DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023

DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023

MINISTRY of DEFENSE Booklet

On the Publication of Defense of Japan 2023

HAMADA Yasukazu
Minister of Defense

The world is at a turning point in history. The international community is facing its greatest
trial since World War II (WWII), and we have entered a new era of crisis.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is an unprecedented situation. A permanent member of

the United Nations Security Council has shown disregard for international law by launching
an aggression against a sovereign country and repeating rhetoric and actions that can be
interpreted as threats of nuclear weapons use. Additionally, China is rapidly enhancing its
military capability qualitatively and quantitatively, including nuclear and missile forces, while
continuing and amplifying its unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts
in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Furthermore, North Korea is rapidly advancing
its nuclear and missile development, repeatedly launching missiles.

Under these circumstances, it goes without saying that diplomatic efforts are the foremost
priority of Japan, which has experienced WWII and has since been pursuing the path of a
peace-loving nation. Japan remains unwavering in its commitment to respecting the rule of
law and settling any disputes not through the use of forcible measures but peacefully and
diplomatically. At the same time, in order to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese
nationals, it is essential to make efforts to “defend our country by ourselves” and increase
deterrence. In other words, we need to make the opponent think that “attacking Japan will not
achieve its goals.”

Japan’s intentions and tangible measures for achieving them are articulated in our new
National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program that
were adopted by the Cabinet last December. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) will follow
through on them, including reinforcement of our defense production and technology bases.
In doing so, we will focus on two priorities: first, to maximize effective use of our current
equipment by improving operational rates, securing sufficient munitions, and accelerating
investments in improving the resiliency of major defense facilities; and second, to strengthen
the core areas of our future defense capabilities, including stand-off defense capabilities that
can be utilized as counterstrike capabilities and unmanned assets.

However, no matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/Self-Defense Forces (SDF)
procure, our defense capability cannot be demonstrated without personnel to operate them.
The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. We will speed up our efforts to
improve their lives, work environments and treatment.

In recent years, diplomatic efforts have also gained importance for defense. Since my
appointment as Minister of Defense, I have held discussions on numerous occasions with
defense ministers, including Secretary of Defense Austin of the United States, Japan’s only
ally, and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Marles of Australia, working to
deepen our cooperation and collaboration. Building upon these discussions, we will continue
to pursue various cooperation, including the joint development of the next-generation fighter
aircraft by Japan, the United Kingdom, and Italy.

Even if my counterparts and I were to have different views, it is important to make persistent
efforts to maintain and increase our communication through dialogue, aiming to build trust
and avoid unforeseen circumstances. As such, I will continue to make these endeavors.

From this perspective, Defense of Japan 2023 outlines the security environment surrounding
Japan and the activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF. The beginning focuses on the changes
before 2013 (when the previous National Security Strategy was formulated) and the changes
through 2022 (when the current National Security Strategy was formulated), which includes a
special feature titled, “An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change.” Additionally, the National
Defense Strategy is explained concisely and clearly with photos and diagrams to deepen
readers’ understanding.

It is important above all that initiatives for defense of Japan have the understanding and
cooperation of the people and are highly transparent to the international community. In this
regard, this white paper has played a critical role. We sincerely hope that Defense of Japan
2023 will be read by as many people as possible and help increase their understanding of the
activities and efforts of the MOD/SDF.
Special
Feature
1 An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change
1 The Regional Security Environment Surrounding Japan
Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Over the past decade, countries and others neighboring Japan
have been significantly strengthening their military capabilities as well as rapidly expanding and intensifying missile launches and demonstrations of
their military force.

Military developments in countries and others neighboring Japan since 2013

(focus on cases confirmed for the first time)

North Korea Russia

North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and Russia’s military activities in the Indo-Pacific region
imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before. including Japan, together with its strategic coordination
with China, are of strong security concern.

China
Northern Territories issue
China’s current external stance, military activities, and Four nuclear tests Airspace intrusion off the Nemuro Peninsula (2015)
other activities have become a matter of serious concern Airspace intrusions off Cape Shiretoko (2020, 2021)
(2013, 2016 (two tests), 2017) Airspace intrusion off the Nemuro Peninsula (2022)
for Japan and the international community, and present * Two tests before 2012 (2006, Russia
Russia
an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge. 2009) Airspace intrusion RussiaRussia Movements of China and Russia to
off Rishiri Island Russia
[Source: AFP/Jiji] (2013) strengthen their military ties
Since 2016, China has been flying military aircraft over the Sea Navigation in • Joint flights by bombers (July 2019, December
of Japan, expanding and intensifying the scope of its activities. China Japan’s territorial 2020, November 2021, May and November 2022)
waters (2017)
• First confirmation of Chinese military aircraft (Y-8 early warning aircraft • Joint navigation by warships near or around Japan
and Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft) over the Sea (October 2021,
of Japan (January 2016) H-6 bomber September 2022)
• First confirmation of bombers (H-6) (August 2016)
Joint navigation by Chinese
• First confirmation of a formation including fighters and Russian warships
(December 2017) Russia Airspace
intrusion off Cumulative number
Takeshima of scrambles (Times) 9,151
Since 2013, China has been flying military aircraft Island (2019) (decade-based Total: Approx. 3.1 times Others186
over the Pacific Ocean, expanding and intensifying
（Russia: ）Russia
Russia Russia comparison) China: Approx. 7.2 times
the scope of its activities Airspace intrusion off Approx. 1.6 times 3,096
• First confirmation of passage by Chinese military aircraft Okinoshima Island Airspace intrusion
(Y-8 early warning aircraft) between the main island of (2013) off Hachijojima
Okinawa and Miyakojima Island (July 2013) Island (2019) 2,988 China
Others 218
• First confirmation of bombers (H-6) (September 2013) 5,869
China Navigation in Japan’s territorial waters (2016, 2021, 2022) Russia 1,956
• First confirmation of passage of a formation including fighters *Multiple instances in one year were confirmed for the first
China’s attempt to unilaterally change time in 2022 (April, July, September, November, December) China 814
between the main island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Island
(September 2016) the status quo by force in the East China 2003–2012 2013–2022 (FY)
Sea / Rapid expansion and increase of Active advancements
• First confirmation of passage of unmanned aerial vehicles to the Pacific Ocean by China
between the main island of Okinawa military activities
and Miyakojima Island (August 2021) Airspace China Russia
Activities by Chinese aircraft carriers in the Pacific Ocean The Chinese aircraft
intrusion off Airspace carrier “Liaoning”, which
Unmanned reconnaissance/ Uotsurishima intrusion off
attack aerial vehicle (TB-001) • First confirmation of entry into the Pacific Ocean by “Liaoning” (first was the first to conduct
Island (2017) Minamidaitojima aircraft carrier) (2016) shipboard takeoffs and
Issues Island (2019)
• Flights by carrier-based fighters (including presumed ones) carried by
Promotion of unilateral changes to the concerning “Liaoning” over the Pacific Ocean (April 2018, April 2020, April and
landings by carrier-based
fighters (presumed) in the
status quo by force and the creation of Taiwan December 2021, May and December 2022) Pacific Ocean
faits accomplis in the South China Sea • “Liaoning” had the highest number of shipboard takeoffs and
• Since 2014, China has engaged in large-scale landings (more than 300) during its operational period (2022)
and rapid land reclamation and infrastructure • First confirmation of entry into the Pacific by “Shandong”
development on seven features of the Spratly Islands (second aircraft carrier). More than 600 shipboard takeoffs and
landings were confirmed. (2023)
* China has had de facto control over the Scarborough
Shoal in 2012
August 2014 Continuous activities of Chinese warships and others around the Senkaku Islands
Issues • Entry into Japan’s contiguous zone by Chinese navy surface ships (June 2016, January and June 2018, July 2022)
China is making concerning • Frequent cases in recent years of China Coast Guard vessels attempting to approach Japanese fishing
progress on creating the South vessels in Japan’s territorial waters (8 cases in 2020 →18 cases in 2018→11 cases in 2022)
a fait accompli in the China Sea • First intrusion into Japan’s territorial waters by China Coast Guard vessels, etc., equipped with a
Fiery Cross Reef
gun-like armament (from 2015)

A China Coast Guard vessel equipped

March 2020
Area after reclamation:
Intensified activities by China around Taiwan with a gun-like armament intruded into
Japan’s territorial waters [Courtesy of
Approx. 2.72 km 2 • Although China is maintaining its policy for peaceful reunification with
(reclamation Japan Coast Guard]
completedin 2015) Taiwan, it has not ruled out the possibility of the use of force
Approx. • Five Chinese ballistic missiles landed in Japan’s EEZ (August 2022) J-16 fighter
3,750 m Large harbor • Significant increase in number of Chinese aircraft entering Taiwan’s
Runway airspace (2022)
(approx. 3,000 m) *380 in 2020→972 in 2021→1,733 in 2022 Image of China’s ballistic missile
launch in August 2022
[Sources: CSIS/AMTI/Maxar] Chinese military aircraft confirmed around Taiwan J-11 fighter
[Website of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense]
Booklet － 1 2023 Defense White Paper
Japan formulated its new National Security Strategy (2022 NSS) in December 2022.
Special Feature 1 focuses on changes in areas such as the security environment, build-up of defense capabilities, and cooperation and collaboration with
our ally and like-minded countries and others from pre-2013 (when the previous NSS was formulated) to 2022 (when the current NSS was formulated).

Supported by the increase in its defense budget at a high level, China is extensively and
rapidly enhancing its military capability, with focuses on its naval and air forces
as well as its nuclear and missile forces. Missile forces noted to have been
developed or deployed in recent years

Announced defense budget Modern naval forces Modern air forces Nuclear warheads

(100 million yuan) 14,505 (Vessels) 134 (Aircrafts) 1,270 (Number) 350
Approx. Approx. Approx. 50 5th Approx. 1.5 times
DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM),
which is viewed as being capable of carrying 10
Modern
2.2 times 1.6 times submarines 2.2 times generation 240
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
83 57 fighters (MIRVs) [Imaginechina/Jiji Press Photo]

6,503 565 4th

40 0 generation
Modern destroyers
and frigates fighters
565 1,220
43 77
DF-17 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM), which
is viewed as being capable of carrying a Hypersonic
2012 2022 (Year) 2013 2022 (Year) 2012 2022 (Year) 2012 2022 (Year) Glide Vehicle (HGV) [Avalon/Jiji Press Photo]

Number of days of intrusion into Total number of confirmed vessels Number of days of intrusion into Total number of confirmed vessels
Japan’s contiguous zone by China Coast of the China Coast Guard, etc., that Japan’s territorial waters by China Coast of the China Coast Guard, etc., that
Activities around Guard vessels, etc. intruded into Japan’s contiguous zone Guard vessels, etc. intruded into Japan’s territorial waters

the Senkaku Islands (Days) 336 (Vessels) 1,201 (Days) 37 (Vessels) 103
Approx. Approx. 1.4 times
Approx. Approx.
China has relentlessly Percentage 1.6 times 73
3.7 times of days in 2.8 times 23
continued attempts to year 92%
unilaterally change the 428
91 Percentage
status quo by force around of days in
year 25%
the Senkaku Islands for
2012 2022 (Year) 2012 2022 (Year) 2012 2022 (Year) 2012 2022 (Year)
many years

Rapid progress in nuclear and missile development. It is believed that North Korea has the ability to
attack Japan with nuclear weapons fitted to ballistic missiles.
Rapid improvement in missile-related technology over the past decade
Number of launched Number of nuclear warheads in stock* Improvement of secrecy and promptness Improvement of capability to breach ballistic
ballistic missiles, etc. missile defense (BMD)
Image
(Number) 151 (Number) Approx. 20
Conventional ballistic missile
Approx. Approx.
8.4 times 2.5 to 3.3 Space
in number of Includes 4 missiles
times Atmosphere
Irregular trajectory
launches that flew over Japan 6∼8
Includes 3 missiles Transporter erector Trains Submarines
18 that flew over Japan launcher (TEL) [Source: EPA/Jiji] •Development of ballistic missiles capable of flying
•Development of various platforms at low altitudes with irregular trajectories
1998–2012 2013–2022 (Year) Before 2012 2022 (Year)
 ➡ Enables launches from any point and concealment •Development of “hypersonic gliding flight warheads”
*According to SIPRI Yearbook 2022. •Pursuit of solid-fueled missiles  ➡ Aim to breach missile defense networks by
(Overall, North Korea has enough fissile material to produce 45 to 55 nuclear warheads)  ➡ Easier to store and handle than liquid fuel making interception difficult

Russia is promoting the modernization of various types of equipment, including its nuclear capabilities,
and reinforcing its armaments by deploying new types of equipment in Japan’s Northern Territories and
the Chishima Islands. In addition, Russia is moving to deepen its coordination with China by increasing
joint activities.
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has shaken the very Over the past 10 years, Russia has strengthened its missile capabilities with the deployment
foundation of the international order and is perceived as the most of new equipment in the Far East, including Japan’s Northern Territories
significant and direct threat to security in the European region. “Bastion” surface-to-ship missiles “Bal” surface-to-ship missiles Su-35S fighters
• Range of 300 km • Range of 130 km • Deployed to Etorofu Island from 2018
• Deployed to Etorofu Island in 2016 • Deployed to Kunashiri Island in 2016

Aggression against Ukraine (2022)

Annexation of Crimea (2014)
Ukrainian housing complex destroyed by
Armed men seized gorvenment buildings Russian missile attack (January 2023)
and military facilities on the Crimean [Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Headquarters of
Peninsula in Ukrainian territory (December the State Emergency Service of Ukraine]
2014) [Source: AFP/Jiji] [Russian Ministry of Defence website] [Russian Ministry of Defence website] [Russian Ministry of Defence website]

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 2

 2 Reinforcement
 of Japan’s Defense Capabilities:
Buildup of Defense Capabilities, etc. Promoted Since 2013
Japan’s defense capabilities are the ultimate guarantor of national security and demonstrate Japan’s resolve and capability to defend itself. Defense
capabilities cannot be replaced by any other means. The SDF play a central role as the “last stronghold.” Japan has consistently committed to modest and
efficient development of defense capabilities since the end of World War II.

2013
December 2013 July 2014 May 2015
• Establishment of the National Security •D evelopment of Seamless Security • Cabinet decisions to expedite procedures for promulgating
Council Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival security operations, maritime security operations, etc.
and Protect its People (Cabinet (“Responses to foreign naval vessels navigating through the territorial waters
• Passage and promulgation of the or the inland waters of Japan that do not constitute innocent passage under
Act on the Protection of Specially decision) international law,” “Government responses to incidents such as unlawful landings
Designated Secrets December 2014
on remote islands, etc., by armed groups,” and “Responses to acts of infringement
when SDF ships, etc,. detect foreign ships committing said acts against Japanese
• Formulation of the NSS, 2013 NDPG, • E ntry into force of the Act on the private ships on the high seas”)
and 2014 Medium Term Defense Protection of Specially Designated September 2015
Program (MTDP) Secrets • Passage and promulgation of the Legislation for Peace
and Security
Changes in Defense-Related Expenditures by Item (Fiscal Year) *On a contract basis with the exception of annual budget expenditures (initial)
Annual budget expenditures (initial) Expenses for sustainment and maintenance Buildup expenditures for ammunition R&D
(Trillion yen) Including SACO (100 million) 20,355 (100 million) 8,283 (100 million) 8,968
6.82
Approx. 1.1 times
5.40 Approx. 1.5 times
4.75
11,424
Excluding SACO Approx. 1.7 times Approx. 2.2 times
6.60 7,862
5.18 2,480 2,911
4.68
1,457 1,309

2013 2022 2023 (FY) 2013 2022* 2023 (FY) 2013 2022 2023 (FY) 2013 2022 2023 (FY)

*Figures for FY2022 include the FY2021 supplementary budget.

Strengthening of the Defense Architecture in the Southwestern Region

Deployment of units to the southwestern region, which has become a void in
terms of SDF deployment
• Establishment of the GSDF Yonaguni Coast Observation Unit (2016)
• Establishment of GSDF Area Security Force units (2019: Amami Oshima Island, Miyakojima Island; 2023:
Ishigakijima Island)
• Acquisition of GSDF Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles (from 2012) and GSDF Type-03 medium-range
surface-to-air missiles (from 2014)
• Deployment of GSDF surface-to-ship missile units and surface-to-air missile units (2019: Amami Oshima Island; 2020: Miyakojima
Island; 2023: Ishigakijima Island) Ainoura
• Deployment of ASDF mobile air surveillance radars
(2022: Yonaguni Island)
Development of a full-scale amphibious operations
capability
• Refurbishment of an MSDF landing ship
• Enhancement of the functions of the MSDF Minesweeper
Squadron (from 2016) Amami Oshima Island
• Establishment of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment
Brigade (2018: Ainoura)

Reinforcement to ensure air superiority

• Establishment of the early warning aircraft unit (2014: Naha) Miyakojima
Island
• Reinforcement of the Fighter Aircraft Units and establishment of the 9th Air Wing Yonagunijima Naha
(1 ➡2 squadrons) (2016: Naha) Island
• Establishment of the Southwestern Air Defense Force (2017: Naha)

Ishigakijima
*The numbers related to equipment held and units in this document are a comparison of the numbers in FY2013 and those in FY2022. Island
For example, “Acquisition of GSDF V-22 Ospreys (0→13 aircraft)” indicates that Japan had zero such aircraft at the end of FY2013 and 13 at the end of FY2022.

Booklet － 3 2023 Defense White Paper

 Special
Feature 1 An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change
Squarely facing the reality of the increasingly severe security environment, Japan decided to build truly effective defense capabilities under the 2013
National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) and the 2018 NDPG, and has strengthened our defense capabilities as well as resolutely defended the lives
of Japanese nationals and their peaceful livelihoods as well as Japan’s territorial land, waters and airspace. However, Japan’s neighboring countries and
others are increasing their military activities while strengthening their military capabilities. With regard to future defense capabilities, Japan must clearly
demonstrate its intention to never tolerate any unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts at any point in time.

2018 2022
December 2018 December 2022
• Formulation of the 2018 NDPG and • Formulation of the NSS, the National Defense Strategy of
2019 MTDP Japan (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP)

Strengthening of Comprehensive Strengthening of Command and

Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Control Capabilities; Utilization
• Deployment of the PAC-3MSE surface-to-air guided missiles (2020–2022) of the Space Domain
• Increase in the number of Aegis-equipped destroyers (6 ➡8 ships)
• Launch of X-band defense
(completed by 2020)
communications satellites
(Kirameki-1 and Kirameki-2)
(2017, 2018)
Buildup of Stand-off Defense Capabilities • Strengthening the capabilities
• Buildup of stand-off missiles (JSM, JASSM) to respond to opposing forces from a of various communication
safe distance without being attacked (outside of the threat systems
zone) (JSM: since 2018, JASSM: since 2023)
[Courtesy of Mitsubishi Heavy
• Research and development on Upgraded Type-12 surface-to-
Industries, Ltd./JAXA]
ship missiles, upgraded hyper velocity gliding projectiles and
hypersonic missiles. etc. (from 2018)

Utilization of Unmanned Assets

Misawa
• Acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (Global Hawk) (0➡ 2 aircraft) (from 2015)
• Establishment of the Reconnaissance Group (2022: Misawa)

Strengthening of Capabilities in the Maritime and Air Domains

• Acquisition of F-35A/B fighters (0 ➡ 33 aircraft) and P-1 patrol aircraft (5 ➡ 34 aircraft)
• Acquisition of KC-46A aerial refueling/transport aircraft (0➡ 2 aircraft)
• Increase in the number of submarines (16 ➡ 22 submarines)
Asaka (completed in 2022)
Fuchu
Ichigaya • Refurbishment of Izumo-class destroyers as well as takeoff and
landing testing of F-35B fighters (2021)
• Acquisition of a new type of frigates (FFM) (0 ➡ 4 vessels)

Strengthening of the Joint Operational Architecture

• Establishment (in Asaka) of a new command center (Ground Component Command) to conduct integrated
Enhancement of Maneuver and operations of the various regional units for nationwide operation of the GSDF (2018)
Deployment Capabilities • Strengthening of the Joint Staff’s posture in the domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum (from 2020)
• Acquisition of GSDF V-22 Ospreys (0 ➡ 13 aircraft)
• Acquisition of C-2 transport aircraft (1 ➡ 16 aircraft)
• Establishment of Rapid Deployment Regiments (0 ➡ 6 regiments) Strengthening of Capabilities in the Domains of Space,
• Procurement of Type-16 mobile combat vehicles (0 ➡ 160) Cyber, and Electromagnetic Spectrum (From 2020)
• Establishment of the ASDF Space Operations Squadron (2020: Fuchu), as well as the ASDF
Space Operations Group (2022: Fuchu) with expanded units
• Establishment of the Cyber Defense Group (2014: Ichigaya) under the SDF
Supervised Units of Communication Systems, expansion of the Group’s functions,
and then establishment of the JSDF Cyber Defense Command (2022: Ichigaya) by
abolishing the SDF Supervised Units of Communication Systems
• Establishment of the GSDF Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (2020)
• Acquisition of the GSDF Network Electronic Warfare System (NEWS) (from 2017)
• Development of the ASDF stand-off electronic warfare aircraft (since 2020)

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 4

 3 Ties
 with Japan’s Ally, Like-Minded Countries, and Others:
Deepening of Cooperation and Collaboration

2013 2018
2015 Establishment of the new Guidelines 2017 Entry into effect of
Passage of the Legislation for Peace the new Japan-U.S. ACSA
and Security Expansion of activities subject to the provision
of goods and services in accordance with the
implementation of the Legislation for Peace and
Japan-U.S. Alliance

Security

The Japan-U.S. Alliance has become 2017 SM-3 Block IIA, Reached
stronger than ever, and its deterrence the stage of joint production
and response capabilities have been
enhanced. Protection of U.S. Forces
and deployment
weapons, etc., has also become possible.

the Japa n-U.S. Alliance

Strengthening

Japan has promoted mutual understanding and confidence building with

Cooperation and Exchanges Among partner countries and strengthened bilateral and multilateral defense
People and Troops relations.
Defense Cooperation and Exchanges

■ “2+2” Meetings and Defense Ministerial Meetings

FY2013 FY2022

“2+2” 3 times 5 times

Defense Ministerial
Meeting
20 times 37 times
Countries with a
“2+2” framework
4 countries 9 countries Japan-Australia 2+2 (December 2022) Japan-U.S.-Australia Trilateral Defense
Ministerial Meeting (October 2022)
Note: Defense ministerial meetings are meetings with defense ministers of other countries.

■ Participation in Multilateral Exercises

FY2013 FY2022

Times 19 times 43 times

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White Paper.
Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted as one exercise.
The Indo-Pacific Deployment (IPD) Talisman Sabre
Commenced in 2017 Participation since 2015
Contributes to regional peace and stability Enhances cooperation and interoperability
through port calls to countries in the Indo- with the militaries of various countries and
Pacific region and multilateral exercises with strengthens Japan’s deterrence and response
the militaries of various countries during the capabilities through a multilateral field training
deployment period exercise in Australia

Booklet － 5 2023 Defense White Paper

 Special
Feature 1 An Era of Upheavals: 10 Years of Change
No country can now protect its own security alone.
While deepening the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which is the cornerstone for Japan’s security, Japan has also been strengthening cooperation with various
countries.

2023
2019 The Japan-U.S. “2+2
2+2”” 2020 60th anniversary of 2023 The Japan-U.S. “2+2
2+2””
the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Confirmation that a cyber attack can Expression of determination to continue Confirmation that an attack in space
constitute an armed attack under to strengthen the Alliance could lead to invocation of Article V of
Article V of the Japan-U.S. Security the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty
Treaty

■ Main Japan-U.S. Bilateral Exercises

Improvement of interoperability and Japan-U.S. joint response capabilities
FY2013 FY2022

Times 24 times 108 times

Note: See the reference materials in the 2014 and 2023 editions of the Defense White
Paper. Exercises with participation by two or more branches of the SDF are counted
as one exercise.

Capacity-building involves utilizing Japan’s capabilities to help other countries build their own capabilities. Japan has
Capacity Building been combining more practical and diverse means to further strengthen and deepen defense cooperation and exchanges.

Steady deepening and expanding

■ Cumulative numbers of recipient countries and projects for
capacity-building
FY2013 FY2022
Number of recipient 16 countries,
5 countries
countries 1 organization
Capacity-building to Mongolia Capacity-building to the Philippines
Number of projects 9 projects 51 projects (PKO (engineering)) (vessel maintenance)

Japan has been promoting defense equipment and technology cooperation with other countries in order
Defense Equipment and to contribute to the promotion of our national security, peace, and international cooperation, as well as
Technology Cooperation contribute to the maintenance and strengthening of defense technology and industrial bases.

Steady deepening and expanding

■ Number of countries with which Japan has concluded agreements
on the transfer of defense equipment and technology
FY2013 FY2022
Number of countries
with agreements
2 countries 13 countries
Transfer of the air surveillance radar systems to the Japan-U.K.-Italy joint development of next-generation
Philippines (since 2020) fighter aircraft (since 2022)

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 6

Special
Feature
2 NDS
Japan faces the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII. Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality and
fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on the capabilities of its opponents and new ways of warfare,
warfare, in order to protect
the lives and peaceful livelihoods of the Japanese nationals.
Thinking strategically, Japan’s deterrence will be enhanced by fundamentally reinforcing its defense capabilities as well as reinforcing the
defense architecture for national defense as a coherent whole.
whole.
Based on this recognition, the Government of Japan finalized the NDS to comprehensively present Japan’s defense objectives, approaches
and means to accomplish those objectives, and the means to achieve them. The NDS replaces the NDPG, which was formulated six times since
1976. The NDS represents a major turning point for postwar defense policy and provides the direction and content for strengthening defense
capabilities over the mid-term to long term. The Government will make every effort to deepen the public’s understanding of the significance of
this major turning point.

Defense Challenges
The military background for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was that Ukraine did not possess sufficient capabilities to deter Russia’s aggression.
Also worth paying attention to in this event is that a country with strong military capability has one day come to possess the intention to
launch an aggression. A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the intention to do so; accurately gauging other’s
intent from outside is inherently difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists conditions under which threats
may materialize.
To protect one’s country from such states, it is necessary to possess deterrence capability that makes others realize the difficulty of making
unilateral changes to the status quo by force, as well as to develop defense capability that are focused on opponent capabilities.
In addition, whether Japan will be able to respond to these emerging new ways of warfare is a major challenge in building future defense
capabilities. Japan’s future security and defense policy will directly affect the peace and stability of the region and the international community.

Emerging new ways of warfare

Large-scale missile attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles EEZ

• It is necessary to intercept incoming missiles and prevent them from

landing in Japan
• It is necessary to constrain missile launches by opponents and make
it difficult for them to conduct missile attacks Taipei
• Even if missiles hit facilities, runways, etc., it is necessary to conduct
persistent response by minimizing damage and quickly restoring the
affected facilities, runways, etc.
Image

Russia used over 5,000 ballistic and cruise missiles Five of the nine ballistic missiles fired by China into the
for strikes throughout all of Ukraine vicinity of Taiwan landed in Japan’s EEZ (August 2022)

Asymmetric attacks via the domains of space, cyber, or electromagnetic Hybrid warfare including information warfare
spectrum, unmanned vehicles, etc.
• Detect suspicious signs promptly and share that information in as real-time as
• S trengthening of detection, protection, and other response capabilities in the possible
domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum is an urgent issue • Be able to deploy SDF units ahead of opponents to where they are expected
• It is necessary to introduce a variety of unmanned equipment that can operate to attack, and also to have the transportation capabilities to quickly evacuate
on land, sea, and in the air, and develop capabilities to respond to unmanned Japanese nationals from dangerous areas
vehicles of opponents • Win information warfare including the dissemination of disinformation, etc., and
prevent confusion and such
Approach and
near-field activities
Destruction by by suspicious
anti-satellite satellites, etc.
missile
Obstruction by
Obstruction by jamming weapons
laser weapons Caption of a video taken and
posted of President Zelenskyy in
front of the Presidential Office to
Chinese military unmanned reconnais- Threats to the stable use of space counter disinformation that he had
sance aircraft flying between the main left Ukraine (February 2022)
island of Okinawa and Miyakojima Is- [Facebook account of
land (January 2023) President Zelenskyy]

Booklet － 7 2023 Defense White Paper

Special Feature 2 covers the NDS, which was formulated in December 2022.
It particularly focuses on the part regarding strengthening Japan’s own architecture for national defense,
and concisely explains the content on the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities to defend Japan.

Japan’s Three Defense Objectives

(1) Shape a security environment that does (2) Deter and respond to unilateral changes to (3) Should deterrence fail and invasion of
not tolerate unilateral changes to the the status quo by force and such attempts Japan occur, take primary responsibility
status quo by force through cooperation and collaboration to deal with the aggression and, while
with Japan’s ally, like-minded countries, receiving support from our ally and
and others, and bring the situation under others, disrupt and defeat the invasion.
control swiftly.

Prime Minister Kishida participating in the G7 Summit Meeting Japan-U.S. bilateral training with U.S. Air Force aircraft (February Photo of training for amphibious operations (February 2023)
(May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan] 2023)

Three Approaches to Realize the Defense Objectives

(1) Strengthening Japan’s own architecture (2) Strengthening deterrence and response (3) Reinforcement of collaboration with like-
for national defense capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance minded countries and others
“Fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s “Demonstrating the joint resolve and “Reinforce collaboration with as many
defense capabilities” capabilities of Japan and the United countries as possible”
“Reinforcing the defense architecture of States”
the whole country”

Next-generation fighter aircraft Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (January 2023) Signing of the Japan-U.K. Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA)
(January 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]

Operation of the Space Situational System has started in F-35B takeoff and landing testing on the destroyer JS “Izumo” Multilateral exercise with Japan, U.S., U.K., NLD, CA, NZ (October
collaboration with JAXA [Courtesy of JAXA] (October 2021) 2021)

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 8

 Seven Fields of the Fundamental Reinforcement of Defense Capabilities
Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce our defense capabilities by emphasizing seven pillars as the necessary functions and capabilities for
national defense. In particular, the top priorities for the next five years are to improve equipment operational rates, secure sufficient ammunition
and fuel, and expedite investment in key defense facilities in order to effectively maximize the use of current equipment, as well as to reinforce

01 05
future core capabilities such as stand-off defense capabilities and unmanned defense capabilities.

Stand-off defense capabilities Command and control and

Strengthening of capabilities to respond to opposing forces from intelligence-related functions
a safe distance without being attacked
Reinforcement of command and control and intelligence-related
functions for quick and
Identify a large amount of
accurate decision-making images using AI

Acquisition of Tomahawk missiles

Development of upgraded Type-12 Utilization of images using AI

surface-to-ship missile technologies (image)

Integrated air and missile

defense capabilities
Strengthening of capabilities to
respond to increasingly diverse
and complicated airborne threats,
02 Mobile deployment capabilities
and civil protection
Reinforcement of maritime and air transportation capabilities
for rapid maneuvering and
deployment of necessary units.
06
including missiles These capabilities are used to
protect the people of Japan.
Building Aegis System Equipped Vessels
(image)
Acquisition of transport vessels (image)

Unmanned defense capabilities

Enhancement of intelligence gathering and combat support
capabilities through unmanned assets 03 Sustainability and resiliency
Buildup of sufficient ammunition, guided missiles, and fuel at
an early stage. Japan will also
secure funds for the acquisition
and repair of equipment as well
as for improving the resiliency
07
of facilities.
Acquisition of middle range
reconnaissance UAVs (image) Securing ammunition storage facilities

Cross-domain operation
capabilities
04
Enhancement of capabilities in the domains of space, cyber, and
electromagnetic spectrum as well as ground, maritime, and air
capabilities needed for combat
“Counterstrike capabilities”
Key to deterring invasion against Japan
The capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an
opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against
the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against
fusing all capabilities incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network. This
discourages the opponent from attacking and deters armed attack
Development of stand-off electronic itself.
warfare aircraft (image)

Booklet － 9 2023 Defense White Paper

 Special
Feature 2 NDS
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases
The rapid progress of science and technology has fundamentally changed the nature of security, and various foreign countries are now working
to surround themselves with such technology.
In order to ensure stable procurement of equipment, it is essential to maintain and strengthen the defense production and technology
bases in Japan as a virtually integral part of its defense capabilities.

Reinforcing Defense Production Base

〉
〉〉Building a strong and sustainable defense industry
〉
〉〉Responding to various risks
〉
〉〉Promoting transfer of defense equipment and technology

Reinforcing Defense Technology Base

Photo of Industry Day
〉
〉〉Research and development that will lead to
fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities
at an early stage
〉
〉〉Active use of cutting-edge civilian technologies

Long-term operational type UUV

Reinforcing Human Resource Base and Transformation of Medical Functions

It is the SDF personnel who demonstrate the defense capabilities. No matter how much advanced equipment the MOD/SDF procures, it will
not be able to demonstrate its defense capabilities without human resources to handle that equipment. The MOD/SDF will promote efforts to
strengthen our defense capabilities in terms of human resources.
We will also strengthen our readiness to protect the lives of SDF personnel who fight.

Reinforcing Human Resource Base

〉
〉〉Reinforcement of recruitment measures
〉
〉〉Utilization of SDF Reserve Personnel and others
〉
〉〉Improvement of living and work environments and
treatment
〉
〉〉Human resource development
〉
〉〉Improving reemployment
〉
〉〉The award of honors for more SDF personnel
Online briefing sessions for people eligible for recruitment

Transforming Medical Functions

〉
〉〉Establishment of a seamless posture for medical care
and evacuation of patients between the frontline and
medical evacuation destinations
〉
〉〉Strengthening of education and research on medical
treatment for war injuries
Photo of patient transport training

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 10

 Area Previous plan Current plan
(FY2019–FY2023) (FY2023–FY2027)

Stand-off defense capabilities 0.2 trillion yen 5 trillion yen

Integrated air and missile defense

1 trillion yen 3 trillion yen
capabilities

Unmanned defense capabilities 0.1 trillion yen 1 trillion yen

Cross-domain operation capabilities

(space, cyber, land, maritime, and air equipment)
3 trillion yen 8 trillion yen

Command and control and

0.3 trillion yen 1 trillion yen
intelligence-related functions

Mobile deployment capabilities/

0.3 trillion yen 2 trillion yen
civil protection

Ammunition and 2 trillion yen

1 trillion yen
guided missiles
Sustainability and

(Approx. 5 trillion yen including other areas)

resiliency

Repair of equipment, 9 trillion yen

4 trillion yen
etc. (Approx. 10 trillion yen including other areas)

Improving the
1 trillion yen 4 trillion yen
resiliency of facilities

Reinforcing defense production 0.4 trillion yen

base (Approx. 1 trillion yen including other areas)
1 trillion yen

Research and development 1 trillion yen

(Approx. 3.5 trillion yen including other areas)

Others 4.4 trillion yen 6.6 trillion yen

Planned amount for FY2019–FY2023 Necessary expenditure

over the next 5 years
17.2 trillion yen
(contract-based amount) 43.5 trillion yen
(contract-based amount)
Booklet － 11 2023 Defense White Paper
 Special
Feature 2 NDS
Necessity of Securing Expenditure
Japan
Strengthening of capabilities to counter
Improved missile and radar capabilities Opponent’s threat zone
opposing forces from a safe distance
of various foreign countries
without being attacked

Trajectory of ballistic missile

Radar coverage
Increasing diversity and complexity of airborne threats, Detection point
Ra
Strengthening of interception and da
r li
such as missiles flying at extremely high speeds ne
of
other capabilities to respond to sig
ht
(hypersonic speeds), at low altitudes, and on irregular Detection point
airborne threats Irregular trajectory
trajectories
New threats

e
er
ph
Launch point Impact point

os
m
m
0k
At
10
Deal with new aspects of combat using unmanned equipment

Strengthen intelligence gathering capabilities for missiles and other assets of opponents, through the utilization of satellites
Reinforce the defense posture to respond to increasingly sophisticated, skillful cyber attacks
Improve the capabilities of various types of equipment as well as acquire them at an early stage in order to respond to the rapid buildup of military
capabilities in neighboring countries and others

Conduct seamless, continuous intelligence gathering on the increasingly intensifying military activities in various countries
Strengthen intelligence functions to win information warfare as seen in the aggression against Ukraine

Strengthen maritime and air transport capabilities for

Promote acquisition of transport
rapid deployment of units to remote islands and other
vessels, etc.
areas

Resolve the shortage of ammunition and guided missiles

Shortage
in order to prevent an invasion against Japan during a
Sufficiency
contingency Sufficiency

Occurrence of situations where equipment cannot be Secure sufficient funds for repairs, etc., to eliminate situations where
operated due to parts shortages, etc. equipment cannot be operated due to parts shortages, etc.

Of all SDF facilities, approx. 20% have protection performance and approx. 60% have earthquake resistance performance
⬇
Roughly 10 years later, 100% of facilities will have both protection and earthquake
resistance performance Aging facility built in 1942 (81 years old)

The defense industry is defense capability itself. Need to respond appropriately to diverse issues such as successive withdrawals of companies,
disruption of raw materials supply from overseas, and cyber attacks on companies

Amidst the rapid progress of science and technology, if we

Strengthening of investment, etc., in advanced
lag behind in research and development of future equipment
technologies necessary for future ways of warfare
it is difficult to recover from a delay

Secure the necessary budget for training and education of personnel, fuel for equipment, etc.

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 12

 Ⅰ
Part
Security Environment
Surrounding Japan

Overview Chapter 1

International Community is Facing the Greatest Post-War Trial Yet 

States that do not share universal values nor political and economic systems based on these values are expanding their influence, and unilateral changes to the status quo
by force and such attempts, including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, represent a serious challenge to the existing international order. The international community
is facing the greatest post-war trial yet, and has entered a new era of crisis. In addition, changes to the power
balance have brought about interstate competition across the political, economy, military, and other spheres,
and the competition between the United States and China is growing particularly intense. The international
community is presented with greater difficulties to rally together in taking on common challenges.
Furthermore, rapid development in science and technology are fundamentally changing the paradigm
of security. Countries are striving to develop cutting-edge technologies that prove to become “game
changers” and that are resulted in fundamental changes to the way the military is organized as well as the
way warfare is prosecuted, and the security sphere is expanding into the economic sphere, encompassing
areas such as the competition for control over advanced technologies.
In addition, risks in cyber and other domains are becoming more serious. It is highly likely that
information warfare, including the dissemination of disinformation, will be conducted on a regular basis,
U.S.-China Summit Meeting in November 2022 [AFP/Jiji]
and that hybrid warfare combining military and non-military methods will be employed in an even more
sophisticated manner.

The Security Situation Intensifies in the Indo-Pacific Region 

The Indo-Pacific region in which Japan is situated faces a host of security challenges. In particular, the
number of arms including nuclear weapons and missiles is rapidly building up around Japan, and the
Chinese naval vessel Jiangwei II-class frigate, which entered the
tendency towards unilateral changes to the status quo by force is further increasing. contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands on July 4, 2022

Russian Aggression and Defense by Ukraine Chapter 2

Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force Shake the Foundation
of the International Order, Including in Asia 
The Russian aggression against Ukraine undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. It
is a serious violation of international law prohibiting the use of force and of the United Nations (UN) Charter.
Such unilateral changes to the status quo by force have shaken the very foundation of the international
order, including in Asia.
The situation in which a permanent member of the Security Council, which is supposed to take
primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, openly engages in military actions
challenging international law and the international order, claims innocent lives, and repeatedly uses
language and actions that can be interpreted as threats involving nuclear weapons, is unprecedented.
While the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) estimates the
number of noncombatant victims in Ukraine may be over 8,000 as of April 2023, the actual number is
possibly much larger as accurate numbers cannot be determined due to the ongoing fighting, and the An apartment building in Zaporizhzhia destroyed by a Russian missile
attack (image released by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine on
number is likely still increasing now. If such Russian aggression is tolerated, it could send a message with March 5, 2023)
the wrong implication that unilateral changes to the status quo by force are acceptable in other regions as
well, including Asia. Therefore, the international community, including Japan, should never tolerate Russia’s action.
It is possible that Russian national strength will decline and the military balance between Russia and surrounding countries will change in the medium- and long-
term, because of significant casualties of conventional forces in this aggression. Furthermore, through Russia’s deepening cooperation with China and other factors,
this may have an impact on global affairs, including the development of the strategic competition between the United States and China and its impact on Asia. Therefore,
it is necessary to monitor related trends with keen interest.

Booklet － 13 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

Defense Policies of Countries Chapter 3

New U.S. Strategy Places Emphasis on Alliances and Partnerships 

The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy released by the United States in October 2022 characterize China as a “pacing challenge,” Russia as an
“acute threat,” and North Korea as a “persistent threat.” In the Nuclear Posture Review released at the same time as the National Defense Strategy, it was noted that,
the United States will face two major nuclear powers by the 2030s
with China’s emergence as a major nuclear power.
In this context, the United States showed its recognition that
mutually-beneficial alliances and partnerships are a center of gravity
for its national defense strategy because it cannot meet these complex
and interconnected challenges alone. In particular, it states that it
will promote partnerships with allies and efforts to form multilateral
frameworks such as the Quad and AUKUS to counter China’s coercive
behavior in the Indo-Pacific region. The United States also continues
to demonstrate its commitment to a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
through ongoing “Freedom of Navigation Operations” in the South
China Sea and the passage of U.S. Navy vessels through the Taiwan
Strait.

Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting in May 2023 [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]

China’s Intensification of Unilateral Change to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts 
China has been increasing its defense budget at a rapid pace for an extended period of time,
and supported by this, it has been extensively and rapidly enhancing its military capability in
a qualitative and quantitative manner, with focuses on its naval and air forces as well as its
nuclear and missile forces.
For example, it has been pointed out that China may possess 1,500 nuclear warheads
by 2035, and it is proceeding rapidly with the construction of its second indigenous aircraft
carrier, which has been noted to be equipped with an electromagnetic catapults systems, as
well as the development of a wide variety of unmanned aerial vehicles.
Backed by these tremendous military capabilities, China has been intensifying its activities
across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly the
area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean including
Xi Jinping, currently in his third term as general secretary [EPA/Jiji]
areas around the Izu and Ogasawara Islands, extending beyond the so-called first island
chain to the second island chain. It is increasing military pressure on Taiwan and continues to
entrench its military foothold in the South China Sea.
Regarding Taiwan, in particular, China launched nine ballistic missiles in August 4, 2022,
five of which landed within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a
threat to local residents.
China’s current external stance, military activities, and other activities have become
a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and present an
unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge to which Japan should respond with its
comprehensive national power and in cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded
countries and others.
China’s second indigenous aircraft carrier “Fujian” [China News Service/Jiji Press Photo]

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 14

 Ⅰ
Part
Security Environment
Surrounding Japan

U.S.-China Strategic Competition Escalates; Tension Grows in Taiwan 

China regards unification with Taiwan as “a natural requirement for realizing
the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and is highly wary of the United
States’ involvement in issues concerning Taiwan.
In 2022, then Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Pelosi and
other members from both parties of Congress visited Taiwan. Following this,
the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to reinforce security cooperation with
Taiwan was passed, indicating that both the U.S. government and Congress
plan to further strengthen support for Taiwan.
Responding to this, China has further intensified military activities
around Taiwan.

U.S. Speaker of the House Pelosi meets President Tsai Ing-wen during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan (August
2022) [Website of the office of the President of Taiwan]

North Korea Makes Advances in Nuclear and Missile Development 

In recent years, North Korea has been repeatedly launching ballistic
missiles and other missiles at an unprecedentedly high frequency. It is also
concentrating on enhancing its nuclear and missile related technologies
and operational capabilities. For example, North Korea has repeatedly
launched ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories and missiles
it calls “hypersonic missiles,” and it is also pursuing the implementation of
long-range cruise missiles with the intention of mounting them with tactical
nuclear weapons. In October 2022, it launched a ballistic missile that passed
over Japan, and it has also repeatedly launched ICBM-class missiles. Such
military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s
national security than ever before and significantly undermine the peace,
stability and security of the region and international community.
The new type of ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong–17” North Korea launched in November 2022 [Korea
News Service]

Russia Adopts the “Strong State” Model and Ramps Up Strategic Coordination with China 
Russia has been developing and deploying a variety of new weapons under its “strong
state” model. Since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, it has also been making
moves to increase troop numbers and expand and reorganize its military units. Russia has
actively continued it’s military operations in the Far East even in the midst of its aggression
against Ukraine, and the “Vostok-2022” strategic command post exercise was conducted
with more than 50,000 troops and the participation of a total of 14 countries including China
and India. Russia has also been making moves to strengthen a strategic tie with China.
The repeated joint bomber flights and joint navigations of vessels by Russia and China are
clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are of grave concern from the
perspective of the security of Japan and the region. We must continue to monitor actions
by the Russian military in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, with strong concern.

President Putin (center) inspects exercise “Vostok 2022” in September 2022

[Website of the Presidential Executive Office of Russia]

Booklet － 15 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

Trends and Challenges Facing the International Community

Concerning the Domains of the Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Chapter 4
Spectrum and Information Warfare
Trends Concerning Military Science and Technology That Extend into Information Warfare, etc. 
Science & technology, and the creation of innovation are sources of Japan’s economic
and social development. Appropriate use of these technologies is essential not only for
security, but also for addressing global-scale issues such as climate change. Countries
are making efforts for the research, development, and military applications of artificial
intelligence (AI), quantum technology, next generation information and communication
technology, and other advanced, potentially game-changing technologies that could
dramatically change the future character of warfare.
In addition, there is concern about information theft of advanced technologies
for military use by abusing cyberspace or corporate activities, including acquisitions
and investments. Countries are taking measures from the perspective of so-called
“economic security,” such as strengthening export controls and screening mechanisms
for foreign investments, as well as increasing the independence of technological
development and production.
NATO cyber defense exercise “Cyber Coalition 2022” [NATO website]

Trends in the Domains of Space, Cyber and Electromagnetic Spectrum 

Space-based technologies and information and communication networks have become
core infrastructure in people’s everyday lives and for the military. Meanwhile, countries
such as China and Russia have been pointed out to be strengthening their capabilities
to interfere with other countries’ use of space, and their nations and militaries are being
involved in cyber attacks.
Countries are to improve their capabilities in the domains of space, cyber and
electromagnetic spectrum while recognizing these capabilities as methods of warfare
that effectively deter enemies from demonstrating their war potential.

Transfer and Proliferation of Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
The transfer and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that deliver
such weapons, have been recognized as a significant threat since the end of the
The U.S. Vice President gives a speech on space policy, including the ban on DA-ASAT testing [DVIDS]
Cold War. In recent years, as competition and confrontation among states have been
sharpened, and as the current international security environment becomes complex
and severe, there is concern that it is becoming difficult for the international community
to rally together in taking on common challenges such as arms control, disarmament,
and non-proliferation.

Impact of Climate Change on Security

and the Military 
Armed Forces of many countries strive for resiliency in order to continue their activities
regardless of climate change, and also work on security crises arising from climate
change diligently.
Pakistani soldiers conducting a rescue operation [Website of the Pakistan Army]

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 16

 Part
Ⅱ Japan’s Security and Defense Policy

Basic Concepts of Japan’s Security and Defense Chapter 1

Defense Capabilities To Protect Japan’s Independence, Peace, and Security 
Peace and security are essential for Japanese people to live with a sense of safety and for Japan to continue to prosper, but these cannot be secured by simply wishing
for them.
What we must prioritize first and foremost is developing proactive diplomacy to protect the lives and livelihood of Japanese nationals. It is essential to promote
multilateral cooperation with like-minded countries through the Japan-U.S. Alliance as a cornerstone. At
the same time, diplomacy needs to be backed by defense capabilities. As its strategic approach, Japan will
fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including counterstrike capabilities, while developing its
diplomacy under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Moreover, from the perspective of preventing
the emergence of threats to Japan, the importance of the role played by defense capabilities in cooperative
efforts in the Indo-Pacific region is increasing.
Recognizing the role of such defense capabilities, Japan will ensure its peace and security by exerting
efforts in a variety of fields, including diplomacy and economy.
In addition, adhering under the Constitution to the basic precepts of maintaining an exclusively
defense-oriented policy and not becoming a military power that poses threats to other countries, Japan has
Prime Minister Kishida conducting a review at the International Fleet
efficiently built a highly effective, integrated defense force, while firmly maintaining the Japan-U.S. Security Review
Arrangements, civilian control of the military, and observing the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

The National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Chapter Chapter Chapter

2 3 4
Strategy of Japan, and the Defense Buildup Program, etc.
Creating a Defense Architecture That Can Surely Protect the People 
We are currently living in an era where the world order is facing grave challenges, and confrontation and cooperation are intricately interwined. Moreover, Japan has
entered a new era of crisis, facing its most severe and complex security environment since WWII. To respond to this severe security environment, Japan formulated
the National Security Strategy of Japan (NSS), the National Defense Strategy of Japan (NDS), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP) in December 2022. These are
thought to mark a major turning point in Japan’s postwar defense policy, enabling the fundamental reinforcement of necessary defense capabilities and creating a
defense architecture that can truly protect the people.
The NSS is positioned as Japan’s supreme national security policy document. It outlines the Government’s strategy to respond with a whole-of-government
approach in a wide range of areas including economic security, technology, and intelligence, in addition to the traditional areas of diplomacy and defense. In particular,
in FY2027, Japan will take the necessary measures to ensure that the budget level for both the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities and complementary
initiatives reaches 2% of the GDP in FY2022 (approximately 11 trillion yen), in order to reinforce Japan’s own architecture for national defense.
The NDS outlines Japan’s defense objectives and its approaches and means by which Japan accomplishes those objectives. In order to defend the lives and
peaceful livelihood of Japanese nationals amid the most severe and complex security environment since the end of WWII, Japan needs to squarely face the grim reality
and fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, with a focus on opponent capabilities and new ways of warfare (massive missile attacks; hybrid warfare, including
information warfare; asymmetrical warfare leveraging the domains of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum and with unmanned aerial vehicles and other assets;
threats using nuclear weapons, etc.). To this end, the NDS establishes a policy for the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities, including the possession of
counterstrike capabilities.
As for the functions and capabilities required for defense, Japan will first strengthen its (i) stand-off defense capabilities and (ii) integrated air and missile defense
capabilities, in order to disrupt and defeat invading forces from a long distance, thereby deterring an invasion of Japan itself. Should deterrence fail, in addition to capabilities
(i) and (ii), Japan will strengthen its (iii)
unmanned defense capabilities, (iv)
Japan’s Three Defense Objectives
cross-domain operation capabilities,
and (v) command and control/ (1) Shape a security environment that does not tolerate (2) Deter and respond to unilateral changes to the status (3) Should deterrence fail and an invasion of Japan occur,
unilateral changes to the status quo by force quo by force and such attempts through cooperation take primary responsibility to deal with the situation,
intelligence-related functions, in order and collaboration with our ally, like-minded countries while receiving support from our ally and others, to
to ensure asymmetric advantage while and others disrupt and defeat the invasion

gaining superiority across domains.

Furthermore, to operate in a swift as
well as persistent manner to crush the
opponent’s will to invade, Japan will
also reinforce its (vi) mobile deployment
capabilities/civil protection, as well as
its (vii) sustainability and resiliency. As Prime Minister Kishida participating in the G7 Summit Meeting
(May 2023) [Website of the Prime Minister’s Office of Japan]
Bilateral training with U.S. Air Force strategic bombers and
other aircraft (March 2023)
Exercise for amphibious operations, etc.
(February 2023)
when and how unilateral changes to

Booklet － 17 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST
the status quo by force occur are hard to predict, Japan will strengthen its defense capabilities by FY2027, in five years, to the point Japan will be able to take primary
responsibility for countering any invasion of Japan that occurs and disrupt and defeat the invasion while receiving support from its ally and others. In addition, further
efforts will be made by approximately ten years from now to better ensure these defense objectives are met, and to reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities so that any
invasion of Japan can be disrupted and defeated earlier and at places further afield.
In addition, Japan will also reinforce its defense production and technology bases as virtually integral part of a defense capability, as well as the foundation for SDF
personnel, who are at the core of defense capability, to demonstrate their abilities.
The DBP indicates the level of defense capability Japan should possess, including what needs to be done to reach that level. It describes various measures to
realize the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities at a budget of approximately 43 trillion yen for the next five years, which is on a completely different
level from the past. In particular, Japan will work to fundamentally reinforce areas at the core of its future defense capabilities, such as stand-off defense capabilities
and unmanned defense capabilities; improve operational rates, secure ammunition, and accelerate investment in fortifying key defense facilities to maximize the use
of existing equipment; and further reinforce defense production and technology bases and the human resource base.

Budget for the “First Year” of Fundamentally Reinforcing Defense Capabilities 

Regarding defense-related expenditures for FY2023, the MOD has secured a budget appropriate for the content of the first year of the “buildup program” (budget for
the “first year” of fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities), which will build up the initiatives necessary to fundamentally reinforce defense capabilities within
five years.
The annual budget expenditure includes ¥6,600.1 billion (year-on-year increase of ¥1,421.3 billion (27.4%)) allocated for DBP-related expenditures, an amount
that rises to ¥6,821.9 billion when U.S. Force realignment-related expenses are included, with the “substantial increase of the defense budget” having been secured.
In addition, future obligation concerning new contracts (new
programs) includes ¥7,067.6 billion (2.9 times that of the (Unit: 1 trillion yen)
6.82
previous fiscal year) allocated for DBP-related expenditures. 6.80
Excluding SACO, realignment of the USFJ, government aircraft, and building national resilience 6.60
Contracts will be fulfilled in the first fiscal year as much as 6.30
Including SACO, realignment of the USFJ, government aircraft, and building national resilience

possible so that the necessary equipment can be delivered to

5.80
each unit for operation as expeditiously as possible. Specifically, 5.26 5.315.34
5.40
5.30 5.13 5.19
budgets for areas that constitute the core of Japan’s future 4.95 4.94 4.93 4.94 4.96 4.96 4.95 4.90 4.86
4.81 4.80 4.78 4.77 4.79 4.78 4.71 4.75 4.88
4.98 5.05
5.18
5.07 5.12
defense capabilities, such as “stand-off defense capabilities” 4.80 4.94 4.93
4.92 4.92 4.94 4.94 4.93 4.88 4.83 4.82 4.86 4.90
4.94 5.01
4.79 4.78 4.74 4.70 4.68
4.66 4.65 4.68 4.78
and “unmanned defense capabilities,” have been significantly 4.30
Original maximum
amount
Decrease for 10 consecutive years Increase for 11 consecutive years
increased, while investments aimed at improving operational 3.80
rates, securing ammunition, and enhancing the resiliency of key 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023

defense facilities (including the construction of key command

centers underground and development of barracks, etc.) Category Area Total program expenses for five
years (Contract basis)
Program expenses for FY2023
(Contract basis)
Program expenses for FY2023
(Annual expenditure basis)
have been expedited in order to maximize the use of existing Stand-off defense capabilities Approx. 5 trillion yen Approx. 1.4 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
Integrated air and missile defense capabilities Approx. 3 trillion yen Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen
equipment. Unmanned defense capabilities Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.02 trillion yen
In allocating the budget, programs for the buildup of defense Cross-domain Space Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
operation Cyber Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
capability that have hitherto been managed by being classified capabilities Vehicles, ships, aircraft, etc. Approx. 6 trillion yen Approx. 1.2 trillion yen Approx. 1.1 trillion yen
Command and control and intelligence-related functions Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.3 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen
under one of the two categories of “procurement expenditures Mobile deployment capabilities/Civil protection Approx. 2 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
for major equipment, etc.” and “other expenditures” will now Ammunition, guided missiles Approx. 2 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
(Approx. 5 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.8 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.3 trillion yen including other areas)
Sustainability and Maintenance expenses for equipment,
be classified under one of the 15 new categories for each staff resiliency
Approx. 9 trillion yen Approx. 1.8 trillion yen Approx. 0.8 trillion yen
etc., and ensuring operational availability (Approx. 10 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 2.0 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 1.3 trillion yen including other areas)
office and organization. The resulting budget is allocated after Improving the resiliency of facilities Approx. 4 trillion yen Approx. 0.5 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen
Approx. 0.4 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
having accumulated budget items with greater precision, Reinforcing defense production base (Approx. 1 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.1 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.1 trillion yen including other areas)
Approx. 1 trillion yen Approx. 0.2 trillion yen Approx. 0.1 trillion yen
which prevents issues of insufficient funding for expenditures Research and development (Approx. 3.5 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.9 trillion yen including other areas) (Approx. 0.2 trillion yen including other areas)
Base measures Approx. 2.6 trillion yen Approx. 0.5 trillion yen Approx. 0.5 trillion yen
related to ammunition, maintenance, facilities, living and work Education and training expenses, fuel expenses, etc. Approx. 4 trillion yen Approx. 0.9 trillion yen Approx. 0.7 trillion yen
environments, etc. Total Approx. 43.5 trillion yen Approx. 9 trillion yen Approx. 4.4 trillion yen

Organizations Responsible for Japan’s Security and Defense Chapter 5

The MOD and the SDF develop policies and execute missions based on the fundamental stance discussed at the National Security Council, which is a part of the
Cabinet.
In addition, the MOD/SDF have adopted a joint operations architecture in which GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF units are operated in an integrated manner. In order to
realize seamless cross-domain operations at all phases from peacetime to contingencies with the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of joint operations, various
issues are being discussed with the goal of promptly establishing permanent Joint Headquarters to unite command of GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services by reviewing
the existing organization.

Framework for Activities of the SDF and Others Chapter 6

The 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security defined new situations to be addressed, such as “Survival-Threatening Situations” and “Situations that Will Have an
Important Influence,” enabling seamless response to any situation. The Government of Japan will continue to take all possible measures to respond to such situations.

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 18

 Ⅲ
Part
Three Approaches to Achieve
the Defense Objectives

Japan’s Own Architecture for National Defense Chapter 1

Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities and

Strengthening Its Architecture for National Defense 
Defense capability is the ultimate guarantor ensuring Japan’s security. It will deter Three Approaches to Achieve the Defense Objectives
threats from extending to Japan, and in the case that a threat does reach Japan, it
(1) Strengthening Japan’s own
will be disrupted and defeated, thereby demonstrating Japan’s resolve and capability architecture for national defense

to defend itself to the end.

A threat materializes when the capability to inflict harm is combined with the
intention to do so, yet accurately gauging other’s intent from outside is inherently
difficult. When a state’s decision-making process is opaque, there always exists
conditions under which threats may materialize. To protect one’s nation from such
states, it is necessary to have deterrence capability that makes others realize that
Next-generation fighter aircraft
unilateral changes to the status quo by force are difficult, as well as to develop
(2) Enhancing deterrence and response (3) Reinforcing collaboration with its
defense capabilities focusing on opponent capabilities. Regarding future defense capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. like-minded countries and others
capability, Japan needs to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities so that
it can respond to new ways of warfare, and thereby discourage opponents from
harboring the intention to launch aggression against Japan.
Japan will also build an overall national defense architecture by integrating
its national power, which includes its diplomatic, intelligence, economic, and
technological capabilities, and systematically combining all policy means.
U.S. Marine F-35B landing on the MSDF JS “Izumo” Multilateral exercise with Japan,
(October 3, 2021) U.S., U.K., NLD, CA, NZ (October 2021)

Creating a Security Environment That Does Not Tolerate Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force
Responses to Unilateral Changes to the Status Quo by Force and Such Attempts 
Japan must deter, through cooperation and collaboration with its ally, like-minded countries and others, unilateral
changes to the status quo by force and such attempts that concern Japan’s peace and security. In order to influence
an opponent’s actions, it is necessary to improve and enhance training and exercises such as Flexible Deterrent
Options (FDO) and Strategic Communication (SC) with a whole-of-government approach, as well as with our ally, like-
minded countries and others. The MOD/SDF is conducting continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) from peacetime as well as analysis in cooperation with relevant government ministries and agencies to detect
indications of contingencies at an early stage, and are scrambling fighters and other aircraft.

Personnel responding to a scramble

Responses to Invasions of Japan, Including Missile Attacks 

In response to an invasion against Japan, including our remote islands, Japan would disrupt and defeat the invading
forces from a long distance. We will also acquire superiority across domains and conduct cross-domain operations
that organically integrate capabilities in the ground, maritime, and air domains, as well as in the domains of space,
cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum to secure asymmetrical superiority, and disrupt and defeat the invading forces.
Japan would also continue persistent actions to crush the opponent’s will to invade.
Moreover, in response to an invasion of Japan, including missile attacks, Japan will intercept missiles flying over
the high seas and our territorial airspace with its missile defense system. In addition, as a measure for self-defense
to the minimum required level to prevent invasion, including missile attacks, Japan will utilize capabilities including
stand-off defense capabilities to enable itself to conduct effective counterstrikes in the opponent’s territory, and
Aegis-equipped destroyer “Maya” test-launching SM-3
thereby deter missile attacks from happening. Block IIA missile

Booklet － 19 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

Large-scale terrorist attacks and attacks against critical infrastructure including

nuclear power plants are also serious threats. The MOD/SDF will take effective measures in
the event of such attacks in close cooperation with relevant organizations. In addition, when
an invasion of Japan is predicted, the MOD/SDF will utilize mobile deployment capabilities
to facilitate initiatives for civil protection, including evacuation guidance for residents.

Responses to Invasions of Japan,

Including Responses to Information Warfare 
As military activities around Japan become more active, while striving to gather information
quickly and accurately through various means on a regular basis, the MOD/SDF is reinforcing
functions such as information gathering and analysis.
In the international community, emphasis is being placed on information warfare,
a method of warfare that uses the spread of disinformation and strategic information to Personnel participating in civil protection training

influence public opinion and decision-making in other countries while creating a security
environment favorable to one’s own country, even when a conflict has not yet erupted. In light of this situation, the MOD/SDF, from the perspective of the defense of
Japan, will build a system and posture that can reliably handle integrated information warfare with special regard to the cognitive dimension, with a focus on fact-
checking and analyzing disinformation and promptly and appropriately disseminating information.

Sustainability and Resiliency Enhancement Initiatives

to Ensure Warfare Sustainability 
In order to defend Japan in the future, the current warfighting sustainability of the SDF is not
necessarily sufficient in the form of ammunitions and fuel, and the number of operationally
available equipment. It is necessary to squarely address these realities and strive to ensure
and maintain sufficient warfare sustainability so that the SDF can continue persistent
activities in contingencies, which serves as an effective deterrent. To this end, the MOD/
SDF will urgently possess adequate ammunition as necessary, build up ammunition storage
facilities and fuel tanks, and improve equipment availability. In addition, major command
headquarters will be moved underground and structurally reinforced, and other facilities
Securing ammunition storage facilities
will be relocated.

Measures for Protection of the Life, Person, and

Property of Japanese Nationals 
Besides invasions of Japan, large-scale disasters and infectious disease crises are other
serious threats that require the utmost efforts by the nation to respond. In the event of a
large-scale disaster, etc., the MOD/SDF will cooperate closely with relevant organizations
to effectively carry out life-protecting activities, emergency, livelihood support, and other
essential services.

SDF personnel engaging in life-protecting activities

SDF Activities Since the Enforcement of the Legislation

for Peace and Security 
Since the Legislation for Peace and Security went into effect in 2016, various preparations and trainings related to this legislation have been made. In 2022, the MOD/
SDF participated for the first time in a field training exercise based on a scenario with a declaration of a Survival-Threatening Situation by the Government of Japan. In
addition, in accordance with the Article 95-2 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, the first coordinated asset protection was conducted among Japan, the U.S., and Australia
and the SDF provided security for the U.S. and Australian forces.

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 20

 Ⅲ
Part
Three Approaches to Achieve
the Defense Objectives

Japan-U.S. Alliance Chapter 2

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements as a Cornerstone for Japan’s Security 

The Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,
together with Japan’s own national defense architecture, constitute a cornerstone
for Japan’s national security. Japan has maintained its peace, security, and
independence centered on the Security Arrangements with the world’s dominant
military power, the United States, with which it shares basic values such as
democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and a capitalist economy as
well as interests in maintaining the peace and security of the world and has strong
economic ties.
The NDS calls for further deepening of discussions with the United States
on both countries’ respective roles, missions, and capabilities to further reinforce
Japan-U.S. joint deterrence capabilities in an integrated manner from the
perspective of deterring invasion against Japan. Specifically, Japan will further
deepen cooperation with the United States to smoothly implement allied cross-
domain operations of the Alliance, including in the domains of space, cyber, and Japan-U.S. Defense Ministerial Meeting (January 2023)

electromagnetic spectrum, and to improve interoperability. Furthermore, Japan will

reinforce collaboration in such areas as air defense, anti-surface warfare; anti-
submarine warfare; mine warfare; amphibious operations; airborne operations;
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting (ISRT); protection of assets
and facilities; and logistics support. In order to effectively realize the division of
roles and missions between Japan and the United States in light of the fundamental
reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities, Japan will ensure close operational
coordination with the United States through Japan-U.S. bilateral planning. In
addition, Japan will work to improve response capability of the Alliance, including
readiness and interoperability of the Alliance, through more advanced and practical
exercises and training. In order to ensure that the United States extended deterrence
with nuclear deterrence at its core remains credible and resilient, Japan will further
actively engage in and deepen bilateral discussions on extended deterrence,
including those at the ministerial level. To deter unilateral changes to the status Bilateral training with U.S. Marine F-35B (October 2022)
quo by force and such attempts, as well as to deter various contingencies from
emerging, Japan will further expand and evolve operations including joint flexible
deterrent options (FDO) and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) activities as a part of routine bilateral efforts by Japan and the United States
on a regular basis.
In addition, while the presence of U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) functions as
deterrence, it is necessary to make efforts appropriate for the actual situation of
each area in order to mitigate the impacts of the stationing of the USFJ on the
living environment of the local residents. In particular, the realignment of the USFJ
is a very important initiative for mitigation of the impact on local communities,
including those in Okinawa, and maintaining the deterrance capability of the U.S.
Forces. Therefore, the MOD will advance the realignment and other initiatives and
make continuous efforts to gain the understanding and cooperation of the local
communities hosting USFJ facilities and areas.

Japan-U.S. bilateral training (February 2023)

Booklet － 21 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

Collaboration with Like-Minded Countries and Others Chapter 3

Promoting Collaboration with Like-minded Countries and Others to Realize FOIP 

The MOD/SDF is actively promoting multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation
and exchanges in order to strengthen ties with as many countries as possible under the
vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).
In recent years, the MOD/SDF have been advancing high-level exchanges, bilateral/
multilateral training and exercise, capacity building, and other defense cooperation and
exchanges not only with Japan’s ally, but also with a wide variety of countries in Asia,
Africa, and Europe.
The MOD/SDF is also expanding the establishment of institutional frameworks such as
Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA), Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA),
and the Agreement concerning the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, with
like-minded countries and others. Japan-Australia Defense Ministerial Meeting (December 2022)

Maritime Security 
As a maritime nation, it is extremely important for Japan to reinforce the maritime order and ensure the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and safety. For this
reason, the MOD/SDF are promoting multilateral cooperation concerning maritime security, such as the monitoring of maritime situations, including ongoing counter-
piracy operations off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.

International Peace Cooperation Activities 

The MOD/SDF have been dispatching two headquarters personnel to MFO, whose mission
is to monitor the ceasefire between Egypt and Israel, and has decided to dispatch two
additional headquarters personnel. Also, four SDF personnel are working for the UNMISS
Headquarters in South Sudan. In addition, the MOD/SDF actively contributes to international
peace cooperation activities by dispatching personnel to the UN Secretariat and PKO training
centers, and by providing various support to the UN Triangular Partnership Programme.
From May to June 2022, the SDF transported humanitarian relief supplies by the
aircraft from the UNHCR warehouse in Dubai to the countries surrounding Ukraine.
Additionally, from February to March 2023, the SDF transported disaster relief supplies
in response to the earthquakes which occurred in Turkey and Syria, under the Japan
Disaster Relief Team (JDR) Law. B-777 special transport aircraft unloading disaster relief supplies at Incirlik Air Base
(Turkey) during the international disaster relief activities for the earthquake in Turkey
The SDF is always prepared to respond to such urgent requests.

Arms Control, Disarmament

and Non-Proliferation 
The MOD/SDF are working with related ministries and agencies to develop an international
posture and training program for arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation on
weapons of mass destruction and missiles that could serve as their means of delivery,
conventional weapons, and cargo and sensitive technologies that could be adapted for
military use.

A discussion with representatives from participating countries and organization in PSI

training (August 2022)

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 22

 Part
Ⅳ Reinforcing Common Bases, etc.
Reinforcing Defense Production and Technology Bases as Chapter 1
a Virtually Integral Part of Defense Capability, etc.
Reinforcing Defense Production and
Technology Bases 
Science and technology are rapidly advancing, and countries are developing cutting-
edge technologies that could become so-called “game changers” which dramatically
alter the future character of warfare. In addition, the development of new technologies
such as artificial intelligence (AI) has expanded the character of warfare not only in the
ground, maritime, and air domains, but also in the space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic
domains, including the cognitive dimension. In response to these changes, each country
is actively engaged in research and development to ensure its technological superiority.
On the other hand, Japan’s defense production and technology bases have been exposed
to challenging conditions resulting from growing issues such as supply chain risks and a Next-generation fighter aircraft to be jointly developed by Japan, the United Kingdom,
series of withdrawals from the industry. In light of these circumstances, the NDS states that and Italy

Japan’s defense production and technology bases are essential infrastructure for securing
the stable research and development, production, and procurement of equipment in Japan
and for incorporating the cutting-edge technologies necessary for new ways of warfare
into its defense equipment, making these bases virtually defense capability itself, and that
efforts will be made to reinforce these bases.
In addition, in order to acquire the necessary equipment for new ways of warfare, it
is imperative for Japan to leverage the technology that it possesses. The development
of scientific technologies and innovations based on Japan’s advanced technological
capabilities is at the source of its economic and social development and constitutes a key
element of its comprehensive national power integral to its national security. In addition,
actively utilizing technological capabilities developed by Japan’s public and private sectors
Upgraded Type 12 Surface-to-Ship Missile [Provided by Nagoya Guidance & Propulsion
in the area of national security without being held back by existing approaches is an Systems Works, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.]
essential activity for strengthening Japan’s architecture for national defense. It is important
to work strategically to ensure technological superiority as a nation by actively leveraging
the results of research and development in science and technology in Japan’s public and
private sectors for the research and development of defense equipment. Therefore, it is
necessary to further promote research and development domestically and develop and
strengthen the technology base for the technology areas on which Japan should focus.

Promoting Transfer of Defense Equipment and Long-term operational type UUV

Technology 
The transfer of defense equipment overseas is a key policy instrument to ensure peace and
stability, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, to deter unilateral changes to the status quo
by force and to create a desirable security environment for Japan. The Three Principles on
Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, its Implementation Guidelines, and other
systems are to be considered for revisions in order to promote smooth transfer of defense
equipment and technology of high security significance and international joint development
in a broad array of fields. In addition, Japan will carry forward with the transfer of defense
equipment and technology in the joint public and private efforts by establishing a fund, and
implementing measures including providing corporate assistance as necessary to smoothly
promote such transfers.
Technical education for Philippine Air Force personnel

Booklet － 23 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

Reinforcing the Foundation for SDF Personnel, the Core Chapter 2

Element of Defense Capability, to Demonstrate Their Abilities
Reinforcing Human Resource Base 
The core element of defense capability is SDF personnel. The MOD/SDF will
reinforce the human resource base to create an environment that enables
all SDF personnel to demonstrate their own abilities while maintaining high
morale and pride.
Despite a severe recruitment environment with a declining number of
people eligible for recruitment due to a declining birthrate, the MOD/SDF is
working on recruitment activities and also reinforcing mid-career recruitment
to utilize human resources from the private sector in order to ensure stable
recruitment of excellent human resources. Regarding SDF Reserve Personnel
and Others, the MOD/SDF is making efforts to utilize personnel with
specialized skills etc.
In addition, the MOD/SDF will work to improve the living and work
environment of personnel, improve their salary treatment, support their re-
Recruitment activities by a Provincial Cooperation Office (joint job fair)
employment, promote measures related to award of honors and privileges,
and provide family support measures.

Response to Harassment 
In September 2022, an investigation of a harassment incident involving a
former member of the GSDF who was sexually harassed while on active duty
resulted in a substantiated finding. This is an extremely serious incident that
was not properly handled despite the fact that the victim reported the incident.
In light of the current situation, including the ever-increasing number of
consultations, the Minister of Defense has instructed the implementation of
a fact-finding inspection for the entire SDF by Inspector General’s Office of
Legal Compliance and the establishment of a committee of experts to conduct
a fundamental review of the anti-harassment policy.
Based on the findings of the study by this committee of experts, the MOD/
SDF will implement new policies and strive to create a work environment with
zero tolerance for harassment of any kind. The MOD’s Committee of Experts on Harassment Prevention and Measures

Work-life Balance and

Women’s Participation 
Ensuring preparedness to consistently respond to various situations requires
creating an environment in which staff are both mentally and physically healthy
and are able to maintain high morale and fully demonstrate their abilities.
To this end, the MOD/SDF is adopting working style reforms to correct
working long hours and measures such as teleworking to make work hours
and locations more flexible.
In addition, the MOD/SDF is working to promote the participation of
highly motivated and capable women, such as by lifting restrictions on the
assignment of female SDF personnel.
Female SDF personnel are active in
a wide range of service areas

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 24

 Part
Ⅳ Reinforcing Common Bases, etc.
Medical Organization that Saves the Lives
of SDF Personnel 
The NDS states that, from the perspective of sustainability and resiliency, the SDF
will transform the SDF medical force into an organization that saves the lives of
SDF personnel.
In particular, the MOD/SDF needs to establish a seamless posture for medical
care and evacuation from the frontlines to the destination hospital, in order to Training for the
improve the life-saving rate of injured personnel. transport of patients
to medical centers in
Furthermore, the MOD/SDF will reinforce education and research on combat Okinawa
trauma care in the National Defense Medical College and improve management
necessary to further enhance the clinical experience of medical and nursing officers.

Reinforcement of Policy-making Function 

For the SDF to respond to the increasingly severe strategic environment, strategic and
agile defense policy planning and making are required. To this end, the MOD/SDF is
closely cooperating with relevant ministries and agencies, private research institutions,
and private companies particularly defense industry as their core. In addition, the
First international
MOD/SDF is reinforcing their intellectual base by reviewing and reinforcing research conference on policy
systems, centered on the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS). simulation to be held
in Japan

Measures Relating to Training and Exercises Chapter 3

In order to fulfill its challenging mission of defending Japan, the SDF constantly conducts joint exercises and training by the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF services. The
content of these trainings is not limited to conventional domains, but extends into new domains, including that of space, cyber and electromagnetic spectrum. Efforts
are being made to improve cross-domain operations in order to better utilize these domains and enhance defense capabilities.
In addition, in order to reinforce the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, each service of the SDF conducts bilateral trainings with the
corresponding U.S. military service and Japan-U.S. bilateral joint exercises, the contents of which have been deepened year after year.
Furthermore, in order to strategically promote multi-faceted and multi-layered defense cooperation based on the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), the
SDF is actively engaged in bilateral training and exercises with ally and like-minded countries and others in the wider Indo-Pacific region.
Moreover, in recent years, the SDF actively promotes bilateral training and exercises not only with coastal states in the Indo-Pacific region, but also with like-
minded countries and others outside the region, with a view to improving interoperability and deepening ties with these countries.

Training on landing an amphibious vehicle from the sea (Keen Sword 23) Japanese and U.S. long-range firearms deployed on remote islands (Orient Shield 22)

Booklet － 25 2023 Defense White Paper

 2023 Defense
DEFENSE OF JAPAN White Paper

DIGEST

In order to protect Japan’s peace and independence in an increasingly severe security environment, the SDF must become more powerful on its own while
improving its ability to cooperate and collaborate with Japan’s ally and like-minded countries and others, rather than be content with its current capabilities. For this
reason, the SDF is striving to acquire further deterrence and response capabilities through training and exercises.

Replenishment at Sea (RAS) exercise with Royal Australian Navy Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ships Bilateral training with Germany in the airspace of Japan (Japan-Germany bilateral training)

Initiatives on Coexistence with Regional Society and the Environment Chapter 4

Measures Concerning Harmony

with Regional Society 
The various activities of the MOD/SDF are hard to implement without the understanding and
cooperation of each and every person, as well as local governments and other organizations.
Based on this idea, the MOD/SDF will continue to promote various measures necessary in
order to further deepen the trust between regional society and people, and the SDF.

Responding to Climate Change and

Environmental Issues 
It is inevitable that the issue of climate change, including responses to future energy
Subsidy for noise prevention work (Shibecha Junior High School, Shibecha Town, Kawakami-
shifts, will have an even greater impact on future MOD/SDF operations, including various gun, Hokkaido)
plans, facilities, and defense equipment, as well as the security environment surrounding
Japan. The MOD/SDF has long complied with environmental laws and regulations and has
made efforts to thoroughly conserve the environment and reduce environmental impact.
In August 2022, the MOD/SDF formulated the Ministry of Defense Response Strategy on
Climate Change, which outlines strategic measures for the MOD to address climate change.
Going forward, the MOD will promote concrete measures to combat the impacts of climate
change based on this strategy.

Public Relations Activities,

Public Records and Archives Management,
Disclosure of Administrative Documents 
In order to gain the trust and the cooperation from the Japanese people and other countries,
the MOD/SDF strives to be proactive in undertaking easily comprehensible public relations
Public ship tour during “Fleet Week”, which was held concurrently with the International
activities regarding its operations in various ways. Fleet Review 2022.

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 26

 Reference

■ Organizational Diagram of the Self-Defense Forces

Minister of Defense
Chief of Staff, Joint Staff
Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, GSDF Chief of Staff, MSDF Chief of Staff, ASDF

Ground Staff Office Maritime Staff Office Air Staff Office

Ground Component Ground Component Command Headquarters (Asaka) Self-Defense Fleet Fleet Escort Force Escort Flotilla 1 (Yokosuka) Air Defense Command Northern Air Defense Force Northern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Misawa)
Command 2nd Air Wing (Chitose)
1st Airborne Brigade (Narashino) Escort Flotilla 2 (Sasebo)
Air Defense Command 3rd Air Wing (Misawa)
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (Ainoura) Escort Flotilla 3 (Maizuru) Headquarters (Yokota)
1st Helicopter Brigade (Kisarazu) Escort Flotilla 4 (Kure) Northern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Misawa)
System and Signal Brigade (Ichigaya) Northern Air Defense Missile Group (Misawa, Each region)
Fleet Training Command (Yokosuka)
Central Readiness Force Regiment (Utsunomiya) Northern Air Civil Engineering Group (Misawa, Chitose)
Other units
Special Forces Group (Narashino) Other units
Electronic Warfare Operations Unit (Asaka) Fleet Air Force Fleet Air Wing 1 (Kanoya)
Central Air Defense Force Central Air Defense Force Headquarters (Iruma)
Other units Fleet Air Wing 2 (Hachinohe) 6th Air Wing (Komatsu)
Northern Army 2nd Division (Asahikawa) Fleet Air Wing 4 (Atsugi) 7th Air Wing (Hyakuri)
5th Brigade (Obihiro) Fleet Air Wing 5 (Naha) Central Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Iruma)
7th Division (Higashi Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 21 (Tateyama) Central Air Defense Missile Group (Iruma, Each region)
11th Brigade (Makomanai) Fleet Air Wing 22 (Omura) Central Air Civil Engineering Group (Iruma, Each region)
1st Artillery Brigade (Kita Chitose) Fleet Air Wing 31 (Iwakuni) Other units
1st Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Higashi Chitose) Other units
3rd Engineer Brigade (Minami Eniwa) Western Air Defense Force Western Air Defense Force Headquarters (Kasuga)
Northern Army Combined Brigade (Higashi Chitose) 5th Air Wing (Nyutabaru)
Fleet Submarine Force Submarine Flotilla 1 (Kure)
Northern Army Aviation Group (Okadama) 8th Air Wing (Tsuiki)
Submarine Flotilla 2 (Yokosuka)
Other units and organizations Western Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Kasuga)
Other units Western Air Defense Missile Group (Kasuga, Each region)
Northeastern Army 6th Division (Jinmachi)
Mine Warfare Force (Yokosuka) Western Air Civil Engineering Group (Ashiya, Each region)
9th Division (Aomori)
Fleet Intelligence Command (Yokosuka) Other units
Northeastern Army Artillery Unit (Sendai)
2nd Engineer Brigade (Funaoka) Oceanography ASW Support Southwestern Southwestern Air Defense Force Headquarters (Naha)
Command (Yokosuka) Air Defense Force
Northeastern Army Combined Brigade (Sendai) 9th Air Wing (Naha)
Northeastern Army Aviation Group (Kasuminome) Maritime Warfare Research and
Development Command Southwestern Aircraft Control and Warning Wing (Naha)
Other units and organizations (Yokosuka) Southwestern Air Defense Missile Group (Naha, Each region)
Yokosuka District
Eastern Army 1st Division (Nerima) Southwestern Air Civil Engineering Group (Naha)
12th Brigade (Somagahara) Other units
Kure District
2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Matsudo)
1st Engineer Brigade (Koga) Airborne Warning and Control Wing
Sasebo District (Hamamatsu, Each region)
Eastern Army Combined Brigade (Takeyama)
Air Rescue Wing (Iruma, Each region)
Eastern Army Aviation Group (Tachikawa)
Air Tactics Development Wing (Yokota, Each region)
Other units and organizations Maizuru District
Reconnaissance Group (Misawa)
Middle Army 3rd Division (Senzo) Other units
10th Division (Moriyama) Ominato District
13th Brigade (Kaitaichi) Air Support Command Headquarters (Fuchu)
14th Brigade (Zentsuji) Air Training Command Air Training Group Shimofusa (Shimofusa) Air Support Command 1st Tactical Airlift Wing (Komaki)
8th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (Aonogahara) Air Training Group Tokushima 2nd Tactical Airlift Group (Iruma)
4th Engineer Brigade (Okubo) (Tokushima) 3rd Tactical Airlift Wing (Miho)
Middle Army Combined Brigade (Otsu) Air Training Group Ozuki (Ozuki) Air Traffic Control Group (Fuchu, Each region)
Middle Army Artillery Unit (Matsuyama) Other units Air Weather Group (Fuchu, Each region)
Middle Army Aviation Group (Yao) Training Squadron Flight Check Group (Iruma)
Other units and organizations Special Airlift Group (Chitose)
Western Army 4th Division (Fukuoka) Communications Command (Ichigaya) Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron (Komaki)
8th Division (Kita Kumamoto) Maritime Materiel Command (Jujo)
Air Training Command Headquarters (Hamamatsu)
15th Brigade (Naha) Other units/organizations
Air Training Command 1st Air Wing (Hamamatsu)
Western Army Artillery Unit (Yufuin)
4th Air Wing (Matsushima)
2nd Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade (Iizuka)
11th Flying Training Wing (Shizuhama)
5th Engineer Brigade (Ogori)
12th Flying Training Wing (Hofu-kita)
Western Army Combined Brigade (Kurume)
13th Flying Training Wing (Ashiya)
Western Army Tank Unit (Kusu)
Air Basic Training Wing (Hofu-minami, Kumagaya)
Western Army Aviation Group (Takayubaru)
Fighter Training Group (Nyutabaru)
Other units
Other units and organizations
Training Evaluation Research and
Development Command (Meguro) Air Development and Test Command Headquarters (Fuchu)
Ground Material Control Command (Jujo) Air Development and Air Development and Test Wing (Gifu)
Test Command
Other units and organizations Electronics Development and Test Group (Fuchu)
Aeromedical Laboratory (Iruma, Tachikawa)

Space Operations Group (Fuchu, hofukita)

Air Communications and Systems Wing (Ichigaya, Each region)
Aero Safety Service Group (Iruma)
Air Materiel Command (Jujo, Each region)
Other units and organizations

Booklet － 27 2023 Defense White Paper

■ Location of Principal SDF Units [for illustrative purposes] [As of March 31, 2022]
Ministry of Defense; Joint Staff Office;
Ground, Maritime and Air Staff Office
Ground Self-
Defense Force Rebuntou Northern Air
Ground Component Command Headquarters (and Eastern Army Headquarters) Wakkanai Defense Force
Army Headquarters 2nd Division
Division Headquarters / Brigade Headquarters
Asahikawa Abashiri
Tobetsu
Airborne Brigade
Northern 5th Brigade Nemuro
Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade Sapporo Army
Makomanai Obihiro
Helicopter Brigade
Chitose Higashi Chitose
Maritime Self- 7th Division
Defense Force Erimo
Okushiritou 11th Brigade
Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters
Ominato District
Headquarters District Ominato
Principal Naval Bases
Aomori Misawa
Principal Air Bases (Fixed-wing Aircraft Units) Hachinohe
Principal Air Bases (Helicopter Units) Northeastern Army
Kamo
Yamada
Air Self-
Defense Force 9th Division

Air Defense Command Headquarters

Jinmachi
Air Defense Force Headquarters
Sendai
Fighter Units
Sado
Surface-to Air Guided Missile Units 6th Division
Wajima
Aircraft Control and Warning Units (Radar Site) Otakineyama
12th Brigade
Takeshima
Eastern Army
Maizuru District Komatsu Somagahara
Western Air 1st Division
Defense Force Kyogamisaki 10th Division Yokosuka District
Takaoyama Ichigaya
Central Air Defense Force
Maizuru
Moriyama
13th Brigade Itami
Mishima Middle Army Senzo
Kaitaichi Kasatoriyama Omaezaki
Unishima
Iwakuni Kure 3rd Division
Zentsuji
Fukuoka
Sefuriyama 14th Brigade
Sasebo Ainoura
Tsuiki
Kushimoto
District Kasuga
Sasebo
4th Division
Fukuejima Omura Kure District
Kengun Kita Kumamoto
Western Army
8th Division Nyutabaru
Shimokoshikijima Takahatayama
Kanoya
Southwestern
Air Defense Force

Hyakuri

Southwestern
Air Defense Force Iruma
Asaka
Nerima Narashino
Yokota
Ichigaya

Okinoerabujima Atsugi
Funakoshi Kisarazu

Kumejima Yokosuka
Mineokayama
Senkaku Islands Naha
Yozadake
15th Brigade
Tateyama
Yonagunijima
Miyakojima

DEFENSE OF JAPAN Booklet － 28

 DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023

DEFENSE of JAPAN 2023

MINISTRY of DEFENSE Booklet