II O State Power in the Era of Globalization: Case Studies G.

Studies G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order III

The selections in Chapter 3 are state-centric in the best sense, applying the
lens of globalization to an analysis of state power in three comparative case stud-
Globalization and the
ies: the United States, EU Europe (especially Britain, GermanS and France), and
Exercise of American Power
East Asia (with particular emphasis on the resPonse of the Asian Tigers to the
economic crisis of 1997).Taken together, they analyze how globalization shapes
the exercise of state power-and how state power, in turn, shapes the contours,
defines the goals, and determines thb agendas of key institutions of global eco-
nomic and political governance.
9
STUDY AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS Liberal Hegemony and the Future
'Which para-
1. Recall the competing paradigms introduced in Chapter 1.
rtrThich
of the American Postwar Order
digm would best explain the economic crisis in East Asia in 1997?
would best explain the range of responses to the crisis by particular
states?
How would Mearsheimer explain the evolution of EU-U'S. relations since
the end of the Cold rUilar?
G, Jobn Ikenberrl
3. Does the unrivaled power of the United States make it all but impossible
for other states to pursue independent geopolitical strategies? Economic
and social models? In tbis selection, G. John Ikenberry argues that American hegetnony
was buih on d pair of postwar settlements (or tacit ogreements about tbe
era's institutionalized arrangernents) that articulated a compelling uision
for liberal begemony. The more sharply drawn and acutely focused of
the two wos tbe "containment order" that consecrated the Cold War: a
wary balance of power backed by nuclear deterrence and animated by
ideological and geopolitical competition. More sweeping, but also more
diffuse, was the broader uision for a liberal democratic order. Ameicdn
policy makers succeeded because they were able to nake the case that
free trade, on open trading systetn, and a set of muhilateral institutions
were in tbe broader intelests of Western democracies.
Ihenberry argues that it was a case that could be sold conuinc-
ingly to Asian and European portners because the United States was
- satisfied h "lock in"..the terms of these fauorable settlements, prefer
-- ring stability and predictability ta.the uncertainty of an unconstraineQ
.- -hegemonic order in uthicb the United Staus-might aggrandize.euen
. greater pouer. Ikenberry nrgues that the willingness of" tbe.United ,
. States to exercise ',strategic restraint"-and persuade potential part-
ners of their commitment to the principles of a non-coerciue and
mubilateral postu)ar order-was essential to achieuing a settletnent
that utas mutually acceptable to a group of states with huge power
asymrnetries.
 G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Furute of the American Postwar Order II3
I12 Scate Power in the Era of Globalizadon: Case Scudies

American
INTRODUCTION was how to
among a
Iremarkableaspectofworldpoliticsatcentury,sendistheutterdominance
emerged hegelonic.' the,United
fl.of the United St"to nifty yt""
states is still the dominant *orlj
po*.."ftt'it
at rhe center of a relatively stable and tlons, pro-

expanding democratic ."pit"fit' oider'

This is surprising' Most observers have
disap-
;;;;;r"-"tic ,hiftrl' world politics after the cold lgar-such as the rise of
power the
pearance of American ht;;;;; tht of great balancing'
"'u"'
dtt"y of multilateralism' Yet despite exPecta- po*.rr"rh", is, they reduce the long-term implications of asymmetries of power.
iolnp.,itg regional bloci and 'ht
tionsofgreattransfor*"tio"'andnewworldorders'thehalf-century-oldAmer- ig.".*.rr, results from a trade-off; the hegemonic state gets commitments by
politics today. secorrda.y states to participate within the hegemonic order, and
in return the
i."r, orai, is still the dominant realiry in world are not as
This durable ern.ri"ar order is a puzzle.Its relative material power capabili- hegemon places limits on the exercise of its power. The weaker states
leading state does not need
larger package of political institutions' eco- inc-lined ,o f.", domination or abandonment and the
ties have declined to be sure, but its
nomicassets,arrdfa,-flu"grelations-akesitaresilientandsingularworld
is also a puzzle.
capitalist order
power. The durability of tf,e wider democratic
coldwar was an essential "glue" that held the
The conventional view is that the
dampening conflict and facilitating cooP-
advanced industrial countries to8ether,
eration.Yeteven*itho,,ttheSo"vietthreatandCold\TarbipolarirytheUnited
StatesalongwithJapanand.WesternEuropehavereaffirmedtheiralliancepart-
between
expanded trade and investment
nerships, contained poiitit"l conflicts'
and great power balance'
th.m, and avoided a return to strategic rivalry
ThedurabilityofAmericanhege--onyand.Westernorderisapuzz|eprimar-
theo- institutionalized and
tended to rely on realist
ily b.;; scholars of i'ternatiorril ,.l"tion, have #-
emerSe.

ries of balanc. and hege-ony to explain

it' Realist theories of balance argue that .ent-tnat ts, more
result of cooperation to balance against an
order and cohesion in the \rest are a on two core
exrernal threat, in this case the Soviet
union, and with the disappearance of the
and Practices of the
toopt'ation will decline (Slahz 1979; Mearsheimer
1990)' Iogics. First, the constitution-like character of the institutions
threat, allianc. the risks of partici-
".,ah.g;;;; argue that order,is a result of the concentration of ori., ,.ru.i to reduce the "returns to poweg" which lowers
Realist theories resort to balancing
"f state, which uses its commanding position padon by strong and weak states alike. This, in turn, makes a
material power capabiliri* i, " iirrgl. also exhibit
order will and relative gains competition less necessary. second, the institutions
to creare and maintain order. vitli the decline of hegemonic Power,
an "increasing returns" character, which makes it more and more difficult for
decay.Tounderstand't'..o,,.inu.dprimacyoftheUnitedStatesandthecontin- to comPete against and
.oit'io" of the advanced industrial world' we need to would-be orJers and would-be hegemonic powers
go
ued durability
".ra balance' replace the existing order and leader'
i.y".a our existing theories of hegemony and is a
three arguments' Fir The implication of this analysis is that the American hegemonic order
In particular, I want to,jtt"k9
political order. This is not only because the United
the tht,Yttry:
Western states was set ln relatively rt"bl. expansive
toei. of otd.t "rrd power today, but also because it is
"ToT States is an unmatched economic and military
ateral m444ge!nent- of in 'strategic restraint," reassuring partners and
openness' reclp ,"iq"a, capable engaging
of its distinctively penetrated domestic political
f"cilitatlrrg .ooperation.'Because
.l order, it was system, b.."ur. of the array of international institutions it has created to
"id States has been able to remain at the center
;ii,.'+'rr-iHrtilt;r#;ti.p"'a'n'.o"'h"*y:'^1:'Si:T:':,il:Tl -"rr"g. political conflict, the United
of l""rg. and expanding hegemonic order. Its capacity to win
in specific struggles
a.long with the cold war, but the much
il":",'fffi::;ffi;;;i,a.i; ."a.a
liberal order lives on'
"
more deeply rooted Vestern

II
 G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Fucure of the American Postwar Order I 15
of Globalization: Case Studies
lI4 State Power in the Era

sophisticated set of ideas about American security interests, the causes of war
the larger hegemonic orddi
with others within the system may rise and fall, but ani depression, and the proper and desirable foundations of postwar political
,..rin, in place with linle ProsPect of decline' order. Indeed, although the containment order overshadowed it, the ideas behind
postwar liberal democratic order were more deeply rooted in the American exPe-
. TWO POSTWAR SETTLEMENTS _'*
,i.nc. arrd a thoroughgoing understanding of history, economics, and the sources
.
' world \Var II produced nvo poitwar _iertlements. one was a reactlon t..
to dete- of political order.
The most basic conviction behind the postwar liberal agenda was that the
;.;;;;.i;;.rr"*irfif,l Soviet Unioii, and it culminated in th€ containment
and closed autarkic regions that had contributed to world depression and split the
il'il;;;;rr"r.*."; based on the balance of power, nuclear deterrence'
a reaction to the
world into competing blocs before the war must be broken up and replaced by
poiiri."t and ideological competition. The other -settlement was an open and nondiscriminatory world economic system. Peace and security were
and the resulting world war'
..onorni. rivalry and politicai turmoil of the 1930s impossible in a world of closed and exclusive economic regions. The challengers
relations among the
and it culminated in a wide range of new institutions and to iiberal multilateralism occupied almost every corner of the advanced industrial
order. This settlement was
wesrern industrial democracies-a western liberal world. Germany and Japan, of course, were the most overt and hostile chal-
multilateral institutions,
built around economic openness, political reciprociry lengers. Each had pursued a dangerous pathway into the modern industrial age
and ioint management of relations' thai combined authoritarian capitalism with military dictatorship and coercive
by dampeninfi
it. Cold \flar did play a role in reinforcing Western:9!id*iy were also' regional autarky. But the British Commonwealth and its imperial preference sys-
i"..;;;;;;.;;r;;;;"tive giins cord \yar threats
"o-p.,itior,. ,.i-, *", also a challenge to liberal multilateral order. The hastily drafted Atlantic
;ili;^;;;il"i-.rn.rr, tigr,so*shi to convince an otherwise reluctant Charter was at American effort to insure that Britain signed onto its liberal
",
funds foiposrwar reconstruction and assibtance' Cold
Consress to appropriate democratic war aims. The loint stdtement of principles affirmed free trade, equil
aJded n'g""T iritiiar
ilffi;#:l;;;;; ,r'. u"i,.i States
]:l::::-:: access for countries to the raw materials of the world, and international collabo-
momentsinthemanagementof!0esternorder.Butthetwoseftlemenrshaddis-
become ration in the economic field so as to advance labor standards, employment secu-
political logiis' and has
(as
linct political uiiipns, intellectual.r4tionales, riry, and social welfare. Roosevelt and Churchill insisted on telling the world that
qlear lately) historical traiectories' they had learned the lessons of the interwar years-and those lessons were fun-
populat tY-glyt:.",1' It is celq-
.. The containment o,i.' is well known in the yt"" ,aftet vo1i1 v"t l,-*ne.1 damentally about the proper organization of the'Western world economy. It was
brated in our historicall."oon* of the early nor iust America's enemies, but also its friends and .America itself, that had to be
'inrr.pid American officials struggled to make sense of Soviet military power and
reformed and integrated.
men" faihioned'a coher-
geopolitical intentions. l" ,fr.r.?rft years,'a few "wise This liberal
.,grand strategy" for building order within the vestern world
of Soviet communism. The
ent and reasoned response to rhe ilob"l challenge
reflected a confluence of ideas and designs from a wide array of American offi-
containment that emerg-ed was the core concept
that gave. clarity and
doctrine of cials and thinkers involved in making posrwar poiicy. One grouP' located pri-
n,,po,"toseveraldecadesofAm-ericanforeignpolicy.Inthedecadesthatfol.
'lo*.d, were built on the con-
marily at the State Department and inspired by Cordell Hull, was primarily
,pr"*ling bureaucratic and military organizations interested in creating an oPen trading system after the war. They gave voice to
tainment orientation' it" Uipot"t division ol the
world' nuclear weapons of
the old liberal view that free trade and oPen economies would check tyranny and
of two expansive ideologies-
size and sophistication, the ongoing clash military aggression and reinforce peaceful international relations. Trade officials
the centrality of the contain-
all these circumstances gave life to and reinforced
""*it; at rhe State Dg:partment saw liberal trade as a core American interest that
just
ment order. reached back toihe Open Door policy of the 1890s. Their argument was not
Bycomparison,theideasandpoliciesof.Wcsternliberalorderweremoredif- interests, but that an open gading sys-
that free trade would advance American
It *as less obvious that the liberal democratic agenda
fuse and wide-ranging. tem was an essential element of a stable world political order'
was a "grand strategy" designedto advance American security interests' As a Another group of thinkers was concerned with creating political order
this agenda would be seen as
result, diring the cold w", i-t w"s inevitable that among the democracies of the North Atlantic region. This vision was of a com-
secondary_aPreoccupationofeconomistsandAmericanbusiness'Thepolicies m,rrriry berween the United states, Britain, and the wider Atlantic
or union
andinstitutionsthat,oppo*.afreetradeandeconomicopennessamongthe
But wofld. Ideas of an Atlantic union can be traced to the turn of the century and a
,o.i.ti., were quintessentially the stuff of-"low politics'"
advanced industrial few British and American statesmen and thinkers, such as John Hay, British
thisviewiswrong.Theliberaldemocraticagendawasbuiltonarobustand

il
 G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Fumre of the American Postwar Order ll7
of Globalization: Case Srudies
I 16 State Power in the Era

\?al- Second, most of the ideas that were proposed and debated before contain-
Bryce' American Ambassador to London
Ambassador to \Tashington Lord These ide'as resur- ment and the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union dealt with
the recon-
Helrry Adams'
ter Hines Page, Admirar eii*a
T' Mahan' and particularly among the Atlantic countries'
struction of relations within the \rest,
faced during and after lq"riJ \y"r II, reflecting a variery_of convicdons and American officials were clearly preoccupied with how to stabilize Europe and
of.the L-eague of Nations-revealed the
historical experiences: ;;;;;;i"t; integrate the Atlantic world into the core of a wider postwar order. Some post-
community; that there was a pressing need
virtues of a less universal security "rrd
and institutions that united the Atlantic
*"r designs were more universal, such as those concerning free trade and global
to protecr the shared a.-o.r"tii values gou..rr"i.., but they also were to be anchored in a deepened set of relations and
*ortlnorn.. i"nstitutions among the Western democracies' Other ideas, such as the
geopoliti-
more directly by consider-
position on posfwar order was animated This is cal argument. abo,rt access to the Eurasian rimlands, saw the stabiliry and inte-
interests and. the Eurasian rimlands'
ations of American geoiolitical 1930s' as they wit- gratio-n of the liberal capitalist world in essentially instrumental terms' But the
where Americ"r, ,,'"ttrtiittinttt"
btg'n their debates in the policies would have the same result. Likewise, many who supported
and the emergence of German and loals and
nessed the colrapse
"r,t.-*.ria..ono-y pondered was whether the NefO and containment did so not simply to build an alliance against the Soviet
Japanese regional
Ufot'"it" q"t"ion these thinkers confines of the Union but also because these initiatives would feed back into the I7estern liberal
industrial power within the
united States could ..rrr"in "r1- great requirements for democratic order. NATO was Partly a structure designed to reintegrate Germany
geographical.
Hemisphere. \flhat weie the minimum
.wesrern
into the \7est-partly to counter Soviet power, but also to reconstruct and reinte-
thecountry,seconomic."a.iu,"''viability?ForallpracticalpurPosesthis An Ameri- grate Germany as a liberal capitalist country. It was both a means and an end.
tire United States entered the war'
question was answered Uf i"'i-t must have secu- Third, even many of the advocates of containment and the preservation of
be sufficient; the United States
can hemispheric bloc *llttJt'ot of Europe the European balance were also concerned with safeguarding and strengthening
i" Asia and Europe' If the rimlands
riry of market, '"*-'i*t'i"t' imperial powers' the secu- liberal democratic institutions in the \(est. One virtue that Kennan saw in a mul-
"r,d hostile
and Asia became d"ti";;J;;
one or several
remain a Sre t tipolar postwar order was that it would help to protect the liberal character of
,fr, *Ji.*rorrs fot U"ittd St"tt' would be catastrophic' To ,q.-.ri.". politics and institutions. Kennan worried that if bipolar order emerged'
't"
power, the United St"it' to"ld not
allow itself "merely to be a buffer state
on other
rt the Unitei States might find itself trying to impose political institutions
and Japan" (Spvkman 7942t 195)'
between the mighty ;;t;;;ic.;manv states within its sphere and that would eventually threaten its domestic institu-
must seek oPenness' and balance in Europe and Asia' - ' ' The encouragement of dispersed authority and power centers abroad
tions.
"tt-t", order was concerned with encouragtng
Finally, a related uit* of Posrwar would reinforce pluralism at home'
t:-t:,nt' creating t-t9,1j"ropean
political and economit t"itY i"'Uft'tt'n ll American posrwar thinkers and planners did not wait until the Cold War
policy. Those ideas
"thirdforce."Thisviewemergedasastrategicoptionascooperationwiththe
in the State Depart- clarified ,r...r."ry principles and policies of American foreign
Soviet Union U.g"" to b"tt al*" after the war' As officials
'Western Europe and the Soviet Union' a and policies *er. alre"dy actively being formulated, debated, and
implemented'
ment began to rethink relations with industrial coun-
The postwar liberal democratic settlement among the Western
with the esiablishment of a strong and of
new policy emphasis;;;;;;tterned post- tries reflected a synthesis of various intellectual, historical, and political strands
The idea.was to encourage a multipolar vision
economically irr,.g'""JEirope' of power' The policy thinking and experience. But in this amalgam of ideas and agendas was a
independent center
war system' *itn n"'oftasa't"l"tintly of Ameiica's basic postwar goal-to secure an open, stable, interconnected,
legit-
bt;tt;"t^tofttttt-tf-inilutttt approach *tg ? direct and industrial
shift was not to a imate, and jointly managed community of Western democracies'
presence in Europe' Rather' the aim
ongoing American *tiit"'y and
economic
wastobuildEuropeintoanindependentcenterofmilitaryandeconomicpower.
These various
the diversiry of agendas and
p";;;;"; po'*"' orde.r reflect LIMITING THE RETURNS TO POWER
view
problems th"t offiti"i':;;th io
address-but they shared an underlying
The United States had a Posrwar agenda to build a new structure of rela-
'Western powers. But how actually was agreement
thatthemajor.Westernindustrialpowersmustbeunitedandinterconnectedin it tions among the industrial
additional conclusions follow' First'
is
new and fo.ta"Int"t"l ;";: postwar secured? How was it that American dominance was rendered acceptable
to the
clear that sophisticatJ
*.lt-a.u.loped sets of ideas and plans about 'Western and \7hy was it that the Europeans and Japanese
"ni ';"t;"1 co"tainment' Indeed' it is remarkable Europeans Japanese?
order predated tt" 'i" J bipolariry "nd policy did not balance against American power, returning the industrial countries
to a
States was in organizing its foreign
how late and reluctant the iJnited world of strategic rivalry fragmentation, and estrangement? How were American
around a global balance of Power'

L_i
 G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Future of the American Postwar order I 19
of Globalization: Case Sudies
II8 State Power in the Era

ment creates greater certainry over what the hegemonic'state will do

in the
hegemony and the great uPheaval of the
war turned into a widely acceptable domination is mitigated.
future. The possibility of indiscriminate and ruthless
political order?
(through policy and structural Just as importantly, the possibility
of abandonment is also lessened' If the hege-
The answer is that the United States engaged predictable, this means that the secondary states do
..strategic restraint,'' thereby reassuring its would.be European .orri. ,t"a. is rendered more
circumstance) in not need to spend as many resources on "risk premiums,' which would other-
the American postwar order-would not
and Asian Partners that ianicipation in wise be needed to prepare for either domination or abandonment.
the united States gained the acquies-
entail coercive domination. In other words, But why would a newly hegemonic state want to restrict itself by agreeing
to
cence of secondary states by accePting
limits on the exercise of its own hege-
limits on the use of hegemonic power? The basic answer is that a constitutional
Inoni. po*.r. At the heart'of the Alerican hegemonic order is an ongoing First, if the
wlthin an institutionalized political sertlement conserves hegemonic Power, and this for two reasons.
trade-off: the united States agrees to oPerate hegemonic state calculates that its overwhelming postwar power advantages are
participants'
pt"*tt in return, its parmers agre€ to be willing order might "lock in" favorable arrange-
""a, .t."rty ii the immediate aftermath of world'war II, oJy *o*"nrary, an institutionalized
This logic is seen -ort ments that continue beyond the zenith of its power. In effect, the creation
of basic
whentheasymmetriesinpo*..,el"tio,',betweentheUnitedStatesandtheother ordering institutions is a form of hegemonic investment in the future' The hege-
'Western industrial countries were most extreme' At such moments' there are for a
monic state gives up some freedom on the use of its power in exchange
hegemonic state to construct a Postwar
incentives for the victorious and suddenly order that safeguards its interests in the future.
durable and predictable
orderthatislegitimate"naa"."ut..Thatis,thereareincentivesfortheleading This investment motive rests on several assumptions. The hegemonic state
power position into a durable political order
state ro converr it, r"uor"fl. posfwar must be convinced that its power position will ultimately decline' If it does, it
st"t.s within it. To achieve a legitimate
that commands the allegiance of the othe, should want to use its momentary position to get things that it wants accom-
ordermeanstosecure"g*.**,amongtherelevantstatesonthebasicrulesand
members plished. On the other hand, if the new hegemon calculates that its power position
political order is one whose
o.Jllor., of political "?a... e legitima=teoverall orientation of the system. They iill remain preponderant into the foreseeable future, the incentive to conserve its
willingly participate *ith th.
"nllgr.. power will Jir"pp."t Also, the hegemon must be coriVinced that the institutions
abide by its rules pJitiptts because they accept them as desirable-they
",,a i .r.",., wlll persist beyond its own power capabilities-that is, it must calculate
embrace them as their own' that these institutions have some independent ordering capacity. If institutions
has an incentive to move
More specifically, the newly emerged hegemon are seen as simply isomorphic with the distributioii'of
power, the appeal of an
towarda"constitutio,,"l""ttlt,,,t"t"f"tthewar-thatis'tocreatebasicinsti-
can do with its institutional settlement will obviously decline'
tutions and operating fti"tipftt that limit what the leading state of "winning" The second reason why a hegemon might want to reach agreement on basic
implications
power. ln .ff..t, .o,,,tilt'i""4 agreem€nts reduce the institutions, even if it means giving uP some autonomy and shon-term advantage,
to reduce the
directry, they serve
in internationar rerations, or, to put rt more is that it can reduce the "enforcement costs" for maintaining
order' The constant
returnstoPower.Thisisfundamentallywhatconstitutionsdowithindomestic
within the use of power capabilities to punish and reward secondary states and resolve con-
orders. They set limits on what a state
thar gains disproportionately to the interests and
flicts is costly. liis fat more effective over the long term shape
ordercandowithtto"g"i"t,therebyreducingthestakesofunevengains'This
gains into orientations of other states than to directly shape their actions through coer-
can turn short-term
means that they reduce tlie possibilities that a state cion and inducements. A constitutional settlement reduces the necessity of the
along-termpo*.,"au""tage'Takentogether'.constitutionalagreementssetlim- costly expenditure of resources by the leading state on bargaining, monitoring,
realize that their
its on what ."nioii r, -o-.rrory advantages. Losers risk everything and enforcernent.
".,o., i*plr"ry-ro accept those losses is not to
losses are limited Even if there are reasons why the leading and secondary states might
favor a
"rra advantage'
nor will it give the winner a permanent constitutional order, it is not obvious that they would accept the risks seemingly
; :r;;;;; ;;; ;;.
;^;;' d o n co nstitu'i? ""1, i:':lt'
T::j: ::::.':: #l inherent in such an order. The leading state, in placing limits on its
use of power'
,n.;:rT;#ili"";;;' ;;d*' d-mo re torerabre o11
':*:':?:::, II: must be confident that it will not be exploited by secondary states' and secondary
ffi #iil;;;il;;;;;;";;r.,y.ik..-.11.i_1.:X::Xi"'l.j';liili
out (more or less) within an agreed states must be confident that they are not opening themselves up to domination
:t'"T$?',:ili:;ffi; state are carried -t
process, it means that competition over out-
- -^--^rirl^- arror nrrt- or abandonment by the leading state. In effect, each state agrees to forswear a
up* institutlonalized political range of actions that, in the absence of guarantees that the other
state will also
""a
comes will not simply be determinei
by brute material power' which will.always states to
abiJe by the limits, it would be prudent to pursue. For self-regarding
Second, the institutionalized settle-
work to the advantag. oi th. leading state.
 of Globalization: Case Studies
n G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and the Furure of, the American Postwar Order l2l
I2O State Power in the Era

economy organized around a nondiscriminatory system of trade and payments.

agreetopursuetheirinterestswithinbindinginstitutions,theymustconveyto
assurance that they will not
The United States kne* it held a commanding position and sought to use its
each other a credible sense of commitment-an power to give the postwar order a distinctive shape. But it also prized agreement
advantages'
their mutual restraint and exploit momentary over d.adiock, and it ultimately moved a great distance away from its original
"y-aon of ways in whictt the united states and its prospective
There were a variefy proposals in setting up the various postwar economic institutions,
and create reassurances and
parmers were able ,o out'"orn" these constraints A second major way that the united states proiected reassurance was
crediblecommitments_allofwhichreflecttheremarkablyliberalcharacterof
restra.int" over
of "strategic structural-its own liberal democratic polity. The open and decentralized charac-
e-..i."n fr.remony. These include America's policy hegemony' which pro- ter of the American political system provided opportunities for other states to
p"r*". "ta*; the'*pe"etrated" character of American
the use exercise their "voice" in the operation of the American hegemonic order, thereby
vides opportunrtres ror uoi"" reciprociry in hegemonic relations;.and
"nd reassuring these states that their interests could be actively advanced and
of..institutionalbinding',asamechanismtomutuallyconstrainthe.hegemon
was established in processes of conflict resolution would exist. In this sense, the American postwar
ways' the Posflvar order
and secondary states. L"each of these order wa, a
,.penetrated hegemonyr" an extended system that blurred domestic
limit the returns to power'
- way that served to which
a
the United States provided reassurances
to lts partners and international politics as it created an elaborate ransnational and transgov-
irr. firr, *"y in
it was a 'reluctant hege- ernmental political system with the United States at its center'
order-that
was in its basic orientatitt to*-a Posnvar the There are actually several ways in which America's penetrated hegemony
sought
mon" in many respecr',]"J'n"t it fundamentally "c*tT:-1' 1Tong serves to reinforce the credibility of the United States' commitment to operating
.Westernstatesonamutuallyacceptableorder,evenifthismeantextenslvecom-
forcefully presented American within an institutionalized political order. The first is simply the transparency of
;;;il Itis revealing rhai the initial and most the system, which reduces surprises and, allays worries by panners that the
proposal for a postwar system
;;;t posrwar order was the State Department's United States might make abrupt changes in policy. This transparency comes
iia
o"ly an American conviction aboup
of free uade. This propJsai "ot "fl""t from the fact that policy-making in a large, decentralized democracy involves
thevirtuesofopen-"'kt",butitalsowasavisionoforderthatwouldrequire many players and an extended and relatively visible political process. But not
very limle direct American involvement
or management' The system would be
only isit op.tt and decentralized system, it is also one with comPeting political
it"titg the United States to oPerate within it' but without
largely self-regulating, parti.s
"r,
an indepettdent press-features that serve to exPose the underlying
the"burdens o1 dit.., and ongoing
supervision' ' -- -,:^- "nd
intrgriry and viabiliry of major policy commitments. The open and competitive
Thisviewonpostwartriderefl.iteaamoregeneralAmericanorientationas American proJ.r, may produce mixed and ambiguous policies at times' but the trans-
the war came to It wanted a world order that would advance p"r.rr.y of ih, pro..tr at least allows other states to make more accurate calcula-
",t ""d' organize and run that order' It is in this
interests, but it was "t;;;;t; "ctively iiorr, t6e tikety direction of American foreign policy, which lowers levels of
the United stareJ *as a reluctant
superpower. This general characteris- "too,
sense that uncertainfy and provides a measure of reassurance-which' everything else being
ticwasnotlostonEuropeans,anditmatteredasAmerica'spotentialPartners to cooPerate'
to cooperate with the United States' To the
ho* - provides greater opportunities
equal,
contemplated whether
"nd Another way in which the penetrated hegemonic order provides reassurances
extenttheUnitedStatescouldconveythesensethatitdidnotseektodominate to partners is that the American system invites (or at least provides opporrunities
credibiliry to America's proposals for a
constitu-
the Europeanr, i, g""" 8'; for) the participation of outsiders. The fragmented and penetrated American sys-
tem allows and invites the proliferation of a vast network of transnational
tionalsettlement.ItprovidedsomereassurancethattheUnitedStateswould and
use its overwherming power position
simply to
operate within limits ;J;;, transgovernqrental relations with Europe, Japan, and other parts of the industrial
dominate. *o.lJ, Diffo.e and dense networks of governmental, corporate, and private asso-
compromises that the united States
This orientation was refrected in the ciations tie the system together. The United States is the primary site for the
*"0: il#"^fi;;,t;;;;;;; ui'*' "uo"' ine l::'j":::::::Jl: Posrw-ar
pulling and hauling of trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific politics. Europeans and
ffi :;T:#ffi,in.;ffi ;G"nr,*o"i.a"bo,,1port*"rdepressionandthe j"p"rr!r. do not have elected officials in Washington-but they do have repre-
;:#:,ffi :ffi ffi"ffi
| --^^ A-^-:^^to crarL
;.;;*,'+;,*:::"::.:::::,::T.:':::,#i;':il::* ,.nt"tiu.r. Although this access to the American political Process is not fully rec-
;:ffi::il;: Hffi ,ipi;;'I'j':::::::,:"T:':::::,':i::.il1;:T; the openness and extensive decentralization of the American
ilil;;;';'"-.Tr'.u'n'ds:a:;;lolT:::i:1':,.::-T::';":i::'r"JTi j: iprocated abroad,
other states that they have routine access to the decision-
i:Iff :#lffi ;F;''';;ii"'1;'
*"-ents 1'1'::::: :*::fi ,::.1';iln,'*i;
the principles of a postwar
liberal system assures
making processes of the United States'
:::iH il;;iil'.'ili and
"ccept

[{
 G.JohnlkenberryLiberalHegemonyandtheFucureoftheAmericenPoswarOrder|23
of Globalization: Case Smdies
I22 State Power in the Era
'Western ordir have been particularly
institu- The constitutional features of the
was murually conveyed was in the into the
A final way in which reassurance on the important for Germany and Japan. Both countries were reintegrated
tions themselves, which i'""iata"lock in" and-"binding" constraints advanced industrial world as "semi-sovereign" powersl that is, they accepted
fears of dominarion or aban-
United States and i., p"rin.rr, ,hereby mitigaring their joint unprecedented constitutional limits on their military capacity
and independence
made systemalc efforts to anchor (Katzenstein 1987). As such, they became unusually dependent on the array
of
donment. The western countries Governments
Uinai"g institutional mechanisms' .western multilateral economic and security institutions' The west-
commitments in p'in"iplJ"na with other states but regional and
their options' to cooperate
might ordinarily seek to f""'ut ern politicil order in which they were embedded was integral to their
stability
'!(hat the United States and the other
to leave oPen the "ntro'i "ilot"t"tr"*' and iunctioning. The Christian Democrat Walther Leisler Kiep argued in 1972
'western states did ;;t ;; ti"ttlv the opposite: ^thev built long-term
that ..the German-American alliance . . . is not merely one asPect of modern Ger-
"ftt;;;;
;;i;tlrnrnitrnt"" that *ere difficult that to retract' They
place in our poli-
economic, political, this can be man history, but a decisive element as a result of its preeminent
""d and relationships' to the extent
"locked in" their t"'";;;;;
(Schwartz 1995:
tics. In eff..t, it provides a second constitution for our country"
and Japan
done bv institu- 555). \yestern economic and security institutions provide Germany
makes sense onry if international and
;o;:;;:T:il:iturio'"r binding ordering impact on the_actions of with a political bulwark of stability that far transcends their more immediate
tions or regimes ."" i,"l.X^;;;t*- they can take on a life practical PurPoses.
states. The assumption is that
institutions are sticky4h"t Overall, American hegemony is reluctant, penetrated, and highly institution-
and constraining even the states
that create them'
stable and durable
and logic of their o*n, 'f'"-fit'g are essentially agree- alized. All these characteristics have helped to facilitate a rather
as a strateg;y, they left
states employ institutioial binding the war Europeans more
.\tr?.hen after
what it is that political order. American strategic restraint
ing to mutualfy .on,,'"itt iittn"lut''
l" tfftct' institutions specify
iorried about abandonmenr than domination, and they actively sought American
costly for states to do oth-
states are expected," d;;;G
nl"tt i' difficult and
institutionalized commitments to Europe. The American polity's transParency
mechanisms
institutions' examples of binding to
erwise. In the case of international and permeability fostered an "extended" political order-reaching outward
incrude rrearies, i""rro;;;';;s"ni""rionr, ioint managemenr responsibilities' the oiher industrial democracies-with most of its roads leading to'Washington.
mecha-
lnJ'p'i""tiptt' of relations' and so forth' These Multiple
agreed upon ,r"na"'a' *voice opponunities'' thereby provid- Transnational and transgovernmental relations provide the channels'
nisms raise the "costs oit*itl "nit""tt layers of economic, political, and security institutions bind these countries
conflict' commitments. The
i"* -..ft""it-s to mitigate or resolve.the
*nt!n tl:, together in ways rhat ieinforce the credibility of their mutual
monetarv are highly inte-
The Bremon'Woods-eco"omic and i::?tdt llt^titutional Unitea States remains the center of the system, but other states

binding logic. These *t" first accords to establish for the of coercive
" t**ii:l.tnternadonal grated into it, and its legitimacy diminishes the need exercise
't" to between
ensure economic cooperation
institutional and legal framework io*., by the United States or for balancing responses from secondary s*tes.
states.Theywereconstructedaselaboratesystemsofrulesandobligationswith
the \Testern govern-
adiudicating disputes' In effect'
ot".i-i"ir.r"f p'o"tau"' ior oig"tti"d transnational political systems' AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND
ments created oiio"tJion"tly
",, "*", of tft Uttittd States and tT-"-'Tj INCREASING RETURNS
Western
Moreover, ,h. dt^ot'"lit "f'"t"tttt interstate connections' The
of these-dense of Ameri-
countries facilitated tnlton'tot'ion grounds for reciprocal The bargains struck and institutions created at the early moments
prouiaed congenial persisted for fifty years' but they have actually
permeabiliry of aorn.i"-in'r",i,oiion, can h.gemony have not simply
inJ;;;ilt" tht advanced industrial world' in wider structures of politics and society of the
and oluralisti. "putti"i ""'o" provided additions institu- b..o-J mole deeply rooted the
"'^"
il;;;;. it ,ri. 6]il v;;'; security alliances countries that panicipate within the order. That is, more people and more of
"i old saying that NATO was created to "keep of the American
tional binding .pp""""itit'' The in" is a satement about their activities are hooked into the institutions and operations
Americans
the Russians out, the C;;;";t
do*"' and the
liberal hegemonic order. A wider array of individuals and
groups, in more coun-
,n.""ifi"".. for locking in long-term commitments
,*,r.io.., ,.alms of activiry has a stake--or a vested interest-in the contin-
the importan* tries and more
"f The American-Jap""est secu'iry alliance also had a similar
uation of the system. The costs of disruption or change in this system
have
and expectations' served as alliances in
..dual contain-..rr,, .i"."'*r. ifr.r. institutions not only steadily grown over the decades, Together, this means
that "competing orders"
external threats' they
the ordinary ,tn" oir"nJitrf"t" to,balance againstrelations' conduct busi- or "alternative institutions" are at a disadvantage. The system is increasingly
"' utnut' to build political
also provided -t"t'""i'''i'-"t'd hard to replace.
ness, and regulate conflict'

U
 G.|ohnlkenberryLiberalHegemonyandtheFutureoftheAmericanPoswarorderl2S
of Globalizadon: Case Sudies
I24 State Power in the Era
rises dramatically-even if potential institutions, when compared with existing
because of the phe-
more efficient and desirable. In terms of American hegemony'
primarily this
have a."lock t"l-:.t^Y is on.r,
to increasing returns to
The reason institutions
returns' There are several
"'itttt _l"ir "r.
rn"r, short of a maior war or a global economic collapse, it
is very difficult
nomenon of increasing new instttuttons'
initial start-up *r,, to creating
existing order.
i" ,ne type of historical breakpoint needed to replace rhe
institutions. First, there "r;G. or accord more closelv ""rir"g. even if a new would-be hegemon or coalition of states had an
;;;;;i";' miEht be'moratintit"t This would be true
Even when alternadve
P';;;i';;;"' ih' g"in' {':XX'Ji:i:::fi#"tT':; interest in and agenda for an alternative set of
global institutions-which they
with the interests'f
before they.ovtt*t:.:1:r";; do not.
overwhelmingly gteater ettect
in the opera-
\rhile the increasing returns to institutions can serye to Perpetuate
rnsttlu-
,"ratt.-"t";e"r, the'e tend to be learning "r.lJt.".a
a new start-uP that
itt"t giut it advantages over tions of many sorts, American hegemonic institutions have characteristics
tion of the existing t""]t*J" tend to t""tt tti"'tt"t commitments with lend themselves to increasing returns. First, the set of principles that
"t'd
institution. Finally' i"'titution' costs farticularly
institution and raise the irrfor.s these institutions-particularly principles of multilateralism,
openness'
other actors i"'tltui'JJi*#;t;;" embed the "the interdependent web
"nd togetht;;;;;t' No"1t andreciprocity_arcon...h"tcommandagreementbecauseoftheirseeming
Taken "o"tr"Jtt'
i""""'1tg returns" (Nonh 1990:95\' for states to
of change. and legitimacy. organized around principles that are easy
fairness
of an instituti"""r -"t'* n'"Li*?-""iut ttto'i* it becomes very difficult for
'when institut't"';;;;;i"t'*tr"g ,.g"ra[s, of tireir specific international power position, the institutional
"...p,, ir"-or. ,oburt easy to expand' Moreover' the principled basis of
potential replacement
in'iltu'ion' to- comPete "t'
:t::r"jrr]}| ift;:::tH:
;#.;
'h.g.-oni" "nd about
order also makes it more durable. This is Ruggie's argument
thJ multilate ral organization of postwar international institutions: "all
other
*1*11,"',"':'.tfi ":"Jl.;i:,'J:lJri[#',l#ieilT* *l*'1"':; organizing principles
formats wcrer::t-':ffi;;;;:;i-rgh
yo,to;;::;ffi luck and cir-
iiing, l.irrg eqoal, an arrangement based on generalized
standardization. rh.
,,""l"rit-rt"n. The rwo
,;:''vd ;4{ cir-
be mor. elastic than one based on particularistic
interests and situational
l
,noJd
",:::l*}_ind
initially had equal *?t-1t.6"1.rrcy, expanded its market share' Increasing returns
.*ig.n.i.r" (Ruggie 1993:32-31. Potential alternative institutional orders are at
to
ll.' x;;;;t* nn::;;[if#*ffi
cumstances unrelated

t?#;; to
;*:;f i"'.'Jl$::l; "n-"dd.d
disadvantage because the principles of the current institutional
are adaptable, expandable, and easily accepted
as legitimate'
order

enough advantagcs
;;;;;;"e. WS at an early and critical moment
Uy second, the open and permeable character of
American hegemonic institu-
technologY, a very smalt tech-
tott"i"a'f" *tornot"'io" of connecting
I

returns. One of the most important asPects

tions also serves to fa.ilitate increasing
alowed it to lower n' nroa"tt*
of increasing returns is that once a particular institution is established, other insti-
nologies and products'#ilil;;*":::::y"n*',T:Tffi :y.ff:i# :1: interconnected and
The costs ot swrcT..il;i;r; tutions and relations tend to grow up around it and become
ioffi,."n,'otogv to comPete' ,n. technologv
mutually dependent. A good analogy is comPuter software' where a software
"r,a
", ::"'
p."oau*ion T l:;;,* :ffit;il:ffffi ;il;,,Je.,t technorogi"s.of providei like Microsoft, after gaining an initial market advantage, encourages
gets embeddeo t" ph"ttotenon programs on Microsoft's
illl hee,emonic order has t"ni-it*a 'hi' ii. prorir.r",ion of sofrware applications and based
American Postwar after 1945' when the
to n' tl?i"'t"io* o"n-t t"'li'nor,,t"ts agenda were
;;;;g language. This, in turn, leads to a huge complex of providers and users
increasing returns h."uily dependent on the Microsoft format. The result is an expanding
alternatives to America's Posrwar momentary *ho
imoerial, bilateral' *i;;;;; was able to use its unusual
and "r. communiry.of individuals and firms with an increasingly dense set of
most imminent, the jt desired' The pathway to the pre- -"rf..t
advantages to tt"."lJttil; p"tt"gt.*here really only
commitmentstoMicrosoft_commitmentsthatarenotbasedonloyaltybuton
'ltt ']"'itl,,"ii.;;-t"t*
began *r, ,rllro* ii. g..*itstealiry that changing to another format would be more costly' even
sent riberal h.g.*onr"'order "tft*'on
" decisivelv the
oiiltt''-*oulJshape if it were more efficient.
Britain and the uti"d S;;;t'-"id " the institutions' such this sort of pro-
of io'ta potitit"t t11-" ntt once The penetrated character of American hegemony encourages
basic orientatio" A set of transnational and
'nl liferation of connecting groups and institutions. dense
a

ffi
vo o ds a1d GATT' ;i.1:
Voods -:"tl
were es!aDusr"-'
**rl*;:;::ffi
'r.r*ti,:l':lL:'ffi1;#i,H'#J,J5il,,.*^.r'*f::':::1._:::
.,s Sr.*o"
Bretton "'i'Jo:ilr, :::,Hli:;
i;;ti;;merica's gieat burst of
ir"rrrgou.rrr-ental chaniel, "r. *ou.r, into the trilateral
regions of the advanced
institutions spans
indusirial world. A sort of layer cake of inter-governmental
institution-building atter.
*ott' :1::"-l "' of flux and opporturury
war opens tl:.1"fi;;iJ;"t
and Pacific' Global multilat-
or -o.."t outward from the United States across the Atlantic
,il; and change: crisis
interstate relations to
n*t:-T;;J;;;;.;; " *nitt' eral economic institutions, such as the IMF and !7TO, are connected to more cir-
;;;t
'"-'it Jno,i"n
set made, and
t" tf'::::#
tottnt of institutions, such as the G7 and G10. Private groups'
ot i""'"'ing;;;' tffi:il:ilffi#' "h"ng' cumscribed governance
comes and goes' the cost c
inrtiroiion"t selection
U
126 State Power in the Era
of Globalization: Case Sudies

and their
suchaStheTrilateralCommissionandhundredsofbusinesstradeassociations,
]"*l* rc individual governments
t G. John Ikenberry Liberal Hegemony and

The stability of this bargain comes from

hesemonic order is infused with
;il;il;;;;i",
institutions
the Future

and
of the American Postwar

its underlying logic: the postwar

practices that reduce the returns
the implications of winning and losing are minimized
Order I27

are also connected inut'trntnt across the in intra-'western relations and yet not worry
'" "t:;;;;; fnt rise of trade and contained. A state could "lose"
ioint management institJon'' "t"ay ""J interdePendent' which
tore thatthewinnerwillbeabletousethosewinningstoPermanentlydominate.This
industrial *o'iJ h"' made these
"ou""it'
advanced for a
within these countries PerPetuation
is a central characteristic of domestic
liberal constitutional orders' Parties that
in turn has expanded t#t"J;;;;cy limits. They cannot use their pow-
*"Vffi";fi *"* win elections must operate within well-defined
ers of incumbency to undermine
or destroy the opposition parry. They can press
*t:-'iffi:;atshirts'"h:11,'l:-::t:::i::T:1;[f
to il;;; artay of individuals and but there are limits and laws. This
hegemonic order are
l"t"""itgry costly
" a stake in the sys-
il;l;;;r"r. of office to the limits of the law,
More and -o" otop-lt
have
reassures the losing Party; it can
accept its loss and prepare for the next election'
groups who make ;;;il' importantlS the open and. penetrated
"o r"'1tY The features of the posnvar order-and,
i.-,-.u.n if tt''v t'"ut."l i"l'n"r"' ::""nl'fl. i:*;";$;;:::"Ji characteroftheAmericanpolityitself_havemechanismstoprovidethesame
to America's European and Asian partners'
;:".1$*','*il:1[li:f xti::::""*'r';'""irderhaveexpandedand .or, of
"tt,rt"nces
Secondly,theinstitutionsofAmericanhegemonyalsohaveadurabilirythat
that'the con-
deepened'Moreanct;;t";;;;;;o,urfrr1;treirlivesdisruptedifthesvstem increasing returns. The overall system-organized
ti"""i-*f'rch is another way of saying comes from the phenomenon of
were to be radically reciprocity' and multilateralism-has become
of openness'
stituencvf o'p""'uing;il:;"';"'n:l'::iti1"'Jil:lt"'lffil,".:i'iJ'*'::
lt is tn thtt "t"t"i ntm.ipies
ir.*"rrrrgry connected to the *ider d..p.. institutions of politics and society
;;;t i' git""' than ever before' "nd
*i,r'i".t'."avancedindustrialworld.Astheembeddednessoftheseinstitutions
order is stable and growing' to intro-
;;;;;", it has become increasingly difficult for potential rival states
duceacompetingsetofprinciplesandinstitutions.Americanhegemonyhas war or
CONCLUSION Short of large-scale
of gteat i..o-. highiy inititutionaiized and path-dependent.order appears to be immune
dominated by a handful .Jono-i. crisis, the American hegemonic
The rwentieth century
began. as ltt-l
" The character of that "
t[[A
i^inl'"d by a single suPerpower' fromwould-behegemo"icchallengers'Evenifalargecoalitionofstateshad
powers, but it will tna its existence' American justify the benefits
type of order' to change'
domination i' t' intttt*'ili^ti
tt-l*"tlJ ^t th" fact of political order that sur-
interests that favored
"" "ltt"t"tiut from the present sys-
larger to be radically higher than are those that flow
domination o, h"gt-o"f,t il;;;*t' ":d:l't reluctant' pen-
*oold h"u. and no set
American hegemony is state (or coalition of states)
*jr. r"riamentally, tem. But there is no potentiallegemonic
rounds it is unique ", is what makes it world of the 1940s
in'a' word' liberal' This horizon. The
etrated, and highly instltuiionalized-or .i*r principles and org".riz"tions euen on the interests than the world of
expansive' "i ideologies' and
unusual, and it is "r'o
*i"t t"kes it so stable and rii'rri.g global distribution.of contained far more 'lu"i 'y"t*t'
thJ
Even with the enct ;ilft;lJ*"r-"nd countrtes the
--- 1990s.
and the other industrial of positive feedback
power, the relations Ut*tt"
tf" United' States
This chapter ifr. phenomenon of increasing returns is really a rype where the United States
foop. ii i,iti"l ir,rtitutions are t""blithtd
and cooperative' successfully'
of Eorop. and Asia ;;;'"-"trt"urt r"gtton'1"' tndo"d andrather
'stablo facilitated in their credibirity and functioning, this allows
offers two ."io' tt"'on'?'n' nt*i""n than i* partners have confidence the binding character of
tht -"jot iniustrial countries "r-f,
it *. ,o*, to make choices that serve to strengthen
cooperation inttg'"tion''"-o"' the importance
""a Both reasons underscore these institutQns.
triggered balancing "J;;";';-t;t' basic logic. Its open and penetrated
The American hegemonic order fits this
;;Hi,*tffi:f ;:*ffi:""Ti:?i1$iiy arter the war to insure
that rera-
character invites participation and creates
assurances of steady commitment' Its
ottlt"t"*i'hin an institutionglized
tions among'n' riut'"i"a"-tt''J;;:]id
institutionalized.hara.te,alsoprovidesmechanismsfortheresolutionofcon-
ofit"d theother countries a bar- vithin this liberal and institutional-
United St"tt' flicts and creates assurances of continuity.
political Process' It tf;;;-'ht states will continue to rise and fall' The
s'"i" ized order, the fortunes of particular
!ain: if the united "g""a:" "t-':T.::tl;;##:'].i::t#it:#:'fi, U"irJ ii"t.t itself, while remaining at the center of
the order' also continues to

*t'"1;::ll;iT';[;:1ff :T:::i:il:i:i":ff ;i*:,:::*:acquies

got the reassurance that the
;;;i.;.; gains and losses. But the mix of winning and losing across the system

cence other *i"ff"t't"i.|'

of the ""a-ry,*'urn them' isdistributedwidelyenoughtomitigatetheinterestthatparticularstatesmight
dominate nor abandon
United States would "ti'ht'
t
 Sutc Powtr in thc En of Globalization: Case Studics
Robert Hulter
Wadc Arncrica's Empirt
Rulcs en UnbrJanccd
have in replacing it. In an order where the relulns to power are low and the lVorjd
returns ro ilstitutions are high, stability will be its essential feature,

References 10
"Ifty IVe Vill Soon Miss the Cold Wa\" The Atlantic MotthL,
Mearsheimer, Joha 1990, America's Empire
266:35-50. Rules an unbalanced
Nonh, Douglass C. 1990, Irlstitttiotts, Institutional Chaage and Economic Perfot>aazce, World
New York: Cambridge University Prcss.
Ruggie, John G. 1993, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an l\stit]ution," in Muhilatetal-
ism Marte6, Ruggie (ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 3-47.
Schwam, Thomas A. 1995, "The United Sktcs aod Germany aficr 1945: Allianccs.
Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold lVar," Diplomatic Hktory 19: Robert Hunter Wad.e
s49-68.
Spykman, Nicholas 19 42, Arneica's Strategy in the World, New York: Harcourt, Bracc.
Valtz, Kenneth 1979, Theory of Intenatioflal Politics, New York: Wiley.
Vebei, Steve 1995, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Powe\" in Muhilatealism Matters.
John Gerard Ruggie (ed.), New York: Columbia Univcrsiry Prcss, pp.233-92,

STUDY AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

Why were the rwo posrwar sertlements described by Ikenberry so imDor_
rant for the srabiliry of the posr-World War II order? Arc they stiil in
place?
Does Ikenberry consider the consolidation of American hegemony the
lesult of a grald strategyl Why-or why not?
Does the post-9/11 foreign policy of the United States mark a decisive
break with the doctrine of straregic restraint?

r
**$*$i+*'x*r***rffi
U