Goettingen Journal of International Law 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and

Universal Jurisdiction in International
Criminal Law: Antagonists or Perfect Match?

Britta Lisa Krings

Table of Contents

A. Introduction ................................................................................................ 739

B. The Principles: Definitions ........................................................................ 741
I. Principle of Universal Jurisdiction ......................................................... 741
II. Principle of Complementarity ................................................................ 745
1. Art. 17 Rome Statute: Issue of Admissibility of Cases Before
the ICC ................................................................................................ 746
2. As a State Obligation/Right ................................................................ 748
a) A State’s Obligation? ...................................................................... 748
b) Addressees of the Principle of Complementarity as a State’s
Right/Obligation.............................................................................. 749
3. The Rationale Behind the Principle of Complementarity................... 750
C. The Interplay Between the two Principles ................................................. 751


LL.M. (Genève). This article is based on a paper delivered during the 2009/2010
Master Course at the Geneva Academy. The author especially thanks Prof. N. Michel
(Geneva Academy) and Ms. C. Del Mar for their helpful comments on the paper.

doi: 10.3249/1868-1581-4-3-krings
 738 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

I. Interplay Universal Jurisdiction / Complementarity as an

Admissibility Issue Under Art. 17 Rome Statute ................................... 751
1. Does the Complementarity in Art. 17 Rome Statute Embrace All
Different Linkages of the Member States? ......................................... 752
a) Only Active Personality and Territoriality (as in Art.
12 (2) (a), (b) Rome Statute) ........................................................... 752
b) All Jurisdictional Links Which Are Accepted by the State ............ 753
c) Discussion ....................................................................................... 754
d) Conclusion ...................................................................................... 758
2. Does the Complementarity as an Admissibility Criterion Also
Cover the Use of Universal Jurisdiction by Non-Member States? ..... 759
II. Interplay of the Principles Regarding the States’ Obligation/Right
to Complementarity ................................................................................ 760
1. Is There an Obligation of the State to Investigate/Prosecute if Only
Universal Jurisdiction Can Be Applied?............................................. 760
2. Can the Use of Universal Jurisdiction Cause a Clash Between
Willing States and Violate the Right to Complementarity of
a State? ................................................................................................ 762
D. Conclusion ................................................................................................. 762
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 739

Abstract
The concepts of complementarity and Universal Jurisdiction as such raise
various concerns, just in themselves. The combination of these concepts
may be a very reasonable one, however, it tends to cause confusion and
renunciation within the international community. The objective of the
present work is to present very briefly the two different legal concepts and
provide an analysis on their compatibility. In order to come to a result, the
principle of complementarity is evaluated as both, an admissibility criterion
and a State obligation and right, to primarily be able to deal with a case in
their national legal system, acknowledging that criminal jurisdiction is
situated in the heart of State’s sovereignty. Universal Jurisdiction is brought
into a relation with these two ideas of complementarity. This paper
addresses possible solutions.

A. Introduction
Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda stated “lately,
some in the more powerful parts of the world have given themselves the
right to extend their national jurisdiction to indict weaker nations. This is
total disregard of international justice and order. Where does this right come
from? Would the reverse apply such that a judgment from less powerful
nations indicts those from the more powerful?”1 This clearly critical, almost
hostile approach towards Universal Jurisdiction may be representative for a
contemporary suspicion in the spheres of the African Union.2 It is, however,
not a final argument against this concept. The recent establishment of a
system of international criminal justice, which sooner or later will most
probably mainly consist of the International Criminal Court (ICC), is built
to deal with those most responsible for egregious crimes, mostly mass
crimes. Accordingly, it leaves a huge gap between those most responsible
and those innocent. The low-level perpetrators of these crimes can only be
held responsible, if the national jurisdictions contribute their share. This is

1
Address at the ‘Facing Tomorrow Conference’, Presidents Discussing Tomorrow,
Jerusalem, Israel, (13 May 2008), found in C. C. Jalloh, ‘Universal Jurisdiction,
Universal Prescription?: A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union Perspective
on Universal Jurisdiction’, 21 Criminal Law Forum (2010) 1, 1, 1.
2
Id., 2-4.
740 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

where the principle of complementarity comes into focus. It ensures that the
ICC is nothing more and nothing less than an international court of “last
resort”, supposedly stepping back where the States themselves can and want
to deal with international crimes. Complementarity is a matter of
admissibility in the Rome Statute, but also a guiding principle of the ICC’s
relationship to the national jurisdictions. A recent example of the practical
importance of the question of scope and nature of complementarity in
relation to Universal Jurisdiction arose in Germany. A Rwandan national,
living in France, was suspected of the commission of crimes against
humanity in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2009. The ICC
investigated in this matter as did the German General Federal Prosecutor of
the German Federal Court, basing the investigations on Universal
Jurisdiction. With regard to the ICC’s investigations the Germany General
Federal Prosecutor dismissed the investigation in accordance with § 153 f II
1 No. 4 German Code of Criminal Procedure.3 Universal Jurisdiction, being
a jurisdiction related concept, may be relevant on the level of determination
of admissibility and in the finding of obligations of States. The core
question to be raised in the present work is: How do the two principles
mingle, is there a possibility of reconciling two possibly polar concepts? It
was stated that with the establishment of the ICC the use of Universal
Jurisdiction was only necessary in cases outside the scope of jurisdiction of
the ICC.4 This article considers three divergent positions, first, the principle
of complementarity furthers/improves the use and implementation of
Universal Jurisdiction, second, in the exercise of complementarity there is
no room left for nationally prescribed Universal Jurisdiction,5 or third,
Universal Jurisdiction enforces the principle of complementarity effectively
by increasing the number of potential National States that are able to deal
with international crimes that were committed.

3
German Federal Constitutional Court, Decision of 1 March 2011, 2 BvR 1/11, 31
Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2011) 6, 353, 354.
4
S. García Ramírez, ‘Principio de Complementariedad en el Estatuto de Roma’, 4
Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional (2004), 149, 154-156.
5
Burke-White even argued that the establishment of the ICC as such leads to a
reluctance of States to engage in proceedings under Universal Jurisdiction. W. W.
Burke-White, ‘Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and
National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice’, 49 Harvard
International Law Journal (2008) 1, 53, 63.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 741

In the following, the principle of complementarity and universal

jurisdiction will be very briefly defined, however, these definitions do not
claim to be academic and final definitions but to be understood as working
definitions for the purposes of the present work.6 After that the possible
interplay between the two concepts is discussed and a conclusion is drawn.

B. The Principles: Definitions

I. Principle of Universal Jurisdiction
The principle of Universal Jurisdiction provides for jurisdiction of a
State over certain crimes without requiring any of the normally required
linkages,7 such as commission on its territory,8 nationality of either

6
The difficult task of finding a final definition for the principles was – in relation to
Universal Jurisdiction – even left open by the ICJ, as stated in a dissenting opinion to
the Arrest Warrant Case; on the lack of a definition for Universal Jurisdiction: Jalloh,
supra note 1, 6.
7
Princeton Principles, Principle 1 (1), in ‘The Princeton Principles on Universal
Jurisdiction’, available at http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ihrli/download
s/Princeton%20Principles.pdf (last visited 28 January 2013), 28; Amnesty
International, ‘Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement
Legislation’ (2001), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR53/002/
2001/en/be2d6765-d8f0-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c11 8e/ior530022001en.pdf (last visited
28 January 2013), 11; B. Broomhall, ‘Towards the Development of an Effective
System of Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes Under International Law’, 35 New
England Law Review (2001) 2, 399, 400; J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public
International Law, 8th ed. (2012), 467; D. Carreau, Droit International, 10th ed.
(2009), 387, para. 1039 (he refers to the nationality requirements only); R. Cryer et
al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd ed. (2010), 44;
M. Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of
National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes Under International Law
(2008), 25; K. Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 5th ed. (2004), 663, para. 7; G. de La Pradelle, ‘La
competence universelles’, in H. Ascensio et al. (eds), Droit international penal
(2000), 905, para. 1; M. E. Odello, ‘La Corte Penal Internacional y las legislaciones
nacionales: Relación entre Derecho Internacional y derechos nacionales’, 1 Foro:
Revista de Sciencias Jurídicas y Sociales (2005) 1, 295, 316; R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal
Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’, 2 Journal of International Criminal
Justice (2004) 3, 735 et seq., 745; B. H. Oxman, ‘Jurisdiction of States’, in R.
Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. VI
(2012), 546, 552, para. 37; J. J. Paust et al., International Criminal Law: Cases and
742 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

perpetrator or victim,9 or the threat towards its national security.10 Thus, it

enables a State to prosecute a person under its jurisdiction no matter where
or against whom the crime, was committed, independent of the perpetrator’s
nationality. Some understand Universal Jurisdiction to be limited to
situations in which the perpetrator is present in the State that uses Universal
Jurisdiction (iudex loci deprehensioni/forum deprehensionis).11

Materials (1996), 95; X. Philippe, ‘The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and

Complementarity: How do the Two Principles Intermesh?’, 88 International Review
of the Red Cross (2006) 862, 375, 377; L. Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction:
International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2003), 22 (phrasing it negatively).
8
Known as principle of territoriality, providing for jurisdiction of the State on whose
territory the crime was committed, see Cryer et al., supra note 7, 40-41; Oxman,
supra note 7, 549, paras 13-17; O’Keefe, supra note 7, 735 et seq., 739.
9
Principle of personality, either active (nationality of the perpetrator) or passive
(nationality of the victim) nationality are relevant to establish jurisdiction, see Cryer et
al., supra note 7, 41-43; Oxman, supra note 7, 552, paras 34-36; O’Keefe, supra note
7, 735, 739.
10
The ‘protective principle’, enabling a State to exercise its jurisdiction over foreigners,
acting in foreign territory but threatening the national security, see I. Cameron,
‘International Criminal Jurisdiction, Protective Principle’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The
Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol I (2012), 712, 712, para. 1
(in id., 715, para. 13, the major difference between universal and protective principle
is that the first protects values of the international community whereas the latter
protects the National State’s very own interests); Cryer et al., supra note 7, 43;
Oxman, supra note 7, 550-551, paras 27-28; O’Keefe, supra note 7, 735 et seq., 739;
Reydams, supra note 7, 22.
11
National Legislations: Netherlands (Internationals Crimes Act, § 1 Art. 2 (1) (a), 19
June 2003, available in V. Santori (ed.), ‘Domestic Implementing Legislation and
Related Documents’ (CD-ROM), in C. Kreß et al. (eds), The Rome Statute and
Domestic Legal Orders, Vol. II (2005)); Canada (Crimes Against Humanity and War
Crimes Act 2000, Sec. 6 (1), available in id.); Case law: ICJ, Arrest Warrant Case
(Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Separate Opinion of Judges R. Higgins,
P. H. Kooijmans & T. Buergenthal, ICJ Reports 2002, 63, 76, para. 45; Scholars:
Institut de Droit International (ed.), ‘Universal Criminal Jurisdiction With Regard to
the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes’ (26 August
2005), available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiF/resolutionsF/2005_kra_03_fr.pdf (last
visited 28 January 2013), 2, para. 3 (b); C. C. Joyner, ‘Arresting Impunity: The Case
for Universal Jurisdiction in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability’, 59 Law &
Contemporary Problems (1996) 4, 153, 165; G. Abi-Saab, ‘The Proper Role of
Universal Jurisdiction’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 3, 596,
601; A. Cassese, ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?: A Plea for a Sensible Notion of
Universal Jurisdiction’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 3, 589,
592; O’Keefe, supra note 7, 735 et seq., 752-754.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 743

Furthermore, it remains unclear to which crimes the concept relates. Initially

it was only accepted in relation to piracy, the tendency today is, however, to
extend it to more – international – crimes.12
The principle of Universal Jurisdiction is not undisputed.13 There are
treaties that contain or acknowledge the principle of Universal
Jurisdiction,14 it is found in various domestic legislations,15 and claimed to

12
Princeton Principles, Principle 2 (1), supra note 7, naming piracy, slavery, war
crimes, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture; M. C.
Bassiouni, ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives
and Contemporary Practice’, 42 Virginia Journal of International Law (2001) 1, 81,
151-152, 156 (arguing that it is the status of being “ius cogens crimes that implies that
universal jurisdiction exists”); Odello, supra note 7, 316; Oxman, supra note 7, 552-
553, paras 38-39.
13
General overview of the discussion: S. Macedo (ed.), Universal Jurisdiction: National
Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law (2004);
strongly against Universal Jurisdiction: G. P. Fletcher, ‘Against Universal
Jurisdiction’, 1 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 3, 580; addressed and
opposed by: A. Eser, ‘For Universal Jurisdiction: Against Fletcher’s Antagonism’, 39
The University of Tulsa Law Review (2004) 4, 955.
14
Such as International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, Art.
9, 20 April 1929, 112 L.N.T.S. 371, 379 (under condition of request of extradition);
Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Art. 8, 26
June 1936, 198 L.N.T.S. 299, 311 (under condition of request of extradition); Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Art. 49, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 62; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Art. 50, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 116; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 129, 12 August 1949,
75 U.N.T.S. 135, 236; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Art. 146, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 386; Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Art. 28, 14
May 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, 260; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Art. 5 (2), 10 December 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (containing primarily the aut dedere aut iudicare principle, as a
secondary step, implicitly calls for Universal Jurisdiction).
15
Such as: Belgium (Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International
Humanitarian Law, Art. 7); Canada (Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act
2000, Sec. 8, supra note 11); Germany (Code of Crimes Against International Law, §
1; German Criminal Code, § 6); New Zealand (International Crimes and
International Criminal Court Act 2000, § 8 (1), available in Santori, supra note 11);
Spain (Ley Orgánica de Poder Judicial, Art. 23 (4), available in Santori, supra note
11); United Kingdom (International Criminal Court Act 2001, § 68, available in
Santori, supra note 11).
744 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

be accepted as customary international law.16 Universal Jurisdiction

sometimes is distinguished from the principle aut dedere aut iudicare,
which is considered to be related, but not essentially the same.17 The idea of
this principle is basically that no State should shield alleged perpetrators of
certain crimes from criminal responsibility but should either prosecute under
their own (possibly also universal) jurisdiction or extradite to another place
of jurisdiction.18
Although the rationale of Universal Jurisdiction is to close the gap of
impunity for the commission of certain grave crimes,19 its practical
importance may be challenged, since diplomatic and policy reasons may
pose serious obstacles to its practical use, or at least to its uniform
“universal” use of and towards every State, which is sometimes challenged

16
The PCIJ found in the S.S. Lotus case that the states were free to prosecute under
universal jurisdiction as long as international law does not limit this broad jurisdiction,
Case of the S.S. Lotus, PCIJ Series A, No. 10 (1927), 19 [Lotus Case]; recently and
more explicitly found by Amnesty International, supra note 7, 11; Institut de Droit
International, supra note 11, 2, para. 2; P. Benvenuti, ‘Complementarity of the
International Criminal Court to National Criminal Jurisdictions’, in F. Lattanzi & W.
A. Schabas (eds), Essays on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(1999), 21, 25; Broomhall, supra note 7, 404-405 (referring to “permissive” Universal
Jurisdiction); J.-M. Henckaerts & L. Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International
Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1 (2005), 604 (Rule 157): “State practice establishes this rule
as a norm of customary international law with respect to war crimes committed in
both international and non-international armed conflicts.“; Philippe, supra note 7, 386;
C. L. Sriram, ‘Exercising Universal Jurisdiction: Contemporary Disparate Practice’, 6
International Journal of Human Rights (2002) 4, 49, 50; G. Werle, Principles of
International Criminal Law (2005), 60, para. 174.
17
See Bassiouni, supra, note 12, 152-153.
18
Amnesty International, supra note 7, 11; A. Abass, ‘The International Criminal Court
and Universal Jurisdiction’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006) 3, 349, 353-
355; M. P. Scharf, ‘Aut dedere aut iudicare’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. I (2012), 749, 749, paras 1-2;
contested except for war crimes by J. Stigen, The Relationship between the
International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions: The Principle of
Complementarity (2008), 192.
19
See Assembly of the African Union, Decision on the Report of the Commission on the
Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 30 June 2008 - 1 July 2008, Doc
Assembly/AU/14 (XI), 1, para. 3; id., Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly
Decision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 1-3 February 2009,
Doc Assembly/AU/3, para. 3; Bassiouni, supra note 12, 154; Broomhall, supra note 7,
401-403.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 745

as being “neo-colonialism”.20 It is hardly imaginable that an economically

and/or politically dependent State initiated proceedings against a national of
the more powerful State based on the principle of universal jurisdiction
since this could and would be a cause for diplomatic casualties.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there are various cases in which the
principle of Universal Jurisdiction has been used or acknowledged.21

II. Principle of Complementarity

The principle of complementarity is mainly read in connection to the
International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, which is supposed to be
complementary to the national jurisdictions. The basic idea of
complementarity existed, however, already in the context of the treaty of
Versailles in 1919, in which the Allies authorized the Germans to try some

20
Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Separate Opinion
of Judge S. Bula-Bula, ICJ Reports 2002, 100 (where the exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction was described as “neo-colonial intervention”); Bassiouni, supra note 12,
154-155; G. Bottini, ‘Universal Jurisdiction after the Creation of the International
Criminal Court’, 36 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
(2004) 2/3, 503, 505-506; Cryer et al., supra note 7, 52; Jalloh, supra note 1, 4;
Sriram, supra note 16, 51.
21
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić a/k/a “Dule”, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A (Appeals Chamber), 2 October 1995,
para. 62; Prosecutor v. Bernard Ntuyahaga, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion to
Withdraw the Indictment, ICTR-98-40-T (Trial Chamber), 18 March 1999;
Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon and Brima Bazzy Kamara, Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, SCSL-2004-15 AR 72(E)/SCSL-2004-16-
AR72(E) (Appeals Chamber), 13 March 2004, paras 67-71; Belgium: Public
Prosecutor v. Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi et al., Chambre de mises en accusation of
Brussels, 16 April 2002; International Arrest Warrant for Hissène Habré of 19
September 2005; Germany: Public Prosecutor v. Tadić, German Federal Court of
Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), Examining Magistrate, 13 February 1994, 1 BGs 100/94,
14 Neue Zeitschrift für Stafrecht (1994) 5, 232; Public Prosecutor v. Djajić,
Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 3 St 20/96, 23 May 1997, 51 Neue Juristische
Wochenzeitschrift (1998) 6, 392; Israel: Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann,
Jerusalem District Court, Judgement of 12 December 1961, 36 ILM 18, 26, para. 12
says “the jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal.”; Spain: Unión
Progresista de Fiscales de Espana et al. v. Augusto Pinochet, Audiencia Nacional, 5
November 1998, English translation in R. Brody & M. Ratner (eds), The Pinochet
Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (2000), 95.
746 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

of the war criminals themselves in Leipzig, Germany.22 In the following,

complementarity will be discussed under two different aspects, first as an
issue of admissibility before the ICC23 (1.) and second as a State’s right and
obligation (2.). In addition, the basic rationale of complementarity is
elaborated on (3.).

1. Art. 17 Rome Statute: Issue of Admissibility of Cases

Before the ICC
The Rome Statute prescribes in Art. 17 that “the Court shall determine
that a case is inadmissible where:

“(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State

which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”.24

Accordingly, the Statute connects issues of admissibility with the

(national) jurisdiction of States,25 and grants primacy to the national
jurisdiction as long as the State does not remain “wholly inactive”,26 there is

22
M. Bergsmo & P. Webb, ‘International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,
Complementarity and Jurisdiction’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. 1 (2012), 688, 691, para. 12; M. El
Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal Law (2008), 11-
18; General historical overview: id., 11-154.
23
Opposed by F. Mégret, ‘Why Would States Want to Join the ICC?: A Theoretical
Exploration Based on the Legal Nature of Complementarity’, in J. K. Kleffner & G.
Kor (eds), Complementary Views on Complementarity (2004), 1, 42 (stating that
“admissibility is in fact also a deeply jurisdictional issue in its own right”); general
overview of the ICC’s approach to complementarity: N. N. Jurdi, ‘Some Lessons in
Complementarity for the International Criminal Court Review Conference’, 34 South
African Yearbook of International Law (2009), 28.
24
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 17 (1) (a), 17 July 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3, 100 (emphasis added).
25
Stigen holds the view that it is the international jurisdiction that is referred to in Art.
17 Rome Statute, rather than the national jurisdiction, which nevertheless “typically
will be required”, Stigen, supra note 18, 190. His argument is not convincing, though,
because it lacks authority and cannot be read into the Statute easily.
26
J. K. Kleffner & G. Kor, ‘Preface’, in id., supra note 23, V, V; supporting this:
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 747

no deficiency in the domestic investigation or prosecution or there is an

attempt to shield a person from such “criminal responsibility from crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court”.27 Often discussed among scholars is
the question of a standard of the unwillingness or inability to genuinely
carry out investigations or prosecutions,28 however, more relevant to this
work is the question of what kind of jurisdiction of the State is embraced.

Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of
Arrest, ICC-01/04-01/06-8 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), 10 February 2006, para. 29; D.
Robinson, ‘The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity’, 21 Criminal Law
Forum (2010) 1, 67, 102; W. A. Schabas & S. Williams, ‘Article 17’, in O. Triffterer
(ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Observers’ Note, Article by Article, 2nd ed. (2008), 605, 615-616, para. 23; W. A.
Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute
(2010), 340-344 [Schabas, ICC Commentary]; supporting this: Office of the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (OTP), ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues
Before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (September 2003), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905
_Policy_Paper.pdf (last visited 28 January 2013), 5 [OTP, Paper on Some Policy
Issues]; J. K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal
Jurisdictions (2008), 103-105 [Complementarity in the Rome Statute]; Stigen, supra
note 18, 199-202.
27
Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 17 (2) (b), supra note 24, 101.
28
Providing some information: OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues, supra note 26, 4;
Assembly of State Parties to the International Criminal Court (ASP), Report of the
Bureau on Stocktaking: Complementarity – Taking Stock of the Principle of
Complementarity: Bridging the Impunity Gap, ICC-ASP/8/51, paras 9-11; see also:
Benvenuti, supra note 16, 42-46; Cryer et al., supra note 7, 128-129; El Zeidy, supra
note 21, 163-207, 222-235; J. T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus
the ICC’, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta & J. R. W. D. Jones (eds), The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1 (2002), 667, 674-678; F.
Jessberger, ‘International v. National Prosecution of International Crimes’, in A.
Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), 208,
212; Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute, supra note 26, 126-158; El
Zeidy, supra note 22, 163-170, 222-228; Schabas & Williams, supra note 26, 616,
623-625, paras 24 & 33; Schabas, ICC Commentary, supra note 26, 344-347; Stigen,
supra note 18, 251-330.
748 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

2. As a State Obligation/Right
The principle of complementarity is implemented in paragraph 10 of
the Preamble to the Rome Statute and in Art. 1 Rome Statute.29 It needs to
be clarified if the principle of complementarity provides for an
obligation/duty on States, to investigate and prosecute crimes under their
jurisdiction in addition to the right of a State to claim for priority in
prosecuting a crime. Finally, it needs to be elaborated who is actually an
addressee of the said principle.

a) A State’s Obligation?

The States’ primacy in investigations and prosecution based on

complementarity results in an actual right of complementarity or primacy of
the States. The principle of complementarity could nevertheless also be read
as an obligation of States to become active.30 This is partly based on
paragraph six of the Preamble, which contains the Member States’ duty to
“exercise criminal jurisdiction”.31 It was stated that “complementarity, as
established and governed by the Rome Statute, was meant to […] serve as ‘a

29
Namely “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”.
30
OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues, supra note 26, 2; id., Informal Expert Paper: The
Principle of Complementarity in Practice, ICC-01/04-01/07-1008-AnxA, 30 March
2009, 19 (note 24) [OTP, Informal Expert Paper]; Situation in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui, Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of
Germain Katanga, pursuant to Art. 19 (2) (a) of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/07-949
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), 11 March 2009, para. 48 [Situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Defence Motion Katanga]; R. Kolb, Droit international penal (2008),
258; R. B. Philips, ‘The International Criminal Court Statute: Jurisdiction and
Admissibility’, 10 Criminal Law Forum (1999) 1, 61, 64; W. A. Schabas,
‘Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplementary Thoughts’, 19 Criminal Law
Forum (2008) 1, 5, 6 [Schabas, Complementarity]; contested by Broomhall stating
“the Statute imposes no obligation on States Parties to prosecute the crimes it
defines”, Broomhall, supra note 7, 408.
31
Cryer et al., supra note 7, 127; Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute, supra
note 26, 241-247; Schabas, Complementarity, supra note 30, 6; Schabas & Williams,
supra note 26, 606, para. 1.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 749

catalyst for compliance’.”32 This assumption is nevertheless not possibly

based on the mere words referring to complementarity in the Rome Statute,
which explains that the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be “complementary” to
national jurisdiction. However, it may be feasible to read the obligation and
the corresponding right of complementarity of the States out of the notion of
complementarity as such in conjunction with the State parties’ obligations to
“cooperate fully” with the court as stipulated in Arts. 86 and 88 Rome
Statute.33 These provisions are supposed to relate to the cooperation
between States and the court after a case has been declared admissible
already. One might nevertheless read the complementarity – taking place
before and instead of a prosecution by the ICC – into these norms and
understand the principle of complementarity as a right and obligation of the
State, which may oblige a State to actively exercise its national jurisdiction
in the sense of an effective complementarity even if this means that the
work of the ICC would not exist anymore. Accordingly, right and obligation
of States to nationally pursue the end of impunity for the crimes listed in the
Rome Statute exist. How strong these are practically will be determined by
future practice.

b) Addressees of the Principle of Complementarity as a State’s

Right/Obligation

Since the principle of complementarity is enshrined in the Rome

Statute, one wonders if it can be expanded to non-member States to this
treaty. As found above, complementarity is both, an obligation incumbent
upon States and a right, accordingly the application of complementarity in
its obligatory nature on third States would violate the rule that treaties
cannot bind third States, as established in Art. 34 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and reflected in customary international law.34 On the other
hand, the principle of complementarity as a right of States can be applied
voluntarily by third States, which is likely because States will probably take

32
F. Gioa, ‘Comments on Chapter 3 of Jann Kleffner’, in Kleffner & Kor, supra note 23,
105, 106.
33
Id.
34
Kasikili/Sedudu Island Case (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1999,
1045, 1059, para. 18.
750 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

the chance to exercise their sovereign right of jurisdiction over persons

within their jurisdictional scope, an obligation to do so will most probably
not be accepted by third States. Hence, States that implemented Universal
Jurisdiction within their national laws will also exercise this linkage for
prosecuting persons but based on their sovereign decision to do so.

3. The Rationale Behind the Principle of Complementarity

The rationale of the principle of complementarity – as an obligation
and right as well as a part of admissibility – needs to be carefully
established. It might be manifold: on the one hand it avoids proceedings on
the international level, where the access to evidence, witnesses and local
investigation organs is complicated and distant in favor of the virtually
closer jurisdiction of the National State;35 on the other hand it ensures that
State parties to the Rome Statute keep their sovereign right to try crimes
committed under their jurisdiction;36 another reason is to close the gap
between the prosecution on the international level, which are still only
dedicated to few individuals, and the prosecution of the National States in
their own legal systems, in order to actively fight against impunity by
prosecuting a higher number of perpetrators.37 One may come to the

35
OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues, supra note 26, 2; id., Informal Expert Paper,
supra note 30, 3; Cryer et al., supra note 7, 127; Schabas, Complementarity, supra
note 30, 5.
36
OTP, Informal Expert Paper, supra note 30, 3; Situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Defence Motion Katanga, supra note 30, paras 18-19; R. Cryer et al.,
supra note 7, 127; El Zeidy, supra note 22, 159; Kolb, supra note 30, 259; Philips,
supra note 30, 63-64; P. Sands, ‘International Law Transformed? From Pinochet to
Congo…?’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2003) 1, 37, 40; Schabas, ICC
Commentary, supra note 26, 336; Schabas & Williams, supra note 26, 606, para. 1;
Stigen, supra note 18, 15-18; L. Yang, ‘On the Principle of Complementarity in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 4 Chinese Journal of International
Law (2005) 1, 121, 122; García Ramírez, supra note 4, 151; Mégret, supra note 23,
23, who at the same time describes complementarity as “a potent threat to State
souvereignty”.
37
OTP, Informal Expert Paper, supra note 30, 3; Situation in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Defence Motion Katanga, supra note 30, para. 20; M. Boot, Genocide,
Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (2002), 55, para. 54; F.
Jessberger & C. Powell, ‘Prosecuting Pinochets in South Africa: Implementing the
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 751

conclusion that all of these reasons play a role for the implementation of the
principle of complementarity into the Rome Statute.38

C. The Interplay Between the two Principles

I. Interplay Universal Jurisdiction/Complementarity as an
Admissibility Issue Under Art. 17 Rome Statute
For a case to be admissible the requirements of Art. 17 Rome Statute
need to be fulfilled. The possible interplay of complementarity and universal
jurisdiction may be found in the wording of the Rome Statute only
implicitly, when it refers to “a State which has jurisdiction over it”. The
State’s jurisdiction could contain different ways of establishing such
jurisdiction, including Universal Jurisdiction. Another issue is the question
if the use of Universal Jurisdiction by a non-member State rendered a case
inadmissible before the ICC.39
The analysis will be conducted on the basis of an example. For this
purpose, the recent case of German arrests and prosecution under its

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 14 South African Journal of

Criminal Justice (2001) 3, 344, 347; Philips, supra note 30, 63-64; G. Strijards, ‘The
Institution of the International Criminal Court’, 12 Leiden Journal of International
Law (1999) 3, 671, 673.
38
Sands, supra note 36, 40.
39
Another question that arises is whether in case of a Security Council referral (Art. 13
(b) Rome Statute) the admissibility test of Art. 17 Rome Statute still applies. This is,
however, unlikely to affect the relationship between complementarity and Universal
Jurisdiction, therefore it will not be dealt with in more depth. The argument is made
that the complementarity turns into being a “supremacy of the ICC” in such cases, see
further: in favor of primacy: L. Arbour & M. Bergsmo, ‘Conspicuous Absence of
Jurisdictional Overreach’, in H. A. M. v. Hebel, J. G. Lammers & J. Schukking (eds),
Reflections on the International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos
(1999), 129, 139-140 (“It must be expected that the Council will give the Court
jurisdictional primacy vis-à-vis the relevant national judicial systems when it makes a
referral as an enforcement action under Chapter VII. The Security Council’s power to
conduct international judicial intervention derives from the Charter and is unaffected
by the ICC-Statute.”); Kolb, supra note 30, 258; A. Zimmermann, ‘The Creation of a
Permanent International Criminal Court’, 2 Max Planck United Nations Yearbook
(1998), 169, 220; against primacy: Stigen, supra note 18, 240; Kleffner,
Complementarity in the Rome Statute, supra note 26, 165-166.
752 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

nationally incorporated Weltrechtsprinzip (Universal Jurisdiction),40 of two

Congolese men who were allegedly members of the militia “Forces
Démocratiques du Libération de Rwanda” and responsible for war crimes
and crimes against humanity, one of them as a leader/commander will be
used.41 Since the Democratic Republic of Congo is a situation before the
ICC the possible conflict between the two systems, the national and the
international can be illustrated. Assuming that these two men were sought
after by the ICC Prosecutor and there was a pending decision of
admissibility before the ICC. Would the ICC be barred from exercising its
jurisdiction due to the principle of complementarity?

1. Does the Complementarity in Art. 17 Rome Statute

Embrace All Different Linkages of the Member States?
It is clearly stated that the State that has jurisdiction over the crime
committed, may investigate and prosecute with primacy over the ICC. What
is, however, not clear is which linking principle will be accepted by the
ICC. There are different possible scenarios, either the ICC will strictly refer
to its own – limited – way of jurisdiction or it will accept whichever
linkages the National States implemented into their legal systems, may it
embrace universal jurisdiction or not.42

a) Only Active Personality and Territoriality (as in Art. 12 (2)

(a), (b) Rome Statute)

The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to cases of territoriality and

active personality, thus to crimes committed on the territory of a State party
to the Rome Statute, or by a national of a Member State, Art. 12 (2) (a), (b)

40
German Code of Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), § 1,
supra note 15.
41
German Federal Prosecutor General (ed.), ‘Press Release of 17 November 2009’,
available at http://www.generalbundesanwalt.de/de/showpress.php?themenid=11&ne
wsid=347 (last visited 28 January 2012).
42
Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute, supra note 26, 110-113.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 753

Rome Statute.43 This allows the assumption that the “framers” of the Rome
Statute wanted to only accept these bases of jurisdiction in general, thus,
also for the national jurisdiction mentioned in Art. 17 Rome Statute. 44 This
may be because these are the most traditionally accepted ones or because
this would constitute the strictest way of establishing jurisdiction. Lattanzi
discusses the issue and concludes that

“[i]l paraît donc plus cohérent avec l’exigence d’une répression

effective des “crimes les plus graves qui touchent l’ensemble de
la communauté international […] que la complémentarité
s’évalue seulement à l’égard de certaines jurisdictions
nationales et en considération aussi des rapports que la Cour a
avec les Etats les plus strictement reliés au crimes.”45

b) All Jurisdictional Links Which Are Accepted by the State

Since the wording of Art. 17 Rome Statute is not precise on the issue
of jurisdiction of the State, it also allows the assumption that States are
actually free to prescribe whichever principle in respect of jurisdiction they
may like, be it passive personality or – more important for the purpose of
this paper – universal jurisdiction. According to this idea, the language of

43
Leaving aside the possibility of a Security Council referral as foreseen in Art. 13 b)
Rome Statute, and the acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdiction by a third State.
44
German Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 1, 354; M. Henzelin, Le principe de
l’universalité en droit penal international (2000), 447, para. 1419: “Le défaut majeur
du Statut est cependant que le Préambule ne dit pas clairement que les Etats,
compétent à titre complémentaire pour poursuivre et juger les crimes décrits, le sont
selon le principe de l’universalité. Rien ne laisse en effet entendre que le Statut
n’envisage pas tout simplement que les Etats soient compétents pour poursuivre et
juger les crime décrits selon leur compétence actuelle, territorial, personnelle et de
protection.” (emphasis added and footnotes omitted); Schabas, ICC Commentary,
supra note 26, 340.
45
F. Lattanzi, ‘Compétence de la Cour pénale internationale et consentement des Etats’,
103 Revue Générale de Droit International Public (1999) 2, 425, 431; whereas it was
also held that “[t]he principle of complementarity obligates the Prosecutor to defer to
national legal systems where the State that normally exercises jurisdiction is in the
process of investigating or prosecuting the crime” leaving the character of said
jurisdiction less clear (emphasis added); I. Stegmiller, The Pre-Investigation Phase of
the ICC (2011), 284.
754 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

the Rome Statute seems to give the discretion to States regarding which
principle of jurisdiction they believe are convincing and applicable under
this concept. The jurisdiction of a State could easily have a very broad
scope, including Universal Jurisdiction. The idea of including the nationally
prescribed Universal Jurisdiction in the jurisdiction referred to in Art. 17
Rome Statute was supported by scholars.46 Arbour even uses the term of
“compulsory“ Universal Jurisdiction based on the Rome Statute that obliges
the Member States to implement Universal Jurisdiction within their national
legislations, which leads to the assumption that it falls under the concept of
jurisdiction in the sense of Art. 17 Rome Statute.47 Further, it was found that
because of the ICC’s limited ability to try all perpetrators, in combination
with the concerned States’ expected unwillingness and inability to
prosecute, “the sole choice remaining will often be between universal
jurisdiction and impunity.”48

c) Discussion

Owing to the lack of clear wording and clarifying jurisprudence on

this issue, a deeper analysis is necessary. The dual understanding of
“jurisdiction” finds some argumentative support and consequently the
examination requires special scrutiny. Relying primarily on a systematic
interpretation, the provisions of Arts. 1 and 17 Rome Statute and the
Preamble thereto would need to be seen in the context of the Rome Statute
as a whole and in relation to the other provisions dealing with jurisdiction.
Under this approach, the accepted jurisdictional links, territoriality and
active personality as addressed in Art. 12 (2) a) and b) Rome Statute,
establish a rather clear system of accepted links of jurisdictions. Here, the
Rome Statute is cautious and conservative concerning the developments in
general international law, which would probably accept some more links to
establish jurisdiction. In this line of argumentation, one needs to conclude

46
In the context of Art. 19 Rome Statute: C. K. Hall, ‘Article 19’, in Triffterer, supra
note 26, 637, 649-650, paras 13 & 14; generally: E. David, ‘La Cour pénal
internationale’, 313 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (2005),
325, 348-349; W. A. Schabas, ICC Commentary, supra note 26, 340.
47
L. Arbour, ‘Will the ICC have an Impact on Universal Jurisdiction?’, 1 Journal of
International Criminal Justice (2003) 3, 585, 586-587.
48
Broomhall, supra note 7, 409.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 755

that the system of the Rome Statute is coherently strict in providing the
court with jurisdiction and it may be considered as being more coherent
with this system to only accept the named links for jurisdiction within the
national legal framework as well. Another argument in favor of this
conclusion is that the assumption that within one treaty a specific term such
as “jurisdiction” is used in one rather than in various different meaning.49
This requires understanding “jurisdiction” in Art. 12 Rome Statute in the
same way as in Art. 17 Rome Statute. Such a holistic approach is
nevertheless difficult to maintain in regard to the Rome Statute, which was
drafted by different groups dealing with different parts of it, hence the group
that was in charge of the Jurisdiction within Art. 12 must not necessarily
have been in charge for the wording of Art. 17 Rome Statute.50
There may be, however, other provisions that systematically point into
another direction: Art. 18 Rome Statute stating that “the Prosecutor shall
notify all States Parties and those States which [...] would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned” in case there is enough basis to start
investigations. Further, Art. 19 (2) c) and d) Rome Statute distinguish
between those States that have jurisdiction over a case in accordance with
Art. 12 Rome Statute and those having jurisdiction over a case “on the
ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case” which allows the
conclusion that there are other jurisdictional links accepted generally by the
Rome Statute, than only those of Art. 12, as e.g. the passive personality
principle.51 In conclusion, the systematic approach would probably point at
a more restrictive jurisdiction for States, at least excluding Universal
Jurisdiction, even though there is no definite answer that does not leave a
slight ambiguity. Accordingly, the result of this interpretation is that the ICC
could still exercise its jurisdiction over the two arrested men, not accepting
the Universal Jurisdiction exercised by Germany as being covered by the

49
Referred to as “Principle III: integration – that treaties are to be interpreted as a
whole” M. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Practical Working of the Law of Treaties’, in M. D.
Evans (ed.), International Law, 3rd ed. (2010), 172, 183.
50
W. A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th ed. (2007),
19-20.
51
Hall, supra note 46, 649, para. 13, even including Universal Jurisdiction; D. D. N.
Nsereko, ‘Art. 18’, in Triffterer supra note 26, 630-631, para. 9.
756 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

scope of Art. 17 Rome Statute as long as the principle of ne bis in idem does
not prevent it from doing so.52
Using a teleological interpretation would require to regard the object
and purpose of the principle of complementarity for the admissibility before
the ICC. Here, the above mentioned rationale of the principle may help in
order to evaluate the content: if one considers the remaining sovereignty for
the States the main reason behind complementarity, it is essential to
conclude that it is within the States’ free discretion to prescribe Universal
Jurisdiction within their national systems and apply it to those who possibly
could be dealt with by the ICC. Hence, the Congolese men could be arrested
and tried by Germany, without involving the ICC. A strong hint towards this
approach is the general reluctance within the Rome Statute to restrict States
in their sovereignty too much.53 The fight against impunity as part of the
rationale of complementarity does not clearly hint towards either of the
possibilities because in the light of the end of impunity it does not matter if
a case is tried by the ICC or the national legal systems, as long as there is
criminal accountability. Under considerations of numbers, nevertheless, the
ICC will not be able to deal with all perpetrators, thus the implementation of
Universal Jurisdiction with the rationale of ending impunity could be
relevant in those cases, where the ICC is “overloaded” with cases and the
“classical” jurisdictional States are “unwilling” or “unable” to prosecute.54
Considering the practical implications i.e. the close nexus to evidence,
victims and witnesses and also to the concerned societies as the rationale
renders it illogical to use Universal Jurisdiction instead of trying the
perpetrators in front of the ICC.55 However, the rationale behind the
complementarity is manifold and can therefore not be reduced to one of the
named aspects. With the teleological interpretation there is hence no clear
outcome, although the reasoning of practical consequences might be –
practically seen – very important.

52
The principle of ne bis in idem was raised by the Defense in Situation in the Central
African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,
Corrigendum to Defence Reply to the Observations of the Prosecutor and of Legal
Representatives of the Victims on the Application Challenging the Admissibility of
the Case, ICC-01/05-01/08-752-Corr (Pre-trial Chamber III), 14 April 2010, para. 24
(4).
53
As found supra B. II. 2 and B. II. 3. regarding the ICC’s jurisdiction.
54
Amnesty International, supra note 7, 5; Broomhall, supra note 7, 409.
55
Generally on the practical problems of the use of Universal Jurisdiction: id., 412-414.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 757

There are two further points that need to be discussed: first there is the
possibility that the ICC could be more effective in prosecuting and trying a
case because there might be situations in which the ICC as an international
court has simply more authority to obtain the necessary information and co-
operation and second, based on human rights considerations proceedings in
front of the ICC might be the more favorable and desirable solution for the
accused, since the system of the ICC grants the accused a certain minimum
standard regarding fair trial guarantees which could be disregarded in some
States’ legal systems, maybe especially in those which did not ratify the
Rome Statute.56 These minimum standards regarding a fair trial might even
be part of the requirement of being genuinely willing and able to conduct
investigations and eventually proceedings since efficiency of these
proceedings logically includes minimum human rights standards, e.g. a
confession that is achieved by torture hardly suffices the standard of
efficient proceedings. Additionally, the international proceedings also
guarantee for a public observance of international media.57 Assuming that
the Congolese men were arrested in a State that earns unfortunate fame for a
system of ill-treatment and human rights violation during judicial
proceedings, the prevalence of the ICC proceedings would be beneficial to
the accused. Accordingly, this is another reason against the use of Universal
Jurisdiction within the scope of Art. 17 Rome Statute. Even considering that
the ICC is able to seize the case in accordance with Art. 17 (2) Rome Statute
if the proceedings do not respect the “principles of due process recognized
by international law” the application of universal jurisdiction at first leaves
the concerned person in the situation where a due process is not provided
for. Further, the ICC might be reluctant to seize cases which are already
dealt with via Art. 17 (2) Rome Statute due to political and policy reasons.
Another argument in favor of implementing the Universal Jurisdiction
into national jurisdiction referred to in Art. 17 Rome Statute is the Lotus
principle which states that as long as international law does not prohibit
something, it may be applied,58 which means in the present discussion that
as long as there is no internationally recognized prohibition of Universal
Jurisdiction, the States may use it and the ICC would be obliged to respect
this as national jurisdiction. This argument can be contended by the

56
See infra C. I. 2.
57
Principles 9 and 10 of Amnesty International’s 14 Principles on the effective exercise
of Universal Jurisdiction try to make sure that such situation does not occur.
58
Lotus Case, supra note 16, 19.
758 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

assumption that the Member States to the Rome Statute waived the use of
this right.
There also could be a situation of concurrence between the ICC and
two States wishing to deal with a case by using Universal Jurisdiction.
Applied to the example: Germany has the men, Belgium wants them, in
order to try them and the ICC conducts investigations as well. How to solve
that? Wouldn’t it be reasonable to ask Universal Jurisdiction-using Germany
and Belgium to step back? In such situation a rule of subsidiary jurisdiction
for at least the one State that does not have hold of the respective accused
and thus would need to conduct in absentia proceedings in favor of the
forum deprehensionis State would appear to be a reasonable solution.59 No
matter how the concurrence is solved between the States, the ICC would
need to accept the principle of complementarity although it might be a
diplomatic solution to allow the ICC to step in.

d) Conclusion

As a concluding answer to the question which forms of jurisdictional

linkages are envisaged in Art. 17 Rome Statute for the States’ jurisdictions it
needs to be underlined that there is no clearly set standard of the ICC itself.
The issue is still open and may come up in the future. Considering that the
ICC still is a relatively young institution it might be important for it to
acquire new cases. On the other hand – considering the geographical scope
the ICC already has – its prosecutor won’t be short of work in the near
future and necessarily will restrict its work to those cases that concern the
“big fish” and it will try to find agreements and solutions with the States.
Also the policy paper on complementarity in its general tone is rather
suggesting a broad understanding of the concept; hence, most probably there
are not going to be clashes between the ICC and States that use Universal
Jurisdiction. Accordingly, the tendency goes – as also seen in the national
jurisdictions, accepting one by one the Universal Jurisdiction – towards
accepting Universal Jurisdiction within the national framework and
accepting it as well as a prevailing national jurisdiction, also, because the

59
As done in Belgium, see: M. Rau, ‘Das Ende der Weltrechtspflege?: Zur Abschaffung
des belgischen Gesetzes über die universelle Verfolgung völkerrechtlicher
Verbrechen’, 16 Humanitäres Völkerrecht (2003) 4, 212, 213.
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 759

end of impunity is the raison d’être of the ICC as such. Thus, as long as one
generally accepts the existence of Universal Jurisdiction, Art. 17 Rome
Statute encompasses the notion of Universal Jurisdiction, if a Member State
prescribed it within its national law earlier. With the help of the above
mentioned example: the two Congolese men, arrested by the German
Federal Prosecutor General will be tried within the German legal system and
the ICC could not get hold of them, even if it would try to.

2. Does the Complementarity as an Admissibility Criterion

Also Cover the Use of Universal Jurisdiction by Non-
Member States?
Concerning the question whether a case is admissible before the ICC
under the principle of complementarity even if there was a non-member
State that exercised its nationally prescribed Universal Jurisdiction over that
same case, the exemplifying case needs to be modified regarding the
prosecuting State. Hence, it needs to be assumed that it was a non-member
State, e.g. China that prosecuted the two men and still the ICC’s Prosecutor
prepares the prosecution of them in front of the ICC. First, as found above,
the principle of complementarity binds Member States to the Rome
Statute,60 this even more if it is applied to the admissibility test of
complementarity, which is a rather procedural rule of the Statute. If
nevertheless China decides to prosecute with Universal Jurisdiction, the
above raised concern of minimum standard of procedures comes up again.
This, because especially for those States that did not join the Rome Statute,
the international standard that was established by that treaty is not
obligatory and therefore the advantage for the accused to be under the
jurisdiction of the ICC rather than a random other State is a real argument
against the acceptance of the exercise of the third States’ Universal
Jurisdiction by the ICC. Further, the application of the admissibility test of
Art. 17 in its full fledged version, deciding about “inability” and
“unwillingness” of the third State would constitute a violation of that third
States’ sovereignty since that State never accepted the ICC’s and the Rome
Statute’s authority to evaluate the efficiency of that State’s domestic legal
system. Any decision of the ICC on the admissibility test would violate – at

60
See supra B. II. 2. b).
760 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

least indirectly – the principle of par in parem non habet iurisdictionem.

However, the role of the ICC as being a court of last resort would lead to the
conclusion that even the third State’s action would suffice to trigger
inadmissibility.61 Additionally, some practical considerations would also
render it less important that the ICC deals with such a situation: justice is
already done and there are presumably many other cases the ICC will be
asked to deal with. Hence, the exercise of Universal Jurisdiction by China
e.g. would be enough to block the ICC from declaring a case admissible.

II. Interplay of the Principles Regarding the States’

Obligation/Right to Complementarity
It was mentioned that “[t]he main burden of enforcing international criminal
law will in future rest not with the International Criminal Court and
probably not with the countries of commission, but with third States willing
to prosecute.”62 This presupposes for such cases where the third State uses
Universal Jurisdiction, that its use and the right and obligation to
complementarity are compatible. In the following it will be analyzed if there
is an obligation of the State to prosecute a case if the only possible basis is
Universal Jurisdiction (1.) and whether the use of one State’s Universal
Jurisdiction can be considered a violation of another State’s right to
complementarity (2.).

1. Is There an Obligation of the State to Investigate/Prosecute

if Only Universal Jurisdiction Can Be Applied?
As it was concluded above that there is an obligation on the members
to the Rome Statute to prosecute the crimes envisaged by the Statute in their
national legal systems arising out of the principle of complementarity.63 At
this point, it needs to be evaluated if this obligation to nationally prosecute

61
David, supra note 46, 348-349.
62
Werle, supra note 16, 69, para. 200 (emphasis added).
63
See supra B. II. 2. a).
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 761

the Rome Statute’s crimes is also tailored at the prosecution under Universal
Jurisdiction. In short: can the complementarity of the Rome Statute oblige
Member States to prescribe Universal Jurisdiction? Now, taking up the
aforementioned example, is Germany not only able to prosecute the
Congolese militia men with primacy over the ICC but rather obliged? One
could argue that there is no such notion as obligatory Universal Jurisdiction
under international law and therefore there is no obligation under the
principle of complementarity to prosecute crimes using only Universal
Jurisdiction.64 There was, nevertheless also mentioned that “although the
ICC Statute does not oblige states to exercise extraterritorial, in particular
universal, jurisdiction over the international crimes in question, the system
of international justice envisaged by the ICC Statute will work effectively
only if states extend their jurisdiction to crimes committed
extraterritorially.”65 This could be backed up with legal opinions holding for
an obligatory use of Universal Jurisdiction, which then, under the above
concluded obligation to prosecute as encompassed by complementarity in
the Rome Statute, would be obliging members to the Statute to prosecute
alleged crimes under Universal Jurisdiction nationally. Acknowledging the
lack of strength of the obligation of complementarity as such, since not
based on the mere wording of the Statute,66 it would be an extension of the
Statute to assume that there is an obligation on States to use Universal
Jurisdiction to comply with their complementarity demands vis-à-vis the
Rome Statute. As a conclusion, a State, such as Germany in the example, is
not obliged but rather allowed to prosecute an alleged perpetrator under
Universal Jurisdiction, since there is no internationally recognized
obligation to implement Universal Jurisdiction into their legislative system,
even if there may be a trend towards such implementation in some States.67

64
Philippe, supra note 7, 379.
65
Jessberger & Powell, supra note 37, 349.
66
See supra B. II. 2. a).
67
Rau, supra note 59, 214.
762 GoJIL 4 (2012) 3, 737-763

2. Can the Use of Universal Jurisdiction Cause a Clash

Between Willing States and Violate the Right to
Complementarity of a State?
Using the above cited example, it needs to be clarified if the use of
Universal Jurisdiction by Germany establishes a violation of the right of
complementarity of another State, e.g. Belgium which also wanted to
prosecute the arrested men for the alleged crimes committed in the DRC.
Even under the assumption that Belgium is not obliged to prescribe
Universal Jurisdiction nationally, if complementarity entails a State’s right,
the exercise by Germany factually prevents Belgium from doing so itself. In
this hunt for possible prosecution it is necessary to balance the different
interests and to elaborate a strategy of who would have priority in the
prosecutions. This problem was not discussed before in relation to
complementarity and Universal Jurisdiction, it does seem to be reasonable,
though, to consider the State of presence of the alleged perpetrators (forum
deprehensionis) the privileged State to prosecute the perpetrators. Thus, the
possible concurrence for the right to deal with criminals will probably be
solved on the basis of practical considerations.

D. Conclusion
Finally, the statement of President Kagame is not reflecting the
complete legal truth about Universal Jurisdiction and its use; it does
nevertheless contain a little grain of truth – especially on the international
relations level. Drawing a conclusion on the above raised question of how
the two concepts work in relationship to each other, how they interplay, one
needs to come to the result that the concepts are consistent with each other
and help enforcing each other based on the above found reasons. By
including nationally prescribed Universal Jurisdiction into the national
jurisdiction referred to in Art. 17 Rome Statute the number of States that
could nationally deal with a case increases, which thereby supports the idea
that the ICC is a court of last resort. Also the use of Universal Jurisdiction
of non-member States fulfils the inadmissibility criterion of art. 17 Rome
Statute.
Concerning the obligation and the right evolving from
complementarity, the use of Universal Jurisdiction cannot be obligatory on
the States. Furthermore, the use of Universal Jurisdiction by one State is not
 The Principles of ‘Complementarity’ and Universal Jurisdiction 763

violating another State in its right to also use their right to complementarity,
because in such situations some rule of subsidiary jurisdiction need to be
applied. Although the present work leads to the conclusion that Universal
Jurisdiction could and probably should be a major part of international
criminal law, it is necessary to present some doubts concerning the practical
implementation of this concept without being “biased” towards certain
States or applying it in a “neo-colonial” manner. The basic idea of fighting
impunity might need Universal Jurisdiction and States that are willing to
implement and use it. It needs to be handled with caution regarding political
stability and peaceful and friendly relations between the prosecuting and the
“prosecuted” States. There are also situations, in which the ICC would do
good in declaring a situation admissible for itself, instead of relying on
Universal Jurisdiction of a State. This in cases where the judicial guarantees
are not complied with, or the accused is not present and the Universal
Jurisdiction is used in its in absentia version.