ON MODELS AND REALITY: SOME NOTES ON

THE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF ELITES

IN DEVELOPING SOCIETIES
DANTE c. SIMBULAN

THE TERM ELITE, LIKE OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONCEPTS,

has been the subject of much intellectual debate. It has also been
utilized to advance diverse points of view. A mere listing of the pro-
ponents of the theory of the elite will indicate the dynamic nature of
the concept. Men of varied political persuasions such as Saint-Simon,
Auguste Compte, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels
were among the early writers on the subject. 1 Thus some elite writers
have been called "elitist" anti-democrats, but even liberal democrats and
socialist writers have since used the term. Furthermore, the term elite
has been alternately applied to the "right leaders" of Saint-Simon, the
"scientific priesthood" of Compte, the "leaders of the social forces" of
Mosca, the "superior beings" of Pareto, and lately, to the men who occupy
the "institutional command post" of C. vVright Mills. 2 Even Karl Marx's
"ruling class" which refers to "those who own and control the means
of production" could, in some ways, be related to the elite concept al-
though in a much broader context.
The above illustrates the flexibility and analytical advantage of the
concept. It identifies and concerns itself with the leading individuals
in a group or community, independent of the personal preferences or
ideological persuasion of the investigator. But, more importantly, it re-
lies on empirical proof for its development.

I
It is perhaps for this reason that the study of elites has already un-
dergone an interesting revival. The series of studies on American com-

1 See Doctrine of Saint-Simon: An Exposition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958),

particularly the discussion of George G. Iggers in the Introduction, ix-xi;
Gaetano Mosca, Elementi di sciencia politica, trans. by Hannah D. Kahn and ed.
and rev. by A. Livingston as The Ruling Class, (New York and London: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939); Compte published in 1853 a work entitled Sys-
teme de politique positive, ou traite de sociologie, an elaboration of Saint-Simon's
idea of the ruling group; Pareto was the more elaborate of the elite theorists.
His Trattato di sociologia •generale, trans. as Mind and Sociely by Andrew Bongiorno
and Arthur Livingston, ed. by A. Livingston, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935)
appeared in several volumes; Robert Michels, Political Pm·ties: A Sociological
Study of The Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. (Glencoe: The Free
Press, 1949).
2 C. Wright Mills, Power Elite. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1956).

421
 422 ASIAN STUDIES

munity power structure by Floyd Hunter, Robert C. Schulze, Delbert

C. Miller, W. Lloyd Warner, and the Lynds 3 among others have, aside
from Harold Lasswell and C. Wright Mills, provided the data upon
which the continuing analysis of elites has centered.
The studies made by the above scholars suggest, in general, the
existence of a pyramidal "power structure" and that the influentials in
the community could be located at the apex of the social pyramid:1
These findings in America are, of course, no different from those
earlier made by Robert Michels in his penetrating studies of political
parties in Europe from which he came out with his now classic "iron
law of oligarchy."5
But the oligarchic (or undemocratic) situation described in the find-
ings of tiiese sociological studies could not long remain unanswered.
Dahl, Polsby, Meisel, and others soon came up with articulate demands
for "tests" of the existence of "ruling elites," and polemics on the "myth
of the ruling class." 6 Soon a pluralist (and presumably "democratic") con-
cept of elites and the power they wield was developed which, as to be
expected, is critical of the stratification approach of the earlier investi-
gators.
Essentially, the "pluralists" accept the reality of power in the com-
munity but reject the research findings of Hunter, Schulze, Miller, Warner,
Mills and the Lynds that the socio-economic elite in a community do-
minate political life. They find these findings irrelevant in New Haven
and comes up with their own model of community power. 7 The com-
mon theme of the "pluralists" is that power and influence are so well
dispersed in the community that the period has ended "when social

3 See Floyd Hunter, Community Pou:er Structut·e, (Chapel Hill: University of

North Carolina Press, 1953); Robert 0. Schulze, and Leonard U. Blumberg, "The
Determination of Local Power Elites," American Journal of Sociology LXIII,
(1957); Delbert C. Miller, "IndustiY and Community Power Structure . . .
American Sociological Review, XXIII (1958); W. Lloyd Warner et al., Demo-
cracy in Jonesville, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949); Robert S. Lynd and
Helen W. Lynd, Middletown in Transition, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1937);
Harold Lasswell et al., The Comparative Study of Elites, (Stanford: Stanford
Univ. Press, 1952).
4 See particularly, Hunter, Ibid., pp. 75 ff., 156 ff., 195; and the Lynds ibid.,
pp. 74-101. -
5 "It is organization, [Michels wrote], which gives birth to the domination of
the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the dele-
gates over the delegators. Who says organization says oligarchy." Political Par-
ties, (Introduction, Collier Book Edition, 1962, p. 15).
6 Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Poli-
tical Science Review, LII (1958), pp. 468-469; "The Concepts of Power," Beha-
vioral Science, II, (1957) pp. 201-215; Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1961); Nelson Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power: A
Reassessment," Social Fot·ces, Vol. 37, (1959), pp. 232-236; James H. Meisel, The
Myth of the Ruling Class, (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1958).
7 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Ibid; Dahl has as colla-
borators in this study Nelson Polsby who wrote Community Power and Political
Theory and Raymond Wolfinger who come out with The Politics of Progress.
 ON MODELS AND REALITY

status, education, wealth, and political influence were limited in the

same hands," 8 ' They raised questions such as, "Is influence predictably
distributed in the population?" "Does the possession of economic re-
sources make one influential?" 9 Dahl talks of a "slack in the system,"
which means to say that "a great gap between their [the influentials]
actual influence and their potential influence exist."1°
How relevant are these models, which have been developed out of
Western community studies, when applied to non-Western settings? To
even the cursory observer of the environment of non-Western politics,
these questions may seem a bit like exercises in futile hair..:splitting. Dahl
himself has made the warning: "I had better make clear at once ·that
explanations presented in this study [Who Governs?] are tested only
against the evidence furnished in the political system of New Haven."1.1
But the problem is a real one. Already foreign-trained scholars of
the "Dahl School" have returned to their "underdeveloped settings" and
are conducting inquiries along the New Haven-type model. Offhand,
there seems to be nothing wrong with the procedure so long as the
model is taken as such and abandoned or modified if the facts do not
fit it.. But when the empirical data· are forced into the model, as one
graduate student recently tried to do, the result can be chaos and utter
confusion. This confusion is not limited to students. Even established
authorities and scholars sometimes manifest this confusion. Pye, for
instance made the observation that
the dominant characteristic of all the political systems of Southeast Asia is
that they are still, as in the traditional and colonial periods, shaiply divided
between the ruling few, who possess a distinctive outlook and culture, and
the vast majority of the population, who are oriented to village units and
the peasant's way of life.12
Similarly, Malcolm, an American official of long residence in the Philip-
pines, 1s observed that
The Filipino social system divides among [along?] class lines. On the lower
level are the taos. On the higher level are the caciques or ilustrados. Sand-
wiched between the two widely separated extremes is the middle class.
The taos are peasants who constitutes the rural laborers of the ISlands.
They are the largest group in number, but provide the smallest count in
the matter of education. Hard workers in the fields, although often paid

8 Dahl, ibid., p. 24.

9 See Polsby, "The Sociology of Community Power. . . " op. cit. pp. 232-283.
10 Dahl, ibid., p. 305.
11 Dahl, Who Governs, ibid., vi.
12 Lucian Pye, "The Politics of Southeast Asia" in Gabriel A. Almond and
James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of Developing Areas, (New Jersey: Prince-
ton Univ. Press, 1959), p. 117. ·
lS From 1912 to 1949, George A. Malcolm was successively Dean, College
of Law; : Univ. of the Philippines; Justice of the Philippine Supreme Court, Staff
member of · the Office of the U. S. High Commissioner to the Philippines; and
Professorial Lecturer, U. P.
424 ASIAN STUDIES

barely living wages, they are resigned to their lot, if not stirred by leaders
to violence. The sad fate of the taos has been that from time immemorial
they have all too often been oppressed by their employers and preyed upun
by usurers . . . .
The caciques are large landowners or persons of influence. Small in nurn-
·ber, but wealthy, well educated, and cultured, they constitute the ruling
class.l4

More recently, David Wurfel noted that "to a larger extent than in any
Southeast Asian country, except bureaucratic-capitalist Thailand and
Communist North Vietnam, the Philippine economic and political elites
are coterminous. "15
The above and other observations made by some scholars are remark-
able in their similarly. Yet, what is noteworthy is that in spite of such
suggestion of the existence of an oligarchical situation, the picture that
emerges is somewhat muddled, especially when viewed in the light of
other comments from the same writers. Wurfel, for example, has writ-
ten elsewhere that "the Philippines, thanks in part to American tute-
lage, today enjoys the most democratic government in Southeast Asia." 16
Malcolm, in the same book where he described the Filipino "ruling class",
has also referred to the Philippines as the "show window of democracy
in the Far East." 17 Coleman, drawing on Pye's study of Southeast Asia
politics, has made the Philippines a "model" of political democracy. 18
These observations tend to blur the leadership picture for they suggest
the existence side-by-side of "democracy" on the one hand and a "ruling
few" on the other. 19
One difficulty seems to be partly due to the limitations imposed by
the "models". The symbolic reality - found in the political rituals and
in the official utterances of the elite - is confused with the objective
reality. What ought to be is often mistaken for what is and deviation
from the established social myths is usually looked upon with disappro-
bation. Fred Riggs has expressed this view quite well and he calls it a
"vicious circle": "the more artificial and remote from reality the alien
models, conventional wisdom, and cliches accepted by an entrenced in-
telligentsia elite", he wrote, "the more difficult it becomes for realistic

14 Malcolm, First Malayan Republic, (Boston: The Christopher Publishing

House, 1951), p. 36.
15 David Wurfel, "The Philippines," in George McTurnan Kahin (ed.) Gov-
ernment and Politics of Southeast Asia, (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961),
p. 457.
16 Section on the Philippines, "Comparative Studies in Political Finance,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 25, No. 4, November 1963, p. 757.
17 Malcolm, op cit., Chapter I, p. 21.
18 See concluding Chapter in Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 559-560;
also Table 6, p. 564.
19 Much, of course, depends on what one means by "democracy" but the
two terms generally suggest divergent connotations.
 ON MODELS AND REALITY 425

thinking and scholarly research to gain acceptance - the more "sub-

versive" such activities appear to be."20
What is suggested here is that the conditions present in Western
models - both social and economic - may be absent in the developing
societies and, therefore, the "pluralistic" situation described by Dahl may
not be expected to operate. Why is this so? Let us now examine an
alternative approach.

II
Let us adopt the most common usage of the term elite as applied to
those individuals who occupy those positions in society which are at the
summits of key social structures. Thus we have economic elites, political
elites, intellectual elites, military elites, social elites, etc. who occupy, res-
pectively, the top of the corresponding social structures (namely, the
economy, government and politics, education, the military, and so forth).
What are the characteristics or attributes that place individuals or
groups in dominant positions way above the rest of society? We shall
refer to these attributes as the key values essential to the exercise of in-
fluence. These key values are wealth, skill, education, political power,
and status or prestige. 21 Under this definition, there could be as many
elites as there are values.
Elite status, therefore, is largely determined by the possession of
these key values. Hence, most people in different societies desire these
key values and often engage in competitive activities to attain them.
Theoretically, elite status may be attained by any individual who
acquires these values and possess them in sufficient amounts as compared
with the members of his group or community who may not have them at
all or who may have them in much lesser amounts. It should be noted that
this analysis makes no reference to the social class origin of the indivi-
dual. It merely states that an individual who is "successful" in acquir-
ing these key values become an elite of the functional social structure.
The elite concept, therefore, is also theoretically independent of the class
concept.
But, in practical life, the sharing and distribution of these values
differ from culture to culture, from country to country. Where these are
widely shared or distributed, larger and broadly-based elites may emerge;
where there is high inequality in their sharing and distribution, a· small
and narrowly-based elite often results.

20 Fred Riggs, "A Model for the Study of Philippine Social Structure,"
Philippine Sociological Review, Vol. VII, No. 8, July, 1959, p. 18.
21 This list of key values is not comprehensive. A particular society may
have other key values but these are to be established by first-hand investigation.
All influence-wielders in most societies, however, possess one or more of these
key values.
426 ASIAN STUDIES

A common pattern, too, is the tendency of concentration or agglu-

tination of these values in the same hands since possession of any, or all
of these values enhances the acquisition of more of the same or provide
the possessor with the means to acquire the other values. Thus, the better
off an individual is, the more opportunities in life he enjoys. Wealth may
not only bring more wealth but also facilitates the acquisition of power,
prestige, and the other values. Those categorized as belonging to the
elite of wealth will most likely also be the best educated, the most skilled,
the most prestigious and the most influential in the realm of decision-
making. Or some of those possessing wealth, but not having skills, can
"buy" these by putting technocrats - bureaucrats, image-builders, mass
media people, politicians, military men and even intellectuals - in their
payrolls.
Here. we can see the other side of the "pluralist" coin, where
those possessing the key values may not necessarily fight among them-
selves, but may collaborate within the elite system to preserve elite in-
terests. This is particularly true when middle class intellectuals are
coopted into the elite system and become eloquent defenders of the
status quo.
Therefore in countries which are characterized by a marked degree
of social stratification, where no far-reaching social and economic change
have yet affected the vast masses of the people and wide gaps divide
social classes, there will likely be a high inequality in the sharing and
distribution of wealth, education, power, prestige, and skill among the
various social classes. The posession of these values tend to be concen-
trated, not only in the same hands but also in the same social strata. In
short, when persons become "elite" in relation to several of these key
values and have, therefore, a high generalized influence, we say that
they are the elite of society.22 And when these individuals with high
generalized influence are found in the same social strata, the elite con-
cept becomes applicable, not only to individuals occupying a high posi-
tion in a functional hierarchy but also to their families. The elite con-
cept, in this case, may now be used with reference to the upper strata.
Thus, the elite concept merges with the class concept.

III
No society may be said to be truly static for structures are general-
ly in flux. Sociologists, however, speak of a "changing society and a
"static" society depending on the presence or absence of certain dynamic
factors that may produce social and economic changes resulting in the
restratification of society. Thus, a "changing" society may be charac-

22 For a more elaborate discussion of this point, see Lasswell's Comparative

Study of Elites, op. cit., p. 6.
 ON MODELS AND REALITY 427

terized by limited extremes of wealth and poverty, rapid industrialization,

wide occupational opportunities, minimum of class distinctions, education
open to all with needed ability, etc. A "static" society manifests the
opposite of the above: its economy is agrarian-based, great social and
economic inequalities exists, class distinctions are markedly apparent, and
an aristocracy is dominant in the social, economic and political spheres. 23
It is commonly pointed out that since most of the developing so-
cieties had the similar historical experience of having been colonized,
they became beneficiaries of western political and economic institutions,
which were consciously or unconciously introduced by the colonial rulers.
Western technology, public education, representative government, po-
pular elections and "free enterprise", were supposed to have produced
massive changes, not only in the economy but also in the social and
political structures of the colonies.24 But why did the traditional imba-
lance between social classes, between elite and non-elite continue to
persist? What actual changes occurred and who were affected by these
changes?
It should be noted that the colonial powers erected the superstruc-
tures of their regimes upon the foundations of the then existing social
and economic institutions. In the process of consolidating their control,
they saw the advantage of utilizing the native elite for their own
purposes, thereby institutionalizing the status and role of the latter as
the dominant class among the indigenous population. A direct conse-
quence of this policy of course the preservation of the social and
economic superiority of this group.
The innovations that were introduced such as public education, re-
presentative government, "free enterprise," and popular elections did
not basically alter the existing power relations. Since the basic social
and economic structures remained essentially intact, "change," or what
others would call "modernization" became circumscribed. The innova-
tions did not permeate evenly to all levels of society. Traditional pat-
terns of economic and social relations continued to persist and the pros-
perity associated with "progress" had generally been confined to a limit-·
ed group in society. One has but to see the ever-widening gap between
the developed and underdeveloped sectors of these societies, the con-
trast between the progressive urban enclaves where the rich foreign and
indigenous elite reside and the stagnant rural communities, and the great
23 This tyPology should be taken as a convenient analytical device to mark
points in a continuum. Cf. Chester L. Hunt, "Social Class Structure," in Hunt,
et al., Sociology in the Philippine Setting, (Manila: Alemar's, 1959), pp. 154-155.
24 "The Philippine society," writes Frank Golay in this connection, "for better
or for worse, has made an unambiguous decision to organize its economy on the
basis of private initiative. . . . in which economic activity by the individual is re-
warded liberally. This enterprise type of economic organization is a legacy of
American colonial rule ... " Golay, The Philippines: Public Policy and Economic
Development, (New York: Cornell Univ. Press, 1961), p. 4.
428 ASIAN STUDIES

disparities in the economic and material resources controlled by a tiny

minority of plutocrats and the abject poverty of the great majority of
these societies to realize the validity of this statement.
This does not imply, however, that the traditional indigenous elite
continued to be caste-like in character. Entry to elite status did not
remain closed for long. Since the colonial regimes failed to attract ad-
ministrators in sufficient numbers from their own nationals, the need
for recruiting trained colonials arose. This need became intense with
the growth of colonial bureaucracy. Hence, promising young natives
were recruited not only from the upper class but also from the other
strata of society and these were given training in the local schools estab-
lished by the colonial rulers or were sent to the schools of the "mother
country" to be trained as teachers, soldiers, lawyers, doctors, etc.25
These two groups then became the core of the "westernized" elite
who closely collaborated with the colonial rulers in the furtherance of
their objectives and in the attainment of the colonial goals. They
acquired western values, learned to speak the western language,
and adopted western styles of life. 26 As loyal agents of colonial rule,
they naturally shared in the bounties of power. Having acquired educa-
tion and skills they were given positions in the colonial government and
soon acquired more of the key values previously discussed.
The withdrawal of the colonial rulers from their colonies left this
westernized elite firmly in control. They expanded and diversified their
economic holdings. From agricultural landholdings, they went into bank-
ing, manufacturing, business, and the professions. Some entered into
business alliances with foreign capitalists while others sought (and are
seeking) to dislodge foreign businessmen from the premiere position
they occupy. They organized, financed and led the political par-
ties. They controlled bureaucracies and governments. They tried, and
often succeeded, in controlling public opinion and education. In short,
they developed and prospered while the mass of their countrymen re-
mained stagnant. And the gap separating them and their people con-
tinues to remain today a wide chasm.27

25 Thus, many young Indians, Ceylonese, Malaysians, and Nigerians went to

British schools; Indonesian students went to Holland; Algerians and Vietnamese went
to France, and Filipino "pensionados" were sent to America to study.
26 S. Arasaratnam, commenting on this phenomenon in Ceylon, noted that the
westernized Ceylonese elite would describe the island as a "little bit of England"
and take pride in this clescription. See S. Arasaratnam, Ceylon, (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 9.
27 For detailed evidences of these points, see, for example, Seymour Martin
Lipset and Aldo Solari (eds.) Elites in Latin America, (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1967); Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis, (Lon-
don: Oxford Univ. Press, 1964); Rupert Emerson, Representative Government in
Southeast Asia, (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1955); Hugh H. Smythe, and Ma-
bel M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite, (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1960); E.
Stanley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Eco-
 ON MODELS AND· REALITY 429

IV
The foregoing propositions and discussion are meant as possible
starting points for a comparative and more intensive study of elites in
developing societies. More refined techniques in methods need to be dev-
eloped and more empirical data should be accumulated. ·But ·the .main
plea of this .essay is that while details are important they ·should not
distract the investigator from seeing the total picture. The airri is to look
closer at the trees but at the same time not to get lost and fail to see
the forest. Our concern with refined methodological tools; with empi-
ricism and "behavioralism," should not reduce us, in the words of C.
Wright Mills, to social scientists of the narrow focus, preoccupied with
the trivial details "the almighty unimportant fact."2 8
Re&earchers on elites in the developing societies must confront at
the outset the reality of built-in oligarchical structures. They are often
obvious enough that even the unsophisticated observer can easily detect
their existence and operation. The problem, however, is to examine these
structures systematically. without distorting the total picture.
It may help also to heed the suggestion of Neumann that when we
study the complex phenomenon of political power, we can use as a frame
within which the analyses have to be made the basic proposition that
"political power has its roots in economic power;" that "the form of gov-.
ernment may or may not truly express the distribution of
The doctrine of separate powers may or may not· express the fact that·
social forces are as balanced as are · the political institutions. .As a rule,
they are not. Constitutional law meri!lly supplies the frame for the exercise
of political power but does nat indicate its holder or its functions. . . .
Constitutional law, secondly, indicates the form in which political power
may be legitimately exercised. While the significance of both aspects of'
constitutional may not be underestimated, empirical sociological studies
of the locus of political power are

Finally, the selection of·· a model shotild be based on its usefulness

in the analysis, that is, one that approximates the reality that is being
described and analyzed. The investigator must never be satisfied \Vith
ambiguities and clichls. Furthermore, he should strive to clarify re-

nomic Development, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1961); Charles A. Beard,
The Economic Basis of Politics, (New York: Vintage Books, 1957); Jose Medina
Echavarria and B. Higgins ( eds.) Social Aspects of Economic Det,elopment in
Latin America. Vol. II (Paris: UNESCO, 1968); and Dante C. Simbulan, "The
Socio-Economic Elite in Philippine Politics and Government, 1946-1968," (Ph.D.
dissertation, Australian National University, 1965, prt"seritly h(•ing prepared for
publication in book form as the Modern Principalia: A Study of the Philippine
Elite.).
28 C. Wright The Marxists, (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962), p. 10.
29 Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Power:· Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. LXV, June, 1950, pp. 177-liS.
llO Ibid., p. 178.
430 ASIAN STUDIES

lationships between the concepts and "models" he has developed or

adopted on the one hand, and the concrete reality on the other.
But there is, however, a problem here. Scholars, like other human
beings, develop preferences. They, too, acquire certain values which
they unconsciously or (consciously) apply to the phenomena they are
studying. In the process, they sometimes mistake their preferences (or
ideals) for the reality they are investigating and in the resulting con-
fusiop, they may also mistake .the part for the whole and end up describ-
ing, as in the Philippine example, the case of a "democratic" tail wagging
the "oligarchical" dog.