Võ Văn Thưởng

Resigns as
President of Viet
Nam
Carlyle A. Thayer

Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 12

March 27, 2024
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Table of Contents
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2
Vo Van Thuong’s Resignation Will Throw a Spanner into Vietnam’s Leadership
Succession Process ................................................................................................................ 2
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1 ............................................................ 4
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 2 ............................................................ 5
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 3 ............................................................ 6
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 4 ............................................................ 7
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 5 ............................................................ 9
Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor? ................................................................... 10
Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership ......................................................... 13
Biography of Vo Van Thuong ............................................................................................. 16
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography .............................................................................................. 18
Thayer Consultancy Publications ........................................................................................ 20

Introduction
This Reader is a sequel to Leadership Change in Vietnam (Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 1),
issued on April 11, 2023 that chronicled leadership change in Vietnam from January to March
2023, including the rise of Vo Van Thuong to the office of President of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam. This Reader (Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 12) chronicles President Thuong’s
demise a year later in eight Background Briefs that provide an assessment of events as they
unfolded from rumours on Vietnamese social media to the official announcement of Thuong’s
resignation. The two most recent Background Briefs provide an analysis of who is likely to
replace Thuong as state president and the implications for leadership transition at the
forthcoming fourteenth national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party scheduled for
early 2026.

Vo Van Thuong’s Resignation Will Throw a Spanner into Vietnam’s Leadership

Succession Process
This Background Brief considers two questions: why President Thuong may be forced to resign
after only one year in office? How significant would a leadership reshuffle be and what are
the reasons behind it?
We request your assessment of the following report by Reuters that was just released:
Vietnam's parliament is set to meet on Thursday to discuss unspecified "personnel
issues", according to a letter sent to legislators seen by Reuters, amid speculation of a
reshuffle of the Communist-ruled country's top leadership.
Multiple Vietnamese officials and diplomats said the possible resignation of the
country's president Vo Van Thuong may be one of the personnel matters the
parliament will discuss.
 3

Q1. Why might President Thuong be forced out after only a year in office ?
ANSWER: Vo Van Thuong is being forced to resign as state president for his failure to exercise
proper supervision over provincial officials in Quang Ngai province during his tenure as
provincial party secretary from 2011-14.. Thuong signed off on a decision to award the Phuc
Son Group responsibility to develop the Tra Phuc South Bank River Road Project.
On 8 March this year, the Ministry of Public Security, after an investigation, arrested and
detained provincial officials from Quang Ngai province for receiving bribes during Thuong’s
tenure as provincial party secretary. Among the officials arrested were Cao Khoa, the former
permanent deputy secretary of Quang Ngai province, Dang Van Minh, former Director of the
Quang Ngai province Department of Traffic and Transport, and Dang Trung Hoanh, a relative
of Thuong and a district party official in Vinh Long province.
Thuong’s case closely parallels that of his predecessor Nguyen Xuan Phuc whose wife was
reportedly involved in a COVID-19 related scandal and Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime
Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also failed to properly supervise senior
diplomats involved in bribery for return air transport back to Vietnam during the COVID-19
pandemic.
Q2. How significant would a leadership reshuffle be and what are the possible reasons behind
it?
ANSWER: This is an immensely significant leadership reshuffle becomes it involves replacing
one of the four pillars of Vietnam’s leadership (party secretary general, state president, prime
minister, chairman of the National Assembly) twenty-one months in advance of the 14th
national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party. The Central Committee must decide
whether Thuong’s replacement is a caretaker for Thuong’s remaining term in office or
whether Thuong’s replacement will continue in office after the next party congress.
There are likely two candidates vying for the post of president, Minister of Public Security To
Lam and Permanent Member of the Secretariat Truong Thi Mai. Both will be over 65 in 2026.
Vietnam faces a conundrum in selecting its new leaders in 2026. The original 18-member
Politburo elected in 2021 will be reduced to fourteen if Thuong resigns. Unless an exemption
is given to the statutory retirement age of 65, only three incumbents will be qualified for the
four top leadership positions – Tran Thanh Man, Dinh Tien Dung and Tran Cam Tu. None
appear to be in the running as the next party leader.
Nguyen Phu Trong, now in his unprecedented third term in office, is expected to retire in
2026. Thuong, who is the youngest member of the Politburo was widely viewed as Trong’s
protege. Thuong would have been qualified to serve two five-year terms as party General
Secretary. Now an exemption on the age requirement will have to be given for Trong’s
successor.
Usually the process of determining the new party leadership takes place commencing from
mid-term between national party congresses. It involves a through vetting of possible
candidates and a series of straw polls to determine who has the support of the majority of
the Central Committee.
Thuong’s resignation will likely throw a spanner (monkey wrench) into the leadership
selection process as potential candidates for future leadership posts are forced to show their
hand.
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However, it must be noted that the final selection of future leaders will be in the hands of
party delegates to the fourteenth national party congress. They will elect the new party
Central Committee. The new Central Committee will elect the new Politburo and from among
its members the next party General Secretary.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 18, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716888133/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-s-Resignation-Will-
Throw-a-Spanner-Into-Vietnam-s-Leadership-Selection-Process.

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1

This Background Brief provides a first take on breaking news in Vietnam that the Vietnam
Communist Party leadership has agreed on the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong from
all offices that the holds in the government and party.
The breaking news in Hanoi is that the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee has
agreed on the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong just now. Could you provide an
assessment of this controversial development?
ANSWER: Vietnam has just witnessed the resignation of two state presidents within two
years. And the eighteen-member Politburo elected in 2021 has been reduced to fourteen.
This is unprecedented and indicates that Vietnam has much work to do to ensure a smooth
leadership transition at the next national party congress n early 2026.
According to the official media, President Vo Van Thuong violated party regulations and his
flaws negatively affected public perception as well as the Party's reputation. Therefore, the
Central Committee accepted his resignation as president and from all other positions in the
government. Social media says Thuong's short comings occurred twelve years ago when he
was party secretary of Quang Ngai province where there was a bribery scandal by officials
whom Thuong supervised. No explanation has been given that explains the timing of Thuong's
resignation after such a long period of time.
The party Central Committee apparently did not recommend who would replace Thuong. This
means that the Vice President, Vo Thi Anh Xuan, will step up as acting president. She is not a
member of the Politburo, and it is unlikely she will serve out the remaining term in office that
expires in May 2026. Therefore, the Central Committee will have to meet again, likely at the
regular session in May, to decide who among the present Politburo will be president
But the matter doesn't end there. Will the new president serve out the remaining term of
office, which is twenty-six months, as a care taker? Or will the next president be expected
to remain in office after May 2026 to serve a new full five-year term? Even if the Central
Committee decides on this course, it will have to be approved by the delegates to the
fourteenth national congress scheduled to meet in early 2026.
Vietnam needs to clarify and streamline its regulations to ensure a swift and orderly transition
in the future. The matter is pressing because Vietnam has just elevated four countries as
comprehensive strategic partners with the expectation that increased trade and investment
would boost Vietnam's development.
 5

Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 20, 2024.

https://www.scribd.com/document/716889084/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-
Vietnam-s-President-1.

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 2

This Background Brief addresses four questions: why was Thuong considered a rising star?
What are the implications of his resignation for the national party congress scheduled for
2026? What was my reaction to the news of Thuong’s resignation? What should observers
anticipate to happen in coming days?
The Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee has just approved the resignation of
President Vo Van Truong. We urgently request your analysis of this unexpected event.
Q1. Why was Vo Van Thuong considered a rising star?
ANSWER: Thuong acquitted himself well after graduation from university in the Ho Chi Minh
Communist Youth Movement and in local government in Ho Chi Minh City. He was quite
popular young people particularly university students.
Q2. What does Thuong’s resignation mean for 2026 National Party Congress?
ANSWER: There are only three members of the current Politburo who now qualify for
selection to the four pillars of leadership – general secretary, prime minister, state president
and chairman of the National Assembly – at the next national party congress scheduled for
early 2026. Thuong would have been the youngest of four if he had not resigned. Any other
incumbent member of the Politburo will have to be given a special exemption from the
mandatory retirement age of 65 to serve in one of the top for posts.
Q3. What was your reaction when Thuong’s resignation was announced?
ANSWER: The party’s official explanation for Thuong’s resignation did not specify precisely
what party rules he violated or when the violation took place. Also, if social media is correct
that the alleged incident took place twelve years ago what explains the timing of the charges
brought against Thuong?
It appears that To Lam, Minister of Public Security, may have moved pre-emptively to
eliminate a possible rival for party leadership before candidates were selected for review by
the Central Committee in advance of the fourteenth national congress scheduled for early
2026. It is possible the health of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong may have played a role.
Social media reported that when President Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigned last year, To Lam
threw his hat into the ring to replace Phuc. Thuong won the vote.
Q4. What should we anticipate or look forward to next?
ANSWER: The National Assembly today approved Vo Van Thuong’s resignation as president
but as of this writing has not confirmed that Vice President Vo Thi Anh Xuan will be the acting
president under the terms of the state Constitution. Anh Xuan is not expected to serve out
the remaining term of office which ends in May 2026. The party Central Committee is likely
to make a decision at its ninth plenum around May this year.
Vietnam’s political system will remain stable and party committees and sub-committees will
continue to prepare policy documents and long-term socio-economic development plans for
 6

the next national congress. The personnel sub-committee, head by General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong, will continue to vet and approve candidates for the new Central Committee to be
elected by delegates to the fourteenth national party congress. There will, of course, be
jostling within the top leadership to see who replaces General Secretary Trong.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716889672/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-
Vietnam-s-President-2.

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 3

This Background Brief considers three questions: what is my immediate take on Thuong’s
resignation? What will be the impact on internal politics and the succession process,
especially on General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong? Will there be any major implications for
Vietnam’s foreign policy including relations with China?
We are preparing a report on the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong, the second
Vietnamese President who has fallen from grace in a little over a year. As a top expert on
Vietnam and regional affairs, we request your insights on the possible implications of this
development.
Q1. What’s your take of his resignation?
ANSWER: While there was plenty of forewarning over the last two weeks that Vo Van Thuong
was likely to resign as state president, the official announcement was a disappointment
because of its lack of specificity. Thuong is accused of violating party rules but no specific
details were provided or when the violations took place. Social media in Vietnam points to a
bribery scandal that took place under Thuong’s watch when he was party secretary of Quang
Ngai province twelve years ago. That was before General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong
launched his “burning furnace” anti-corruption campaign and before he promulgated his list
of what party members should not do.
The timing of the charges were described as a “recent”: development. This raises the
suspicion that the Minister of Public Security To Lam may have organised a political hit against
a potential rival as party leader at the next national congress scheduled for early 2026.
Q2. How will this shocking episode affect Vietnam’s internal politics, and particularly the
succession process considering Thuong is considered a protege of Nguyen Phu Trong, who is
widely believed to have health issues?
ANSWER: Thuong’s resignation reduces the Politburo from its original 18 members to 14. If
Nguyen Phu Trong, who is aged, ailing and into his unprecedented third term retires, this
number will be reduced to 13. If present party rules on length of service (no more than two
terms in office and mandatory retirement at 65) are enforced there will be only three
candidates for the four top leadership positions – party general secretary, prime minister,
president and chairman of the National Assembly.
In short, the Central Committee with have to give special exemptions for over aged candidates
or alter the party rules prior to the next national party congress.
In October last year, the eighth plenum of the Central Committee commenced formal
planning for the fourteenth national congress scheduled for early 2026. General Secretary
 7

Nguyen Phu Trong took charge of the personnel sub-committee that will vet and nominate
candidates for the new Central Committee. Ordinarily this process takes place at a measured
pace over two and a half years with straw polls conducted in the final year prior to the
congress.
Filling the post of state president will be a delicate matter of deciding whether to appoint a
care taker who will retire at the end of term in May 2026 or appoint a person who will be
expected to be re-elected after the next party congress. This will precipitate jostling among
the party and government wings for a seat on the Politburo and for a say in who will fill the
top leadership posts known as the ”four pillars.“
It is likely that those who supported General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign will
exert strong pressure to preserve his legacy and protect their own positions. Those in the
government wing will want to increase their influence and limit the anti-corruption campaign
to contemporary violations of the law and party regulations.
Q3. Will it have any major implications on Vietnam’s foreign policy and its relations with major
powers, especially China? Vietnam’s Le Hoai Trung just visited China and met Liu Jianchao on
18 March in Jinlin.
ANSWER: Vietnam’s foreign policy orientations to diversify and multilateralize external
relations and the four no’s defence policy are firmly set in stone and will not alter. What will
change is Vietnam’s engagement with its four new comprehensive strategic partners – South
Korea, United States, Japan and Australia. The key here is economic relations, trade and
investment and science and technology innovation. China will have to lift its game to retain
influence in Vietnam.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716891978/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-
Vietnam-s-President-3.

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 4

This Background Brief addresses five questions: What conclusions can we draw from the
charge that Vo Van Thuong resigned due to “violations” and “shortcomings”? Who will be the
next President? How will the leadership reshuffle impact on Vietnam’s political stability? Will
the fallout from Thuong’s resignation undermine investor confidence? What will be the
impact on Vietnam’s foreign policy including relations between China and the United States?
We request your assessment regarding the resignation of Vietnam’s President Vo Van
Thuong.
Q1. The ruling Vietnam Communist Party said Thuong resigned due to “violations” and
“shortcomings” after only a year in office. What do you make of that?
ANSWER: It is unclear from the official party announcement precisely what party regulations
Vo Van Thuong violated and when these violations took place.
Social media commentary strongly suggests the violations took place in 2012 when Thuong
was party secretary of Quang Ngai province. Either Thuong failed to properly supervise
subordinate provincial officials under him or he or a family member directly benefited from a
road development scheme that was awarded after provincial officials were paid bribes.
 8

Thuong has been vetted many times for higher office since his term as Quang Ngai province
party secretary ended in 2014. The question that arises is why has this case surfaced after
twelve years? This leads to the supposition that the Minister of Public Security To Lam is
getting rid of possible rivals in a bid to stay on in power after the fourteenth party congress
in early 2026.
Q2. Who do you believe will be picked as the next president?
ANSWER: This is likely to be a two-step process. The National Assembly is likely to appoint the
current vice president, Vo Thi Anh Xuan as acting president in the interim. Next, the Central
Committee will have to decide who will serve as president for the remaining term of office
that expires in May 2026. There appears to be two likely candidates, To Lam and Truong Thi
Mai, Permanent Member of the Secretariat.
Q3. Thuong is the second president who has been forced to resign within a year in Vietnam.
In your view, how will this reshuffle influence the country’s political stability?
ANSWER: Last year the eighth Central Committee plenum commenced planning for the next
national party congress; this included appointing a personnel sub-committee headed by
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to vet and nominate candidates for the new Central
Committee. Ordinarily this would be a multi-stage process right up to the eve of the national
congress in which several straw polls would be taken to determine the support that each
prospective candidate has. Thuong’s abrupt resignation will have the effect of speeding up
this process and exposing differences within the leadership. There will be little negative
impact on domestic political stability.
Q4. Do you think Vietnam’s deepening political upheaval will undermine investor confidence?
ANSWER: These events are taking place while an American business mission of approximately
fifty companies are currently visiting Vietnam. They will be reassured by their Vietnamese
counterparts that Vietnam will remain on a steady course. Vietnam made an orderly
transition after the death of President Tran Dai Quang and the resignation of President
Nguyen Xuan Phuc and there is no reason why Vietnam won’t be able to do so now.
Q5. Will the leadership changes have an impact on the country’s strategic orientation in
foreign policy, particularly its relations between the U.S. and China?
ANSWER: These policies are set in stone and are the result of collective decision-making by
the Central Committee and Politburo. Individual personalities do not have a decisive impact
on foreign policy. The state president follows the script he is given.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716892923/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-
Vietnam-s-President-4.
 9

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 5

This Background Brief considers five questions: Why did Vo Van Thuong resign? Were security
authorities aware of the bribery scandal in Quang Ngai province when Thuong was appointed
president last year? Is Thuong a victim of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s relentless
pursuit of corruption? Has General Secretary Trong been out maneuvered by rival factions
using Thuong’s resignation to discredit the party leader? How does the public view this – a
sign of the party’s loss of control?
Q1. What is your assessment of the resignation of President Vo Van Thuong and how
damaging is this for General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong?
ANSWER: Recall that Nguyen Phu Trong was expected to retire at the thirteenth national
congress in early 2021 and nominated Tran Quoc Vuong as his successor,. At a Central
Committee meeting in November 2020 Vuong failed to get majority support and dropped out.
At the eighth plenum of the Central Committee in October last year, planning for the next
party congress commenced. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong took charge of the
personnel sub-committee responsible for vetting and nominating candidates for the new
Central Committee to be selected at the fourteenth national party congress in early 2026.
Trong experienced some blow back for his heavy-handed or lack of consensual approach.
So Trong is not the unchallenged strong man in Vietnam’s political system as he is sometimes
portrayed
Trong’s current health problems signal that his era as party leader is coming to an end. Those
who have benefitted from or used his anti-corruption campaign are anxious to preserve their
influence for the next 21 months.
Trong’s hand is weakened with the demise of Thuong. If Trong wants to preserve his legacy
of anti-corruption and party-building he will now have to horse trade with the various
“interests groups” (Vietnamese term for factions).
Q2. Were Vietnam’s top leaders completely unaware of the scandal in Quang Ngai province,
and his possible links to it, when they appointed him last year?
ANSWER: There is evidence that some Quang Ngai provincial officials were well aware of the
bribery scandal but it was such a normal occurrence no one took action. After Thuong left
Quang Ngai and moved to higher office, he was vetted at each step of the way. He was almost
untouchable when Trong took him under his wing.
The key here is the timing of dredging up a scandal that took place twelve years ago. This has
the fingerprints of To Lam and the Ministry of Public Security all of it. Vietnamese social media
reports that when Nguyen Xuan Phuc was forced to resign as state president, To Lam stood
against Thuong and lost the vote.
Q3. Is Nguyen Phu Trong showing he is willing to go after close allies in his relentless pursuit
of corruption?
ANSWER: Trong’s anti-corruption campaign evolved to demonstrate that no person or
organisation would be left untouched, and in a new fillip that officials would be held
accountable for the actions of their subordinates. If they recanted first they would be
permitted to retire with some dignity. Thus, Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Pham Binh Minh fell
 10

victim. In addition to Trong’s proclivity to take a hard line stance against senior officials, public
opinion clearly played a role as well,.
Q4. Or, was General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong outmanoeuvred by rival factions, who used
Thuong’s resignation to discredit the party leader?
ANSWER: Trong’s hand was forced when the Ministry of Public Security and the Central
Inspection Committee, which responsibility in this area, presented him with evidence that
Thuong was culpable in a bribery scandal. Funds reportedly were given to a family member
to be used for Thuong’s housing/ancestral home.
Thuong was widely viewed as Trong’s protege. If party regulations on length of service (one
full 5-year term on the Politburo but no more than two terms in a ministerial-level post) and
mandatory age retirement age of 65, only three members of the present Politburo would
qualify. Thuong at 54 is the youngest of this group and at his age he could be elected party
general secretary for two consecutive terms. Anyone else on the Politburo would need a
special exemption to the age requirement to serve as party leader; but given their present
age that person would only be able to serve one five-year term.
Q5. Vietnam’s party leaders really seem to be struggling with corruption. Blazing furnaces
are all very well but if all the public can see is infernos might they conclude that the party is
failing to keep control, rather than being in control and stamping out the fires?
ANSWER: There is no doubt that Vietnam’s one-party state is “ruled by law” rather than
“governed by law” and this contributes to a high incidence of corruption. For example,
Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index (PCI) for 2022 ranked Vietnam
77th out of 180 states surveyed. Vietnam received a score of 42 on a scale ranging from 0
(highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
But – and this is significant – Vietnam’s PCI score rose from 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of
175 states surveyed) to 31 in 2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong’s first term in office, to 36 in 2020 (104/180) at the end of Trong’s second term in office,
and to 39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong was elected for a third term. In sum, Vietnam’s PCI
score jumped just over 39 points during Trong’s tenure as party leader. Vietnam’s score of 42
in 2022 was just below the global average of 43 of 180 countries surveyed.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716893708/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-
Vietnam-s-President-5.

Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor?

This Background Brief addresses three questions: what accounts for Thuong’s demise – is he
a victim of the anti-corruption campaign or factional politics inside the party? Is the power of
General Secretary Trong diminished by the loss of an ally and potential successor? Who is
likely to replace Thuong as president, and who is the potential successor to General Secretary
Trong?
We request your expertise in responding to the following questions:
Q1. Vo Van Thuong was once considered “the morally authoritative leader the Communist
party needs to continue its anti-corruption campaign”, but now he has also stepped down,
 11

most likely because of a corruption scandal. Do you think this reflects that the corruption
problem is deep rooted in Vietnam, or that the factional struggle in the party has become
more serious?
ANSWER: The official announcement of Vo Van Thuong’s resignation was issued by the Office
of the Party Central Committee (Thông cáo Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng) on 20 March. This
announcement stated, “recently, according to reports from the Central Inspection Committee
and competent agencies (Ủy ban Kiểm tra Trung ương và các cơ quan chức năng), he violated
Regulations on what party members cannot do and the Regulations on the responsibility of
setting an example for officials and the party members, first of all, members of the Politburo,
members of the Secretariat, members of the Party Central Committee…”1 The announcement
concluded, “Mr Vo Van Thuong’s violations and shortcomings have negatively affected public
perception, as well as the reputation of the Party and the State.”
There has been intense speculation in Vietnamese social media that Thuong was implicated
in a bribery scandal related to a road development project that he approved when he was
party secretary of Quang Ngai province in 2012. It is unclear whether Thuong failed to
properly monitor his subordinates or whether Thuong or a family member benefitted from
the bribery scheme. Regardless which account is accurate what explains why these charges
werfe brought against him twelve years later?
The reference to “recently” (vừa qua) in the announcement by the Office of the Party Central
Committee suggests Thuong committed a serious violation of party regulations within the last
two and a half years. Secretariat Regulation No. 37-QD-TW on what party members should
not do (Quy Định V ề những điều đảng viên không được làm) was issued in October 2021.
What account for Thuong’s demise – the anti-corruption campaign or party in-fighting? There
is no question that corruption is rife at all levels in Vietnam and that General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong has made his “burning furnace” (đốt lò) campaign against corruption not only his
highest priority but his legacy to the party as he prepares to step down after an
unprecedented third term in office at age 80.
The anti-corruption campaign has been wide-ranging and left virtually no stone unturned.
Since the last national party congress n 2021, four members of the 18 member Politburo
elected then have been forced to resign for violating party regulations.
In June 2022, on the tenth anniversary of Trong’s anti-corruption campaign, the Ministry of
Information released the following figures:
• 168,000 CPV members were disciplined and 7,390 “punished for corruption or links with
corruption,” including “170 officials under the Party Central Committee’s management”
• 16,699 cases of corruption, abuse of position, and economic-related irregularities were
prosecuted. US$2.6 billion worth of ‘corrupt assets’ have been recovered, including
76,000 hectares of wrongfully appropriated land. US$41.8 billion in fines have been
levied.
At least seventy high-ranking party officials, including five ministers or former ministers, were
disciplined since 2021 alone.

1
Quy Định về những điều đảng viên không được làm, Quy định số 37, October 25, 2021 and Quy định về trách
nhiệm nêu gương của cán bộ, Đảng viên trước hết là ủy viên Bộ chính trị, ủy viên ban bí thư, ủy viên ban chấp
hành trung ương, Quy định số 08-QĐ/TW, October 25, 2018.
 12

Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on Transparency
International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index (PCI) where scores are tabulated on a scale
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Vietnam’s PCI score rose from a low of 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of 175 states surveyed) to
31 in 2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s first term in office.
Vietnam’s PCI score rose to 36 in 2020 (104/180) at the end of Trong’s second term in office,
and to 39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong was elected for a third term. Vietnam’s PCI score rose
to an all-time high of 42 in 2022 (77/80) but dropped slightly to 41 (87/180) in 2023.
In sum, Vietnam’s PCI score improved over 38 points during Trong’s tenure as party leader.
But Vietnam ranks just below the global average and still has a long way to go.
Prior to Thuong’s resignation, there were only four members of the Politburo, including
Thuong himself, who were qualified under existing regulations to stand for election to
Vietnam’s four top leadership posts at the next party congress in early 2026 – party General
Secretary, prime minister, president and chairman of the National Assembly. Thuong is the
youngest member of the Politburo was widely tipped to replace Throng as party leader. Given
his age, Thuong would have been eligible to serve two consecutive five-years terms before
reaching the mandatory retirement age of 65.
Now that Thuong is out of the picture, the Central Committee will have to grant a special
exemption from the statutory retirement age for another member of the Politburo to qualify
for election. The current Minister of Public Security To Lam is most likely to benefit from
Thuong’s demise.
If Thuong committed a serious breach of party regulations in recent years, then without
question he is a victim of General Secretary Trong’s “burning furnace” anti-corruption
campaign. However, it Thuong’s demise is related to a twelve-year old bribery case, he is most
likely a victim of party-factionalism.
Q2. As Thuong was seen as an ally and potential successor of General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong, does Thuong’s resignation means that Trong’s power has been weakened?
ANSWER: Party General Secretary Trong is not all-powerful. At the last national party congress
in 2021, he advanced Tran Quoc Vuong as his successor. The Central Committee failed to
ratify Vuong when a coalition of provincial representatives voted against him.
In March, General Secretary Trong successfully removed President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and
Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh from the Politburo for their failure to supervise
subordinates involved in corrupt practices. But when Trong considered taking action against
Prime Minster Pham Minh Chinh, whose family members were allegedly implicated in a
COVID-19 related scandal, senior members of the leaderhip pushed back arguing this would
be destabilising.
General Secretary Trong had a stroke in 2019 and was reportedly seriously ill earlier this year.
His protégé, Thuong, is now out of the running. Trong is a “lame duck” leader who is expected
to retire at the 2026 national party congress.
In sum, Trong, who heads the Personnel Sub-Committee to select candidates for election at
the next national congress, cannot dictate who will replace him as party leader. He will have
to bargain and seek consensus among members of the Personnel Sub-Committee before
seeking ratification by the Central Committee.
 13

Q3. Based on the current situation, could you please analyze who will replace Thuong and be
the new potential successor of Trong in 2026?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s National Assembly has already approved Vo Thi Anh Xuan, the current
vice president, as acting president. Anh Xuan is unlikely to hold this position until the end of
the term in May 2026 because she is not a member of the Politburo.
It seems likely that the Central Committee will nominate a candidate for state president at its
next executive session, the 9th plenum, in May if not sooner. The Central Committee must
decide whether it should appoint a caretaker to fill out the term in office and retire, or pick a
person who is expected to continue in office as the next president after the 2026 party
congress. Truong Thi Mai, Permanent Member of the Secretariat, and Public Security Minister
To Lam, are viewed as the front runners.
The Central Committee could follow the precedent set when President Tran Dai Quang died
in office, that is, appoint someone senior on the Politburo to hold two posts concurrently until
the end of term.
Regardless of which scenario is followed the new state president can only serve until the
expiration of the current term in May 2026.
At present, only three members of the fourteen member Politburo are qualified to stand for
election to one of the four top leadership posts – Tran Thanh Man (deputy chairman of the
National Assembly), Dinh Tien Dung (secretary of the Hanoi party committee) and Tran Cam
Tu (head of the Central Inspection Committee). All three persons will be under 65 years of
age in early 2026.
If it is assumed that Nguyen Phu Trong will retire, there are ten remaining members of the
Politburo who would need an exemption for exceptional service to serve beyond age 65. The
current prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, chairman of the National Assembly, Vuong Dinh
Hue, and Permanent Member of the Secretariat, Truong Thi Mai, are the most senior having
served two terms on the Politburo and will be aged 68-69 when the next party congress is
held.
Vuong Dinh Hue would appear to be the most qualified person to replace Trong as party
leader. He would be following in the footsteps of general secretaries Nong Duc Manh and
Nguyen Phu Trong who both served as Chairman of the National Assembly. Hue scored the
second highest number of votes in the National Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 24, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716894769/Thayer-Who-Will-Be-Nguyen-Phu-Trong-s-
Successor.

Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership

This Background Brief considers five questions: who is likely to replace Vo Van Thuong as
president, To Lam or Truong Thi Mai? What qualifications must the next president have to be
elected? Is the Vietnam Communist Party experiencing a personnel shortage and is the
Politburo understaffed? What went wrong with the party’s personnel management at the
thirteenth national party congress and what are the lessons for the fourteenth national
congress? Will the anti-corruption campaign slow down or be ramped up in the future?
 14

When the Vietnam Communist Party selects the next state president behind closed doors, we
will prepare a report on who is most likely to win the presidency. We request your insights
into the following questions:
Q1. Who do you think is more likely to replace Vo Van Thuong: To Lam or Truong Thi Mai?
Why?
ANSWER: The person who replaces the current Acting President of Vietnam, Vo Thi Anh Xuan,
will serve out the remaining term in office that ends in May 2026, that is, four months after
the fourteenth national party congress scheduled for early 2026.
There is a remote possibility that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong could follow the
precedent set when Tran Dai Quang died in office, and serve concurrently as party General
Secretary and state President. Trong’s current health conditions and physical stamina weigh
heavily against this scenario.
Truong Thi Mai would be “safe as houses” to become the next president. She is an
experienced veteran senior leader who has held a variety of high-level posts in the Vietnam
Communist Party. Recently, Mai stood in for President Thuong to receive the new Lao
Ambassador, giving rise to speculation in some quarters that she was tipped to replace
Thuong.
As a Permanent Member of the Secretariat and Head of the Organisation Committee Mai
would be expected to play a substantial role in personnel selection for the next party
congress. Mai, who is 66 years old, would be a good replacement for Thuong especially if she
has no future leadership aspirations. Mai will be 68 when the next national congress is
scheduled to be held. In order to continue in office she would need a special exemption on
exceptional grounds. Her gender could stand against her.
When Tran Dai Quang died in office there were conflicting claims about To Lam and his
ambitions. One account avers that Lam put his hand up and stood against Vo Van Thuong and
lost the vote. The other account states that when Lam was asked to stand for president he
declined. It was speculated that Lam had ambitions to become party leader and did not want
to give up his influential post as Minister of Public Security at that time.
It is strongly rumoured that Lam has ambitions to become party General Secretary. Lam will
be over 68 when the next party congress is scheduled. He too would need a special
exemption.
Mai would seem the best candidate to serve as president until May 2026. She is senior to Lam
in party ranking. Both were subject to a party vote of confidence but the results remain
confidential.
Lam, as a minister, was also subject to a vote of confidence by deputies to the National
Assembly. These results were made public and they reveal that while Lam has substantial
support among his peers, he also has his detractors. He received 43 votes of low confidence
placing him thirty-sixth out of forty-four officials who were voted on. Lam’s indiscretion in
eating gold plated steak offered to him on a sword while on official business in London in late
2021 may come back to haunt him.
Q2. What are the qualifications/criteria the Party wants most of the next president to make
sure he/she serves out the rest of the term?
 15

ANSWER: As Thuong’s dismissal made clear, the person to serve as state president must have
a clean sheet and not committed any of the nineteen things party members must not do (Quy
Định về những điều đảng viên không được làm, Quy định số 37, October 25, 2021) as well as
regulations on the responsibility for setting an example for officials and party members, first
of all members of the Politburo, members of the Secretariat and members of the party Central
Committee. (Quy định về trách nhiệm nêu gương của cán bộ, Đảng viên trước hết là ủy viên
Bộ chính trị, ủy viên ban bí thư, ủy viên ban chấp hành trung ương, Quy định số 08-QĐ/TW,
October 25, 2018).
Q3. Is the current Politburo short-staffed to fill vacant positions? Is the CPV going through a
personnel shortage?
ANSWER: From the very beginning the Politburo was under-staffed. At the thirteenth national
congress in early 2021, the outgoing Central Committee recommended a Politburo of 19
members. Only 18 were elected. Since 2021, four members of the Politburo have been
dismissed and not replaced, bringing the total down to 14. Of this number only three are
qualified for election to a higher post without the need for a special exemption from the
mandatory retirement age or exceeding the two-year limit in holding the same office. To Lam,
for example, will have served two full five-years terms as Minister of Public Security.
Q4. With 4 out of 18 members kicked out of the Politburo more than half way through its
term, what has gone wrong with the personnel work of the 13th Central Committee? What
are the lessons for the fourteenth national party congress?
ANSWER: Since 2011, when Nguyen Phu Trong was elected party General Secretary, he has
made party-building his main priority including his campaign against corruption and negative
phenomena. His anti-corruption campaign has two lines of effort, punishing officials and
cadres for violating the law and holding officials accountable for supervising their
subordinates.
General Secretary Trong headed the personnel committee charged with vetting candidates
for the Central Committee for the twelfth and thirteenth national congresses. In June 2022,
on the tenth anniversary of Trong’s anti-corruption campaign, it was announced that 170
officials under the party Central Committee had been punished for corruption. Since 2021, at
least seventy high-ranking party officials, including five ministers or former ministers were
dismissed. Thuong was the fourth Politburo member to be dismissed since 2021.
General Secretary Trong deserves credit for his effort to combat corruption and improve
leadership selection by establishing rigorous criteria. But Trong must also bear responsibility
for leaving Politburo vacancies unfilled and some responsibility for overseeing a leadership
selection process that has turned up so many bad apples. Trong must redeem himself as head
of the personnel committee that is presently selecting candidates for election to the Central
Committee by party delegates to the fourteenth national party congress. The personnel
committee must be extremely rigorous in vetting candidates for future leadership positions.
Q5.With the anti-graft campaign sweeping away top leaders like Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo
Van Thuong, how has it affected the Party's credibility? Will the anti-corruption campaign
slow down or be ramped up?
ANSWER: In the absence of public opinion polls and independent media reporting in Vietnam,
it is not possible to establish credible metrics to judge public opinion. The results are likely
mixed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the results are mixed with the public generally
 16

supportive of General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption efforts. Vietnamese academics have

raised the question, however, are the number of party officials caught up in the anti-
corruption drive only the tip of the iceberg?
The other side of the coin is elite cynicism over why some leaders are punished and other are
not. While it is early days, the feedback I have received from Vietnam is total surprise that Vo
Van Thuong was forced to resign and the lack of transparency about what he did that merited
such disciplinary action.
The future of Genera Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign hangs in the balance,
particularly if he retires at the end of his current term. The party is divided between those
who have jumped on board the anti-corruption campaign in order to advance their careers,
and those who fear the anti-corruption campaign has gone too far and has been needlessly
disruptive.
Tran Quoc Vuong, Trong’s protégé, fell into the former category and his career was cut short
by a coalition of provincial officials who were concerned about likely domestic disruption if
he became party leader. A similar coalition pushed back against Trong’s supporters who
wanted to see Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh dismissed.
It is too early to tell what the trajectory of the anti-corruption campaign will take because the
leadership transition will take twenty-one months to conclude. Whatever decisions are made
about candidates for membership on the next Central Committee will have to wait until early
2026 when delegates to the fourteenth congress elect the new Central Committee. The new
Central Committee will then elect the Politburo and from among its members the next party
General Secretary.
“Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief,
March 27, 2024. https://www.scribd.com/document/717885830/Thayer-Personnel-Issues-
Facing-Vietnam-s-Party-Leadership.

Biography of Vo Van Thuong

The following is the biography of Vo Van Thuong who was elected as the President of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on March 2, 2023:
Date of birth: December 13, 1970=
Native land: An Phuoc commune, Mang Thit district, Vinh Long province
Date of Party admission: November 18, 1993
Education:
- General education: 12/12
- Degree: Bachelor of Philosophy
- Master of Social Sciences and Humanities
Reward: Third-class Labor Order; Medal "For Young Generation"; Certificate of Merit by the
Prime Minister (2004)
Positions:
- Alternate member of the Party Central Committee, 10th tenure;
 17

- Member of the Party Central Committee: 11th, 12th and 13th tenures;
- Secretary of the Party Central Committee: 12th and 13th tenures;
- Member of the Politburo: 12th and 13th tenures;
- Deputy to the National Assembly: 12th, 14th and 15th tenures.
Working career:
- From 1988 to 1992: Student of Faculty of Philosophy of Ho Chi Minh City University.
- From 1992 to 1993: Member of the Central Committee of Vietnamese Students' Association.
- From 1993 to 2004: Vice Secretary and then Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Committee
of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (HCYU); Chairman of Ho Chi Minh City Youth
Union; Member of the HCYU Central Committee and the Standing Board of the HCYU Central
Committee; Member of the HCM City's Party Committee (from October 2003).
- From November 2004 to October 2006: Member of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee,
Secretary of the Party Committee of District 12.
- April 2006: At the 10th National Party Congress, elected alternate member of the Party
Central Committee.
- October 2006: Permanent Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Central
Committee, First Secretary of the Youth Union Central Committee (from January 2007),
President of the Viet Nam Youth Federation, Chairman of the National Committee for
Vietnamese Youth. Deputy of the 12th-tenure National Assembly.
- From January 2011 to April 2014: Member of the Party Central Committee; Secretary of the
Quang Ngai provincial Party Committee (from August 2011).
- From April 2014 to January 2016: Member of the Party Central Committee, Permanent
Deputy Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee.
- January 2016: Politburo member, Secretary of the Party Central Committee.
- From February 2016 to January 2021: Politburo member, Secretary of the Party Central
Committee, Chairman of the Party Central Committee's Commission of Information and
Education; Deputy of the 14th-tenure National Assembly.
- From January 2021 to now: Politburo member, Permanent member of the Party Central
Committee's Secretariat (from February 2021).
- On March 2, 2023, at the fourth extraordinary meeting of the 15th-tenure National
Assembly, he was elected President of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam./.

Source: “Biography of President Vo Van Thuong,” Government News, March 3, 2023,

https://en.baochinhphu.vn/vo-van-thuong-sworn-in-as-new-president-of-viet-nam-
111230302142430588.htm.
 18

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra. He
is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered in
Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.
Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in Political Science (B.A.
1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971) and a PhD in International
Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He studied Thai language at
The University of Missouri at Columbia (intensive summer 1966), Vietnamese language at Yale
(1969-71) and Cornell (intensive summer 1970), and Lao and Vietnamese languages at
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (intensive summer 1971).
Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political Science,
Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in the Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU
to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of Regional
Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific Command, Hawaii.
He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original contributor to the
Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic
Coordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
 19

During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations Observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School Flag Bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials=
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
 20

Thayer Consultancy Publications

BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Australia-Vietnam Relations, 1973-2023: Papers and Presentations by Carlyle A. Thayer,
Thayer Consultancy Bibliography No 1, June 24, 2023.
South China Sea Code of Conduct, 2018-2023: A Bibliography, Thayer Consultancy
Bibliography No. 2, August 6, 2023.
Vietnam’s Relations with the Russian Federation, Thayer Consultancy Bibliography No. 3,
August 16, 2023.
DISCUSSION PAPERS
Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations: A Critical Review, Thayer Consultancy
Discussion Paper No. 1, October 2020.
Vietnam Aligns with China and Plays the United States: A Critique, Thayer Consultancy
Discussion Paper No. 2, March 2023.
Recent Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Critique, Thayer Consultancy Discussion Paper No. 3,
March 2023.
READERS
Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 1, April 11, 2023.
Vietnam People’s Army, 2016-2020: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 2, April 12,
2023.
Vietnam People’s Army, 2021-2023: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 3, April 12,
2023.
Vietnam-United States Relations, 2021: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 4, April 19,
2023.
Vietnam-United States Relations, 2022: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 5, April 20,
2023.
Vietnam-United States Relations, 2023: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 6, April 21,
2023.
Vietnam and Australia: Strategic Partners, 2018-2023: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader
No. 7, April 22, 2023.
Revival of the Quad, 2017-2018: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 8, May 15, 2023.
The Quad and the Indo-Pacific, 2019-2013: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 9, May
15, 2023.
Cambodia, 2021-2023: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 10, July 25, 2023.
Vietnam-Russia Relations, 2016-2023: A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 11, August
20, 2023.