FILED: APPELLATE DIVISION - 1ST DEPT 03/18/2024 09:38 AM 2024-01134

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 11 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 03/18/2024

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

APPELLATE DIVISION: FIRST JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

-----------------------------------------------------------
)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by ) Appeal Nos: 2024-01134

LETITIA JAMES, Attorney General of the State ) 2024-01135
of New York, )
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Sup. Ct. New York County
) Index No. 452564/2022
-against-
) (Engoron, J.S.C.)
)
DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP, JR., )
ERIC TRUMP, ALLEN WEISSELBERG, )
JEFFREY MCCONNEY, THE DONALD J. )
TRUMP REVOCABLE TRUST, THE TRUMP )
ORGANIZATION, INC., TRUMP )
ORGANIZATION LLC, DJT HOLDINGS LLC, )
DJT HOLDINGS MANAGING MEMBER, )
TRUMP ENDEAVOR 12 LLC, 401 NORTH )
WABASH VENTURE LLC, TRUMP OLD )
POST OFFICE LLC, 40 WALL STREET LLC, )
and SEVEN SPRINGS LLC, )
)
Defendants-Appellants, )
)
IVANKA TRUMP, )
)
Defendant. )
)
)
-----------------------------------------------------------
)

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF

A STAY PENDING APPEAL PURSUANT TO CPLR 5519(c)

HABBA MADAIO & ROBERT & ROBERT PLLC

ASSOCIATES, LLP Clifford S. Robert
Alina Habba Michael Farina
Michael Madaio 526 RXR Plaza
112 West 34th Street, 17th & 18th Floors Uniondale, New York 11556
New York, New York 10120 Phone: (516) 832-7000
Phone: (908) 869-1188 Email: crobert@,robertlaw.com
Email: [email protected] [email protected]
mmadaio@,habbalaw.com Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald
Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Jeffrey McConney, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization LLC, LLC, DE Holdings LLC, DE Holdings

DE Holdings LLC, DE Holdings Managing Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor
Member LLC, Trump Endeavor 12 LLC, 401 12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,
North Wabash Venture LLC, Trump Old Post Trump Old Post Of ce LLC, 40 Wall Street

Of ce LLC, 40 Wall Street LLC and Seven LLC and Seven Springs LLC
Springs LLC
-and-

Christopher M. Kise

(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)

CONTINENTAL PLLC
101 North Monroe Street, Suite 750

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Phone: (850) 332-0702
Email: [email protected]

Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald

Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

LLC, DE Holdings LLC, DE Holdings

Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor

12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,

Trump Old Post Of ce LLC, 40 Wall Street

LLC and Seven Springs LLC

-and-

D. John Sauer
(Pro Hac Vice Application Pending)
JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC
13321 North Outer Forty Road, Suite 300
St. Louis, Missouri 63017
Phone: (314) 562-0031
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald

Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

LLC, DE Holdings LLC, DE Holdings

Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor

12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,

Trump Old Post Of ce LLC, 40 Wall Street

LLC and Seven Springs LLC
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...............................................................1

ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................3

I. This Court Has Discretion to Stay the Disgorgement Award................................................3

II. This Court Should Exercise Its Authority To Stay Execution of the Judgment....................7

A. The Attorney General Misstates the Governing Standard. ............................................8

B. The Exigency and Hardship to Defendants Warrant a Stay............................................8

1. Posting a Full Undertaking Is a Practical Impossibility............................................8

2. A Stay Will Impose No Cognizable Hardship on Plaintiff. ....................................10

C. The Court Should Maintain the Interim Stay as to Non-Monetary Relief...................11

D. The Disgorgement Award Will Not Survive Appellate Review...................................12

1. The Judgment Contradicts This Court's Statute-of-Limitations Ruling.................13

2. Disgorgement Requires a Showing of Causation. ..................................................17

3. Supreme Court's Valuation of Mar-a-Lago Is Indefensible....................................20

4. Supreme Court Triple-Counted Damages on the Old Post Office Sale..................22

a. Supreme Court conflates proceeds with profits from sale. ...............................23

b. Supreme Court double-counts disgorgement from OPO sale...........................23

c. Courts do not disgorge income derived from ill-gotten proceeds.....................24

5. The Award Is Grossly Disproportionate and Unconstitutional...............................25

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................29

iii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Applehole v. Wyeth Ayerst Labs.,

213 A.D.3d 611 (1st Dep't 2023).............................................................................................15

Austin v. United States,

509 U.S. 602 (1993).................................................................................................................25

BMW of N.A., Inc. v. Gore,

517 U.S. 559 (1996).................................................................................................................27

Boesky v. Levine,
193 A.D.3d 403 (1st Dep't 2021).............................................................................................13

C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter Co.,

368 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ............................................................................................10

Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

188 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)......................................................................................10

County of Nassau v. Canavan,

1 N.Y.3d 134 (2003)........................................................................................................... 25-26

CT Chemicals (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Vinmar Impex, Inc.,

189 A.D.2d 727 (1st Dep't 1993)...............................................................................................4

CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. V CWCapital Invs. LLC,

195 A.D.3d 12 (1st Dep't 2021)......................................................................................... 13-14

Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Royal Blue Realty Holdings, Inc.,
2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31510(U), 2016 WL 4194201 (Sup. Ct. 2016)...........................................8

Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass I,

636 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1980)..............................................................................................6, 10

Guardian Loan Co. v. Early,

47 N.Y.2d 515 (1979).................................................................................................................6

Hateley v. SEC,
8 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1993)........................................................................................................17

Henry v. Bank of Am.,

147 A.D.3d 599 (1st Dep't 2017).......................................................................................13, 15

iv
In re Adelphia Commc Is Corp.,
361 B.R. 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)...................................................................................................7

In re Jamie J.,
30 N.Y.3d 275 (2017).................................................................................................................7

In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases,

783 F.3d 414 (2d Cir. 2015).......................................................................................................6

Int'l Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co.,

62 B.R. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)...............................................................................................7, 10

J.P Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co.,

91 A.D.3d 226 (1st Dep't 2011).........................................................................................17, 20

Klingenberg v. Vulcan Ladder USA, LLC,

No. 15-CV-4012-KEM, 2017 WL 4836313 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 25, 2017).................................11

Kokesh v. SEC,
581 U.S. 455 (2017).................................................................................................................25

Kusay v. United States,

62 F.3d 192 (7th Cir. 1995)......................................................................................................29

Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc.,

734 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).........................................................................................17

Matter of Part 60 RMBS Put-Back Litig.,

195 A.D.3d 40 (1st Dep't 2021)...............................................................................................15

Matter of Seiffert,
65 N.Y.2d 278 (1985)...............................................................................................................11

Morse v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass I,

2018 WL 4784585 (Tex. App. Oct. 4, 2018) .............................................................................6

N. Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co.,

799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986)......................................................................................................6

Navy Yard Hous. Dev. Fund, Inc. v. Carr,

No. 33936/96, 2002 WL 1174711 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 23, 2002)..............................................8

O'Donnell v. McGann,
529 A.2d 372 (Md. App. 1987)..................................................................................................6
Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co.,
331 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 2003).......................................................................................................27

People v. Ernst & Young, LLP,

114 A.D.3d 569 (1st Dep't 2014).............................................................................................25

People v. Evans,
94 N.Y.2d 499 (2000)...............................................................................................................16

People by James v. Trump,

217 A.D.3d 609 (1st Dep't 2023)................................................................................... 2, 13-15

People ex rel. Spitzer v. Direct Revenue, LLC,

19 Misc. 3d 1124(A) (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2008).......................................................................24

Pickwick Int'l, Inc. v. Tomato Music Co.,

119 Misc. 2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1983)..............................................................................................5

Plymouth Venture Partners, II, L.P v. GTR Source, LLC,

37 N.Y.3d 591 (2021)............................................................................................................. 5-6

Prince v. City of New York,

108 A.D.3d 114 (1st Dept. 2013).............................................................................................26

Rogal v. Wechsler,
135 A.D.2d 384 (1st Dep't 1987).............................................................................................13

Schafer v. VSB Bancorp, Inc.,

68 Misc. 3d 827 (Sup. Ct. 2020)............................................................................1, 4, 8, 10, 12

Schwartz v. New York City Hous. Auth.,

219 A.D.2d 47 (2d Dep't 1996)......................................................................................... 1, 4-5

SEC v. Blatt,
583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978)..................................................................................................17

SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc.,

408 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 2007)..................................................................................................17

SEC v. First City Fin. Corp.,

890 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1989)................................................................................................17

SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc.,

101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996).............................................................................................17, 20

Vi
SEC v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Inv. Fund,
289 F. App'x 183 (9th Cir. 2008).............................................................................................18

SEC v. Govil,
86 F.4th 89 (2d Cir. 2023)........................................................................................................24

SEC v. Hallam,
42 F.4th 316 (5th Cir. 2022).....................................................................................................24

SEC v. Huff
758 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (S.D. Fla. 2010).....................................................................................18

SEC v. MacDonald,
699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983) ......................................................................................................17

SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,

458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972)............................................................................................. 24-25

SEC v. Metter,
706 F. App'x 699 (2d Cir. 2017)..............................................................................................26

SEC v. Patel,
61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995).......................................................................................................17

SEC v. Razmilovic,
822 F. Supp. 2d 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ......................................................................................18

St. Louis, Imn Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams,

251 U.S. 63 (1919)...................................................................................................................27

State by Abrams v. Solil Mgt. Corp.,

128 Misc. 2d 767 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1985)............................................................................24

State by Lefkowitz v. Hotel Waldorf-Astoria Corp.,

67 Misc. 2d 90 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1971)................................................................................24

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,

538 U.S. 408 (2003).................................................................................................................27

Tax Equity Now NY LLC v. City of New York,

173 A.D.3d 464 (1st Dep't 2019)........................................................................................... 4-5

Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,

784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986)................................................................................................. 6-7

vii
TWA, Inc. v. Hughes,
515 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1975).....................................................................................................10

United States v. Bajakajian,

524 U.S. 321 (1998)........................................................................................................... 25-27

United States v. Viloski,

814 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2016)............................................................................................... 25-26

Wallace v. Smith in and for County of Maricopa,

532 P.3d 752 (Ariz. 2023)..........................................................................................................6

Waves of Hialeah, Inc. v. Machado,

300 So.3d 688 (Fla. App. 2018).................................................................................................6

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

N.Y CONST. Art. I, § 5...................................................................................................................25

N.Y CPLR § 5240 ...........................................................................................................................5

N.Y CPLR § 5519(a)(2)..................................................................................................................4

N.Y CPLR § 5519(c).......................................................................................................................4

N.Y Exec. Law § 63(12) ...............................................................................................................12

N.Y Penal Law §80.05(5)..............................................................................................................26

N.Y Penal Law §80.10(1)(e).........................................................................................................26

U.S. CONST. Amend. VIII..............................................................................................................25

Other Sources

Aleks Phillips, How Much Is Mar-a-Lago Worth? Valuation of Trump Property Raises Questions,
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2023)....................................................................................................21

A.R. Hoffman, Ermr in New York's Civil Fraud Case Against Trump Is Flagged by Industry
Insiders, Who Say Valuation of Mar-a-Lago Cited by Judge Is Based on a Misunderstanding

of Basic Real Estate Practice, N.Y SUN (Oct. 2, 2023)..........................................................20

Race to Represent 2018: Letitia James, Democratic Attorney General Candidate Statement,
YouTube.com (Aug. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v-hsnv7-
27, 2018),
y82r4 ........................................................................................................................................28

viii
Richard C. Reilly, Practice Commentaries, McKinney k Cons Laws of NY, CPLR C:5519:4 ........8

See what New York AG said while running for of ice about charging Trump, CNN.com Oct. 3,
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/10/03/letitia-james-prosecute-trump-2018-
2023,
comments-running-ofEce-cnntm-vpx.cnn ...............................................................................28

Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney k Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5519:4...........8

Siegel & Connors, NY Prac § 522 at 993 (6th ed 2018)..................................................................6

Spectrum News NY1, Letitia James promises to be a legal check on President Donald Trump as
NY attorney general, Facebook (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v--475134182893178.......................................................28

The Editors, Trump s $355 Million Civil Fraud Verdict, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2024)...................3

Washington Post, New York k next attorney general targeted slumlords. Now she s going after
Dec. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/19/new-yorks-
Trump, 19, 2018,

next-attorney-general-targeted-slumlords-now-shes-going-after-trump .................................28

Why Letitia James Wants to Take on Trump as NY's Attorney General, YouTube.com (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v-D1yj0NKSsuU............................28

ix
 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court should stay execution of Supreme Court's Decision and Order After Non-Jury

Trial of February 16, 2024, see Affmnation of Urgency of Clifford S. Robert ("Robert Urgency

Aff.") Ex. A (the "Judgment"). The Attorney General's leading argument-that this Court lacks

authority to waive or reduce appellate bond requirements under any circumstances-contradicts

the plain language of CPLR § 5519(c), this Court's inherent authority, and a host of New York

cases. "CPLR § 5519(c) clearly gives the Court discretion with respect to such automatic stays

and also allows it to stay all proceedings to enforce a judgment or order appealed from in a case

(b)."
not provided for under subdivision Schaffer v. VSB Bancorp, Inc., 68 Misc. 3d 827, 834 (Sup.

Ct. 2020) (emphasis added).

In deciding whether to enter a stay, the Court may consider "any relevant factor, including

party.'"
the presumptive merits of the appeal and any exigency or hardship confronting any Id. at

Defendants'
834. Here, ongoing diligent efforts have proven that a bond in the judgment's full

impossibility."
amount is "a practical AfErmation of Gary Giulietti ("Giulietti Aff.") ¶ 18. These

diligent efforts have included approaching about 30 surety companies through 4 separate brokers.

Affmnation of Alan Garten ("Garten Aff."), ¶ 5. A bond requirement of this enormous

magnitude-effectively requiring cash reserves approaching $1 billion, Giulietti Aff. ¶ 17-is

unprecedented for a private company. Even when it comes to publicly traded companies, courts

routinely waive or reduce the bond amount. Enforcing an impossible bond requirement as a

condition of appeal would inflict manifest irreparable injury on Defendants, and "defeat or impair

jurisdiction."
[this Court's] appellate Schwartz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 219 A.D.2d 47, 48

(2d Dep't 1996). By contrast, waiving the bond requirement will impose no cognizable harm on

1
the Attorney General. The case involves no actual victims and no award of restitution, and she is

Defendants'
fully protected by real-estate holdings. This factor alone warrants a stay.

The manifold errors in Supreme Court's judgment further warrant a stay. Among other

errors, Supreme Court disrespectfully disregarded this Court's previous ruling in this case that the

statute of limitations applies and that "[t]he continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend

periods."
these People by James v. Trump, 217 A.D.3d 609, 611-12 (1st Dep't 2023). Moreover,

Supreme Court ridiculously valued Mar-a-Lago, in Palm Beach, Florida, as being worth "between

million,"
$18 million and $27.6 understating its actual value by about 50 to 100 times. Supreme

Court imposed a massive disgorgement award in the absence of any evidence that the alleged

misrepresentations caused the supposedly ill-gotten proceeds, in violation of the black-letter

requirement that the disgorged amount must be causally connected to the violation. Supreme Court

double- and triple-counted and committed errors in the such as

damages, elementary process,

conflating the proceeds of a sale with the profits from that sale. Such basic mistakes would have

been prevented if this case had been allowed to be adjudicated in the Commercial Division, where

it belonged.

These errors establish that the disgorgement award is unconstitutional. It is "grossly

disproportional"
in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States Constitution and

a parallel clause of the New York Constitution, as well as basic principles of due process and

selective prosecution. Because the judgment is unconstitutionally excessive, the bond requirement

violates the Eighth Amendment as well, because it imposes an irrational, punitive sanction.

Defendants'
This case has no victims, no damages, and no actual fmancial losses. None of

sophisticated business partners testified that they would have changed any transaction in light of

"misrepresentations,"
the alleged and all of these sophisticated parties, along with their law firms

2
and other service providers, were well aware of the ironclad disclaimers present in all of the

financial statements at issue. The $464 million penalty in this case has been aptly described as

shoplifter."
"using a Hellfire missile to annihilate an [alleged] The Editors, Trump's $355 Million

victim."
Civil Fraud Verdict, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2024). "There was no real financial Id. "This

is choosing a target and then hunting for something to charge him with, which is an abuse of the

law."
Id. The judgment seeks to destroy a successful business that employs many hardworking

New Yorkers, has contributed approximately $300 million in taxes to public coffers just during the

dates in question in this case, and has made historic contributions to the State and City of New

York. The Court should stay the judgment pending appeal, and put the brakes on the Attorney

General's overzealous litigation crusade. If oral argument would assist the Court in coming to that

conclusion, we respectfully request an opportunity for such a hearing.

ARGUMENT

I. This Court Has Discretion to Stay the Disgorgement Award.

The Attorney General argues that, under CPLR § 5519(a)(2), this Court has no authority to

stay execution on any condition other than an undertaking in the full amount of the judgment. See

Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion for a Stay ("Opp. Brief") at 15-20. This argument

is meritless, and is a continuation of the Attorney General's consistent lack of respect for the

authority, jurisdiction, and impact of this Court. This Court has both express statutory authority

and inherent authority to issue unsecured or partially secured stays of execution pending appeal

under § 5519(a)(2).

order,"
As relevant here, § 5519(a)(2), entitled "Stay without court provides that service

upon an adverse party of the notice of appeal stays all proceedings to enforce the judgment pending

appeal where an undertaking in the full amount of the judgment is given by the appealing party.

3
 order,"
N.Y. CPLR § 5519(a)(2). Section 5519(c), entitled "Stay and limitation of stay by court

provides that "[t]he court ... to which an appeal is taken ... may grant a limited stay or may vacate,

subdivision."
limit or modify any stay imposed by subdivision (a) ... or this N.Y. CPLR § 5519(c)

(emphasis added). As the emphasized language provides, § 5519(c) confers on this Court

discretion both to grant unsecured stays in cases covered by (a)(2)-i.e., cases involving money

modify" (a)."
judgments-and to "vacate, limit or preexisting stays "imposed by subdivision Id.

Thus, the appealing party may obtain an automatic stay under (a)(2) by posting an undertaking,

but he or she may also petition the appellate court for a discretionary stay under § 5519(c).

This is the uniform understanding of § 5519(c) in New York courts. "While CPLR

§ 5519(a) sets forth the conditions for entitlement to an automatic stay, CPLR § 5519(c) clearly

gives the Court discretion with respect to such automatic stays and also allows it to stay all

pmceedings to enforce a judgment or order appealed from in a case not provided for under

(b)."
subdivision Schafer, 68 Misc. 3d at 834 (emphasis added). "CPLR 5519(c) permits this

Court ... to grant a discretionary stay of proceedings to enforce the order or judgment appealed

(b)."
from, or to vacate, limit or modify any automatic stay obtained pursuant to CPLR 5519 (a) or

Schwartz, 219 A.D.2d at 48 (emphasis added). "The scope of the stay authorized by subdivision

(c) is thus coextensive with the stay authorized by subdivision (a), namely, a stay of enforcement

only...."
proceedings Id. (emphasis added). Regarding the "discretionary stay ... under CPLR

5519(c)," 'coextensive' stay"

"the scope of this discretionary stay is with the automatic under

§ 5519(a), and "applies ... to provide non-governmental parties with the opportunity to stay

appeal."
pmceedings to enforce the judgment or order appealed from pending the Tax Equity Now

NY LLC v. City of New York, 173 A.D.3d 464, 465 (1st Dep't 2019) (emphasis added); see also CT

Chemicals (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Vinmar Impex, Inc., 189 A.D.2d 727, 729 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that

4
a defendant seeking a stay of execution of a money judgment may opt "either [to] seek a

undertaking"
discretionary stay pursuant to CPLR 5519(c) or to post a[n] ... under 5519(a));

Pickwick Int'l, Inc. v. Tomato Music Co., 119 Misc. 2d 227, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("[T]hese grounds

fully warrant this Court to exercise its discretion and dispense with the posting of any bond pending

the outcome of the appeal...").

In addition, this Court has inherent authority to issue equitable stays of judgments pending

appeal. Schwartz held that, in addition to § 5519, "[t]here is ... another broad source of authority

for this Court, in the exercise of its appellate rather than original jurisdiction, to grant such a

case."
general stay of proceedings in an appropriate 219 A.D.2d at 48. Schwartz reaffirmed "this

Court's inherent power to grant a stay of acts or proceedings, which, although not commanded or

forbidden by the order appealed from, will disturb the status quo and tend to defeat or impair our

jurisdiction."
appellate Id. Likewise, in Tax Equity Now, this Court held that a stay of lower-court

proceedings was not available under § 5519(a) or (c), yet the Court "exercise[d] [its] inherent

appeal...."
authority to grant a discretionary stay of the proceeding pending 173 A.D.3d at 465.

Moreover, CPLR § 5240 reinforces this broad equitable authority. It provides that "[t]he

court may at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person ... make an

order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending or modifying the use of any

procedure."
enforcement N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5240. The Court of Appeals describes § 5240 as a

"general provision[] that permit[s] 'any interested person'-including a judgment debtor-to

scheme."
secure remedies for wrongs arising under the statutory Plymouth Venture Partners, II,

L.P v. GTR Source, LLC, 37 N.Y.3d 591, 600 (2021) (emphasis added). "Section 5240 ... lays out

the court's power to, 'at any time, on its own initiative or the motion of any interested person, and

upon such notice as it may require, make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,

5
 procedure.'"
extending or modifying the use of any enforcement Id. "CPLR 5240 grants the courts

broad discretionary power to control and regulate the enforcement of a money judgment under

article 52 to prevent 'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other

courts'."
prejudice to any person or the Id. (quoting Guardian Loan Co. v. Early, 47 N.Y.2d 515,

519 (1979)). "[T]his provision 'centers in one place the pervasive judicial power to right, on a

procedures'."
case by case basis, any wrong in connection with any of the numerous Article 52 Id.

at 601 (cleaned up) (quoting Siegel & Connors, NY Prac § 522 at 993 (6th ed 2018)).

This authority matches the universal practice in other jurisdictions. Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 62 authorizes the federal courts to "stay enforcement of the district court's judgment,

condition."
without the posting of a bond or other In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search Cases, 783 F.3d

414, 417 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass I, 636 F.2d 755,

761 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming the decision to require no bond on appeal); N. Indiana Pub. Serv.

Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 281 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[I]t is a misreading of Rule

62(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to suggest that an appellant who wants to stay

execution pending appeal must post a bond."). Other states, likewise, universally recognize an

requirements.1
appellate court's authority to waive or modify bond

In fact, courts routinely exercise this authority to waive or reduce enormous,

disproportional, and unjust bond requirements. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d

1
See, e.g., Wallace v. Smith in and for County of Maricopa, 532 P.3d 752, 757 (Ariz. 2023) (noting
bond"
power of trial court "to reduce the amount of a supersedeas in "an appropriate case");
"authority"
O'Donnell v. McGann, 529 A.2d 372, 377 (Md. App. 1987) (noting the to modify a
bond "does exist"); Waves of Hialeah, Inc. v. Machado, 300 So.3d 688, 691 (Fla. App. 2018)
(noting trial court's authority, under appropriate circumstances and conditions, to "reduce a
supersedeas bond"); Morse v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass I, 2018 WL 4784585, at *1 (Tex. App. Oct.
bond"
4, 2018) (noting ability of trial court to "lower the amount of a supersedeas when
appropriate).

6
1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (reducing a $12 billion bond

obligation to $1 billion); In re Adelphia Commc Is Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

(imposing a $1.3 billion bond obligation to secure a judgment that required the distribution of "111

tradeable" billion"
million shares of freely stock, "more than 9.4 tradable interests, "and $7.136

billion in cash"); Int'l Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 62 B.R. 723, 732 (S.D.N.Y.

1986) (finding that defendants were not "likely to be capable of posting a bond in the full amount

judgment,"
of the approximately $38 million and reducing the bond requirement for each to

"full-undertaking-only"
$10,000). The Attorney General's theory is inconsistent with these and

many other cases. It would impair and defeat this Court's appellate jurisdiction in cases involving

outrageous judgments-i.e., the very cases where appeal is most necessary.

For this reason, the Attorney General's position raises grave constitutional concerns. As

the Second Circuit recognized in Texaco, where posting the full amount is impracticable, an

"inflexible requirement [denying] a stay of execution unless a supersedeas bond in the full amount

posted"
of the judgment is is "irrational, unnecessary, and self-defeating, amounting to a

process."
confiscation of the judgment debtor's property without due Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1154,

rev'd on other gmunds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). This is reason enough to reject the Attorney General's

interpretation of § 5519. See, e.g., In re Jamie J., 30 N.Y.3d 275, 282 (2017) ("[W]e should

construe the statute, if possible, to avoid the [constitutional] infirmity...").

H. This Court Should Exercise Its Authority To Stay Execution of the Judgment.

This Court should stay execution of all portions of the Supreme Court's Decision and

Order, including both disgorgement, and other forms of equitable relief. See Memorandum of Law

in Support of Stay Pending Appeal Pursuant to CPLR 5519(c) ("Opening Brief") at 11-14.

7
 A. The Attorney General Misstates the Governing Standard.

The Attorney General argues that "any exercise of inherent power to grant a stay ... would

circumstances."
require a showing of extraordinary Opp. Brief at 17. That is misleading and

incorrect. "Under CPLR § 5519(c), 'there is no single factor in determining whether to grant a

guide'
stay, the court's discretion is the and 'it will be influenced by any relevant factor, including

party.' "
the presumptive merits of the appeal and any exigency or hardship confronting any

Schafer, 68 Misc. 3d at 834 (cleaned up) (emphases added) (citing and quoting Deutsche Bank

Natl. Trust Co. v. Royal Blue Realty Holdings, Inc., 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31510(U), 2016 WL

4194201 (Sup. Ct. 2016), and Richard C. Reilly, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws

of NY, CPLR C:5519:4)); see also Navy Yard Hous. Dev. Fund, Inc. v. Carr, No. 33936/96, 2002

WL 1174711, at *2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 23, 2002) (same) (quoting Siegel, Practice Commentaries,

McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C5519:4); Opening Brief at 10-11.

B. The Exigency and Hardship to Defendants Warrant a Stay.

party."
First, the Court may consider "any exigency or hardship confronting any Schaffer,

68 Misc.3d at 834. Here, this factor alone justifies a stay of the judgment.

1. Posting a Full Undertaking Is a Practical Impossibility.

In the Opening Brief, when their efforts to obtain such a bond were still ongoing,

Defendants stated their expectation that it would be "impossible to secure and post a complete

bond."
Opening Brief at 15, 25. Diligent efforts since that time, including "countless hours

world,"
negotiating with one of the largest insurance companies in the have proven that "obtaining

amount"
an appeal bond in the full of the Judgment "is not possible under the circumstances

presented."
Giuletti Aff. ¶¶ 3, 9-10. The amount of the judgment, with interest, exceeds $464

million, and very few bonding companies will consider a bond of anything approaching that

8
magnitude. Id. ¶ 12. The remaining handful will not "accept hard assets such as real estate as

collateral," securities)."
but "will only accept cash or cash equivalents (such as marketable Id. ¶

13. Moreover, sureties would typically "require collateral of approximately 120% of the amount

judgment,"
of the which "would require Defendants to hand over collateral in the form of cash or

approximately"
cash equivalents of $557 million. Id. ¶ 19. In addition, sureties would likely

charge bond premiums of 2 percent per year with two years in advance-an up-
approximately

front cost over $18 million. Id. ¶ 20.

In short, "a bond of this size is rarely, if ever, seen. In the unusual circumstance that a bond

of this size is issued, it is provided to the largest public companies in the world, not to individuals

businesses."
or privately held Id. ¶ 16. The actual amount of cash or cash equivalents required

"to collateralize the bond and have sufficient capital to run the business and satisfy its other

obligations" billion."
"approach[es] $1 Id. ¶ 17. As a result, "obtaining a bond for $464 million

impossibility."
is a practical Id. ¶ 18.

The Attorney General claims that Defendants "fail to provide information about what steps

undertaking."
(if any) they have taken to secure an Opp. Brief at 18. In fact, those efforts were

Defendants' Defendants'
ongoing when stay motion was filed, and they have since confirmed

impossibility."
expectation that a full undertaking is a "practical Giuletti Aff. ¶ 18. The Attorney

General speculates, without evidence and revealing her misunderstanding of basic business

credit"
practices, that sureties might accept "an irrevocable letter of as collateral. Opp. Brief at

equivalents."
18. But any such ILOC "would still typically have to be fully backed by cash or cash

sale"
Guiletti Aff. ¶ 15. Obtaining such cash through a "fire ofreal estate holdings would inevitably

result in massive, irrecoverable losses-textbook irreparable injury.

9
 Defendants'
The practical impossibility of obtaining a bond interferes with right to appeal

and threatens this Court's appellate jurisdiction. Schaffer, 68 Misc.3d at 834. For this reason,

"practicable."
courts routinely waive or reduce bond requirements when securing the bond is not

Fed. Prescription Serv., 636 F.2d at 760. See, e.g., Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki,

188 F. Supp. 2d 223, 256 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (waiving the bond requirement for a $247 million

judgment where "it would be almost impossible to find a bonding agency willing and able to secure

size,"
a judgment of this and "the posting of a supersedeas bond here would be far from

practicable") (cleaned up); TWA, Inc. v. Hughes, 515 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir. 1975) (granting a

substantial reduction of the bond amount where, "[b]ecause of the unprecedented size of the

judgment, the obtaining of a supersedeas bond was impracticable"); Int'l Distribution Centers, 62

B.R. at 732 (finding that defendants were not "likely to be capable of posting a bond in the full

judgment,"
amount of the approximately $38 million and reducing the bond requirement for each

to $10,000); C. Albert Sauter Co. v. Richard S. Sauter Co., 368 F. Supp. 501, 520-21 (E.D. Pa.

1973) (allowing $100,000 bond on $1.5 million judgment).

Other features of the Judgment, moreover, threaten to dramatically compound these

punitive financial hardships. See Opening Brief, Point II. The provisions preventing the individual

Defendants from serving as officer and directors of businesses that they have successfully helmed

for and them from loans from bank registered in New York-
decades, preventing seeking any

Defendants'
which encompasses most nationwide lending institutions-radically interfere with

ability to continue to conduct profit-making activities during the pendency of appeal. See id.

2. A Stay Will Impose No Cognizable Hardship on Plaintiff.

By contrast, there is no significant exigency or hardship to Plaintiff. First, there are no

Defendants'
victims, as there were no damages and no financial losses. Second, real estate

10
holdings-including iconic properties like 40 Wall Street, Doral Miami, and Mar-a-Lago, see

Garten Aff. ¶ 10-greatly exceed the amount of the judgment. Such assets are impossible to

secrete or dispose of surreptitiously, leaving the plaintiff effectively secured during the pendency

of an appeal. Cf Klingenberg v. Vulcan Ladder USA, LLC, No. 15-CV-4012-KEM, 2017 WL

4836313, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 25, 2017). The Attorney General speculates that Defendants might

judgment,"
try to "evade enforcement of the Opp. Brief at 20, but she does not explain how

Defendants might surreptitiously conceal or sell off some of the world's most famous real estate

holdings before the appeal is final. See Opening Brief at 11-14.

C. The Court Should Maintain the Interim Stay as to Non-Monetary Relief.

The interim stay extends to the injunction against the individual Defendants "from serving

in the financial control function of any New York corporation or similar business entity registered

and/or licensed in New York State, and/or serving as an officer or director of any New York

York,"
corporation or other legal entity in New and "which enjoined certain individual and

corporate defendants from applying for loans from any financial institution chartered by or

years."
registered with the New York State Department of Financial Services for three (3) Interim

Stay Order (NYSCEF No. 6) ("Stay Order") at 2. The Court should maintain these aspects of the

stay pending appeal.

The Attorney General barely addresses these aspects of the interim stay. See Opp. Brief at

"Defendants'
23. Her cursory argument has no merit. The Attorney General contends that

interests" interest."
financial are supposedly outweighed by the need to protect the public Id. But

the only authority she cites is a case involving attorney disbarment, which is far afield from

Executive Law § 63(12) See id. (citing Matter of Seiffert, 65 N.Y.2d 278, 280-81 (1985)). It is

vital to be clear that Executive Law § 63(12) is inapplicable to the facts of this case in the first

11
place, under both the U.S. and the New York State Constitutions, and was wrongfully relied upon

by both the Attorney General and Supreme Court, an issue that will be expanded on at length in

Defendants' Defendants'
the merits briefing of the appeal. As explained in opening brief, Opening

Brief at 38, the stayed provisions of the injunction exceed Supreme Court's statutory authority

under Executive Law conduct-

§ 63(12). That statute authorizes the court to enjoin only unlawful

not lawful, productive business practices. Section 63(12) provides: "Whenever any person shall

engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or otherwise demonstrate persistentfraud or illegality

in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply, in the

name of the people of the state of New York, to the supreme court of the state of New York, on

notice of five days, for an order enjoining the continuance of such business activity or of any

acts...."
fraudulent or illegal N.Y. Exec. Law § 63(12). Under the statute's plain language, the

activity"
"such business that courts may enjoin is business activity pervaded by "persistent fraud

illegality,"
or id.-not ordinary, lawful business activity such as running profitable companies and

taking out loans. "In every case where a court has granted a permanent injunction pursuant to

Executive Law § 63(12), courts have limited the relief to only enjoining the specific activity from

arose."
which the fraud Opening Brief at 39 (citing cases). The Attorney General has no answer

to this point, and in fact, she does not cite any cases involving § 63(12). See Opp. Brief at 23.

D. The Disgorgement Award Will Not Survive Appellate Review.

In deciding whether to stay execution, the Court may also consider "the presumptive merits

appeal."
of the Schafer, 68 Misc. 3d at 834. Here, like the other provisions of the Judgment for

which Defendants seek a stay, the disgorgement award will not survive appellate review.

12
 L The Judgment Contradicts This Court's Statute-of-Limitations Ruling.

First, Supreme Court's judgment clearly failed to comply with this Court's June 2023 ruling

on the statute of limitations. As this Court held, "[a]pplying the proper statute of limitations and

the appropriate tolling, claims are time barred if they accrued-that is, the transactions were

2016."
completed-before February 6, Trump, 217 A.D.3d at 611-12 (citing Boesky v. Levine,

193 A.D.3d 403, 405 (1st Dep't 2021), and Rogal v. Wechsler, 135 A.D.2d 384, 385 (1st Dep't

1987)). "For defendants bound by the tolling agreement, claims are untimely if they accrued

2014."
before July 13, Id. Critically, this Court held that "[t]he continuing wrong doctrine does

periods."
not delay or extend these Id. (emphasis added) (citing CWCapital Cobalt VR Ltd. V

CWCapital Invs. LLC, 195 A.D.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Dep't 2021), and Henry v. Bank of Am., 147

A.D.3d 599, 601-602 (1st Dep't 2017)).

completed,"
The Attorney General wrongfully argues that new "transactions were Opp.

Brief at 31, every time Defendants submitted an annual statement relating to long-completedloan

transactions. This argument directly and disrespectfully contradicts this Court's June 2023 ruling.

First, as Boesky makes clear, such ongoing communications that relate to a prior completed

transaction do not toll the statute of limitations for alleged fraud. InBoesky, this Court held that a

fraud claim against an attorney relating to the erection of a tax shelter was time-barred,

notwithstanding the fact that the defendant maintained an ongoing representation and series of

communications with the plaintiff relating to the same tax shelter that extended into the limitations

period. Boeksy, 193 A.D.3d at 405. The Attorney General dismisses Boesky as a supposedly

case" limitations."
"inapposite common-law fraud that "did not address § 63(12) or its statute of

Opp. Brief at 33. This argument is astonishing, given that this Court cited Boesky as its lead

authority in holding that "claims are time barred if they accrued-that is, the transactions were

13
 2016."
completed-before February 6, Trump, 217 A.D.3d at 611-12 (citing Boesky, 193 A.D.3d

"inapposite,"
at 405). The principal case cited by this Court in its statute-of-limitations ruling is not

Opp. Brief at 33-it is binding.

The Attorney General's argument also contradicts this Court's holding that "[t]he

periods."
continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend these Trump, 217 A.D.3d at 612

doctrine"
(citing CWCapital, 195 A.D.3d at 19-20). CWCapital describes the "continuing wrong

"defendants'
as applying to a course of conduct where activities amounted to a series of wrongs,

period."
each of which gave rise to its own limitations Id. at 16. Under the doctrine, "a new claim,

accrue[s]"
with a new limitations period, ... each time the defendant engages in a new action within

doctrine,"
the challenged course of conduct. Id. at 18. Under the "continuing wrong each act in

violation"
the series constitutes "a distinct subject to its own limitations period. Id. at 18-19.

Like Supreme Court's judgment, the Attorney General's argument merely reasserts the

continuing wrong doctrine expounded in CWCapital and rejected by this Court in its ruling in this

case. See Opp. Brief at 31. The Attorney General contends that new "transactions were

completed"
every time Defendants "submitted new [allegedly] fraudulent and illegal statements

after July 2014 if the Statements were submitted in connection with a loan initiated prior to July

2014." "defendants'
Id. The Attorney General contends that activities amounted to a series of

period."
wrongs, each of which gave rise to its own limitations CWCapital, 195 A.D.3d at 16. She

accrued"
incorrectly argues that "a new claim, with a new limitations period, ... for each new

violation"
statement. Id. at 18. She contends that each act in the series constituted "a distinct that

re-starts the limitations period. Id. at 18-19; compare Opp. Brief at 31-32. This is a straightforward

assertion of the continuing wrong doctrine, which this Court ruled does not apply in this case.

14
 The other case that this Court cited in its ruling, Henry v. Bank of America, makes this

doctrine"
conclusion equally clear. Henry describes the "continuing wrong as applicable "where

there is a series of continuing wrongs and serves to toll the running of a period of limitations to

act."
the date of the commission of the last wrongful 147 A.D.3d at 601. Again, that is exactly

what the Attorney General wrongfully contends-that the subsequent statements relating to the

wrongs."
pre-July 2014 loans and insurance policies constitute "a series of continuing Id. Henry

emphasizes that the continuing wrong doctrine "may only be predicated on continuing unlawful

acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct. The distinction is between a

wrongs."
single wrong that has continuing effects and a series of independent, distinct Id. Again,

that is what the Attorney General contends-that the subsequent statements constituted

acts" wrongs."
"continuing unlawful and "a series of independent, distinct Id.; compare Opp. Brief

at 31-33.

By holding that the continuing wrong doctrine does not apply here, this Court has already

considered and rejected the Attorney General's position. The Court held, correctly, that "plaintiff

breach"
asserts a single to which the subsequent statements were merely ancillary, and thus "the

apply."
continuing wrong doctrine does not Henry, 147 A.D.3d at 601-02.

The Attorney General's argument, therefore, is directly foreclosed by this Court's previous

periods."
ruling, which held that "[t]he continuing wrong doctrine does not delay or extend these

Trump, 217 A.D.3d at 612 (emphasis added). This Court's holding on the statute of limitations is

the law of the case, which "bind[s] a trial court (and subsequent appellate courts of coordinate

court...."
jurisdiction) to follow the mandate of an appellate Matter of Part 60 RMBS Put-Back

Litig., 195 A.D.3d 40, 48 (1st Dep't 2021); see also, e.g., Applehole v. Wyeth Ayerst Labs., 213

15
A.D.3d 611, 611 (1st Dep't 2023). "[T]here is no discretion involved; the lower court must apply

court." (2000).2
the rule laid down by the appellate People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 499, 503

The proper application of this Court's previous ruling forecloses over 75 percent of the

judgment. Under that ruling, the only timely claims are those with respect to the Old Post OfEce

Loan and 40 Wall Loan, and only for Defendants bound by the tolling agreement. All claims based

on the following transactions are time barred:

" The Doral loan closed on June 11, 2012, with a loan to
Trump Trump
Endeavor 12 LLC. See Affirmation of Clifford S. Robert in Further Support
of Stay Pending Appeal ("Robert Reply Aff.") Ex. CC, ¶ 115.

" The Point contract was awarded on 21, 2012. See Robert
Ferry February
Reply Aff. Ex. DD.

" The loan for 401 North Wabash Venture LLC closed on November 9, 2012.
See Robert Reply Aff. Ex. CC, ¶ 131.

" Old Post Office LLC was selected the GSA in 2012 to
Trump ultimately by
redevelop the OPO property and signed a lease for that purpose on August

5, 2013. Id. ¶ 146.

Appellants'
As set forth in demonstrative exhibit, Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. X, this error alone

accounts for about $351 million of the overall award, since correctly applying the statute of

limitations eliminates any damages associated with the Old Post Office Award, Ferry Point, the

Doral Loan, and the Chicago Loan, eliminating $285 million in damages before pre-judgment

interest, and $351 million including pre-judgment interest. See id.

2
For the same reasons, the Attorney General's lengthy argument that the continuing wrong
doctrine should apply here-see Opp. Brief at 31-33-is beside the point. See, e.g., Opp. Brief at
32 (arguing that "[t]his Court has ... reinstated § 63(12) claims as timely where OAG brought the
claims based on misrepresentations that occurred during a limitations period that started prior to
the limitations period"). The Attorney General admits that the subsequent statements on which
she relies all relate directly to loan and insurance transactions completed before the limitations

period, and thus they fall in the heartland of the continuing wrong doctrine, which has been rejected

by this Court in this case. Opp. Brief at 33.

16
 2. Disgorgement Requires a Showing of Causation.

There is no evidence, and no finding by Supreme Court, that the relevant lenders and

insurers would not have given Defendants loans and policies on the same terms in the absence of

"misrepresentations."
the supposed Opening Brief at 30. The Attorney General argues that this

glaring omission in the trial record makes no difference, because "[a]ctual reliance on the

fraud,"
misrepresentations is not required under § 63(12) to establish Opp. Brief at 26, and she

victims,"
"does not need to demonstrate direct losses to Opp. Brief at 27. This argument overlooks

a basic principle of the law of disgorgement-the element of causation.

Disgorgement requires a showing of causation between the alleged misconduct and

supposedly ill-gotten gains, neither of which exists here. Opening Brief at 30. "[T]he disgorged

violation.'"
amount must be 'causally connected to the J.P Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co.,

91 A.D.3d 226, 232-33 (1st Dep't 2011), rev'd on other gmunds, 21 N.Y.3d 324 (2013) (emphasis

added) (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996)). "The amount

ordered"
of disgorgement must "be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to

violation."
the First Jersey Securities, 101 F.3d at 1475 ; see also SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890

F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1995). Thus,

"disgorgement extends only to the amount with interest by which the defendant profited from his

assessment."
wrongdoing. Any further sum [constitutes] a penalty SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325,

1336 (5th Cir. 1978); see also, e.g., SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 735 (11th Cir.

2007) (same); SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); Hateley v. SEC, 8 F.3d

"disgorgement"
653, 656 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing so-called exceeding actual gain from fraud);

Litton Industries, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 1071, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

Disgorgement must be based on a showing of "gain causation"-i.e., proof that the amount to be

17
disgorged was caused by the (alleged) wrongdoing. See, e.g., SEC v. Razmilovic, 822 F. Supp. 2d

234, 260 n.22 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (government is "required to prove a causal connection between

the fraud and [defendant's] ill-gotten gains for the purposes of disgorgement ... or, in essence, gain

causation"); SEC v. Huf, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (disgorgement requires

showing of "gain causation"); see also SEC v. Global Express Capital Real Estate Inv. Fund, 289

F. App'x 183, 190 (9th Cir. 2008) (disgorgement order must be limited to "the profits causally

connected to the violation").

required"
The Attorney General incorrectly argues that "reliance ... is not to demonstrate

a violation of Executive Law § 63(12). Opp. Brief at 26. Even if reliance is not required to show

a violation, which it is, causation is required to justify the particular remedy of disgorgement-i.e.,

evidence that the alleged misrepresentations actually induced the banks and insurers to agree to

less favorable terms. Here, there is no evidence of that critical point. Indeed, not one witness

testified that any bank or insurer would have altered the terms or pricing of any loan or policy due

to any alleged misrepresentation in the SFCs. On the contrary, every witness agreed that their

business decisions were based on their own analysis, thus defeating any showing of causation.

With respect to Deutsche Bank, Nicholas Haigh, head of risk management for the Americas

Private Wealth Management business, testified that all decisions were made based on the bank's

own internal analysis. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. Q, ¶¶ 31-74, citing PX-290; PX-291; PX-293;

PX-294; PX-298; PX-300; PX302; PX-2960; PX-3137 (Robert Reply Aff. Exs. MM-UU). For

example, for the Doral loan, Mr. Haigh testified that President Trump's financial strength was

assessed on the basis of Deutsche Bank's own adjusted values, not the guarantor's self-reported

estimates, especially as to liquidity and net worth. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. Q, ¶ 39. David

Williams, a current Deutsche Bank employee, similarly testified that an individual's reported net

18
worth is largely subjective or subject to the use of estimates and in underwriting a loan, the bank

would make adjustments to client-reported numbers to account for this subjectivity. Id. ¶ 77, 80.

Likewise, Jack Weisselberg of Ladder Capital also testified that net worth was not a key

factor in refinancing the 40 Wall Street loan. Id. ¶ 124. He testified that, while the stated net worth

process,"
on the SFC was something that Ladder Capital "would look at in the underwriting it was

factor"
not a "key in the ultimate underwriting decision. Robert Reply Aff. Ex. BB, 1877:11-24.

Rather, liquidity played a primary role over the importance of certain contingent liabilities. See id.

1877:11-18.

Similarly, David Cerron of the New York City Parks Department stated that the License

Agreement did not require that President Trump submit his SFCs to the Parks Department, and he

personally never reviewed the SFC in connection with the Ferry Point agreements. See Robert

Urgency Aff. Ex. Q, ¶¶ 141-142. The Parks Department did not rely on President Trump's

Statements of Financial Condition. First, in the award criteria for the concession, the financial

capability of the offeror was weighted the lowest-it was only 10% of the selection criteria. See

Robert Reply Aff. Exs. BB, 2819:2-23 and VV, PX-3290 (Request for Offers). Second, during the

term of the license, the Parks Department never received any of President Trump's Statements of

Financial Condition, which itself takes the Ferry Point agreements out of this case completely. See

Robert Reply Aff. Ex. BB, 2844:15-21. Under the Guaranty Agreement, President Trump was

required to submit No Material Adverse Change Letters ("No MAC Letters") which were to

"reaffmn the initial financial statements that were shared with the city during the award process

same."
were in material respects the Id. 2804:20-2805:7. Mr. Cerron admitted that when he

reviewed the No MAC Letters, he "was not reviewing them to determine whether President Trump

contract."
had the financial capability to perform the Id. 2844:22-25 (emphasis added). The

19
determination of whether someone has the financial capability to perform under the contract is

made during the award process (which concluded in February of 2012). Id. 2845:1-13; Robert

Reply Aff. Exs. EE, PX-3291; DD, DX-981. The sole remedy for failure to submit No MAC

Letters under the Guaranty was to increase the security deposit to a maximum of $470,000. See

Robert Reply Aff. Ex. BB, 2832:18-21.

In sum, no witness ever stated that any business decision would have changed, given

additional information about the SFCs. Accordingly, the alleged misstatements are not "causally

to"
connected the supposedly ill-gotten gains, J.P Morgan Securities, 91 A.D.3d at 232-33; First

Jersey Securities, 101 F.3d at 1475, and disgorgement is unavailable as a remedy. The Attorney

General has no answer to this fundamental point. Nowhere does she cite any evidence that the

SFCs caused the banks or insurers to enter into any transactions that they would not otherwise

have entered into-especially not when confronted with ironclad disclaimers.

3. Supreme Court's Valuation of Mar-a-Lago Is Indefensible.

In its judgment Supreme Court relied on a tax assessment to value Mar-a-

summary order,

million,"
Lago at "between $18 million and $27.6 and thus accused Defendants of "an

appraisal."
overvaluation of at least 2,300%, compared with the [tax] assessor's Robert Urgency

Aff. Ex. L at 26 (italics in original). This reliance on a tax assessment "is based on a

practice,"
misunderstanding of basic real estate and the Palm Beach County Appraiser's OfEce

value."3
confirmed that its assessment does "not [reflect] the market The chief property appraiser

for Palm Beach County stated that its assessments were "for tax purposes only and not for

³
See, e.g., A.R. Hoffman, Error in New York's Civil Fraud Case Against Trump Is Flagged by
Industry Insiders, Who Say Valuation of Mar-a-Lago Cited by Judge Is Based on a

Misunderstanding of Basic Real Estate Practice, N.Y. SUN (Oct. 2, 2023) (quoting an expert

saying that "any real estate professional would say that market value and county appraisal are not
thing,"
the same and real estate professionals "don't even look at county appraisal data").

20
 institution."4
financing or ... for a lending Yet in its post-trial decision and order, Supreme Court

doubled down on this erroneous determination, holding that Defendants overvalued Mar-a-Lago

more."
by "possibly a billion dollars or Robert Urgency AfE Ex. R at 77. This holding is

indefensible.

Supreme Court disregarded unrebutted evidence that Mar-a-Lago's market value was

higher than the price listed on the supporting data to the SFC every year from 2011-2021. See

Robert Reply Aff. Ex. BB, 6121:11-6126:9. Trial evidence established that Mar-A-Lago could

have sold for $705 million in 2011 to $1.215 billion in 2021 (including membership sales), which

greatly exceeds the values listed in the supporting data to the SFCs-which ranged from

$347,761,431 to $739,452,519. Robert Aff. Exs. PX-

Seeid., 6121:11-6126:9; Reply WW-GGG,

708, PX-719, PX-731, PX-742, PX-758, PX-774, PX-788, PX-793, PX-843, PX-857, PX-1501.

Supreme Court also did not consider that Mar-A-Lago is a property in a league of its own because

of its history, architecture, finishes, characteristics, as well as the prime and unique location in

Palm Beach spanning from the lake, the intracoastal waterway, to the Atlantic Ocean,see Robert

Reply Aff. Ex. BB, 6111:10-14.See id., 6106:18-6108:9, 6116:4-12, 6133:5-13, 6134:7-6135:1,

6140:10-17.5
6135:21-6136:10,

Supreme Court and the Attorney General contend that Mar-a-Lago should not have been

valued as a private residence, but only as a club. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 66-67, 78; Opp.

4
Aleks Phillips, How Much Is Mar-a-Lago Worth? Valuation of Trump Property Raises

Questions, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 23, 2023).

5
Supreme Court's failure to grasp Mar-a-Lago's unique value reflects a broader trend in the court's
analysis of failing to understand the economic realities of real estate business. For example,
Supreme Court persistently assumed that such businesspeople have an incentive to overstate their
net worth to obtain more favorable credit. This overlooks that overstatements can result in adverse
estate tax consequences that could easily outweigh any such advantages. The Commercial Division
would likely not have made these clear errors.

21
Brief at 5, 25. That is their sole basis for arguing that Mar-a-Lago was overvalued. See id. This

holding is hard to square with the fact that President Trump is currently using Mar-a-Lago as his

permanent private residence, and has been doing so for years. In any event, the Attorney General

disregards unrebutted evidence that no prohibition exists on Mar-A-Lago being used and valued

as a single-family residence, or the fact that its use as a club adds to its value. See Robert Reply

Aff. Exs. FF-LL, DX-478, DX-359, DX-360, PX-1013, DX-427, DX-429, DX-484. As explained

by a preeminent Florida land use lawyer, when read together as they must be, the Deed of

Conservation and Presentation Easement to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, dated

March 26, 1995, the Deed of Development Rights, recorded on October 17, 2002, the Rules of The

Mar-A-Lago Club, the Town of Palm Beach's zoning code, and the Town of Palm Beach's decision

to allow President Trump to actually use Mar-A-Lago as a residence, all support the unrebutted

residence.6
conclusion that no prohibition exists on Mar-A-Lago being used and valued as a private

See id. Ex. BB, 6060:24-6061:3, 6061:16-21; 6062:14-24; 6066:12-17; 6068:7-13; 6068:14-10;

6075:10-6076:20; 6077:2-11; 6078:4-6082:8; 6083:6-19 and Exs. HH, JJ-KK, FF, LL, DX-360,

DX-427, DX-429, DX-478; DX-484; see also Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. Q, ¶¶ 570-572, citing

DX.478, DX-359, DX-360, PX-1013, DX-427, DX-429, DX-484 (Robert Reply Aff. Exs. FF-LL).

4. Supreme Court Triple-Counted Damages on the Old Post Office Sale.

In 2012, the U.S. General Services Administration ("GSA") awarded the Trump Old Post

Office, LLC ("OPO"), a contract to redevelop the Old Post Office property. See Robert Urgency

Aff. Ex. Q, ¶ 6. On August 12, 2014, OPO closed on a loan with Deutsche Bank in connection

with the Old Post Office. ("OPO Loan"). See id., ¶ 8. On May 11, 2022, nearly ten years after the

6
Supreme Court excluded this expert's opinion as an inadmissible legal opinion, but then failed
to explain how his legal analysis was incorrect.

22
original loan, President Trump sold the redeveloped Old Post Office for $375 million and used

$170 million of those proceeds to repay the Deutsche Bank loan. See Robert Reply Aff. Ex. m,

"profits"
¶¶ 570-571. Supreme Court awarded disgorgement of the from the Old Post Office in

the total amount of nearly $220 million. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 83. This award reflects

three elementary errors.

a. Supreme Court conflates proceeds with profits from sale.

First, with respect to the Old Post Office sale, Supreme Court conflated the proceeds of

the sale with actual profts from the transaction. Supreme Court held that certain Defendants "are

jointly and severally liable, in the amount of $126,828,600, for the ill-gottenprofts Donald Trump

Office."
netted from the sale of the Old Post Id. at 83. However, the testimony and exhibit the

Attorney General cited make clear that that figure was the amount offroceeds from the transaction.

See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. P, ¶ 221,citing 3626:1-24 and PX-1373 (Robert Reply Aff. Exs. BB,

HHH). That figure is the sale proceeds distributed to President Trump and his children after

repaying the mortgage and other associated costs, not the profit. To calculate profts from a sale,

one must deduct equity from the proceeds of the sale, i.e., the value of the seller's cumulative

investment in the property prior to the sale. Neither Supreme Court nor the Attorney General

bothered to do so-nor presented any evidence of that figure. Thus, Supreme Court's conclusion

that the nearly $135 million proceeds of the Old Post Office sale constituted "net profits received

sale"
on its overstates the amount of disgorgement by at least tens of millions of dollars.

b. Supreme Court double-counts disgorgement from OPO sale.

Second, Supreme Court punished Defendants for entering into the Old Post Office loan by

awarding disgorgement in the sum of both (1) their purported interest-rate savings in obtaining

"profits"
that loan and (2) their alleged from the sale of Old Post Office. See Robert Urgency Aff.

23
 "gained"
Ex. A. This is manifest double-counting. If Appellants improperly interest-rate savings,

which they did not, then the amount of the interest-rate differential alone would serve to make any

"profits"
purportedly aggrieved party whole. To also order disgorgement of for the sale of the

"gains,"
same property, in addition to alleged interest-differential is duplicative, and thus purely,

wrongfully punitive. The Attorney General is "not entitled to punitive damages or treble damages,

respondent,"
or both, from as "Executive Law Section 63(12) does not provide for either of these

damages"
extraordinary remedies and petitioner is limited to obtaining restitution or compensatory

alongside an injunction. See State by Abrams v. Solil Mgt. Corp., 128 Misc. 2d 767, 773 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. Cty. 1985), af'd, 114 A.D.2d 1057 (1st Dep't 1985); see also State by Lefkowitz v. Hotel

Waldorf-Astoria Corp., 67 Misc. 2d 90, 92 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1971). Any award of disgorgement

Appellants'
in excess of actual damages caused by alleged misconduct is impermissibly punitive.

See People ex rel. Spitzer v. Direct Revenue, LLC, 19 Misc. 3d 1124(A) at *7-8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.

Cty. 2008) (finding disgorgement only available "in an amount related to the actual damages

misconduct," respondents'
caused by the since "[d]isgorgement of profits to the state would

effectively constitute punitive damages not authorized by statute.").

c. Courts do not disgorge income derived from ill-gotten proceeds.

Third, even in cases where disgorgement of the proceeds of fraud is applied, as it is not

proceeds."
here, "a court cannot order disgorgement of income derived from the ill-gotten SEC v.

Govil, 86 F.4th 89, 107 (2d Cir. 2023) (emphasis added); SEC v. Hallam, 42 F.4th 316, 329 (5th

Cir. 2022) ("disgorgement could not include 'income earned on ill-gotten profits'"); SEC v. Manor

Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that the lower "court erred in

ordering appellants to [disgorge] profits and income earned on such proceeds"). Here, included

in the $464 million judgment, was approximately $186 million, plus interest, representing profits

24
Supreme Court found Defendants to have made from the sale of the Old Post Office and Ferry

Point. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 83-84. Thus, Supreme Court ordered Defendants not

merely to disgorge allegedly ill-gotten gains from more favorable loan terms, but also to disgorge

profits and income earned on the loan proceeds. This was improper. "[O]rdering the disgorging of

assessment,"
profits and income earned on the proceeds is in fact a penalty not disgorgement.

Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d at 1104.

5. The Award Is Grossly Disproportionate and Unconstitutional.

fines."
Both the United States and New York Constitutions prohibit "excessive U.S.

CONST. Amend. VIII; N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 5 ; see Opening Brief at 29-33. A fine is constitutionally

offense."
excessive if it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the defendant's] United States

v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998); County of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 140 (2003).

"fine."
Supreme Court's disgorgement award clearly qualifies as a The Excessive Fines

kind,"
Clause applies to all "payments, whether in cash or in ordered to be paid to the state,

proceeding," "penalty" part" "punitive"

including in "civil if the payment is a or assessed "in for a

"deterrence."
purpose such as Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-610 (1993); see Canavan,

1 N.Y.3d at 139-40 (quoting Austin); United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2016).

Here, Supreme Court explicitly stated that disgorgement under Exec. Law § 63(12) was intended

wrongdoing."
"to deter Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 81 (quoting People v. Ernst & Young, LLP,

114 A.D.3d 569 (1st Dep't 2014)). Indeed, Supreme Court went so far as to erroneously state that

"penalty."
Ernst & Young authorized disgorgement as a Id. at 82. Moreover, in Kokesh v. SEC,

581 U.S. 455 (2017), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "disgorgement is imposed for punitive

purposes"
and that whenever "an individual is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction to the

penalty."
Government as a consequence of a legal violation, the payment operates as a Id. at 463-

25
64; see also SEC v. Metter, 706 F. App'x 699, 703 (2d Cir. 2017) (assuming that "in light of the

Supreme Court's recent decision in Kokesh . . . disgorgement [is] essentially punitive in nature and

thus [is] a fine within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment").

disproportional."
The $464 million penalty is also "grossly To determine whether an

offense,"
ordered payment is "grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the both this Court and

"essence" "seriousness"
federal courts consider (1) the and of the (alleged) offense; (2) the

imposed"
"maximum . . . fine that could have been under penal statutes prohibiting the conduct at

harm"
issue; and (3) the "severity of the caused by the defendant's conduct. Canavan, 1 N.Y.2d at

140; Viloski, 814 F.3d at 110. All these factors dictate that the award is grossly disproportional.

The first factor-seriousness of the alleged offenses-overwhelmingly favors the

Defendants. In its rulings on the Attorney General's Second through Seventh Causes of Action,

Supreme Court identified the Penal Law provisions that Defendants allegedly violated. See Robert

Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 77-81. Under these provisions, the offenses that Defendants supposedly

committed are mere misdemeanors. See id. A $464 million penalty for misdemeanor offenses is,

on its face, grotesquely disproportionate. Indeed, this Court has struck down a fine of only $2,000

as excessive punishment for a misdemeanor offense. See Prince v. City ofNew York, 108 A.D.3d

114 (1st Dept. 2013).

Second, the Penal Law provisions that the Attorney General incorrectly alleges that the

Defendants violated authorize fines in the thousands of dollars, ranging from $1,000 for the Class

A misdemeanors, to $5,000 for the Class B misdemeanors, to $10,000 for corporate offenses-

offense"
though fines up to "double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the

gain,"
N.Y. Penal Law §80.05(5), or "the corporation's id. §80.10(1)(e), are allowed. On its face,

a $464 million sanction is wildly disproportional to these figures. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at

26
324 (forfeiture of $357,144 violated the Eighth Amendment where maximum fme for offense at

issue, misreporting how much currency defendant was taking out of country, was $5,000).

harm" Defendants'
The final factor-the "severity of the caused by conduct-also proves

the unconstitutionality of the $464 million order, because no actual harm was ever alleged or

shown here. As Supreme Court acknowledged, Defendants made full and timely payments to the

multi-billion-dollar financial institutions and insurance companies that eagerly extended credit and

underwrote insurance policies for Defendants. See Robert Urgency Aff. Ex. R at 4 ("undisputed

that defendants have made all required payments on time"). Indeed, Supreme Court expressly held

losses" public"
that no "showing or allegation of direct to any party, whether "consumers or the or

the financial institutions involved, was required here. Id. at 81. Without any actual harm, an

astronomical $464 million forfeiture plainly violates the Excessive Fines Clause, of both the New

York and federal Constitutions. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (forfeiture of $357,144 violated the

Eighth Amendment where harm shown was "minimal").

excessive"
In addition, a "grossly damages award also "violates the Due Process Clause of

Amendment."
the Fourteenth BMW of N.A., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); see Parker v.

large"
Time Warner Entm't Co., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) ("devastatingly damage award "out

suffered"
of all reasonable proportion to the actual harm violates due process); see also St. Louis,

Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919) (states cannot impose penalties

"so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously

unreasonable"). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has "decline[d] . . . to impose a bright-line

ratio," digit"
it has indicated that a monetary sanction exceeding a "single multiplier of actual,

compensatory damages will in most cases violate Due Process. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.

Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). Here, no actual, compensatory damage of any kind was

27
 damages"
shown; the "actual, compensatory are $0.00. The $464 million order, far from applying

digit"
a "single multiplier, applies an infinite multiplier and is hence on its face "grossly

excessive."

For closely related reasons, the Attorney General's conduct is unconstitutional because it

constitutes selective prosecution of the worst sort, as her conduct during her campaign, and after

her election, unequivocally proves. Opening Brief at 22-24. In her campaign for Attorney

president"
General, Ms. James called then-President Trump "an illegitimate and pledged to deploy

elected.7
the full might of her Office against him if In one campaign video, she described him as

"illegitimate," "incompetent," land,"

"ill-equipped to serve in the highest office of the and

offenses" land."8
someone who should "be indicted for criminal by "attorneys general across the

Trump."9
In another campaign video, Ms. James promised "to take on President Donald In her

election acceptance speech, she called President Trump someone who "stands as an affront to all

that I believe in and all that this country and this state represents, and someone who we must keep

law."10
in check by the long arm of the As the Washington Post put it, "On the night of her victory,

Trump."Il
she stood in front of supporters in Brooklyn and all but declared a war against The

Attorney General has no convincing response to this point.

7
see what New York AG said while running for ofice about charging Trump, CNN.com Oct. 3,
https://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2023/10/03/letitia-james-prosecute-trump-2018-
2023,
comments-running-office-cnntm-vpx.cnn.
8
Why Letitia James Wants to Take on Trump as NY's Attorney General, YouTube.com (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v-D1yj0NKSsuU.
9
Race to Represent 2018: Letitia James, Democratic Attorney General Candidate Statement,
YouTube.com (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v-hsnv7-y82r4.
10
Spectrum News NY1, Letitia James promises to be a legal check on President Donald Trump
as NY attorney general, Facebook (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v--475134182893178.
11
Washington Post, New York's next attorney general targeted slumlords. Now she's going after
Dec. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/12/19/new-yorks-next-
Trump, 19, 2018,

attorney-general-targeted-slumlords-now-shes-going-after-trump (emphasis added).

28
 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should stay the execution of the monetary portion of the

judgment without requiring the posting of an undertaking, and maintain all other aspects of the

interim stay granted on February 28, 2024. If the Court considers denying a stay on any issue,

Defendants respectfully request that this Court schedule this stay motion for oral argument at a

time of the Court's convenience. In the event that this Court declines to grant a stay, Defendants

respectfully request that the Court grant Defendants permission to appeal to the Court of Appeals

Appeals.12
and enter a temporary stay to allow them to seek relief from the Court of

12
This Court should reject the Attorney General's alternative request for expedited briefing and
hearing. Opp. Brief, Point m. She cites no authority to support this request, and it makes little
sense in a case of this complexity, which involves a detailed factual record and a 40-day trial
Defendants'
transcript. The merits of appeals should be considered in the ordinary course and on
waste'
an ordinary schedule. '"Haste makes is an old adage. It has survived because it is right so
often."
Kusay v. United States, 62 F.3d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1995).

29
Dated: New York, New York Dated: New York, New York
March 17, 2024 March 17, 2024

Respectful y submitted, Re t tt ,

HA A I & & ROBE T PLLC

ASSOCIATES, LLP C ifford S. Robert
Alina Habba Michael Farina
Michael Madaio 526 RXR Plaza
112 West 34th Street, 17th & 18th Floors Uniondale, New York 11556
New York, New York 10120 Phone: (516) 832-7000
Phone: (908) 869-1188 Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected] [email protected]
[email protected] Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald
Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Jeffrey McConney, The Donald J. Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization LLC, LLC, DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings
DJT Holdings LLC, DJT Holdings Managing Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor
Member LLC, Trump Endeavor 12 LLC, 401 12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,
North Wabash Venture LLC, Trump Old Post Trump Old Post Office LLC, 40 Wall Street

Office LLC, 40 Wall Street LLC and Seven LLC and Seven Springs LLC
Springs LLC
-and-

Christopher M. Kise
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
CONTINENTAL PLLC
101 North Monroe Street, Suite 750

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Phone: (850) 332-0702
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald

Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

LLC, DJT Holdings LLC, DE Holdings

Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor

12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,

Trump Old Post Office LLC, 40 Wall Street

LLC and Seven Springs LLC

-and-

30
 D. John Sauer
(Pro Hac Vice Application Pending)
JAMES OTIS LAW GROUP, LLC
13321 North Outer Forty Road, Suite 300
St. Louis, Missouri 63017
Phone: (314) 562-0031
Email: [email protected]
Counsel for Donald J. Trump, Donald

Trump, Jr., Eric Trump, The Donald J.

Trump Revocable Trust, The Trump

Organization, Inc., Trump Organization

LLC, DE Holdings LLC, DE Holdings

Managing Member LLC, Trump Endeavor

12 LLC, 401 North Wabash Venture LLC,

Trump Old Post Of]ìce LLC, 40 Wall Street

LLC and Seven Springs LLC

31