Zeszyty Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Krakowie

Naukowe 4 (988)
ISSN 1898-6447
e-ISSN 2545-3238
Zesz. Nauk. UEK, 2020; 4 (988): 103–115
https://doi.org/10.15678/ZNUEK.2020.0988.0406

Sylwia Czakowska

The Similarities and Differences

between Earnings Management
and Fraud
Abstract

Objective: The main objective of this article is to indicate differences between earnings
management and fraud.
Research Design & Methods: The research methods applied are based on a critical analy-
sis of the literature on the subject, both in Polish and English, a comparative analysis of
legal acts and inductive reasoning.
Findings: Earnings management involves intentional and lawful actions undertaken by
an entity’s management, aimed at changing the figures it reports, particularly earnings,
in order to present the desired picture of the entity’s financial standing and economic
position, as well as its achievements in financial statements for the purpose of misle-
ading financial statement users or obtaining benefits guaranteed in managerial contracts.
This is achieved by applying accounting judgment and estimates, changing these estimates,
choosing specific methods from among the acceptable accounting methods allowed by the
applicable accounting regulations, structuring of economic transactions or undertaking
actual activities.
Implications / Recommendations: Earnings management should not be identified with
fraud, as earnings are managed within the framework of legal regulations in the field of

Sylwia Czakowska, Kujawy and Pomorze University in Bydgoszcz, Institute of Economics, Depart-
ment of Finance and Accounting, Toruńska 55-57, 85-023 Bydgoszcz, e-mail: s.czakowska@
kpsw.edu.pl, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3956-8966.

This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0); https://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 104 Sylwia Czakowska

accounting and taking account of solutions adopted in the accounting policy of a given
entity. However, any abuse in this field, whether it involves departing from or violating
the accounting principles or standards, may lead to intentional misstatements in financial
statements – that is, fraud in its broad sense.
Contribution: Inspiring further development of research on earnings management from
the viewpoint of determinants or tools applied.
Keywords: earnings management, financial statement, fraud, fraudulent financial
reporting.
JEL Classification: M41, M42.

1. Introduction

Economic crises and recessions experienced by a number of sectors and the

deterioration of the financial situation and profitability of enterprises are compel-
ling reasons for management boards to undertake actions aimed at managing their
earnings so that they achieve the desired level by way of influencing the amounts
of revenues and expenses, as well their distribution over time (Kuzior 2011,
p. 175). Consequently, financial statements present the financial data management
expects, which can be used to influence stakeholders and motivate them to under-
take specific actions. The English-language literature on the subject defines this
phenomenon as earnings management.
Because of the growth in importance of information generated by financial
reporting as regards decision usefulness, and spectacular instances of accounting
fraud committed by management boards of American companies, resulting in their
collapse at the beginning of the 21st century, earnings management is a major area
of research in contemporary accounting (Dechow et al. 2012, pp. 275–276; Kamela-
-Sowińska 2003, p. 4; Piosik 2016, p. 9; Vladu & Cuzdriorean 2014, p. 696).
An analysis of the literature on the subject leads me to propose the following
research hypothesis: the compliance of actions undertaken as part of earnings
management with the applicable legal regulations in the field of accounting and
with the accounting policy adopted by an entity makes it possible to distinguish
earnings management from fraud. The main objective of the article, then, is to
highlight differences between earnings management and fraud. The research
objectives are achieved in three ways. The article describes the essence of and
defines earnings management, characterises fraud and earnings management from
the viewpoint of legal regulations related to auditing, and reveals the relationship
between fraud and earnings management. The research methods applied are based
on a critical analysis of the literature on the subject, both in Polish and English,
a comparative analysis of legal acts and inductive reasoning.
The Similarities and Differences between Earnings… 105

2. Earnings Management as an Intentional and Lawful Action

of the Management Board

Financial statements are an important source of information about an entity’s

financial standing and economic position, as well as its earnings. This informa-
tion is essential for assessment of the entity’s activity and determines investment
decisions (Remlein 2015, p. 150). A significant element of financial statements
are earnings, which prove the effectiveness of an entity’s activities. Management
boards strive to improve results, which can lead them to employ earnings manage-
ment (Emerling 2016, pp. 23–24).
Earnings management is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon that is
difficult to measure. As a result, it is variously understood and defined by theore-
ticians, practitioners and accounting regulators (Callao, Jarne & Wróblewski 2014,
pp. 135–136).
Earnings management was initially equated with management consciously
intervening in the process of preparing the financial statement in an effort to
obtain certain benefits. But intervention interferes with the neutral course of this
process (Schipper 1989, p. 92). It has also been pointed out that the occurrence of
earnings management is conditioned by the asymmetry of information between
an entity’s management and other users of financial statements (Schipper 1989,
p. 95). I believe that preparing the financial statement requires the active participa-
tion of managers, as they are responsible for presenting in the financial statement,
in a reliable and faithful manner, information about the financial position and
the financial result achieved by the entity. In addition, information asymmetry
enables managers to use information about the company in financial reporting that
is unavailable to others to achieve their own objectives.
It has also been argued that earnings management occurs when managers,
using judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions, change
financial statements in order to create a desired picture of an entity’s financial
standing. In so doing, they misinform some stakeholders or obtain benefits guar-
anteed in managerial contracts, the realisation of which depends on the fulfillment
of specific conditions provided for in these contracts (Healy & Wahlen 1999,
p. 368). Research has shown that managers manage earnings by using (Healy &
Wahlen 1999, pp. 368–369):
– judgment (estimates) in financial reporting – for example, in establishing
the period of economic usefulness, residual value or asset impairment, and deter-
mining pension benefits liabilities;
– acceptable accounting methods allowed under the applicable accounting
regulations, including amortisation / depreciation methods, methods of valuating
balances and methods of pricing the quantity and outflow of inventory;
 106 Sylwia Czakowska

– structuring economic transactions with the aim of selecting and designing

so that their effects are disclosed in accounting books in a manner planned in
advance.
Preparing the financial statement involves choosing from among the methods
permitted in the applicable accounting regulations or establishing reliable esti-
mates for some items of this report in order to faithfully reflect the financial
situation and the financial results to be reported. To create the desired image of
the entity in the financial statement in order to influence stakeholders and induce
specific actions or achieve personal benefits, the entity’s management board
exhibits some subjectivity in choosing from among alternative solutions accept-
able in accounting regulations, estimating or structuring transactions. Given that,
Wójtowicz has argued that earnings management is the effect of conscious and
planned activity of those responsible for reporting in an entity. This activity is
reflected in the choices made in the field of financial reporting and is eventually
disclosed in the earnings presented (Wójtowicz 2010, p. 83).
Others maintain that earnings management is justified and the decisions made
by an entity’s management board as regards financial reporting with the aim of
achieving stable and predictable earnings are lawful (McKee 2005, p. 1, after:
Kuzior 2011, p. 175). This means, therefore, that earnings management fails to
cover illegal actions violating the applicable law, and an entity’s management can
manage its earnings by (McKee 2005, p. 4, after: Kuzior 2011, p. 175; Park 2017,
p. 1215):
– selecting specific methods, rules and models laid down in the accounting
standards,
– making appropriate operating decisions.
Earnings management manifested in the decisions made by the entity’s
management board regarding the rights to choose or professional judgment
(described in the accounting policy) or operating activities that do not violate
accounting regulations should not be considered illegal activities. A certain degree
of flexibility existing in accounting regulations, on the one hand, is aimed at
enabling the entity’s management to more fully implement the principle of a true
and fair view, while taking into account the specificity of its activities. It also
provides an opportunity to create the desired financial results. In the subject liter-
ature, earnings management is identified with an objective or a set of objectives
adopted by an entity’s management board and an integrated set of instruments for
its or their achievement related to the methods adopted, and, in particular, with
accounting estimates (accounting instruments) and the transactions conducted
(material instruments). In consequence, (short-term) earnings, which are known to
management, are not disclosed, though they would have been in a financial state-
ment if a specific sub-group of objectives and instruments had not been applied.
The Similarities and Differences between Earnings… 107

Nevertheless, earnings are managed in correspondence with the balance-sheet

policy adopted by a given entity, in particular in the case of accounting instru-
ments, and therefore in compliance with the applicable balance-sheet laws (Piosik
2016, p. 22).
Several key aspects of earnings management are worth focusing on here
(Grabiński 2010, p. 76):
– the occurrence, in the field of financial reporting, of areas which are subject
to discretion and require the application of professional judgment and estimates
contributes to the emergence of the phenomenon of earnings management;
– the need to apply professional judgment and estimates in financial reporting
may be used by an entity’s management board to provide external stakeholders
with information. That information, on the one hand, is inside information known
only to the entity’s management, thereby potentially resulting in an improved
quality of the financial statement. At the same time, it can be false information
used to mislead stakeholders;
– benefits guaranteed in managerial contracts are significant incentives for
managers to achieve the objectives provided for in the contracts and expressed
with the values of the reporting items, and to influence the values of those items;
– earnings management may contribute to an increase or decrease in the trans-
parency of financial statements;
– leveraging earnings management, an entity’s management may influence the
behaviour of both current and potential investors;
– earnings management can be perceived in a positive light when it has
a favourable influence on an entity’s value in the long term, or in a negative light
when the management board undertakes opportunistic actions.
In the context of the above considerations and for the purposes of this article,
earnings management can be defined as intentional actions undertaken by
an entity’s management board, which consist in selecting and applying appro-
priate methods and estimates, or undertaking real activities, leading to changes in
financial statement items, and, in particular, in the earnings disclosed, in order to
present the desired picture of the entity’s financial standing and, thereby, misin-
form some stakeholders or obtain benefits guaranteed in managerial contracts.
Earnings management does not encompass illegal actions, and is in compliance
with the accounting policy adopted by an entity. Therefore, it should not be iden-
tified with fraud.
 108 Sylwia Czakowska

3. Fraud and Earnings Management in Legal Regulations Related

to Auditing

The term “fraud” denotes consciously misleading a person or using an error

that person has made for one’s own benefit (Słownik języka polskiego PWN 2020).
In turn, the Polish Penal Code (The Act of 6 June, 1997, Art. 286, paragraph 1)
defines fraud, in its broad sense, as causing another person to disadvantageously
dispose of his own or someone else’s property with the purpose of the perpetrator
gaining a material benefit by misleading this person, or by taking advantage of
a mistake or inability to adequately understand the action undertaken.
Fraud-related provisions and requirements are also included in national and
international legal regulations on auditing. The National Auditing Standard
(NAS) 240 in Poland was adopted in the wording of the International Standard on
Auditing (ISA) 240 “The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit
of Financial Statements”1. According to this standard, fraud is an intentional act
by one or more individuals among management, those charged with governance,
employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or
illegal advantage (ISA 240, paragraph 11a). Like the Polish Penal Code, ISA 240
presents a wide definition of fraud. However, according to the provisions contained
in legal regulations related to auditing, only two types of fraud, resulting in signif-
icant distortions in financial statements, fall within the auditors’ area of interest
(ISA 240, paragraph 3): fraudulent financial reporting and the misappropriation
of assets.
Fraudulent financial reporting is understood as producing intentional misstate-
ments, including omissions of amounts or disclosures in financial statements, to
deceive financial statement users (ISA 240, paragraph A2). Misappropriation of
assets denotes the theft of an entity’s assets and is often perpetrated by employees
at various levels within an entity (ISA 240, paragraph A5).
According to ISA 240, fraudulent misstatements in financial statements may
consist in (Wąsowski 2010, pp. 15–16):
– manipulation, falsification or alteration of source data or documents based on
which financial statements are prepared,
– misrepresentation in or intentional omission from financial statements of
events, transactions and other significant information,
– the recording of fictitious transactions,

1
The National Council of Statutory Auditors in Poland, by way of its resolution
no. 3430/52a/2019 of 21 March 2019 on auditing standards and other documents, introduced NAS
240 (National Auditing Standard 240) in the wording of ISA 240 issued by the International
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB).
The Similarities and Differences between Earnings… 109

– the misapplication of accounting principles (policy) relating to amounts, clas-

sification, manner of presentation or disclosure,
– the misappropriation of assets.
This standard addresses a peculiar symptom of actions undertaken by an enti-
ty’s management – that is, earnings management, which is aimed at deceiving
financial statement users by influencing their perception of the entity’s perfor-
mance and profitability. In the beginning, earnings management may manifest
itself in insignificant actions or inappropriate adjustments of assumptions or
changes in judgments made by an entity’s management. However, an increasing
number of new pressures and incentives may cause an increase in the scale of these
actions, and, consequently, lead to fraudulent financial reporting, which consists
in an entity’s management intentionally and materially misstating the entity’s
financial statements (ISA 240, paragraph A2). It should therefore be emphasised
that, according to ISA 240, earnings management may lead to fraudulent financial
reporting, but it is not in and of itself the same phenomenon (Wójtowicz 2009,
p. 97). This standard also indicates that earnings management may manifest itself
in (ISA 240, paragraph A2):
– reporting reduced revenues in a bid to minimise taxes;
– inflating earnings in order to meet market expectations, maximise manage-
ment compensation when it is tied to the entity’s performance, or secure bank
financing.
To sum up the above, based on an analysis of legal regulations related to
auditing, fraud should not be identified with earnings management. Nevertheless,
according to ISA 240, the intensification of actions undertaken as part of earnings
management, manifesting themselves in operating activities or changes in previ-
ously adopted methods or estimates, may lead to fraudulent financial reporting,
which is fraud, and of interest to auditors.

4. Fraud versus Earnings Management

The above considerations lead to the conclusion that a common feature of earn-
ings management and fraud is intentional action, as both of the cases are about
the intentional presentation of an intended picture of an entity’s financial standing
with the aim of misleading financial statement users or realising management’s
interests. By contrast, the differences between these two phenomena include
the scope of departure from the truth, methods applied and persons responsible
(Wójtowicz 2007, p. 36, 2009, p. 97).
Fraud occurs when the actions undertaken by persons responsible for finan-
cial reporting in an entity, including the management board, violate accounting
 110 Sylwia Czakowska

principles and are contrary to the provisions of law (Stolowy & Breton 2004, p. 9;
Wójtowicz 2007, p. 37). Earnings management, on the other hand, consists in an
entity’s management undertaking specific actions, both intentionally and regu-
larly, within the framework of legal regulations in the field of accounting and
taking account of solutions adopted in accounting policy (Guan, He & Yang 2006,
p. 569, after: Kassem 2012, p. 31; Koumanakos, Siriopoulos & Georgopoulos
2005, p. 663, after: Kassem 2012, p. 31; Wójtowicz 2009, p. 97, 2010, p. 86). These
are legal actions related to the management board taking advantage of discretion
while making estimates (professional judgment) in financial reporting, taking
opportunities to choose specific methods from among the acceptable accounting
methods allowed by the applicable accounting regulations, or the structuring of
economic transactions with the aim of achieving planned profits or specific objec-
tives (Healy & Wahlen 1999, pp. 368–369; Jones 2011, p. 7, after: Kassem 2012,
p. 31; Stolowy & Breton 2004, p. 11). The majority of researchers agree that earn-
ings management ends at the moment of departing from or violating accounting
principles or standards (for example, Beneish 1999, Rosner 2003, after: Piosik
2016, p. 20; McKee 2005, after: Piosik & Strojek-Filus 2013, p. 14; Fijałkowska
2006, Piosik 2016).
So, the literature on the subject usually distinguishes earnings management
from fraud. At the same time, numerous studies, along with the above-mentioned
legal regulations on auditing, indicate that, although actions undertaken by
management boards as part of earnings management do not violate the standards
and provisions contained in accounting regulations, those actions can lead to the
presentation in financial statements of inaccurate and unfair information about
an entity’s earnings and financial standing, and, consequently, mislead stake-
holders, and, in particular, both current and potential investors (Healy & Wahlen
1999, pp. 368–369; Lo, Ramos & Rogo 2017, pp. 3, 24; Nelson & Skinner 2013,
p. 35). Furthermore, earnings management may in certain circumstances turn into
fraud, especially when the actions undertaken by management, including creative
accounting2, fail to bring the desired effects in the form of achieving planned
figures (DeFond 2010, p. 406; Jones 2011, p. 7, after: Kassem 2012, p. 32). It is
therefore argued in the literature that the bounds enabling distinction between
earnings management and fraud are defined by the intentions (motives) of manage-
ment (Kassem 2012, p. 32; Higson 2003, p. 129, after: Kassem 2012, p. 32; Piosik
2016, p. 22; Wójtowicz 2010, p. 86). However, intentions are not quantifiable, so

2
Creative accounting consists in taking advantage of the rights to choose, “fields of free
action” and legal loopholes in national and international accounting regulations in order to disclose
financial data in financial statements so that it provides the most favourable picture of an enterprise
(Śnieżek & Wiatr 2011, p. 115, 119).
The Similarities and Differences between Earnings… 111

they are not subject to research (Dechow & Skinner 2000, p. 238; Wójtowicz 2010,
p. 86).
To sum up, while both earnings management and fraud involve consciously
undertaking action, earnings management should not be considered on a par with
fraud, as fraud is identified with illegal actions that are beyond the scope of actions
undertaken as part of earnings management.

5. Summary

Earnings management involves intentional and lawful actions undertaken by

an entity’s management, aimed at changing the figures reported, and, in particular,
earnings, in order to present the desired picture of the entity’s financial standing
and economic position, as well as its achievements in financial statements for the
purpose of misleading financial statement users or obtaining benefits guaranteed
in managerial contracts. This is achieved by way of applying accounting judgment
and estimates, changing these estimates, choosing specific methods from among
the acceptable accounting methods allowed by the applicable accounting regula-
tions, structuring of economic transactions or undertaking actual activities.
According to ISA 240, fraud is an intentional act by one or more individuals
among management, those charged with governance, employees, or third parties,
involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage. However,
the auditor only deals with two types of fraud that result in significant distortions
in financial statements: fraudulent financial reporting and the misappropriation of
assets. Moreover, this standard identifies a particular manifestation of the activ-
ities of an entity’s management, namely, earnings management, which, through
insignificant actions, inappropriate adjustments of assumptions or changes in
judgments made by an entity’s management board, is aimed at deceiving finan-
cial statement users by influencing their perception of the entity’s performance
and profitability. ISA 240 indicates that intensification of actions undertaken as
a part of earnings management, manifesting themselves in operating activities
or changes in previously accepted methods or estimates, may lead to fraudulent
financial reporting, and therefore fraud.
As a result of the research conducted, it has been established that earnings
management should not be identified with fraud. While a common feature of these
two phenomena is the consciousness of action, in contrast to fraud, earnings are
managed within the framework of legal regulations in the field of accounting and
taking account of solutions adopted in the accounting policy of a given entity.
However, any abuse in this field, whether it involves departing from or violating
the accounting principles or standards, may lead to intentional misstatements in
 112 Sylwia Czakowska

financial statements – that is, fraud in its broad sense. The results obtained from
the conducted research have allowed us to achieve the objective of the study and
verify the research hypothesis, which was: the compliance of actions undertaken
as part of earnings management with the applicable legal regulations in the field of
accounting and with the accounting policy adopted by an entity makes it possible
to distinguish earnings management from fraud.
The subject literature indicates that earnings management can be distinguished
from fraud on the basis of management’s intentions (motives). However, inten-
tions are not quantifiable, and can therefore not be subject to research. The main
difference between earnings management and fraud is the compliance of actions
undertaken as part of earnings management with the applicable legal regulations
and with the accounting policy adopted by an entity. Earnings management takes
place within the framework of operating activity or uses a certain degree of flex-
ibility existing in accounting regulations in order to create the desired picture of
the entity in the financial statement. This picture may be intended to influence
stakeholders and motive them to undertake specific actions or for managers to
reap personal benefits. The management of an entity may seek to realise its own
objectives by choosing from among alternative solutions that are acceptable in
accounting regulations, as well as estimating or structuring transactions. This is
an inspiration for further development of research on earnings management from
the viewpoint of the determinants or instruments applied.

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The Similarities and Differences between Earnings… 115

Podobieństwa i różnice pomiędzy kształtowaniem wyniku finansowego

a oszustwem
(Streszczenie)

Cel: Głównym celem artykułu jest wskazanie różnic pomiędzy kształtowaniem wyniku
finansowego a oszustem.
Metodyka badań: Zastosowane metody badawcze opierają się na analizie krytycznej lite-
ratury przedmiotu, zarówno polsko-, jak i anglojęzycznej, analizie porównawczej aktów
prawnych oraz metodzie rozumowania indukcyjnego.
Wyniki badań: Kształtowanie wyniku finansowego stanowi celowe i zgodne z prawem
działanie kierownictwa jednostki, którego zadaniem jest doprowadzenie do zmian w rapor-
towanych danych finansowych, w szczególności zaś w wyniku finansowym, aby przedsta-
wić pożądany obraz sytuacji finansowej i majątkowej oraz dokonań jednostki w sprawoz-
daniu finansowym służący wprowadzeniu w błąd użytkowników tego sprawozdania bądź
osiągnięciu korzyści zagwarantowanych w kontraktach menedżerskich. Realizowane jest
ono poprzez stosowanie osądu (szacunków) w rachunkowości, dokonywanie zmian tych
szacunków, wybieranie określonych metod spośród akceptowalnych metod rachunkowości
dopuszczonych obowiązującymi regulacjami rachunkowości, strukturyzację transakcji
bądź podjęcie realnej aktywności.
Wnioski: Kształtowania wyniku finansowego nie należy utożsamiać z oszustwem, gdyż
odbywa się ono w ramach regulacji prawnych z zakresu rachunkowości oraz z uwzględ-
nieniem rozwiązań przyjętych w polityce rachunkowości danego podmiotu. Jednakże
nadużycia w tej kwestii, polegające na odstąpieniu czy też naruszeniu zasad bądź stan-
dardów rachunkowości, mogą prowadzić do umyślnego zniekształcenia sprawozdania
finansowego, czyli oszustwa w szeroki znaczeniu.
Wkład w rozwój dyscypliny: Inspiracja do dalszego rozwijania badań nad kształtowaniem
wyniku finansowego w odniesieniu do determinant lub zastosowanych narzędzi.
Słowa kluczowe: kształtowanie wyniku finansowego, sprawozdanie finansowe, oszustwo,
oszukańcza sprawozdawczość finansowa.