FACTS OF THE CASE

The “events that led to this appeal can be summed up quickly. The
plaintiffs, Ghanshyam Dass and his two younger brothers, filed the case
out of which this appeal is derived on November 12, 1949, in the Court of
the Civil Judge of Agra. They asked for the recovery of Rs. 26,000/- from
the Dominion of India through the Defence Secretary, New Delhi. It was
asserted that their late father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta signed a contract
with the Governor General-in-Council for the delivery of charcoal to the
Military Delivery Depot at Agra between April 1, 1943, and March 31,
1944. He produced the necessary supplies in accordance with it and
earned remuneration for them on a regular basis at the agreed-upon
pricing. He made the essential supplies in accordance with it and
periodically received payments for them at the agreed-upon prices. It was
argued that clause 8 of the contract contained an escalation clause, which
stated that the contractor would be entitled to the price at the higher rate
if the price of charcoal increased by more than 10% during the term of
the contract. According to the allegations, the price of charcoal ” increased
steadily starting on the day the deal was signed.

The Father “subsequently insisted that the charge be paid at the revised
rate. The military authorities paid for a portion of the supplies at the
higher price, but they refused to pay for the remaining above the agreed-
upon figure. Seth Lachman Dass served a notice on the Dominion of India
through the Defense Secretary in accordance with Section 80 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. It appears that he received a letter from the military
authorities rejecting his request for payment at the enhanced rate before
he passed away on” October 28, 1949. He passed away, though, before he
could bring a claim. Later, on “November 12, 1949, the plaintiffs—his
three sons—filed a lawsuit seeking the money as his legitimate heirs and
successors. The defendants disputed the claim, arguing, among other
things, that the notice supplied by their Father could not have been for
the advantage of the plaintiffs and that, as a result, the suit was invalid
due to a lack of notice in accordance with S. 80 of the Code.”

However, the learned “Civil Judge decided that since the plaintiffs' father
had already provided notice, it must be for their benefit and no further
notice under S. 80 was required. He determined that, in accordance with
clause 8 of the contract, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive the sum of
Rs. 20,710.50, which represented the difference between the higher rate
and the contractual rate for the supplies that had been paid for, and he
consequently decreed the plaintiffs' claim to that extent. The High Court
overturned his verdict on the matter after receiving an appeal, reasoning
that the plaintiffs' father's notice was insufficient and ineffective as a
notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure as far as the
plaintiffs were concerned.”

LEGAL ISSUES

 Whether the statutory provisions under section 80 of the Code of

RULES

 Section 80(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

ANALYSIS
Section “80 of the CPC is a key provision since it permits citizens to
communicate their grievances with the government prior to filing a
lawsuit. The section requires written notice to the appropriate government
body two months before any legal action is launched against the
government or any public employee acting in their official capacity. The
purpose of this section is to provide the government with a chance to
consider the complaint and potentially reach a mutually agreeable
resolution without resorting to litigation.”

The verbatim of section 80 is as follows: “No suit shall be instituted

(a) in the case of suit against the Central Government... a Secretary to

and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office,
stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence
of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain
a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.”

As was “said above, Section 80 outlines a clear procedure for how and
where a person must send a legal notice expressing their grievances when
a dispute develops with the government or a public official. In the case of
Bhagchand Dagadusa and Ors. v. Secretary of State for India 1 in Council
and Ors., the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council determined that this
provision is simple, unequivocal, and mandatory and does not permit of
any implications or exceptions.”

1
(1924) 26 BOMLR 1
The court cited its ruling in the matter of Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and
Anr. v. Union of India2 when addressing the issue of whether the legality
of a notice can be questioned on the basis that it does not strictly adhere
to section 80's requirements. [1957], which stated that even though the
wording of the section must be scrupulously followed, this does not entail
that the notice should be examined in a petty or unreasonable manner.
On the basis of this reasoning, it has been determined that a notice that,
despite having a few formal flaws, essentially complies with the provision
by setting forth the claim and the remedies set forth in the annexed copy
of the plaint.

The 1976 CPC (Amendment Act) section 80(3), which established the
notion of considerable compliance and was supported in the Dhian Singh
case, was also taken into consideration by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court ruled in this case that even though section 80(3) does not
apply retroactively to cases that were pending before February 1, 1977, it
can still be applied to the current case because it reiterates the idea of
substantial compliance that was also mentioned in the Dhian Singh case.

Finally, the court “cited Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and
Anr. [1955], which determined that Section 80 of the Code is only a
provision of the Procedure Code that was created to give the rules and
tools necessary for the courts to administer justice between the parties.
Because it just concerns with procedure, it is merely a component of the
law and must be construed in a way that advances justice rather than
working against it.”

In the end, the Supreme Court decided that the notice given in the
current case complies with “all the requirements of Section 80 of the
Code. Seth Lachman Dass sent a notice of claim to the Dominion of India
before the litigation was started. The whole purpose of filing a notice
under Section 80 is to inform the government enough in advance of the
2 1958 AIR 274
case that will be made against it so that, if it so wished, the government
may settle the claim out of court or offer compensation without going
through a legal procedure. The current case's facts and circumstances
unequivocally show that Section 80's requirements were satisfied. The
petition was therefore approved, and the Learned Civil Judge of Agra's
ruling was upheld.”

CONCLUSION

A significant ruling in the Ghanshyam Dass case defined the reach and
applicability of Section 80 of the CPC in the context of legal issues
involving the government. The supreme court addresses a much more
significant issue with regard to the procedural aspect of the CPC
provisions and how they are meant to facilitate justice rather than as a
way for parties to use them to defeat the cause of justice on purely
technical grounds, even though it reiterates the significance of the
provisions of section 80 and their strict compliance. The practice of relying
on strict adherence to the rules established by earlier judgements in order
to thwart the advancement of justice was strongly condemned by the
court.