believed that the course of history is determined by a dynamic
interplay between two essential elements: events and forms. Events
refer to specific occurrences, actions, or incidents that take place in
history. They are the tangible and observable manifestations of his-
torical developments, such as revolutions, wars, treaties, social move-
ments, and other significant happenings. Cattaneo acknowledged
the importance of events as they shape the course of history and often
bring about abrupt changes in societies and institutions. Forms, on
the other hand, are the underlying structures, institutions, and social
organizations that provide the framework for events to occur and be
comprehended. They represent the deeper and more enduring as-
pects of society, including its customs, traditions, laws, and political
systems. Forms can be thought of as the long-lasting patterns and
structures that influence the course of events over time. Cattaneo’s
principle suggests that understanding history requires analyzing both
events and forms. Events capture the dynamism and spontaneity of

53
Figure 3.4: Drawings of Monument to the Resistance, Cuneo, Aldo Rossi.

historical developments, while forms provide the stability and continu-

ity that shape how events unfold. By studying both aspects, historians
can gain a more comprehensive understanding of historical process-
es and the interactions between individuals and institutions. Cattaneo
believed that a scientific approach to history required identifying the
underlying forms and structures that give rise to events. By doing so,
historians can uncover the broader patterns and principles that gov-
ern the progression of societies and their historical changes. This em-
phasis on understanding both the immediate events and the enduring
forms distinguishes Cattaneo’s historical approach and contributes to
his significance as a thinker in the study of history and society.

“Urban artifact” is another important concept of Rossi’s literature. In

his book, he mentions it as “…like the city itself are characterized by
their own history and thus by their own form.”.128 He also mentions
about four characteristics of an “urban artifact”:

“We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban ar- 128. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
tifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 29.
is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to
certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory.”.129 129. Ibid, 32.

54
 Rossi also talks about the relationship between urban artifacts and
collectiveness, and says “At this point, we might discuss what our idea
of the building is, our most general memory of it as a product of the
collective, and what relationship it affords us with this collective.”.130
Another point he makes about urban artifacts is about the functionality
of the urban artifacts: “In an urban artifact, certain original values and
functions remain, others are totally altered; about some stylistic aspects
of the form we are certain, others are less obvious.”.131 Here, he points
out that the original and first functionality of an urban artifact is not an
inherent feature. Jo mentions this notion and says “Rossi(1982) makes
the observation that forms have an autonomous life which supersedes
the functions for which they were designed.”.132 Later in the same arti-
cle, Jo also says “Rossi argued that architecture should achieve formal
autonomy, to gain identity, in order to meaningfully relate and to con-
vey meaning.”.133 Later, he talks about the relationship between urban
artifacts and the individual: “If one takes any urban artifact -a building,
a street, a district- and attempts to describe it, the same difficulties
arise which we encountered earlier with respect to the Palazzo della
Ragione in Padua. Some of these difficulties derive from the ambiguity
of language, and in part these difficulties can be overcome, but there
will always be a type of experience recognizable only to those who
have walked through the particular building, street or district.”.134 As he
pointed out while he was defining the “city”, he underlines the phe-
nomenological aspect of this interaction between the artifacts and the
subject. In the following sentence, he also mentions about the subjec-
130. Ibid, 29. tivity of this kind of experience: “Thus, the concept that one person has
of an urban artifact will always differ from that of someone who “lives”
131. Ibid, 29. that same artifact.”.135 Graziadei mentions this idea and says “For Ros-
132. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec- si, it is to childhood that the phenomenological separation between
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi- the self and the world can be traced, and this is the separation experi-
tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1, enced by the architect between the project as merely a representation
(2003): 234.
and the project as a completed and lived building.”.136
133. Ibid.
While he describes the “city”, he quotes from French anthropologist
134. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; and ethnologist Lévi-Strauss and, says “Setting forth the problem in
Original: 1966), 33. this manner, Claude Lévi-Strauss brought the study of the city into a
realm rich with unexpected developments. He noted how, more than
135. Ibid, 33.
other works of art, the city achieves a balance between natural and
136. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal artificial elements; it is an object of nature and subject of culture.”.137
is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra- Here, he mentions this notion of balance between naturality and ar-
phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 63.
tificiality, nature and culture. This notion is later mentioned in another
137. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City paragraph: “It is in this sense not only the place of the human condi-
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi- tion, but itself a part of that condition, and is represented in the city
nal: 1966), 33.
and its monuments, in districts, dwellings, and all urban artifacts that
138. Ibid. emerge from inhabited space.”.138 Here, there is an important point.

55
He points out that “urban artifacts” emerge from “inhabited space”.
Thus, he describes “urban artifacts” as a perceptional thing that is
surrounded by the life, not as a physical object of its own. Also, this
point also can be related to Heidegger’s concept of “dwelling” and
“building”.

One of the most important concepts in Rossi’s architecture is “type”.

Architectural historian Mary Louise Lobsinger mentions the impor-
tance of “type” in Rossi’s architecture in her article “That Obscure
Object of Desire: Autobiography and Repetition in the Work of Aldo
Rossi”:

“We know that by the early 1960s Rossi employed a more

precise understanding of the architectural -design and ana-
lytical- equivalents of literary type. Type as discussed above
gave Rossi a scientific means -that is, a logic with both ma-
terial and conceptual dimensions- to transcribe the literary
idea of typicality and a realist critical method into a theory
of architecture. Collaborative studies on typology based on
analytical drawings that traced morphological change in
Italian cities put in place the physical evidence to support a
materialist critical apparatus. A teoria della progettazione
and a teoria dell’architettura, a theory and a practice of ar-
chitecture, could now be defined. The studies from this period
form the backbone of Rossi’s The Architecture of the City.”139

He describes the “type” as “… developed according to both needs

and aspirations to beauty; a particular type was associated with a
form and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely from
society to society.”.140 Thus, he relates the “type” with form and cul-
ture. In the article we previously mentioned, Lobsinger says “For Rossi,
139. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure
type stood as a totalizing gesture against the modality of the new, Object of Desire: Autobiography and
aesthetic expressions based on subjective inclinations or on psycho- Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey
logical experience. His conception of type was grounded on Luk- Room, no. 8 (2002): 52.
acs’s characterization of the typical in literature.”.141 Later, Rossi also 140. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
comes up with a definition: “I would define the concept of type as City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
something that is permanent and complex, a logical principle that is Original: 1966), 40.
prior to form and that constitutes it.”.142 Here, there are two important 141. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure
points he underlines. One is the concept of permanency, which later Object of Desire: Autobiography and
he related to history. The other point is that the “type” is “a logical Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey
Room, no. 8 (2002): 47-48.
principle that is prior to form”. Later, he explains what he meant by
“logical principle” is not a precise prescription by a quotation from 142. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
Quatremère de Quincy: “Everything is precise and given in the mod- City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 40.
el; everything is more or less vague in the type.”.143 Here, he points
out the difference between “model” and “type” as well. Jo says “Ros- 143. Ibid.

56
Figure 3.5: School-Cemetery [montage] Left: Fagnano Olona School, Right San Cataldo Cemetery, Both drawings by Aldo Rossi.

si(1982) suggests that in architecture type is the product of the history,

the spatial composition and the use of Building. This interpretation
does not contradict the definition of type in Quatremère de Quincy’s
treatise. Rossi’s interpretation of Quatremère’s type, however, is both
literal and idiosyncratic.”.144 Jo also says “For Rossi, type is something
that precedes the form; it is the principle that remains unaltered in
spite of the changes of the form. In this sense, type is seen as an
objective, logical principle.”.145 Lobsinger underlines the influence of
Quatremère and Argan in her article as well:

“Following Quatremère, Argan contended that type was not

a preset image or a model to be copied and thus relevant to
the practical making of objects. In contrast to a model, type
was notional, a schema carrying the residue of all previously
made forms. Type was an “interior structure” where all spe-
cific value, character, and quality had been sublimated. Type
144. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec- contained infinite formal possibilities and thus when put into
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi- practice by an architect would always produce different re-
tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1, sults or architectures with “no obvious resemblance to each
(2003): 235.
other.” The influence of Argan on Rossi is clear when Rossi
145. Ibid. writes in the Autobiography: “Nothing can yield more un-

57
Figure 3.6: Façade and Plan Drawings of “Colonnades de la Place Louis XV”, Paris, Quatremère de Quincy

foreseen results than a repetitive mechanism. And no mech-

anisms seem more repetitive in their typological aspects than
the house, public buildings and the theater.”146

Here, it is important to mention Italian art critic Giulio Carlo Argan as

well. Argan departs from Quatremère’s insistence on deriving princi-
ples from nature as an ideal. For Argan, “type” is derived from vari-
ous building in a timeline. He mentions this with these words:

“The birth of a “type”, therefore dependent on the existence

of a series of buildings having between them an obvious for-
mal and functional analogy.”147 146. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure
Object of Desire: Autobiography and
Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey
Argan also mentions the “vagueness” of type with a quotation from Room, no. 8 (2002): 46.
Quatremère. Then, he comments on this notion with these words:
147. Giulio C. Argan, “On the Typology
of Architecture,” translated by J. Rykwert,
“The notion of the vagueness or generality of the “type” in Theorizing a New Agenda for Architec-
-which cannot therefore directly affect the design of build- ture: An Anthology of Architectural Theory,
ings or their formal quality, also explains its generation, the ed. Kate Nesbit (New York: Princeton Ar-
chitectural Press, 1996), 246.
way in which a “type” is formed. It is never formulated a pri-
ori but always deduced from a series of instances.”148 148. Ibid.

58
 Here, we can understand that Argan considers “type” as a vague
and derived concept which is developed from a “series of instances”.
He also mentions “type” as a “reduced” concept:

“The “type” therefore, is formed through a process of reduc-

ing a complex of formal variants to a common root form.”149

For Argan, “type” reduces “complex” variants of history to a specific

“form”. Lobsinger also gives us details about Argan’s understanding
of “type” in this passage:

“Argan argued for a positive conception of type as an ab-

straction but not merely as such. Type was useful to architects
because it had the capacity to bring together the sociohistor-
ical moment and the absolute past. Since architectural types
had been passed down through centuries by means of trea-
tises, it was “legitimate to postulate the question of typology
as a function of both the historical process of architecture and
also of the thinking and working processes of the individual
architect.”. In other words, type displayed both the arc of to-
tal history and the specificity of the historical moment. Argan
argued that type presented and synthesized social-historical
and individual experience in the concrete present.”.150

Here, we can sense the roots of the concept of “event” and “sign”
in Rossi’s architectural perspective. We can see it in a more direct
manner in Lobsinger’s these words: “For Argan, the past is neutralized
in type as an “absolute within the present,” and thus type presents
the past as a historical abstract form in the present.”.151 Graziadei
mentions this notion and says “For Rossi, cities are places for both the
living and the dead, where fragments and elements of the dead act
as signals and warnings to the living.”.152

Bandini mentions this relation among Quatremerè, Argan and Rossi

as well and she says:

149. Ibid. “Quatremerè de Quincy’s definition of type was first introduced

150. Mary L. Lobsinger, “That Obscure by Argan in his essay Suf concetto di tipologia architettonica
Object of Desire: Autobiography and which is considered fundamental by Rossi for his discussion of
Repetition in the Work of Aldo Rossi,” Grey type. Almost paraphrasing Quatremere, Rossi writes,
Room, no. 8 (2002): 46.

151. Ibid. ...type is a constant, it is recognisable in all architec-

ture, it is also a cultural element and as such can be
152. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal
is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra- researched in different architectures. Typology then,
phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 63. becoming largely the analytical moment of architec-

59
 ture is even better individuated at the urban level.

Again and again Rossi stresses the importance of typology at

the urban level.”153

Here, we can understand that, despite the influence, there is a signifi-

cant difference in Rossi’s perspective. He grasps the notion of “typol-
ogy” on an urban scale, unlike Quatremerè and Argan.

There is another significant point to conclude the “type” section of this

chapter and that is to understand the relation between “history” and
“type” in Rossi’s understanding of architecture. Seungkoo Jo explains
this notion with these words:

“Rossi(1982) recognizes historical process: type reacts dia-

lectically with technique, function and style. As an example,
he cites the house with a loggia: the basic plan of organiza-
tion has existed for centuries, but changes in social customs,
construction techniques, and family hierarchies have caused
many variations in its actual design. In this sense, Rossi’s inter-
pretation of building is both acultural and ahistorical. Type is
the abstraction of memory to which will be referenced, and
type is an abstract principle concerning basic needs and
beauty while specific forms depend on historical circum-
stances and social context.”154

While Rossi is describing further the “urban artifact”, he rejects the

function as an essential feature of the “urban artifacts”. He says “We
have indicated the principal questions that arise in relation to an ur-
ban artifact -among them, individuality, locus, memory, design itself.
Function was not mentioned. I believe that any explanation of urban
artifacts in terms of function must be rejected if the issue is to elucidate
their structure and formation.”.155 Later, he explains his point further:
“More specifically, we reject that conception of functionalism dictat-
ed by an ingenuous empiricism which holds that functions bring form
together and in themselves constitute urban artifacts and architec- 153. Micha Bandini, “Aldo Rossi,” AA Files,
ture.”.156 He explains his stance in this paragraph: no. 1 (1981): 109.

154. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec-

“Although the doctrine of functionalism has earlier origins, it ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi-
was enunciated and applied clearly by Bronislaw Malinows- tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1,
(2003): 235.
ki, who refers explicitly to that which is man-made, to the ob-
ject, the house: “Take the human habitation… here again the 155. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
integral function of the object must be taken into account City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 46.
when the various phases of its technological construction and
the elements of its structure are studied.” From a beginning of 156. Ibid.

60
Figure 3.7: Doric Order, “Principi di architettura civile”, Francesco Milizia.

this sort one quickly descends to a consideration solely of the

purposes which man-made items, the object and the house,
serve. The question “for what purpose?” ends up as a simple
justification that prevents an analysis of what is real.”157

He also underlines the fact that we consider the function as a primary

and essential feature of an urban artifact causes us to undervalue the
importance of the “meaning” that a particular artifact embodies. He
says “For if urban artifacts present nothing but a problem of organi-
zation and classification, then they have neither continuity nor individ-
uality. Monuments and architecture have no reason to exist; they do
not “say” anything to us.”.158 Later, he quotes from Milizia:

“With respect to function itself, Milizia writes, “… because of

its enormous variety functional organization cannot always
be regulated by fixed and constant laws, and as a result
must always resist generalizations. For the most part, the most
renowned architects, when they wish to concern themselves
with functional organization, mainly produced drawings and
157. Ibid.
descriptions of their buildings rather than rules that could then
158. Ibid, 48. be learned.” This passage clearly shows how function is un-

61
Figure 3.8: A Drawing of Aldo Rossi.

derstood here as a relationship and not a scheme of orga-

nization; in fact, as such it is rejected. But this attitude did
not preclude a contemporaneous search for rules that might
transmit principles of architecture.”159

Here, he criticizes the existing understanding of function as a scheme

of organization and rejects it. Instead, he proposes Milizia’s under-
standing which is a non-generalizable relationship between archi-
tecture and the individual.

Before examining further, we need to understand the importance

of Pierre Lavedan’s and Marcel Poëte’s works. Pierre Lavedan , is a
French historian and town planner . Marcel Poëte was a multifaceted in-
dividual known for his exceptional contributions as a librarian, historian,
and urban planning theoretician. Born with a fervent passion for knowl-
edge and the preservation of culture, Poëte’s career in librarianship flour-
ished, allowing him to become a custodian of valuable historical texts
and a facilitator of scholarly pursuits. Rossi explains the importance of
Lavedan’s and Poëte’s work with these words:
159. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
“From the street, Poëte’s analysis passes to the urban land, which Original: 1966), 54-55.

62
 contains natural artifacts as well as civic ones and becomes
associated with the composition of the city. In the urban
composition, everything must express as faithfully as possible
the particular life of the collective organism. At the basis of
this organism that is the city is the persistence of the plan.

This concept of persistence is fundamental to the theory of

Poëte; it also informs the analysis of Pierre Lavedan, one of
the most complete analyses available to us, with its inter-
posing of elements drawn from geography and the history
of architecture. In Lavedan, persistence is the generator of
the plan, and this generator becomes the principal object of
urban research because through an understanding of it one
can rediscover the spatial formation of the city. The genera-
tor embodies a concept of persistence which is reflected in
a city’s physical structures, streets, and urban monuments.”160

Rossi opens up the concept of “urban artifact”. Firstly, he explains

the concept of “structure” and the relation between form and
function by the reference to Lavedan’s work:

“Structure, as Lavedan understands it, means the structure

of urban artifacts, and in this way it resembles Poete’s
concept of the persistence of the plan and the plan as
a generator. As this generator is by nature both real and
abstract, it cannot be catalogued like a function. More-
over, since every function can be articulated through a
form, and forms in turn contain the potential to exist as ur-
ban artifacts, one can say that forms tend to allow them-
selves to be articulated as urban elements; thus if a form
is articulated at all, one can assume that a specific urban
artifact persists together with it, and that it is precisely a
form that persists through a set of transformations which
constitutes an urban artifact par excellence.”161

Then he explains the notion of his perspective to this relation be-

tween form and function:

“I have already made a critique of naive functionalist

classifications; I repeat, at times they are acceptable, so
long as they remain within the handbooks of architec-
ture to which they are appropriate. Such classifications
presuppose that all urban artifacts are created to serve
160. Ibid, 51.
particular functions in a static way and that their struc-
161. Ibid, 55. ture precisely coincides with the function they perform

63
 at a certain moment. I maintain, on the contrary, that the
city is something that persists through its transformations, and
that the complex or simple transformations of functions that it
gradually undergoes are moments in the reality of its struc-
ture.”162

Here, we can understand that function is not a major element of an

urban artifact from Rossi’s perspective. As a matter of fact, it “persists”
through its transformations. Thus, he describes the value of an urban
artifact as what persists after a functional transformation. This kind of
rejection of function, certainly, gets a lot of criticism, especially about
the “rationality” of his stance. In the book, Rossi responds to these
critiques as well:

“The terminology of the so-called rationalist variety is no less

imprecise. To speak of rational urbanism is simply a tautology,
since the rationalization of spatial choices is by definition a con-
dition of urbanism. “Rationalist” definitions have the undoubted
merit, however, of always referring to urbanism as a discipline
(precisely because of its character of rationality) and thus offer a
terminology of clearly superior usefulness.”163

Later, Rossi examines the role of persistence with a question: “In what
way did the ancient city become the origin of the modern city?”.164 This
comparison leads him to an answer, “Such a transformation could not
have occurred except within or around the ancient cities, since these
represented a man-made complex, a halfway point between artifice
and nature, meaning to give permanences: they are a past that we are
still experiencing.”.165 Then he explains his perspective through the theory
of Poëte in the context of “persistences”:

“Poëte’s theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will try to
summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number of hypoth-
eses among which are economic considerations that relate to
the evolution of the city, it is in substance a historical theory cen-
tered on the phenomenon of “persistences.” These persistences
are revealed through monuments, the physical signs of the past,
as well as through the persistence of a city’s basic layout and
plans. This last point is Poëte’s most important discovery. Cities 162. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
tend to remain on their axes of development, maintaining the City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 55-56.
position of their original layout and growing according to the
direction and meaning of their older artifacts, which often ap- 163. Ibid, 56.
pear remote from present-day ones. Sometimes these artifacts
164. Ibid, 57.
persist virtually unchanged, endowed with a continuous vitality;
other times they exhaust themselves, and then only the perma- 165. Ibid, 57-59.

64
Figure 3.9: Untitled Architectural Drawing, Aldo Rossi.

nence of their form, their physical sign, their locus remains. The
most meaningful permanences are those provided by the street
and the plan. The plan persists at different levels; it becomes
differentiated in its attributes, often deformed, but in substance,
it is not displaced. This is the most valid part of Poëte’s theory;
even if it cannot be said to be completely a historical theory, it is
essentially born from the study of history.”166

Thus, we understand many points of Rossi’s perspective. One of which

is that we understand, on a deeper level, he relates the “persistences”
with historicity. He considers Poëte’s “most important discovery” as the
persistence of a city’s “basic layout” and “plans”. Here, we see that
his understanding of “persistence” is an informational value, rather
than a physical one.

Rossi points out another important notion of his perspective, later in

the book. This is the relation between persistences and the continuity
of urban change and development. He says “In contextual preserva-
tion there is a sort of urban naturalism at work which admittedly can
give rise to suggestive images -for example, a visit to a dead city
166. Ibid, 59. is always a memorable experience- but in such cases we are well

65
Figure 3.10: Application of écorché to architectural drawings, examples from the Dictionnaire, Viollet-le-Duc,1875.

outside the realm of a past that we still experience. Naturally, then, I

am referring mainly to living cities which have an uninterrupted span
of development.”.167 Here we can understand that what he means by
“persistence” is not a static state-of-being, but rather a dynamic and
adaptable nature of urban artifacts. We can see this notion later in
this chapter: “I mainly want to establish at this point that the dynamic
process of the city tends more to evolution than preservation, and
that in evolution monuments are not only preserved but continuously
presented as propelling elements of development.”.168 Later, he starts
to explore specifically which features serves for this purpose of evo-
lution in the urban development process. He says “We have called
these urban elements, which are of a dominant nature, primary ele-
ments because they participate in the evolution of the city over time 167. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
in a permanent way, often becoming identified with the major arti- nal: 1966), 60.
facts constituting the city. The union of these primary elements with an
area, in terms of location and construction, permanence of plan and 168. Ibid, 60.
permanence of building, natural artifacts and constructed artifacts, 169. Ibid, 86.
constitutes a whole which is the physical structure of the city.”.169 Jo
mentions this notion and says “For Rossi, within an urban environment 170. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec-
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi-
there are some primary elements(monuments) with the collective tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1,
memory of the urban populace.”.170 He points out the primary func- (2003): 235.

66
 tions of a city to search a definition for “primary elements”: “When
we study a city, we find that the urban whole tends to be divided
according to three principal functions: housing, fixed activities, and
circulation.”.171 One of these functions is, later, he relates with “prima-
ry elements”. This function is “fixed activities”. He explains this term:
““Fixed activities” include stores, public and commercial buildings,
universities, hospitals, and schools. In addition, the urban literature
also speaks of urban equipment urban standards, services, and infra-
structures.”.172 Later, he explains the relation between “fixed activities”
and “primary elements” as well:

“I use the term fixed activities because the notion is gener-

ally accepted. But even if in speaking of fixed activities and
primary elements we partly refer to the same thing, the two
terms presuppose entirely different ways of conceptualizing
the urban structure. What they have in common is that both
refer to the public, collective character of urban elements, to
the characteristic fact of public things that they are made by
the collective for the collective and are by nature essentially
urban. Whatever reduction of urban reality we make, we
always arrive at the collective aspect; it seems to constitute
the beginning and end point of the city.”173

Here, he underlines the collective nature of these primary elements

which we already mentioned are, by definition, persistent in the evo-
lution of the city. Actually, it is not only a matter of persistence, these
elements also are fertile and generative in the context of the creation
of the new city. Rossi mentions this notion in the latter part of the same
chapter: “In this sense a historical building can be understood as a
primary urban artifact; it may be disconnected from its original func-
tion, or over time take on functions different from those for which it
was designed, but its quality as an urban artifact, as a generator
of a form of the city, remains constant. In this sense, monuments are
always primary elements.”.174

171. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City In the context of value among primary elements, Rossi puts “monu-
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi- ments” before anything else. He explains this with these words: “A
nal: 1966), 86.
monument stands at a center. It is usually surrounded by buildings and
172. Ibid. becomes a place of attraction. We have said that it is a primary ele-
ment, but of a special type: that is, it is typical in that it summarizes all of
173. Ibid.
the questions posed by the city, but it is special because by virtue of its
174. Ibid, 87. form its value goes beyond economics and function.”.175 The reason-
ing behind this is later explained in the “Locus” chapter of Rossi’s book.
175. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; However, before this explanation, the importance of the relation be-
Original: 1966), 92. tween the city and the history in Rossi’s work should be understood:

67
 “The history of the city is always inseparable from its geog-
raphy; without both we cannot understand that architecture
that is the physical sign of this “human thing”. “The art of ar-
chitecture,” wrote Viollet-le-Duc, “is a human creation,” and
again, “Architecture, this human creation, is, in fact, only an
application of principles born outside us and which we ap-
propriate to ourselves by observation.” These principles are
in the city; the stone landscape of building -of “brick and
mortar,” in C.B. Fawcett’s expression- symbolizes the conti-
nuity of a community.”176

Later, he explains further this notion in the “The Locus” chapter. He

says “The locus is a relationship between a certain specific location
and the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and universal.”.177
This singularity and universality, naturally, create a unique value to a
place that is nourished by its memory and history. He explains this with
these words: “In his general theory of architecture, the locus partici-
pates as a unique and physical place.”.178 Later, he also mentions this
value and says “The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions
and qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary for
understanding an urban artifact.”.179 Then, he underlines the relation
between “locus” and “history” and says “As is evident, the substitution
of Gothic art as place for Gothic landscape is of enormous impor-
tance. In this sense, the building, the monument, and the city become
human things par excellence; and as such, they are profoundly linked
to an original occurrence, to a first sign, to composition, permanence,
and evolution, and to both chance and tradition. As the first inhab-
itants fashioned an environment for themselves, they also formed a
place and established its uniqueness.”.180 This relation is not a modern
relation we create. This is embedded in the necessity of architecture
throughout history. He makes this point in this passage:

“The comments of the theoreticians on the framing of the

landscape in painting, the sureness with which the Romans
repeated certain elements in their building of new cities,
acknowledging in the locus the potential for transformation
-these and many other facts cause us to intuit the importance
176. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
of certain artifacts; and when we consider information of this City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
type, we realize why architecture was so important in the Original: 1966), 97.
ancient world and in the Renaissance. It shaped a context.
177. Ibid, 103.
Its forms changed together with the larger changes of a site,
participating in the constitution of a whole and serving an 178. Ibid, 103.
overall event, while at the same time constituting an event
179. Ibid, 103.
in itself. Only in this way can we understand the importance
of an obelisk, a column, a tombstone. Who can distinguish 180. Ibid, 106.

68
Figure 3.11: A Child’s Grave, Hale County, Alabama, 1936, Photo by Walker Evans.

anymore between an event and the sign that marks it?”181

Now, we can see the reasoning behind the importance of “monu-

ments” among other primary elements in Rossi’s perspective. In the
essence of the city, he defines two main elements that create the city
as a man-made object:

“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where

does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its
function, its memory, or in something else again? We can
now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has
marked the event.”182

This understanding of “what a city is” coincides with the understand-

ing of “what architecture is” in Rossi’s thought world. He explains this
notion in this passage:

“It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf

Loos: “If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide
181. Ibid, 106.
in the forest, formed into a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we
182. Ibid, 106. become serious and something in us says, “someone lies

69
 buried here.”. That is architecture.” The mound six feet long *The Italian fatto urbano comes from the
French faite urbaine. Neither the Italian
and three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure archi- nor the English translation “urban artifact”
tecture precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is (also used by Sir John Summerson in an
only in the history of architecture that a separation between essay of 1963 entitled “Urban Forms,”
see note 7, chapter l) adequately renders
the original element and its various forms occurred. From this the full meaning of the original, which im-
separation, which the ancient world seemingly resolved for- plies not just a physical thing in the city,
ever, derives the universally acknowledged character of per- but all of its history, geography, structure,
and connection with the general life of
manence of those first forms.”183 the city. This meaning is the one intended
throughout this book.
Another important primary element in Rossi’s perspective is “plan”. -Ed.
Before he starts describing the role of plan as a primary element in
the city, he explains the architectural and urban stance towards the
“plan”: “We know that many geographical or urbanistic texts classify
cities into two large families: planned and unplanned. “In urban stud-
ies it is usual to emphasize as primary the difference between planned
and unplanned towns. The former has been conceived and founded
as towns, whereas the latter have emerged without conscious plan-
ning. They are settlements that have grown and been adapted to
discharge urban functions. Their urban character has appeared in
the course of their growth, and their layout is essentially the product
of accretion of buildings about some pre-urban nucleus.” Thus writes
Arthur E. Smailes in his text on urban geography, as have many oth-
ers.”.184 After this short explanation, he explains his perspective: “Con-
sequently, I consider the plan to be a primary element, the equal of a
monument like a temple or a fortress. The nucleus of a planned city is
itself also a primary element; it does not matter whether it initiates an
urban process or characterizes it, as in Leningrad or in Ferrara. The
notion that the existence of a plan makes for a rigidly defined spatial
solution of a city from an overall perspective is very much debatable;
the plan is always but one moment of the city in the same way that
any other primary element is.”.185 Here, we can understand that the
value of the plan is not directly related to the order it brings to the
city, rather its value comes from the epochal and temporal features
of the plan which marks a specific timeframe in the city as it continues
to change and develop. He underlines this notion with these words:

“Whether the city grows around an ordered or disordered

nucleus or around a single artifact, then, does not make much
difference (although it surely raises different morphological 183. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
issues); both these conditions tend to constitute characteristic City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 107.
artifacts.”.186
184. Ibid, 99.
Rossi values the relation between the human and the urban artifact
185. Ibid, 99.
whether it is ordered or not. He says “Once again, all these con-
siderations are important only because behind them are artifacts 186. Ibid, 99-100.

70
 that show their direct connection to man. For the elements constitut-
ing the city -these urban artifacts which are by nature characteristic
and characterizing and as much a product of human activity as a
collective artifact- are among the most authentic human testimonies.
Naturally when we speak of these artifacts we are speaking of their
architecture, their meaning as a human creation.”.187 In this relation
between the urban artifacts and humankind, we understand a rela-
tion that works in both ways. Rossi describes this notion with a quo-
tation from a French scholar who was criticizing the French university:
“It is the architectural nothingness of the French university which made
me understand its intellectual and spiritual nothingness.”.188 Here, we
can understand that Rossi perceives architecture as a reflection of the
representation of humankind. Graziedei says “For Rossi, the pursuit of
architectural representation is in itself a way of addressing the issue
of mortality.”.189 Rossi sums this up in this passage: “I am not speaking
of the monumental character of these works of architecture, nor of
their stylistic aspects: I refer to their presence, their construction, their
history, in other words, to the nature of urban artifacts. Urban artifacts
have their own life, their own destiny.”.190

We can see Rossi goes on particular patterns over and over again.
There are two main concepts in his understanding of the city: “city as
a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”.

“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of

certain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repos-
itory of history. In this book we have made use of the histor-
ical method from two different points of view. In the first, the
city was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built
over time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discon-
tinuous way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology,
the history of architecture, and the histories of individual cit-
ies- the city yields very important information and documen-
tation. Cities become historical texts; in fact, to study urban
phenomena without the use of history is unimaginable, and
perhaps this is the only practical method available for under-
standing specific urban artifacts whose historical aspect is
187. Ibid, 100.
predominant. We have illustrated this thesis, in part the foun-
188. Ibid, 101. dation of this study, in the context of the theories of Poete and
Lavedan as well as in relation to the concept of permanence.
189. Robin M. Graziadei, “The Personal
is Universal: On Aldo Rossi’s Autobiogra-
phy,” Architectural Design, 89 (2019): 63. The second point of view sees history as the study of the ac-
tual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is comple-
190. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; mentary to the first and directly concerns not only the real
Original: 1966), 101. structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis

71
 of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagina-
tion. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately
linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be
confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople,
and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their
physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also
speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but
physically disappeared.”191

One may ask “What is the relation between “urban artifacts” and
“city as a work of art”?” or “in which context are these related?”. He
explains how he relates the “urban artifacts”* and “city as a work of
art” in the first chapter of the book:

“How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art?

All great manifestations of social life have in common with
the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life.
This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but
this is only a secondary difference because one is a product
of the public and the other is for the public: the public pro-
vides the common denominator.”192

Here, there is a significant notion of Rossi’s work. He also mentions

this relation between “life” and “architecture” later in the chapter
named “How Urban Elements Become Defined”. He says “The prin-
ciples of architecture are unique and immutable; but the responses
to different questions as they occur in actual situations, human situa-
tions, constantly vary. On the one hand, therefore, is the rationality of
architecture; on the other, the life of the works themselves.”.193 Here,
we can see that the value Rossi gives to this relation is equivalent to
the value he gives to the rationality of architecture. This is why Rossi
stands separately from the Early Modernists and Functionalists, on the
fundamental intellectual level. He says “To consider city and build-
ings separately, to interpret purely organizational functions in terms
of representation, is to return the discourse to a narrow functional-
ist vision of the city. This is a negative vision because it conceives
of buildings merely as scaffolding for functional variations, abstract
191. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
containers that embody whatever functions successively fill them.”.194 (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
He brings a new paradigm to the discourse of architecture. He says, nal: 1966), 127-128.
“I believe that we will not transcend functionalist theory until we rec-
192. Ibid, 33.
ognize the importance of both form and the rational processes of
architecture, seeing in form itself the capacity to embrace many dif- 193. Ibid, 116.
ferent values, meanings, and uses.”.195
194. Ibid, 118.

195. Ibid, 116.

72
 UNDERSTANDING CHRISTIAN NORBERG-SCHULZ

Christian Norberg-Schulz was an architectural theorist who was of-

ten related to architectural phenomenology and archetypes. Apart
from a few projects he participated in in the earlier years of his ca-
reer, he did not practice during his lifetime. Instead, he mostly focused
on theoretical and conceptual aspects of architecture, producing nu-
merous written works.

During his lifetime, Norberg-Schulz has written and contributed to the

writing of numerous books. These books were published mainly in En-
glish or Norwegian. Among these books, a few of which were quite
popular and also significant: “Existence, Space and Architecture”
(1971), “Genius Loci, Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture”
(1980), “The Concept of the Dwelling” (1985), and “Principles of Mod-
ern Architecture” (2000). In the article “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s
Phenomenological Project in Architecture”, Lebanese architect Elie
Haddad sums up the role of these books in Norberg-Schulz’s world
of thought: “While Norberg-Schulz started out with Intentions in Ar-
chitecture (1963), a work that was clearly influenced by structuralist
studies, he soon shifted to a phenomenological approach with Ex-
istence, Space and Architecture (1971), and then with Genius Loci
(1980) and The Concept of Dwelling (1985). He attempted through
this trilogy to lay down the foundations of a phenomenological inter-
pretation of architecture, with an underlying agenda that espoused
certain directions in contemporary architecture.”.196

Norberg-Schulz was influenced by several architects, theorists, and

philosophers. Without any doubt, the greatest impact on his work
came from German philosopher Martin Heidegger. He frequently
referred to Heidegger’s writings on architecture in his work. Haddad
mentions this situation in his article and says “It was this later Heide-
gger who would become influential among a number of architec-
tural theorists, namely Christian Norberg-Schulz, who was among
the first to attempt to translate this phenomenological approach in
architecture.”.197 In the article “The Critical Reception of Christian
Norberg-Schulz’s Writings on Heidegger and Place”, Rowan Wilk-
196. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project in en underlines this reference to the term “dwelling” in Heidegger’s
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review approach: “The role of architecture, according to Norberg-Schulz,
15, no. 1 (2010): 88. is to provide a “means to visualize the genius loci, and the task of the
197. Ibid, 89. architect is to create meaningful places, whereby he [sic] helps man
to dwell”.”.198 Norberg-Schulz was also heavily influenced by Swiss
198. Rowan Wilken, “The Critical Recep- architectural historian and critic Sigfried Giedion who was his tutor at
tion of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Writ-
ings on Heidegger and Place,” Architec- ETH Zurich. He was also affected by Walter Gropius and Mies van
tural Theory Review 18, no. 3 (2013): 342. der Rohe, especially in this early career.

73
In Norberg-Schulz’s work, the effect of “psychology” can be ob-
served as well. He was specifically interested in “Gestalt psychol-
ogy” which is a school of psychology founded in 20th-century. It
provided the foundation of the modern study of “perception”. In the
dictionary of Britannica, it is described with these words:

“Gestalt theory emphasizes that the whole of anything is

greater than its parts. That is, the attributes of the whole are
not deducible from analysis of the parts in isolation. The word
Gestalt is used in modern German to mean the way a thing
has been “placed,” or “put together.”.”199

In the article “The Heaven, the Earth and the Optic Array”, Akkelies van
Nes mentions this interest and says “Literature and art, phenomenology,
and Gestalt Psychology influence Norberg-Schulz’s work.”.200 Haddad
also mentions this interest in his article and says “Norberg-Schulz’s dis-
cussion of perception was largely influenced by Gestalt psychology, to
which were also added the socialization of perception and the process
of ‘‘schematization’’, that is the way in which perception leads to the con-
struction of an understanding of the world, based on the pioneering stud-
ies of Jean Piaget in child psychology.”.201 As Haddad mentions, Nor-
berg-Schulz’s works are also affected by Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget.
Piaget’s theory suggests that children actively construct their understanding
of the world through a series of stages, which are characterized by distinct
cognitive abilities and ways of thinking. According to Piaget, individuals
199. “Gestalt psychology,” Britannica, Ac-
actively construct their schemata through their interactions with the envi- cessed June 2, 2023, https://www.britan-
ronment. Initially, children have very basic schemata, but as they interact nica.com/science/Gestalt-psychology.
with and learn about the world, these schemata become more complex
200. Akkelies van Nes, “The Heaven,
and sophisticated. Schemata can be thought of as mental categories that the Earth and the Optic Array: Nor-
allow us to organize and interpret incoming information. They help us berg-Schulz’s Place Phenomenology and
recognize patterns, make predictions, and understand new experiences its Degree of Operationability,” Footprint
3 (2008): 114.
based on our existing knowledge. “Schemata” exists for various domains,
such as objects, actions, relationships, and concepts. Piaget proposed 201. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
that cognitive development involves two important processes: assimilation berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review
and accommodation. Assimilation occurs when individuals incorporate 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.
new information into existing schemata.202
202. Jean Piaget, The Construction Of Re-
ality In The Child, (New York : Ballantine
Norberg-Schulz was also affected by “semiology” which means “the Books, 1971), 395-402.
study of signs and sign-using behaviour” according to Britannica Dictio-
nary.203 In the article, Haddad says “This theory, influenced to a large 203. “semiotics,” Britannica, Accessed
June 2, 2023, https://www.britannica.
extent by Charles Morris’s interpretation of semiotics, constituted a similar com/science/semiotics.
attempt to develop a comprehensive structure—that is, an “architectural
totality” that would account for all the dimensions of architecture: the tech- 204. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
nical structure, environment, context, scale and ornament.”.204 In a book Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review
review of “Architecture: Meaning and Place”, Linda Krause sums up Nor- 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.

74
Figure 3.12: Diagrams of “Space cells. Closure, guiding walls”, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

berg-Schulz’s interests with these words: “He consults Gestalt psycholo-

gy, German existentialism, and, especially, elements from Heideggerian
phenomenology.”.205

In the later years of his career, he was also influenced by the book “The
Language of Architecture Postmodern” which was published in 1977 by
Charles Jencks. With this impact, he joined Po-Mo with enthusiasm and
excitement for new possibilities of expression. However, his excitement
didn’t last long. In the 1990s, due to the growing isolation of Postmodern
Movement, by pronouncing that it “was dissolved in playful superficiali-
ty”, he returned to a major study of fundamentals of modernity which we
later see in his last book “Principles of Modern Architecture”.206

Here, we need to underline the importance of this book “Principles

of Modern Architecture”. Although this is not the most known book of
205. Linda Krause, Journal of the Soci- Norberg-Schulz, it has a different value among his books because
ety of Architectural Historians 50, no. 2
(1991): 197. of the fact that this is the ultimate book he talks about and responds to
various Modernist arguments and sums up his stance in this context.
206. “Christian Norberg-Schulz,” Archi- Also, we can see how concepts like “genius loci” takes a role in the
tectuul, Accessed June 2, 2023, https://
architectuul.com/architect/christian-nor- context of other areas of discussion. Thus, we will examine this book
berg-schulz. with additional attention.

75
Figure 3.13: Bruder Klaus Field Chapel, Peter Zumthor.

The terms “archetypes” and “phenomenology” can be considered

as two main themes of Norberg-Schulz’s architectural writings. In the
“Free Plan” chapter of his last book, he mentions this notion and says:

“Our discussion of the phenomenology of the free plan has

shown that it may be subject to many interpretations which
are equally valid. In some cases a particular interpretation
has been worked out as a consistent “grammar” of design.
This is for instance the case in the works of Mies van der
Rohe, which illustrate implicit “rules” for the juxtaposition of
walls, openings, and furnishings, relative to a structural skel-
eton. A grammar which covers all the various versions of the
free plan, is however hardly possible.”207

Here, we can understand his recognition of this “grammar” of design

as well as the difficult possibility of such grammar. However, later in
the same chapter, he also says:
207. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
“In the daily work of the architect that means to have un- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 43.
derstood the phenomenology of the free plan, and to have
been trained in the use of its “grammar”.208 208. Ibid.

76
 Therefore, despite the difficulty, he considers “phenomenology” and
“grammar” as crucial necessities of architectural practice.

In the book “Existence, Space and Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz

defines 5 different concepts of space. He says “We have so far
distinguished between five space concepts: the pragmatic space of
physical action, the perceptual space of immediate orientation, the
existential space which forms man’s stable image of his environment,
the cognitive space of the physical world and the abstract space of
pure logical relations.”.209 Then, he further explains these concepts
and says: “Pragmatic space integrates man with his natural, “organic”
environment, perceptual space is essential to his identity as a person,
existential space makes him belong to a social and cultural totali-
ty, cognitive space means that he is able to think about space, and
logical space, finally, offers the tool to describe the others.”.210 He
describes the “existential space” in another paragraph:

“… we have within the psychological dimension to distinguish

between immediate perceptual space and the more stable
space schemata. The latter are composed of elements which
have a certain invariance, such as universal elementary
structures (archetypes) and socially or culturally conditioned
structures, and, of course, some personal idiosyncrasies. To-
gether these make up man’s “image” of this environment, that
is, a stable system of three-dimensional relations between
meaningful objects. We will therefore unify the schemata in
the concept existential space.”211

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers “existential

space” as a stable image of the environment which contains uni-
versal/archetypal structures, social/cultural structures, and personal
features. In the article “Heidegger and The Architecture of Projective
Involvement”, Kevin Berry describes “existential space” with similar
quotations from Norberg-Schulz and Frampton:

“Norberg-Schulz provides an example when he argues that

bodily orientation - which architecture shapes - produces an
orientation of a higher order: existential orientation. In one
passage, he succinctly explains how “existential space” is
built up from bodily experiences:

209. Ibid, 11. The vertical direction represents a rising-up or fall-

ing-down, and has since remote times been considered
210. Ibid, 11.
the sacred dimension of space. It represents a path to-
211. Ibid, 11. wards a reality which is higher or lower than daily life.

77
 The vertical axis, the axis mundi, is therefore an arche-
typal symbol of a passage from one cosmic region to
another. If verticality has something surreal about it, the
horizontal directions represent man’s concrete world of
action . . . The simplest model of man’s existential space
is then a horizontal plane pierced by a vertical axis. On
the plane man chooses and creates paths which give
his existential space a more particular structure.

Similarly, Frampton writes, “Man is not a dualistic being . . .

Since man has an asymmetrical physical structure with a top
and a bottom, a left and a right, and a front and a back,
the articulated world, in turn, naturally becomes a heteroge-
neous space.”.”212 (Figure 3.14)

Later, Norberg-Schulz defines “architectural space” as an addition

to this system. He defines the “architectural space” and says “On the
basis of a theory of “existential space”, I therefore develop the idea
that architectural space may be understood as a concretization of
environmental schemata or images, which form a necessary part of
man’s general orientation or “being in the world”.”.213 In the article
“On Being Moved by Architecture”, Jenefer Robinson describes
Norberg-Schulz’s approach with these words:

“In Genius Loci, Norberg-Schulz maintains that good archi-

tecture creates a “place,” an environment that has a mean-
ingful location (beside a river, surrounding a hilltop, or even
clinging to a mountain like La Paz, Bolivia), a sense of orien-
tation given by paths and foci such as the central piazza in
an Italian village or town, and a distinct character that estab-
lishes an identity both for itself and those who congregate in
it. Like Merleau-Ponty and Pallasmaa, Norberg-Schulz dis-
tinguishes between space as “mathematical concept” and
space with an “existential dimension”.”214
212. Kevin Berry, “Heidegger and The Ar-
chitecture Of Projective Involvement,” Log,
In another paragraph, Norberg-Schulz says “Architectural space, no. 42 (2018): 111.
therefore, can be defined as a concretization of man’s existential
213. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
space.”.215 These descriptions not only helps us to understand what is Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
“architectural space” according to Norberg-Schulz but also helps us 1971), 7.
to understand what is “existential space” as well. Haddad underlines
214. Jenefer Robinson, “On Being Moved
the importance of this in the book and says “…this work betrayed a by Architecture,” The Journal of Aesthetics
shift which would be translated later into a move towards a phenome- and Art Criticism 70, no. 4 (2012): 341.
nological approach. In the foreword, Norberg-Schulz announced, in
215. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
fact, a ‘‘new approach to the problem of architectural space’’, attempt- Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
ing to ‘‘develop the idea that architectural space may be understood 1971), 12.

78
Figure 3.14: The difference between
vertical and horiztonal dimension can
be observed on a Renaissance façade.
Palazzo Medici Riccardi, Michelozzo di as a concretization of environmental schemata or images, which form a
Bartolomeo, 1396-1472.
necessary part of man’s general orientation or “being in the world”.”.216
As we can see Haddad understands this notion of “being in the world”
as a “move towards a phenomenological approach”.

“Locality” is a frequently repeating concept in Norberg-Schulz’s ar-

chitecture. In the “New Regionalism” chapter of his book, he explains
the importance of “locality” and regional character, responding to
the opposing stance modernist architecture takes. He starts this chap-
ter with these words: “As all buildings form part of a concrete “here”,
they cannot be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular
qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality has been
recognized as the genius loci, and historical buildings normally had
216. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor- a distinct local flavor, although they often belonged to a general
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In “style”.”.217 Later, he points out the necessity for a “new regionalism”
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review and says, “We understand, thus, that the “new regionalism” implies
15, no. 1 (2010): 90.
something which goes beyond the demand for “context”; primarily it
217. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of means to become part of a tradition, in the sense of offering a new
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, interpretation of certain objects of human identification.”.218 Here, we
1988), 135.
can see he points out the new opportunities for a different paradigm
218. Ibid. of locality by saying “new interpretation of certain objects of human

79
Figure 3.15: An example given by Norberg-Schulz, Palomba Sabina, Lazio.

identification”. By “object”, he does not mean a form, he means an

“element” or a “character”. To better understand this notion, we can
observe this passage:

“What, then, are these objects? We have already suggested

the answer with the notion of genius loci. It follows from what
has been said above that the genius loci comprises more
than what is close at hand. “The buildings bring the earth
as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the same
time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the
expanse of the sky.”, Heidegger says. What is gathered by
a building, that is, by a man-made place, is an “inhabited
landscape”.”219

Here, we can understand he points out an internal value rather than

an external being. Also in this passage, we see the two important
concepts of Heidegger’s writings, “nearness” and “dwelling”, which
are key elements in Norberg-Schulz’s perspective towards architec-
ture as well. Later, he explains “inhabited landscape” further and says
219. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
“A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is a “lived Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
space” between earth and sky. First of all it reveals itself as a certain 1988), 135.

80
 Stimmung. This German word means something like “atmosphere” or
“character”, and moreover it says that man is gestimmt, “tuned”, by his
environment.”.220 Here, we encounter with a new term “Stimmung”
which is a German word for “atmosphere” as it says in the passage
as well. This term for “atmosphere” is also a commonly used word in
the phenomenological approach in architecture. In the article “Heide-
gger’s Thinking on Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz explains the term
“inhabited landscape” and says “An inhabited landscape obviously
is a known landscape, that is, something that is gewohnt. This land-
scape is brought close to us by the buildings, or in other words, the
landscape is revealed as what it is in truth.”.221 In the book “Christian
Norberg-Schulz’s Interpretation of Heidegger’s Philosophy”, Hendrik
Auret says “Christian Norberg-Schulz’s stedskunst mined the poetic
depths of understanding lived space in terms of Heidegger’s notion
of place. However, when it came to understanding the nature of lived
time, he relied on Sigfried Giedion’s formulation of time as continuity
and change.”.222 Thus, we can observe here how Norberg-Schulz
brings together the “locality” and “phenomenology” with the “bridge”
of Heidegger’s ideas. This notion will be clearer later in his book.

Here, we need to better understand the term “genius loci” to under-

stand how Norberg-Schulz realizes the concept of “locality”. In his
book, “Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Architecture”,
Norberg-Schulz explains “Genius loci is a Roman concept. Accord-
ing to ancient Roman belief every “independent” being has its genius,
its guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to people and places. It ac-
companies them from birth to death, and determines their character
or essence. Even the gods had their genius, a fact which illustrates
220. Ibid. the fundamental nature of the concept’’.”.223 Here, Norberg-Schulz
explains the etymological roots of the term “genius loci”. In his review
221. Christian Norberg-Schulz, “Heideg- of “Genius Loci”, Harris Forusz mentions this notion and says “Our
ger’s Thinking on Architecture,” Perspecta
20 (1983): 65. need to expand into the “meaning” of architecture, to understand this
spiritual quality that Norberg-Schulz perceives as being imbedded
222. Hendrik Auret, Christian Nor- in the context of place, is the central theme of this book.”.224
berg-Schulz’s Interpretation of Heideg-
ger’s Philosophy: Care, Place and Archi-
tecture (London: Routledge, 2019), 127. In the article “The “Genius Loci” of Hamar”, Ivo Strecker underlines
the deepness and complexity of the concept of “genius loci” and says
223. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius
Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Archi- “Nothing would be easier than to put Norberg-Schulz down, asking
tecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18. him what he literally means by genius loci and to define precisely,
possibly even in mathematical terms, the “spirit” of a particular place.
224. Harris Forusz, Review of Genius
Loci, by C. Norberg-Schulz, JAE 34, no. Yet this would be nothing but the “odious” tactic pointed up by Tyler
3 (1981): 32. above. The communicative intentions of Norberg-Schulz would be
obstructed and his potentially fruitful ideas would be lost.”.225 To bet-
225. Ivo Strecker, “The ‘Genius Loci’ of
Hamar,” Northeast African Studies 7, no. ter understand and analyze the meaning of the word, Wilken refers
3 (2000): 93–94. to the work of architectural historians Gunila Jiven and Peter Larkham:

81
 “According to Gunila Jiven and Peter Larkham’s reading of
Genius Loci, four “thematic levels” can be recognized in
Norberg-Schulz’s treatment of the concept of genius loci.
These are:
1. “the topography of the earth’s surface”;
2. “the cosmological light conditions and the sky as natural
conditions”;
3. “buildings”; and
4. “symbolic and existential meanings in the cultural land-
scape”.”226

Norberg-Schulz explains the nature of “genius loci” and says “How,

then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically in two ways,
which we may call “visualization” and “complementation”.”.227 These
two methods, “visualization” and “complementation” are the key el-
ements to understanding his approach. In this passage, he explains
these both terms in several aspects:

“The two modes may also be combined. Visualization is ex-

emplified by Italian hilltop towns which reveal the inherent
topographical structure, and complementation by an en-
closed man-made settlement, an “artificial oasis”, in the in-
finite desert. It is important to realize that neither of the modes
are cases of symbolization. Visualization and complementa-
tion produce forms which do not represent anything else, and
therefore may be considered fundamental architectural acts.
Vernacular architecture is in general based on these modes,
but the same also holds true for the great “monuments” of the
early civilizations. Thus Heidegger uses a Greek temple to
show how a building “opens up a world and gives to things
their look”. The forms which are related to a particular region
evidently possess similar properties, and become elements
of a tradition or “way of building”. Symbolization is therefore
a derivation from the original act of revelation, and a mean-
ingful language of architecture is not an arbitrary system of
conventional “sign”, but an interrelated set of visualizations
and complementations. Place is hence the point of depar-
tures of architecture, as well as its goal.”228 226. Rowan Wilken, “The Critical Recep-
tion of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Writ-
Here, several points are made. Firstly, he explains their relation with ings on Heidegger and Place,” Architec-
tural Theory Review 18, no. 3 (2013): 343.
“symbolization” in the conventional definition, which is a weak rela-
tion since “Visualization and complementation produce forms which 227. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
do not represent anything else…”. Then, he explains their relation with Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 135.
“typology” by saying “elements of a tradition” or “way of building”.
After this, he points out an interesting point. By redefining the term 228. Ibid.

82
Figure 3.16: Ancient Greek Temple at Paestum, Mahaffy John Pentland,1890.

“symbolization”, he establishes the relation between these two meth-

ods and “symbolization”. To Norberg-Schulz, “symbolization” is not
an “arbitrary system of conventional sign” but is an “interrelated set of
visualizations and complementations”. Thus, the point he makes in the
first sentences of the passage was directly aiming the conventional
understanding of “symbolization” and he proposes a new approach.

One of the concepts which take an important role in Norberg-Schulz’s

architecture is “nearness”. The term was first popularized by philoso-
pher Martin Heidegger as we already mentioned. Norberg-Schulz
often uses Heidegger’s vocabulary to express the relation of his
thoughts with Heidegger’s. In the “New Regionalism” chapter of his
last book “Principles of Modern Architecture”, he says “Things bring
the world close to man, and make it palpable and real. When we say
that “life takes place”, we thus imply that life has to be related to an
immediate “here”.”.229 Here, we can see his understanding of the rela-
tion between “life” and “place”. The point he makes is as “life” needs
a “place” to be, the “place” needs a “living” around itself to become
a place. This relation works both ways. Later, he underlines the impor-
tance of “imagination” to make place and explains it in this passage:
229. Ibid, 137.

83
Figure 3.17: The Roman division in quarters, The Concept of Dwelling, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

“The word “imagination” is certainly of fundamental impor-

tance when we consider architecture as a making of places. To
keep and embody an environmental character is not an intel-
lectual problem; it rather depends openness to the qualities of
the surroundings, and furthermore the ability to “translate” what
is “seen” into meaningful images. We could also say that the
new regionalism demands a phenomenological rather than a
scientific approach. Phenomenology is concerned with what is
“near”, and thus it links up with the aim of giving architecture a
new foundation in man’s immediate being-in-the-world.”230

Here, he gives us an important hint. He approaches the concept of “lo-

cality” as a “perceptional” term, rather than a “rational” one. Thus, new
regionalism should be shaped around the phenomenological approach,
rather than scientific, according to Norberg-Schulz. Norberg-Schulz also
mentions this notion about phenomenology in his book, “Intentions in Ar-
chitecture” as well. He explains this and says “Spontaneously, the world
consists of the phenomena, or our experiences.” We define according
to Jorgensen: “The word “phenomenon” designates every “something”
230. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
which may be experienced, and its contrary “nothing” does not desig- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
nate anything, but expresses that I do not experience anything, that is, 1988), 137.

84
 that nothing is present to me.”. 231 Here, we can understand his basis of a
“thing” is an interaction or a reflection it creates with the subject.

Later, Norberg-Schulz explains “New Regionalism” further and starts

to give us details about his approach. He says “A study of folk ar-
chitecture reveals a series of basic typologies. The spatial layout of
farms and villages, thus, in general derives from three basic modes of
organization: centralization, succession and clustering.”.232 After this,
he explains these terms in a detailed manner in this passage:

“If we indicate the types on maps of the respective countries,

a meaningful relationship between the layout of the settle-
ments and the regions reveals itself. Clusters, thus, tend to be-
long to hilly and topographically complex landscapes, row
formations are usually found in valleys (or along rivers and
roads), and regular enclosures (round or square) on flat, ex-
tended lands. Thus architecture visualizes and complements
the spatial properties of the natural place.”233

Here, he explains the relation between “dwelling” and the environ-

ment in terms of visualization and complementation. He continues to
explain with another example:

“The interior spaces of folk architecture mostly represented a

complement to the natural environment. The white rooms of the
south offer a necessary relief in a hot and dry climate, whereas
the “rosepainted” interiors of the Norwegian peasant cottages
make life possible during a long, cold and colorless winter.”234

Here, we can understand that he sees a great value in the cultural and
geographical traditions of building knowledge which is accumulated
over a long time by the collective experience of the communities. After
this passage, he directly points out his stance on this notion:

“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have

231. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Intentions profited more from a study of these things, than from the ab-
in Architecture (Cambridge Mass: M.I.T. stract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus
Press, 1968), 28.
was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena
232. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”235
1988), 137.

233. Ibid, 139. Here, we can understand Norberg-Schulz considers the “phenom-
enological” approach as a better alternative to the “analytic” and
234. Ibid, 139.
“abstractive” approach like Bauhaus. In his review of “Genius Loci”,
235. Ibid, 139. Harris Forusz underlines this notion with these words:

85
 “The appeal that Christian Norberg-Schulz makes is that af-
ter decades of abstract, “scientific” theory it is urgent that we
return to a qualitative, phenomenological understanding of
architecture. The intent of this theoretical approach, which
draws on Norberg-Schulz’s broad experiences and exten-
sive knowledge base, is to reveal the “spirit of place,” which
he names from Classical Roman sources, “genius loci”.”236

Later, Norberg-Schulz points out an important notion about this stance

by a quotation on Sigfried Giedion on Alvar Aalto’s works: “When
Giedion called attention to the regional qualities in Alvar Aalto’s works,
he introduced the discussion with a few pages on the Finnish landscape
and architectural tradition of the country. Here we read: “Finland cov-
ered with its network of lakes and forests, suggests in its structure the
days of Creation, when water and earth were first separated.”. And,
indeed, hardly any other European country has preserved a stronger
sense of its origins. This sense does not only consist in a love for the
local landscape, but also in traditions which relate the natural environ-
ment to human life.”.237 Here, he underlines the value of the traditional
and geographical ways of building embedded in their relation with
human life. After this, he gives an example of Italian architect Paolo
Portoghesi to explain further. Firstly, he says “Already in his first works
Paolo Portoghesi wanted to re-interpret some of the basic themes of the
Italian tradition. The ENPAS-offices in Lucca (1958-62) recall the wall
articulation of a Baroque palazzo, whereas his Casa Baldi (1959-61)
at the outskirts of Rome also shows references to the local landscape
and the traditional building materials of the region.”.238 Then, he speci-
fies his point in the example of Casa Baldi in this passage:

“Casa Baldi, thus, represents a new kind of eclecticism, and

Portoghesi himself explained that he wanted to design an
“ambiguous building, open to many interpretations”. In his
explanatory text he also emphasized the “value of memory”,
and pointed out that a true work of architecture cannot exist
outside the tradition. He furthermore maintained that the his-
torical references present in Casa Baldi do not consist in iso-
lated motifs, but in methods of spatial organization and char-
236. Harris Forusz, Review of Genius
acterization which are still valid because they are “deeply Loci, by C. Norberg-Schulz, JAE 34, no.
rooted in each of us.”239 3 (1981): 32.

237. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of

Here, he makes two important points mainly. Firstly, he explains the Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
significance of the interpretation of Portoghesi in the context of histor- 1988), 141.
ical references. The other point is the aspect of understanding these
238. Ibid, 143.
historical references as the spatial organization and characterization
in the means of an “idiosyncrasy” which is “deeply rooted in each of 239. Ibid, 143.

86
Figure 3.18: A photo of Casa Baldi, Paolo Portoghesi.

us”. Later, he says “Together with Robert Venturi, Portoghesi certainly

was one of the first to point out the need for a new relationship to
place and history…”.240 Later, he gives the example of Ricardo Bofill
and says “Thus Bofill demonstrates that regional character resides in
how things are, and that a work of architecture may bring them close
to man by revealing their essence. In his book “L’architecture d’un
homme” Bofill emphasizes the importance of localization, and char-
acterizes his own work as a “brutal protest” against the international
style.”.241 Then, he gives the example of Jorn Utzon: “As visualizations
of earth and sky, they give back to architecture its basic “dimension”
as an art. The platforms of Utzon makes the earth become alive as a
concrete ground, which simultaneously offers a sense of belonging
and possibilities of movement.”.242 As you can see Norberg-Schulz
often uses this kind of point examples to introduce the vocabulary of
Heidegger for our understanding and explain his vision.

Later, Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of “New Region-

240. Ibid, 147. alism” by examining the works of his former professor, Sigfried Gie-
dion: “When Giedion launched the idea in 1954, he had already
241. Ibid, 151.
ten years earlier published an article entitled “The Need for a New
242. Ibid, 151. Monumentality”. Evidently he considered regionalism and monu-

87
Figure 3.19: A photo of “Les Espaces d’Abraxas”, Ricardo Bofill.

mentality two aspects of one general problem: the need for meaning
in architecture.”.243 After this, he underlines an important notion in Sig-
fried Giedion’s approach to regionalism in this passage:

“Giedion, however, emphasizes that the new regionalism

should not be confounded with the German Heimatstil based
on the “Blut und Boden” ideology of the Nazis. And, in fact,
there is a basic difference. Whereas the Nazis and similar
totalitarian regimes excluded the dimension of time, reducing
architecture to a set of “eternal” forms, the new regionalism
aims at ever new interpretations of the given environmental
qualities. Giedion therefore did not talk about a return to re-
gionalism, but about a new regionalism. The new regional-
ism is in other words creative rather than nostalgic.”244

Another outstanding chapter in Norberg-Schulz’s book “Principles of

Modern Architecture” is “New Monumentality”. He starts this chap-
ter with these words: “The term monumentality implies that we expect 243. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
something more from our buildings than more “functional” fulfillment. Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 151.
We also want that architecture should “mean” something. “The walls
rise towards heaven in such a way that I am moved.”, Le Corbusier 244. Ibid, 151.

88
 wrote, “that is architecture.”.”.245 He starts by drawing our attention
to the necessity of “meaning” in architecture. Wilken underlines this
notion and says “Norberg-Schulz’s overarching claim is that “when
all the components seem to embody basic existential meanings, we
may talk about a ‘strong’ place”.”.246 Forusz mentions this notion with
these words: “Norberg-Schulz believes that beyond the pragmatic
and the experiential aspects of architecture there is a specific need
for a metaphysical belief in architecture, an aspect which can con-
tribute to the architect’s understanding of the existential “meaning” of
place.”.247 Almost referring to these “metaphysical” aspect of archi-
tecture, Norberg-Schulz continues with a quotation from Giedion:

“Monumentality springs from the eternal need of people to

create symbols for their activities and for their fate or destiny,
for their religious beliefs and for their social countries where
modern architecture has monumentality.”248

After this, he explains the etymology of the word “monumentality” and

says “The Latin monumentatum simply means “things that remind,” or,
in other words, things that have an enduring significance.”.249 Under-
lining this kind of definition gives us a hint about his understanding of
monumentality which is similar to the concepts of “event” & “sign” in
Rossi’s understanding. Then, he says “If one however prefers to use a
less loaded expression, one might say “meaning in architecture”. The
quotation from Giedion suggests that meanings are expressed by
means of “symbols”, and symbolization has in fact become a primary
concern of the present. As we already pointed out, symbolization
implies the need for a consistent language of “images”.”.250 Here,
he directly points out this relation with “meaning in architecture”. He
also gives us a new term that we will often come across in his writings,
245. Ibid, 153. “language of images”. He already mentioned “grammar” of design in
246. Rowan Wilken, “The Critical Recep- the previous chapter, and now he mentions “language” of images. As
tion of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Writ- you can see there is a degree of similarity he sees between literature
ings on Heidegger and Place,” Architec- and architecture. This notion can be seen in the term “universal gram-
tural Theory Review 18, no. 3 (2013): 344.
mar” which was presented by linguist Noam Chomsky to explain the
247. Harris Forusz, Review of Genius Loci, term “deep structure” of Carl Jung in linguistics. Chomsky describes
by C. Norberg-Schulz, JAE 34, no. 3 “universal grammar” as the knowledge of human beings inherent in
(1981): 32.
language, immanent in language, common in all languages.
248. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, Later, Norberg-Schulz asks a question: “What is for instance the
1988), 153.
meaning of words such as “sign”, “symbol” and “image” in relation to
249. Ibid. architecture, and what is the role of “memory” and “enduring signifi-
cance” in a world of openness and change?”.251 Then, he responds
250. Ibid.
with a quotation by Heidegger: “The poetical understanding which
251. Ibid. is manifest in the image, is preserved in language. “Language is the

89
house of Being”, Heidegger says, and, “man speaks only as he re-
sponds to language”.”.252 Thus, he considers “language” as kind of a
reference system to “be” and to “express”, in the most general terms.

Norberg-Schulz also talks about “archetypes” in this chapter. Right

after explaining “language of images”, he makes quite important
points in this passage:

“Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality

of the world. The architectural language consists of arche-
typal images that reveal those structures which are invariant
with respect to place and time. The archetypes are not forms
which exist in some distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich.
Rather they represent basic modes of being in the world, or
“existential structures”. As a matter of fact the archetypes do
not exist at all, only their various manifestations. A “typical”
tower, thus, does not exist, but “towerness” is revealed in its
multifarious aspects by means of ever new tower-images.
Thus the work of architecture becomes “an offering to Ar-
chitecture”. These words of Louis Kahn suggest that it is pos-
sible and meaningful to talk about architecture in general,
although only single works exist.”253

Here, there are a few points that need explanation. One of which
is the meaning of “Ding an sich”. It is a term in Kantian philosophy
that means “the-thing-in-itself” in German. Another point is the fact
that Norberg perceives the “archetype” as an abstract idea, rather
than a material being. Then, he explains his stance on architectural
language and style:
“There can only be one architectural language, since there is
only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is basically
only one spoken language, although there are many “tongues”.)
The styles represent different choices within the one and same
language, or, in Heidegger’s terms, different responses to Lan-
guage. Thus we have three systems of images:
language, which consists of invariant archetypes,
style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and
tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes.”254

Here, there is an important notion of Norberg-Schulz’s perspec-

252. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
tive. As you can see, he considers all three systems of images as Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
derivatives of “archetypes”. This notion can be understood as Nor- 1988), 153.
berg-Schulz perceives archetypes as a fundamental component of
253. Ibid.
architecture, like letters or words in literature. He also responds to a
predictable question about how a tradition of a certain locality, or a 254. Ibid.

90
Figure 3.20: Engravings, “In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?”, Heinrich Hübsch.

style of a historical period can originate from a concept of universal-

ity like archetypes. He responds, “It may also happen that a tradition
corresponds so closely to the archetypes, that it may be used outside
the place or region where it originated.”.255 Here, we assume that
he is referring to specific cultures which gained universal value in the
history of humankind, like Ancient Greek or Ancient Roman architec-
ture. Also, traditional Japanese architecture can be an example, if we
consider its relation with Modern architecture. Then, he explains this
notion about style and tradition further in this passage:

“Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as

systems of types. In order to have an existential foundation,
these types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the
general language. Basically a type is not a sign or a met-
aphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which
possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation.”256

Norberg-Schulz’s perspective on this notion can create several ques-

tions in the definitive aspect of archetypes. To better understand this
255. Ibid.
perspective, we need to get a grip on his understanding of arche-
256. Ibid. types. This was predicted by Norberg-Schulz. Thus, he explains his

91
Figure 3.21: Drawings of Ancient Egyptian Architecture, “De l’architecture égyptienne”, Quatremère de Quincy.

understanding of archetypes after the last passage. He specifically

dwells on the archetype’s being “a priori” feature and he explains his
stance in this passage:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for

all, whereas the other considers the types a result of gener-
alization and historical development. In a certain sense both
hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant
interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The
temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and
changed through experience and experiment. The important
point is however, as we have already asserted, that they re-
ceive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic
meaning consists in their being variations on a “theme”.”257

Norberg-Schulz underlines there are two main aspects to the under-

standing of “types”. One of which is “something given a priori once for
all”, which takes us to a metaphysical field which is commonly related
to Platonic philosophy. On the other hand, he mentions the other per-
257. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
spective which is a “result of generalization and historical development”, Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
which takes us to a materialistic understanding of this notion which can be 1988), 155.

92
 related to Aristotelian philosophy. Here, he takes a dualist stance on this
notion and says, “In a certain sense both hypotheses are correct.”, which
is an important point to understand. In his explanation, on the one hand,
archetypes are “interworldly” structures that are not present in the phys-
ical world, just like Plato’s world of ideas. On the other hand, types are
“developed” and “changed” with “experience” and “experiment”. Later,
he says “Modern architecture wanted to return to the “beginning as if
nothing had ever been done before”. One did not recognize, however,
that this can only mean a new interpretation of the archetypes.”.258 Here,
we can see that his understanding of archetypes are as a fundamental
component of architecture as we mentioned before. Thus, he criticizes
“functionalism” for denying this notion, and says: “Functionalism, thus, did
not accept the existential roots which give architecture its meaning.”.259

This notion is an important point in Norberg-Schulz’s perspective.

However, when we discuss and examine it in the conceptual field, it
can easily become quite a complex discourse. This is why this pas-
sage is important to understand his stance since he is explaining his
understanding of types with a direct example of an existing situation:

“In Egypt the conditions of the land itself suggests a compre-

hensive, “cosmic” order. Hardly any other country possesses
a geographical structure of such simplicity and regularity. The
lifegiving Nile flowing from the south to the north and the ever
present sun rising in the east and setting in the west, are the ba-
sic elements. A pair of orthogonal axes is thus indicated. The
south-north direction is furthermore emphasized by the long
and narrow Nile valley delimited by deserts on either side.
The climate is dry and stable, and together with the regular
flooding of the river, it seems to indicate eternal permanence.
“Order” and “constancy” in fact denote the fundamental
properties of the Egyptian world, and architecture served to
give it concrete presence. Stone was selected as the main
building material, because it is hard and resistant to decay,
and its natural character was enhanced by smooth surfaces
and sharp edges. A general system of symbolic organiza-
tion was developed, in which the horizontal axes are com-
bined with the vertical direction to form a regular and uniform
space. In the pyramid this understanding of the world was set
into work as a balanced synthesis of vertical and horizontal
forces. At the same time its incomparably massive and solid
construction seems to embody strength and permanence. The
pyramid, however, was the goal of a spatial sequence which
258. Ibid.
comprised two other typical images: the regular hypostyle
259. Ibid. hall, where orthogonal space is fixed and visualized, and the

93
 axial causeway, which gives directed movement concrete
presence. Finally, Egyptian architecture realized the obvious
complement to the desert: the artificial oasis of the walled en-
closure. A comprehensive inventory of archetypal forms is thus
set into work: grid, path, center and enclosure.”260

The important notion is the relation between the values of a culture

and the conditions this culture was in. Haddad underlines this view
with these words: “Specifically, Norberg-Schulz stressed the con-
nection between the man-made world and the natural world, his-
torically evident in various places and environments from around the
world.”.261 To Norberg-Schulz, this is directly related to the “order” of
the community as the means of organization. Krause underlines this
and says “…meaning for Norberg-Schulz springs from certain of our
physical and psychological predispositions. Citing Gestalt psychol-
ogy and Jean Piaget, he claims that the built environment expresses
the innate and precognitive human activity of ordering and sorting.
Thus, meaningful architecture expresses order, hierarchy, and classi-
fication.”.262 After this passage, he starts to compare the values and
conditions of Ancient Egypt with the values and conditions of Ancient
Greek and explains his understanding behind the reasoning of the
differences between these two cultures and geographies. Then, he
focuses on the Greek temple:

“The existential understanding which is expressed by the Greek

pantheon, was visualized by the temple. Basically, all Greek
temples belong to the same “family”, and may be described
as plastic bodies, where the articulation and detailing deter-
mine an appropriate character. The character is “condensed”
in the “order”, that is, the column and its entablature.”263

Here, he underlines the “order” as a well-known feature of Ancient 260. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Greek architecture. He relates the “order” in architecture to the or- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
der of a culture. This order is deeply related to the “meaning”. Nor- 1988), 157.
berg-Schulz explains this notion and he says, “In the temple, the order 261. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
plays a constituent role, that is, the character it embodies is given a berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
“pure”, dominant presence. In other Greek buildings the orders are Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review
15, no. 1 (2010): 93.
rather used as “characterizing elements” which do not constitute the
structure, but relate it to a world of meanings.”.264 Norberg-Schulz 262. Linda Krause, Journal of the Soci-
considers this notion as a significant point to understanding the rela- ety of Architectural Historians 50, no. 2
(1991): 197.
tion between “locality” and “universality” of architecture. He explains
this with a quotation from Heidegger: 263. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 157.
“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete
presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”, 264. Ibid.

94
Figure 3.22: Drawing of Ancient Greek Homes, Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand,1800.

Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work

of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world
and at the same time sets this world back again on earth,
which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”.”265

We can see that Norberg-Schulz understands this “order” in Greek

architecture as an element of “locality” and an element of “universal-
ity” at the same time. He says, “Greek orders are rooted in concrete
places, but their meaning is universal.”.266 Then, he concludes this
subject with these words in this passage:

“We understand that the spatial types remain mute until they are
“set back on earth” and given presence by means of the orders.
Thus “the temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look
and to men their outlook on themselves”, Heidegger says.”267

After these points Norberg-Schulz made on Ancient Egypt and An-

265. Ibid. cient Greek architecture, he draws our attention to Ancient Roman
architecture. Firstly, he mentions Etruscan necropolises and their ex-
266. Ibid.
cavated rooms with “cave-like” interiors. He explains the importance
267. Ibid. of these “entire cities for dead” with a quotation from Austrian arche-

95
Figure 3.23: Ancient Roman House, Georg Rehlender, 1894.

ologist Kaschnitz von Weinberg: “The man who excavates a space

in the soft rock does not construct an “opposite” which, like the Greek
temple, faces him.”, Kaschnitz von Weinberg wrote, “he rather pene-
trates into amorphous matter, and his creative activity consists in mak-
ing for himself an existential space.”.”.268

A few passages ago, at the end of the passage on Ancient Egypt,

Norberg-Schulz says “A comprehensive inventory of archetypal
forms is thus set into work: grid, path, center and enclosure.”.269 Nor-
berg-Schulz uses this inventory as a template to understand these
Ancient civilizations’ architecture. He underlines the “order” he under-
stands in Ancient Roman architecture:

“The Romans thus imagined the world as a total, embracing

space, organized by means of an orthogonal set of horizon-
tal and vertical axes, and characterized by applied Greek
268. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
orders. The Pantheon in Rome (120 A.D.) visualizes this con- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
ception in a grand and easily comprehensible way. Here an 1988), 161.
archetypal image as powerful as the Greek temple makes
269. Ibid, 157.
itself manifest, and the Pantheon therefore became one of the
prototypes of western architecture.”270 270. Ibid, 161.

96
 Here, he underlines the relation between Greek and Roman archi-
tecture. He also creates a continuous connection from Ancient Greek
architecture to Western architecture which he will further develop lat-
er in the book. Then, he explains the importance of “basilica” in the
context of this continuity:

“The basilica is another Roman type of basic importance. Here

the content is not the structure of the world as such, but man’s
being in this world as destiny and project, understood as a
path which leads him along, on the earth and under the sky.
The basilica, thus, consists of two superimposed zones which
accompany the longitudinal axis; the lower is “populated” by
anthropomorphic columns while the upper is related to the sky
by means of decoration and light entering from above.”271

Norberg-Schulz explains the main features and orders of a basilica.

After explaining the importance of the basilica, he underlines its con-
nection with churches in the context of his “inventory of archetypal
forms”:

“From the very outset a few profoundly symbolic spatial struc-

tures were used for the building of churches: the concept of
“center” and “path”, which were imagined in terms of the Ro-
man rotunda and basilica. The church proper was based on
the longitudinal basilica which was interpreted as an expres-
sion of the “path of salvation”, whereas a centralized space
was used when the building task was a baptistry, mausoleum
or martyrium, that is, the “before” and “after” of earthly life.”272

Here, we can see there are several features and orders of the Roman
“basilica” and “rotunda” that inspired the Christian churches. Thus, Nor-
berg-Schulz considers there is a great value in such relation in architec-
ture in the course of history. He underlines this notion with these words:
“Thus a temporal understanding of a complete world of earth, sky, man
and divinity is concretized, and architecture becomes a true imago
mundi.”.273 Here, we understand Norberg-Schulz sees architecture as
a tool that “concretizes” the periodical understanding and meaning of
existence and carries it through time, thus, giving us a chance to see the
whole. After this standpoint, he continues to example:

“The “logic” of Gothic architecture visualizes the hierarchy

271. Ibid, 161. of parts explained by scholastic philosophy, whereas in Re-
naissance buildings we encounter the logic of an eternal
272. Ibid, 163.
geometrical order. Perfection of form thus replaced symbolic
273. Ibid, 163. integration. According to Alberti, the most perfect and there-

97
 fore most divine form is the circle, and centralized buildings
therefore came to visualize cosmic order.”274

As we see in this passage as well as the passage about Ancient Egypt,

he underlines the reference of “cosmic order” which is not a certain mat-
ter of fact, but rather a concept that periodically changes in the course of
history. Thus, he creates the relation between “order” and “type”:

“A type was not considered a fixed ideal, but a kind of living,

complex thing which, within certain limits, offered an infinite
possibility of variation. When the analytic-scientific attitude of
the Enlightenment was adopted by architects and theorists,
an important change took place. For J.N.L. Durand, archi-
tecture became a mechanical putting together of fixed ele-
ments of a quasi-abstract nature. These parts constitute a set
of models to be imitated, and are arranged with the aid of
similarly abstract axes and networks of such. The notions of
character and image are thus abandoned and superseded
by mere quantification. The classical orders were degraded
into superficial decoration, and “style” became something
arbitrarily added to the building a posteriori.”275

To Norberg-Schulz, another feature of “monumentality” which is lack-

ing in Modern architecture is the “architectural image”. He explains
this by giving examples of Modern era architects and their connec-
tions with the traditional architecture, and he says in this passage:

“Furthermore, we have mentioned that the pioneers of the

modern movement in many cases had a positive attitude to
history. Le Corbusier repeatedly referred to the past in “Vers
une Architecture”, Mies van der Rohe praised the “wood-
en houses of old”, Frank Lloyd Wright was profoundly influ-
enced by the Japanese house. Giedion, finally, introduced
the concept of “constituent fact” to show how modern archi-
tecture had been prepared for by Borromini, Guarini and
other masters of the past. But a basic element was still lack-
ing: the architectural image.”276

Here, we can understand that he recognizes these connections and the

interpretations of Modern architects to be nourished and influenced by
274. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
the past. However, he points out the fact that all these interpretations Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
mainly lack “the architectural image” which he sees as essential for 1988, 165.
meaning in architecture. Furthermore, he mentions Le Corbusier’s Ron-
275. Ibid, 165.
champ chapel and says “Ronchamp is undoubtedly a great work of art
because it gathers a rich world of meanings and is capable of mov- 276. Ibid, 169.

98
Figure 3.24: A photo of Ronchamp chapel, Le Corbusier.

ing us, but still, it remains unique solution without typological value.”.277
Thus, he accepts there were interpretations to create an “architectur-
al image”, however, it remained in unique solutions which we can-
not benefit from in a typological way, as exampled in Ancient Greek
architecture. He determines the problem of Modern architecture on
the “architectural image” as lack of holistic approach in architecture
and he says “Thus modern architecture tended to oscillate between
abstract generalization and atypical particularization.”.278

Later, he asks the question “What, then, is the nature of a universal-

ly valid architectural image?”.279 Explaining this, he says “We have
mentioned the pyramid, the dome, the pediment and the arch as ex-
amples of such images. They reveal general relationships between
down and up, here and there, outside and inside, and are at the same
277. Ibid, 169. time easily recognizable.”.280 Furthermore, he says “We could also
say that the above-mentioned form are images because they possess
278. Ibid, 169.
a place-creating potentiality. Any place reveals a particular relation-
279. Ibid, 169. ship of earth and sky, and is constituted by architectural images. The
loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence
280. Ibid, 169.
a “loss of life”.”.281 Haddad mentions this notion and says “Here
281. Ibid, 169. Norberg-Schulz presented a pragmatic assessment of the problem,

99
Figure 3.25: Drawings of Trenton Bathhouse, Louis I. Kahn.

from the destruction of the “urban fabric” to the loss of character and
place.”.282 Thus, Norberg-Schulz underlines the necessity of arche-
types in such architecture through a quotation by Louis I. Kahn:

“Kahn used to say that the only volume of an encyclopedia

that really interested him was “volume number zero”. He also
said that he “loved beginnings”. It seems fair to interpret these
statements as expressions of a wish for a return to arche-
types, that is, for a return to what was there “before” history
and “before” styles.”283

However, although he gives Kahn as an example in the context of his

approach to architecture, he also criticizes Kahn’s architecture and
points out the deficiencies he observes: 282. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
“And still, something is lacking. Kahn’s images are certainly relat- Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review
15, no. 1 (2010): 95.
ed to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they
do not constitute any symbol system which responds to the lan- 283. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
guage of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 169.
for variation, combination and translocation of meanings.”284
284. Ibid.

100
 In this manner, Norberg-Schulz mentions two architects that he ad-
mires their works in this context in this sentence:

“Two architects have contributed in a particularly decisive

way to the recovery of the typical image, the American Rob-
ert Venturi and the Italian Aldo Rossi.”.285

Haddad mentions this connection and says “…he joined Venturi, Ja-
cobs, and Rossi in criticizing Modern Architecture for its shortcomings,
especially at the level of the urban environment.”.286 He, later, explains
the value he sees in their works. Firstly, he explains the value of Venturi’s
work, and he says “The resulting independence of form and function is
in the interest of a more effective functionalism, because our “allowing
form and function to go their separate ways permits function to be truly
functional.”.287 Thus, he considers there is a great value and potential
for a typical architectural image in the separation of “form” and “func-
tion”. Also, there are methodological similarities in Norberg-Schulz’s
work to Venturi’s. Haddad says “As in the case of Venturi, but using a
different approach, Norberg-Schulz returned to history in its wider
sense to give comparative examples of buildings, towns and land-
scapes as examples that naturally incorporate these qualities of ‘‘ex-
istential space’’, creating meaningful and wholistic environments.”.288

Later, Norberg-Schulz underlines the work of Rossi and says “His point
of departure is a wish for a typology which is commonly understand-
able and which may help us to recover the city as a “work of art”.”.289
285. Ibid. He also underlines the importance of the distinction between “type”
and “model” which was pointed out by Rossi for the first time. Also, in a
286. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In previous passage, Norberg says “When an architectural image unites
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review spatial and plastic qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which
15, no. 1 (2010): 91. forms part of a work of architecture.”.290 This term “architectural thing” is
287. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of quite relatable when we consider Rossi’s term “urban artifact”.
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 169. However, Norberg-Schulz also criticizes Rossi and explains the im-
288. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor- perfections he sees: “Although some of them are given slight overtones
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In of local memories, they are not articulated with reference to earth and
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review sky. Rather they seems to exist in a realm which is outside time and
15, no. 1 (2010): 91.
place.”.291 Then, he also says “The embodiment in the here and now
289. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of is almost entirely lacking, and thus his compositions do not allow for
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, orientation and identification, and for life to take place.”.292 Here we
1988), 169.
can understand Norberg-Schulz considers the relation with the place
290. Ibid, 153. as an essential value in architecture, and he opposes an approach
that abstracts and isolates the architecture from the place. He ends this
291. Ibid, 175.
chapter of “New Monumentality” underlining this stance:
292. Ibid, 175.

101
 “Typology is not architecture, and before it can become a
useful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from the
rationalists’ world of abstractions and brought back to the con-
crete world of phenomena. This does not mean that we con-
sider the language of types a matter of mere feeling, but rather
that it ought to get an existential foundation, where thinking and
feeling are united, through a phenomenological understand-
ing of the world which relates the given to the archetypes.”293

Underlining the importance of “place” for Norberg-Schulz, we come

across another important chapter in Norberg-Schulz’s book, “Principles
of Modern Architecture”. This chapter is the chapter of “New Place” in
which he talks about the new forms of understanding the place. He starts
the chapter by explaining the norm of “honesty” in Modern architecture:

“Modern architecture from the very beginning was concerned

about meaning. Early pioneers such as Frank Lloyd Wright,
Henry van de Velde, Adolf Loos and Hendrik Petrus Berlage,
denounced the “lies” of historicism, and demanded a new,
authentic architecture. The point of departure of the modern
movement, therefore, was not primarily problems of function
and technology, but the demand for “honesty”. Thus Giedion
wrote: “According to the easy explanation that was advanced
later, the movement developed as the application of two prin-
ciples: the abandonment of historical styles, and -consequent
upon this- the use of “fitness for purpose” as a criterion.”294

Here, we can see that he manifests the opposition between “histori-

cism” and “modern movement” as an opposition between “honesty”
and “lies”. Norberg-Schulz also mentions this notion of honesty while
talking about “image” in a later chapter and says “… house ought to
look like house, and nothing else.”.295 Thus, the whole discourse turns
into a matter of “morality”. He mentions this notion in this passage:

“As a consequence, the modern movement gave much atten-

tion to questions of “honesty” and “morality”, and in general
aimed at the recovery of authentic and original forms which
could substitute the “devaluated symbols” of historicism. Thus
the movement developed the general principles of “func- 293. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
tionalism” and “structuralism”, believing that the expression Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 153.
of function and structure would generate new meaningful
forms. To some extent the promise was fulfilled.”296 294. Ibid, 177.

295. Ibid, 185.

Here, after underlining “honesty” and “morality” as we mentioned,
he talks about “functionalism” and “structuralism” as a tool to create 296. Ibid, 177.

102
Figure 3.26: Plans of “Unité d’Habitation”, Marseille, France, Le Corbusier.

a new domain of meaning in architecture, and he also says that was

partially successful but not sufficient. Later, he considers post-modern-
ism in this manner and says:

“Post-modern architecture therefore concentrates its attention

on the problem of meaning. So far, it seems to be of general
agreement that meaning has to do with images rather than
functional or structural forms. A form is meaningful because
it “represents” something, and because it tells us something,
and because it helps our orientation in and identification with
the world in which we live.”297

Here, we can see the approach of post-modern architecture is to use

“image” as a tool to represent “meaning” in architecture. However,
Norberg-Schulz criticizes this approach that reduces the meaning of
architecture to “sign”:

“The nature of the image is however hardly understood.

Many post-modernists regard it as a “sign”, that is, an arbi-
trarily chosen element which “signfies” something else. Ac-
297. Ibid, 177. cording to semiological theory the language of architecture

103
Figure 3.27: Models of sign and symbols, Charles Jencks.

becomes “a system of agreed-upon rules to communicate”.

Evidently, architectural forms may function as signs, but their
meaning cannot be reduced to a mere matter of “agree-
ment”, and their purpose to interpersonal communication.
Basically, an image is not a sign. An image reveals rather
than communicates, it illuminates and explains.”298

After this criticism, Norberg-Schulz thinks of the necessity of an expla-

nation on the value of “image”, in the deeper sense. Thus, he starts to
explain his point of view with a quotation from Heidegger: “Only im-
age formed keeps the vision. Yet image formed rests in the poem.”.299
Here, what Heidegger means by “vision” is a key point to understand. 298. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Thus, Norberg-Schulz explains: “A vision, a perception, in the widest Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 153.
sense of the word, needs an image to become “real”.”.300 After this
explanation, he says: “The image, hence, reveals a world.”.301 Then, 299. Ibid.
he explains this notion “In general the image keeps what has been
300. Ibid.
seen, and is therefore a recollection.”.302 To make it clear, he adds
“We ought to emphasize that the image does not “imitate” reality. 301. Ibid.
The work of art “is” reality.”.303
302. Ibid.

At this point of the chapter, Norberg-Schulz points out the most important 303. Ibid, 179.

104
 notion to understand what he means by “visualization” and “complemen-
tation”. He starts with a poem of Heidegger, named “The Thinker as Poet”:

“Forests spread
Brooks plunge
Rocks persist
Mist diffuses
Meadows wait
Springs well
Winds dwell
Blessings muses”304

Then, he explains the importance of this poem:

“… Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are

not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phe-
nomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic
and easily understood meanings. Thus they make the things
stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,
each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this
emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.”305

Here, he explains “visualization”, which is a coherent and self-ex-

planatory term for an architect. His explanation only adds a number
of nuances to the general understanding of this term. However, the
next passage takes the discourse to a quite interesting ground:

“When man makes language speak about the thing, how-

ever, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also
how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at
this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or
“project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be,
means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however,
is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It
is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in
motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”306

Here, we can understand that he considers “image” as a tool not

only resonating with the memory of the past but also projecting a
dream of an ideal. This notion brings us back to the discourse we’ve
mentioned and connects with the archetype as a Platonic “idea”.
304. Ibid, 179.
Then, Norberg-Schulz goes back to the discourse about “place”
305. Ibid, 179.
with this well-explained terminology. He says “The local structures
306. Ibid, 179. are variations on the archetypes. To allow human life to take place in

105
this structured emptiness, architecture has to adapt to the spatiality of
human life itself.”.307 Here, he underlines the importance of the living
and the rituals around a built environment. Also, he considers that ar-
chitecture should adapt to such a living. Then he connects this notion
with the concept of “place” in this passage:

“When a work of architecture visualizes the structure of earth

and sky and complement its lacks, a total world is brought
into presence, and the site is transformed into a place. That
is the meaning of Heidegger’s words: “The buildings bring
the earth as the inhabited landscape close to man and at the
same time places the nearness of neighborly dwelling under
the expanse of the sky.”.”308

Here, Norberg-Schulz points out two main points. A work of architec-

ture not only “visualizes” as an object in the physical world, but also
“complements” as an object perceived and completed by a subject.
This notion underlines the essentiality of the presence of the subject in
architecture. Norberg-Schulz points out this and says: “Thereby the
momentary action becomes part of life, it gets a “measure” and a
meaning, and man may say that he dwells. To create places which
permit dwelling is the profound task of architecture.”.309 Here, ob-
viously, the word “dwell” is not a random selection of a word. It is
directly referring to Heidegger’s “dwell” as the way of “building”.

In “The Concept of Dwelling”, Norberg-Schulz explains this notion

of “dwelling”. As we mentioned before this Heideggerian term is a
quite important concept in Norberg-Schulz’s architecture as well.
Wilken explains the etymology of the word and its relation with Nor-
berg-Schulz’s definition with these words:

“Dwelling is a decidedly opaque and elusive term in Heide-

gger’s writing. The meaning of dwelling—or, more precisely,
the meaning of its Germanic root bauen—appears to shift
with each application, sometimes referring, it would seem,
to a kind of fundamental ontological category, and some-
times taking on a more instrumental sense of cultivation and 307. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
construction— an ambiguity which raises a number of issues 1988), 153.
that will be returned to later in this discussion. Both senses of
dwelling inform Norberg-Schulz’s statement: “Dwelling [...] 308. Ibid.
implies something more than ‘shelter’. It implies that the spaces 309. Ibid.
where life occurs are places, in the true sense of the word”.310
310. Rowan Wilken, “The Critical Recep-
tion of Christian Norberg-Schulz’s Writ-
In the book, Norberg-Schulz defines the “four modes of dwelling”. One ings on Heidegger and Place,” Architec-
of which is “settlement” which Norberg-Schulz says “Man, thus, finds tural Theory Review 18, no. 3 (2013): 343.

106
Figure 3.28: Sections (Area I, A–C,
11–7) of the Great Naquane rock. This
shows a number of houses raised on pile
himself when he settles, and his being-in-the-world is thereby deter-
foundations (nos. 175, 207, 255) as well mined.”.311 He also says “When settling is accomplished, other modes
as the great maze (no. 270), The Idea of of dwelling which concern basic forms of human togetherness, come
a Town, Joseph Rykwert.
into play.”.312 Thus, “settlement” is the fundamental mode of dwelling
that opens up the possibility of other modes. Another mode of “dwell-
ing” is “collective dwelling” which is represented by “urban space” in
the book. Norberg-Schulz says “In urban space man “dwells” in the
sense of experiencing the richness of a world. We may call this mode
collective dwelling, using the word “collective” in the original sense
of gathering or assembly.”313 Another mode of “dwelling” is “public
dwelling” which is represented by “institution” in the book. Norberg
311. Christian Norberg-Schulz, The Con- Schulz says “Agreement thus implies common interests or values, and
cept of the Dwelling: On the Way to Fig-
urative Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, forms the basis for a fellowship or society. An agreement also has to
1985), 13. “take place,” in the sense of possessing a forum where the common
values are kept and expressed. Such a place is generally known as
312. Ibid.
an institution or public building, and the mode of dwelling it serves
313. Ibid. we may call public dwelling, using the word “public” to denote what

107
Figure 3.29: A Diagram of Heidegger’s Concept of Dwelling.

108
 is shared by the community.”.314 Last but not least, another mode of
“dwelling” is “private dwelling” which is represented by “house” in the
book. Norberg-Schulz explains this and says “Choices, however, are
also of a more personal kind, and the life of each individual has its
particular course. Dwelling therefore also comprises that withdrawal
which is necessary to define and develop one’s own identity. We may
call this mode private dwelling, intending those actions which are se-
cluded from the intrusion of others.”.315 Thus, we can understand how
Norberg-Schulz categorizes different types of “dwelling” processes.

Then, Norberg-Schulz brings everything he mentioned in this chapter

together on the “house” as an example. He explains this notion of
“house” in this passage:

“The house serves daily, personal life. Its nature is circumstan-

tial, and its form is related to local and temporal conditions.
This does not mean, however, that all houses are entirely
different. Any situation represents a variation on the general
structures of the world, and it is therefore meaningful to con-
sider the house an imago mundi.”316

Here, we can see Norberg-Schulz understands the “house” presents

the locality and condition of a landscape as a specific being with
universally shared values that refers to the idea of the world. Haddad
says explains Norberg Schulz’s understanding of “house” with a ref-
erence from Heidegger in this passage:

“In discussing the house, Norberg-Schulz referred to Heide-

gger’s essay on dwelling and the etymological roots of
‘‘building’’ which go back to ‘‘dwelling’’, stressing the role of
the house as the ‘‘central place of human existence’’:

The House, therefore, remains the central place of

human existence, the place where the child learns
314. Christian Norberg-Schulz, The Con-
cept of the Dwelling: On the Way to Fig- to understand his being in the world, and the place
urative Architecture (New York: Rizzoli, from which man departs and to which he returns.”317
1985), 13.

315. Ibid. He further explains this notion with the elements he presented in this
chapter and brings everything together in this passage:
316. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 179. “Thus the house primarily complements the lacks of the site and
makes what is close at hand emerge. It constitutes a concrete,
317. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor- individual “here”, and allows life to take place “now”. In the
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review past, however, the concrete “here” became typical, because
15, no. 1 (2010): 90. “neighbourly dwelling” implied the sharing of a site and a

109
 way of life. Vernacular houses therefore appear as variations
of types, and visualize a particular “inhabited landscape”. To-
gether they make up a meaningful place, and their constituent
parts, floor, roof and wall, possess the quality of images.”318

Here, Norberg-Schulz connects the concepts of “place”, “neigbour-

ly dwelling”, “type” and “inhabited landscape”. This passage sums
up the topography of his world of thoughts on the subject of “place”.
He uses the “house” as the simplest representation of these concepts.

Then, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between “type” and

“house” as the essential necessity of enclosure. He says “On the hu-
man side we find the simultaneous needs for refuge (shelter) and
point of departure. The first need is in general satisfied by enclosure,
and generous embracing roofs have in fact always been distinctive
human dwellings. The shape of the roof varies in relation to the giv-
en environment, and serves to adapt the house to its surroundings
through visualization or complementation.”.319 Here, we can under-
stand that he considers “type” as an adaptation to the environment
through visualization or complementation. This notion supports the
idea of “type” not as a stable and constant state, but an ever-chang-
ing and developing phenomenon.

After talking about the “house” as the most personal and individual archi-
tectural being, Norberg-Schulz begins to talk about the other side of the
medallion, the “public institution”. As “house” represents the individuality
of architectural experience, “public institution” takes the role of the socio-
cultural representation. Norberg explains this with these words:

“The public institution serves the agreements of a fellowship.

That is, it is not just a functional container, but should offer an
“explanation” which relates the way of life of the community
to the general structures of the world.”320

Here, we understand that a “public institution” is not only a functional

organization but also a way of communicating in the community that
expresses the characteristics of the collective living of a particular
community. This expression, naturally, happens to be quite clear and
transparent to gather and reinforce the community. What is hidden
or subtle in “house” becomes clear and direct in “public institution”.
318. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Norberg-Schulz explains this and says “When institutions are added Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
to the dwellings, what is faintly suggested becomes a significantly 1988), 179.
and clearly revealed, and the place emerges as a forum for the life
319. Ibid.
of a fellowship.”.321 Later, Norberg- Schulz explains this in a much
more practical manner: “The basic images of the institutions are, as 320. Ibid, 181.

110
Figure 3.30: Longitudinal section of the old basilica, Rome, Il Tempio Vaticano, Carlo Fontana,1694.

we have already pointed out, the great unitary hall (centralized, lon-
gitudinal or gridded), and the distinct volume, such as the tower and
the dome. In the past, public buildings were generally conceived as
compositions of such volumes… We do not have to expand on what
has already been said about the modes of standing etc., but should
emphasize that the articulate built form of the public institution reveals
how a historical epoch understands its being between earth and
sky”.322 Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz referred to
the “earth” and “sky” which are two of the four fundamental elements
of Heidegger’s philosophy, when he was saying “…what is faintly
suggested becomes a significantly and clearly revealed…”.

After talking about “public institution” as a representation of collective

life, Norberg-Schulz begins to talk about the “city” as a larger-scale
manifestation of this collectivity. He starts to explain his interpretation
with these words:

“The city gathers the various existential interpretations of a col-

lectivity. It is therefore pluralistic rather than unitary, and when
321. Ibid, 181.
we say that it constitutes a goal in existential space, it is because
322. Ibid, 181. it offers possibilities rather than a particular explanation.”323

111
Figure 3.31: “İki”, Bursa, Turkey, Yıldız Moran, 1955.

112
 Here, he underlines the “flexibility” for the interpretation of the “city” as
a collective being. However, he also considers the “city” as a reference
point. He explains this notion and says “But also has to be rooted in a
locality and constitute a center which makes a region emerge as what
it is.”.324 We can see he considers the source of its reference as “local-
ity” and “centricity”. He further explains this notion with these words:

“Because of its local rootedness, the city may be considered

a “large house” (Alberti), but this definition does not grasp its
quality as a meeting place.”325

Here, we can see he underlines an important feature of the “city”. This

feature is fundamentally its being a “meeting place”.

Another important notion of this chapter of the book is the criticism

of “place” in Modern architecture. Norberg begins to explain his
criticism by going through several fundamental points. Firstly, he de-
scribes modern architecture as a whole in this passage:

“Together, pre-modern, modern and post-modern architec-

ture make up the new tradition. The first phase gave primary
importance to a reinterpretation of the phenomena of nature
and human life by means of an art nouveau, at the same time
as the new conception of space was emerging. The second
phase concentrated its attention on the setting into work of
this conception in terms of free plan and open form.”326

Here, he points out the new approaches of pre-modern and modern.

On the other hand, he criticizes the late modern and uses this to link
the reasoning of rise of the post-modern architecture. He explains this
in these words:

“The second, modern, phase therefore tended to degenerate

into “late-modern” structural expressionism, at the same time
as the free plan was reduced to “functional patterns” and the
city to a mere question of “planning”. In order to conquer these
shortcomings and recover some of the values of pre-modern
323. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, architecture, the third, post-modern, phase of the new tradi-
1988), 181. tion has returned to the phenomenological approach, and
moreover added a new concern for past “memories”. This
324. Ibid.
does not imply a revival of the academic approach, but sim-
325. Ibid. ply a wish for again becoming part of history.”327
326. Ibid, 193.
We can see that he considers post-modern architecture as a move-
327. Ibid, 193. ment that came into being to solve the problems of modern architec-

113
ture. Then, he underlines the importance of the new approaches to
recover the “language” of architecture:

“The expected recovery of the language of architecture

makes it possible to substitute the ever new inventions which
are dominant today with creative work within a living tradi-
tion. Since language is the “house of Being” and therefore
contains “everything”, it may in fact be used directly to reveal
previously hidden aspects of reality, or, if one prefers, to offer
reinterpretations of reality.”328

Here, we can see he considers the presence of “language” as an es-

sential element of consistent creativity and discovery of new aspects of
reality. However, he also criticizes the new approaches in this context:

“The new tradition, however, does not really correspond to

the styles or the traditions of the past, as it is neither of tempo-
ral nor local nature. Rather it shows how modern architecture
is “on the way to language”.”329

After this criticism of “place” in modern architecture, Norberg-Schulz

further explains his point in the section named “From space to place”.
He underlines the problem of the “loss of the image” with these words:

“This proposition may not seem convincing to everybody,

since we are no longer used to thinking of architecture in
terms of images. Too long we have been giving exclusive
attention to function and structure. Without images, however,
our environment is reduced to a mere spatial container.”330

Here, we can see that he considers the contemporary approach of

architecture to be reduced to “function” and “structure”. Then, he talks
about the relationship between modern and post-modern architec-
ture in the context of “image” and says “We cannot accept, howev-
er, that this implies the “failure” of modern architecture. Neither can
we support the view that post-modernism represents a break with
the new tradition. Post-modernism rather evolves out of modernism,
and its success depends on its being able to combine the free plan
and the open form with the meaningful image.”.331 Here, he criticizes 328. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
post-modern architecture since the movement separates itself from Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 193.
modern architecture. However, Norberg-Schulz thinks they are com-
plementary parts of an evolving whole. Then, he points out a psycho- 329 Ibid.
logical aspect of this need and he says “When the modern world be-
330. Ibid.
comes overwhelming and frightening, it is more important than ever
to master it emotionally, and to learn to grasp it through what we 331. Ibid.

114
 have called a “poetical vision”. Only through love and respect for
things, and thus be able to “save the earth”.” In terms of architecture
this means the creation of true places, and thus the recovery of the
built image.”.332 Here, we can see that Norberg-Schulz considers
“places” as a representation of “built image” and he also relates
these with living in a meaningful narrative. He also criticizes our daily
vision to things in the Modern world with these words:

“Our daily environment consists of things, rather than abstrac-

tions such as molecules and atoms. Present-day education is
almost exclusively based on abstraction, and as a result we
have lost the sense of things and the ability to keep them by
means of images.”333

Here, he points out the lack of the role of images in the Modern way
of thinking in comparison to abstraction. He explains deeper this no-
tion more through the Greek word “techne” and the German word
“Andenken” in this passage:

“To the Greeks techne meant “bringing-forth”, and belonged

to poiesis, revealing. “The essence of technology is by no
means technological”, Heidegger says, because “technolo-
gy is a mode of revealing. Technology come to presence in
the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place,
where aletheia, truth, happens.”. A phenomenological ap-
proach may give back to technology its true significance,
and thus restore architecture as building, in the true sense of
the word. Thus Heidegger says: “Only of we are capable of
dwelling, only then can we build.”. Here “dwelling” means
a poetical or phenomenological relationship to the world, or
what Heidegger calls Andenken.”334

Here, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between Greek word

“techne” and Heidegger’s term “dwelling”. This connection is an im-
portant point to understand Heidegger’s and also Norberg-Schulz’s
perspectives. Thus, he explains further this notion about “dwelling”
and says “Dwelling presupposes a poetic, phenomenological atti-
tude to everything. The understanding which is obtained through this
332. Ibid. attitude must be kept in images.”.335
333. Ibid.
Norberg-Schulz ends this chapter of “New Place” with these words:
334. Ibid. “The new place is new as well as old, in the sense that it presents a new
interpretation of the archetypes of existential spatiality. On the urban
335. Ibid, 195.
level the new place will be varied and pluralistic, on the domestic level
336. Ibid, 195. varied and familiar, and on the institutional level explicitly symbolic.”.336

115
RESEMBLANCE
& DIVERGENCE

“Logic is doubtless unshakable,

but it cannot withstand a man who
wants to live.”
Franz Kafka, The Trial
As we have seen in the previous chapter, there are numerous subjects
that are related to Rossi and Norberg-Schulz. The two authors have
multiple subjects in common. However, there are also many points on
which they have different perspectives or approaches. Within these
similarities and differences, certain aspects hold varying degrees of
importance and priority, due to their interconnectedness with other
subjects within the author’s perspective. Thus, we will examine the
major intersections and variations in the texts. There are also differ-
ences in the approach on a fundamental level, which are also quite
important.

Before we start examining the major concept and issues, it is better to

understand where these two authors stand in the context of the intellectu-
al approach. Both authors partly criticize the “status quo” and underline
the need for a new understanding and new approach to architecture
and the process of design. These criticisms share several common points
with those of other authors and architects from the same period, ultimate-
ly contributing to the emergence of the Postmodern Movement. One
of the major criticisms was verbalized by American architect Robert
Venturi. Venturi underlines the necessity of image and complexity in ar-
chitecture and criticizes Modern architecture’s plainness as a stylistic
approach. There is also the influence of Charles Jencks’ and Sigfried
Giedion’s writings in the criticism of these authors.

The most fundamental difference between the two authors is the dif-
ference between their intellectual approaches. Rossi mentions many
times the necessity of a scientific approach to architecture in both of
his books. Thus, he mainly aims to keep his arguments in the scientifi-
cally or at least logically debatable area of thought. Although at first
sight Norberg-Schulz’s approach seems quite scientific, as we went
through details, we can observe there are numerous references to
the Heideggerian terminology which is vaguely defined. This notion
makes Norberg-Schulz’s arguments quite unclear and lowers the
strength of his arguments.

This difference between their intellectual approaches also corre-

sponds to their stance in architecture as well. Rossi logically bases
his approach on a reference to psychology and typology. On one
hand, he approaches the “city” as “a man-made object” to under-
stand it as a collection of the historical heritage of objects and infor-
mation. On the other hand, he approaches the “city as “a work of art”
to understand it as a product of collective memory and imagination.
He perceives the physical environment as “urban artifacts” which as
abstracted objects of the city. On the contrary, Norberg-Schulz often
criticizes this abstractive and scientific approach. Instead, he propos-

117
Figure 4.1: Drawing of San Cataldo Cemetery, Aldo Rossi.

es a phenomenological and quantitative approach to architecture.

Another important notion about these two authors is that they are both
interested in the mental process and perception of the subjects of
architecture. We can easily observe the influence of psychology and
phenomenology on both architects.

Rossi was mainly influenced by Swiss psychologist Carl Jung. The

terminology he uses often coincides with Jungian terminology. Rossi
often uses the terms “collective memory” and “consciousness” which
are quite important terms in Jungian psychology as well. Also, the
term “archetype” which is often used by Rossi is also a word which is
popularized by Carl Jung in psychology. Although it is not a strong
standpoint in Rossi’s world of thought, he also mentions the phenome-
nological aspect of the architecture from time to time.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, was mostly influenced by Gestalt

psychology and Jean Piaget. The influence of Piaget is especially ap-
parent in his book “Existence, Space and Architecture”. Specifically,
the term “process of schematization” and “socialization of percep-
tion” are relatable to such terminology. Also, we can see that Nor-

118
 berg-Schulz was also influenced by Heideggerian phenomenology.
He often uses the Heideggerian terminology. Most important terms in
this sense are “nearness” and “dwelling” which are strongly related to
the perceptional and cognitive aspects of the architectural process.

One of the common subjects of these authors is the “meaning” in

architecture. This need for meaning translates into different concepts
in their writings.

One of which is “image”. Rossi relates the need for “image” to “mem-
ory” and “history”. To Rossi, “image” is one of the most important tools
to understand our context in terms of time. It helps us to understand
the references by revealing “persistences” and “permanences” in the
city. Rossi considers the most crucial notion of architecture is to reveal
the “history” and “memory” with the “event” and the “sign”. He says
“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where does the
singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its function, its mem-
ory, or in something else again? We can now answer that it begins
in the event and in the sign that has marked the event.”.337 Thus, he
describes the main necessity of architecture as “event & sign”, in other
words, memory.

Norberg-Schulz relates the necessity of “image” to the necessity of

“meaning”. Here, we can observe the influence of Giedion since
he was the professor of Norberg-Schulz at ETH Zurich. He also re-
lates “image” to “locus”. He repeatedly underlines the connection
between “image”, “place” and “life”. He says, “The loss of the image,
therefore, brings about a loss of place, and hence a “loss of life”.”.338
Thus, we can understand Norberg-Schulz aims to find the “meaning”,
which is lacking in architecture, in “image” and in “locus”. These two
elements most powerfully intersect in one physical element: monu-
ments. Thus, monuments play an important role in Norberg-Schulz’s
search for “meaning”. As in Rossi’s perspective, Norberg-Schulz also
acknowledges “the event & the sign” notion as a reference to the
past. However, he also criticizes this point of view as a reduction
of the definition of the “image” to “sign. He mentions the more im-
portant role of “monuments” to reveal the meaning by “visualization”
and “complementation” which has deeper connections with the con-
sciousness of the subject and also with the “image”.
337. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Another common subject of the authors is their interpretation of “phys-
Original: 1966), 106. ical elements” in the built environment. In their writings, both of them
often refer to “type” and “typology”. Also, they attribute an addition-
338. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, al value to certain physical elements.
1988), 169.

119
Rossi defines the physical elements of the city as “urban artifacts”.
According to Rossi, these “urban artifacts” have four main features:
individuality, locus, design, and memory. Among these urban arti-
facts, Rossi prioritizes certain artifacts and names them as “primary
elements”. In his writings, he examples these “primary elements” as
monuments, plans of the city, and basic layouts of the city. Rossi does
not consider the “function” of these artifacts as their fundamental fea-
ture. Thus, to Rossi, these artifacts are a part of the city, even though
their function changes over time. Rossi has two main perspectives to
understand “city”: “a man-made object” and “a work of art”. Thus, we
can understand Rossi’s thinking of urban artifacts is mainly abstractive
and analytical. As “a man-made object”, he considers the city and
the urban artifacts as “traces of time”. This perspective leads him to
consider types as “logical principles” which are “permanent” and
“complex”. On the other hand, as “a work of art”, he considers the
city and the urban artifacts as a result of “collective imagination”.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, defines the physical elements as

“architectural things” which can be related to the term “architectural
space” in his book “Existence, Space and Architecture”. The notion we
need to understand about this term is “architectural space” is defined as
a phenomenological concept. Heideggerian phenomenology plays a
strong role in Norberg-Schulz’s perspective on physical elements of
the built environment, as it played a role in his general perspective on
architecture. Thus, Norberg-Schulz defines the physical elements and
forms of architecture with their phenomenological relation with the sub-
ject. Among these elements, he attributes an additional value to “monu-
ments”. To better understand his understanding of physical elements, we
need to understand how he considers monuments. To Norberg-Schulz,
the most crucial feature of “monuments” is their potential to reveal “im-
age” by “visualization” and “complementation”. Both acts interact with
the subject. Norberg-Schulz describes “visualization” as a revelation
of images that can be related to the past. He says “…they make the
things stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,
each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging
of things by means of images “visualization”.”.339 On the other hand,
he describes “complementation” as a “dream” or a “project” which
can be related to an imagination of a future. He says, “To reveal how
things could be, means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack,
however, is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”.
It is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion,
and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”.340 Thus, we can see 339. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Norberg-Schulz fundamentally defines every physical element of the Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 179.
built environment by its phenomenological projection of the subject.
340. Ibid.

120
Figure 4.2: Diagrams of Space, Intentions in Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

Another common subject of the authors is how they relate daily activities
and rituals, in other words, living, with architecture. Both have different
perspectives on this subject with some similarities and common points.

There are numerous points that Rossi’s perspective coincides with dai-
ly life and rituals. On the fundamental level, as we mentioned before,
Rossi has two main understandings of the “city”: “a man-made object”
and “a work of art”. As we can see here, both of these definitions are
derived from human activities fundamentally. Thus, the presence of
daily life and rituals can be found in the foundation of Rossi’s under-
standing. We can better understand Rossi’s aspect, if we understand
his relation with “teatro”. Rossi considers “city” as a “teatro” in which
human events take place. Also, he often underlines the importance of
“collectiveness” which is not only related to daily life but also related
to the social interactions of individuals. This notion of “collectiveness”
is quite important. It is related to other important concepts of Rossi
such as “collective memory” and “collective imagination”. Another
important notion is Rossi’s description of “type”. He relates “type”
with the form and the way of life of certain timeframe. He explains this
and says “as “… developed according to both needs and aspirations
to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form and a way

121
 Aldo
Rossi

Psychology and Phenomenology

Carl G. Jung Jean Piaget
Gestalt psychology Gestalt psychology
Heidegger

Meaning: Image, Memory, Locus

collective memory visualization
collective imagination complementation
locus genius loci
event & sign

Physical Elements and Types

urban artifact architectural thing
city as a man-made object typical image
city as a work of art

Living and Rituals

inhabited space inhabited landscape

Christian
Norberg-Schulz
Figure 4.3: Diagram of Resemblences & Divergences of Aldo Rossi & Christian Norberg-Schulz.

122
 of life, although its specific shape varied widely from society to soci-
ety.”.341 Thus, he associates the “logical principle” of the “type” as a
knowledge which is obtained through experiences of the past. Most
importantly, Rossi describes the fundamental objective of architecture
as revealing the “memory” with the “event” and “sign”. Thus, we can
understand the crucial role of human events in Rossi’s architecture.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, has a quite different approach.

As his fundamental approach to architecture is phenomenologi-
cal, he considers the relation between daily life and architecture to
emerge from this phenomenological aspect. To Norberg-Schulz, the
process of “building” starts in the mind. We can see the first sign of
this thought in his relatively early book “Existence, Space and Archi-
tecture”. He explains various types of spaces. Specifically, “existen-
tial space” is relatable with the term “being in the world” which is a
frequently used term in Norberg-Schulz’s books and writings. Also,
“architectural space” is directly related to the built environment as
it was defined as the “concretization of the environmental schema-
ta or images”.342 This mental process of “building” can be under-
stood better in the concept of “nearness” which we will examine
later. Also, interactive acts of “visualization” and “complementation”
which is related to “monuments” and “image”, can be related to the
phenomenological experience of the subject. Another fundamental
point is Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of the process of building.
As we mentioned before, Heideggerian phenomenology plays an
important role in Norberg-Schulz’s architecture. Both Heidegger
and Norberg-Schulz consider the process of “building” as a process
of “dwelling”. This process of “dwelling” can be described as the
simultaneous and parallel progress of living and building. Thus, both
consider the process of “building” as a never-ending process that
follows the routines and the rituals of daily life.

As we can understand from these examples, there are numerous

similarities and differences in these authors’ understanding of archi-
tecture. Thus, we will examine these notions in a more detailed and
deeper sense.

341. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the

City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 40.

342. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence

Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
1971), 7.

123
 PSYCHOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Considering the impact, the most significant subject that directs the
thoughts and writings of Rossi and Norberg-Schulz is presumably psy-
chology. Both writers create connections between their works and var-
ious psychological fields in their writings. Although there are common
points, most of the time, they mention different works of psychology.

Rossi was influenced by many names and movements in psychology.

He describes this influence with these words: “That the study of col-
lective psychology has an essential part in the study of the city seems
undeniable. Many of the authors to whom I feel closest in this work
base their studies on collective psychology, which in turn is linked
to sociology.”.343 Later, he also gives specific examples of Gestalt
psychology in architecture and says “Valuable information also may
be obtained from the experiments conducted under the banner of
Gestalt psychology, as undertaken by the Bauhaus in the domain of
form and as proposed by the American school of Lynch.”.344 Thus,
we understand Rossi also values the role of Gestalt psychology in the
works of Bauhaus and Kevin Lynch. Later Rossi underlines the impor-
tance of the role of psychology in architecture in this passage:

“But what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individ-

ual sees the city in one way and that other individuals see it
in another? And how can this private and uncultivated vision
be related to the laws and principles from which the city first
emerged and through which its images were formed? If we
are concerned with the city architecturally from more than
a stylistic point of view, it does not make sense to abandon
architecture and occupy ourselves with something else. In-
deed, no one would entertain the idea that when the theore-
ticians tell us that buildings must respond to criteria of firmness
commodity, and delight, they must explain the psychological
motives behind this principle.”345

For Rossi, the main influence was from the Swiss psychologist and
founder of analytical psychology Carl Gustav Jung. The term “arche-
type” was popularized in psychology by Carl Jung, long before intro-
duced to architecture. Jung defines and describes the term “archetype”
in his works, in many ways. These traces of these various definitions and
343. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
descriptions can be observed in the writings of Rossi. Clearly, Jung’s City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
approach to this term inspires Rossi to adapt and use the term in the ar- Original: 1966), 112.
chitectural vocabulary. The architectural description of Rossi has many
344. Ibid.
fundamentally common points with Jung’s description despite the differ-
ence between the two disciplines. Defining the “archetype” is not the 345. Ibid, 114.

124
Figure 4.4: The Map of Psyche, Carl Gustav Jung.

125
only point of connection among their works. In an article, Micha Ban-
dini mentions how Jung influenced Rossi’s understanding of “analogy”
and, through this, his work “Analogous City” in this passage:

“Rossi himself had quoted Jung’s definition in his ‘Analogical

Architecture’ article in which he discussed, amongst others,
those two projects. Jung had said, in defining analogy:

I have explained that “logical” thought is what is ex-

pressed in words directed from the outside world in
the form of discourse. ‘Analogical’ thought is sensed
yet unreal, imagined yet silent; it is not a discourse
but rather a meditation on themes of the past, an
interior monologue. Logical thought is ‘thinking in
words’. Analogical thought is archaic, unexpressed,
and practically inexpressible in words.

The ending words of this quote must be seen as particularly

appropriate for the design phase Rossi was experiencing.
The clarity of the Analogous City collage measured against
the written explanations of it would have reflected this ‘prac-
tically inexpressible in words’ quality.”346

Another important common point is the terms “collective memory”

and “collective imagination” which are quite important and funda-
mental concepts in Rossi’s architecture. These terms can be traced
back to the term “collective unconscious” which is one of the most
important works of Jung. Rossi mentions “collective memory” as “the
deepest structure of urban artifacts”:

“With these considerations we approach the deepest struc-

ture of urban artifacts and thus their form -the architecture of
the city. “The soul of the city” becomes the city’s history, the
sign on the walls of the municipium, the city’s distinctive and
definitive character, its memory.”347

Here, we can see a direct connection with the term “deep-structure” in

Jungian psychology, which is defined as the fundamental information
of the Jungian archetypes by Carl Gustav Jung. In the first chapter of
the book “Four Archetypes”, As between Plato’s world of ideas and the
world of forms, the “collective memory” and the “city” can be confused 346. 153. Micha Bandini, “Aldo Rossi,”
in Rossi’s work. Rossi responds to this confusion with this passage: AA Files, no. 1 (1981): 109.

347. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
its people, and like memory it is associated with object and Original: 1966), 130.

126
 places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This re-
lationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the
city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of land-
scape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory,
new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas
flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.”348

Here, we can see that Rossi clearly describes his understanding of “collec-
tive memory” not as a physical element like “urban artifacts” of the city, but
as an “idea” of these elements which is completely a mental projection.

Norberg-Schulz also has numerous references to psychology in his

writings. He was mostly influenced by Gestalt psychology and the
works of Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget. Also, we can observe the
effect of German Existentialism and Heideggerian phenomenology
on Norberg-Schulz’s perspective on the relation between architecture
and psychology. We can observe the first sign of these influences in
one of his early books “Existence, Space and Architecture”. In the first
chapter of the book, Norberg-Schulz explains the concept of space.
He starts to the chapter with this sentence: “Man’s interest in space has
existential roots.”.349 Thus, he gives first hints about his understanding of
space. He continues with these words: “It stems from a need to grasp
vital relations in his environment, to bring meaning and order into a
world of events and actions.”.350 Thus, the roots of this relation are fun-
damentally connected to the survival of the subject through “meaning”
and “order”. Later, he starts to specify different types of spaces in his
perspective. Firstly, he mentions “pragmatic space” which is directly re-
lated to this survival necessity, and says, “While the pragmatic space
of animals is a function of inborn instincts, man has to learn what ori-
entation he needs in order to act.”.351 Then, he examples from African
and ancient Egyptian languages to explain these pragmatic relations.
However, he makes another important point and says, “In both cases
it is clear that a cognitive concept of space had not been abstracted
from the direct experience of spatial relations.”. Thus, he starts to define
“cognitive space”.352 Then, he gives numerous examples to explain fur-
ther this “cognitive space” and its relation with perception.
348. Ibid, 130.
To be able to structure this relation, Norberg-Schulz refers to Ge-
349. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence stalt psychology and the works of Jean Piaget. Firstly, he explains
Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger, the similarly static nature of early physics and early psychology. He
1971), 9.
says “Like those used in physics, early psychological concepts had
350. Ibid. a static, absolute character, but recently a more dynamic approach
has been introduced. The absolute “laws” of Gestalt psychology, for
351. Ibid.
instance, have been replaced by Piaget’s more flexible “schema-
352. Ibid. ta”.”. Thus, he considers the works of Piaget as an update to Gestalt

127
psychology. Then, he explains “schemata” with these words: “A sche-
ma may be defined as a typical reaction to a situation.”.353 Then, he
mentions different concepts of Piaget’s terminology in the passage:

“Piaget describes the process as a combination of “assimilation”

and “accommodation”, “assimilation” referring to the action of
the organism on surrounding objects, and “accommodation” to
the opposite state… Piaget ends by defining “adaptation” as “an
equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation”.”354

Later, he connects these concepts of Piaget and cognitive space to

the perceptual space and existential space in this passage:

“We thus see that the synthetic space of primitive man has been
split into several specialized constructs which serve us in our ori-
entation and adaptation to different aspects of the environment.
In addition to the cognitive spaces, we have within the psycho-
logical dimension to distinguish between immediate perceptu-
al space and the more stable space schemata. The latter are
composed of elements which have a certain invariance, such
as universal elementary structures (archetypes) and socially or
culturally conditioned structures, and, of course, some personal
idiosyncrasies. Together these make up man’s “image” of this
environment, that is, a stable system of three-dimensional rela-
tions between meaningful objects. We will therefore unify the
schemata in the concept existential space.”.355

As we mentioned before in the previous chapter, we can understand

that Norberg-Schulz considers “existential space” as a stable image
of the environment which contains universal/archetypal structures,
social/cultural structures, and personal features. Then, he defines “ar-
chitectural space” with these words: “Architectural space, therefore,
can be defined as a concretization of man’s existential space.”.356
Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers architecture as a tool to concretize
this multiple-step psychological process. Here, another important no-
tion can be observed. This is the influence of German Existentialism
on how he understands the “human psyche” through interaction with
space. Thus, we can understand that fundamentally there is Existen-
tialism under Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of psychology. 353. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
1971), 10.
This is a crucial point if we consider the repetitive reference to the
concept of “being-in-the-world” in Norberg’s writings. This concept 354. Ibid, 10-11.
is the main connection between German Existentialism and Heideg-
355. Ibid, 11.
gerian phenomenology in Norberg-Schulz’s writings as well. Thus, in
a way, psychology plays a fundamental role that bringing together 356. Ibid, 12.

128
Figure 4.5: Principles of Gestalt Psychology.

different systems of thought in Norberg-Schulz’s work. We can ob-

serve this role in the references to Heideggerian philosophy in his
work. To better understand this relation, we need to take a look at
Heidegger’s understanding of the psychological processes related
to the interaction of an individual with space:

“Spaces, and with them space as such—”space”—are always

provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open
up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say
that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through
spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations.
And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces
by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in
going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them.
Rather, we always go through spaces in such a way that we
already experience them by staying constantly with near and
remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of
the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at
all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as
357. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language,
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already
York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155. pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it.”357

129
Figure 4.6: Aerial photo of Göbeklitepe, oldest permanent human settlements, Şanlı Urfa, Turkey.

Here, specifically “going through spaces” and “going toward the door”
are quite important examples of how Heidegger thinks about the phe-
nomenological and psychological process which we go through in in-
teraction with space. Thus, the act of “going toward the door” starts in
the mental processes before the physical action. This notion is also pres-
ent in Norberg-Schulz’s writings as well. We can observe the traces of
this notion if we examine how Norberg-Schulz explains the interaction
between subject and space. As we mentioned before in the previous
chapters, Norberg-Schulz explains this interaction with two terms:

“How, then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically

in two ways, which we may call “visualization” and “comple-
mentation”.”358

Here, we can see that Norberg-Schulz does not directly refer to

“space”, but he refers to “place”. However, as we will explain further in
the next chapter, Norberg-Schulz does not consider “space” as an ab-
stract concept from the context in general. Thus, we can understand as
well as Heidegger, Norberg-Schulz also thinks of this relation of “sub-
358. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
ject” and “space” as a psychological process at the fundamental level. Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 135.

130
 Another significant point that is related to the role of Heideggeri-
an phenomenology in the relation between psychology and Nor-
berg-Schulz’s works is two terms that are frequently referred to in his
writings. These are “nearness” and “dwelling”. In the book “Poetry,
Language, Thought”, Heidegger explains “nearness” and underlines
the notion that what he means by “nearness” is not the distance:

“Man puts the longest distances, behind him in the shortest time.
He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts ev-
erything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic abo-
lition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not
consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in
point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on
the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from
us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in
itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness.”359

Here, we can see Heidegger describes “nearness” as a cogni-

tive and perceptual concept rather than a physical one. In the arti-
cle “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, he explains the relation between
“building” and “dwelling” as he reminds us of their etymological
roots, and brings back their former and richer meanings. As he does
this, he follows these roots and claims that, in fact, the concept of
“building is inherent to the concept of “dwelling”. Later, he takes a
step further and claims that “thinking” as well represents the same
act. These relations can be understood better in an example of the
“bridge” he gives in the article:

“In what way does building belong to dwelling?

The answer to this question will clarify for us what building,

understood by way of the nature of dwelling, really is. We
limit ourselves to building in the sense of constructing things
and inquire: what is a built thing? A bridge may serve as
an example for our reflections. The bridge swings over the
stream “with ease and power.” It does not just connect banks
that are already there. The banks emerge as banks only as
the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge designedly causes
them to lie across from each other. One side is set off against
the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch along the
stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With the
banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other
expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream
359. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Lan-
guage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter and bank and land into each other’s neighborhood.
(New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 163.

131
 …

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers

the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only
something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The
location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the
bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream
that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be
a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge
does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location
comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is
a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows
a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities
and ways by which a space is provided for.”360

Here, Heidegger sums up all of the connections between “building”,

“dwelling” and “thinking”. As we can observe, there are numerous
references to the cognitive and perceptual interactions and psycho-
logical elements in the passage. Most importantly, he reasons the
existence of “place” as a result of a cognitive process.

Last but not least, there is another notion that reveals the role of psy-
chology in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture. This no-
tion occurs in the chapter in which he describes “type”. He mentions
different ways of understanding “type” in this passage:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for

all, whereas the other considers the types a result of gener-
alization and historical development. In a certain sense both
hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant
interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The tem-
poral and local types, on the contrary, are developed and
changed through experience and experiment. The important
point is however, as we have already asserted, that they re-
ceive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic
meaning consists in their being variations on a “theme”.361

Here, we can see he recognizes the two different understandings

of “types”. One of which is “something given a priori once for all”,
which takes us to a metaphysical field which is commonly related to 360. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Lan-
guage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter
Platonic philosophy. On the other hand, he mentions the other per- (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 149-
spective which is a “result of generalization and historical develop- 152.
ment”, which takes us to a materialistic understanding of this notion
361. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
which can be related to Aristotelian philosophy. Here, he takes a Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
dualist stance on this notion and says, “In a certain sense both hy- 1988), 155.

132
 potheses are correct.”, which is an important point to understand. On
the other hand, Carl Jung underlines a similar point in his book “Four
Archetypes”. In the chapter named “On the Concept of the Arche-
types”, Carl Jung describes the concept of “archetype” and its fea-
tures. In the chapter, he describes “archetype” as the same concept
as the “idea” of Platonic philosophy. Considering what he later says
about “idea”, this becomes a significant point:

“Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the

nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and
the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change
Figure 4.7: Interference leads to what
Egon Brunswik has called ‘intermediary
was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree
objects’. The phenomena perceived are caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of
intermediary objects, while science aims which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time
at the abstraction of ‘pure’ objects. Chris-
tian Norberg-Schulz.
the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary
and derived.”362

Here, we can understand Jung also considers “archetype” as a con-

cept that can be a result of a development process. Although we
cannot directly relate these two interpretations of Jung and Nor-
berg-Schulz in the context of an influence or inspiration, we can still
appreciate the fact that they show parallelism with each other. This
notion is not just a simple coincidence that we just realized. This no-
tion, in fact, is a direct marker of the resemblance between Jung’s and
Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “archetype”.

Taking everything into consideration, we can determine that Rossi

and Norberg-Schulz both have numerous points that influenced or
inspired by the discipline of psychology, in their works. The two au-
thors also have several common points in this manner. The influence of
Gestalt psychology and Jungian psychology is the major similarity in
their works. Also, psychology plays an important role in the definition
of the process of fundamental concepts of their works.

362. Carl G. Jung, Four Archetypes, trans.

R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8.

133
 MEANING: IMAGE, MEMORY, LOCUS

Another significant subject that directs the works of Rossi and Nor-
berg-Schulz is “meaning” in architecture. The lack of “meaning” in
Modern architecture was a norm that was recognized by Rossi, Nor-
berg-Schulz, and also other architects of the era. Norberg-Schulz
points out this by explaining the main intention of his professor, Sigfried
Giedion: “When Giedion launched the idea in 1954, he had already
ten years earlier published an article entitled “The Need for a New
Monumentality”. Evidently he considered regionalism and monumen-
tality two aspects of one general problem: the need for meaning in
architecture.”.363 This norm would eventually play an important role in
the Post-Modern Movement and various individual responses.

Rossi and Norberg-Schulz as well often underline the significance of

“meaning” in architecture in their writings. Although he does not often
directly point out, Rossi frequently refers to the importance of “meaning”
while he explains other concepts. For instance, in the book “Architecture
of the City, while he was talking about the quality of architecture, he
says “The quality of architecture -the quality of the human creation- is the
meaning of the city.”.364 In the same chapter, while he talks about “urban
artifacts”, he underlines the necessity of meaning with these words:

“Once again, all these considerations are important only be-

cause behind them are artifacts that show their direct connec-
tion to man. For the elements constituting the city -these urban
artifacts which are by nature characteristic and characterizing
and as much a product of human activity as a collective arti-
fact- are among the most authentic human testimonies. Nat-
urally when we speak of these artifacts we are speaking of
their architecture, their meaning as a human creation.”.365

Rossi also gives us an important hint about his understanding of

“meaning” in architecture in the preface of the book. He finishes the
preface with these words:

“Perhaps, as I said at the beginning, this is the meaning of the

363. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
architecture of the city; like the figure in the carpet, the figure Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
is clear but everyone reads it in a different way.”366 1988), 151.

364. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the

Here, we can understand Rossi does not think of “meaning” as a stat- City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
ic or absolute concept, but as a dynamic and open-ended concept Original: 1966), 101.
that every individual interprets for themselves, like a work of art.
365. Ibid, 100.

Norberg-Schulz, on the other hand, has a more direct approach 366. Ibid, 19.

134
Figure 4.8: Diagram of “The Theory of
Evolution”, Charles Jencks.
to the necessity of “meaning” in architecture. Firstly, he recognizes
the previous effort of Modern architecture to create such a world of
meaning in this passage:

“Modern architecture from the very beginning was concerned

about meaning. Early pioneers such as Frank Lloyd Wright,
Henry van de Velde, Adolf Loos and Hendrik Petrus Berlage,
denounced the “lies” of historicism, and demanded a new,
authentic architecture. The point of departure of the modern
movement, therefore, was not primarily problems of function
and technology, but the demand for “honesty”. Thus Giedion
wrote: “According to the easy explanation that was advanced
later, the movement developed as the application of two prin-
ciples: the abandonment of historical styles, and -consequent
upon this- the use of “fitness for purpose” as a criterion.”367

Here, we can see that he manifests the opposition between “histori-

cism” and “modern movement” as an opposition between “honesty”
and “lies”. Thus, the whole discourse turns into a matter of “morality”.
367. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, He mentions this notion in this passage:
1988), 177.

135
Figure 4.9: A Manifest Drawing and Writing on “The Room”, Louis I. Kahn.

“As a consequence, the modern movement gave much atten-

tion to questions of “honesty” and “morality”, and in general
aimed at the recovery of authentic and original forms which
could substitute the “devaluated symbols” of historicism. Thus
the movement developed the general principles of “func-
tionalism” and “structuralism”, believing that the expression
of function and structure would generate new meaningful
forms. To some extent the promise was fulfilled.”368

Here, after mentioning “honesty” and “morality”, he talks about “func-

tionalism” and “structuralism” as a tool to create a new domain of mean-
ing in architecture, and he also says that was partially successful but not
sufficient. Later, he considers post-modernism in this manner and says:

“Post-modern architecture therefore concentrates its attention

on the problem of meaning. So far, it seems to be of general
agreement that meaning has to do with images rather than
functional or structural forms. A form is meaningful because 368. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
it “represents” something, and because it tells us something, Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 177.
and because it helps our orientation in and identification with
the world in which we live.”369 369. Ibid.

136
 As we can see, according to Norberg-Schulz, the approach of post-mod-
ern architecture is to use “image” as a tool to represent “meaning” in ar-
chitecture. Norberg-Schulz agrees with the fact that “image” is the essen-
tial tool to represent the “meaning”. He relates the “image” with various
concepts in architecture. In this manner, he mentions most frequently “mon-
umentality”. However, it is important to understand what he means by
“monumentality”. He starts with an etymological explanation of the word
monumentum which is the Latin word “monument” comes from:

“The Latin monumentatum simply means “things that remind,”

or, in other words, things that have an enduring significance.
Hence there is no reason for being afraid of “monumentali-
ty”. If one however prefers to use a less loaded expression,
one might say “meaning in architecture”.”370

In this passage, there are two major crucial points. One of which is the
meaning of the word momentum, “things that remind”. This is a direct refer-
ence to “memory”. The other point is Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of the
term “monumentality” which he describes as “meaning in architecture”. Thus,
he creates a connection between memory, monumentality, and meaning.

Another concept Norberg-Schulz frequently mentions as a part of

the problem of “image” is the place, in other words, locus. He says
“The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of place, and
hence a “loss of life”.”.371 This kind of reasoning is quite often in var-
ious points in his writings. Thus, he sees a great value in “place” in
order to solve the problem of “image” and also “meaning”.

Lastly, Norberg-Schulz sees “typology” as a tool to solve the problem of

the “meaning”. He says “Typology is not architecture, and before it can
become a useful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from
the rationalists’ world of abstractions and brought back to the concrete
world of phenomena.”.372 Later, he explains what kind of a role “typolo-
gy” can take in this manner and he says “And still, something is lacking.
Kahn’s images are certainly related to the archetype and they are easily
recognizable, but they do not constitute any symbol system which re-
sponds to the language of architecture. They do not, like the Greek or-
ders allow for variation, combination and translocation of meanings.”.373
Thus, he defines the notion which he later calls “typical image” that is
open to “variation, combination and translocation of meanings”.
370. Ibid, 153.

371. Ibid, 169. Both authors responded to this necessity of “meaning” in their own
ways. However, there were numerous common points in the ap-
372. Ibid, 175.
proach to the solution of this problem. These common points can be
373. Ibid, 169. gathered under three subjects: image, locus, and memory.

137
 IMAGE, MEMORY, LOCUS

The concept of “image” takes a significant place in both Rossi’s and

Norberg-Schulz’s works. As we mentioned in the previous section,
numerous architects recognized the lack of “meaning” in Modern
architecture in the second half of the twentieth century. Although there
have been various interpretations to resolve the problem of “mean-
ing”, by that time, the general approach was through reference to
“image” and “historicism” which also refers to “image” fundamen-
tally. Parallel to these movements, Rossi and Norberg-Schulz were
mostly focused on the “image” as well.

Rossi mentions “image” at various points in his writings. Rossi first un-
derlines the importance of image on the urban scale. He points out
this with these words:

“The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these

problems and invests all of man’s inhabited and constructed
realm with value. It arises inevitably because it is so deeply
rooted in the human condition.”.374

Here, there are two major points in this statement. One of which is his
understanding of “architecture” as an equivalent concept to “urban
image”. Thus, we can say that Rossi considers “urban image” as a
crucial part of architecture. The other point is that he considers “urban
image” as a notion that is “deeply rooted in the human condition”.
We can relate this to the existential perspective of Norberg-Schulz
who frequently refers to the term “human existence”.

An important influence on Rossi’s perspective was by French philoso-

pher and sociologist Maurice Halbwachs. He was a French sociol-
ogist who made significant contributions to the understanding of col-
lective memory. He proposed the concept of collective memory in the
early 20th-century, emphasizing the role of social groups in shaping
and preserving memories. According to Halbwachs, individual mem-
ories are not purely personal but are shaped by and interconnected
with the memories of the social groups to which individuals belong,
such as families, communities, or nations. Collective memory is a
shared and constructed version of the past that is shaped by the inter-
actions and experiences of individuals within these groups. Halbwachs
argued that people remember events and history through the lens of
their social context, and that individual memories are influenced by
the dominant narratives and representations created within their social
374. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
groups. These collective memories are continually evolving and subject City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
to reinterpretation, as new experiences and social dynamics impact Original: 1966), 27.

138
Figure 4.10: Urban Scene: Scena Per il Teatrino, Aldo Rossi, 1978. Magic marker and paint on board, 730 × 1073 mm.

how the past is perceived and passed on. Halbwachs’ ideas have had
a lasting impact on the fields of sociology, anthropology, and memo-
ry studies, shaping our understanding of how societies construct and
maintain their shared historical narratives and identities. The concept of
collective memory continues to be relevant in analyzing how societ-
ies remember and commemorate events, and how memory influences
group cohesion and identity.375 In the chapter “Collective Memory” of
his book, Rossi relates “image” with the “memory” with a quotation from
Halbwachs with these words:

“As Halbwachs writes in La Mémoire Collective, “When a

group is introduced into a part of space, it transforms it to
its image, but at the same time, it yields and adapts itself to
certain material things which resist it. It encloses itself in the
framework that it has constructed. The image of the exterior
environment and the stable relationships that it maintains with
375. Nicolas Russell, “Collective Memory
before and after Halbwachs”, The French it pass into the realm of the idea that it has of itself.”376
Review. 79:4 (2006): 792–804.
Here, we can see how Halbwach relates “image” with “memory”.
376. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; After this, Rossi describes his perspective on “collective memory” to
Original: 1966), 130. clear possible misunderstandings:

139
Figure 4.11: A Drawing of a Building Block from IBA 84, Aldo Rossi. Watercolor and ink on paper, 36.6 x 50.5 cm.

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of
its people, and like memory it is associated with object and
places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This re-
lationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the
city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of land-
scape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory,
new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas
flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.”377

Here, the first point Rossi makes is the fact that he considers “memory”
as an abstract notion which later mentions as an “image”, not as a
physical being which he calls “permanences and persistences” later
in the book to differentiate. The other point he makes is the relation
between “locus” and “collective memory”. We can understand he
considers “locus” as a place where “collective memory” takes place.
However, the most important point is that he considers this relation
between “locus” and “memory” as the source that creates the pre-
dominant “image” of the city. Later, he mentions “memory” as “con-
sciousness of the city” in this passage:
377. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
“Memory, within the structure, is the consciousness of the city; Original: 1966), 130.

140
 it is a rational operation whose development demonstrates
with maximum clarity, economy, and harmony that which has
already come to be accepted.”378

Later, Rossi relates “memory” to two notions: “myth” and “ritual”.

Through these two concepts, Rossi separates the notion of “memory”
from the place and physical elements for a deeper understanding of
“memory”. He explains his point with these words:

“I believe that the importance of ritual in its collective na-

ture and its essential character as an element for preserving
myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of mon-
uments and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the
city and of the transmission of ideas in an urban context.”379

Here, we can that Rossi examines the relation between “myth” and
“ritual” to render a deeper understanding of “memory”. Later, he
compares this relation with “monument”:

“For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of

myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment
that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible.”380

Here, we can understand that Rossi considers “monument” as a tool

to carry “memory” through time, as “ritual” does for “myth”. Later,
Rossi explains the importance of “monument” in this manner:

“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where

does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its
function, its memory, or in something else again? We can
now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has
marked the event.”381

This notion of “event & sign” can be related to the “image” through
“memory”. Rossi mentions this notion with a quotation from Adolf Loos:

“It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf

Loos: “If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide
in the forest, formed in to a pyramid, shaped by a shovel,
we become serious and something in us says, “someone lies
378. Ibid, 131.
buried here.”. That is architecture.” The mound six feet long
379. Ibid, 24. and three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure archi-
tecture precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is
380. Ibid, 24.
only in the history of architecture that a separation between
381. Ibid, 106. the original element and its various forms occurred. From this

141
 separation, which the ancient world seemingly resolved for-
ever, derives the universally acknowledged character of per-
manence of those first forms.”382

However, Rossi does not limit “image” to only “memory”. As we men-

tioned before, Rossi mainly uses two complementary perspectives to
understand the “city. These are the concepts of “city as a man-made
object” and “city as a work of art”. The concept of “memory” coin-
cides with the “city as a work of art”. On the other hand, Rossi gives
“image” a value beyond this. He points out the value of the image in
case we think of it as a result of “collective imagination”:

“The second point of view sees history as the study of the

actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is com-
plementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real
structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis
of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagina-
tion. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately
linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be
confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople,
and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their
physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also
speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but
physically disappeared.”383

Here, we can understand that Rossi values the “image” of the city as
a concept beyond its “memory” and its “permanences”.

Last but not least, mentioning Rossi’s drawings would help us to un-
derstand his relation with “image”. One of which is the drawing of
“Analogous City” which can be considered as a visual representa-
tion of the values mentioned in the book “Architecture of the City”.
“Analogy” is an important tool of Rossi. He mentions this notion in the
“Introduction to the First American Edition” section of the book:

“This overlapping of the individual and the collective mem-

ory, together with the invention that takes place within the
time of the city, has led me to the concept of analogy. Anal-
ogy expresses itself through a process of architectural de-
sign whose elements are preexisting and formally defined,
382. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
but whose true meaning is unforeseen at the beginning and City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
unfolds only at the end of the process. Thus, the meaning of Original: 1966), 107.
the process is identified with the meaning of the city.”384
383. Ibid, 128.

Norberg-Schulz has a different approach in the context of “image”. 384. Ibid, 18.

142
Figure 4.12: Life in a Norwegian, “tun” at the end of the nineteenth century, The Concept of Dwelling, Christian Norberg-Schulz.

However, there are also points that intersect with Rossi’s approach.
Inspired by Heidegger, Norberg first defines three systems of imag-
es. These systems are “language”, “style” and “tradition”. He men-
tions and explains this with these words:

“There can only be one architectural language, since there is

only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is basically
only one spoken language, although there are many “tongues”.)
The styles represent different choices within the one and same
language, or, in Heidegger’s terms, different responses to Lan-
guage. Thus we have three systems of images:
language, which consists of invariant archetypes,
style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and
tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes.”385

There is an interesting point in this statement. Norberg-Schulz de-

scribes these three systems of images through “archetypes”. Thus, in
his perspective, “archetypes” plays an important role in the context of
“image”. He explains this notion with these words:
385. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 153. “Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as

143
Figure 4.13: The Duck and the Decorated Shed Diagrams, Robert Venturi.

systems of types. In order to have an existential foundation,

these types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the
general language. Basically a type is not a sign or a met-
aphor, but a relatively stable gathering of a world, which
possesses the capacity of adaptation and variation.”386

Here, Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between “type” and “im-

age” fundamentally. He later points out the importance of the “adap-
tation” and “variation” of the “image” through a new term: “typical im-
age”. He explains the necessity of “typical image” with these words:

“And still, something is lacking. Kahn’s images are certainly relat-

ed to the archetype and they are easily recognizable, but they
do not constitute any symbol system which responds to the lan-
guage of architecture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow
for variation, combination and translocation of meanings.”.387

Norberg-Schulz also details his understanding of “language”. Firstly, 386. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
he describes the relation between “language” and “architecture” in Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 153.
this passage:
387. Ibid, 169.

144
 “Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality
of the world. The architectural language consists of arche-
typal images that reveal those structures which are invariant
with respect to place and time. The archetypes are not forms
which exist in some distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich.
Rather they represent basic modes of being in the world, or
“existential structures”. As a matter of fact the archetypes do
not exist at all, only their various manifestations. A “typical”
tower, thus, does not exist, but “towernesss” is revealed in
its multifarious aspects by means of ever new tower-images.
Thus the work of architecture becomes “an offering to Ar-
chitecture”. These words of Loius Kahn suggest that it is pos-
sible and meaningful to talk about architecture in general,
although only single works exist.”388

Here, there are three main points. First of all, Norberg-Schulz defines
“architecture” as a “language” previously described as “which consists
of invariant archetypes”. The second point is parallel to this notion. He
describes “architectural language” through “archetypal images”. Thus,
he brings together these four concepts. Another point is how he defines
“archetypes”. He defines it as “basic modes of being in the world” or
“existential structures”, not as abstract forms as an ideal “Ding an sich”.
Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers “archetypes” as being strongly con-
nected to “context” and “existence”. In this passage, he also makes a
point about the term “typical image” we mentioned before.

Here, there is an important point which is the point Norberg-Schulz

directly comments about Rossi. Firstly, he mentions Rossi as one of the
two architects who contributed to the recovery of the “typical image”
with these words:

“Two architects have contributed in a particularly decisive

way to the recovery of the typical image, the American Rob-
ert Venturi and the Italian Aldo Rossi.”389

After this, Norberg-Schulz starts to explain Venturi’s significance in this

sense which is also worth mentioning:

“The resulting independence of form and function is in the

interest of a more effective functionalism, because our “al-
lowing form and function to go their separate ways permits
388. Ibid. function to be truly functional.”390
389. Ibid, 169.
We can clearly see that Norberg-Schulz considers a value in the inde-
390. Ibid, 169. pendency of form and function, and admires Venturi in this manner. Lat-

145
er, he mentions Rossi’s contribution in his point of view with these words:

“His point of departure is a wish for a typology which is com-

monly understandable and which may help us to recover the
city as a “work of art”.”391

Norberg-Schulz underlines Rossi’s aim for a clear “understandable”

typology. He sees a great value in this notion in the aim of recovering
the “city as a work of art”.

In the chapter “New Monumentality” of the book “Principles of Mod-

ern Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz points out the relation between
“image” and “symbolization” with a quotation from Sigfried Giedion:

““Monumentality springs from the eternal need of people to

create symbols for their activities and for their fate or destiny,
for their religious beliefs and for their social countries where
modern architecture has monumentality.”.

The quotation from Giedion suggests that meanings are ex-

pressed by means of “symbols”, and symbolization has in
fact become a primary concern of the present. As we al-
ready pointed out, symbolization implies the need for a con-
sistent language of “images”.”392

Norberg-Schulz recognized a necessity for a consistent “language

of images” for “symbols” and “symbolization”. In Norberg-Schulz’s
approach to architecture, “symbols” and “signs” plays an important
role. Elia Haddad mentions this importance in his article:

“This theory, influenced to a large extent by Charles Morris’s in-

terpretation of semiotics, constituted a similar attempt to develop
a comprehensive structure—that is, an “architectural totality” that
would account for all the dimensions of architecture: the technical
structure, environment, context, scale and ornament.”393
391. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
We can understand that “semiotics” inspired Norberg-Schulz to aim Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
for a “comprehensive structure” which he calls “architectural totality”. 1988), 169.
In his first book “Intentions in Architecture”, he gives two following 392. Ibid, 153.
chapters for these two concepts.
393. Elie Haddad, “Christian Nor-
berg-Schulz’s Phenomenological Project In
Later, Norberg-Schulz examples “typical image” through ancient civ- Architecture,” Architectural Theory Review
ilizations. He starts with Ancient Egyptian architecture and underlines 15, no. 1 (2010): 89.

146
Figure 4.14: The Egyptian grid towns.

the importance of grammar which consists of “order”, “hierarchy”

and “classification” and its relation with the values and environmental
conditions of Egyptians. He explains how the route of the Sun and
the direction of the Nile River shapes the general orientation of the
civilization through “grid”, “path”, “center” and “enclosure”. Then, he
starts to example it through Ancient Greek architecture. He under-
lines the “universality” of the “image” of Ancient Greek architecture
with a quotation from Heidegger:

“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete

presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”,
Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work
of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world
and at the same time sets this world back again on earth,
which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”394

Here, Norberg-Schulz underlines the value of Ancient Greek archi-

tecture in the aspect of how it brings together “locality” and “univer-
sality” of “image”. He reinforces this notion by saying “Greek orders
are rooted in concrete places, but their meaning is universal.”.395 This
notion of connecting particular “local” or “specific” elements with
“universality” is a repetitive pattern in Norberg-Schulz’s works. An-
other example can be observed in the part he talks about “house” in
this passage:

“The house serves daily, personal life. Its nature is circumstan-

394. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of tial, and its form is related to local and temporal conditions.
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, This does not mean, however, that all houses are entirely
1988), 157.
different. Any situation represents a variation on the general
395. Ibid. structures of the world, and it is therefore meaningful to con-

147
Figure 4.15: “On the way to figurative architecture”, Michael Graves. From The Concept of Dwelling, Norberg-Schulz.

sider the house an imago mundi.”396

In various parts in his writings, he mentions this aspect with the term
“imago mundi”. However, before examining “imago mundi”, we
need to understand what an “architectural thing” is. He explains the
term “architectural thing” with these words:

“When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic

qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part
of a work of architecture.”397

The term “architectural thing” can be related to Rossi’s “urban artifact”.

However, this rises another question about what “architectural image” is.
Norberg-Schulz responds to this with these words:

“What, then, is the nature of a universally valid architectural im-

396. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
age?...We have mentioned the pyramid, the dome, the pedi- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
ment and the arch as examples of such images. They reveal gen- 1988), 179.
eral relationships between down and up, here and there, outside
397. Ibid, 153.
and inside, and are at the same time easily recognizable.”398
398. Ibid, 169.

148
 Norberg-Schulz gives some hints about the “gathering” he will later
mention, with the words “relationships between down and up, here
and there, outside and inside”. What he means by “achieving ima-
go mundi” is that when a subject interacts with a complete work that
“gathers the Fourfold” in Heideggerian terms, the specific image of the
“architectural thing” expands and gives a glimpse of a deeper under-
standing of the world. Norberg mentions this notion with these words:

“Thus a temporal understanding of a complete world of

earth, sky, man and divinity is concretized, and architecture
becomes a true imago mundi.”399

Thus, Norberg-Schulz considers one of the objectives of an “architec-

tural thing” as a connection to the general understanding of the world.

After this passage, Norberg-Schulz gives us another important con-

cept to understand his perspective on “image”. He mentions this con-
cept with these words:

“We could also say that the above-mentioned forms are im-
ages because they possess a place-creating potentiality. Any
place reveals a particular relationship of earth and sky, and is
constituted by architectural images. The loss of the image there-
fore brings about a loss of place, and hence a “loss of life”.”400

Norberg-Schulz underlines the fact that he values the forms he men-

tioned as images due to their “place-creating potentiality”. He rein-
forces this statement by equating “loss of images” with “loss of place”
and “loss of place” with “loss of life”. This statement repeats several
times in various books by Norberg-Schulz. It fundamentally under-
lines the value of “locus” in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “im-
age”. Thus, it opens a new path for us to pursue.

“Locus” is one of the most important concepts in Norberg-Schulz’s

world of thought. It is a key to understanding his perspective. Be-
fore we start diving into the “locus”, we need to understand a fun-
damental point of Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “place”. Nor-
berg-Schulz frequently mentions the statement “life takes place” in
his various writings. This statement is deeply related to the Heideg-
gerian philosophy. Heidegger has an immense influence on Nor-
berg-Schulz’s perspective on “space” and “place”. Thus, we should
examine his approach to “space”. Heidegger explains an individu-
al’s interaction with the “space” in this passage:
399. Ibid, 163.

400. Ibid, 169. “Spaces, and with them space as such—”space”—are always

149
 provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open
up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say
that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through
spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations. And
only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces by their
very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in going
through spaces we do not give up our standing in them. Rather,
we always go through spaces in such a way that we already
experience them by staying constantly with near and remote
locations and things. When I go toward the door of the lecture
hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were
not such that I am there. I am never here only, as this encap-
sulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the
room, and only thus can I go through it.”401

As we can observe, Heidegger considers “space” as a notion that starts

in the cognitive process of the individual. Thus, he thinks of “space” as a
concept before a physical emptiness. This point of view is important to
understand other elements of Heidegger’s perspective. One of which is
“nearness”. He briefly explains “nearness” with these words:

““Man puts the longest distances, behind him in the shortest

time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts
everything before himself at the shortest range. Yet the frantic
abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does
not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us
in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on
the radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from
us in point of distance can be near to us. Short distance is not in
itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness.”402

We can again observe the same notion. To Heidegger, “nearness” is also

a spatial concept that is fundamentally related to cognitive and percep-
tual processes, rather than a physical distance. However, the most import-
ant point Heidegger makes on “place-creating” is when he explains how
“dwelling” and “building” are related to each other in this passage:

“In what way does building belong to dwelling?

The answer to this question will clarify for us what building, under-
stood by way of the nature of dwelling, really is. We limit ourselves
to building in the sense of constructing things and inquire: what is a 401. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language,
built thing? A bridge may serve as an example for our reflections. Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New
York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155.
The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It does
not just connect banks that are already there. The banks emerge 402. Ibid, 163.

150
Figure 4.16: A View of Walton Bridge, Canaletto, 1753–1755

as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge de-
signedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side is
set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch
along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With
the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other
expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and
bank and land into each other’s neighborhood.

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers

the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only
something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The
location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the
bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream
that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be
a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge
does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location
comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is
a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows
a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities

151
Figure 4.17: Therme Vals, Peter Zumthor, Photo by Fernando Guerra.

and ways by which a space is provided for.”403

In the first paragraph, we can see that Heidegger relates not only
the connection but also the opposing banks not existing before the
“bridge”. The realization of the “bridge” created the connection as
well as the two sides of the river as places. Especially in the last para-
graph, we can see that Heidegger directly considers “dwelling” as a
tool to define a “location”.

Another important notion of Heidegger’s terminology is the “neigh-

bourly dwelling” which is a rarely mentioned concept in his writings.
However, the importance of this concept is recognized by Nor-
berg-Schulz. In the article “Heidegger’s Thinking on Architecture”,
Norberg-Schulz points out this importance with a quotation from
Heidegger in this passage:

“In the Hebel essay Heidegger says:

The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited land-
scape close to man and at the same time place the
403. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
nearness of neighbourly dwelling under the expanse Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
of the sky. 1988), 149-152.

152
 This statement offers a clue to the problem of architectural
gathering. What is gathered, Heidegger says, is the “in-
habited landscape.” An inhabited landscape obviously is a
known landscape, that is, something that is v. This landscape
is brought close to us by the buildings, or in other words, the
landscape is revealed as what it is in truth.”404

Here, Norberg-Schulz interprets Heidegger’s statement. This inter-

pretation can be considered as a connection between “locus” and
“memory” in Heidegger’s work.

Now, we can examine the term “locus”. This term directly appears in
the term “genius loci” which is one of the most important terms in Nor-
berg-Schulz’s writings. The word “loci” comes from the word “locus”
which means “place” or “locality”.405 Norberg-Schulz introduced the
term “genius loci” in the book “Genius Loci: Towards a Phenomenology
of Architecture”. He describes the term in the book with these words:

“Genius loci is a Roman concept. According to ancient

Roman belief every “independent’’ thing has its genius; its·
guardian spirit. This spirit gives life to people and places.1
accompanies them from birth to death, and determines their
character or essence. Even the gods had their genius, a fact
which illustrates the fundamental nature of the concept.”406

In the chapter “New Regionalism” of the book “Principles of Modern Ar-

chitecture”, he describes the meaning of “genius loci” with these words:

“As all buildings form part of a concrete “here”, they can-

not be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular
qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality
404. Christian Norberg-Schulz, “Heideg- has been recognized as the genius loci, and historical build-
ger’s Thinking on Architecture,” Perspecta ings normally had a distinct local flavor, although they often
20 (1983): 61–68. belonged to a general “style”.”407
405. Harper Douglas, “Etymology of
locus,” Online Etymology Dictionary, ac- Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers “genius
cessed May 21, 2023, https://www.ety- loci” as unique “qualities” of a specific place. Also, he understand
monline.com/word/locus.
“locus” by examining the relation between “building” and “place”.
406. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius He explains this relation with a quotation from Heidegger:
Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Archi-
tecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18.
““The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape
407. Ibid, 135. close to man and at the same time places the nearness of
neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.”, Heideg-
408. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius
Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Archi- ger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-
tecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18. made place, is an “inhabited landscape”.”408

153
Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of the term “inhabited
landscape”. This concept of “inhabited landscape” can be related
to the term “inhabited space” in Rossi’s writings. Later, he explains this
term in this passage:

“A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is

a “lived space” between earth and sky. First of all it reveals
itself as a certain Stimmung. This German word means some-
thing like “atmosphere” or “character”, and moreover it says
that man is gestimmt, “tuned”, by his environment.”409

Here, there are two important concepts in this statement. One of

which is “lived space” which can be related to the term “lived time” in
Sigfried Giedion’s terminology. This notion of “lived space” was once
more referred to previously in this chapter with the word “gewohnt”
while we were examining “neighbourly dwelling”. Another important
concept of the statement is the term “Stimmung” which means “at-
mosphere” as Norberg-Schulz also mentions. Norberg-Schulz de-
scribes the “first” feature of the “lived space” as “atmosphere” which
gives us an idea about his phenomenological understanding of the
space. He also describes “Stimmung” with these words: “Let us so
far only point out that the Stimmung of the locality evidently influenc-
es the general languages of form, just as it “tunes” the people who
live there.”.410 After these descriptive statements about “genius loci”,
Norberg-Schulz explains one of the most important elements of his
understanding of locus with a question and an answer:

“How, then, is the genius loci kept and embodied? Basically

in two ways, which we may call “visualization” and “comple-
mentation”.”411

These two terms “visualization” and “complementation” are key ele-

ments to understanding Norberg-Schulz’s approach to “locus”. Later,
he explains these terms further:

“Visualization is exemplified by Italian hilltop towns which reveal

the inherent topographical structure, and complementation by an
enclosed man-made settlement, an “artificial oasis”, in the infinite
desert. It is important to realize that neither of the modes are cas-
es of symbolization. Visualization and complementation produce
409. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Genius
forms which do not represent anything else, and therefore may Loci: Towards a Phenomenology of Archi-
be considered fundamental architectural acts. Vernacular archi- tecture (New York: Rizzoli, 1980), 18.
tecture is in general based on these modes, but the same also
410. Ibid, 141.
holds true for the great “monuments” of the early civilizations. Thus
Heidegger uses a Greek temple to show how a building “opens 411. Ibid, 141.

154
Figure 4.18: Ayub National Hospital, Dhaka, Bangladesh, Louis I. Kahn, 1962. Photo by Cemal Emden.

up a world and gives to things their look”. The forms which are
related to a particular region evidently possess similar proper-
ties, and become elements of a tradition or “way of building”.
Symbolization is therefore a derivation from the original act of
revelation, and a meaningful language of architecture is not an
arbitrary system of conventional “sign”, but an interrelated set of
visualizations and complementations. Place is hence the point of
departures of architecture, as well as its goal.”412

Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers “visualiza-

tion” and “complementation” as fundamental acts of architecture.
Also, he separates these acts from “symbolization” to clear potential
misunderstandings. He also gives hints about how he understands “vi-
sualization” and “complementation”. Later he mentions a poem from
Heidegger, he starts explaining with “visualization” in this passage:

“Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not

arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenom-
ena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic
and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things
412. Ibid, 135. stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,

155
 each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this
emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.“413

Here, we can understand “visualization” is mostly about what the

“thing” represents with its existence through time and space. With this
in mind, the term “visualization” coincides with “memory” or the past
of the “thing”. After this, Norberg-Schulz explains “complementation”
Figure 4.19: The simplest model of man’s
with these words: existential space, Existence, Space and
Architecture, Christian Norberg-Schulz.
“When man makes language speak about the thing, how-
ever, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also
how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at
this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or
“project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be,
means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however,
is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It
is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in
motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”414

Here, we can understand “complementation” is mainly related to what

the “thing” could be potentially. Hence, the term “complementation”
coincides with “dream” or “project” as Norberg also mentions, in oth-
er words, the potential future of the “thing”. This potentiality was men-
tioned previously in our writings as well while we were examining how
Norberg-Schulz relates “loss of image” to “loss of place” and “loss
of place” to “loss of life”. He states that he considers some “forms” he
mentioned as “images” due to their “place-creating potentiality”.

The term “locus” is present in Rossi’s writings as well. Although his approach
to “locus” does not consist of the rich understanding of Norberg-Schulz,
Rossi also underlines the value of “locus”. He defines it with these words:

“The locus is a relationship between a certain specific location and

the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and universal.”415

Here, we can understand Rossi understands “locus” as the relation

between “building” and the “location”. Later, he explains further with
these words:
413. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the City
“The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions and (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; Origi-
nal: 1966), 179.
qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary
for understanding an urban artifact.”416 414. Ibid, 179.

415. Ibid, 103.

Here, we can observe that Rossi considers “locus” as “conditions” and “quali-
ties” of the space which are necessary to understand “urban artifacts”. 416. Ibid, 103.

156
 This is an important point when we consider Norberg-Schulz defines
“genius loci” as unique “qualities” of a specific place, as we men-
tioned before. Thus, we can understand what Rossi means by “locus”
is similar to what Norberg-Schulz means by “genius loci”. Rossi un-
derlines the importance of “locus” to understanding “urban artifact”
by describing it as one of its four main features of it:

“We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban ar-
tifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it
is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to
certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory.”417

Another point he makes about “locus” is, as we previously mentioned,

when Norberg-Schulz explains the relation between “city” and “col-
lective memory”. He describes “city” as the “locus” of the “collective
memory” in this passage:

“Thus we consider locus the characteristic principle of urban

artifacts; the concepts of locus, architecture, permanences,
and history together help us to understand the complexity of
urban artifacts. The collective memory participates in the ac-
tual transformation of space in the works of the collective, a
transformation that is always conditioned by whatever mate-
rial realities oppose it.”418

Here, it is important to mention the analogy of “teatro” to understand

how Rossi understands the “city” in the context of “locus”. This is well
explained in the article by Seungkoo Joo with these words: “Jo says
“Rossi(1982) sees the city as the theater of human events, …”.419 He
also says “The locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space, time,
form, and site of a succession of both ancient and more modern
events.”.420 He describes further with this passage:

“Rossi argues in his book, A Scientific Autobiography (1981),

that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespear’s Globe Theater,
revealing the similarity even in the common names of The-
417. Ibid, 32. aters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespear’s dictum, All the
418. Ibid, 130. World’s stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the
world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would
419. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec- have searched for a way to express the space of theater.”421
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi-
tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1,
(2003): 233. Here, we can understand that Rossi considers “city” as a “theater” in
which “human events” takes place. Thus, “city” is the “locus” of these
420. Ibid.
events as “theater” works in the same way.
421. Ibid.

157
 PHYSICAL ELEMENTS AND TYPES

Examining how Rossi and Norberg-Schulz approach “physical el-

ements” and “types” is another major subject to understanding the
similarities and differences between their works. Both authors have
different approaches in this context. However, there are various points
that these two different approaches intersect. We will examine these
approaches to understanding the intersections with their reasoning.

As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main perspectives to under-

stand the “city” which complement each other: “city as a man-made ob-
ject” and “city as a work of art”. These two main perspectives are Rossi’s
fundamental understanding of “physical elements” in the city. He sums
up his understanding of the “city as a man-made object” in this passage:

“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of cer-

tain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repository
of history. In this book we have made use of the historical
method from two different points of view. In the first, the city
was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built over
time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous
way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology, the history
of architecture, and the histories of individual cities- the city
yields very important information and documentation. Cities
become historical texts; in fact, to study urban phenomena
without the use of history is unimaginable, and perhaps this is
the only practical method available for understanding specif-
ic urban artifacts whose historical aspect is predominant. We
have illustrated this thesis, in part the foundation of this study, in
the context of the theories of Poete and Lavedan as well as in
relation to the concept of permanence.”422

Here, we can understand “city” as a man-made object “built over

time” which retains “traces of time”. He states that in this perspective
“cities become historical texts” which is related to the “locality” and
“history” of the city. This concept coincides with the term “visualization”
in Norberg-Schulz’s terminology. After this, Rossi sums up his under-
standing of the “city as a work of art” in this passage:

“The second point of view sees history as the study of the actu-
al formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is complemen-
tary to the first and directly concerns not only the real structure
of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis of a
422. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagination. City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately linked, Original: 1966), 127.

158
Figure 4.20: Aphrodisias, Ara Güler, 1958.

so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be con-

founded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople, and
Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their phys-
ical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also speak
in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but physically
disappeared.”423

Here, Rossi underlines the perspective that understands the city as a

result of “collective imagination” which “represents ideas of the city that
extend beyond their physical form” and creates an urban image that re-
flects the “universal” understanding of the city. This notion coincides with
the concept of “complementation” in Norberg-Schulz’s terminology.

Rossi considers the “city” to consist of “urban artifacts”. According to

Rossi, “urban artifacts” have four main features: individuality, locus, de-
sign and memory. He explains this in this passage:

“We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban ar-
tifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it
423. Ibid, 127-128.
is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to
424. Ibid, 32. certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory.”424

159
Figure 4.21: Monument to Sandro Pertini, Milan, Aldo Rossi, 1988-90.

Later, he defines “primary elements” as urban artifacts which have per-

manent participation in the city. He explains this notion in this passage:

“We have called these urban elements, which are of a domi-

nant nature, primary elements because they participate in the
evolution of the city over time in a permanent way, often be-
coming identified with the major artifacts constituting the city.
The union of these primary elements with an area, in terms of
location and construction, permanence of plan and perma-
nence of building, natural artifacts and constructed artifacts,
constitutes a whole which is the physical structure of the city.”425

Here, we can understand Rossi considers “primary elements” as “ma-

jor” artifacts that play a stronger role in the “evolution” of the city. He
explains further and examples of “monuments” as primary elements in
this passage:

“In this sense a historical building can be understood as a pri-

mary urban artifact; it may be disconnected from its original
425. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
function, or over time take on functions different from those for City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
which it was designed, but its quality as an urban artifact, as a Original: 1966), 86.

160
 generator of a form of the city, remains constant. In this sense,
monuments are always primary elements.”426

After defining “monuments” as “primary elements” of the city, Rossi

describes the importance of “monuments” in this context. He values
“monuments” as “primary elements” to a different degree. He ex-
plains this in this passage:

“A monument stands at a center. It is usually surrounded by

buildings and becomes a place of attraction. We have said
that it is a primary element, but of a special type: that is, it is
typical in that it summarizes all of the questions posed by the
city, but it is special because by virtue of its form its value goes
beyond economics and function.”427

Here, we can see that “monuments” is considered as a “special type”

of “primary element. Considering also the notions of “event” and
“sign” which we previously mentioned, this statement leads us to the
conclusion that “monuments” plays a significant role in Rossi’s archi-
tectural perspective. Rossi describes the importance of “monuments”
in the context of “event” and sign” with these words:

“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where

does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form,
its function, its memory, or in something else again? We can
now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has
marked the event.”428

Thus, Rossi considers “event” and “sign” which marks the event as a
fundamental raison d’être for “urban artifacts”. Rossi underlines this
objective of the “monuments” that will carry the “memory” through time
with these words at another point of his book:

“For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of

myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment
that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible.”429

He underlines the importance of this notion with a quotation from Ad-

olf Loos in this passage:
426. Ibid, 87.
“It is in this sense that we can interpret a comment by Adolf
427. Ibid, 92. Loos: “If we find a mound six feet long and three feet wide
in the forest, formed into a pyramid, shaped by a shovel, we
428. Ibid, 106.
become serious and something in us says, “someone lies bur-
429. Ibid, 24. ied here.”. That is architecture.” The mound six feet long and

161
 three feet wide is an extremely intense and pure architecture
precisely because it is identifiable in the artifact. It is only in the
history of architecture that a separation between the original
element and its various forms occurred. From this separation,
which the ancient world seemingly resolved forever, derives
the universally acknowledged character of permanence of
those first forms.”430

In this passage which we previously mentioned as well, this time I

would like to draw your attention to another part of this passage. Ros-
si describes a separation that “derives the universally acknowledged
character of permanence of those first forms”. This notion directly co-
incides with the term “archetype”. Thus, we can observe how Rossi
relates “event & sign” with the “archetype”.

Later, Rossi explains and describes this concept of “permanence” with

Poëte’s theory which he mentioned before while he was explaining “city
as a man-made object”. He briefly summarizes his theory in this passage:

“Poëte’s theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will

try to summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number
of hypotheses among which are economic considerations
that relate to the evolution of the city, it is in substance a
historical theory centered on the phenomenon of “per-
sistences.” These persistences are revealed through mon-
uments, the physical signs of the past, as well as through
the persistence of a city’s basic layout and plans. This last
point is Poëte’s most important discovery. Cities tend to re-
main on their axes of development, maintaining the posi-
tion of their original layout and growing according to the
direction and meaning of their older artifacts, which often
appear remote from present-day ones. Sometimes these
artifacts persist virtually unchanged, endowed with a con-
tinuous vitality; other times they exhaust themselves, and
then only the permanence of their form, their physical sign,
their locus remains. The most meaningful permanences are
those provided by the street and the plan. The plan persists
at different levels; it becomes differentiated in its attributes,
often deformed, but in substance, it is not displaced. This
is the most valid part of Poëte’s theory; even if it cannot be
said to be completely a historical theory, it is essentially
born from the study of history.”431 430. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 107.
Here, there are several points that we need to realize. One of which
is how Rossi describes “persistences”. He says “persistences” reveal 431. Ibid, 59.

162
Figure 4.22: Stonehenge, Wiltshire, England.

through “monuments” which he describes as “physical signs of the

past” as well as through the persistence of a city’s “basic layout” and
“plan”. Thus, Rossi considers not only physical objects like “monu-
ments” but also general morphological features of the city as a tool
for “persistence”. However, Rossi accredits a greater value to “monu-
ments” in this manner. He explains this with these words:

“In fact, I am inclined to believe that persistence in an urban

artifact often causes it to become identified as a monument,
and that a monument persists in the city both symbolically and
physically. A monument’s persistence or permanence is a re-
sult of its capacity to constitute the city, its history and art, its
being and memory.”432

Another important point that we should understand from Rossi’s brief

explanation of Poëte’s theory is that he considers “persistence” as an
informational value rather than a physical object. Considering this, we
can understand what Rossi means by “permanences” and “persistenc-
es” coincides with what he means by “types”. He defines “type” with
these words:
432. Ibid, 60.

163
 “I would define the concept of type as something that is per-
manent and complex, a logical principle that is prior to form
and that constitutes it.”433

Rossi points out that he considers “type” as a “logical principle” which

is “permanent” and “complex”. Later, he explains his understanding of
how “type” is constituted with these words:

“The type developed according to both needs and aspira-

tions to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form
and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely
from society to society.”434

It is important to understand Rossi’s relates “type” with a “form” and a “way

of life”. He explains the aspect of “form” with an examination of Quatre-
mère’s statements about “type” and “model” in this passage:

“One of the major theoreticians of architecture, Quatremère

de Quincy, understood the importance of these problems and
gave a masterly definition of type and model:

“The word ‘type’ represents not so much the image

of a thing to be copied or perfectly imitated as the
idea of an element that must itself serve as a rule for
the model… The model, understood in terms of the
practical execution of art, is an object that must be
repeated such as it is; type, on the contrary, is an
object according to which one can conceive works
that do not resemble one another at all. Everything is
precise and given in the model; everything is more or
less vague in the type. Thus we see that the imitation
of types involves nothing that feelings or spirit cannot
recognize…

“We also see that all inventions, notwithstanding

subsequent changes, always retain their elementary
principle in a way that is clear and manifest to the
senses and to reason. It is similar to a kind of nucle-
us around which the developments and variations of
forms to which the object was susceptible gather and
mesh. Therefore a thousand things of every kind have
come down to us, and one of the principal tasks of 433. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
science and philosophy is to seek their origins and City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 40.
primary causes so as to grasp their purposes. Here is
what must be called ‘type’ in architecture, as in every 434. Ibid, 40.

164
 other branch of human inventions and institutions ....
We have engaged in this discussion in order to ren-
der the value of the word type-taken metaphorically
in a great number of works-clearly comprehensible,
and to show the error of those who either disregard
it because it is not a model, or misrepresent it by im-
posing on it the rigor of a model that would imply the
conditions of an identical copy.”

In the first part of this passage, the author rejects the possibility
of type as something to be imitated or copied because in
this case there would be, as he asserts in the second part,
no “creation of the model”-that is, there would be no mak-
ing of architecture. The second part states that in architecture
(whether model or form) there is an element that plays its own
role, not something to which the architectonic object conforms
but something that is nevertheless present in the model. This is
the rule, the structuring principle of architecture.”435

Here, there are two major points that are important to understand.
One of which is the difference between “model” and “type”. Rossi
as well as Quatremère considers “model” as a “precise” and “given”
concept which can be considered as the information to produce a
specific form, and type as a “vague” concept which can be consid-
ered as the principles and rules that manifest that form. Rossi explains
this notion with these words:

“Type is thus a constant and manifests itself with a character

of necessity; but even though it is predetermined, it reacts di-
alectically with technique, function, and style, as well as with
both the collective character and the individual moment of the
architectural artifact.”436

Rossi relates “type” with the various aspects of architecture like “tech-
nique”, “function” and “style”. He also states that he considers “type”
as a “character of necessity” in architecture. He underlines this notion
with these words:

“Ultimately, we can say that type is the very idea of architec-

ture, that which is closest to its essence. In spite of changes, it
has always imposed itself on the “feelings and reason” as the
435. Ibid, 40. principle of architecture and of the city.”437
436. Ibid, 41.
In comparison to Rossi’s understanding of “physical elements”, Nor-
437. Ibid, 41. berg-Schulz has a similar approach. He defines physical objects of

165
Figure 4.23: In Morning on the River, Jonas Lie,1911-12.

architecture as “architectural thing”. This notion coincides with Rossi’s

concept of “urban artifact”. He explains this concept of “architectural
thing” with these words:

“When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic qual-

ities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part of a
work of architecture.”.438

Norberg-Schulz points out that an “architectural thing” consists of a

gathering of “image”, “space” and “form”. This explains a previously
mentioned issue as well. As we mentioned before, Norberg-Schulz
explains the qualities of “genius loci” with two fundamental acts which
are “visualization” and “complementation”. He explains these two
acts in these passages:

“…Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are

not arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phe-
438. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
nomena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things 1988), 153.

166
 stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,
each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this
emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.

When man makes language speak about the thing, however,

he usually does not only tell how they are, but also how they
could be, that is, how he would like them to be at this moment.
In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or “project” is
generally present. To reveal how things could be, means to
add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however, is not only
mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It is what the
situation lacks, which sets the historical process in motion, and
makes ever new interpretations necessary.”439

Here, there is an important detail. Norberg-Schulz explains an ab-

stract concept which is “genius loci”, yet he explains it through the
word “thing”. This notion gives an idea about how he considers “ar-
chitectural thing” as a gathering of “image”, “space” and “form”. Nor-
berg-Schulz’s understanding of “architectural thing” as a gathering can
be related to Heideggerian philosophy. In the example of “bridge”,
Heidegger describes this assembly of “image”, “space” and “form”:

“The bridge swings over the stream “with ease and power.” It
does not just connect banks that are already there. The banks
emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge
designedly causes them to lie across from each other. One side
is set off against the other by the bridge. Nor do the banks stretch
along the stream as indifferent border strips of the dry land. With
the banks, the bridge brings to the stream the one and the other
expanse of the landscape lying behind them. It brings stream and
bank and land into each other’s neighborhood.

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers

the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only
something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The
location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the
bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream
that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be
a location, and does so because of the bridge. Thus the bridge
does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location
439. Ibid, 179. comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is

167
 a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows
a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities
and ways by which a space is provided for.”440

We can observe how Heidegger merges these three concepts to-

gether in the example of “bridge”. However, this poetical narration
makes it hard to understand what Heidegger specifically means. Thus,
we need to examine another statement in Norberg-Schulz’s under-
standing which he explains with a quotation from Heidegger:

“The buildings bring the earth as the inhabited landscape

close to man and at the same time places the nearness of
neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the sky.”, Heideg-
ger says. What is gathered by a building, that is, by a man-
made place, is an “inhabited landscape”.”441

We can understand Norberg-Schulz considers “building” as a “man-

made place” and “inhabited landscape”. This gives us an idea about
the continuity between Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of “form”
and “space”.

On the other hand, the relation between “form” and “image” in Nor-
berg-Schulz’s perspective can be observed in the concept of “type”.
Firstly, we need to understand how he defines “type”. He points out
that in this passage:

“A type was not considered a fixed ideal, but a kind of living,

complex thing which, within certain limits, offered an infinite
possibility of variation.”442

This notion of possibilities of variation was also mentioned before in

the section we were talking about “typical image”. Thus, it would be a
good approach to inspect the “image” in this manner. As we mentioned
before, Norberg-Schulz considers there are three systems of “images”:

“There can only be one architectural language, since there

is only one world and spatiality. (Analogously there is ba- 440. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Lan-
guage, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter
sically only one spoken language, although there are many (New York : Harper & Row, 1971), 149-
“tongues”.) The styles represent different choices within the one 152.
and same language, or, in Heidegger’s terms, different re-
441. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
sponses to Language. Thus we have three systems of images: Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
language, which consists of invariant archetypes, 1988), 179.
style, which is a temporal choice among the archetypes, and
442. Ibid, 165.
tradition, which is a local adaptation of the archetypes.”443
443. Ibid, 153.

168
Figure 4.24: The Repetitive images of the German Tudor facades.

As we can see, these three systems of “images” are “language”, “style”

and “tradition”. However, the more important point is all three of these
systems are defined through “archetypes”. Later, Norberg-Schulz ex-
plains further the concepts of “style” and “tradition” in this passage:

“Both the styles and the traditions may be understood as sys-

tems of types. In order to have an existential foundation, these
types ought to be variations on the archetypes of the general
language. Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but
a relatively stable gathering of a world, which possesses the
capacity of adaptation and variation.”444

Norberg-Schulz underlines the fact that he considers “style” and “tradi-

tion” as “systems of type”. Also, he underlines that he considers “type”
as a “gathering of a world” which is open to “adaptation” and “vari-
ation”. Considering the similarity between this statement and the state-
ment about the previously mentioned description of “building”, the dif-
ference between Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of a “form” and a
“type” becomes vague and uncertain. This uncertainty may be cleared
by another statement he makes when he explains “typical image”:

“Kahn’s images are certainly related to the archetype and

444. Ibid, 153. they are easily recognizable, but they do not constitute any

169
Figure 4.25: “The Ideal City”, Fra Carnevale, 1480–1484.

symbol system which responds to the language of architec-

ture. They do not, like the Greek orders allow for variation,
combination and translocation of meanings.”445

Thus, we can observe that Norberg-Schulz understands “image”, “form”

and “type” in a continuity. “Type” and “image” resonate in the “form”.
Later, Norberg-Schulz explains the aspect of “language” in this passage:

“Architecture is a language. As such it keeps the spatiality of the

world. The architectural language consists of archetypal imag-
es that reveal those structures which are invariant with respect to
place and time. The archetypes are not forms which exist in some
distant realm as an ideal Ding an sich. Rather they represent basic
modes of being in the world, or “existential structures”.”446

We can understand Norberg-Schulz considers “architecture” as a “lan-

guage” that “consists of invariant archetypes” as he previously described.
Thus, he continues with a description of “archetypes” in the passage. He 445. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
considers “archetypes” not as ideal “forms” like “Ding an sich”, the-thing- Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 169.
in-itself, but as a “representation” of fundamental structures of existence.
He continues with a wider description of “archetypes”: 446. Ibid, 153.

170
 “As a matter of fact the archetypes do not exist at all, only their
various manifestations. A “typical” tower, thus, does not exist,
but “towerness” is revealed in its multifarious aspects by means
of ever new tower-images. Thus the work of architecture be-
comes “an offering to Architecture”. These words of Louis Kahn
suggest that it is possible and meaningful to talk about archi-
tecture in general, although only single works exist.”447

What Norberg-Schulz points out here is that “archetypes” are not

physically existing forms, but rather “manifestations” of an ideal being.
He also gives another aspect of “archetypes” with another quotation
from Kahn:

“Kahn used to say that the only volume of an encyclopedia

that really interested him was “volume number zero”. He also
said that he “loved beginnings”. It seems fair to interpret these
statements as expressions of a wish for a return to archetypes,
that is, for a return to what was there “before” history and
“before” styles.”448

Thus, “archetypes” are what we have left when we separate the tem-
porary tendencies in architecture. Then, he relates this fact with the
intention of a “new architecture” in Modern architecture:

“Modern architecture wanted to return to the “beginning as

if nothing had ever been done before”. One did not recog-
nize, however, that this can only mean a new interpretation
of the archetypes.”449

This leads us to another important issue of Norberg-Schulz’s perspec-

tive which is also a concern of Carl Jung. This is the question if “arche-
types” are “a priori” or not. First of all, we need to understand how
Jung considers “archetypes”. He explains that with these words:

“Archetype, far from being a modern term, was already in use

before the time of St. Augustine, and was synonymous with
“Idea” in the Platonic usage.”450

447. Ibid, 153. Jung considers the term “archetype” as a synonym of the term “Idea”
in Platonic philosophy. Then, he answers this question of “a priori” with
448. Ibid, 169.
these words:
449. Ibid, 155.
“Once again, in the age-old controversy over universals, the
450. Carl G. Jung, Four Archetypes, trans.
R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), nominalistic standpoint has triumphed over the realistic, and
7-8. the Idea has evaporated into a mere flatus vocis. This change

171
Figure 4.26: Ancient Greek Orders.

was accompanied—and, indeed, to a considerable degree

caused—by the marked rise of empiricism, the advantages of
which were only too obvious to the intellect. Since that time
the Idea is no longer something a priori, but is secondary
and derived.”451

Jung points out that he considers “archetypes” not “a priori” but “second-
ary” and “derived”. This approach coincides with Norberg-Schulz’s ap-
proach to the issue. He describes his approach with these words:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for

all, whereas the other considers the types a result of gener-
alization and historical development. In a certain sense both
hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invariant
interworldly structures but as such they do not appear. The
temporal and local types, on the contrary, are developed and
changed through experience and experiment. The important 451. Carl G. Jung, Four Archetypes, trans.
point is however, as we have already asserted, that they re- R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge, 2003), 8.
ceive their meaning from the archetypes. That is, their basic
452. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
meaning consists in their being variations on a “theme”.”452 Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 155.

172
 These statements rises a new question: Where these “types” can
be derived from? We can understand this by examining what Nor-
berg-Schulz states about “typical image” previously. Norberg-Schulz
examples “typical image” through ancient civilizations. He starts with
Ancient Egyptian architecture and underlines the importance of gram-
mar which consists of “order”, “hierarchy” and “classification” and its
relation with the values and environmental conditions of Egyptians.
He explains how the route of the Sun and the direction of the Nile
River shapes the general orientation of the civilization through “grid”,
“path”, “center” and “enclosure”. These elements of “grammar” and
“orientation” mainly derived from civilization’s interaction with the “envi-
ronmental conditions”, in other words, the interaction between “culture”
and “nature”. Naturally, the outcomes of these interactions are strongly
dependent on the “locality”. However, Norberg-Schulz states that in
specific cases, it can have outcomes that is beyond their geography:

“It may also happen that a tradition corresponds so closely

to the archetypes, that it may be used outside the place or
region where it originated.”.453

Norberg-Schulz mentions the aspect of “universality” of the “archetypes”.

He underlines this notion with an example of Greek architecture:

“The orders endowed Greek building with the concrete

presence of a “thing”. “Thinking is the nearing of the world”,
Heidegger says, and in his essay on “The Origin of the Work
of Art” he tells us how the Greek temple “opens up a world
and at the same time sets this world back again on earth,
which itself only thus emerges as native ground.”.”454

Lastly, Norberg-Schulz underlines the importance of “typology” in the

pursuit of “meaning”. He states this in this passage:

“Typology is not architecture, and before it can become a use-

ful aid in our pursuit of meaning, it has to be freed from the ratio-
nalists’ world of abstractions and brought back to the concrete
world of phenomena. This does not mean that we consider the
language of types a matter of mere feeling, but rather that it
ought to get an existential foundation, where thinking and feel-
ing are united, through a phenomenological understanding of
the world which relates the given to the archetypes.”455
453. Ibid, 153.
As we can understand here, Norberg-Schulz states that “typology”
454. Ibid, 157.
is not “architecture”, but a tool to search for meaning in architecture.
455. Ibid, 175.

173
 LIVING AND RITUALS

Another significant subject that directs the works of Rossi and Nor-
berg-Schulz is the role of “living” and “rituals” in architecture. For both
authors, “living” has a crucial role in architecture which is beyond the
Modernist understanding that is limited to “function” and “circulation”.
Both authors point out different deeper relations between “life” and
“architecture”. We will examine these to understand the intersection
of both perspectives.

For Rossi, “life” takes a fundamental role in architecture. We can un-

derstand the importance of living in Rossi’s perspective in his definition
of “architecture”. He defines it with these words:

“I use the term architecture in a positive and pragmatic sense,

as a creation inseparable from civilized life and the society in
which it is manifested. By nature it is collective.”.456

We can see that he considers “architecture” as a “creation insep-

arable from civilized life and society”. He also underlines its “col-
lective” nature. However, Rossi does not consider this creation as a
completely “collective” occurrence. He also describes “individual”
creations of “civilized life” and “society” as well in this passage:

“Within this idea exist the actions of individuals, and in this sense
not everything in urban artifacts is collective; yet the collective
and the individual nature of urban artifacts in the end constitutes
the same urban structure. Memory, within the structure, is the
consciousness of the city; it is a rational operation whose de-
velopment demonstrates with maximum clarity, economy, and
harmony that which has already come to be accepted.”457

On another point, Rossi says “The changes in housing and in the land
on which houses leave their imprint become signs of this daily life.”.458
Thus, he underlines the role of “daily life” in architecture. Rossi also
describes “architecture” through two main points: “Aesthetic intention
and the creation of better surroundings for life are the two permanent
characteristics of architecture.”.459 Thus, Rossi considers the objective
of architecture as the creation of better surroundings “for life”. 456. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 21.
As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main approaches to “city”.
These are “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”. 457. Ibid, 131.
We can clearly see that both of these approaches are fundamen-
458. Ibid, 22.
tally connected to “human creation” as Viollet-le-Duc calls it. This is
not a conscious process of creation. This is a creation mostly as a 459. Ibid, 21.

174
Figure 4.27: ”Road to Power” , Serge Najjar, 2011.

result of “living” and “rituals”. Thus, Rossi’s two main approaches are
fundamentally derived from “living” and “rituals”. Rossi mentions this
connection with these words:

“How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art?

All great manifestations of social life have in common with
the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life.
This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but
this is only a secondary difference because one is a product
of the public and the other is for the public: the public pro-
vides the common denominator.”460

We can understand that Rossi considers the “city as a work of art” as

an outcome of “unconscious life”. He also mentions that this “uncon-
scious life” is primarily collective.

Another important concept to understanding this relation between “archi-

tecture” and “living” in Rossi’s perspective is the term “inhabited space”.
Rossi considers “inhabited space” as a source where various urban ele-
ments emerge. He underlines this consideration with these words:
460. Ibid, 33.

175
Figure 4.28: Sukhala Houses, Gurunsi Villages, Tiebele, Burkina Faso.

“It is in this sense not only the place of the human condition,
but itself a part of that condition, and is represented in the
city and its monuments, in districts, dwellings, and all urban
artifacts that emerge from inhabited space.”461

Here, we can see that Rossi relates “city”, “monuments”, “districts”,

“dwellings” and “urban artifacts” to “inhabited space” and “human
condition”. Rossi underlines these two elements in another point which
he describes “urban image”:

“The urban image, its architecture, pervades all of these

problems and invests all of man’s inhabited and constructed
realm with value. It arises inevitably because it is so deeply
rooted in the human condition.”462

Rossi points out that he considers “urban image” gives value to “in-
habited space” which he considers it is deeply connected to the “hu-
man condition”. However, these statements do not give a clue about 461. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
what is exactly the “human condition” or “inhabited space”. We can City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 34.
find an answer to this question in this sentence of Rossi:
462. Ibid, 27.

176
 “All these experiences, their sum, constitute the city.”463

We can understand Rossi’s perspective on this issue. He considers

“city” as a sum of “experiences” which can be considered phenom-
enologically related to “daily life”, “routines” and “rituals”. Later, he
describes this notion with these words:

“One can say that the city itself is the collective memory of
its people, and like memory it is associated with object and
places. The city is the locus of the collective memory. This re-
lationship between the locus and citizenry then becomes the
city’s predominant image, both of architecture and of land-
scape, and as certain artifacts become part of its memory,
new ones emerge. In this entirely positive sense great ideas
flow through the history of the city and give shape to it.”464

As we can clearly understand Rossi points out that he considers “city”

as locus of the collective memory. In the article “Aldo Rossi: Archi-
tecture and Memory”, Seungkoo Jo explains this notion with these
words: “Rossi argues the city is the locus of collective memory, and
by this means that the city acts as a wax tablet that gathers up the
traces of lived experience in order to create its monuments.”.465 Thus,
Joo points out that what Rossi means by “collective memory” can be
understood as “traces of lived experience”.

Another aspect of how Rossi considers the role of human actions in

the city can be observed the allegory of “teatro”. In his article, Jo
says “Rossi(1982) sees the city as the theater of human events, …”.466
He also says “The locus Rossi defines is the intersection of space,
time, form, and site of a succession of both ancient and more modern
events.”.467 We can see that the allegory of theater has a significant
role in Rossi’s understanding of architecture. This notion becomes ap-
parent with this passage from Jo’s article:

463. Ibid, 29. “Rossi argues in his book, A Scientific Autobiography (1981),
that his model, the Teatro, was Shakespear’s Globe Theater,
464. Ibid, 130. revealing the similarity even in the common names of The-
465. Seungkoo Jo, “Aldo Rossi: Architec- aters of the World. Rossi quoted Shakespear’s dictum, All the
ture and Memory,” Journal of Asian Archi- World’s stage, and looked for the universal knowledge of the
tecture and Building Engineering 2, no. 1, world in the Teatro, where it seems likely that the Globe would
(2003): 234.
have searched for a way to express the space of theater.”468
466. Ibid, 233.
Thus, Rossi considers the “city” as a “theater” where “human events”,
467. Ibid, 233.
in other words, “life” takes place. This is deeply connected to Nor-
468. Ibid, 233. berg-Schulz’s notion of “life takes place” which we will examine later.

177
Another significant point Rossi makes about the role of daily life in
architecture is through “primary elements”. He describes the “primary
elements” with these words:

“We have called these urban elements, which are of a dom-

inant nature, primary elements because they participate in the
evolution of the city over time in a permanent way, often be-
coming identified with the major artifacts constituting the city.”469

After this description, Rossi relates “primary elements” with the major
human activities and daily life in the city which he calls “fixed activities”:

“I use the term fixed activities because the notion is gener-

ally accepted. But even if in speaking of fixed activities and
primary elements we partly refer to the same thing, the two
terms presuppose entirely different ways of conceptualizing
the urban structure. What they have in common is that both
refer to the public, collective character of urban elements, to
the characteristic fact of public things that they are made by
the collective for the collective and are by nature essentially
urban. Whatever reduction of urban reality we make, we
always arrive at the collective aspect; it seems to constitute
the beginning and end point of the city.”470

As we can clearly observe he considers “fixed activities” and “pri-

mary elements” as the same. Thus, we can say, for Rossi, the crucial
feature of “primary elements” is their value as “activities”. He also
underlines the collective nature of these primary elements which we
already mentioned are, by definition, persistent in the evolution of
the city. It is not only a matter of persistence; these elements also are
fertile and generative in the context of the creation of the new city.

After understanding the importance of “fixed activities”, we can ex-

amine the persistences and permanences of the city. Rossi examples
these elements primarily as “monuments”, “plan” and “basic layout”
of the city. However, we need to understand why Rossi considers
these permanences of the city valuable fundamentally. We can find
an answer to this question in this passage:

“I have asked many times in the course of this book, where

469. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
does the singularity of an urban artifact begin? In its form, its City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
function, its memory, or in something else again? We can Original: 1966), 86.
now answer that it begins in the event and in the sign that has
470. Ibid.
marked the event.”471
471. Ibid, 106.

178
Figure 4.29: “A possible beginning for
contacts at other levels”, From “Life Be-
tween Buildings”, Jan Gehl.

Here, Rossi reveals one of the most important points of his understand-
ing of architecture which gives us an understanding of the role of “human
events” in Rossi’s architecture. He considers the fundamental raison d’être
of an urban artifact as a “sign” of an “event”. Thus, we can see that “human
events” play a fundamental role in architecture in Rossi’s perspective.

Another important notion is how Rossi relates “type” with “daily life”.
He points out that there are two main elements that define “type”:
“form” and “way of life”. He underlines this notion with these words:

“The type developed according to both needs and aspira-

tions to beauty; a particular type was associated with a form
and a way of life, although its specific shape varied widely
from society to society.”472

We can understand Rossi considers a “type” to be associated with a

“form” and a “way of life”. He also mentions the specific shape can
vary from society to society.

Last but not least, Rossi directly mentions “rituals” in the book, while
he was explaining the relation between “myth”, “ritual” and “monu-
ments”. Firstly, he starts to talk about “myth” and he explains its refer-
ence to the past. Then, he underlines the importance of “rituals” as a
tool to transfer myths from generation to generation. He mentions this
notion with these words:

“I believe that the importance of ritual in its collective na-

ture and its essential character as an element for preserving
myth constitutes a key to understanding the meaning of mon-
472. Ibid, 40. uments and, moreover, the implications of the founding of the

179
Figure 4.30: House on an island, Ellidaey, Iceland.

city and of the transmission of ideas in an urban context.”473

Rossi points out the “collective nature” of rituals and also its “essential
character” that preserves “myth”. He also mentions the necessity of
“myths” to understand the meaning of “monuments”. Later, he under-
lines this relation with these words:

“For if the ritual is the permanent and conserving element of

myth, then so too is the monument, since, in the very moment
that it testifies to myth, it renders ritual forms possible.”474

Rossi points out that “rituals” are similar to “monuments” in the context
of “permanent” and “conserving” the myths which are our connection
to the past.

The role of “life” is also quite important in Norberg-Schulz’s perspec-

tive. He considers “life” as the fundamental reference point of ar-
chitecture. This can be understood in the sentence “life takes place” 473. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
which he frequently uses in his writings. He underlines this notion with City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 24.
a quotation from Team MLTW with these words:
474. Ibid, 24.

180
 “Rooms are unspecific spaces, empty stages for human
action, where we perform the rituals and improvisations of
living. They provide generalized opportunities for things to
happen, and they allow us to do and be what we will.”475

Another frequently used term is “being in the world” which can be re-
lated to “life” as well in an existential and phenomenological context.

This phenomenological and existential aspect plays a significant role

in Norberg-Schulz’s thoughts on the relation between “architecture”
and “living”. Firstly, Norberg-Schulz does not approach “architec-
ture” in an abstractive and scientific way. His approach is in a quali-
tative and phenomenological manner which he also suggests:

“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have

profited more from a study of these things, than from the ab-
stract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus
was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena
into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary
demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”476

With that being said, we can understand, for Norberg-Schulz, “ar-

chitecture” is not separate from “life”. It is an inherent part of the “life”
that we need to consider in the context.

Examining how Norberg-Schulz considers “space” fundamentally can

improve our understanding of how he relates “human actions” to “space.
In the book “Existence, Space and Architecture”, Norberg-Schulz men-
tions various types of spaces. Firstly, he mentions “pragmatic space” which
is directly related to this survival necessity, and says, “While the pragmatic
space of animals is a function of inborn instincts, man has to learn what
orientation he needs in order to act.”.477 Then, he examples from African
and ancient Egyptian languages to explain these pragmatic relations.
However, he makes another important point and says, “In both cases it is
clear that a cognitive concept of space had not been abstracted from the
475. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of direct experience of spatial relations.”.478 Thus, he starts to define “cogni-
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, tive space”. Then, he gives numerous examples to explain further this “cog-
1988), 43.
nitive space” and its relation with perception. Thus, for Norberg-Schulz,
476. Ibid, 139. the relation of an individual with space is pragmatically and cognitively
connected to the “survival necessities” that shape human actions as well.
477. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
1971), 9. Understanding how Norberg-Schulz considers “type” can give us a
perspective as well. Firstly, we can find hints at his understanding in
478. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger, his definition of “type”:
1971), 9.

181
 “Basically a type is not a sign or a metaphor, but a relatively
stable gathering of a world, which possesses the capacity of
adaptation and variation.”479

Norberg-Schulz points out that he fundamentally relates “type” with

“adaptation” and “variation”. These two concepts are responses to
the necessities in “daily life”. However, he underlines the most import-
ant notion while he explains “type” in this passage:

“One regards the types as something given a priori once for

all, whereas the other considers the types a result of gener-
alization and historical development. In a certain sense both
hypotheses are correct. The archetypes are certainly invari-
ant interworldly structures but as such they do not appear.
The temporal and local types, on the contrary, are devel-
oped and changed through experience and experiment.”480

As we can observe here, Norberg-Schulz relates “types” with “experi-

ence” and “experiment”. These two concepts are directly related to the
information that the individual extracts from the different conditions of “life”.

Another important point to understand is how Norberg-Schulz de-

scribes the “two fundamental acts” of architecture: “visualization”
and “complementation”. These two acts are mentioned frequently in
Norberg-Schulz’s writings. He describes “visualization” after a quo-
tation from Heidegger in this passage:

“Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not

arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenom-
ena. Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic
and easily understood meaning. Thus they make the things
stand forth as such, and by bringing them together in a poem,
each of them helps the others to emerge. We have called this
emerging of things by means of images “visualization”.”481

After this description, he mentions “complementation”. Then, he de-

scribes it as well in this passage:

“When man makes language speak about the thing, how-

ever, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also
479. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or 1988), 153.
“project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be,
480. Ibid, 155.
means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however,
is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It 481. Ibid, 179.

182
Figure 4.31: “Tour de France”, Robert Capa, 1939.

is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in

motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”482

We can clearly understand that “visualization” is about the past and

the current reality of a “thing”. On the other hand, “complementation”
is about the “lacking” part and the future of a potentially completed
“thing”. However, the importance of these two concepts is not direct-
ly related to their meaning. The most important point of these con-
cepts in the context of relation between “architecture” and “living” is
the fact that these are both interactive acts. The subject of architec-
tural interaction does not take a passive stance in Norberg-Schulz’s
understanding. Rather, he takes an active role in a cognitive manner,
projecting and shaping the architectural experience.

The Heideggerian term “dwelling” plays an important role in Nor-

berg-Schulz’s understanding of “architecture”. This concept is also
related to “daily life” and “rituals”. In the article “Building, Dwelling,
Thinking”, Heidegger describes “building” as a continuous act of or-
ganization and reorganization of space. In his perspective, the process
of “building” does not end with the completion of the structure. As the
482. Ibid, 179. subjects of the structure and the space live around it, every addition,

183
Figure 4.32: Nebelivka Hypothesis, David Wengrow, 18th International Architecture Exhibition of the Biennale di Venezia.

subtraction, or change redefines the space. Thus, the process of “build-

ing” never ends. Later, he explains the relation between “building” and
“dwelling” as he reminds us of their etymological roots and brings back
their former and richer meanings. As he does this, he follows these roots
and claims that, in fact, the concept of “building is inherent to the con-
cept of “dwelling”. Thus, the term “dwelling” is deeply related to “living”
in a place. Actually, “living” is the only notion to create this “dwelling”.

In the book “The Concept of Dwelling”, Norberg-Schulz mentions

four main categories of “dwelling”. These are “settlement”, “collec-
tive dwelling”, “public dwelling” and “private dwelling”. He intro-
duces these categories starting with the term “settlement”. To Nor-
berg-Schulz, the first step of any kind of “dwelling” is to “settle”. He
underlines the importance of this notion with these words:

“Thus the settlement interprets the site and transforms it into a

place where human life may take place.”483

Norberg-Schulz underlines the fact that the act of “settlement” transforms 483. Christian Norberg-Schulz, The Con-
cept of the Dwelling: On the Way to Fig-
the “site” and allows “human life” to take “place”. This statement also urative Architecture (New York: Rizzoli,
points out that when “human life” comes to a site by “settling”, the “site” 1985), 31.

184
 turns into a “place”. This is the fundamental and existential change Nor-
berg-Schulz considers happening as the result of “settlement”.

This notion can be observed in another point in Norberg-Schulz’s

work. The term “inhabited space” coincides with this change from
“site” to “place. He mentions this term firstly in this passage with a
quotation from Heidegger:

“What, then, are these objects? We have already suggested

the answer with the notion of genius loci. It follows from what
has been said above that the genius loci comprises more than
what is close at hand. “The buildings bring the earth as the in-
habited landscape close to man and at the same time places
the nearness of neighborly dwelling under the expanse of the
sky.”, Heidegger says. What is gathered by a building, that is,
by a man-made place, is an “inhabited landscape”.”484

As we can observe here, Norberg-Schulz describes “inhabited land-

scape” with the term “man-made place”. Thus, we can see that he
considers a direct relation between “dwelling”, “life” and “place”.
Later, this relation is also mentioned with these words:

“A landscape is a space where human life takes place. It is a

“lived space” between earth and sky.”485

Norberg-Schulz directly points out the relation between “place” and

“life”. He also mentions the term “lived space” with can be related
to Giedion’s term “lived time”. Later Norberg-Schulz examples these
notions in a statement about “house”:

“Thus the house primarily complements the lacks of the site and
makes what is close at hand emerge. It constitutes a concrete,
individual “here”, and allows life to take place “now”. In the
past, however, the concrete “here” became typical, because
“neighbourly dwelling” implied the sharing of a site and a way
of life. Vernacular houses therefore appear as variations of
types, and visualize a particular “inhabited landscape”.486

484. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of Here, we can observe that Norberg-Schulz considers “house” as a
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita, marker of a particular place and time. This way, it allows “life” to take
1988), 135.
“place”. This notion frequently gets mentioned by a specific sentence
485. Ibid. in Norberg-Schulz’s writings:
486. Ibid, 179.
“The loss of the image, therefore, brings about a loss of
487. Ibid, 169. place, and hence a “loss of life”.”487

185
CONCLUSIONS

“Knowledge can be conveyed, but not

wisdom. It can be found, it can be lived,
it is possible to be carried by it, miracles
can be performed with it, but it cannot
be expressed in words and taught.”
Hermann Hesse, Siddhartha
 Without a doubt, both Rossi and Norberg-Schulz were in search of
a better approach to a new understanding of architecture. Although
there were differentiating and contrasting points, both have ap-
proaches that are self-consistent. This shows a richer understanding
of different possibilities to approach a problem.
The most important difference between the two authors is their funda-
mental approach. Norberg-Schulz directly refers to this in this pas-
sage:
“Let us only suggest that modern architecture would have
profited more from a study of these things, than from the ab-
stract exercises of the Bauhaus. The approach of the Bauhaus
was analytic and pseudo-scientific, splitting the phenomena
into bits. The study of vernacular architecture on the contrary
demands a “synthetic”, phenomenological attitude.”488
Norberg-Schulz prefers a “phenomenological” approach rather than
an “analytic” and “scientific” one. He also criticizes the “abstract”
methods of the Bauhaus. Norberg-Schulz’s stance on this situation is
not a surprise considering the influence he recieved from the “Gestalt
psychology” which is a school of thought that looks at the human
mind and behavior as a whole. “Gestalt theory” emerges against the
“structuralism” of the time which is fundamentally connected to “at-
omism”, “sensationalism” and “associationism”. Thus, the structuralist
approach views that more complex ideas arise from the association
of simpler ideas. Gestalt theory, on the other hand, views complex
ideas are more than their simpler parts, thus, cannot be understood
by atomizing and disengaging.
On the other hand, Rossi’s main intention is to create a “scientific” base
for architecture. Thus, his tools to create such architecture often co-
incide with the structuralist approach. Both on the urban scale and
architectural scale, his approach consists of a degree of “abstraction”
and “atomization”. He also often uses repeating “isolated” shapes,
forms, and elements in his designs. In a way, Rossi’s architectural de-
sign approach can be understood as a “collage” of architectural ob-
jects and elements. However, Rossi also considers “city” as a whole
frequently in his writings. Two main columns of his work, “city as a man-
made object” and “city as a work of art”, can be great examples of
such consideration. Thus, Rossi occasionally rearranges his approach.
Undoubtedly, one of the most significant similarities between Ros-
si and Norberg-Schulz is their frequent references to the discipline
of psychology. Since both authors often mention the psychological
488. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
aspects of the architecture. Rossi’s relation with psychology can be
1988), 139. understood majorly through the works of Carl Gustav Jung. Nor-

187
Figure 5.1: Drawings of Gallaratese Housing Complex, Aldo Rossi.

berg-Schulz, on his part, often refers to the Gestalt psychology and

the works of Jean Piaget.
In the book “The Architecture of the City”, Rossi directly refers to the
importance of psychology in this passage:
“But what can psychology tell us if not that a certain individ-
ual sees the city in one way and that other individuals see it
in another? And how can this private and uncultivated vision
be related to the laws and principles from which the city first
emerged and through which its images were formed? If we
are concerned with the city architecturally from more than a
stylistic point of view, it does not make sense to abandon ar-
chitecture and occupy ourselves with something else. Indeed,
no one would entertain the idea that when the theoreticians tell
us that buildings must respond to criteria of firmness commod-
ity, and delight, they must explain the psychological motives
behind this principle.”489
Rossi considers psychological motives as the base principle of the
criteria of architecture. Rossi often refers to Jungian psychology in this
489. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
respect. Firstly, one of the most important concepts of Rossi’s architec- City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 114.

188
 ture, “collective memory”, is a term taken from Jungian psychology.
Rossi also refers to Jung through the term “collective imagination” as
well. Rossi also often uses Jung’s definitions in various points in his
works. An example of this is in Rossi’s article “Analogical Architecture”
in which he mentions Jung’s definition of “analogy”. Another example
can be the definition of “archetype”. Rossi refers to Jung’s definition of
“archetype” in his book.
“Gestalt psychology” has an immense influence on Norberg-Schulz’s
understanding of architecture. However, he also criticizes it and con-
siders it “static” and “absolute”. He considers Jean Piaget’s work as
an update to Gestalt psychology which brings “dynamism”. He men-
tions this notion with these words:
“Like those used in physics, early psychological concepts
had a static, absolute character, but recently a more dynam-
ic approach has been introduced. The absolute “laws” of
Gestalt psychology, for instance, have been replaced by
Piaget’s more flexible “schemata”.”490
Norberg-Schulz uses Gestalt psychology and Piaget’s concept of
“schemata” to have a better understanding of space. In the book
“Existence, Space and Architecture”, he structures a system of spaces
through these two elements of psychology. His understanding of the
interaction between subject and space is mostly shaped by the psy-
chological and phenomenological experiences of the subject.
In this respect, Norberg-Schulz often refers to Heideggerian phe-
nomenology as well. He underlines the points of Heidegger’s ref-
erences to the psychological aspect of this experience. One of the
most important references to this notion can be found in this passage:
“Spaces, and with them space as such—”space”—are always
provided for already within the stay of mortals. Spaces open
up by the fact that they are let into the dwelling of man. To say
that mortals are is to say that in dwelling they persist through
spaces by virtue of their stay among things and locations.
And only because mortals pervade, persist through, spaces
by their very nature are they able to go through spaces. But in
going through spaces we do not give up our standing in them.
Rather, we always go through spaces in such a way that we
already experience them by staying constantly with near and
490. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Existence
Space & Architecture (New York: Praeger,
remote locations and things. When I go toward the door of
1971), 10. the lecture hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at
all if I were not such that I am there. I am never here only, as
491. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language,
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New
this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already
York : Harper & Row, 1971), 154-155. pervade the room, and only thus can I go through it.”491

189
Here, we can understand the value Norberg-Schulz gives to the cog-
nitive aspects of the spatial experience by referring to this passage of
Heidegger. He points out that the act of “going through” happens in
the mind of the subject before the physical act and he considers this
cognitive process as the essence of the act.
Before we go through a deeper grasp of these cognitive process-
es in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture and its relation
with Rossi’s understanding of architecture, we need to underline and
point out a few terminological similarities between both authors. One
of which is the similarity between Rossi’s “urban artifact” and Nor-
berg-Schulz’s “architectural thing”. These two terms are the terms they
use to describe an architectural form or a physical object. Rossi first
mentions “urban artifact” in his description of architecture with these
words:
“Architecture came into being along with the first traces of the
city; it is deeply rooted in the formation of civilization and is a
permanent, universal, and necessary artifact.”492
Then, he explains the concept of “urban artifact” further with these words:
“We need, as I have said, only consider one specific urban ar-
tifact for a whole string of questions to present themselves; for it
is a general characteristic of urban artifacts that they return us to
certain major themes: individuality, locus, design, memory.”493
Norberg-Schulz on the other hand defines “architectural thing” with
these words:
“When an architectural image unites spatial and plastic
qualities, it becomes an “architectural thing” which forms part
of a work of architecture.”.494
Here, Norberg-Schulz points out that an “architectural thing” consists
of a gathering of “image”, “space” and “form”. As we can see in
both cases, there is a reference to “locality”, “form” and “memory” of
the physical object.
Another important similarity is between the terms Rossi’s “locus” and Nor-
berg-Schulz’s “genius loci”. Although Norberg-Schulz as well uses the 492. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
term “locus”, he usually uses it to point a “place” or a “locality”. However, Original: 1966), 21.
Rossi uses the term “locus” in the same way Norberg-Schulz uses the term
“genius loci”. Rossi defines the term “locus” with these words: 493. Ibid, 32.

“The locus is a relationship between a certain specific loca- 494. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
tion and the buildings that are in it. It is at once singular and 1988), 153.
universal.”495
495. Ibid, 103.

190
 Here, we can understand Rossi understands “locus” as the relation
between “building” and the “location”. Later, he explains further with
these words:
“The locus, so conceived, emphasizes the conditions and
qualities within undifferentiated space which are necessary
for understanding an urban artifact.”496
Here, we can observe that Rossi considers “locus” as “conditions”
and “qualities” of the space which are necessary to understand “ur-
ban artifacts”.
In the chapter “New Regionalism” of the book “Principles of Modern Ar-
chitecture”, he describes the meaning of “genius loci” with these words:
“As all buildings form part of a concrete “here”, they can-
not be alike everywhere, but have to embody the particular
qualities of the given place. From ancient times, this quality
has been recognized as the genius loci, and historical build-
ings normally had a distinct local flavor, although they often
belonged to a general “style”.”497
Here, we can understand that Norberg-Schulz considers “genius
loci” as unique “qualities” of a specific place. Also, he understands
“locus” by examining the relation between “building” and “place”.
This is an important point when we consider Rossi defines “locus” as
“conditions” and “qualities” of the space and Norberg-Schulz de-
fines “genius loci” as unique “qualities” of a specific place. Thus, we
can understand what Rossi means by “locus” strongly coincides with
what Norberg-Schulz means by “genius loci”. This concept which
Rossi names “locus” and Norberg-Schulz names “genius loci” is
quite important in the process of formation of archetype which we
mentioned in the introduction. Because the “locus” determines the
“physical conditions” which will test the “form” for better optimization
and fitness. Thus, the features of the ”locus” will be represented in the
“form” and this will eventually alter the “image”.
After we pointed out these terminological differences, we can now
examine the role of cognitive processes in Norberg-Schulz’s un-
derstanding of architecture and its relation with Rossi’s understand-
ing of architecture. The importance of cognitive processes in Nor-
berg-Schulz’s understanding of spatial experience can be observed
in the two acts he mentions as the “fundamental acts of architecture”.
These are “visualization” and “complementation”. These two acts
496. Ibid, 103.
strongly coincide with Rossi’s two complementary understandings of
the city: “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”. This
497. Ibid, 135.

191
Figure 5.2: A Drawing of Ancient Roman City.

proximity can be one of the most important points of this study, due to
the importance of these concepts in the authors’ understanding of ar-
chitecture. These are the fundamental notions of both authors’ studies
and it shapes and touches all other segments of their works. Thus, we
will deeply examine and reveal this similarity.
Firstly, we need to understand the proximity of these concepts. Thus,
we need to go through the points which define and describe these
concepts. Norberg-Schulz explains the concept of “visualization by
mentioning a poem from Heidegger. Later, he comments on it:
“…Heidegger’s words are therefore selective. But they are not
arbitrary, and they do not abstract from the given phenomena.
Rather they penetrate to their core, and reveal basic and easily
understood meaning. Thus they make the things stand forth as
such, and by bringing them together in a poem, each of them
helps the others to emerge. We have called this emerging of
things by means of images “visualization”.498
In this case, “visualization” is mostly about what the “thing” represents
with its existence through time and space. This notion can also be
498. Christian Norberg-Schulz, Roots of
observed in this passage: Modern Architecture (Tokyo: A.D.A. Edita,
1988), 179.

192
 “Visualization and complementation produce forms which
do not represent anything else, and therefore may be con-
sidered fundamental architectural acts. Vernacular architec-
ture is in general based on these modes, but the same also
holds true for the great “monuments” of the early civilizations.
Thus Heidegger uses a Greek temple to show how a build-
ing “opens up a world and gives to things their look”. The
forms which are related to a particular region evidently pos-
sess similar properties, and become elements of a tradition
or “way of building”.”499
As we can see, “visualization” is directly related to the existing prop-
erties of a form. With this in mind, the term “visualization” coincides
with “memory” or the past of the “thing”.
On his part, Rossi explains the concept of “city as a man-made ob-
ject” in a quite similar manner. He sums up his understanding of the
“city as a man-made object” in this passage:
“The study of history seems to offer the best verification of cer-
tain hypotheses about the city, for the city is in itself repository
of history. In this book we have made use of the historical
method from two different points of view. In the first, the city
was seen as a material artifact, a man-made object built over
time and retaining the traces of time, even if in a discontinuous
way. Studied from this point of view -archaeology, the history
of architecture, and the histories of individual cities- the city
yields very important information and documentation. Cities
become historical texts; in fact, to study urban phenomena
without the use of history is unimaginable, and perhaps this is
the only practical method available for understanding specif-
ic urban artifacts whose historical aspect is predominant. We
have illustrated this thesis, in part the foundation of this study, in
the context of the theories of Poete and Lavedan as well as in
relation to the concept of permanence.”500
We can consider the “city” as a man-made object “built over time”
which retains “traces of time”. He states that in this perspective “cities
become historical texts” which is related to the “locality” and “history”
of the city.
Depending on these statements, we can understand that both of these
concepts refer to the existing position of an architectural form in the
499. Ibid, 135. context of “time” and “space”. Norberg-Schulz relates the “genius
loci” of a place with its “past” and “memory” and considers “visualiza-
500. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
tion” as an act to acknowledge this information through the interaction
Original: 1966), 127. of the subject with the place. Rossi considers the “city” as a “man-made

193
object” and in this perspective, he interacts with “collective memory”
which consists of the historical and local values of the space and the
urban artifacts which form the city.
A similar situation applies to the relation between the terms “com-
plementation” and “city as a work of art”. Norberg-Schulz explains
“complementation” in this passage:
“When man makes language speak about the thing, how-
ever, he usually does not only tell how they are, but also
how they could be, that is, how he would like them to be at
this moment. In the speaking about thing thus, a “dream” or
“project” is generally present. To reveal how things could be,
means to add something they are “lacking”. A lack, however,
is not only mean visualization, but also “complementation”. It
is what the situation lacks, which sets the historical process in
motion, and makes ever new interpretations necessary.”501
Here, “complementation” is mainly related to what a form could
be potentially. Hence, the term “complementation” coincides with
“dream” or “project” as Norberg also mentions, in other words, the
potential future of the form.
On the other hand, Rossi sums up his understanding of the “city as a
work of art” in this passage:
“The second point of view sees history as the study of the
actual formation and structure of urban artifacts. It is com-
plementary to the first and directly concerns not only the real
structure of the city but also the idea that the city is a synthesis
of a series of values. Thus it concerns the collective imagina-
tion. Clearly the first and second approaches are intimately
linked, so much so that the facts they uncover may at times be
confounded with each other. Athens, Rome, Constantinople,
and Paris represent ideas of the city that extend beyond their
physical form, beyond their permanence; thus we can also
speak in this way of cities like Babylon which have all but
physically disappeared.”502
Rossi underlines the perspective that understands the city as a result
of “collective imagination” which “represents ideas of the city that
extend beyond their physical form” and creates an urban image that
reflects the “universal” understanding of the city.
These statements show that both of these concepts refer to an imag- 501. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
inary projection of a form. Norberg-Schulz underlines the creative Original: 1966), 179.
process of the interaction between the subject and the form. He
502. Ibid, 127-128.

194
Figure 5.3: “The Tower of Babel”, Pieter Bruegel, 1563.

points out that the subject finds a “lacking” aspect of the form and
interprets it in his mind. This perspective is deeply related to Gestalt
psychology. The result of the process is a “dream” or “project” of the
form which gives us an idea about what the form could be. On the
other hand, Rossi underlines the “representative” aspect of this cre-
ative process. He points out that the information formed due to the
“collective imagination” gives us an idea about the “universal” and
“timeless” understanding of the form.
As we underlined the similarities between these concepts of Rossi and
Norberg-Schulz, we can examine the role of these concepts in their
understanding of architecture. One of the first and most obvious points
is the fact that both authors refer to the physical elements in the city
while defining and describing these concepts. Norberg-Schulz uses
the word “thing” for this description. Undoubtedly, the word “thing” is
related to the term “architectural thing” in Norberg-Schulz’s terminol-
ogy of architecture. As we mentioned before, this term coincides with
Rossi’s term of “urban artifact”. Rossi, on the other hand, describes the
city as a man-made “object” and a “work” of art. Thus, he underlines
the physicality of these concepts. He underlines the notion that the city
is fundamentally a cluster of physical objects. This notion is important
due to its role in the process of the formation of archetypes. As we

195
Figure 5.4: “The Persistence of Memory”, Salvador Dali, 1931.

mentioned in the introduction, “creating subject” creates the “form” to

satisfy particular necessities. The fact that both authors base their defi-
nitions and description of the concept on the basis of “forms” reinforc-
es our statement about this process of formation of archetypes.
Another important notion is the fact that these concepts directly or in-
directly refer to the other fundamental concepts like “locus”, “image”,
and “memory”. As we mentioned before, Rossi relates the point of
view that he names the “city as a man-made object” with the “col-
lective memory” of the city. This collective memory is related to the
historical and local values of the city. The locality aspect of the term
“city as a man-made object” may not be distinct in Rossi’s description.
However, if we take a look at the theory of Poëte which he directly
referred in the text, we can understand the connection:
“Poëte’s theory is not very explicit on this point, but I will try
to summarize it briefly. Although he presents a number of
hypotheses among which are economic considerations that
relate to the evolution of the city, it is in substance a historical
theory centered on the phenomenon of “persistences.” These
persistences are revealed through monuments, the physi-
cal signs of the past, as well as through the persistence of

196
 a city’s basic layout and plans. This last point is Poëte’s most
important discovery. Cities tend to remain on their axes of
development, maintaining the position of their original layout
and growing according to the direction and meaning of their
older artifacts, which often appear remote from present-day
ones. Sometimes these artifacts persist virtually unchanged,
endowed with a continuous vitality; other times they exhaust
themselves, and then only the permanence of their form, their
physical sign, their locus remains. The most meaningful per-
manences are those provided by the street and the plan. The
plan persists at different levels; it becomes differentiated in
its attributes, often deformed, but in substance, it is not dis-
placed. This is the most valid part of Poëte’s theory; even if
it cannot be said to be completely a historical theory, it is
essentially born from the study of history.”503
As we can observe here, explaining Poëte’s theory, Rossi often refers
to the importance of “locus”. We can also understand that Rossi re-
lates the concept of “city as a man-made object” to the “persistenc-
es” and “permanences” of the physical elements of the city, like mon-
uments, plans, or basic layout of the city.
On the other side, Rossi relates the other point of view “city as a work
of art” with the “collective imagination” of the city. The term “collective
imagination” is related to the “image” of the city which goes beyond
the “memory” and “permanences”.
Norberg-Schulz values these two acts through their potential. This
potentiality was mentioned previously in our writings as well while we
were examining how Norberg-Schulz relates “loss of image” to “loss
of place” and “loss of place” to “loss of life”.
“We could also say that the above-mentioned forms are
images because they possess a place-creating potentiali-
ty. Any place reveals a particular relationship of earth and
sky, and is constituted by architectural images. The loss of the
image therefore brings about a loss of place, and hence a
“loss of life”.”504
He states that he considers particular “forms” he mentioned as “imag-
es” due to their “place-creating potentiality”. He underlines the fact that
he values the forms he mentioned as images due to their “place-cre-
ating potentiality”. He reinforces this statement by equating “loss of
503. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the images” with “loss of place” and “loss of place” with “loss of life”. This
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984; statement repeats several times in various books by Norberg-Schulz.
Original: 1966), 59.
It fundamentally underlines the value of “locus” in Norberg-Schulz’s
504. Ibid, 169. understanding of “image”. However, another important notion about

197
this quotation is the part where he relates the “loss of place” through
the “loss of image” with the “loss of life”. This statement gives out the
hierarchical order in Norberg-Schulz’s understanding of architecture
which is fundamentally based on “life”. Thus, this statement underlines
the fact that Norberg-Schulz as well considers the main intention of the
architectural production process to maintain and protect the “essential
act” which we mentioned in the introduction. However, due to the in-
fluence of Heideggerian philosophy, Norberg-Schulz understanding
of the “essential act” overlaps with the “creative act” and “derivative
act”. Thus, the living itself creates the form, place, and image. The fact
that Norberg-Schulz expresses his thoughts on architecture through
two acts reinforces this statement.
Rossi, on the other hand, has a separate understanding of this notion.
As we mentioned before, Rossi has two main approaches to “city”.
These are “city as a man-made object” and “city as a work of art”.
We can clearly see that both of these approaches are fundamen-
tally connected to “human creation” as Viollet-le-Duc calls it. This is
not a conscious process of creation. This is a creation mostly as a
result of “living” and “rituals”. Thus, Rossi’s two main approaches are
fundamentally derived from “living” and “rituals”. Rossi mentions this
connection with these words:
“How are collective urban artifacts related to works of art?
All great manifestations of social life have in common with
the work of art the fact that they are born in unconscious life.
This life is collective in the former, individual in the latter; but
this is only a secondary difference because one is a product
of the public and the other is for the public: the public pro-
vides the common denominator.”505
Rossi considers the “city as a work of art” as an outcome of “uncon-
scious life”. He also mentions that this “unconscious life” is primarily
collective. Thus, Rossi considers the urban artifacts which form the city
as an outcome of the unconscious life.
In conclusion, although Rossi and Norberg-Schulz have quite different
fundamental philosophies of architecture, they have a similar basis to
understand architecture. This similarity can be unclear at first sight. How-
ever, under serious examination, it is obvious that this intersection of their
interpretations is strongly related to the elements that shape the process
of formation of archetypes. This process of formation is fundamentally
based on the intention to maintain and protect the “essential act” which
is the living and the rituals. Hence, Rossi and Norberg-Schulz under-
stand the main intention of architecture is to let “life take a place”. 505. Aldo Rossi, The Architecture of the
City (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1984;
Original: 1966), 33.

198
199
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