UNIVERSAL CONNECTIVITY BOARD WITH CONNECTASSURE PRODUCT SECURITY WHITE PAPERpdf
UNIVERSAL CONNECTIVITY BOARD WITH CONNECTASSURE PRODUCT SECURITY WHITE PAPERpdf
STERIS is committed to providing secure products to our Customers due to the significant
role that our medical devices play in their patient care and healthcare delivery services.
STERIS understands the increasing cybersecurity threats to the healthcare and public health
sector. We are committed to incorporating industry-recognized cybersecurity guidance and
practices in the development, deployment, installation, continuous monitoring, and
maintenance of our medical devices. We are also committed to complying with applicable
regional, federal, and local privacy and security laws and regulations, including HIPAA Security
Rule, HITECH ACT and other regulations.
STERIS improves security and privacy throughout the UCB lifecycle by adopting practices
such as:
Complaints about the Company’s compliance with HIPAA Rules or its Privacy Policy should
be provided in writing to the Privacy Officer. Complaints should be made through the
Company Integrity Helpline, which can be accessed by phone or through electronic
reporting.
Electronic reporting:
- Within the United States: www.reportlineweb.com/steris
- International: https://iwf.tnwgrc.com/steris
Phone numbers:
- Within the United States: 1-855-326-9721
- International: Refer to: https://www.steris.com/about/business/code-of-conduct
UCB w/ CAT Product Security Whitepaper
1
Title: Universal Connectivity Board Product Security White Paper
The purpose of this document is to detail how our security and privacy practices have been
applied to the Universal Connectivity Board.
This table provides a quick summary of the STERIS UCB Connectivity solution from data
privacy and security perspective. Multiple terms like UCB are introduced here. Refer to
further sections in this document for details.
System Architecture
Connectivity to STERIS Equipment is illustrated in the System context diagram below and
each sub-system is described further below.
STERIS Equipment
This is STERIS Equipment supported by STERIS Connectivity Architecture. This is typically a
STERIS Infection Prevention Technology (IPT) product like a Sterilizer, Washer / Disinfector
or Automated Endoscope Reprocessor sending data to ConnectAssure Technology software.
Each UCB is provisioned with unique X.509 PKI Client Certificates to authenticate and
hardened by applying Chain of Trust method, refer to section System Hardening Standards for
more details.
- Client Certificate based UCB Authentication – UCB leverages the X.509 PKI Standard.
Client Certificate is installed by STERIS in the UCB during manufacturing.
- UCB Authorization – UCB is authorized to submit data for the Equipment Serial Number
for which the UCB was provisioned. If a UCB Client certificate is compromised and
installed on another UCB or any untrusted device, any data sent by these devices is
rejected.
- Provisioning UCB during manufacturing and assembly by STERIS with a unique X.509
PKI Client Certificate before shipping
- Certification Rotation on a regular basis per assessment by STERIS and may change
over time based on revised assessments.
- As of this version of this document, Certificates are valid for one year from the time of
manufacturing of the UCB and auto rotated every three months when UCB is connected
to STERIS Certificate Management Service.
- UCB Software patches/images are code-signed. This allows only code trusted and
signed by designated STERIS certificate to be installed on the UCB.
- Only trusted UCBs can download UCB Software. Each UCB is provisioned with a unique
Client Certificate. Only Client Certificates signed by the STERIS Certificate Authority
can successfully authenticate to the Remote Upgrade Service for downloading software
updates.
The above measures ensure UCB is protected from the possibility of any spurious or
unauthenticated software, even when STERIS software updates are hosted on STERIS
Vendor’s SaaS platform.
Hardware Specifications
Operating Systems
Following URLs and ports are required to be open for UCB to access Remote Software Upgrades:
* Web sockets based: This service requires WebSocket to be enabled. Ensure your (STERIS
Customer) firewall allows requests to pass through to the Host and all URLs of this host.
Equipment machine and cycle data is transmitted. No PHI or PII data is transmitted
Data in Transit: Encrypted
Data at Rest (in UCB): Not Encrypted
For overall System Architecture diagram, refer to diagram below, repeated from page 5.
STERIS has created the Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) for UCB and updates the same
regularly. For requesting SBOM, contact: [email protected].
UCB
Connectivity
Name of Standard Version Number Source of Standard
Component
UCB High Assurance
Secure Boot & Chain of Trust HABv4 Booting (HAB) on
i.MX6
dm-verity with
Code Signing for UCB
1 signed hash using
Software
STERIS private key
PKI x.509 Digital Certificates
V3 PKI
for Authentication
Transport Channel Security TLS 1.2, 1.3 TLS
- UCB is an embedded Linux system with three major components. Bootloader, kernel
and root filesystem.
- All the components are signed, and the signatures are checked during boot.
Illustration below elaborates how each component is validating the signature of next
component in the boot chain thereby resulting in only STERIS signed components installable
on the UCB. If existing UCB software if altered by any means, the chain of trust will fail and
UCB will not start the altered component in the chain.
UCB implements a secure boot process where the bootloader, kernel and root file
system are signed.
Signature of all the components is verified during the boot process.
High Assurance Boot (HAB) is used for validating the signature of the first stage
bootloader.
Bootloader will check the signature of the FIT image.
FIT image is a container that contains Linux kernel image, device tree and an initial
ramdisk.
Kernel runs the init program from the ramdisk image, which has the logic to verify
the integrity of the final root filesystem before mounting it.
Table below elaborates the Malware Protection and Malware-free Shipping measures taken
by STERIS.
STERIS Key Management x.509 Key Management for Azure Web Application
Service UCB Firewall, Crowdstrike Falcon
Remote Software Upgrades Remote Software Upgrades Software artifacts are code-
(IoT Rollout) to UCB signed. Only STERIS signed
software can be installed on
UCB
In addition, for the UCB, STERIS is subscribed to monitor changes to UCB’s SOUP software
from Cybersecurity perspective and incorporate the changes as suggested by third party
(vendor for monitoring SOUP software).
Authentication Authorization
Target Application/Service
Source System Target Standard Comment
Application/Service
UCB STERIS Key MAC Address and Unique UCB MAC
Management Service Server Address and Time-
Authentication limited registration of
UCB to Key
Management Service.
Registration done
during UCB kitting
process in STERIS
premises
UCB Remote Software PKI X.509 Client Remote Software
Upgrade Service Authentication. Upgrade of UCB
Mutual
Authentication
between UCB &
Remote Software
Upgrade Service
Network Controls
STERIS will collaborate with HDOs to respond to any queries on Cybersecurity as HDOs assess
the network controls required to further improve Security in the network context the UCB is
deployed in HDO premises.
UCB
IP address for the UCB can be assigned the following ways:
Audit Logging
UCB is an embedded device initiating outgoing communication with required endpoints. Login
to UCB through Remote Access software is not supported.
Patch Management
If the UCB is allowed access to the Remote Software Upgrade endpoint, the UCB performs
regular checks for new software updates and downloads the software to install the upgrade
at a pre-defined time (Sunday, 3AM UTC).
Future (planned functionality): Customers may elect to receive notifications when new
software updates are available. Customers can modify update schedule for the current
pending update and setup default schedule (day of week and time) for future updates.
The following process is adopted to apply software updates to the UCB:
‐ New image of the UCB is signed by STERIS certificate and uploaded to Bosch Rollout
service
‐ UCB regularly checks for any available updates by authenticating itself to Bosch Rollout
‐ UCB downloads software and verifies digital signatures and integrity of the software
‐ Once the pre-defined scheduled time for software update is met, UCB reboots with the
new image (updated software). UCB verifies that a cycle is not running before
rebooting. If a cycle is running, UCB will re-attempt after the cycle has been
completed.
‐ If the UCB fails to reboot with the new image, re-attempt is made three times. If the
UCB fails to boot after three attempts with the new image, UCB is rebooted with the
previous working version
‐ Currently there is no provision to manually update UCB software onsite by STERIS
Field Service Engineers.
Service Handling
This section describes maintenance/repair activities that may or may not be performed on
an as-needed basis by STERIS Service.
Our Corporate IT program is committed to ongoing NIST CSF maturity Level monitoring by
an independent third party.
Our Product Cybersecurity Program is migrating to the NIST CSF framework and will enroll in
the same maturity assessment program as our IT Corporate Cybersecurity Program.
Security Testing
Otherwise known as the MDS2 form, the form for this product can be requested through your
STERIS Sales or Service representatives.
Disclaimer
The information contained in this Product Security White Paper is for reference purposes only.
Nothing contained in this document or relayed verbally to any Customer will be deemed to
amend, modify or supersede the terms and conditions of any written agreement between
such Customer and STERIS, or STERIS’s subsidiaries or affiliates (collectively, “STERIS”).
STERIS does not make any promises or guarantees to Customer that any of the methods or
suggestions described in this Product Security White Paper will restore Customer’s systems,
resolve any issues related to any malicious code or achieve any other stated or intended
results.
Abbreviations
• BU – Business Unit
• CSF – Cybersecurity Framework
• HAB – High Assurance Boot
• Healthcare Delivery Organization ‐ HDO
• H‐ISAC – Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (https://h‐isac.org/)
• IPT – Infection Prevention Technologies ‐ https://www.steris‐healthcare.com/products/ipt
• IT – Information Technology
• MDM – Medical Device Manufacturer
• MDS2 – Manufacturer Disclosure Statement (MDS) for Medical Device Security
• NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology
• NVD – National Vulnerability Database
• PII – Personally Identifiable Information
• PHI – Personal Health Information
• PS – Product Security
• PSO – Product Security Officer
• PSM – Product Security Manager
• PKI – Public Key Infrastructure
• RM – Remote Monitoring
• OWASP – Open Web Application Security Project ‐ https://owasp.org/
• CWE – Common Weakness Enumeration ‐ https://www.sans.org/top25‐software‐errors/
• SOUP – Software of the Unknown Provenance
• SPD – Sterile Processing Department
• TLS – Transport Layer Security
• UCB – Universal Connectivity Board
• USB – Universal Service Bus
• UTC – Coordinated Universal Time
• X.509 – Standard format for public key certificates
Revision History
References
STERIS Corporation
5960 Heisley Rd.
Mentor, OH 44060–1834 • USA
440–354–2600 • 800–548–4873
www.steris.com
This document is intended for the exclusive use of STERIS Customers, including architects
or designers.