Overview of the Committee

The African Union (AU) was instituted with the vision of building “an integrated, prosperous and
peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.” It was
established on 9 July 2002 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and launched on 11 July 2002 in Durban,
South Africa. The AU consists of 55 member states which represent all the countries on the African
continent. Member states are divided into five geographic regions- Eastern, Western, Northern,
Central, and Southern, which were defined by the OAU in 1976. The objective of the AU is to
promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; promote democratic principles and
institutions; protect human and peoples' rights; and accelerate economic, social, and cultural
integration of the continent. To achieve this, the African Union has adopted various policies and
initiatives, such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa. The African Union has also created various institutions to
help support its vision, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the African Committee of Experts on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child. The African Union leads policy-making and implementation of Agenda
2063 which aspires to "A peaceful and secure Africa" by promoting a conflict prevention approach
and establishing a culture of peace and tolerance in the roots of Africa and its youth. In addition to
that, it is a key pillar of African Peace & Security Architecture (APSA), which is a body for peace,
security, and stability in Africa.

At SLMUN 2023, we will be simulating a committee akin to the Assembly of the AU, which will
constitute the mandates of specialized agencies as well, mainly the Economic, Social and Cultural
Council. However, delegates will not be granted executive powers as with the Assembly, but rather
represent the countries and their standing policies as seen in the Executive Council. Committee
decisions will be made with at least two-thirds of its members in attendance and voting. The
decision on whether or not a question of the procedure will be made by the majority of the member
states' voting eligibility and decision.
The Agenda
Conference Topic

The Economic Consequences of Conflict in Africa

Practice Debate Topic

Sustaining the One African Market (AfCTA)

Practice Debate Topic:

Sustaining the One African Market (AfCTA)

Background

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is a significant trade agreement that aims to
create a unified marketplace for goods and services across Africa. Signed by all African countries
with the only exception of Eritrea, the agreement has the potential to revolutionize the continent's
economic landscape by establishing a market of 1.2 billion people with a combined GDP of $3.4
trillion. The primary goal of AfCFTA is to eliminate tariffs on 90% of goods traded between African
countries and to establish a framework for reducing non-tariff barriers to trade. The economic
integration of African states is not a new concept. The Abuja Treaty passed in 1991 by the OAU
called for economic integration and coordination of trade between African states. Currently, there
are multiple regional blocs in Africa, also known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs),
many of which have overlapping memberships. The RECs consist primarily of trade blocs and, in
some cases, some political and military cooperation. Examples include the East African
Community and the Economic Community of West African States. The AfCFTA aims to resolve the
challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships and expedite the regional and continental
integration processes. It also hopes to enhance competitiveness at the industry and enterprise
level by exploiting opportunities for scale production, continental market access and better
reallocation of resources.

Additionally, the agreement encompasses provisions for protecting intellectual property, promoting
competition, and supporting small and medium-sized enterprises. Nevertheless, there are
challenges to implementing the AfCFTA, such as logistical problems, political opposition, and
concerns about the impact of increased competition on certain industries. Furthermore, it is
necessary to invest in infrastructure and trade facilitation measures to promote intra-African trade
growth. If successful, the AfCFTA has the potential to contribute significantly to Africa's economic
progress and development. However, overcoming the implementation obstacles of the agreement
will require a collaborative effort from African governments, businesses, and other stakeholders.

History

Economic integration brings numerous advantages to a country, such as the ability to specialize
and trade freely, leading to cost reductions and long-term wealth and power growth. The AU and
the OAU have been pursuing this goal as a cornerstone of African unity. The Single Continental
Market concept is straightforward - it benefits the entire continent, including the economy and
infrastructure investments. The AfCFTA, which has become the world's largest free trade area by
creating a single market, has a significant impact on Africa's economic integration. According to an
AfCFTA development study, “over 25 per cent of intra-African trade gains in services would go to
transport alone: and nearly 40 per cent of the increase in Africa’s services production would be in
transport”.

The AU has identified the AfCFTA as one of Agenda 2063's flagship projects, which aims to
establish an ambitious trade agreement covering critical areas, including the economy, digital
trade, and investment protection. However, Africa still faces numerous issues that need to be
resolved, making it difficult to introduce new projects requiring support and development.
Disagreements, differences, and restrictions between countries, such as Eritrea's refusal to sign
the AfCFTA Agreement, are among the challenges. Eritrea recognizes the importance of trade for
economic growth and development but its policies promote regional cooperation, necessitating
collaboration between neighbouring countries on joint projects, policy coordination, and other
aspects. Nonetheless, each African country has its policies and government, making it challenging
to eliminate non-tariff barriers.

Regional Integration in the AfCTA

The RECs, or Regional Economic Communities, are groups of African states that serve as the
pillars of the AU. These communities were established before the launch of the AU and have
evolved independently, with distinct functions and structures. The primary aim of the RECs is to
promote economic integration within their respective regions and the wider African Economic
Community (AEC), which was initiated under the Abuja Treaty of 1991. The Abuja Treaty has been
operational since 1994 and seeks to establish an African Common Market, with the RECs serving
as the building blocks for this initiative. The AU recognises eight RECs namely:

• Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)

• Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
• Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD)
• East African Community (EAC)
• Economic Community of Central African States
(ECCAS)
• Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS)
• Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD)
• Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Regional trade agreements and economic communities have been a staple of intra-African trade
for decades. ECOWAS, for instance, was established in 1975 with a focus on economic
integration. Communities like the COMESA and SADC also have a long lineage. Today, there are
a plethora of overlapping regional trade agreements and RECs of varying sizes and stages of
economic and political integration. Approximately 19 per cent of intra-African trade takes place
within the framework of existing regional trade agreements. Hence, RECs are a prominent feature
of AfCFTA. AfCFTA calls for the agreement to be governed by the ‘best practices’ of those RECs
and envisages that RECs will be represented in the Committee of Senior Trade Officials under the
agreement in an advisory capacity. However, overlapping mandates and friction with the AU have
diminished their benefit.
Key Issues
In the status quo, there exist many issues that Africa and AfCFTA face; which can prevent the
achievement of creating one single African market. While a range of issues persist two of the most
persistent ones are,

● Poverty and Corruption

● Political Fragmentation and Restrictions

1) Poverty and Corruption

According to a study conducted by the IMF in 2021, one of the reasons that Africa ranks near the
bottom when it comes to competing with the global economy, is that Africa is held back by
fragmented markets that inhibit efficiency and constrain economic growth. According to Ventura
(Ventura, 2022), the world's poorest countries are all African, a fact that raises questions regarding
how feasible a single continental market may be.

The existence of mass amounts of corruption and a lack of regulation to mitigate it has
continuously undermined the efforts of citizens to improve their living standards; in terms of
achieving higher levels of economic, social and environmental welfare. According to statistical
research about fraud by Business Tech in 2022, “Money and Gift Card” scams remained the top
fraud scheme (42%) in the last three months followed by third-party seller scams (29%) and
unemployment scams (27%). The quarterly trend of stolen credit card or fraudulent charges is
stable – 11%.”.This also includes phishing scams (22%), fundraising scams (17%), people’s
accounts being taken over (16%), and identity theft (16%). The lowest is ransomware at (3%)

2) Political Fragmentation and Restrictions

Across Africa, electoral fraud, corrupt takeovers and other issues have sustained instability in
every corner of the continent. Leading the world to wonder if a successful transition into democracy
may ever be attained. This remains one of the key issues Africa faces as of 2023, political
fragmentations and restrictions impede and halt the continent's development. An example of one of
the political issues impeding economic development is the Ethiopia Tigray conflict, which is a
recent conflict between the Ethiopian government and the People of Tigray or The Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF). This posed a significant threat to the African region, ranging from security
concerns to refugee threats and crises.

The different political complexities in Africa have led the continent to face restrictions and
challenges that other continents do not face. One such barrier is the existence of complicated tariff
and non-tariff barriers. Tariff barriers are taxes or duties levied on goods traded internationally.
Non Tariff barriers, on the other hand, impedes international trade.
Talking Points
1. How can African countries address the challenges and barriers to intra-African trade, such
as infrastructure gaps, customs delays, and non-tariff barriers?
2. What role can international partners, such as development finance institutions and foreign
investors, play in supporting the implementation and success of the AfCTA?
3. How can African countries use the AfCTA to promote sustainable and inclusive economic
growth, reduce poverty and inequality, and achieve the Agenda 2063 and the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals?

Further Reading
Tayo, T.T. (2023) The road to Africa's single market: Progress so far and challenges for the future,
APRI. Available at: https://afripoli.org/the-road-to-africas-single-market-progress-so-far-and-
challenges-for-the-future.

Prasad, D. (2021) Regional Integration and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement: From
parallelism to harmonisation, International Bar Association. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, London.
Available at: https://www.ibanet.org/regional-integration-afcfta.

“World Bank (2020) The African Continental Free Trade Area; The African Continental Free Trade
Area: Economic and Distributional Effects, Washington, DC: World Bank.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/1c04980c-dcd8-5bd9-9abc-
a028630500db.”

Diallo, M.D. (2023) The African Continental Free Trade Agreement's Ventures in 2022, Africa Up
Close. Available at: https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/the-african-continental-free-trade-
agreements-ventures-in-2022/.

Karingi, S. and Aidi, W. (2022) The AFCFTA Country Business Index: Understanding private
sector involvement in the AFCFTA, Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-
in-focus/2022/08/11/the-afcfta-country-business-index-understanding-private-sector-involvement-
in-the-afcfta/.

Tayo, T.T. (2023) Promoting investment to power Africa's single market, ISS Africa. Available at:
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/promoting-investment-to-power-africas-single-market.

PSC Report (2022) Untangling Africa's mixed bag of regional organisations, ISS Africa. Available
at: https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/untangling-africas-mixed-bag-of-regional-
organisations.

African Development Bank. (2019) “African Economic Outlook.” Building Today, a Better Africa
Tomorrow, the African Development Bank. Available at:
https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-outlook-2022.

Conference Topic:
The Economic Consequences of Conflict in Africa

Background

Following the end of the Cold War, Africa became a theatre of violent conflicts from Burundi to
Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Sierra Leone, Somalia to Rwanda and Guinea to
Sudan. Even though the OAU was unable to resolve the conflicts that raged throughout Africa at
the time, it understood their impact when it emphasized in the Cairo Declaration of 1993 that, “No
single factor has contributed more to the present socio-economic problems in the Continent than
the scourge of conflicts in and among our countries”.

The scourge of conflicts would emerge as one of the toughest challenges that confronted the
continent to date, as the OAU’s successor continues to grapple with the influx of violence in the
continent. In the past year, regionalised conflicts persisted, manifested in dynamics around armed
conflicts in Ethiopia, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. There was deepening and expanding violent extremism, which increasingly threatened
certain African states. In the Sahel, jihadists expanded their activities to coastal states, including
Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab remained a potent threat across
significant parts of Somalia. Repeated attacks by Boko Haram splinter groups wreaked havoc in
Lake Chad Basin. And armed attacks by Islamists on military outposts, civilians and infrastructure
surged in Mozambique’s northern province of Cabo Delgado. Democratic backsliding continued,
with insurgencies, insecurity, and weak governance led to Unconstitutional Changes of
Governments (UCGs), with two successful coups in Burkina Faso and three failed attempts in
Guinea Bissau, Gambia and São Tomé and Principe. According to a report by Chatham House,
hotspots in 2023 will be in the western Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, Eastern DRC, and Northern
Mozambique, all of them crossing state borders.

These conflicts are having devastating consequences for the development of the African continent.
Henceforth, there is a need for the delegates to dive into the geopolitical complexities of Alkebulan
and formulate solutions to mitigate the economic consequences of conflict. This study guide aims
to provide you with a background understanding of the conflicts in Africa, their causes and their
economic implications.
Causes of Conflicts in Africa
In the 1998 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the causes of conflict and the
promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
pointed out five main sources of conflict in Africa: historical legacies; internal factors; external
factors; economic motives; and particular situations. This extends to a multiplicity of factors such
as arbitrary borders created by the colonial powers, the heterogeneous ethnic composition of
African states, inept political leadership, corruption, the negative effect of external debt burden and
poverty.

1) Historical legacies: The colonial Powers divided Africa into new territorial and administrative
units. This led to the arbitrary partition of African Kingdoms, States and communities, and the
imposition of artificial ethnic mixtures. In addition, infrastructure and commercial relations instituted
by the colonial powers were not designed for the benefit of the indigenous economy, but for the
advantage of the metropolitan country. As currently composed, the boundaries of most African
states were arbitrarily drawn without regard to ethnic and cultural affinities. In some cases,
European boundaries forced starkly different, rival cultures to cohabit within the confines of a
single state. For instance, the disregard of Arab, Christian and Indigenous demographics in
Sudan’s independence has primarily contributed to ethnic conflict that persists to date. Additionally
to the arbitrary partitioning, the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the ‘Scramble for Africa’, the proxy wars
of the Cold War, etc. have all contributed to the wars of today.

2) Internal factors The nature of political power in many African States, together with the real and
perceived consequences of capturing and maintaining power, is a key source of conflict across the
continent. Insufficient accountability of leaders, lack of transparency, inadequate checks and
balances, non-adherence to the rule of law, absence of peaceful means of leadership change and
lack of respect for human rights, are all elements making political control become excessively
important. In addition, in Africa, the state is the major provider of employment and political parties
are largely either regionally or ethnically based. The multi-ethnic character of most African States
makes the conflict even more likely, leading to an often violent politicization of ethnicity. Sudanese,
Nigerian, Algerian and Liberian civil wars lend credence to the fact that African leaders have failed
to forge national unity in their respective countries. Inept leadership has also resulted in political
transition conflicts, mainly coup d'etats. Since 2020, there have been successful military coups in
Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali and Sudan, and failed ones in the CAR, Djibouti, Guinea-
Bissau, Madagascar, Niger, and Gambia and São Tomé and Príncipe. Additionally in the scope of
political conflicts, there have also been civil rights conflicts, with the Arab Spring having begun in
the Maghreb.

3) External factors. Inter-state conflicts have occurred mainly over disputed territories like the
Chad-Libya conflict over the Aouzou strip and the Tanzania-Uganda war that toppled Idi Amin in
Uganda. There have also been liberation conflicts spurred by regions seeking self-determination
as seen in the Western Sahara conflict between the Polisario Front and the Kingdom of Morocco.
This source of conflict also comprises intervention from non-African powers in African States and
intervention among African States.

4) Economic motives: Despite the devastation that armed conflicts bring, many profit from chaos
and lack of accountability, and may have little or no interest in stopping a conflict and much interest
in prolonging it. Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international
arms merchants. Another example is the traffic of diamonds and other valuable raw materials,
whose control has been a constant root of clashes in places such as the DRC, Liberia and Angola.

5) Other sources of conflict. Ever since Annan’s tenure, a host of new factors have plagued
Africa. This includes the prominent rise of jihadism and religious extremism, as well as the growing
scarcity of land and water due to climate change. For example, in the CAR, rifts between the
Seleka and Anti-Balaka depict a recurring theme of Muslim-Christian conflict in Africa, while the
Sahel has become an epicentre of jihadist terrorism. Desertification has contributed to famines in a
number of African states such as Ethiopia and Mali and most recently severe droughts in Somalia,
all exacerbating conflicts.
Conflicts in Focus
Conflict dynamics in Africa are often complex and interconnected, with historical and socio-
economic factors contributing to ongoing violence. Below are a few regional briefs that would help
guide your research into understanding notable ongoing conflicts in Africa. However, it's important
to note that these regions are not homogenous and that conflicts can vary widely within them.

The Sahel

The arid Sahel region extends

through fourteen countries in the
north of sub-Saharan Africa. Since
the early 2000s, Sahelian countries
have been afflicted by continuous
internal and cross-border security
challenges, such as intense armed
conflict and severe terrorist attacks
spearheaded by Jihadist groups
like Boko Haram, Al Qaeda, the
Islamic State Greater Sahara
(ISGS) and Ambazonia separatists
challenging fragile governments
and taking advantage of porous borders, high levels of corruption, and weak rule of law. Newly
released research by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies quantifies the Sahel to be Africa’s
deadliest region with killings from Islamist groups increasing by 63 per cent in the past year.

While both the United States and France have military operations trained on containing extremism
in the region, there has been a notable trend towards the withdrawal of troops. The drawdown and
exit of Western forces from Mali, both the French Operation Barkane and international
contributions for the UN’s MINUSMA mission there, adds new dimensions to regional security
challenges. In their absence, Russia, through its Wagner Group proxy, has established a presence
promising to roll back the jihadist threat and build public trust in the Junta now in charge there. This
has only led to a further rise in human rights abuses and civilian casualties associated with
Wagner operations. As terrorist groups continue destabilizing the Sahel region in sub-Saharan
Africa, violence has spilt over into coastal West African states which were previously beyond the
reach of regional jihadist groups. Al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM)
now controls 40% of Burkina Faso’s territory, according to U.S. government estimates, and the
group is increasingly spreading outward. In 2017, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Ghana, and Burkina
Faso formalized their cooperation to combat the spread of Islamist groups under the Accra
Initiative. The AU and the ECOWAS have also advocated for closer coordination between the
affected states to combat the influence of the militant groups. Other efforts include the Group of
Five Sahel States (G5 Sahel), which saw Mali withdraw in 2022 and the Multinational Joint Task
Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram. This year could be a point of no return if the AU and regional
governments do not act soon to avoid an arc of instability stretching from the Atlantic to the Red
Sea.

African Great Lakes

The Great Lakes region comprises
interlacustrine countries such as Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. While seen as a
region with great potential after independence,
the region has, in recent decades, been marred
by civil war and conflict, with various armed
groups vying for control over the region's natural
resources, including gold, diamonds, and coltan.
In Eastern Congo, M23 – the Tutsi-led rebellion
group – resumed its conflict in Eastern DRC
against the Congolese National Armed Forces
(FARDC). This was nearly a decade since M23
surrendered to a multinational onslaught in
eastern Congo-Kinshasa back in 2013.
According to the UN, Rwanda has been
supporting M23, despite denial from the
government. Last November, Kenya’s parliament approved the deployment of soldiers to the DRC
as part of a joint military force from the East African Community (EAC) bloc, which the DRC joined
in March 2022. The resurfacing of the M23, ten years after its defeat, is a testimony of the inability
to translate military victory into political success in the Great Lakes. The political process is lagging
behind military action, which isn't helping to demobilize armed groups. The recent proliferation of
peace initiatives hasn't made combining political and military solutions easier, partly because the
M23's defeat was not accompanied by efforts to deal with the conflict's root causes. The trust
deficit between the DRC and some of its neighbours is at the heart of the current crisis, and the
competition between SADC, the EAC, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region (ICGLR) over peace initiatives isn't conducive to productive joint monitoring of member
states' commitments.

Horn of Africa
 The Horn of Africa is one of the most complex and
conflicted regions of the world. Each of the
countries of the Horn- Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Djibouti and Sudan, suffer from protracted political
strife, arising from local and national grievance,
identity politics and regional inter-state rivalries.
For 150 years, the Horn has also been a theatre
for strategic power struggles; the British Empire’s
demand to control the Red Sea, Egypt’s attempt to
control the Nile Waters, the Cold War confrontation
in which each of the principal countries of the Horn
switched sides at crucial junctures, and most
infamously the Bush Administration’s “Global War
on Terror.”

As of late, the rise of the al-Shabaab in Somalia,

the Tigrayan War between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation
Front (TPLF), the South Sudanese Civil War between forces of President Salva Kiir’s government
and Vice President Riek Machar’s opposition forces, the genocide stridden “Land Cruiser War” in
Darfur and the Las Anod conflict between the Somaliland National Army and militias of the
Dhulbahante clan, Puntland and Al-Shabaab have again highlighted the turbulence of the Horn.
However, there are signs of hope in the region. In November 2022, the AU brokered the Pretoria
Peace Deal which saw a ceasefire agreed upon between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF.
They also assisted Somali-led offensives with AU peacekeeping troops (AMISOM) to restore
Somalia's sovereignty to a third of the territory formerly misruled by al-Shabaab. These vastly
different strategies present how deepening AU involvement can stabilize regional violence in the
continent.

While these are some of the main regions of conflict and violence, other recent hotspots include
the Central African Republic, the Maghreb and Cabo Delgado in Mozambique.
Economic Consequences
As history has repeatedly shown, conflicts impose immeasurable human suffering and large
economic and social costs. The loss of human life; destruction of infrastructure, human capital, and
institutions; political instability; and greater uncertainty associated with conflicts can impede
investment and economic growth, not only during the conflict but also afterwards, making it difficult
to escape the “conflict trap.” Conflict can have substantial effects both on the revenue and
expenditure sides of a country’s public finances. This limits the government’s ability to respond to
conflicts in an effective way, thereby aggravating their economic and social costs. On the revenue
side, conflicts can reduce collections by disrupting economic activity, causing capital flight,
destroying a part of the tax base, and lowering the efficiency of tax administration. On the
expenditure side, an increase in conflict intensity is associated with shifting from growth-friendly
capital expenditures to military spending.

During the conflict, military victory, or at least the avoidance of defeat, becomes an overriding
priority for the government, which then shifts resources away from strategies that only have long-
term pay-offs towards those that deliver short-term gains. In economic terms, this can be thought
of as a shortening of time horizons, or an increase in the government’s discount rate. The same
shortening of time horizons is likely to affect private economic behaviour. Faced with the
uncertainties of civil war, people discount the future more heavily. One of the consequences of
discounting the future more heavily is an increase in opportunistic behaviour. Normally, the main
defence against opportunism is people’s concern about not acquiring a reputation for opportunism
since this will harm their ability to be trusted in future deals. However, as the future becomes more
uncertain, there is a stronger incentive to snatch opportunities as they arise. Hence, one of the
legacies of conflict is heightened opportunism in society, which in turn reduces productivity in all
activities that normally depend on an element of trust. In particular, it may be atypically difficult to
enforce credit transactions.

At the regional level, conflicts pose an additional challenge because of their potential spillover
effects. Conflicts can spread to neighbouring states, a direct spillover effect. They can also have
indirect spillover effects by depressing economic activity (for instance, due to increased uncertainty
or trade disruption) or by creating social strains (for example, due to a large influx of refugees) in
nearby countries, even if those countries remain uninvolved in the conflict.
Addressing the Issues
Governance

The AU has stepped up conflict management and democratic consolidation efforts, achieving
relative success in diplomacy, peace support operations (PSOs) and review of normative
governance frameworks. Progress included the agreement to end hostilities in Ethiopia’s northern
Tigray region and one that is paving the way for the establishment of a civilian government in
Sudan. These reflect the potential of AU mediation to advance peace, security and stability on the
continent. The AU’s preventive diplomacy role was evident in the elections and peaceful power
transfers in Kenya and Lesotho. Its continued commitment to restoring lasting peace, security and
stability in Somalia showed itself in the successful evolution of the AU Mission in Somalia into the
AU Transition Mission in Somalia. Another achievement was its support for the implementation of
the SADC Mission in Mozambique mandate. In addition, AU's commitment to promoting
democracy and good governance was clear in the adoption of the Accra, Malabo and Tangier
declarations. These declarations illustrate progress in addressing UCGs and their repercussions
for democratic consolidation, peace and security. Other key engagements seek solutions to
country and region-specific conflicts via different mechanisms, missions and representatives.

Terrorism

The Algiers Convention actioned even before the global response against terrorism after 9/11,
defines terrorism as any act or threat of an action, whatever its motives or purposes, that is
intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose
of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to carry out or to abstain from any act. This definition and the convention
overall paved the way for the AU and its member states to adopt decisions, frameworks and
mechanisms to address the threat. Key among these was the 2002 Plan of Action on the
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, initiated to further implementation of the convention
through greater cross-border collaboration on policing and surveillance. It was extended by the
2011 African Model Anti-terrorism Law, which identifies offences perpetrated by terrorist groups
and outlines how AU member states can address them. Offences include money laundering and
financing of terrorist groups, hostage-taking and terrorist bombings. Combatting terrorism is also
key to the AU Roadmap to Silence the Guns by 2030, which expresses Africa’s commitment to
addressing insecurity issues to prevent them from afflicting future generations. In implementing
these frameworks, the AU has staged various PSOs. The PSC deployed operations such as the
Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army and AU Transition Mission in
Somalia. Guided by subsidiarity, the council has also coordinated deployment with RECs and
regional mechanisms in various initiatives. These include the MNJTF against Boko Haram, the G5
Sahel Joint Force and the SADC Mission in Mozambique. The most recent AU decisions on
curbing terrorism were made during the 16th extraordinary summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in
May 2022. The key outcomes included making the African Standby Force (ASF) fully functional
and establishing a counter-terrorism unit within it. The summit also called for the signing of a
memorandum of understanding between the AU and RECs and regional mechanisms on the ASF
to improve and coordinate PSOs.

Macroeconomic Policies

While multilateral efforts such as the AfCTA and Agenda 2063 have been taken by the AU,
macroeconomic policies and institutions on national levels have a significant role to play in
lowering the impact of conflict, even when it is ongoing, both to alleviate the immediate harm and
to improve the country’s long-term economic prospects. The following includes a few global
examples of measures to mitigate the economic consequences of war,

1. Protecting economic and social institutions from becoming inoperative or corrupt: A non-
African, yet encouraging example is the Palestinian Monetary Authority’s business
continuity planning, which was instrumental in maintaining a workable payment system and
a robust macroprudential framework during periods of elevated stress, such as the 2014
tension in Gaza.
2. Prioritizing public spending to protect human life, limiting the rise in fiscal deficits, and, to
the extent possible, helping to preserve economic growth potential: These policies try to
tackle directly the challenges of damage to human and physical capital. In Afghanistan, the
new government in 2002 and 2003 tried to maintain fiscal discipline and provide basic
services to the population with the help of external assistance. It focused on spending on
security, education, health, and humanitarian assistance.
3. Stabilizing macroeconomic and financial developments through effective monetary and
exchange rate policies: Lebanon offers a good example. Following the formation of a
national unity government, in 1992 authorities adopted an exchange-rate-based nominal
anchor policy that targeted a slight nominal appreciation of the Lebanese pound against the
US dollar. This policy successfully stabilized expectations, and inflation fell to single digits.

Once conflict subsides, the policy focus should shift toward rebuilding and economic recovery. This
has proved difficult, however, as countries are often still fragile even when the worst of the violence
ends. Often governments do not have full control of all the territories within their borders, and
security remains elusive. At such a time, economic policies should aim to solidify the peace.
Rebuilding and modernizing institutions, mobilizing resources for reconstruction, and fostering
stronger and more inclusive growth should be the top priorities. The AU’s policy on Post-Conflict
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) provides guidance on addressing the needs of countries
emerging from conflict, including the needs of affected populations; preventing the escalation of
disputes; avoiding relapse into violence; addressing the root causes of conflict; and consolidating
sustainable peace.
Notable Foreign Policies
Where Nigeria goes, so goes West Africa

Upon independence in 1960, Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, declared
“Africa is the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy.” That policy stance of Afrocentrism has been
the recurrent theme of successive Nigerian administrations to date. This notion was predicated on
the sovereignty and equality of all African states, eradication of colonialism, proactive support
towards human rights, respect for the principle of non-interference and promotion of mutual
cooperation among independent African states. Nigeria has strongly pursued regional and sub-
regional integration by being the largest African contributor to ECOWAS and the AU. Nigeria also
has taken the lead in articulating the views of developing nations on the need for modification of
the existing international economic order.

However, the nation has made it clear that domestic policies override regional aspirations when in
August 2019 it closed its land borders with Benin Republic, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. This was
in violation of the key ECOWAS agreement guaranteeing freedom of movement across the region.
The rationale for the border closure was that it would curb the smuggling of drugs, illegal arms, and
imported agricultural products into the country. Yet given a regional environment where Nigeria
needs close relationships with its neighbours to tackle everything from Lake Chad to Boko Haram,
creating economic hardship for everyone around is hardly a good way to establish oneself as a
trustworthy regional leader. The border closure was not the only trade-related issue that saw a
clash between Nigeria’s domestic considerations and regional aspirations. The country was one of
the last to ratify the AfCFTA, a delay caused by business concerns from the Manufacturers
Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS).

Notwithstanding those challenges, Nigeria’s leadership in regional security has been significant.
The country was instrumental in the establishment of the MNJTF, comprising troops from the
Republic of Benin, Cameroun, Chad, Niger Republic and Nigeria and the creation of the Economic
Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) multinational force to intervene
and help end the fratricidal Liberian civil war in 1990. Nigeria also provided the bulk of troops for
ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone. Under the auspices of the UN’s and the AU’s Peace Keep
Missions, Nigerian troops have also performed creditably in Peacekeeping Missions in Congo,
Mali, Somalia and Sudan. Under the new Tinubu presidency, the importance of working with
ECOWAS on matters of regional economic development and security is likely to be stressed even
more as Nigeria battles the ever-growing threat of terrorism in West Africa.

An Imperfect Hegemon in the Horn

By the late 2010s, Ethiopia was well-positioned to establish itself as a stabilizing power in the
Horn. Until of course, its “law enforcement operation” in the Tigray region. Before the invasion,
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was regarded as a dynamic reformer and highly sought after as a
champion for African interests. It reflected a broader Ethiopian ideal of increased involvement in
the geopolitics in Africa. An ideal which was diminished by the brutality of the Tigray campaign and
the lack of restraint to resort to violence by Abiy’s government. After two years of rebuffing African
Elders and largely sidelining the AU’s efforts to stop the devastating conflict, Addis Ababa has
become an unlikely and uncomfortable frontman for African equities. Once one of the fastest-
growing in Africa and a tantalizing opportunity for investors, Ethiopia’s economy is also struggling.
External shocks, such as COVID-19 and Russia’s war in Ukraine, compounded by the war in
Tigray see the nation needing to restructure $30 billion in debt and rein in inflation.

Nevertheless, Ethiopia remains undeniably important to the future trajectory of the region and
continent. Ethiopia is a strong advocate of the AfCFTA, a mediator in many significant conflicts
such as South Sudan and a driving force in maintaining UN-AU peacekeeping missions. Addis
Ababa is still the home of major multilateral organizations including the AU, Pan African Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, UN Economic Commission for Africa and the African Standby Force.
With peace settling in the region, Ethiopia is by far better positioned than its neighbours in the Horn
and would expand its geopolitical reach in the unfolding new decade.

Congo-Kinshasa’s Fragile Path to Integration

Following the Great War of Africa, there was much hope for the DRC to emerge as a regional
power in Central Africa, making optimal use of its natural resources, including minerals such as
cobalt and copper, hydropower potential, significant arable land, immense biodiversity, and the
world’s second-largest rainforest. However, it has only been a “resource curse” for the nation as its
fragility was exposed in the preceding decades with never-ending conflict, political upheaval and
instability. The DRC in the status quo is far from reaching regional dominance but remains one
Sub Saharan Africa’s most important actors simply due to its sheer wealth of resources and
geopolitical presence.

In 2019, the DRC began an extensive reshaping of its diplomatic action and foreign policy
objectives under President Felix Tshisekedi. There was an increased determination to enhance the
nation’s presence in international forums and a revitalization of its engagement at AU summits and
other sub-regional organizations. This new foreign policy direction followed a period of relative
isolation that started during former President Joseph Kabila’s tenure. A period which also saw the
deterioration of the relationship between the Congolese government and the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). President
Tshisekedi’s break from isolation gave way to all-out foreign policy outreach. The DRC has
strengthened its role within regional bodies such as SADC, ECCAS, ICGLR and COMESA. Most
remarkably, the country formally joined the EAC in 2022. The new arrangement expanded the EAC
as far west as the Atlantic Ocean and further opened Congo’s market of 90 million people to the
region. While this move actualizes Tshisekedi’s foreign policy objectives, the decision is
underpinned by regional tensions as it strengthened the DRC’s multilateral effort to curb Rwandan-
backed militias in its Eastern region. Tshisekedi also seeks support from farther afield to buttress
his position in negotiations with its hostile neighbour in Rwanda.
East Africa’s Powerhouse

Kenya is one of the largest and most advanced economies in East and Central Africa. Its GDP
accounts for more than 50 per cent of the region’s total in terms of current market prices. Its
economic growth prospects are supported by an emerging middle class and an increasing appetite
for high-value goods and services. Alongside this growth, Kenya has shown a commitment to Pan-
Africanism and growing its sphere of influence in the region. The disposition towards an Afro-
Centric orientation has influenced the country’s commitment to the EAC, the realization of Agenda
2063 and the implementation of the AfCFTA. President-Elect William Ruto will likely prioritize the
advancement of economic interests, even as he seeks to advance leadership in EAC affairs. This
is backed by how the Kenyan economy serves as the EAC’s anchor. The region’s overall
performance is heavily influenced by what happens there.

On matters of security, the peace diplomacy pillar will also continue to occupy an important place
in Kenya’s foreign policy engagements, due in part to the continuing terror threats and territorial
and other disputes in the region. Kenya has been deeply involved in preventive diplomacy,
peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction across Africa. Former President
Uhuru Kenyatta made it a focal point for Kenya to leverage its seat in the UNSC to advance peace,
stability and inclusive growth in Africa.

Another intriguing characteristic of Kenya's policy is its recent geopolitical rebalancing, which saw
an increased shift towards “Looking to the West”. While Kenya still maintains close ties with China,
this trend is vastly in contrast to the rest of the continent experiencing Chinese expansionism.

South Africa and the Ubuntu-inspired African Renaissance

The Republic of South Africa, widely seen as one of Africa’s most stable countries and a regional
superpower, stands among the leaders of the continent with its developments in a wide range of
fields such as the economy, diplomacy, academia, culture, and art. South Africa’s foreign policy
focuses on building unity, inclusive economic development and shared prosperity for the African
continent and its people. Former President Thabo Mbeki in particular, architected South Africa’s
vision for an African Renaissance. A policy which saw South Africa challenge the notion that it is
the exception to the continent and rather emerge as a committed partner to attaining the collective
goal of regional growth and prosperity. Under Mbeki, South Africa was a key part of the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), providing the necessary infrastructure and material
support needed for its implementation. Additionally, the policy was driven by the country’s role in
the SADC and the AU being involved in key initiatives such as the South Africa Investment
Conference (SAIC) and the AfCFTA.

Post-1994 South Africa has played a leading role in the transformation of peace and security
architectures in Africa, most prominently in the development of the SADC Organ, the APSA and
the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. However, despite a record of
peacekeeping missions (both UN and AU) in countries such as Burundi and the DRC, the nation
has seen a decline in peacekeeping, especially following the Zuma Administration. Nonetheless,
conflict resolution through negotiations has remained the hallmark of South Africa’s foreign policy
with a further push by President Ramaphosa, who as chair of the AU, mediated in the dispute
between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Key successes
in peace diplomacy include the Pretoria Peace Agreement (Ethiopia), the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement (Burundi) and the Global and Inclusive Agreement (Eastern DRC).

It’s also vital to understand that South Africa has key access to international platforms including
the United Nations Security Council (2007-2008, 2011-2012 and 2019-2020), G20 and the BRICS,
enabling it to advocate for debt relief and developmental assistance for Africa. Yet, South Africa’s
vote in 2011 in support of UN Resolution 1973, which led to a NATO-led intervention in Libya, the
incidence of xenophobic attacks by South African citizens on other African nationals and the recent
Durban riots have all negatively impacted South Africa’s credibility in promoting an African agenda.
This has highlighted the disjunction between the government’s intent of promoting an African
agenda and the awareness and acceptance of the people of this Ubuntu-inspired foreign policy.
Treaties and Conventions
Constitutive Act of the African Union: This is the legal document that establishes the AU as a
successor to the OAU. It lays out the mandate and obligations of the organization.

Niamey Convention: Requires State Parties to promote cross-border cooperation, including in

areas of security and demining of border areas.

Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union: Aims to establish a decision-making body to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in
Africa.

1969 OAU Refugee Convention: Within the framework of the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights this Convention, seeks to draw a distinction between a refugee who
seeks a peaceful and normal life and a person fleeing their country for the sole purpose of
fomenting subversion from outside.

Kampala Convention: Addresses the protection and assistance of internally displaced persons
(IDPs).

OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa: Aims to eliminate the threat
posed by mercenaries to African people.

Banjul Charter: Aims to cover civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, as well as the
rights of people and has been ratified by every member state of the AU.

Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism: Focuses on the

criminalization of terrorist acts, the prevention of terrorist financing, and the protection of victims of
terrorism.

Abuja Treaty of 1991: Provides a framework for the establishment of a continental economic
community. It recognizes the role of RECs as building blocks for the continental economic
community and mandates the harmonization of economic policies and the coordination of activities
between the AU and RECs.
Talking Points
1. What are the multifaceted and interdisciplinary strategies that could be employed for
sustainable post-conflict reconstruction?
2. To what extent can RECs contribute to the stabilization of conflict zones, and what policy
recommendations can be proposed to address the geopolitical, socio-economic, and
cultural factors that may hinder their efforts in the status quo?
3. In what specific ways can the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Arab
League enhance their cooperation and collaboration with the African Union to overcome
the challenges of conflict resolution?

Note that the above is not a complete list. However, we want these topics to be talked about at the
conference, in addition to your own research.

Further Reading
Rother, B., G. Pierre, D. Lombardo, R. Herrala, P. Toffano, E., Roos, A. G. Auclair, and K.
Manasseh (2016) “The Economic Impact of Conflicts and the Refugee Crisis in the Middle East
and North Africa.” IMF Staff Discussion Note 16/8, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1608.pdf

Conflict and conflict resolution in Africa (2020) ACCORD. Available at:

https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/conflict-and-conflict-resolution-in-
africa/#:~:text=A%20few%20cases%20of%20liberation,the%20Chechnya%20conflict%20in%20Ru
ssia.

Agence Française de Développement (AFD) (2018) Crisis and development. The Lake Chad
region and Boko Haram, Issuu. Available at: https://issuu.com/objectif-developpement/docs/web-
lac_tchad_va-20180809_465c23d2fc5934.

Dr Alex Vines OBE Managing Director (2023) Africa in 2023: Continuing political and economic
volatility, Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. Available at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/africa-2023-continuing-political-and-economic-volatility.

Understanding Conflict in Africa. (2021) House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/live/9fMnHUHj3VA?feature=share.

Ethiopia's Tigray Conflict Peace Deal showcased the African Union's peace diplomacy, but several
sticking points remain (2023) Africa Up Close. Available at:
https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/ethiopias-tigray-conflict-peace-deal-african-union/.

Koczan, Z. and Chupilkin, M. (2022) The Economic Consequences of War, CEPR. Available at:
https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/economic-consequences-war.
United Nations; World Bank (2018) Pathways for Peace; Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to
Preventing Violent Conflict: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict. World Bank, Washington,
DC. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/4c36fca6-c7e0-5927-b171-
468b0b236b59.

Omanga, D. (2020) Decolonization, decoloniality, and the future of African studies: A conversation with
Dr. Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Items. Available at: https://items.ssrc.org/from-our-
programs/decolonization-decoloniality-and-the-future-of-african-studies-a-conversation-with-dr-sabelo-
ndlovu-gatsheni/.

Samuel, M. (2023) Nigeria's New President Must Prioritize the Boko Haram Crisis, issafrica.org.
Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigerias-new-president-must-prioritise-the-boko-haram-
crisis.

Reyntjens, F. (2023) Back to the future in the Great Lakes: Who's backing the M23?, African
Arguments. Available at: https://africanarguments.org/2023/03/back-to-the-future-in-the-great-
lakes-whos-backing-the-m23/.

Mohamed (2023) Intelbrief: Jihadist groups threaten to destabilize the Sahel and coastal West
Africa, The Soufan Center. Available at: https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2023-april-4/.

Picco, E. (2023) Ten years after the coup, is the Central African Republic facing another major
crisis?, Crisis Group. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-
republic/dix-ans-apres-le-coup-detat-la-republique.

Xia, H. (2023) Striving for peace in Africa's Great Lakes Region: Ongoing efforts to resolve the
current crisis, ACCORD. Available at: https://www.accord.org.za/analysis/striving-for-peace-in-
africas-great-lakes-region-ongoing-efforts-to-resolve-the-current-crisis/.
Advice from the Chairs
It is important to understand that Africa is a vastly complex continent with a wide variety of problems.
Nearly all the AU member states have experienced violent conflict in the past, and continue to deal with
the residual effects. However, the complexity does not excuse any lack of nuance in debate. Delegates
are expected to dwell on the specifics of ongoing and past conflicts with a thorough understanding of
the geopolitical factors influencing unrest in all regions of the continent. There should be a clear
distinction made between the various types of conflicts and the locations where it is taking place. While
the agenda allows for a broad discussion we expect in-depth debate on isolated cases as well, to avoid
overgeneralization in formulating resolutions. It is also important to keep in mind to not purely base your
substance on conflict resolution as the conference agenda focuses on addressing the economic
consequences.

As a ground rule, be well-versed in the SLMUN Delegate Guide, the Constitutive Act of the AU and the
Study Guide. However, we expect delegates to use this guide for baseline research only. By no means
do we expect a reiteration of what is already mentioned here. The topics covered in the study guide are
not exhaustive and are not intended to be either. This is simply indicative of pressing issues and topics
of concern which must be addressed and will give you a bird’s eye view of the gist of the issue.
Delegates will have to research extensively to identify and address the roots of the issue and focus on
resolving them. We expect a solution-oriented debate and hence superficial discourse and meaningless
arguments will be strongly discredited. It is imperative that you are fluent in your foreign policy and are
able to negotiate with opposing blocs to come to a consensus by the end of the conference. But while
your own foreign policy should be at the helm of your research, delegates must be aware of the
domestic law and international relations of other member states for the purpose of effective resolution
writing. While pointing out the deviations in foreign policy and faults of other delegates is accepted,
please be advised that any accusation without credible sources will be severely penalized.

There is a disclaimer to be had with regard to the study guide. The geopolitical landscape and
conflicts of Africa are constantly evolving, much more rapidly and aggressively compared to other
regions in the world. For instance, when we began writing, Sudan was holding onto peace despite
tensions between Burhan and Hemedti. But just a month or so later, we were witnessing violent clashes
between the Sudanese Army and the Rapid Support Force in Khartoum. Hence it is important to
understand that all the information provided in this study guide is updated as of April 2023 only. Any
other developments made in the months leading up to the conference have to be taken into account by
the delegates.

SLMUN hasn’t simulated the African Union since 2016 and we understand that the simulation can be
an overwhelming experience, especially for first-timers. But what fun is MUN if it isn’t challenging?
Delegates are more than welcome to flex their creativity and bring in their wealth of experience from
other committees. We strongly encourage all delegates to participate fully in the conference and if any
doubt persists in their minds (either substantive or related to parliamentary procedure), please do not
hesitate to clarify the same with the chairs. We wish you the very best with your research and hope to
have an excellent conference this year!