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 NEW YORK TIMES ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

CHINESE ORAL HISTORY PROJECT OF

THE EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, PART II

THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Glen Rock, New Jersey

Microfilming Corporation of America
1978

Copyright Qy 1978 The Trustees of Columbia University

in the City of New York
NEW YORK TIMES ORAL HISTORY PROGRAM

CHINESE ORAL HISTORY PROJECT OF

THE EAST ASIA*1 INSTITUTE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, PART II

The Wellington Koo Memoir

Glen Rock, New Jersey

Microfilming Corporation of America
1978
COPYRIGHT @ 1978 The Trustees of Columbia University
in the City of New York

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying and recording or by any information storage
or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the
Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York.

This is an oral history micropublished as part of the CHINESE ORAL

HISTORY PROJECT OF THE EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
PART II: THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR. Details about this collection
as well as the 7 transcripts in the CHINESE ORAL HISTORY PROJECT OF
THE EAST ASIAN INSTITUTE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, PART I, may be
obtained from:

Microfilming Corporation of America

21 Harristown Road
Glen Rock, New Jersey 07452
(201) 447-3000, Extension 216
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Preface, Tables of Contents, and Notes

This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Fndowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the East Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1976. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027,
 PREFACE

This massive autobiography in some 11,000 pages is the result of seventeen

years of collaboration between Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, China's leading diplo­

mat of the Republican Period, and the Chinese Oral History Project of the East

Asian Institute of Columbia University. It is fitting that Dr. Koo worked

with Columbia on his memoirs, since he is a graduate of Columbia College (1908)

and earned the Ph.D. degree under the Department of Public Law and Government

in 1912. Furthermore, Dr. Koo gave his extensive collection of public papers

to Columbia University where they are permanently available in Special

Collections library for research by scholars.

Dr. Koo was born on January 29, 1888 and began his public career in 1912

under President Yuan Shih-k'ai. He continued to serve every Chinese government

thereafter save for that of the Chinese People's Republic. He was several times

Foreign Minister and participated in every important international conference

that concerned China, from the Versailles Conference in 1919 to the conferences

founding the United Nations in 19^5* Dr. Koo served as China's Minister in

Washington from 1915 to 1918, and from 1932 to 1956 he was successively Ambassador

in Paris, London and Washington as well as being China's Representative to the

League of Nations and the United Nations. Dr. Koo's final public office was

as a Judge and then, Vice-President of the International Court of Justice at

the Hague from May 1957 to February 1967* The main facts of Dr. Koo's career

are found in Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, edited by Howard L.

Boorman and Richard C. Howard (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967“

1971), vol. II, pp. 255-259.

Interviewing with Dr. Koo began in 1958 and continued as time permitted

in his busy judicial schedule, but after his retirement in 1367, Dr. Koo devoted
 2

a major portion of his time to the project. Five scholar-interviewers worked

with him successively during the seventeen years. For all phases of his career

before 1932, Dr. Koo depended upon his memory, assisted by research done by the

scholars working with him. Dr. Koo dictated his memoirs to a tape recorder and

answered questions raised by the interviewers. The tapes were then transcribed

and the adiolar-assistant became editor, or in some cases, another person took

ovei the task of organizing the narrative, eliminating duplication, and checking

names, dates, and remembered facts. After sections had been edited and retyped,

they were submitted to Dr. Koo for his correction and approval. For the period

after 1932, Dr. Koo had the use of his diaries, minutes of conversation, and

an extensive file of telegrams concerning diplomatic problems.

Costs of this project were met from grants by the Ford Foundation to the

East Asian Institute,with Columbia absorbing overhead expenses. During the final

two years the enterprise was supported by a grant from the National Endowment

for the Humanities. In December 1975» work on the project had to cease, even

though not every part of the vast manuscript was completed in final form.

In 1958 Miss Julie How started the work with Dr. Koo in New York and then

continued interviewing and editing in Hong Kong. Through their collaboration

the first section, Volume I in 1^3 pages, dealing with Dr. Koo's childhood and

early education in Shanghai and his college and graduate years at Columbia, were

completed. Then came work on Dr. Koo's first decade in diplomacy up to 1922,

including sections on his first mission to Washington, his role as a delegate at

the Versailles Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the Washington

Conference. Dr. Te-kong Tong assisted on the last year of this period and the

section was edited by Dr. Donald Sutton. The retyped version covers 295 pages

in Volume I I.
 3

Dr. Kai-fu Tsao commenced interviewing in 1963, covering the second decade

of Dr. Koo's public career from 1922 to 1932, when he was an important official

in the Peking Government, several times as Foreign Minister, and also as Minister

of Finance and Acting Premier. With the overthrow of the Peking Government by

the Nationalists in 1928, Dr. Koo avoided politics at the national level, but

was recalled late in 1931 after the Mukden Incident in September. He presented

China's case to the Lytton Commission investigating Japan's invasion of Manchuria.

This decade.is covered in 365 pages of Volume III, and the transcripts were

edited by Dr. Sutton.

Dr. James Seymour began interviewing in August 196^+, exploring the periods

of Dr. Koo's missions to Paris, London, and Washington. These were the troubled

years of Japan's aggression against China, the war in Europe and German occupa-

tion of France, the Pacific War, and the civil war in China which resulted in the

Nationalist retreat to Taiwan. As China's Minister and then Ambassador in

Paris and London, as her Representative to the League of Nations and the United

Nations, and for ten years as Ambassador in Washington, Dr. Koo was in a pivotal

position to influence China's foreign relations. Some 2,000 pages of transcripts,

about half of which Dr. Seymour edited, covered these decisive years in a pre­

liminary way.

After his retirement early in 1967, Dr. Koo made his permanent home in New

York and was able to devote much more time to the project. Mrs. Crystal Seidman

way assigned to spend full time on the work of interviewing and editing. With

the availability of Dr. Koo's papers, the character of the developing manuscript

changed. Mrs. Seidman began exploring the extensive documentary resources for

the years after 1932. She combined previous transcripts with new interviews

and added much documentary material selected by Dr. Koo. Mrs. Seidrnan's
r account of her work during nine years, which resulted in Volumes IV through
VII, some 9,000 pages of edited version, follows:

In September I966, I began interviewing Dr. Koo two or three

times a week. Dr. Koo's preference, as expressed in theoretical dis­
cussions and practice, was always for the written word and document
above memory as an accurate transmitter of events. Having kept careful
records of his public career as it transpired, having been able to pre­
serve many of these (especially those relating to his post-1932 career),
and having subsequently deposited them with Columbia University, he
was well equipped as a memoirist to suit his documentary inclination.
At the outset of our collaborative effort, he worked almost exclusively
from the Notes of Conversations and the Diary. As I got to know Dr.
Koo better and became more familiar with the Koo Collection, I encouraged
the use of the Telegraph File as wel1.
The Notes of Conversations are a comprehensive, chronological
file of the minutes of the interviews or conversations that took place
between Dr. Koo and various personages of foreign countries on topics
related to his work as a diplomat. They exist with considerable regularity
from 1932 to 1956. As China's Minister, Ambassador or Representative at
the League of Nations or the United Nations, Dr. Koo had occasion to
converse officially, semi-officia11y and informally with leading states­
men, politicians and diplomats. Shortly after each official conversation,
and after some informal ones that proved informative, he would dictate
the contents to a secretary. Sometimes the minutes, as for example
during the negotiations for the Sino-American Treaty of 1954, were recorded
by a secretary on the spot. In either case, Dr. Koo would re-read and
correct the secretary's draft.
The Diary is a daily account beginning March 26, I936, when Dr.
Koo returned to Paris as the first Chinese Ambassador to France. (The
volumes for December 29, 1939 to April U, 1941, and for October 10, 1943
to January 17, 1944 are missing.) The Diary often contains an official
agenda for the day and notations of many of the important national
and international events touching on Dr. Koo's career. It covers
informal conversations not covered in the Notes, as with visiting
Chinese. Entries on personal life, theoretical remarks, judgmental
pronouncements and the like are sparse.
 5

The Telegraph FiIs is composed of an extensive body of telegrams

exchanged between Dr. Koo, as head of a diplomatic mission, and the
foreign office and between Dr. Koo and the highest officials of the
state. It begins essentially with the French mission in September-
October 1932. It is organized in folders either chronologically or
by subject.
The approach used in the interviews was firstly chronological
and then, naturally, topical. In preparation for our meetings, Dr.
Koo asked for consecutive portions of the Diary and Notes. Having
reviewed these, he would begin an interview with a brief general intro­
duction of a subject, and then read out from the Diary and the Notes
somewhat selectively. In using the Notes, he made minor modifications
in the original text as he read and often punctuated his reading by
comments. Often he asked that entire sections of the Notes be quoted.
My job as an interviewer at this time was limited to some questions
of clarification engendered by the material read out. Experience very
quickly showed that many relevant questions, if answerable, would soon
be answered by the documentary materials themselves as they were reviewed,
and that such answers would as often as not conflict with those supplied
offhand from memory. Overviews, subjective reactions, comparisons,
general impressions were, of course, inquired into, and were supplied
spontaneously by Dr. Koo; so were matters unlikely to be touched on
in the documentary materials, concerning, for example, diplomatic
practices and modes of running an embassy or organizing a delegation.
At some point, we began to utilize the Telegraph File. Perhaps
it was a diary entry which read something like this: "Sent important
telegram to the Generalissimo, summarizing my view of the latest develop­
ments in the war, and my suggestions as to what the government should
do in the circumstances." Eventually, I spent some time in searching
through the Koo Collection for appropriate folders of telegrams from
the files, which I brought to Dr. Koo for use in our interviews. He
would look them over, and translate them to the tape recorder, some­
times quite selectively, but usually not. Dr. Koo is, as I said, a
firm believer in the intrinsic value of the historical record.
By the interviewing process just described., we eventual 1 y covered
 6

the years 1932-Al and 19^6-56. Each interview had been recorded on
tape, the tape transcribed by a secretary and the transcription checked
by the interviewer. It was now time to organize this sizable body of
materials to see what we had, to edit it, and fill in the gaps.
The introductory pattern of the first interviews had already
determined the nature of all future work. From the outset, we had
been dealing with many facts and details. These needed both background
material to explain them and give them a context, and more factual
detail to resolve any questions raised. Where it was possible, I turned
to Dr. Koo for the answers; otherwise I relied on research, using both
the Koo Collection and other sources, newspapers as well as books.
Meanwhile the interviews continued. At this stage they were
somewhat different from the earlier interviews, since I was now working
directly from the transcript and the supporting papers in the Koo
Collection. We often began our interviews with a general discussion or
with a discussion of the period or problem in question. In the latter
case, I would recall to Dr. Koo the dates, names, places, circumstances,
etc., to provide the context before asking a specific question. We
worked off-the-tape. I took notes where appropriate. These discussions,
which increased our rapport and gave me a more intimate knowledge of
Dr. Koo's attitudes and approaches, were followed by on-tape interviews,
relying heavily on the telegrams, which Dr. Koo spent many hours translating.
in these latter interviews and in the editing, I
found other materials from the Koo Collection useful, such as official
memoranda and aide-memoires, press statements, embassy and foreign office
releases, reports of subordinates on special subjects, and personal
letters exchanged with colleagues. There is also a file of speeches
by Dr. Koo for the American period, which he asked me to refer to and
which I often sought out to supplement a diary entry relating to the occa­
sion or to China's publicity requirements at the time.
With such a wealth of documentary material on hand, it was possible
to produce a high1y-re1iab1e work. Statements from memory were checked
against the materials in the collection as well as outside sources.
The Notes, Diary and Telegrams in particular were checked against each
other to obtain firm dates and to clear up ambiguities. (For example,
the contents of important conversations recorded in the Notes of
 /

Conversations were also telegraphed to the Foreign Minister and/or

Chiang Kai-shek. So two versions existed on Dr. Koo's side alone.)
In editing, I used the top copy of the original transcript of the
interviews, which had been typed in duplicate. (The carbon copy is
filed.) The top copy, as cut up, rearranged, added to, deducted from
and researched is called the Editor1s Draft. The latter as typed
(again in duplicate) is called the First Edited Version. (The carbon
copy is filed.) The top copy of this version was sent to Dr. Koo section
by section as it was completed. When he completed reviewing each section,
correcting it if necessary and answering any questions written into the
text by the editor, we met to go over it together. Then it was amended
and copy-edited by this editor in the case of Volumes VI and VII and
Parts A and B, 1. of Volume IV. The doubly corrected copy of the First
Edited Version, Volumes VI and VII, was retyped to become the Final
Edited Version.
The top copy of the First Edited Version, Volume IV, Parts B, 2.
through E were not reviewed by this editor after having been typed or
after having been seen by Dr. Koo. There is no Final Edited Version
of Volume IV.
I consider the Preliminary Draft of the French Mission (covering
November 1937 " December 19^0) a rush job, since I did not have sufficient
time to check many of the facts. Nor did I have time to review the
draft once typed. Each sub-unit, however, was sent to Dr. Koo when
typed and has his approval and occasional notations and corrections.

Dr. Koo, himself, provided a 79 page section dealing with his ten years

on the World Court, which constitutes Volume VIII.

In addition to the work of the five scholar-interviewers and the one

editor, others assisted materially on the project. Mrs. Mary Schoch and Miss

Debbie Bell provided administrative oversight. Transcribing of interviews

and typing of edited versions was done successively by the late Mrs. Dorothy

Hu, Miss Julie Wei, Mrs. Margaret Chang Chen, Miss Gail Klement, and Miss

Elizabeth Blair. Miss Blair worked for five faithful years. My late colleague,
Professor Franklin Ho, as co-director of the Chinese Oral History Project,

was helpful in many ways. We are also indebted to Columbia's former president,

Dr. Grayson Kirk, to the former deans of the School of International Affairs,

the late Dr. Schuyler C . Wallace and the late Dr. Andrew W. Cordier, to

Dean Harvey Picker, and to successive directors of the East Asian Institute,

Professors James W. Morley, A. Doak Barnett, Gerald L. Curtis, and Myron L.

Cohen, all for their support. Many persons in the Columbia Library System

and in the Administration provided facilities essential for a project of

this scale, for which we are grateful.

Major credit, of course, belongs to Dr. Wellington Koo, who devoted

so much of his spare time to this honest and thoughtful reflection on his

distinguished career. His collaboration with our project has resulted in a

unique resource for the understanding of Chinese history during the Republican

Period.

C. Martin Wi1 bur

Director of the Chinese Oral History Project

January 1976
 -4-

REMINISCENCES OE WELLINGTON KOO

Status of the manuscript as of December 9, 1975

Volume Sub j ec t Period No. of Pages Edited No, of Pages Unedited

Childhood and Education 1888-1912 14 3

11 First Decade as Diplomat 1912-1922 295

Hi Service in China 1922-1932 365

:v Mission to Paris 1932-1941 935 (1st Edited 3 30

Draft)
1377 (Preliminary
Draft)
Second Mission to London 1941-1946 ca. 900 350

Second Mission to Washington I 1946-1950 1929

VII Second Mission to Washington II 1950-1956 44 13

also
10,357 680
V 111 Ten Ye j r s on the V r1d Cour t 1 9 5 - • - 1r" 6 79
1C,4 36

P Compiled by C . L.r. W/7 5

 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME I : CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Birth i
Family 2
Education (elementary school) 6
Play 7
Music 13
Mischief 13
Death of maternal grandmother 16
Incident with monk 1 lg
Education (classical) 19
Education (western) 23
11Iness 26
Education (St. John's College) 28
Reform sentiment at St. John's, Shanghai, 1900-1904 30
Recollections of the Sino-Japanese War 1894 and the
Reform Movement 1898 32
Departure for the US, summer 1904 37
Year at Cook Academy, 1904-1905 41
Indecision concerning course of study and summerat Cornell, 1905 45
Freshman year at Columbia, 1905-1906;Freshman-Sophomore contests 47
Contact with the Mission to study constitutional government in the
west, winter, 1905-1906 54
First visit to Washington, D. C., 1905-1906;
Meeting Sir Chen-tung Liang-ch'eng 55
Recollections of the Russo-Japanese War and the Peace Conference
1904-1905 55
Friendliness to foreign students at Columbia 57
Recollections of Columbia professors and President Butler 58
Study of Latin, summer, 1906 and geology, 1906-1907 65
Athletic activities 68
Non-athletic extracurricular activities (dramatics,debating,
Spectator, Board of Student Representatives, mock conventions,
and others) 71
Recollections of Stagg Whiting and a hunting trip to the Adirondacks 78
Visit to London, summer, 1908 (Wang Ch'ung-hui and Minister ,_
Wang Ta-hsieh) 81
Journey by boat to Shanghai, summer 1908 83
Contrast between East and West 84
Problem of marriage and divorce 86
Engagement 87
Wedding, 1908 92
Return to US with bride 102
Divorce, 1911 104
Return to Columbia University, 1908 107
Contact with T'ang Shao-i's mission to Washington, 1908 107
Interpreting news dispatches for the Herald.end,1908 109
US policies, especially regarding Manchuria 112
Visit to Washington on the invitation of T'ang Shao-i,January1909 114
Public debate of the issue of republic vs.monarchy avoided by
Chinese students in the US 120
Telegrams from Chinese students in the US to Peking government
Meeting with Sun Yat-sen,fal1,1909
 Table of Contents (Conf'd)

Decision not to graduate in 1908

Difficulties in passing the swimming test, 1909
Writing Ph. D. dissertation
Reaction to the Wu-ch'ang Uprising, 1911
Invitation from YUan Shih-k'ai rece ived mid-February, 129
1912 133
Orals and arrangements for the doct
oral dissertation, 1912 133
Buying reference books to bring bac k to Peking
Journey to Peking on the Trans-Sibe 142
rian Railway 143
 OUTLIME
REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME II: FIRST DECADE AS DIPLOMAT

PROLOGUE Arrival in China and Initial Impressions: Spring 1912

Peking in the Early Years of the Republic: 1912-1916

1. Politics in Peking under Yuan Shih-kai
a) Yuan and T'ang Shao-i
b) A Conversation with Yuan in 1912
c) Yuan and the Kuomintang
d) The Monarchical Movement and Yuan's Death

2. My Life and Career in Peking: 1912-1915

a) The Circumstances of my Marriage to May T'ang
b) 'I lie loreign Office at Peking: The Reorganization of 1912
c) My Work in the Foreign Office
d) Promotion to Counselor
e) My Experiences in the President's Office

3- China's Foreign Relations: 1912-1916

a) Eiontier Disputes and Negotiations with Britain and Russia:
1912-1916
b) The Japanese Occupation of Tsingtao and the Twenty One Demands
1914-1915

4. Pelting Society
a) Peking in Transition
b) The Returned Students in the Capital

My First Mission in Washington: 1915-1919

1. My Appointment as Minister to Washington: August 1915 \
2. The Chicago Loan of 1916
3. The United States Declares War
4 . The Death of my Father
5. China Joins the War
6. The Lansing-Ishii Motes: November 1917
7. Preparations for Peace
S. From Verdun to Versailles: The Eve of the Conference

The Paris Peace Conference

1. Minister Lu Arrives in Paris: The Problem of Precedence within
the Delegation
2. The Question of Representing the Southern Regime at the Conferenc
1 . Early Friction in the Chinese Delegation
4. My Presentation of China's Case before the Council of Ten:
January 28, 1919
5. The Missing Despatch-box and the Submission of China's Case in
Wr i t i ng
v. More Difficulties within the Delegation: Lu's Sudden Departure
and Return, and the False Report of mv Engagement
7* Tlie c oincil of Four Decision and Chinese Attempts to Revise it
'3 • Ihe Attempt to Secure a Reservation on the Shantung Articles
^ • 3’he Eve of June 28th: China Absents herself from the Sianing
of the Treaty
10. The Background to China's Decision
11. Aftermath
r D My First Mission in London and the Washington Conference
1. My Appointment and the Convening of the Washington Conference
2. The Conference: Organization and Procedure
3. The Shantung Conversations

REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME III: SERVICE IN CHINA

E. Political Life in Peking: 1922-1924

1. Dr. Yen's Second Premiership: June 11, 1922 - August 5, 1922
2. Dr. C. H. Wang's Cabinets and the Conflict with Parliament:
August 5, 1922 - November 19, 1922
3. The Formation and Fall of General Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet
4. The Regency Cabinet: June 13 - October 12, 1923
5. Some Recollections of President T'sao K'un and Colonel Wu P'oi-fu
6. The Second Fengtien-Chihli War and General Feng's Coup d'Etat
September - October 1924
F. Politics, Civil War and Finance
1. My Retirement and my Return to Peking as Minister of Finance:
1925 - July 1926
2. The Crisis of the Mid-Autumn Festival
a) Obstruction from the Five Banks
b) Paying the Garrison
3. The Military Government of Chang Tso-lin: June 1927 - June 192m
4. Sir Francis A g1e n, Chang C hia - a o, and the Peking Government
r a) The Dismissal of Sir Frances: February 1, 1927
b) Diplomatic Repercussions
c) Epi1og ue

G. Questions Arising in my Terms of Office as Foreign Minister: 1922-1928

I. Joffe's Mission
2., The Wireless Contract: Attempted Bribery
3. The Gold-Franc Question
4. Minister Yoshizawa's Credentials and the Regency Cabinet
5. The LinCh'eng Case
6. Negotiations witli Soviet Russia: 192 3-1924
a) C. T. Wang Signs the Draft Agreement: March 1924
b) The Cabinet Rejects the Wang/Karakhan Agreement
c) The Bomb Incident and the Settlement of May 31, 1924
7. The Rendition of Weihaiwei Discussed
8. The Settlement of the Wanhsien Incident
9. The Termination of the Si no-Belgian Treaty of 18 6 5
10. The Boxer Indemnity Refund and the China Foundation
II. Raid on Russian Embassy: April 1927

H. The Peking Government in Retrospect

1. Some Reflections on the Failure of Democratic Government in ctin^i \x<
1912-1928
2. Conflict between the Three Branches of Government: 1912-1928
3. Some Aspects of the Administration of Government at Peking: J >12-1928

r a) Cabinet Meetings
b) Financing the
c) Official
d) Irregular Practice in the Provinces
 c) Irregular Practice at the Foreign Office
t ) Irregular Practice in the Ministry of Finance
. Foreign Affairs at Peking and Nanking Contrasted
. Diplomats a n d D i p 1 o in a c y

he Manchurian Crisis of 1931

. Sojourn Abroad and Recall to Manchuria, 1928-1929
. Marshal Chang Shueh-liang's Clash with Soviet Russia: 1929-1930
. The Coming of the Mukden Incident
. Nanking s Policy and the League of Nations: September—Novmeher 1931
• My Appointment as Foreign Minister: November 28, 1931
. lopular Reactions and the Fall of Chiang Kai-shek's Government
. The Lytton Commission
a) In China
b) In Manchuria
c) Lord Lytton's Cane
 Ou 11in e

Volume IV of the Koo Memoirs: Mission to France, 1932-41.

r fCpircp jtauou . fAm A-E; OtfobOv iA 3'l - ^oiVm ^ tH'U.

Part A: DIPLOMAT AT PARIS AND GENEVA DUPING THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT:

October 1932 1933
Section 1 . The Trip to Europe from China: The Lytton Report
and Contacts with the Lytton Commission Aboard Ship
September 5 - October 2, 1932
Section 2 . The Paris Legation and the Chinese Delegation
to the League of Nations
Section 3 . The First Weeks at Geneva and Paris:
Reaction to the Lytton Report:
early October - November 21, 1932
Section 4 . Pleading China's Case in the Council
and Assembly of the League:
November 21 - December 27, 1932
Section 5 . VJorking for an Acceptable Final Report
under Article 15, Paragraph 4:
December 27, 1932 - February 14, 1933

Part B PURSUING THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE LEAGUE'S FINAL RFPOPT ON

THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT: FEBRUARY 14, 1933 - J U N E 1 9 < 4
Section 1. On the Ouestion of Invoking Sanctions u n cl e r
Article 16 of the Covenant:
February 14 - May 1933
Section 2. The Tanoku Truce and the Shift in Focus from
n Sanctions against Japan to Economic and I’ e c h n i c a 1
Aid to China: May 15 - September 1933
Section 3. My Work and Observations as World Interest T urns
away from China: October 1933 - June 1934
a) Reaction Abroad to the Events in China ur i nu
the Final Months of 1933: October - December 1 9 i
b) My Work in Paris and Departure for China:
January - June 1934

Part C: MY LEAVE OF ABSENCE IN CHINA: MID-JUNE 1934 - MARCH 1936

Part D: MY FIRST YEAR AS AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE: EVOLUTION OF THE

EUROPEAN SITUATION AND A NEW POLICY FOR. CHINA:
MARCH 1936 - MARCH 1937

Part E: 1937, A CRUCIAL YEAR IN EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST:

JANUARY - DECEMBER 1937
Section 1. The Immediate Antecedents of the Lukouchieo
Incident: January - July 9, 1937
Sec ti on 2 . Diplomatic Efforts upon the Outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War: July - September 1937
a) Diplomatic Efforts Immediately after the
Lukouchiao Incident: July 1937
b) Diplomatic Efforts as the Fighting 1 z f ; n d .
First to Shanghai: Auoust - early September ] 9 }7
Section 3. Diplomacy at the League of Nations:
n
July - early October 1937
Section 4 . Efforts to Secure Material Assistance from
Abroad Following the Lukouchiao Inciden■:
June - October 1937
! nt l.: Section 5. The Brussels Conference on the Sino-
Japanese Conflict: October - November 1937
a) The Background of the Conference: October 1937
b) Defending China's Course at Brussels:
November 1 - 15, 1937
c) Questions of Foreign Assistance: Particularly
in Transit Facilities Pursued during thie First
Stages of the Conference: November 1 - 15, 1937
d) The Conclusion of the Conference and of
Efforts to Obtain Assistance under its Aegis:
November 15 - 24, 1937

1'a.rf V: THE LEGATION AND EMBASSY

 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO
r
VOLUME IV MISSION TO FRANCE

(PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM)

1. The Aftermath of the Brussels Conference:

late-November 1937 - mid-May 1938
A. Proposals for an Armistice and Coordinate Action by the Powers
late-November 1937 - January 1938
B. China Continues to Seek Assistance and Support Abroad from
the Individual Powers and from the League:
a) late-January - late-March 1938
b) late-March - mid-May 1938

2. The Need for Aid Becomes More Urgent and Sometimes More Difficult
to Obtain in View of a Deteriorating Military Situation in China
and Europe's Drift toward War:
late-May - August 1938

3. The Failure of a New Appeal to the League of Nations in 1938

in View of the European Crisis:
September 1938

4. Diplomatic Efforts in View of the Initiation of Japan's Southward

r Expansion Movement and the Decline of Individual Initiative among

the Western Powers:
October - mid-November 1938

5. The Possibilities of Joint Action by the V7 ester n Pov/ers

in the Far East in Light of the European Situation:
mid-November 1938 - early-February 1939

6. The Vagaries of Joint Action in the Far East by the Western

Democracies as Japan Attempts to Strengthen her Political Hold
on China and to Expand Militarily in the Pacific Ocean Area:
1ate-December 1938 - February 1939

7. The Effect of the Blatant Actions of the Axis Pov/ers in

E'urope and the Far East on East -West Efforts at Cooperation:
late-February - early-April 1939

8. Urging Cooperation between China, Great Britain and Franco:

early-April - early-June 1939

9. The Reaction to Japan's Political and Economic Onslaught on China

June - mid-August 1939

10. The Outbreak of War in Europe and its Effect on China and
Chinese Government Policy:
August 22 - September 18, 193911

11. A Period of Doubt and Uncertainty:

September 16 - October 21, 1939
Volume IV -2 Preliminary Draft

12. Reevaluating China's Foreign Policy in View of the European

War and Allied and American Suspiciousness of Moscow:
October 21 - mid-December 1939

1 l . Problems of Sino-French Cooperation, Particularly with Regard

tl) tbo All-Important Question of Transit throuuh Indochina:
September - December 1939

1-I . The Drift of French Foreign Policy until the War Reaches
the Doors of Paris:
late-Decernber 19 39 - May 17, 1940

It. The Fall of: Paris and the French Surrender to Germany:
May 18 - June 23, 1940

16. Japanese Advances in Indochina under Vichy France:

late-June - August 18, 1940

1 / . The Franco-Japanese Agreement on Indochina:

August 19 - September 25, 1940

18. Reactions to the Franco-Japanese Agreement of September 1940

and to the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan:
.1 at e-Sep tember - ear ly-December 1940
 outline

REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME V: SECOND MISSION TO LONDON

A. Initial Period: July 1941 - October 1942

1. Commencement of Mission
1

My Appointment as Ambassador to London

1
General Objectives of Mission
8

2. Five Major Issues

12

The British War Loan

12
The Burma Road
23
The Hong Kong Issue
27

Indian Independence
36

War Policies
50

3. General Account of the First Phase

(July 1941 - October 1942)
34

Initial British Public Attitudes Regarding

China's cause
54
Inter-governmental Relations During the Month
Preceding Pearl Harbor
61
America Enters the War
75
January - September 1942: Prosecuting the War
90
m r . to China
Plans for the Tcip^and for the Parliamentary
Goodwill Mission
28

The Voyage to Chungking

36
Sojourn in China: October 1942 -
March 1943

Sojourn in China (October 1942 - March 1943)

China, October 1942; My Talks with Chinese

Leaflets and Eflorts to Gain Support
for a Si no-British Alliance

China, November 1942: Further Talks with

Chinese Leaders ,
1. / 7

Hie British Goodwill Mission to China, November-

December 1942
199

China. December 1942: Further Conversations

241

Ihe Sino-British Treaty of January 11, 1943

271

China, January-February 1943: General Deve­

lopments
301

Final Days in China: March 1-9, 1943

345
C. Sojourn in the United States: March - May 1043
5. Sojourn in the United States (March-May, 1943) 341

Voyage from Chungking to Washington 391

Washington, March 24, 1943 - 406

San Francisco, March 25- , 1943: Talks with

Madame Chiang Regarding Her Proposed
Trip to England. ; 415

Washington, March } 1943 421

With Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's Party in Los

Angeles and enRoute East, April 1-14,1947 ^ 427

New York Areas, April 15-May 3, 1943 439

Washington, May 3-6, 1943: Talks with President

Roosevelt and Others 448

New York, May 6-7, 1943 467

Abortive Attempt to Arrange a Meeting Between

Madame Chiang Kai-Shek and Winston Churchill 473

T. V. Soong's Talks with Churchill and Roosevelt 497

The Problem of the Chinese Seamen 506

\
Other Conversations [in Washington], May, 1943 525

D. Developments in Britain

6. Developments in Britain, June, 1943 539

Manifestations of British Friendship for

China,Julyl943 953

T. V, Soong’s Visit to London, July - August

19 4 3 ’ 5r

Late August through November, 1943 ’ 579

. • >
1944 - 1945 (June)

1944 - 1945 (June)

Washington, August-October, 1944:

The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and
The Deterioration of Sino-American Relations

Chinese Preparations for the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations:

August 24 -31,1944 617

The First Phase of the Conversations: China not Present 632

The Second Phase of the Conversations: China a Participant 643

China's Relations with the United States and the Soviet

Union: August - October, 1944 667
»
London, October - December 1944: Meeting Criticisms of *
the Ciiinese Government 698

London, January - February, 1945: Visits of Various

Chinese Representatives, and the Trade Union
Congress 716

China, March 1945: Discussions On Sino-Soviet Relations,

the Impending San Francisco Conference, etc. 742

Washington, April 1945: Preparations for the San Francisco

Conference 78 3

The San Francisco Conference (April - June 1945):

China's Delegation 307

The San Francisco Conference: Preliminaries andConvocation 8i 7

The San Francisco Conference: Behind the Scenes 832

Material to be Edited

MATERIAL TO BE EDITED
original transcript pp• 1075-1421
May-June 1945 - July 1946
 Outline

Volume VI of the Koo Memoirs: Mission to Wnshinfitcm ( I) : 19 4^-1950

Part A: THE INITIAL PERIOD: July 5 - December 30, 1946

Section 1. Commencement of Mission-. July - September 1946
Section 2. The First Session of the United Nations General
Assembly; October - December 1946

Part B: THE PERIOD OF PARTIAL AMERICAN DISENGAGEMENT FROM CHINA:

January - March 1947
Section 1. The End of the Marshall Mission and United States
Mediation in China: January 1947
Section 2. American Reactions to the Widening Conflict in
in China: February - March 1947

Part C: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON SINO-AMEHICAN

RELATIONS: March - early September 1947
Section 1. The Moscow Conference, The Truman Doctrine and
American Foreign Aid Policy: March - April 1947
a) The Moscow Conference, particularly as it
reflects China's Position in the Council of
Foreign Ministers.
b) The Truman Doctrine and American Foreign Aid
Policy.
Section 2. Developments from May to September 1947, as
Gathered from Chats and Conversations: May -
September 6, 1947

Part D: CHINA RENEWS REQUESTS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: April - June 1947
Section 1. China Requests a One Billion Dollar Loan:
April - May 1947
Section 2. American Reactions to the Chinese Request: June 1947

Part E: TOWARD A CHANCE IN UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY: July - December 1947
Section 1. The Period of the Wedemeyer Mission: July - September 1947
a) The Period of the Wedemeyer Mission to China:
July 11 - August 25
b) Repercussions of the Mission in China and the United
States: September 1947
Section 2. The International Background as focused in the United
Nations: September - December 1947
Section 3. China Receives Token Assistance: end September ~ December 1947

Part F: THE BATTLE FOR THE CHINA AID PROGRAM: late December 1947 -
September 1948
Section 1. The State Department Bill on Aid to China: late December -
mid-February 1948
Section 2. The Congressional Debate Leading to the China Aid Act of
1948: mid-February - April 5, 1948
Section 3. Implementation of the China Aid Act: April - September, 1948
a) Negotiations and Appropriations: April - June 1948
b) Procurement of Military Supplies: June - September 1948
c) The Diplomatic Background: July - September 1948

Part G: INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, AMERICAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND Till-. 14

EFFECT ON SIMO-AMERICAN RELATIONS: 1948
Section 1. International Developments: 1948
Section 2. American Domestic Politics - The Presidential Fleeti.-n 0 1948
Pa it H. S I NO-AM KR I CAN HP],ATI ONS_T N THE LIGHT
OF THE DETEP IOF;AT IMG
L ‘ ^ P ^^ I niJ TIJ CHINA: October 1)48 - m i d - .7 a n u a r y 194 9
Section 1 Chinese Requests for American Assistance
October -
mid- November 1948
Section 2 Hie Situation in China and American Reactions
to it
October and November 1948
Section 3 Madame Chianq's Visit to Washington to Press for Aid:
November 25 - December 30, 1948
Section 4 Aid Prospects during the Period of Peace Proposals
by the Chinese Government: December 1, 1948 - mid-
Januaryl949

Par t 1 : IHb (KIT I CAL PERIOD: January - 0ctober 1949

Section 1 The situation in China and Some Attempts to A
count
for it: January - March 1949
Section 2 The American Response to the Uncertainties in the
Chinese Situation, Especially the Possibility of a
Coalition Government (I): mid-January - mid-February
] 949 1
Section 3 . The American Response to the Uncertainties in the
Chinese Situation, Especially the Possibility of a
Coalition Government (II): mid-February - mid-April 1949
Section 4 . The Quest for a Constructive Policy as Fighting Resumes:
mid-April - late-June 1949
Section 5 . The Quest for a Constructive Policy in the #Face of
Disunity: mid-June - late-August 1949
Section 6 . Requests for Renewed Aid in the Face of the White
Paper: July - mid-August 1949
Section 7 . The International Front with Specific Reference to
Regional Pacts: January — October 1949
Section 8 . The Status of United States Military and Economic
A id
to China: early-August - September 1949

Part J: THE :LOSS _HIE MAINLAND: September 1949 - June 1950

Section 1 . The Question of Recognition and
China's Appeal to
the United Nations: September 1949 - mid-January 1950
Section 2 . Ihe Retreat of the Government from
Canton to Formosa:
October 1, 1949 - December 8, 1949
Sec tion 3 . The Question of Aid to Formosa and
Ha i non: December 9,
1949 - March 7, 1950
a ) Ex tens ion of the China Aid Act: December 9, 1949
February 15, 1950
b) United States Aid and the Chinese Presidency:
F e b r u a r y 15 - March 7, 1950
Section 4 The Lo s s of the Mainland, the Situation in China and
Some of the Problems Thereby Created: September 1949
June 1950
a) Some Accounts of the Loss of the Mainland and the
Resulting Situation in China: December 1949 - June
19\
b) Problems Created by the Loss of the Mainland:
September 1949 - June 1950
c) Difficulties at the United Nations: February -
June 1 9 50
Section 5 The Status of United States Aid to China Immediately
Iiier to the outbreak of War in Korea: mid-Februaiv -
June 1950 1
 Outline

Volume VII of the Koo Memoirs: Mission_t o Wa shing to n (II): 1950-56.

Fart A: SINO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS FOLLOWING THE OUTBREAK

KOREAN WAR: June 24, 1950 - February 1, 1951
Section 1 The Outbreak of the Korean War and its Immediate
Effect on United States Policy toward China:
June 24 - late-July 1950
Section 2. A Visit to Formosa for Consultation on Current Problems
late-July - August 21, 1950
Section 3 The C o n s e q u e n c e s of American Ambiguities with R e q a i d
to Formosa: August 1950 - February 1, 1951
a ) Formosa's Legal Position in Light of American
Ambiguities: August 22 - mid-September 1950
b) China's Position at the United Nations:
September 1950 - February 1, 1951
c ) The Rudiments of Mew Aid to Formosa:
August - December 1950

Part B: THE PERIOD OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WA R

late-Dec ember 1950 - July 1951
Section 1. Prospects of Change in the United States C hin a Policy:
1ate-December 1950 - April 24, 1951
a) Developments in Aid Policy and Attitud !§55°-a
Nationalist Government: late-December
S?^flb?uf??g^a!fp?bHjbt?5?iand Econom i c Aid t o !■’ o r m o s
Section 2. The International Background and American Po 1 i t i ca
Controversy: March - July 1951
Section 3. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program and Aid to Ch i na
April 24 - July 1951

Part C THE MOW PANG-CH'U - CHOU CHIH-JOU CONTROVERSY AND PKi SONAL- STYLE
POLITICS: THEIR BEARING ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC OP IN IONA. ND THE
UNITED STATES POLICY OF AID TO CHINA eptember 1950 -19 5 8
Section 1. General Mow's Allegations and their Repercuss ions :
September 1950 - early-August 1951-
Section 2. The Government Takes Action: mid-August - lat e - O c * o b e r 19
Section 3. The Legal Case and Postponement of the Commit t e e o f
Inquiry: October 26, 195 1. - January 27, 19 5 2
Section 4. Major Setbacks in the Legal Case: January 22 - m i d - D e c e rn 1)
1952
Section 5. A Postscript to the Mow Case: mid-December 19 52 - 195 8

Part D: CHINA. AND THE JAPANESE PEACE SETTLEMENT: September 1949 -

August 1952
Section 1. Preliminaries to a Peace Treaty with Japan: September
1949 - August 1952
Sec tion 2 . Negotiations and Revisions of the Provisional Draft
of the Japanese Peace Treaty: February - May 1951
Section 3. The Question of Chinese Participation in the Japanese
Peace Treaty: mid-May - June 1951
a) Facing the Opposition to Nationalist China's
Participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty:
late-May - June 21, 1951
b) The London Formula: late-June 1951
Section 4. China' Exclusion from the Multilateral Peace Treaty
with Japan: June 20 - July 11, 1951
Section 5. The Reaction to China's Exclusion from the U u 1 t i 1 -i * e r a 1
Treaty and its Refercussions on the Negotiations for
a Bilateral Treaty: July 11 - September 1951
 Section 6. The Bilateral Peace Treaty with Japan: September 8,
1981 - August 5, 1952
a) Difficulties in Starting the N e a o tia t i o n s :
September 8, 1951 - January 25, 1952
b) Negotiation, Conclusion and Ratification of the
Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty: January 26 - August 5, 195

'art E THE PERIOD OF THE CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS IN KOREA:

A un u s t .19 5 1 January 20, 1953
Section 1. The International Background of the Period:
August 1951 - January 20, 1953
a) The International Background: August 1951 - Hay 1952
b) More on the International Background: June 1952 -
January 20, 1953
Section 2. The Situation in the United States as it Related to
United States' China Policy: August 1951 - January 20,195
a) China Aid and the Mutual Security Program: August -
Dec embe r 19 51
b) Si no-American Relations in the First Part of the
Election Year: January - early-June 1952
c) An Ostensible Improvement in Sino-American Relations:
June - October 10, 1952
d) A Republican Victory and Mew Hope for Free China:
October 12, 1952 - January 20, 1953

Part F: AS THE NEW LEADERS IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW TALK ABOUT PEACE:
January - August 1953 ~
Section 1. The Eisenhower Administration's "New"China Policy:
January 20 - March 17, 1953
Section 2. The Korean Armistice and its Effect on Nationalist China:
January - August 1953
a) The Deadlock is Broken: Agreement on the Prisoner
of War Issue: Uncertaintly for Free China:
January - June 8, 1953
b) The Armistice Agreement and the Proposed Political
Conference: June 8 - August 1953
Section 3. Questions of Assistance and Cooperation between the
United States and Free China: March 16 - August 1953
a) Efforts to Secure Military Cooperation and Res­
olve such Problems as the Chinese Troops in
Indochina and Burma: March 16 - May 1953
b) Mutual Security Assistance to China for FY1954:
May 5 - August 1953

9art G: FROM PANMUNJOM TO GENEVA: September 1953 - February 18, 1954

Section 1, How Continued Attempts to Bring World Problems to the
Conference Table Affect Nationalist China: September
1953 - February 18, 1954
Section 2. Embassy Affairs: September 1953 - February 1954
a) Embassy Affairs with Emphasis on General Chiang
Ching-kuo's Visit to the United States: September
1953 - mid-October 1953
b) Embassy Affairs with Emphasis on Questions of
American Aid to China: mid-September 1953 -
February 1954
c) Miscellaneous Questions: mid-October 1953 -
February 1954
Fart H: THE T I fl E OF THE G !■] N E V CONFERENCE ON KOREA AND INDOCHINA
February 18 - August 1954
Section 1. The International Situation at the Time of the Geneva
Conference on Korea and Indochina: February 18 -
July 1954
a) Developments Preliminary to the Opening of the Geneva
Conference: February 18 - April 26, 1954
b) The Geneva Conference, its Setting and its Effect on
Nationalist China's Position: April 26 - July 1954
Section 2 Embassy Affairs, with Emphasis on Aid and the Problems
Raised by Former-Governor K. C. Wu's Allegations
against the Government: 1 ate-February - July 17, 1954
Section 3 Prelude to the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense
Treaty: March 1953 - July 17, 1954
Section 4 A Second Visit to Taiwan: July 17 - August 1954

Part I: theSINO-AMERICAN MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY OF 1954: Auaust 2 4

December 1954
Section 1 The International Background of the Treaty' s C o n c 1 u s i o n :
August 24 - October 1954
a) The First Ouemoy Crisis, the SEATO Pact and the
Situation at the United Nations: August 24 -
September 1954
b) How International Concern over the Formosa Stra i t
Crisis Effected Negotiations for the Treaty:
September 19 - October 1954
Section 2 The Formal Negotiations and Conclusion of the 'J' r o a t y
in Washington: November - e a r 1 y-D ec ernbe r 1954
a) The Early Stag es of the Negotiations: November
1954
b) The Final Stages of the Negotiations: November 11
early December 1954
Section 3 Some Other Matters Handled by the Embassy during t.
Period of the Negotiations Special Visitors and S p o c i a 1
Aid Questions: August 24 - D e c emher 195 4

Part J: THE BRINGING INTO FORCE OF THE SINO-AMERICAN DEFENSE _T P_E / T 7

AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF CRISIS IN THE OF FS H 0RE IS I - PN DP:
early-December 1954 - mid-January 1955
Section 1. China's Ratification of the Sino-American Mut ua 1
Defense Treaty under Difficult Circumstances: ea r
December 1954 - mid-January 1955
Section 2. Some Major Decisi.ons Regarding the Offshore I s lan
The Formosa Resolution; Proposals for the a c hen '
Evacuation and a Cease-Fire in the Formosa S t ra i t
mid-to-]. ate January 19 5 5
Section 3. Some Problems in Implementing the Offshore I s I a n d
Decisions: January 27 - February 7, 1955
Section 4. The Windina Down of the Formosa Crisis: Febru ary -
early-May 1955
a) Ratification and Coming into Force of the S i n o
American Defense Treaty, the Completion of t h e
Tachen Evacuation and the Tabling of the S ec u / i t y
Council Cease-Fire Resolution: February - m i d - M ; rch
195 5
b) The Pressure to Abandon Quemoy and Matsu t O t h
Communists is Withstood; the Communists Ad Opt a Cnn-
ciliatory Line: mid-May - early-May 1955
 ra r t K : TMF LASING OF INTERNATIONA L TENSIONS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
Pi: PUBLIC OF CHINA, May Dec ember 19 5 5
S e c 11 o n Th e BI q Four S u rn nit Meet i n a “r
oT J”u 1 y 1955: May - July 1955

r Sect ion The United S ta t e s-Chi ne se Corniriunist Talks at Geneva

and the Question of Chinese Representation at the United
Nations: August - December 1955
a) "Item One" at Geneva--The Question of Detained
Civilians--and the Representation Issue at the
United Nations: July 25 - September 10, 1955
b) "Item Two" at Geneva and the Representation Issue
at the United Nations: September 10 - late-October 1955
c) The Package Deal for Admission of New Members to
the United Nations Threatens Nationalist China's
Position at the United Nations: November - December 195
d) The Continuing Negotiations on "Item Two" on the Spirit
of East-West Detante Recedes at Geneva: late-October -
Dec ember 19 5 5
Section 3 Miscellaneous Affairs Including Aid and the Sun Li-jen
Case: May - December 1955

I' a r t L: THE END OF MY MISSION TO WASHINGTON: January - early-May 1956

Section 1. International Issues during the Final Period of my
Washington Mission: January - May 1956
a) The Anglo-American and Geneva Conversations from
the Nationalist Chinese Point of View: January -
early-February 1956
b) Winding Up my Mission to Washington in the Face
of the Stepped Up Communist Political and Diplomatic
Offensive: early-February - early-May 1956
r Section 2 . My Resignati.on and Departure from Washington: January -
early-May 1956

r
 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

Volume VIII: Ten Years on the World Court

at The Hague: l‘J56 - 19 66

1. After Retirement from the Diplomatic

Service and my Election to the
International Court of Justice

2. The Sea Voyage to The Hague

3. My Commencement on the Court

4. First Private Meeting of the

Court for the Session and ray
Formal Installation as a Judge

5. My Participation in the Work

of the Court

6. Life at The Hague

7. Renting a House and Making a

Temporary Home at The Hague

8 . - - -

A Question of Protocol
Relations with the Royal House
Relations with the Diplomatic Corps
Social Life with the Dutch Community
The Chinese Community at The Hague
Foreign Dignitaries Visiting the Court
Visits of iny Relatives and Friends

9. Question of Posing my Candidacy for

Re-election to the Court
ON VOLUMES IV, VI, VII OF THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO
AS DONE WITH MS. CRYSTAL SEIDMAN

In September 1966, I began interviewing Dr. Koo two or three times

a week. Dr. Koo's preference, as expressed both in theoretical discussions

and practice, was always for the written word and document above memory
as an accurate transmitter of events. Having kept careful records of

his public career as it transpired, having been able to preserve many

of these and (and especially these relating to his post-1932 career)

and to subsequently deposit them with Columbia University, he was well

equipped as a memoirist to suit his documentary bias. At the outset

of our collaborative effort, he worked almost exclusively from the Notes

of Conversations and the Diary. As I got to know Dr. Koo better and
became more familiar with the Koo Collection, I encouraged the use of

the telegraph file as well.

The Notes of Conversations are a comprehensive, chronological file

of the minutes of the interviews or conversations that took place between

Dr. Koo and various personages of foreign countries on topics related to

Dr. Koo's work as a diplomat. As China's Minister, Ambassador or

Representative at the League of Nations or the United Nations, Dr. Koo,

in carrying out his work, had occasion to converse officially, semi­

officially and informally with leading statesmen, politicians and

diplomats. Shortly after each official conversation, and after some

informal ones that proved informative, he would dictate the contents to
a secretary. S°metimes the minutes, as for example during the negotiations

for the Sino-American Treaty of 1954, were recorded by a secretary

on the spot. In either case. Dr. Koo would re-read and correct the

secretary's draft.
The Diary is a daily account beginning March 26, 1936, when Dr.
Koo returned to Paris as the first Chinese Ambassador to France. (The

volumes for December 29, 1939 - April 14, 1941 and October 10, 1943 -
January 17, 1949 are missing.) The Diary often contains an official
agenda for the day and notations of many of the important national and

international events touching on Dr. Koo's career. It covers informal

conversations not covered in the Notes, as with visiting Chinese.

Entries on personal life, theoretical remarks, judgmental pronouncements

and the like are sparse.

 -2-

The Telegraph File is composed of an extensive body of telegrams

r exchanged between Dr. Koo, as head of a diplomatic mission, and the

foreign office and between Dr. Koo and the highest officials of the state.

It begins essentially with the French mission in September - October 1932.

It is organized in folders either chronologically or by subject.

The approach used in the interviews was f i rst ly chrono logica 1 and,

incidentally, topical. In preparation for our initial meetings. Dr. Koo

asked for consecutive portions of the Diary and Notes. Having reviewed
these, he would begin an interview with a brief general introduction

of a subject, and then read out from the Diary and the Notes somewhat
selectively. In using the Notes, he made minor modifications in the

original text as he read and often punctuated his reading by comments.

Often he asked that entire sections of the Notes be quoted.

My job as an interviewer at this time was limited to some questions

of clarification engendered by the material read out. Experience very

quickly showed that many relevant questions, if answerable, would soon

be answered in the course of time by the documentary materials themselves

as they were reviewed, and that such answers would often as not conflict
with those supplied offhand from memory. Overviews, subjective reactions^

comparisons, general impressions were, of course, inquired into, and were

supplied spontaneously by Dr. Koo; so were matters unlikely to be touched

on in the documentary materials, concerning, for example, diplomatic

practices and modes of running and organizing an embassy or delegation.

At some point, we began to utilize the telegraph file. Perhaps it

was a diary entry which read something like this: "Sent important

telegram to the Generalissimo, summarizing my view of the latest

developments in the war, and my suggestions as to what the government
should do in the circumstances." Eventually, I spent some time in

searching through the Koo Collection for appropriate folders of telegrams

from the files, which I brought to Dr. Koo for use in our interviews.

He would look over them, and translate them, sometimes quite selectively,
but usually not. Dr. Koo is, as I said, a firm believer in the intrinsic

value of the historical record.

By the interviewing process just described, v/e eventual].'/ covered

r the years
tape, the
1932-41
tape
and 1946-56.
transcribed by a
Each interview had
secretary and the
been recorded on
(top copy of the)
transcription checked by the interviewer. It v/as now time to compile

and edit this sizable body of materials to see what v/e had, to
organize this and fill in the gaps.

The introductory pattern of the first interviews had already

determined the nature of all future work. From the outset, we had
been dealing with many facts and details. These needed both background
material to support and explain them and give them a context and more

factual detail to resolve any questions raised. Where it was possible,

I turned to Dr. Koo for the answers, otherwise I relied on research,

using both the Koo Collection and outside sources, newspapers as well
as books.

Meanwhile the interviews continued. The interviews at this stage

were somewhat different from the earlier interviews, since I was now
working directly from the transcript and the supporting papers in the

Koo collection. We often began our interviews with a general discussion

or with a discussion of the period or problem in question. In the later

case, I would recall to Dr. Koo the dates, names, places, circumstances,

etc. , to provide the context before asking a specific question. We

worked off-the-tape. I took notes where appropriate. These discussions,

which increased our rapport and gave me a more intimate knowledge of

Dr. Koo's attitudes and approaches, were followed by an on-tape interview,

relying heavily on the telegrams which Dr. Koo spent many hours
translating.

In these latter interviews and in the editing, the materials from

the Koo Collection, outside of the three major types listed, that I

found most useful were the various official memoranda and aide-memoires,

press statements, embassy and foreign office releases, reports of

subordinates on special subjects and personal letters exchanged with

colleagues. There is also a file of speeches by Dr. Koo for the

American period, which Dr. Koo asked me to refer to and which I often

sought out to explore a diary entry relating to the occasion on which

the speech was delivered or the nature of China's publicity requirements

at the time.

Obviously, with such a wealth of documentary material on hand,

it was possible, in editing the Koo manuscript, to produce a highly-

reliable work. Statements from memory were checked against the

documentary materials in the collection as well as outside sources.

 4-

The Notes, Diary and Telegrams in particular could be and were checked

against each other to obtain firm dates and to clear up ambiguities.

(For example, the contents of important conversations recorded in the

Notes of Conversations were also telegraphed to the Foreign Hinister
and/or Chiang Kai-shek. So two versions existed on Dr. Koo's side alone.)

In editing, I used the top copy of the original transcript of the

interviews, which had been typed in duplicate. (The carbon copy is filed.)

The top copy of the original transcript, as cut up, rearranged, added to,
deducted from and researched is called the Editor's Draft. The latter

as typed (again in duplicate) is called the First Edited Version. (The

carbon copy is filed.) The top copy of this First Edited Version was

sent to Dr. Koo section by section as it was completed. When he in turn

completed reviewing each section, correcting it if necessary and

answering any questions written into the text by the editor, we met
to go over it together. Then it was reviewed, amended and copy-edited

by this editor in the case of Volumes VI and VII and Parts A and R, ] 0f

Volume IV. This doubly corrected copy of the First Edited Version,

Volumes VI and VII, was handed to the typist. As typed it is the

Final Edited Version.* I

The top copy of the First Edited Version, Volume IV, Parts rf 2.

through E were not reviewed by this editor after having been typed or
after having been seen by Dr. Koo. There is no Final Edited Version
of Volume IV.

As for the Preliminary Draft of the French Mission (covering

November 1937 - December 1940), I consider it a rush job, during

which I hadn't sufficient time to ascertain many of the fact. Nor did
I have time to review the draft once typed. Each sub-unit, when typed,

was, however, sent to Dr. Koo and has his approval and occasional

notations and corrections.

Crystal S eid man

1 2/75
r THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO
ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT
(of the interviews with Ms Lorch-Seidman
pp. 2199 - 11598)

Interviews were tape-recorded, with the exception of off-record

remarks and background conversations. The interviewer made notes for
the use of the transcribing typist of many of the names that cropped
up, of unclear-sounding words and phrases, etc. The typist ideally
typed everything said and put within brackets anything about which
she was uncertain, which sounded unclear or garbled, a name that
couldn't be spelled, etc. (Cautionary note: actually, the quality
of the original transcript varies. Typists did not always render
conversations so precisely nor use brackets so scrupulously.) The top
copy of the transcript was then corrected and eventually became the
core of the Editor ' s Dra f t. The carbon copy is uncorrected.

n
 THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO
EDITOR'S DRAFT

The First Edited Version (Volumes Iv, VI and VII) is the Editor ' s
DraTt as typed. The carbon copy of the typed version remains as it came
from the Typist. The top copy has been approved and corrected by Dr.
Koo. For Volumes VI and VII and Volume IV, Part A and B, it has also
been revised, amended and copy-edited by Ms. Seidman. The First Edited
Version, top copy, as fully-revised both by Dr. Koo and the editor is
the draft from which the Final Edited Version is typed.
Brackets [] enclose all material added by the editor. This
includes material not found in the oriqinal transcript of the interviews
with Dr. Koo nor in the editor's notes of Dr. Koo's non-transcribod
remarks; quotes not explicitly stated for inclusion by Dr. Koo; material
found in the transcript or notes, but summarized or reworked to a high
degree; and questions and remarks addressed to Dr. Koo by the editor for
clarification.
With few exceptions, recalled conversations in The Reminiscences
are based on Dr. Koo's Diary and Notes_of Conversations. Those based
directly on the frlotes are normally paragraphed by speaker:

I said... .
Mr. Hoover replied....
Then I asked....
Mr. Hoover replied....
There are exceptions. For example, if there are more speakers, each
making very terse remarks, all remarks might be included in a single
paragraph. Or the conversation with Mr. Hoover, might contain a
paragraph or two ustng the form: "When I asked. * . ., Mr. Hoover replied
• • • •
II *

Conversations based on the Diary are most often paragraphed by

subject. Conversations recalled from memory are usually emphasized
to be such by such phrases as: "If I recall correctly..."
In Volumes VI and VII, for the period after 1949 , "Peiping'’ is
used for "Peking." In the interviews of 1966-1970 Dr. Koo always used
the words Peiping" or "Peiping regime" himself and his diary entries
for the 1950s always used "Peiping." So this term was chosen by Dr.
Koo, around 1970, as the preferable one in editing, though later he
varied from time to time in his choice of words.
 In the Editor's Draft, the sources are often clearly indicated
in the margins. In the right-hand margin will be found the page
number of the original transcript. In the left-hand margin will be
found the word "diary" with the date, if the Diary was the source of
the transcript, or the telegram number, its date, its sender and
receiver, if the source was a telegram. If the Notes of Conversations
are the source, since they are usually xeroxed and then reworked,
they can be easily identified as such.

Crystal Seidman
12/75
 THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO
r
FIRST EDITED VERSION

The ^Irst Edited Version (Volumes IV, VI and VII) is the Editor's
33 typed. The carbon copy of the tyned version remains as it
came from the typist. The top copy has been approved and corrected by
Dr. Koo. For Volumes VI and VII and Volume IV, Parts A and B, It has
also been revised, amended and copy-edited by Ms. Seidman. The r 1 rot
Edited Version, top copy^as fully-revised both by Dr. Koo and the
editor is the draft from which the Final Edited Version is typed.
Brackets M enclose all material added by the editor. This
includes material not found in the original transcript of the interviews
with Dr. Koo nor in the editor's notes of Dr. Koo’s non-transcribed
remarks; quotes not explicitly slated for inclusion by Dr. Kooj material
found in the transcript or notes but summarized or reworked to a high
degree; and questions and remarks addressed to Dr. Koo by the editor
for clarification.

n
The brackets,, while useful to the scholar, were really intended
for the use of Dr. Koo himself. Sections of the First Edited Version
were handed to Dr. Koo on completion for his comment and approval. He
judged whether the bracketed materials accurately reflected his own
views, his own voice and style. As for questions raised in the brackets,
they are either answered in notes in the margins in Dr. Koo's own hand
or were discussed by Dr. Koo and the editor and subsequently incorporated
in the text.
Dr. Koo’s corrections, deletions or additions are usually made in
pencil. Sometimes they are noted by a check (vO in the right-hand
margin, but not always. The curious reader must simplv distinguish
his handwriting from the editor's. Dr. Koo also sometimes indicated
his approval of bracketed material by one or several circles (oo) in
the right-hand margin.
With few exceptions, recalled conversations in The Reminiscences
are based on Dr. Koo1s Diary and Notes of Conversations. Those based
directly on the Notes are normally paragraphed by speaker:
I said....
Mr. Hoover replied....
Then I asked....
Mr. Hoover replied....
There are exceptions. For example, if there are more speakers, each
makincr very terse remarks, all remarks miqht be included in a single
paragraph. Or the conversation with Mr. Hoover might contain a
paragraph or two using the forint "When I asked...., Mr. Hoover replied

Conversations based on the Diary are most often paragraphed by

subject. Conversations recalled from memory are usually emphasized
to be such by such phrases as: "If I recall correctly..."
In Volumes VI and VII, for the period after 1949, "Peiping" is
used for "Peking." In the interviews of 1966-1970 Dr. Koo always used
the words "Peiping" or "Peiping regime" himself and his diary entries
for the 1950s always used "Peiping." Co this term v/as chosen by Dr.
Koo around 1970 as the preferable one in editing, though later he varied
from time to time in his choice of words.
 THE REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME IV: MISSION TO FRANCE

PRELIMINARY DRAFT FORM

(covering November 193? - December 1940 in 10 units)

The Preliminary Draft consists of the original transcript as

edited for English style (punctuation, spelling, grammar), for Internal
consistency and fluidity and to avoid repetition. The transcript in
this case relies most heavily on the Diaries (not available for December

29, 1939 ~ April 14, 1941) and the Notes,, of, Conversations.
NO attempt has been made by the editor to rigorously check the
transcript against the original documents and outside sources, nor in
general to ascertain the facts, including the Identification and
spelling of the names of persons mentioned in the text. Brackets,
[], indicate material added by the editor, including guestions

addressed to Dr. Koo.

The editor did not correct the typed version of the Preliminary
Draft. It has however been approved by Dr. Koo, to whom each section
was handed on completion. All penciled or blue-ink notations are

Dr. Koo's.
 The Final Edited Version is the First Edited Version as fully
corrected by the editor, corrected and approved by Dr. Koo, and then
typed. The typed Final Version has not itself been corrected by an
editor for typos and omissions.
FILMED
BY
 I M I I I I M I I I M I I IM I I IIII | M
II IIII | I I I II |I Illll|
II M 11111 M II11 Ml | M II1111111II11 M I 1111111 I 111 11 IM|

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 1 00
mm
THIS BOOK IS THE

BEST COPY BAILABLE

AT TIME OF FILMING
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Volume I:

Childhood and Education (1888-1912)

This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Endowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the Fast Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1976. The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the Fast Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
REMINISCENCES OF DR. WELLINGTON KOO

First Edited Version

Volume I

Childhood and Education

(1888-1912)

Julie How

Interviewer and Editor

 OUTLINE

REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

VOLUME I : CHILDHOOD AND EDUCATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Birth 1
Family 2
Education (elementary school) 6
Play 7
Music 13
Mischief 13
Death of maternal grandmother 16
Incident with monk 18
Education (classical) 19
Education (western) 23
Illness 26
Education (St. John'sCollege) 28
Reform sentiment at St. John's, Shanghai, 1900-1904 30
Recollections of the Sino-Japanese War 1894 and the
Reform Movement 1898 32
Departure for the US, summer 1904 37
Year at Cook Academy, 1904-1905 41
Indecision concerning course of study and summerat Cornell, 1905 45
Freshman year at Columbia, 1905-1906;Freshman-Sophomore contests 47
Contact with the Mission to study constitutional government in the
west, winter, 1905-1906 54
First visit to Washington, D. C., 1905-1906;
Meeting Sir Chen-tung Liang-ch'eng 55
Recollections of the Russo-Japanese War and the Peace Conference
1904-1905 55
Friendliness to foreign students at Columbia 57
Recollections of Columbia professors and President Butler 58
Study of Latin, summer, 1906 and geology, 1906-1907 65
Athletic activities 68
Non-athletic extracurricular activities (dramatics ,debating,
Spectator, Board of Student Representatives, mock conventions,
and others) 71
Recollections of Stagg Whiting and a hunting trip to the Adirondacks 78
Visit to London, summer, 1908 (Wang Ch'ung-hui and Minister
Wang Ta-hsieh) 81
Journey by boat to Shanghai, summer 1908 83
Contrast between East and West 84
Problem of marriage and divorce 86
Engagement 87
Wedding, 1908 92
Return to US with bride 102
Divorce, 1911 104
Return to Columbia University, 1908 107
Contact with T'ang Shao-i's mission to Washington, 1908 107
Interpreting news dispatches for the Herald,end,1908 109
US policies, especially regarding Manchuria 112
Visit to Washington on the invitation of T'ang Shao-i,January1909 114
Public debate of the issue of republic vs.monarchy avoided by
Chinese students in the US 120
Telegrams from Chinese students in the US to Peking government
Meeting with Sun Yat-sen,fall, 1909
 Table of Contents (Cont'd)

Decision not to graduate in 1908 124

Difficulties in passing the swimming test, 1909 125
Writing Ph. D. dissertation 125
Reaction to the Wu-ch'ang Uprising, 1911 129
Invitation from Yllan Shih-k'ai received mid-February, 1912 133
Orals and arrangements for the doctoral dissertation, 1912 135
Buying reference books to bring back to Peking 142
Journey to Peking on the Trans-Siberian Railway 143
 June 27, 1958

EARLY CHILDHOOD

At the end of a bright, broad street branching off from the

main business centre of the Chinese city of Shanghai there was an

imposing gateway in the shape of an inverted faru Iitide the two

wide gates were two houses. One of them was occupied by the owner

of the estate himself and the other, less pretentious in appearance

and more Chinese in style, stood some fifty yards back and was

connected only by a dark, narrow alley. In this second house I

was born on January 29, 1888--the fourth child to the family of

Koo Hsiung (Ching-chuan) and his twenty-three year old young wife

n£e Chiang.

According to my mother's mother who looked after me most of

the time till her death, my arrival in the family was looked upon

as an auspicious event. Her account was simple. For several

years my father had been a member of a customs brokerage firm

owned by his father-in-law and earning enough to support a rapidly

growing family. Bad times set in and the general recession in

business compelled the firm to close its doors. But though he

found himself idle, the family had to live, and this state of affairs

caused no little worry to him. When I was conceived, my mother,

already burdened with the daily chore of bringing up two boys and

one girl and attending to her aging mother-in-law, did not wish to

have another baby to add to her work and worry. My mother (who
 2

herself told me later with a sense of humour and a vague belief

in predestination) took to the expedient of drinking a certain

kind of tea heavily in the hope of bringing on a miscarriage but

was surprised at the fruitlessness of her special effort. Then

one day good news came to my father. An old friend of my

mother^ family gave him an offer to serve as deputy purser on one

of the ships of the Chinese Merchants1 Navigation Company, a

government owned enterprize. This was quickly accepted and greatly

improved the immediate economic situation and future prospects of

the family. In a few months, my father was earning enough to

enable him to move to the larger house where I was later born and

to engage a cook and a maid for the first time in the married life

of the young couple.

A few words here about the spirit and atmosphere of my family

during my childhood days will be useful and may even be interesting

in the attempt to describe how I was brought up and to detect

some of the influences which played a part in the formation of

my personality and character. As my father was away most of the

time, returning home only two or three times a week when his ship

came to Shanghai, the recognized head of the household was my

paternal grandmother. She was an honest soul but also a strict

and punctilious lady. She always expected and of course always

received first attention from my mother as her daughter-in-law in

full conformity with Chinese tradition and Confucian precepts. Her

own mother who stayed with the family most of the time was only
 3

a guest and her children must also come next. The whole household

was dominated by her influence. She had been practical, hardworking

atld frugal all her life and of course insisted that others in the

family should follow her example.

In holding to this attitude, she had many good reasons. She

herself came from the family of a gentleman farmer and farmers in

China to this day are well-known for their industry and frugality.

She was a teen-age bride of my grandfather and soon became a young

widow, having lost her husband in the Taiping Rebellion which overran

the whole country during mid-nineteenth century.

The Koo family was then one of the leading scholar-mandarin

families of Kiating, a town about 24 miles northwest of Shanghai.

Known as such it became the target and victim of one armed rebel

band, which kidnapped my grandfather and his kid brothers for

ransome. They sent word that they were being put under various

forms of torture in order to force them to tell how much wealth they

possessed and told their only way of survival was to surrender all

they owned. This information led to the family's frantic effort

to raise funds by mortgaging their farms and houses and selling

their jewelry and other articles of value at whatever they could

in those hard times. They were released and returned home. But

they did not live long after they regained their freedom. Two of

them died of their wounds suffered at the hand of the rebel kid­

nappers. Within a few days after their return the other two

including my grandfather passed away successively as a result of

 4

their captivity worry and impaired health. One main column of the

insurgent forces was reported rapidly approaching Kiating and my

grandmother fled with her young son of four years old and still

younger daughter. The party travelled on foot by night and hid

themselves in some farmer's home in daytime, enroute to Shanghai.

On the third day they were almost overtaken by the advancing

rebels. She was carrying her daughter in her arms, followed

by her son on foot. On the spur of the moment, she decided to

lighten her burden and threw the girl baby into the wayside creek.

With her son alone, she quickened her pace and reached Shanghai on

the fourth day exhausted and destitute. She went to a relatives

home and was given shelter and food. There she took up knitting

and embroidery in order to earn something with which to send her

son to school and support her small family of two.

But the fear of her little daughter's fate haunted her all the

time and so she braved another journey alone on foot to find her.

She retraced the whole path and stopped at shere she had had to

part with her little girl. She visited one farmer's house after

another and anxiously inquired if any of them had seen the baby.

By sheer chance one of them, having heard the crying of a little

soul, had picked her up and turned her to his wife’s care. My

grandmother was overjoyed to see her only daughter again and,

after giving the kind-hearted farmer’s family what little she

had saved from her earnings, brought her back to Shanghai and so

re-united the grief and poverty stricken family.

 5

For ten years she devoted herself to needlework to make a

living and educate her son. In addition to her daily chores of

:t
housekeeping she worked till late hours night after night by

the side of a dim light fed with soyabean oil and burning a single

wicker. At the same time she kept her son working hard at Chinese

reading and writing and mathematics. When he was fourteen years

old, he joined a Chinese firm dealing in Peking, Cantonese and

foreign merchandize and wares. Thereafter my grandmother's

burden of supporting the family was lightened to some extent by

her young son being able to earn his own board and lodging.

I have given this brief account of the vicissitudes through

which the Koo family underwent in order to explain how simple

living, hard work and frugality came to be regarded as indispensable

virtues by my grandmother. She ardently cherished them even

in her later more affluent days and always sought to inculcate them

in the minds of every one in the family.

Before I was two years old, my younger sister arrived as the

fifth child. It was a strenuous and trying chore to look after

five young children and an aging and rather demanding mother-in-law.

To lighten her burden her own mother took it on to be responsible

for me, and, to her unexpected joy, my paternal grandmother was

especially fond of my second brother and preferred to take care

of him as her darling. She looked after his food and clothing and

had him with her most of the time. This improvised division of labor

made more bearable the daily chores of my mother including her

 6

dutiful attendance upon her mother-in -law all the time.

I was sent to school with my second brother when I was

three years and one month old. It was a private school, about

a mile from my house, and opened by one Mr. Ghu, a widower in his

early thirties. He was both the manager and teacher and indeed

the only teacher. He had tried and failed in a dogen trials at

the government- sponsored examinations for official candidates to

the civil service and decided upon teaching as the only practical

way for him to make a living. The tuition he charged was considered

reasonable at two silver dollars every four months, thus making

a total of six dollars a year for each pupil. There were about

twenty-five pupils in all, though he would have gladly accepted

more if more had applied. They were of ages ranging from a

little over three years as was in my own case to 15 or 16 years

old ones. Of course their studies were of different levels,

some quite advanced such as the Five Classics and some just

beginning to learn the individual written characters of the Chinesa

language. My brother and I were of the latter class.

We attended this school every day seven days a week, except

for customary festivals and New Year, which were of course

national holidays throughout the land. I remember I enjoyed the

daily attendance so much that even when my brother did not want to

go either because of a headache or feeling tired or even when it

was snowing hard in winter, and my mother told me to stay home,

I went just the same. I made many friends t 2re and we played

together during two or three intermissions each day. Even under

 7

the watchful eyes of the teacher in the study room, we managed to

have some fun by concocting some games or passing secret messages

over a string connecting us but hidden from the teacher. This daily

pilgrimage became, as it were for the time being, the raison

d'etre of my life, for I felt I was learning as well as having fun.

It went on for ten years and I expected it would continue on

indefinitely until it suddenly ended against my will.

Before explaining how this crisis happened and what it led to,

I would like to say a few words about the problem of recreation

for young boys in my time. Outside a very few missionary schools

which encouraged athletic games and sports, there was no idea

among Chinese teachers of the need and importance of the development

of the body along with the development of the mind. In fact

there were no Chinese schools organized as the missionary schools

were students were grouped into classes and required to devote

part of their time to physical exercise and athletic sports.

Accordingly, the Chinese boys who were sent to school or taught

by a private teacher at home to acquire knowledge had to rely

on themselves to find ways and means of amusing themselves for

recreation and play. Like most other dhildren I was keen on playing

as well as on studying.

But the Chinese toy industry was still in its very primitive

state. It consisted of little more than handicraft products in the

form of kites and paper lanterns during the new year festival and

multi-colored mud figurines of all kinds usually displayed at

periodic temple fairs. There were some ancient Chinese games

 8

like "shooting pebbles", "rolling the coin", and cricket fights.

But these competitive games required contestants and in our

neighbourhood there were no boys of my age. The result was that

I was compelled to play only with my second brother and my younger

sister most of the time.

One of our favorite games was "shuttle cock". This was

something like badminton, except the shuttlecock was made of

feathers sewed on to the cloth which wrapped a copper alloy coin

with a square hole in the centre, and not on a piece of cock. It

was played by foot and the game consisted of kicking it up in

the air and letting it drop on the foot as many times as possible.

Archery was another sport, with homemade bows and arrows and a

piece of board nailed onto a wall or with a wooden door as the

target.

These simple games were amusing, however,only for an hour or

two. I got soon tired of them and would look for other things to

do to kill time. Boyish ingenuity soon came to ray help and led me

to make many a mock invention. The sight of a fire-hose which I

saw at one of the fires in the neighborhood gave me the idea of making

a water pump with odd pieces of bamboo poles which were a eommon

household article used for drying clothes in the sun. Cutting a

section of about 18 inches long, boring the inside through the bottom
a
segment, inserting/circular piece cf tinplate inside to be at the

bottom and fastening it with a piece of wire, I had provided the

principal part of the pump ready with an indispensable valve. Then

I picked a smaller section, bored it through, wrapped the end

with cloth to make it more or less airtight, inserted this end into

the other bamboo as the piston and formed the pump completed and
 9

ready for use. Through suction and pressure by keeping my thumb

on and off the aperture at the top of the piston, I worked the

pump in a bucket of water and was pleased to find it work quite

well, sending a spray of water as high as the roof of our

two storey building. Frequently, I directed the rising spray to

fall into our neighbors’ yard and was greatly amused to hear

him yell out that it was raining suddenly.

Often disturbed or annoyed by my brother and sister yelling

at the top of their voice to call the maid or the cook from their

room to the far end of our house, I wondered why some easier way

could not be found to send for them. The practice of my teacher

at school to ring a handbell to signify the end of the school

day gave me the idea of hanging a good-sized bell on the kitchen

one end of
wall and attach/it with a cord and, passing it through a number of

screw-rings screwed into the door-entrances of several rooms on

the ground and second floors, fixed the other end of the cord so

that it hung down on the wall in a corner. By pulling it any

one upstairs could notify any servant in the kitchen that he or

she was needed upstairs. This contraption was much appreciated

by the whole family and constantly utilized.

But another pseudo-invention of mine did not become very

popular and was doomed to the fate of a child's plaything. This

was a "telephone" made of a long silk thread, each end of which

was attached to an empty paper match-box. By whispering through

one box I in one room could communicate what I wanted to tell another
 10

in another room without letting others present hear the conversatkion.

This gadget, however, was not accepted by my family as of practical

use and only my younger sister was impressed by it to make some

use in talking to me.

There was far more fun, however, in making paper lanterns in

the shapes of different kinds of animals such as rabbits, ponies,

and dogs or in cubic form with cut figures representing leading

characters of a Chinese play pasted on to a paper cylinder inserted

inside the lantern frame and carefully attached one end of a hair

to an arm or a head separately and loosely affixed to the particular

figure and the other end to the central pivot of the lantern, through

the top of which was super-imposed a plaited paper disc, so that

when the two candles at the base of the lantern were lighted, the

hot air from the flame sent the disc revolving and thereby moving

the arm or head of the figures affixed.to the cylinder. It was fun

making these lanterns and whenever I had some difficulty which

appeared to me insuperable at the time I would go to the temple

fair in the city and watched the lantern makers carefully to learn

their secrets. To my own satisfaction and to that of my parents,

I formed homemade lanterns cost much less than those on sale at

the market and gave me added fun ini making them.

A much simpler task but ever a great thrill was to make kites

at home and fly them in some nearby open field. There other boys

would be flying kites bought at the market place. But my brother

and I would be specially proud in showing them the singing bow

 11

attached to our kite and half way on the string, made with our own

hands, and in listening to their singing high in the air stirred

by the breeze.

This pastfcime was, however, only for a few weeks of the

New Year holidays each year. When the Lantern Festival, which usually

fell on the 15th day of the First Moon, was past, school would begin

again and little time was left for laborious undertakings to get

fun at home, except on other festival days in the course of the

year or whenever there was an engagement party, a wedding or a

birthday celebration. On any of these occasions it was a legitimate

holiday for me. In fact, whenever such a felicitous event was to

take place, my family would be busy for weeks or sometimes for

months in advance to make all sorts of preparations. One of the

things to be done was to decorate all offerings to the departed

spirits or celestial deities in the form of fresh and dried fruits

and even cooked foods with red paper figures, not only to make

them more pleasing to the eyes of the guests but also more auspicious

for the future of the family. Both the number of these figures

required and the delicacy of the work involved in cutting them often

proved taxing. But I watched carefully how my mother and elder

sister did the work and soon was able to share it with them. After

a while, I was found so efficient that I was made responsible for

the greater part of the task, so that they could devote more time

to other equally important preparations.

A more enduring and at the same time more fascinating or

 12

-or intriguing recreation was copying scrolls or paintings. The

former contained proverbs, verses or quotations from the Chinese

classics written by well-kViown caligraphers of ancient or contemporary

times, and the latter were pictures of landscape scenery, scenes

from famous novels or other subjects such as trees, flowers and

animals painted by famous Chinese painters. I recall it was far

easier at least in my opinion at the time, to imitate some

caligraphers1 writing than to copy beautiful paintings of renowned

artists. I carved limestone seals and affixed my name or that of

my elder brother on our works in vermilion red. I remember my

two brothers who joined in this new undertaking were so satisfied

with the result that we decided to make a commercial enterprise

of it, so as to earn some pocket money to supplement our meagre

daily allowance of four copper cash. We launched the business

on the New Year Eve when it was the time-honored custom in all

families to buy some new scrolls to decorate their front door or

some new pictures to embellish the interior of their houses as a

token of welcome to the advent of another year. Much to our

disappointment the whole venture was a total failure. Suspected

prospective buyers came and went by our stand covered with our

honest works but none did more than cast a casual glance and passed

on. We wondered what was the reason for their lack of interest.

The price labels appeared to us sufficiently attractive in comparison

with those exhibited at other stands but none were effectively

attracted to make a purchase. Perhaps it was the poor quality of

 13

the works displayed or rather the childish looks on our faces

deterred them from giving any patronage to us.

My feeling of frustration did not last long. My interest turned

to the family musical band organized by our next door neighbor and

I eagerly joined it and played it during the entire festival period.

Indeed I was so fascinated by the different musical instruments

that I decided to try to learn to play on most of them. This took

a great deal of ray spare time but it was interesting and amusing

to me. There was no available teacher to give lessons and I had

to content myself with bits of advice from some good players here

and there. After weeks of persistent effort, I was able to play

a few simple tunes on the Chinese flute, picolo and fiddle.

Chinese music was intriguing, especially the folk songs and

popular ditties which appealed to me particularly and which I learned

to play fairly on the three instruments. But as my skill advance^

I became more ambitious. I attempted other instruments, notably

the four string fiddle in contrast to the simple two string specie,

the Chinese hand organ built with twenty-odd tender bamboo sticks,

and the Chinese guitar (pH-p^). Thus playing on one or another

of these instruments became a hobby and it gave me much recreation

and pleasure throughout the early years of my life.

So far I have given an account of myself as a good boy. But

I was no angel, because I was not free from mischief. Even as

a child I loved to tease people and enjoy a good laugh. One of

my fatherrs sedan chair carriers was a husky man of more brawn than
 14

brain. Though physically strong and powerful, he was deadly fearful

of ghosts. This laid him open to practical jokes played on him.

One dark night, I wrapped myself in white bed sheet and pulled a

white pillow case over my head with two holes specially cut in it

so as to enable me to see and at the same time to make me look

more horrible. I hid myself behind a door leading into the big

hall of our house. As he and his fellow worker replaced the empty

chair on a high wooden frame in the entrance and he alone came into

the hall pitch-dark for want of any light, I suddenly emerged on

him as if from nowhere. He was so frightened that he cried and

ran. I ran after him in my full ghostly regalia and he yelled

louder and dashed forward faster to seek help from our cook. When

the latter came out, I took off my tall pillow-hat and enjoyed a

boisterous laugh. He laughed with me but the cook gave me a

good scolding which I felt in my heart that X fully deserved.

Our cook was a simple-minded soul. She was most loyal to

the family and devoted to her work. One of her absorbing tasks which

she took on herself was to be jealously watchful of the larder

and indeed all the purchases she made for our table. In summer it

was our custom to buy and store up watermelons about a carry-load

at a time, usually about 15 or 20 pieces. She would carefully

check them every day each time after 2 or 3 pieces were cut up and

eaten by the family. It was an instinct of frugality on her part

 15

but none-the-less annoying to the youngsters of the household.

I was one amongst them. So one early morning when she was still

out marketing, I wrapped two melons in two bath towels and dropped

them into a deep well in the backyard. When afternoon came and

I as usual asked for watermelon to eat to cool myself, she went

to the pile and found two melons missing. She was most serious

and appeared confounded how the theft could have taken place. She

accused our chair-carriers and other servants and they of course

denied to her disbelief. When the row was still raging among them,

I quietly pulled up the melons from the well and brought them back

to her. She was as much confounded as pleased, lamely trying to

blame me for the incident. But my explanation and excuse that it

was to make the melons more delicious for having been thus cooled

calmed her and the improved taste of the specially cooled melons

also helped to extinguish the fury and anger of the wrongly

accused ones.

To further console the cook in order to continue to get on

good terms with her, I helped her make cakes and Chinese ravioli

in the kitchen. This help she particularly appreciated as it saved

her time and work.

A less explosive but equally mysterious trick was played on

my sister who had been busy for days making all kinds of embroidered

belts, bags and fan holders for her fianc4 in preparation for her

wedding some weeks ahead. When she stopped her work and went

downstairs to have lunch, I sneaked into her room and carefully

 16

took up the embroidery where she left and hurriedly finished it.

I then left the house on some pretended urgent mission. On my

return I found her still greatly puzzled who it could be that had

done the work for her in her short absence for lunch. The whole

household was in a quandary and wonderment. Some superstitious

souls like the cook suggested some angel must have descended from

Heaven to do it for my sister as a reward for a good soul. I kept

quiet until the evening when they appeared really nervous and unable

to sleep well and then I told them the truth. They at first were

sceptical about my story and were reassured only when I took up a

needle, put a thread across its eye and did a few stitches to

prove that I was able to do it and had really done it.

When my maternal grandmother died I was seven years old. It

was a very sad event for me, because she had regarded me as her

darling and had looked after me in every conceivable way. So I

watched with a measure of disgust how the womenfolk of our

relatives could pretend to weep and wail without tears. Of course

it was a time-honored custom that every sevehth day for seven

weeks and especially the fifth week after a death in a family the

close friends and relatives should come and attend the ceremony of

renewed mourning. It was also a custom for the weepers to wail

aloud the story of their friendship with the departed soul and

mourn their irreparable loss. This must have been a spontaneous

expression of sorrow in its origin. But it had grown to be a

 17

recognized custom. Indeed it had been pushed so far as to make the

occasion a kind of contest as to who could weep loudest and wail

out aloud the most moving story of friendship with the deceased

in his or her lifetime. Evidently to me there was no sincerity

in the weeping of some of our mourners at the catafalque set up

in the family. I noticed one of my aunts weeping and sobbing especially

loud but with her handkerchief pushed against her eyes all dry.

She had a very thin spread of hair over her scalp and wore a bun of

false hair at the back of her head fastened to it with a lacquer

hair-pin. As she swayed back and forth in her artificial weeping

and wailing, her bun shifted up and down on the back of her head.

Suddenly I was tempted to pull the pin away gently and the bun

fell into my hand. I put both in my pocket and walked away. This

mischievous act was done so gently that my aunt continued to weep

and wail without the least suspicion of what had happened or

how she looked to others with her hairdo altogether changed. I

sat quietly in the next room to await the explosion. Soon there

was an outburst of spontaneous laughter amongst the half dozen

mourners. Some one of them evidently caught a glimpse of my

aunt*s hairdo minus the bun and could not restrain her chuckling.

This spread to others who saw what had happened. The victim at

last realized what had occurred and that she was the butt of

the laughter. But instead of getting angry she joined with

the laughter and the whole room became a boisterous scene with

every one wondering who was the real naughty boy. I went in to
 18

hand back the two missing articles and, while inwardly feeling

elated at the success of the joke played, readily apologized arid

accepted some mild scolding, and premised not to do it again.

When I found nothing special to do to amuse myself, I

would go to the room overlooking the front street and watch the

passers~by“*-men, women, children and stray animals. One of the

sights was a group of two or three young monks from a nearby

Buddhist temple belonging to an order which required its followers

to be vegetarians all through their lives. One morning I noticed

a monk walking jauntily with his right hand up in the air carrying

a plateful of white bean curdle. He looked about nervously while

pressing forward back to his temple. X saw some red liquid inside

his plate and it occurred to me suddenly that there might be

some tasty bean sauce steamed pork underneath the innocent looking

vegetable fare. I yelled at him and told him what I suspected

he had in his plate. He vigorously denied it and began to run.

I rushed downstairs and chased after him Finally I overtook him

and insisted upon seeing what he had besides the bean curdle.

Iri his nervous attempt to keep me away, he dropped the plate and

there splashed the red pork as well as the white curdle, to the

amusement of all the passers-by. He was more frightened than

embarrassed and dashed away. It was fun but X felt it was a little

unkind to the ascetic monks. Though I determined not to do

this sort of detective work, I learned afterwards that the young

monk got a reprimand from the abbot of his temple for thus
 19

violating one of its standing rules against meat-eating.

While X had practically complete freedom and little interference

from my parents in devising ways and means of amusing myself when

I was out of school, I was not so fortunate, at least in my opinion

then, as regards the question of my education. I had been quite

happy and in fact eager to study at Mr. Chu^ school and had taken

for granted that I was to continue on indefinitely till I was ready

to take part in the Imperial civil service examinations with a view

to taking up a public career. Little had I thought of what my

father was planning for me. Early in 1898 when the Chinese New

Year holidays were drawing to an end, he suddenly disclosed his plan

to me. He said 1 was getting on in years as a boy and should work

with greater concentration on Chinese classics and the art of

writing the conventional eight-legged essays in order to prepare

more effectively for the Civil Service Examinations. He had a pro­

minent friend who had engaged a private teacher to teach his

own children for the same purpose and who was willing to have

me join them in the studies under the same teacher who was an

excellent scholar. This school was starting in three days and I

was to get ready for it. He broke the news to me so suddenly that

I was completely overwhelmed by surprise. I tried to argue against

his idea but it was of no avail. On the t rd day he had every­

thing ready and remained behind at home to carry out his new

program for me, in contrast to his usual custom of going to his

office at the Shanghai Military Intendent and Customs Superintendent's

Yamen at 7:30 A.M. He ordered one of his chair carriers to bring

 20

my bag of books and he himself escorted me to see his friend and

meet the teacher. Reluctantly I went, having no choice at all.

t
When we reached the friends house situated in a far and isolated

corner of the city, my very first impression was one of repulsion.

The front door of the huge house naturally quite becoming of a promi­

nent mandarin was draped in deep mourning which I later learned

was for the loss of the grandmother of the family. She had died a

little over a month earlier and all the members from the mandarin

down to all his children were clothed in white broadcloth in conformity

with the recognized Book of Rites. After a cordial exchange of the

usual amenities between him and my father, I was taken to the

school room and introduced to the teacher. The latter was a fellow

citizen of Kiating to my father and promised to do his best to look

after my education. In no time my father took leave and I was left

to face the new situation alone and unaided.

I found there were altogether four pupils besides me, two sons,

one daughter and one niece of the mandarin. The room was large

but dreary. We were all constantly under the teacher^ wandering

eyes. When listening to each of us reciting the four classics, he

was meticulous and painstaking. When lunch time came, meals were

served in the classroom and he and the pupils ate together. The

food was fine but I did not eat much. Everything seemed so different

and disagreeable. The teacher appeared stern and unsympathetic and

the other pupils stiff and formal quite in contrast to what I had
 21

been accustomed to see in my old school.

After one dayfs experience I felt convinced that this new

school was no place for me. On returning home met by our chair

carrier I decided not to go back the next day. I told my

father about it but he would not hear of it at all. He insisted that

I should continue my studies there for my own good, and he waited

for me in the morning again to see me start in the custody of the

an
faithful servant on what I considered to be/odious journey to

his mandarin friend^ even more odious private school. On the way

I tried to run away but I was c? the robust chair-carrier

and literally forcibly taken to vl. But the third day

I was successful in getting away. I ran so fast that he could

not come near me with his heavy physique and panting heavily as

he chased after me. I went to my aunt*s house for hiding but

when she overcordially welcomed me and invited me to stay for

lunch, I suspected some one from my own family had been there

already to warn her of my possible visit and so I turned away to

go to the family of my grand aunt. No sooner had I arrived than

my father appeared in his sedan chair. Without saying a word, he

came after me and with his two hands lifted me into his chair

and sat down himself. We were instantly carried aloft and back

to home. As soon as the carriers lit down the chair, I got away

from my father*s grip and ran into our house and upstairs into

my sister*s room locking the door at once. When my father ran

upstairs after me my sister dashed out and stopped him. The

sudden dollision caused her beautiful and valuable jade earrings

 22

fall on the floor and break into pieces. This disaster made her burst

into crying with tears dropping down her face, and led my father

to give up the chase.

The struggle between him and me, however, was not over. It

was only temporarily suspended. The next morning it developed into a

crisis. He tried to get hold of me by the window but I was too

alert not to escape from my room by another door and lock myself into

another room, the windows of which opened not on the courtyard but

only on the street outside. This quick tactic gave my mother an

opportunity to intervene in my favoir. She told him that she could

not understand my attitude but she felt strongly that my stubborn

refusal to attend the new school must have a good reason or must have

been based upon a strong feeling on my part. I had always been eager

to study at Mr. Chi^s school and had made good progress. Even on a

raining or snowing day I declined to listen to her advice and stay home but

always went to school. So it could not be for fear of hard work or for

lack of ambition that I disobeyed his order or disregarded his wishes.

In her opinion, I was destined to make a good mark in the world and should

not be forced to do something or study at a place to which I strongly

objected. Why should not my father let me go back to the old school

for another year as I wanted and see what I would like to do as to

schooling then, since as I grew older I might be able better to understand

what was really good for me and my future. This persuasive appeal for a

truce had its effect and my father consented, though with obvious

reluctance and distaste.

 23

I returned to Mr. Chu*s school but found the atmosphere somewhat

changed. Perhaps this feeling was more psychological on my part due to

the fact that I did not join my fellow pupils together at the start

of the year as usual and therefore there was an interruption in our

long association.

My father was not happy because of the frustration of his plan for

me. Nor was I after I went back to the old school, though not knowing

what to do. Perhaps all this was known to my sister who had recently

married and whose young husband had just joined a new Presbyterian

missionary school, the Anglo-Chinese College on Kunshan Road in the

Shanghai British Settlement. He suggested to me one day to join him

there and this suggestion was heartily endorsed by my mother and sister.

My father did not indicate his feeling at the time but he must have

approved; for my admission to the college's preparatory department,

he used to escort me back to there every Monday morning after a weekend

at home.

The new surroundings and new studies were refreshing. I started the

study of the English language at the college along with arithmetic and

geography. There were about fifty boys in the English class and the

teacher, an American returned student, introduced a novel system based

upon competition. Besides the usual chair and desk for each pupil in the

classroom, there were four benches ranged two on each side of the

teacher. On these benches were seated a dozen selected pupils who had

made the best records in spelling. The others remained in their original

seats. Those seated on the benches were arranged according to age. The
 24

The teacher would announce a word to be spelled to the whole class and

those not seated on the benches were given the first opportunity. If no

one among them could spell it correctly, it would be referred to the

youngest boy on the benches. If he failed, the next boy would have the

opportunity to spell it. If he could not do it, the one next to him would

be given the chance, and so on. I was chosen among the twelve boys and

as I was the youngest, I was given the last place on the four benches.

The whole process was exciting and the spirit of rivalry and

competition was very keen. By one chance after another, I was moved

up gradually, sometimes one place in a week and othertimes two or three

places in a day or rather in an hour - the duration of the class. Once

I attained the top seat, I formed the hope and made up my mind to do

my best to retain it. Many other boys naturally had the same ambition

to reach the honor seat and keep it, especially the one who had lost

it and who naturally wanted to regain it. Thus every time the class met

- and we met three times a week, it was an exciting event for all. It

was my exceeding good fortune to be able to hold on to the top place

on the benches till the end of the semester.

Another event which impressed me and caused me much anxiety was

the general examinations held toward the end of the semester in 1899.

Each student was required to take part in the examinations of each

subject or course of study he had pursued and it was the practice of

Anglo-Chinese College to work out all the marks on the percentage basis

and add them up to a total. This total was the determining factor

in numbering him in the general and comprehensive list of the names of the
 25

entire student body to be announced on the Commancement Day. He whose

marks received in the general examinations had totalled the highest

of all would head the list and his name would be followed by that

of the second highest total marks and so on. This practice was

generally well understood and welcomed by the students because it was

modelled to a degree after the Imperial Examinations which had been

held throughout the length and breadth of the land for centuries as

the means of recruiting civil service candidates for the Government.

Although I happened to be the youngest member of the entire

student body, I harbored the secret ambition of heading the college list

at the end of the semester. It was not that I had wanted the honor of

my own volition and aimed at attaining it from the beginning. Only

the fact that I had been doing well in all my studies and more particu­

larly the speculation of the teachers amongst themselves reaching the

ears of some students had given rise to a general expectation and had

served to raise my goal. But unfortunately it was not in the cards for

me to realize my ambition. I came out of the examinations in English,

Chinese, Geography and*Bible Study, but in Arithmetic, a subject which

I had found the easiest of all and in which I had been able to get

100 every week, I failed to get the maximum marks. I recall that my class

had about fifty students and for the final examination ten questions

were posted to them all. It was from nine o^lock to noon. I was

absorbed in working on. one question after another and by 11:30 I

was already working with the tenth, expecting to finish the whole

test in another five minutes when my teacher who had always been very
 26

sympathetic to me came over and asked how I was getting on, adding

that more than four fifths of my classmates had finished their work,

handed in their paper and left the room. This well-intentioned reminder

gave me a shock and/quickly said that 1 was near the finish also. In

the hurry to complete my work, I forgot to add the last two sums to

produce the correct answer. This inadvertence reduced my total for the

general list and my name was given the 8th place amidst some 350

students. It was a great disappointment to me and to ray teachers who

had fully expected me to receive the much coveted first honor, even

though in the 8th place I was given a prize in the form of a huge English

dictionary.

During the following summer vacation I was struck with an attack

of malaria or intermittant fever. It was a stubborn disease. Every

other day, I would be seized with violent shivering and high fever would

follow, making me feel very sick with a complete loss of appetite. Though

one of the best known doctors in town - a Doctor Chang, nephew of the

deaf Doctor Chang, recognized as the head of the medical profession in

Shanghai - came to attend me every afternoon and though my mother

personally prepared the medicine in accordance with his prescription,

no improvement was visible for weeks in my tormenting condition. The

doctor was as much disappointed as she was and could offer no good

explanation in his prescription note, which according to the Chinese

custom of his profession always started with an account of the patient's

illness and his progress or deterioration, followed by a list of the

names of the herbs or other ingredients which were to be obtained from

 27

a local drugstore and boiled into a stew, usually black in color, for the

sick person to take as hot as possible. My trouble began soon after

mid-July and it was not until October when the weather in Shanghai

became cooler and more comfortable that I began to show improvement.

I got rid of the fever then but my convalescence took another month before

X was able to get about as usual. By that time, the second semester at

Anglo-Chinese College had long started. It was too late for me to

rejoin it. But I was anxious to resume my studies somehow. I looked

around for a school as a stop-gap for the rest of the Chinese calendar

year which would end some time in February 1901. I enrolled in the

Wang Family Day School, which was headed by a Mr. Wang, a returned student

from Japan and run on the lines of a modern school. The curriculum

consisted of several subjects such as Chinese, history, calligraphy, and

composition, arithmetic, geography, English, and physical exercise. It

was a fairly large school with an attendance of about 100 boys, mostly

of my age. The contrast with Anglo-Chinese College was quite marked.

was no required course on the Bible and no compulsory attendance of

any religious service. The emphasis placed on the study of Chinese

was particularly noticeable.

During this period an important change took place in my plan of edu­

cation. My brother-in-law Mr. Chiang Tsang-kwai who had introduced me

to Anglo-Chinese College where he had been studying himself wanted to go to

St. John!s College, an Episcopal missionary institution headed by

Bishop Groves as general superintendant and Dr., F Hawks-Pott as

president. Chiang hailed from Ningpo and belonged to one of the

 28

prominent business families in Shanghai. His close friends at Anglo-

Chinese College were also scions of well-to-do Ningpo families eminent

in the Shanghai business and industrial circles. This group of young

men all decided to transfer to St. John's College, whose fame was

rising rapidly because of the success of its graduates in the Chinese

official world, such as Alfred Sze and his brother Thomas after

completing their education at Cornell University in Ithaca, N.Y.

Yielding to Chiang's persuasion I joined them in applying for

participation in the entrace examinations of St. John's. We went there

K-
together and spent a shole day for this purpose. The outcome of our

trial would not be known until three weeks later in January. It

was a period of uncertainty and anxious waiting. Not being confident

of success, I quickly applied also for admission into the Nanyang

College, a Chinese government institution and a strong rival of

St. John's in the educational world. I took part in its entrance

examination without having had an opportunity to advise my brother-

in-law of my enterprise. As it turned out unexpectedly, I found

my name first in the list of successful candidates published by St.

John's College and two days later in that of Nanyang College. This

dual success, while exceedingly gratifying, posed a difficult problem

for me. Each institution had its advantages and disadvantages as I

saw them then and for a time I was tormented by the pangs of indecision.

But when Chiang came to bring me the news of our common success at St.

John's, of which I had already learned through the newspapers and

when I told him of my venture for Nanyang College, he quickly disposed

of my problem by stresing all the arguments in favor of my joining

St. John's. What influenced me most at the time, I think, was the

fact that if I went with him and his friends to St. John's, they

could all look after me and the additional reason which was

decisive for me was that my mother and sister were both strongly in

favor of his view for this very reason. I readily yielded to his urging,

for after all I was then only a little over 13 and felt the need of his

care and company in a new and strange place.

 3d -f

During the first four years of the twentieth century, I

was studying at St, JohnTs College, having entered St, John’s in

1900, I remember the atmosphere both inside and outside the

college was then filled with talk of reform - constitutional re­

form, social reform. Public opinion was very much upset by the

misfortunes which had attended the country following the Boxer

Rebellion. The country was filled with discontent with the

Manchu government because of its mishandling of foreign relations

with the result that great calamities befell the country, such

as the heavy indemnity, for example, imposed by the Allied Powers

as a penalty for the anti-foreign riots attendant upon the Boxer

Uprising*

The general talk was not only for reforms but the estab­

lishment of modern schools to pay more attention to foreign

learning, Western technology and, if not to discard, at least to

pay less attention to the study of the Classics* There were two

groups of opinion - a conservative group in favor of the retention

of the study of the Classics. They were willing to concede only

that Western sciencnes and technology should be studied, but only

as a supplement and aid to the Chinese Classics. The Chinese

Classics, in their opinion, should still form the basis of

education. This movement was headed by the very famous viceroy,

Chang Chih-tung, who was then viceroy of the two provinces of

Hunan and Hupei in the Yangtze valley. The other group was

greatly influenced by the programs and doctrines of the reform

party headed by KTang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chTao# They were for

a complete modernization of school programs. This movement went

so far as to affect the teachers and students in the colleges and

schools throughout the country.

Their influence reached St. Johnfs and I remember at

the beginning of 1904, the college authorities, seeing the pre­

valence of public sentiment in favor of what they called a new

education, decided to reorganize the Chinese faculty. Several

new teachers were engaged in place of the old-fashioned ones.

My Chinese class had for a change a returned student from Japan

who was all in sympathy with the new ideas advocated by the party

of KTang Yu-wei and Liang Chi-chTao. I remember in those days

many hundreds and thousands of Chinese youths and students went

over to Japan to study. That was the nearest country, the least

expensive, you see, for a Chinese student. You know, missionary

schools in those days were still run more or less on a sectarian,

religious basis. St. John^, for example, still required the

study of the Bible, attendance at chapel, daily morning prayer

services, and the weekly Sunday services. The study of Chinese

was relegated to a far less important place in the curriculum at

St. John^ as in other missionary schools. But the student body

felt much more keenly the need to reform Chinese studies. The

authorities of the college, seeing this, had to do something to

meet the popular demand and sentiment.

 Our new teacher was a completely different type fresh

from Japan, lifter several years of study in Japan, he was full

of new ideas and was more than welcome to the students. I remem­

ber he introduced what to us was an altogether new method of

teaching. Instead of requ’ring us to read and recite the Classics,

he began to give lectures on various subjects - some based on

quotations from the Classics, others on current topics. His

lectures became very popular. We the students were more than in­

terested; we were really fascinated by him. He completely revolu­

tionized the method of teaching. As I was saying, the old school

teacher never lectured. He only pointed out to us what to read

and he expected every student to be able to recite volume after

volume of Chinese Classics. He would only answer questions about

the meaning of a particular word or phrase. He himself didn’t take

the trouble of preparing an interesting, instructive Itcture which

could mean much more to the students than just reading the Classics.

Having studied in Japan, our teacher was known to be a

sympathizer of the K’ang-Liang group. Although K’ang Yu-wei and

Liang Chi-ch’ao were then in exile in Japan because of the failure

of their political coup in Peking a few years earlier, their in­

fluence remained and inspired the student body - the younger

generation - to a very great extent as a result of their teachings

and writings.

Yes, I remember, but only vaguely, the Hundred Days

Reform of 1#9$. I was twelve sui at the time* The country

felt uneasy and anxious as to whether the political reforms would

be carried out* It was the general talk of the people at the

market place, you see, that the leaders of the reform movement

were undertaking a gre$t task.and Although they all knew that

Emperor Kuang-hsu was in their favor, they also knew that the

Empress Dowager and her party, who in popular estimation were

renegades and extreme conservatives, would do everything to

obstruct the reforms* That was why the reform movement failed*

And as you know, Emperor Kuang-hsii was imprisoned by the Empress

Dowager* I was conscious of the general unrest and the talk that

was going on everywhere, in schools, in the newspapers. I was

much too young, of course, to grasp the full import of what was

really underlying the great movement but I remember very well the

feeling and the vague hope shared with the rest of the people, my

family, the general populace, that the reform movement would succeed.

You see, the reform movement took birth from a series of

reverses which had befallen the nation such as the disastrous de­

feat by Japan in the Chinese-Japanese War of 1&94* What do I re­

call about the War? Well, only stories of the fighting* In those

days there were no reliable war news bulletins* The local papers

which were very few in Shanghai printed only what was announced

by the authorities and they were very cursory for lack of good

news. I remember a few enterprising adventurers began to issue

what they called spot war news, mostly illustrated, based largely,

I suppose, on rumors. I remember I was really tickled by an issue

showing Japanese soldiers lying on the ground. They had fallen

and couldn’t get up and our troops massacred them. Why? Because

their uniforms were in Western style. They wore tight trousers

and once they fell, they couldn’t get up! This illustrates the

unreliability of the so-called war news of those days. Things of

that sort got into my head. In the end, of course, we knew

that China was defeated, Formosa was lost to us, and an indemnity

was «iforced upon us. We felt very depressed without fully re­

alizing the consequences. There was a general feeling of dis­

appointment and dissatisfaction with the government and with the

dynasty. This was followed by the reform movement which again

failed, you see^then came the Boxer indemnities.

Were there organizations among St. John’s students for

the study of political and current questions?.

Well, as far as I recall, there was no organization formed.

among St. John’s students, fowled. The teachers gave lectures,

read us newspaper editorials, and showed us articles from the

current magazines of the reform party. And we were really ex­

cited to listen to them; b-ooau-ae it was far more interesting than

the study of Chinese Classics. I think there were about two or

three Chinese teachers and they used the new method. The other

teachers didn’t teach me, but I suppose they must have been

equally interesting. No, the students did not express their views
 -f <

in an organized or representative capacity since there was no

student organization then.

The fact that more and more students were leaving^/ in

quest of new education abroadj impressed us a great deal. That

must have impressed the authorities of the college also - the fact

that before finishing their course at St. John’s students wanted

to go to the United States to study. Why? Because they said they

wanted to acquire new learning. The American teachers at St.

John’s were encouraging but at the same time they must have been

struck by the sudden desire to go abroad. This was something

which had not taken place in the three decades since the founding

of the college.

Were we clear as to the programs of K’ang Yu-wei and Liang

7
Chi-ch’ao? I think we were conscious of their ideas in a vague

way. The students were for reform, for a stronger government.

The general feeling was that every time China had to deal with a

foreign power, she always lost out. We found this most distaste­

ful, discouraging, and depressing without knowing how and why. We

vaguely thought that reform was a good idea without understanding

what it meant. Well, I was too young, I suppose, to grasp its

significance. That’s how I recall it... We felt that the air

was full of a sentiment for reform and that was a good thing. The

impact of Sun Yat-sen on the students? Not in those days. I

don’t recall that there was much talk about Sun Yat-sen.
 3(c
7

As for student publications, there was the St. Johnfs

Echo. It was a monthly publication edited by the students. But

I think there were very few articles on political subjects and if

there were any, they could not have been very enlightening. It

was in English. You see, one of the weak spots in the missionary

schools of those days was the policy of subordinating the study

of Chinese to the study of English and English subjects. Take,

for example, history, I remember very well Chinese history was not

taught at St. Johnfs. Only United States and English history was

taught. So when this new teacher came and began to lecture on

Chinese history - Chinese personalities,famous statesmen, generals,

and patriots we were thrilled to listen to him. Up till then, as

I said, Chinese was a matter of routine and the teachers were

paid not much better than employees of the college. They were pro­

bably paid about one-tenth at most^ or maybe some of them even

one-twentieth, of the salaries of professors of the foreign depart­

ment. These were mostly Americans. There were some English. I

remember that the science teacher was an Englishman and his wife

was, of course, English.

The study of Chinese was a mere formality, and not a

very important formality at that. I remember very well certain

students who had studied there from the first year of the pre­

paratory school right through to senior year in college - seven

years - and yet their knowledge of Chinese remained at the first-

year level. Apparemtly, the aim of a missionary school was to

train Chinese not with a view to what China needed as a nation,

but what the missionary movement needed. What they wanted most

to do in the way of general education was to disseminate a know­

ledge of Western science in order to make the individual better

prepared to make a living without any reference to or apprecia­

tion of the needs and requirements of the country as a whole.

I think it was largely due to our new teacherfs ideas

that my classmates and I began to feel more keenly the need for

a change^not of the system of government or questions of a big

political order, because I was too young to realize all that;

we simply felt that something was wrong and new methods and ideas

were needed. At the same time, the increased interest of some

students in western education and the departure of one group

after another for foreign study had a great effect on my class­

mates and myself. I remember two of my classmates bsfch &€ who»*

came from wealthy families of Nan-hsin which owned larged silk

filatures in Shanghai/ one day spoke to me. They told me that

they had decided to go to the United States to study and asked

me to join them. I was impressed by their idea, for they had

very little knowledge of what it meant to go abroad. I asked

who else were to go. Well, it turned out that four of my class

were going. The other two were nephews of Dr. Alfred Sze, Henry

and Phillip. They had been told to go abroad and study, I suppose

because of the influence of their uncles, Alfred Sze and Thomas

Sze CSze Shao-hsiang]•

 The Sze boys also urged me to join them* I readily

expressed my willingness, but I had to consult my family. When

I told my parents, my father didn?t say yes but he didn’t really

raise any objection, but my mother strongly objected to my leaving.

Sh<* said, "Why go so far for an education?" She wanted to know

how long I would have to stay abroad. When I told her it would

mean at least four or five years, she objected all the more. I

tried my best to explain to her that that was the thing to do,

that not only was I going but a number of my classmates were

going^ too, and that quite a few at St. John’s had already left.

I told her that Alfred Sze and Thomas Sze had studied abroad and had

come back. That was what China needed. And I wanted also to get

a new education. She was never convinced, but I went ahead with

the preparations.

The first thing to do was to get some foreign clothes -

quite an excitement, you see, to go to a foreign-style tailor. But

so far as booking of my passage was concerned, it was all done by

my classmates who had somebody to help. One trying experience was

the cutting of my queue. As soon as I had communicated to my

parents my determination to go abroad, I decided to cut my queue

off, especially since the other boys were going to do the same

thing. So one day, I went to a barber shop. In those days even

the barbers were not accustomed to cutting queued off a Chinese.

The barber hesitated and asked me repeatedly whether I really wanted

to have my queue cut off. I said yes. He cut it off and charged
me, I think, double the ordinary fee* But it was a courageous

thing on his part* He wrapped the queue in a ribbon and put

it in a paper bag and I took it home and gave it to my mother

who was shocked at the sight and wept. She took it and put it

in her trunk and locked it up as a precious possession* She was

really upset.

I remember there was then the question of expenses.

One day I spoke to my father. You see the fare for the trans­

pacific trip in those days was considerable although it was much

lower than what it is today. My father told me that there would

be no difficulty and asked me not to worry. He told me that as

a matter of fact the Viceroy of Kiangsu province, Tuan-fang,

whom he had known for some years, had offered me a scholarship

because the Kiangsu ProviVlcial government was sending a few

students to the United States to study. It was then the fashion

for forward-looking high officials to encourage and to do some­

thing to send students abroad. My father told me that he had

politely declined the offer in a telegram telling the viceroy

that he was able to take care of my expenses and would rather

have this scholarship awarded to some other student whose family

was financially less fortunate.

Altogether seven of us left for the United States in

August, 1904. Three Sze boys - Henry, Philip and Allen - Allen

is Philip’s brother. There was Chu Pang-sheng, the only child

of the well-knowiChu family which owned large real-estate

holdings and a silk filature. He was only 19. Another member

of the group was Carlos Sun [Sun Chia-luJ. I want to mention

him especially^ because he later had a great deal to do with me.

Then there was a Kiangsu government scholarship recipient -

Edward Yang, whose father was a district magistrate near Nanking.

None of us had been abroad and none of us had ever

taken a ship. So we all felt a little seasick. By the time we

landed at Yokohama, our first stop, we felt as if it had been weeks

Y
since out departure from the homeland. Our first thought was

to get a Chinese meal. We docked in the evening and were to sail

again at 10 orclock, so we rushed back on a steam launch. We

kept ourselves together with some of the foreign passengers on

the launch. The sea was very choppy as we approached the big

passenger ship. We had to scale the ladder to get back on the

ship. I was closely behind Mr. Yang, who did not understand a

word of English. He was a typical Chinese boy from an old-

fashioned Madarin family. He was fairly big, had a large queue,

and was very clumsy in his movements. I wanted him to get onto

the ladder first, you see, to be sure that he got on the boat.

As he tried to step onto the ladder, the launch rolled and he step­

ped right into the water. I quickly got hold of him, but there was

nothing to hold onto except his queue! It was a big queue, so

with both hands I prevented him from sinking. He had one foot

in the air. Our other companions c$me along and helped to lift
him out* He was quite frightened* You know, in our cabin as we

laughed and teased him, he was angry. He said, "You people had

all the time urged me to cut my queue off, I refused^and you see

now I was right. My queue saved my life. If I hadnft a queue,

I might have bees drowned." So, although we had convinced him

to cut his queue off and he had promised to do so at Honolulu,

after that experience he refused to carry out his promise and he

landed in San Francisco with his queue on. It took nearly a

year before he cut his queue off.

The trip was uneventful, although everything we did was

a new experience, such as being questioned by immigration offi­

cers and attending to customs. We were taken care of by Mr.

Alfred Sze who took charge of the group. I think he had a com­

mission to take care of the students sent by Kiangsu Province. He

himself was a Cornell graduate and, of course, knew upstate New

York very well. He put us in Cook Academy. Actually, he gave us

a choice of two schools and told us the advantages and disadvan­

tages of both. But he himself preferred Cook Academy, because

the son of the viceroy of Kiangsu, Mr. Tuan-fang, had been study­

ing there the year before and he was quite satisfied with the school.

I remember Carlos Sun and I decided to go to Cook Academy. The

others went to some other preparatory school.

Cook Academy was situated in a village called Montour

Falls with a population of 900, I was told. It was a boarding

school. We lived there, studied there, all in one building.

It was a co-educational school. The girls lived on the first

floor; the boys were on the second and third floors. The

teachers lived there also. It was a large building. A co­

educational boarding school was unusual for those days, but I

think it was the case of a private school having limited

means. The students were recruited from the surrounding villages.

It was a country school really. It was a very economical school^

I remember we lived easily on $900.00 a year, everything included -

tuition, board, and lodging. A good deal of the vegetables were

grown right on the farm attached to the school. There was very

little possibility of spending more. I remember the only way

we could spend money was to take a walk to the village nearby

and get a cup of cocoa for five cents. Ten cents for an egg sand­

wich. That was all one could spend.

We stayed one year at Cook Academy. You see, when we

first arrived, the principal interviewed us, trying to iind out

how much we knew and how much we still had to study. Seeing how

poorly we spoke English, he felt that it would take us somejtime

to improve our English and to complete the preparatory work. He

estimated that it would take us two years if we wanted to do it

thoroughly and without too much pressure. But my fellow student,

Carlos Sun, who was a much older boy than I, wanted to do it

in one year and he had a very good reason for it. He, like me,
was a self-supporting student or rather was supported by his

family and his father had made plans for him for five years*

He could only spend one year <&n preparatory work if he was going

to finish a college Course in four years. So we both felt that we

must try to complete our preparatory work in one year. The princi­

pal was quite willing to see how we got along. We did finally

find it possible to complete the preparatory work in one year

instead of the estimated two years.

Life at Cook Academy was very interesting and we were

very well treated both by the teachers and students. I don’t

think there were more than a hundred and thirty students. There

were about two boys to one girl. Did we find co-education strange?

Well, we were shy. You know we were not able to speak English

very well. The students were curious and took a friendly interest

in the two foreign boys. We were altogether absorbed in our studies

and what we wanted to be and it was very pleasant to find the

girls as well as the boys very friendly, sympathetic, and ready

to help. The same was true of the teachers. The principal was

Dr. Norton. He and his wife made a wonderful couple. They took

a paternal interest in us. No, the school had no religious af-

filiations,^services at which announcements were made and a very

short prayer was held. Sundays we were free to go to any church

we wanted.

I carried on my studies without much difficulty and I

was particularly interested in English and mathematics. In fact,

my mathematics teacher considered my work so satisfactory that

he made me a sort of assistant in teaching some of his pupils who

found mathematics particularly perplexing. One girl was desperate

because she could not understand geometry. The teacher evidently

got more and more vexed. No matter how he explained, she could

not understand. So finally, he turned to me and said, "Koo, you

do your mathematics very well.” He asked if I could explain to

her how l solved a particular problem. So after class she came and

asked me to help her. I asked for a piece of paper and a pair

of scissors. She could not understand how the square of the hy­

potenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of

the other two sides. I drew a right triangle, you know, a rather

large one. I first measured the length of the sides. Then I

cut it, you see, and measured the hypotenuse and she found it

worked out exactly right. So then she understood. You know the

teacher just wrote the figures on the blackboard. ItTs very

difficult to understand a formula like that. But by seeing the

piece of paper cut and then turning around and measuring it ex­

actly, she saw that it came out right. She was exhilerated and

I remember the next day in class she dashed up to the teacher and

said that she understood at last.

Well, therefs not much to tell about my work at Cook

Academy except that, toward the end, I was told the Board of

Regents required all students to take an examination, especially

those who wanted to teach or enter one of the state universities

or colleges* You see, a certificate from the Board of Regents

would automatically admit a student to a state college or univer­

sity* My teacher told me that X did not have to take the examina­

tion in mathematics because my marks were always 100; I was some­

how exempt under the regulations* The other subjects I passed and

I was prepared to enter college, but that posed quite a problem*

As a matter of fact, throughout that year it was diffi­

cult for me to decide, not so much where to go as what to study.

I remember arguing time and again with Carlos, who was my room­

mate. He was all for me to take up an engineering career. He him­

self was going to Cornell to study mechanical engineering. I told

him that I wanted to study political science and diplomacy and he

argued against it. I was nearly convinced by his arguments. In

the first place, he said that an engineer^ career was much more

independent, one did not have to bow and scrape to the higher authori­

ties as one would have to do in an official career• There was

security; so long as you had the skill you could always be sure

that you would be kept at whatever work you were called upon to

do. It was a career which would insure you a living. China was

in great need of engineers to build railways and bridges. He

was all against an official career because in politics everything

was based on influence and nepotism and the final determinant

was not merit. Secondly, Carlos argued that a lone individual

could do very little in the political world unless he joined a

political party or organized one himself* Thirdly, he said that

throughout Chinese history political life was very dangerous*

One might even sacrifice one!s life* Carlos referred to the fall

of the three patriots at the time of the Kfang Yu-wei Reform

movement* They were truncated, you know. Although they were

great patriots, scholars and able men...

He kept on repeating these arguments. I told him I

wanted to do something in a way that would improve conditions in

the country. In the first place, I said I wanted to do something

which would be for the good of the country, Hot that I had any

exaggerated ideas of my own importance, but my aim was to serve

the country, you see, to bring about reforms, especially in the

conduct of foreign relations. In the second place, I said that

my father had always wanted me to take up an official career. In

fact, he had, in conformity with the fashion and in line with the

policy of the government, purchased some sort of honorific title

for me, in preparation for an official career. The idea was that

I would start off a few grades ahead of the others. In the third

place, I said, an official career would have more glamor and do

more honor to my parents than if I were to acquire wealth or

merely make a simple living. What China needed most was a new

set of officials who could bring about reforms.

Our discussions went on and on and the force of Carlos1

arguments was such as to confuse me and to make it very difficult

for me to decide* I can still recall the torment I felt because

of the indecision* Even after I graduated from Cook Academy I

was unhappy because I was unable to decide on a course of study.

It was especially difficult v .th Carlos urging me all the time to

join him at Cornell. Carlos applied for and received admission

to Cornell and urged me to go with him to Ithaca. I did, not

because I had made up my mind to accept his arguments, but only

because I could make use of the summer to polish up my German

in preparation for entrance to Columbia. I was informed then that

while the certificate from the Board of Regents of New York State

would admit anybody to any of the state colleges or universities,

Columbia did not accept the RegentTs certificate.

Even before I left China, I had wanted to go to Columbia.

I had heard of Columbia. It was very well-known, you know, es­

pecially for L4m political science department. We read once in a

Chinese newspaper about Chin Y. Yen, the firs Chinese to receive

the degree of doctor of philosophy from Columbia. He was in

political science, specializing in comparative constitutional

government. At Cook Academy I poired over Columbia University’s

catalogue and found quite a few professors listed whose names

were in the newspapers. So there was no doubt in my mind as to

which college I wanted to go to, only which course of studies

to pursue.
 Finally, I left the question open and went with Carles

to Ithaca in order to take a course in German• Something hap­

pened at Ithaca which really helped me solve my problem or rather,

to put it off to my own satisfaction. One night there was a

Cosmopolitan Club meeting and I, for one reason or other, was

asked to speak. Maybe it was a Chinese night. I gave a talk

onrtChina Awakened” or something along that line, to tell something

of conditions in China and the general sentiment for reform. But

my mind was more on the problem of deciding on my course of

'(W
study. As soon as I finished my speech, Dr. Jeremiah E. Jenks,

professor of political economy at Cornell University, who was

a great friend of China, came over to congratulate me. Without

any ceremony, I put my problem to him. After listening to me

very patiently, he at once gave me the advice that I wanted. He

said, ”Forget this problem of yourS|> DonTt worry about what you

are going to study. Go to Columbia and take the required courses.

He said that he felt sure that in the course of two years - fresh­

man and sophomore years - I would be able to decide without any

difficulty. I was fully satisfied with this advice, and my mind

once more was at ease.

I spent six weeks taking the summer course in German and

then went on to take the entrance examinations at Columbia. I

passed everything except chemistry but I was admitted on condi­

tion that I would make up chemistry in college. So, at the end

of September, I was fully matriculated and started my life at

Columbia.

Now I would like to tell you about the impressions I

had of Columbia during my first year. Of course, it was an

entirely new experience; I found myself in new surroundings,

new faces. But the first impressions as well as those which

followed were all of a very pleasant kind. In the first place,

I was pleased to see everybody on campus, both faculty and

students/very friendly and sympathetic. The fact that I was a

young Chinese boy practically fresh from China made me perhaps

somewhat interesting to them, but everywhere I received what I

had not fully expected - friendship and sympathetic consideration.

As a freshman I had to observe edicts issued by the sophomores for

the behavior of freshmen. I had to wear a little cap with a

A/
white button on top, not very becoming headgear. But I did it

as a sign that I, along with my classmates, was a newcomer.

The traditional rivalry between the two classes gave rise

to a number of activities which appeared interesting but were some­

times rather rough. One of these was the flag-pole contest.

The idea was for the freshman class to challenge the sophomores

by taking down the flag which the sophomores had put on top of a

pole planted in the center of South Field. It was a regular

fight. Each class had something in the neighborhood of 500 stu­

dents, so one could imagine what a tough struggle it was. The~

The flag was defended by rows and rows of sophomores around the

pole* The freshmen were organized by their leaders into several

columns for the attack. They were to send someone to climb the

pole and take down the flag* I was, of course, with my class,

but suddenly somebody seized me without consulting me at all

and threw me up, supported by a few other classmates, on top

of the heads of these sophomores* I knew what to do. I tried

to head out for the pole and climb up. But for a time I felt

I was being torn to pieces because somebody got hold of my leg.

He tried to pull me down but I did all I could and got away. We

didn’t succeed the first time. We reorganized our columns and

launched a second attack, this time through a ruse devised by

our stratigically minded classmates. While the attention of the

sophomores was focussed in one direction, I was speeded away to

another corner. My classmates got hold of me and suddenly threw

me over the heads of the sophomores onto the pole and I took

down the flag. That was really a flag day for me. The whole class

wiM jubilant and, of course, we sang and booed and the sopho­

mores booed back at us, but we had our fun. That also gave me a

new experience of the excitement of American college life.

One day, late in the fall, word was passed around to the

effect that half a dozen of our classmates had been kidnapped by

the sophomores and spirited away to an unknown destination. While

Wtefeire the sophomores were celebrating, the prisoners were being

made to do all sorts of tricks to amuse them. A call was sent

out by our class officers Ifbr the class of f09 to gather

on South Field late in the afternoon. I went and we were given

directions by those in charge as to our strategy. They had

found out that the hiding place was at Dobbs Ferry or Yonkers.

We went in the direction of Dobbs Ferry, not knowing whether it

was Yonkers or Dobbs Ferry. As v/e approached Dobbs Ferry, our

scouts found out that it was a hotel in Yonkers. We went on by

tram, several hundred strong. When we got there, our commander-

in-chief organized us into several columns^' some were to attack

from the frontj others were to attack from the right, left, and

rear. My column was to attack from the rear. We found our­

selves confronted by a ten-foot wall partly surrounding the hotel.

It was difficult to scale the wall since there were no ladders/

but a couple of my classmates - tall fellows - picked me up and lifted

me onto their shoulders and I quickly had my hands on top of the

wall. But apparently the attack was no surprise to the defen­

ders, because I immediately felt something fall on my hand. It

was a chair thrown out by one of the defenders. I had no diffi­

culty jumping down to the inside yard, followed by others. The

yard was filled with sophomores defending their stronghold.

Soon there was a melee all around. A great big fellow tackled me,

but somebe^ty yelled, "No!" and caught somebody else tw*-

to fight me, because the other fellow was evidently too big

and I would have had no chance. I got into a scuffle with some­

one roughly of my stature and weight. This time, another

sophomore came to his rescue, because apparently I was getting

the upper hand. But again a boy from the crowd shouted, M3top,

only one against oneI” I felt greatly relieved and also im­

pressed by the American spirit of sportsmanship, even in the

heat of battle.

After we fought our way into the hall, we saw that it

was in cho^.s because the column advancing from the front had

already entered. The prisoners had been released and they had

joined the fight. It was a scene of utter confusion, but suddenly

we stopped fighting and listened to the noise outside. The police

had arrived, followed by a fire engine. The safety of the two

classes forced us into a sudden alliance. We took up the common

cause and together fought the policemen and firemen. That was

no difficult task, because we were several hundred strong, where­

as there were less than three or four policemen and probably

about four firemen with one engineer. They were disarmed and

stripped of their uniforms and helmets. Some of us donned the

uniforms and we began to cheer. As it was getting dark, the

policemen got away and reported. As we saw a crowd of people

approaching, we fled and came back helter-skelter on the tram.

Others got on commuter trains. We thought everything was over until

the next day, when we saw The New York Times. The Times printed

a graphic story of the dramatic fight between Columbia students

and the citizens of the town. It was reported in The Times -

its veracity has never been verified - that the town council

had held an emergency meeting and had passed a resolution to the

effect that the town had been unlawfully invaded by Columbia

students to the great alarm of the townspeople. It was resolved

that the next time Columbia students - more than five, I think -

approached the town, an alarm was to be sent out, the women were

to go to the church for safety, and the men were to go to the

armory to take up rifles for the defense of the town.

I think the publicity given to this incident brought

the two classes into trouble, at least the class officers, who

were sent for by the dean of the college, who gave them a scold­

ing and a warning not to resort to such antics in the future.

By the end of my first year, all my doubts about my

major field had been dissolved. There was no longer any question

but that I was to take up political science and international

diplomacy as my principal field of study and I remember how

grateful I was for the advice of Professor Jenks, because with­

in only one year at Columbia my mind had been made up.

How did I finally make my decision? Well, as I went

along during the first year, I became interested in many things

outside my studies. I joined the Philolexian Society and entered

oratorical contests, I reported as a candidate for the board

of editors of the Spectator. From time to time I v/as invited

by clubs and socrties to give talks and I usually spoke on

subjects which were of interest to me as well as to the audience.

They were subjects concerning China - her condition, her problems,

her future. So as I went along^ my interests were channelled in

political directions. As Columbia College itself is devoted to

the study of the humanities, my interest grew more and more in

the direction of the humanities rather than engineering. I suppose

that v/as the feeling underlying my decision. Also, of course,

when I read the newspapers every morning, the first thing 1 would

look for was news of China. While studying in the United States

my general attention was all the time concentrated on what was

happening in China.

One event which perhaps influenced my decision was the

mission of the Chinese Imperial Commissioners to study consti­

tutional government in the West. They came, I remember, in the

winter of 1905-1906, headed by Viceroy Tuan-fang. Their program

included a visit to Columbia University. As a Chinese Student

at Columbia, and also as president of the Chinese Students1 Club

in New York, I was the representative of the Chinese student

body in welcoming the mission. I accompanied them on their visit

through the university and was impressed by the fact that the

principal advisers on their staff were all American or English

returned students# One of them was Dr# Allred oze who had es­

corted us to the United States. I was also included in many

of the functions given in their honor.

It was during my first year at Columbia that I made

my first visit to Washingtoni D.C#, at the invitation of the

director of the Hupei Provincial Government Students, Mr. Chang

(£* ChuanJ, son of the famous viceroy Chang Chih-tung. It was

my first experience with Washington life and I was very much

impressed by the beauty of the capital of the Uhki Slitfu. But what

impressed me most was my visit to the Chinese minister, oir

Chen-tung Liang Chfeng, who had been knighted by the King of

England* He was much admired by the Chinese student body and

the American public because he was a baseball player# He had

made the Andover baseball team# He went to Amherst, but I don t

think he finished his work there* His reception was most friendly,

far friendlier than a young student would have expected from an

imperial official. But I suppose, having himself been a Chinese

student in the United States, he was more than glad to meet

another of the younger generation.

I vaguely recall that when I came to the United States

in the fall of 1904, the Russo-Japanese War had just broken out.

The war came practically to an end soon after I entered >olumbi^#

On the good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt, a peace

conference was held Ait Portsmouth, N# H# Of course, I tried to

follow the negotiations at the time, but I was too young to

Tasp all the implications of the issues raised at the conference,

hll I remember is that the question of war indemnity played a very

important part and that the Conference finally agreed, on the advice

of President Roosevelt, to drop the question. This naturally in­

curred the dissatisfaction of the Japanese. It was said at the

time that the Japanese delegates saw the wisdom of dropping the

indemnity question. But on their return to Tokyo they were attacked

by a mob expressing dissatisfaction with what they called unwar­

ranted surrender on the part of the Japanese peace delegates. At

that time, the Japanese were popular in the bnited States. The

fact that little Japan had shown its will and ability to defeat the

big bear in the north caught the imagination of the American people.

But as public opinion in Japan began to blame the bnited States

for insisting upon a peace that did not carry with it a war in­

demnity, rumblings of aniit-American sentiment could be heard. And

this, as it developed, led to a continuous diminution of the

friendly relations between the two peoples. In facet, this deteri­

oration of relations steadily continued, aggravated by the

Cfcaliiornia State laws prohibiting the holding of land by Japanese,

and by the question of exclusion of Japanese immigrants. I don’t

think there was any favorable turn up to the Japanese attack on
Manchuria, with the possible exception of the earthquake dis­
aster in Japan in 1923, when the bnited States, alone;: with other
countries/sent substantial aid for the relief of the suffering
Japanese*
Now, going back to Columbia --- As I said, I was sub­
jected to a great deal of hazing and teasing from members of
the sophomore class. I saw more than once some of my class­
mates being dumped in the fountain. But the sophomores accosted
me in a very freindly way. I felt that a foreign student at
Columbia was treated very well and that helped make me feel some­
what at home. I was no exception to the rule, because this was
true of many other foreign students. Among the many friends I
made on campus there wfliae a Persian, a Russian^and a 100 per cent
Negro from Zululand. I remember them well because they all did
well. The Zulu student entered an oratorical contest and carried

away a prize, I felt that this friendly attitude towards foreign

students explained why Columbia had become so well-known. Not

only China but other countries in Asia as well as in Europe

thought very highly of Columbia. Before leaving their native

lands, many already wanted to study at Columbia.

You know, in those days, Columbia had a very exceptional

faculty composed of leading scholars from different parts of

the world. Names like (\J°hn William] Burgess on constitutional

law, [Frank J.J Goodnow on administrative law, [Edwin R. A.J

Seligman on economics, John Bassett Moore on international law

and diplomacy, Charles Beard on history, Clames Harvey] Robinson

on European history, [Franklin Henry] Giddings on sociology,

£a.V, Williams] Jackson on the Near East and Western Asia. I

could mention dozens. All these were names with an international

reputation.

I took courses from all of them except Jackson. But

I got to know Jackson well because he organized a society.

Later on, I took courses from professors in the Law School;

[George W.] Kirchwey, [Harry Alonzo] Cushing, Monroe Smith on

Roman Law# An famous names.

Yes, I must say that I had great fortune in having the

opportunity of studying under all of these famous names. And I

came to know them fairly well. You know, they took a special
interest in me and I was invited to their homes to have lunch or

dinner or to attend a tea party.

When I studied under Beard, he was still a young in­

structor. His lectures were always well attended and they were

most interesting. He was anything but a routine teacher. He

must have taken a great deal of pain in preparing his lectures

because they were full of the human side of historical facts, as

well as dates and names of places, I remember taking Beards

course at &:10 A.M. It was always an effort to get up in time

to have a simple breakfast consisting of a roll and a cup of

cocoa before heading for the classroom. One day, a classmate

we
and I got up late as usual andAdashed off to the dining-room to

get something to eat. When we looked at the clock, we left

hurriedly for the classroom which was some distance away. He

got in through the window and I followed without giving it a

thought. When we got in, there was absolute silence. We saw

Professor Beard standing erect and absolutely quiet. We were

surprised. Not until v/e were both seated did he start to speak.

He had been calii^the roll and had just gotten to the letter TTKM.

He called out my name and I answered, TfPresent’T, then he looked

at me and said very calmly, TtKoo, we see you made it, but you

didnTt enter the classroom in a very graceful manner.T’ He

pointed to the door and said that was the regular, conventional

form of entry. He spoke in such a calm manner that the whole

class burst into laughter and even applauded* V/e were all im­

pressed by his considerateness,

crfs
Yes, I knew his wife, Mary Beard, She scholar

and writer. Both of them, you know, took a very keen interest

in the students amd especially foreign students, I felt they

were most friendly,

Goodnow was a first-class teacher. He was, of course,

a recognized authority on administrative law, I remember he

took a special interest in me and acted as a kind of adviser to

me because I used to go to him as well as to Professor Moore for

advice. Especially in later years, I went principally to Bassett

Moore and Professor Beard for advice whenever I had some problem

to solve.

John Bassett Moore was a dear old professor. I looked

to him not only as my sponsor but also as a sort of leading ad­

visor. He impressed me as a man of broad interests and a kind

heart. Time and again he included me in his tea parties which

were given at his home not for the student body but people of

New York society. Sundays I would be asked to have lunch with

him and his family. He was a most meticulous scholar. He em­

phasized the importance of learning two things: one, to know

where to find material needed in oners studies, whether for

writing or for knowledge and two, to learn to reason. He said

it was not necessary to try to burden one^ memory with facts

and dates, the names of persons and places; what was much more

important was to learn where to look for them. That way you
keep your mind clear and you could do your own thinking and not

be just a compiler of chronicles* I think he probably had in

mind examples that we should not follow in the field of inter­

national law scholars and writers*

MooreTs teaching was most effective in its own way. I

remember he would sometimes remain long behind the class was over

and put himself out to answer questions. Time and again he would

spend ten, twenty minutes, sometimes half an hour^ to discuss with

me and others points he had raised in the lecture. He would try

to clarify these points and sometimes entered in an argument in a

most genial spirit. You know, unlike most professors, he had

had some practical experience. He had been assistant secretary

of state for a time, and I think time and again he was acting

secretary of state. He was, of course, the author of those

two monumental works, The International Arbitrations and The

Digest of International Law.

My impressions of President Nicholas Murray Butler?

Well, we were all very much impressed by his personality,

by his speeches and, of course, by his practical mindedness.

1 always felt that he had first-class administrative talent.

But we were also impressed by his keen interest in life that was

going on outside the university, especially political life. There

were many campus whispers about his political ambitions and his

activities among the Republican leaders in New York. I think he

made it a policy to cultivate the friendship of the leading

members of the various branches of New York society. That, I

suppose^ explains his success in raising funds and later enlisting

support for the development of the University for which he really

accomplished a great deal* I remember when I entered Columbia,

although it was already a very large institution, it was not

nearly as impressive as when I left. So many more new buildings

had been put up and so much expansion and development had taken

place during my seven years at Columbia - all due to the influence

work, and effort of President Butler. He also had special abili­

ty in knowing the leading scholars of the world and that perhaps

explains how he was able to invite so many prominent scholars

in different fields to join the faculty at Columbia. He had a

really comprehensive and broad view of the role of the university,

not only in the country, but in the world. I felt that this was

due in part to his extensive travels which he used to undertake

every year outside of the United States.

President Butler was an authoritarian in running the

University. He kept a watchful eye over members of the faculty.

Some faculty members were inclined to criticize things that were

going on in the University, ideas and criticisms which did not

always meet with President Butlerfs approval#

as* >
As a student, I saw as much of him. if not more than
A ;
other students. Somehow or other he came to know me quite well,

because being a foreigner, I was more conspicuous in any gathering

which he attended* Several times I went to his office for

advice. In those days the president’s office was far less

inaccessible to students. I remember very well when I saw

the Secretary of the University, {Frederick PaulJ Keppel/ and

posed a problem, he would somehow refer me to President Butler.

Later when Keppel became Dean of Columbia College {Frank D.]

Fackenthal also would refer me to President Butler. I remember

in those days Fackenthal was upstairs and had a private elevator.

In the case of Keppel he still had his office on the first floor

of Low Memorial Library, on the left as you go in. You see, his

office was on the left and the President’s office was further

down the hall.

I don’t recall now what my questions were. They con­

cerned my personal problems or they pertained to relations between

China and the United States, something like that. Once or twice
President Butler
in my student days, h* referred to me personally when I attended

some gathering at which he spoke or some social occasion. This

was rather an unusual thing for him to do. Once, at a reception

given by the president to the freshman class, he said, turning

towards me, ’’Speaking of the culture of different countries,

here’s an example of Chinese culture. Note the suppleness I”

Yes, I must say that I was one of his admirers. Of course,

not everyone was his admirer. He had a foreeful character. He

could act decisively, if not drastically or ruthlessly.

 My study program during the first year at Columbia

was simplified by the fact that certain courses were required

for all freshmen* It was not until the end of the year that

I encountered a problem which really was of my own creation.

I found out that those who did not take the course, Latin A,

would get only a B. S. degree. But I wanted to work for a

B. A. degree. I consulted the registrar and my adviser, and

they confirmed this rule. I made up my mind immediately to

study Latin during my sophomore year. The dean of the college

told me that I could not expect to take it up without having

already studied it in high school. At any rate, he suggested

that I should see the head of the Latin department, Professor

CNelson GlennJ McCrea. I went and saw him* He was puzzled.

He explained that Latin A was a required course for those work­

ing for a B. A. degree, but it presupposed that the student had

already studied four years of Latin in high school* Without this

preliminary training, he did not see how anyone could take up

Latin A. I told him that I could start to study Latin during

the summer in preparation for taking up Latin A in my sophomore

year. Well, he doubted very much that a student could accom­

plish in the course of one summer what would normally take four

years of study. He asked me why I wanted to take Latin and why

I had such a strong preference for a B. A. I said I did not

really know. I merely felt that a B. A. was the thing to get

and not a B. S*, because I was not much interested in natural

sciences. He explained that the B. S.? degree did not mean that

the recipient was a student of natural sciences, merely that

he was a student of science^. It simply marked the difference

between those students of Columbia College who fulfilled all

requirements except Latin A, who would be awarded a B. S., and

those who completed Latin A, who would receive a B. A.

Finally Professor McCrea said that in the case of an

American student, he certainly would not encourage him to try

and take Latin A. Since I was a Chinese student and he did not

know how much a Chinese student could do, he thought that I might

try, but I would need a very good teacher. At my request he re­

commended a Latin teacher from Horace Mann School, I got in

touch with him and we made arrangements. He was to teach at

Wesleyan College in Middletown, Connecticut, and I was to go

there and live with him in order to take lessons from him.

Everything was arranged and I started on my Latin studies. I

was to start from the very beginning and to finish four years

of Latin in something like six to eight weeks.

He gave me two hours every day. After two weeks, he was

quite pleased that I had finished the first yearfs work. At

that point, I got a telegram from one of my classmates from

St. Johnfs who told me that he was coming to the United States.

He gave me the date of his arrival with his group and begged me
to meet them in New York, I said this was something which

I could not turn down and asked for a leave of absence of two days#

My teacher strongly objected at first and tried to deter me from

going# He said that if I should make that visit, I would find

on my return that two weeks1 work had been lost# I was torn

between the two horns of a dilemma# Finally I told him that I

could not possibly refuse to go because this group consisted

mostly of my classmates at St# Johnfs. Knowing what a trying ex­

perience I myself had on my trip to the United States, I felt that

they would need my assistance# He agreed reluctantly and warned

me that I must not overstay my leave. I went and met them and then

came back. My teacher wanted to test how much I remembered#

Well, to his surprise, I still remembered a substantial part, but

I had ^forgotten a very substantial part.aiso-# So he said the only

thing to do was to review and to spend more hours on what I had

already studied. That took me fully twtf days# After that I

went on rather satisfactorily from his viewpoint. At the end of

six weeks, Unfinished the four years1 work# He had completed

his teaching and we parted#

I went back to Columbia to look up Professor McCrea# I

told him what I had done# He said he had already received a

report from my teacher and that he was somewhat amazed# But he

said that in order to let me take the entrance examination in

Latin, he wanted to test me right there# He pulled down first

Cicero and asked me to translate, which I did. Then he took up
Virgil and Horace and asked me to translate some of the verses
he designated, I did what I could. Evidently he was satisfied.
He said he would arrange for me to take the entrance examina­
tion for Latin A, just before the beginning of my sophomore
year. I took the exam and was very anxious about the outcome,
but he was merciful enough not to leave me in suspense too long.
I went to him in the afternoon and he said, T,You passed. You
can take Latin A now,” This pleased me a great deal. It was a
year course. The first half-year resulted in a B minus which he
thought was not too bad, but the second half-year showed better
results, and I actually got "A plus’* • This solved one of the
problems I had at Columbia in my studies.
Another amusing experience took place during my sopho­
more year. One of my close Chinese friends at Columbia was a
student at the School of Mines. He kept telling me the importance
of developing the mining industry in China. I got interested; I
wanted to know something about mining. He said to begin it
would be useful to study geology. I went to Professor [James
Furman} Kemp who was then head of the School of Mines or the
principle geologist at Columbia. He asked me about my background
of studies, and said that ’’Geology I” was pretty advanced. It
was the only course for beginners at the School of Mines. I wanted
to take it. He at first tried to discourage me, but seeing how
determined I was to learn, well, he said I could try, I remember

the textbook used was a very thin one, perhaps not over a hundred

pages. The first lecture was on the first page and a half, but I

could not make head or tail out of what was being said in the

lecture and I read the first page and a half over and over again.

I couldn’t make anything out of it, but I was determined to

understand. On every line I found probably half a dozen words I

had to look up in the dictionary. Well, it was very trying but

I did not want to give it up.

Actually I must have spent at least ten days on the first

page and a half. Finally, at the end of that time, I suddenly

experienced a feeling of exhilaration; I understood everything

on that page and a half! From that time on I found it rela­

tively easy and I enjoyed very much the laboratory work every

Saturday - testing different kinds of stones and making a report.

I remember the laboratory instructor paid me special attention

knov/ing how poor a background I had for studying geology. And

it turned out that I passed every test which used to take place

every six weeks, £o, I got through this course to my own satis­

faction and apparently to that of my teachers.

Now I’d like to tell you something about my extra­

curricular activities at Columbia- in sports as well as non-

athletic activities. Speaking of the first, I was interested

in many things on the athletic field and in the gymnasium. I

recall I was fascinated by practically every kind of sport.

I joined the rowing team on the suggestion and urging of

my classmates. But to take part in a crew presupposed that the

student be of robust build and strength. I was very tiny; I

donTt think I weighed more than 105 pounds. But that was pre-

cisely the reason they wanted me to join, not as^oarsman but as

a coxswain. The coach did all he could to encourage me to take

it up. For two weeks I went out and rowed on the Harlem. It

was interesting but I felt I was not doing my job well. The

coach on the shore signalled me to swear at some of the crew

members who were not keeping their oars in order. I did all I

could, but they did not seem to take much notice of what I was

saying. So, at the endof two weeks, I decided to quit and I told

the coach. First, he thought that there was no reason to quit.

I told him that I did not know how to swear as he told me to do.

He said that anybody could learn how to swear; that was a very

easy thing. But I said no, my English was not sufficient for

that purpose. So I gave it up.

Later, I joined what was called the prospective track

team. I went in for the 100-yard sprint and the 220-yard hurdle

race. But I wasnTt fast enough. That was apparent from the very

first. So later I took up, at the coach’s advice, the quarter-

mile and the half-mile race and kept working at it, but I was not
satisfied, nor was the coach, with the progress that I was making*
finally he suggestfc/that I should try the cross-country race,
from University Hall or behind the gymnasium to 96th Street
along Riverside Drive* I remember it was long and arduous. On
my way back, when I saw a number of my fellow contestants drop­
ping off, I was very much tempted to do the same thing* But there
were stations along the road* The coach and his assistants
had recruited many upperclassmen and they were yelling at me:
TTKoo, don’t quit! Don’t be a quitter! Keep it up!” Those
words impressed me very strongly and I kept up the race each time
and usually finished if not last, probably next to the last
man, quite a few minutes behind those that had already arrived*
I was never much of a success at cross-country, but I
remember I worked very hard for the shorter distances. I got up
early every morning to practice on South Field. This was in
front of the two dormitories, Hartley and Livingston* Sven when
I went away in the summer, as when I spent the summer with my
Latin teacher at Middletown, I worked very hard for six weeks
hoping to make some progress* But competition was very keen at
Columbia and I never made much of an impression on the coach
or my fellow contestants* I had my only satisfaction from the
attempt to be something on the track when I won a relay race
between the two dormitories on South Field*
I took up cane spree in the gymnasium at the persuasion
of the gymnasium director, but I had been at it only about two

or three weeks when I realized that it was incomprehensible to

exert all oneTs energy in getting the cane away from one's

opponent. The cane was about the length of a baseball bat, but

it was even at both ends. The twisting and wrestling in the

attempt to get the cane from one's opponent was good exercise

for one's arms. But I didn't find it very interesting. Besides,

it was an indoor sport and I preferred to be out in the open.

I believe it has been given up altogether nowadays.

Then there was the fascinating game of tennis which

attracted me very much. I worked at it. Again it was something

that didn't suit me very much or rather, for which I wasn't very

well qualified. I was of relatively small build and was not tall

enough. The only satisfaction I had after two years of conscien­

tious practice was the winning of a doubles tournament at the

Chinese Students' Conference one summer C1910J - me on the base­

line and my partner at the net. Vihat won the tournament was his

brillant play at the net rather than my efforts on the baseline.

I also took some interest in soccer. I rather liked it

because I had had a try at it even at St. John's, though I was

a small boy then. But one day I got the ball right in the middle

of my belly. It brought me down and I fainted. That was the

end of my interest in soccer.

Other campus activities which were not of an athletic

 character interested me more and more as time went on, I took

part in oratorical and debating contests, usually held under

the auspices of the Philolexian Society. I reported to the

Spectator to take part in the qualifying contest for member­

ship on the editorial board. I even joined the Dramatic

Society.

I was rather surprised when the coach included me in

the cast of the Sophomore Show. The title of the show was

"She Stoops To Conquer". The part assigned to me was very

insignificant. It was that of a messenger boy but even then

it was rather flattering to me, because there were over thirty

contestants and the cast was made up of not more than a dozen

people. I didn’t do much in the play, but I enjoyed the

experience.

Of course, there were other activities, such as working

for the Varsity Debating Team. I was glad to be able to make

it in the end. I went to Cornell [February, 1909} while another

team went to Philadelphia to debate with Pennsylvania Univer­

sity’s team. It caused some thrill at the time because while

I was a foreigner on Columbia’s team, the Cornell team had a

g^rl member, a Miss Cook. It was reported that she had been

chosen partly because it was hoped that her feminine character

would be an effective offset to the novelty of a Chinese on

Columbia^ team* The result was satisfactory to us. Columbia
won the debate, although the decision was only that of two to
one.
At the end of six weeks of trial reporting, I made the
Spectator board and became an associate editor along with a few
of my fellow contestants. I was glad to make the Spectator
board as an associate editor. This was considered as quite an
honor by the student body. I liked the work and kept at it, so
gradually I worked up from associate editor to news editor.
Then after another year I was elected to the managing board and
later became editor-in-chief in ray senior year. Although the
work on the Spectator was arduous, it was good experience. It
certainly helped me a great deal in trying to improve my writing
as well as to come to know my fellow students more intimately.
I served also as business manager of Columbia ilonthly as well
as a member of the board of editors of The Columbian.
All these extra-curricular activities gave me an in­
sight not only into campus life but life of the University as
a whole. Working on the Spectator gave me a particularly ex­
cellent opportunity to be acquainted with all that was going
on in the University, since it was the paper’s function to get
news for the information of the whole University. I found the
benefit derived from these extra-curriculaTTactivities of great
importance to me as a student from a foreign land, trying not
only to acquire knowledge but to learn something about the life
and the people of this country.
I think it was during my junior year that an announce­
ment was made one day that elections v/ere to be held to elect
nine members to the Student Board of Representatives. The board
was to represent the entire student body in their relations with
the University authorities including the faculty. The news crea­
ted quite an excitement because this was an opportunity to serve
as a representative of the very large student body. I was in­
terested, but did not at first entertain the idea of being a
candidate. Some friends of mine were eager to get on the board
and declared their candidacy. They also urged me to run but
I was at first very skeptical, feelingl would have little chance
to succeed. Besides, I knew nothing about campaigning for
office. But in a few days, as one student or another came to me
for my vote, I began to see how the thing was done. So, finally,
I yielded to my friends and became a candidate. When others
came to me for my vote, I would give it on condition that they
would give me theirs. But the number of people who came to me
directly was naturally limited and I depended upon my classmates
to do most of the campaigning.
One thing struck me as very unusual and interesting.
At the time, there was a great deal of anti-Semitic feeling among
the student body, especially among those who were members of
fraternities. Yet the proportion of Jewish students was quite
large, of course not nearly as large as at New York University
©r New York City College. As a Chinese I had no prejudice against
people of any race. China has always been a country where
racial discrimination was not understood and still less prac­
ticed by the people. Under Confucius* teachings, it was generally
accepted as a sound precept that all men within the four seas
are brethern. At Columbia I made no racial distinctions in my
associations. I made friends with students of all races, iiany
of my friends on campus were of the Jewish faith, just as I
had many friends among those of other religious faiths. Both
sides seemed to feel that they would rather cast their votes for
a Chinese than for one from the other group. That put me in an
advantageous position, gaining support from both the Semitic
and non—Semitic groups of students. This fortunate fact, for­
tunate from my point of view, perhaps accounted to a large mea­
sure for my success at the ballot for the Student Board of
Representatives. I felt that what mattered in one's relations
was not to take note of his friends* religious faith or beliefs;
the personal character, worth, and sentiment of the fellow
counted more for me than what he worshipped. I don’t think that
I reasoned it out at the time but as I said it was something in­
born in any Chinese. Racial or religious discrimination was
something that a Chinese found very difficult to understand and
therefore it never came into his mind as a factor to consider
in his relations with the outside world.
There was another thing outside of the classroom
which I would like to mention because it gave me an insight
into the political aspect of American life. That was the
mock convention organized under the sponsorship of Professor
Charles A. Beard, who was then giving a course on politics and
government as well as on other subjects at the University,, The
convention was modelled on the national conventions of the two
principal parties in the United States. The student body was
divided into a nn\yber of delegations corresponding to the num­
ber of states. Each delegation was to nominate a candidate for
president and a candidate for vice-president of the United States.
I was designated to speak and nominate at a mock Republican Con­
vention the then Speaker of the House of Representatives, (Joseph
Gurney Cannon], who was known the Czar of Congress. Well,
that was an interesting experience and it gave me a great in­
sight into the political system of the United States under
which the president and vice-president were nominated to their
high offices.
The Speaker of the House held the post for, ITd say
over twenty years, and he was then spoken o? as one of the
possibilities for the presidency. A man, you know, with a thin
face and a brown beard. People thought he was ruthless. It used
to be said that he was such a strong and dictatorial Speaker that
it was very difficult for anyone to get the floor. If he saw
someone he didnTt like putting up his hand and asking for the
floor, he would simply turn his head and pretend not to see him
at all. He would only give the floor to those he thought should
speak. That was the general comment of those days. Later on
I met him in Washington, I found him a man of strong personality,
very decisive in his opinions, and comments, but he also impres­
sed me as being very able and effective. It greatly modified
my impression of him which was then current, namely, that he
was a dictator, I remember that I got quite a vociferous and
prolonged applause from the convention which gave me the idea
that the speech went fright as far as a nominating speech was
concerned and gave me hopes for a time that he might be nominated,
but I donTt recall who was actually nominated at the mock convention
Did I find American politics perplexing? Yes, it v/as
perplexing, but at the same time it was fascinating for me to know
what really counted in American politics, how candidates were
chosen, how votes were obtained, and how people would go about
trying to influence prospective voters. One of my classmates
was G. B. Compton\CGeorge Brokaw) who was much older than the
average student in our class. He gave me a great deal of in­
sight into American politics. As a student, he was already
very much interested in ward politics and in the local, state,
and national elections. He was a Republican and he used to go
out and make stump speeches for his party and for his party
candidates. I believe he later made a good deal of progress
as a politician.
The mock convention left a deep impression on me because
of the intensity of the efforts made by various delegations to
get votes for their candidates or favorite sons. Yet I believe
it v/as nothing compared with what actually takes place every
four years at the nominating conventions.
I joined a number of societies, among them I’he French
Society, which aims to promote the study and appreciation of
French culture and the speaking of the French language. And I
v/as a member of King's Crown which aims to promote the welfare
of the stuaent body on campus and to work for the good name of
Columbia University. We had periodic meetings and gave parties
and receptions. We usually tried to pay special attention to the
incoming freshmen, acquainting them with the traditions and ideals
of Columbia and trying to help them to get acquainted and to
feel at home as new students. I was among the very few elected
to the senior society of Nacoms. The members were all-round
men chosen for their public spirit.
Among my friends at Columbia, the person to whom I
turned most frequently for advice was a graduate student, E. 3.
Whiting [Stagg Whiting}• He was much older than I and took a
personal, friendly interest in me. He was a conscientious and
enthusiatic worker for the YMCA and a very religious person.
It was he who, during the holidays, would invite me to attend
either a picnic or make a trip with him# He was a social
welfare worker, very well-known on campus# He had a warm heart
for all foreign students. Being a single man, perhaps, a con­
firmed bachelor, he devoted all his time to his work. I remem­
ber one winter in 1906, he arranged a shooting party for me. We
went to the Adirondacks to shoot deer. It was a normal experi­
ence but I had no idea what it was all about. Walking with our
guide, each of us carrying a gun, we went into the depths of the
forest.
Several incidents burned deeply into my memory. One
was that I nearly killed my guide. He was behind me as we had
to get over a fence. I used my shot gun as support and the gun
went off. I got really scared. The guide gave me a good scold­
ing. He said that I must not carry my gun with the barrel up;
I should always have it turrWdownwarh and have it locked, neither
of which wise precautions I had observed.
The second incident occurred when I finally saw a
doe followed by several deer. I was so fascinated by the sight
that I was paralyzed and just watched without raising my gun at
all. Perhaps, in my sub-conscious mind, I didn’t want to shoot.
But then I got another scolding from the guide who took up my
rifle and began to shoot, but by that time the deer had gotten
away beyond rifle range.
 There was a third incident. The guide had joined Mr,
Whiting and I was alone coming home, Whiting evidently had some
interesting possibilities. As I came back I lost my way. As
the day was drawing to a close and it was getting darker, I began
to feel frightened. I kept hiking forward and turning back and
lost my direction altogether. Then I reasoned that if I went
early in the morning and the sun was on my right, coming back
it should be on my left. The father I went left, the less it
looked like my old path. And the birds and beasts made all kinds
of frightening noises. I had visions of having to spend the
night in the forest. I sat down and collected my thoughts. It
suddenly dawned on me that if the sun was on my right when I went
in the morning, it should be on my right on the way back, because
the sun had meanwhile moved. So then I turned back and knew that
I was in the right direction. But it was pitch dark already and
I felt almost certain that I would have to pass the night alone —
a frightening thought; Then mu;deni * I heard a saot and a voice
in the distance ressambling an Indian call*, I yelled out and
a few seconds later I heard sorashout, !,Shoot your gun!n I
fired a shot. They found out then where I was located and found
me. This experience remained in my mind because it taught me a
lesson: one should not undertake anything without having acquired
some previous knowledge and getting a few pointers from the ex­
perienced ones. I was altogether fresh, rather thoughtless, in
rushing into the sport of shooting without sufficient preparation.
But I enjoyed the change and the vacation thanks to Stagg
WhitingTs invitation and company. He was a born philanthropist
and humanitarian. In later years, we carried on correspon­
dence. He became quite prominant in the field of social work.
I went back to China during the summer of 1908. I
travelled by way of Europe in order to see something of the
old continent. It was, of course, quite an experience; it
was the first time that I saw Europe. I went to England and
France, and was very much interested in what I saw. I found
for the first time that the customs and many of the old institu­
tions in Europe were quite different from those in America. I
was so fascinated that I wished that I could stay longer, but I
was in a hurry to get hbme.
It was in London that I first met two men with whom I
subsequently had a good deal to do in my public and social life.
One was Dr. Wang ChTung-hui, who was then reading law at Middle
Temple# I wasnTt very interested then in what he was studying,
but I had great pleasure in making his acquaintance. We spent
practically two days together. He took me around London and
also gave me a Chinese dinner. Perhaps there were no good Chines
restaurants about or a meal in one of the Chinese restaurants
would have cost too much. In any case, he decided to take me to
an acquaintance of his in a little house on Lime Street. When
we stopped in front of the house and were about to enter, I
wondered what was inside, for there was no appearance of a
restaurant. As a matter of fact, it wasnTt a restaurant; it was
a Chinese laundry run by one man, a native, X think, of Dr.
Wang19 home town* At the back of the shop there was a living
room where the owner did the cooking himself and served the
Chinese dinner to the two of us* We enjoyed it tremendously! it
was real Cantonese home cooking.
The other man I met was the Chinese minister, Mr. Wang
Ta-hsieh, a well-known Chinese scholar and mandarin. Like many
of his Chinese colleagues abroad, he was not able to speak
English, although when I saw him he told me that he was trying to
speak the language. In those days, all Chinese diplomatic re­
presentatives, especially of the scholarly type, were dressed
in Chinese costumes, and they looked impressive. Mr. wang re­
ceived me in his gorgeous robes. It seemed that he took more
than an ordinary interest in me, because our conversation lasted
much longer than I had expected. He asked all kinds of questions
about Chinese students in the United States, about politics here,
and about my own preferences. After the visit I talked with
some of my Chinese friends, including Wang ChTung-hui. I learned
from them that he was particularly interested in Chinese students
and was always keeping an eye on those he would like to recommend
to the government. That was, of course, the fashion of the day.
Practically all ministers abroad were expected to recommend
well-trained, promising young men for government service.
I add these notes to let you know how I came to know
these two men, because later on I had a great deal to do with
them in my career.
I took a P. & 0. liner which went through Suez, touch­
ing a number of British ports - Colombo, Singapore, Hongkong -
and then on to Shanghai. It was a long trip lasting some­
thing like forty days, and it was very hot. I remember the trip
gave me some very deep impressions, not only of the differences
between Europe and the United States, but between the East and
West. If I were to summarize my impressions then in a few
words, I would say that I was struck by the poverty of the
peoples of Asia. As soon as one passed Suez, it was a dis­
heartening spectacle all along the voyage to see how poor the
common people were in contrast with the prosperity and affluence

of the West. The people of Asia appeared backward in their know­

ledge and there was such a high degree of illiteracy and poverty
that they were hardly able to feed or clothe themselves properly.
I remember that these impressions burned into my mind. They
brought home to me the fact that most of the countries through
which I passed were colonies of the Western powers, either of
Great Britain or France, and I felt that was probably one of
the main reasons for their condition. Of course, that idea
was supported by, and I suppose originated from, my study of
European history.
When I arrived at Shanghai, I found everything so
different, not in comparison with the time 1 left it, but with
what I had seen in the United States. Everything appeared strange
the streets, the houses, the clothes, the customs. This sharp
contrast made me realize how backward Shanghai was and how much
needed to be done to bring the country and the people into any­
thing approaching the conditions of living abroad. While I
was pleased to see my parents, my brothers/and my sister, the
feeling was one of frustration and the desire to play my part
later in the modernization and rebuilding of China.
I had the impression that China was in the throes of a
social, intellectual, and cultural revolution. There was no
political revolution going on, but the country and the people
were very unsettled in their ideas. In Shanghai, of course,
people were anxious to seize and accept readily new ideas from
the West. Many of the social customs appeared to be outmoded.
While opium smoking was prohibited by law, foot binding was
still prevalent. The whole country was in ferment. New schools
were established, but many of them were still run on the old
model. The people of Shanghai - and I’m sure in other treaty
ports also - were finding western ideas much more acceptable
than the old Chinese ones. The student class - people of my
generation - were very much interested in the transformation
 85

of politicc1 ideas. Like many other young Chinese of my time, I felt that

China’s troubles were due to exploitation by the Western powers. But we

felt also that this was itself due to the weakness, inefficiency, and corruption

of the Manchu Dynasty. The general feeling among Chinese youths was that

China could not be strong without overthrowing this alien regime But I

went home not to study political conditions, but in response to the call

of my father. My visit was limited to a few weeks and was taken mainly

for personal reasons, so I did not go deeply into the situation in China

at the time.

My conclusion was that there was much that the Chinese people could

do to improve the conditions of their country, and yet they were not doing

very much. The people who should take the initiative were not allowed to

do so. I felt that something was radically wrong with the government, which

should have been encouraging the people to do things but had instead dis­

couraged their initiative in reforms.

 86

[The whole question of my first marriage, which took place during

this visit to China, and my subsequent divorce, is a complicated one, but

interesting, perhaps, for the light which it sheds on the old and new

social conventions. At this point, therefore, I should like to give a

straightforward account of the developments relating to the marriage 1

It was the custom of the times for parents to arrange matches

for their children, and to do so as early as possible Confucian teachings

were rather rigid. In those days, when they reached their teens, boys and

girls were not supposed to make friends or even to see one another The

social life of the Chinese people of all classes, especially of the upper

class, was circumscribed by many rigid rules of etiquette Whatever

entertainment there
was, for business or official reasons, was arranged as stag
affairs. The womenfolk never took part. Even on important oc­
casions such as weddings, birthday parties, and funerals, when
relatives and friends would come either to congratulate or to
condole, men and women would take their meals separately. Ten
would usually have their lunches and dinners in one part of the
building; the women in another.
It was left largely to the professional matchmakers or
close relatives of the family to make proposals for marriage.

It was also true that parents of daughters were more anxious for
their daughters to be engaged than were parents of boys. In my
case, a number of proposals were brought by professional match­
makers. Sven when I was as young as eleven, my mother mentioned
the subject to me in a very discret^ way in order to sound out
my feelings. I had no interest at all in an engagement or marriage,
but as more and more proposals came, my parents began to pay more
attention. One particular proposal appeared to appeal to them.
It came from the family of the famous ,TDeaf Doctor Chang”,
who might be called the dean of the Chinese medi­
cal corps. The proposal, brought by a matchmaker known to both fami­
lies concerned the grandniece of the,fDeaf Doctor Chang”. Che was
the only child of the family, two years younger than I. Ky
mother tried half humorously to find out my reaction. I was then
too young really to understand or be interested in the idea. I
.just dismissed the idea but the thing dragged on. Other proposals
were withdrawn in due course, but this one stayed, and the
matchmaker would come every now and then to ask for a reply.
It was not until I was twelve and a half that a confer­
ence between my parents settled the matter for me without letting
me know. My only recollection was of the girlrs father, who
was also a doctor. My parents told me that he was very fond of
me. About two years earlier,when my sister was seriously ill,
he used to come every day to attend her. One late afternoon he
paused to talk to me and look over my copy of a Chinese painting.
It was spread out on the table and he stopped to look at it, ex­
pressing his admiration.
The engagement was made without evoking any thrill, I
assure you, on my part, perhaps because I was too young to under­
stand the meaning ofan engagement. In accordance with the
custom of the times, the ceremony of engagement was quite an
event. There was a procession of engagement gifts from the boyTs
family to the girl’s family, and there were return presents from
the girl’s family to the boy’s family. The busiest people were
the official go-betweens. They were selected by the families to
represent them respectively, usually some prominent friends or
relatives. It was a whole-day celebration, but it was not part
of the social code for the boy and the girl to meet. In any
case, I did not meet my fiancee. I had no idea how she looked or
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how she was getting along in her studies. The only thing that
went through ray mind v/as that the girl should not bind her feet
and that she should attend a modern school. This was known to
my parents but I think they took no steps to convey the idea.
The event was over without producing any thrill on ray part. I
suppose there was no more thrill on the girl’s part, but for
that matter I would not know.
Time went on and I left for America in 1904j rfhen I
v/as sixteen years old. I gave no more thought to my engagement.
Three years later, during my junior year, my father, v/ho used
to write to me regularly, wrote to say that he was getting on
in age, that all my brothers and sisters had married, and I was
the only one of the five children that had not yet started a home.
He gently suggested that as I was finishing my studies, I should
go home and get married. This was quite a surprise to me and
I felt somewhat upset. I v/as then completely absorbed in my
studies, in campus life, in my activities outside the campus,
and had some definite ideas about what I wanted to do later in
life. I had no thought of marrying, whether this girl or any
other. So I wrote back to say that the most important thing was
to complete my education and that v/ould still take some time;
marriage should take place after I had finished my studies and
had entered upon a definite career so that I would be able to
support a family and not^like so many young men of my generation^
be dependent on my parents for the support of the new familv. t

wanted to be independent, and not add to the burden of my father,

as in the case of my oldest and second brother*. This was, of

course, quite a normal situation in China, but somehow or other

I did not think it was right.

My tactful refusal to agree to the idea started quite

a chain of correspondence. As the difference of opinion between

us became sharper with increased correspondence, an unexpected

crisis arose - that is to say, my father stopped writing. I

remember the letter that I had written him giving a reasoned

statement of the various reasons in support of my attitude. They

were probably so clearly and cogently put that he found it dis­

pleasing and at the same time difficult to refute all my arguments.

After a while, my brother mentioned the subject in his

letters to me, saying that it was the custom and it world be an

act pleasing to my father and my mother for me to settle down

and marry after I returned, which he hoped would not be too far

off. And as he wrote as a kind of conciliator, trying to bridge

the differences between my father and myself, he tried to give

me the impression that the girl herself was very worthy, beauti­

ful, and intelligent, and that sne would make a good life partner*

Since he touched on the personal side of the girl, I remember

I wrote back stipulating two conditions: one, that she unbind

her feet; two, that she study some English^attending a modern

school rather than continuing to study Chinese at home.
My brother’s description of the girl was not too con­
vincing, because I was not sure whether he had written on the
basis of hearsay or had actually seen the girl. So I wrote back,
posing the question specifically - whether he had seen the girl.
His reply indicated a kind of evasion on that point but he re­
peated his remarks about the beauty of the girl. He said that
her feet had been unbound and that she was studying English. He
did not say whether she was taking lessons at hone or attending
school.
As I was not in favor of getting married, I didn’t reply
immediately. I'y brother sent more letters to m"/ urging me
definitely to return after the college closed in the summer and
saying that my father had plans for arranging a marriage. Re­
garding the two conditions that I had put forward, he said that
he had called on the girl’s family. He told me that he was well
received by the girl’s father, and that as he touched on the
subject, he caught a glimpse of the girl, not in the hall where
her father was receiving him, but in another room. That is, the
girl herself was peeping, eavesdropping. Again it wasn’t con­
vincing, but I was sorry to hear that my father was rather upset
about my refusal. I said that I would go back and see him if
he really wanted to see me, but only on condition that there
would be no marriage. We would merely talk over the matter.
 In due course, I got a reply that my father fully ac­

cepted my idea* He really wanted to see me after four years* The

question of marriage would be discussed but it would not be forced

on me. With that understanding, I arranged for my return to

Shanghai for a visit.

I have already told you about the impressions I had

on returning to Shanghai in 190S. My mind was turned towards

the future, but my family, especially my parents, were mainly in­

terested in my personal life.

My mother was the first one to give me a hint that my

father had in mind to arrange for my marriage and said that he

wanted to have a good talk with me. I remember the following

morning we had a sort of first meeting after four years. We had

a very polite conversation and as he tried to bring up the

subject I brushed it off at once. Seeing that I was not in the

mood, he changed the subject and said he would talk about it

later. In the evening he was with my mother and they sent for

me. The three of us had a conference. The topic was my marriage.

He repeated what he had written in his letters - that he was

getting along in years, that it was the duty of the parents to

arrange for the marriage of their children, and that I was the

only one in the family for whom he had not yet arranged a marriage

He wanted to do it so as to discharge his duty. After that he

could take things easy and enjoy whatever was left of his lifespan
 It was a very serious talk and left me with the impres­

sion that he really meant every word of what he said. But I

a
was not in trhe mood to yield. I was thinking more of my own

future and career. I said I was not the only child, that I

was one of three sons, that both my brothers had already married,

and he already had grandchildren. I said that they did not need

to feel that my marriage was as important as in the case of an

only son. This argument did not please my father at all. In

fact, I think he became exasperated. My mother tried to per­

suade me to agree to the marriage, but I didn’t yield. The

conversation broke up abruptly when my father left the room,

obviously displeased, his face red. And that was the end of the

conference.

1 did not take it as seriously as my mother, who

evidently knew how strongly my father desired to see me married.

Naturally, as my mother, she was not opposed to it. But she

was also probably sympathetic toward me without fully ap­

preciating all tiie reasons that I had advanced.

The following morning my brother came to my room and

said that I should not be so obstinate, that my father had done

his very best for me, and that I was in a fortunate position

to have a father who was able to bear all the financial responsi­

bility for my marriage. My brother reminded me that my father

had been through many difficult periods in his life and that he
was a self-made man risen from poverty as a result of the TTai

p*ing Rebellion* My brother contended that after having worked so

hard to reach his present enviable position, my father was en­

titled to enjoy the rest of his life with peace of mind and joy

at the rise of his children. He said the conversation held the

previous night was so upsetting to the old man that he refused

to eat and would not let anybody in his room. My brother told

me that he had just gotten into his room by climbing through

the window and had .seen the old man in tears* He said that I

might not feel or understand what was in my father’s mind but

that everything he proposed was for my own good. My brother

said that he could see that my father was right - I was too modern

and too much imbued with western ideas. After all, he said, we

were all Chinese. So he wanted to tell me plainly, if not

bluntly, what I should do. He said the only thing was to say

yes and let the old man go ahead - that would be the last thing

he would enjoy doing and which he considered a duty on his part,

as he had already made plain to me. My father had told him that

he had never expected to raise a child and give him the best of

an education and yet find him unable to understand what was in

his mind. This not only disillusioned him but took away all

joy from his life.

This talk was most touching to me and I began to see

the other side of the picture, still feeling,hov/ever, absolutely

convinced of the soundness of my own attitude as far as my future

was concerned* I felt that my father v/as taking the matter too

seriously, but I could understand why he did so in the light of

the customs of society.

The brother Ifve been talking about is my oldest brother

with whom I had always been close, I had two brothers. The

second one was just two years older than I. The eldest was

seven years older, so I always looked to him as a sort of adviser.

He put the issue this way - by following my own selfish desire

I would be displeasing my father even more, practically making

him unhappy for the rest of his life. In fact, he said, one

could not tell what might happen if the old man persisted in

his hunger strike. If anything should happen to him, where would

I stand? My brother understood what I wanted, but he did not fully

agree with me. He thought I was over-ambitious and over-western

in my outlook. It was a-iright for me to want this and that, but

he thought I could not be too selfish and just have my way without

regard to the wishes of my parents, of my family. He stood in

the middle.

This long talk between my brother and myself resulted in

a reluctant conclusion on my part. I said that if my father took

it that seriously, I would certainly not want to cause him un­

happiness and perhaps even illness. So, if he wanted me to marry,

I would go through the marriage formality just to please him and

to save his face, a point which my brother had pointed out to

me. Besides the good name of my father, he also felt that ray

attitude would reflect on the girl’s family as well. And since

both families were of good standing in society, it would be most

unfair on my part to be so selfish.

This understanding was quickly conveyed to my father

by my brother. He gave up his hunger strike and orders were

given to proceed with the preparations for the wedding. The

family became busier every day as time went on. I remember

I took no interest whatever and went about rny own way, visiting

friends, scouting around bookshops.

As the day approached, the whole house was decorated

in accordance with Chinese custom. All the arrangements had

been made for the ceremony, which included a great procession

to the bride’s heme. The visit of the bride’s brother to the

bridegroom’s family was itself a very important event. He was

escorted both in front and in the rear by guards on horseback.

The same v/as true of the return visit of the bridegroom to the

bride’s family before the v/edding ceremony. In addition, '.here

were the visits, with suitable retinues, of the official go-

betweens. Those representing the groom’s family paid their

formal visit to the girl’s family and the go-betweens o° the girl’

family returned the visit to the groom’s family.

After all this was over, the regular ceremony began with
a lon^; procession of marshals on horseback, bands of musicians,

bearers of those big lanterns and enormous brass gongs. In

other words all the old-fashioned attendants of various kinds were

present, marching ahead of the sedan chair and followed by a few

guards. It was one of those regular processions, nothing unusual,

perhaps on a scale a little larger than the average in Shanghai,

When the time was approaching for the procession to

return with the bride, I became interested in watching from the

top floor the arrival of the procession. As our house had

several courtyards, the main hall was way back. It was rather

a long procession, I saw the chair in which the bride was

carried and I stayed on watching the crowdd that attended the

procession. Then 1 heard a noise running through the whole house.

They were calling for me - the servants, my brother, some rela­

tives. They were all looking for the bridegroom] They finally

found me on the second floor and I was literally dragged back to

see that the bride had arrived. It was time for the ceremony.

I was dressed by a few attendants in the proper costume and

conducted downstairs to go through the elaborate formal ceremony.

There were two items on the program: the worship of

heaven and earth and the worship of our ancestors, followed by

the wedding ceremony itself. Facing each other, surrounded by

guests, musicians of all kinds, and the master of ceremonies,

we were supposed to kow-tow to each other. Usually both the

bride and groom were tipned well in advance not to kneel down

testily, on the theory that he who knelt first would find himself

dominate&w • So for a few seconds we stood there, although the

master of ceremonies kept on ordering us to kow-toy;, neither side

would give in. After a while we made a sort of bow to each other

simultaneously, and the ceremony was considered completed.

We were then escorted upstairs to the bridal chamber,

with a silk ribbon half red and half green tied to the arms of

the bride and groom. More music was played and more guests

crowded into the room. We went through certain other formalities

Congratulations were offered everywhere. After a f,ew minutes we

were conducted downstairs again to be presented to the groom’s

parents, the elder relatives, and certain close "riends of the

family. This took quite a long time because at each introduction

the musicians played according to the instructions of the master

of ceremonies. Each introduction v/as a ceremony in itsel '.

As it was already evening, the bride and groom took

their meal in their chamber. The bride was partially relieved

of the paraphernalia of her ceremonial robes. der crown v/as

removed. The groom was likewise allowed to remove the heavy

satin embroidered outer robes, keeping the long gown on. This v/a

semi-official, but it was purely a formality. Neither of' us ate

much, although the guests did everything to force us both to

 drink as much as possible

That over, the v;hole ceremony was considered completed.

The musicians started playiny in the courtyard below to signify

that t'ie bride and groom were to retire to their privacy and

all the guests were to leave their room. As the guests left,

I left with them. I went to my motherrs room and went to bed.

Nobody took any notice until about half an hour later, when the

bridesmaids began to look for the bridegroom and could not find

him. Finally, my brother found me in my motherrs room. You

see, because it was still hot, my mother made her sleeping quar­

ters in a room on the ground floor, leaving her room open. So

I made use of it for myself. That created quite a sensation,

but my mother understood my feelings. It was she who advised

them not to insist too much upon my going to the bridal chamber.

She saw that I was tired and let me have a good night’s sleep.

By the following day, of course, most of the guests

had left. Only a few relatives had stayed behind. I noticed

that my absence from the bridal chamber was quite a topic of

conversation, but I didn’t pay any attention. I went to my

mother’s room again the second night and several nights following

until my mother told me one day that she wanted to use her own

room and that it was not right for me to stay away from my

bride’s room. It looked bad/she said, and people would start to

talk, and my father was worried and displeased. Soy at her

begging I went back to the chamber but only at night after

dinner, I slept on the couch. Of course, my formal wife was

so Chinese that this was a shock to her and she asked me to

sleep in the big bed, I said no, that was for her, dhe said

that if I wanted to sleep alone, she would take the couch and I

could sleep in the bed. So that went on for a few nights without

any incident. It was typical of a Chinese girl of the old

days that she should be forbearing, patient and naive, thinking

that there was nothing unusual in the situation.

All the time my mind centered on how to return to

America as quickly as possible. One day I saw my father before

he left for his office and told him that as the ceremony had been

carried out and I was married, he should be happy. I was ready

to go back. Evidently he must have heard a great deal of gossip

about my behavior, so he said very plainly that it would be

7
alright for me to go back, but I must take my bride along. He

said he wouldn’t know how to take care of her;as she was my

wife, it would be good for her also to see something of the

world. Beside^, since I wanted her to study English, it v/ould

be an opportunity for her.

I thought that I had already made a great concession

going through the formality. I didn’t receive very favorably the

idea of being forced into the position of looking after rny wife
when I would have a lot to do at Columbia* I tried to argue

him out of it but he was adamant. He said, TrWhat would people

say-so soon after your marriage, you leave all alone, leaving

your young wife behind? You must remember, she comes from a

family where she is the only daughter. She is the apple of

her parentsT eyes* You canTt leave her like tnat.TT He made

it an absolute condition that I take her or else he would not

let me go back. So once more I had to accept the alternative.

I told my father that I would take her along if he would pay

for the passage. That was no difficulty for him, so I went

ahead and booked the passage and he gave me the money to pay

for it.
The preparations for our trip occupied all our time.

The bride, I'm sure, fully understood the situation, but Chinese

girls of her background had no independent ideas, or if they

had, they would not insist upon theiju Her role was to do what she

was told. She was willing, perhaps half delighted, that I was

to take her. We shared a cabin and for over two weeks we tra­

velled together. After the heat in Shanghai and the worry and

torment of going through many things against my own wish, I

must have been exhausted;because I was quite seasick all the way.

In fact, she stood the voyage much better than I. Nothing

happened. Literally, in accordance with the Chinese ethical

code, "Fu-ch'i hsiang-chin liu-ping,,, we respected each other as

guests. I took it on myself to explain to her something about

life abroad and the conditions she would find in the United

States, and I explained to her that I was thinking of finding

some place outside of New York for her to study English. That

would be the best way for her to learn English quickly. She

readily agreed. Not knowing anything about conditions in

America or abroad, she told me that whatever I arranged would be

agreeable to her, so long as she could study English. She wanted

to learn as quickly as possible.

I remember during the journey we did not talk about

anything personal, that is, personal between us/except what

was good for her, for her education, and the conditions she

v/ould find in the United States. I looked upon her as my sis­

ter; I felt responsible for her. Upon landing in San Francisco,

we went straight to New York. The day we arrived, I took her

to Philadelphia, where I had a friend to recommend a school for

her. He suggested a family, an old couple with a daughter, I

think of German extraction, and I made the arrangements. The

landlady was motherly and took a great interest in her. She or

her daughter would take turns to initiate her in the study of

English.

I stopped at a hotel and she moved into this house.

The next day, when all arrangements had been made, I left for

New York. In this connection, I might say that her total ignoranc
of the English language and her small feet did not bother me
very much. My brother in his letters to me before I left New
York had assured me that she had made rapid progress in English
and that she had natural feel. But it didn’t make much difference
to me actually, because it was of no interest to me personally.
I went to see her whenever I could and always when
there was a holiday, whether Christmas or Easter. I would
take her out to have a Chinese dinner or to see a picture, but
the main burden of our conversation consisted of an exchange of
ideas as to what each of us wanted to do. I also explained to her
that the important thing for each of us was to have a career
and to do what we could to serve our country and our people.
In order to do that, one must be well prepared. She readily
understood. As to personal problems, I told her that we should
aim at happiness, and happiness could come only when it was based
on love. That v/as something which could come only naturally. In
our case we had never known each other, never even seen each other.
We were thrown together as husband and wife purely because of
arrangements made by our parents without even consulting us. It
was so in my case, and I presumed it was so in hers. And she
confirmed it. When her parents mentioned the matter to her, she
was never allowed to express her views. And, of course, she
could not;because not having seen me, she could not have formed an
opinion. So, from the very start, she seemed to understand that
this sort of marriage was too artificial and too unnatural,

V'/henever we met, we met as friends, and I tried to

give her a good time outside. We used to have a little amuse­

ment or recreation and talk about our future. There was never

any difference of opinion or argument between us as to our

future relations. This went on. By the second half of 1909,

when she had been here almost a year, she had learned some

English. Her progress was remarkably rapid5she not only could

read almost anything in the newspapers or simple books, but she

could also speak some English. I’m sure the landlady and her dau­

ghter, who took a great interest in her, must have given her a

great deal of information as to the problems of American life,

American ideas and ideals. All in all, she impressed me as

having made very rapid progress in understanding not only

American life but the personal problems of life.

It was in the fall of 1909 that I raised a sorely per­

plexing problem. I felt that it was no use to go on maintaining

artificial relations; we must come to some arrangement by which

each would be free to do as he or she liked. This would be the

best for both of us. I believe she did not express either con­

currence or disapproval. She listened, evidently without rea­

lizing fully the significance of all that v/e had talked about.

She merely asked what was to be done since we had been formally

married. I had already looked up these questions and told her

that according to Chinese civil law, there were provisions for
divorce by mutual consent* All that was necessaiy was for the
parties concerned to sign an agreement* i quoted the exact
provisions and promised to send her a copy o.i. tne text* ihis
I did upon my return to New York, and after a long time she wroue
saying that she wanted to talk things over with me personally.
When we next met, we discussed the question again and she asked
what she was to do afterwards. I said that was up to her, that
if and when we signed an agreement, v/e would each be free. Che
would be free to stay either in the United States - in that case
I would be responsible for her expenses to study - or she could
return to China and live either with my parents or go back to
her own home according to her own preference. She could work,
teach or continue to study. I said that although I felt she v/ould
have no difficulty regarding the financial side of the situation,
because she was the only daughter and her parents were sure to
look after her, so far as I was concerned, she could have every­
thing that had been sent to her by our family for our engagement
and wedding. She could also have all the things that her family
sent to me. They were all in the bridal chamber under her lock
and control - she had all the keys and she could do what she
liked. I would consider all that as belonging to her.
So the general outline of an agreement was more or less
agreed upon and I came back to New York and worked out a draft
 I d (0

agreement. Sometime lateral brought her the draft and asked her
to study it to see if she understood everything and if she wanted
any changes. Several months passed, I went to see her. She
said she could not think of anything to suggest for revision and
that if I wanted to have the agreement signed, she was ready to
sign it, I told her that in order to avoid unfounded gossip or
cause unhappiness to her parents or mine, it would be best tor
her to make the copies in her own handwriting to show that she
did so without any pressure on my part. This suggestion she
readily accepted. I suggested she should prepare four copies,
which she did. It took her, I think, a couple of weeks before she
wrote to me that the copies were ready.
It was sometime in 1911, I think, that we signed the
agreement. It was stated in the agreement that each of us was
to keep a copy, one copy was to be sent to her parents, another
copy to my parents. We parted in a very friendly way. After­
wards she said that she did not knov; whether she wanted to re­
turn home right away; she v/as going to continue because she
had become interested in her studies. I went to see her as usual
every now and then. I believe it was not until the latter part
of 1911, after the Revolution, that she returned to China. jwent and

saw her off.

 107

I returned to Columbia in the fall of 1908. In November, an

event took place which was of great interest to me. I refer to the

visit of Mr. T’ang Shao-i as special envoy to see President Theodore

Roosevelt. It was reported at the time that the United States was

inclined to remit a portion of the Boxer indemnity funds left over in

the United States Treasury after all claims raised by American citizens

for damages during the Boxer Rebellion had

been met* The chief purpose of the Mission reportedly was to
negotiate an arrangement regarding the means of remission and
the purposes to which the money would be used. It appeared that
both sides were favorably disposed toward devoting the money
for the dispatch of Chinese students to the United States. The
idea was favorably received by the people on both sides of the
Pacific. The Missionfs second purpose, which was not given much
publicity, but which was known to have been an equally impor­
tant one, was to negotiate with the United States for the in­
vestment of American capital in the development of Manchuria.
Mr. Tfang Shao-i came to the United States as special envoy
when he was governor of Fengtien, one of the three northeastern
provinces constituting what was generally known as Manchuria, a
territory as large as the combined areas of Germany and France.
My interest, of course, was derived mainly from the
newspapers, and I did not follow up the activities of the Mission
in Washington. But at this time, a crisis arose in Peking be­
cause of the reported deaths, almost at the same time, of Emperor
Kuang-hsu and the Empress Dowager Tzu-hsi. The news came rather
suddenly, although the illness of the Empress Dowager had pre­
viously been reported. Press dispatches from Peking also
carried rumors prevalent in Peking to the effect that the
Emperor^ death was brought about in circumstances causing a
great deal of speculation. At any rate, the dual casualties
not only brought the imperial family and the nation into a state
of national mourning as was required in those days, but gave
rise to a very serious political crisis over who was to succeed
to the throne. Evidently, there were two factions in the im­
perial family and court circles, as well as among the high offi­
cials, both stemming from the political rivalry between two
cliques. which had arisen at the time of the so-called Reform
Movement sponsored by Krang Yu-wei. In other words, there was
one group more or less liberally inclined who originally was
for Emperor Kuang-hsii and now stood for a candidate who appeared
to them as being more in line with their liberal ideas. ihis
candidate was Prince PTu-lun, who had been Imperial Commissioner
sent at the head of the Chinese Mission to the ot. Louis Exposi­
tion in 1904. The other group, which might be called the pro-
Empress Dowager faction^had been all-powerful in Peking under
the Empress following the imprisonment of .emperor Kuang—hsu. It
favored a successor who could be guided, if not controlled, by
this faction, so that their power and influence c©uld continue.
Their favorite was a nephew of Emperor Kuang-hsii, son of Prince
Chfun. He was actually made emperor under the reigning title of
Hsuan-t’ung, then a child of three.
What was of interest to me personally at the time was
an invitation from the New York Herald to assist them in the
interpretation of the news dispatches which were pouring in
from Peking and elsewhere in China in connection with the com­
plicated maneuvers and the exotic and unfamiliar Chinese names
and titles, I remember that the Herald wanted me in the first
place to explain the personal relationships within the imperial
family, particularly with reference to the two candidates to
the throne and their respective sponsors and supporters. Some­
times the}' wanted the information so urgently that they tele­
phoned me at the University. I would go to the library to look
up and check and then with the information rushed off to the
Herald. With conflicting reports of one prospective candidate
gaining in favor over the other, the Herald editors were most
anxious to know what I considered the likeliest possibility. Of
course, I had no inside information and could only offer an
opinion, or rather a guess, with what background knowledge that
a Chinese normally had, particularly knowledge of the circum­
stances and atmosphere of the court in Peking. I ventured the
conjecture, and felt very firmly about it, that Prince P’u-lun
would have no chance, although personally, I remember, I was
hoping that he would be the successful candidate. He was known
throughout China as being more liberal minded, particularly be­
cause he had seen something of the outside world on his mission
to St. Louis. The conjecture v/as based mainly on the power of
the group which the Empress Dowager had built up during her long
years of ruling China. The influence and power of her supporters
 Ill

were deep!,, rooted. This factor prevailed in spite of the fact

that Prince P’u-lunTs claim to the throne, in accordance with
lineage and precedence/was stronger than Prince Ch’un’s son who
was the deceased emperor’s nephew*
It was a novel experience to join the foreign news
department after a day’s work on campus and to pore over the
telegrams that were received almost hourly, sometimes even more
frequently. This lasted, if I recall correctly, about two or
three weeks. It intensified my interest in political maneuvers
and life in Peking and their effect upon the country as a whole*
It also gave me an insight into the workings of a great news­
paper office* Furthermore, it brought me into contact with
the prominent editors of a great newspaper. The New York Herald
was then especially well-known in the Far East. It had a spe­
cial correspondent stationed in China to gather and report news.
Furthermore, the Herald had come out for a policy on the part
of the United States to work closely with China. In fact, it
was advocating in its editorial columns that there should be
an American-Chinese alliance. The idea was definitely put for­
ward by the well-known editor-in-chief [T. H. Hamilton} and the
proprietor [James Bennett Gordon]. The New York Herald gave
prominence to the rivalry between Japan and Russia, which had
brought about a kind of Russo-Japanese conspiracy to exclude United
States interests in Manchuria. On the other hand, China, knowing
the sinister designs of those two countries in Manchuria, was
feeling uneasy and determined to seek the cooperation of the
United States by interesting it in Manchuria.
It was also about this time that American railroad in­
terests, principally the so-called Harriman Group, had the idea
of building a railroad to encircle the globe via Manchuria.
V/ashington appeared to be sympathetic toward the idea, in the
interests of the maintenance of a balance of power in the Far
East and with it the preservation of peace in that region. £e.
H.J Harriman^ plan consisted mainly of linking railroad com­
munications between Peking through Manchuria with the Trans-
Siberian railway, leading from there to Paris and the Atlantic
seaboard. Harriman contemplated building a tunnel under the
Bering Strait and putting a railway from Alaska through the
tunnel to Siberia. The transcontinental line from New York to
the West Coast had just been completed. The scheme was a
magnificent idea. It appeared to many as somewhat in the
nature of a dream, but then the railroad empire in the United
States had become a reality out of some such dream. Also in
the air then, perhaps inspired by this scheme of building a rail
road around the globe, was the idea to internationalize all rail
roads in Manchuria in order to facilitate the realization of the
twin policy of developing a global railroad system and saving
Manchuria from the imperialistic grasp of Japan and Russia.
 /t 6 X j *’ ^
lif <i,» Secretary of State under President 'Phvwlure UuWT^ei-t”,
was favorable to the idea of promoting American interests in
Manchuria with the cooperation of American financial and rail­
road interests. HarrimanTs scheme was the subject of diplomatic
negotiations between the bnited States on the one hand and
several countries on the other, including Japan, Russia, Great
Britain, and China. The Far Eastern situation appeared to be
very much in the mind of V/ashington at the time, and that perhaps
explains the importance of the editorial policy of the New York
Herald.
TUT
\vhat affected Mr. T?ang Shao-i fs mission wasA with
the death of the Empress Dowager, Yuan Shih-kfai fell from power.
Yuan had been the power behind the throne and he had supported
Mr. T'ang's mission. Private advices from Washington such as
I was able to get at the time indicated that the mission was pre­
paring to shorten its visit. That could be easily understood
because Mr. TTang Shao-i was a very important supporter of the
Yuan Shih-k’ai group. With the passing from the scene of the
Empress Dowager, Yuan Shih-k^i lost not only his power but his
position. In fact, it will be recalled that he was summarily
dismissed by the new regime. The new regime, with a child on
the throne as the titular head^was not entirely opposed to the
Emoress Dowager’s supporters. However, personal rivalry and poli­
tical enmities played a very important part and Yuan Shih-k’ai
had to flee Peking, glad to be alive. It was reported that with
the change, funds to Mr. TfangTs mission stopped* It was, of
course, a straw in the wind as to how his mission was viewed by
the new regime. With this denouement in Peking, the interest of
the American railroad and financial group, and with it the policy
of the United States, naturally were left in abeyance. It would
have been purposeless for the mission to continue. With the
circumstances so changed, it was not able to make much head­
way in its efforts to enlist American political and financial
support.
Before the mission left, Mr. TTang Shao-i extended an
invitation to the Chinese student body. He invited forty Chinese
students for a stay of ten days as his guests in Washington. The
invitation was extended through the Imperial Chinese minister in
Washington. How were the forty students chosen? That was un­
known, but in any case I was one of the forty. It v/as said at
the time that the Chinese Legation had someone on its staff who
v/as in charge of Chinese Government students and students sup­
ported by provincial governments. He generally kept an eye on
all Chinese students in the United States. Coming to think of
it, I recall that Dr. W. W. Yen was then third secretary of the
Legation and was in close contact with Chinese students. He may
have had something to do with making up the list. I remember
the year before, 1907, I had visited Washington at the invitation
of Dre Yen, who had come with Dr. V/u TTing-fan^ on his second
mission to the United States. Dr. Yen had taught a course in
translation at St. JohnTs which I took and I was much interested
in the kind of work he was doing at the Legation and whether he
liked it. He gave me the impression that he was not kept very
busy, and that what English correspondence came up was handled
largely by Mr. Jung Kfuei, who was then fe&e first secretary. I
gathered the impression that he was much interested in the Chinese
students, and tha*. He inquired murrh about a few students that he
personally knew. He wanted to know how they were doing and how
I was doing.
In any event, my recollection was that the list of
forty was generally regarded as fairly representative, because
the students chosen were among those who were generally recognized
by the students as representative of the student body. We did not
think - and I do not think now - that the political beliefs or
feelings of the students played an important role in their selection.
The ten-day visit began in the first part of January. I
went down there and, of course, the students got together to talk
over things. We tried to organize a little so as to have some­
one serve as the spokesman of the party, both to represent its
views if they should be sought by the mission and to express its
own sentiments on a suitable occasion. I was chosen by the stu­
dent body as its representative. I do not know why, but I suppose
it was because I was the editor-in-chief of the Chinese StudentsT
Monthly ar.d had taken an active part in the organizing of the
Chinese students* I remember there was a big dinner given by
Mr* Trang Shao-i to the students, at which he welcomed us and
said that China was on the threshold of a great movement to modern­
ize the country and to make it strong and powerful* In order to
carry out this policy, what was needed most were trained men, men
who had had a modern education, familiar with the ideas and the
methods of those Western countries that had risen to power in
the family of nations. He said that Chinese studying in the United
States, just as Chinese studying in other countries in the West,
would be greatly needed and that there were great opportunities
for them upon their return. It was a speech of encouragement and
inspiration and as the representative of the invited body, I
was called upon to respond* I remember I made a brief speech
suitable for the occasion* It appeared to be well received not
only by those whom I represented but by Mr. 'Hang and his group.
After the meeting Mr* Hang himself came over to me and said that
I had made a good speech. He congratulated me, as did Dr. Wu
Hing-fang, the famous vegetarian diplomat. Yes, this was my first
meeting with Hang Shao-i.
The visit gave me a glimpse of diplomatic life among
the Chinese. One little incident which left a deep impression
on me occurred one morning when a few other members of the student
group and I went to call on Mr. TTang Shao-i. I think we went
in response to his invitation. V/e got there a few minutes ahead
of time and waited in the reception hall. Dr. Wu T’ing-fang appear­
ed first to receive us and said that the special envoy would come
down very shortly. Among the students - and for that matter the
Chinese community in general - it was known that there was friendly
rivalry between the two diplomatic representatives. This was
not unnatural between a resident minister and a special envoy in
the same capital. After waiting a few minutes, Dr. V/u appeared
a little restless, feeling perhaps that Mr. TTang should have
come down sooner. At that point Mr. T^ng began to descend the
staircase. As he came down slowly, step by step, Dr. Wu turned
his head and told Mr. T’ang, ’’You are a little late. These young
stud' nts have been here for several minutes waiting for you.” He
added that he had been with the students from the time they arrived.
Mr. T’ang stopped midway and said, ”Yes, I know, you have had
your say. I’m late. You know, as I stand, I’m above you.” It
was physically true, but it was also an amusing expression of
Chinese protocol; being special envoy he, of course, took prece­
dence and it was quite in conformity with Chinese official pro-
to^col that the highest dignitary should appear the last.
I remember the ten days went by quickly and during that
interval we had dinner parties and did some sightseeing. Of
course, we realized that we had been invited there by the mission
by Mr, TTang personally, as a token of special interest in
Chinese students, as his speech to them at the dinner party
clearly indicated. It was not known to us how well the mini­
ster was kept informed of the discussions between the special
envoy and the American government. Nor did we know how keenly
Mr. TTang felt the need of consulting the minister. In any
case, soon after Mr. Tfang left Washington for Europe, Dr.
Wu TTing-fang was recalled. Chang Ying-tTang, one of Mr.
TTangTs friends and supporters, who served formerly as one of
his secretaries, was appointed minister to Washington. Mr.
Chang had been Mr. TTangTs chief counsellor in Peking. He
had been to India and as a result of Mr. TTangTs recommendation,
had been appointed resident general in Lhasa.
I may add in this connection that Dr. Wu TTing-fang
as Chinese minister was very popular in the United States. He
was invited to speak in different parts of the country and his
speeches were very much appreciated. Some of his speeches were
printed in a collection of the world’s best orators. I remember
attending a few meetings where he spoke and being very much
impressed by the scholarly character of his speeches. It was
said later that it had been elaborated greatly by his counsellor
Dr. Jung K’uei. What always struck me as striking whenever I
attended Dr. WuTs addresses was not only the scholarly quality
of his speeches but his personal appearance. He always appeared
in gorgeous Chinese robes, with an equally gorgeous vest over
his long gown made of imperial satin and he always wore a
Chinese skull cap, with a great big gem in front. His appearanc
was both imposing and impressive. I remember he was always well
received by the American audience, I suppose both for being a
rare spectacle as well as a good speaker.
 Coming now to your question about the political opinions
of Chinese students, I have the clear impression that the
Chinese students in those days did not belong to any party* They
were interested as Chinese in the welfare of their fatherland.
I would say that generally speaking, political opinions were not
voiced very much. The Chinese Students1 Alliance took care that
anything that was proposed should be above partly-. Therefore,
it was not difficult to get almost unanimous support if a tele­
gram was proposed to be sent to the Peking Government on a
current question. The years between 1905 and 1911 were an in­
teresting period in the history of China, crowded with momen­
tous political events. The government under the Manchu Dynasty
had announced its firm intention to study and bring about con­
stitutional government. That was the demand of the people of
China. V/hile the TTung-meng-hui under Dr. Sun had a definite
program to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty and restore China to the
Chinese people, publicly the issue was never raised among the
student body. There was never, as far as I recall, an open de­
bate between those advocating a republic and those favoring a
constitutional monarchy. I think a public debate was purposely
avoided at Chinese students1 conferences. We knew, of course,
that the whole student body could not have one opinion on the
subject.
What did we say in the telegrams to the Peking Government?
Well, the first telegram I remember was sent in support of the
boycott of Japanese goods in retaliation for the violation of
Chinese law by a Japanese steamer, the Ichi Maru, in 1906, It
was quite a diplomatic incident between China and Japan, When an
issue became a subject of controversy in China, much debated
in the Chinese press, the student body would express its views in
the name of its organization. In February, 1911, the Chinese
StudentsT Alliance sent two wires in support of the movement for
the immediate convocation of Parliament or the summoning of a
special session of the National Assembly.
W
im .
There have been students who belonged to the Tung-meng-
A
hui, but they certainly did not make known their membership.
Speaking of the T’ung-meng-hui, I recall meeting Sun Tat-sen, I
think in the fall of 1909. I was introduced to him by V/. F. Chen
in his room. Just the three of us. We had a pleasant cha-^ then
went to a Chinese restaurant on 125th Street. We had a meal
together and then came back. Dr. Sun did most of the talking;
I was fascinated by what he was saying. He appeared to have sound
reasons for organizing a political party believing that every­
body interested in the welfare of the country should belong to
that party. But he did not explain fully what program such a
party should have. I knew that he had been agitating for the
overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the founding of a republic
largely on the model of the United States. But he did not speak
openly for it. I suppose the reason was that he was fully
aware that this was a controversial subject and he did not know
what my sentiments were. Certainly, as I recall, he did not
speak out for a republic. He spoke of the need to build up
China as a great power and maintained that China had all the
elements of a great power. special stress on the impor­
tance of industrialization and economic development.
He did say that some day there must be a revolution
in order to bring about the overthrow of the Manchus. He said
that once he had the support of the people and an organized
armed force, there would be certain victory. I remember he ex­
plained how easy it was to march with this army from the south
of China to Peking, although it would be a distance of twelve to
fifteen thoiwatm miles. I was particularly impressed by the
knowledge he showed of the geography of the country. He would
name one tom after another. In a general way, he said that
there must be a revolution and when this revolution started a
/

well organized armed force would have no difficulty marching

on Peking. He said he would start either from Canton or
Kweilin. He would then say that in such and such a place there
would be a river, in another place there would be a mountain of
such altitude. Yes, youTre right, this was the embryo of the
idea of the Northern Expedition. I suppose the idea survived
and was carried out even after his death.
 Several things impressed me very much* He mildly
urged that every thinking Chinese should join the revolutionary
party to bring about the downfall of the Manchus and work for the
salvation of the country* But he was not outspoken. He knew,
I suppose, that that was a subject which any serious-minded young
Chinese would have to think over. IJhat he wanted was evidently
to sow the seed of his faith in this cause. Another impression
I had wasrhis magnetic personality. He had a wrarmth of feeling and
a friendliness that were really disarming. He made me feel that
he was just a friend. I suppose he took care that nobody should
be overawed in his presence and he certainly succeeded! Our
conversation lasted till three oTclock in the morning. He
did not get tired. W. F. Chen and I were fascinated. We listened
and also put questions to him. Of course, maybe it was a re­
laxation for him to talk to young Chinese students.
His real work was to enlist the support of the overseas
Chinese Community in Chinatown.
 My studies for a college degree were completed at the
end of 1903, This created quite an interesting problem for me*
Towards the end of my junior year, I recall, I got a notice from
the registrar saying that I had completed the required 124
points - actually I think I had completed 126 points - and that
therefore I was qualified to graduate. I was asked to report
to the registrar for making the usual arrangements for gradua­
tion. I went and told him to his surprise that I did not want
to graduate. He said, "Are you sure you donTt want to graduate?
Why did you come to Columbia at all?" Well, I told him that I
wanted to graduate with my own class, 1909, to which I felt very
much attached, particularly because of several responsibilities
I had assumed such as the editorship of the Spectator, a job I
wanted to do very much, and membership on the Student Board of
Representatives, and the Senior Society of Nacoms. I wanted to
be able to participate in all those organizations and undertakings.
It was perhaps a boyish idea, but at that time I felt very strongly
that I should not graduate except with my own class. The regis­
trar said he didn’t see how I could refuse to be graduated be-
causejd, according to the regulations / I had fulfilled all the
requirements. Since I insisted and since he appreciated my rea­
son for not wanting to graduate that year, he said he would think
it over and have another talk with me. So this matter was left
in suspense for two or three days. Suddenly I got a postcard
asking me to call at his office. I went and he told me trium­
phantly that he had found a way. He said I could refuse to pay
the ii>25.0G graduation fee. Then he would take my name out, point­
ing out in his report that I had failed to fulfill all the re­
quirements for graduation.
Oh, by the way.there was another experience which I
should relate speaking of requirements for graduation. There
was quite a serious difficulty which I encountered, namely,
the required course in physical education which was something
new. The actual classwork was not difficult but I had some
difficulty passing the swimming test. Although every week I
joined my class in swimming, I found it difficult to dive from
the tower. As time went on, my instructor felt anxious because
practically everyone in my class had passed. The year was
drawing to a close. I still had not taken the examination be­
cause I kept putting it off. Finally he told me bluntly, "Koo,
you know that the swimming examination is just as important as
any other course on the college curriculum. If you do not want
C
ft '-A

to take it, you simply could not graduate.ft That scared me and
I said I would do it sometime the following week. He said the
following week would be the last chance I would have and suggest­
ed that I do it the following Monday and not put it off to the
later part of the week. I went Monday and I passed most of the
test: swimming with breast strokes, you see, from one end of the
of "thn pool to the other; I swam on my back; sidestroke; every­
thing, Then finally I had to go up to the tower and dive down,
I went up and came down without diving. He said, "WhatTs the
matter?" I said that I couldnft do it, "No, no," he saidf"You
come with me," And so he said, "Jump, jump!" I couldn’t do it.
I just came down instead. He came down and grabbed me and said,
"You come up." I got up to the tower nnd the third time it
somehow seemed even higher than ever before. He said, "Now,
be courageous, close your eyes and jump." He said, "I know you
can’t dive headonward but you just step right out with your
eyes shut." I did and plunged right in. I remember very well
that my feet touched bottom^__I^got so scared^ But I popped
right up. And the moment I popped up, I swam to the ladder, got
out, and said,"What do you think of it?" "Well," he said, "You
did it but you did it very clumsily." That was the last hurdle
in graduating from Columbia College.
From the beginning of 1909, I registered as a student
in the Law School and as a post-graduate student in the Depart­
ment of Political Science. I took up law on the advice of
Professor Moore, my professor in my major field, which was
international law and diplomacy. As I hatf£ said before, I often
went to Professor Moore for advice in connection with my studies.
He took a fatherly interest in me and sometimes spent a great
deal of time discussing what I should or should not do in connection
 with my preparations for a public career* He advised me strongly
that I should register in the Law School not so much to acquire
1k degree of LL*B, but to get a knowledge of the fundamentals
of statutory and common law. In his opinion, t>fce Anglo-American
Common Law was an inexhaustible reservoir of the pronciples of
law which were at the bottom of the Anglo-American judicial
system. He felt strongly that a knowledge of private law would
be of great help later in my career dealing with international
law and diplomacy as he had found out in his own experience.
He not only cited as evidence of his conviction the great work
which he edited and compiled, International Arbitrations, but
recalled to me how essential he found a knowledge of law in
dealing with practical, concrete problems which arose in the
foreign relations of any country, as he had found in the power
relations of the United States. As you know, he was assistant
secretary of state for several years and at one time was acting
secretary of state. I studied in the Law School for two years
and followed the curriculum, that is, I took every course ex­
cept those relating to procedure.
My studies in my major field, international diplomacy,
were under Professor John B. Moore. I took two minors - consti­
tutional and administrative law under Professor Goodnow and govern­
ment under Professor Beard. I consulted Professor Moore as to
whether it would be necessary to work for an M. A. jn answer
to my inquiry, Professor Moore said that if I wanted to take an
M. A. degree, all I had to do was to write a thesis. So I decided
to work for an M. first. Professor Moore assigned
a subject for my thesis: "History and Law of the Case of TCalderaf.T!
Now I would like to take up the topic of my prepara­
tions for the Ph. D. and my post-graduate studies in general
at Columbia. It had always been my desire to continue my studies
after graduation from Columbia College. As I stated before, the
requisite number of credits had been fulfil]ed at the end of
three years. So, in my senior year at Columbia College, I was
really doing post-graduate work. In 1909, I obtained a Master’s
Degree along with my B. A.
The subject of my doctoral dissertation was "Alien
Claims against the Chinese Government", a subject which Profes­
sor Moore said was of great practical importance and concerning
which very little had been written. Having compiled his monumental
work, International Arbitrations, which deals with international
claims of one government against another or a group of governments
against another^ Professor Moore was, of course, deeply interested
in this subject. He felt that something should be written to carry
the thought a step further and produce something in international
jurisprudence which would stimulate the interest of other
students of international law. I remember he suggested something
along the same line to S. M. Borchald. Borchald and I worked in
the same seminar room, the two of us facing each other, and we
discussed and argued and debated various aspects of our studies.
He later took up teaching at Yale University, became professor
of international law there, and published that standard work on the
diplomatic protection of American citizens abroad.
[ worked on my subject for two years trying to collect
all the relevant data. It was a new subject and a relatively
new field. The Chinese sources were not too well organized, but
I had to work on them as part of the primary sources. Other
sources were the British parliamentary reports which are known
generally as the Blue Book; the reports of the French Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies, known generally
as the fellow Book; and similarly, the Black Book of the German
Foreign Office. In that respect the Columbia library was very
good, and I spent about two years in the basement of Low Library
going through the different source books and marking the pas­
sages to be copied. I typed myself and also got a typist to
help.
VJhile this work was going on, I was interested in many
extra-campus activities such as the Chinese Students1 Alliance^
the Chinese Students Monthly, the political events going on in
China, the Chinese StudentsT Summer Conferences. Following the
outbreak of the Revolution in 1911, I suddenly realized that
three years had elapsed since the completion of my undergraduate
studies and I had not yet started writing my dissertation. Somehow
or other the Revolution opened a new vision of opportunities
for young people trained abroad to serve the country* This
vision dawned on me with great force, the more so because,
theretofore, I had had little inclination towards entering the
Chinese Imperial Government Service, even though my father was
most anxious that I should do so and had already taken steps to
prepare for my mandarin career* I remember the Imperial Govern­
ment went quite far in its attempts to encourage the return of
Chinese students from abroad and to enlist their services. Many
of my friends and former schoolmates, such as Pang-sheng Chu and
Carlos Sun, who had come abroad with me, Samuel Young, and
Fong Sec, who studied in Teachers1 College about the time that
I was attending Columbia College, Dr* W* W. Yen and Mr. Alfred
Sze, who had already joined the civil service of China, had
taken part in the imperial examination set up especially for the
purpose of enlisting returned students from abroad.
I had always been interested in diplomatic relations and
had wanted to improve the conduct of ChinaTs foreign affairs, but
I wasntt very keen on entering official life, which was then
very much criticized by public opinion. My early determination
to enter the foreign service had been left in abeyance, especially
after Carlos Sun argued with me in favor of a professional career.
After the first year at Columbia I had made up my mind that a
professional career would not be interesting to me. And as I
 worked on the Spectator and on the Chinese Students1 Monthly.
I became increasingly interested in writing. I had the vague
notion of founding a Chinese newspaper in China. Later, as I
took up law, I had the idea of taking up legal practice. These
thoughts, I suppose, passed through my mind for a period. As
you will see later, I was led to give them up altogether as the
Revolution took place and the spirit to serve the country was
quickened once more.
i.'7hat was the reaction of the Chinese students in
America to news of the Uprising? The news came as a great
surprise. I remember for several days we lost interest in our
studies and concentrated on the news, buying one edition after
another of the afternoon and evening papers and sometimes tele­
phoning the Herald office for more information. The Revolution
impressed us as having succeeded quite easily. We felt that
the mutiny of the Imperial troops at Hankow was a very good signal
of the cause, because these troops were considered part of
for the success p-f the model army that the government relied upon
to uphold the throne. A part of it, I think^was under the com­
mand of a Manchu general. The deputy commander was Li YUan-hung.
When these troops, I think it was one division, revolted at
Wu-chTang, the Manchu general disappeared and the deputy general
as far as we knew at this end, was asked to assume command and he
did. We knew the revolution did not take place according to
schedule. Some of the students had a sort of pipeline to the
 W-Srhe TTung-meng-hui, you see, men like V/. F. Chen and S. T.
Kang, V/. F. Chen was the man who introduced Dr. Sun Yat-sen
to me. S. T. Kang was a mining student; I think he was also
Cantonese. I think they had pipelines through the TTung-meng-
hui in Chinatown.
The insurrection impressed us as being so effective
that vie felt the revolution was sure to succeed. That was our
immediate reaction. Later, our hearts sank when the government
began to send troops down to Hankow to fight the rebels. For
several days we held our breath, eagerly waiting for more news
and hoping that the revolutionary cause would still succeed in
spite of the measures of suppression.
The Revolution intensified my desire to return to
China. I remember I went to my professor and consulted him on
the taking of the oral examination for the Ph. D., and the
necessary preparations. From time to time, of course, I reported
to Professor Moore about my findings in digging out data for
my dissertation. ihis was more laborious than I had expected. V/ith
a full-time typist supplementing my own typing, the data cards
began to pile up. I was very anxious to get on with my work.
I submitted one day an outline of my dissertation. I remember
there were nine chapters and an introduction. The main burden
of the proposed dissertation was to summarize all the cases
of foreign claims against China from the beginning of intercourse
with foreign countries. The introductory chapter was designed
to provide a general background of relations between China
and foreign countries, the status of foreigners, the nature
of the treaties binding on China and the extra-territorial re­
gime under which foreigners lived in China. Other chapters were
terr designed to evolve some general principles applied in the
settlement of those claims, the rules for the assessment of
damages, the mode of payment, the question of interest, and
differences between government and individual claims against the
Chinese Government. The proposed table of contents was accepted
as satisfactory with a few suggestions for revision, and that
marked a definite step forward in the preparatory work.
In the fall of 1911, especially after the outbreak of

the Revolution in October, I began to write seriously and to

review the books I had studied, the lectures I had attended, and

the courses of the past year as preparation for the oral ex­

amination for the Ph. D, The few months that followed the

Revolution constituted a period of intensive work. It was not

long before I felt that I was making good progress, while follow­

ing as much as possible the course of events ih China.

About the middle of February fl912j I received an

official letter from the Chinese Legation in Washington inviting
me to make a call on Minister Chang Ying-tfang. Not knowing in
the least what it was all about, I went down within a few days
over a weekend. There, to my great surprise, I was informed by the
minister that he had received a telegram from the secretary-
general of President Yiian-Shih-kfai; conveying an invitation to
me from the President to join his office as English secretary.
It came so suddenly, like a bolt out of the blue
sky, that I was somewhat taken aback and unable to picture^myself
the nature and requirements of this post. A president was some­
thing new in China; the Republic itself was a new thing. I
think Dr. Sun Yat-sen had just resigned in favor of President
Yuan Shih-k'ai and, I suppose, it was then that they began to
think about the organization of the office of the president. It
was a pleasant surprise to me, but I didn’t jump at the offer.
In fact, I saw a lot of difficulties in the way of immediate
acceptance. I told the minister that I appreciated the offer
as a very agreeable surprise, but that I could not leave the
United States because I was in the midst of preparations for the
Ph. D, degree. I asked him to telegraph back that I was very
sorry that due to my work at Columbia, which I wanted to finish
and which I could not finish until the summer, I was not able
to accept. The minister said the telegram came in such positive
terms and that it was such a great opportunity for a young man
to start his career with such a post that he thought I should
not refuse it. He even said that I could come back later to
finish my Ph. D. work. He urged me to accept and return to help
the new government* But I saw mountains of difficulties because
at the time it was far more important to me to complete my
work at Columbia once and for all. I saw very clearly that
should my academic work be interrupted, it would be very diffi­
cult for me to pick it up again and complete the requirements
later. So I left the minister very much disappointed. He told
me that he would telegraph back what I had said. He felt equally
certain, however, that my refusal would not be accepted.
I came back' to New York and at once went to Professor
Moore to report what had happened. He appeared to be very much
surprised, almost upset, judging by his expression, that I should
have turned down the offer without first consulting him. I
said that I had had no idea why I was invited to visit Washington
and that it was only after my arrival that I learned of the offer
I said that I wanted to complete my studies with him. Then he
gave me a lecture. He said he had always understood that I was
studying for the Ph. D., in preparation for a public career to
serve my country, and that this was a very great opportunity for
a young man to enter his country’s service and to take part
especially in the post-revolutionary work of reconstruction and
development, a work which China as a nation needed very much in
order to occupy again a legitimate, proper place in the family
of nations. I said I was left under the impression that Peking
would not accept my refusal and, according to the minister, the
offer was sure to be renewed. The professor therefore cau­
tioned me that if the offer should come again, I must not de­
cline it and that I must first have a talk with him.
I asked him about the oral examination because I felt
that time was passing rapidly. It was just as important and
indispensable a requirement as the presentation of a dissertation.
He said that as far as he was concerned, he was ready to hold
the oral examination any time I wanted and was ready for it. But
he said that there were two other professors who had charge of
my minor studies. He would consult them and suggested I should
also talk it over with them. Two or three days later, I reported
to him that my talks with them were satisfactory and that it
was entirely up to me to suggest a date. I left the matter at
that point without suggesting a date.
Before very long, I think before a week had passed, an
official letter came from t£*e- Minister Chang, enclosing a copy
of a telegram which he had received from Peking in reply to his
telegram, in which the minister was asked to urge me to accept.
I rushed to Professor Moore and told him the news. He v/as de­
lighted. He said that that settled everything for me and that I
must go. In return I raised a question - how about my disserta­
tion and my oral examination? He said the oral examination could
be held any day I wanted it. About the dissertation, he wanted to
know how far I had gone. He asked me to give hirn what I had
already written so that he could go over it and let me know
what he thought of it. I did exactly as he told me and pre­
sented him with four chapters - the introduction and three
chapters that I had already completed. Two days later he sent
for me and told methat he had read all the chapters I had given
him. He thought that the introductory chapter which provided
background material on the position of foreign powers in China
was enough to qualify as a dissertation. It would make, he said,
an attractive volume on the subject. He had discussed the matter
with the two other professors and they agreed with him. In other
words, he would accept the introductory chapter as my dissertation
with the title, of course, modified. He told me that I could
complete the other chapters later; they could form a separate
book altogether. He was rather pleased with the work that I
had been doing because it was along the lines he had suggested
and had expected that I should develop. So the two things which
I had uppermost in my mind - the oral examination and the written
dissertation - were settled.
I wrote the Chinese minister saying that after Considera
tion of the matter and consultation with my professors, it was pos
sible for me to leave for China, but not before a month at the
earliest. In his letter, he had asked me to let him know the
date of my departure. He wanted me to go back by the shortest
route possible.
I remember my first oral was held some time in March •
As usual it was a nerve-racking affair xor tne prospective candi­
date. I remember I reviewed all the books and lectures of the
past four, five, or six years. In accordance with custom, the
examination could be and was attended by members of the faculty
who had no specific charge of my major or minor. But since 1
was a student in practically every course given in the Depart­
ment of Political Science, I was a pupil of all the professors
there. So quite a few attended, including Professor Seligman
and Professor Ptobinson, as well as my minor professors, Goodnow
and Beard, and, of course, Professor Noore, also one or two
professors from the Law School who had given lectures in the
post-graduate department.
I was somewhat nervous and wondered what questions
would be put to me. First, Professor Moore examined me. I
remember he asked me to explain my views of what were and should
be the criteria for recognition of new governments, evidently
with a thought to the question of recognition of the new Chinese
government. I gave my views to the best of my ability and he
appeared satisfied. Then Professor Goodnow was asked to examine
me. To my great surprise, he did not ask any question that v/as
discussed in his classroom - I had studied at least tv/o years
under him, taking all the courses that he gave. I remember dis­
tinctly the question that took me by surprise. He asked me what
features of the American Constitution appealed to me as being
suitable for adoption in China, from the viewpoint of the in­
terests of China and the requirements of the Chinese nation. It
was a stimulating question, and 1 remember I took a pause to
reflect a little before I gave my answer. As far as I c^n re­
call now, I said that the separation of power was a fundamental
theory which would do well in a country that was just starting
on its road to democracy. Professor Beard asked a few questions.
He said that judging from what I said, I was in favor of the
republican form of government and asked whether I could give
reasons for it. I gave my views and he seemed to be satisfied.
I donTt know whether he agreed with me altogether, but he also
asked to what extent the theory could be established in China, I
gave my answer in a brief statement expressing my appreciation of
the supremacy of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting
the Constitution and settling constitutional differences. That
was a principle which established the rule of law on the highest
basis. Professor Seligman asked some questions but I cannot re­
call them now.
The examination lasted a little over two hours and as
usual the professors retired for consultation. I was left sitting
in my chair with a few spectators, mainly, I think, students of
the graduate department. From the nature of the questions asked
and the answers I had given, I could not feel sure that I had
passed, but after fifteen or twenty minutes they came out, announcing
that I had passed the examination. At this point I vaguely re­
call that Professor Beard or Professor Moore made an announcement.
Then there was the question of my dissertation. As
I stated already, Professor Moore was quite satisfied with what
I called the introductory chapter. It turned out to be a fairly
full account of the rights and obligations under the treaties of
the foreign powers and foreign nationals in China and the parti­
cular regime of extraterritoriality and consular jurisdiction
under which foreign nationals lived, traded, worked or preached.
There was the question of technical arrangements which Professor
Moore thoughtfully suggested that I should think over. Of course,
I had had no experience and did not know what to do. Time was
so short. It would require some time to see to the printing and
to find a publisher. Then there was the proofreading. I raised
all these questions. Professor Moore said that Professor Beard
was the best man to advise me and he suggested that I should have
a talk with him. He knew that Professor Beard v/as very much in­
terested in me and was most favorably disposed to render all pos­
sible help.
I arranged to see Professor Beard, I think, the following
day. He gave me all kinds of encouragement, expressing his great
satisfaction that I had been called to the service of my country.
He emphasized that it v/as a great opportunity for me and a very
 good thing for Columbia also. As to practical questions, he asked
me to leave them to him, I think he said he was connected with
the editorial board of Columbia University Press, or was on the
Board of Trustees* He said he could make arrangements with
Columbia University Press to undertake the printing and the publi­
cation, with whatever business arrangement that would be necessary,
I told him that this, by which he meant, I suppose, the cost of
printing^ would cause no difficulty, I said I had to leave very
shortly and would not even have time to do the proofreading, which
I knew was quite an undertaking from my experience on the Columbia
Spectator, He assured me that this would present no problem and
that Mrs. Beard would be very glad to take on the task. He said
that the only thing about which neither he nor Mrs. Beard could do
anything was the preface. That I must write myself. But I said
I was busy preparing to leave and that I could not begin to write,
at the earliest, until I was on board ship crossing the Atlantic.
(/
He said that would be alright. If I could send the preface back
kid
as soon as Islanded in England, he would get it in time to have
it printed and get the dissertation out before comnencement so
that I would get my degree conferred in the early part of June.
I wrote the preface in mid-Atlantic. I remember it was a fairly
brief preface and I mailed it back from England. Thus, all
preliminaries in connection with the dissertation were satis­
factorily disposed of.
 Before I left, I suggested to Minister Chang to
telegraph to Peking my opinion that it would be very useful for
me t^ buy a certain number of important reference books not
only for my work, but with a view to establishing some scrt of
reference library. He saw the soundness of the suggestio . and
said he would telegraph and ask for some money. In due course,
a special allowance of something like <#500*00 arrived along with
my passage money. So, when I went to London, I purchased a set
of British Foreign State Papers going back to the beginning of
the 19th century. They were indispensable sourcebooks for any
student of foreign relations because they contain the most im­
portant, most basic diplomatic documents. Most years one big/
fat volume was published; other years two or even three volumes
were published. It was quite a bulky collection. In addition
I also bought the Parliamentary Reportsj the so-called Blue Books,
having any bearing on China. Just before I left America, I had
placed an order for a set of the United States Foreign Relations.
I also secured a set of diplomatic correspondence of the American
Revolution which antedated and was the predecessor of the Foreign
Relations, and a set of the United States Supreme Court decisions
and reports. They were very useful. In France I got a set of
the Yellow Books. I remember the prices of those sourcebooks were
relatively low because they were all government publications. I
think the United States Foreign Relations cost something like a
dollar a volume. I made arrangements for them to be shipped by
sea to Pekin^
I mention this because there was nothing of the kind in
Peking, except possibly the archives or libraries of the
foreign legations, I was very glad to have thought of it. Shortly
after my arrival in Peking, the books also arrived, La-freg-y--a-s
they became the nucleus of a working library in the Foreign Office, bhr,a±
I was made concurrently to join the Foreign Ministry, along with
my post in the presidents office^ I was assigned to be a kind
of librarian, I stayed four years in the Foreign Office and was
responsible for building up the library. I managed to get some
modest appropriations from the Foreign Ministry. The library
became the foundation of the Foreign Ministry1s special library.
At the same time, I was promoting the formation of an
association of returned students from America and Europe in co­
operation with Dr. fpaul D]J Reinsch. I was able to push for­
ward this idea of consolidation of the various returned students.
With an appropriation from the Carnegie Peace Foundation through
the efforts of Dr. Reinsch, we started a political science library,
which became quite a well-developed library placed under the charge
of Dr. Yuan T’ung-li. Later on, I will come to the formation of
the association.
From London I went to Paris and then to Berlin. I travel­
led by train, and changed trains, I think, at Warsaw. I took the
^frans-Siberian Railroad back to Peking, arriving there toward the
end of April.
 FILMED
BY

^Microfilming

Corporation of
America
 i

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Volume II:

First Decade as Diplomat (19.12-1922)

This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Ford Foundation and the National
Endowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the Fast Asian Institute.

Copyright C 1976, The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the East Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

Volume II: First Decade as Diplomat (1912-1922)

Interviewers: Julie How and T. K. Tong

Editors: Julie How and Donald Sutton

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Prologue: Arrival in China and Initial Impressions--Spring, 1912

A. Peking in the Early Years of the Republic

B. My First Mission in Washington, 1915-1919

C. The Paris Peace Conference

My First Mission to London, and the Washington

Conference
 The journey from Warwaw to Peking, which l took in the

latter part of April, 1912, lasted about thirteen days. I appre­

ciated the broad-gauge railroad and the comfortable cars. although

the trip itself was somewhat tedious]. But my interest intensified when

I reached Manchouli, the port of entr> on the frontier between China

and Russia. After a stop for formalities, the train went right

through. All along the railway line there were signs both in Russian i

and in Chinese. This was true as far down as Ch'ang-th'un. Looking

out the windows of my compartment, I could see soniethiig of the

Russian influence in North Manchuria-Russian rail ray guards, Russian

railway employees, and Russian signboards in front of Russian owned

factories, principally in Harbin. After Ch'ang-ch'un the situation was

similar, except that the signboards were in Japanese and Chinese and tin*

railway guards were Japanese. The presence of these foreign influences

reminded me of and confirmed what I had studied concerning the history

of China's foreign relations with Russia and Japan in Manchuria.

I wondered what I would find in Peking and what sort of

atmosphere --,physical, social and official -- would greet me. This

was not merely my entry into ^Chinese official life; it was my first

visit to North China. There were a great many differences in climate,

social customs, and life in general between North China and the

Yangtze Valley in South China.

From Mukden on, my interest was intensified by two

 X

acqaintances I mot on the train. They were both Chinese: one,

an elderly man who told me he was assistant traffic manager of
the Peking-Mukden Hailway; the other, his young daughter. They
were both very sympathetic and friendly, especially the old man.
It was almost embarrassing to me, because he insisted that I should
stop over in Tientsin and spend a few days as his guest, saying
that since it was my first visit to North China, he would like to
show me around the city. But I excused myself because I was
anxious to get to Peking. I went on from Tientsin to Peking.
I was met at the Peking station by two or three secre­
taries sent by Mr. T’ang Shao-i, then the premier, and I was es­
corted to the Prime MinisterTs Office, which was in the School of
Nobles in the northeastern corner of the city. But I didn’t
stop there. I had myself conducted to the Wagons-Lit Hotel in
the Legation Quarter where I registered for a room. I did not
stop at the Prime Minister’s Office because the prime minister was
not present. I was told he was with the president. I asked the
two secretaries to arrange for my oall on Mr. T’ang and they
promised to let me know.
The following morning I got word that Mr. T’ang would
take me to see the president in the afternoon around four o’clock,
but it wasn’t made clear to me at what time I was to go to the
Prime Minister’s Office. I waited for further information. As
it was approaching four o’clock, I became a little anxious about
the arrangement. While I was talking with the hotel manager,
asking for information on how to get to the Prime .Minister’s
Office, a servant rushed in to say that His Excellency Mr.
T’ang had come to see me. I was flabbergasted and confused,
because I was not expecting a visit from him. 1 had fully in­
tended to go and see him. He came and I conducted him to the
sitting room in the hotel. I guess we sat down for about five
minutes or so. He said he was on his way to the President’s
Office and had come to take me to introduce me to the President.
I got into his carriage and we went to the President’s Office.
It was a large office inside the Winter Palace, lie
told the president that I was Mr. Koo, who had just arrived from
the United States on the order of the president. I made my
bow which he returned, and then he asked me to sit down opposite
his desk. Mr. T’ang was on his right, in an armchair, and they
began a conversation about the appointment of the governor of
Chihli Province. I listened without understanding the back­
ground or importance of this appointment. After they finished
the subject, apparently without coming to a conclusion, Mr.
T’ang told the president that while I would be serving in the
President’s Office, he was to make me also one of his secretaries
This did not seem to please the president, and in an animated ton
he said, ’’But I sent for Mr. Koo. You recommended him. It was
all to help ME here in the office as my secretary.” './hereupon
Mr. T'ang said. "Well, lie would not have much to do in your office,

and 1 think he could run between the two places.

I had vaguely suspected that Mr. T ang had recommended me,

hut 1 had had no opportunity to check this. But there it was made

clear to me that Mr. T;ang had recommended not only me but, I think,

a number of other students. He must have reviewed that list of forty

students whom he had invited, and made a rpport to the President.

1 learned afterwards that before Mr. T;ang left for the United

States, Yd an Shih-k'ai had told him to look out for bright young men,

with a view to recommending them for service in China. Evidently, this

was one of the purposed of Mr. T!ang's mission. Of course, the scene

had changed radically from the tire Mr. T;ang left China as special envoy.

Among others recommended bb Mr. T'ang was a Nanking boy, Box Tseng.

| Tseng Kuang-jang]. He married the sixth daughter of Ts'ai Shu-t ang,

one of Mr. T'ang's closest friends who had gone abroad with him in the

late seventies. Now that was one who had also been enlisted in the

service of the Prime M nisters' Office. There were others who came to

join the government later. They must have been distributed, I suppose ,

to the various ministries. Evidently for appointment to the President's

Office and for the Prime Minister's Office, only certain kinds of

people were qualified - people who had studies political science or

international law, diplomacy, or the humanities.

 President YUan and Prime Minister T'ang seemed to have

a little friendly argument over me. Of course, I kept respect­

fully silent and finally, when Mr. T'ang offered a compromise, the

President said that it perhaps would do.

My first impressions of Yttan Shih-k'ai? It was my iirst

meeting with him. He at once impressed me as being a very strong

and powerful personality. He appeared a man of great ambit ion and

determination, a born leader of men. Another tiling which struck rne ver

much was the fraternal terms in which he and Mr. T'ang addressed

each other. Mr. T'ang would address Yttan Shih-k'ai as "Mr. President",

sometimes "My elder brother"; the President invariably addressed Mr.

T'ang as "Lao-ti" (younger brother).

That was the beginning of my official life. I was taken back

to my hotel in Mr. T'ang's car. Although I had asked him to excuse me

and said that I would find my own way back, he insisted on taking rne

back. It was not until two or three days later that I saw him again

He suggested that I should move into the Prime Minister's Office and

said that he had instructed the secretary in charge of general affairs

to provide me with living quarters. I moved in there in due time.

Life at the Prime Minister's Office was quite different from

what I had been accustomed to in the previous seven or eight years In

America. At Columbia I stayed in Hartley Hall, even

 u

149

JiH ;» graduate student. I think I spent one year in Livingston Hall, and

six years in Hartley. Back from the United States and far away from my

home in Shanghai, with no relatives near me, living at the Prime Minister's

Office was quite an experience. In a way it reminded me of life in a

St. John's dormitory. Not only the customs but the food itself was very

different from that in Shanghai. The northerners loved cereals, wheat

flour, and "hsiao-mi" - birds' food, they call it in the south. The

cooking, of course, was all done Peking style But I was a young man and

not too particular, yet finding it quite trying, at least for the first

few days .

My stay in Peking was full of interesting impressions It was

my first visit, as I have said. Everything - the dresses of the people,

the language, the customs, the atmosphere, the appearance of the streets -

seemed so different In Peking. A great part of the population was of

Manchu descent. They spoke Mandarin with a soft accent It was pure Mandarin,

just as the people of Paris speak French with that Parisian accent As

a rule, the men were still wearing long queues; those who apeared here

and there without queues were exceptions. The women

appeared to be so different from t ose in ihan^hai. v>orne of tfu'm
wore dresses falling just below the knee. Vhry were, ' • ne o e,
of the humbler classes. ;omen from the better cl mse » tp* “ ; re i
in the vch T i-p’ao''fChinese dressesj with a vest in tie ''enUtr
and with a row of buttons just below their shoulder. rsur
headdress was most fascinating. It was something like tie
Japanese headdress, but not so cumbersome or heavy,
of greeting one another, whether men or women, was particularly
noteworthy. They would curtsey to each other, a custom which wa ;
not seoaat all in and around Jhanghai. in Peking it was considered
to be the recognized way of greeting.
The restaurants served mostly Peking food, and it was
not at every restaurant that one could obtain well-boiled rice.
The staple food was made of flour, wheat^and millet, and other
grains. The whole atmosphere was interesting. There was that
imposing Forbidden City inside which, we v/ere told, Fmperor
Hsilan-tTung was still living with his royal household. In fact,
outside the gates of the Forbidden City, the Imperial Lunar
Calendar was still used rather than the Gregorian Calendar which
the Republic of China had officially promulgated for the entire
nation.
The transitory character of national life as reflected
in Peking could be seen even in the government gazette. The
date of each issue is marked both in the old and the new calendars.
 IP

151

The double aspect of life, private, popular, and official, was seen at

every turn. The populace of Peking, high and low, showed a tenacious

inclination to preserve the old customs and manners. On the other hand,

there was also in the air a tendency to adopt new, modern customs and

manners. Even during the first two or three weeks, I noticed the continuous

arrival of men of all ages, principally from the south The older men,

as well as the younger ones, came in clothes much more common in the

Yangtze Valley and not a few of them appeared actually in western-style

clothes. Although the tailoring did not have the mark of Saville Row,

one could see as well as feel the influence of new people from different

parts of the country, chiefly the south, as well as the influx of new

ideas. In other words, China appeared to be very much in a stage of

transition from the old regime to a new era.

 )

1S2

A few days after my arrival, a mandate was issued appointing

me and seven others as secretaries to the Prime Minister. It was conslden

quite a distinction for a young man who had just returned trom abroad,

especially since most of his colleagues were in their forties. Some were

in their fifties. A few of them had been secretaries of the State Council

which was the highest governing body in the Empire They had passed

through nearly all the different stages of the imperial examinations

In other words, they were recognized Chinese scholars of high standing

There were one or two educated in modern schools, with whom I was able to

get along somewhat easily. The attitude of the older secretaries was

half paternalistic, half cool. I could understand their attitude because

they had been in public service for twenty

or even thirty years and yet found themselves on the same level
with young people like myself, just returned from abroad.
As the Office of the Prime Minister was just being or­
ganized and the regulations on division of work, rank, and pay.
were still being drafted, it was not clear to me what was to be
my work. Roughly speaking, the older secretaries were assigned
the work of drafting Chinese documents - petitions, telegrams,
dispatches, reports - and I, as the prime Minister told me in
reply to my inquiry, was to take charge of all the correspon­
dence from foreign countries, foreign friends, or official
sources, to the Prime Minister. I was the only one assigned
this work. I was supposed to be capable of handling all foreign-
language correspondence. As I found out later, most of it was
in English. I might say that the older colleagues looked askance
at me because while I was a young man, probably the youngest of ^
eight - I was in my twenties - somehow or other, for a reason I
did not understand, I was placed No. 4 on the list of eight secre­
taries. I found the work unexciting, because it consisted mainly
of personal correspondence to the prime minister from his friends
in foreign governments. Though the subject matter of most of
the correspondence was not personal, the nature of the communi­
cation received was of a personal character. It might be des­
cribed as semi-official.
I found my work relatively vory light, while some of my
older colleagues appeared to carry a heavy burden. I felt very
uncomfortable and went to the prime Minister. I told him that
if he had anything more for me to do, I would be very glad to
undertake it. I also told him that I found my work occupied
very little of my time. His answer was a very enlightening one.
He said, ’’Don’t worry too much about your work, you are just
starting on your official career. Office work is not the only
thing in which you should be interested. Have you seen Peking?
Do you know much about Peking life? Have you been here before?”
to tk-*
All my answers were, of course,^negative. Do he said, ’’Whenever
you have nothing to do, go out with some of the younger clerks.
Box Tseng, who is in charge of general affairs, will prepare
the transportation and organize parties. He is going to take
a party of young people including my daughter to do some sight­
seeing at noon today - you join that. You ought to know some­
thing about Peking.” I said I would gladly do so because I would
like to know something siore about Peking, the people, and their
life, their customs, but I also thought if there was any other
work for me to do, especially something on the Chinese side, I
would like to take it on. He said he would keep the matter in
mind, as he fully appreciated my desire to get as much experience
and to learn as much about official correspondence as possible.
I joined the sightseeing party. Of course, that took
the whole afternoon and I enjoyed it. But when I came back rny
mind was still on my work. I discussed this with some of my
younger colleagues and one of them suggested that I get on a
new committee appointed to draft regulations and to sort out
suggestions and proposals from various provincial authorities -
the governors in the provinces - relating to the question of
levying a patriotic tax. That was something new in China, and
I might be able to contribute to the subject by drawing from my
knowledge of foreign countries. I think one of the older secre­
taries made the suggestion to the Prime Minister who at once
approved it, and so I was made a member of this committee. We
finally got together and began to discuss the great variety of
suggestions made by the provincial governors in their telegrams
responding to the call for ideas. I went through these voluminous
telegrams all couched in the classical Mandarin style, and felt
my shortcomings very keenly. In the first place, I had no spe­
cial knowledge of what a patriotic tax should be and what re­
gulations were necessary to make such a tax a success. For that
matter, my colleagues were no better informed than I, but they
were at least familiar with the form and style of a set of regula­
tions. So I worked hard. We appointed a drafting committee to
make the first draft. I remember the first draft was prepared
by the senior or rather, the oldest, secretary, - that is, the
person heading the list of secretaries - Mr. Hsu Pao-heng. He
had been for many years secretary of the State Council.
 After the regulations were finally passed by the
committee and submitted to the Prime Minister, i was impressed
by several things which have remained fresh in my mind. In the
first place, the patriotic tax was an appealing idea, but I
thought it could not raise a large amount of money. The trea­
sury was depleted and in very difficult straits. In the second
place, I was struck by the fact that the governors or the pro­
vinces had no idea of effective administration. All the answers
came by telegram. I remember one of the longest proposals was
sent by the governor-general of Chihli Province. His office was
in Tientsin, only 75 miles away from Peking. A communication sent
from Tientsin would reach Peking if not the same day, at least the
following morning. Or, if he had chosen to send a special messen­
ger, he could reach Peking the same evening. But no, he pre­
ferred to telegraph his recommendations consisting literally of
thousands of words, probably five or six thousand, and all in
codel The drafting committee had to wait in suspense while the
telegram was decoded. That was one thing which, quite apart
from the question of the patriotic tax ^impressed me very deeply
at the time. I wanted to know why this particular means of
communication was chosen. When I put the point to my senior
colleague, his answer was very enlightening. He said that in
the official world, ordinary communications, no matter how im­
portant their subject, are not given the same attention as a
telegram. In order to provoke attention and urgent considera­
tion, it was the recognized practice of all high officials to
send communications by telegraph. It was perfectly true. My
experience later confirmed what he said. One important reason
for the practice was that official telegrams did not have to be
paid for by the provincial authorities. They were usually
charged. And those accounts were increased from year to year.
They were never collected since the telegraph service was a
government enterprise altogether.
You see how these little things would strike a person
fresh from abroad, while other people in China all took them for
granted - it was the thing to do, nothing unusual about sending
communications by telegraph, regardless of the nearness of the
sender to the receiver. Yes, the wa}^ of doing thipgswere so
different from what I had learned abroad! The contrast was all
the greater because I had left for America when I was a young
boy. It was my first contact with Chinese officialdom, my first
chance to know how Chinese officials carried on their business.
The Secretary-General to the Cabinet was a returned
student from Belgium, Mr. Wei Chfen-tsu. He took a personal in­
terest in me. Not only would he turn over to me for reply mes­
sages which he received in foreign languages, mainly in French, -
some were addressed to him, others addressed to the Prime Minister
but he would also discuss with me life in Peking, particularly e-f
the official world and the problems which the Prime Minister was facing

He was a good Chinese scholar, and his knowledge of conditions in Europe

and Western life made him in my view a well-rounded man for Chinese

government service. As a matter of fact, he was later sent abroad as

minister to Belgium and minister to Germany. He was appointed one of

five plenipotentaries on our delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris,

where we found ourselves colleagues.

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 > f i lkl lf- r//' UNDER YUAN
<ru. ■ • ,

In Peking tiie new government had just been established and I

found that while every attempt was being made to introduce reforms

and make changes in order to follow the elementary principles of

a republican form of government, there was no precedent of any

sort, and the leaders and their staff appeared to be groping in

the dark with very good intentions but with little knowledge of

what should be done. The atmosphere was one of expectation for

change and there was curiosity as to how the relations between

the government and the Revolutionary Party would develop. Mr. Tang s

function,as Premier, was to modernize the structure of the govern­

ment and also to create a feeling of confidence among the Kuumiwfeang

/ „ • U,' . t\i/c Of kvo-w* s i( I/Cil 5* V\ ( Q- ^ ~
members of thej Revulty. The leaders of Parliament ^

were already in assembly in Peking and important members of the

party were arriving. The reason for this situation originated

^ 1 T— } I ^ ^
in the settlement between the so-called North and the Souths The

old Imperial government represented by Yuan Shih-k'ai at Peking,

but by T'ang Shao-i in Shanghai, had come to an agreement with

the leaders of the iowgwy aPagfey-oE 4i'hc South at the so-called

peace conference in Shanghai. The provision was that Sun Yat-sen

was to resign as President of the Republic and Yuan Shih-k'ai was to

be elected to succeed him. It was done evidently with great

C A t/C
reluctance on the part of the RewieKi4ei«rry“'P«-&ty but that was the

sine qua non for the North. So Dr. Sun Yat-sen loyally executed

his part of the agreement by resigning and the Provisional Assembly

 in Nanking duly elected Yuan Shih-k'ai as Pr (visional President

on the understanding that Mr. T'ang Shao-i was to be Premier. Rut

to put all the conditions of the peace agreement into practice

evidently was not an easy matter. And the fall of I'ang Sbao-i s

cabinet was due principally to the disagreement between him and

Yuan Shih-k'ai over the execution of one of the understandings.

beUi««rT^the president and prime minister.|’xu was clear from

the beginning that it would not be an easy task for I'r. T’ang to

carry out his policies without the Ctfll-hearted support of the

president. On the other hand, it was evident that Or. T’ang’s

views of how a republican form of government should be run did not

coincide with the ideas of the president. Or. T’ang had lived for
^ > /1 i
several years during his most impressionable p^rrod ‘ in the united

States and had visited the country a few times. He was able to

write and read English fluently and had maintained his contacts
with his friends abroad and with events of the outside v/orld.

He had had experience in Chinese official life, but^always

stoo'i for modernization and new methods of administration.
j
President Yuan Shih-kai was in the first place a man

with military background. He belonged entirely to the old school,

al though he had been to Korea as Resident General and

he always had on his staff modern-educated secretaries and

advisors such as Hr. T’ang. His outlook was that of the old

school although when compared with diehards of the conservative

camp, he was considered fairly modern, even liberal. He had

made his name as organizer of the new army and was known also

as a good viceroy of Chihli Province. He was a man of action, a

good administrator, a leader of men, but somehow or other, he did

not like to travel - he had never been south of the Yangtze River.

He was shrewd and knew how to deal with men, but his inclinations

were not in the direction of democratizing the state.

/Ithough they had been sworn brothers for many years and

were very friendly, Mr. T’ang and President Yuan saw many poli­

tical problems from different angles. When they had to deal

with actual problems, a clash was almost inevitable. The im­

mediate issue that created a crisis was the appointment of the

governor of the Province of Chihli, the metropolitan province,

the control of which had from time immemorial been considered

of great importance to Peking. Apparently, in his negotiations

with the TTung-meng-hui, the party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen who had

resigned in favor of President Yuan Shih-kai, Mr. TTang had

 promised to appoint General ./ang Chih-hsian;, a v« teran of thn

T’ung-meng-hui, to be the governor. 're \\ :■ at ^Van 'hih-k' it

was strongly opposed t this suggestion and, quit*' in i cordano*'
with tradition decided that the governor of the iietropol 11an

Province, so close to Peking, should be a man of h':> ov/n faction,

who enjoyed his confidence. He wanted to appoint Phao Ping-ohun,

who was then minister of the interior. Actually, r. ihao’ >

name was put forv/ard as a compromise by President fban PhLh-k’ai.

Evidently he wanted some other man, one of his own proteges, to

fill the post. Mr, T,angTs refusal to accept even Chao Ping-

chun, minister of the interior in his own Cabinet, v/a a the straw
- 3*
which broke the camels back. The quarrel became critical

and irreconcilable. Mr. T’ang sent in his resignation, which was

no surprise to the president, because the controversy had been

going on for some time.

In conformity with the customs of Chinese officialdom,

the president tried to persuade Mr. T’ang to give up his resigna­

tion but that was merely a gesture. Knowing the president's

£■
feeling about the matter, Mr. T’ang left the capital for T/ientsin A

^without even waiting for his resignation to be accepted. The

sudden fall of the cabinet was a disappointment and disillusionwwrnf

to me. It gave me something of a shock but also an insight into

the intricacies of political life - the struggle for power and

the strong feelings which prevailed when it carne to making an

important ppointment.
 :t was understandable, of course, that President Yuan

should have fought tooth and nail for his own man to fill the

post. Chihli Province was the base of his own political power.

He had been viceroy of the province and had organized the imperial

modern army at Hsiao-chan. Many of the official posts in the

province, such as superintendent of customs, collectors of

salt revenue and inland customs, district magistrates, prefects,

were held by his supporters and followers. No wonder he insisted

vfeth such vigor on keeping the province for one of his own men!
/
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T^-was a dlfncuU qilualluh becairgg Yuan Sbtn-1c4-ai-«ev«4f-
jf / \ (/ Ah ^ cv~a. iyv\ r i .j b. ■ Vvu? ' kvy r ^
raaii-Refi 'what a republic mewirt htto
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e&tablished. T, rayself, recall one conversation witfe-
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Yuan Shih-k’ai(ln the Fall of 1912. I went to report to him about

an interview 1 had had with the British Minister on the question

of Tibet. After I finished my report, I naturally rose to leave,

but he asked me to remain for a while and have a talk. One of

the first questions he asked me was how China could ever be a

successful ^Republic and what, after all, was the meaning of

bringing about a successful Republic, given the conditions in China.

I said that it had originated far back in Rome where the Roman

citizens attached great importance to the rights of the citizen

to the elected legislative body. Though Rome did not last very

long as a Republic, the idea revived tv. the Middle Ages where the

emergence of a middle class in the so-called free cities was a sort

of forerunner of democratic government. The free cities were

relatively small in size and their population was not great. The

idea, however, of the rights of citizenship and of political

liberties had been planted in the minds of the people. Those

ideas spread and in the 13th Century in England were the

foundation of British democracy. Although England remained outwardly

a constitutional monarchy, it was, nevertheless, a democracy In

its working, and its origin traced back to the Magna Carta in the

13th century. From there on the so-called Americans (originally

colonial immigrants flrom England) established, after a few

centuries of colonial administration, a Republic, as a result of

their revolution. They succeeded easily because they carried with

them their love of freedom and their concept of rights and liberties

under law. Their ideas spread in Europe, Latin America, and in

recent years to Asia. The conditions in China, I continued, were,

as the President said, very different especially with such a large

country and numerous population. But I said it would only take time

to educate the people in the fundamental principles of a democratic

government.

He asked me about the meaning of a republic. I said the expression

Res Publica meant the public state or the country that belonged to

the people. But he wondered how the people in China could understand

all that. When the Chinese housemaid wanted to clean the house,

she would gather all the dirt and dust and dump it on the public

streets; all she cared was to keep the house clean without any regard

for the condition of the streets. I said that was natural. It was

ignorance on their part; but if the people lacked education, they

certainly loved liberty and it was just that they themselves did

not know how to achieve it. It would be for the government to

introduce laws and institutions with the object of advancing the course
ol democracy. His reply was, how long would that take? Would

that not take centuries to do? So I said it would take time,

but 1 believed it would not take so long. That ended the

conversatIon.

I mention this conversation to indicate that Yuan Shih-k'ai

himself did not understand what a Republic should be like and appa­

rently did not understand why a Republic would necessarily be

better than any other form of government. His administration

showed more and more an inclination toward the restoration of

the monarchy, maintaining the old institutions with himself at the

top as the supreme head. Not only had he no idea or concept

of what a Republic required or how democracy worked, but he did

not seem to indicate any keen desire to put either into practice.

Vm - iww ^

On my arrival in Peking five months after the establishment

of the Republic I had expected to find some radical changes from

the Peking I had read about as a boy; but to my surprise I had

found the atmosphere in the capital very much that of the old

dynasty. Even the officials in the government were in many cases

unchanged. The secretarial staff of the President’s office and

his entourage -- old colleagues, friends and collaborators, all

appeared to me to belong to the old school. They dressed in

old-fashioned costumes with long sleeves covering their hands.

Many of them retained their long nails as a sign of scholarly

refinement. They were -- it seemed — all great scholars, including

two "chuang yuan" ( ) scholars laureate. I felt out of place,

a stranger to them and in a strange atmosphere myself. As an

example, all the official communications, correspondent* 5; wore --

and had to be -- in the old forms. The only changes were in the

manner of addressing and in the dating,which was now in accordance

with the new calendar.

There was discontent among the members of the provisional

Parliament with the manner in which the government was being run,

and some of them did not hesitate to state forcefully that if was

the duty of the parliament to control the action of the government

~ a
and to constrain the government to alter its ancient procedure and

methods in order to conform more to the basic principles of

democratic government-

In August, 1912 Dr. Sun carried out his plan of a formal visit

to Peking and called on Yuan Shih-k'ai as President of the Republic.

It lasted three days. Great hopes had been entertained for a

good understanding between the two leaders, and for an agreement

on some of the main problems affecting the development of the new

form of government. But the hopes were disappointed because

no great solution or agreement was reached. What led to some

consolation on the part of the Republic was that so far as Dr,

Sun Yat-sen1s personal position was concerned, he was offered a

post to be created as Director-General of a National Railway Admin is

tration which was to plan and carry out a comprehensive scheme of

railway development in the country. Dr. Sun Yat-sen accepted and

established his headquarters in Shanghai. But evidently it was only

a temporary expedient and was considered as such on both sides.

On the part of Yuan Shih-k'ai the new post was intended to

satisfy Dr. Sun Yat-sen and make him refrain from further opposing

Yuan's government. On the other hand, Dr. Sun accepted perhaps

with the aim of securing a base of operations for his political

cause and the cause of the Kuomintang. It was clear to the people

there was no mutual confidence, or trust, between the two leaders.

The activities of the Kuomintang in the country made Yuan Shih-

k'ai apprehensive and more suspicious of the Kuomintang. One by

one he tried to place his own loyal supporters in various positions

in Shanghai and in Yangtze Valley: for example, General Ho Feng-lin

as garrison commissioner of Shanghai; admiral Chen Chu-jen as the

commander of the Yangtze Flottilla in his headquarters below Lu-

shan. As these changes took place, more dissatisfaction mani­

fested itself on the part of the Kuomintang of the opposition leaders.

Both in Peking and in the Yangtze Valley and South China,

the straw that broke the camel's back was the sudden assassination

of Sung Chiao-jen, who was one of the ablest and most energetic of

the Kuomintang leaders. He was only thirty-one and expected by his

fellow members to be next in line for the post of premier. He had

left Peking after resigning the cabinet post of Agriculture and

Forestry in T'ang Shao-i's time. Down in the south he carried on

a campaign of publicity in education to awaken the people to the

basic principles of the republican form of government. His sudden

disappearance from the political scene was a great shock not only
to the Kuomintang but also to the country at large. That cert a Inly-

enraged the Kuomintang and began to make it clear to them that there

was no room for peaceful reconciliation with Yuan Shih-k'ai. In the

Yangtze valley and in South China, grumblings of dissatisfaction and

open criticism against Yuan's administration became louder and louder.

Civil war once more broke out in July 1913 in those southern provinces

under the Kuomintang governors.

By this time Yuan had built up a very strong position In Peking.

Shortly after the revolt broke out Hsiung Hsi-llng became premier.

Premier Hsiung was a Chinese scholar of progressive tendencies,

and a native of Hunan Province and an energetic man of middle age. He

was less modernized than T'ang Shao-i but certainly more; progressive

than most of the officialdom in Peking and for that matter in the

country too. But the composition of his Cabinet showed that Yuan

Shih-k'ai had arranged to include many of his own loyal supporters,

men more or less of his own thinking. Hsiung's government did not

last very long because the new premier found it difficult to carry out

his own policy. He was primarily a financier and believed that foreign

loans should if possible be avoided, and if they were necessary, that

the terms and conditions of the foreign loans should be such as not

to infringe upon the sovereign rights of a nation. But Yuan was most

anxious to contract foreign loans. In 1912 the coffers of the state

had been empty and not only was it necessary to have funds with which

to carry on the administration, but Yuan himself had wanted to build

up a large war chest with a view to suppressing, if possible once aryl

 forever, the opposition of the Kuomintang and the Kuomintang domina­

ted provinces in the country. He had really built up his strength

and did not have much difficulty in suppressing the revolt in a

relatively short time. This success was followed by a policy of

drastic suppression of the Kuomintang activities. The Provisional

Parliament was dissolved and orders were issued for the arrest of

a number of important Kuomintang persons. Dr. Sun, himself, left the

country and went to Japan, followed by his lieutenants.' way-

'T/V7 ■ t .( A<; t q, V - , . ^*4 n
* waa clear for Yuan Shih-k ai and his lieutenants to rule the country

in accordance with his policy of dictatorship, disguised by some of

the trappings of a democratic form of government. In place of

Parliament he set up the so-called Constitutional Compact Conference

to work out the draft for a new constitution in place of the one that

T'ang was engaged in drafting. This body had only an advisory role

and usually rubber-stamped what President Yuan submitted to it. In the

administration, former statesmen or politicians began to emerge more

and more around Yuan Shih-k'ai to urge upon him the doctrine of old

policies and forms of administration. The grand ceremony of the annual

worship of Confucius and the annual worship of heaven at the temple

of heaven were restored after a set of rules and regulations were

promulgated. In the old days it had been the emperor's prerogative

to conduct these ceremonies and they were now restored. The new

rules and regulations went so far as to prescribe costumes, robes,

and rites, and were not much different from those observed under the

old dynasty. Even orders of nobility such as the Ch'ing-ta-fu were

re-established. In short the administration again took on more and more

the ceremonies, and the forms of a monarchical form of government.

Even in the first year or two of the Republic there were signs of

a movement to establish a monarchical government. Especially after the

suppression of the so-called Kuomintang revolt in 1913, rumors,

reports and whispers were current about such a movement in charge of

of Yuan K'o-ting, President Yuan Shih-k'ai's elder son. Yuan K'o-

ting had spent a few years in Germany; through his friend, Yin Ch'ang,

a Manchu general, who was Imperial Minister at the Court of Kaiser

Wilhelm 11,(1901-05), he saw the Kaiser and became a friend of the

German Crown Prince. He was much impressed with the orderliness and

discipline of the people of Germany, the prestige of the Kaiser's family,

the unchallenged position of the Kaiser himself and the great honor

and prestige enjoyed by the Crown Prince. When he returned to

Peking he became the advocate of a political doctrine to the effect

that China could become a strong nation only if she established a

dynasty with his father as its founder and with himself, eventually,

as successor to the throne. The ardent supporters of the Ch'ing

dynasty and the high officials who had served the emperor before

the revolution and had refused to join in the service of the Republic,

approached Yuan K'o-ting, or themselves were invited to join the circle.

He had his headquarters in Yingtai, an island in the palace. There

in the center of the capital met the die-hards of the imperial system.

They were not confined to the members of the old officialdom but also
included the disappointed politicians under the Republic and gradually

they enlarged their circle. Officially, the government knew nothing

of the activities of the elder son of the President. But it was

generally understood that the President himself and his own closest

advisers were in favor of the idea and as time went on, the idea became

more and more openly discussed. In August 1915 a commission came to

be organized, called Ch’ou-an-hui ( ) or Peace Promotion

Commission headed by a scholar called Yang Tu.

In 1915 after the question of the 21 Demands was disposed of by

the treaty of May 7th, 1915 with Japan, there was no serious question

on the diplomatic front except that the First World War was raging

in Europe. The immediate effect of the war on the commerce and busi­

ness of the country was rather favorable, as the need in Europe for

certain supplies and raw materials became more and more pressing. There

was an apparent wave of incipient prosperity in the country and

advocates of the Imperial System considered the time ripe for pushing

their cause to a head.

Before I left Peking to take up an assignment as Minister to

Mexico, the atmosphere in Peking already was thick with the reports of

activities of this Peace Promotion Commission and a group of active

promoters behind it headed by the President’s elder son. I myself had

great doubts about the possibilities for success of such a movement.

I believed strongly that in spite of China's horrid tradition of imperial

rule the Chinese people were by nature and in their daily life as fond
 v'

of liberty and freedom as any other: it was only that they dLd not

know how to institute, develop, and preserve a democratic sytem which

would ensure these privileges. The ancient Chinese classics had

clearly stated that the Emperor should listen to the wishes of tin*

people, and that their will should be taken as the guiding principle

of his rule. It had always been said that the foundation of the state

was the people themselves. Because of my own personal belief, T

kept away from anything connected with the movement while I was in

Peking. More than likely, the promoters of the Imperial movement

knew about my personal inclination -- my political philosophy -- so

I myself was never approached by any of the members of the movement

to enlist my support.

Foreign reactions to the imperial movement varied in China and

abroad. In its initial stage it was promoted through various Chinese

newspapers, perhaps because the authorities then were still not

prepared to come out in the open and acknowledge it. One Chinese paper,

that is to say a newspaper published in the Chinese language, but

owned by the Japanese, was most frank and full in the reporting of

practically every important development in connection with the movement.

That v?as the Shun-1' ien Shih-pao, which was generally understood to

be the mouthpiece of the Japanese legation and also of the Japanese

armed forces stationed in North ^hina. That paper purported to report

what it considered to be news, but between the lines it seemed to

support the movement. The foreign press in Shanghai said very little

at first but the North China Daily News declared itself sympathetically
disposed. In Peking, it was generally understood that the British

Legation headed by Sir John Jordan, a personal and close friend of

was
Yuan Shih-k'ai,/also in sympathy with the idea of reestablishing the

throne. The Japanese Legation was outwardly discreet, but in private,

it was hinted to Japanese speaking Chinese officials that if the

movement was to succeed it would necessarily require the support of

Japan, and that would be forthcoming if China would pursue a

policy favorable to Japan.

After I went to Washington and took up the post of ^hinese

Minister to the United States toward the end of 1915, the movement

in Peking was being pushed forward with great energy, and it became

clear that Yuan Shih-k’ai would declare himself Emperor on the New

Year's Day of 1916. Great progress had been made toward that great

event, so it was taken for granted that it would be an accomplished

fact in a few weeks. Officially, neither the State Department nor the

political leaders in Washington said anything in public about the

movement. But, privately, their views were clear to me, and some

of them spoke to me directly. They expressed their regrets that

the first Republic in Asia was to be overthrown after only a few

years of experiment. They also expressed to me their skepticism

about the prospect of success of the new movement in the long run.

One of the few papers abroad which appeared to support the idea was

the London Times in England. The Times took its stand in its

editorial comments that if peace and order were to be established

in China, Yuan Shih-k'ai was the man who could do it, provided that he

succeeded in the attempt to reestablish imperial rule X While I was

abroad I lost contact with the situation in Pekinw;, but, toward t h*'

end of the year, I was struck with a surprising change in the form

of a communication from the Wai-chiao-pu. This communication

directed that in future all official communications sent out from tie

embassy were to be dated as the first year of Hung-hsien; and that

communications to the President were to be put in the form of a me­

morial to the throne. It was evident that the plan to make Yuan

Shih-k'ai emperor had gone far, and that the promoters had tie whole

situation in their hands and were about to succeed completely. Per­

sonally, I felt not only surprised but also fairly irritated. I recall

that the Revolution in 1911 time and time again saw Chinese students

and myself engaged in a debate as to the most desirable form of

government. There were some among us who were strongly for consti­

tutional monarchy and one was my former college-mate at St. Johns

who was working for his M.A. at Columbia. But he did not succeed

in convincing me of the merits of constitutional monarchy, so my

reaction when I received the communication from the Wai-chiao-pu was

a natural one. I sent for the Secretary and instructed hirn to draft

a reply that I found it difficult to carry out the instructions

because the so-called monarchy had not been proclaimed. As far as

I could learn from the newspapers from China, the people had not

been officially informed of the abolition of the Republic or the

installation of any imperial rule. Diplomatically, until a change

in the form of government was recognized by the government to which I

was accredited, I could not send out a communication dating differently

from what wc had been doing; so that as far as the ^legation in Washing-

ton was concerned, we would continue to use the old form. Although

my Secretary and my staff, for that matter, strongly advised against

It, T decided to send this reply. Curious to say there was no

apparent reaction. To my greater surprise, when the government

Gazette of some weeks later arrived, I found that one of the dis­

patches from our Legation to the Wai-chiao-pu was dated according

to the new imperial calendar and given the heading "in memorial

to the throne", which made the rest of the Mission angry. So I sent

out a dispatch of protest that they had no right to alter the form

of the dating of the communications from the Legation. If they wanted

to do that, they should have notified us first and I could resign.

The rapid push toward the installation of the Imperial rule led

to the outbreak of open opposition and an anti-imperial war was

declared by the leaders of South China headed by Governor T'ang Chi-

yao of Yunnan. His proclamation against the attempt to abolish the

Republic and set up Yuan Shih-k'ai as emperor found a favorable res­

ponse in many provinces. Even the governor of Szechuan, one of Yuan's

ardent supporters, came out and declared openly in favor of the Republic.

General Ch'en Yi telegraphed his opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai, to

open his eyes that the country really was against the reestablishment

of Imperial rule. And as the war tide turned against the forces

of the government. Yuan Shih-k'ai finally decided to abandon the whole

attempt.
 It was known in the earlv years of the Republic while I

still in Peking that Yuan was not In sympathy with the republican

form of government and was inclined to favor the reestablishment

of the traditional form of Imperial rule. But he was not too an­

xious to approve a change even when his eldest son was actively

promoting it. Perhaps the main factor that made Yuan Shih-k'ai

give in was a superstition on his part. In Yuan's family for

generations, not a male member had ever lived beyond the age ot

58. Yuan was then in his early fifties and he himself, his family

and his close friends were all afraid of the year when Yuan would

be 58. So in 1915, when his birthday was approaching In September

the advocates of the imperial rule played on his superstition and

his full support. The curious fact is that he died shortly after

the abandonment of his plan to be an emperor. He was just 58.

 ■)V

The Circumstances of My Marriage to May Tang

I remember after Tang Shao-i resigned early in June 1912 the

seven other secretaries and I resigned en bloc from the Prime Minister's

Office, as was then the practice. I left Peking for Tientsin because

Mr. T'ang had gone there and I wanted to keep in touch with him. I

was invited to join the T'ang family at luncheon or dinner almost daily

and was asked to be present whenever President Yuan Shih-k'ai sent

Mr. Liang Shih-i to see Mr. T'ang to consult him on various matters.

Among other things, I consulted Mr. T'ang about my resigning also from

the President’s Office. As a matter of fact, I had already told the

secretary-general that I wanted to resign and had sent a letter to

him. Mr. T'ang was very much surprised. He said it was alright for

me to resign from the Prime Minister's Office but that it wasn't

necessary to resign from the President's Office. He said that

resignation from the Prime Minister's Office was provided for in the

regulations governing the Civil Service, but the staff of the

President stood apart as a separate entity. They were not included

in what was called the official system since they were appointed at

the pleasure of the President.

T told Mr. T'ang that as he had left Peking, I wanted to take

time to think over what I wanted to do. Meanwhile I wanted to go to

Shanghai to see my parents because I had gone straight to Peking

after my journey via Siberia from the United States. He said that it

was alright for me just to make a trip, but I was young and just.
 1,
1

starting on my career, and the President's Office was a good place

for me to stay and carry on my work. He told me that on several of

Mr. Liang's visits to Tientsin the latter had brought word that the Presi­

dent wanted me to return and stay in his office. I was undecided,

feeling rather frustrated in view of the shortness of Mr. T'ang's

term of service and especially the cause of his resignation. Mr.

T'ang told me that Mr. Liang would be seeing him that afternoon and

he wanted me to join in the conversation. When Mr. Liang arrived,

Mr. T’ang sent for me. I remember the first thing Mr. T'ang said was

to ask Mr. Liang to convey the President's message to me directly.

X felt complimented by the message, feeling that my work at the

President's Office was of no great importance. Mr. Liang said that

President Yuan had asked him to get me to go back to Peking and he

had asked Mr. T'ang to use his influence to urge me to return. Mr.

T'ang said that he had already told me what Mr. Liang had conveyed

from the President. He turned to me and said, "You should go back

after your visit to Shanghai. You may not find enough work to do,

but your place is really in the Foreign Office." He felt sure that

some day I would be there. I told him that Dr. W. W. Yen, who was then

Vice-Minister, had invited me to join the Foreign Office but I wanted

to consult him first. So Mr. T'ang said, "By all means accept the offer."

He said that that was where I could make use of what I had learned

and that the two posts would not conflict, just as there was no

conflict between my work at the President's Office and the Prime Minis­

ter’s Office. He said it would be quite alright for me to take a

vacation to go to Shanghai and see my parents; afterwards I should

return to the President's Office and begin work at the Foreign Office.
T'ang Shao-i's advice helped me to decide the course of my future work.

Meanwhile I stayed on in Tientsin waiting for steamer accommoda­

tions to go to Shanghai. It was during that period when I was stranded

for two weeks or more that Mr. Tang took great interest in me and

introduced his daughters to me. I had met May before, at the Kuo Wu

Yuan when her father was still premier, and again on the picnic that

Mr. Tang had suggested soon after my arrival in Peking. Now, at his

suggestion we always went out in the afternoon, either to make a tour

or to do some shopping or to drink tea. As I was alone, I was almost

a house guest, although I was staying at the Li Shun Te ( ^ 'P ),

a British hotel in the British concession at Tientsin. I always had

my lunch and dinner with them unless I had other engagements. It was

during that period that May and I became quite acquainted. I had

not seen her since the picnic in Peking, because the whole period of

Mr. Tang Shao-i’s tenancy was about a month and the daughters went

to visit him in Peking and returned to Tientsin. They never stayed in

■>
Peking. So then, when I was about to leave, Mr. Tang told me that

May wanted to see her aunt in Shanghai since she had not been to

Shanghai for sometime and could I not escort her to Shanghai on my

trip? I said it would be a great pleasure, and I was pleased. He

said she would stay with Mr. Tsung Meng-yu, a relative of hers in

Shanghai. So we went on the same boat, and, of course, we became more

acquainted.
 It was after I returned from Shanghai that we became engaged, and

we were married the following year. We set the date, I think, as

June 2, 1913. Miss Tang had already been living in Shanghai.

According to Chinese custom, she called on my father, and we made

arrangements for the wedding.

Then Tang Shao-i spoke to me and said he was very glad that we

were going to get married; he was going to be married too and he

wondered whether I would not change my date to June 3 or June 4

because he wanted his wedding to take place on June 2. It was

natural for Mr. Tang to want to be married first because he was an

elderly man in his fifties. Although nothing was wrong, it would not

look very well in Chinese eyes if the father married the day after his

daughter. He was going to marry a young girl, a Miss Wu. Even May

had not known about his plans to marry; the change of date was rather

sudden, only about three or four days before June 2. We were married

in the same place, in the garden at Honken.

Such were the circumstances of our marriage:despite various reports

in the press and so forth, there was nothing mysterious or exceptional

about it. Sometimes it was said I met her in Washington while her

sister was married to Mr. Henry Chang, son of the Chinese Minister in

Washington, then Chang Yi-tang, a close friend of Mr. T'ang Shao-i. But
) . .
the truth is that at that time May Tang was never in Washington.
The Foreign Office at PekinR: The Reorgan izat ion of 1912

On returning to Peking after the visit to my parents in Shanghai,

T had taken up my new post at the Foreign Office, where I was to do most

of my work for the next three years. The Foreign Office, or Wai-

chiao-pu ( i\ K " i ) as it was now called, had been set up only a

few months before by Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang. The Wai-chiao-pu succeeded

the old Wai-wu-pu (^ ' ). This, it will be recalled, was founded

as a result of the settlement of the Boxer trouble and the treaty of

1901, when China was required to establish what was described as a

responsible ministry of foreign affairs with which the foreign delega­

tions in Peking could deal regularly and effectively. Something was

done in the early years of the twentieth century to meet this requirement

but it was more superficial than real. Much of the internal organiza­

tion of the Wai-wu-pu which was simply another name for the former

Tsung-li shih-wu ya-men remained the same as before the Boxer Incident.

A few returned students were included to join the service but its work

was still conducted much as before except that nominally one single

minister instead of a number of ministers were now responsible for the

conduct of China's foreign affairs.

When Minister Lu took up the foreign portfolio under Mr. T'ang Shao-

i, the first Premier of the Republic, one of the first things he did

was to reorganize the Ministry and put it on a basis much like the

foreign ministry of any Western nation. He recommended to the government

 s

for submission to the parliament a new law and regulations tor re­

organizing the Foreign Ministry. One minister was made responsible

for handling foreign affairs assisted by one Vice Minister, and the

routine work of the Ministry was divided among four divisions -

the Divisions of Political Affairs, Commercial Affairs, Protocol

Affairs and General Affairs. In addition, there was a Secretariat

to be composed of four Secretaries and an Office of Counselors

consisting of four Counselors who were required to deal with legal

questions such as treaties and the enforcement of the laws and regu­

lations relating to the Wai-chiao-pu as well as other matters.

On the other hand, Mr. Lu reorganized the diplomatic and con-

, I 0
sular and diplomatic service abroad a professional service. The

members of the foreign service were to be career men because rightly

he considered that the conduct of foreign affairs as well as service

in the missions abroad were of a professional character and that it

required specially trained men to fill the various posts. What he

did was, in fact, an innovation in Peking because it had been a

favorite practice for various high officials to recommend candidates

for appointment to a government department. The number ol prospective

officials always remained very groat. One of the ways of getting an

appointment was to get a recommendation in the form of personal letter

from someone important enough in the government, addressed to the

head of the ministry where the candidate desired most to receive an

appointment. This practice had always been regarded as a headache

for any ministry's chief. Mr Lu Cheng-hsiang however, wished to

reassure his staff members that they should devote all their time and

energy to their service. He was courageous enough to announce to the

Ministry that he would not accept any recommendation of any quarter

unless the candidate recommended was properly trained for foreign service,

by which he also meant service at the Ministry. His idea was wel­

comed not only by the members of his own ministry but quite approved

by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. It was a

remarkable fact that during Mr. Lu's terms of office as Foreign

Minister even the President of the Republic did not propose any one,

either from his own office or among the circles of his friends, for

appointment by the Foreign Minister. Only on one or two occasions did

he make a suggestion to the Foreign Minister and then the man

suggested always turned out to be one properly trained for foreign

service.

For the consular and diplomatic service abroad, Mr. Lu made

a great effort to recruit men who would prove more effective as

representatives of China. In that field great reform was really

needed,for under the old dynasty, officials - naturally Manchus as

well as Chinese - had been appointed to important capitals as

diplomatic representatives who frequently neither understood nor

spoke any foreign language. The appointment to serve in a foreign

country was looked upon as a short cut to promotion to the official

world in China. In fact, the term of three years of service abroad

was generally regarded as hardship service; after serving that term an

official could return to Peking and would almost as a cert a intv receive

a special promotion. For that reason, many despairing candidates in

the capital after waiting for office for years without success w«>uld

approach some newly appointed Chinese minister in order to be appointed

either as a member of the new minister's staff or as a consular represen

tative. The size of the new minister's staff was not stipulated hv the

Foreign Office so that he had discretion to take a few secretaries

or attaches and other people for appointment to consular service in the

country or countries to which he was accredited.

It was also the practice, before Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang' s

reforms in the Foreign Office, for a Chinese Minister to a foreign

country to be given all the funds necessary for his three years'

service abroad, including his own emolument, the expenses of conduct­

ing his mission and also the salary of whatever staff he should

establish. More than that, he would also be given to take with him

the funds required for the payment of the consuls and the upkeep of

the consulates within his jurisdiction. It was evidently a bad practice

as it proved a great temptation for the minister to handle the funds

in any way he liked. Some of the people he took along with him for

appointment to consulates or vice consulates willingly offered to

work for no pay, on the understanding that at the end of the three

years' term they would receive a strong recommendation to Peking

for promotion. The result of this old system was that the Chinese

minister in one country practically a dictator oi the whole diplomatic

and consular service within his sphere of operation. Moreover, if

service abroad was generally considered a hardship service from the point

of view of living and comfort, at the same time it was regarded, at

least by some of the ministers, as a source of financial recuperation.

The Wai-chiao-pu, newly established after the Boxer trouble, tried to

introduce some reforms in this sphere but did not go very far. Now

Minister Lu required that not only the head of the diplomatic mission

in a foreign country, but all his staff members and the consul and

vice-consul and their staff members, should be subject to appointment

by the foreign ministry in Peking. Besides each mission abroad had

to work out a budget subject to approval by the Ministry, specifying

the number of staff members, their grades and their remuneration, as

well as the allowance to be granted to each mission to meet the expenses

of different kinds.

The budget was calculated on an annual basis, but the funds were

now remitted each month.

Thus both the foreign service abroad and the service in the

ministry were put on a more modern basis. Missions abroad were

required to submit periodical reports. For telegraphic communications

not only were special codes used as before, but these codes were

changed from time to time in order to ensure security and secrecy.

All these measures of reform were much needed and they were

effectively pushed forward by Minister Lu's able lieutenant, Mr. Wang

 a'

Kuang-chi. Mr. Wang bad been a close associate of the Minister

abroad and was a right hand man to him in the Ministry. He was a

man of great energy and courage. When he received an order from

the Minister to execute, he was fearless in carrying it Into effect

regardless of any criticism or hard feeling, even on the part of his

closest friends.

My service in the Ministry lasted a little over four years before

I was appointed first as Minister to Mexico and later to Washington and

then concurrently to Cuba. During those four years*'1 found my

j/r
4
work both interesting and enlightening. It vwfs one thing to read al1

about th^ diplomatic questions from bcj^eRs and records but it was quite

ano :r to have to deal with cupjr^nt problems as a Secretary and Counse-

.or to the Foreign Ministp^T My main work as a Secretary was to attend

the interviews of tb^ Minister of Foreign Affairs dr the Vice Minister

with the heada^f the foreign missions in Parking. Minister Lu was

an excellent and famous scholar and spf&e French fluently. However

he-<fid not speak the English l^rfguage;

My Work In the Foreign Office

My service in the Foreign Office lasted a little over four years

before I was appointed first as Minister to Mexico and later to

Washington and concurrently to Cuba. During those four years, I found

ray work both interesting and enlightening. It was one thing to read

all about the diplomatic questions from books and records but it was

quite another to have to deal with current problems as a Secretary and

Counselor to the Foreign Minister.

My main work as a Secretary was to attend the interviews of the

Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Vice Minister with the heads of

the foreign missions in Peking. Minister Lu was an excellent and

famous scholar and spoke French fluently. However he did not speak

the English language; as his Secretary, it was my frequent duty to

interview the English speaking ministers from abroad in the Legation

Quarter. This unusual practice was prevalent only in Asian countries.

Elsewhere it has always been customary that whenever an embassy or

legation desired to discuss some question with the government to which

it was accredited, the Ambassador or Minister himself would call at

the Ministry or otherwise send a member of the mission to represent hl.m.

But in Peking, it had long been otherwise and the settlement of the

Boxer trouble resulting in a humiliating treaty further enhanced the

prestige of the foreign missions. It was much to my surprise as a

student of diplomacy to find that whenever the Foreign Minister desired

to give an answer to a foreign representative, instead of sending for

him to call at the ministry, he would send one of his secretaries

with the reply to the legation in question.

So the work of visiting the foreign legations was divided <»nong

the four Secretaries according to the language of the foreign mss (on.

For the Japanese Legation, a Japanese speaking Secretary was res­

ponsible and evidently he would be sent either to see the Japanese

minister or to see the lieutenant if something had to be communtinted

verbally to the Japanese legation. I was in charge of the English-

speaking legations, that is, the British and the American, tin- Dutch

and sometimes the Belgian and the Portuguese. Although the last

mentioned mission used French more often than English, 1 would be

sent whenever my French-speaking colleague was not available. I he

fourth Secretary spoke German.

Another part of my work was to handle foreign correspondents

including those of newspapers in China such as the Peking and Tientsin

Times and the North China Daily News. There was no division of

information or publicity, and thus the work of looking after such

matters fell to the Secretaries under the direction of the Minister

and the Vice Minister.

In the first year or two, I found the amount of work I had to do

hardly sufficient to occupy all my time. It was therefore my interest

to see in what ways I could help Mr. Lu and Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, the
9
Vice Minister, to further modernize the ministry and facilitate

its handling of a growing amount of diplomatic questions. One of

my first efforts as I have described above was to establish a li/rar/

 \X

1 »ir the MiniHtry. Another matter which interested me was the system

of arranging and filing the archives in which I found much room for

improvement. From time immemorial it had been the practice in the

Ministry to paste all communications relating to one particular

question onto a single roll, one after the other. When each new

communication was prepared and submitted to the Minister, it would be

attached to the roll, so that in reading the draft he could refer to

previous correspondence on the same question. However some of the

questions had drifted on for years, and the volume of correspondence

had grown to a very unhandy size. The wear and tear of bringing up

and taking back the complete file made the rolls of correspondence
/
look very threadbare. More off^ten than not, the Minister or the Vice

Minister who had to read over a draft and approve it had no occasion

at all to refer to any previous communication. So I suggested that

a bureau of archives should be organized, and that only the most

recent communication should be kept at the Division where it had

been dealt with. All communications that had been received more than

a month ago should be sent to the bureau of archives for filing and

indexing. The suggestion was heartily approved by the heads of the Minis­

try and, also at my suggestion, a member of the Ministry was

appointed to serve as head of the new Bureau. All the old files

were turned over to him and he was given a staff to assist him in this

work.

As I was originally responsible for this measure, I made it a

practice to drop in occasionally at the Bureau of Archives and see

how the work was proceeding. To my great surprise one morning I ? • nl

original diplomatic notes and memoranda from the foreign lee,a* ions

cut into sections, pasted separately on different sheets and t iled

in different files. When I asked the new head of the bureau whv

he did this, he answered that since the communications had to he riled

analytically, he had cut up the notes according to the questions they

dealt with. I was flabbergasted and saw in my imagination great

horrors of looking for some particular communication and finding

only a dissected section. As I was unable to convince the new head,

who insisted that his method was the best one, I took the matter to the

Vice Minister and told him that it was a great pity to cut up the

original communication and that the practice should be changed. The

Vice Minister was even more angry than I was because he at once saw

how foolish it was and how difficult it would be later to locate any

one complete communication. He was so exasperated that he wrote

down an order relieving him of his office.

The next thing which I found necessary to do was to establish a

Bureau of Translation. Its function was to look over the foreign

newspapers, and to cut out, file and translate into Chinese articles

or news reports dealing with questions of interest to China. f was

made responsible head of this new office and given a fairly large

staff of assistants. Its staff had to be fairly large because it had

to deal with foreign newspapers of many languages - English, French,

German, Japanese, Italian and Spanish.

 Newspapers from abroad took some time to get to China.- The

London Times, and the New York Times and Herald Tribune, would arrive

about three weeks after publication, and the Spanish paper took even

longer. Their value consequently lay less in news reports than in

their editorials and special articles. On the other hand foreign

language newspapers published in China would arrive at the Foreign

Office on the same day, in the case of those printed in Peking and

Tientsin, while the Shanghai papers would be only two or three days

late.

It was with thi-a group, theforeign newspapers published in China,

that our work in the Bureau was mainly concerned. Not only were most

items of news to be found in them, but their editorial opinions

were illuminating. I believed it was important to be kept informed of

the trend of foreign opinion in China, since it usually reflected the

trend of opinion in the home countries. In many cases the foreign

newspapers were virtually the mouthpieces of the missions of their

respective countries at Peking.

Of course the Ministry was also informed on the state of opinion

abroad by China’s diplomatic missions in various countries. Their

reports however were not systematic in treatment, nor were they

regularly sent although Minister Lu had instituted a weekly report

from the missions. Such reports would on the whole be concerned

with general conditions abroad; only occasionally did the missions

send in a special report dealing with matters of interest to China,

and even then it might not be dependable. All such reports from the

missions were filed in the Division of Political Affairs or the

Division of Commercial Affairs and there was no coordination with

information gathered by the Bureau of Translation.

The purpose of the Bureau in the Ministry was to inform the

Minister and the Vice Minister and also the President's Office and

the Cabinet’s Office of what was going on in the foreign press. As

time went on^ the number of issues sent out became larger iand larger.

The work took a great deal of the staff’s time because the important

articles and editorials all had to be translated into Chinese.

Then I would spend perhaps three quarters of an hour looking over the

translation - for the translators might often misunderstand an English

phrase or idiom.

The work of the Bureau was much appreciated by the different

departments especially by the President's Office; in fact it became

a regular part of the President's daily routine to read the transla­

tion of the news. I remember at least half a dozen times, when T was

out in the evening at dinner parties, being called up by the Presi­

dent's office to inquire why the news bulletin - as we called it -

had not yet arrived there. When I said that it had just been sent out

the servant would say that was alright as long as it came before ten,

when the door at the gate of the President's Office would be closed.
 A

Otherwise, he said, he would get into trouble, since the news

bulletin was always the first thing the President would ask to

read in the morning. At first the Translation Bureau's bulletin

confined itself to translating the important articles, editorials

and news reports in the foreign language papers in China and later

abroad. It did not pick up the translation of news services such as

the Reuter and Associated Press, because, so far as the Ministry was

concerned, the Minister could read their despatches in English,

while the Vice Minister would usually receive an oral translation.

An incident at the beginning of 1914 made it necessary for the

Bureau to undertake the translation of the Reuters despatches for the

President's Office. The incident itself was a pure accident and not

important; it was, however, amusing. On January 2nd, 1914, a Sunday

morning, the Vice Minister of the Foreign Office telephoned and asked

me to go there at once to see him. It was very unusual for him to

send for anyone on a Sunday morning. When I arrived there, I found

him in a quandary. He showed me a copy of a congratulatory telegram

from the Emperor of Japan just communicated to him by the Japanese

Minister. The Japanese Minister, he said, was very worried, because ""

Gai-mu-shu in Tokyo had telegraphed him twice that all the congratula­

tory telegrams sent by the Emperor to the chief or heads of the state

of countries with whi^,h Japan had treaty relations had been answered,

but no reply had come from Peking. One could imagine the anxieties

of the Gai-mu-shu vis-a-vis the Imperial Office. The Vice Minister

wondered what to do. He had telephoned to the President's Office but

nothing had been received; his secretary had telephoned the tele­

graph office and they did not know the answer. I think the copy

was in English: I saw it was just a customary communication of

congratulations for the New Year. I suggested we could send a draft

reply and inquire at once if it had not been received at the

a
President’s Office. I told him tbeh that in matter of this sort,

there was no room for laxity of any kind. A telegram must have

been sent, otherwise the Japanese Minister would not have brought
T .?> ,
this copy. Mr. Ch^o gradually saw the point and asked me to prepare

a draft, which I did, and the reply was at once despatched. But

he was still uneasy. How could such an important despatch from one

government to another have gone astray, he said; for still no word

had come from the President's Office. So I said I would go and

try to look into the matter and I went direct to the President's

office from the Foreign Office.

7><6 WW •]

Ae—Ialso attached to the President's Office, I knew all

the different divisions there and went straight to the Division

of Protocol, called Wu-kuan-ch'u ( , ). This Division not

only dealt with letters and messages to the President, from

newspapers abroad or from foreign dignitaries who had visited him,

but also translated for the President a copy of Reuter's despatches

that was subscribed to by the President's Office. The Division

was headed by Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-k'an, assisted by several returned

students including one from Harvard. When I arrived I only saw the

Admiral, who was somewhat flabbergasted and almost annoyed by my

wanting to know whether the telegram had been received. He said

there was no telegram from Tokyo. If I liked, he said, pulling out

a whole drawer-full of New Year telegrams, you can go over them

yourself. This I did and suddenly found one telegram signed

"Yurihito". There was no address, but someone had written a note

in Chinese saying: "Telegram from Mr. Yao of Tokyo, no reply necessary.

Well, I said, here is the telegram. He said, What? I said...

^ c, u f •' -i
"¥o»inhito-1* ( ) was the Japanese Emperor's name. He was

so surprised and he said how could anyone know this was the emperor's

name but I said that every government should expect to know because
<5
•¥urihito was a chief of state like King George V of England. So

Admiral Tsai was pleased, and yet half sorry for I could see on his

face a look of confusion and worry.

>

According to Admiral Tsai, the note had been written by a man in

his staff who had been educated in the United States. The main thing

however was that the telegram had been found, so without telling

anybody else, I telephoned the Vice Minister,, who told me to come back
.) „r '
Ts<ko >1V - 11 »a
at once with the telegram. The Vice Minister was Oaao--T-s«—Httg-, who

had been educated in Japan and was specially interested in relations

It. C C
between Japan and China. He was angry and said P must go to the

President's house and report to him at once. How could such an

-f t tt5 kVww
important thing be so carelessly handled? I hacked- hi-Ttr up- rather
X- Wv.; tsA y
because it wou4d mean -far break up the protocol office. He said
 V

must go.

In those days not only President Yuan but the whole government

was anxious to get on well with Japan and to avoid any kind (if itu i-

dent. When Mr. Chao came back he told me that the President was

furious and, in fact, wanted to completely do away with the Protocol

ot&vce. I said that would not be fair, and I suggested that the

Vice Minister could soften the blow by persuading the President not to

make too much out of this incident. After all, it was only a question

of protocol: the answer had already been sent, and even though it

was perhaps 36 or 48 hours late I said I was sure that they would

soon receive the reply in Tokyo. By then the whole thing would oe

over.

In the afternoon we went to the Protocol ofe±±ce. We found that

the man mainly responsible for the error had been penalized by the

forfeit of three months' salary. An additional order had come from

the President that from that day on all the foreign despatches

including Reuters and Associated Press must be translated by the

Bureau of Translation in the Foreign Office and submitted to him.

That was the origin of the extension of the Bureau of Translation's

work to cover the news services. Incidentally I soon found out that
in ^'-1-
although'ffhe" Protocol QffiAeg continued to send their translations of

the foreign news bulletins, the President would never look at them and

asked only for the translation from the Foreign Office.

Promotion to Coun.se 1 orship

After a little over a year as Secretary I was promoted to Counselor

I POK
in the Foreign Office. The task of the Counselor was to ch—fo the

i.o.nu£e» or orders before they were approved for promulgation. The

four counselors had the duty of checking them from the legal point

of view and they had to sign each draft before the Vice Minister and

the Minister would finally approve it. This work was relatively

limited but I continued to enjoy the work which I had started as a

Secretary. I had been concurrently in charge of the Bureau of

W' </ \

Translation, and had been preoccupied with the library, indexingy the

archives.

But my main interest was in connection with specific diplomatic

questions which arose from time to time. I kept myself busy by

preparing special memoranda and reports. When an important diplomatic

question arose, the Minister, Vice Minister and the head of the

particular Division concerned would meet to consider how to meet the

situation. Officially it was the duty of the division concerned -

whether the Division of Political Affairs, or the Division of Commer­

cial Affairs, to prepare a draft of reply or a memorandum. I was always

given a copy of the original communication for my use, and I would be

invited to participate in the discussion. Time and again I would

express my views as to what the answer should be and not infrequently

they would be incompatible with those of the head of the Division. In

such a situation, I would duly be asked to prepare a draft for dis­

cussion and final adoption. The result of this practice was that
although my office was considered to be a generally quiet ottice, 1

found myself occupied all the time. From a staff of two copyists it

was expanded to include one secretary for me and four copyists, and

sometimes even extra ones.

My three colleagues in the Counselor’s Office were amazed at

the manner in which I was conducting myself. One of them, a relat1ve

of mine who was much older and had been in the Chinese officialdom at

least twenty years longer than I, cautioned me once. He told me that

the way I was carrying on was most dangerous. He asked me il F knew

the secret of success in Peking officialdom. I said T did not.

He said nobody else would ever tell me but as a good friend of mine,

he would. He said: "In Peking officialdom, the more you try to do

the more likely you are to make mistakes. The less you try to do, thr

fewer mistakes you will have; if you do nothing, you can never make

a mistake. That is the way to be sure of success in your official

career." It was news to me but I appreciated the sincerity with which

he gave it. My answer was that all my life, especially during my

eight years in the U.S., I felt I had studied with a view to making

myself useful, and had moreover a keen interest in anything connected

with China's foreign relations and diplomatic history. Here at last,

I said, I had found anexcellent opportunity and I really enjoyed the

work. He said I might continue to try but advised me not to forget

his advice.

The activities of my office did not avoid arousing personal

animoslties^for most of the questions T was called upon to handle fell

within the jurisdiction of that division. In Chinese officialdom, the

feeling of jealousy was very keen; they always thought that I was

trying to put my nose out and show myself. In fact as a returned

student I never entertained any desire to compete with anybody because

1 felt it was everybody's part to help in handling any question to the

best advantage of China. While preparing a memorandum I would some­

times have difficulty in getting a reply from the Political Division.

I tried to get along without them for a while, but, as may be

imagined, it was almost impossible. I had to report the delicate

situation to the Vice Minister and ask him what I could do about it.

He would then send to the Division for the file and send it on to me;

thus the Division would not know that I had it, and in any case could

not have ignored the request of the Vice Minister. I was on very

close terms with the Minister and the Vice Minister. My advantage was

that when the Political Division disagreed with me and said my way was

not the proper way to handle the matter, the Minister, and the Vice

Minister, usually approved my idea. When the Political Division answered

they couldn't do it, I always was able to make the necessary draft.

But I always saw to it that my draft was not sent directly to the

Vice Minister; I would go over to the Political Division and ask the

chief, a Mr. Ma, what he thought of it.

My training had of course equipped me well for such work. In

the beginning, people in the Foreign Office had the idea that, being

an American returned student, I could not be qualified to make a

draft in Chinese unless the use of a foreign language was cal 1 ■ - I t >r ,

in which case I would write it in English. Though mv Chinese was

not of first quality I could always put it in a clear and

expressive form. Probably that gave me an advantage too. The

resentment of some of my colleagues was not surprising. Some ot them

were very old and had been in the service for twenty-five or thlrtv

years before I joined them. But I never tried to make myself shine or

blow my own horn. My purpose was to get things done in the best way

for the advantage of China - an approach which, as my cousin told mo,

was somewhat different from the prevailing mood in Peking.

My Experience' in the President's Office

Apart from my work in the Foreign Office I continued to act as

English Secretary to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, even after my promotion

from secretary to counselor in the Foreign Office. It was as the

President's Secretary in 1912 that I had the conversation I have

already described in which President Yuan showed he did not understand

the nature of republican government. But rtiost of my work as his

Secretary bore some relation to foreign affj^rs, and I was able to

observe his method and approach in foreign questions. President Yuan

had for decades been dealing with men and affairs. As Viceroy of

Chihli Province and later Grand Councillor on the Imperial Grand

Council his nuin function apart from his military career had been to

give advice on, or deal with diplomatic questions. So, although he

had never been abroad and could not speak or read one word of a

foreign language, he still understood how to handle a situation where

foreigners were concerned.

After first joining the Foreign Office, I went to the President's

('V 1 ( d ') 4'\> t j ^ ^ (.A •> f h’ -j £' } -V t ,
Office almost daily. I might be asked to draft statements for

publication in the foreign press; more often I would be handed corres­

pondence and communiques which had been addressed to the President's

Office. The President would hand over the most important telegrams

and notes in consultation with the Foreign Minister, who used to call

on the President almost every day, usually in the morning. I was a

sort of convenient link on a far less exalted level. The person I

saw most often was the secretary-general of the President's Office;

but sometimes I was specially sent for bv the President.

On such occasions I would act as interpreter at interviews between

him and the foreign ministers or distinguished visitors from abroad.

As was the custom in the Foreign Office, each interview had to he at

once recorded and translated into Chinese and submitted to the Presi­

dent for his approval. The President would telephone me that on the

following day at such and such an hour, so and so would call, and

would I be present? Often the visitor would be one of his old friends

from the British fission, or Dr. Paul S. Reinsch the American Minister.

The majority of questions would be dealt with by interviews at the

Foreign Office on which the President was kept fully informed. But

the interviews between the President and some of the foreign ministers

who knew him well covered all sorts of diplomatic matters and were ot

special importance because they would be employed when the foreign

minister concerned wanted to get a direct reply from the President

himself or to hear his personal views. Sometimes the President would

have extended talks with one of the Ministers - as weH be seen In t he

✓ i, , r L ^
case of the Tibetan question; as I said before, Sir John Jordan would

always prefer to deal directly with the President. From time to

time there were important visitors from abroad such as Professor

Goodnow, who was invited to visit China for advice on the kind of

constitution which would suit China best. Several interviews took

place and I was present. It was generally taken for granted that

Professor Goodnow was strongly in favor of reestablishing the

throne in China in favor of a monarchical form of government. And I

believe it incurred for him some criticism abroad.

 \

-i /f . ^
Professor Goodmtw18 iirst vifiit was during a tour. On his

(*wn init iat iv<> he called on the President and made his acquaintance.

T explained to the President that Professor Goodnow was my own

professor in administrative law, which was his special field, although

he was also a scholar on American constitutional law. So the

conversation at the first interview was mainly on the administrative

aspecty how to organize an effective government which could ensure

peace, order and security in the country. His views were very much

liked by the President and he was invited to make a second visit. At

the second visit they went at length into the subject and he was
is
asked to submit a memorandum or two on the subject. In th£ interview,

as far as I recall, he spoke at length and explained his own views

after surveying the conditions in China. China, he said, had a tradi=

tion of imperial government, and the nationalist spirit of the Chinese

people was not developed as it was in the West. He came to the

conclusion that what China needed was a strong central government in

order to consolidate the country instead of the existing system of loosely

bound provinces where the military governors exercised almost sovereign

privileges. Of course, a strong central government was also the

idea of Yuan Shih-k ai and at the back of his -heerh, the only form

he could conceive of was an imperial form of government.

Another visit I remember was paid by the editor-in-chief of

the Saturday Evening Post in 1914 after the outbreak of the First

World War. He was one of the outstanding journalists and publicists

in the U.S. and was very highly recommended to the President. He had,
in fact, cabled his request for an inter.lew, and had said he w 1 I rv

only if the President was willing to give him an exclusive interview

T remember that he came in a great rush and an appointment 1 »1 been

made already. So the day after he arrived in Peking he went to see

the President. At the meeting he asked a number of questions both

in regard to the war in Europe and on the way in which China would be

affected in her relations with Japan. His questions called tor i

great deal of thought and consideration and the President was not vet

prepared to give any answer. I suggested that he could think it over

and give the journalist a written statement which would give him more

time. But the journalist said he had to leave the next morning /it

ten o’clock and would like to have a statement before then.

The interview took place at five o’clock and did not f ish

until about six. As I saw him out, a lieutenant of the President

followed me to say that the President wanted to see me after f had

seen this man off. I went back to the President's Office and he said

to me, ’’You prepare a statement, you know Americans very well." So

I asked him to give me some general points and ideas, which he did;

and I said I would try to do that.

After I left the Office, it was already seven o'clock hut I

knew that the thing had to be done before this man left at twenty minutes

after ten the next day on the morning train for Tientsin. When I.

went back I did not go to the dinner party I was invited to but
telephoned to two of my Chinese assistants at the Foreign Office.

We worked all night;as I drafted iT in English, they translated

it into Chinese and then I went over and corrected it. In. the morning

when the whole thing was finished, I went over to the President's Office

the President was always an early riser. I showed him the Chinese

copy of the statement which had of course to be in English and asked

if he wished to make any changes. I was most anxious that he would

not suggest any because there would be no time. When He had looked

it over, to my pleasant surprise he said, "Very good, very good."

I went directly to the station, where I caught the journalist and

handed the statement to him. He said he had no time to telegraph

5o
it in Peking but would do in Tientsin. It was rather lengthy -

the Chinese version was a little over a thousand words - and he said

it would cost him over three thousand dollars in telegraphing.

 u

At the beginning, these letters did not as a rule

involve very serious questions of policy. Later, when 1 was

transferred to the Foreign Office, I not only had this new work

at the Foreign Office but had much more to do at the President’s

Office. Telegrams and letters touching upon foreign questions

and foreign personalities were turned over to me either for con­

sultation by the Foreign Ministry or for direct reply from the

President’s Office. There were two principal divisions at the

Foreign Office: Political Affairs and Commercial Affairs. Each

had a big staff. Officially I was one of four private secre­

taries to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was our duty to

arrange interviews between the Chinese Minister of Foreign

Affairs and the heads of diplomatic missions in Peking. We

handled the translation work and took notes on the interviews.

V/e also handled the semi-official, private correspondence of the

foreign minister and vice-minister. I—in my cas** the

si^&t'icTr-was somewhat unusual; I—was-the link between the /

President’s Office and the Foreign Office at a low level.

 V.'hen I asked the secretary-general to the president,

Mr, Liang Shih-i, what would be the nature of my work as English

secretary to President Yuan, he said that I would not keep

regular hours at the President’s Office, I was expected to be at

the Prime Minister’s Office every day, but I could go to the

President’s Office anytime I wanted to or anytime I was sent for.

Without making it too hard and fast a rule, he would like me to

see him at least three times a week to see what work he wanted

to turn over to me, I didn’t find my work at the President’s

Office very strenuous. Every now and then, some English corres­

pondence would be turned over to me for reply, and I would be

shown official telegrams received on topics or questions which

concerned foreign countries or foreign personalities. I was

left with full discretion in drafting replies, PTaTTTyaI'ly^'iH’vreul.d

submit the draft to th.e president through the secretary-general

for his apnroval or corrections.

Frontier Disputes and Negotiations with Britain and Russia 1912-1916

Most of the important diplomatic questions which arose from

1912 to 1916 were connected with the territory on the boundaries of

China: with Britain over Tibet; with Russia over Outer Mongolia;

and with Japan over Manchuria, and later, as a result of the

outbreak of the First World War, over Shantung Province. The un­

settled political situation, with the outbreak of the Revolution

and the subsequent establishment of the Republic, led to a period

of political disorder throughout the country, especially along

the frontiers. Those countries which had common boundaries with China

did not hesitate - as in previous centuries - to take advantage

of the unsettled conditions in China either to expand their spheres

of interest within China or to extend their political influence

across her traditional frontiers.

With Great Britain, the question of Tibet was the subject of

a long drawn-out controversy. This dispute arose out of a

situation for which not only the Tibetans themselves but the Bri­

tish authorities in India were responsible. The question of

boundaries between Tibet and India and the status of Tibet in the

political framework of the Chinese empire had been more or less

resolved by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1908, negotiated by

Mr. T’ang Shao-i on the Chinese side and Lord Kitchener on the

British side. Under that convention. Great Britain confirmed

the recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet and recognized the

specia1 rights of China, on one hand, and Great Britain on the

other, in Tibet. The position of the Chinese Resident and the

number of his armed guards were fixed in the convention as were

the status of the Chinese representatives in a number of important

cities in Tibet. Generally speaking, Great Britain and China were

to hold more or less equal rights in Tibet. The outbreak of the

Revolution in China proper was seized upon by the Tibetans to throw

off Chinese rule. How much of this Tibetan move was inspired and

aided by the British in India was not known, but what happened

clearly indicated that the Tibetans found themselves with sufficient

arms and military strength to force the Resident and his guards to

leave Tibet. They also pushed forward toward China proper in an

attempt to consolidate their rule of the Eastern part of Tibet. There

were actually outbreaks of fighting along the Tibetan-Szechuan

borders between the Tibetan invaders and the Chinese forces in

that region. The British offered their services to bring about a

ceasefire. This was accepted and arrangements made for negotiation

to settle the boundaries between Tibet and China. Consequently,

soon after the installation of Yuan Shih-k'ai as President of the

Republic, the British Minister brought up this question and urged

the opening of negotiations between China and Britain to settle the

Tibetan question.

The British offer was accepted and negotiations were started

in 1913. Being a personal friend of Yuan Shih-k’ai, Sir John Jordan

always sought to discuss important matters directIv with the President

and the Tibetan question was one of the questions that formed the

subject of negotiation between the two. My role was that of an

interpreter at these interviews, although the British Minister himself

always brought his own interpreter --first, Sir Sidney Barton and,

later, a Mr. Hardy. These conversations were most enlightening to

myself and gave me an opportunity to know more about the issues

involved. The President spoke his mandarin with a very strong

Honan accent, which was at first not easy to understand, especially

for a foreign interpreter. Sir Sydney or Mr. Hardy would occa­

sionally have difficulty in making his interpretation clear to

Sir John Jordan and sometimes at making the President understand.

It was naturally easy for me, being a Chinese, to put it in a more

understandable phrase. So as time went on, after the first inter­

views, both sides seemed to agree to accept me as interpreter. I woul

put Sir Jordan’s English words into Chinese for the President and

the latter’s Chinese words into English, with Sir John's personal

interpreter taking notes. After the interview his secretary and

myself would review briefly the essential parts. This was a great

help to me in writing up the interview in Chinese and I suppose it

was equally helpful to my British counterpart. When I had completed

the record, it was sent to the President for approval and a copy

was submitted to the Foreign Minister for his information.

 The personal interviews between the President and the British

Minister were only part of the negotiations. Whenever the President

was not able to receive Sir John Jordan, he would send me to call

on him instead. The records of my interviews with the Minister were

always promptly submitted to the President. These conversations at

the British legation probably formed a substantial portion of the

negotiations.

In preparation for the interviews at the British legation,

I found it always necessary to look up and study the different

points in dispute in order to familiarize myself with the histori­

cal facts and current situation. It was a fascinating task because

it gave me an opportunity to know a great deal more about the geo­

graphy of Tibet. This portion of the Chinese Empire, brought

to China by the Manchu Emperor in the early days of the Manchu

dynasty,has a pattern to it. It was a place very little known to

the country at large and even to the leaders of the government,

but there was a group of specialists on Tibet, who were thoroughly

conversant not only with the geography but with the history,

institutions and the customs of Tibet. I discovered this group

in the so-called Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. One

of the councillors to this government office was a Chinese scholar

Mr. Wu who was a real expert on Tibet. It was my good fortune to

know him and I found it not only most helpful but necessary at times

to consult him and seek his advice. The main point of dispute was
about the boundary to be drawn, first between Tibet and Szechwan

Province and later between so-called Inner and Outer Tibet; his

knowledge of the country was so thorough that I always found the

answer to any question I put to him.

The interviews at the legation, just as those at the President'

office, would last about an hour, but occasionalIv could be longer,

and in these meetings, sometimes I found the discussions trying. T

was alone on the Chinese side but the British Minister was represen­

ted by his Chinese secretary on one hand and his military attach*'

on the other. The latter had travelled on horseback over Tibet and

knew the country well. Although he did not take part in the nego­

tiation, he was always at hand. For Sir John Jordan frequently

consulted him and called upon him for explanation - either to

clarify a point or to strengthen his argument. At times my prepara­

tion of the night before would put me in a position to clinch

an argument with the minister; he would then tease me by saying

that he, himself, not having acquired an academic degree like that

of Doctor of Philosophy, could not possibly hope to be so fluent

in debate. I would taunt him by saying this was just a polite

remark on his part, but I knew perfectly well that his life-long

experience in diplomacy, especially in dealing with Qhinese official

put him in a position always to be able to carry his point. Then we

would laugh together over it and try to resume our negotiations.

Sir John was a remarkable man; he spoke Chinese, mandarin Chinese,

very well. But in his conversations either with the President or in

his interviews with me , he always confined himself to English.

The negotiations dragged on for months and the stumbling block

was over the question of fixing a boundary between Inner and Outer

Tibet. The controversial question was keen and discussion often

became hazardous because both sides were aware of the difference

in the status of the two parts of Tibet. In Outer Tibet, right

next to Szechuan Province, China continued to exercise greater

authority and power than in Inner Tibet. In the latter area,

Tibet practically exercised all her rights and sovereignty. It

was this factor which made both sides adhere to their respective

positions. After nearly two years of negotiation, there was no

definite settlement;. The only agreement reached was to set up a

mixed commission to go to Simla on the borders of Tibet with India

to settle the boundary question. The Chinese representative

was Mr. Ch’en Yi, a student of Tibet who was quite familiar with

the geography, history and customs of the country. After several

weeks of negotiation, a tentative agreement was reached between

the two commissioners. It was telegraphed to the Wai-chiao-pu in

Peking and the text was promptly submitted to the President for his

approval. Neither the Foreign Office nor the President’s Office

were completely satisfied with the drafted terms and the President
especially wanted to make certain changes. But before the new

instructions were prepared for despatch to Mr, Ch'en, a telegram

from him reported, to the great surprise and dissatisfaction of

the President and the Foreign Office, that the agreement had been

initialed. In fact, this unauthorized action on the part of the

Chinese representative made the President so angry that, he ordered

him to return at once to make a personal report. This brought

an end to more than two years of attempts to settle the Tibetan

question. It brought about a protest from the British government.

But by that time the Tibetan question had become a matter of public

interest and concern in the country. Since there was no immediate

possibility of finding a solution, it was shelved once more, at

least for the time being. That was the situation in 1916 when

I was appointed Minister to Mexico and departed from Peking for

my new post.

The other question was that of Outer Mongolia which was one

of the principal dependencies of the Chinese Empire. Russia had had

designs on that country for a long time and reports continued to

come in from Ulan Bator, the capital of the country, indicating

activity on the part of the Russians to undermine Chinese rule and

authority over Outer Mongolia. There was no legal sanction for

Russia to make any claim on Outer Mongolia other than China. I he

Russians knew it, but the Chinese revolution was too good an

occasion, for Russia not to make use of it to advance an expansionist

policy in Asia. November 21, 1912 - it was a thunderbolt out #

of a clear sky - the Russian Minister asked for an urgent interview

witli the new Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Liang Ju-hao,

who had taken up the post of Foreign Minister only a few days before

The Russian minister presented a set of three demands and verbally

told the Foreign Minister that unless China accepted these proposals

Russia would take steps in Outer Mongolia without consulting

China. Clearly he wanted to convey a threat in order to compel

China's acceptance.

I was then one of the four Secretaries in the Ministry.

Immediately after the Russian minister left, Mr. Liang sent for me

and showed me the text of the proposed demands. Mr. Liang was

in great anger. He said that he had never thought such barehanded

blackmail possible in the 20th Century; he said it was preposterous

for Russia to make such demands on China. I told him that this was

a part of a policy of imperialism currently pursued by most of the

powers in Asia. While it was possibly not unusual, the important

question was to consider how to deal with it.

The Foreign Minister appeared to be somewhat taken back by

ray calm attitude, and showed surprise, not annoyance; he burst out,

declaring that he himself was certainly not going to deal with it.

He would simply send in his resignation and let some other foreign

minister undertake the task. I tried to calm him and said it was a
difficult time in the Foreign Office to conduct China's foreign

relations because the country was weak. The only way was to stand

firm on the country's rights and negotiate without yielding any

important ground. His reply was that while I had been trained and

had studied diplomacy and International Law, he had not. He said

he felt that his own duty to the President and to the country was

to resign immediately from the post. This he did, and duly called

on the President to express his intention. Evidently the President's

effort to retain him was unsuccessful - for the resignation was

duly prepared, on the Minister’s instruction, and sent in to the

President the same afternoon.

Recently I spoke to Dr. P. T. Liang, the son of Mr. Liang Ju-

hao, or M. T. Liang as he was called. During his father's stewardship

of the Wai-chiao-pu Dr. P. T. Liang was studying in England; he

has sent me a short letter quoting from the letters which he t»dd

received from his father at that time. These extracts explain more

fully the reasons why he resigned. Here are 2 brief quotations:

"Peking, 21 September, 1912

"You probably have seen from the newspaper that I have

been made the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As I have

written before, the appointment was net of my own seeking,

since I would rather not have entered the Cabinet. It was

impossible for me to avoid it; the appointment was forced

on me by the President's nomination and its approval

by the parliament, all v.’ithout my consent being previously

obtained. I have not the least desire for that appointment.

I have only accepted to save complications by any further

refusal. Happily the present Provisional Government

will be succeeded by a government of six years duration

in about four months hence, when another Cabinet will be

formed, and I hope to be relieved then. The position of

Foreign Minister is naturally the most difficult of all

the Cabinet positions. I hardly care to assume the respon­

sibilities of the post."

"Peking, 29 September 1912

"I assume that you must have known now I am very busy

all the time. The work of the Foreign Office is not

pleasant as most of it concerns disagreeable, debatable

matters which could not be settled to the satisfaction of

all parties. Xn Mongolia there is considerable trouble from

the Russians, against whom we Chinese are called powerless.

Their aims and desires are not far to seek. The Japanese

in Manchuria are quiet, but it is presumed they are only

waiting to see how the Russians in the North succeed. Tibetan

affairs also hang fire. It is hard to predict how China will

come out in the end with so many powerful neighbors

knocking at her door."

"I am thinking of leaving the Foreign Office as I dislike

the work owing to too much interference. The work itself

is already difficult and when interference is added to

it, it makes it so much more annoying and difficult.”

"Tientsin, 16, November, 1912.

"I have now resigned my position in the Foreign Office. A

I have stated in my previous letters there has been too

much interference with my work making it most disagreeable

for myself and my staff. Culminating in the incident

in the Russian agreement with the Living Buddha. In

respect to Mongolia when my views as regards legitimate

action so sharply differed from those also responsible

for our international relations. I considered that is

about time that China should take a diplomatic stand

against the present aggression. For easy yielding in

Russia's most immoral international conduct would, in

my opinion, lead to other equally uncalled for claims

on the part of other land grabbing nations of which we

have had such sad experience during the recent period

of the late reign. A stand has to be made sooner or

later against any further encroachment and to me now

is the time. Russia practically says to China that she

wants Mongolia which in area is as large as China proper.

If wr should rm*eklv Ttn-rf her in her audacious act I am

rat hri certain that other neighboring powers would prefer

similar claims in order to preserve what is called

in diplomatic terms uthe balance of power" - which may result

in the dismemberment of our land. Since the forced

opening of our foreign trade some sixty years ago, we

have been too ignorant; we lost i^urma, Indochina, Korea,

Formosa, part of Koja, Tibet, the hinterland of Hongkong

and the Port of Kiaochow, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, Kwang-

chou-wan and other areas either through our moral weakness

or fear of our foreign aggressors. The game has to be

stopped otherwise I despair, for the process must inevi­

tably end in our extinction as a nation. The policy of

resistance is one that I considered the most timely one

to adopt against the present Russian depredation. But as

I stated those who were equally responsible with me in

shaping our foreign policies have not agreed with me

concerning the procedure, aspects which I think are fatal,

particularly at this juncture when our people expect so

much from the Republican Government we have just formed.

Holding the views that I do, I could not but consider

resignation my only possible action in yiew of the divergent

opinions held by others who were equally responsible with

 n*? in shapini? o>.r t r»-i.n puli-v.''

These letters are original source materials ami ImlUate ex u * l\

why he accepted the offer of the Foreign Office and whv v!*« resigned

only one month later. Of course M. T. Mang had ret l r od t r ■ fl l*»

cial service many years before and was called out rd retirenent *

join the Cabinet. Though he had for a short period served as Customs

Taotai in Tientsin, his career had been spent mainly in railway

administration. In other words, he was not one <d th< s»» win* had

consistently followed a career of diplomatic work with foreign

representatives either abroad or in China.

As far as I know Dr. P. T. Liang does not possess other letters

of this sort, though he said his father wrote more regularly to

his brother P. K. Liang in England. Dr. M. T. Liang's letters to

his son show how useful and important it is to keep such private

papers. I am so sorry that in my own case the papers which l had

for the period between 1912 and the end of the Paris Peace Con­

ference were left in Tientsin and are now lost.

Under Liang Ju-hao's successor as Foreign Minister, Mr. Lu

Cheng-hsiang (November 15, 1912 - September 4, 1913), the negotia­

tions with Russia dragged on without result, and were continued

by the next foreign minister, Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i, who was a relative

of the President by marriage and was one of the President's former

collaborators. Mr. Sun was of an entirely different type of

personfllity from Mr. Liang, t Vie latter a Cantonese of fiery tero-

peiaira-nt. H«* was one of the early returned students having studied

in f la* United States in the late 70's of the 19th Century; after

his return he had been mainly in the railway administration of the

country and had served for a time as Custom's Taotai in Tientsin.

He had also been one of the Chinese ministers to Europe. He was a

scholar of the old school, having successfully passed several grades

of the imperial examination. He had great patience and a great

respect for Yuan Shih-k'ai; he knew as Foreign Minister he did

not have to employ much initiative, but had only to seek instructions

from the President, who was very experienced in negotiating with

foreign representatives.

The three Russian proposals consisted of the demands for recognition

of the autonomy of Outer Mongolia; the withdrawal of Chinese garrison

l' V
from the country and provision of Chinese immigration to Outer

Mongolia. The Russian attitude was so adamant that it was

impossible to continue the negotiation for long without yielding any

substantial ground, and Yuan Shih-k'ai was not prepared to make

any important concession. So the negotiation was eventually

suspended without any agreement or understanding. Finally, insti­

gated by the Russians in Ulan Bator, the Outer Mongolians took

steps to force the Chinese Resident and garrison out of the

country.with the aid and support of the Russians just as the

Tibetans in Lhasa succeeded in expelling the Chines*' ^esidmr

and his guards from Tibet with the aid and support of the British

in India.
llu .I.’nxinttBf (k cupat Ion ot Isingtao and the TwentN-One Demands, 1914-1915

Wb«*n tiu* l irnt World War broke out and the German army invaded

neutral Belgium, the news was received in Peking with great appre­

hension. I ( was not that there was any fear of war spreading to

t tie Far East immediately, but it was generally believed that Japan

would take advantage of the situation in Europe in order to push

forward her policy of expansion on the mainland. This fear very

shortly materialized into a real menace for China. In August,

hardly a month after the outbreak of the war in Europe, the Japanese

Government sent an ultimatum to Germany to evacuate the German

leased territory in Tsingtao and the surrounding area including the

Kiaochow Bay. The Germans were naturally not in any position to

adopt a strong attitude, but they nevertheless rejected the

Japanese demand. Evidently, when the ultimatum was dispatched to

Berlin, the Japanese military authorities had already made the nece­

ssary preparations to carry out its threat of attacking Germany's

leased territory. It took the form of a landing of Japanese troops

in Shantung. The Germans originally built all their forts down

toward the sea in case of a naval assault, but the Japanese took the

Germans by surprise by landing behind Germany's leased territory at

Lunkow, a short distance East of Chefoo and marched towards Tsingtao.

The Japanese government did not notify the Chinese government through

its legation in Peking until the landings of the Japanese armed forces

had already begun at Lunkow. As a matter of fact, President Yuan

Shih-k'ai first learned of t h*- landing in .« tt'lejirap l* rep rr t

the Governor of Shantung.

The Japanese action was clearly an Invasion t f China's neutril

territory, and therefore a gross violation of Internal Iona 1 law.

China was in no position, at least in the opinion or the Coverninent ,

to offer any effective resistance. The question, therefore, arose a*i

to what to do and how to meet the situation.

A meeting was hurriedly called hy the President to tnko place

s
in the Presidential-} Office with himseli as chairman. All t he

cabinet ministers were present and, in addition, counselors won

invited to attend the conference. I was then the Counselor of the

Foreign Office and was one of the three asked to be present at (In­

gathering. The two others were Dr. C. C. Wu, counselor of the

Kuo-wu-yuan (cabinet) , an English barrister, educated at. Ox­

ford, and a member of Lincoln's Inn. The third man was also

counselor of the Kuo-wu-yuan and Japanese educated, Chin Peng-plng.

The president called the meeting to order and said that he had

invited three counselors to be present because they were all fami­

liar with international law, having each studied law in a different

country. He announced that the question he wanted to discuss at

the meeting was what China should do about the Japanese invasion of

China's territory. He wanted to first of all know the opinion of the

t hr < ** IrtwviTh. I wjir the f lr«t c>ne called upon to state niy views.

Without hesitation, T said t liat the action of Japan in landing Jap­

anese troops at 1 unk(*w was a clear case of violation of international

law because China had already declared her neutrality in regard to

the war that was raging in Europe and under international law it

was up to belligerents to respect China's neutrality. As a result,

China had the obligation to defend her territory to protect her

neutrality, in order to show that China actually was discharging

her duty as a neutral. So the case was a clear one for resistance to

Japanese entry into China's neutral territory.

President Yuan then called on Dr. C. C. Wu saying that he

would like to hear from him as a student of international law,

educated in England. Dr. Wu, who was a son of the well-known former

Chinese minister in Washington, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, remarked briefly

that his views corresponded entirely with those expressed by myself

and he, too, thought that in order to claim and enjoy the rights of

a neutral state under international law, China must discharge her

duty as a neutral. If China did not make some attempt to protect

her neutrality, her silence would be considered as acquiescence,

if not acceptance of the Japanese action. President Yuan then

asked Mr. Chin Peng-ping to express his views. The latter said

that the situation created by the Japanese was an abnormal one and

he really hesitated to give his definite views.

Thereupon the President turned to the Minister of War, General

Tuan Ch’i-jul. wanted t kn -w fr<-m r'. Miniarer 'f War fit

China was prepared to take miHtarv action In !»«r*'n«»’ >»f her

neutrality. General Tuan said In reply Our | ( t ** Pr*’«! den' >■ » •

the order, the armed forces could put up resistance in! tt f > 1 • -

the Japanese from proceeding rewards t hr Inter! >t : •.»• x P»

But it would be a very difficult operation in view of the insufflt lent

supplies of arms and ammunition. The President then asked iln point

blank how long the Minister of War thought resistance could be

effectively offered. General Tuan said, without hesitation, *8 hours

President Yuan then asked him what would he d<> after '♦H hours’

The Minister looked at the President and said he would then wait

upon the President's instructions. He then turned to t fie Foreign

Minister, Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i, who simply mumbled something to thr

effect that he did not have any definite view. He looked around for

some expression of views from the other ministers but there was

no response. Thereupon, the President gave a deep sigh and remarked,

evidently to myself and to Dr. Wu, that he could well understand

the lawyers’ opinions as to what China should do under international

law; but how could China do her part as a neutral if she were not

fully prepared for action? In his opinion, international l^w had been

created by human beings. In view of her actual situation, why couldn't

China make an international law of her own? The President had pre­

pared a slip of paper, and he was speaking from it. He recalled that

China had faced a similar situation in Manchuria ten years before,

when the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 had been fought over Chinese

territory. The Japanese armed forces could not be stopped; the

only way was to delineate the "fighting zone", in this case the
<<>ri id nr through which t i»- Japanese winjld have t march In their

at tal k on TBlngtao. He Bald he would like to have this demarcation

made 1 mm hum how to Welhsien on the Tsingtao-Kiaocixw-Tsinanfu

bounded by
Railway. Thus it would be/on the North and the railway office in

the South leading to Tsingtao and this line from Lunchcrw to Weihsien

on the West. China would not interfere with the Japanese passage

through that area but outside of that area China would continue to

observe her neutrality.

Evidently it was an extraordinary measure to meet an extraor­

dinary situation. He asked the lawyers present to make a draft of the

regulations to define the so-called fighting zone and prepare a

set of regulations to enforce China’s neutrality outside of that

area. In view of the statement made by the Minister of War about

China being unprepared to continue to offer perpetual resistance and

also in view of wiiat the President had announced as to his views of

what should be done, it was generally accepted that what had been

proposed was perhaps the only practical policy that China could

adopt under the circumstances. The three counselors got together and

prepared the draft of an official statement and a set of regulations.

These were approved and promulgated as China's official policy.

As the Germans were fully occupied in Europe, their resistance

at Tsingtao was only symbolic and lasted only two days. Capitulation

followed and the Japanese forces soon entered and took over the

whole of Germany’s leased territory, including the port of Tsingtao.

After their occupation, the Japanese force* without 1* ’ is i <

control of the whole railway from Tsingtao to Tslnanful, This

greatly alarmed the governor of Shantung and poeed a new prtshlem t t

the Chinese Government. There was, however, no tactful wav t< prevent

this further action by the Japanese. In fact, apprehension Increase 1

in the capital on the part of the Government that Japan would

follow her military action In Shantung with a demand for more

rights and privileges in China: it was felt that Japan had found an

unusual opportunity to push forward its expansionist policy on the

mainland and that she would certainly not fall to take advantage

it.

This apprehension was well-founded for in January, 1LM j,

the Japanese Minister, newly arrived from Tokyo, asked for a special

interview with the President. At this meeting he presented a set

of demands - the notorious Twenty One Demands - and insisted upon a

promise from the President to keep these demands a secret. He

added to these demands by saying that if this secret should be leaked

out, Japan would not fail to take action against China. These de­

mands came to China as a bolt from the blue. At once it created a

very tense situation in the government and it was a big problem as

to how to deal with this extraordinary diplomatic demand from Japan.

President Yuan was an experienced statesman and was aware not only

of China's own weakness but also of Japan's policy of/mperial expansion.

He decided at once to accept negotiation. The Japanese Minister

had hinted that whilo some of the demands must be accepted, others

w<r«' negotiable. These 21 Demands were divided into 5 groups, the

1 list one relating to Shantung; the second one to Manchuria; the

third, the Yangtze Valley; and the fourth, to Fukien Province.

The final one concerned the employment of Japanese advisers in the

central government, a standardization of arms in the Chinese armed

lories and the employment of Japanese instructors for Chinese police

throughout the country.

As soon as the policy of negotiation was decided upon, the

Foreign Minister, Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i was advised to resign by the

President and Mr. Chen^hsiang was once more appointed the Foreign

Minister, evidently for the purpose of conducting the negotiation

with the Japanese Minister in Peking. The Japanese, on their part,

wntU-ed to urge that the negotiation be over as quickly as possible

and should be held once a day in order to expedite the work and conclude

a treaty within the shortest period of time possible. President

Yuan, on the other hand, was most anxious to prolong the negotia­

tions in the hope of obtaining some diplomatic support from abroad,

especially the United States. The confirmation of the delegation

was another immediate question of procedure to be arranged between

the Foreign Office and the Japanese delegation. China proposed that

each side should be represented by a delegation of five members; and

the newspapers were speculating as to who would make up the Chinese

delegation. It was a foregone conclusion that the Minister and the

Vice Minister, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, who w,is Japanese edu* ate<! , would

certainly be the two leading negotiators; as to the other three, -v

name was mentioned as a certainty on the ground that these negotia­

tions would be very difficult and the outcome would depend great Iv

upon how much support China could get from the English speaking

countries, especially the United States and Great Britain. My task

might be to handle the publicity part of the negotiations for the

foreign press abroad, as well as in China. But the question of the

members represented on each side once more became an Issue. ['he

Japanese proposed only the Minister, Foreign Minister and one

Secretary, at most, to make up the third member of each delegation.'

Evidently/ because the Japanese minister was under instruction from

Tokyo to conduct the negotiations in secret and to exclude any Chinese

member who was in more or less close contact with the English-

speaking ministers in Peking, and particularly in contact with the

English-speaking press abroad, ^he Japanese insistence finally

obliged China to drop her proposal and accept the Japanese counter­

proposal - thereby excluding me and another Secretary from the

Chinese group. My own exclusion did not mean that I was kept unin­

formed of the nature and progress of the negotiations from one meeting

to another, and, as a matter of fact, after each meeting with the

Japanese minister and his colleagues the Foreign Minister always called

a small conference to discuss the problems raised.

The first few meetings were protracted and made little progress
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beyond a few questions of procedure. Mr. Lu, in fact, had been

instructed by President Yuan to conduct the negotiation as slowly as

possible, which conflicted with the keen desire of the Japanese

minister to expedite the negotiations as much as possible. In

pursuance of the President’s instructions, Mr. Lu conceived of many

excellent ideas to slow down the negotiations. The Japanese wanted to

hold one meeting a day, five days a week; Mr. Lu proposed one meeting

a week and tried to argue, as gently as possible, in favor of his own

suggestion; he was, he said, busy with many other diplomatic problems,

and he had to attend meetings of the cabinet. After much insistence

on the part of the Japanese minister, a compromise was reached to

hold three meetings a week.

Mr. Lu's next task was to shorten the duration of each meeting.

It was decided that the meeting should take place three times a week,

from four to six o'clock. Mr. Lu introduced the pleasant and ingenious

device of serving tea after his opening remarks. To the undisguised

annoyance of the Japanese Xi-nister> he saw to it that the tea was

prolonged as much as possible, although Mr. Hioki realized that it was

an Oriental courtesy he could not reject.

In the meantime there was an urgent need to gather diplomatic

support behind Peking. Although the Japanese Minister had extracted

a promise to keep the demands secret from all other foreign countries,

I made it plain to the President and Foreign Minister that this

so-called promise, extracted under duress, China was under no

obligation to keep. X suggested that in the actual situation of the

world, the only country which could give China support - that is to

say, diplomatic and moral support, was the United States. In my view,

it was absolutely necessary to let Washington know the nature of the

Demands. London should also be informed for Great Britain's interests

in China, particularly in the Yangtze Valley, were very substantial.

Although she was herself engaged in a life and death struggle, I

felt confident that Great Britain would do discreetly what she could

to see that China was not made to pay to Japan a price so heavy as to

seriously affect British vested interests in China. Evidently,

China’s only weapon to protect herself was to seek whatever support

she could from the Anglo-Saxon countries, for the other countries with

interests in China were in no position to concern themselves with what

was going on in Asia. France, herself, was fully occupied with the

daily struggle with Germany; Russia, too, was already a victim of the

war undertaken by Germany and Austria^/against her. | While dribbles of

the Demands began to appear in the foreign press and arouse/ interest

and concern, especially in Washington and London, J. f it was my part

a4=&o to keep the British and American legations informe^with the full

approval of the President and the Foreign Minister. After each

roe-etln'g be-feween-* -after each conference at the Foreign Office, I would

see the American minister, Dr. Paul Reinsch and the British minister,

Sir John Jordan, if—not—the i~uim^ day, <Tf the latest—th^-io-l-lowioffi^-ffnj-rniTig;"'

if not the same afternoon, at the latest the following day. Tokyo

began to appear annoyed as the Japanese Ambassador in Washington

telegraphed to his government asking for full information on the nature

of the demands and especially about the fifth group. Apparently the

Japanese mission”, embassies and legations abroad were not kept

fully informed of the nature of the demands and the progress of the

negotiations. The Japanese ^mbassador in Washington was reported to

have practically denied the existence of the so-called fifth group

of demands, and was greatly embarrassed to be confronted at the

[ O A. C
State Department with the copy of the whole 21 Demands. From then the

Japanese Government itself began to feel embarrassed - if not at the

negotiations in Peking, certainly in her relations with Washington and

London. With the black cat out of the bag, the Japanese Foreign

Minister, at least, must have shared the feeling that it was then

inadvisable continuing to deny the existence first of the 21* Demands

at all, then of the fifth group. As the secret became more and more

widely known, the Japanese negotiators began to press harder and harder

for a rapid conclusion and for a conclusion of a treaty to

to terminate the negotiation. Minister Lu continued to pursue the

policy of protraction but found it more and more difficult to do so.

Under great pressure he had to conclude the discussion on one point

after another until all the four groups had been disposed of.

By this time China had won the evident support of the foreign

press abroad and the sympathetic consideration in Washington. Un­

doubtedly the American Government made its views known to the Japanese
Ambassador in the Capital, and through its own ambassador, to the

Japanese Government in Tokyo. The influence in favor of the Chinese

cause was being felt by the Japanese Foreign £££4ee. China then

took an adamant stand on the Fifth Group and refused to discuss it at

all, while the Japanese continued to press for such discussions.

Toward the middle of April, the negotiations came to a stalemate after

the first four groups had beien disposed of. The Japanese kept pressing

China for discussing the fifth group, but President Yuan stood firm

and he refused, giving all kinds of reasons for delaying the nego­

tiations. The support from Washington was evident for not submitting -

to reassure China of her stand. Yuan Shih-k'ai decided to send a

special envoy, a Japanese adviser, to Tokyo to contact particularly

the elder statesmen of Japan, who exercised great influence over

Japanese government and particularly over the Foreign Ministry: for

all the nature and policies were determined in the Council of elder

statesmen before the Emperor. The outstanding personality in Japan

and her most venerable statesman was Prince Saonji. It was President

Yuan’s hope to find out from the elder statesman’s personal view as

to how far Japan would go to insist upon acceptance of the fifth group

by China. Evidently it took a long time for the Japanese to have the

opportunity of achieving his mission and for nearly three weeks the

negotiations were suspended, for- Japan., for the Japanese ^inister^ ['i- ' /

was pressing for China for the negotiation to come to a rapid termina­

tion. President Yuan was directing the Foreign Minister not to

resume the negotiations and put them off as long as possible. By

the first of May a report came from Tokyo, both from the Chinese

minister there and from the Japanese adviser, that if China accepted

the first four groups as they were negotiated, China could refuse to

discuss the fifth group; but the treaty to wind up the negotiations

on the four groups must be concluded as soon as possible, or Japan

might take some kind of action either in Shantung or in Manchuria.

The Japanese minister continued to urge early conclusion of the treaty

but President Yuan, not knowing the inclination of the Japanese

government to relapse that of the fifth group, continued to pursue

the policy of protraction - even with a strong hint from the Japanese

minister that an ultimatum would be sent if China did not accept the

results of the negotiation already agreed upon. The hint became a

reality on May 7th. The Japanese minister delivered an ultimatum

from the Japanese Government blaming China for the delay and calling

upon her to conclude the treaty within forty-eight hours. In the note

from the Japanese minister, while it clearly contained an ultimatum

to the effect that unless China agreed to sign the treaty within

forty-eight hours, she would have to accept the consequences of her

v .... .
action^ the ultimatum, as a matter of fact, had been expected on the

Chinese side and did not create such a stir as might have been

imagined.

Still it was an ultimatum, setting a time limit of 48 hours. The

question for China was not so much whether to accept the ultimatum as

how to draft a reply of acceptance of the terms. This task fell upon

me. The Foreign Minister came to see me in the German hospital where
I had been laid up for two days with high fever, as a result, according

to Dr. Krieg head of the hospital, of strain and fatigue. As Mr. Lu

consulted me over the contents of the ultimatum and the nature of the

reply I offered to draft a reply after he told me that the President

had directed him to accept and submit a draft reply. This idea

did not take long because he did not call for a lengthy reply; the

important point was how to deal with the fifth group in writing as the

first four groups had been negotiated at length and the results

more or less had been agreed upon. My draft was a very brief one

and as regards to the fifth group, I made it clear that China could

not accept. This was approved by the Foreign Minister who took it to

the President and he, too, approved it. But while the note was being

prepared, the Japanese speaking-member of our delegation, Shih Li-pan,

who,as it was a practice, at the time was in close touch with the

Japanese minister and his staff, suggested that Th be wise to show the

draft to the Japanese minister first before dispatching it: if it should

be found unacceptable, he argued, it would create a very awkward and

"Is-' a
dangerous situation. The Vice Minister, €ha‘©—$b4h~4*as&g:'-agreed. When

Mr. Shih came back, he brought the reaction of the Japanese minister

to the effect that the language was too categorical and suggested that

it would be more acceptable to Tokyo if the draft could be revised - to

say that the Fifth Group would be left for future consideration. I

thought this was unnecessary and rather compromising in the eyes of

the Chinese public and the friendly nations abroad. It might also

furnish a pretext for Japan to raise the question again in the future,

for Mr. Shih said that the Japanese minister had made him understand
that by modifying this phrase, it would make the reply more acceptable

to Tokyo and save the face of the Japanese Government. As I was

confined in the German hospital, I was not able to take part in

discussions at the President’s Office for final approval of the draft

and the phrase was retained in the reply.

The next step, I believed, was to issue a full statement of

the position of the Chinese Government throughout the negotiations and

of the circumstances under which China had been obliged to

conclude the treaty. My suggestion was not quickly understood by some

of my colleagues in the Foreign Office. According to them, anything

China said would be likely to antagonize the Japanese Government and

invite unfavorable retaliation; since China had accepted the ultimatum,

the matter should be considered closed and the less said about it the

better. But I explained that it was unusual in peace time for a country

quietly to accept an ultimatum making demands of an extraordinary nature

which affected its sovereign rights. It was necessary to leave a record

for future historians, making clear why China undertook the negotiations,

how they were conducted, and what China’s reasons were for rejecting the

Demands that were found unacceptable. Thus it was imperative to issue

an official statement in the name of the Chinese Government. The

Foreign Minister endorsed the idea and it was submitted to the

President who in turn approved it. Before approving it, both the

Foreign Minister, Vice Minister, and the minister in Washington were

asked how the statement was to be drawn up. The heads of the
department were responsible but the Foreign Office thought it would be

a tremendous task to try to review the whole course of the negotiations

and to isf,ue a statement within the same evening or on the day

following.

' 1 .v ^ •: a* i v-
Ify was to serve any purpose^, I said, it must be published

promptly so that it could be carried in the press both in China and

Svaax^
abroad. A-s there was discussion of ■foowirarad who should do it and how it

should be written, I suggested if the thing must be done quickly, as

I thought it should be, it would be difficult in the department to

undertake the task; I would do it. The Foreign Minister was delighted

with my suggestion, only pointing out that in my actual state of

health, I should ask the doctor whether he would permit me to do so.

I assured him that though I had a temperature of 101, I felt perfectly

able to dictate it. It was quickly arranged with Dr. Krieg,head

of the clinic,that I should have the use of an extra room for two

secretaries. In the second place, I asked him if he had any objection

to my working late that night, possibly till daybreak; if there were

any patients in nearby rooms, it was possible that they might be

disturbed. His answer was most friendly and sympathetic: although

he was German, he spoke Chinese well and appeared to support China's

cause especially after the Japanese treaty. So he said that he would

arrange for the removal of one patient to a room farther away so that

he would not hear anything. I asked for the assistance of W. H. Donald,

an Australian, who was then the correspondent of an Australian paper

and who later succeeded Mr. George Morris as correspondent of the

London Times. I told him that X would dictate to him and he would write

down in longhand; he arranged for Mr. Pratt, his assistant, to do the

typing. We started about half past nine and finished at three o'clock

in the morning. The dictation of each part was immediately followed

by typing it out so before daybreak it was already in typed form. We

covered about 12 to 14 pages. Then it had to be translated in the

Ministry, which was quickly accomplished. The whole text was submitted

to the President by the Minister and Vice Minister and as soon as it was

approved it was published.

The treaty of May 25, 1915 following the Twenty One Demands

was undoubtedly one of the most important diplomatic problems of the

time. The treaty was signed, but certainly as far as China was concerned

and in some respects as far as U. S. was concerned, the question

remained open. It became a diplomatic controversy once again both at

the Peace Conference at Paris and at th© Washington Conference in 1921-2.

The development at those two conferences will be taken up later.

j. Peking in Transition

Peking in the early years of the Republic was an extraordinary

city. Having visited many capitals abroad, I found Peking in some

ways rather unique. In the first place, it was of course the site of

the government of the Republic of China with the President and the

Cabinet and various other governmental departments and offices,

administering the country and making laws and decrees for all the

provinces. At the same time, there remained in the center of Peking

the Forbidden City, subject to the control and jurisdiction of the

former emperor, Hsuan-t'ung (3. ). Within the precincts of the

Forbidden City, the calendar was still the imperial calendar. While

according to the official calendar for the whole country 1912 was the

first year of the Republic, inside the Forbidden City, the same year

was described as the fourth year of the reign of emperor Hsuan-t’ung:

one could read this date on the gates of the imperial city where it

was posted for the information of the entourage and the officials

of the palace. It was certainly an anomaly and the attention of the

President was called to this extraordinary feature. He saw the point

at once and sent a special deputation to visit the Lord Chamberlain

of the palace and asked him to bring the point to the abdicated

emperor with a view to getting his consent not to publish the

imperial calendar in any place where the general public could read

it. His agreement was given in due course, so that one could say

the foundation of the Republic was further strengthened.

There were other practices which carried over from imperial

times. On the birthday of the Emperor or on New Year's Day, the

President would send a special representative to offer his congratulations.

This did not provoke much attention or criticism on the part of the

public. But what appeared to be even more extraordinary was that

the high officials in the Government who had served previously under

the emperor would also make visits to the palace and offer

felicitation in their personal capacity. In return, they would

receive acknowledgement in the form of a scroll, or a big character

such as happiness or longevity carved beside the Emperor's seal.

Personally I did not make any visit because I had never served under

the dynasty - my public service having begun with the first year of

the Republic; but there were among the returned students some who
awarded by Hsuan-t'ung
did. Dr. W. W. Yen, for example, had the happiness character/hung

up over the mantlepiece in his drawing room.

Many of the American returned students before the Republic had

taken the new imperial examination held specially to recruit western

educated returned students. This was done more than once after the

American Boxer Indemnity remission and before the Revolution. The

desire of the throne to enlist the service of western trained Chire se

scholars was so keen that a special provision was introduced to confer

literary degrees upon the candidates. In the old days, the chtl-jen,

chin-shih, and han-lin degrees were coveted by the whole body of scholars

in the country and in some popular provinces such as Kiangsu and Hupei,

the chance of passing an imperial examination and receiving a degree

was very slight. In the case of a chit-jen ('^r'V ) probably only

one or two in a hundred succeeded, although in the less popular

provinces it was far easier. But the new imperial examination

was intentionally made as easy as possible for the candidates. Even

those who, born and brought up in the U.S. as children of overseas

Chinese, had no Chinese education and had not even learnt to speak

or write Chinese, were given degrees. One of these men was Samuel

Young, who had received an M.A. in education at Columbia. Instead of

writing a Chinese composition on a Chinese subject they could submit

an essay in English, French, or German if they wanted to. Therefore,

Mr. Li Tung-hui, Dr. Fang, and Mr. Alfred Sze, as well as Mr. Samuel

Young and Mr. W. W. Yen, were awarded either a chin-shih [^ -t 1

or chti-jen [ -9^ jalthough under the Republic their titles were

"foreign chin-shih" and "foreign chd-jen". It was because these

students had received special recognition from the throne that they

considered it proper to make a ceremonial call on the emperor on

special occasions such as his birthday or the New Year. The practice

was generally accepted as nothing striking and as not unreasonable,

though from the point of view of western democracy it might seem

strange.

A curious phenomenon in Peking was the Legation Quarter, a

feature more or less unique to Peking. As a consequence of the

Boxer settlement in the form of theProtocol of 1901, the legation

quarter was placed under the control of the diplomatic body. Most of
the legations were situated inside the quarter, which had walls

specially built around it and was surrounded with a band of territory

called the glacis. The administration and the regulation of traffic

inside the quarter was entirely in the hands of the diplomatic body.

There were even special police and the Chinese po' .ce of Peking could

not enter without permission. Most of the legations also had the

legation guards, the number of which varied according to the size of

the country which the legation represented. Japan had the largest

force in Peking, while the U.S., Great Britain, and France all had most
x lrtt wecvv>
of their garrison forces along the railroads in Peking and Shan-hai-

kuan Railway. The Chinese offender or criminal fleeing from

Chinese jurisdiction in Peking to the Legation Quarter could not be

apprehended by the Chinese police without the permission of the

police authorities in the quarter. Thus Peking consisted of the

imperial palace (the Forbidden City) the Legation Quarter and the
*
capital of the Republic. In other words, there was not only an im-

perium in imperio, in fact there were two imperii in imperio.

Even at first glance a visitor to Peking could see that every­

thing was undergoing a period of change if not of great confusion. In

some respects, the old-time Peking remained. For example, the means

of transport still consisted largely of mule carts and sedan chairs

for the upper classes, particularly of the Manchu clan. There were

horse-drawn carriages for the high officials and diplomatic representa­

tives, and there was the ricksha for the average citizen. There was no

tram or bus to be seen in the city at that time.

Social customs were another example of transition. Dinner parties

were given sometimes in the foreign style, serving foreign food,

or in the Chinese style, serving completely a Chinese menu. Speaking

generally, all the dinners and luncheons given at the Foreign Office

were in a foreign style with foreign food and wine. That was more due

to the preference of the successive foreign ministers, beginning

with Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang followed by Mr. Sun Pao-ch’i, both of whom

had served abroad, the latter as Minister to Japan and the former

for a considerable number of years in Europe. Parties at the

President's Office always had a foreign menu with foreign wine,

whether it was a reception or a dinner if the guests were mainly

from the diplomatic corps, but when parties were given there for a

completely Chinese company, only Chinese food was served.

I remember being invited to one dinner at the beginning of 1913.

I believe it was the annual dinner to the Tibetan and Mongolian Princes,

and the food was Chinese with some dishes of the Mongolian kind added

to it. I was interested to see that the arrangement of the tables

was altogether in the imperial style, with the President's table in

the back of the hall right in the center with himself alone. Then,

to his right and left, there were about eight or ten tables on each

side. Each table had six persons and six dishes. I found them

not only unattractive but hardly eatable, and refrained from touching

any of them. The host at the table urged that I should eat something

or else I would go home hungry. As he was speaking I caught a

glimpse of a beautiful-looking roast duck at the end of the table

on the far side which had no seats. I stretched out my hand and

tried to penetrate the duck with my chopsticks, but I couldn't do

it. I thought the duck was over-roasted, it was so hard. As I

kept on poking, the table host enlightened me by saying that it was

put there for looks, not to be eaten. It was a wooden duck, painted)

Then I realized what, lengths were resorted to in cutting down the cost

of dinner parties, not necessarily on the part of the general

manager in charge, but on thepart of the cook who must necessarily

take his share out of such a big party.

Foreign diplomatic ministers in the Legation Quarter of course

always entertained by giving foreign-style dinners or lunches. As

Secretary or Counselor, I was frequently invited to the legations

for such parties. Although my work was mainly with the English-

speaking legations, my social contact was not limited to them. Thus

every year I was invited to formal, diplomatic dinner parties at the

German, Russian, Italian, Belgian and Dutch legations, as well as at

the British and American legations. It was an interesting eye-opener

for me to see how different ministers conducted themselves at these

parties. Some of them very amiable, others formal, but the foreign

ministers represented in Peking, in that period, appeared to be all

very important personalities. For example, the Dutch minister Van

, with whom I had frequent contacts socially, later

became the head of government - premier - and after his resignation

was appointed President of the Privy Consul to the Queen. The

Belgian minister was then Baron , whom I met again in

Washington as my colleague; and later as Belgian Ambassador in

London. Count Sforza, a military man, was the Italian Minister in

Peking. He later opposed the Mussolini regime, and after the

fall of Mussolini became foreign secretary of Italy for several

years. Subsequently he became Italian ambassador in London. Sir

John Jordan was a great personality in Peking and a personal friend

of President Yuan Shih-k'ai. He was the dean of the Diplomatic

Corps from the days of the end of the Dynasty and was a very impressive

figure in the first years of the Republic. Dr. Reinsch, personal

friend of President Woodrow Wilson, was a very popular minister in

Peking. He had a great sympathy for the Chinese people and the

Chinese cause and was most popular with Chinese not only in the

government but in the educational world. !

Outside the Diplomatic Corps, there was a cosmopolitan community

made up of people of many countries and different vocations. The

Canadian, for example, Mr. Harry Huntley, who designed and built

the Peking medical center for the Rockefeller Foundation, had an

American wife. They entertained very generously and made many Chinese

friends; I was a frequent guest at their house. So was I at the

house of Cyril Cook, representative of the Imperial Chemical

Industries of England, who had an attractive, most sociable wife of

American and Mexican extraction, and likewise entertained very

extensively. The social side of Peking life was a delightful one,

if sometimes too demanding as far as time was concerned. But I found

it interesting as well as necessary to keep in touch with the leading

principal members of the foreign community outside the Diplomatic

Corps, in order to get some idea of their reaction at any given time

toward political developments in China and the activities of the govern­

ment in various fields.

In those days, an innovation was introduced in Peking at a time

when it was probably a new custom in many countries abroad. This

was the cocktail party, first initiated by the United States minister

At first it impressed people because it was neither a reception nor

a meal - lunch or dinner. The hour was unconventional, usually from

six to eight, just after office hours and before dinner time; the

guests would stand and talk, sipping cocktails of various concoctions

Curious to say, this new method of entertainment gradually became

a very popular institution. It was followed by other legations

and also by some of the Chinese officials. I suppose even in the

United States the cocktail party was something quite new.

For a variety of reasons the cocktail party soon proved itself

to be a worthy newcomer. Not only was the hour convenient, but

guests could come and go as they pleased without being bound down.

In those days formal receptions were always held in the evening,

following a dinner party. To the dinner, only a select group of

guests would be invited. Then, at the reception, a much larger

number of guests would be asked to attend. At these formal reception

parties, you would form a line and often there would be a long, long

queue of guests trying to reach the hosts to say "How do you do."

Then the drinks would be served by a large number of waiters and

you would wait until a certain hour when the buffet was open. But
7
at cocktail parties it was much simpler. 2§~~fco 30 guests were

considered a good number, and they would shake hands with the host

as soon as they arrived. On a hot day in the summer it would be in

the garden and you would sit on the steps leading to the garden,

or on porcelain stools; whereas at evening receptions it would be

much more formal. To cocktail parties you could go direct from the

office in your day dress, whereas in the evening you would have to

wear white tie and frock coat with decorations.

There was a good deal of uncertainty if not confusion, as to

what one should wear to the Chinese parties, as well as to some of

the official functions. As I have said before, the keen desire'of

the officials in the Chinese Government was to appear in foreign dres

It became a rage, especially for the old-fashioned officials of the

scholarly types and there were some amusing sights. I remember at

the reception given to the diplomatic corps after the U.S. recognized

the Republic, a picture was to be taken with President Yuan Shih-k’ai

in the center and the officials of government and members of the

Diplomatic Corps arranged according to precedence. I was on the

reception committee assigned to look after the guests and see that

they were properly seated according to their order of precedence.

While the photographer was adjusting his camera, I suddenly

noticed something unusual in the first row, in the dress of the

chief secretary to the President, Mr. Liang Shih-i. When I looked

« ow £v\\
closely, I saw he had a morning coat, striped trousers, but without

a collar. I was amazed but at the same time felt helpless. I

approached him and said to him gently that he had forgotten to put

on his collar. Perhaps if he had a handkerchief he might put it

around his neck. Mr. Liang was rather startled at my remark. Then
/
he said that in China, officials never wore a collar in summertime when

they put on their official dress, which was quite true.

Ladies who were invited to evening receptions had just as much

difficulty in appearing in the right dress. At the New Year reception

to the Diplomatic Corps to which all the ministers and heads of the

government departments were invited, the Princess Kung-san-no-er-pu,

wife of the head of the Bureau of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs greatly

surprised not only myself but many members of the Diplomatic Corps.

She had on a half Mongolian and half Chinese loose dress of gorgeous

color, which was all right; she was short and stubby. But tipped

right over her eyes she wore a Western hat, decorated with fruits

ani flowers which I thought was very good but more suitable for

an Easter Parade. She felt perfectly at ease for nobody there men™

tioned anything to her, so she enjoyed the party.I

I heard of another amusing episode from an American returned

student, Hsu Wei-tseng. Mr. Hsu, graduate of a mission law school,

was appointed to the high provincial court of Shansi province. Right

after he took up the new post, he had to pay a courtesy call on the

Governor of Shansi Province, who was a Manchu of the old school. He

was conducted into the reception room and soon the Governor came down,

wearing his big, black gown and a Chinese robe and coat. Mr. Hsu

was a young man, just spic and span in a frock coat, striped trousers
and a top hat. The governor scrutinized him very closely and started

conversation by asking him which honorable country he came from? So

Mr. Hsu replied "Your Excellency, my humble country is the Republic

of China." Thereupon, the Governor remarked how fortunate it was

that they both came from the same country.

Another amusing incident took place at one of the President's New

Year receptions. The Governor of a metropolitan district near Peking

appeared in a very curious dress. The whole diplomatic corps was

invited and as its members were beginning to arrive, I noticed that

the Governor Shen Ching-chien was dressed in the western style but

had some kind of a white dress trailing behind underneath his morning

coat. I approached and noticed that it was a shirt that he was

wearing outside his trousers. I did not know him well enough to

point it out to him directly but I spoke to my Vice Minister of

foreign affairs Mr. Tsao Ju-lin who was a very intimate friend of

his. Mr. Tsao said that he would speak to him but would like me to

be present too; so the two of us went up to Governor Shen and Mr. Tsao

told him that he was not properly dressed. The Governor was at first

a little surprised and asked in what way? Mr. Tsao asked me to

explain, which I did. Then the governor explained it was the

fault of his valet. He had had a very trying morning, he said. Since

he was to put on the foreign dress - morning coat and trousers « he

ri
had got up especially early, with the assistance of his valet. As

it was the fashion for Chinese officials of high standing always to

be accompanied by their valet at ceremonial occasions, carrying the hat

box and changes of dress, Governor Shen sent for him at once and

scolded him. Shen said he had tried very hard to put the shirt inside

even though it felt uncomfortable. But the valet had told him it

was not quite the proper way; the shirt, according to him, was like

the ch’ien-i ), a long robe in blue that extended almost

to the ankle beneath the ceremonial official robe of dark blue which

was always three or four inches shorter. He scolded the valet rather

severely and said it was all due to his fault that he had appeared

in the wrong dress. On the advice of Mr. Tsao, he disappeared in an

anteroom on one side. As it was, already two or three ministers had

arrived and were chuckling at the garment of Mr. Shen Ching-chien, which

made it all the more urgent for me to spirit him away for the necessary

adjustment of his dress.

The uncertainty during this period of transition reached practically

every sphere of life. Socially it was difficult for us to know exactly

what to wear at a dinner party. If it was an official function where

foreign guests were expected, it was certain that I should appear in

foreign dress; but at private dinner parties, I had some very trying

experiences, especially in winter time. If it was a cold day and the

host seemed to be sufficiently modern, I would expect his house to be

heated and I would go in a comfortable light Chinese dress or in

everyday western style dress. But it was always a speculation.

Time and again I would find myself nearly freezing to death when I

found the house kept entirely in the old style with no means of heating:

I and the other guests would perhaps be received in a great main hall

with the windows opened wide. While I was trembling with cold I would
see how the other guests and the host enjoyed the fresh air, being

dressed in either silk or cotton padded coats, if not in fur coats.

At other times I was careful to put on my fur robes or cotton padded

Chinese dress; then I would suddenly find myself in a house perfectly

heated with hot stoves. As other guests arrived, comfortably clad

in light foreign or Chinese dress, I, myself, would feel not only

the discomfort but the embarrassment of having so overwrapped myself.

I learnt from experience to inquire before attending dinner parties if

the house would be heated so as to know how to drdss for my own

comfort.

c -y

There was also the question of how prompt) a dinner party would

start; in some houses the old custom prevailed while others followed

the new custom. At times I would arrive promptly to find that not

even the host was present and might wait for three quarters of an

hour before he would Lappear while the other guests would take even

longer. From experience it was found that, as a rule, where foreign

guests were expected and the dinner was to be served in the foreign

way then the time indicated on the invitation card was reliable. If it

was a purely Chinese party, the time would be given as one of the

twelve two-hour periods; shen-k'o j for instance meant between

four and six o’clock. When the time specified appeared to me to

be very early for dinner then I would take care to have my servant

inquire what time one was expected to arrive. I remember that once I

went to attend a dinner in a restaurant set for shen-k'o ^ . To

be discreet I arrived at five o’clpck instead of four, but to my

great surprise, nobody was there and not even the table was set. I

thought I had mistaken the date, but the restaurant keeper said, No,

no, Mr. So and so was givjeti a dinner but he had not arrived yet. I

waited fully an hour and still nobody appeared; so I ordered a little

light refreshment and left. The next morning he appeared at my house

to offer his apologies; he was not only sorry for having been late

but he was most grateful that I had taken some refreshment. Because

the Chinese custom is that if, in the absence of the host, you leave

without eating anything, it is considered slightly impolite.

In other respects, changes from the old to the new were apparent.

The manner of greeting friends or new acquaintances varied. In some

places one would still bow ( ) > while in others it was the

custom to shake hands. When all the famous stars of the Chinese

opera were ordered to give a command performance at the President's

Palace, they curtsied on appearing before the high officials. The

first time Mei Lan-fang was presented to me he made his curtsy,

although I was only a Secretary at the foreign office. But two

years later, when we again met, he bowed to me instead of curtsying.

After his return from a tour abroad we met again, and from that time

on, we always shook hands. This change marked not only the simplifica­

tion of the social customs but also a certain democratization on the

part of the people. The Chinese people as a whole were in democratic

spirit; until the Republic, there had been nine classes of people

who were considered inferior in social standing and whose children were

not allowed to take part in the examinations; and among those classes
had been numbered the actors and actresses. Anather and very
'"-X
significant illustration of change was the emergence of women in

public life. The scattering of women members in parliament was an

extraordinary sight for the people in general. Net all of them were

western educated although one of them, I recall, was French

educated. Another one was a school teacher in China. One of the

two was called "T’ang". Both of these two were eloquent public

speakers; because of their ability to speak, they were very popular,

and were often invited to address large meetings. On occasion I

attended to listen to them, and they impressed me as being not only

unusual but also amusing. Each time one of them spoke, in some parts

of the speech, she would burst out into tears, evidently with the

sole purpose of impressing the people. They were good speakers, but

appeared to be somewhat^histrionic.

The equality of women was also asserted in the sphere of law. In

the law courts, cases became more and more frequent of disputes and

controversies between brothers and sisters over the division of

property left by their parents. Under the dynasty when the old

laws prevailed from time immemorial, married daughters were not entitled

to a share of the property of their parents on the death of either the

mother or father. The property was divided among the sons and with

a minor share for the unmarried daughter. But with the introduction

of the law of equality of the sexes, the married daughter, no matter

how long she had been married, was entitled to her share of the

inheritance. There were still cases in which the property was divided

and settled in accordance with the will of the father or the mother;
but when disputes were brought before the court, those wills which

were not in conformity with the new law were declared illegal and the

heirs who had benefitted by the former division had to make up the

share which was due to the married daughters under the new law.

The transitional character of the period was evident everywhere.

Peking, itself, presented an anomaly from the point of view of the

structure and practice of the administration. Official documents

were drafted and published entirely in the old fashioned Chinese

style as was customary under the dynasty. The only change in the

documents was the title of the person addressed. That is to say,

„ memorials and petitions were now addressed to the President or the

Prime Minister, but their manner of expression followed the old tTimfe

custom of the imperial regime. At official ceremonies or functions

the curtsying and kowtowing were dying out. But in many an official

family, the old time practice still was observed, and on a birthday

party or on a New Year's Day, members of the family and the retinue

of servants would kowtow to the master and mistress of the household

instead of making bows. As a rule, the rising generation, the youth

of the country was eager to take on western customs and adopt western

dresses. But the older people continued to wear the old fashioned

dress. In every department of the government, at least half of the

personnel would be old-fashioned officials who had served for years in

the days of the dynasty; it was principally in the Ministry of Foreign

Af-falr-s and Ministry of Communications that foreign educated returned

students were serving. Other departments, such as the Ministry of

the Interior or the Bureau of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs,

carried on in very much the same way as they had always carried on

from time immemorial. Even in the Foreign Office where I, myself,

was a member, some of the customs still remained; for example, the

arrival of the Minister would be proclaimed by one of the servants

at the gate who would yell out the announcement from the entrance right

to the various departments. This happened not once but many times in

a day: the Minister would go out and make a visit and come back and

his arrival would be again proclaimed. The custom was eventually

changed by Minister Lu who ordered that the arrival of the Minister

could be announced by pressing a button to make an electric bell

ring, which was much less disturbing although also much less picturesque.

This became an established practice and endured right through the

Republican regime until 1928.

Koo, '“ellin^ton

The American and European Returned-Students in Peking

Apart from my official duties, I took an interest in

the activities of certain organizations in Peking. There
was a group of American returned Students who met
perhaps three or four times a year at dinner parties. I
found that these meetings were social functions and every­
one would try to recall the good old times they had had as
students. From my experience as a student in the U.S.,

I thought there was plenty of room for forming a returned

students society, which might hold, periodical meetings,
arrange for lectures by prominent speakers from either
the United States or the Chinese world, and hold discussions
on topics of common interest to all. This idea found a
great supporter in Dr. Y. C. Tsou (Tsou Fu-lin?), who was
then the president of Tsinghua College. He was a ^ale
graduate specializing in education and was highly public
spirited. With his support I pushed forward the idea and
succeeded in forming an American Returned Students Socieft-
consisting of Chinese graduates from American universities and
colleges of al 1 age brackets.

One of the first things necessary for an active program

to interest the returned students was to form a library.
The dues collected from the members were very limited and
there were no funds that could be raised in Peking for this
purpose. I therefore approached Dr. Pad S. Reinsch, the
Koo, Wellington

American minister in Peking. Dr. Reinsch had been a professor

of political science at Wisconsin University aid had taught
a number of Chinese students there. I'he idea of forming a
library at once appealed to him. He must have had in mind
the need of studying the problems of government and organiza­
tion for China - the first Republic in Asia.for he suggested
that it should first start out as a library of political
science. When we spoke of the question of finding the
necessary financial support, he thought it was not a
difficult problem. He knew he could be of help by approaching
institutions in the U.S. such as the Carnegie Foundation, one
division of which was in charge of the promoting of libraries
throughout the world. He believed it would first be neces­
sary to find a suitable place for the society. This rai sed
a problem but we were not discouraged. I consulted with
Dr. Tsou and he undertook to find quarters where a few rooms
might be used without cost as the headquarters of the society
and the site of the proposed library. Through some Man chu
friends of his, he discovered that there wasa good prospect
of getting permission from the committee which was in charge
of the Man-jen-k'o. The Man-jen-k*o was a place still under
charge of the palace. It was a beautiful place serving the
purpose of gatehouse and entrance to the ancestral halls
of the imperial family in Peking. The courtyard inside the
entrance was most beautiful with very old pines and firs.
Koo, Wellington
\YV

The row of rooms forming the entrance to this place were

empty andaavailable for our purpose. With this encouraging
information, we at once prepared ad submitted anecessary
petition to the committee and after some time received a
formal authorization. The news was gratifying to Dr. Reinsch
who at once undertook to communicate with the Carnegie
Foundation in the U.S. and in due course we were informed
that he had succeeded in obtaining, I recall, from three
to five thousand U.S. dollars. This handsome amount enabled
us to proceed with the work of getting ready the rooms to
serve as meeting place and library, and with the purchasing
of the books, which were mainly in English, with some Chinese
and a few French books.

Once this society andthe library were organized, it

occurred to me that the next step was to unite with the
British returned students who had like the American returned
students also met occasionally in the past but had no
organization or any kind.

Dr. Tsou Fu-lin endorsed the idea but he thought that

he would leave the work of interesting the British returned
students in the idea to myself, especially as I was living in
Peking while he was living in Tsinghua on the outskirts of
Peking. I remember I gp preached several of the returned
students who v/ere then in Peking, one of them was Dr. C. C. Wu,
Koo, Wellington

n*

another was Dr. 0. C. Chen; and another was one working

at the Bar; k of China. i'hese three were not only capable
in their respe ctive fields but also had a good background
as students. Dr. 0. G. Wu was a barrister, I think of Lin­
coln’s Inn; S. C. Chen was the man who wrote the book at
the University of -London, and the banker was likewise
a graduate ol an English college. In discussing the idea
with all these three, it was interesting to note the
difference in the temperament of the British returned
students as contrasted to the ^tmerican returned students;
they were more deliberate if not more skeptical and it took
us some time to reach the agreement that the idea was a good
one. They then anp reached other British returned students
to get their approval. This was soon obtained and we then
started to discuss how to combine together and form another
or gam. zat i on to be called the British and American returned
students’ Association (Ou-mei t' ung-hsueh-hui ). This was
done and we inaugurated the club at a dinner meeting and
adopted a simple constitution for the united club.

After this step was taken, naturally it occurred to

Dr. Tsou, that we should try to bring the European Beturned
Students together and join with the British and American
returned students into a grand organization of Western
educated students. To our pleasant surprise we found that
Koo, Wellington
l\4

the European educated students had some form of an organi­

sation of their own already although its purpose was,like
the other two, confined to social gatherings from time to
time. Iheir organization was called the French, German
and Belgian Returned students’ Club (Liu Fa Pi fe Hui).
The active member of this group was a colleague of mine
at the Foreign Office, Mr. Ch'en Lu who was then the head
of the Political Affairs Division. He was later to be
Acting Foreign Minister at the time of the Leace Conference
in Paris. He also preceded by a few years as Chinese
minister to France. He was a French returned student. Ano­
ther was Mr. Wang Ching-ch'i, who had studied in Belgium
as well as in France and was a member of the Foreign Office
whom I knew well. I approached them and discussed the idea
several times with them but the problem was more difficult
than I had imagined. For evidently their club consisted
already of returned students from at least three countries
and they felt that it had for this reason been a difficult
thing to keep going. I assured them that there would no
onerous obligations. All that would be necessary was to
get approval from their members: ail the work of organizing
the amalgamation of their club just as had been done with
the British returned students would not entail any work
on their part, '■‘•’he example of the British returned
students’ club thus finally convinced them, that there was
Koo, Wellington

no reason for any serious objection. One argument which

had apparently weighed with them considerably at first
was the limited influence which this body of western returned
students could expect to exercise directly or indirectly on
t}ie course of development of uhina, socially as well as in
other aspects. But it was necessary to make it dear that
the new united body would have no political purpose of any
kina. its main ourpose was to to bear a beneficial influence
upon the public by holding lecture meetings, charity functions
and social welfare undertakings.

After quite a few months the amalgamation was approved

at a special meeting of the French, Belgian, Germac
returned students. The final step was to hold a grand
meeting of the union of the three clubs an d adopt the
\

name of Ou*-mei-t ’ ung-hsueh-hui (European and American

returned Students1 Association.) This title was not '

adopted without much discussion specially from the Franco-

\

Belgian-German members who did not qate like the idea of

merging their existence in the American returned students
body. Some wnated to retain their identity, feeling that
there was much difference not only in the education bqt
perhaps in the outlook of the returned students from the two
continents. But the precise wording of the name of this
organization satisfied them all.
Koo, Wellington
iW

As far as I recall, the composition of the new

European and Amer:can returned students Association was
as follows: there were 85 to 90 returned students, from
America, about 55 from Great Britain, and 100 from the
three continental European countries. 1‘he small number of
American returned students in 1 eking may seem surprising; but
it should be remembered that fsi nghua College, established
with the American share of the Boxer Indemnity for the
purpose of preparing Chinese for college education in the
United States, had been founded only in 1911 and had barely
sent its first batch of students to America. Many of the
graduates of American universities who had already returned
were trained in such subjects as engineering or commerce,
and were thus serving the country as railroad builders,
mine adm.inistrators or traders in areas far from the caoital .

This new organization began to attract more and more

attention from both the government and the general public.
--When--the que&tion-• of • drafting • a new constitution fo-r- the
"Republle wa-e -raised
>VJ ’-j

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) /o CL-
 t L

My Appointment as Minister to Washington, August 1915

My service in the Wai-chiao-pu lasted until I was appointed

Minister to Mexico in 191^. The circumstance which led to the

appointment was somewhat unusual and originated in a rather unfor­

tunate episode. The Chinese Minister in Washington was then Mr.

Hsia Chia-fu Mr. Hsia had served for rayay years as jCbnsul in

New York, and had previously been Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in

one of the Southern provinces in China. Although he could hardly

//•'I. t ' ■ * 1 £■?
speak any foreign language, he had aJbwayfr-fo&an connected with the

eonckre-fe—rrf consular ce-pr-e-caaffairs. The post in

Washington was a coveted one in the Chinese Foreign Miftisfery, and

"fe-- A f-r -- - ■- ',''1
when Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i was the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hsia Chia-fu,

his brother-in-law by marriage,, d to the President

for appointment to Washington. It was known widely in the Wai-chiao-

pu circle that President Yuan Shih-k’ai was not at all keen about

the recommendation. But Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i was one of the loyal and

long-time supporters of the President as well as a close friend and

a relative by marriage, one of Mr. Sun's daughters being married to

one of the President's sons. Yuan Shih-k'ai reluctantly approved

| 1 V*
the recommendation and Mr. Hsia was duly appointed. When Mr. Hsia

arrived at Washington, it was an important and difficult time because

the First World War has broken out and the position of the United States,

as well as its policy and attitude, became a matter of almost vital

but
importance not only to China/also to the Allied Powers. As the war
-A< S
entered the year 1915, there was talk of the White House desiae-ing to

offer its good offices to bring an end to the struggle. It was a

natural wish on the part of the United States to restore peace. For,

first of all the United States and the American people were always

opposed to war and did not want to be in any way involved; and in the

second place Great Britain and France, after the overrunning of

Belgium by the German armed forces, were very hard-pressed. Apparently

A
the popular feeling in the United States in favor of the early

restoration of peace had impressed Minister Hsia. He, too, was

entirely in favor of the idea but he thought that President Yuan

J . 4., .-n a—-l -y-A.wyW y^^t. cCt^C*(
Shih-k'ai was in a better position than President Wilson to undertake

the task of offering his mediation in negotiations to bring an end

to the war. So withouD warning his government aall1 entirely

A
on his initiative, he called on the Secretary of State and made a

proposal to the effect that President Yuan should be invited to offer

C./<~ t, A
his help since it was President Yuan's personal desire to undertake

such a task.

IlifY <’
Peking knew nothing of this until the American Minister to China
A
called to inquire what was President Yuan's precise desire to mediate

in the war. This news was like a thunderbolt out of a blue sky and

the President burst into a rage, being fully aware of China's position

in the international sphere and the utter impropriety of any such move

on his part. He was so furious that he told Sun Pao-ch'i, the Foreign

Minister, to dismiss Mr. Hsia at once. Mr. Sun pleaded with the

President, for it was Mr. Sun himself who a short time before had

strongly recommended Mr. Hsia for the post. He felt it was a blow to

his prestige personally as well as officially and tried very hard to

save Minister Hsia the humiliation by offering to assume responsibility

himself. The President, however, was not impressed by Mr. Sun's

pleading. When the latter offered to resign himself, he accepted his

resignation. Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang was again asked to take up the

foreign portfolio in order to follow up the problem that had been posed

by Minister Hsia in Washington.

After Mr. Lu took up office and had a conference with the

President, he sent for me and told me that both he and the President

considered that I should be sent to Washington as counselor to the

Legation in order to take charge of its affairs. It was a very sudden

development for me and I told him that I realized the delicacy of the

situation due to this incident but would like to consider. After a

day's consideration and consultation with one of my close friends, who

was also a right hand man of Minister Lu, namely Mr. Hsia"yh-ting, I

reported again to the Minister. While I appreciated the confidence

that he and the President had in me, I said it would not be a practical

move, because I felt I could not fulfill their expectation. I

explained that as counselor I could offer my advice and make my

suggestions to the Minister in Washington; however he was the one

primarily responsible for whatever was done. If he should always

agree with me, accept my ideas and act accordingly, there would be no

difficulty; but if he and I should disagree, I would be in a very

awkward position. If I did not insist, there would be no effect .„/

/%C.\ i~f . •/ •. / ■»«Y ‘
btrt—than, I said, my presence would ba^.nf nn nee andrL might disappoint

the Foreign Minister.

 vv-

0/ _
Mr. Lu replied that Minister Hsia would be there only for a short

while*- iLwjwas Mr. Sun Pao•*chi^a--n©fe~-te-~re€A-l-l-~h.urL.at-.-onee-pbut

i --------------------------------------------------------- - i *»»■■■'
to give him some time, so as not to make it appear too embarrassing r
A A vi ^
for him. But for that, Minister I|sia would.be recalled already, as
? \ -v ‘j* 1
\ M,
the President desired. They agreed that I was the man to handle the

situation and our relations with the United States in Washington. They

would be delighted to have me sent off to act ajl Chargd d*Affaires

-JhedLore fatM* tfn
a^wfeide/being appointed, as the Minister to Washington, since it was the
.-tff ? it, r% - | 'N.
established practice to appoint always a man of sufficient age and

experience for a first class nomination. All this explanation I

thought was reasonable but I told him from the practical point of

view it would be better to appoint a new minister, somebody more

experienced and fully qualified to be the Chinese minister; in any

case the new minister would require some time to prepare for his

mission and departure, so that Mr. Hsia did not have to leave the
■

Washington post right away. But Minister Lu said that President Yuan
L-""
Shih-k’ai had made up his mind that I was the only one he would

like to see help the government to play its part in Washington and

my declining would be an awful disappointment to him.

'■ • T • K-/ri
^ *• i 1 >• M ^ fa-1 [L ^ '“•i-K if i A * t < ■•..iv'\ , pfcc
(- , i S * ' **--"*' t • r. • ■ - jU
In the afternoon Mr./Dj. sent for me igaAn. Probably upon the
•',WK
suggestion of Mr . Hsia Y^-t'ing, one of Minister Lu's confidants; they <V
( iv
had worked out a new formula to get me appointed as Minister to Mexico.
/
After getting the agrdment of the Mexican Government, I would make

haste to leave in that capacity and would go to Mexico to present my

r
v " * v*
credentials as quickly as possible. T-har p a would transfer - f,/
■'4
jje. to Washington. Thus the new minister in Washington would be the
A
minister transferred from Mexico and I could therefore overcome the

impression of excessive youth and inexperience.

I was now fully convinced of their keenness to have me go to

Washington. Their arrangement - while distinctly flattering for

myself - was practical as far as it went. But I told them that it

would not be quite courteous to Mexico fcup fehe

f /' i / *( 1 j * U-'
poai—a«d to transfer me to Washington no sooner than I had arrived. They

were somewhat puzzled by my repeated attempt to decline what was a

somewhat unusual offer of promotion. But I was only thinking of the

proper thing to do in the circumstances without giving much thought

to my own career. I was asked point blank what I thought should be

i
done. I consulted Mr. Hsia Yv-t'ing and we came to the conclusion
-f'/“ ■'•/ * 'H-t (• t '■ ■f‘

that there wnn jpfy_ -i f x was appointed Minister to

\ 9- nHifZ ‘d-J&y ^ tf'-ry
/ y i.-U *■■■■
Mexico, but wa-s, sent on a special mis
nission to England in order to ^
/i ■ lr' l c ey lC- i -f ^ i! '*^v ^
tAar. y»J i
gain time for the transfer This ,/
yy K l( t, K >
idea appealed very much to Mr. Lu and also to President Yuan because- c
/.ry^ y
of the importance of the war in Europe. The President naturally wanted 4¥\
4* *
to know about the situation in Europe - particularly about the British

attitude to the war and its duration. It was finally settled that I

was to be appointed Minister to Mexico and sent upon a special

• ^ i >-/- h i C 1 Hv Cr ^
mission to London not J_y wJt-ly the aptacting
A ~f ^ J h U-

the-Bxi-t-lsh._fi.Qvernment bu.t mainly to observe and report on the war \ . “v V'~-

aftiar consultation with Minister Alfred- in T.rmdrm— AL^f-4-y^t I was /

^- y ?*= (■ »;• a ^
_ 4 / /. {n-y tru *
suspicious of the purpose of w-mission to London. I thought that
7 7S
fyj fit {<■»*■* it** yu 4 $ y'

C- 0 t-ik. * ■'■e-t-'vf Tu*' tec. U ;

v
 \*v

possibly they wanted me to sound out Dr. Sze and the British

authorities on the -Baucfr-qach TOUbied idea of reestablishing the

throne. But I was glad to be assured that I would not be asked to

take up any political question in London and certainly I would have

had nothing to do with that.

My appointment to Mexico was carried out in accordance with proce-

dure by asking for the agr^ment, which was transmitted by the Mexican

minister in Peking. He was greatly delighted, heartily congratulated

me and gave me a farewell luncheon. Presumably he was gratified that

T • , 4 —
X was going to Mexico sJLz&ce X had studied for many years in the
/» y. f I f -r-. ttCf „V / / . •
United States, and-«4«^a.fe4on~-Mexico ^
A ^
uhara.^.^and Ij^reover he was familiar with my work in the Wai-chiao-pu
1
There was no reason for him to suspect when the actual transfer was

made, that it had been pre-arranged; it was only natural that when Minister

I^sia was recalled the Government should want me to be in Washington

rather than in Mexico City.

In fact outside three or four men, the whole of the Wai-chiao-

pu itself did not know anything, except for Mr. Hsia Yu-t'ing. Of
iJf ^
course, a delicate matter of that sort was usually kept secret.
y

Being hard pressed to leave as quickly as possible I took little

over two weeks to prepare; I left Peking early in August 1915. In

those days, travel by boat was the only means and it took me three

weeks to get to San Francisco. From that city I went straight to

New York - as I had no business in Washington, I did not go there.
because
It was not easy to secure accommodation on the boat to London/in

those days the American line was practically the only line left: all the

other big trans-atlantic lines had ceased operation because of the

war. As it was, I had great difficulty in securing a small cabin

on the boat which took ten days crossing the Atlantic. I think it

was the President Grant. I was warned by my friends to be careful

because the German submarines were then operating in the Atlantic.

But I had no choice and sailed after a short stay in New York. Only

on two occasions were there the submarine warnings and we saw no

submarines. The United States was then a neutral but in the disfavor

of the Central Powers because Great Britain, and France depended in

large measure upon the United States for war supplies. My crossing

was uneventful with the exception of false alarms and I arrived safely

in London.

The Minister to London, Dr. Sze, and myself were old friends;

we lost no opportunity to exchange our views on many subjects

particularly on the war in Europe. Curious to say he must have suspected

that I was sent to London to convey some confidential message to him

about the political developments in Peking because he kept asking

me about the reported rumor of the imminent restoration of the throne.

I couldn't enlighten him except to show that it was no part of my

mission to report on the Peking situation; I knew he did not know

what was actually going on but he, himself, did not indicate whether

he was for or against the reported movement in Peking. He only

indicated his great doubt that the monarchical movement could materialize
in view of the certain and growing opposition not only from the

Kuomintang but in many provinces south of Yangtze River.

As to the war, he arranged for me to meet the Permanent Secretary

of the Foreign Office, we had an exchange of views. If I remember, he

was . And I was given a lunch party by the British

Government to greet me although I was on no official mission to England.

Britain then was fully in its life and death struggle and the whole

atmosphere was tense with the war effort. I was most anxious to

ascertain whether there was a general feeling that the war would last

for many years. But there was no anxiety, quite noticeably, and the

general view was that victory would be quick if the United States could

be brought in on the side of the Allied Powers. Dr. Sze and I were

in agreement in our estimate of the war and its duration. I made a

point not to send in any report to Peking except through Dr. Sze

and usually asked him as the Chinese Minister in London to report our

conclusions.

My stay in London was unexpectedly long, as it took time to put

my nomination through the Chinese Government. A definite procedure

was required before my transfer to Washington could be effected. On

the President’s instruction a recommendation had to be prepared to

put before the Cabinet. After the Cabinet's approval and the

concurrence of the President and the Prime Minister, agr^ments have

to be obtained from Washington. It was not until the middle of

October that I was informed that the necessary procedures had been
completed, and was asked to prepare for departure for Washington. But

as it was my first appointment to a foreign post, it was necessary for

me to make adequate preparation. It was not until the middle of

November that I was able to sail for New York. Minister Hsia was

kind enough not only to telegraph to me his congratulations but to

express his willingness to help me in any way and to promise to wait

for my arrival at Washington. All this was a great consolation and

comfort to me. We had first met and seen a good deal of each other in

New York, when he was the Chinese consul and I a student at Columbia;

as president of the local Chinese students’ club, I had often held

club meetings in the Consulate. Mr. Hsia and Mrs. Hsia had been hos­

pitable no only to me but to all Chinese students in New York.

After I arrived in Washington, I was not able to do very much

except to ask Minister Hsia for his advice as to the affairs of the

Legation. As far as the State Department was concerned, I was not

able to pay any visit immediately because I had not yet received my

letter of credentials. Minister Hsia however did bring me to see

Mr. E. T. Williams, then the Director of Far Eastern Affairs.

Meanwhile I waited in Washington for the letters of credentials which

were being prepared in Peking. Such official documents are not at all

simple because of the formalities required and certainly took a

great deal of time. Every wire from Peking said that at first they

were about to be despatched and later that they had already been

despatched. Three weeks passed. It was already December, and still

the much expected documents had not arrived.

It was at this time that the wedding of President Wilson to

Mrs. Galt was being prepared. As the heads of all the diplomatic

missions were invited to the ceremony, the State Department wanted to

have the Chinese minister present and I was informed thatan invitation

would be sent to me in due course. But a question of protocol caused

some hesitation. Since I had not yet presented my credentials as

minister, officially I could not act as the head of the mission.

All communications from the Legation to the State Department were

signed first by Minister Hsia, and afterwards by Mr. Yung Kuei the

counselor's chargi d'affaires and not by me. The State Department

was very considerate and said they felt that President Wilson would like

to see the new Chinese minister at the ceremony. As regards the question

of protocol, they made an interesting and rather novel suggestion: if

the Legation would arrange for the contents of the letters of credentials

to be cabled to Washington with a certified copy addressed to the

State Department, they would accept the document in place of the

formal one, which could be submitted later. With this clever arrangement,

the ceremony was pushed forward; I presented my set of credentials

which really was a copy of the cabled text, and on the same evening

of the same day, received an invitation to the marriage ceremony.

It was a great social event for Washington. As the new Chinese

minister - my first appointment - and as the youngest of all the

delegates from the mission, I greatly enjoyed the beautiful spectacle

of Mrs. Galt's wedding to the Chief Executive of the United States.

I was reminded of a meeting with him a few years

before, in 1910 or 1911. It was at Princeton University when he was

its president. At a dinner at his house there had been a discussion

on political philosophy as well as on government and administration

in the United States which he had treated so ably in his book

The State. He had asked me many questions about hina and the

possible political development of the Chinese people. I had been

impressed by him, especially by his profound belief in the virtues

of democracy and representative government. As the meeting lasted for

a long while, he must have taken exceptional interest in me at the

time; this I thought might explain why President Wilson wanted me to

attend personally at his wedding.

Koo, Wellington V

B 2. The Chicago Loan of 1916

When I left China to take up my first mission abroad, the political

situation in the country was complicated by the reported movement to

reestablish the imperial throne, by Yuan Shih-kai and his entourage. As

I have said, the whole movement was aborted as a result of nationwide

opposition, especially in the provinces south of the Yangtze River,

culminating in a civil war in which the forces in favor of the imperial

regime were defeated. Though the termination and abolition of the

incipient imperial rule was proclaimed on March 22, the attempt to save

the situation on the part of the monarchists was futile; and the sudden

abandonment of his design further weakened the position of Yuan

Shih-kai, who was then laid up with serious illness. When he died, Vice-

President Li Yuan-hung, his legitimate successor under the constitution

of the Republic, was duly installed as the chief executive of the

Republic of China. A new cabinet was formed and its minister of finance

was Dr. Ch'en Chin-tao, a Ph.D. from Yale University and a well-known

economist. The death of Yuan Shih-kai and the sudden installation of

Li Yuan-hung found the country in great confusion, the national treasury

empty. It was necessary to obtain funds with which to carry on the

administration from Peking. Dr. Ch'en Chin-tao, as Finance Minister,

was most anxious to secure financial assistance from abroad in the form

of a loan. With Europe pre-occupied in the war, the only country

which had a financial market to carry on international financing was the

United States. I was urgently called upon by Dr. Ch'en to seek and obtain

an American loan for at least five million dollars.

Koo, Wellington
vJ

The assignment was not an easy one, but I undertook it willingly,

a
with the conviction that the restoration of the Republic was/right step

and that it was necessary for everyone to help in strengthening the

government. After making several inquiries in New York, I opened

negotiations with the Continental and Commercial Trust and Savings

Bank which had branches in Boston and Chicago. Mr. Allen, who was

head of its New York office was not only favorable to the idea, but was

most sympathetic with the Chinese cause - although he himself had never

been to China or the Far East. We carried on negotiations at

several meetings in New York. In the final talks, I had an interesting

and unusual experience for myself. I was talking with Mr. Allen face to

face across his desk. But I heard voices from the telephone receiver

on the side. My curiosity was aroused and he assured me that it was

perfectly all right: while he was discussing with me, his partners in

Chicago and Boston were also listening on the telephone. He told me

that I was negotiating not with him alone but also with the two others

in their absence. It was a novel experience for me; it impressed me

with the progress of American business and with the extent to which

it was applying modern techniques of communication.

As I recall, the discussions and the negotiations were not too diffi­

cult except over one question — the question of security for the loan.

Mr. Allen was familiar with the character and returns for the previous

loan which China had concluded with foreign banks and he said that some­

thing more than the guarantee of the government to repay the loan was
Koo, Wellington

necessary. Hewanted to have the wine and tobacco revenue not only ear­

marked for therepayment but supervised by a representative of the

bank. This was the principal point of dispute and debate. But

I told himthat China had come to the American market not just to secure

a loan of such a modest amount as $5 million: she had intended to break

away from the traditional practice of making with the loans some kind of

political arrangement which took the form, in the case of railways, of

the appointment of a foreign trust manager to supervise and control

the traffic of the railway to be built; in the case of the Reorganiza­

tion Loan, of the establishment of a special salt bureau with a foreign

chief accountant appointed by the group of lending banks to control and

supervise the revenue of the salt bureau. Such provisions were an

encroachment on China*s sovereignty. Japanese and European bankers never

hesitated to insist on such terms, but they were not legitimate terms

for a purely business loan. I reminded him that it was for these reasons

that President Wilson had declared his opposition to American banks

joining the so-called consortium for making the Reorganization Loan

to China in the first year of the Chinese Republic on the ground that

the terms of the consortium constituted a political encroachment on

China as a sovereign nation. I pointed out to Mr. Allen that it would be

a splendid precedent for an American bank to set the example of making

loans to the Chinese Government a purely business proposition. After

much discussion, he was satisfied with an assurance on the part of the

Chinese Government, to be inserted in the contract, that it would repay

the loan out of its general revenue and especially the revenue from the
Koo, Wellington
\V

Wine and Tobacco Office. As to certain other terms, such as the discount

which usually was a considerable amount in the case of previous loans,

was also of standard rate. In the case of the Reorganization Loan, I

recalled to him that it was too much to charge such a commission and

discount, since out of every hundred dollars the Chinese Government

received less than ninety dollars. There was also a provision in the

Reorganization Loan agreement that the customs revenue, upon which the

loan was secured, had to be deposited in specified banks belonging to the

various lending countries, and the. uses to which the proceeds of the

Reorganization Loan were to be put were also specified and to be controlled

by a formal procedure requiring approval of the banks which were holding

funds deposited by the Chinese Government. In the case of the railway

loans it was also usual that the material, supplies and equipment which

were required to build a particular railway had to be purchased by

the agents of the lending banks. All these unusual provisions were

dropped and I was glad to be able to conclude a loan agreement which would

serve as a precedent and example for future financing abroad by the

Chinese Government.

But an unexpected development and reaction arose. On my part, I had

tried to make the loan as non-political as possible, and believed I had

succeeded in doing so; but while the news of the conclusion of the loan

was welcomed by the government, the loan was strongly opposed by the

political party in opposition. One day, to my great surprise, and it

was an unpleasant surprise, I received a personal telegram from my

father-in-law Mr. T*ang Shao-i, who was one of the principal leaders of

the Kuomintang, expressing great dissatisfaction that of all people I

 \h
Koo, Wellington

should be the one to have concluded such a loan for the government in

Peking. He said that his and my political friends in China had openly

condemned the loan; he called upon me to cancel it if X ever wanted

finally to return to China and see my friends. Evidently, this loan

was considered to be a political move to strengthen the national coffer in

Peking and it was thought to have been made for the purpose of supplying

the armed forces under control of the Chinese Government in the capital

for the purpose of fighting the opposing party in the country.* This was,

as a matter of fact, entirely uncalled for, and I at once sent a full

reply to Mr. T*ang explaining that I had undertaken it on the request

of the Minister of Finance Dr. Ctien Chin**tao who himself was a

prominent leader of Kwangtung, a returned student, and a member of the

Kuomintang party. However the government in Peking thought to use the

proceeds, I had concluded the loan for the purpose of assisting the new

government, which was the first after the restoration of the Republic.

It was purely a business loan, with no political motive or idea behind

it. This incident showed to what extent the political struggle and the

civil strife was pushed, for the loan aroused the open opposition of the

Southern forces. The American banking world received a rather unfavorable

impression and for the time being further efforts on my part were well-

nigh impossible.

The Republican regime lasted a little over a year in Peking, because

it was overthrown by a sudden move on the part of General Chang Hsun

with his armed forces in the summer of 1917. Fortunately, this daring
Koo, Wellington

adventure was soon put an end to be General Tuan ChH-jui, who, although

well-known as a general and statesman under the old regime, was

strongly opposed to the restoration of the Manchu emperor. At the head

of an efficient armed force, he had no difficulty in overcoming

General Chang Hsun and driving him from Peking. The so-called restored

imperial regime lasted for only two weeks, and the Republic was

restored for the second time under the aegis of Marshal Tuan ChH-jui.
Koo, Wellington
\

B 3# The United States Joins the War

JjZ3
Meanwhile the war was raging in Europe^did not yet involve the

United States as a belligerent on the allied side but it soon became

the principal consideration both of the government in Washington and the

American people generally. Great Britain and France, hard-pressed by

the mighty German army, were inadequately prepared to meet this challenge

and found it is necessary to rely upon the United States for much indirect

aid and assistance. Different missions of financial experts and

industrial specialists were continually sent to the United States to

negotiate war loans, to arrange war financing, and to place orders for
u
war supplies of different kinds tc American manufacturers. Not un­

naturally all these matters were pushed to conclusion with the approval

of the United States Government. The sudden demand upon the American

industry produced what might be called a boom in the U.S. The steel

industry, for example, was suddenly burdened with a rush of big orders

for its products. Curious to say the American people welcomed this

influx of orders not only from the business point of view but also out

of a natural sympathy for the allied cause. With this incentive to

economic and industrial prosperity the American people appeared to be

quite determined to remain neutral although it was not at all certain,

for the Administration was really thinking about the possible development

of the war. It was known then that the policy of Berlin and Vienna

was to keep the U.S. out of the war while the allied nations not

unnaturally hoped to see the U.S. play a direct role in the strife.
 Koo, Wellington

Ontthe international scene, 1917 was an eventful year, for the United

States and the allied cause and for China too. Besides the Lansing-

Ishii agreement which was concluded in the latter part of the year,

the events which led the United States first to break off relations with

Germany, then to declare war and join the allied cause were highly

significant, in fact of historic importance for the world.

The German high command, seeing the amount of aid to the allied

cause from the United States in the form of munitions and other supplies

of war, made it a policy to intercept as much as possible the traffic

obviously detrimental to Germany and the other central powers.

Germany resorted to a ruthless policy of submarine warfare: American

merchantmen carrying war supplies to England and France were stopped

on the high seas and often ruthlessly attacked. Many such ships were

sunk by German submarines without warning and innocent lives were

heavily sacrificed. Action on the part of the German high command brought

forth repeated protests from Washington on the grounds that they were

not only in contravention of international law but contrary to

considerations of humanity. But Germany continued this form of warfare;

although there were times when the protests became particularly strong

so that she stopped it for a time, she would shortly resume it once

again.

The straw that broke the camel*s back in the relations between the

United States and Germany appeared to be the sinking of the

Lusitania, one of the largest transatlantic liners. A heavy toil of lives

was taken by this ruthless attack. It aroused nationwide indignation in

Koo, Wellington

the United States and brought forth a most vigorous note of protest.

Couched in the terms of an ultimatum, it called upon the Berlin govern­

ment to stop submarine warfare, to respect American rights as a neutral

in the war and to give positive assurance that Germany would refrain

from this warfare altogether. Diplomatic relations were broken off in

April as a mark of displeasure on the part of Washington and as a warning

of its determination to go further if Germany should refuse to pay

attention to the warning. Failing to receive a satisfactory reply,

the United States determined to act. President Wilson went to Congress

to announce the United States1 Declaration of War, just as he had done

some weeks earlier to report his protest to Germany and his decision to

sever relations between the two countries as an indication of his earnest­

ness. The rather sudden declaration of war, however, was generally

accepted by the American people who not only entertained a natural

sympathy for the Allied cause but were aroused and indignant at the

continued German attacks on the American merchantmen.

It was my practice to visit my colleagues on both sides of the war

from time to time in order to check with them on the real war situation

in Europe and the views which their respective governments cherished as

to the war outlook.

At the State Department, which I visited most frequently, I was able

to gether information, on the situation in Europe as reported to Washington

by American representatives abroad. From time to time, I called upon

Mr. Lcnsing, the Secretary of State. As I found him very much occupied
Koo, Wellington ^vi

the visits of the Allied ambassadors were very frequent and naturally

perhaps more important. 1 also saw an Assistant Secretary of State

who was in a position to spend more time with me. Mr. Breckinridge l^ong,

a Southerner from an old, distinguished family in Virginia, was a firm

supporter of President Wilson from the start of his political career and

had exercised a great deal of influence at the Department because of his

free access to the White House. He and I would have long talks, not only

as to the relations between China and the United States, but as regards

war in general in Europe and what the United States attitude was.

The American declaration of war was an event of far-reaching sig­

nificance. It was welcome in London and Paris and other Allied capitals,

foaat Evidently it caused dismay and disappointment in Berlin. German

policy before this historic event appeared to be divided. Count Bernstoff,

German ambassador at Washington, was decidedly in favor of exercising

caution in regard to the submarine warfare lest the United States

should be pushed into the war against Germany. This was generally

known in the American capital; but I also personally had it confirmed

by my occasional talks with him at the German Embassy. Bernstoff had

no hesitation in telling me of his anxiety lest his appraisal of the

situation in the United States and of the temper of the American govern­

ment should not be accepted. As a matter of fact, and as events turned

out, it was not accepted by Berlin, for the German high command also had

its own representatives in the United States. Their reports, it was

known then, presented a strong view that the United States was most

unlikely to enter the war, first becauseof the natural hatred of war on

the part of the American people, second because of their distaste

Koo, Wellington

for any intervention in any European affairs, and third because of the

United States was not prepared to enter the struggle in Europe. They

reached the conclusion that even if the United States should enter the

war it would take a long time before it could mobilize its economic,

industrial and military forces to produce any effect on the war in Europe.

Bernstoff^ reports to the German Foreign Office did not carry as much

weight as those sent to the German high command, although he fully warned

his government of the consequences of any neglect to take American

protests seriously.

The United States entry into the war, of course, was heartily

welcomed by England, France and other Allied countries, as I gathered

from my talks with the British and French Ambassadors. Sir Cecil

Springr-igfet was a scholarly diplomat and he and I could talk for an

hour or more to exchange our views of what we each thought would likely

develop xvith American policy and also about the feelings of our respective

governments, and in addition the situatinn in England and China.

Monsieur Duser, the French Ambassador, was then a , although a

career diplomat, was most amicably disposed towards , and I

could gather from his remarks that the situation in Europe was serious;

what the people and the government in the Allied countries placed their

greatest hope on for victory in the war was to have the United States

participate in it. The news of American entry into the war was most _

welcome to him as well as Sir Cecil Springrigfet. Shortly afterwards

Great Britain became the first country to send a war mission to Washington.

The object of this mission was announced to be a friendly visit as a

mark of gratitude and appreciation to the United States; but it did not
Koo, Wellington

take long for the general public and the diplomatic corps to know that

its real purpose was concerned with the United States as to how the two

should cooperate and in what respects the United States could render its

greatest aid to Great Britain pending active participation in the

war by the United States. I think it was at the beginning of June when

the British war mission, headed by a weli-known, distinguished statesman

and diplomat, Sir^Arthur Balfour arrived at short notice in Washington.

 J^D
Koo, Wellington

B 4. Tbe Death of My Father

The evening of the day when the British mission arrived, there was

a great state reception given by the United States Government at the

Pan American Union building. Heads of the missions of Allied and

neutral countries in Washington were all invited to the reception.

Just as I had finished dressing and was about to start for the

reception, I got a telegram from my brother in Shanghai reporting the

death of my father. Although I knew that my father, as a result of a

fall, had been laid up for several weeks, there had been no indication

of any serious development in the letters which I continued to receive

from Shanghai. The sudden news was most upsetting and for a time I

considered whether I should refrain from attending the reception.

My decision was based mainly on the consideration that the absence of

the Chinese minister from the capital of a country which was very

friendly to China would be at once noticed, and might give rise to

speculation - especially after the incident of the Twenty One Demands

in 1915 and the persistent propaganda effort on the part of Japan. It

might lend credence to the idea that in anything concerning China, Japan

was the country to be consulted and that Japan had the right to

speak for East Asia as a whole. I did not want to allow even temporarily

any opportunity for our Japanese rivals to further their cause.

So after a few minutes reflection I decided to go. I found the

Koo, Wellington

members of the War Mission impressive and the welcome most

warm-hearted. President Wilson, himself, was at the head of the

receiving line. After shaking hands with the President and the

Secretary of State and being introduced to members of the Mission,

I slipped away - I was not feeling in any mood to join in this

celebration.

The problem before me was then whether to continue to remain in

Washington or to ask to resign in order to observe the traditional

period of mourning. I had no difficulty in making up my mind, and

I telegraphed my resignation to the government in Peking. The reply

was not unexpected. I was asked to consider the critical time that

China was passing through and informed that it was most important that the

legation in Washington should not be left to the care of the Chargl

d’Affaires at this time. I was requested to heed the ancient sages’

advice that in a situation like this patriotism should be given priority

over considerations of filial piety. Under the dynasty resignation

was obligatory. But in the Republic it was discretionary, as the reply

of the government indicated. Still, I wanted to ask for leave in order

to attend the memorial service. According to the Chinese custom, the

service was to take place at the end of the fifth week, which would

give me time to travel to Shanghai. My government, however, thought

the situation in the United States and the importance of the relations

between the United States and China were such that I should not absent

myself from Washington at the time.

 V
Koo, Wellington

The quandary was however solved for me by both a telegram and

a letter from my brother in Shanghai. The gist of his communications

was that when my father was seriously ill he had been assured that

X would be sent for to see him; but his answer had been that they

should stop thinking about sending for me. He said that it was more

important for me to remain in Washington and attend to the affairs in

the relations of the two countries, than to take time to travel just for

the sake of seeing him. He said his mind was completely at ease with

me serving in Washington and he wasn*t worried at all. Of course, he

would like to see me, but he thought it was more important for me to

remain in the United States than to travel to see him. On his

insistence, my brother said, my mother and he did not send me a telegram

asking me to come; and, in view of my father's wishes, he advised me not

to ask for leave to go back to attend the Memorial Service. I was very

much touched by what my father had said of me and I reluctantly decided

to stay and not to return to China for the Memorial Service. As

events turned out, I found my presence in Washington rather important;

not only did China declare war, but the British War Mission was followed

by a French War Mission, and then Ishii, heading a group of Japanese

diplomats, came to Washington in order to influence the United States

policy in China.
Koo, Wellington

B 5. China Declares War

During 1917, a very important problem arose for me and for China -

that is, what policy my own country shouli adopt in consequence of

the United States1 participation in the war. I kept my government as

fully informed as possible of the development of United States policy.

Periodically I communicated my own views to my government, urging them

to give the fullest consideration to what I considered to be the

advantages of China's joining the Allied cause... this, without knowing

very clearly what was the current opinion in Peking and in China as

a whole. I certainly did not know at the time that this question would

give rise to havoc and confusion and even civil strife in China. I

knew that my own views were favorably received by the Government, headed

by General Feng Kuo-chang, a distinguished military man, but also an

accomplished statesman; by General Tuan Ch'i-jui as the Prime Minister;

he too, even more strongly than President Feng, was in favor of my

views. As I saw the situation then, it was not difficult to realize

that in order to get a decent settlement of the Shantung question and

to advance the international position of China at the end of the war,

it was necessary for China to join the Allied cause, in the final victory

of which I, myself, no longer entertained any doubt. That the Allies

would win was the general opinion after the entry of the United States

into the conflict.

Although the idea of the Chinese entry into the war did not occur

to me before, I was now altogether in favor of acting together with the

Koo, Wellington

United States, more especially since I considered the United States a

real friend of China, the proof of which was her policy and her actions

at the time of the Twenty-one Demands. The State Department and the

officials of the government did not touch either upon the possibility

of China*3 participation in the war until the United States itself had

entered in it. But after its entry, it was not difficult to understand

from m y talks with various high officials and even with some of the

important members of Congress that they believed China should side

with the United States. Both Mr. Lansing and Mr. Long indicated this

unofficially to me not so much for the sake of the United States, as they

put it, but for the sake of China. Mr. E. T. Williams did too, but

perhaps with less emphasis, being the head of the Far Eastern

division; he was not-as- expressive as regards United States policy as

the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State.

The struggle in Peking continued on an ever-increasing scale

between what were known in the Chinese press as the cold war and the

anti-war factions. Those in favor of joining the United States in the

struggle were headed by General Tuan ChH-jui, supported by President

Feng Kuo-chang and his military colleagues. But they were strongly

opposed by certain groups in Parliament, supported by the rank and file

of the Kuomintang both in the Capital and in the South. From the point

of view of China*8 international position it was not clear to me why

this suggested line of action for China, based, as it was, entirely on

Koo, Wellington

China*s interest in the world, should be opposed, but it was not difficult

to understand in the light of the political struggle between the North

and the South represented by President Feng and General Tuan Ch*i-jui

in the North and the regime in Canton with Dr. Sun Yat-sen as the

head of the Southern Parliament. It was clear that the Southern party

opposed the war not so much because it ranged China on the side of the

United States as because they feared that China,s entry into the war

would simply provide an excuse for the North to build up its armed forces

with aid of different kinds from the United States if not from the

whole group of Allied powers in preparation to attack and overcome the

Southern opposition forces. In other words, while my suggestions to the

government were based entirely on what I considered to be in the best

interests of China as a country in the world community, it was turned

into a big stake in the struggle for supremacy between the two opposing

parties.

This political struggle was further aggravated by the activities

in Peking of the diplomatic representatives on both sides in the world

war. The feeling of antipathy between the ministers and members of the

legations of the two camps. Even before I left Peking in August,

1915, only a few weeks after the outbreak of the war in Europe, it was

conspicuously noticeable in the Legation Quarter \»hen I went there to

(,{ ..f j- .. I r-Oi {c C
visit some of the ministers that if there were two ministers of two
e<)
camps happening to find themselves on the same side of the street,

one or the other would at once cross the street and walk on the other

sidewalk. The strong feelings of the Allied ministers were reflected

in talks and even representations to the Chinese Foreign Office and

to Chinese officials, Of course it was not suggested that China should

Koo, Wellington

directly participate in the war, but there were many ways in which

China was expected to show her sympathy for the Allied cause. After

the United States entered the war, the Allied ministers increased their

efforts to-seek China*s sympathy and support, and looked upon the

United States entry into the war as an overwhelming reason for China to

enter the war on the Allied side. The one minister, however, who

exercised greatest influence in this direction was Dr. Paul S. Reinsch,

American Minister, who, by his deliberate cultivation of the friendship

of the Chinese people in all walks of life and by his undoubted sympathy

and support at the time of the Twenty-one Demands, was regarded in

every section of the Chinese community as a real friend of China. He

certainly did not hesitate to make it clear after the United States

entry into the war that it would be to Chinese interests to range herself

on the American side.

But the supporters of China*s participatinn in the war did not go

unopposed by the new German Minister, Admiral Heinz. Admiral Heinz,

the new minister, was a distinguished admiral and enjoyed the confidence

of the Kaiser and the German high command. Thus his appointment

shortly after the American entry into the war was rather unusual

and had attracted a great deal of attention. As it turned out later, the

general opinion that this appointment was a significant one was well

founded. No sooner than he had arrived in Peking, he began to

entertain very extensively among Chinese statesmen, politicians,

members of Parliament, college professors and influential leaders of

the Chinese community.

Koo, Wellington y*1

Germany’s motives in keeping China neutral were based on more

than psychological considerations. Until the United States had joined

the war, Asia was active in the backyard of the United States and China

was a very important factor - with her tremendous capacity in manpower

and natural resources. The Germans at first must have considered that the

war would not last very long and that they would secure the final victory

so long as they were able to keep the United States from joining in. Once

the United States had joined the war with its tremendous industrial power,

China's raw materials would be of even greater use, and if the war should

last for a long time, China's manpower might be brought to bear oji the

struggle. Nor was this fanciful thinking on the part of Germany, because

in Europe already, immediately behind the war front, tens of thousands

of Chinese laborers had already been enlisted and were working behind

the trenches in order to release the French and British manpower for

the front itself.

The strategic center in this struggle in Peking was the

Parliament, because a declaration of war by China had to be first approved

in Parliament. For days the debate went on in the legislature between the

two camps. The Chinese pepers reported that it was a common sight to see

the ministers of the Allied powers sitting in the public gallery listening

to the debates, and it was said that Admiral Heinz never failed to be

present at any sitting when the question of China's entry into the war

was being debated. Outside Parliament, these elements in the political

picture and in community life which were opposed to the war held demon­

strations and mass parades to warn the government against taking a decision
Koo, Wellington
%

in favor of supporting the Allied cause. This struggle went on for

several weeks until General Tuan ChH-jui, who had been a fervent

supporter of China's participation in the war from the very

outset of the United States entry into the war, sought and received

support from the governors of a large number of Provinces.

When I learned of this struggle in Peking, I decided to make a com­

prehensive communication listing the advantages that China might obtain

by her participation in the war. My long telegram, sent at this

critical moment, also gave a resuml of my talks with the high officials

of the American government, and with the ambassadors of the Allied

Powers. X was reassured by General Tuan's reply that my telegram had been

mimeographed and circulated among the members of the Cabinet. How much

influence it had, I do not know. It may have carried some weight with

some of the Cabinet ministers and members of Parliament on the

government side who were not too enthusiastic in support of China's

participating. At any rate my telegram was welcomed by the government.

Premier Tuan made a personal appeal to Parliament on May 8; however

it would not support China's entry to the war. It was not until August

14, after Parliament had dissolved and moved to the South, that war was

declared in Peking.

It was curious to note then that the Chinese press carried the news,

not only as to the victory on the part of the government against the

Southern anti-war section but that it was also a great success for the

efforts of the Allied ministers and a bitter defeat for Admiral Heinz.
Koo, Wellington

The German community was really amazed and dismayed and they had reason

to feel so because, as soon as China entered the war, at the suggestion

of the Allied Ministers the Germans, with very few exceptions, were all

deported. The German institutions were seized; German banks and commer­

cial firms were turned over. -B«t J:he Allied ministers had reason to advo­

cate such measures because the war was a total war.

While the struggle was going on between the two Chinese factions, the

Allied ministers made a number of offers in order to induce China

to enter the war, and promised that if China participated in the war

they would see to it that China would be recognized as a great nation. It^

was this promise which Minister Lu recalled at the Peace Conference to

Premier Clemenceau and to Mr. Lloyd George when China was allotted only

two seats at the Peace Conference instead of five which was demanded.

At any rate, great efforts were made by the Allied Minis,ers at Peking to

enlist China on the side of the Allied Powers, especially after the

United States entered the war. General Tua^s decision was courageous

because of the strc *g opposition which he encountered in adopting the policy;

and it was important because of its effect upon China’s international

position by enabling her to put forward her claims at the peace

conference. China’s entry into the war was much opposed by Japan and

the Japanese opposition diminished only after the Allied governments

reassured her of their recognition of Japanese interests in appreciation

of the Japanese aid in the war. Of course, the assurance they had given

to Japan --«s«ur«TTce'-wi>ieh became known only after the end of the war

and revealed only at the Peace Conference. Even the United States, whose
Koo, Wellington

entry into the war had been sought and was heartily welcomed, was not kept

informed of the secret agreement which both Great Britain, France, and
7
Italy had made with Japan, recognizing Japanese special interests in China.

$ h frr f i •j t*. j ! •? f „j
Another event, following China'a joining the war on the American side
CAJ *
was the dispatch ofChinese War Mission to the United States. I+-

was headed by a Major General and a Rear Admiral, invited by the United

States to visit American military and industrial centers and to work

out plans by which the United States could assist China in her war

efforts. Two incidents remain fresh in my memory in connection with this

special war mission. One was that no sooner had the mission arrived

when it was bombarded with American representatives of American

armaments firms or by brokers in this field for contracts to purchase

American war supplies. It was the desire of the Chinese government to

purchase a number of arms, particularly machine guns, but I was approached

one day by a Chinese Rear Admiral with a problem, or at least what he

considered to be a problem. He said he had ordered 20,000 machine guns;

after he had signed the contract and paid the first instalment, the

representative of the firm went and saw him and told him he would send

him a check as part of the commission which otherwise the company would

have paid to the broker. I do not recall how much it was, but it sounded

at the time that it was a considerable sum and he wanted to know whether

he could accept it. My answer to him was unhesitant. I told him it would

not be correct for him, for any official of the Chinese government,

acting on behalf of the government to accept any money, whatever it was for.
Koo, Wellington

for a commission or a rebate. If he accepted it, he would regret all

his life having done so. He saw the point at once. Certainly he would

tell the representative of the firm that he would take no part of the

money, and that in making thk contract he had simply been carrying out his

official duty.

Another striking incident was the visit I made with the Mission to

the Bureau of Standards. After going around the different sections of

the Bureau, we were conducted into a dark room, with the windows closed.

The official who was conducting us closed the door and pointed to

equipment in the center of the room. In a hushed voice he said showing

this to us was a special act, and asked us not to reveal anything he

might say in explanation as to what it was. He said although the

Japanese were also on the Allied side, the American Government would not

think of allowing them in the room and in the case of the other

European Allies it would have to consider very seriously before doing so.

We were already curious and he then showed us a needle - that was

pointing in the direction of Mexico; the needle, he said, could detect

where wired messages from Berlin were going and had helped to reveal that

Gjarman agents were busy in Mexico. Orders were communicated from

Berlin while espionage reports and reports of sabotage action in the

United States were sent back from Mexico City. This incident was

interesting, not so much from the technological point of view because

none of the members of the Mission nor myself were technicians, but

because of its indication of the friendly feeling the Americans enter­

tained toward China and China1s representatives. This was in 1918. Today,
Koo, Wellington

more than 40 years later, there are all kinds of devices for instant

communication and detection - but in those days, it was quite a

scientific feat on the pa rt of the American government.

Koo, Wellington \\ r
^ 'h’

B 6. The Lansing**Ishii Notes, November 1917

Out in the Far East attention naturally focussed on Japan who

had seized the war in Europe as a god-sent opportunity to push forward

her own policy of territorial aggrandizement on the continent, seeking

hegemony and domination in Asia. The war in Europe occupied all the

attention of Great Britain and France in Europe. Both countries had

very large colonies and other economic and political interests in Asia

but they were unable to look after them while they themselves were ab­

sorbed in the struggle to save their home countries from Germany. The

sudden presentation of the Twenty-one Demands on China was only one

illustration of the Japanese policy in Asia. This policy further involved

a determined effort by Japan to bring about the withdrawal of the U.S.

from Asia and the western Pacific especially from China. Japan considered

the Chinese mainland as a natural sphere of Japanese influence; she had

always considered it a sore point to see the existence and continued

expansion of American interests in China especially since tbe

establishment of the first Republic of China. The United States on her

part was not disposed to sacrifice her relationship with China. For

three quarters of a century already, American missionary enterprise,

American educational and philanthropic effort and American trade and

commerce had been building up a conspicuousposition in China. In the

U.S. itself, while the first contact of the American public with the

cphinese had been at the time of the influx of Chinese laborers for the

construction of mines and railways in the U.S., more recently the

Koo, Wellington

the presence of Chinese students in American had started to create some

understanding and appreciation there not only of the importance of

China as a nation in the Pacific but also of the grandeur of Chinese

civilization and culture. With the preoccupation of Great Britain

and France in the war, the U.S. was the only important country that

could interfere with and prevent Japan1s policy of expansion in eastern

Asia. Therefore, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of

May 1915, the outcome o£ the Twenty-one Demands, it was expected -

certainly in China and not improbably in Washington - that Japan would

continue to press her policy of domination in Asia and seek, if not

the immediate withdrawal of American interests from the Chinese

mainland, certainly the agreement on the part of the U.S. that all

international questions related to China should not be dealt with

without consulting first with the government at Tokyo.

In effect the Japanese government seized upon the war in Europe as

an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen her position vis a vis the

United States. A high-ranking diplomatic mission headed by Viscount

Ishii, an accomplished diplomatist, was despatched in 1917 to negotiate

and conclude an agreement which would embody official recognition on the

part of the U.S. of Japan^ special and preponderant interests in China.

Ishii*s mission naturally caused great uneasiness in Peking. As the

Chinese minister in Washington I made every effort to warn the U.S.

Government of Japan*s sinister motives, for by means of widespread

publicity Japan was trying to make it appear as if the mission was to

seek and promote a better understanding between the two countries

 Koo, Wellington

regarding their respective interests in China. Mr. Robert Lansing,

who succeeded Mr. Jennings Bryan as Secretary of State, was a

student of international affairs; he had studied and written about

international problems particularly about the relations between China

and U.S. and about American interests in Asia. For a period of years,

he had been advisor to the Chinese Legation in succession to Mr. John

Foster, his father-in-law, who also had served previously as Secretary

of State. Mr. Lansing, therefore, had a good knowledge of the situation

and was aware of the policy of Japan on the Asia mainland and the

precarious position of China. It was not difficult for him to appre~

ciate the significance of the Ishii mission. Every time I went to see

him, I spoke to him about the possible Japanese motive behind this

special mission and the anxiety in Peking about its presence in

Washington. Mre Lansing never failed to assure me that the U.S.

Government was fully aware of Japan1s design in China: he would cer­

tainly see to it that the U.S. would not weaken its position or let

its interests diminish to benefit Japan.

But as time went on and the visit of Viscount Ishii was prolonged,

the uneasiness on the part of the Chinese Government in Peking

continued to grow. It became more and more difficult for me to get

full information on the progress of the negotiations between Mr.

Lansing and Viscount Ishii, In newspapers both in China and in the

U.S., there were reports that the Japanese envoy had made some

progress in Washington towards securing American recognition of Japan’s

policy in China. According to these, the term geographical propinquity

Koo, Wellington 0L

had already been agreed upon by the two countries to refer to Japan*s

relationship with China. The news aroused further anxiety on my part

and I made continued efforts to seek elucidation on the precise nature

of the understanding reached between the Secretary of State and the

Japanese envoy. To me, the securing of American recognition of the

principle of geographical propinquity, despite its seeming innocuousness,

was a diplomatic design cleverly conceived to disguise the rather more

objectionable term of preponderant interest or special interest which

tended to justify one country*s attempts to assert its influence in

another. In ray interviews with Mr. Lansing he sought to assure me that

the recognition of this principle was merely the recognition of a

geographical fact and was agreed to only after firm objection on the

part of the U.S. to terms such as "special or preponderant interests".

He assured me that the U.S. had rejected Japan’s first request for

American recognition of Japan’s special or preponderant interest in China

and that Viscount Ishii had only reluctantly accepted the formula based

upon geographical propinquity of China to Japan. China’s anxiety was

great because the Chinese Government had asked to be duly consulted in

negotiations that affected China directly. But Mr. Lansing himself did

not consider this proposal by China as at all feasible, probably because

of Japan’s certain opposition to it.

After lengthy negotiations between the two representatives,

in November 1917 the so-called Lansing^Ishii Notes were published. I

had then more clear evidence of the precise nature of the agreement
Koo, Wellington \^1

reached and spared no effort to point out to the Secretary of State the

hidden danger of the agreement, not only to China but also to

American interests in the Chinese mainland; it was certain that Japan would

insist upon her own interpretation of the nature and scope of the

principle of geographical propinquity in pursuit of her traditional and

basic policy of territorial aggrandizement in China.

Mr. Lansing, I recall, again did his best to reassure me and told

me that there was nothing sinister about the notes. There was no secret

provision, and everything that had been agreed upon was contained in the

notes. Whatever Japan might interpret them to mean, the U.S. had pointed

out to Japan exactly what it meant by them. I remember I put the

question to him why this formula was given recognition: if it was harm­

less surely it was unnecessary. Mr. Lansing*s explanation was that Ishii

could not have left Washington without making some agreement with the

U.S.; the exchange of notes gave him something to bring back to Japan.

He gave me to understand that recognition of the principle was also a

temporary arrangement subject to revision when the struggle in Europe was

over. As it may be recalled, the understanding was duly terminated at

the Washington Conference in 1922 when notice was served on Japan of the

desire of the U.S. government to abrogate the agreement. This action

was taken not altogether out of a desire to meet China1s wishes but also

because, ever since the publication of the Notes, the general reaction

on the part of the American people and the American press had not been too

favorable.

Not the least motive in 1917 for conccluding the Lansing-Ishii

Koo, Wellington

was the pressure of the was in Europe. The U.S. Government was fully

aware of the need of enlisting Japanese assistance to the Allied cause

in the Far East. X had the impression then that the British Government

was most anxious that an agreement should be reached by the U.S. with

Japan. As a matter of fact. Great Britain found herself in a most

delicate position in regard to the relation between Japan and China on

one hand and Japan with the U.S. on the other. She had large interests

in China as well as in other parts of Asia. The sudden attack on Tsingtao^

,#the occupation of the Kiaochow leased territory had already given a clear

indication of what Japan might do elsewhere in Asia. But Britain^

primary consideration was to win the war and for this purpose she had

to secure Japanese assistance in as many forms as possible in the

Pacific if not in Europe itself. Without the agreement between Japan and

Washington, without paying some price for Japanese assistance. Great

Britain could not count upon Japan. As it was revealed to me later at

the Paris Peace Conference, Great Britain asked for and received a

substantial amount of Japanese aid in transporting troops from Australia

to the European front and in patrolling the waters of the western Pacific

to guard against the activities of the German submarines. The agree­

ment concluded between London and Tokyo in regard to Shantung and other

Japanese interests in China were at that time a dead secret, unknown even

to the U.S. Government, but they clearly indicate to what degree the

British Government was anxious to secure Japanese aid and assistance in the

war.

Sir Cecil Spring the British ambassador was one of my friends in

Koo, Wellington

Washington and from time to time we had talks regarding the situation

in the Far East, the war in Europe and the possible effect upon the

situation in Asia. As X recall - and it could be expected his views

were entirely in line with those of his government which was unaware of

the possible mischiefs Japan could do in Eastern Asia and the western

Pacific but which at the same time was anxious to secure Japan1s help

in the war. His view was based upon the idea that in war time the first

object to seek was to win the war; all other questions could be left to

be exhausted after the victory. As far as the British ambassador was

concerned it was a realistic view of the situation of the Far East and it

reflected the view of his government and his people. But my recollection

was that he was fully aware of the great opportunity offered by the

war to Japan to advance their own interest in Asia, but what could other

countries do except U.S. and the U.S. was not likely to make any serious

move all by herself.

I also maintained friendly, even intimate relations with the

French ambassador, and from time to time I would call on him as I would on

other ambassadors whose countries had extensive interests in Asia

especially in the Far East to discuss the world situation and exchange our

views. M. Duser, though a 100 per cent Frenchman, and a great diplomat,

was also a profound scholar, who had made a special study of the English

drama and I understand had written a book on it. And I recall that Al­

though he was of the older generation, very cultivated in the refinements

of his native language, he always used English.

Koo, Wellington
o

B 7. Preparations for Peace, 1917-1918

Toward the latter part of 1917, when the whole nation of the United

States was being geared up for its active participation in the war in

Europe, an international event of far-reaching significance took place

in Europe. It was the October Revolution in Russia, started by the

Bolsheviks. They were of course Communists and overthrew the regime

established by the Mensheviks after the Rebruary revolution the same

year. Though Imperial Russia had been an ally on the side of the

Western European powers, the regime itself at St. Petersburg had always

been looked upon with distaste because it was an autocracy with little

consideration for the welfare of its people. The February Revolution

was welcomed in the United States as a change for the better for the Russian

people. When Kerensky, the new Russian premier and head of the Mensheviks

sent a mission to the United States with a view to seeking aid, it was

cordially welcomed in Washington. But the replacement of the Kerensky

regime by the Bolsheviks came as a great surprise and aroused a great

deal of anxiety as to future developments in Russia. One of the deveut

policies of the new regime was to terminate the war and make peace with

Germany and Austria. In spite of the efforts made by London, Paris and

Washington to dissuade the new revolutionary government in St. Petersburg

from abandoning the war, the Bolsheviks went ahead and began negotiations

without inuch loss of time. Finally the so-called treaty of peace was

concluded between Russia and the Central Powers.

This event undoubtedly intensified the desire of the United States

Koo, Wellington

for the early restoration of peace. As it •was well-known the American

people had always a distaste for war-devotion to the

cause of peace. Moreover the departure of Russia from the camp of the

Allies in this first world struggle made the outlook of the war itself

uncertain from the point of view of the Allied Powers - especially in

Europe, although it must be said that the 0reat determination of England,

France and the United States to win the war remained unshaken. President

Wilson, of course, fully realized the inherent love of peace on the part

of the American people, among whom a few such as Mr, Adams and Henry

Ford were advocating peace at almost any price, and the White House

spared no effort to prepare for the peace which must come in the end.

Being a first-class politician as well as a statesman. President

Wilson had an ear to the ground for the popular mood. Accordingly, in

one of his speeches on the war situation he made it clear that the

United States had joined the war on the Allied side in order to build a

new world for the future, so that the children and their children for

generations in the future would not again have to take sides and fight.

As he put it, for the United States the war was a war to end all wars.

This belief was evidently ardently held by the President, and since

the cause was fully shared and advocated by Colonel House, one of his

closest friends and collaborators. Colonel House was regarded by President

Wilson as well qualified to be confidential representative to the Allies.

More than once he was sent to the British and French capitals to sound out

the views of the Allied governments and to draft the peace terms which

would wind up the great struggle and establish a new order for the world.

There was widespread interest in the idea of establishing an

organization to safeguard world peace not only in the United States

Koo, Wellington

but also among certain circles in England, France and even beyond;

consequently I regarded it as of great interest and importance to China

as well. Institutions like the Carnegie Peace Foundation and certain

circles in American Universities were discussing and drafting programs

with a view to the realization of such a grand idea. Similar societies

and associations made their views known, particularly in England, and

they were headed by men like Lord Robert Cecil, Lord Raker and Lord

Samuel. In France there was Leon Bourgeois, the great lover of world

peace. In South Africa, General Smuts1 views were also entirely in

accord with the general desire to make the formation of an organization

to guarantee future world peace as the most important objective of the

war wlrfciriJ^^rheirr waging.

j

Realizing the importance of this movement for China, I took it upon

myself to set up a small committee to collect materials - including

the various drafted plans which were published from time to time

in the United States, England and elsewhere, to study and analyze them

with the desire of finding out what should be tie policy of China and

what parts of the draft should be supported by the Chinese nation.

IChis small committee, set up in the Chinese Legation under my

direction, also had a responsibility to me to study the questions of

special interest to China which the Chinese Governemnt should bring

up at the peace conference. As was generally acknowledged at the time,

ever since the opening of intercourse with Western European powers in the
Koo, Wellington
\l<3

middle of the nineteenth century, China had not had a square deal in her

relations with them. She had been subjected from that time on to a

series of unequal treaties; her territorial integrity had been impairedy

C & V\. c e oM
not-only by the system of territories as the price paid for losing one
aO
war after another with the European powers, bttfe had her sover­

eignty infringed upon through her acceptance of consular jurisdiction

and various other special privileges and rights exacted from her. I

thought it was time that China should air her grievances internationally

at the coming peace conference in order to win back some of her lost

rights. China*s grievances, hmwwig^ were not confined to those against

imperialistic policies of the European powers. She suffered in the

latter part of the 19th Century from Japan as well. The most recent

form of Japanese aggression was the notorious Twenty-one Demands and

the treaty which was forced upon China by Japan as a result of Japan*s

ultimatum to China. These and other problems I listed and assigned to

the committee to study and prepare draft-memoranda for presentation to the

government at Peking for consideration and approval. Among the members

of the committee were Mr. Y. C. Yung, Dr. W. Wu, who later became

president of Soochow University, and Dr. P. W. Wei, Ph.D. of Columbia

University, who was my secretary.

After his special trips to Europe, I sought and obtained an inter­

view with Colonel House. He was a most careful man and one of few words.

But he and I were able to talk rather freely probably because he knew

that I was interested in his cherished subject of a world organization

to preserve peace - not merely as a practical question but also because X

was a student of international relations and world problems. While

Koo, Wellington

exercising caution and discreetness, he always gave me some salient points

regarding the views of London and of Paris on his pet subject. E\ery

time he returned he always reported directly to President Wilson. This

was a fact generally known and at times I tried to sound him out on the

President^ reaction to his report. Thus my contact with Colonel House

was most useful since It gave me some indication not only of Colonel House

own views but also those of the President on the question of the future

peace organization, a subject which I myself also regarded as one of

supreme importance for mankind.

It was curious to note that while the preparation for peace was

going on, quietly but steadily, the United States in the Spring of 1918

sent its first expeditionary force to Europe. That marked the begin­

ning of the flow of American armed units to participate actively in

the fighting in Europe. The appearance of the American soldiers on the

European front on the side of the Allies was a great boost for the

morale of the people in the Allied Countries. It definitely gave

rise to a hope and confidence that the World War in Europe would be

definitely won in the end by the Allied and Associate powers. This hope

and confidence was reported by me to the government in Peking and at the

same time I proposed that they should start preparations for the

Peace Conference vh ich was sure to take place after the war ended. From

the summer of 1918, I sent report after report of the studies which the

committee and I made in the Legation and urged my government to consider

them at the earliest possible time. The Allied victory at the Battle

of Verdun and the steady despatch of American expeditionary forces to

Koo, Wellington

Europe made me. feel that the end of the war was not far off: clearly China

should not delay preparing for the peace. I looked upon the coming

conference as an unusual opportunity for China to seek and obtain some

fair treatment and readjus tment of the grievous consequences from which

China been suffering for more than half a century. The government

was then headed by General Tuanaand his Cabinet was composed of a number

of prominent and enlightened statesmen who had always been interested in

China's international problems; they readily accepted my suggestion. The

most notable man in the Cabinet was Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang, the Foreign

Minister, and I was informed that his Ministry was establishing a committee

to study the problems China should present to the Peace Conference, using

as the basis for their study various reports that I sent.

The questions which I thought should be prepared were first, those

of direct interest to China which should be inserted in the peace treaty

between the Allied and Associated powers, including of course China, on

one side, and the Central Powers on the other. I believed that the treaty

to be concluded with Germany, which was expected to be the first of the

treaties signed at the peace conference, should incorporate, among other

questions, the return of Tsingtao and the leased territory of Kiaochow

and furthermore the restoration of the equipment and instruments taken

from the Imperial observatory at Peking by the German forces at the time

of the Boxer trouble. An indemnity should be asked of Germany, not only

for damages caused to China as a result of the German occupation in Shantung

but also for the expenses that China had incurred in repatriating German

nationals from China

Koo, Wellington

I was definitely of the opinion then that the question of Kiaochow

and Tsingtao was one which China could justifiably take up at the

peace conference, and seek a settlement without paying attention to the

Sino-Japanese treaty based on Japan’s Twenty-one Demands. Of course this

was directly contrary to Japan’s views. Japan had always been insistent,

ever since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1915 that it was for her to

discuss the Shantung question at the peace conference, and not for China

to do so. Even after China entered the war on the side of the Allies,

Japan spared no effort in bringing pressure upon Peking. Diplomatic

correspondence between Japan and China disclosed clearly the determined

purpose of Japan to exclude China from the Peace Conference, at least

so far as the Shantung question was concerned, and she sought and obtained

China's reluctant consent that Japan would return the Shantung Province

to China by negotiation after Japan had had her seizure of German rights

there confirmed in the peace treaty. Thus Japan considered it to be her

right to negotiate with Germany to the exclusion of China, while we took

the stand, and I was strongly urging it on the Government, that China

should raise the question at the Peace Conference as a matter of her own

right, ignoring the treaty which she had signed with Japan under duress.
Koo, Wellington

B8. From Verdun to Versailles - the Eve of the Conference

The general feeling in the summer of 1918, especially after the Battle

of Verdun, was that the end of the war was approaching. Both this general

feeling and my warning to Peking to take early steps to prepare for peace

were justified by the turn of events because by October, Austria sued for

peace. This made Germany^ collapse imminent, and the war was definitely

ended when an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918. While the early

termination of the war was not unexpected, the armistice seemed to take

the governments of the Allied and Associated Powers by surprise because a

great hustle seemed to show itself in Washington and equally in Peking.

With an unexpected expediteness, the Chinese Minister in Paris was

notified that a supreme council would be set up and meet to consider the

terms of peace which should be asked of Germany and the other Central powers.

Minister Hu Wei-tet^s telegram asked the government to appoint a represen­

tative to attend the proposed meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allied

and Associated Powers.

To my great surprise, I received a telegram not only notifying of

our Minister Hu*s telegraphic report, but appointing me to be China*s repre­

sentative and instructing me to go to Paris at once. I was greatly sur­

prised and though it was out of the question for me to leave Washington at

the time because I considered it was more important for me to remain

in Washington during the following few weeks when the question of the peace

terms with both Germany and other Central powers would be pushed to a con­

clusion b«<«4H*e« it was known that the United States government certainly had
Koo, Wellington

a great deal to say which would have a great influence upon both the British

and French governments. ^ioreover-^Htt-wa«-op-inion that this was par-

f iv\ U »' V'
ticularly true as regards the questions affecting China and Japan. The

Chinese Government .would not count much upon either Great Britain or France.

The only real hope was to secure the support of the United States at the

peace conference.

There was another reason which although it was of minor importance

also played a part in making me decide not to go to Paris at once. It was

in
the death of my wife/October 1918, a victim of the current epidemic known

as Spanish influenza. Her death was not only a great loss but a terrible

shock to me because she passed away after only a few days of illness,

leaving two children, respectively, of one year and two years of age.

As I recall, the epidemic was of a frightening character. A number of the

diplomatic missions in Washington had similar occurrences. The Spanish

military attache, for example, marched in the funeral procession of the

military attache of the Japanese Embassy. But within four days, he

himself passed away of the same disease. My own Legation lost not only

my wife but the wife of my third secretary and the son of my second secretary,

all within ten days. The epidemic was so bad that it was difficult to

secure coffins for the dead people. The passing of my wife upset ray own

family and the sorrow that the two members of my staff suffered made

the whole atmosphere of the Legation most depressing. I had seriously

thought of resigning and actually did send in my resignation in October after

the passing of my wife, but once again I was urged by my government to

think more of China*s need of service from me at the time.

 Koo, Wellington
vt“

._This was a personal reason behind ray decision not to go to France immediately.

My major reason was that during the days before the convocation of the peace

conference in Europe it was necessary to get as much information as possible

about the policy and views of the United States government, particularly

of the President, for he would be a determining voice in the deliberations

of the peace conference, being at once the head of the most powerful

country on the side of the Allies, and the recognized spokesman of the

Allied cause throughout the world. His famous fourteen points remained

a favorite topic for conversation in many quarters. Not only did they

become a serious subject for study and consideration in the chancelleries

of Europe, but they constituted a ray of hope for the oppressed nations

in Asia, and particularly in Africa.

These reasons which I had for refusing to leave the United States

immediately for Paris were further strengthened by the announcement that

President Wilson himself would head the United States delegation tcy^he

Peace Conference. It became more important for me to seek an interview

with the President himself on the problems o# the prospects of the coming

Peace Conference which it was then known would be held in Paris. Toward

the latter part of November, the question of the peace conference became

a top question as a result of the deliberations of the Supreme Council in

Paris. I visited the State Department many times during those days in

the hope of getting some accurate information as to the way in which the

Peace Conference would be organized and what countries on the Allied side

would be represented. It was not surprising to be informed that the

United States was a friend of China and would do its best to promote
 7, - &
Koo, Wellington
Vt°

the Chinese cause and see to it that China was represented at the Peace

Conference; however the final program plan would have to be discussed and

agreed upon by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in Europe.

For China the immediate question was to know the number of seats

China would obtain at the Peace Conference. China*s government desired and

expected that she would be treated as a great power and that her delegates

would be equal in number to those of the principal Allied and Associated

powers. The impression which the Chinese Minister in Paris obtained from

the Quai d*Orsay was almost as encouraging as that from Washington: that

China could send as many delegates as she desired, but that the question

of the seats at the conference would depend upon the questions to be

looked up at each meeting. The Chinese government, particularly the Chinese

Foreign Minister, were rather optimistic on this problem because, at the time

when the Allies were trying hard to get China to enter the war on their side,

they promised that if China entered the war she would be treated at the

peace conference following its termination as a great country. This

promise, couched in general terms, was confirmed in the diplomatic notes

of Great Britain and France in Peking. Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang placed much

reliance and confidence on this formal promise. But when the question

actually arose after the war was terminated and the question of organizing

the Peace Conference arose, Chirm—fousKi.great cause for disappointment when

it was decided by the principal Allied powers that there would be three

categories of countries to sit in the Peace Conference on the side of the

Allied and Associated Powers. The five principal ones, each, were

entitled to five seats; countries which rendered certain effective aid and
Koo, Wellington

assistance in the war were entitled to three seats; and the remaining

members of the Allied camp would be entitled to two each. China fell into

the last category, and was thus allotted only two seats. The disappointment

in this decision was great, both in China and in other countries placed in the

third category. The Chinese Government was unhappy, not only because of

its effect upon China^ prestige, both in the country and abroad, but also

because of the difficulty which it gave rise to for the government to decide

who should be appointed plenipotentiary delegates. Immediately after,

the organization of the Peace Conference was brought to the attention of

the Chinese Government, the Foreign Minister had sent telegrams to me

and other Chinese ministers abroad that he counted upon their cooperation at

the Peace Conference. In the telegram to me he made it clear that I would

be appointed as one of the plenipotentiaries. To at least four other minis­

ters he expressed the same desire and intention, for example, the Chinese

minist€*rs in Paris, London, Copenhagen, and Brussels, repectively Dr. Hu

Wei-teh, the doyen of the Chinese foreign service abroad. Dr. Alfred Sze,

Dr. W. W. Yen, who had been concurrently minister to Denmark and Minister

to Germany, and finally Mr. Wang Yun-pao. Accordingly Mr. Lu felt himself

in a predicament as to how to decide and who to appoint to the limited

number of seats assigned to China when the limit was two. Instructions

went forward to different Allied Capitals and to Washington to try to urge

upon them readjustment. The efforts made in different capitals, were,

however, unsuccessful, and the appointment of Chinese plenipotentiaries

was held up by the Foreign Minister who, himself, naturally, was to be the

head of the Chinese Delegation whatever size it might be.

As time went on very rapidly, the Chinese Minister was urged to go to Paris
Koo, Wellington 0*

as quickly as possible. He had expected to leave about the first of December,

1918, but the few ships that were still operating between Asia and Europe were
was
already booked to capacity. It/at first impossible to secure accommodation
) ■■ , 5 ■ t -j . y ■■ 1 staff
not csnly* for him»«l‘f, but also for his family and the minimum/which he

needed to bring with him. The Minister in Tokyo was instructed to make a

great effort to arrange with some Japanese shipping line for the necessary

accommodations, but while they promised to do their best, they did not

have any success. So the actual departure was some weeks later than expected.
Hv i <x,w ) j '^
^Uid-going through Korea and Japan,- ho wswt through the United States,

San Erancisco and New York, without, however, visiting Washington on hi«-
aa t • k Kw- ~
way, h€Ki reluctantly made a visit to the Japanese Foreign

Minister i-tHTokyo.

The reason for his reluctance was that he was not feeling well, and would

have liked to have rested more in Yokohama before sailing on to Paris by

the United States. Minister Lu Tsung-yu, the Chinese Minister in Tokyo,

had on instruction from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, made all the

contacts and arrangements for Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang not only to visit

the Foreign Ministry but also to be received by the Emperor of Japan in

a private audience and to attend a lunch party arranged by the Prime

Minister. It was apparent that the Japanese were looking forward to entertain­

ing Minister Lu. Japan’s hope was that China would raise no difficulty

for her at the Peace Conference and they wanted to talk things over with the

Chinese Foreign Minister. On receiving word from Foreign Minister Lu -

already on his way to Japan - that he would not be able to carry out the

arrangements made for him, Mr. Lu Tsung-yu, Chinese Minister, was so

embarrassed that he first pleaded illness so as to be excused from carrying

Koo, Wellington

on his duties at the Legation and later offered his resignation. It took

several telegrams from the Chinese Prime Minister and the President to

dissuade him from actually resigning. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Lu

was also urged by the President and Prime Minister to do his best to visit

Tokyo and follow the arrangements that had been made for him. It was for

this reason that Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang went to Tokyo to pay a visit on the

Foreign Minister, but he declined both the audience with the Emperor and the

luncheon party.

As Foreign Minister Lu was on his way to San Francisco, I was myself

about to leave Washington for Paris. Before doing so, I asked to call on

the President: I wanted a final interview to ascertain the American attitude

towards China*8 hopes at the conference and to sound the President^ views

on the prospects of the Peace Conference, particularly in connection with the

cherished desire to bring about a world peace organization. I was parti­

cularly anxious to hear President Wilson^ reaction toward a memorandum which

I had, with instructions from Peking, addressed to him through the Secretary

of State. This communication was a long document summarizing China*s hopes

and expectations at the Peace Conference and asking for the United States1

support in order to secure general approval at the conference. As I recall,

the document - put into Englisty at the Legation on the request of the

Foreign Ministry, consisted of several points. The principal ones were:

first, that China should be treated thereafter internationally on the

basis of the principle of equality among nations; second, that China*s

sovereignty and independence should be respected by the treaty powers.

Third, that the Protocol of 1901 which was the Boxer trouble in 1900 should

be revised, if not completely abrogated. The two points that were emphasized
Koo, Wellington

in the communication were first the withdrawal of the foreign legation

guards in Peking and the stationing of foreign military garrisons along

the Peking-Shanhai-kuan railway. It was urged with a good deal of force

that the protocol had been carried out in full ever since it had been made.

Severe provisions such as the punishment of the principal instigators of the

Boxer rebellion, the despatch of special missions to Berlin, and Tokyo to

offer our regrets for the killing of a Japanese legation secretary, the

assassination of the German envoy; etc. had all been accomplished, even the

difficult item requiring the stoppage of the imperial examinations for three

years, which had evidently been designed to impress the educated, literary
j
classof the Chinese people had also been carried out. The only provisions

which remained still in force out' by memcnjaiKium

related to the protection of the foreign legations in Peking and the

restriction placed upon China*s tariff autonomy. The memorandum urged that

with respect to the protection of the legation, that there was no longer

any need of legation guards and foreign garrisons along the Peking-

Shanhai~kuan railway. The safety of the diplomatic representatives in Peking

since the time when the protocol was signed had been a generally recognized

fact. Therefore, the memorandum urged that the guards and garrisons should

be permanently withdrawn.

The second point was that in view of China's fiscal difficulties and

in the interest of doing justice to China the tariff rate of foreign imports

should be raised at once to 12 1/2 percent in return for the abolition of

the so-called the likin, which was then imposed on goods passing through

from one place to another within China. Since the question of the abolition

of likin would take some time to put into effect, it was urged that the

import duty on foreign articles should be at once raised to an effective 5

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Koo, Wellington l1}

percent, because at the time, the treaty-sanctioned 5 percent import

duty amounted, in fact, only to about 2 1/2 to 3 percent.

With reference to this series of China*3 desiderata at the

Peace Conference, I had already made representations at the State Department:

I had been assured by both the Secretary of State Mr. Lansing and the

Assistant Secretary of State Mr. Breckinridge Long of the sympathy of

the U.S. towards China*s hopes as stated in the memorandum. But X wanted

to get a direct reaction from the President, in order to assure the government

in Peking. When I was received at the White House, President Wilson in

reply to my question confirmed the sympathetic attitude of the U.S.

towards China*s desiderata. He was delighted that X was going to Paris

and he hoped that X would keep in touch with the U.S. delegation. But

evidently he was more preoccupied with his program for the peace conference.

He talked at length about his hopes in the Conference and he reiterated what

he had already stated in his famous Fourteen points; if the world was to have

permanent peace, he said there must be a new order. The war had to be

settled not on the basis of old diplomacy: there should be no territorial

gains for any of the victorious powers nor any reward in indemnities,

secret diplomacy should be abolished, and a new order should be introduced

by setting up a world organization to preserve peace. This last item was

his favorite subject. When we had exchanged views on this subject, he made

it clear that he would count upon China*s support at the Conference for a

League of Nations. I at once assured him of China*s support, for I knew

the
that/Chinese Government was heartily in favor of the idea after receiving

the memorandum on the subject which I had sent to Peking. He invited me

to go with him on the same boat to France, but I politely declined because

I had made all the arrangements to sail shortly.

Koo, Wellington

I think I sailed on the 4th of December - I had been urgently directed

by my government to proceed to Paris as quickly as possible to take part

in an y meeting of the supreme council which I was in charge of the

preparation of the principles and policy which were to guide the impending

Peace Conference. My voyage across the Atlantic was uneventful except that it

was an unduly long one, taking ten days. The Chinese minister in Paris

sent his counselor to meet me at Cherbourg together with the Chinese consul

at the French Capital and I had no difficulty with my trip to my destination

in France.

It was my third visit to Paris. I had been in Paris first in 1908

and again in 1912, I had hurriedly passed through on my way to Peking by

way. of Moscow. At first sight I found Paris greatly changed. The war

had done no visible damage to the French capital but the atmosphere was

different. The streets were hardly crowded at night and even such big

thoroughfares, as the Grand Boulevard and the Champs Elysles were rather

quiet, their lights subdued. The cafes were doing little business.

French people seemed to prefer, at the time, to stay more at home than to

come out into the streets and enjoy themselves. I was told many of the

prominent French families especially the womenfolk had left Paris during

the war and were only just beginning to come back.I

I had no difficulty in getting a house as headquarters for myself and

the four secretaries I brought along with me. But it was difficult to have the

house heated, a common difficulty at the time because coal supplies were

scarce, as my colleague from London, Dr. Alfred Sze who arrived just before

had warned me. It was through the special effort of my colleague, Mr. Hu
Koo, Wellington
■vn

Wei-teh, the Chinese minister to Paris, that I was able to secure a sufficient

supply of coal to last for a week; thereafter, it was a necessary routine to

urge the Legation to continue to secure coal for my house. Food supplies

were somewhat scarce also, but X left that entirely to the French housekeeper.

My preoccupation was to do the necessary preparatory work along the

lines of the work of the committee which I had set up in the Legation in

Washington. With the data which the committee had collected and compiled

X drafted a program for the delegation which was to be submitted for approval

to Minister Lu upon his arrival. I recall clearly that I made a list of

seven questions - (1) 21 demands and the Shantung Question (2) the relin­

quishment of leased territory, (3) the abolition of consular jurisdiction in

China, (4) the return of the foreign settlements in different parts of China,

(5) the withdrawal of the foreign forces stationed in China, (6) the abolition

of the foreign post offices established on Chinese territory and (7) the

restoration of tariff autonomy to China. Dr. Sze and I discussed the list

and we decided to apportion the work to members of the future delegation.

I volunteered to prepare four memoranda on the items 1, 2, 3, and 7. Dr. Sze

agreed to take up 5 and 6; and 4, the return of the foreign settlement to be

prepared by Dr. Hawklin Yen. He was my college mate at St. Johns and also
f > VW
a fellow candidate of Doctor of Philosophy at Columbia. He had not yet

arrived but he was coming with Minister Lu and was already on the way and

was one of the counselors of the Chinese delegation. This was a tentative

program subject, of course, to Minister Lu*s approval after his arrival in

Paris.
Koo, Wellington
\'l^

While I was gathering material for drafting the four memoranda, I

was immediately occupied with my work on the subject of a League of Nations.

This did not take me long, and I completed two memoranda on the subject; one,

on the principles which were to serve as the basis of the new world organi­

zation and the views of the principal Allied and Associated powers so far as

X knew them. The second memorandum dealt with the importance of the future

world organization to China and reasons why China should give her full

support to the proposed organization. I knew these two subjects were rather

new from the Chinese point of view. Little had been known about the

idea in China, and it had yet to be discussed even by my Chinese

colleagues in the Foreign Service. This was not unexpected since the need

of a future world organization to preserve international peace had aroused

the greatest amount of interest in the U.S. while in England and France

the subject appeared to have provoked very little interest or discussion.

^ 'J-
I was, therefore, not at all surprised when one of Chinese colleagues

in Paris, coming to fetch me for a dinner party, and finding me absorbed

in writing, asked me what X was writing about. I told him that I was

preparing two memoranda, one of which had already been completed; and

when I handed him the first one for him to read, his answer was a typical

reaction. "Why do you waste your time on a subject like that?" he

said, "Since it*8 of no importance to China or, most likely, to the

world at large. So come on let*s go to dinner." He refused to take it

along with him, although I offered him a copy. Nevertheless, I remained

convinced that this question of a League of Nations would occupy the

greatest amount of attention if not from other countries certainly from

the U.S., and especially from President Wilson and Col. House.
 d

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Koo, Wellington

G 1. Minister Lu Arrives in Paris: The Problem of Precedence within

the Delegation

Minister Lu and his party arrived at Cherbourg on January 11th,

1919. The exact time of his ship’s arrival had been uncertain but the

time for the arrival of his train in Paris was even more so. Several

reports had come from the counselor of the Legation and the special

military representative. I was waiting at the house of General

T’ang while several other Chinese diplomats were waiting in their own

quarters or in the Chinese Legation. We all were anxious to meet the

Foreign Minister and his party at the station. It was, however, not until

four o’clock in the morning that it was definite that the train was to

arrive in half an hour. We all rushed to the station just in time to

welcome the Chinese Minister and his family and associates fron Peking.

It was an imposing assemblage. Practically all the heads of the Chinese

diplomatic missions in Europe were present, lined up on the platform

amidst a number of French representatives from the Quai d’Orsay and the

office of the Secretariat-general Designate to the Peace Conference

as well as a considerable number of French Charge d’Affaires. Hotel

Lutetia to which the party was conducted was the general headquarters

of the Chinese delegation where all the chefs de mission of Chinese

foreign service had rooms. I had my office there.

The first meeting called by the Foreign Minister was held in the

afternoon of the day he arrived. The immediate question which occupied

Koo, Wellington

the attention of the Chinese diplomats present was the number of dele­

gates that China would be entitled to nominate for the Conference. It

was evident that this question was very much on the mind of Minister Lu;

it was equally evident that he felt very strongly about China being allotted

only two seats, according to the information at the time. After the

report that the principal Allied and Associated powers would each have five

seats, it had been hoped that at least five seats would be assigned to

China too. Now Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang was in especial difficulty because

he had telegraphed not only to me but to about half a dozen other

Chinese ministers abroad inviting them each to join the delegation and

be one of the delegates. But he took it upon himself to see the French

Foreign Minister and the French Prime Minister, who was understood to

be the future president of the Peace Conference. He pinned his hopes

very largely on these two gentlemen because ha, himself, was a very

good French scholar and had always kept in close touch with France.

Meanwhile he asked Mr. Sze and myself to take the matter up again

respectively with the British and American delegations. The U.S.

delegation as usual was most sympathetic and they assured me that

President Wilson would extend his support. It was pointed out to me at

the same time, however, that this question was one of interest not only

to China but also to certain other Powers such as Brazil and Spain who were

also asking for an increase in the number of seats assigned to them. The

concerted efforts in different directions made by the Chinese representa­

tives did not bring much encouragement except for the feeling that the
 [V
Koo, Wellington

U.S. would back China^ request if not for five seats, at least for more

seats than two.

The response from the French and the British was far less encouraging.

From the Quai dIOrsay the reply was mostly discouraging. It was explained

to Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang that what counted most at the Peace Conference

was the amount of war effort made by each nation on the Allied side.

Minister Lu based his argument at the Quai dIOrsay on a report that Brazil

had succeeded in having verbal representation increased from two to three

seats; he urged that China should be similarly treated. But he was told

that China had given little positive war aid while Brazil,by patrolling

the south Atlantic with her naval units, had done great service to the

Allied cause because she had given protection to Allied ships transporting

war ammunition.

In the afternoon of January 18th, just about 36 hours before the formal

opening of the Peace Conference, Minister Lu called a meeting of the

Chinese Delegation attended by all the heads of the Chinese diplomatic

missions in Europe; and naturally including me from Washington. Also

present were a number of advisors from China and the counselors of the

principal missions in Europe. The question was to decide who should be

the official delegates of China at the Peace Conference in order that

Minister Lu could ask the President to issue the necessary mandate

appointing them. Of course this was a subject involving personalities, on

which no other minister present was willing to offer any suggestion.

koo, Wellington

Several said that it was for the Foreign Minister to decide. After much

emotion, perplexity and hesitation, he finally announced that in the

general interest of ChinaIs cause and in view of the need for the help

of the U.S.,England and of course, France, he would like to ask the

President to nominate five delegates anyway, since it had been made

clear to Minister Lu at the Quai d^rsay that while China, could only

occupy two official seats, she might send any two delegates to the

meetings and would not necessarily be confined to the same two delegates

all the time. He said he would like to have Dr. C, T. Wang to be the

second delegate; myself, as the third delegate; Dr. Sze, as the fourth;

and Dr. Wei Chen«tsu, as the fifth. He added that he wanted to include

Dr. Wei Chen-tsu because he had been the Secretary«General of the Commission

on thePreparation of the Peace Conference in Peking at the Ministry and

was,moreover, experienced with official Chinese documents and official

practice. He added that he would very much like to include Minister Hu,

who was then the Chinese minister in Paris, the seat of the Conference,

but as the number of the seats was so limited, he asked Dr. Hu to under­

stand that he would count upon him for his cooperation and would consider

him as an equal member of the delegation among ourselves, but, officially

he would continue to act as Chinese minister in Paris which status would

enable him to render his services to the delegation.

Mr. Hu, a gentleman diplomat of the old school and a Chinese scholar,

naturally said he would continue to help the delegation without any

special title, and assured Minister Lu that he was not anxious on that

point.
Koo3 Wellington

Then I spoke and said that as far as the mandate was concerned, I

felt it would be much more appropriate if X was put fifth instead of third

Dr. Alfred Sze was much senior to me in the foreign service and Minister

Wei was also senior to me in age and in 1912 at the Kuo«wu yuan had been

my immediate chief as secretary-general of the Cabinet when I was one of

his secretaries. In any case, it would not make an,r difference to me

if X was given as fifth delegate because I would continue to work as

before. What I was interested in was the work which was to take place.

Minister Lu said that contact with the U.S. Delegation was of utmost

importance to the questions China was interested in and that I was the

natural person to keep in close contact with the U.S. Delegation. Mr. Wei

was to be in charge of the drafting of documents in Chinese and of

internal administration within the delegation: it was to meet the wishes

of Mr. Wei, himself, that he was to be named the fifth.I

I insisted that as far as Mr. Wei was concerned, I could understand

but in regard to Mr. Alfred Sze, it would be only proper that he should

precede me. This Minister Lu was finally able to appreciate. He

said that the list would be made up as follows: Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang,

Mr. C. T. Wang, Dr. Alfred Sze, myself, and Mr. Wei Chen-tsu. A note

was to lc prepared by the Secretary-general Mr. Yueh Chu-ju, counselor of

the Legation in Paris and would be despatched as soon as it was signed;

Mr. Wei was to prepare a telegram to the President of China asking him

to issue a mandate appointing these five men as indicated. These

communications were duly sent.

Koo, Wellington

For my part, I felt the difficult question had been solved. To my

great surprise, the solution was upset in Peking. The following

morning, a Sunday, I had an urgent telephone from Mr. Yueh saying that

Minister Lu would like to see me at once at the Hotel Lutetia where

he was quartered. I dropped into the Secretary-general^ office to find

out what the matter was that was so urgent. He asked me to read

a drafted note practically finished on the typewriter. The draft

requested the recall of the note which had been sent less than 24 hours

before to the Secretary-general of the Peace Conference and stated that

in reference to the order of the Chinese delegates, the President^

mandate had jus«_ been received appointing five Chinese delegates in the

following order: Minister Lu, myself. Dr. C. T. Wang, Dr. Sze and Dr. We

I told Mr. Yueh, at once, "Please don1t send it, I am going to talk to

Minister Lu about that matter."

Minister Lu was very much upset and was feeling indisposed. I

found Minister Lu not quite dressed; without saying anything he

handed me the telegram containingthe President^ mandate indicating the

order of the five delegates with my own name now placed above Dr. Wang

and Dr. Sze. I told him that this was a surprise to me and that he

could explain to Peking that the official notification had already been

sent and it would not be becoming to recall the first one and to send

in the second one purely because of the order of the delegates. Any

such sudden change, I said, could produce an unfavorable impression; it

would probably reflect badly on the authority of the Foreign Minister

himself, who, after all, was representing China internationally at this

Conference.
Koo, Wellington

Minister Lu appeared somewhat distressed but he was very firm. No,

he said, his note was only a note from the Foreign Minister: a telegram

containing a presidential mandate superseded any diplomatic notes from

the Foreign Minister. And the wishes of the President must be respected:

we were all servants of the government. I told him that it was imma­

terial as far as I, myself, was concerned, whether I was in the first

spot or in the fourth spot, but that he, himself, was not sure that he

would be able to attend all the meetings, as his health was not too good.

When I insisted on my view, he went on to say that he had received an

unofficial telegram explaining the situation to him and expressing anxiety

on the part of the President and the Government about his health. On

that point he felttifaat Peking was right; if he was not able to keep up

his work at any time, naturally, in the eyes of Peking, I would be the

one to act for him and advocate China^ cause. In view of the political

situation at home, he stated that he thoroughly understood the anxiety

on their part about his health because of the inconvenience of China

represented by the Southern delegate Dr. C. T. Wang. He terminated by

saying he had simply wanted to inform me of the mandate. Mr. Yueh

had already been asked to prepare the note and it would be despatched.I

I saw there was no more room for me to argue, so I went to Mr. Yueh^s

office and told him of the reaction. I told him not to send it and to ask

Minister Lu to think it over. The importance of the order of the dele­

gates was an insignificant one and only concerned the two delegates

themselves. But Mr. Yueh said, the old man told me to prepare it quickly
Koo, Wellington

and said he would sign it at once. "Well," I said, "This is an internal

matter and it does not concern the conference." But he said, "You

know as well as I do that once he has made up his mind he can’t change

it. With that, I said I would go and talk to Alfred Sze, who was the

one who was most concerned.

I went directly to Mr. Alfred Sze’s apartment. He received me

very cheerfully but the moment I mentioned that a telegram had just come

from Peking, the moment said 1 just came from the Hotel , and

had been shown the text of a telegram from the President concerning

the appointment of delegates, he asked me quickly what was in it.

As soon as I told him, I could see him turn blue in his face and remain

silent with anger. I told him not to think too much of it, I was not

going to accept the second place. "You are much senior to me in the

foreign service," I said, "and as far as my work is concerned, there is

no question of which is more important, they are all important. I am

not going to accept it, so you can rest assured in me. If you want to

know the reason, besides the official reason I have a personal reason: I

am ten years younger than you are, I have ten years more of opportunity."

Dr. Sze remained silent as a stone and did not say a word. I thought

that the conversation could not be carried on any further. So I went

to Mrs. Sze, who was the wife of a cousin of mine. I assured her that I

had taken no initiative as regards my place on the Delegation and had

frankly stated my position at the meeting of the Delegation the day

Koo, Wellington [V

before. I left her after she assured me that she believed me and

understood my attitude, and promised to do all in her power to explain

it to her husband. This unfortunate situation could have been avoided

either by Peking changing the mandate of the President and approving

the order recommended by Minister Lu or it could equally have been

avoided by Minister Lu accepting my advice and refraining from sending

another note;to the president of the Peace Conference. But Minister Lu

insisted on sending it. Lu evidently was ,on the horns of a dilemma and

found the situation personally most difficult for him. He himself was

not enjoying too good health, and Peking knew it; and it was quite right

for Peking to be prepared in case Minister Lu's health would again fail

him as it did twice during his voyage from Peking to Paris, particularly,

for example, in Japan, when his indisposition made it necessary to

abandon the whole program which the Chinese minister in Tokyo had arranged

with the Japanese Foreign Office and the imperial palace. I felt certain

that his decision to notify a change to the Peace Conference would

create great personal difficulty in the Delegation. Yet evidently he

was equally sure that he could not ignore the terms of the president^

mandate.

This was one horn of his dilemma. The other horn was that at the

same time he, felt in duty bound to keep the second place for Dr. C. T.
had
Wang. As he/explained at one of the Delegation^ meetings he had

personally made a promise to Dr. C. T. Wang in New York at the time

when he was urging him to join the Delegation in order to present a

united front, vis a vis the Peace Conference. Minister Lu made it

Koo, Wellington w

clear to me that he had told Dr. C. T. Wang he would represent China

regardless of the number of seats China would be assigned at the

Conference. If China had just three seats Dr. C. T. Wang would be one

of them, if China was going to have only two seats, Dr. Wang would be

one of the two. This promise he felt he must keep, not merely for

personal reasons but also for China - vis-a-vis the whole conference

and the outside world. As it turned out. Dr. C. T. Wang became the

fourth delegate, while Dr. Sze was second and I third. What friction

this helped to cause within the Delegation will be seen shortly.

Koo, Wellington

e 2. The Question of Representing the Southern Regime at the Conference

The problem of Southern representation had exercised the Peking

government for some time before the start of the Conference. It had

been hoped that the political regime in theSouth could secure some kind

of official representation but that was obviously an impossible situation

internationally. Dr. C. T. Wang had been particularly eager to take

part in the Peace Conference as a member of the Chinese Delegation.

In fact Dr. Wang had personally taken some effective steps with the

help of one of his personal American friends to get the South represented.

Dr. John R. Mott, to whom Dr. Wang conveyed his personal desire, had

made a suggestion to the American minister in Peking to persuade the

Chinese Government to accept the idea. This was done at a personal

visit of the American minister to the President, Mr. Hsu Shih-ct^ang.

Meanwhile Dr. C. T. Wang stayed in New York from early summer or late

spring 1918 until his departure for Paris on the same boat as Minister

Lu. Before I left Washington myself, I had a report that he was

quietly conducting a campaign to seek American sympathy for the South

by visiting important personages and his personal friends in America.

Before Minister Lu left Peking, some of his political friends had

suggested - in fact I had myself in a despatch from Washington - the

desirability of China*s presenting a united front at Paris. I did so

because I was impressed with the activities of the representatives from

the southern regime in the U.S. on behalf of that regime in opposition

to the Chinese government at Peking. They referred to the government in

Koo, Wellington

Peking as the northern regime and referred to me as the spokesman of

that regime. More active than Dr, C. T. Wang were two men who had been

officially sent from Canton and who issued a number of public statements

on behalf of the South and gave interviews to the press. Unlike Dr, Wang,

Quo Tai-chi and Mr, Eugene Chen did come to Washington and it was

during their visit to the American capital that I invited them

to dinner at the Legation, I remember sending one of the counselors of

the Legation to extend a personal invitation and explain to them that

the dinner I wanted to give was a private one to have a personal talk as

old friends. On that explanation and understanding they accepted and

came, for I had known them for many years rather closely. We had a

perfectly frank conversation, each holding to his own view. The

whole conversation was friendly, though there was no agreement on any

of the points that were discussed at the time. They were strongly in

favor of the southern regime and would like to see the fall of the Peking

government. I, on my side, explained to them that it was unfortunate

but not unnatural for us to have internal political quarrels, but that -

it was unnecessary and unwise to wash our dirty linen in public. I told

them that I had been rather surprised and somewhat upset to read about

their reference to the Chinese Legation in Washington as the spokesman

of the Peking regime and I explained that as far as X was concerned, I

considered myself as a diplomatic representative of the Republic of China

whose territory and jurisdiction was clearly defined in the Constitution

of the Republic, I said that it had never entered my mind that I was

representing the Republic of China minus certain southern Provinces. I

said politics should be confined to home and I remember pointing out to

them that one of the most advanced democracies was Great Britain1s,

although it was a monarchy. Not only private individuals but even

members of the Parliament in Great Britain could and often did criticize

the government publicly and openly, but there was hardly a single

incident in my recollection when an Englishman travelling abroad had

publicly criticized his own government. Domestic politics in other

words were best confined within a country^ boundaries in order to main­

tain its international prestige abroad.

To all this they did not answer directlyj it would have been difficult

for them to counter my argument. They spoke with equal frankness of

their feelings toward the government at Peking. They stated how

unrepresentative the Chinese regime in the North was of public opinion

in China - that it was really a regime of military chiefs, not representa­

tive of the Chinese people as a whole. The party, however, ended as

amicably as it started; because of long-standing personal friendship,

all of us could and did speak on sensitive matters without being mis­

understood on either side. We parted as much personal friends as ever.

They went to Paris much later than Dr. C. T. Wang. They went there

not so much to participate in the conference as to watch the Chinese

Delegation. I gathered from them that Dr. C. T. Wang was not representing

the southern regime at all. Privately they made it clear that although

Dr. C. T. Wang was appointed to the Chinese Delegation by the government

at Peking so that the South would be represented they were the two

representatives actually sent by the Southern regime. This was no

surprise to me because I recalled receiving a report from my Legation in

Washington after Dr. C. T. Wang had left for Paris. Dr. Quo and

Mr. Eugene Chen had apparently been completely surprised and furious that
Koo, Wellington
m

their political ally. Dr Wang, had sailed with Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang

without even telling them before sailing. Their statement disavowing

Dr. C. T. Wang as spokesman of the southern regime at the Chinese Dele­

gation was later confirmed on more than one occasion by other leaders of

the Canton regime, such as Mr. Wang Ching-wei and Dr. C. C. Wu, both

of whom arrived later in Paris.

Both Mr. Wang and Dr. Wu came also to represent the southern regime

and watch the Chinese Delegation as well as the international situation

regarding China at the Conference. Dr. C. C. Wu had been asked

by Minister Lu to join him, in a telegram sent from Peking to Canton

addressed to Dr. Wu in person. Dr. C. C. Wu*s reply did not indicate

whether he would go or not, simply pointing out certain conditions of a

political character. One of the conditions was that the political system

in Peking should be revised so as to make it more representative of the

whole of the people of China. Although the letter was couched in polite

language, it was unmistakable that the southern regime was opposed to the

government of Peking and most critical of its character and principles

of policy. Finally he was sent by the South in order to watch the

conference and the Delegation. Minister Lu and I and some of the others -

all knew him well. In fact. Dr. C. C. Wu and I had been colleagues in

Peking for nearly two years. When he arrived in Paris he was again

invited to join the Delegation. Officially he replaced Mr. Wei as fifth

member of the Chinese Delegation, though he did not play a very active

role at the Conference.

As far as the Peking government was concerned, none of the

observers or delegates sent by the South was actually recognized as

representatives of a separate regime. But we were most anxious - I

was particularly so - to keep them informed of the work of the Delegation

because we considered ourselves the members of the Delegation - as

representatives of the whole of China - and there was nothing for us to

hide from anybody, even from supporters of the southern regime

 Koo, Wellington

C 3. Early friction in the Chinese Delsgatinn

The revision of the order of the delegates was most unfortunate

because it gave rise to unimaginable difficulties within the Delegation,

especially between Mr. C. T. Wang and Mr. Alfred Sze on one side and

Minister Lu on the other, while on occasions X also became a target for

criticism and opposition at the delegates1 meetings. One- e-ans«- o-f- friction

was my assignment to the Commission headed by President Wilson to

draft a covenant for the League of Nations.

In the first week after the formal opening of the conference we were

busy with the organization of the various commissions and it took some

campaigning to get China elected on some of them. Dr. C. T. Wang and Dr.

Sze were working respectively on the Economic and Financial Commissions;

and I attended daily - sometimes twice daily-sessions of the Commission on

the League of Nations. There were also memoranda to be prepared: some

were assigned to advisors such as Dr* P. Yen, I had been busy with three

or four myself, and Dr. Sze was drafting one on the foreign post-offices

in China and one on foreign armed forces.

One of the first cases of open friction among the delegates was

assignment to the Commission headed by President Wilson to draft a

covenant for the League of Nations. Minister Lu evidently considered me

as a student on the subject and had read my two memoranda on this subject

with keen appreciation. He endorsed what I first proposed and afterwards

carried out a program to secure China1s representation on this commission.

Koo, Wellington i i*)

As I was the only Chinese representative on the Commission, I drafted a

report after each meeting, for the benefit of Minister Lu and my other

colleagues. In view of the urgency each report was telegraphed imme­

diately to Peking, sometimes even before Minister Lu had read it - when he

was not available - in order to keep Peking informed. The Foreign Office

was most anxious to know the development on the question and the Delegation

was especially instructed to report as quickly as possible. More than once

telegrams came from Peking conveying the anxiety and impatience of the

President and the Premier to receive reports on the procedure in this

Commission. It was my tactic to have a copy of the telegraphed report

circulated among the delegates. But time and time again, my reports

became the subject of objections from Mr. Alfried Sze and Dr. C. T. Wang.

It was evident, however, that their criticism was not well directed,

because it was not pertinent; it appeared to be inspired more by a desire

to make difficulties for me as well as for Minister Lu.

One criticism which was expressed in very strong terms was that one

of my telegrams was a misrepresentation of the real discussion within the

committee and a bad one for China because it made it appear that China was

unnecessarily siding with the countries which were in favor of a

monarchical form of government. They said the telegram supported the

Hung-hsien regime and Yuan Shih-k'ai as Emperor. I was taken by surprise

because it was evident that they thoroughly misunderstood the term

"imperialism." It was not a term signifying the form of the government

so much as a policy in favor of colonization and my report simply referred

to the views expressed by those countries such as Great Britain, France

Koo, Wellington

in defense of their colonial policy in connection with the creation of a

mandate system to solve the question of the colonies taken over from

Germany. They insisted that my report had that implication and made it a

point of attack against Minister Lu because they said it must have been

inspired by Minister Lu because he had served as Premier under the Hung-

hsien regime. Their point was that I should have made known that China

was opposed to any form of monarchical form of government, now that

China was a Republic. But they interpreted imperialism as an imperial rule.

Thus the delegation meetings became a gathering for the two delegates

Dr. Wang and Dr. Sze to indulge in fault findings and to attack either

Minister Lu or myself. The first meeting after the question of the

order of the delegates had created difficulty in the Delegation was

a proposal by Dr. Sze to appoint a new secretary-general for the Delega­

tion in order to take down the minutes and carry out assignments by the

Delegation outside. The secretary»general in office then was Mr. Yueh Tsao-

chun, who was counselor of the Legation under Minister Hu Wei-teh in

Paris; he had ^-een working together with Minister Lu and was most

familiar with members of the French Government and the diplomatic

corps in Paris. But Dr. Sze and Dr. C. T. Wang were evidently most dis­

pleased with Mr. Yueh because he drafted a note for Minister Lu altering

the order of the precedence of the previous note and had dispatched it

without consulting these two gentlemen beforehand or listening to my

suggestion to hold up the note for reconsideration. It was most embarrass­

ing to hear the criticism of these two gentlemen directly against

Koo, Wellington

Mr. Yueh as a personal agent of Minister Lu and that the Delegation should

have a secretary-general appointed after approval of the whole

Delegation. Dr. Sze proposed Mr. Sze Ping, First Secretary of the

Chinese Legation in London, and his own trusted associate, to take the

place of Mr. Yueh. Dr. C. T. Wang was the one who seconded the motion.

I spoke up and expressed my views that Mr. Yueh had been carrying out his

duties very diligently and that he was well-qualified because of his contacts

in Paris. But Dr. Sze said that a motion had been made and seconded and

asked the chairman to put it into vote. Of course no one was suggested

except Mr. Sze, and Mr. Wang was the only one in favor. I said it was

not that Mr. Sze was not qualified: Mr. Yueh was doing very well and

I considered the change unnecessary. The rest of the delegates and ad­

visers attending the meeting said nothing: there were a number of

ministers, such as Dr. W. W. Yen from Denmark, former minister at Berlin,

Wang Feng-chi, Chinese minister in Rome, Minister Tai from Spain and

Minister T!ang Tsai-fu from Holland and quite a few other Chinese diplo­

matic representatives. Either they felt that they were not entitled

to vote, or they were not aware of the purpose behind the proposal, or

they did not want to take part in a personal quarrel among the delegates

being themselves only advisers. Mr. Wei Chen-tsu, however, endorsed

what I said and considered any change to be unnecessary. Minister

Lu, the chairman, however, being a polite and mild gentleman and evidently

in conformity with the old philosopher of Lao-tzu, did not try to oppose

the proposal and merely said that the motion was adopted with his own

endorsement. With that, Mr. Yueh retired and Mr. Sze was called upon to

take his place at once. In future, Mr. Sze Ping was to take notes
Koo, Wellington

of the meetings of our Delegation instead ofMr. Yueh, who remained the

Secretary-general of the Delegation to the Peace Conference. This

was the first time that any proposal or suggestion within the Delegation

had been formally moved, seconded and put to a vote; as far as I

remember it was the only time.

Koo, Wellington

C 4. My Presentation of China1s Case before the Council of Ten,

January 28, 1919

The presentation of China1s case at the Council of Ten was one of

great significance, as it was known to both those in China and abroad

that the Shantung question loomed large and was one of the difficult

and tantalizing problems which the conference had to face. It had

been expected that sometime during the course of the conference China

would be called upon to present her case. But it was not expected that

the summons would come as early. It was on January 27th, at lunch time,

that we got the first intimation that China would be asked to present

her case in the same afternoon. This friendly warning came from Mr.

E. T. Williams, who was chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division of

the State Department and adviser on the U.S. Delegation in Paris. He told

us that Japan had made her case in the morning session for retaining the

German leased territory of Shantung. He was most anxious that the

Chinese Delegation should be prepared for this invitation. And he said

that a formal letter would come from the Secretary-General of the

conference. I reported this message to my colleagues at the

lunch table.

This news fell upon all those present at the lunch table like a

thunderbolt out of a clear sky. At the table were Mr. Alfred Sze,

Dr. C. T. Wang, Mr. Wei, Mr. Hu Wei-teh, Mr. Yueh: it was a practice

for the delegates, including Minister Lu, to take lunch together and to

talk over the program for the Delegation. Minister Lu was conspicuously

absent: he was laid up, indisposed, and did not join the lunch party.

Minister Yueh at once offered to telephone Monsieur Dutasta, who

Koo, Wellington «r,L

was French Ambassador to Switzerland and secretary-general of the Con­

ference and the close and personal friend of M. Clemenceau, French

Premier. He came back with the report that Monsieur Dutasta was pre­

paring a letter of invitation that would reach the delegation as soon as

it was signed. This confirmed the report just telephoned by Mr. Williams.

It appeared that all the internal difficulties of the Delegation had

disappeared from the minds of those present who attended the lunch, and

they all remained absolutely silent. I fully realized, and I am sure the

others did also, the importance of the appearance of the Chinese

delegates at the afternoon meeting.

The letter of invitation soon came in the course of our discussion;

the time set was three o^lock. The letter actually arrived a little

after two. I then said this has to be reported to Minister Lu. Mr.

Yueh went upstairs to inform him but returned and said that Minister

Lu could not possibly attend the meeting as he was quite ill. Minister

Lu had asked us to decide who would go and attend the meeting and

present China^ case. It was then well after two o'clock, so I said there

was no question as to who should attend, and I suggested Dr. C. T. Wang

and Dr. Alfred Sze as the next ranking delegates on the Chinese Delegation.

Knowing the feeling that Dr. Alfred Sze and C. T. Wang had and having

always kept maintaining that the order of the delegates was unimportant,

I never expected being placed before Dr. Sze, so there was no question

that Dr. C. T. Wang and Dr. Alfred Sze ought to go and present China's

case. As far as tte conference was concerned, any two might go: no

matter how many delegates China appointed herself she could always send
Koo, Wellington

any two delegates - today A and B, tomorrow C and D, or A and C or A and

D.

Dr. Sze at once said, MI am not going - I am not prepared on this

question. "If anyone should go, you should go," he said, pointing

at me, because you have been studying the question and preparing it." I

replied that I supposed only one would speak, even if two went, so that

Dr. C. T. Wang could speak as the second delegate in the absence of

Minister Lu, the chief of the Delegation. "The time is so short,"

I said, "We needn*t be kWhH." The secretary-general wanted to know

the name of the delegate to be present so that the chairman could

announce. I urged those present to agree quickly on who would go

so that Mr. Yueh could notify the Secretary-General. "If Dr. Sze will
Wang
go, and Dr^,was going to speak anyway," I said, "Dr. Sze doesn’t

have to speak." Dr. Wang said if he must go, he would go, but he would

not speak; he pointed to me and said that Dr. Koo should go and speak

on behalf of the Delegation. I said someone must speak but I was not going

Dr. Sze should go with Dr. Wang. Dr. Wang said that he would go only on

condition that I would go with him and do the speaking. "Well," I said,

"I cannot deny that I have been preparing this case and know something

about it, but nothing has been finally prepared or put in the final

form and we even had not discussed the question." It was finally

settled without any formal agreement. Dr. Alfred Sze was most sincere that

he was not going, and he left the table and went upstairs. C. T. Wang

said I must go, and he would go on condition that he would not have to

speak. So finally we took the bargain. I said you are the second dele­

gate, in the absence of Minister Lu; you would naturally be the one to act
Koo, Wellington

in his place. But he said, "I am not prepared and you are, as we all know .

"Well," I said, "If you insist, I will speak; I have only one condition.

When they call upon the Chinese delegate to present China’s case, you

will get up and say I will ask my colleague to speak for China. You have

only to say one sentence." He said that if I insisted on that, he

would do that. With that understanding, we decided to go.

The two of us went to the Council meeting scheduled at three o’clock.

It was the first time that the Chinese Delegation was represented and it

was summoned purely because the Council was to take up the so-called

Shantung question which was of direct concern to China, as well as to

Japan. M. Clemenceau was in the chair and because he was President of

the Conference, and ex officio, I suppose. Chairman of theCouncil of Ten,

as well as Gba-i-rman of the Supreme Council of Five. The room was a

medium-sized one, probably about 25 or 30 representatives. Mr. Lloyd

George, Mr. Arthur Balfour, President Wilson, Mr. Lansing, the Italian

Premier Orlando and his foreign secretary, Mr. Ishii and Baron Soriinu,

on the chairman’s right, on the floor, and facing them, we were seated on

his left. In the center the rows of benches were nearly filled with the

Japanese delegates: Baron Makino, Marquis Saionji, and other delegates

of the Japanese group, as well as a few others seated in the center of

the room. The chairman called upon the Japanese Delegation to present the

views of the Japanese Government on the Shantung question.

Baron Makino made a fairly brief statement, claiming for Japan respect

for the treaty which Japan and China had signed and explaining that the

question was settled between Japan and China on the basis of tte Sino-

Japane.se treaty and agreements entered into between them; and he exjj) lained
 0^7
Koo, Wellington

—Lt- on the service rendered to the Allied cause during the war.

Evidently it was not a very convincing statement, for obvious reasons

and when he terminated, M. Clemenceau called upon the Chinese Delegation

to see whether they were ready to reply to the Japanese statement or

would need some time to preapre an answer. I conferred with Dr. Wang

and asked him to say that I would be ready to give a reply but we would

need some time to prepare a Chinese statement. M. Clemenceau said that

he - the Council - would be glad to hear the Chinese statement the

next day. The meeting was then adjourned.

The next day January 28, we again went and, as the only item on the

agenda during our presence was the Shantung question, M. Clemenceau

called for the Chinese Delegation to make their statement as agreed upon.

I urged Dr. C. T. Wang to rise and say that he had asked his colleague,

Wellington Koo, to present the views of the Chinese Government. Where­

upon, X was called upon to speak and I made a statement lasting a little

over half an hour without any notes. It was an extemporaneous statement,

but I was mentally prepared as I had been studying the question and formu

lating the line of approach. Immediately upon concluding my statement

there was applause from the gentlemen of the Chinese Delegation and Presi

dent Wilson walked over and congratulated me, followed by Mr. Lloyd

George, Mr. Arthur Balfour, Mr. Robert Lansing, congratulating me on the

statement I had made. Both President Wilson and Lloyd George said it

was an excellent statement of China*3 views. A number of others on the

front bench, facing the Chairman^, also shook hands with me and Dr.

C. T. Wang. The whole atmosphere was a sharp contrast to the silence

 j
Koo, Wellington P

that followed the conclusion of the Japanese statement the previous

day.

M. Clemenceau stated that he would like to have a written

statement of the views of the Chinese Government just presented and

he asked whether the Delegation would be able to send a statement in

writing within the next two or three days. I said that as the Chinese

Delegation would like to present as full a statement as possible, it would

require some time to communicate with our government and get all the

necessary data. This delay was unavoidable because the chairman

had asked also for the text of the agreement concluded between China and

Japan to be annexed to the written statement which the Chinese delegation

was expected to send in. So, finally, the chairman agreed to a period

of one week, at the end of which the statement with the agreement was

to be communicated to the Council.

When we left the room - before we left the room - a number of those

present, mainly American, British, some French, crowded around us and

told us how favorable an impression they had of the China statement

of the Shantung Question, and said that the fact that so many of the

principal delegates at the meeting had come over afterwards was a good

omen for China.

Although the proceedings of the Council of Ten were secret, it

appeared the delegates of the principal Allied and Associated Powers

had their press officers who were in the habit of receiving press repre­

sentatives after the meetings. So, in the evening, the local papers
Koo, Wellington 00?
r

already published news reports of the meeting - of course in^general

terms, but stressing the favorable reception accorded to the Chinese

statement by the principal delegates outside of the Japanese Delegation.

The same news was obviously telegraphed to different countries, as

well as to China and Japan. For in the following few days, telegrams

of congratulation came to the Delegation on what they called

the excellence of the pre sentation of China,s case. These felicitations

included a telegram from the President of China, the Premier, one from

the Foreign Ministry, and other government leaders; in addition, there

were telegrams of congratulation from provincial authorities and public

officers of Shantung Province, and the student federations, etc. All

these reports aroused great hope in China and also among friendly circles

in Paris of the certainty that China would win her case at the Conference.

Many of the members of the Chinese Delegation felt equally optimistic. I

naturally felt encouraged and pleased with the reception, but it was

one thing to have the statement favorably received and quite another

thing to secure a favorable settlement in the end.

Koo, Wellington U

C 5. The missing despatch box and the submission of China^ case in

writing

I was more concerned with the preparation of the written statement

and the same evening, after reporting to Minister Lu and the other

delegates, I invited them all to my house to have dinner and a meeting to

discuss the general lines of the written statement. There was not much

discussion because they all indicated that I would know what was to be

put in the written statement, since I had been studying it all along.

Much discussion turned on the question of what to do about the Sino-

Japanese agreements called for by M. Clemenceau to be annexed to the

written statement. I had a tentative list, but it was found by advisers

from Peking to be incomplete. Both C. T. Wang and Minister Alfred Sze

urged, and I agreed with them, that all the relevant agreements should

be appended to our statement, whether they were secret or not. But

I told them, as for my own data collected in Washington, hardly any of

the agreements made in the Fail of 1918 were filed. It was therefore

decided unanimously that a telegram should be sent at once to Peking

for the text of the agreements concluded with Japan, because even the

Foreign Minister's files brought along by him did not contain these

agreements.

Unfortunately much of the data brought from the Wai-chiao-pu had

been contained in the despatch box called the Ting-tzu-hsiang

which was lost. I had brought along from Washington all the data on
Koo, Wellington

the League of Nations but many of the documents on the Shantung question,

were not available. A number of secret agreements had been signed with

Japan, especially various loan agreements, of which even the missions

abroad had not been notified. The disappearance of the Ting-tzu-hsiang

was rather mysterious. It was a file box, a case containing the most

confidential documents relating to Manchurian, Shantung and Mongolian

and Tibet. Where it was lost was unknown. Most likely in Japan, but

information was conflicting. Some said they had seen it in New York

harbor, on the dock; others said it had never been seen in the U.S.,

either in San Francisco or New York. Score upon score of telegrams had

been exchanged between the Chinese Delegation in Washington and the New

York Consulate, back and forth, about this case. And the Consul general,

Mr. Tsou Yu-chen was directed to interview the baggage master of

the ship and the dock chief - but, to the end, their efforts were

unsuccessful. The case had accompanied Minister Lu and entourage all the

way across the Pacific. I had my feelings that it was stolen deliberately

by the Japanese intelligence service. Nobody else would want it. It was

a big wooden case containing just the documents of greatest interest to

Japan.I

I was well aware that the Japanese knew everything that was going on,

in every department. I remember when I travelled in 1915 from Peking to

take up my first assignment as Minister to Mexico and on a special mission

to London, I carried some documents, too: I had two so-called personal

attendants, detailed from the Peking police quarters - two strong men on
 1 c1>
h
Koo, Wellington

■X ) VvJ
the train, on the boat; they were literally watching uwenty-four hours,

twelve hours each. When one lunched, the other would take over so that not

for one minute was the case left unwatched. When I landed in Shimonoseki

from Korea, there was a very amusing incident. They knew that X was

arriving and, as I waited to take the train to Tokyo, I noticed that a

man and a girl were watching me and following at a distance. I felt

annoyed. In order to get away from them, I walked into the station reading

room and picked up a newspaper to read. Since I couldn't read Japanese,

it was in English. The girl came in, sat down next to me and got hold

of a paper too. Her companion came in and walked to another part of

the table. As I was reading, I cast my eyes to my right to see what she

was reading. She was looking at the English newspaper upside down. It

was more than a suspicion of mine that these two people were interested

in my movements: everytime I spoke to my secretary, they came nearer to

catch what I was saying. So it was a customary precaution to have the

documents guarded.

Well, the Ting-tzu-hsiang was never recovered, so that all the hope

I had int- those documents to furnish all the necessary details y'which had

been promised by the Wai-chiao-pu was never realized. However we

telegraphed to Peking for the text of all the agreements and exchanges of

notes concluded between China and Japan in the few months preceding the open­

ing of the Peace Conference. I recall it took us some time - first to get

all the texts of the agreements from Peking and then to have them translated

into English. These agreements had lengthy texts, and the telegrams

communicating them had to be deciphered and not infrequently words either

unclear or missing had to be cleared up by telegraphing to Peking again.

 U
Koo, Wellington

For some reason or other, several times the replies from Peking stated

that all the agreements had now been communicated, but we found some

missing and we telegraphed for them and after a time they found

another document and telegraphed it to Paris once again. Some of the

delegates, particularly C. T. Wang and Alfred Sze stated that they were

under the impression that Peking was not anxious to let the delegation

have the texts of all its agreements for political reasons. Whether that

impression was correct or not, we found still some missing. The

missing ones included the Railway consortium Agreement and the War

Participation Loan Agreement.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the understanding at our dinner meeting,

I was preparing the general statement. It took me a little over a

week, but it was necessary to wait for a final approval of the other

delegates. Mr. Yueh reported that the Secretary-General of the Peace Conferenc

telephoned, wanting to know how soon the written statement would be sent

in; they were anxiously awaiting it. And the Chinese delegation -

especially myself - was most anxious to rush things through, too, but

it took time. Finally, the whole thing was completed and we had a meeting

of the Delegation for final approval before it was submitted by Mr. Yueh.

At the last minute everyone agreed that the. memoranda containing the

formal statement of China, together with the annex of the relevant agreements

had to be presented in the proper form. We had a group of ten at my

house, including my housekeeper. We found that there was no ribbon and

I insisted that we should have some. I remember the housekeeper rushed

out and bought some but it was not enough for one copy; and we had to

supply several copies - not only a foif^al copy to the Council of Ten, but
Koo, Wellington

we wanted to send a copy of the statement to the principal delegations

** the United States, Great Britain, and some other friendly delegations.

It was an all night affair, seated in the dining room around the dinner

table. I felt helpless because I was the only delegate present - the

others were office secretaries and not experienced in putting official

diplomatic documents into correct style.

Koo, Wellington

C. 6. More Difficulties Within theDelegation: Li^s Sudden Departure

and Return, and the False Report of my Engagement

Once the statement was sent in, my colleagues and I expected that

it would take the Council of Ten some time to discuss and reach a con­

clusion. The first impression had been a favorable one, for several

weeks following our presentation of the case, conversation at dinner

parties and interviews with delegates of friendly countries all

encouraged us to think that ChinaIs case had already been won.

By this time a great number of Chinese statesmen had come especially

to observe the Conference and to advise the Delegation. Those who had

arrived in Paris included a great many leaders of all the political

parties: Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Mr. Chang Ching-chiang, Mr. Li Shih-tseng

were from the Kuomintang, and there were others from that party. There
u
were leaders of the Yen-chipf hsi. It was in opposition to Kuomintang,

but in cooperation with the government in Peking - including Liang

Ch'i-ch’ao. There were leaders of the so-called Communications group.

There were also representatives of the Min-pen-she including, I think,

Dr. Carson Chang and Professor Li who had taught at American universities

and colleges, and had written correspondence to the Chinese Legation in

Washington, there were also men like Mr. Tseng Ch’i and Tso Shun-sheng,

head of the Young China Party. Among these leaders it seemed to be

generally believed that China had won her case. Judging by the telegrams

of congratulation the Delegation received, the same impression must have

prevailed in C'hiaa too.

Koo, Wellington

Meanwhile the friction among the delegates was growing more serious. At

one of the meetings early in February which was called for ten o’clock,

I arrived a little early, for it was a habit to get there two or three

minutes in advance. No one was there except the new secretary-general

and one or two secretaries. At the head of the long table the usual

place was reserved for the dhairraan. Minister Lu, but I saw there were two

chairs instead of one. It was a strange arrangement and entirely new

to me and I asked the new secretary-general what the idea was and who

had been responsible? He said it was the gentleman named Maljor Chao

Lin-sun. Maj.or Chao had come as Dr. C. T. Wang's personal secretary

and had been attached to the delegation with my approval after a

telegraphed request from Dr. Wang. It was he, according to Mr. Sze Ping,

who rearranged the seating. I asked why; he did not know except that

Mr. Chao told him that Dr. C. T. Wang represented the South just as Minister

Lu represented the North; since they were on an equal footing, they

should sit as co-chairmen. But a more amusing situation arose when all

the gentlemen arrived and Minister Lu, frowning at the arrangement,

nevertheless took the seat quietly on the left next to me. And

C. T. Wang walked in with great dignity and sat down in the chair on

the right. It was almost a comic picture - Minister Lu was apparently

so taken aback that he remained quiet for a few seconds. But Dr. C. T.

Wang took the bull by its horns, announced the meeting was now opened

and called for reports. Minister Lu said nothing but as the meeting

went on Dr. C. T, Wang elbowed further and further to the left and each

time caused Minister Lu to edge away until the Minister was off the

table, at my side. It was evident that others felt the same distaste if

not disgust with the situation, but the meeting went on. I remember I

said nothing and kept: refraining from making the report. Finally I called

attention to the change of seating, which was unusual to me, pointing

Koo, Wellington A

out that Minister Lu was Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the

Delegation. I remember saying that this situation must be cleared up

before we could proceed with the work of the meeting. It was, however,

an unimportant meeting because the reports were not forthcoming except

the one from the secretary-general. It was adjourned.

The next day. Minister Lu did not attend the meeting and said he

was indisposed and laid up in bed. Shortly after Minister Lu disappeared

and left Paris. His destination was not known. Even his closest friend

and life-long supporter, Mr. Wang Fang-chi, Minister to Rome, did not

know; nor did Mr. Hsia Yu-ting, another of his intimate friends, the

Minister to Brazil. We were not only surprised but also wondering how

to deal with the situation. The membership of the Delegation was evidently

divided into two camps. One, in sympathy with Dr. Sze and Dili.Wang

and the other was with Minister Lu. I remember after a brief talk with

Mr. Wei Chen-tsu, I called a meeting of some of the advisers and the

experts and insisted on continuing with our work in spite of the

absence of Minister Lu. The delegates were not included. It was

really an informal, personal sort of meeting in our offices, not in the

Delegation at all. I felt it was most urgent that the work of preparation

should be continued as assigned and that utmost effort should be made

to locate Minister Lu and bring him back. I think it was Mr. Wang

Fang-chi*s report that most likely Minister Lu had gone to Switzerland

he had a house on Lake Locarno which was his favorite spot for rest.

During the rest of February we went on with our work despite Mr. Lu’s
Koo, Wellington *
l'

absence. The seven memoranda embodying China’s desiderata were ready

for submission to the Peace Conference by the middle of March.

Peking was greatly alarmed to learn that Mr. Lu had left Paris

and gone to Switzerland ostensibly for a rest - their chief representative

had suddenly abandoned his delegation. In Paris rumor had it that Mr.

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who had left Peking for Paris was to replace him as the

head of the Delegation. [In fact the President and the Prime Minister

telegraphed to Mr. Lu saying that Mr. Liang was working over various pro­

blems affecting China because of his close association with the

commission on the preparation of the Peace Conference. Minister Lu was

to keep Mr. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao fully informed of whatever problem^were

being taken up and give him all documents, including confidential

documents.] The rumor was not taken too seriously by the members of the

Delegation, but Mr. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, because of his background had

always been regarded as less adamant upon questions which affected

relations between China and Japan. The impression may not necessarily

have been true at the time; but the fact that he was a close adviser of

the President in Peking and the head of the Progressive Party which had

always supported the Government against the South, appeared to lend

some credence to the rumors. Minister Lu came back about the first part

of March, when he had been reappointed Foreign Minister as a result of

a cabinet reshuffle in Peking. While in Switzerland he was in communica­

tion with Peking: the files of telegrams which are now available

indicate that he had been negotiating with Peking to have his authority

increased so as to enable him to deal with the internal problems of the

Delegation. He came back to Paris with the title of president of the

Koo, Wellington
0

Delegation and with authority to decide by himself any question, if

necessary without securing the approval of the four other plenipo­

tentiaries. I suppose this move was particularly aimed at the two of

his colleagues who had been causing him great difficulty within the

Delegation. After the return of Mr. Lu, though personally, there

was no improvement in the relations of the delegates at the meetings of

the Delegation, there seemed to be less open obstruction. The

opposition was more submerged but occasionally it would reveal itself

to be directed more against me than against Mr. Lu. One morning, I

think it was sometirue in May, I received a telegram from one of my close

friends in Shanghai informing me that the North China Daily News

had come out with a two full-page editorial directed particularly at me.

The editorial started with a report that, in order to cultivate the

friendship of the pro-Japanese clique in Peking, f had been engaged to

marry Mr. Tsao Ju-lin’s daughter. Mr. Tsao Ju-lin, of course, was then

known, rather wrongly, as the head of the pro-Japanese party in Peking.

The telegram went on to say that the editorial commented how sad it

was for China at the most critical time in her history, when the prospect

of her victory abroad seemed to be certain, that one of China’s brilliant

diplomats, upon whom China was depending at this critical moment,

had turned against his own country’s interest by allying himself with

a pro-Japanese group and contracting to marry Miss Tsao. It was such

a surprise to me that I could hardly believe that anybody could have

invented such a baseless rumor. It was true that I had known Mr. Tsao

Ju-lin and worked with him in the Foreign Office, especially at the

time of the Twenty-one Demands. But I had always found Mr. Tsao, so far
Koo, Wellington

as concerned the questions in which X had participated an able diplomat

and a supporter advocating China’s interests, because I knew nothing of

any other dealings which he might or might not have had.

This report came like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky and I

telegraphed back at once to find out how the rumor originated. A

prompt reply from Shanghai said that the report was given out in Canton

and sent to Shanghai by a news agency. This made me suspect that it

might have had something to do with the situation in Paris and I was

curious to know whether my suspicion was well founded or not.

For two days, I did not say anything to anybody; but when I

received the second telegram from Shanghai, X decided to question one of

my colleagues who was close to the Canton regime. It was at a lunch

party given by me in honor of Mr. Li Shih-tseng. Being considered as

an elder statesman, Li Shih-tseng was put up at the end and Dr. C. T.

Wang was at my right. So toward the end of the lunch, I told Dr. C. T.

Wang that I was most curious: I had received a telegram from Shanghai to

the effect that I was engaged to marry Miss Tsao. I said it could not

possibly be true because it had never entered my mind; although I was

a widower then because I had lost my wife. I told him that the news had

gone from Paris to Canton and had been given out by Canton. So I asked

him whether he knew about it or whether it was he who sent it. And his

face became red but he said, "Yes." I said, "Do you believe it was

true?" so he said, in Chinese: "It was my duty to report what I heard."

•I
"This is a personal matter," I answered, and we’ve been in the meetings
Koo, Wellington i

and see each other everyday, at least you could have asked me first,

before you sent the telegram". So his face became redder and he said,

"I hope it*8 not true." I said, "You know it is not true." Then he said,

"I am not the only one who sent it: C. C. Wu also sent the same report."

That ended our conversation and I was greatly upset that one of my own

colleagues in the Delegation who was a well-educated gentleman could have

resorted to such tactics for political motives.

By then Dr. C. C. Wu had left for New York.„ I wrote him a personal

note at once to get a reply from him whether it was true. Meanwhile,

I went to see Mr. Wang Ching-wei whom I had known for years and told him

what happened and what C. T. Wang had said. And Wang Ching-wei was so

mad he said "You come with me and I*11 slap his face in your presence.

How could he be so dirty as to deliberately create a lie of that kind?"

He himself was unaware of any such report. I restrained him because I

did not want to create an incident, knowing Wang Ching-wei: he sometimes

could be petulant. I said I just wanted to let him know since

C. T. Wang was representing the South. Wang Ching-wei said "No, no.

He stooped so low7, in his character - in his conduct." In any case

he continued, he was not representing the South because his points were

objected to; he had ignored the objection and had come by himself to

Paris. I had no way of knowing whether this was true or not, but it

confirmed other information that C. T. Wang was not representing Canton.

Minister Lu. had told us at the very first meeting in January that he

wanted Mr. C. T. Wang to have the second spot on the delegation because he

had already promised it to him.

Koo, Wellington

It was with a great effort that I restrained Mr. Wang Ching-wei

from going directly to Mr. C. T. Wang*s place. A few days later, I

heard from Dr. C. C. Wu in New York by personal letter in his own

handwriting. In the letter he said he could definitely tell me that

C. T. Wang was a liar. He said he had never heard of this thing and

he was going to write C. T. Wang telling him what he thought of him

and he intended to tell him that he was a liar. So as far as I was

concerned that settled the incident. It certainly taught me the

lesson that in politics one could be as indifferent to truth as

C. T. Wang was.

I never had met Miss Tsao. She was in Peking and I was in Paris.

I don*t know how many daughters Mr. Tsao had or which daughter I was

supposed to be engaged to. And we never communicated, Mr. Tsao Ju-lin

and I, not a word, since the time that we had been colleagues at the

Foreign Office in 1915.

Koo, Wellington 1' 0

C 7. The Council of Four*s Decision and Chinese Attempts to Revise It

After President WilsonTs departure for the U.S. and the disappearance

of Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang, the Chinese delegation was busy with the

preparation of the seven memoranda representing China’s desiderata. These

were finally completed and sent to the Peace Conference about the middle

of March, just before the return of President Wilson to Paris.

President Wilson’s visit to the U.S. and the situation which developed

in his country in connection with the Peace Conference, particularly with

the Draft Covenant of the League of Nations, appeared to affect his

position and prestige at the Conference. The Draft Covenant was the work

of the Commission of Eighteen under the chairmanship of President Wilson

and it had been his profound hope that he would secure the approval of the

Senate of the U.S. so as to push it through in the Peace Conference and

achieve one of his most cherished objectives. But he found fairly strong

opposition in the Senate headed by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts and

Senator Borah from Wisconsin. Their opposition seemed to have taken effect,

I suppose because of a general lack of interest on the part of the Ameri­

can people as a whole. The isolationist sentiment in the U.S. was still

strong and the opposition of the Senate reflected public opinion in the

country. Whatever the causes of this unfavorable reception in the U.S.

of the Draft Covenant of the League of Nations, the situation in which

the President found himself upon his return to Paris proved to be a difficult

one. He, on his part, felt that he would have to be cautious in handling
Koo, Wellington
0

the various problems which still faced the Conference, including the

Covenant of the League of Nations which had yet to be approved by the

Conference, and which was not so favorably viewed in the principal

allied countries in Europe. Interest and attention seemed to be concen­

trated on the big political and territorial problems presented by

various countries which had to be finally settled.

France was insisting on her war indemnity, on the annexation of the

Saar region which was a great source of iron and coal for Europe and on

the importance of establishing an international force for the League

of Nations in order to cope with the probable restoration of the German

might on the European continent. These claims on the part of France

ran counter to the views and the policy of the U.S. as expounded by

President Wilson.

There were also a number of newly-restored, countries like Czecho­

slovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia which had territorial claims against

Germany. But the question of Fiume gave perhaps the greatest difficulty

to President Wilson. M. Orlando, representing Italy, was adamant upon

annexation of Fiume for Italy. England and France were lukewarm in

supporting President Wilson and the latter had to stand practically alone
■j
against Italy. His position was understandable, for he could not have
c
yielded on this question without abandoning the principle of no

territorial annexation, which was one of his fourteen points. His decided

opposition to the transfer of Fiume to Italy led to the withdrawal of the

Italian Delegation.
Ko9j Wellington
}>l

Japan, which was one of the five principal Allied and Associated

Powers constituting the Council of Ten and the Supreme Council, stood

firm on the question of the annexation of the Pacific Isles including

Guam which was of special interest to the U.S,, while the exclusion of

Guam from the transfer of the control of the former German-held islands

in the Pacific to Japan was indispensible condition upon which the

President insisted. Another issue was the claim put forward by Japan

to incorporate the principle of equality in the Covenant, a plan which

the U.S. opposed whole-heartedly in the commission to draft the Covenant

of the League of ^ations and which, however, was one of Japan*s most

earnest claims.

In short, the whole situation which faced the President upon his

return to Paris was quite a contrast to that which had prevailed before

he left France for Washington. It was a situation which the Chinese

Delegation considered as most unfavorable to China's cause. But there

was nothing at the time to indicate anything definite about the possible

outcome of the Shantung question as presented by China and as insisted

upon by Japan. For the six weeks following President Wilson's return,

the Council of Ten and the Supreme Council tackled the various concrete

problems in spite of the breakdown of the unity of the five powers as the

result of Italy's withdrawal from, the Conference. This was only one

symptom of the difficult position of the Peace Conference which particu­

larly affected the position of President Wilson. China was expecting

and took steps to persuade the friendly powers, especially the U.S.

and Great Britain, too, to take up the Shantung question as early as

Koo, Wellington

possible for fear that the powers over the other question would delay

the Conference and leave the principal part to a hurried decision

unfavorable to China. Conversations with members of the delegations

of the U.S., Great Britain and France seemed to indicate that there was

no definite plan and that it would be some time before the question could

be taken.up. The U.S. Delegation seemed to be less optimistic because

of various difficulties facing the President at the Conference in dealing

with other questions and because of the dissatisfaction if not the

resentment directed against him by other countries whose claims were opposed

by the President. It may be noted that Colonel House advised the

Chinese Delegation to accept a settlement with Japan, while Secretary

Lansing doubted the wisdom of such a settlement, and General Bliss and

Ambassador White sided more or less with Lansing.

Toward the end of April, it was known that the question of Shantung

had been taken up and discussed and some kind of settlement reached.

On April 22nd, the Chinese Delegation received notice that President

Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau would like to see the

Chinese Delegation; Minister Lu and I went to the meeting at the

President^ residence at the Place d’gtats Unis. We found only five

people present - the President, the British Minister and the French

Premier, with General Hankey, as the English interpreter, and a French

captain whose name I do not recall now, as the French interpreter.

We were cordially received but we noticed the serious look on the faces

of Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, which was an unfavorable omen.

M. Clemenceau suggested that President Wilson would speak for all of

them. President Wilson started by saying how many problems the conference
Koo, Wellington

was faced with and how difficult it had been for him to reach a settle­

ment on some of them. One of the difficult problems was the Shantung

question. It was all the more difficult, he said, because even

France had intervened with an agreement with Japan to support Japan1s

claim at the conference with regard to the Shantung question. And he was

representing the U.S. - was the only free one - the only one unhampered

to deal with the question. And he said the proposed settlement wished

by the Supreme Council was that for the one he was going to tell us

it might not be to our satisfaction, but he said it was the best they could

do under the circumstances, and then he told us the formula which was

that Japan would receive the leased territory of Kiaochow and all the

rights stipulated in the treaty between China and Germany and that Japan

then would return the leased territory to China, but would keep all the

economic rights, including the Kiaochow, Tsinan-fu railway. This

statement was that embodied in the settlement agreed upon by the Supreme

Council; of course,he said, we could have realized even without first

hearing from them. It might not meet with our expectation but that was

the best result that could be obtained frcm the Council in view of the

difficult situation facing the other members of the Council. [He

was referring to France and England, who had committed themselves to

support Japans claim, and Italy, which had already withdrawn from the

conference.]

Minister Lu asked me to speak on his behalf because President Wilson

could understand English more directly and I did. I told President Wilson
 Pu
Koo, Wellington

Minister Lu asked me to speak on his behalf because President Wilson

could understand English more directly and I did. I told President

Wilson very frankly how disappointed I was and how unfair it was;

such a settlement would only be a disappointment to the Chinese people

and would really sow the seeds for future trouble in Asia. In our view,

such a settlement was not in the best interests either of China, or of

world peace. I pointed out to him that the settlement said nothing about

a time table according to which Japan was to return all her rights

in Shantung to China. In any case what China had askea for was not a

transfer through Japan but a direct transfer to China. That was the

main point of our claim and the main point in our memorandum on the

Shantung question. President Wilson seemed to show a good deal of sym-

he understood
pathy. He said/what I had said but the situation in the U.S. was such

that it was the best he could obtain for China. But he tried to assure

us that after the conference the League of Nations would be able to

adjust all claims for readjustment and to uphold the code of justice

among nations. China, as a member of the League of Nations, would be

free to present her claims before the League at any time she should

desire. I tried to point out that the League of Nations was a good thing

but that China had doubts whether the League of Nations would be in

a better position to alter the settlement that had just been suggested

by President Wilson.

Lloyd George then said he would like to ask a question. He said would

China prefer then the settlement which China had reached with Japan, not
 p1
only as a result of the Twenty One Demands but especially as agreed

upon in the exchange of notes of September 1918 between Japan and China,

or would China on full consideration prefer the settlement just stated,

which made it clear that Japan was to succeed only to the economic

rights as stipulated originally in the treaty between China and Germany

and not to the Kiaochow leased territory. I pounced up and told Minister

Lu what Lloyd George had said and suggested this was an unfair choice

and that we could not accept either, and Minister Lu fully agreed.

President Wilson turned to M. Clemenceau and asked if he had anything

to say, and M. Clemenceau said he agreed completely with what Lloyd

George had just said. So, after consultation with Mr. Lu, I said that

Mr. Lloyd GeorgeIs question would put China on the two horns of a

dilemma, neither of which would be a fair solution of the question, or

contribute to the cause of world peace or the cause of China. And

I explained what the aim of Japan was in Asia, and said that the

possession of the economic rights in Shantung which was one of the stra­

tegic provinces along the coast would merely serve the facility of Japan1s

program of setting up an empire in East Asia. A policy which was

obviously, we believed, opposed to the best interests of the Western

powers.

President Wilson said that perhaps the Chinese Delegation would like

to consider what he had just said about the settlement and would

understand better that such a proposal was the best obtainable under the

circumstances. 1 asked for a copy of the formula which had been just

stated by President Wilson and also the minutes of the proceedings of the
Koo, Wellington

n
Council of Ten at which the settlement was reached. At this point,

President Wilson turned to Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Lloyd George

turned to General Hankey, who said that the minutes of the Council
a
of Ten were confidential and secret. But I urged that on such/serious

matter of direct concern to China, the Chinese Delegation should be

furnished with full record of what had been discussed and how the

settlement had been reached. President Wilson said that he would

consider with his other colleagues and suggested that the

Chinese Delegation would perhaps like to take some time to study what

he had just been saying.

The decision of the Council of Ten was a great disappointment to

the whole Chinese Delegation and also to the government in Peking. We

lost no time in reporting to the President and Prime Minister through the

Foreign Office. It had not been unexpected that the final settlement

would not be very favorable but it had not been even suspected that it

would be as-unfavorable as it actually was. Japan won her principal

claim for direct transfer of Germany^ territory and economic rights to

Japan and was to negotiate subsequently with China for return of the

leased territory to China. In other worcfe, the Twenty-One Demands, or

at least the first few articles relating to Shantung in the treaty of

May 25, 1915, based on Japan's Twenty-One Demands, were respected as well

as the exchange of notes of September 18 or- 19. I remember during the

conversation Mr. Lu and I had at the President Wilson's residence, I

pointed out that the settlement proposed and notified to us was really

based upon the 1915 treaty which as everybody knew had been accepted by
 1
Koo, Wellington

China after an ultimatum. The exchange of notes had been only a sequel

to that treaty. And it was a generally recognized principle of international

law that a peace-time treaty made under duress and threat of war could not

be regarded as valid. To all these pleadings. President Wilson’s reply

was that he realized that it was not the best settlement for China,

but it was the best obtainable under the circumstances, in view of the

position in which the other powers friendly to China like Great Britain

and France, found themselves in Peking.

It was already the end of April; the remaining six or seven weeks

may be divided into two periods. The first one was occupied by a struggle

to get a full copy of the text of the decision reached at the Council of

Ten in order that China could be fully acquainted with the nature and

extent of the settlement. It took a great deal of effort on the part

of the delegation to persuade the United States Delegation, British

Delegation and French Delegation to agree to the communication of the full

text. This was obtained in the end, although it was given to us under

a pledge of complete secrecy. They said it was not the practice of the

Council of Ten to furnish a record, as other countries whose claims

had been settled by the Council of Ten had had their requests for the

full text turned down.

When, after about two weeks, we saw the full text, we were not any

less disappointed than we had been by the verbal communication from

Koo, Wellington

President Wilson. But continued efforts were made to modify the

settlement, and in this the Chinese Delegation was encouraged by the

attitude of the members of the United States Delegation. They felt it

was not a fair settlement; even Col. House, a very close friend and

confidential envoy of President Wilson during the war, did not hesitate to

say that he was disappointed that President Wilson had been placed in such 1__

a difficult position by the fact that Great Britain and France had committed

themselves - had tied their hands •• and were unable to render any help

at all to China. I saw Mr. Lansing, Mr. Henry White, as. well as Mr.

E. T. Williams and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck and Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, a

confidential secretary to President Wilson. I saw also Mr. Tasker Bliss,

one of the five U.S. envoys. Without exception, they all felt sorry

for China. They said that it was a disappointment to them and they could

not quite understand why President Wilson had felt himself to agree that

we should be given this settlement. It then appeared clear that the

settlement had been made by President Wilson without the full consultation

of his own delegation. This was no surprise because for some time already

after President Wilson^ return to Washington, it had been generally

understood that the President felt an urgent need to reach a settlement

on the various problems facing the Conierence and often took it upon

himself to accept settlements even in the face of opposition from some of

his colleagues. Of course, as President of the U.S. he alone was

responsible for the United States and he was entitled to his authority.

But the fact that in accepting a settlement, he did not fully consider

s*r respect the views of the whole delegation seemed to convey a general

sense of dissatisfaction among its members. Almost every day or two I

would see one or more of them and their discontent was almost unmistakable.
Koo, Wellington

After the conference, the published memoirs of Dr. Lansing showed that

this impression had been a correct one.

While the members of the United States Delegation, except President

Wilson, were sympathetic toward China, and even discussed with me as to the

manner of revision, the delegation, naturally, could not take any definite

position without the approval of President Wilson himself. It was more and

more difficult to see President Wilson in person since he was deeply

occupied with the other problems of the Conference. On the several

occasions that I saw Colonel House, he indicated - despite his sympathy

for China - that he was skeptical of the possibility of obtaining any

revision of the Shantung settlement, whose terms had been adopted and

ap proved by the Council of Ten.

Throughout May until the early part of June, the delegation concen­

trated its efforts on securing a revision. We were no more successful

with the other allies than with the United States. By this time Italy,

the fourth principal Allied country friendly to China, had already with­

drawn from the conference. When the British delegates were approached,

they said their hands were tied and they thought that the actual decision

was the best obtainable in the circumstances. They made it clear that the

problem was not what Great Britain or France or the United States would

like to do; it was mainly the practical question of securing the agreement

of Japan on any revision of the terms, which appeared to them to be quite

impossible. France, of course, stood firmly by the decision, and on one

occasion M. Pichon, whom Minister Lu saw and spoke to, expressed himself
KoOj Wellington

as being contented with the settlement because it had been secured only

after great pressure directed against Japan. It was apparent to us that

the unsatisfactory decision had been the result of a compromise between

Japan and the other four principal Allied Powers constituting the Council

of Ten.

mm
When it was found that no modification was obtainable/the secretary-

general of the conference was busy preparing for the signing of the German

plenipotentiaries - the Chinese Delegation was overwhelmed with a feeling

of dissatisfaction and felt little interest in the impending communication

of the terms of the peace to the German envoys except in the particular

provisions of direct interest to China. These included the section on

the abrogation of the treaties,between China and Germany concluded

before the war, the restoration of the astronomical instruments taken

from Peking by the Germans during the Boxer trouble and of course the

article relating to the transfer of German rights in Shantung to Japan, which

was definitely a sore point. Besides these there was China,s interest

in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant was made the

first part of the treaty of peace at the instance, it was understood then,

of the United States, particularly of President Wilson, in order to make

sure that the Senate of the United States could not reject the Covenant

of the League of Nations without rejecting the whole peace treaty.

After having learned of the terms of the settlement approved by the

Council of Ten and the Supreme Council, the Chinese Delegation understood

that nothing would be done on China1s seven memoranda embodying her

desiderata, submitted with the object of readjusting China^ relations with

the foreign powers on the basis of justice and equality. All the Chinese
Koo, Wellington
P'

Delegation received was a communication from the secretary»*general of the

Peace Conference acknowledging the receipt of the memoranda without

promising any action by the Conference. I3 myself, had not expected

any direct action by the Conference because the problems arising directly

out of the war were already so difficult and numerous that there was

hardly time to take the trouble of giving consideration to China*s

problems. This situation had, in fact, been made clear to me and Minister

Lu at the time when President Wilson informed us on the settlement of

Shantung, because he said that if China should consider herself to be

c
either threatened by Japan or if Japan had failed to observe her obligatinns

to China, China could always bring the situation to the Council of the

League of Nations. Likewise Chinals desiderata embodied in her memoranda

could be communicated to the League of Nations to be considered by the

new world organization.

It was kncwn, of course, that after the Germans were given the terms

of peace to be embodied in the peace treaty, it would not be long before

the conference would be closed. It was therefore an urgent question

for the Chinese delegation to consider what attitude to take towards the

peace treaty, which embodied an objectionable settlement on the Shantung

question. From the very outset, I took the position that China should

not sign the treaty without making reservations as regards the Shantung

settlement. So that this would be the last resort, it was necessary for

us to make a concentrated effort to secure the reservation which would

protect China. For the rest of the Delegation the question of adopting

final attitudes was still premature. There was hope that it might be

still possible to secure some modification of the exact settlement.

Koo, Wellington
7
although it appeared to me very clear that after the communication of

the terms of the peace treaty to Germany it was practically beyond

doubt that no revision of those clauses would be possible. Germany

was certainly not in a position to propose any modification of those

articles of special interest to China - nor was there any likelihood

that she would do so. For Germany it was merely a question of losing

all her territorial and economic interests in Shantung, China: it didn*t

matter to her whether she lost them to Japan or to China. She had more

important questions to consider in connection with the terms of the

treaty in Europe.
Koo, Wellington

C 8. The Attempt to Secure a Reservation on the Shantung Articles

The discussions on the final attitude to be adopted were not par­

ticipated in by the whole delegation. By that time, Dr. Alfred Sze_ had

already gone back to London, and Dr. W. W. Yen, and some other Ministers

who were advisers of the delegation had returned to their posts in Europe,

the discussion therefore took place only among those remaining, with

Minister Lu absent and confined in the St. Cloud Hospital. The general

attitude of the Delegation had not altered from the sentiments expressed

at earlier meetings. At those meetings, it was discussed whether China

should sign with thereservation and, if the reservation should fail,

whether China should refuse to sign. All present were in favor of

securing a reservation for the articles in the German Peace Treaty

relating to the Shantung question. No one favored signing the treaty

without the reservation, although some who were equally dissatisfied with

the decision of the Council of Ten of the Supreme Council expressed great

concern as to the consequences of China’s refusal to sign in the event

of a failure to secure a reservation. Three of the members expressed

a clear opinion: Dr. Sze, Dr. C. T. Wang and I myself were in favor of

not signing. I spoke at some length not only of the disappointment but

of the unfairness of the decision, and the conclusion reached was that

every effort should be made to secure a reservation.

The task of securing a reservation was then the sine qua non for a

fairly favorable Peace Treaty as far as China was concerned. But the

situation had become more difficult because by that time the Conference
Koo, Wellington

was concentrating on the effort of winding up its task and summoning

the Germans once more to Versailles to append their signature to the

Peace Treaty. President Wilson was preparing to leave Paris for the

United States and Prime Minister Lloyd George had already returned to

London; but the Delegation continued to make representations to the

principal delegations.

Not long before the 28th of June, the date set for the final meeting

at Versailles when the treaty would be signed, it fell upon me in

Minister Lu*s absence to approach the French as well as the American

delegations and for Dr. Alfred Sze to approach the British Delegation,

with a view to seeking their support for a reservation to be made in the

peace treaty on the articles relating to the settlement of the Shantung

question.

The French were most adamantly opposed to any reservation. Before

he fell ill. Minister Lu had spoken to M. Pichon, the French Foreign

Minister, about China^ desire to make a reservation to the peace

treaty, and the French Foreign Minister had told him that it was abso­

lutely impossible, on the grounds that if one reservation was accepted,

other countries would likewise make their reservations, as the settle­

ments which had been made for many of the Allied and Associated nations

had been found by them to be not entirely satisfactory. The French

made it clear through Mr. Hu Wei-teh, Chinese Minister to Paris and M.

Yueh, the secretary-general and the counsellor of the Legation in Paris,

reported that the French were positive in refusing to support any

Koo, Wellington

reservation by the Chinese Delegation to the Shantung articles. The

British Delegation on their part considered that any reservation was out

of the question, and like the French were adamant in their stand against

it. Sir Ronald Macleay, adviser to the British Delegation who had

served as the British Minister in Peking, was the channel through which

Dr. Alfred Sze contacted the British delegation most of the time, and

I myself also had talks with Sir Ronald. Personally he was sympathetic

to the Chinese cause and promised to do his best to persuade his chief,

but he indicated clearly that the question of making a reservation was

a serious one and he did not think there was any hope for it.

The members of the American Delegation, on the contrary, were in

favor of a reservation, and several members, including Secretary of

State Lansing, discussed with me the terms of the reservation. But

he made it clear to me that of course no reservation, however it was

worded, could be supported by the United States delegation unless it was

approved by President Wilson. Moreover Colonel House indicated to me that

such a reservation would be difficult to secure support for since it

opened the way for other delegations to make reservations to the

treaty. His attitude, although different from the other members of the

United States Delegation, seemed to reflect the opinion of President

Wilson, for the United States delegation soon found out that President

Wilson did nothing to support any reservation by the Chinese Delegation.

His final decision was disappointing to those members of his own

delegation who were in favor of China making a reservation on the

Shantung articles, just as it was disappointing to the Chinese Delegation.

Koo, Wellington

The reasons the President had were perhaps the following: (1) any

reservation by the Chinese Delegation would set an example which would

be eagerly seized by several other delegations who had been dissatisfied

with the decisions on questions of special interest to them. (2) The

President had particularly in mind the Covenant of the League of Nations

which had been objected to in several respects by the Senate of the United

States and might suffer reservations from other delegations, particular­

ly from Japan, which had been insisting upon the incorporation of the

principle of racial equality; (3) As it was made known to me, a

refusal on ChinaIs part to sign the treaty if the reservation was not

allowed was out of the question. It would exclude China from member­

ship in the League of Nations. However in the view of the Chinese

Delegation in the case of failure to secure a reservation, then the only

thing left for China to do was to refuse to sign. Seeing that the

reservation was out of the question, the third reason became a cause

of anxiety to the other members of the United States Delegation. Even

Colonel House considered that aspect of the question as of great

importance to China and believed the Chinese Delegation should give

it full consideration. Reflecting the thoughts of President Wilson

Colonel House pointed out to me that China becoming a member of the

League of Nations would secure redress to her grievances in her dealings

with other powers. By refusing to sign, she would be unable to become

a member and would lose the advantage of membership. The other members

of the United States Delegation acknowledged the importance of China’s

becoming a member of the League of Nations but were as keenly

disappointed as the Chinese Delegation about the Shantung settlement.

Koo, Wellington

I reported this aspect of our question to Minister Lu who fully appreciated

the importance of China's membership in the League of Nations. At the

I told him, however,
same time/that I would study the question and see if there was any way

to solve this difficulty.

The United States Delegation had assured me that they too would

seriousl}r look into this aspect of the problem. It was a happy coin­

cidence a few days later, when I discussed Chinals predicament with Mr.

Lansing, Mr. E. T. Williams, afwi Colonel House and his assistant Mr.

Baker that we all saw the same light to the darkness which seemed to

envelop the whole situation concerning China at Paris. They said they

found out that China would become a member of the League of Nations by

signing the Austrian Treaty since the first part of the proposed Peace

Treaty with Austria consisted of the text of the covenant of the League

of Nations. With this discovery, I was even more firmly convinced that

if a reservation were out of the question, impossible to secure, China

should definitely refuse to attach her signature to the Peace Treaty.

But the efforts to secure the reservation continued, in fact, until the

morning of the very day on which the treaty was to be signed at Versailles.

After failure to secure the approval of President Wilson, who by that

time had returned to Washington and that of Great Britain, whose Foreign

Minister, Mr. Balfour, also considered the reservation unfeasible, it

was very unlikely that we could secure the approval of the French, who

were apprehensive lest one reservation would lead to many other reser­

vations in the Peace Treaty. Nevertheless the Chinese Delegation con­

centrated its effort on the French delegation. As Minister Lu was laid up

Koo, Wellington

I took it on myself to carry on the representations.

On the afternoon of June 27th, the day before the Treaty was to be

signed, I saw M. Pichon. I had already spoken to Monsieur Pichon about

at least two of the final three alternatives: first, a reservation in the

body of the text of the treaty settlement, secondj a reservation to be

appended after signature and third, a declaration at the preliminary

conference to be recorded in the minutes, to the effect that in signing

the treaty China did not accept the articles relating to Shantung. The

conversation only lasted about five minutes. He was adamant that any

such declaration even though it was not to be attached to the treaty but

only to be made at the conference was out of question because it would

create a sensation. The final meeting of the conference, he said,

was purely a ceremonial one, for signing; an official declaration by

China would be a departure from usual practice and would strike a dis­

cordant note in the Allied ranks. With this rebuff, the hope of securing

a reservation seemed to be gone, and the question remained whether to sign

the treaty nonetheless.

The government seemed to have fully made up its mind that the treaty

should be signed, if possible with a reservation. Minister Lu seemed

to agree with this and inclined toward signing the treaty, being apprehen­

sive of the consequences of a refusal to sign. By late June public

opinion in China was strongly in favor of not signing the treaty if no

reservation was possible and it appeared that in China the question of

a reservation did not enter people’s minds. The efforts we were making
 Koo, Wellington

in Paris to secure a reservation were more or less kept in confidence in

the hope against hope of success, though we were reporting fully on our

progress to Peking. After June 24th, a succession of telegrams came

from the Peking Foreign Office indicating the high tension in China and

the pressure being brought upon the government against signing and

asking the minister to exercise his discretion. That of course, placed

the chief of the Chinese Delegation in a very serious, difficult position.

Mr. Lu by this time had already been at St. Cloud for a few days.

It was at this point that a letter was received from the Secretary-

General of the Conference asking the Chinese Delegation, as it was asking

the other delegations, to send the seals of the China^ two plenipoten­

tiaries, who were to sign the treaty on June 28th. Although it was

customary to affix the seals after the signing, it was found necessary,

in view of the size of the conference to simplify and shorten the

ceremonial meeting at the signing. When this was reported to me at the

Delegation meeting by Mr. Yueh, I expressed nry apprehension. I said

that it would be better to wait until the last moment before June 28th

before deciding whether to send the seals: sending them beforehand

probably would seriously endanger our attempt to secure a reservation

and while so far we were meeting with no success, it was absolutely

essential not to give the impression by sending the seals so early that

the Chinese Delegation was not very serious in trying to get a reservation

But the explanation given by the Secretary General Yueh was that the

secretary-general of the conference M. Dutasta positively told him that

the request for the seals was purely a matter of procedure to shorten

the ceremonial meeting without in any way committing or compromising any

delegation.
Koo, Wellington
1*

It turned out that ray apprehension was fully justified because

according to reliable reports from some of the delegation quarters

especially from French government circles, the general impression was

that the Chinese Government in Peking had already given instructions

to sign the treaty but that some of the Chinese delegates were holding

out to secure a better treatment from the conference.

Koo, Wellington

C 9, The Eve of June 28th: China Absents Herself from the Signing of the
Treaty

On the evening of the 27th of June, theday before the signing of the

Versailles Peace Treaty, I went to St. Cloud to report the whole

situation to Minister Lu in his bedroom. By that time, the unfavorable

decision by the Peace Conference on the Chinese question had caused

great dissatisfaction and if not the only reason it had been one of

the principal reasons which led to the May 4th Incident. In Paris,

Chinese political leaders, the Chinese student organizations and the

Chinese community^ representatives as a whole were daily bombarding

the headquarters of the Chinese Delegation with requests for a definite

assurance that China would not sign the treaty without a reservation,

and with the threat that if they were to sign they would do everything

to stop them from doing so. I was anxious to get the final word from
Lu
Minister/in order to be in a position to face these various bodies which

were anxious to know the Delegation^ stand. In fact, telegrams from

China had been pouring into the Delegation from various public organiza­

tions and the governors of some of the Provinces, urging the Chinese

Delegation not to sign. They were all the more anxious because they

said the government in Peking was in favor of signing and therefore it

was the patriotic duty of the Delegation in Paris to take a positive stand

in conformity with the wishes of the people of China.

It was after dinner and I found Mr. Yueh with Minister Lu. Our

talk continued for several hours. In the middle, Monsieur Yueh took

leave of the foreign minister and left to return to Paris. An amusing -

or at the time it appeared to be very portentous incident then occurred.

Two or three minutes after he left he rushed back, looking pale: he

told the Foreign Minister that he had been attacked in the garden on
Koo, Wellington -) il ^

on the hospital grounds. According to his story, there must have been

hundreds of Chinese men and women, including many students and some

overseas merchants. They had stopped him and asked him to tell them

why he was in favor of signing the Peace Treaty, Even after he assured

them that he was only the Secretary-General of the Delegation and did not

have a say of signing or not signing, the crowd closed in on him and

threatened to beat him up; they considered him as a confident of Minister

Lu who they thought had already decided to sign the treaty against the

wishes of the other members of the Chinese Delegation. According

to Monsieur Yueh, they threatened to kill him, and one of the members,

a girl student actually pointed a pistol at him through her overcoat

pocket. Then he had run back. He said he would have to spend the

night at the hospital. I tried my best to calm him and said that they

may have threatened, but they couldn*t be so serious as to want to kill

him. So about two o^lock, I asked to leave and took Mr. Yueh along and

said I would look after his safety. We went down and the crowd closed

on him. When they saw me, the tension seemed to be eased because

evidently they had understood that I was on the side of not signing

the treaty. I told them that China would certainly not sign thetreaty

without any reservation and at that time it looked as if a reservation

was out of the question because we couldn't secure any support,so

there was no question of China signing the treaty. I told them not to

worry about it.

And with that assurance, they dispersed and we left. Years later

in New York, I would often see Madame Wei Tao-ming and her husband. She
Koo, Wellington

had formerly been Su Mei-cheng and was among the crowd in

St. Cloud on June 27, 1919. On one occasion four years ago she

was reminiscencing and telling the guests around how brave I

was in the crisis, so I told them I knew all about the incident:

I said I was certain at the time that what she pretended to be

a pistol was only a tree whit concealed in her pocket. She

laughed and said, "You are so right, Mr. Yueh actually was

frightened and I just chuckled in the darkness," but she said

she found me so brave. And I said, "I knew you didn't have

a pistol." So it was true that it was a sort of comedy although

it was a serious effort on the part of the patriotic students

and overseas Chinese.

The main purpose of my visit to Mr. Lu was to report to

the Foreign Minister and chief of our Delegation it was impos­

sible to secure any support for the reservation even though I

had offered not to incorporate it in the body of the treaty

but to attach it at the end under our signatures. Furthermore

M. Pichon had rejected our proposal to make a declaration at the

Preliminary Conference. I knew that the government in Peking

and Minister Lu, himself, as well as some delegates of our mem­

bers like Dr. W. W. Yen, were of the opinion and I shared their

view that to isolate China herself from the great body of the

conference would be a very serious move, although on the other

Koo, Wellington

hand I was firmly convinced that world sentiment as well as

public opinion in China would entirely agree with China if she

refused to sign after a complete failure of her efforts to make

reservations to the Shantung articles. With that view I suggested

making another attempt to issue a verbal declaration prior to

the Conference, and showed Minister Lu a modified text of the

declaration. As usual he endorsed it without any hesitation.

I suggested that in order not to create a sensation at the

Conference, we should notify the French, and I undertook to

see the Secretary General.

It was with great difficulty that I had an appointment

made early in the morning of June 28th with the Secretary

General M. Dutasta who said the declaration was unacceptable.

I felt a sense of indignation as well as a great disappointment.

That closed all doors to any compromise and it was clear to me

that China should definitely decline to attend the signing.

I went to St. Cloud to report to Minister Lu. It was

early in the morning, I remember very clearly. After I left

the hospital, all along I rode by myself in my car. It was

quite a journey, from Paris to St. Cloud, probably about five or

six. It took about fifteen or twenty minutes and as the car

rode along in the early morning, everything looked so sad to

Koo, Wellington

\^6
cT
me - the color of the sky, the shade of the trees and the

deserted streets. I thought the day must remain inthe history

of China as the day of sorrow. And at the same time, I pictured

to myself the stateliness of the reception at the conference and

the surprise and emotion that the other delegates present would

feel at seeing the two chairs reserved for the Chinese pleni­

potentiaries standing vacant. It was a memorable day for me and

for the whole Delegation and for China. China's absence must

have been a surprise if not a shock to the Conference, to the

diplomatic world in France and to the entire world beyond.

Koo, Wellington

C 10. The Background to China's Decision

The role of the Peking Government up to the eve of June

28 gave much cause for speculation in the Chinese Delegation

in Paris. In effect no definite instructions were received

until the afternoon of June 28, after the Chinese representa­

tives had absented themselves from the Plenary Session. The

new foreign minister, M. Lu, had asked the President and the

Premier for definite instructions to sign or not to sign -

it was natural for him to feel that such a serious matter

should not be left to him. But Minister Lu was instructed by

the Peking Government to use his discretion. On June 26th or

27th Minister Lu asked again for specific instructions: the

decision not to sign had to come from Peking in order to

strengthen his position, because the instructions received up

to that time were to sign. When by the afternoon of 27th,

it became crystal clear that China's hope of making a reser­

vation even to be attached at the end of the treaty was doomed

to failure, the situation was again telegraphed to Peking and

it was pointed out that in the circumstances that it would be

better notto sign. The telegram asked the government for

new instructions. Then a communication was received from

Peking referring to an earlier telegram from Peking and

wondering why it had not been received in Paris. In fact

this was a telegram instructing the Delegation not to sign;

it arrived in the afternoon of June 28, I think about 3:00 p.m.,

that is after the final session of the Conference was over.

By that time it was a surprise that any telegram came at all.

On the one hand, there was speculation in the minds of

inquiring persons, whether the final instructions had really

been sent earlier and were held up somewhere en route. For a

refusal on China s part to sign the treaty was not desired by

any country, certainly not by France, because it was a serious

situation, and China's action created a breach in the ranks

of the allied powers. It was not only an international incident,

but a very striking precedent. We knew that the French had

already been putting pressure on Peking. The French minister

in Peking was instructed and carried out the instruction of

persuading the Chinese Government to order the Delegation to

sign. We learned about this without seeing any written evidence

from two of our foreign advisors, one of them a minister

plenipotentiary Monsieur Padou and the other a Belgian, Monsieur

Decodt, who was in very close touch with the French. M. DeCodt,

formerly of the Belgian Foreign Office , was a legal advisor to

Mr. Lu in the Wai-chiao-pu.

 Koo, Wellington

On the other hand, some of us in the Delegation also

speculated that maybe the government did not want to take it

on itself to make a decision. Peking could have learned that

the meeting had already taken place before despatching the

telegram. In a way, the hesitation of the provisional government

was understandable because the situation in Paris was such that

it could change from hour to hour depending upon the outcome

of the representations that the Delegation was making in

favor of the reservation. It was difficult for the government

to decide at such a distance away from the scene. in other

words, while public opinion in China was fully certain and con­

vinced that China should not sign, the government in Peking

and the Foreign Minister in Paris felt the great responsibility

of taking a course of action, the outcome of which was really

unpredictable. Even minister Lu himself, although he first had

been in favor of signing the treaty, perhaps even without a

reservation, as the situation developed in china and in Paris with

strong pressure from Chinese public opinion, he came to agree

with me and opposed the idea of signing. I still wonder, even

if the final instructions were to tell him to sign, whether he

would have done it.

The final decision was not taken after a full consultation

Koo, Wellington

1 Va
among the delegates and advisers. Actually many of those

officially and unofficially connected with theDelegation were

no longer active, even if they were still in Paris. At the

end they wanted to dissociate themselves from the tragic

situation in Paris. At first, high hopes of the success of

China's cause at the conference had led to the migration of

all the important political leaders and distinguished people

to Paris. The decision of the Council of Ten and the

communication from President Wilson, Lloyd George and M. Cle-

menceau to the Chinese Delegation caused such a disappointment

that people just drifted away and there was no longer much

coherence, even in the Delegation itself. The Delegation had

disintegrated and became just a group of individuals - not

even very numerous; there was Minister Lu in St. Cloud, whom

I constantly contacted; there was I, myself, a secretary-general;

even the minister to Paris, Mr. Hu Wei—teh was not seen very much.

On the morning of June 28th, I did not see Dr. C. T. Wang,

or know where he was, though it is possible that he did go to

see Mr. Lu. I was running back and forth between Paris and

St. Cloud and did not have time to go to the headquarters at

Lutetia and J didn't make attempt to locate him; but if any

one was to sign, it would have been he and the Foreign

Minister, the two first plenipotentiaries whose seals had

 Koo, Wellington
0^
yJ

already been sent in.

But there was no doubt of the consensus of opinion among

the delegates that without a reservation we should not sign -

Dr. Alfred Sze, for example, despite his previous doubts, had

expressed this view before his departure for London; I knew

he shared my resentment and indignation at the adamant attitude

taken by M. Pichon. As I have shown, thefinal consensus in

the delegation and the decision taken were arrived at independently

and not as a result of instructions fxom Peking.

Looking back at China's stand at the Versailles Peace

Conference and the developments preceding it appears to be a

turning point in China's history, both from the domestic and

international point of view. China's participation in the

Peace Conference - led to the necessity of disclosing all the

secret agreement mc.de between China and Japan particularly in

the year 1918 just on the eve of the termination of the war. The

disclosure of these secret agreements which the government had

been under obligation to Japan not to disclose led to a great

wave of public indignation. The public in China, in general,

believed the secret agreements to be entirely against the

best interests of China and the Southern regime considered

them part of a deliberate policy by the government in Peking to

Koo, Wellington
-p

sign agreements with Japan and thus secure financial and other

support with the intention of suppressing the opposition party

in the country by force of arms. This feeling seemed to have

been originated from the time when the Anfu party took control

in Peking and seized the political power in the North to carry

out its policy of collaboration with Japan in line with Japan's

wishes.

The Conference had a great influence on politics in China.

Internally open warfare was restrained on both sides during the

conference, although serious fighting was shortly to break out

and start the first Mukden Chihli War. One could wonder what

would be the situation in China either if China had succeeded

in settling the Shantung question at Paris to her satisfaction

or if she had signed the treaty without the reservation. These

are questions which probably could never be fully answered now.

Koo, Wellington

c \\
D—1, The Aftermath of the Peace Treaty

Though the firm expression of China's stand created a favor­

able impression in China and abroad, it gave rise to problems

in the capitals of the principal Allied and Associated Powers.

In Peking, the American, British and French ministers made

representations to the Chinese Government on the desirability

and importance for China to take steps to amend the embar­

rassing situation - embarrassing, that is, from their point

of view. In reply it was proposed that these powers should

approach Japan with a view to persuading her to set a definite

time limit for the reversion of the former German leased terri­

tory to China. The Japanese government also felt surprised at

China's final refusal to attach her signature to the peace

treaty. China's action created a delicate situation for Japan,

for she could not legally take over the rights she succeeded

in obtaining in German treaty without China giving her consent

by way of her signature. In fact, Japan had already exercised

her rights and prerogatives in Shantung by virtue of her

military occupation as a result of her armed intervention

against Germany, but she was naturally anxious to obtain not only

the recognition of the powers in Paris but also the concurrence

of China through her acceptance of the German peace treaty.

Koo, Wellington
v>

In Washington, the situation became even more serious.

Even before the signing of the German treaty, there had been

opposition in the United States Senate to the Covenant of the

League of Nations in a number of respects and this opposition

had been growing after President Wilson's return from Paris for

the second time. Nor was it confined to the group headed by

it was shared
Senators Lodge and Borah but/also for various reasons by

many other senators. China's protest and her refusal to sign

met
the treaty/with general approval among senators and congressmen

as well as by public opinion. In other words, the failure on

the part of the Peace Conference to do justice to China

regarding the Shantung question added oil to the fire which had

already been smouldering in connection with the Covenant of

the League of Nations. Every effort was evidently being made by

the administration to persuade the Senate to ratify the

peace treaty. While it was simple to explain why theCovenant

of the League of Nations was framed in the terms in which it

actually was written, it was not so easy for President

Wilson to convince the United States Senate and public

opinion of the considerations which he had had in accepting the

Paris settlement of the Shantung question.

Before the Versailles Peace Treaty was submitted to the

U.S. Senate on July 10, diplomatic efforts were made, for

both in Peking and Tokyo. Japan appeared eager to enter dis-

Koo, Wellington A
'.t

cussions with the United States and Great Britain to find a

formula which would meet with China's approval and at the

same time save Japan's face. It was not doubted that after what

had happened in Paris, Japan would surely return the German

former leased territory to China, but it was not at all certain,

at least from the Chinese point of view, what negotiations

and what terms would be asked of China. Japan was at first

not quite disposed to accept any time limit suggested by

Washington for this eventual return. But, according to

information imparted by the United States in Peking and also

to the Chinese delegation in Paris, Japan was not definitely

opposed to giving a definite promise with regard to the time

limit after which she would hand back to China the German

leased territory assigned to her by the Versailles Treaty.

The center of gravity in regard to this question had now shifted

from Paris toPeking, so far as China was concerned. The

Chinese Government was not averse to considering a time limit

and one year was suggested by the American and British ministers.

In its attitude the Chinese Government was very conscious of

the general interest aroused throughout China in this

question and of the political situation which prevailed then

between the North aid the South. Peking government would not

probably want to give her immediate acceptance without feeling

out the sentiment in the country. Moreover, Peking insisted

Koo, Wellington
J

upon a written undertaking in which Japan made clear that she

would be unwilling to give to China; she was even reluctant to

make any commitment to the United States and Great Britain.

Japan's failure to build a form of undertaking resulted in an

impasse as regard to this question. Criticism on the part

of the American public opinion to President Wilson encouraged

more protests in China, a fact which added to the hesitation

of the Chinese Government in Peking to accept any arrangement

between Japan on one hand and the United States and Britain

on the other with nothing more than a verbal promise from

Japan at the start. During the mounting campaign in the

United States Senate, in which as much objection was raised to

the Shantung clauses as to the Covenant of the League of

Nations, the government in Peking became more hesitant and

public opinion grew stronger against any further negotiations

with Japan on this question. The attitude of the Chinese

Delegation in Paris was made clear to Peking: I had convinced

Minister Lu that having refused to sign the treaty China tem­

porarily was in a difficult position internationally, but that

the opposition in the United States to the treaty had created

a situation which was bound to lead to other developments favor­

able to China's cause on theShantung question.

The battle in the United States grew hotter and more

Koo, Wellington
P

objections were raised in the Senate which made it clear that

it would be a surprise if the Senate should finally decide

to ratify the treaty. The final refusal of the Senate by a

very substantial margin to ratify the treaty was not only a

great disappointment to President Wilson himself but also

created a situation which the Republican party was able to

use to their advantage. It appeared certain that the Versaille

Treaty would become a political issue in the presidential

election in the following year, since the opposition in the

U.S. to the Shantung provisions was not confined to Republican

Senators and Congressmen but was quite general on the part

of the American people. I felt confident that the United

States would have to find some way, especially if the

Republican party should win the election in 1920, to amend

the Shantung question in favor of China whatever might happen

to the Covenant of the League of Nations.

As it developed later, the final decision of theU.S.

Senate to turn down the Versailles treaty and to refuse to

ratify it created a very serious international situation

specially for United States, France, Great Britain and Japan,

not to mention the other states, had all been looking at the

U.S. as an active member and principal supporter of the new

Koo, Wellington a

world organization to deal with international disputes and other

problems. It was realized that the absence of the United States

from the League of Nations would certainly weaken the organiza­

tion and impair its chances of maintaining world peace. In

other words, the repercussions of China’s refusal to sign the

German peace treaty soon became far reaching internationally.

America's withdrawal created problems for the other powers

as well as for herself. When the league of Nations was

inaugurated in December 1920, and China was elected to the

council of the League of the Nations and I was appointed the

Chinese representative. It was crystal clear to me that

the council, at least, felt greatly disappointed and even

embarrassed; everytime an important question was taken up

for consideration in the council, the attention of the

representatives of the new world body would turn to Washington

as to how far the U.S. could be interested in that particular

problem and what its attitude was, knowing it had to keep

close touch with the U.S. and American observer in Geneva. This

part of the problem, I shall take up later in connection with

China's role and other aspects of the League of Nations.

The presidential election in 1920 in the United States

was looked upon as an event of great importance to the outside

Koo, Wellington

world as well as to the United States itself. The failure of

the Peace Conference to settle all the political problems

had caused most of them to be held over to await consideration

by the League, of which the United States was not a member.

This made the outcome of the presidential election all the

more important. The victory of the republican party at the

poll in November 1920 made it certain that the new administra­

tion would take the Shantung question up and formulate a

definite policy as one of its first tasks.

i

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Koo, Wellington 1 c\
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D 2. My Mission in London and the Convening Qi the

Washington Conference

I returned to Washington inOctober, 1920, to wind up

my diplomatic mission in the American capital and waited

before going to London to take up my new assignment. This

assignment was an exchange with Dr. Alfred Sze who had been

appointed to succeed me in Washington. This development

was not unexpected on my part because once China had been

elected to the Council of the League it was a foregone

conclusion that I would be appointed concurrently as the

Chinese representative on theCouncil. Soon after my return

to Washington, I continued my communications with Peking

with regard to the program to be prepared before China

occupied her seat on thecouncil and subsequently on the first

assembly, which was to meet within a year. Soon after my

arrival in Washington a formal presidential mandate appointed

was
me Chinese representative on the council and the mandate/pro-

mulgated, I believe, in December 1920 when I was already

installed in London. By that time, a great deal of interest

was taken in China in the new world organization since if

the memoranda which China had presented to the Peace Conference

had not expressly stated that the Shantung question would be

Kog, Wellington

brought before the League of Nations, President Wilson had

suggested this when Minister Lu and I were discussing the

Shantung question with him in Paris.

From the end of 1920 on I was in charge of the Chinese

Delegation in Paris after Minister Lu's return to Peking.

The other three delegates besides Minister Lu had left Paris

had either returned to China like Dr. C. T. Wang or to

their posts; China's Delegation continued to wait to take

charge of Chinese interests in the Hungarian and Turkish

treaties of Peace. China's interest in these two treaties

was relatively limited with no particular question affecting

China except in Hungarian treaty the article relating to the

F rr ...
advocation of the unequal treaties, which was an important

item for China. The Hungarian Treaty was signed in the fall

of 1919 and followed by the Turkish Treaty in 1920. Shortly

after taking over the mission in the British capital, I

presented my credentials to the King, George V. Although I

had been the Chinese Minister to the United States for

several years, the contrast between London and Washington,

the set-up of the diplomatic corps and diplomatic procedure

as well as social customs and life in general, was quite

noticeable. I remember the Lard Chamberlain of the - the

T\w wej 3 ing-con

1^'

chief protocol officer who was also the grand master of

ceremonies at the Palace, explained to me how I was to be dressed

and what the ceremony of presentation of credentials - letters

of credence would be. It was amusing to me to wear breeches

and pants; it was a requirement of proper dress for the

occasion and I was also told the custom was that the new

envoys in audience was not to initiate a conversation but to

answer any question which was to be asked by his majesty. I

had the impression that the ceremony would be a very solemn

one, that it would be formal. To some extent it was, but I

found the King, although dressed in his royal uniform, quite

friendly, and after the presentation of the letters of

credential, and our exchange of formal speeches, the King

started a conversation. Though the new envoy was supposed

to present his letter of credence with a speech and the king

was to reply with a formal the practice was simply to

exchange written speeches. The audience was impressive and

interesting and lasted not more than twenty minutes.

My first year in London was not altogether spent in London,

in the capital, because several times I had to go to attend

the council although one of -the meetings was held in London

itself. The chief question that occupied me outside my work

Koo, Wellington

with the League of Nations at the council of the League of

Nations and the first assembly in September 1920 was in

connection with the Shantung question. Lord Curzon was

Secretary of State. He had been Viceroy in India at the

age, I think, of only 36 and was looked upon as an authority

on questions relating to Asia and to the Far East. He

was known to be a statesman and a great intellect, but

rather difficult in his relations with other people. Not

only his staff at the foreign office, but also the chiefs

of the missions found it hard to get on with him. This

knowledge was useful to me because it enabled me to be on my

guard when I saw him. Some of the members of the Foreign

Office used to tell me, in mild complaint, that his lordship

always worked according to his own hours and had no hesitation

in keeping some of his close collaborators in the Foreign

Office to whatever time he himself cared to work. Even on

Sundays, he would send for members of his staff by telephone

to give orders or dictate some important dispatch, while

he himself was resting in bed. My appointments with him were

always at a late hour. I found him unexpectedly interesting

in conversation. Whenever I went to see him I always had

some definite question or questions to discuss, but our inter­

views lasted longer than I had expected because he would pick

Koo, Wellington
in

up other questions not of particular concern to China but

of general interest. Not infrequently they would be

questions affecting the relations between the U.S. and

Great Britain. He knew - and said so - that the United

Stated was very friendly with China and that China was always

in close touch with Washington, so that frequently he would

discuss with me the situation in Washington and the policy

and attitudes of the U.S. on questions affecting the Far

East and particularly China.

In the late autumn of 1921, the newspapers published

reports of the desire of the new administration in Washington

to call a conference to discuss principally the question of

limitation of naval armament and to take up the Far Eastern

question accentuated by the Shantung question still outstanding.

It was an unexpected but interesting disclosure in the British

paper that Mr. Lloyd George and Lord Curzon were not working

closely together in connection with the proposed conference.

Late in October, Lord Curzon's secretary asked me to see him,

and spoke tome about the news that Washington was probably

about to call an international conference. He seemed tobe

anxious to know something from me about these reports and I

had the impression that he was not fully aware of what

was going on. It turned out that Mr. Lloyd George was himself
 2v<
Koo, Wellington

conducting confidential relations between the British and

American governments, without keeping his Foreign Secretary

fully informed. It was no surprise to me because the

favorable topic of conversation in high society was the

rivalry between Lord Curzon and Mr. Lloyd George. Lord

Curzon's chief ambition in life was to become Prime Minister

of Great Britain, an ambition of which Mr. Lloyd George must

have been quite aware. The newspapers did not avoid this

topic and the Evening Mail on the very afternoon that I

was asked to see Lord Curzon came out with a study of the

prospects of an international conference in Washington and

dwelt upon the rivalry of the two British statesmen to

play a principal role inthe conference. It was not until

just before the day I was to sail for the United States that

Lord Curzon asked to see me to give me the information

which he had not previously been in a position to give me

that the British Delegation definitely would not include him.

We had an exchange of views not altogether on the. Chinese

situation but on the general situation in the Pacific and

Asia. This conversation completed my contact with the

British Foreign Office.

The Washington Conference was in fact proposed by the

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Koo, Wellington

United States toward the end of October and was already

discussed confidentially in the capitals of the countries

invited to take part. I was pleasantly surprised by a

personal telegram from W.W. Yen, Chinese Foreign Minister,

which was signed by Dr. Y. C. Tsou, who was president of the

Tsinghua College and who was a personal intimate friend of

both the foreign minister and myself. The message stated that

Dr. Yen would like me to serve as Chinese plenipotentiary

to the Washington Conference^ but would like to know whether

I was disposed to accept. The position of second plenipo-

tentiary was Mr. Alfred Sze, since he was the resident minister

in Washington ^rfe the fir“telegation. I at once understood

the purpose of this telegraphic inquiry, because I recalled

the difficulty we had had in Paris. I had no hesitation in

sending a reply to the effect that if my service was needed

for the Chinese Delegation at the proposed conference, I would

be quite willing to accept the appointment and that Dr. Yen

should have no apprehension about precedence, because, I

po^-^ted out, not only was Dr. Alfred Sze the resident minister

in Washington but also he was senior to me in his diplomatic

career. As a result an official despatch from the Wai-chiao-pu

invited me to be one of the Chinese delegates. The President's

Koo, Wellington

mandate made public after the convocation of the conference

appointed Dr. Alfred Sze first delegate, myself the second

and Dr. C. H. Wang the third delegate. This mission was an

important one for China and I was glad to be called upon to

take part in it although I had had little knowledge of the

discussions between China and the United States either in

Washington or in Peking. It appeared to all intents and

purposes the preparations were made in a very brief period

and the purpose of the conference sprang from the common

desire of the U.S. and of Great Britain, the two principal

naval powers apart from Japan, to settle the question of the

limitation of naval armament with Japan, the question of

disarmament being a popular theme in the U.S. as well as

in Great Britain. The Far Eastern question was considered

important because of the Shantung question; although the

new administration was Republican, the leaders were fully

aware of President Wilson's assurance to China that China's

grievances would be taken up by the new world organization

to which President Wilson was personally dedicated and as was

the Republican party at the time.

Koo, Wellington 1*

D 2. The Conference - Organization andProcedure

I sailed in the early part of November with a general

knowledge of the problems which would come up at the

Washington Conference so far as China was concerned. The

voyage was uneventful. When my wife and I with a couple

of secretaries arrived in New York the American Government

had its representative meet me and the local authorities

altogether extended a formal welcome. We went directly to

Washington and were installed in Moran House which was specially

provided by the U.S. Government for the Chinese Delegation;

it was a very spacious mansion situated prominently on

Massachusetts Avenue. Both in New York and Washington I

was impressed not only by the cordiality of the American

welcome but also by the crowd of overseas Chinese that turned

out, indicating a keen interest in the impending conference.

The other members of the Delegation arrived in San Francisco

within one or two days of my arrival and they came direct by

train to Washington. Dr. Alfred Sze was already in Washington

as Minister to the U.S. Dr C. H. Wang the third plenipo­

tentiary was not accompanied by Mrs. Wang but had a number of

important Chinese officials travelling with him in various

Koo, Wellington ^

capacities connected with the delegation. There were three

high advisers namely, Mr. Chou Tzu-ch'i, who had served

among other capacities as Governor of Shantung province,

Minister of Finance, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs,

and Premier (kuo-wu tsung li) and even Acting Minister of

War at one time. The second man was Mr. Liang Ju-hao generally

known as M.T. Liang who was Foreign Minister for three

months in 1913 or 1914. He was one of the early students

sent to the U.S. in the late 70's or early 80's. After his

return to China he remained mostly in the railway administra­

tion although he was at one time Customs Tao-t'ai at Tsientsin.

He was a close friend of Mr. T‘ang Shao-i, another of the

early students sent to America. The reason why he was

appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs was because he had

at one time or another been in the Secretariat of President

Yuan Shih-k'ai when Yuan was Viceroy of Chihli, and also

because T'ang Shao-i was a sworn brother to President Yuan.

It was also the custom of the time of always having someone

serve as foreign minister who could speak some foreign lan­

guage, either English or French. Mr. M. T. Liang was a

friend not only of myself, as I had known him for years and

also served under him as secretary of the Foreign Office,

but was also a close friend of Mr. Alfred Sze and Dr. C. H.
Koo, Wellington

Wang. He was a Cantonese. The third man was Admiral Ts'ai

T1ing-kan also one of the early American-returned students.

I was rather agreeably surprised that with their political

prestige at home and their standing as senior statesmen they

had been appointed as advisers to the three plenipotentiaries,

who were in effect junior to them. My surprise did not

last very long because a telegram from the Foreign Office

as well as information from Dr. Alfred Sze indicated that

they had been selected as high advisers to the plenipoten­

tiaries because of their friendship and their prestige which

might enable them to smooth out any personal difficulties

among the plenipotentiaries, a move which I well could

understand after our experiences at Paris. This intent

was confirmed by some of the members of the Chinese Delegation

who accompanied them.

A number of problems called for solution by the countries

participating in the Washington Conference. Many of them

sprang directly from the War, or the changed situation at its

end. There was an apparent rivalry of interests between Japan

and the U.S. in the Pacific and the Far East, a situation

which naturally called for some kind of understanding and

agreement between Tokyo and Washington. The policy of Japan

Koo, Wellington

in China, and the question of Shantung had been left

unsettled at the Peace Conference in Paris, had since

become a political issue in the U.S. When the Republicans

carried the presidential elections in 1920 it was a foregone

conclusion that something would have to be done to redeem

the promises of the Republican Party during the presidential

campaign to render justice to China's cause which was always

a very popular cause in the U.S. On the British side, the

impending termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance,

a thing very much desired by the Dominions - especially

Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and very much hoped for by

Washington, made it necessary for Great Britain to readjust

her foreign policy in the Pacific and the Far East. The

weakened position of Great Britain as a sequel of world war X

it also compelled her to seek closer cooperation with the

U.S. internationally, and the failure of the U.S. to join

the League of Nations as a result of the U.S. Senate's

refusal to ratify the Versailles Treaty of which the Covenant

formed the first part left the international situation in a

state of uncertainty. As for Japan, she had found herself

to be the naughty boy at the Peace Conference and now had to

face up tothe situation: she had to come to some sort of under­

standing with Washington both with regard tothe China problem

Koo, we1lington n /U>
1 [

and the situation in the Pacific.

For China, the importance of the Conference was obvious.

From her viewpoint the main opposition party was Japan. She

had great hopes that at last the Shantung question would have

a chance of definitive settlement, and that she would obtain

certain international guarantee of her security and also inter­

national recognition of her status of equality with theother

nations of the world. In other words, two principal questions

were uppermost in the mind of the Chinese government and nation:

S | ■J’ * ^ • : K,
The immediate settlement of the Shantung and the abolition of

the so-called unequal treaties which at the time meant

particularly safety from Japan's policy of territorial exten­

sion and economic penetration on the Chinese mainland. China

herself was torn by political strife and military conflict

between different groups, not only between the South and the

North, but also between the rival tu-chuns at the time. The

people at large - those who were generally devoted to China's

national interests - had high hopes that the settlement which

was expected from the Washington Conference would serve to

solve the Chinese situation and bring about peace and possible

national development. So all in all, the Conference was looked

upon next—onrly' by othex na-tions but also by China as a great

Koo, Wellington

event and &he had great hopes in its outcome

I was somewhat surprised at the size of the Delegation

appointed by the Chinese Government. Its members had not

only been directly appointed by the Foreign Office but some

were from the various Ministries, so that the Chinese

Delegation was composed of 130 members. We had about 35 to

40 members in the Chinese Delegation to the Paris Peace

Conference, a considerably smaller body than the present

number of technical delegates, special delegates, represen­

tatives of the various Ministries. Of course a great many

people went to Paris, the heads of different political

parties, the newspaper, correspondents, etc., but they

went on their own initiative or the initiative of the

parties they represented or in other non-official capacities.

were
So far as the galaxy of prominent political leaders/concerned,
outs: K.ov1'-*-'
of course the Versailles Conference the Washington

Conference; the mention of a few names will illustrate the

point - on the part of the Kuomintang, there was Wang Ching-

wei, Li Shih-tseng, Dr. C. C. Wu, , on the part

of the Progressive Party, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, on the part of

t
the Chiao-tung clique, Yeh Kung-cho. At the time practically

every party or group was represented on their own initiative

Koo, Wellington

because they felt that the outcome of the conference would

have a great effect on the future development of China.

As for the work of the Conference, there were two classes

of meetings, one the meetings of the plenipotentiaries

which determined policy and attitude to be adopted at the

Conference on the basis of the general instructions from the

Chinese Government. The other was what we called the

delegation meetings, which were usually attended by the

plenipotentiaries, high advisers, and their advisers, tech­

nical counselors, the secretary—general, and the secretary to

the secretary general. Then once in a while we had the meetings

of the entire delegation. The second group of meetings

bold regularly in connection with the work of the Conference

mainly for the purpose of informing the Delegation and

assigning work to the technical counselors and tie calling

for expressions of opinion and so forth. It was agreed among

the plenipotentiaries to divide the work of thdConference

in the following way. Dr. Sze volunteered to be in charge of

the question of the withdrawal of armed forces, and the relin­

quishment of the abolition of foreign post offices; Dr. Wang

volunteered to have charge of the questions of the return of

foreign concessions, and tire cancellation of extraterritorial

Koo; Wellington
i13

jurisdiction which involved the question of China's new code

and the organization of Chinese courts/ a field with which

he had always been intimately associated and with which he

~ to ■ 0 K €
was very familiar. Dr. Wang also took charge of the Jge

Demands. The voluntary assumption of the remaining questions

was left to me. I took charge of the following questions:

the leased territories, the spheres of influence, the customs

tariff, the Shantung question, and the abrogation or the

revision of the unequal treaties. The procedure adopted at my

suggestion was that each memorandum prepared by a plenipo­

tentiary (or with the assistance of technical experts) should

be presented to all three for discussion and approval before

being presented to the conference.

Publicity was to be taken care of by Dr. Philip Tyau,

the Secretary-General of the Delegation, and Dr. Yun-hsiang

Ts'ao, Deputy Secretary-General of the Delegation. Since

the publicity work was conducted under my supervision, I managed

to have a number of principles approved unanimously by all

the representatives; these principles were to govern our atti­

tude and viewpoints not only concerning the questions to be

submitted to the conference but also in regard to domestic

Koo, Wellington

problems such as the political situation in China and the

inter-party rivalry. These principles served as a guide not

only to the two publicity offices of our delegation but also to

those members who were going to make public speeches in

Washington, New York, or any other places in the United States.

This procedure proved to be rather useful.

The technical councillors of the Delegation were very

(
helpful. Those who were familiar with theEnglish language

were most needed; those who were familiar with the Chinese

language and the Chinese situation were helpful in drafting

communications to the Chinese government. There were a

number of experts selected from various ministries and

departments, such as those from the Ministry of Communications

and the Ministry of Justice; they were going to handle the

questions of the railways and extraterritoriality respectively.

There were also experts from the Navy and the Army. Most of the

delegation staff were appointed by the Foreign Office, but some

of the staff were recruited locally. Huang Fu, an adviser

to the Delegation, was already in New York.

the
As far as China was concerned,/most important problem of

the conference was the Far Eastern problem. China was not
Koo, Wellington

invited to the Naval Disarmament Conference. Nine Powers,

including China, were to discuss the Far Eastern problem. In

addition to China, Japan, the United States, Great Britain,

and France, there were Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and the

Netherlands.

Insofar as many prominent figures constituted the various

delegations, especially those of the leading nations, I

would say that the Washington Conference is comparable with the

Paris Peace Conference. The United States was represented by

its Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes as head of its

delegation, Senator Elihu Root, and Senator Underwood. Great

Britain was represented Try Arthur Balfour, President of the

Privy Council, etc. France was represented by Briand, Viviani,

and Sarraut, an authority on the Far Eastern affairs. Japan

was represented by Baron Kato, Minister of the Navy, and Baron

Shidehara, Japanese Ambassador in Washington. The Netherlands

was represented by van Bloplaud and van Karnebeek. Each nation

tried to send as many prominent diplomats to the conference

as she could. Many of the delegates were not only familiar

with theFar Eastern situation but also well known in China either

because/cthey had served as their countries' representatives in

China or because they had been in one way or another connected

Koo, Wellington

with the Chinese problems.

Apart from the Chinese and the Japanese delegates, the British

delegates and the American delegates^ played an important part. It

was commented in the press that the participating countries were all

well represented. This public opinion indicated the importance the

various governments attached to the conference. I do not remember

now whether or not Prime Minister Lloyd George actually came to the

conference. In the conference there were animated debates in

connection with the Twenty-One Demands, and lively debates in connection

with the revision of treaties, leased territories, and customs and

tariffs in China.

Secretary of State Hughes, who was the chairman of the conference,

was very business-like and sympathetic toward China. Senator Root was

of a different type; he gave me the impression that he understood Japan

far more than China. The confused situation and lack of unity in

China presented an unfavorable picture of China in comparison with

Japan. Senator Underwood was in charge of the customs and tariff

problem; he was not only reasonable and fair-minded but also very

sympathetic and understanding; he tried to find out formulas for com­

promise and reconciliation; he always gave me the impression that he

quite understood China*s sentiments and aspirations. I think that

Senator Underwood was a Democrat. The British delegate Lord Arthur

a
James Balfour was/great statesman, highly experienced in international
i
Koo, Wellington

problems, and on the particular problems in question. He was

objective, though he always kept the British interest first of all in

his mind. His way of expressing his view, his calm dispassionate

logic and his sometimes philosophic presentation impressed me greatly.

The French and with them the Dutch and Belgian delegates relatively

played a less prominent part, although M. Sarraut intervened very

often in the discussions on the various problems. There was no question

that outside Japan and China the British and Americans played the most

important role.

Admiral Kato hardly appeared in the first two meetings. The meetings

were always attended by Baron Kijuro Shidehara and Mr. Masanao Hanihara;

all three of the Japanese spoke English. I think Mr. Sarraut and M.

Briand spoke French. The Dutch spoke English, except van Karnebeek who

spoke French. Van Blokland spoke English very well. Viviani spoke

both languages very well but spoke only French in the conference. He

was more fluent in French. Schanzer spoke French and Italian. When

we were outside, we all spoke English.

As the more controversial topics centered upon those of a political

character, such as the Twenty-One Demands, and the abrogation of the

leased territories, and the customs tariff, Dr. Wang and I usually spoke.

We had arranged that each was to defend the topics on which he had
Koo, Wellington

agreed to prepare memoranda, so that our division of labor was quite

clear-cut. But following the delivery of the prepared arguments, when the

actual debate took place, then any of us might intervene. I spoke

on the whole more often in the debate after the initial rallies.

The most important work, however, was delegated to the committees.

After the general discussions at the preliminary meetings of the Commission

of the Pacific and Far Eastern Questions, committees were formed on

different subtopics. And in each committee when the members took up

o4 Co V f'Se tki ■( & WQJC XH y V ’**-■ y
the discussion^; often turning out to be very intense and sometimes even
.MJ
heated. I believe there were committee minutes too, although they have

been revised. The general impression X had had from Versailles was

that they were prepared to enter into discussion of all the comments

we brought up. Their main purpose was to seek a settlement, first of

all, of the Shantung question, and one or two topics outside

the Shantung problem so as to justify the meetings on Far Eastern problems.

The question like the first four divisions of the Twanty-one Demands

and the unequal treaties were discussed in a general way, but no

positive action was taken on them. I suppose they were just too

complicated. On the question of extraterritoriality, they decided that

it could not be settled until after a commission of study had made a

visit to China and studied the judicial system. The Chinese delegation

was of course very much concerned with the abolition of spheres of in­

fluence and the rendition of leased territories and foreign concessions

be
in China. We had some discussion which was considered not to/solved
Koo, Wellington

ry\%

in the conference. It was the general attitude that the conference

“ ~ -frk.KA
could not take up questions concerning individual powers. Ifa^was-'-gloQ-

Jojae cfn which the United States Delegation found embarrassing to express

its views, although I suppose at heart they were sympathetic because

of their adherence to the policy of the Open Door^ /so although China

submitted a rather comprehensive list of problems, the actual results

apart from the Shantung questions, embodied m resolutions on the

revision of the customs tariff rate, .J

Qrvt--
the problems of extraterritoriality j* and a number of other questions, all

non committal, except as regards the withdrawal of foreign forces and

foreign post offices.

The relationship between the Pacific and Far Eastern Questions

on the one side and the Conference as a whole was rather unusual.

And the relationship and the Shantung Conversations and the Conference

was even more unusual. The Shantung Conversations were supposed to

have taken place outside of the Conference, in accession to the

wishes of Japan. The other problems, so far the Pacific and Far

Eastern Questions were concerned, formed a subsidiary portion of the

general conference which had as its main purpose the limitation of

armaments.
Koo, Wellington

D The Shantung Conversations

The background of the Shantung question between China and Japan

is rather complicated. After the Paris Conference China1s attempts to

ahieve and fair and just settlement of the Shantung question had been

disappointed. As we have seen. President Wilson had tried to do justice

to China on this question, but his efforts had been handicapped because

he had been unable to obtain the support of the other Great Powers. Lloyd

George had told me that Great Britain was not in a position to support

China because Britain had made commitments to Japan during the war. The

contributions made by Japan prior to America^ participation in the war

had been greatly appreciated by Great Britain. Great Britain, he

concluded, could not abandon her commitments and in accordance with them

she would support Japan in the Peace Conference.

At the Paris Peace Conference Japan had promised by negotiation within

a year or two to hand back Tsingtao and territory to China, but the

political situation in China was such as that the Chinese Government

did not appear to have the confidence to secure some compromise on the

grounds of expediency. I could understand that any such partial

arrangement would not give China a real state of justice. Especially

since the question had become a political issue in the United States,

judging from the controversy between the Senate and the Administration

in view of the approaching election in a yearfs time in 1920, I believed

it would be wise for China rather than to accept some kind of unfavorable
o
settlement to take a little time and see how the situation
 Koo, Wellington

03*

-ijivolved internationally. This suggested line of policy was approved

by Peking including Mr. Yen the foreign minister giving deep consider­

ation to my view. This was the background.

The idea of having the Shantung questions considered as an international

question rather than as a question between China and Japan led to the

ingenious arrangement of holding conversations, as they said, "on

the fringe" of the Washington Conference so that in order to compro­

mise with Japan*s point of view that this conversation was quite separate

from the Conference. The United States considered that what mattered

was that agreement, as Charles Hughes said, should be spread on the

record of the Conference. It should form a part of the record of

the €on£erence,,t ati accepted part of the Conference. All along China

had taken the stand that on the Shantung question^ China would not

directly negotiate with Japan. The stand directlyopposed that of

Japan. We considered it as a question which concerned not only China

and Japan but also the general situation of the Pacific and the Far

East. Therefore, just as this question had been brought to the Paris

Peace Conference, it should be settled directly in the Washington

Conference. Finally the ingenious formula adopted of holding conver­

sations apart from the naval limitation conference, yet at the same

time on the fringe of the Conference. In order to satisfy China, who

was opposed to direct conversations, the United States proposed to Great

Britain that they should have observers present at the conversation without

taking part; they explained to the Chinese that these observers would

sit and watch at the same time, but their main purpose was to observe
Koo, Wellington

and in case of difficulty to offer their services to patch up differences.

Now as regards the actual conversation, Japan was represented by Kato

and Shidehara. On the Chinese side, there was Dr. Sze, Dr. C. H. Wang,

and myself. Each side was accompanied by one or two advisers or

technical counselors depending ijpon the question. Mr. Huang Fu sat

behind the Chinese representatives. During the first few weeks there
t 41
was a Chinese secretary-general. Dr. Philip Giuwte, assisted by

someone from the secretariat, and the Japanese side also had a secretary-

general, It was decided at the very first meeting that each side would

provide secretaries to draw up the minutes for approval by the represen­

tatives, although the minutes were not to be officially confirmed by

the delegates. Baron Kato did not come regularly and only the opening

meeting did he say something. After the first two or three meetings,

he didn*t appear at all; I think because the discussions on the ques­

tion of limitation of armaments became very interesting and even critical,

he was fully occupied while we were carrying on conversations on the

Shantung question at the same time as the other meeting. And so it

was just Shidehara, assisted by Hanihara, and Debuchi. Our three

plenipotentiaries remained the same from the beginning to the end.

After the first meeting it was always Baron Shidehara who actually

negotiated on the Japanese side while I was the one who did the most

talking on the Chinese side. Our basic policy or attitude on any question

was always discussed beforehand among the three plenipotentiaries, so

that what I said was always in accordance with the agreed stand.
Koo, Wellington

Arguments and reasons were left to me as an active negotiator just as

i
they were to Shidehara on the Japanese side^

The first problem which faced the plenipotentiaries was whether

to begin with the major or minor points for discussion. Among the

simpler questions were those of the checking of the archives,handing

over the administration and the taking over of the port administration.

The port administration was really a part of the administration of Kiao-

chow, but it was very important, for it included the administration of

the piers and docks, and yielded a great deal of revenue. Then there

were the questions of the police and the post; it was not difficult

for the two sides to come to agreement on these relatively simple

questions.

The most important question from the point of view of both

sides was the Kiao^chow Tsinanfu Railway. At first it was a part of

the understanding on both sides that the railway question would be

taken up after the simpler questions had already been disposed of. But

the Chinese representatives had difficulties in their own delegation as

to this line of procedure, although the first ten days of the conver­

sation seemed to have yielded a great deal of substantial agreement. There

was a general sentiment among a section of the Chinese delegates,

spearheaded by General Huang Fu, that in following this course of procedure

China was running the risk of losing time and finding Iherself later on

in a difficult position to press for a full settlement of the railway

Koo, Wellington
tV)

question. His idea wa that China should attack the railway question from

the very beginning while my idea, also that of Dr. Sze and Dr. Wang,

was that as a technique of negotiation and in view of the strong feeling

on both sides it would be a wiser course to dispose of some of the

simpler questions at first in order to create an atmosphere favorable

to a free and frank discussion of the most difficult question. Huang

Fu argued that the railway question was the most important question

of the whole Shantung problem and it was Japan's policy to delay dis­

cussion as much as possible so that she would be able by playing for time

to force China into a position where she had to accept the Japanese

claims or fail to reach a settlement at all on the whole Shantung

problem. Of course the two courses were argued in the conversations

but from a technical point of view the Chinese representatives asserted

that to hold over the bigger questions was a wiser course and I think

Baron Shidehara readily agreed to the suggestion without betraying any

ulterior motive; as a practical negotiator he also saw the point of

disposing with simpler questions first.

But as a result of the view of Huang Fu and others, before we

finished a list of the simpler questions, in the middle of the dis­

cussion, after ten or twelve days, we suddenly took up the question

of the railway, and of course this question involved many difficult

problems. First of all the Japanese, when asked to expound their views,

unhesitatingly said that they would like to have this question settled on

the same basis as the original Chinese-German railway agreement. Japan

was simply taking over and substituting herself for Germany on the
Kop, Wellington

basis of a railway loan agreement, with the overall administration

remaining nominally in Chinese hands but actually in the control of the

Japanese. But under the bid loan agreement, the President of the company

had been a Chinese but actual ly running the company were a German engi­

neer, a German traffic manager and a German accountant. Another

difficult question was in connection with the railway police for the

protection of the railway within what they called the railway zone. The

third difficult problem was the right to the exploitation of the

mineral resources within the railway zone. Japan took a firm stand with

regard to the railway, and with regard to these different aspects,

undoubtedly out of their belief in support from Paris and London. Great

Britain and France took the position in the end that while territorial

rights concerning the Kiaoehow territory and Shantung province, insofar

as Shantung had been a German sphere of influence, would be given back

to China, Japan would be entitled to succeed to all the economic

rights, not only in connection with the railway but also in the

province of Shantung. This policy I took occasion to oppose and criticise

very strongly in our conversations with the heads of the three other

delegations. I told them at the time that while Japan*s political

and territorial interests were an obvious menace to the integrity

of China, her economic exploitation was equally dangerous; it was a

slower process but even more effective as a weapon of infringement on

Chinese sovereignty.

Japan was firm in her attitude to the railway. She was putting
Koo, Wellington

forth the claim that from her point of view the settlement should be a

very simple one: simply to recognize Japan as the successor of Germany

in connection with all the railway interests. But when prodded hard,

Baron Shidehara could not defend Japan1s position as successor

because the railway had already been constructed and was already in

operation; there was no need of a railway loan agreement. To counter

the Japanese stand China offered to redeem the loan. We recognized

Japan by conquest had acquired the financial and economic interests of

Germany centered in the railway as evidenced by the railway agreement,

but China wanted also to pay off the loan which would do away with

the whole agreement and make the railway revert to China. (The railway

loan was $25,000,000). So on that point discussion and debate went on

day after day. Finally the Chinese Government directed its representa­

tives to accept in principle a railway loan agreement, but to negotiate

for as short a term as possible. I announced that we would accept the

principle of ^railway loan agreement, adding I remember "the Japanese

representing themselves", which was a good debating point to stand

upon and provoked general laughter on the part of the observers, Mr.

John Van A. MacMurray and Sir Miles Lampson. [Mr. MacMurray was then the

chief of the Far Eastern Division in the State Department while Sir Miles

Lampson the British observer was the Chief of the China Service in the

British Foreign Office; the idea was that Mr. MacMurray would keep in

close contact with the Chinese Delegation and Sir Miles with the

Japanese Delegation.] When the Japanese insisted on a loan and to take

the place of Germany in the loan agreement we countered by saying that

there was no need of a loan; China was ready to pay it off and it was
 Koo, Wellington

i1*
unusual for any nation to insist on another nation accepting a loan when

the loan was not required. As I put it, Japan seemed anxious to make

China a debtor to Japan when China was neither in need of a debt or

money.

But on enquiry to independent sources in China as to whether the

required funds could be raised easily and promptly the answer was a

disappointment to the Chinese Delegation. The Delegation had been

receiving telegrams from different parts of China, from the governors

of the provinces, from public organizations, such as student organiza­

tions, from a number of southern provinces - Kwangsi, Hupei, Yunnan -

and from General Wu p’ei-fu - all were in favor of paying the loan right

away. Chang Tso-lin even went to the extent of remitting the the sum

of $15,000 or $20,000 to meet the expenses c£ the Chinese delegation in

ts-—
Washington because the Peking government was in arrears. After we had

received so many telegrams assuring us of the readiness with which the

necessary sum could be raised, and notifying us of their proffered

contribution which on paper came to over $40 million, the Chinese

Delegation sent a confidential inquiry by telegram to the Bankers

Association in Shanghai and to the heads of Chinese Chambers of Commerce

to ask them whether the promised contributions could be counted upon and

whether cash could be raised, because even though some of the governors

lived up to their promises and signed a check or money order, whether they

all could be converted into cash from the Exchange was another question.

The confidential answer the delegation got was very disappointing: so

far something less than half a million dollars had been collc.cted and
Koo, Wellington

as far as they could see the total amount that could be counted upon could

not be over $2 or $3 million. They pointed out that these promises were

of a political character and it would be very difficult to collect from

the responsible people. One factor to be considered - very important

from the point of view of China*s economic and financial situation « was

that even if the necessary amount of cash could be collected, it would

create a currency crisis in the financial world (chin-yung-chieh) and

drastically affect the financial situation of Shanghai, the principal port

of foreign trade. Therefore tt were unanimously of the opinion that

what the telegrams to fche Delegation had promised could not be counted

upon and- that even if they could the effect on ChinaTis money market - the

handing over of such a vast sum as $25 million in foreign exchange would

cause a great crisis in the money market of Shanghai. The Government of

course never intimated to the Delegation that the money could be readily

collected - it was quite aware of the situation. Knowing it could not

find that much money itself, the government directed the Delegation to

accept in principal a loan agreement but to try to negotiate a period as

short as possible. We suggested three years, later extended to five.

The Japanese wanted 20 years at first; they came down to between fifteen

to twelve years.

That was one question finally disposed of. Then came the question

of three key posts, that of the chief engineer, chief accomitant, and

chief traffic manager. We claimed that since the railway was to be a

Chinese government railway, and since Kiao-chow was to be handed back to

China, the railway connecting Kiao-chow to Tsinanfu should be managed and

Koo, Wellington

administered entirely by the Chinese. And if the Japanese wanted some

guarantees on account of her financial interests in the railway i.e.

the loan- we offered them the post of chief engineer; China was to appoint

the chief accountant and chief traffic mana ger. But Japan Attached

greater importance to the other two posts than the chief engineer post.

We said that since the railway had already been built, if Japan wanted she

could appoint a chief engineer bu: China would supply the ordinary care of

the equipment and locomotives and plant and so forth. But Japan did not

want it. Both sides were aware that the railway had already been in

operation. In the old days the post of chief engineer was very important,

before the line was built, because it affected the location of the line

which might go through certain parts that had natural resources, trade

centers, and so on; moreover the engineer had had the initiative and

control of the matter of obtaining supplies, where to place orders, etc.

Finally we left the question of the engineer. The Japanese were quite

willing to have a Chinese chief engineer but they accepted a deputy

Chinese engineer, and since Japan had a financial interest in the railway

administration, we did not insist very much on the Chinese chief engineer.

The center of the dispute was over the chief traffic manager because

he would be in control of the day-to-day operation of the railway and

handling of the goods and would have great effect on the trade. It was

on that question that both sides argued at length for many days. The

Japanese proposition was that the chief traffic manager be Japanese

and whnn the Chinese objected that a Chinese be chief traffic manager, they

compromised by offering a Chinese deputy traffic manager, at first three

Koo, Wellington

years afterwards and later concurrently. We insisted on a Chinese chief

traffic manager and offered the deputy to the Japanese. Both sides became

so adamant on this point after arguing for several days that no progress

could be made. I do not know how much difficulty the Japanese had with

their own government but the Chinese delegates on their side had

strong pressure in their delegation and here General Huang Fu played

a very prominent role. All along he insisted that the Chinese Govern­

ment should stand firm and have all the three posts reserved for the

Chinese because if we leave any post, especially that of the

chief accountant and traffic manager, to the Japanese, it would mean

that Japan would have a grip on the railway and it would interfere with

the flow of Chinese trade and the development of the economic resources

of Shantung. Because of the opposition in the Delegation to go to any

compromise on the question, the Chinese delegates held on to their position

for a while, but seeing no progress was made and the two observers,

who, while not taking part in the negotiations felt themselves responsible

that the conversation should make as rapid progress as possible modified

their view. MacMurray talked to us just as Sir Miles probably talked

to the Japanese, suggesting we find some formula which could be more

acceptable to both.

So the final position we took was that the Chinese in any case should

have the post of chief traffic manager but that of accountant was

yielded to the Japanese; since the Japanese were to have the chief

accountantship it was only fair that the Chinese should have the

chief traffic manager. At first, the Japanese offered a Japanese chief

traffic manager and a Chinese deputy traffic manager, which we

i/vy^ W
turned down, aMadw^e, reply made the same offer to Japan. Japan

declined. Finally as the conversations got into an impasse Baron

Koo, Wellington

Shidehara pointed out that this point should not be such a difficult

question: after all it was only one of the many problems connected

with the railway and so, he said, in order to show the extremely concilia­

tory attitude on the part of the Japanese Delegation, he offered to

accept the Chinese traffic manager with a Japanese deputy. The rights

of the two officers would be more or less equal - they would have to agree

on things. But he said that it was his personal suggestion. It was

contrary instructions which the Japanese’Delegation had received. The

instructions directed him to insist on a chief Japanese traffic manager,

while the most that Japan could agree on was a deputy Chinese traffic

manager. But he said in order to get over this difficulty he would

take it on himself to recommend to his government to have a Chinese traffic

manager and a Japanese deputy with equal powers. He wanted it to be

understood it was his personal suggestion, but if the Chinese Delegation

could accept this compromise proposition, he promised he would do every­

thing possible to persuade his government to accept it. On our side

we promised to consider the formula.

There were a great many newspapermen outside, two or three Chinese

journalists and a great many American and European and Japanese jour­

nalists; they were trying to ask what was the progress so far, but we

said nothing. So we went back. General Huang Fu of course heard it.

I remember the same evening just before dinner time, he came in the

company of some other members of the Delegation, without seeing me or

Dr. Alfred Sze, but spoke to Dr. Wang,and probably Ma Soo. General

Huang Fu, and Chiang Mon-lin, though I1m not sure if he came or not,

reported that certain members of the Delegation were strongly opposed

Koo, Wellington

to accepting the formula. At a meeting we held that evening. Dr. Wang

and myself and Dr. Sze thought that we should, but Dr. Wang told us

of Huang FuIs visit so we tried to discuss the alternatives again.

After weighing the arguments and so forth, we still came to the conclu­

sion that if we wanted to settle the Shantung question then we ought

to accept it because, as I pointed out, this was the last door. If

we declined it the conference was sure to break up. Dr. Sze and Dr.

Wang saw it exactly in the same light, but Dr. Wang was worried

about the opposition. In the morning in Moran House there was a con­

stant flow of calls from members of the Delegation, the general im­

pression being that General Huang Fu as well as the Kuomintang were

strongly^opposed to it.

So I think we decided to refer the question to the high advisers,

and told them that it was provoking a great deal of criticism and un­

easiness. When we had explained it to them, they agreed with us, which

gave us some encouragement. As was usual, just before going to the

meeting we met in order to go together. It was already about half past

two when people began to assemble nearby. The noise became greater and

greater and as we were about to leave, between half past two and three
~T^ v y
o*clock, the secretary Philip Gfaiao came to say that there was a mob

in Moran House and outside wanting to see the delegates: they had

heard that the delegates were going to accept the Japanese formula. Their

attitude was so threatening that the secretary Dr. Gfeiao and two or

three others said that we had better not go down, but time was going
Koo, Wellington

very fast and there were telephone calls every two or three minutes

from Mr. MacMurray asking what had happened: the Japanese had arrived and

we were late. To the first two or three calls, we said we're going,

we*re going. By then the people downstairs were yelling and I wanted to

go down myself. Dr. Wang and Dr. Sze thought I shouldn't and sent Dr.

Chiao, and Y. F. Tsao, but they couldn't calm them. The telephone rang

again - they wanted to talk to one of the delegates. I answered the

phone and told Mr. MacMurray what the trouble was, and he said, "Oh,

that's easy;" he would ask the police to send a detachment of mounted

police. I begged him not to do that, I said certainly we would be able

to come if he would ask the Japanese to be a little patient.

We went downstairs. I told the people waiting there that the

Chinese delegates thought that the agreement just reached with Japan

was a fair compromise, adding that if they believed that that agreement

was an evidence of treason on the part of the Chinese delegates, the

Chinese delegates could withhold the signing of it. I went on to explain

that in any diplomatic negotiations one could not get one hundred per

cent of what one wanted and that, in this particular case with Japan,

the Chinese delegates had got more than fifty percent. I pointed out

that both from the technical point of view and from the point of view of

prestige, we had got the maximum from Japan and could not expect

Japan to yield any more. If we did not accept this, I said, the con-
•a-
ference would certainly break up; in that case there would be no certainty

that the conference would be resumed because China was not in a position
Koo, Wellington

to bring pressure upon Japan. I also told them that the British and

American delegates had already indicated that they were surprised by

Shidehara*s conciliatory attitude and bad paid great compliment to him;

and that, in my personal opinion, he was a reasonable man and was

familiar with the Western sense of justice. Finally, I told them

that, since a representative represents his country, his government,

and his people, he must be responsible to them and must not misuse the

peopled rights, but I warned them that, if the conference broke up,

we could not see any way by which it could be resumed. Then, the

people around me responded: "We don^ care about that.1 The only thing

we want is that you should say no." I told them that I might say no,

but again I reminded them of the consequences of the break-up of the

conference. Eventually, we delegates broke through the crowd, and

some people in the crowd called us traitors.

When we reached the Pan American Building, the Japanese delegates had

been waiting for us for half an hour. Accordingly, they asked us what

our answer was. I said that we appreciated the spirit of the compromise

proposition they had presented to us, but .... When I uttered the word

but, Mr. Shidehara went out of the room right away. I believe that the

Japanese delegates should have known that the Chinese peopled objection

to the agreement was strong and that the Chinese Delegation was even

surrounded by the Chinese people; I believe that they should have ex­

pected a definite no from the Chinese Delegation.

At that time, just before Christmas, Mr. Liang Shih~i was

Koo, Wellington

appointed Prime Minister. Mr. Obata, the Japanese Charge D^ffaires in

Peking, called on Mr. Liang and congratulated him on the occasion. When

Obata asked Liang what his new policy on the Shantung question would

be, Liang said, "To have a loan to redeem the railroad." On December

28, 1921, the Chinese Delegation received from the Foreign Office a

telegram which contained this story. Actually, just before his interview

with Liang, Obata had called on Dr. Yen, who continued to be the

Foreign Minister in the new cabinet, and asked him whether the Chins se

Delegation in Washington had been acting in accordance with the instruc­

tions sent from Peking. (Obata was apparently instructed by his govern­

ment in Tokyo. It should be noted that Obata was more or less tympa-

thetic with the so-called "young officers group" in Japan.) Dr. Yen^

answer was noncommittal. Therefore, Obata had decided to call on Liang.

Accordingly, Liang*s answer - "to have a loan to redeem the railroad"

- was transmitted to Tokyo and from Tokyo to Washington. In Washington,

Secretary Hughes and a few others learned it from the Japanese Delegation.

The Americans were shocked by Liang’s remark.

Thus, for two or three weeks, there was a confused situation. The

Chinese Delegation asked the government in Peking whether the Shantung

conversations would be resumed in Peking, pointing out that, if that

would be the case, we would alienate the friendly sympathies of Great

Britain and the United States. The answer was that our government had

no such intention. Meanwhile, the British and American delegates invited

the Chinese delegates to exchange personal opinions.

Koo, Wellington

According to the press. General Wu P*ei-fu sent a circular telegram

denouncing the new cabinet, particularly the new prime minister. The

Chine se Delegation did not know what was happening in Peking; they got

information from the Americans and the British. Dr. Sze and I saw Mr.

Hughes, at his invitation, and later saw Mr. Balfour at his invitation.

Both urged us to reconsider our opposition and pointed out the confusion

which would follow from the failure to settle the Shantung question just

because of China’s adamant stand on the question of the traffic management.

Mr. Balfour said the world outside would not understand how such an

important conference, which was taking place in Washington, could not

wind up its work because of China1s adamant stand on this particular

point. Mr. Hughes impressed on us that the Shantung conversations, though

held on the fringe of the Conference, were really a part of the Conference;

unless the Shantung question was settled, the conference on the limita­

tion of armament could not bring its sessions to an end.

After the second week had passed, X asked what was the Japanese formula

then. They both said that they had been informed by Baron Shidehara

that Japan would not accept anything less than a chief Japanese traffic

manager, with the post of a deputy traffic manager for a Chinese, who could

not take office for five years.

 FILMED
BY

^Microfilming

Corporation of
America
 THE WELLINGTON KOO MEMOIR

Volume III:

Service in China (1922-1932)

This memoir was made possible by grants
from the Pord Foundation and the National
Endowment for the Humanities to Columbia
University for the East Asian Institute,

Copyright C 1976, The Trustees of Columbia

University in the City of New York. All
rights reserved. This work may be cited
and brief passages may be quoted as with
any scholarly work, but the memoir may not
be published, nor sold, nor otherwise re­
produced in any form without written per­
mission from the East Asian Institute of
Columbia University, New York, New York 10027.
 REMINISCENCES OF WELLINGTON KOO

Volume III: Service in China, 1922-1932

Interviewer: T. K. Tong

Editor: Donald Sutton

 Ill SERVICE IN CHINA, 1922-32

Table of Contents

E Political Life in Peking, 1922-24

F Politics, Civil War, and Finance, 1925-27

G Terms of Office as Foreign Minister, 1922-28

H The Peking Government in Retrospect

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 srx~:*e«rg--of Political Life in Peking, 1922-1928,

Part I. Dr. Yen's Second Premiership, June 11, 1922 to August 5, 1922

At the end of the Washington Conference, Dr. Yen sent a telegram

to the Chinese delegation in Washington, expressing the hope that the

three delegates would visit Peking for consultation with regard to the

implementing of a number of resolutions of the Washington Conference,

particularly the agreement concerning the Shantung question. Dr. Sze,

as a matter of fact, did not go back to China; but Dr. Wang went back

to China immediately after the Conference so that he would be able to

report the work of the Conference to the Government. I was to go back too

after having made some arrangements in England, I thought I might be

able to go back to China in the spring.

As soon as the Conference was over, I returned to London, and I

did not begin to make my trip to China until late in April. I remember

I took a ship of the Peninsula & Oriental Line. In those days, it took

more than five weeks from London to Shanghai through the Suez Canal. When

I reached Shanghai in the latter part of May, it was already hot, at the

beginning of summer.

In Shanghai I sent a telegram to Foreign Minister Yen, reporting

my arrival and indicating that I would be in Peking within a few days

to make a personal report to him. Yen replied with a telegram extending

his welcome. On May 31 I arrived in Peking by train. In Peking, I

 I

lived in T1ieh-shih-tzu hu-t'ung, and Yen lived in Shih-ta-jen hu-t'ung.

Soon after my arrival, one day at 2:30 p.m., I called on Yen to report

to him not only on matters concerning the implementation of the resolutions

of the Washington Conference but also on the present relations between

China and Great Britain. To my surprise Dr. Yen did not say anything

either about the resolutions of the Washington Conference or on interna­

tional relations in general. He said he was going to leave Peking W

that same night to fetch his wife and children from Hangchow for the

summer. He wanted to give me a dinner of welcome, he said, but since

he had to leave that same night, he had asked the Vice Minister of the

Foreign Office to play host on his behalf, and the dinner had already

been arranged. I was somewhat taken aback by the information that he

was going to leave on that very day. When I asked him how soon he would

come back, he said he would be away from Peking for a few days in order

to take a rest. He added that, since he had been working for some time

in the Government in the capacity of Foreign Minister, he wanted to take

a longer rest for the sake of his health, and he hoped that I would take

up his job in the Foreign Office.

This suggestion was a surprise to me because I had come back only

for official consultation in connection with the international situation

in general and particularly with the Shantung question, and I had no

intention to remain in China for long. Furthermore, I had no intention

to enter into politics and wished to go back to London where I had been

assigned for only a little more than one year.

 At that time the political situation in Peking was in a turmoil.

After Dr. Yen’s departure from Peking, I visited President Hsu Shih-

ch’ang and a few others. President Hsu received me very enthusiastically

and complimented me on the work of the Chinese delegation in the

Washington Conference and on the part I played in that conference. He

told me that he wanted to give me a luncheon of welcome and had asked the

chief of the Miscellaneous Affairs Section to make the arrangement for

it. As a result of the courtesy calls, I gathered that the political

situation in Peking was in a state of flux. The newspapers printed

a lot on the activities of the political leaders who were gathering in

Tientsin. It was expected that a coup d’dtat might take place.I

I had been absent from China for seven years in which the

political situation in China had undergone great changes. In August

1915 I left Peking to take up my post as Chinese minister in Mexico.

In May the same year a treaty was signed between China and Japan

following the negotiations about Japan’s Twenty-one Demands, in which

I had participated at the request of President Yuan Shih-k'ai and Foreign

Minister Lu Cheng-hsiang. Right in that year, the monarchical movement

sponsored by the so-called Ch’ou-an-hui got under way. Then followed

che death of President Yuan in 1916, Then followed the overthrow of

the Republic by General Chang Hsun in 1917. Then followed the

restoration of the Republic by Marshal Tuan Ch’i-jui in that same year.

Then followed the constitution protection movement late in that year.

Then in 1917 in the tenure of Chief Executive Tuan Ch’i-jui, there was

the controversy as to whether China should participate in the European

war when I, from my post in Washington, advocated Chinese participation.

In 1920 there was a civil war.

\

c""'."..
Meanwhile disputes centering upon the constitution had continued

to rage, not the least of which was the question of presidential

succession. After the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai, the Southerners insisted

that the former Vice President, Li Yuan-hung, had succeeded Yuan as

president in accordance with the Old Constitution, while the Northerners

maintained that he had succeeded Yuan in accordance with the New

Constitution. General Li Yuan-hung served as President after the death

of Yuan Shih-k’ai until 1917 when he was overthrown by Chang Hsun. After

the restoration of the republic, Feng Kuo-chang had been elected Vice

President to Li Yuan-hung: he succeeded Li Yuan-hung as the president.

Thus, when Li Yuan-hung was overthrown by Chang Hsun, he turned over the

presidency to Feng Kuo-chang. Feng Kuo-chang served until October 10,

1918. The three, Yuan Shih-k’ai, Li Yuan-hung, and Feng Kuo-chang,

served together one presidential term of five years. Yuan was inaugurated

on October 10, 1913, so Feng's term naturally expired on October 10, 1918.

Then Hsu Shih-ch’ang was inaugurated president. At the same time there

were a great number of Cabinet changes in those seven years.

So when I went back to Peking in May 1922 I was somewhat at a

loss as to the actual political situation. Some changes were in the air

and as the day passed before the date set by the President for the

welcoming dinner, each day brought more developments indicating that the

situation was working towards a crisis. I remember on the morning of

the day set for the luncheon in my honor, on June 11, 1922, I telephoned

to the shu-wu-k’e-chang (head of the Division of Miscellaneous Affairs)

asking him to report to the President that seeing how much he must be

preoccupied with the political situation, he should cancel the party

and I begged him not to feel any embarrassment in doing so. The

shu-wu-k*e-chang said that he had early that morning given instructions

to have everything ready as planned and had even asked who w~v Id be

present, so that the President really wanted to have this party held

as had been arranged. I attended the luncheon, which was at ChU-jen

Hall. There were about 40 people there. Cabinet ministers, the Vice

President, the leading military authorities, such as the garrison

commander [hsien ping ssu ling], police chief [ching fe-s a tsung chien] ,

commander of military police were all present. It was an all Chinese

party, and the leading members of the government and the official world

were invited. At the table I was on President Hsil's right and we

eschanged remarks; he asked questions about. Washington and England without

betraying the least sign that anything was going to happen. He was

absolutely calm. He turned to the guests on his left and spoke to those

opposite him in a perfectly normal way. After lunch - it was a foreign

lunch - he said that we would have coffee and cigarettes in another

room. He said that he would say a few words. We retired to this

drawing room and as fieffee was being served we were all standing,

circulating. President Hsu said he wanted to say a few words to the

gathering which gave him great pleasure; he knew it was not usual for

the host to say anything on an occasion of this kind but he felt it was

a good opportunity to say something he wanted to say. Then he

announced that in view of his getting old and his health not being too

strong, he felt it was time for him to take a rest. He understood that

arrangements had been made to look after national affairs, so he wanted

to take this opportunity of saying goodbye to the guests. He said he

had all the travelling arrangements ready. He would go direct to the

station and return to Tientsin. Everyone was so surprised. Maybe

in the company there were some - but I think few - who could have known

his decision to leave. So instead of saying goodbye we waited for him

to leave in his car and we all followed to see him off at the railway

station! This was June|2; he left for his retirement around 3:00 p.m.

Shortly after, either the next day or the same afternoon, Li

Yuan-hung was due to arrive. I think instead of going back, we stayed on

- to welcome the new president! Dr. Wang Ch’ung-hui was among those

at the station when President Hsu left, but by the time General Li's

train pulled in, I was surprised to see Dr. Yen as well. I said,

"When did you come back?" He said, "Last night." Just a few days

before, he had left Peking for Hankow after bringing his wife back. I

saw him walk over and whisper something to Dr. C. H. Wang. So I said

to myself there must be something going on. This was on the railway sta­

tion. Dr. C. T. Wang was there too, and many faces familiar to me.

X was surprised to see not only Dr. Yen there but many others who I had

been told were away from Peking. They had been in Tientsin or elsewhere,

but all of a sudden turned up at the station! Most of them followed

President Li Yuan-hung to his house in Kan-ch'ang hu-t'ung, but I

went to my home.

Dr. C. H. Wang before I left the station said, "I have something
 1
important to tell you." After a while he came to my house and said

he had an important message from Dr. Yen. He wanted him to tell me

that he had recommended me as foreign minister. I felt so queer. I

said he had mentioned something about his being tired of being the

Foreign Minister, therefore he wanted to go to Hangchow for a rest. But

Dr. Wang said he specially asked him to convey roe the message. But

I said that could not possibly be, so far as I am concerned. I had just

come back to report and I had brought very few articles of clothing with

me; I had left everything in London.

Well I didn’t take it very seriously but I thought there was some

kind of political game going on. The reason I did not follow the crowd

to General Li’s house was that while we were waiting - there was Wu

Ching-lien, speaker of the house, Wang Chia-hsiang, president of the

Senate, and many others, including some of my closest friends in

Peking - was-Jdart. I gathered that President Li would form a Cabinet

and it was known that Wu, Wang, Yen, and C. T. Wang had gone to

discuss the formation of the new Cabinet. Then in the afternoon it was

announced that the Cabinet would be announced the same afternoon. But

later in the afternoon, they said it was not ready yet, and that Dr.

Yen had left- Peking for the Western Hills. Dr. C. T. Wang had been sent

by the President to persuade Dr. Yen to come back. The reason, I think it

was reported to me, was that General Li Yuan-hung wanted to nominate

Mr. T’ang Shao-i as the prime minister and W. W. Yen as foreign minister

pending the arrival of Mr. T'ang Shao-i, and that Dr. Yen meanwhile

was to act as Premier. Dr. Yen did not like it so he left. Well,

it was uncertain when Mr. T'ang Shao-i would come or whether he was willing

to come at all, but it was the unanimous desire of the parliament leaders
that Mr. T'ang should be the prime minister. Evidently a bargain

had bean struck between the Southern or Hu-fa faction - with the

moral support of the Chihli party, for Hsu Shih~ch'ang, the resigning

president, was one of the original members of the Chihli clique.

General Li Yuan-hung was not pitching on the presidency, he was again

to be the Vice President. I think some understanding must have been

reached betwen the Chihli and the southern group that General Li would

act temporarily as president to pave the way for Ts'ao K'un's accession.

Well the Cabinet was not formed the same evening. Dr. C. T.

Wang went to the Western Hills and did not succeed in bringing Dr. Yen

back. It was reported to the Cabinet makers and finally Dr. Yen's

point was carried. Now when his premiership was announced, he began to

form his Cabinet. I>i#£erenfc- friends came to me and said that General

Wu P'ei-fu, in fact both the Pao-ting and Loyang groups, then in the

same camp - were in favor of a Cabinet including ex-members of the

Washington delegation, and would I be willing to take a Cabinet post?

I said I had just come back to take a look and try to help out in the

implementation of the Washington Conference resolutions, especially

the Shantung Treaty, but they said the all-round sentiment was in favor
Moirj-d
of a hg«&a represented cabinet. "Anyway," they said, "you'll hear from

Dr. Yen." Then they went home.

Before two o'clock, several phone calls came to tell me that I

would be in Dr. Yen's cabinet. I wasn't keenly interested - I was just

 Q

curious - how could X be chosen, since I had not been in political life

in Peking, and had only just come back? Among the people Dr. Yen was

consulting there was evidently a division of opinion. Those in the

conference proposed in their own version Dr. C. H. Wang as Minister of

Justice; Dr. Yen had hesitated and then said Dr. Alfred Sze was also
Kam ~ -i''-
a htt^a representative, therefore he wanted him to be Foreign Minister.

He wanted me to be Minister of Education. Somebody said apparently

Dr. Yen had decided that pending Alfred Sze’s arrival he would act

concurrently as Foreign Minister himself, and that I was to be the

Minister of Education. Among the callers, there were two or three

Chinese from Dr. Wang's entourage, some parliamentarians, Chou Tzu-

ch'i especially with his liaison man the newspaperman W. H. Donald, who

was very much mixed up too. He loved China and had many friends.

One of them said, "Dr. Yen was going to telephone to you." At two

o'clock the phone rang and the servant said that Yen Tsung-li wanted

to speak to me. When I took up the telephone the voice said, "Wait,

the Premier will be with you in a moment," but after I had held on for a

while no one came so I hung up. After about twenty minutes to half an

hour, someone said that Dr. Yen had so many demands from different circles

that he had to finally decide on Lin Ch'ang-min as Minister of Education.

I think that Lin Ch'ang-min was then the secretary general of the House,

the Chung-i Yuan. Towards the evening it was announced it was Huang

Yen-p'ei.

Next day Dr. Yen called Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui to tell me that he wanted
 \S

to include me but he was very sorry that so many groups wanted to be

represented in the Cabinet that he was unable to; but he wanted me to

work closely with him, and therefore offered me the presidency of the

Council on Financial Affairs, and asked for my concurrence. I told

Dr. Wang that neither education nor finance was my line and in any

case I had come back just to stay a short while and my intention

remained the same. But no, he said, the financial affairs of China are

chaotic and Dr. Yen has something which a pure financier could not take

care of. He had to find some man outside of the financial world,

independent and knowing the international situation well, since Chinese

financial problems were intimately connected with international banking.

I told him this was completely outside my line. Later Dr. Yen telephoned

me himself asking me to give a hand and so forth; he told me that in

organizing and employing personnel, I would be left entirely to use my

own judgment and that the job would have the same pay as that of a Cabinet

minister and asked me to reconsider his offer. He said the establishment

of the Council on Financial Affairs was already announced; wouldn't

X just help out? Of course Chinese finance was in a mess, and there

was always talk of financial reform, of solving the external debt,

internal debt, etc.

Later I found out more about the struggle over the premiership,

the titular premiership. Wu Ta-t'ou [Wu Ching-lien] the Speaker of the

House, strongly urged that Mr. T'ang Shao-i should be the titular head

of the Cabinet with Dr. Yen acting as Foreign Minister pending the arrival

of Mr. T'ang. And Dr. Yen had his own political friends. They advised

him not to accept that because it would be rather embarrassing. So the

argument Dr. Yen put up before be left for the seaside was, "What

am I to do as 'Acting premier'? When I want to form a judgment, should

X consult Mr. T’ang or should I not? Should I form a cabinet according

to his wishes or according to what I think should be done here? From

the political point of view it was a problem. Wu Ching-lien, being the

Speaker and the backbone of Li Yuan-hung1s comeback, had a program

mapped out, and he fought for it and so the conflict of views could not

be solved and as Dr. Yen went away in protest, the situation became a

deadlock, because it was not certain whether Mr. T'ang Shao-i would
W kM
accept, and if accepting, when he would come. So with C. T. Wang's

help - C. T. Wang was then vice president of the Senate, and Wang Chia-

hsiang was its president - President Li was advised to accede to Dr.

Yen's wishes. But when the Cabinet was announced, Wu Ching-lien was

already dissatisfied. He was so dissatisfied that he spoke to some of

his colleagues, of whom several being also close friends of mine, came to

tell me. They said, "I'm afraid Dr. Yen's Cabinet will not last long,

he'll have a hard time when his cabinet is submitted for the approval

of Parliament." For Mr. Wu Ching-lien's group made it known that

the House would not be able to approve the Cabinet unless there were

members in it acceptable to the House. At that time he was the head

of the group called "I-yu-she" (Friendship Association). The

"Cheng-hsueh hsi" was also close to him, so that Wu had the Lower House

in his hands. When it became apparent that his Cabinet would not be

approved by the Parliament, Dr. Yen declared that his Cabinet would hold
 w

office for about six weeks and would be an interim one. Since the

Parliament would not meet until August 1, 1922, it was not necessary

to have his Cabinet approved. He offered his resignation as soon

as Parliament met on that date.

Dr. C. H. Wang*s Cabinets and the Conflict with Parliament,

August 5, 1922 - November 19, 1922.

The resignation of Dr. Yen's Cabinet was a foregone

conclusion. Since late July 1922 the formation of a new Cabinet

had been under consultation behind the scenes between the

President's Office on the one hand and the Parliament headed by

Wu Ching-lien on the other. General Wu P'ei-fu at Loyang favored

a Cabinet formed by the representatives who had participated in the

Washington Conference; this idea was then popular in China. In

this respect, General Wu was in close touch with the Pao-ting

yck
Clique, whose spokesman was Ts'ao Ssu-yi-, Ts'ao K'un's younger

brother. General Wu's spokesman was Sun Tan-lin. He had another

representative.whose name was Kao En-hung, but he had more confidence

in Sun Tan-lin. Both Sun and Kao were natives of P'eng-lai,

the birthplace of General Wu.I often saw Sun and Kao, especially

the former, in the home of Dr. C. H. Wang, who was my close friend;

in fact, Wang introduced Sun to me.

When Dr. C. H. Wang was appointed as Acting Prime

Minister on August 5, 1922, he asked me to be his foreign Minister.

Kao En-hung was the Minister of Communications. I understood that

every cabinet nomination was telegrammed to Loyang for approval.

Actually, T'ang Shao-i was Prime Minister, and C. H. Wang was only

Acting Prime Minister pending T'ang's arrival. Wu Ching-lien took

it upon himself to communicate with Mr. T'ang. For a short

time it was hopeful that T'ang, who was in Shanghai, would accept

the premiership. In Wang's acting premiership, the Cabinet

consisted of T'ien Wen-lieh Minister of the Interior, Kao

{ fLS. . 1L >
Ling-wei Minister of Finance, Chang Shao-tseng Minister of

War, Li Ting-hsin Minister of the Navy, Chang Yao-tseng Minister

of Justice, Wang Ch'ung-hui concurrently as Minister of Education , Lu

Hsing Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, and Kao En-hung

Minister of Communications. Since this was the composition of the

Cabinet, I could well understand the reason why T'ang did not want to

accept the premiership. Some of the personalities in the Cabinet

could not possibly be acceptable to T'ang. The so-called

T'ang Shao-i Cabinet was simply a design to use his name. The

Cabinet was actually the result of an agreement reached between

Loyang and Paoting with the understanding of I-yu-she headed

by Wu Ching-lien. Kao Ling-wei belonged to the Paoting Clique.

The cabinet headed by Dr. C. H. Wang as Acting

Prime Minister was organized on August 5, 1922. After

T'ang Shao-i definitely declined to accept the premiership, the

Cabinet was reorganized on September 19 with C. H. Wang as

Premier, Sun Tan-lin as Minister of Interior, Lo Wen-kan as

Minister of Finance, Chang Shao-tseng as Minister of War, Li

of
Ting-hsin as Minister of the Navy, Hsu Ch'ien as Minister/Justice,
T'ang Erh-ho Minister of Education, Kao Ling-wei Minister of

Agriculture and Commerce, and Kao En-hung Minister of

Communications. X continued to serve as Foreign Minister

/WVvVv,

Dr. C. H. Wang's Cabinet had a rough time because the

relationship between the Cabinet and the Parliament headed by Wu

Ching-lien wai> not smooth. According to my knowledge, there were

several reasons for this. First, there was the question of submitting

the list of Cabinet members to the Parliament for approval, and the

names of Sun Tan-lin and Kao En-hung were not favorably received

by the parliamentary circles. The reason was obvious. Many

Parliament members said that Sun and Kao were not qualified to be

Cabinet members and were of unknown political quality and that

their names were included in the Cabinet list simply because they

were Wu P’ei-fu's men. Besides, there were many aspirants for

Cabinet posts. It was known that Dr. C. H. Wang was under the

influence of Sun and Kao and that Wang was in constant contact

with General Wu through Sun and Kao, especially through Sun.

General Wu was a strong man and the backbone of the cabinet. Mr.

Wu Ching-lien on his part was politically a strong man and always

insisted that he should have his way. Although from time to

time General Wu considered the question of constitutionality to be

important, he did not have any particular love for the parliamentarians.

That was the way in China in those days.

 It was made known by Wu Ching-lien’s group,

which was supported by some other groups, that when Parliament voted

upon the ministers’ nomination for approval in accordance with the

Constitution there was no possibility that the two men Sun Tan-lin

and Kao En-hung would be approved as Cabinet ministers. It

is difficult to say whether or no Sun and Kao were qualified to be

Cabinet ministers. Normally, a Cabinet minister would have to have

national reputation and have adequate amount of experience in public

life. Personally, I liked these two gentlemen and got along with

them very well, but their political experiences wer-e very limited;

I do not know whether they had any political experience. Sun

Tan-lin was General Wu's chief secretary, while Kao En-hung had

been head of the Telegraai Office in Shanghai. In a special sense,

both of them were qualified to be Cabinet ministers because they

were fellow provincials of Marshal Wu P’ei-fu and had the confi­

dence of Wu; from the political point of view, it was not bad to

include them in the Cabinet because they would act as General Wu’s

spokesmen and no Cabinet could last long without Wu’s backing.

From another point of view, the appointing of Sun and Kao was

not a happy choice because the parliamentary groups, especially

Mr. Wu Ching-lien’s group, were most anxious to have their men

to be included in the Cabinet. Wu Ching-lien was a man of ambition;

he had always wanted to be prime minister. The very fact that

Wu Ching-lien had cooperated with the Loyang and Paoting Cliques

in unseating Hsu Shih-ch'ang and bringing back Li Yuan-hung was

due to an agreement reached between Wu on one hand and the Loyang

and Paoting Cliques on the other. Though it could not be verified,

it was known among the political circles that there was an under­

standing that, after the unseating of Hsu Shih-ch'ang, Li Yuan-hung

would be brought back to the presidency for the time being, in order

to prepare the way for Ts'ao K'un's election to the presidency,

and that, after Ts'ao K'un was elected President, Wu Ching-lien would

become prime minister and form a Cabinet.

That was the basis of the understanding, but General

Wu P'ei-fu, while stressing peaceful constitutionality, did not have

much liking for parliamentarians. I doubt very much that he under­

stood the principles and ideas of representative government although

he was a very honest man and an efficient soldier and stood for

morality and legality in the classical sense of the old school.

So, once more, the Cabinet was on one side, the President

was on another side and Parliament was on still another side. There

was also the so-called "party of real strength." It was a sort of

four-corner arrangement, which had its advantages but also its

disadvantages. The conflict of political interests always came to the

top in the actual running of the government.

 After Mr. Wu Ching-lien and his friends in Parliament

had made it known that the two ministers Sun Tai- lin and Kao

En-hung could not possibly be approved by Parliament, Dr. C. H.

Wang was advised, with the approval of General Wu P'ei-fu through

the channels of Sun and Kao, not to send his list of Cabinet members

to Parliament for approval. This, therefore, would not give

Parliament an opportunity to upset the Cabinet. That was the

fundamental cause of the difficulties of Dr. Wang's own Cabinet.

These difficulties led to the open quarrel between the Prime

Minister and Wu Ching-lien as head of Parliament. This open

quarrel, in turn, led to the refusal of Finance Minister Lo

Wen-kan to supply the necessary funds to Parliament and finally

to the Lo Wen-kan case, M-&- arrest^ and his -detention/

Friction between Parliament and Cabinet began almost at

once. Right after the forming of Dr. C. H. Wang's Cabinet, Mr. Wu

Ching-lien himself and a few others in Parliament called on Lo

Wen-kan and asked for funds which Parliament was entitled to

receive within the national budget. Dr. Lo found it difficult

to make the required payments, but he did not make any suggestion as

to how the financial difficulties of Parliament should and could

be met. It is curious to say that Dr. Lo, while he had many

friends in Parliament, did not like Mr. Wu Ching-lien, the

Speaker, who was a strong personality and domineering to anyone

who could not understand him. Dr. Lo was also a strong

personality; he thought that, as minister of Finance, it was

up to him to furnish the funds and that he could use that

power as a weapon. On the other hand, Wu Ching-lien took the

stand that, since Dr. Wang’s Cabinet members could not all be

approved, it w<Mild mean the upset of that Cabinet.

One day, Mr. Wu Ching-lien came to see me and

complained about the Finance Minister's unsympathetic attitude and

refusal to furnish funds for Parliament and asked for my advice.

I said I would telephone Mr. Lo and support Mr. Wu's request for

funds. When I telephoned Lo he said, "Don't pay much attention

to him." He explained that, in the first place, the Treasury

did not get much money and, in the second place, Wu was not

cooperating with the Government. Well, that might have been a

good reason privately, but that was not a wise way to handle the

situation. After all, I thought, Parliament was entitled to its

monthly funds. Mr. Wu Ching-lien said how could he pay his

secretaries and how could Parliament function without funds?

I told Wu that the Treasury might be empty and suggested he

borrow some money and ask the Finance Minister to guarantee the

loan. Wu said that Finance Minister Lo would not do that, which

was why he had come to me. He told me that a friend of his

had arranged with a Belgian bank a loan of $30,000 silver for

monthly parliamentary appropriation, but the bank requested that

the Finance Minister should write the bank a letter to that

effect and this letter should be countersigned by the Foreign

Minister. Thereupon I called up Dr. Lo again, but he refused to

do it. I argued with him. F.e said that what the bank wanted was

really the signature of the Foreign Minister and asked me to go

ahead with the loan agreement. I said, "When you say 'Go ahead,' you

approve it." I added that it was the Ministry of Finance which had

to guarantee the repayment because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

had no funds, Since Dr. Lo and I were always on friendly terms,

I signed the letter in question and sent official communications,

together with copies of the agreement between Wu Ching-lien and the

Belgian bank, to the President and Finance Minister. In this

care, I was only the intermediary.

There had already been some friction between the

Ministry of Finance and Parliament. One reason was that Dr. Lo

was on Dr. Wang's side and Dr. Wang was on the side of Sun Tan-lin

and Kao En-hung, the two spokesmen of General Wu P'ei-fu. Dr.

Wang did not fully inform me of the political maneuvers and consulta­

tions. Dr. Lo was a life-long friend of Dr. Wang's. Dr. Wang

was a scholar and a very courteous person, while Dr. Lo was the

opposite and was always ready to fight. Both of them were

Cantonese. I speak and understand Cantonese too, but I did not get

mixed up in their personal affairs.

 As time went on the situation became more and more

strained. Parliament kept on sending one communication after

another to the President, asking him to communicate the names of the

new Cabinet members, but the President was always advised by the

Cabinet, or rather by the two Wu P'ei-fu spokesmen, not to do so.

This created a very awkward situation.

So, Parliament tried to find fault with the Govern­

ment. It repeatedly asked the President to order the Prime

Minister to appear personally before Parliament, but Dr. Wang would

never do so. Once, twice, and thrice this question was brought to

the Cabinet. I always took the stand that, in this respect,

Parliament was acting constitutionally and that the Cabinet should

act in accordance with the Constitution; I said the Cabinet should

send somebody to Parliament. So for two or three times the

Cabinet sent me to Parliament. Some people warned me, "You

would have a very unpleasant time!" I said that was a situation

every parliamentary government had to deal with. The only way was

to face the situation and there was no way to avoid it. I added

that parliamentary members were human beings too and that, so long

as you could make up a good case, they could not make trouble with you.

Since Dr. Wang noticed that I was always in favor of getting further

answers from Parliament, he asked me to go to Parliament.

When I came to Parliament, the audience were solemn

because they all wanted to make trouble. Then, they began to ask me
questions and I answered them very politely; I was honest with

them, trying to tell them the truth, the reasons, the difficulties

as well as the pros and cons. Usually, at the end of my explana­

tion, there was applause, and some members would come to me to

extend their appreciation of my presence would say that I, in

coming to Parliament, set an example of respect to the Constitu­

tion. Probably this was their real feeling. They told me that I

was lucky and I handled the situation al^ right. But this

didn’t mean satisfactory settlement; although Parliament members

treated me pretty well, their real intention still was to create

troubles for the Cabinet. This may be explained by an old

Chinese phrase: "What the drunken old man really interested

in is not wine, but something else."

I acted as a liaison man between the Cabinet and

Parliament. I used to entertain some of the Parliament members and used

to have guests of three, four, or five tables, always including

the Cabinet ministers. That was the Chinese way of getting along

with the members of Parliament, and they appreciated my hospitality.

The personal relations of Dr. Wang, and Dr. Lo

with Wu P'ei-fu’s men were also rather cool. One evening the

trouble finally came to a climax. After much arrangement, I

tried to bring a sort of rapprochement more or less in an open

way between the Cabinet and Parliament. I don't remember what

the occasion was, but it was a dinner party I gave to the leaders of
Parliament and the members of the Cabinet in an effort to bring

both sides together and reconcile them. The party took place

in the big mansion of the Foreign Office. Dr. C. H. Wang was on

my opposite side. I had Wang Chia-hsiang, President of the Senate,

on my right side and Wu Ching-lien on my left side. The moment

when Wu Ching-lien saw Dr. C. H. Wang, he showed his displeasure

on his face. I tried to humor them. Then, Wu said to Dr. Wang,

"You are the Prime Minister? What kind of Prime Minister are

you? Do you have any respect for the constitution?" This

certainly was an open insult to Dr. Wang in front of about forty

people in the party. Then, someone said, "Quiet down! Quiet

down!" After all Dr. Wang was the Prime Minister, and he had to

defend his dignity. Then, I said, "Let’s forget it!. Let's

drink!" The party ended in displeasure.

The real issue concerned the submitting of the names

of the Cabinet members to Parliament for approval. Both in the

Cabinet meetings and in Dr. Wang's house, I tried to convince him

that the course he was pursuing was not the wisest. I said,

"You are an internationally known jurist; therefore, everyone

expects that of all the persons you would pay the most scrupulous

respect for the Constitution. It is required by the Constitution

that the names of the Cabinet members should be submitted to

Parliament for approval; this was part of the constitutional

law. You must make a decision. There are three alternatives. One
is to act in accordance with the Constitution and to ask the

President to submit the names of the Cabinet members to Parliament

for approval. If some names are not approved, then you proceed to

make necessary changes. The second alternative is that, if you do

not want to submit the Cabinet for approval, you should resign.

That would be constitutional too, and your resignation would be

understood by the nation and by Parliament. The third alternative

is that, if you think that your Cabinet list would not be approved

because the two Wu P’ei-fu's men are included in the list, then you

should ask General Wu to choose two other men to be included in the

list. These are the three alternatives, but you have so far

followed none of them. What you have done is just to disregard

Parliament, This is an impossible way. You just have given

the parliamentary leaders a chance to attack the Cabinet.

Personally, I know the third course would be very difficult

for you because of the two Wu P'ei-fu men [who strongly insisted

that the Cabinet should not submit the list of its members for

approval], and at the same time you cannot reach General Wu over

their heads. Since these two men opposed the first course and since

the third course could not be done, the only course is to

resign. You cannot stay on and at the same time refuse to choose

any one course."I

I knew that Dr. Wang was under the influence of these

two men. I also knew Wu Ching-lien was haughty and domineering.

Sometimes I talked to Dr. Wang even in my house, but he was a man

of few words. He did not want to show that he was a coward

and that he was the loser in the struggle with Wu Ching-lien and his
not
parliamentary tricks. But I knew that this situation could/last

long aid that some parliamentary members were cooking something else

to force us out. Therefore, I believed it was better for us to

resign than to be forced out. Dr. Wang never said yes or no.

He could not make a decision.

With such a political atmosphere in the capital, it

seemed that something would happen to accentuate the political

conflict between the Cabinet and Parliament. It did not take long

to see that this speculation was not unfounded. One evening -

it was Saturday evening - a dinner party was given at the Naval

Club by Admiral Li Ting-hsin, Minister of the Navy. The usual

prominent members of the Cabinet and the armed forces were present.

Among the military leaders there were the Garrison Commander of

Peking, the Chief of the Police in Peking, and the Chief of

the Gendarmerie. There were also some members of Parliament.

In the course of the dinner, one of the generals came in and

spoke a few words to General Wang Huai-ch'ing, the Garrison

Commander. Sensing the situation, I thought that something would

happen. After the dinner, at 9:15 p.m., Lo Wen-kan left with,

I thought, T'ang Erh-ho, Minister of Education. I remained for a

while and left ten minutes later. When I reached home I

received a telephone call from Mr. Lo's home, saying that a few

military men arrived and took him away in a way as if he had been

arrested. It was such a shock to me that I went immediately to

it
Dr. C. H. Wang's home in order to find out what/was all about.

Dr. Wang said he had also been informed that Dr. Lo had been

arrested and that, together with Lo, another man, who was the

head of the treasury department of the Finance Ministry, had also

been arrested. This man, a Cantonese and one of Lo's personal

friends, was young and had impressed me as quite able. Dr. Lo's

arrest was a shock to Dr. Wang. I suggested to him that he should

report this to the President and find out why Dr. Lo, Minister of

Finance, had been treated in such a way as had been reported. Dr.

Wang appeared to be very much depressed and said that if I

thought the President should be approached and asked for instructions,

I should do so with Dr. Wang's approval. I tried to impress

Dr. Wang that Lo's arrest was a matter affecting the whole cabinet,

of which Dr. Wang was the head; this was a serious action, the

responsibility for which should be determined. Dr. Wang said that

he wanted to resign. I told him that would probably follow as

a matter of course, but, first of all, we should try to find out

what was behind such an unusual event. Evidently, Dr. Wang

felt very much disturbed.

Although Dr. Wang and I were convinced of Dr. Lo's

personal honesty as Finance Minister, there must clearly have

been some pretext under which Lo was arrested. I left Dr. Wang's

house about 11:00 p.m. As I left him, I told him that, since I

had his approval, the first thing I would do the next morning was

that I would go to the President's Office and try to find out

what was behind this turn of events.

Shortly after 9:00 a.m. the next morning I was at the

President's Office. I was immediately conducted to a room where a

meeting was going on. I was asked to sit down. The President was at

the head of the table. There was General Wang Huai-ch'ing,

Garrison Commander; there was the Commander of the Infantry Division

in Peking; there was the Chief of Police; there were also the

Speaker of the House Wu Ching-lien, anl President of the Senate

Wang Chia-hsiang; there was the Secretary-General of the

President's Office Jao Han-hsiang. There may have been one or two

others present, but I cannot recall their names now. When I arrived

they all remained silent. I felt very much agitated. I spoke

to the President directly to the effect that I took for granted

that they knew my coming was in connection with Dr. Lo's arrest. I

said that Premier Wang Ch'ung-hui was not able to come and that I

came with his approval; I said the sudden arrest of Minister

of Finance was a serious matter not only for the Cabinet but also

for the President for whom, according to the Constitution, the

Cabinet was acting; I said that how could it have happened that

one of the Cabinet minister had been arrested without the knowledge
of the Government, the Premier, or the Minister of Justice; therefore,

I said that my purpose in calling upon the President was to find

out how this event could have taken place and who ordered Dr. Lo's

arrest in order to determine the question of responsibility.

General Li Yuan-hung appeared to be impressed by the

seriousness with which I addressed him in presence of the others

who were present. He said that he did not order the arrest. So

I said that, if the President had not ordered the arrest, who could

have ordered it, adding that, since the Cabinet functioning on

behalf of the President also had no knowledge of it, I considered

it a breach of the law. I went on to impress not only the

President but also those who were present with him by saying that

this event would produce the most undesirable impression abroad.

I said that, as Foreign Minister, I had been trying to impress the

outside world that China, like other countries, was a country ruled

by law; I said that the President, the Cabinet, and Parliament -

all were supposed to act in accordance with the Constitution; then,

X repeated my question: since the President said that he had not

ordered the arrest, then who could have ordered it? I said that,

on behalf of the cabinet, I would appreciate whatever information

given to me. The President then pointed to General Wang Huai-ch'ing

and said that his office had given the order to arrest Lo Wen-kan.

General Wang replied, "But I spoke to the President, and the

President directed me to go ahead." "I did not mean that,"

said the President,"! simply told you the contents of the letter
from Speaker Wu, reporting the matter concerning the Austrian loan;

after receiving the letter, I did send for you, but I did not tell you

to arrest Dr. Lo." General Wang said, "When I came at your summons

and you told me the contents of the letter and I asked whether I

should act in accordance with the law, you said, 'Go ahead'."

"I did not order you to arrest him," replied the President. General

Wang said he had understood that the President meant he should take

Dr. Lo in charge. The President said it was Speaker Wu, who had

proposed the arrest both in speaking and in writing. Wu Ching-lien

himself then said he had just reported this to the President and it

was up to the President to make a decision. Finally, the President

said that he did not mean to have Dr. Lo arrested.I

I intervened to say that, judging from what they had

just said, nobody had given the order for the arrest. The

Garrison Commander certainly had no right to make the arrest without

specific instructions, and the act could not possibly be said

to be legal. I also strongly emphasized that such an event must

be regarded as a disgrace for the Chinese Government and that we

must act quickly to repair the damage that had been done. Pointing

to the military chiefs present there, the President said that

Minister Koo was right and Minister Lo should be released at once.

After indicating that I was glad to know that the President saw the

point and was right, I left. Then, I went back to Dr. Wang's

house to report to him what had been going on. Shortly afterwards,
while I was still there. Dr. Wang received a telephone call probably

from the President's Office, saying that Dr. Lo had been released

and was invited to the President's Office and was presently with a

Mr. Wang, the Grand Master of Ceremonies, (a Cantonese).

Afterwards, I found out what happened was that the

President, the Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate

had had a talk after the meeting. Apparently impressed by the

legal aspect of the case, they agreed that Dr. Lo should be

released. However, since the charge of irregularities against

Dr. Lo in connection with the Austrian loan based on the Austrian

indemnities still remained unsolved, they decided to invite Dr. Lo

to stay in the President's Office as a sort of involuntary guest.

Apparently, setting Dr. Lo free without taking any precautionary

measures would risk the danger of Lo's leaving Peking and, thereby,

of putting him beyond the reach of the law if the accusation

against him in connection with his handling of the Austrian loan

should turn out to be well founded. It was apparent that the

conflict was a three-cornered one between Parliament, the

Cabinet, and the President.

Actually, as to the charge, I was in the dark. Once

I asked Dr. C. H. Wang whether he knew anything about it. Wang

replied that Dr. Lo signed the loan agreement only after having
reported it to him but without having it approved by the

whole Cabinet. I was somewhat taken aback as to why Dr. Lo

did that. Wang explained that Lo did so because it was the

urgency of getting funds to tide over the Mid-Autumn Festival,

which was always a critical time for the Government, particularly

the Ministry of Finance, which had to provide the funds. I asked

why Lo had signed the loan agreement at his home. Wang said that

Lo did so when he was indisposed with a severe cold and was

persuaded to do so by one Mr. Wang, Director of the Treasury

Department, adding that this Mr. Wang was a Cantonese friend of

Dr. Lo's. This Director, Wang went on, introduced to Lo a

well-known foreign export-import firm named Arnold Carberg, the

comprador of which was also a Cantonese and was a friend of both

Minister Lo and the Director. To be sure, I said, the procedure

could not be considered as very regular, but what mattered was whether

there was anything wrong with the contents of the loan agreement.

I added that that was a matter of substance and Dr. Wang should

look into it. The charge made by the Speaker of the House was

that a personal gain had been made by Minister Lo and Director

Wang in the form of kickback. Apparently that was what had stirred

up the President, but it was merely an unproved charge, and

we should find out whether there was any truth in it.

Dr. Wang was fully determined to resign with the

whole Cabinet. I fully agreed with him, but I insisted that

two cases should be brought to light. Both Dr. Wang and I were
fully convinced of Dr. Lo's personal honesty. Moreover this

scandal was brought on for the political purpose of bringing about

the downfall of the Cabinet; it was mainly engineered by the

Speaker of the Hous e Wu Ching-lien together with some members of the

Cabinet such as the Minister of War, who did not hide his

ambition to become the head of the Cabinet. Ihe Minister of

War was in close touch with Wu Ching-lien, and there had already

been talk about his becoming the next Prime Minister. It was

reported that there was a secret pact between him and the Speaker

concerning the division of the political spoils, namely, the

Cabinet posts.
The Formation and Fall of General Chang Shao-tseng^ Cabinet

Whatever the precise truth of the political gossip

about the secret plot of Wu Ching-lien and Chang Shao-tseng to

seize political power might be. Dr. Wang’s Cabinet’s resignation

en bloc was of course accepted by the President. I suppose that

President Li Yuan-hung's political advisers other than Wu Ching-

lien* s group must have advised him to find out some elder statesman,

who was independent of any political clique, to succeed Dr. Wang as

premier. Consequently, Mr. Wang Ta-hsieh, who was a scholar and a

diplomat and had been Chinese minister in London in the Ch’ing

dynasty, reluctantly accepted the appointment as Premier. He had a

high reputation as an elder statesman. He accepted the position of

Premier on the condition that he would serve as a intermediate for

only ten days.

Meanwhile, I had been trying to clear Dr. C. H. Wang’s

Cabinet of any suspicion of dishonesty on the part of Dr. Lo or anybody

else in the Cabinet. At that time, even Dr. C. H. Wang was accused

indirectly of having conspired in Dr. Lo’s maneuvers in connection

with the Austrian loan. This accusation was made even by those

who knew perfectly well that these two men were above suspicion

in so far as honesty was concerned. But it was a fashion of the

time that there were no scruples which a politician should observe

in seeking political power. I don*t know why the other Cabinet

members did not join me in trying to clear the Cabinet of any

suspicion of dishonesty although I spoke to several of them about

this matter. I felt that, since under the Constitution the Cabinet

was to be responsible as a body, anything that went wrong due to the

malfeasance or alleged malfeasance on the part of any member of

the Cabinet would affect the whole Cabinet.

While I was confined to my house with an indisposition,

the President’s chief secretary Jao Han-hsiang called on me and

conveyed the request of the President to me to undertake the

work of forming a new Cabinet following Dr. Wang's resignation.

I did my best to explain to Jao how impossible that would be in the

situation because of the joint responsibility assumed by the

Cabinet under the constitution. I meant that Lo Wen-kan's case

was still not cleared up. Jao said that the President had been

approached by both the Speaker of the House and the President of the

Senate, that they made the joint suggestion, and the President

fully agreed/ that I should succeed Dr. Wang as Premier. He added

that the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate

would call on me personally, but President Li had wanted him to

come to convey this idea first. After I again tried to convince

Jao of the impossibility of my acceptance, he said he would report

my idea to the President, but he asked me not to take an adamant

attitude when the Parliament leaders came to see me.

 Very shortly afterwards, Wu Ching-lien and Wang Chia-hsiang

came to see me. They told me that both the House and the Senate

would support me to be Premier and would give me a carte blanche

to form a new Cabinet. They assured me of the continued support

of Parliament. I gave them the same reason I had given to Jao

Han-hsiang.

They must have gone straight back to the President’s

Office, for the President called me up - I was in bed then - and

urged me to accept the offer in order to smooth over the political

situation. He said that the leaders in Parliament wanted me because

they thought that I had absolutely nothing to do with Lo’s case

and that China needed somebody whose name was known abroad to head

the Government under the President. Then I repeated to him what

I had earlier said to the others. Besides, I said, I was

indisposed with a "flii and so physically, in any case, I would be

unable to undertake the job; politically it was out of question

for me to accept the offer. I went on to explain that it was improper

for me to succeed Dr. C. H. Wang, in whose Cabinet I served as

Foreign Minister since the finance minister in that Cabinet was

charged with certain irregularities which caused the downfall

of that Cabinet. Unless these charges, accusations and suspicions

had been entirely cleared up, I considered it was out of question

for me to accept any position in the Government; moreover, if I

accepted the offer, it would seem as if I had engineered the

 'W

the downfall of the Cabinet in order that I might become the head

of the Cabinet. Finally, the President said that he would look for
me
someone to act temporarily as Premier, adding that he wanted/to remain

in Peking to help him. I said I would remain in Peking and work

unofficially and without any official title.

One day after Wang Ta-hsieh took office as Acting Premier,

Ch'en Han-ti, Secretary-General in Wang Ta-hsieh's cabinet, telephoned

me, telling me that shortly the President's secretary would send me

an appointment, which had just been signed by Wang Ta-hsieh, to be the

president of the Customs & Tariff Commission and that the President,

by so doing, could show his continued confidence in me while I was still

physically not very strong. I told Ch'en that, although personally

I would be willing to help the President, I could not accept any

government appointment and that I would soon send in my resignation.

So I prepared my resignation and sent my secretary to deliver it

personally to Ch'en Han-ti. Then, I telephoned Ch'en, asking him to

do me a favor and, without reporting to the President, explain to the

Acting Premier Wang Ta-hsieh my reasons for resignation and at the

same time submit my resignation for his approval. Ch'en was a han-lin

from Hangchow and a typical gentleman of the Confucian school.

Although there was no close relationship between Wang Ta-hsieh and

me, we admired each other. Wang Ta-hsieh was an old man and always

took great interest personally in me. I remember the first time I

met him was when he was Chinese Minister in London in 1908 and when

I was passing London on my way to Shanghai to visit my home. We had

c
 VI
a long conversation, and he impressed me very much. At that time

I was still a college student.

According to the pre-arranged schedule, Mr. Wang

Ta-hsieh resigned shortly afterwards, &n December 10, 1922.

Dr. C. T. Wang took over the government and was Acting Premier

and concurrently Minister of Finance. At that time, General

Chang Shao-tseng, who aspired to become Premier, was co-operating

actively with Wu Ching-lien to bring about his appointment as

Premier to form a new Cabinet. The delay in Chang's appointment

and the necessity of having a temporary Cabinet headed by

Dr. C. T. Wang was probably cuased by the problem of working out a

plan of cooperation between the proposed Cabinet and the Parliamentary

group headed by Wu Ching-lien. Wu Ching-lien, the Speaker of

the House, had his problems in the House, which, in those days, was

more important than the Senate. Wu was the head of the I-yu-she

(Benevolent Friendship Association), which was one of the

Kuomintang cliques. There were other groups in opposition to Wu’s

group. There were members of the T-yu-she and of groups friendly

to Wu, particularly those who came from Kwangtung province, who were

friends of Dr. C. H. Wang and Dr. Lo Wen-kan. Lu Hsin, Szu-tu

Yin and one Ou-yang were three examples; they were close friends of

Dr. Wang and Dr. Lo; they did not favor Chang Shao-tseng because

Chang, after joining Dr. Wang's Cabinet, tried to upset it.

The formation of Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet, however.

finally materialized with Dr. Alfred Sze as Foreign Minister

Dr. Sze in fact came back and took up his office before his name

was submitted to Parliament for approval; he even moved to the

official residence of the Foreign Minister in Shih-chia hu-t'ung,

the one behind the Shih-ta-jen hu-t’ung. On the day the voting

on the Cabinet list took place in Parliament, Dr. Sze’s name

was approved in the lower House. Immediately afterwards, the voting

took place in the Senate. People both in the Senate and outside it

all took for granted that the approval would present no problem,

but as it happened, the Senate failed to give the necessary majority

vote.

The reason was very interesting. Dr. C. T. Wang,

Vice President of the Senate, had his own group and had great

influence in the Senate. In the Senate he had a right-hand man,

one of the Senators from the Three Eastern Provinces, whose name

I do not remember now. This man was asked by Dr. Wang to take

charge of the Senate while C. T. Wang himself went to the Western

Hills to stay away from the voting. When the voting was about

to take place, he kept on telephoning to the Western Hills,

reporting to Dr. C. T. Wang what was going on in the Senate. There

were more than thirty Senators from the Three Eastern Provinces,

and all of them had already written down the..word agree on their

votes, which were about to be cast for Dr. Sze’s nomination. After

the said right-hand man got instructions from Dr. Wang over the

telephone, he asked all of his fellow senators from the Three

Eastern Provinces to add the word not before the word agree on
their votes. As a result. Dr. Sze failed to get the necessary

majority of votes. This was very awkward. Dr. Wang did so

because he wanted to be foreign minister himself. I had no

direct evidence for this, but this was not only my understanding but

also everybody else's understanding. It was also confirmed by

several of the senators for the Three Eastern Provinces, with

whom I talked about this matter. Besides, since Dr. Sze was not

a political man and was independent, Dr. Wang had no possible

political grudge against him. It is interesting to note that

what made the difference was that all the affirmative ballots

of the said senators were converted into negative ballots just

before casting. Actually, the Manchurian people had always been

for Dr. Sze because toward the end of the Ch’ing period Dr. Sze

was for a time Customs Taotai in Harbin and as such he made quite

a name for himself in negotiating with the Russians; so he

impressed the Manchurian people as one of their friends.

The failure of the Senate to approve Dr. Sze's nomination

upset the forming of General Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet, but

not too seriously. Thereafter, General Huang Fu took Dr. Sze’s

post as Foreign Minister in February 1923 and remained in his post for

nearly two months.

The first act of the new Foreign Minister was to

send to the French minister in Peking a note of reply, agreeing to the

French claim in connection with the settlement of the question of Gold

Francs. It was for a time rumored that I had a hand in Huang Fu’s

resignation, but this was not true. What happened was that this
Gold Franc question first arose during my tenure of the

foreign portfolio. Even in my time, it had been a pending question

of great complexity. The Foreign Ministry kept putting it off and

refrained from giving a reply to the French minister When I

took my post as Foreign Minister in August 1922 I studied the

question on the basis of the files prepared by the head of

Trade and Commerce Department and the head of the General Affairs

Department. I drew up a memorandum for presentation to the

Cabinet, giving an analysis of the question and the reasons why China

could not accept the French demand. In this memorandum I pointed

out that, in view of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, and in view of

international lAw and precedents, the French claim was not well

founded. Accordingly, I gave a reply to the French minister,

who had been pressing for a reply. This negative reply aroused

dissatisfaction not only on the part of the French Legation but

also on the part of certain legations who were very much in the

same boat. In order to make the public understand the question

and obtain parliamentary support for the stand taken by the

Government, the newspapers published something about the question.

Meanwhile, Parliament asked the Government some question about it.

I remember that in the political circles it had been taken for granted

that China could not refuse the French claim;the files of the

Foreign Office even indicated that the conclusion then reached

in that office was rather in the direction of accepting the claim for

fear that a refusal would have repercussions on the payment of the

remitted portions of the indemnity involving several countries in

addition to France - for instance, the Netherlands and Belgium.

 Now before General Huang Fu became Foreign Minister,

Parliament was very interested in financial questions, for instance,

the following three: the Gold Franc question, the question in

connection with the raising of a public loan, and the question

concerning the foreign loan in connection with China's participation

in the European War. I remember that Wu Ching-lien and several

of his colleagues in Parliament asked for a copy of the above-

mentioned memorandum prepared by me. One day they came to my house

since I had already left the Foreign Office. I told them, "I

did prepare a memorandum, but I have no copy of it with me; even if

I had a copy, I should not give it to you privately. You should

approach the Foreign Office and ask for it, then they would have

to give it to you." They did obtain a copy and studied it and

•agreed with its contents.

In Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet, Foreign Minister

Huang Fu had, through some representatives, been in touch with

the French Legation. At that time the Gold Franc question was one

of the current questions that were pressing for a solution.

Also, General Chang was anxious to settle this question because he

felt that, if it was not settled, the diplomatic corps, at least,

the French group, would be able to start trouble by withholding payment

of the remitted portion of the indemnity. So, after Huang Fu took

office, his first official act was to send a reply to the French

Legation.
 Shortly, this news reached Parliament. I am sure

that some leaders in Parliament had friends in the Foreign Office

just as they had in my tenure. As we know, in those days some

officials in the Foreign Office were originally appointed upon the

recommendation of some parliamentary leaders, for example, the

Speaker of the House. The usual pattern was that among the five

or six persons or so recommended one would probably be appointed,

so that the friendly relations with Parliament could be kept.

That was a part of politics. It should be noted the news came up

first in the newspapers. Normally, if the Cabinet and Parliament were

on friednly relations, that kind of news would not attract very

much attention. But Wu Ching-lien was disappointed at Chang Shao-

tseng, who had made several promises to Wu but had carried out none

of them. One of the promises was that Chang would appoint Iwo

of Wu’s friends to be Cabinet ministers. So, trouble had already

started between Cabinet on the one side and Parliament on the other.

Parliament began to ask the President to send the Prime Minister

and the Foreign Minister to go to Parliament to face interpellation

and answer questions. I don't think General Huang Fu ever went to

Parliament to answer questions. As Chang Shao-tseng decided to

ignore Parliament, the rout became more and more acute, and

the Gold Franc issue became an issue between the government and

Parliament. Finally General Huang Fu resigned. I think that Par­

liament even demanded his resignation because he did not come to

Parliament.

Then, without my knowledge, and still less with my

concurrence, I was appointed Foreign Minister. This was certainly

a surprise to me. After the appointment , the Speaker of the House

came to see me. Chang Shao-tseng never came to see me himself; he

was forced out of office. Huang Fu resigned as Foreign Minister on

April 8, 1923, but his resignation was held for some time. (Presi­

dent Li Yuan-hung left Peking on June 13, 1923. Chang Shao-tseng left

earlier.) I remember, soon after my appointment, Ts’ao K’un's

right-hand men came to me and asked me to accept it. All three

had been in Chang Shao-tseng's Cabinet; Kao Ling-wei as Minister of

the Interior; Wu Yu-lin as Minister of Communications; Lu Hsiu-shan

as Minister of War. (Kao Ling-wei was now trying to maintain

the Cabinet.) I gave them a negative answer, telling them that

I could not take the post so long as Lo Wen-kati's case was not cleared

up. Mr. Lo was then under prosecution conducted by the local

prosecution office. The report made by this office in connection

with Lo's case had reached Minister of Justice Ch'eng K'o, who was to

make a decision as to whether or not the local prosecution office

should conduct criminal proceedings in court against Lo. After

listening to my explanation for my firm refusal to accept the new

post, Kao, Wu, and Lu said that, if such was my condition, Lo's case

would be disposed of after I took office. That was their promise.

The point of difference was that I would not take office until Lo

was released.

Finally, a meeting was arranged at the home of a Mr. Ch'en,

 4"\

who was a Fukienese and the editor of the newspaper Asia in

Peking. Since he was in close touch with the political circles in

Peking and since his wife was a very good hostess, his house used

to be the meeting place for many politicians. This meeting

was arranged to give me a direct word of assurance concerning Lo

Wen-ka«~'S-~release and was attended by Wu Ching-lien, Minister

of Justice Ch'eng K'o, Wang Lan-t'ing, Kao Ling-wei, Lu Hsiu-shan,

and Wu Yu-lin. Some one was smoking opium in bed, and others were

smoking cigars. Wu Ching-lien said that the meeting was arranged just

to assure me that Dr. Lo would be released; he indicated that, since

the Minister of Justice was present, necessary arrangements could be

made; he then asked Wang Lan-t'ing to speak on behalf of all

others present. Wang Lan-t'ing tried to impress me with the idea

that it would be of great consequence for the government to be in

function without a foreign minister and that, in such a condition,

the status of the government would always remain in doubt, es­

pecially internationally. Therefore, he asked to me to take up the

in
Foreign Minister's post, so tint China would be properly represented/the

eyes of the world. He added that, as far as Dr. Lo's case was

concerned, there was nothing very serious since Lo would be

released. Then I asked him when Lo would be released. He

answered that Lo would be released right after I took up my

office. Then I asked what was to be done by the Minister of Justice,

indicating that the local prosecution office had submitted a report

to the Minister of Justice and it was up to the Minister of

Justice to give instructions to drop the case. Accordingly, Wu

Ching-lien pointed to Ch’eng K'o and said to him, "You have heard

everything just said; you are the one to carry out all what we have

said." Ch’eng answered, "No doubt, there is no question about

that." Then, I indicated that I would take up my office the day

following Lo’s release, but they said that it would better to have me

to take up my office first and to have Lo released later. They

reasoned that the order given by the Minister of Justice to release

Lo would have to be approved by the Cabinet: it would be better for

me to join the Cabinet beforehand so that I might see to it that

the order be approved, adding that such approval would be done at my

first cabinet meeting. On this understanding I agreed to take

up office. Therefore, I took up office the next day, and Lo was

released. This was at the beginning of July 1923.

Previously, on June 13, 1923, President Li Yuan-hung

had left Peking, and under the Constitution the Cabinet could act

as Regency Cabinet and exercise the power of the President. It

was understood that, for the sake of the good name of China, no

Cabinet should exercise the power of the President without a

Foreign Minister, who under the constitution was to represent the

Cabinet in case, the Prime Minister was absent although, in its

exercise of the presidential power, the Cabinet as a whole, not

any one of its members, was to act as a collective body. This

was one of the factors that convinced me to take up my post as

Foreign Minister. At that time Lo’s case was no longer a

serious one; the most important thing was to maintain a government

before the eyes of the world.

 In the interval between President Li Yuan-hung’s

departure and my acceptance of the post of Foreign Minister on

July 3, there was a group of men in the Cabinet, who were supported

by the Paoting Clique and backed by Parliament, but among whom

there was no one who was internationally known. There was a

legitimate cause of anxiety that the Cabinet could not function

without a Foreign Minister.

I remember when Wu Yu-lin and Kao Ling-wei called on

me and urged to take up the post as Foreign Minister they told me

that, under the constitution, I, as Foreign Minister, would head

the Cabinet. But when subsequently I agreed to take up the

office, I made it clear that, as Foreign Minister, I would work on

matters in connection with foreign relations and that I ba d no

intention to intervene in internal administration because I was not

too familiar with the internal problems. I argued that Mr. Kao

Ling-wei, Minister of the Interior, was, in the absence of the

Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, the man next in line;

in fact he had already been presiding over all the Cabinet

meetings. The other members of the Cabinet saw my point and agreed t

this. I believe that, in the back of their minds, they thought I

did not want to deal with the various political groups, especially

the Paoting group, which really was the backbone of the Cabinet.

I also believe that they wanted me to be Foreign Minister so that

the Cabinet would look more like a government.

tu
The Regency Cabinet, June 13 - October 12, 1923

During the summer of 1923 when I became Foreign

Minister to the Regency Cabinet,Parliament was in session. The

main political topic was the preparation for the election of a

new president. I tried not to associate myself with that matter,

and my colleagues did not attempt to inform me of the behind-the-

scene maneuvers in connection With the election. This made me

comfortable.

The main problem was how to bring the members of

Parliament in line to vote for Ts'ao K'un. House Speaker Wu

Ching-lien and the heads of some groups appeared to have diffi­

culties even in holding a meeting for that purpose. Evidently,

there was some bargaining between Ts'ao Jui on one side and

Wu Ching-lien, who headed the largest group, and the leaders of

other groups both in and outside of Parliament, on the other. In

Parliament there was no meeting at all because many of its members

stayed away for the purpose of preventing it from having any

quorum for a meeting. Meanwhile, social clubs organized by

Parliament members sprang up like mushrooms for the purpose of

maneuvering in the coming election.

During this period, Ts'ao K'un was in Pao-ting. The man

who made frequent visits to Peking was his brother Ts'ao Jui,

who was his campaign manager. Ts'ao Jui, who was known as

Ts’ao Szu-yeh, did much to arrange political matters for Ts'ao

K'un, both before and after the latter's election. Ts'ao Jui

did not appear and did not seem to want to appear either in

public or in any large meetings, but he was the man who did all the

planning and arranging behind the scenes. Ts'ao Jui was much

better educated than his brother; he was a civilian, not a

general; his appearance and manners were much more refined than

President Ts’ao K'un. But he was not very scrupulous, and

consequently he suffered from his poor education; he was objected to

very strongly by Marshal Wu P'ei-fu, for example, although they

belonged to the same political camp. I think Wu Ching-lien not

#
only disliked Ts'ao Jui but even hated him because Tsao Jui

refused to carry out the political deals which he had made with Wu.

It was understood that when Ts'ao K'un was elected to the

presidency Wu Ching-lien would be the premier, thus fulfilling

a life-long ambition of his. Toward the eve of the election

Wu Ching-lien, as the Speaker of the H use, had his weapon in his

hands; undoubtedly he tried to hold up the election, imposing

one demand after another upon the Paoting clique. It was due to

his hard attitude and hard bargaining that the parliamentarians were

split up into different groups. Some of the so-called special

parliamentarian clubs in Peking were in direct rivalry with the

Speaker's group. Wu did not achieve his ambition, since Kao Ling-wei

continued as premier after President Ts'ao's election.

 At the time of the Regency Cabinet, I remember
of
one episode in connection with the raising/funds for the presi­

dential election. Parliament was still in session, and Wu Ching-lien,

the Speaker of the House, was dominating the parliamentary situation.

At one of the Cabinet meetings, the Finance Minister, Chang

?
Ying-hua, brought up the proposition to convert the interests of

the Sino-Japanese war loans into the capital account. I remember

that several of my colleagues spoke in favor of it. But I spoke

against it. The reason I gave was that the loan in connection with

China's participation in the European War had become a political

question in the country and had been very much opposed by

public opinion. It was one of the questions which led to the

May Fourth Movement, I went on, and Parliament had more than

once passed resolutions refusing to recognize it. I said it would

be most unwise for the Government to approve of the transfer of 1 the

interests of the said loan into the capital account. Nobody spoke

after me. Then, Mr. Kao Ling-wei said that, since Minister Koo

objected to it, the Cabinet could leave it on file. That was on

a Tuesday; the Cabinet used to meet in the mornings on Tuesday,

Thursday, and Saturday.I

I think that Wu Ching-lien and some other leaders of

Parliament must have had their agents in the Cabinet because they

knew that the Cabinet was handling the problem of the recognition

of the loan in connection with China's participation in the

European War, a recognition which had been repeatedly pressed upon

the Minister of Finance. And it was the Minister of Finance who

t

brought up this question before the Cabinet.

In the summer I used to go to Pei-tai-ho in Friday evening

to spend the week end. late inp^fehe afternoon of one Friday I

received a telephone call from Mr. Wu Ching-lien himself, saying,

"I heard that you were going to Pei-tai-ho; please don't go!" I

said, "Why?" He said that he had received a report to the effect

that the Cabinet was to bring up the question of the loan in

connection with China's participation in the European War at

the meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning because the other

cabinet members knew that I would be absent from that meeting. I

said, "If that is the case, I shall abandon the trip." The next

morning I went to the meeting. Usually, the meeting was sche­

duled at 10:00 a.m., but actually if started five or ten minutes

before ten o’clock. I arrived about three minutes after ten.

When I.arrived the whole Cabinet was already seated. I took the chair

which was opposite to that of Kao Ling-wei, the Acting Premier, who

said, "The resolution was been passed." I said, "I am sorry

for being a little late." Then, I asked Kao what was the resolu­

tion, He said the resolution concerned the loan in connection

with China's participation in the European War. Then I said,

"I expressed my view on this question the other day; the

cabinet should consider this question very carefully." Accordingly,

Kao said, "Since Minister Koo takes exception to the resolution,

I'll tell the Secretary-General of that Cabinet to shelve the

question, and this resolution will be considered not to have been

d
passed by the Cbinet." Just at this moment the telephone rang, and
Minister Wu Yu-ling was asked to receive the call. The man who

was calling up Wu was Kiang T*eng of the Japanese Industry Company.

I suppose that Kiang must have asked Wu over the telephone about the

outcome of the discussion in the Cabinet. Wu, who went to the next

room to receive the call, said loudly, "Not yet! Not yet! We

are still discussing this question". Thereupon, Kao Ling-wei

repeated that the resolution had not been passed.

I was invited Sunday night to a dinner party given by

Wang Lan-t'ing, who was one of the leaders of the Paoting group and

later became Secretary-General to President Ts'ao K'un. In the party,

in addition to Wang Lan-t'ing, there were Wu Yu-ling, Kao Ling-wei,

Lu Hsiu-shan, and Li Yen-ch'ing. We had very friendly conversations.

Then, Wang Lan-t'ing said, "Before going to dinner, I want to talk

with you about something." And Wu Yu-ling said that he had to express

some view about the loan in connection with China's participation

in the European War; he could understand why I was opposed to the

recognition of the loan because I had made my views clear; however, from

his point of view the question was very important as far as the election

of Ts'ao K'un to the presidency was concerned. "Shao-ch'uan

[Dr. Koo]," he went on, "since you have been trained both in

China and abroad and have established your present reputation, you

will be asked to serve in the Government no matter which group is in

power. But with us the situation is different: if Ts'ao San-yeh

should step down, we would be out of employment." Therefore he

hoped that I could understand their personal position, adding that

he was speaking not only for himself but also for all others who

were present. I rather admired his candor, for what he said

showed that they took me as a friend. I said that I fully

understood their position and that I opposed the recognition of

the loan in connection with China's participation in the European

War not only because Parliament had repeatedly disapproved it but

also for the interests of Ts'ao San-yeh and his group. I

explained, "If the Government should approve it, the immediate

reaction would be opposition from Parliament. Then the people through­

out the country would know the matter, and this would not only

affect Ts'ao K'un's chance of being elected but also give a weapon

to the political opponents to attack Ts'ao K'un even if he is

elected. Moreover, in such a case you would lose your reputation as

officials of the Government. In a word, I oppose it not only

because of my personalposition but also for the good name of the

Cabinet as a whole and for your own interests." I don't know

whether Wu Yu-ling was convinced by me or not. He only said,

"Let's go to eat."

Anyway, the question of War Participation Loan was

shelved. It should be noted that my participation in the Cabinet

meeting in that Saturday morning was a great surprise to the rest

of the members of the Cabinet.

Some Recollections of Ts’ao K'un and Wu P^i-fu

The election of Ts'ao K'un to the presidency was a

foregone conclusion. He was elected on October 5, 1923, and was

inaugurated five days later.

The election was made a subject of violent political

attack, particularly from the South. Neither I nor my Cabinet were

informed of what deals had been made, and we had nothing to do with

such deals. At that time, I thought Ts'ao K'un was popularly

elected; nobody knew to what extent his votes were bought. After

the election, it became a slogan that he won the election through

bribing. Later, some evidence^ of bribery were produced. It is

possible that some votes had been cast for considerations which might

have taken the form of money, of promised political appointments, or

some other form. There was no clear-cut division between black

and white, especially in a political situation where the democratic

processes were in play. Anyway, there was much gossip, speculation,

and rumor about the election. The election activities, however, did

not belong to the Cabinet and still less to the Foreign Office. As

far as matters of this kind were concerned, it was not only my

policy but also the policy of my intimate colleagues in the Cabinet

to leave this sort of thing to the politicians and not to have any

hand in it in order not to identify ourselves as belonging to any

military camp or to any political group. Throughout these years

men like myself, Dr. C. H. Wang, Mr. T'ang Erh-ho, Dr. Lo Wen-kan

always tried to maintain our independent position. We ourselves had

no extra plans. Since we were considered to be independent and were

not affiliated with any political group or any military camp, we were

acceptable to all of them. I stayed longer with President Ts'ao

K'un than with any other chief of state, retaining the posts of

Foreign Minister and for a time Premier in four successive cabinets.

It was said that he was illiterate. I do not know how true it was.

But I noticed, whenever I went to see him or with a report or memorandum

to be submitted to him, that he always put it aside and asked me to

tell him what it was about. In the course of my political life, I

had come to contact practically every important political and military

leader in China, but I certainly considered President Ts'ao K'un

an interesting personality. I thought he must possess qualities which

explained how, having started as a common soldier he could have

reached the peak of political power in China. For that reason I was

very interested in him, and watched and studied him. Several things

I noticed about him gave me the answer which I had been seeking. He

was a born leader, even though his academic education was almost nil.

For fei&ample Ts'ao K'un was able to command the loyalty

or devotion not only of his political supporters but also his military

lieutenants such Marshal Wu P'ei-fu. Marshal Wu was a strong character

and rather authoritarian in temperament, but when any crisis turned

up Marshal Wu P'ei-fu would unhesitatingly accept orders from

Marshal Ts’ao K’un and respect his authority. One instance involving

foreign relations, which I shall deal with in a later chapter,

will suffice to show how Marshal Wu respected Marshal Ts'ao. In March

1924 the. Soviet Ambassador Karakhan and Dr. C. T. Wang initialed

the Sino-Soviet convention for the settlement of many questions

between the two countries, concerning for instance Outer Mongolia

and the Chinese Eastern Railway. Marshal Wu Pei-fu came out as a

strong supporter of the agreement initialed by Dr. C. T. Wang; he

circularized a telegram of criticism against the Foreign Ministry,

of which I was in charge. It became not only an embarrassing

but an annoying situation with Ts'ao K'un, who was the President

in Peking: here Marshal Wu P'ei-fu came out openly against the

Foreign Office of which I was the Minister, criticizing a policy

for which I was responsible, but which I was carrying out only under

the authority of President Ts'ao K'un. I took the matter to the

President and said, "How impossible the situation must be appearing

to the outside world. Marshal Wu P'ei-fu is regarded in China and out­

side China as your most loyal supporter, yet he has openly attacked

one of your ministers. Is that a policy of which you approve?"

President Ts'ao at once saw the point, and visibly showed his temper.

"I am here. I ought to know better than Wu Tzu-yu [Wu P'ei-fu-’. He

could not know what is going on here; and therefore he should shut up."

He said, "I am going to send today my personal representative telling

him to stop sending out telegrams and to shut up because it was

something about which he could not know much. It was somethaagwhich

was the business of the Central Government." And he did send

a man by special train the same afternoon. Next time I saw him,

he said that the emissary had returned with a definite assurance

from Wu P’ei-fu that from then on he would keep silent and not say

a word about it.

There was another case which gave me a very strong

impression and led me to understand how General Ts'ao K'un was

able to rise from a common soldier to the highest position as the

President of China. Exactly three months after his inauguration

Kao Ling-wei’s Cabinet was replaced by a Cabinet under Sun Pao-

ch'i as Premier with me Foreign Minister as before. Three of the

leaders of the Paoting group - General Lu Ching, the Minister

of War; Mr. Wu Yu-ling, the Minister of Communication; and more

delicately Mr. Kao Ling«wei - spoke to me both together and se­

parately, urging me to appoint Mr. Huang Jung-liang as minister to

London. Huang Jung-liang had been a consular official in Australia

and New York and minister to Austria; he was a career diplomat and

a friend of mine. I told them that Huang was a career man and

had some experience, but the appointment to the Court of St. James

required careful consideration because London was then considered

to be the most important post for any country. The next day

they approached me again, and two days later they pressed again.

I felt rather annoyed by the continued pressure. I told them that

I was considering and that for the London post we had to select the

right man for the right post; I also said that Mr. Huang was very
good in Washington and was in general good in temperament, bearing,

and speech, but, as for London, since H had been in that post myself,

I knew something about it and wanted to send the man most suited

for that post. They must have interpreted my answer as a sort of

refusal. One day a Cabinet meeting was called by the President

at his office in connection with some other question. Before Mr.

Sun Pao-ch'i arrived the President was present and so were other

Cabinet members. Mr. Wu Yu-lin across the table addressed

the President. He said that he and Mr. Lu and Mr. Kao had all

spoken to the Minister about the appointment of Mr. Huang Jung-

liang. He said he hoped the President would speak to the Minister

in person directly. The President at once put on a very serious

face and addressed Mr. Wu saying: "Lao ti (Brother), when did

you start to learn about diplomacy. I invited Mr. Koo to be

head of foreign affairs because I know nothing about foreign

affairs. Mr. Koo has been dealing with foreign affairs, so I leave

it entirely to him. Why should you interfere? This matter should

be left entirely to Minister Koo to decide." With this very

direct answer from the President the others kept quiet. I was

very impressed because I had not spoken to the President and did not

explain to him what my reasons were for taking some time to

consider the appointment. But at once his immediate reaction was

that they should not interfere.

In such actions President Ts'ao showed his personality.

Whenever he appointed someone whom he considered to be well qualified

he just let him exercise full authority and discretion. In other

words he believed in the principle "If you appoint someone you have

full confidence in, you do not interfere with him." I thought

his way of dealing with persons and questions was something quite

impressive. He might not have learned that from books but he

was acting in accordance with one of the classical adagesof China

of all times. He was also very broadminded and tolerant. He was

not petty. When Marshal Wu P’ei-fu came in the middle of September

1924 immediately after the formation of Dr. Yen’s Cabinet to draft

a mandate in his headquarters in the presence of the Cabinet,

appointing commanders of the various army units, I remember

that when he had finished the drafting he told the Secretary of

the Cabinet to take the mandate immediately to the President for

approval, so that the President’s seal could be fixed on it. I

for one had served several presidents earlier; they would have

resented the confidence with which Marshal wrote out his mandate.

Marshal Wu had probably not talked the matter over with the

President because he had just arrived that afternoon and his visit to

the President was of very short duration. I was not even sure that

he had seen the President. But there was no difficulty at all, and

the mandate was promulgated in the same evening. In other words,

the President just approved it. This showed the President had full

confidence in Marshal Wu P’ei-fu without feeling sensitive about the

authority which Marshal Wu assumed. So my estimate of President

Ts’ao K’un as a leader was quite high because he had qualities of

leadership even though his education was very little.

My impression of General Wu was that he was not only an

able soldier but also a strict disciplinarian; he was very stern

to all his lieutenants and followers. According to the old

standard, he was a first-class soldier; he was severe, but he

tried to do justice. My impression was that he was clean; he wanted

to do well and serve China well. But, like all ether military men,

he was authoritarian and dictatorial by nature. I remember, once

after he had set up his headquarters in Peking and before he went

to the front, he invited me to discuss the latest developments

on the part of the Japanese and their relations with our Foreign

Office. When I went to see him he was busy with pen in hand because

he liked to give orders in his own handwriting. While General Wu

was talking with me, three military leaders in Peking came to see him.

They were General Wang Huai-ch’ing, Garrison Commander of Peking,

the Infantry Division Commander, and General Ch'e, Head of the

Law Execution Department. General Wu looked at them and just

let them stand there for quite a while. So. General Wu and I

kept on talking. I tried to leave. He told me, "Let them wait

for a little while." The three waited for quite a few minutes.

During our discussion. General Wu was interested in Japan's attitude

toward China. I told him that during the time of civil war there must

be something very important for the three waiting generals to report to

him and that, as I was a civilian, I had better leave right away.

General Wu said, "No." Then he gave them orders without asking them

to sit down. He said to General Wang Huai-ch’ing and the Infantry

Division Commander, "You are to leave at seven o'clock tonight;

the train is ready; you are to telephone back to report at your first

stop." Then, he said to General Ch'e, "You are going to such and such
place on the same train and you are to telephone back and report."

The three asked him whether he had any more instructions. He said

that that there was no more and asked them to leave right away. At

that time Wang Huai-ch’ing was a full general and was very important.

The way in which General Wu spoke to Wang and the two other generals

showed the prestige of Wu. In fact, Wu was not only the military

leader but also the strong man.

The Second Fengtien-Chihli War, and General Feng's Coup d'Etat

For three months after Ts'ao K'un took up office,

I remained Foreign Minister in Kao Ling-wei's Cabinet. Then,

in January 1924, the Cabinet was reorganized and Sun Pao-ch'i

was asked to form a new Cabinet. Sun had not occupied any

Cabinet post before. He recommended that Dr. W. W. Yen be appointed

Foreign Minister. (Mrs. Yen was Sun's sisteif.) Politically, Sun

and Yen had been going along together. I myself did not care

much to remain in the government for the reason that my friends were

all out of it. The so-called Pao-ting clique was new to me.

For example, I never met General Wu P'ei-fu although he highly

recommended Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui to be foreign minister and Dr. Wang

and I were personal friends. The same was true with General Ts'ao

K'un, though I remember that one time before the election Ts'ao

Jui invited me and some others to visit Pao-ting.

Although Sun Pao-ch’i recommended Yen to be Foreign

Minister, President Ts'ao wanted me to remain in my post and told

Sun so. I had previously served as counselor to Sun. What Sun

wanted was to have Yen included in the Cabinet: Yen was much

closer to the Pao-ting group than I. Anyway, Sun agreed to the

President’s suggestion and I remained in the Cabinet as Foreign

Minister. I thought the reason was that during the recent period

I, along with other members of the Cabinet, had been working

patiently to oversorae various difficulties, and it would be an

act of ingratitude to shift me from the Foreign Office to some

other portfolio.

A similar situation arose when Sun Pao-ch'i resigned.

This was in the summer of 1924. When Sun resigned I was still in

the Cabinet. One afternoon, Wu Yu-ling, Minister of Communication,

telephoned me in the Foreign Office to congratulate me on my

appointment as Acting Premier. Since I knew nothing about it,

this information was a surprise to me. My appointment as Acting

Premier was announced on July 2, 1924. I told Wu I would not take

it up because I was not familiar with all the political facts in

Peking and I would continue to devote myself to foreign affairs. He

said that the President and Sun Pao-ch'i agreed that, according to the

order of precedence, if the Premier was absent, it was the

Foreign Minister who was to act on his behalf. So he begged me not

to hesitate and said all the other members in the Cabinet would

continue to help me. I said that was not the question, adding that

I had never aspired to be Premier because I was not familiar with

internal politics. He said that the President insisted I should accept

the new appointment. Instead of conveying my message to the

President, Minister Wu suggested that I should accompany him. So

I went together with him to the President. It was a futile attempt

because President Ts'ao K'un had made up his mind. He said he

understood my sentiment but it would only be a temporary responsibility

because he would look for someone else to organize the Cabinet and I
was to act in the interval.

On that understanding I accepted. The rest of the

Cabinet remained unchanged. As I was also concurrently Foreign

Minister it was very much in the political atmosphere that Sun

Pao-ch'i would be formally succeeded by Dr. W. W. Yen as the

most promising candidate. It was at the same time rumored that

Parliament would prefer me to take l up the post but I did not place

much credence in the report, or take much interest in it, because

in the first place I did not even want to act as Premier. ^he

reason was that I was interested all the time in China's foreign

policy and foreign relations; it had always been my desire to

bring about a revision of China's unequal treaties and I had no

personal taste for politics and political rivalry. The reason

why Parliament preferred me was, I suppose, because my relations

with Parliament in the past couple of years had been always

smooth and friendly whereas it may be recalled that Dr. Yen's

position vis-a-vis Parliament had always been a rather difficult

one, particularly between him and the Speaker of the House. In

1922 his Cabinet did not function well and lasted little over six

weeks. Parliamentary leaders particularly the clique headed by

Mr. Wu Ching-lien apread the report that if his name were submitted

to Parliament they would vote it down.

Finally with great efforts by the Pao-ting clique it was

arranged for Dr. Yen to be accepted by Parliament, and his nomina­

tion by Parliament was approved by President Ts'ao K'un. Then

there was the task of choosing the Cabinet ministers. There

was only one problem, that of the foreign portfolio; the others,

principally the finance portfolio, the Army and Navy and so forth

were all fixed by President Ts'ao K'un. As regards the foreign

portfolio there was a good deal of discussion. I offered to

resign - in fact the whole Cabinet resigned when Dr. Yen was

nominated as Premier to form a new Cabinet. He wanted to be

Foreign Minister himself at the same time and put me in the

finance portfolio. But the Finance Ministry was a key ministry and

it was a foregone conclusion that the Paoting clique together

with Mr. Wu Ching-lien had already agreed on someone. I was

informed by one of the Paoting leaders that Dr. Yen, the Premier,

asked to be Foreign Minister concurrently but that President Ts'ao

K'un and his supporters preferred that I should continue to be

Foreign Minister. They argued that I had been holding the

fort in the Regency Cabinet and I had done well during a difficult

period; there was no reason to remove me from the foreign portfolio

and appoint me to the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce. Dr.

Yen was at first firm and when his firmness turned into a

condition. President Ts'ao K'un was rather upset and intimated

in that case that Dr. Yen need not be Premier. The situation

became a crisis. Finally, Dr. Yen, seeing the determination of

President Ts'ao K'un to have me even at the sacrifice of the

premiership of Dr. Yen, accepted the formula of his taking the

one next to the foreign portfolio, the Ministry of the Interior.

I was again appointed as Foreign Minister. This was the story

that was told me by Mr. Wu Yu-ling, who was one of the closest

political supporters of Mr. Ts'ao K'un.

When the Cabinet was organized I was not happy

because I did not wish to remain Foreign Minister in a Cabinet

of which Dr. Yen was the Premier and in which Dr. Yen himself had

preferred to take the foreign portfolio. It was as if I was

forced on to him in the foreign portfolio, although I knew he

wanted to include me in the Cabinet in some other capacity. But

Dr. Yen and I had always been very good friends and in foreign

pblicy we always saw eye to eye. Speaking in general we were

both for upholding China's sovereign rights and we wanted to do

what we could to put China on a basis of equality with other

nations. We both felt China should not bow to foreign nations

where China's sovereign rights were concerned. On that broad basis

we were pursuing the same policy, although in the matter of

strategy and the manner of negotiation we might not always agree.

We saw eye to eye except in one large sphere, that is, in regard

to relations with Japan. On more than one occasion Dr. Yen was inclined

to be what he called more "realistic" and was less distrustful of

Japan's policy vis-a-vis China than I was. One reason for that was

probably that among his followers there were quite a few people

who were educated in Japan and were in close touch with Japan. For

instance there were Chang Chih-t'an, Shen Jen-ytt, T'ang Tsai-ch'ang,

brother of T'ang Tsai-li. It was my known distrustfulness of

Japanese policy towards China was made a pretext for not including

me in the Cabinet. In June 1922 after our return when he

had been appointed first as Acting Premier to form a Cabinet,

my name, without my knowledge, was pressed on him both by Loyang

and by parliamentarians as being one of the plenipotentiaries of

the Washington Conference who should naturally be included as

Foreign Minister. At that time one reason he gave as making him

hesitate about me was the hostility or antipathy of the Japanese

toward me. I was marked out as the exponent of anti-Japanese

policy in China, especially after the Versailles Conference.

Whatever the cause, I felt there was some reluctance

on the part of Dr. Yen to include me as Foreign Minister and also I

think it was very natural that he should want himself to be

Foreign Minister. When finally upon-the insistence he was

vl
nominated as titular Premier to form a Cbinet I understood that

Loyang as well as the parliamentary leaders still proposed me as

Foreign Minister but he said he wanted me to be in the Cabinet

but in some other portfolio, and when pressed he gave as ground

that his Cabinet should be a hua-fu represented Cabinet; he

designated Mr. Alfred Sze, being the first delegate at the

Washington Conference, as Foreign Minister to meet the view that

it should be a hua-fu Cabinet, and pending Mr. Sze's arrival he was to

act concurrently himself.

 Thus in 1924 I was Mr. Yen's Foreign Minister not

really of his preference but on the insistence of President

Ts'ao K'un and his supporters. Ts'ao K'un looked upon me as a natural

person for the foreign portfolio and so did Wu P'ei-fu even before

then, and they wanted to have a hua-fu represented Cabinet

because the Washington Conference delegates from 1922 on enjoyed

a great deal of prestige.

The Cabinet was confronted immediately by two problems.

First there the sharp rivalry between Generals Ts'ao K’u^n and

Wu P'ei-fu on one side and General Chang Tso-lin on the other.

The situation was deteriorating very rapidly and it was generally

understood that a clash of arms would soon take place. Soon

after the formation of Dr. Yen's Cabinet, General Wu P'ei-fu was

expected in Peking; he arrived a few days after the Cabinet was

formally installed. His visit to Peking was a great event because

he was recognized all around as the power behind the throne. After

the usual round of official dinners in his honor he asked for

a meeting of the Cabinet at his headquarters, naturally with the

approval of President Ts'ao. It was some experience for me to see

him giving instructions to the Premier on what he thought should be

done. He took pencil and paper and wrote down several mandates,

a presidential mandate ordering several high military personalities

for the campaign against Fengtien. He wrote down his own name as
.i. vo; •:
the commander-in-chief and Feng Ytt-hsiang as the third Column,
General Sze as Chief of the Department of Martial Law. Then

he told the Minister of Finance that he was to be responsible

for the financing of the campaign and he spoke in a very stern fashion,

saying he would not tolerate unnecessary delay. T4iere was one

immediate problem of preparing for the Fengtien campaign / drafting

the "campaign order".

The other problem was with regard to the relation

with Japan which was trying to capitalize on the situation at

Shan-hai-kuan by warning the Chinese government not to send any

troops beyond Shan-hai-kuan. General Wu asked me about the

latest Japanese attitude as revealed in the Japanese notes and the

position X took in rebutting the Japanese claim of interference,

wb4eh entirely met with his concurrence, because, vis-a-vis

' ^ 1 • -u • I

Japanese attitude was much the same as mine - standing on China s

^ j tX'-r

rights and waiting to see how m»eh Japan would dare to carry out

her threat of interfering in the internal struggle.

War between Wu and Chang was promulgated on September

24th by which time the military movements had been well under

way and were approaching Shan-hai-kuan. The first reports of the

fighting were favorable, describing the advance of General Wu s

troops at the front where he himself had already arrived. Then

in about a week's time there were reports of the surprisingly

passive attitude of General Feng at Hsi-feng-k'ou. After the

first eager advance General Wu's forces were stopped, partly due
to the reinforced position of Chang Tso-lin's forces and partly due to

the obstacles interposed by the Japanese. There was a stalemate

because of the poor support, also, from General Feng's flank. Then

one morning my butler brought me the first news that the

Telegraph Office had been occupied by General Feng's troops and that

they also surrounded the President's Office. The city had fallen

into the control of General Feng's forces, who had come back from the

front. It was impossible to telephone so I rushed to Dr. W. W. Yen's

home to find out what the situation was and there I found Hsueh

Tu«pi, Pastor Liu; there was also one Cabinet colleague, Chang Kuo-

kan. Later on I think Mr. Wu YU-ling came. Dr. Yen appeared also

to be taken by surprise. The only important question then was what

the Cabinet was to do. All I could gather was both Hsueh Tu-pi,

who claimed to have been sent by General Feng, and Pastor Liu

urged him to stay in the palace with General Feng's support. I

took the position that the only thing to do was for the Cabinet to

resign, seeing the Cabinet was absolutely powerless to do anything

in the situation. There was no question about continuing unless the

President's palace was relieved of the siege, and the Premier had to

have free access to the President, which was said to be out of

question. Dr. Yen appeared to be in a quandary because General Feng

had always been very friendly to him, just as he had been very

friendly to General Feng and all the political leaders in Peking.

And General Feng was a Christian and I suppose that was an additional

reason with which Pastor Liu urged him to cooperate with General Feng.
Although Dr. Yen was offered the facility of telephoning, Dr.

Yen was right in not making use of it, for he would have been

listened in to at all the telephone posts. The final decision was that

the Cabinet would resign. It was not possible to reach the President.

I offered to visit the President but I was told that no one could

go through because the commander of the units surrounding the

President’s Office had positive orders not to admit anyone.

General Feng’s sudden coup d'etat brought back to my

mind what I had told Dr. Yen a few days earlier, that I had noticed

the surprising absence of General Huang Fu. He said that he

had telephoned Dr. Yen that he would not be able to come because

of indisposition or something, but evidently Dr. Yen was kept in

the dark altogether. After quite a while General Huang Fu came to

Dr. Yen's place and carried on a conversation in which I did not

take part, presumably urging Dr. Yen to carry on. I do not know

what passed between them but I knew that Dr. Yen had made up his

mind to resign. I do not know how the resignation was officially

communicated to the President. Probably it was never communicated

because it was a coup d’etat and General Feng was reported to

be arriving shortly in the capital.

By this time many of the Cabinet members were not acces­

sible; and I myself left Peking the day after in a car belonging to

Mr. Harry Hussey, my close Canadian friend. Before I left I was

warned by intimate friends that I could not possibly pass through.

The guards around the Tientsin«Peking motor road were thick, for

both General Feng’s troops and Manchurian forces were coming

towards Peking. General Wu's forces at the front were with­

drawing rapidly and were also reported to be in the neighborhood.

However I followed the advice of Mr. Hussey and a number of my

Chinese friends. The situation had taken such a turn that it

was useless for me to remain in Peking. The car was stopped many

times by armed guards, General Feng’s troops. As we approached

Tientsin, we had to pass Marshal Chang Tso-lin's troops. At

first Mr. Hussey said I must not reveal my identity so he gave

me an appropriate Chinese card which I showed. But when they

were not satisfied I showed my own card, so obviously the troops

did not have any orders to stop me.

It was down by the time I arrived at Tientsin. At

the entrance to the Imperial Hotel in the French Concession in

Tientsin, Leonard Simpson the author of many volumes on Manchuria

and editor of the Peking Leader, appeared. The next morning

the Peking Leader reported that Dr. Koo had escaped from Peking

disguised as a woman. Fortunately Mr. Simpson saw me personally

but what appeared in print went very far and this unfounded

report gained a great deal of circulation. Even Sir Reginald Johnston,

who was Emperor Hsuan T'ung's English teacher and later became

Commissioner of Wei-hai-wei and author in his retirement of the

book Twilight in the Forbidden City cited this report in his

 "U
book. When I was in London many years later I wrote to him, telling

him that that report was unfounded. I also told him that the editor

of the very paper which published this report and from which he evidently

quoted, saw me on my arrival in Tientsin with Mr. Hussey and that

-at- that time I was in normal dress. Sir Reginald Johnston was very

good to me and wrote back, saying that he was sorry to have cited

that untrue report in his book and that he would certainly have

his book corrected in its second edition.

Thus ended my political career in Peking, at least for

the time being. As a matter of fact, I did not get in touch with what

was going on in Peking after this coup d'etat. Looking back today,

I realize that this coup d'etat was only a certain move inspired

by General Feng's personal ambition plus a certain amount of ani­

mosity against General Wu P'ei-fu.

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Koo, Wellington

F 1. My Retirement and My RetnriL to Peking as Minister of Finance^

1925-July 1926

I stayed in Tientsin for a short while and then went to Shanghai

to lead a private citizen^ life. Quite a few of ray political friends

went with me to Shanghai - some after me and some before me. We often

met informally through 1925 and kept ourselves in touch with the current

events. Among my political friends there were Dr. Lo Wen-kan, Dr.

T,ang Erh-ho, and Mr. Sun Tan-lin, General Wu P,ei-fu,s confidant.

There was a bank of which Sun Tan-lin was the president, and we often

met at this for exchange of news and information. Although I was in

private life, politicians of all groups coming to and fro often contacted

me. In other words, despite my retirement, I was kept well informed of wbat

was going on. My main interest was to try to follow the work of the

Customs and Tariff Conference, which had originated in Washington. The

tariff problems had been much discussed at the Washington Conference

and concerned China*8 attempt to recover her full tariff autonomy.

Outside of this, I had very little interest politically. The government

then in Peking was a revolutionary regime without any constitutional basis.

The very title of the chief of the state - the Chief Executive - indicated

that the government was a new regime.

At the beginning of 1926, fighting broke out again between Feng

Yu-hsiang on the one side and Chang Tso-lin and Wu P^i-fu on the other.
Koo, Wellington

The allied forces of Chang and Wu seemed to have no difficulty in gaining

the upper hand, and Feng's troops were driven further and further away

from eastern Chihli and Tientsin to Nan-k'ou and into Suiyuan and Chahar,

the two provinces which were still controlled by his men.

Early in 1926, when the fighting between Feng's troops and the

allied forces began to turn in favor of the latter, political problems

began to come to the fore. Accordingly, General Wu P'ei-fu's headquarters

sent men to Shanghai to approach us - that is myself, T'ang Erh-ho, Lo

Wen-kan, and Sun Tan-lin. The last named. Sun Tan-lin, had of course

been in close touch with Wu's headquarters in Hankow. It was arranged

by Wu's entourage for us to visit the Marshal to join him in celebrating

his birthday on March 12. We were expected to stay in Hankow for a few

days in order to have consultations with Wu, who was understood to be in

a thoughtful mood about the political situation, about what should be

done to reorganize the government. The most favored idea was the

restoration of W. W. Yen’s Cabinet. This idea was understandable

from the point of view of the Chihli Clique. Dr. Yen's Cabinet had

been upset by General Feng's coup d'etat; in order to repair the

damage done to the Chihli Clique it was natural that Yen's Cabinet

should be brought back into existence.

Sun Ch'uan-fang, who was then in Nanking, did not attend Wu's

birthday party. Sun had his representatives in Shanghai, among whom

was Dr. Ting Wen-chiang, who was more a scholar than a politician and had

the confidence of Sun. Ting kept in touch with me, Lo Wen-kan, and
Koo, Wellington

1*)

T'ang Erh-ho and conveyed us an invitation from Marshal Sun to talk

with him. Marshal Sun was also very much interested in the political

as well as the military side. I suppose that he had his own personal

ambition. He was then the Inspector-General of the Five Provinces

of the lower Yangtze Valley, a position which carried with it not only

administrative and military power but practically complete control of

the entire area. In fact, he was an independent warlord, and an impor­

tant factor in the current situation. Naturally he wanted to get in

touch with people like myself, Lo and T'ang, looking upon us as sort of

political friends. Although at that time there was already a good deal

of rumbling between General Wu and Marshal Sun, whenever we saw Sun he

was always curious to know what we thought of the situation and what

General Wu was planning.

Finally, General Wu P’ei-fu sent an invitation in the form of

a telegram, not to ask us to come to Hankow to celebrate his birthday

but to invite us to go there for consultation. Of course, we knew that

his birthday party would take place at the same time. We went. My

stay in Hankow was an interesting and revealing experience for me because

I found out how simply Marshal Wu lived and how devoted he was, not

only to the fighting in the North but also to the study of the political

situation in China as a whole, particularly in the North. He told us

that his program consisted of the restoration of the Yen Cabinet

but that was to be only temporary, adding that for this program he

intended to secure the concurrence and approval of Marshal Chang

Tso-lin, who was not too well disposed to Dr. Yen. But Marshal Wu
Koo, Wellington

1V

thought he could carry this point with Marshal Chang, although the latter

was still unfavorable to the idea.

After two or three conversations ray other friends went back to

Shanghai and I was asked by Marshal Wu to stay for further talks

especially as he would like me to go to Peking direct from Hankow. He

and I had several tete-a-tete conversations and he told me he would like

to have some changes in the Yen Cabinet although the Cabinet as a body

was to be restored. After consultations with Dr. Yen and his other col­

leagues in Peking, both he and they wanted me to replace Dr. Wang K'e-

min at the Ministry of Finance, and that Dr. Alfred Sze was to be appoin­

ted Foreign Minister; pending his arrival Dr. Yen would act concurrently.

He asked me to agree to it: I said no. I gave as the reason for my

refusal that I never had studied much the financial problems of China,

to which he at once answered me that I was chairman of the Finance

Discussion Committee, that according to the report I issued I must have

been quite familiar with the problems. I said that all along I had been

more interested in foreign affairs and questions of foreign policy and in

dealing with foreign powers. He said China*s finances at the time were

inseparable from foreign relations, whether it was a question of

reorganizing China's finances or obtaining foreign credit. Therefore

my experience would be a great help to the reorganization of China's

finances as well as to the financial administration. So he begged me

not to insist on ray refusal but to go to Peking with a list of the

revised cabinet which he wrote up in my presence and gave to me. Seeing

Koo, Wellington
11

that he was rather insistent on ray going over to the Finance Ministry,

I said that Wang K'e-rain had always been recognized as a financial

genius and he had long-standing connections with the Bank of China -

he had been Chairman of the Board and President for many years;

moreover at one time he too had been Special Commissioner of Foreign

Affairs. To this he said Wang could not carry out the duties of the

Finance Office in the way that it should be carried out and that he could

not enjoy the same confidence I would have with the government and the

public in general. He told me not to persifit in my refusal and he

again pleaded that China needed a Finance Minister who would depart frcm

the ordinary run of finance ministers.

Seeing his firm stand I said that I would like to think it over but

I would like to go to Shanghai first. He asked me why. He had a car

attached to certain trains for Peking. I said I wanted to go to Shanghai

first because I wanted to size up the opinion both of the foreign community

and the Chinese in Shanghai for Shanghai was not only the center of

Chinese political opinion but a place where you could find a reflection

of foreign sentiment toward the political situation in China and toward

the restoration of the Yen Cabinet and so forth. I promised him to visit

Marshal Sun on my way back to Shanghai, which was a second reason why I

had to go to Shanghai; he said could I then make it short, stay one day

and come back, but I said it would take at least three or four days.

So finally it was arranged for me to go back to Shanghai and I

Koo, Wellington
11

returned to Hankow in about ten days1 time on April 29. On my arrival I

was accorded an impressive welcome. General Wu’s car brought me immediately

to his headquarters and after that we had a talk. He asked me what I

found out in Shanghai, and when I told him, he asked me to leave for Peking

directly because Dr. Yen and his colleagues were waiting anxiously for

me to bring a list of the revised Cabinet. He handed me the list, which

I asked him to reconsider. I told him I would take the list to Peking

but I wanted him to understand tha t I would not accept the finance

portfolio, because I would not be able to discharge it. He said I should

talk it over with Dr. Yen who was equally anxious. Probably I had been

originally suggested by Dr. Yen himself because toward the last days of

our Cabinet in 1924 the relations between Dr. W. W. Yen and Wang K’e-min

became very strained, so strained that anybody could see it on the surface.

I arrived in Peking by train on May 6, 1926 about 7:00 p.m. and already

practically all my colleagues in the Yen Cabinet were gathered at the

station except Dr. Yen, who they said was receiving callers and could not

come. I was taken directly to Dr. Yen's house and was told that he was

waiting anxiously for my arrival. When I got there it was nearly 7:45.

Dinner was served and immediately after dinner we had a meeting. We

talked over the list. Chang Chih-tan was very prominent there. He was

Minister of Communications. Chang Ching-hui was on the list; he was

Chang Tso-lin's man. Yang Wen-k'ai was comparatively a new name; I do

not remember which clique he belonged to. The list clearly represented

a coalition cabinet between Marshal Wu P'ei-fu and Marshal Chang Tso-lin.

Koo, Wellington

Although the list was published, the Cabinet appointments were

promulgated, the Cabinet was unable to meetj X for one refused to take

up the finance portfolio, and besides, bhe cabinet list was not well

regarded by Marshal Chang Tso**lin. The main reason for the stillbirth

of the Yen Cabinet was understood to be the failure to secure the full

approval of the Marshal. I kept aloof because X did not want to take

up the finance portfolio. In the hope of satisfying Marshal Chang Tso-

lin, Chang Ching-hui was probably suggested as the Minister of the

Army and Cheng Ming-chih as the Minister of the Interior: they were

two important leaders in the Manchurian camp. But what Marshal Chang

Tso-lin wanted was the reorganization of the Cabinet without Dr. W. W.

Yen. So although the Yen Cabinet was restored, it did not function.

Peking was filled with political gossip that the Cabinet was viewed un­

favorably by Marshal Chang Tso-lin who declined to take an interest in

it. And neither the Minister of the Army or the Minister of the Interior,

the two important representatives of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, took up

their offices.

Negotiations continued between the two camps. Marshal Chang Tso-lin

[Yang Lin-k’o]
was represented by Yang Yli-t’ing/and Cheng Ming-chih [Cheng Ch'ien],

Marshal Wu by Chang Ming-ch'i and Pai Chien-wu, with the aim of

reaching a compromise on a Cabinet in Peking. Marshal Chang Tso-lin1s

representative proposed me as Premier, being the Foreign Minister in the

Yen Cabinet and also the representative at the Washington Conference,

and they felt I enjoyed the same good name as Dr. Yen in the international

scene and Wu P'ei-fu accepted, as the principle of a Hua-fu Cabinet

Koo, Wellington

would still continue with me as Premier. Chang Ming-chih came to

Peking and told me about it. He said he had spoken directly over the

telephone with Marshal Wu then and they concurred, because Marshal Wu

did not want to have a man with too much the political color of the Man­

churian camp just as Marshal Chang did not want to have one entirely

identified with Marshal Wu. Chang Ming-chih asked me to do the necessary

preparation. When I expressed my wonder why I should be chosen he gave

me those reasons which I mentioned above. It was a compromise Cabinet

proposed by Chang Tso-lin although I had really been in the Cabinet

already. Then he left for Hankow and said he would come back in two days.

I suppose he had to report to Marshal Wu on the other problems taken up

by the conference in Tientsin. Mr. Chang Ming-chih said a communique

would be issued in Tientsin on the results of the agreement reached at

this Tientsin conference. But the communique was held up at the last

minute. One of my secretaries, Yang Ching-ping, an American educated

student who was very close with the Japanese returned students said

the communique had been held up because Shen Jen-yu had told Chang Chih-

t'an, who communicated to the Paoting leaders in Tientsin, that the

Japanese would be troubled if I were to head the Cabinet. So the

communique was held up pending clarification. It must have impressed

the Paoting leaders, although Marshal Wu in a general sense was part

of the Chihli clique - the Chihli clique was formed of the Paoting and

the Loyang groups - that the report might be true. At any rate the

communique was never issued. It was reported to me that they were trying

to find out how true it was.

Koo, Wellington

Meanwhile somebody in Tientsin, maybe Chang Chih-t’an who was left out

of the restored Cabinet, suggested that pending clarification of the

Japanese attitude it would perhaps be better to have someone acting.

Yen*s Cabinet had been restored in May; meanwhile the conference had been

going on. Still the Cabinet was unable to meet, for although I took

up the finance portfolio by June 8 some of the Manchurian nominees did

not take theirs. So there was a political vacuum.

Finally Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei, a close supporter of Marshal Wu, a man

more or less independent in politics although a first class naval expert,

was persuaded to be Acting Premier. He took over on July 6. He was

Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and concurrently Acting Premier. After

Dr. Yen resigned, I was still nominally Finance Minister; Admiral Tu

came to ask me to take up the finance portfolio and said that when

Dr, Yen resigned he recommended Ts’ai Ting-kan as Foreign Minister.

He realized my disinclination in regard to the finance portfolio, and he

wanted me to be Foreign Minister, he said, but Dr. Yen recommended

Admiral Ts’ai, and since he. Admiral Tu, had been Minister of the Navy

under Yen’s premiership, out of deference he felt he had to accept

Admiral Ts’ai, especially as Dr. Yen said that if there were any

difficulties he would be glad to help Admiral Ts’ai.I

I told him that from the beginning I had refused to be Finance Minister

because I felt I would not be equal to the task and I could not understand

why Mr, Wang K’e-min, who was Dr. Yen's Finance Minister should not continue,

although X knew that both Dr. Yen and Marshal Wu P’ei-fu seemed to feel

that he should not continue. So I suggested that Admiral Tu call on

Koo3 Wellington

Mr. Wang K'e^in and ask him to take up the portfolio. Admiral Tu

said he also had heard that Mr. Wang was not entirely persona grata

with Dr. Yen and he would act on my suggestion. But he thought that even

if Mr. Wang should accept, he might have difficulty persuading Marshal.

Soon after he left, Mr. Wang K'e-min called on me. He said that he

had heard Admiral Tu had come to ask me to take up the finance portfolio

and I said that was true but I told him I suggested that he should

continue. No, no, he said, he would not. His purpose in calling on

me was to warn me that the finance portfolio was not only the most

difficult but also the most dangerous. Then he counted something like

nine predecessors in the Finance Ministry who ended by either being shot

or imprisoned or kidnapped or fleeing as refugees. He said X enjoyed a

perfectly clean reputation in China; why should I jump into a pool of

trouble? I said that was exactly how I felt, and said I had recommended

him. I said when Admiral Tu called on him to ask him to take it up,

please don’t decline. I perfectly agreed that I was not cut out for

finance, whereas he had been and he was. Oh no no, he said, he would not

take it up.

Before departing he said he knew it would be difficult for

me to decline since Marshal Wu as well as Admiral Tu wanted me, but the

best way was to go away from China. He had a suggestion to make, he

said. The Sino-Franco Industrial Bank was one in which the Chinese

Government had substantial holdings through the Bank of China and the
Koo, Wellington

$3

Chinese Government was entitled to appoint a representative: he said

he would see to it that I remained a representative of the Chinese

sd. "t
government and s4-fe on the board of directors of the Sino-Franco Industrial

Bank to be stationed in Paris with a very handsome stipend, and free from

heavy responsibility. I said I appreciated his thoughtfulness and might

go abroad but not in connection with any post, even a semi-official one.

In the same evening the Admiral came back, told me that he had called

on Wang K^-min and said despite much pleading Wang refused to take up

the post. So he had come back to me. He said he was new, he had never

aspired to be Premier, he knew nothing about the political side of

government, and still less about finance. He begged me to help out,

especially since I was very much in the confidence of Marshal Wu P'ei-

fu and Marshal Chang; he said he knew they all liked me and bad confidence

in me as a man of probity to handle the finances. He admitted the Finance

Ministry was a ministry always suspected by all sides a&ar being unclean

and all that, and said that I would have no trouble of that kind. If I

refused, he would have to resign. He then reported to Loyang. Finally

Cheng Ct^ien or someone else urged me to accept, especially as the

Mid^4utumn Festival was approaching and without a Finance Minister the

Cabinet could not possibly survive the festival. So Admiral Tu’s

Cabinet was officially inaugurated on July 6 with me as Finance Minister.

Koo, Wellington

F 2(a). The Crisis of the Mid-Autumn Festival: Obstruction from the

Five Banks

My experience as Finance Minister was most revealing and one of the

most memorable episodes in my political life. After X took office, the

various Ssu-cba ng (section chiefs) came to call and practically

everyone of them suggested what I should do. They perfectly knew that

I was a novice. Some of them I had known but not intimately. I remem­

ber I made only one change, the K^-ts'ang ssu-chang, the man in actual

charge of the Treasury, whb was originally a Bank of China man. I

brought in my own man Kuo Tso-fan for the Treasury Section. He was at

one time closely associated with the banking world and also had some

experience in diplomatic work, in the consular service. Chang was Head

of the Public Debt Section. I think he was recommended to me by Wang

K'e-min. He was able and very straightforward. I picked out Kuo

myself.

The first thing they suggested to me was that I should call on Sir

Francis Aglen, Director General of the Customs. They said every

Finance Minister paid him a visit on taking up the office. I was

surprised and asked why. He was a public functionary under the Ministry

of Finance, but they said he had all the power. In those days no public

debt could be floated without being secured by some kind of customs

revenue either in the form of a remitted portion of indemnity or

secured on the surplus customs revenue, and all that required the
FILMED
BY
Koo, Wellington

nodding consent of the Director General. So I said, "Oh yes, I'd like

to see him." I said I would call him on the telephone. "No," they

said, "^ou should pay him a visit." "No," I said, "I know Sir

Francis." So I called him up. He congratulated me, and I said I would

like to have a talk with him,would he come. He said he would like to

come to pay his respect^, so he came. So there was no need for me to

call on him. But that was the atmosphere then.

Within about two or three days, on my desk, there was a document for

me to sign, and the Public Debt Section Chief came for my signature. I

asked him what it was about and he said it was about an agreement for an

advance from the Bank of China to pay a certain bill. The amount was not

very large, several tens of thousands probably. As I was curious I

began to read it. I saw one article saying that the monthly rate of

interest was 1.5%, which would work out at 18% a year. "That is very

high," I said, and asked for the current market rate. It was 14%

annually, or ordinarily about 1.2% monthly. I remarked that I was quite

sure the Government was being made to pay more than the market rate.

Wasn't the Bank of China supposed to be the fiscal agent of the

Government, and the Government its stockholder? He said it had always

been done that way, and as a matter of fact my signature was just to

legalize the loan because the money had already been drawn. "Well,"

I said, "I want to be fair, and I shall change to the market rate, which

would work out to be something rather less than 15% a year." He said:

"Sir, it's best not to change it." But I said there is no reason why

the Government should pay more than is necessary to a bank which is

Koo, Wellington

partly a government bank. So I just made a correction at the side.

I did not realize that this would be the cause of a great problem

from then on. Evidently it created a sensation among the Chinese

banking world that here was a Finance Minister who would not listen

as he was told by the bank and that I had the nerve to impose a rate

of interest on them. When this man Chang, Chief of the Public Debt

Section and in the service of the Bank of China for many years, had

begged me not to do it, I thought it was not right for the Minister

of Finance to say nothing and just accept everything suggested to him

by the bank. I did not realize that it would convey a most unfavorable

impression in the banking world.

As the Mid-Autumn Festival was approaching, it was necessary

for the Government, particularly the Ministry of Finance, to raise

the necessary funds for paying the various services. Admiral Tu was

equally anxious, but he left the matter entirely to me as Minister

of Finance. This was quite proper. In accordance with the practice

of the time, I contacted the principal banks in Peking such as Bank

[bj. jj
of China, Bank of Communications, the Chin-ch*eng (Golden City) Bank, ts
tfoJL
Ta-lu Bank, and Yen-yeh Bank. These were the five principal banks.

Through them I also contacted some other banks such as the Pao-shang

Bank, which was one of the important banks in North China though not

a national institution and which also had the right granted by the

Government to issue bank notes. It was the five principal banks

Koo, Wellington

VI
/-V -- \
that were considered asrepresentati^M «&* the banking world. I

remember that on September 5 I invited the representatives of the five

banks to a dinner party, in which I talked things over with them.

Looking back today, I think that it sounds almost incredible that

the amount of money which I asked them to lend to the Government was

two to three million dollars, which, according to the estimate, was the

required funds in addition to other revenues which could be counted upon

by the Finance Ministry. In fact, not only the representatives of the

five banks but also those of some other banks were invited to the

same party. After the dinner party we had a discussion, but there

was no result. The spokesmen of the banks were Wang K'o-min and Chang

Chia-ao. Wang's attitude seemed to be non-committal but sympathetic,

whereas Chang’s reply seemed to be a diplomatic answer indicating that the

banks' representatives had to consult among themselves before they

could give an answer.

Days passed by without any reply, and we were getting anxious as the

critical date - the Mid-Autumn Festival - was approaching. Then Chang

Chia-ao told me that, in order to have a quick reply, it would be very

desirable and, in fact, necessary for me to address the Bankers' Union,

so that the whole banking group in Peking would understand why the loan

was required; it was only through such a procedure that the banks as a

group would be able to give a positive answer to my application for a

loan. So it was arranged that the Bankers’ Union would hold a meeting

to which I was invited to speak. I thought that this was not an

Koo, Wellington

ij>

unreasonable arrangement although I told my colleagues in the Finance

Ministry this was very unusual. I agreed to address the proposed meeting

although I suspected that the arrangement was merely a directory move on

the part of the bankers, particularly Mr. Chang Chia-ao, who was the

head of the Bank of China and was recognized as the leader of the

Chinese banking world in Peking. I went to the meeting and explained the

reasons why the Government needed the funds. I said that the minimum

amount required would be two million and half dollars and this amount was

to be used to pay the various services, including the armed forces and the

police, the members of the educational institutions, and so on.

Afte r iny speech and appeal, one of the representatives of the

Bankers' Union, whose name I do not remember now, said that they

would consult and convey to me their reply. Again, several days passed

without any answer. The various organizations of the government,

particularly the armed forces and the military establishments, of which

there were thirteen, sent representatives to the ministry every day to ask

for funds. My home was visited by representatives of the student body

of Peking University, who asked that the funds for the University

and the Teachers' College should be paid promptly.

The reply of the Bankers’ Union, which was conveyed to me through

Chang Chia-ao, was that the amount was more than they could take care

of and that the Yen-yeh Bank, the Bank of China^\Bank of Communications,

the Chin-ch'eng Bank, and the Ta-lu Bank were favorably disposed and
&oo, Wellington

P
would try to provide the Ministry with 500,000 dollars and that was the

best they could d:o. I began to feel that behind the reluctance of the

Chinese bankers to help the Ministry of Finance as they had always done

in the past there was really some political motive on their part. I felt

very indignant at their attitude. They tried to make it impossible for

me to tide over the festival. "Passing the festival" was really "passing

the crisis"; even before my taking office, one of my friends had said the

Mid-Autumn Festival was approaching and it was one of the biggest

headaches for any Minister of Finance, and it would be the better part

of my valour to avoid it. Now, my efforts to meet all the conditions of the

Banks, such as addressing the Bankers' Union had proved futile. The

attitude of the bankers was probably influenced by my reducing the rate

of interest as mentioned previously. They wanted the Chinese Finance

Minister to be a tool of the Chinese banks; they had always been spoilt

as the need for government funds was a factor which the Chinese banks

could always manipulate to their interest.

I recalled the advice that I should not even take up the post of

Finance Minister after Admiral Tu had accepted the acting premiership; and

I recalled how I was even offered the seemingly attractive position in

Paris as government representative on the Sino-French Bank of Commerce

and Industry. But I was undaunted. Having taken up the post of Finance

Minister at the insistence of Admiral Tu, I wanted to do my best.

On the day before the Mid-Autumn Festival, I sized up the condition

of the national treasury. The total amount of money, including both

what was available in the Treasury and the 500,000 dollars, was only

sufficient to pay a percentage of the expenditure of the government.

Koo, Wellington
3c

My recommendation to the Cabinet was that the Finance Ministry could not

pay 100% of the expenditure of the government, but sufficient funds would

be ready to pay 40% of the salary of the civil service of the government,

70% of the salary of the military and police forces, and 70% of the

salary of the staff of the government educational institutions. I was

able to make that report to the Cabinet because I had been successful in

making arrangement for an advance from the Chinese-American Bank of

Trade in Peking, of which the American director was Mr. L. Williams, son

of Mr. E. T. Williams. E. T. Williams was for a long time Charge d’Affaires

in the American Legation in Peking; later he became chief of the Far

Eastern division in the State Department in Washington; he spoke Chinese

and was very friendly to China; his children were brought up in China.

L. Williams, whom I knew personally, was, like his father, known to be a

friend of China. I telephoned him, asking for an appointment to see him;

he said any time that suited me would suit him. So, I went immediately

to see him. It was about 3:00 in the afternoon. I told him that I went

there on an urgent mission. Mr. L. Williams said that he had read in the

newspapers in the last few days that the Chinese Finance Minister had

been put in difficulties by the Chinese banks.

"Dr. Koo, I know that you have been pressed very hard," he added.

"Tell me how much you need to tide over the festival." I told him that

I needed 500,000 dollars. To ray surprise, he said, "Is that all you need?

Would it be sufficient?" I said that I had the consent of the Premier

not to pay the full quota of the expenses and salaries in view of the

depressed state of the national treasury; the government would pay 70%

of the salaries of the military and police forces and the staff and per­

sonnel of the educational institutions and 40% of the salaries of the

Koo, Wellington

civil service and therefore, the borrowing of half a million dollars would

meet the situation. Then, I indicated that I wanted to know what would

be the terms and the procedure.

He said, "Mr. Minister, we know that you are hard pressed, and we

know your responsibilities to meet the situation. So, don’t bother about

the terms until the so-called Mid-Autumn Festival is over; they would be

nothing that you might consider to be unreasonable; that you can be sure

of. Our purpose is to help you out. We have noticed in the newspapers

how difficult it has been for you to get some help from the Chinese

banks, and we think that you should be helped. Therefore, we had been

expecting ,your call. Now that you have come, we want to know would

half a million dollars be enough." I said that half a million dollars

would help me tide over the situation.

"You could have more if you wanted to," he said, "but if you say that

half a million dollars would lieet the situation, we can understand."

I still wanted to talk about the terms.

He said, "No. If you don’t mind, I want to tell you that, while you

are Chinese Finance Minister, we are perfectly willing to lend and that

we are giving you this help not so much because you are the minister

as because you are Dr. Wellington Koo the person. We know that Dr.

Wellington Koo would not fail us."I

I thanked him. "It is already after 3 and I understand your closing

Koo, Wellington

hour is 4 o'clock. I suppose you have to remove the money from the

Legation Quarter."

"No," he said, "Dr. Koo, this morning, anticipating the crisis

we removed our funds from the Legation Quarter and in fact we have moved

out more than you have asked."

"But," I said, "I understand you closing hour is four o'clock. I

need the money and will go back and call a Cabinet meeting and ask the

Treasury to give the checks and they might be presented at all hours

today."

"The money is ready and the bank will be kept open to pay the

checks that you might issue until the last penny is drawn."

"That might be very late," I said.

"We're prepared, we're prepared," he said.

With that I thanked hink.and left, counting upon the $500,000. As

a matter of fact I asked for this $500,000 as a precaution because I

did not feel sure that the $500,000 from the Chinese banks which was

the maximum they could provide would be readily available. During

those few days some of the reports in the newspapers must have been inspired

from quarters not too friendly to the government or to me personally as

Koo, Wellington

the Chinese Minister of Finance. So another friend of mine, a former

Minister of Finance, came entirely on his own initiative - Hsiung Hsi-

ling. He thoroughly understood the situation: not only was he a

financier and economist himself but he too had served as Finance Minis ter

and probably he had had somewhat the same experience of pressure and

maneuvering on the part of theChinese banking world. He came to me and

said he understood the Chinese banks were not helping me out and he

understood also the difficult situation I was in. So he said after

he went and saw Mr. Hussey, Inspector General of the Salt Gabelle, the

resort which was desired by Mr. Hussey and himself as to what could be

done to help the Chinese Finance Minister, (Hsiung Hsi-ling was not only

a former Finance Minister but also had all his early life studied the

Chinese fiscal system) Mr. Hussey told him there was a remittance he

was expecting from one of the branch offices of the Salt Gabelle for the

end of September. The amount was about $500,000, and it was a

dependable remittance. Mr. Hsiung Hsi-ling told me that Mr. Hussey

assured him there was this amount coming to the Government and he

wanted to inform me of it so that I could make my plans accordingly.

I found myself on the eve of the festival with just enough to tide
Koo, Wellington

F 2(b). The Crisis of the Mid-Autumn Festival: Paying the Troops

Then something happened. Before the Cabinet meeting set for the next

day, I went to tell Premier Tu of the arrangements I had made, and said

that we could pass the festival without trouble. He was happy. The same

afternoon, I went to him to report to him the situation after my talk with

Williams. Then X ordered Mr. Kuo Tso-fan, the Chief of the Treasury

Section to issue the necessary checks. X thought I could pass the

festival without trouble and went to see Dr. Lo Wen-kan for a chat. He
and
had just gone out and Mrs. Lo came/while she and I were having a cup of

tea, a telephone message came. It was already toward the evening and

my major-domo, the head of the servants, telephoned to say "All is lost."

I said "What?" He said the house was surrounded by a band of troops with

armored cars, machine guns, the courtyard was filled with officers standing

with swords. He said my secretary Mr. M. C. Yang would explain to me

when he came. The checks issued by the Chief of the Treasury Section were

not honored at the Bank of China and therefore they had come back and

wanted to see the Minister of Finance. I told him to send for Mr. Kuo

Tso-fan, the Treasury Chief. He said he had already come because as soon

as the military officers and soldiers arrived he telephoned to Mr. Kuo.

I asked Mr. Kuo to come to the telephone and wanted to know what it was

all about. Hesaid the checkswere not honored by the Bank of China

because they said no contract had been signed for the advance and that

they could not pay until the contract had been signed. Mr. Kuo said such

a contract had never been signed before, that it was a matter of formality,

and usually, he said, it would be extended until after the festival; they

were evidently making trouble for us.

Koo, Wellington

Meanwhile, the officers were insisting on seeing me. I told him to

tell them to surrender the checks to the Bank of China and to give them

checks on the Sino-American Bank of Trade. He did accordingly and

the officers got the new checks,surrendered the old checks, and left

completely satisfied, because all they wanted was to have the money. They

did not know anything about what game was being played by the banks.

However, only half of them came,since the rest were still at the Bank

of China. Shortly afterwards I wanted to go back. I rushed back but

Athy
at the entrance of the Iron Lion Sfeeaet my major-domo and another

servant stopped me as the whole place was filled with truckloads of

soldiers. So I went back to Lo’s place, and telephoned again. Kuo said

there was trouble at the Bank of China. The officers had wanted to know

why the checks were not paid. When they were told there was no agreement

signed, they were at first impressed, so half of them went to my house.

But the other half still tried to press on, and they wanted to see the

Director, who was Chang Chia-ao. The bank said that without instruction

from the Director, they could not pay; the Director had gone out and they

did not know where. Only on hearing that the checks had been exchanged^

did the soldiers leave. So had the Sino-American Bank not helped, it might

have develped into something untoward and serious.

The next day a Cabinet meeting had been scheduled for me to report as

to how I had made the financial arrangements, and also the disbursements

to the civil servants. The meeting was called at four o’clock. I

submitted my report of the receipts and disbursements on the basis which had
Koo, Wellington

been approved by the premier, 40% for the civil servants, and 70% for the

educational institutions, and 70% for the military and police services.

Everybody in the Cabinet was pleased and congratulated me on having been

able to provide the funds, even though the payment was not 100%.

Just then the Premier^ A.D.C. came to report that hundreds of officers

were forcing an entry and were coming into the State Department.

Admiral Tu, a military man^ himself^was very angry, and demanded to know

who told them to come. They wanted to see the Minister of Finance. I

said I would go and explain to them. The Government had done its best to

get the funds, and the military people and educational institutions were

given special treatment of 70% whereas the government civil servants were

paid only 40%. It was a question of fact. Many of the sources of govern­

ment revenue had been fleeced by the military authorities not only in the

provinces but some even in Peking, such as the Ch,ung-wen«-men Tax Bureau.

So the Government could only get such funds as were directly controlled by the

Salt Gabelle or the Maritime Customs Administration, both of which were

under foreign supervision and control. I wanted to go and explain this to

them. The Premier said, "No. You must^t go, because itTs not fehe
^ Jtizc
question of money but they want^4 make trouble for you. He said he

would talk to them. Then somebody said that would not be desirable either

because they might make a scene and would be very difficult for the

premier. So Chang Chih-t^n the Minister of Communications said that he

knew many of these representatives because the troops werey^f Chihli

although they included some Manchurian units such as the Air Force.
Koo, Wellington
qi
Chang Chih-t’an was also a A^irtherner and said he would go. He talked

to them for a long time and came back. They still insisted upon being

paid in full. Chang Kuo-k’an, Minister of the Interior, said he would

go, and try to calm them. He went, spent some time, and came back without

result. They wanted the remaining 3Q%. It was well after dinner time

but they still remained. Admiral Tu was furious at the show of indis­

cipline. This was a revolt, a rebellion, he said, and should be dealt

with accordingly. But the others said it was a political move designed to

embarrass the Minister of Finance so we should see they got something

te
to report to their leaders. We put our heads together and someone ouggeofeed

whether the Ministry of Finance could give them something in the way of

a promise that when finances were easier the remaining 30% would be made

up. Opinion was very much divided. I said that so far as the Ministry of

Finance was concerned a loan could perhaps be floated on the balance of the

remitted portion of the Austrian indemnity. Someone favored, some did

not like the idea. Admiral Tu was especially against appeasing the

rebels. The idea of issuing bonds secured on the Austrian indemnity

surplus finally gained approval of the Cabinet. It was already midnight

and we decided that the 30% unpaid would be apid with the bonds as soon

as the bond issue was completed. Then Chang Chih-t’an again went out to

tell the body of military officers but apparently he did not obtain

ready acceptance. They said they wanted cash and not bond^paaad after a
3 tvrvv^uojng^aTl^EIs
*v' >
long whiTe^aftar resources of argument finally the military

representatives agreed to the plan.

All that time we were confined in the Cabinet room without food or
Koo, Wellington
C\1

drink and when they finally agreed to disperse after accepting this offer,

we were able to leave too. It was about 4 o'clock, and as we began to

march out, Mr. Lo Wen-kan took hold of one of ray arms and Chang Chih-t'an

took hold of the other in order to protect me. Admiral Tu was in front

and I was immediately behind him. As we reached the main entrance we saw
j<©0
a line of automobiles there. Two officers came and said, "Mr. Fitr*^

here's a car." Admiral Tu turned around and said: "Go away2" he said.

He took me into his car and told the chauffeur to go to my home. Then two

of them at once jumped on the sideboard of the car, one on each side.

Admiral Tu had an A.D.C. who sat next to the chauffeur. Admiral Tu got

angry and shouted "Get out.' Get off.' Obey orders.'" "Obey whose orders,"
they retorted. "Orders from abovej" said the Admiral. He asked who they

were. They would not say.. These men were armed, with revolvers at their

sides. Admiral Tu was fuming, but he could do nothing. So we went, and

all exceptone or two of the Cabinet followed. Quite a few of these military

representatives followed us. We went into the Chinese section of my

home. They were gathered in the courtyard.

It was daylight already, and I ordered ray servants to get some refresh­

ments. Admiral Tu wanted to knew why these men followed us because an

arrangement for the 30% balance had been accepted. They said they wanted

to have a guarantee that the bonds would be paid. They wanted to convert

the bonds into cash. While we were inside there were military people in

uniform taking notes of everything that we were saying, even the chatting.

When I went to wash my hands I was followed by two of them. They followed
Koo, Wellington

when I came back. They did not dare touch us, or raise their hands, but

they were watching us very closely. Dr. Lo, X think, said that we must

get the Director of the Bank of China, Mr. Chang Chia-ao. His bank,

being a government bank, could give an assurance that the loan bond could

be cashed, at least against the $500,000 which they promised but which

they did not pay. The servant telephoned and came back with the report

that Mr. Chang Chia-ao had already gone out - it was about seven o'clock

in the morning. I asked him to telephone again to ask where he had gone

and to say that we wanted to reach him. The message came back that he had

gone out riding, and was taking his morning exercise on horseback; he could

not be located.

Someone suggested that if the Director was not there, there was

always the Chairman of the Board of the Bank of China. It was Admiral

Tu who said that Wang K’o-min might be asked to come immediately. At

about eight o'clock Wang arrived and we told him all that had happened

and how the Bank of China had failed to carry out its part of the promise

to advance $500,000 to the Treasury. Of course four of the banks had

agreed to advance the loan. The Bank of China was committed to at least

one quarter of that sum, and they had not paid it. Having been in poli­

tical life for a long time, Wang was a friend of ours. What we wanted

him to do was to got out, since the military people did not believe the

cabinet, and give them his assurance that the bonds could be changed into

cash, in other words to promise that/the Bank would buy up these bonds.

It was around nine o'clock when Wang talked to them. After he gave them
Koo, Wellington
VO 0

UL'
a personal guarantee s€ cashing 30% of the bonds, they agreed to leave.

Then, Wang came back to us and we expressed our appreciation for the

work he had just done. Finally, some of my colleagues left; Admiral Tu left;

Wang K^-min left; I went to bed, and some of the others went to bed.

Toward the evening a report came over the telephone that there were

still military representatives at the Bank of China, still insisting upon

the payment of those checks which the Finance Ministry had issued against

the 500,000 dollars, assurance of which had been given by the banks.

Apparently the local manager of the Bank of China would not pay because

he had been instructed by the president of that bank that the checks

could not be honored until the contract had been signed. He could not

pay without further instructions from the president, but Chang Kung-
( fkta fcoj
ch’uan^could not be located. Actually, the Ministry of Finance was play­

ing fair; it was the banks that were making trouble. Those who wanted

to get their pay must have known that it was a practice between the

Finance Ministry and the banks that advances would always be made first

by the banks and fulfilled afterwards by the Ministry of Finance. Since

Chang Chia-ao could not be located, some military men who were waiting

at the Bank of China became impatient and shouted to the manager,

"We'll tie you up!" The manager said that he was not responsible for all

this and that they should see the president. Then, recalling Wang K'o-min’s

personal promise at Minister Koo’s house, they said, "Let's go to Wang

Koo, Wellington

l&i

K'o-min’s house." According to the report, when they reached Wang’s

house Wang was just leaving. When they asked him to telephone to the

Bank of China and give it the order to honor the checks, Wang said,

"I am chairman of the board, and the actual administration of the bank was

in the hands of the president; so I could not give such an order directly."

But they said that, since the chairman of the board was in a higher

position than the president, Wang’s remarks simply indicated that he wanted

to get out of trouble. So they shouted at him, "Give the order!" They

also wanted him to go with them to the bank, but, instead of going with

them, he padded. Their checks must have ibecause the Austrian loan was

never issued.

The Mid-Autumn Festival was finally over. Admiral Tu called a

meeting, in which I congratulated him and also expressed my regret that

all the trouble he had had was duetto ray handling of the financial situation.

He said that he knew all about that and that he wanted to congratulate

me because I did well, adding that those politicians, namely the bankers,

want to create trouble not only for me personally but for him and for

the cabinet as a whole. He also indicated that he had had enough of it

and was going to resign. I told him that I agreed to his proposal for the

whole cabinet to resign, but I begged him to put off for a week the

meeting to decide on our resignation, because I told him I had a promise

from Mr. Hussey, Associate Inspector of the Salt Gabelle, that there would

be funds coming within a week. It was surely reliable, and I wanted to have

the funds to pay off the debt owed to the Chinese American Bank. That
Koo, Wellington

\oX

I had taken as a personal obligation, and, unless I remained in the

Finance Ministry, my successor would not pay it off and would be too

glad to have this ready cash to solve his other problems. The best

thing was to wait for one week, I told him and he agreed with me.

So, for one week the Cabinet did not hold any meeting. When

Mr. Hussey reported to Mr. Kuo, who had been told by me to keep in touch
to
with Hussey, that the money was available, it was paid over/the Chinese

American Bank. Then the Cabinet had its final meeting, at which I sub­

mitted a report of my stewardship of Minister of Finance, listing all the

items of receipt and items of disbursement. In the report there was a

balance of something over 20,000 dollars. I wanted the Cabinet to exa­

mine the report and approve it, for I noticed that one of the charges

against my predecessor was that there was no clear accounting in the

period of his stewardship and for I made it a point there should be no

charge of that kind could be levelled against me. I also said that, in

the interests of the whole cabinet whci'g'', I should have a clean

record in ray stewardship. The Cabinet approved my report, and it was

published in The China Year Book of 1928, which was edited by H. G. W.

Woodhead, the editor of the Tientsin Times. My memorandum to the cabinet

meeting was printed in the yearbook with Mr. Woodhead*s introductory note,

which is quoted in full as follows (p.543):

...On the other hand, the following statement of receipts

and expenditure during Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo's tenure of
office as Minister of Finance, June 17th to October 1st
1926, together with a memorandum submitted by him to the
Cabinet Meeting held on October 14th, 1926, although
covering only three and one-half months, is most
instructive in its own way. Despite tremendous handicaps
Kop, Wellington
!0

it is a wonder indeed that out of a total cash receipts

of three and a [half] million dollars - practically fran
the proceeds of loan exclusively - Dr. Koo was able after
deducting the expenditures, to show a cash balance of
nearly twenty-eight thousand dollars. The statement
shows what may perhaps be expected from honest administration
in normal conditions.

In this episode, another very important man, apart from Mr. L.

Williams, the American banker, was Mr. Shen, who was the Chinese

manager of the Chinese American Bank. He was a very nice man

and used to come to see me. He told me that his bank was always

boycotted by the Chinese banks, was not invited to the Bankers

Union’s meetings, and could not join any financial discussion which
^ aV
the Chinese banks had with the Chinese government. In a word, he

said, 4-1—fe he was outside the banking circle. One day Mr. Shen and

Mr. Williams invited me to a Chinese dinner party, at which Mr.

Williams said to me, "Dr. Koo, instead of your thanking us, we

want to thank you." I said, "Why?" He said, "Do you know that this

is the first time we have advanced money to the Chinese Government

andi-ge* it back?" I said, "That would be the logic I - _

jaxrt you don’t have to thank me because I just have done what

everybody should have done, i.e./tw repay what he fee borrowed

from somebody else." There was a certain amount of interest, but

probably it was very low. Furthermore, the money was paid

directly by the Office of the Salt Gabelle Inspector to the

Chinese-American Bank without going through the Ministry of

Finance. As a matter of fact, I considered the borrowing ££ a

matter of personal commitment. For, to recall my question to

 to

Koo, Wellington
)t>^

Mr. Williams about the terms, he would say only that he wanted to

help me put.

Thirteen military and police organizations had taken part in

the demonstration. Such conditions in Peking showed how impotent the

government was even in its own capital. The Government was actually
■ST
dominated by the military elements; it was harassed by the educational

institutions and the student associations. In order to survive and

keep going the Government had to confich in a sort of courageous

and correct way. Otherwise the country would fall into chaos. For
a
the sake of China as a nation,/member_ of the international community

it was necessary to maintain the government although its power had

been shorn. Even though there were military warlords backing the

government they did not exercise their power where it was a matter

of getting funds for the government.

 Koo, Wellington 105

My Premiership, October 5, 1926 to June 17, 1927.

[Note: This section has been entirely re-written by the

editor, but still requires some elucidation from Dr. Koo .

This draft remains in rough form. -- JDS]

Indignant over the way his Cabinet had been treated by the banks

and the military men, Admiral Tu Hsi-kuei resigned on October 2, 1926.

He refused to remain in office one more day, having already stayed on an

extra week at ray request.

As Tu had urged, I then took over the government,acting as tai-li

Premier. My Cabinet, which was formed on October 5, was largely

unchanged from Tu's. It was a coalition Cabinet consisting of

elements adhering to Marshal Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Wu P'ei-fu.

As I insisted, Admiral Tu remained in the Cabinet as Minister of the

Navy [original transcript says Finance], As between the two factions,

Tu was more or less neutral, but perhaps leaned a bit to the side of

Wu P'ei-fu. P'an Fu [?] was recommended for the Finance post by the

Mukden party, and was thus given the post. (P'an and Chang Tso-lin were

great friends.) Jen K'o-ch'eng, Chang Chih-t'an and Yang Wen-k'ai

continued as Ministers of Education, Communications, and Agriculture-

Commerce, respectively. In addition to being Premier, I was also Foreign

Minister, replacing Ts'ai T'ing-kan. Ts'ai,being Cantonese, was very

sensitive to developments in the South. With the Kuomintang armies

advancing Northward, he considered himself to be in an awkward position.

Some rather thorny questions were arising, such as the foreign powers'

threat to recognize the Hankow government.

During this period, my closest associates were Lo Wen-kan, Minister

 / of'Zs
PEKING GOVERNMENT CABINETS, 1926-1927

June 22, 1926 October 5, 1926 January 12, 1927

(to June 16, 1927

PREMIER Adiru Tu Hsi-kuei Wellington Koo Wellington Koo

Foreign Affairs Tslai T’ing-kan Wellington Koo Wellington Koo

Interior Chang Kuo-k!an —(same? ) Hu Wei-teh

Agri cultiure- Yang Wen-k’ai it Yang Wen-k’ai

Commerce

Education Jen K’o-cheng it Jen K’o-cheng

C ommunications Chang Chih-t’an it P’an Fu

War Chang Ching-hui ii Chang Ching-hui

Navy Tu Hsi-kuei tt Tu Hsi-kuei

Finance Wellington Koo P’an Fu T ’ ac g Erh-ho

Koo, Wellington 106

of Justice, T'ang 0rh«ho, soon to be Minister of Finance, and Dr.

Wang Ch'ung-hui, President of the Supreme Court.

In June, 1926, it will be recalled, the southern revolutionary forces

of the Kuomintang began their great Northern Expedition to unify the

country. By the end of the year Wu P’ei-fu's forces were defeated

along the Yangtse River, particularly at Wuchang, which was lost to

the revolutionary troops in October. The whole Wuhan area was taken

over by southern forces, Wu's army suffering a terrible defeat in the

process.

This created a political vacuum in North China, which Chang Tso-lin

was intent on filling by himself. By the end of the year, he moved his

troops into Chihli Province along the Great Wall. At the same time,

the Third and Fourth Armies, under Chang Hsueh-liang and Kuo Sung-ling,

moved along the Peking-Hankow Railway southward toward Kaifeng.

The Cabinet, or at least its civilian members, were not kept fully

informed of the disposition of troops, and we did not try to interfere

in the rivalries of the various military chieftans.

I suppose that our strength was that, being separate from the

conflict, we remained above the various factions. Thus, the military

camps could make use of civilians like T'ang, Dr. Wang, Dr. Lo, Dr. Yen

and myself. We were looked upon by the people at large as independent,

not directly involved in the political struggle and still less involved

in the military struggle for the control of the nation. The northern

warlords had confidence in us because we did not have any ambition to

rule China, and we had no political organization or military force. We

Koo, Wellington 107

were simply individuals working for a common end, the welfare of China.

We did not quite succeed, for it was impossible to restrain the military

elements, who always insisted on fighting it out. But it was different

with the rival Kuomintang. There the civilian elements were working

closely with the military elements, and were part and parcel of the

same movement.

Meanwhile, Marshal Chang's troops kept moving from Manchuria into

North China. Because North China was coming under his influence, it

was necessary to reorganize the Cabinet so as to reflect the changed

military situation. Indeed, the military and political situations were

aspects of the same, and changes in the military situation were usually

followed by corresponding political changes.

So a new Cabinet, was formed on January 12, 1927. Like its two

predecessors, it was a Regency Cabinet -- so called because it exercised

the authority of the Presidency. In it, several of Wu P'ei-fu's men

were replaced by men loyal to Marshal Chang. P'an Fu, whose continuance

as Finance Minister was strongly objected to by Wu P'ei-fu, replaced

Chang Chih-t'an, of the Pao-ting Clique, as Minister of Communications.

P'an was a great friend of the Marshal, and the latter urged me to make

this appointment. (The importance of the post lies in the fact that the

Ministry was a revenue-producing one.) My friend T'ang Erh-ho became

Finance Minister, an appointment urged by Lo Wen-kan.

Hsia Jen-hu, who belonged to the Manchurian Clique, continued as

Vice-Minister. It was not my desire to have T'ang, a civilian, as

Minister of Finance, but Marshals Wu and Chang could not agree on anyone
Koo, Wellington 108

else. Despite the poverty of the treasury, each wanted to have one of

his own men in the post. The important posts of War and Navy did not

change hands. Chang Ching-hui, a rather colorless man, continued to be

acceptable to both sides, although he was identified with the Chihli

faction. The former Minister of Education, Jen K'o-cheng, likewise

remained in the new Cabinet. As ray Minister of the Interior I had

Hu Wei-te. I considered this post important because its occupant

controlled the police. For peace and order, and also for information,

it was important to have the police on one's side.

In the new Cabinet I appointed muself shu-li Premier. "Shu-li"

is sometimes translated "acting", but the term has a special significance

in Chinese. According to the traditional Chinese practice, when the

titular head is absent the man next to him would be tai-che tai-hsing,

namely, acting in the absence of his chief. The next higher designation

would be tai-li , which I had just been. This means to act as a temporary

substitute, and can be translated "acting". Next comes shu-li, which

implies that the person is sole office holder and has full rank. This

term is often used when a young man replaces an older man, so as to imply,

for the benefit of the retiring office-holder, that it is not expected

that the younger man will really be able to "fill the boots" of his

senior. Typically, one has shu-li status for three months, and then the

title is dropped in favor of shih-shou , or the actual appointment. Since

this Cabinet was a Regency Cabinet, and I, together with my colleagues in

the Cabinet, exercised the power of the presidency, I could have appointed

myself wei (to be) the shih-shou Premier in January. But I preferred
 Koo, Wellington 109

to appoint myself shu-li Premier, succeeding myself as tai-li Premier.

When the mandate was published I had a discussion with Mr. Liang Shih-i,

who had played an important role in the politics of North China from

the time of Yuan Shih-k'ai to 1926. He came to see me and told me that

I had been unnecessarily modest. He said I should have appointed myself

as full Premier and not shu-li . I told him that I knew the difference

between wei and shu-li , and had purposely avoided the former because I

considered the situation somewhat abnormal. I was continuing in politics

merely to keep a government going for the sake of China's international

reputation.

In addition tobeing Premier, I also continued as Foreign Minister.

During the period there were two episodes involving our relations with

other countries which I shall discuss later.

Domestically, this was a period of important political maneuvers and

military activity between the Couth and the North. The Nortern Expedition

had been temporarily halted , north of the Yangtse, but it was expected

that the expedition would be resumed, and the Young Marshal as Commander-

in-Chief of the joint party of the Third and Fourth Army Corps was stationed

along the Peking-Hankow Railway on the borders of Honan Province preparing

to check the northward advance of the Kuomintang's expeditionary force.

Politically, Marshal Chang Tso-lin and his admirers were trying to strengthen

his political affiliations with other political groups in North China

who were out of sympathy with the South. The pei-yang group which had

vconsist3d early in 1926 of the pao-ting and lo-yang camps and some other

scattered elements of the original pei-yang group was greatly weakened as

a result of the reverses which Marshal Wu P'ei-fu had sustained in the

 Koo, Wellington 110

Yangtse valley. With the inentionof strengthening his political position

in the North as well as achieving his life-long ambition to be the chief-

of-state of China -- a common ambition with many warlords in China -- he

was known at the time to be holding secret conferences with political

advisers. Finally he moved his headquarters into Peking, into the Palace

of Prince ^h'ing, though he did not live there himself. He came only on

short visits »nd went back to Tientsin where his official residence was

located at the time.

Knowing all this X was prepared and wanted to relieve myself of any

political responsibility. The only reason I had for staying as head of

the (Government was to ensure that the affairs of State would be handled

in an orderly manner in accordance with the Constitution. In these

circumstances that was barely possible; parliament had been suspended in

1926. It turned out that the Manchurian political camp finally decided

to do away with the Constitution, and start with what they called a

"clean slate". As Hi the form of government, they chose a military

government with Marshal Chang Tso-lin at the head with the title of

ta-yuan-shuai -- Generalissimo. Marshal Chang Tso-lin could of course

have claimed the title of President, at least temporarily, but it had to

be legalized by an election held by Parliament. As Parliament had been

dispersed there was no representative body to hold the election. Moreover,

if he was to act as President, there had to be some basic law. If he assumed

the title of President under the then existing constitution, he would

have to observe the limitation of the President's power as well as enjoying

the prerogatives which the instrument conferred on the chief-of-state. I

understood then that all those problems had been discussed by the Marshal
Koo, Wellington 111

with his political advisers among whom were Mr. P'an Fu, Mr. Liang Shih-i,

Mr. Cheng Ch'ien and General Yang Ytl-hing, who was particularly close to

him. They came to the conclusion that the best solution to the situation

was to start with a clean slate and establish a military government, with

the Marshal at its head so as to be free of legal restrictions and

handicaps.

When I was informed of this plan and was asked to remain in the

government that was to be organized with Marshal Chang Tso-lin as the

Generalissimo of a new, unconstitutional, regime, I naturally gave a

negative answer. The only thing I had in mind was that he should

take over in an orderly fashion. While I would raise no objections to

Chang's actions,but I made it clear that I did not wish to accept any

appointment in the new regime.

So two days before the Marshal was to establish his new government

(June 18), I called a Cabinet meeting and the formal decision for us all

to resign was taken, and the inauguration went off with no difficulties

arising.
Koo, Wellington 112

The Military Government of Chang Tso-lin (June 1927-June 1928)

Seeing that in the earlier regimes there had been friction between

the President and the Parliament, and incessant intrigues on the part of

the Parliamentarians to dominate the Government, and seeing that the power

of Parliament over the Government was declared in the constitution, it

was not unnatural that Marshal Chang Tso-lin's group decided finally not

to keep up the appearance of a parliamentary government but to leave

itself a free hand. Actually, it would have been impossible to hold

a nation-wide election in China at that time and it would have been equally

impossible to call back the old Parliament that had been elected in 1913.

Both the military leaders and popular opinion had grown tired of that

Parliament;that was one of the reasons why the members of Parliament

had been sent home, each with passage money paid for.

X went to the Western Hills to my modest country house to take a

rest, and most of my colleagues also had left Peking, By that time

plan Fu's Cabinet was organized on June 20th. X recall that on June 19,

the day after the Marshal was inaugurated, General Wu Chun-shen, then

Governor of Heilungkiang and one of the Marshal's sworn brothers, came

to the Western Hills to see me without announcement or previous warning.

He and I had known each other for some years. Whenever he came to Peking

on business he always visited me and we had friendly talks. His mission

to the Western Hills was to convey a message on behalf of the new chief-

of-state, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, to ask me to go back to Peking because

the Marshal wanted to seek my advice and ask me to help him in the new

regime. He said that Marshal wanted me in any capacity that I preferred

and first of all he would like to have a talk with me. I said that
Koo, Wellington 113

if the Marshal wanted to talk to me X would certainly be glad to see

him, but that I would not want to accept an official appointment from

him, because X had been in political life for so many years and really

wanted to have a rest, and stay in the Western Hills; I was not very far

from the capital and could very easily go into Peking. General Wu said

Marshal Chang wanted me to live in Peking rather than stay in the Western

Hills, with a broad intimation that in no circumstances should I leave

North China. I told him there was no question of that. I had no

intention of leaving Peking for anywhere else in China. On his

insistence I decided to go back the following day and he arranged for

me to see that Marshal as soon as I returned into the capital. According

to General Wu the Marshal wanted me to continue as Premier but I took that

simply a polite gesture because I knew perfectly well that Mr. P'an-fu

had always wanted to be Premier, and he had been a very close adviser

to the Marshal in setting up this new military regime.

When I called on the Marshal at his invitation he received me with

great courtesy and insisted that I should help him in any capacity that

would bg agreeable to me. I repeated what I had told General Wu and

the conversation ended inconclusively. The Marshal kept insisting on

my accepting some office which would be to my liking and I. continued

to decline. When X took leave he said that he would keep in close touch

with me and send someone to continue the conversation.

Shortly after I went back to my house Mr. P*an Fu, who was already

known as the Premier-designate, called on me to say that he had been sent

by the Marshal to invite me to accept the office of President of Depart­

ment of Audit (Shen-chi-yuanl , explaining that the Marshal had understood

Koo, Wellington 114

from me that X did not wish to accept any political responsibility and

he therefore chose this high post for me since the Department of Audit

was more or less an independent department, not directly involved in

any important political questions and that this post had always been

occupied by ex*-prime**ministers, and elder statesmen. As I knew P'an

Fu very well, I could speak even more frankly than to Marshal Chang

Tso-lin. I told him that I had made up my mind to take a rest, and for

that reason alone I really did not wish to assume any position in the

government. It was merely a personal matter with me and therefore I

asked him to explain to the Marshal discreetly but firmly that while

I appreciated his consideration of me I really begged him not to

insist upon this desire. Mr. P'an Fu went into a long statement of

how the Marshal had always counted me as one of his friends and now

that he had taken up himself the post of chief-of-state, he wanted to

do his best for the country, and that it would be difficult for him

to say no to the Marshal, because he had been specially sent to see

me and ask for my consent.

In order to get through the impasse I said I had a solution which

might meet the wishes of the Generalissimo. The solution was to recom­

mend a close political, as well as personal, friend of mine to take this

post. Dr. Lo Wen-kan, I said, had been a personal and political friend

of mine for many years, and appointing him to the post of President of

the Audit Department would be very much the same as if I took up the

post myself. Pan Fu gave two reasons for not agreeing to my suggestion.
Koo, Wellington 115

First, the Generalissimo insisted that I should take up some post in

the new regime, and secondly. Dr. Lo might not accept. I said the

first point had already been discussed not only with him but also

with the Marshal, and as for the second point, Mr. P^n Fu might visit

Dr. Lo and make the offer to him if the Marshal agreed. "Well," he

said,"First get Dr. Lo's consent and then I shall go and visit him."

Whereupon I said that I would suggest that he do the other way around:

first call on Dr. Lo and if Dr. Lo should hesitate and decline to accept

the offer, then I would try to persuade him.

The compromise was that I would telephone Dr. Lo first, informing him

of Mr. Pan Fu^ forthcoming visit, without telling him what P'an^ visit

was for, so that there would be no question about P'an^ being able to

talk personally with Lo. So I telephoned Dr. Lo, telling him that P'an

would come to see him, and Lo asked me what P'an's visit was for. Lo

then indicated that he would be willing to accept the proposed post. So

that solved the personal question between the Marshal and myself.

Aside from this episode, there was no question about my relationship

with the new regime. On two or three occasions Marshal Chang Tso-lin had

a personal talk with me. And occasionally he would invite me to lunch

parties given in honor of the diplomatic corps or some newly arrived

ministers. Thus, while I had no official connection with the government,

I did not leave Peking and maintained friendly, personal relations

with the new regime.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin's insistence that X serve in the government was

not a surprise to me. In the first place, he knew something about the

part I played in the Versailles Peace Conference. In the second place,

at the time of the Washington Conference, he was one of those who had

supported the delegation and I believe, he even contributed a sum of

Koo, Wellington 116

$50,000 towards the expenses of the Chinese delegation. He also promised

two million dollars for the repurchase of the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway.

In the third place, I well recall that in 1926, the year before, after

the defeat of General Feng YU-hsiang by the allied forces of Loyang and

Mukden, while Marshal Wu P'ei-fu insisted upon the restoration of the

Yen Cabinet, Marshal Chang Tso-lin strongly opposed it. At a conference

between the two camps in Tientsin, it was agreed to have me as the Premier

and it was only through an unexpected obstruction, in fact through a

maneuver of Chang Chih-t'an, that my appointment did not materialize.

(We found out through Sun Jen-ytl [?]that it had been argued that if I headed

the Cabinet, China might have more difficulty in her relations with Japan

because in Japan, I was considered to be one of China's anti-Japanese

leaders.) I knew, therefore, that Chang Tso-lin was well-disposed towards

me.

[Chief Secretary to the Cabinet 1926-1927; or Hsin Jen-hu Vice-Minister

of Finance 1926-7; Chief Secretary to the Cabinet from June 1927]

During this period, there were two main questions in Peking so far

as an outsider's observation was concerned. One was the slow but steady

advance of the Northern Expedition from the south, which led to the

gradual retreat of the Third and Fourth Joint Army Corps from their

position in Honan back to the north. On the eastern front there were

first the temporary success of Marshal Sun Ch'uan-fang's advance toward

Nanking and then his sudden retreat. It was generally understood that

Marshal Chang Tso-lin's troops alone would not be sufficient to overcome

the Kuomintang forces, which were pushing forward. For one thing, popular

sentiment was on the side of the South. For another thing, the expedition­

ary force seemed to have a new ele«|:aent ch had not existed in China
Koo, Wellington 117

previously, namely, a) political arm in support of the military arm. The

Kuomintang evidently was politically well organized; it had sent political

officers ahead of the troops to prepare the people for accepting the

Kuomintang troops; also, the political arm was able to organize the people

as soon as the armed forces occupied a city or a town, thereby advancing

the cause of the Kuomintang. The new political element strengthened

the military forces. Heretofore the military chieftains of the North

had always calculated on the basis of their own military strength;

they had not paid much attention to the political aspect. In other

words, the so-called warlords had their personal ambition, and their

methods and viewpoints were rather old-fashioned; they had no synthetized

political ideology to appeal to the imagination of the people. So, it

was generally taken for granted that the Manchurian forces would not

be able to withhold the steady advance of the Northern Expedition and

that it was only a question of time that the Kuomintang would be in

control of Peking.

The other question was China's relations with Japan. The Manchurian

clan was always understood to have attached great importance to the rela­

tions between China and Japan and those between Japan and Manchuria. It

was generally understood that the Manchurian leaders knew how to handle

the Japanese because Manchuria was in a very strategic position vis-a-vis

Japan. When the expeditionary force of Kuomintang were pressing steadily

northward Japan watched the situation in China with great interest. The

incident which led to the assassination of Ts'ai Kung-shih, Commissioner

of Foreign Affairs in Tsi-nan, appeared to indicate that Japan was not

favorable to the northward march of the Kuomintang forces at least into

Koo, Wellington 118

north China. That incident did hold up Kuomintang's northward push for

quite a while.

It was typical of Japan's policy in China that Japan took advantage

of the military situation which was graduxally turning against the

government in Peking and imposed a number of demands on Marshal Chang

Tso-lin. The most important claim made on the Marshal was in regard

to the acceptance of a program of joint operation between the South

Manchurian Railway and the Chinese owned Szu-p'ing chieh-T'ao nan

Railway. The Japanese minister in Peking was then Yoshizawa. The

Japanese had been seeking the settlement of various questions, including

the one which had just been mentioned. The representatives of the

South Manchurian Railway had been hurrying back and forth between

Tientsin and Peking in order to see the Minister of Communications

Ch'ang Yin-huai; they had been seeking to have conversations with him

with a view to settling some of their claims. But Ch'ang Yin-huai

seemed to have adopted a policy of avoiding them. When the Japanese

learned that he was in Tientsin and came there he would suddenly depart

for Peking, and when they went to Peking to locate him he would quietly

slip away to Tientsin. Once it was said that the Japanese learned that

he was going to have a dinner party in one of the amusement houses and

they found him there, but he said that that was not the place to talk

about business and made an appointment for them to see him in his

ministry. When they went to his ministry the next morning he did

not appear. Knowing what the Japanese wanted to get from him, he deli­

berately avoided them

Finally the matter was taken up by the Japanese minister, who asked

for an appointment with the Generalissimo. It was given. Mr. Yoshizawa

Koo, Wellington 119

went eagerly to see the Marshal. The minister insisted on having a

positive answer of yes or no to the Japanese claims particularly the

one on the joint operation of the Chinese railways, the principally

lines running north to south. The Marshal firmly refused it. Thereupon,

Mr. Yoshizawa warned Marshal Chang Tso-lin that without Japanese

support he could not be able to maintain his regime in Peking. Marshal

said that if he could not hold the situation in Peking he would go to

his homeland, that is Manchuria. Mr. Yoshizawa said he would find

it difficult to get to Mukden without Japanese help.

This information was given to me by one of the Marshal’s closest

advisers and it was repeated by others who were in his close confidence.

When Mr. Yoshizawa left it was already three o^lock. The Marshal gave

orders to prepare a special train to go to Mukden. I suppose because

of the steady advance of the Northern Expedition made him want to retire

to Manchuria. That was the evening of June 2. His special train passed

through Tientsin where General Wu Chun-sheng joined him. General Wu had

a special car and the Marshal had another special car. When the train

reached Hua.ng-ku-tun early in the morning — Huang-ku-tun was only a

few miles from Mukden — a bomb went off and there was an explosion.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin,s car in which General Wu Chung-sheng[ ?] had gone

to join him was hit and both were killed. That was June 4, 1928. It

was unknown then where the Young Marshal was. As a matter of fact he

was at the headquarters of the Joint Third and Fourth Army in Nan-ch’iao,

east of Tientsin, where the coal-mine was. The news of the death was kept

secret for several days until Young Marshal was able to reach Mukden disguised

as one of the common soldiers in an open car. It was only after his arrival

that the death of Chang Tso-lin was announced and fundrai'arrangements were

published.
Koo, Wellington I2c

F 4a. Sir Francis Aglen, Chang Chia»ao, and the Peking Government

(a) The Dismissal of Sir Frances ( f

Before X take up the advent of the Northern Expedition,

which was checked, on the one hand by the interference of the

Japanese at Tsinan anct the split between Nanking and Hankow, I

want to say something about the episode leading up to the dismissal of

Sir Francis Aglen* When I was Minister of Finance in Admiral Tu

Hsi-kuei,s Cabinet one of the measures which I proposed to submit

to the Cabinet was to issue a loan to be secured on the remitted

portion of the Austrian indemnity, in order to tide over the

Mid-Autumn Festival. Admiral TsJai Ting-kan was then Director General

of the Customs with Sir Francis Aglen as the Inspector General.

The Cabinet wanted Sir Francis Aglen to come back as soon as possible

from England, where he was then on leave. We pressed Admiral Ts^i

for information, and he said he had telegrammed Sir Francis on behalf

of the Cabinet and that no answer was received. Day after day passed

without getting a reply. I and the whole Cabinet was annoyed. Finally

we asked Admiral Ts,ai in his capacity of Director General of Customs

to find out what the cause was for the failure to reply. Then he got

the reply. Sir Francis did not answer Admiral Ts,ai*s official

telegram on behalf of the Cabinet but he did answer Admiral Ts'ai^

personal telegram saying that he could not leave England soon and

that in any case when he was ready to come back to China his plan

was to go to Canton and visit Hankow. After that information we directed

Admiral Ts^i to tell M«' *>ha4»Jaa^he«ld come back direct to Peking

without visiting Canton or Hankow

Koo, Wellington

As we shall see there was more than a personal decision behind

Sir Francis* failure to return immediately. His answer to Admiral

Ts'ai indicated that he had been kept informed by the Chinese Banks

of what the Government really wanted to do: knowing the situation

as it was, he was not coming back. In Peking, I kept receiving

confidential reports from the heads of the departments in the Ministry;

these reports indicated that there was very little chance of getting

approval for my proposal to issue a short-term loan because Mr. Chang

Chia-ao, President of the Bank of China in his communications with

Sir Francis Aglen, had conveyed his own objection and suggested that

the latter should not come back. We got this information from the

bank itself: the Loan Section Chief of the Ministry of Finance was

a long-time friend of the Bank.of China, and there were several others

in the Ministry of Finance who had been connected with the Bank of
other
China, or one/of the four great banks.

This was in the autumn of 1926 until about Christmas time, when

Sir Miles Lampson, the new British minister, arrived in China.

Before coming to Peking, he too visited Hankow, and Nanking to size up

the situation in the South, which created a very unfavorable impression

on the Peking government. The New Year!s Festival was another very

critical period for the Government, which was very anxious that Sir

Francis Aglen should be present. I think he did come some time in

January, when I was premier and foreign minister concurrently. He

arrived about the same time as Sir Miles Lampson. We felt that he was

flirting with the southern group, a thing he should not have done

as he still remained a public servant under the Government at Peking.

The Government made up its mind to raise a loan on the Austrian

indemnity in order to tide over the Chinese New Year*s Festival. The
 P
A
G
Koo, Wellington I
N
A
T
usual way to underwrite the loan issue was to speak to the repre­ I
0
sentatives of the Chinese banks. I remember X invited Mr. Chang N

Chia-ao, the head of the Bank of China. We had a talk inoWhich

he said it had become a practice so far as the investment world

was concerned always to get the approval of the Inspector General

of the Customs on any loan issue secured on the customs revenue in

one form or another. Without such a guarantee over the signature of t

1 ■

the Inspector General no loan could be sold on the market. So he referred

the government to Sir Francis Aglen, whom we then approached. Sir

Francis Aglen refused to give his consent for a reason which was

unconvincing. If I remember correctly, he said that in the political

situation of China at the time, with the country split up into two,

he could not give his signature. This meant the Government in

Peking was to wither away for lack of financial resources; I do not

know what was at the back of his mind but, bearing in mind his

refusal earlier in connection with the crisis of the Mid-Autumn

Festival to answer Admiral Ts'ai*s telegram and his visiting Canton

and Hankow against the instructions of the government, the cabinet was
~ >
indignant and decided to dismiss him. We reminded Admiral Ts'ai that

he was the immediate superior of Sir Francis Aglen, who was supposed

to be directly under the supervision of the Director General. The

Admiral opposed the Government's plan and pointed out the embarrassments

that would ensue from such a radical departure from established

practice. I was not impressed by his argument and the whole Cabinet

was with me in saying a public servant's first duty was to obey the

orders of the Government. As a foreigner especially he should know

Koo, Wellington

his position was a special one and had no right to put himself in

the position of imposing his own weight on the Government. It was

unanimously decided by the Cabinet to dismiss him, and a mandate

was issued accordingly.

The dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen as Inspector General of

Customs created an uneasiness in the Chinese banking circles. The

mandate of dismissal was promulgated in the evening, and it appeared

in the Government Bulletin the following morning. About 9:00 in

the same morning Chang Chia-ao [Chang Kung-ch*uan], president of

the Bank of China, accompanied by the heads ofthree or four other

Chinese banks, came to see me. I received them and asked them what

was the object of their early call. Mr. Chang Chia-ao, who was the

spokesman, said with great seriousness and earnestness that he wanted

to inform the Government of the great surprise the mandate of dismissal

had created among the Chinese banking circles. The dismissal,

according to them, was an unheard of act, pregnant with grave conse­

quences for the financial market throughout the country, especially

in Shanghai. He wanted to know what the Government proposed to do to

meet the situation; and if the Government was not prepared to cope

with the situation effectively, he declared, it was the opinion of

the Chinese banking world that it would be better for the Government

to step down and give its blessing to others who could cope with the

situation and would know what effective action should be taken imme­

diately.
Koo, Wellington

I was somewhat taken aback at his attempt to create an

impression of gravity and by the threatening character of his statement.

Although it had been expected that the Chinese banking world would

react unfavorably, I had not imagined that the bankers would go so

far as to threaten the government in the way that Mr. Chang Chia-ao

had just manifested. Accordingly, I replied just as seriously and

firmly, stating that when the Government decided to dismiss Sir

Francis Aglen it was fully prepared to cope with any consequences

which might arise. The GovernmentIs act was fair and legitimate,

I said; it was understandable that die Chinese banking world should

have felt concerned, but it was not the bankers* business to threaten
be
the Government if and when the Government should itself/unable to

cope with the situation and that the Government would certainly know

what policy to adopt. I also told Mr. Chang that he had used words

which could not be justified and that it was certainly not up to the

representatives of the Banks to tell the Government to step down.

He said that early that morning telegrams had already been

pouring in from Shanghai, indicating a great feeling of uneasiness

about the Government*s dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen, and that,

was
also indicated in these telegrams, the business men in Shanghai

wanted to know, if the Chinese Government loan market should

develop into chaos, what the Government proposed to do. He went

on to say that the Chinese loan market had been in a state of anxiety;

he asked me what the Government would do if the Chinese loan market

should develop into something very serious. I told him the Government

had not yet received any information from its representatives in

j
Koo, Wellington

Shanghai; I also told him that I was of the opinion that

whether or not the situation would entail unfavorable developments

depended entirely on the banks themselves: if they remained calm

and respected the action of the Government as they should, there was

nothing to fear. Moreover, since the appointment and dismissal

of government officials was a part of the normal function of the govern-

ment, I did not consider this particular action on the part of the

Government in dismissing Sir Francis Aglen as any different from its

appointing and removing higher officials. Mr. Chang said I must have

known that the Chinese government loans were based on the guarantee

given by Sir Francis Aglen; his certain removal from office naturally

brought a loss of confidence on the part of the bond holders. I

replied that the government loans were based not upon Sir Francis

Aglen*s word but upon the surplus revenue «« on which the loans

were secured •••• and that the government loan was not a personal matter

but a loan transaction closely connected with the customs revenue.

When he again warned that the Government, in taking that action,

should bear all the consequences if it decided to reJa&fek in office

without adopting immediate measures I felt astonished that he should

have spoken so bluntly and out of his place. I repeated what I

had said at the beginning that the Government was fully aware of the

possible consequences of such an action -*• which still, clearly, left

him unconvinced. Finally, I said that the banks should know that they

were in a position to p: event any untoward development if they saw

the situation in its proper light. Then I arose and asked to be

excused because I had another appointment in the Foreign Office.

So I left them
Koo, Wellington

Chang Chia-ao*s opposition to Sir Francis Aglen*s removal from

office was revealing both of the financial weakness of the Government

and of the relation between the Banks and Sir Francis. The flotation

of any Chinese government loan had become very difficult; it was

possible only when the condition insisted upon by the Chinese Banks

was accepted by the Chinese Government. This condition was that any

proposed loan should be approved by Sir Francis Aglen over his

signature in black and white. Thus, he was made responsible for what

he had signed and would see to it that the surplus customs revenue

was earmarked for the loan purpose. This had been a practice

insisted upon by the Chinese Banks; every time the Government proposed

to issue a new government loan the Chinese Banks took refuge behind

the Inspector General in order to be in a better position to dispose

of the bonds to their clients, and in this way they made their

legitimate profits. The co-operation between Sir Francis Aglen and

the Chinese Banks had become such that the Inspector General

(Sir Francis Aglen) was regarded in China as the super minister of

finance. The Chinese banks were proud of this co-operation, and

Chang Chia-ao was the connecting link between Sir Francis and the

Chinese banks. As for the Ministry of Finance, it was generally

understood that if he hoped to have enough money to carry on the

administration he should follow the advice and do the bidding of the

again
Chinese Banks. The stand taken by the Banks reminded me/of the

warning given me after I was appointed Minister of Finance but before

I took office. Probably it was an eyesore for the Chinese Banks

Koo, Wellington

for a stranger to the banking world to be Minister of Finance,

especially one who would not do their bidding.

Koo, Wellington

F 4b. Diplomatic Repercussions

My sudden withdrawal from the interview with Chang Chia-ao

and his colleagues at my house was for the purpose of receiving the

representatives of the diplomatic corps in Peking. Shortly after

I arrived at the Foreign Office, seven ministers came after tele­

phoning for an appointment. Instead of receiving them in ray office

I received them in this great reception room in the Foreign

Office on the second floor, because I was told that the seven of

them would come as a group. I noticed there was Sir Miles W.

Lampson, Mr. John V. A. MacMurray, Mr. D^isie of Belgium, I

think Count de Martel, Japanese Minister Yochizawa Kenkichi, W. J.

Oudendyk of Holland and the Italian Minister. They had seen the

mandate of dismissal in the Government Bulletin (Cheng-fu Kung-pao).

I greeted them and asked them to sit down, and as they remained hesi­

tant, I asked what I could do for them. I appeared they had

something special to see me about, as they came in a body which was

not usual. Sir Miles Lampson turned to Mr. MacMurray indicating

that he should speak but Mr. MacMurray said that he would like

to have Sir Miles speak on behalf of them. Sir Miles said they came

to ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs what was the reason of this

unusual act in dismissing Sir Francis Aglen. I felt somewhat annoyed

at the manner in which he put the question. I said: "Mr. Minister,

I am afraid I am not in a position to give an answer to your

question." He said: "Why not?" I said: "Because the matter you

asked is something which concerns the Chinese Government alone. It

is a matter of the ordinary running of the Government. I am sure

Koo, Wellington
\V

you have the intention of intervening in the Chinese government."

He at once denied any intention to intervene but he and his

colleagues wanted to know the reason for this unexpected and unusual

action taken by the Government. I said I wanted to know in what

capacity he put that question to me. He said his position in China

was well known to me and did^not see why I asked such a question. I

said if he asked in his official capacity as the British minister

in China then I could not answer the question because it was about

a matter which concerned the Chinese Government alone. He said

in that case he would explain. He was asking not as a representative

of the British government but a representative in the interest

as

of the bondholders of the bonds on Chinese government loans secured

on the customs revenue, and added that there were a great many of

them, and that there were also a number of loans floated for the

Chinese government by foreign banks among whom were British banks.

I said "Since you speak on behalf of British banks I can see why

you were anxious. The reason is very simple, to say it in one word,

insubordination." He asked what was meant by insubordination, that he

would appreciate a fuller explanation. I said this was an English

word, I was sure he thoroughly understood it. I said his own government

was one- -of•the -boat government^ for its good administration, ' and

the word was understood in every language by those who are respon­

sible for running a government. He asked how it applied to Sir

Francis Aglen. He would like to know officially from me in what

way he became insubordinate. I said that even though he was speaking

Koo, Wellington
\v
on behalf of the collective interests of the British bondholders and

on behalf of the other ministers present, therefore on behalf of

bondholders of other nations, it would serve no purpose to explain

why the government had dismissed Sir Francis Aglen. I had already

stated the reason for it, and that I considered to be sufficient.

And I was sure it would be understood by all the bondholders. So

with that I asked to be excused; I said that I had another appointment.

So I left and went back to my office. It was an unpleasant

meeting but it was also evident to me that they had no good reason

to try to intervene even though they had some justification in speaking

on behalf of the foreign bondholders, especially as I had explained to

Sir Miles that the action taken by the government in dismissing Sir

Francis Aglen would in no way affect the safety of the loans which

had been secured on the customs revenue. I left them first, and they

left afterwards.

Of course the matter was not at an end yet. The Government, in

dismissing Sir Francis Aglen, appointed at the same time, Mr. A. H. F.

€
who had been secretary to the Secretary-General of the

Customs for many years and was known to be in close touch all the time

with the British Legation. Sir Miles had a weapon in his hands with

which to exercise pressure on the Government by prohibiting Edwards

from taking up the position. Admiral Ts,ai TIing-kan who was

Director General of the Customs and as such was the immediate

superior authority over the Customs, was sent for by me and told to
Koo, Wellington

urge Edwards to take up the new appointment at once. Admiral

Ts*ai said he had already signed the documents naming Edwards.

Edwardes was personally willing but intimated that without the British

Ministers approval, he did not dare take it up; and Sir Miles had

made it very clear to him that he should not take it up. Admiral

Ts*ai was then directed by me to make it quite clear to Mr. Edwardes

that he was merely to act during the interval, and that if he was

unwilling to stay, we would look for the proper man to succeed Sir

Francis Aglen. Mr. Edwardes1 hesitation could be understood in

view of his links with the British Legation even though he was a

career member of the Customs Service. Personally he considered

it to be a great honor but without the British minister*s approval

he had good reason to hesitate. There was no treaty that the

appointment had to be approved by the British Minister; but even

before 1900 there were exchanges of notes,fso\that^ long as the

preponderant portion of the Chinese trade was with the British

Empire, the Inspector General of the Customs should be with the

British.

When Admiral TsIai insisted that the action taken by the Govern­

ment was a serious one which might lead to grave consequences so long

as there was no inspector-general functioning in the Customs, and so long

as Mr. Edwardes declined to take up the post, he was asked what he

thought was the best course in the circumstances. He replied that

he thought some arrangement might be made to retain Sir Francis Aglen.

Koo, Wellington rtf

The reason he gave was that his removal not only created a serious

situation in the Customs but caused great dissatisfaction to the

British minister and the Chinese banking world. In other words he was

very unhappy but he did not know what to do himself. He did not think

that he could cope with the situation unless the Government could

find some way out of it. I thought this was too weak. Instead of

seeing the action of the Government in its proper light he could not

dissociate himself from a situation which had become entirely abnormal,

I mean with regard to the Chinese banking world and the customs and Sir

Francis Aglen. In the long run, it was a situation which should not

be tolerated if the Government wanted to assert its legitimate

authority. Therefore I reported to the Cabinet and we unanimously decided

to relieve Admiral Ts*ai T,ing-kan. He was relieved of his post

because evidently he felt very unhappy and felt unable to do

anything. Dr. Lo Wen-kan, the Minister of Justice was appointed

concurrently Acting Director«*General,

Meanwhile Dr, Lo and myself discussed the situation privately,

and he suggested asking Dr. Wang Ch*ung-hui, the then president of the

Ta~li Yuan (The Chief Justice) to find out from the British

Legation whether the refusal onthe part of Sir Miles Lampson to allow

Edwardes to take up the post was really serious, or only simply a

strategical move to put pressure on the Government. Dr. Wang was told

by me to intimate to Sir Miles that Mr. Edwardes was appointed because

originally he had been recommended by the British Minds ter and because

he had always been in close touch with the British Legation. If

Koo, Wellington
1^

he continued to prevent Mr, Edwardes from taking up the new appointment,

the Government would appoint someone else, and the alternative to

Sir Francis was Sir F, W, Maze. Maze was the man in the whole customs

service next to Sir Francis in seniority so that it was assumed he

would be appointed eventually to succeed Sir Francis. However it

was generally known that Maze and the British Legation were not on

good terms, because Maze had independence. Edwardes was appointed to

act temporarily to avoid as much friction as possible with the British

Legation.

The first conversation of Dr. Wang with Sir Miles did not bring

much result, but it made clear one point: Maze would not be

acceptable to the Legation. In other words. Sir Miles sized up the

situation that if it came to a choice between Maze and Edwardes, he

would rather have Edwardes. But his hope remained that somehow the

mandate of the government could be abrogated. I made it very clear

to Dr. Wang, who thoroughly agreed with me, that this could never be

done. So Dr. Wang told Sir Miles that Sir Francis1 restoration to his

post would be impossible, but if he was thinking of some other arrangement

which to the British Legation and the bondholders gave a less unfa­

vorable impression abroad. Dr. Wang said he was quite willing to listen

and report to the Government for consideration.

Finally, my Cabinet and I myself became impatient with the

obstruction from the British Legation. When several days had gone

by. Sir Miles was informed that if he had any suggestion which the

Government could accept on the basis of Sir Francis Aglen’s dismissal.

Koo, Wellington 1^

it might be considered, but the post of Inspector General could not

remain vacant too long and Edwardes would be told to take up that

post within a fortnight. Meanwhile, as Foreign Minister, I had

instructed our Chargl d^ffaires in London W. C. Ct^en to make

representation to the effect that Sir Miles had been trying to

intervene in the Chinese Government administration and to sound out

the reaction of the British Foreign Office. ChIen,s report indicated

that the British Government did not share the same view as Sir

Miles Lampson, who had ..been arguing with the Chinese Government

about the reason of the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen. Ch,en,s

report gave me the impression that the British Government had seen

the impossibility of asking the Chinese Government to abrogate its

official mandate and was in favor of finding some face-saving formula.

At that time the British Government knew that I had asked

Dr. Wang to press Sir Miles to/^raw his objection to Edwardes*

appointment. Finally Sir Miles agreed that Mr. Edwardes could assume

the new post, but he suggested that the effect of Sir Francis Aglen*s

dismissal should be softened abroad by leaving his name on the list

as Inspector General on leave for one year. This was the formula

which Dr. Wang and Sir Miles had recommended to the Government, which

found it sufficiently reasonable to be accepted. With the acceptance

of this formula and with Edwardes taking up office, the episode was

finally concluded.
Koo, Wellington

F. 4c. Epilogue

The GovernmentIs dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen was not prompted

by any feeling of spite or irritation at his refusal to approve the

Austrian loan; it was unanimously approved by the Cabinet and by

some of my colleagues in the Cabinet it was strongly urged as a device

to break up the unholy alliance between the Chinese banking world

and the Inspector-General of Customs, an alliance committed to

dominate the Chinese loan market and to strengthen and perpetuate

its hold on the Chinese Government, particularly on the Ministry of

Finance. While Aglen1s dismissal was strongly objected to by the

Chinese banking world as represented by Chang Chia-ao, it was heartily

welcomed throughout the country. Public opinion in China, in

general, looked upon the action as a legitimate assertion of China*s

sovereign right and Chinese government authority. It was not an

impulsive action; the Cabinet discussed it from all points of view

and took the final decision with full knowledge of its significance

and of possible reactions. I must say that, as far as the response

of foreign public opinion and of foreign governments was concerned,

this episode further strengthened my conviction that, if China stood

on her legitimate rights, her action, no matter how striking or even

shocking it might appear in the Far East or Asia in general, would be

fully understood abroad. After all, the Chinese Government's

action in removing Sir Francis Aglen was one that any foreign govern­

ment would have done if any of its officials, no matter how high

his position, had acted as Sir Francis Aglen had.

Koo, Wellington
vv1
This incident passed without great difficulties. Later, when

I was Chinese Ambassador In London during the war time. Sir Francis

Aglen, then advanced in years, asked the British Government to

approach me, asking the Chinese Government to do a favor for him,

namely, the Chinese Government would agree to his suggestion that the

word retired in reference to his official record in the annual Chinese

customs report be deleted. It was—a very delicate suggestion and a

rather touching move. I saw the difficulty because retired in regard

to the Inspector General was a fact and to alter it in the official

report would put the government in a very difficult position. In

any case, I said that, as Chinese Ambassador in London, I no longer

felt embarrassed by the matter, which happened twenty years ago, and

that I would telegraph the Ministry of Finance and inform it of

Sir Francis Aglen*s suggestion. So, I cabled the Chinese Ministry of

Finance in Chungking. I think this was in 1945. The reply was negative.

I don*t remember who was then the Minister of Finance.

'j'here is no question that Mr. Edwardes was much more co**operative

and submissive than Sir Francis Aglen. Edwardes was a much younger

man; he liked to associate with the Chinese while Sir Francis Aglen

used to keep himself alone and was always conscious of the importance

of his position not on its own account but because of the fawning

attitude of the Chinese banking world. The Chinese bankers looked

upon Sir Francis Aglen as a sort of protector. Whenever the Government

wanted to solve some important financial problem through the flotation

of Chinese government bonds Chang Chia—ao felt himself in a dominant

Koo, Wellington
Vi, J

position because of Lis ability to secure Sir Francis Aglen1s approval

of any program if he recommended it. In another words, whenever

Chang Chia-ao had to deal with the Government on behalf of the Banks,

Sir Francis Aglen stood behind him. So there was a sort of unholy

alliance between the two men. This naturally strengthened Chang1s

position in the political world because in those days the funds in

the national treasury was so depleted that no government could last

very long without calling upon the Chinese banks for financial

help. Chang was fully aware of that.

a
The fluidity of the political situation was/further source of

the power of the two men. One Cabinet followed another like the move­

ments of a kaleidoscope. Sometimes even within the same Cabinet

there would be a change in the Minister of Finance. Therefore, the

only constant factors in the picture were on one hand Sir Francis

Aglen, who, as Inspector General of Customs, was outside the ups

and downs of the government and on the other side Chang Chia-ao,

who, as head of the Bank of China, had the other banks following him

because of his special position vis-a-vis Sir Francis Aglen.

Chang*s own career as a banker was much influenced by his

political ties. He was promoted very rapidly from the position of

manager of the Branch of the Bank of China in Shanghai to that of

president of the Bank of China in Peking. His promotion was due to

v 'i'LUA ----------7-------- -—
his succe»»1 in1 ■celtivgteing- with the Kuomintang.
Koo, Wellington

His policy was to cultivate good relations with the Kuomintang

leaders secretly, and he directed Pei Tsu-i, who was then manager

of the Branch of the Bank of China in Canton, to work in that

direction. Pei carried out Chang^ instructions and contacted Wang

Ching-wei and other Kuomintang leaders. Thus, Pei got many credits.

Then as president of the Bank of China, which was functioning in

Peking, Chang was active and influential in political circles. One

of the political factors in those days was that no political leader

could go very far or succeed very much without financial support,

and the official banks, therefore, enjoyed an important position in

the country and made full use of it.

The policy and maneuvering of the bank leaders worked in favor

of the Kuomintang. Thus banking interests and political interests

easily came into combination.

In 1926 the Northern Expedition had already started. Chang Chia-

ao was a very shrewd banker and a very clever politician, though

eventually he was to lose his position when a stronger influence

came into the Chinese banking world. Of course, his practice was

successful in many respects. As we have seen, the leader of the

Chinese banking world was in a strategical position. Other bank

leaders such as Su Ting-ch1ang, Wu Ta«»chluan, Chou Tso-min, and

T'ang Tan«ya (head of the Ta-lu Bank) of the four other principal

banks, which I mentioned before, had contacted the Generalissimo and

Koo, Wellington

given him financial support. Chang Chia-ao did too, but sometimes

he overplayed his hand; so while he was able, he was not popular; also,

he was too much of a realist, and whenever there was an opportunity he

did not hesitate to make use of his financial power to the utmost.

While the Generalissimo appreciated the financial help given by

the Chinese Banks at.a critical time he also resented their high­

handed attitude: even to this day the Generalissimo still has the

feeling that the Chinese Banks should be regulated by the government.

That was the reason why he later founded his own banks such as the

Nung-min Bank (the Farmer^ Bank) and the United Office of the

Four Banks in order to be in a position to see what was going on in

the banking world and to control the Banks. As we know, the company

law in China was never up to date and in this period of transition the

managers of the abnks used to act as if they were the owners of the

banks. But the government controlled by the Kuomintang was able to

implement the policy of the Party to reduce the influence of

the Chinese private banks, particularly the Bank of China, which

had both government and private shareholders. [My family since my

father*s time had been a shareholder of the Bank of China.]

The Generalissimo fully realized the importance of financial

problems - he understood not only the art of conducting military

campaigns but also the art of buying over military leaders without

fighting. In this respect he followed a generous policy. Evidently

he has been of the opinion that money is useful only when it is used, and
Koo, Wellington
V*'

unlike the Tu-chuns, he never thought of acquiring private fortune. I

remember, a few years later, he paid a price for the purpose of bringing

Manchuria into the jurisdiction of the government in Nanking; some of

his friends such as Chang Ch*un, Wu T,ieh-chIeng, and occasionally

Yu Hsia-ch,ing conducted the negotiations in connection with this

matter. At that time I was in Mukden too. A matter of this kind

was, of course, kept strictly secret. I don^ know exactly the amount

of money the Generalissimo paid in this case because this had never

been positively told. Probably the amount was 15,000,000 dollars, which

was to be paid over a period of years; so the Young Marshal used to

go down from time to time to Shanghai and Nanking to collect the money.
■ p (]fi- / / /

f ? ? ? — / ^ 2

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 Koo, Wellington

_ ' j h Ij-jj >

Questions I had to Deal wiiii as Foreign Minister, 1922-192$:

Joffe, Wireless in Peking and Bribery Attempt, Gold Franc, War

Participation Loan, and Yoshizawa

I am going to recall what I can of the principal

questions which I as Foreign Minister had to deal between 1922

and 1928, With a gap of about a year and a half, namely 1925

to 1926, I was Foreign Minister in seven cabinets including two

of ray own. There were three or four others who served as Foreign

Minister whenever I was out of the Cabinet, such as Dr. C. T. Wang,

General Huang Fu, Dr. W. W. Yen, and Admiral Ts’ai T’ing-kan,

but they remained as the head of the Foreign Office each time

for relatively short periods.

Zzh fr \ ( 5 f Y-

Several questions had to be handled in my time which

were rather important from China's point of view. No sooner had

I assumed office in August 1922 as Foreign Minister than I had a

Soviet representative in the person of Mr. Joffe. He was understood

to be an important member of the Politburo in Moscow, and one of the

top leaders of the Soviet Communist Party. When I received him he

explained that his mission was regarded as very important by his country

although it was an informal one. Soviet Russia was entirely disposed

to support China in her foreign relations, particularly with a

view to the abolition of the unequal treaties, an objective which

he understood to be desired by the Chinese people. It will be

Koo, Wellington

recalled that the Soviet Government back in 1919 and 1920 had on its

own initiative denounced the unequal treaties which Czarist Russia

had concluded with China and proposed to negotiate new treaties on the

basis of the principles of equality and reciprocity. Joffe

suggested that China should officially denounce the treaties with

the other Western powers, a stand in which Soviet Russia would

support China. He would like to know my reaction, as to whether I

thought that the Chinese government could cooperate with Soviet Russia

in the international field. My immediate reaction, which was a

personal one as I explained to him, was that China's first aim was

to do away with the unequal treaties and reestablish China's

foreign relations with all countries on the basis of equality and

reciprocity and mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity

and sovereignty. That stand had already been made at the

Peace Conference in Paris. China was to pursue that policy. I told him

I appreciated the sympathetic point of view which he had just expressed,

but as regards the methods to attain this objective I would like to

report the cabinet and have it considered carefully. However I

intimated to him that, while the objective was correctly understood

by him, the methods he suggested required careful consideration.

Two or three days later after the Cabinet discussed

the question and, on the basis of ray report and my recommendation, it

decided to authorize me to give an official reply to Mr. Joffe. The

second interview with Mr. Joffe was one of great importance because

of the revelation of the real Soviet stand which he made after hearing
Koo, Wellington

a statement of reply from me. I told him the Government had considered

the Soviet proposal and while we fully appreciated the offer of

support and cooperation, the Chinese Government did not intend to

adopt a policy of unilateral action with regard to the unequal treaties.

It proposed to bring about the attainment of the objective of doing

away with the unequal treaties by an orderly method of negotiation,

in the hope and expectation that the foreign powers concerned would

be well disposed to cooperate with China to attain the end which

China as a country had in view. The Chinese Government would consider

a policy of direct denunciation of the existing treaties only after

the foreign powers made it clear that they would not agree to a
C t/W* P ^
revision of the treaties by negotiation or would obstruct the achieve­

ment of China’s national purpose in this direction.

It was obvious that my answer was a great disappointment

to Mr. Joffe. We spoke in English. He said something disparaging of

the intentions of the western powers and remarked that China would

find out sooner or later that she was bound to be disappointed in

expecting so much from them. He said that since the Chinese

Government was not disposed to accept the offer of cooperation from

Soviet Russia he would go now to the south and would discuss the

same proposition with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. He knew that Dr. Sun’s

political interest was at variance with that of the Chinese

Government, and he hoped that Dr. Sun would understand his mission
Koo, Wellington

better. I felt that this was more or less a threat on his part

as a result of his disappointment, a threat which became manifest

when he said that he felt certain that Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the party

he represented would have more appreciation for the friendly offer

he bore from Soviet Russia. He left Peking I believe the

following day and met Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Shanghai. There was no

authentic report of their discussion, but according to intelligence

reports the conversations ranged over the broad principles of

cooperation. The Sun-Joffe Communique didn't say very much. It

was simply an expression of mutual understanding and friendly ex­

change of ideas. I do not recall that the communique itself

specified any concrete agreement, although there must have been

some. Of course the nature of the discussions and negotiations

between Sun Yat-sen and Joffe and the significance of their

meeting became known as the events unrolled in subsequent.

As later events showed, there had been formed what practically

amounted to an alliance for Dr. Sun to carry out his second or third

revolution to seize political power, with the support of military,

financial, and political aid from Soviet Russia. The agreement,

reached between Joffe and Dr. Sun Yat=sen, formed a basis for

co-operation between the Kuomintang and Soviet Russia and provided

for the admission of the Chinese Communist members into the

Kuomintang. This was one episode in the earlier years of my

stewardship of the Foreign Office in 1922-1923.

Koo, Wellington
T". I*! , if' < G - A V . pi- ^ C .* IS 1 iv ^

The next question which I am going to take up was that

of the applications from a Japanese group through Busen-kasha (?)

and from the Federal Wireless Corporation of the United States for

a concession to build and operate a wireless station in Peking.

The matter had originated even before I assumed the post of Foreign

Minister. Immediately after I took office, Dr. Schurman, the American

minister, and Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister, both called on me

for the purpose of pressing the Chinese Government for an immediate

favorable reply. The applications of the Federal Wireless Corporation

had been addressed to the Ministry of Communications, and one application

from the Japanese group had been sent to the Ministry of the Navy.

Within the Chinese Government the ministers of these two ministries were

each advocating the thesis that the wireless station should belong to

his particular ministry. This lad been going on for some time. I

myself felt that, since the wireless station was to be operated as the

instrument of communication mainly for ordinary purposes and not

exclusively for military purposes, it should come under the control

of the Ministry of Communications. The cabinet as a body was undecided

but the majority seemed to sympathize with my point of view.

The Japanese agents continued to press the Ministry of

the Navy just as the American corporation representatives were pressing

the Ministry of Communications. Meanwhile their diplomatic representatives

kept on calling on me, urging an early reply. More than once the

American minister would ask to see me right after the Japanese

minister had called on the Foreign Office and vice versa. I was
sympathetic to the application of the Federal Wireless Corporation

because the proposed wireless station would come under the control

of the Ministry of Communications and as such the wireless station would

serve the general public of the country as an up-to-date means of

communication not only in the Far East but with abroad. Because

of the almost intransigent attitude of the two ministries the

<5V\.
matter dragged FQng, and a decision of the Cabinet was always left

in abeyance.

Despite my own sympathy with the American application, the

conduct and attitude of the representatives of the Federal Wireless

Corporation made it impossible for me to take a definite stand at the

time. As I used to return to my house for lunch, an American represen­

tative called me up and insisted on seeing me at my house. I did

see him, but I was not only surprised but upset when he intimated

that his company was willing to help the Chinese Government by making

a contribution - a financial contribution - if the American application

were granted. I don’t recall the exact amount of money, but I

remember vaguely it was in the region of $15,000, which could be used

at my discretion. I was greatly annoyed. As he bluntly made this

suggestion without any hesitation, I understood what he really meant.

So I said to him that was not the way by which he should have tried

to do business in China and, by so doing, he would defeat his own

purpose. Then I left, bidding him good-bye. I can't remember his name,

he was a Jew, but I still have his pictuire in my mind. After I

returned to the Foreign Office, my secretary telephoned the American

\^'i
Koo, Wellington

minister, saying that I wanted to see him in my office. The American

minister called and I told him what had happened and suggested to him

that, if the United States Government really felt that it was interested

in China and that the Federal Wireless Corporation's application should

receive favorable consideration,the representative of the company

was not the right man for the purpose, and his continued pressence

would make it more difficult for me to urge my own viewpoint, which

had been known to Dr, Schurman from the very beginning. Dr. Schurman

appeared to be equally shocked and quite agreed with me that the

the
usefulness in Peking of the representative of/American company was

ended by his attitude. He was annoyed, and assured me that he would do

what he could to arrange for the departure of the representative of the

American company from Peking and get that company to send another man.

The change of cabinet as a result of the cabinet crisis

arising from Dr. Lo Wen-kan's arrest made it necessary for Dr. Wang's

Cabinet to tender its resignation, and I left the Foreign Office. I

don't know the final outcome of this matter. Possibly the wireless station

was operated jointly by the Japanese and the Americans.

Tkt foil • i ftv c £y.?s.- u>v.

Another-queet-ion- was Jhe so-called Gold Franc Question^

^ arose from the fact that, as a result of World War I, the currencies

of several countries in Europe had greatly depreciated in value and in

exchange. Although the Gold Franc Question concerned France, a similar

question arose with Belgian and Italian currencies, which had likewise

depreciated. The point at issue was that the Protocol of 1901,

following the Boxer trouble, provided an indemnity of 450,000,000

taels to be payable, according to the apportionment among the thirteen

foreign powers, by each in its own currency. The French currency and the

other twelve foreign currencies were all on the gold standard. In

the Protocol "Gold Franc" was used. The question was whether

"Gold Franc" was intended to mean the French currency, which was based

on gold standard or whether it could be interpreted to mean franc

in gold nickel as France insisted.

The"Gold Franc" case had begun before I took up my post as

Foreign Minister and was under study by the Foreign Ministry. When

I took charge, it was one of the questions to which my attention was

called; it was an important question, especially since it would make

such a difference to the Chinese national treasury. The departments

in the Foreign Office were not able to arrive at any conclusion.

I gathered all the documents for study. After a careful examination

of the Protocol, its provisions and the history of the case, I was

convinced that the French claim was not justified - the French

Legation's demand for the payment in Gold Franc in its metallic sense

was unjustified. I remember I drew up the memorandum myself for

report to the Cabinet as well as for communication to the M.nister

of Finance. I do not remember whether I sent a reply to the French

Legation before I left the Foreign Office, but I notice that it

was reported that Foreign Minister C. T. Wang sent a reply on December

28, 1922 to the French minister, rejecting the Gold-Franc demand of

the French government. The French minister had been pressing for a

reply: Dr. C. T. Wang must have sent the reply shortly after he took

office and must have drafted that reply on the basis of my memorandum.

C. T. Wang did not remain very long in the Foreign Office.

General Huang Fu was appointed in early 1923. It was reported at the time

he sent another reply to the French protest against the rejection of the

French claim by the Chinese Foreign Office under Dr. C. T. Wang. In

fact the first official act that General Huang Fu performed after assuming

office was to send a communication to the French Minister accepting the

gold franc. Subsequently it was asserted that, before sending his

reply, he consulted Wang K'o-ming, and that his action was based on

Wang K'o-ming’s advice. It was said that Wang K'o-ming had a large

deposit in the Chinese-French Industrial Bank, and wanted the bank to

survive, which was why he wanted the gold payment approved. I am

not clear about the personal interest which Wang K'o-ming had or did not

have but actually it was widely believed in some circles that China

should accept the French claim because many thought it was well founded.

Such was the general sentiment in the Chinese banking world and even

among the government officials. In ray period of office I was considered

to be rather precarious in taking a special interest in a case in which

my view was contrary to the opinion in the Government and outside in

the Chinese banking world. Of course the French had a weapon. They

could always hold up the customs surplus revenue by withholding their

consent in the diplomatic corps who had authority to release the

surplus revenue, which in this case might be cut down according to the

amount of indemnity and loan payment owing to the French government.

But even before X studied the Gold Franc Question and came to

my conclusion, it was generally understood that there was no question of

accepting the French claim. In accepting the claim of the French

government, General Huang got himself into trouble with Parliament. For

Parliament, particularly that section under the leadership of Wu

Ching-lien, was dissatisfied with General Chang Shao-tseng's cabinet.

Apparently, the secret agreement, which Chang Shao-tseng made with

Wu Ching-lien before Chang was appointed Premier and before Chang's

nomination was approved by Parliament, had not been observed by Chang.

that time it was known that Mr. Wu Ching-lien was promised two portfolios

to be assigned to candidates nominated by him. Whatever the truth was,

as soon as Chang Shao-tseng's premiership was approved by Parliament

there was friction arising between the Cabinet and Parliament. Even

before General Huang Fu was appointed Foreign Minister Mr. Wu Ching-lien's

of
group had already got hold/a copy of my memorandum from the Foreign

Office. X remember that Wu Ching-lien came to me and asked me whether

I had a copy of the memorandum. I told him that I did not have a

copy and that, in any case, as the Speaker of the House, he could

easily get it from the Foreign Office. So he went there and got a

copy. This copy was evidently used as a weapon with which Wu Ching-lien

fought Chang Shao-tseng's cabinet. I don't know why General Huang Fu

was not aware of this memorandum and of the previous correspondence on

the subject. Itwwas very likely that he did seek the advice of Mr.
Wang K’o-ming and Mr. Liu En-yuan, the Finance Minister Very shortly

after Huang’s acceptance of the Gold-Franc claim became known, there

was a furor of criticism and attack on the Cabinet in Parliament, and

Huang resigned.

General Huang's resignation was not accepted until April 8,

1923, and on that date I was appointed to succeed him as Foreign Minister.

I did not take up my office at once. By the time I did take up my

office on July 3rd 1923, General Chang Shao-tseng had left for Tientsin

and the Cabinet was left without a head. As I have said already, my

reluctance and delay in taking up my post as Foreign Minister was due

to my condition that I would not take it up until Dr. Lo Wen-kan's case

was cleared up. Finally, Lo was released from detention.I

I gather that the Gold Franc Question continued to be an issue

until Mr. Li Sze-hao became Minister of Finance when General Tuan

Ch'i-jui was Chief Executive. Li Szu-hao, in the name of General

Tuan’s government, accepted the French claim and even agreed to some

modifications of the payment regulations. The acceptance was a surrender

of the legitimate right of China to insist upon the original position

taken by the Chinese Government at the time when I was Foreign Minister.

Nominally the settlement was brought about by using the exchange rate

of the American dollar, but substantially the settlement was a full

acceptance of the French claim. As a result of the acceptance, the

French minister at once released the surplus revenue of over 10,000,000

dollars to the Treasury.

 ll)

Another financial question which also involved foreign

relations was that of War Participation Loan, the negotiations of which

were carried out by Premier Tuan Ch'i-jui under President Feng

Kuo-chang in the autumn of 1918 on the eve of the termination of

World War I. Of course, the Chinese Government had fallen behind

in the payment not only of capital but also of interest. As the War

Participation Loan along with other Japanese loans became a national

issue, being opposed by public opinion in China, the Japanese sought

regularly to convert the interests area into capital account. When I

took up the foreign portfolio in 1922 the Japanese used to send

communications to the Foreign Office as well as the Ministry of Finance

for the purpose of obtaining conversion of interests into the

capital account.-- When I took up the foreign portfolio in 1922 the

Japanese used to send communications to the Foreign Office as well as

the Ministry of Finance for the purpose of obtaining conversion of

interests into the capital account as well as for periodic confirmation

of the validity of the loan. I myself was opposed to their request.

For one thing, the series of loans negotiated on the eve of the

armistice of the World War had been one of the causes of popular

dissatisfaction in China. The question of War Participation Loan,

though essentially a financial one, was also related to China's relations

with Japan and China's foreign policy in general because it was one

of the questions which had formed a part of the basis of China's

case at the peace conference in Paris. In spite of the insistence

of the Japanese, the loan was never transferred to capital account,

since the Cabinet suspended the question without passing it. I have

already described how I was the sole dissenting voice in the Cabinet,

which tried to approve the measure one weekend when I was thought to be

away from the capital. Since this episode was intimately connected

with the attempt to raise funds for Genetal Ts'ao K'un's election to the

presidency, it belongs rather to domestic than foreign politics.

M UA jte.r I * * ~ F

Also in my second period of office as Foreign Minister

before General Ts'ao K'un's election to the presidency, after President

Li Yuan-hung's departure for Tientsin, and during the time of the Regency

Cabinet - which was carrying on the function of the Government and

exercising the powers of the President under the constitution - there

was one incident which at that time created a great deal of sensation

in Peking. Mr. Yoshizawa, the newly appointed Japanese minister, had

arrived. It was customary for a new minister to call on the Foreign

Minister and request an arrangement for the presentation of his

credentials. In his first meeting with the Foreign Minister, the new

minister would leave a copy of his credentials with the Foreign Minister

so that the Foreign Minister could learn exactly what was said in the

credentials and how to prepare a speech for the chief of state to pronounce

at the ceremony. Without performing this customary courtesy call, Mr.

Yoshizawa sent a communication to the Foreign Office in connection with

a question to be settled between Japan and China. In other words he

undertook to function as the Japanese minister, as Japan's diplomatic

representative, without having gone through the customary procedure

of making a courtesy call requesting an arrangement for the presentation

of credentials and leaving a copy of the credentials. So I ordered that

no notice be taken of this communication and when the Japanese Legation

inquired about it, it was informed that the Foreign Minister did not

know that Mr. Yoshizawa had arrived and in what capacity. The

question was raised as to whether or not he should call. Mr. Yoshizawa

was informed that it was usual that he should make his first visit to

the Foreign Minister for the purpose of presenting a copy of the

credentials and asking for a date for the presentation of the original

credentials. His answer was that since there was no President he

could not present his credentials and therefore there was no purpose in

making the call for setting a date. I was rather surprised that he should

take such an attitude so I said since he would not call then we at

the Foreign Office could not recognize him in any capacity. We did not

know in what capacity he had arrived in Peking and certainly the

Foreign Office was not going to conduct business with him; he had a

charge d'affaires there who could continue to function as charge.

Somehow the incident got into the newspapers’<and evidently he became

embarrassed because he was already making some calls on his diplomatic

colleagues and, when this news came out, they knew that he had not been

fully accredited as Japanese minister.

Curious to say, Mr. Yoshizawa did not take the matter up

through his charg4 d’affaires to arrange some kind of a settlement.

In itself the question was not important but it did have its signi­

ficance, for I looked upon it as a deliberate step on the part of the

new minister to ignore the Chinese Government in Peking. Of course

it was clear that the credentials could not be presented to the

President, since there was no President. But in accordance with the

Chinese constitution, in the absence of the Chief Executive and

the Vice President, the Cabinet was empowered to exercise the powers

of the President in the interval. There was no question of being

unable to present his credentials on the grounds that it was addressed

to the Chief Executive, since two other ministers, the new ministers

of Brazil and Chile, had already presented credentials to the

Regency Cabinet in the President’s palace at the Huai-jen T'ang.

Being the ranking minister of the Cabinet, I had stood in the center

and received their credentials, in the presence of the whole Cabinet.

But the Japanese minister did not choose to do that. He thought

it was not becoming of such a great power as Japan to present

credentials signed by the Japanese Emperor to the Regency Cabinet.

It became a delicate issue. I stood firm that regardless of

the date of presentation of the original credentials, the minister

should first of all make a call and then leave a copy of his credentials

so that the Chinese Foreign Minister, and through him the Chinese

Government, could know exactly what capacity he had in Peking, in

order that we could subsequently do business with him.

 But he would not do that. Instead, he approached some of the

other ministers in the Cabinet. At one of the cabinet meetings I was

greatly surprised by two of my colleagues wanting to speak to me. They

told me that the Japanese minister had called on them and said that I was

unnecessarily insistent upon the observance of diplomatic protocol; in

the special situation of China, Japan had no prejudice against the

Chinese government but could not see its way to the presentation of creden­

tials to the Regency Cabinet. My two colleagues, Mr. Wu Yu-ling, and

Mr. Kao Ling-wei, said they had a way of compromise. They would consult

with the Minister of War, General Lu Chin, and would give dinner party to

which they would invite me and introduce the Japanese minister to me per­

sonally. I was shocked. They told me that in the situation it was the

best way out, since neither side would give in, and Wu Yu-ling said

their suggestion was entirely concurred in by Mr. Wang Lan-ft’ing, who

was a sort of leader, being secretary to General Ts'ao K'un, and who

would also be present.I

I was half annoyed and half amused. I told them that they

entirely misunderstood the whole situation. It was not a personal matter

between Mr. Yoshizawa and me. The stand I took was entirely in the

interest of the Government and I was not Foreign Minister in my

personal capacity, but was Foreign Minister of the Regency Cabinet,

of which they were all a part. Mr. Yoshizawa should have called on

the Foreign Minister and made himself known. Since he declined to

come, that meant that in his eyes, there was no Chinese government.

The Foreign Minister was supposed to represent the government,

"Of which", I said, "you are all full-fledged ministers". Therefore,

I said, I could not come.

Apparently they saw it as a personal matter between them

and the Japanese minister. Certainly they were not called upon to

introduce the Japanese minister to me. That was no way to conduct

foreign affairs! At first they thought I was rather stubborn. But

I told them: "You leave him alone! Leave him to the Foreign Office to

manage!" The dinner did take place but I did not attend it. Finally

the Japanese minister saw no way of getting around me. So through

his Charg£ d'Affaires he arranged with the Japanese-speaking secretary

who was Mr. Shih Lil-pen that he would make a visit and leave a copy,

but leaving the date for the presentation of the credentials in

abeyance. In other words he felt the Japanese Emperor’s credentials should

not be presented to the regency cabinet but only to the regularly elected

President. That was a touchy feeling on the part of the Japanese. So

I said he could call and leave a copy of the credentials. As for the

date of the presentation, I said, that was a matter for the Chinese

Government to decide. If there was a President, his office would

decide, if there was no President, the Regency Cabinet would decide

whether to set a date or not set a date immediately. Finally he

acceded to this point. He called and left a copy of credentials, and

the incident was closed.

Although Mr. Yoshizawa and I did not start our official

relations with very pleasant memories, we became very friendly and,

whenever he saw some of our people, he would always inquire about me

and about my health. The last time when he was sent to Formosa in 1954

as Japanese ambassador, he presented his credentials and was enter­

tained by the President. He asked where was Dr. Wellington Koo:

. Kc
"He is among my old friends from Peking," and asked about my health.

The President said I was in Washington and Mr. Yoshizawa surprised the

Generalissimo by saying: "You know, I am very glad he is enjoying

good health, because he and I are the same age." The Generalissimo

was surprised, and asked how old he was. He was already in his

eighties. The Generalissimo said: "Oh! Ambassador Koo and I

are of the same age," and added that he certainly did not know that

Ambassador Koo and Ambassador Yoshizawa were of the same age. He

said: "Oh yes! We were of the same age. We worked together

in Peking." Evidently his memory was not good.

Mr. Yoshizawa was one of the diplomats of the old school,

very punctilious and exact in everything he did, not only with regard

to protocol, although on this particular point of the presentation

of credentials he was wrong - the whole diplomatic corps in Peking

was on the side of the Foreign Office - but in his whole diplomatic

manner. In interviews, for example, it was always a very exacting

meeting because he would pull out his instructions and would read

them word by word in Japanese, very slowly, and would often stop

in the middle and start from the beginning. And the secretary would

attempt to equal his deliberateness word by word in Chinese. So

usually an interview with him would last much longer than it ordinarily

would. Being a Japanese born and brought upo in the northern part of
Japan in the mountains, he was of robust health but very slow in

speech and action. It was known in Peking among the foreign community

including the diplomatic corps there that he was very fond of playing

golf. There were two courses in Peking, nine holes each, one in the

Pei-po Mountain and another outside the Hsi-chih Gate. But whenever

anyone found Mr. Yoshizawa playing golf, they would pack up and go

home. They had all had the same experience. When he was ahead and they

waiting for him to go through, he would go round the ball, look at it,

and pull out a pamphlet on golf to find out what he should do when the

ball lay at such and such an angle. He would go round again and study

the ball, and then make a stroke. It was hopeless. Such was his

deliberateness of manner. As regards his public duties he was all

Japanese. He was most strict and punctilious. Yet he was a man of

good character, and a gentleman. In 1954 as ambassador in Formosa

he came to meet me at the airport; and when I called on him later,

he returned the visit and insisted on giving me a dinner party which

I accepted because he was very earnest. So notwithstanding the

difficulties when he was minister to Peking especially during the

first days of his post, we were good friends.

L-infcheng Case

I propose to continue a statement of the principal

questions which I had to deal with in my capacity as Foreign

Minister in the government in Peking. I would like to make a few

observations in regard ;.to the Lin-ch^ng ewse. This was a case

of holdup an express train running from Shanghai through Nanking,

Tsinan, and Tientsin aftd to Peking early in the morning of May 6, 1923.

The train was held up by a group of Chinese bandits in the vicinity

of the town of Lin-ch,eng on the border of Shantung province. The

bandit force was far more numerous than either the railway police or

the train personnel, who, therefore,were easily overpowered. The

train was derailed since the bandits had first removed the screws of

one of the rails. On the train were a large number of foreign passengers

as well as many Chinese passengers. They were all kidnapped by the

bandits and taken to their stronghold in the nearby mountains. One

of the foreign travelers, a British subject, was shot dead in

circumstances unknown. Among the foreign passengers kidnapped there

were several women.

The incident aroused great indignation among the Chinese as

well as foreign community in China. The Diplomatic Body met several times

and sent a joint protest to the Waichiaopu. Of course, this was an extra­

ordinary incident although train holdups were at that time nothing

unique or particular to China and from time to time occurred in the

Koo, Wellington

so-called Wild West of the United States. Since so many foreign as

well as Chinese passengers were involved and since the incident concerned

a very daring act of banditry, the Chinese Government officials,

including myself, were naturally very aroused. In reply to the protest

the first measure taken by the Government was to set up a joint commission

of inquiry into the circumstances and actual conditions of the holdup;

this joint commission was also to locate the place trhere the captives

were being held. The Governor of Shantung, General THen Chung-yu

naturally had a special responsibility to try his best to bring about the

release of these captives; he was enjoined by the Government to redouble

his efforts.

The Chinese people were so aroused that from different

parts of China missions of relief were sent to aid the captives as soon

as they were released.

After the report of the commission was received by the

Government the Diplomatic Body sent another joint note formulating the

conditions for settlement, claims for redress, and guarantees against the

repetition of such incidents. The demands of the Diplomatic Body

seemed far beyond what was justifiable in the circumstances. The

joint note referred to the Protocol of 1901, which was a sequel of the

Boxer trouble; it framed the demands in a somewhat similar manner to the

demands incorporated in that Protocol, particularly in regard to the

Koo, Wellington

punishment of the provincial and local officials considered to be res­

ponsible for the incident. Furthermore among the conditions for the

settlement of the question were such items as the reorganization of

the railway police with foreign personnel and the depriving from the

responsible officials of any opportunity for reappointment by the Chinese

Government. The demand for an indemnity to cover losses suffered by the

foreign captives as well as for the one who lost his life, although less

comprehensive than similar claims arising from the Boxer incident, appeared

to me to be still based upon certain principles which were not warranted.

Consequently the Chinese Government agreed to offer certain

measure of redress, but I made the point that nothing should be done

which would infringe upon China^ sovereignty as an independent nation or

would be contrary to or would go beyond the principles and rules of

international law in regard to the protection of foreign nationals on

the territory of China. As regards political conditions or conditions

that smacked of political action such as the punishment of the

governor of the province and the high military authorities in the region,

the Government itself had already taken steps to dismiss the head of the

railway police and to remove the local garrison commander and to call

upon the Governor to do his best to effect the release of the captives.

As for the reorganization of the railway police, in my replies to the

Diplomatic Body X emphasized the principle that that was a matter

pertaining to the internal administration of China and to China*s

sovereign rights which did not permit of foreign interference or

intervention, assuring the Diplomatic Body at the same time, however,

that the Ministry of Communications had already undertaken for some time

a study of the question of the reorganization of the railway police and,

if necessary, would employ some foreign experts. So this demand in

the joint note could not be considered.

In the question of indemnity China could not assume any

liability but, entertaining great sympathy for the foreign captives as

well as for the Chinese captives, it was ready to provide some relief to

pay the expenses incurred and the damages or losses actually suffered.

On one point, namely the amount demanded for the daily expenses of the

foreign captives, the joint note said that $150 should be paid for each

day in captivity, but after a certain date if they were not released then

the amount would be increased to $250 a day per person. This was a

point which I could not understand and declined to accept. I pointed

out that any delay in their release would be caused by the necessity

to negotiate with the bandits so as not to provoke any untoward incident

affecting the life and safety of the captives; plainly, the necessary

time spent in successful negotiations to secure the captives* release

should jnot be considered as giving a reason for increasing compensation.

The main grounds on which the Chinese Government took its

position was that this incident, deplorable as it was, had not been

instigated by any general anti-foreign movement in China. It was a

simple act of brigandage on the part of the armed lawless elements in

that ^region, a region which was practically uninhabited and mountainous.

Koo, Wellington

difficult to protect enough to avoid an occasional incident of this nature

The position taken by the Diplomatic Body appeared to be very serious

because it was the first time that the whole diplomatic corps joined

in the note. And my effort, while recognizing the deplorable character

of this incident, was to show that it did not in any way resemble the anti

foreign movement as the Boxer trouble in 1900. The incident, I stated,

should be viewed in its proper proportion, and the measures of reasonable

reparation and redress should be fixed accordingly.

After somewhat prolonged negotiations the captives were all

released in October. The conditions under which the release was accepted

were not reported to the Government at the time. It was mainly the

responsibility of the Governor of Shantung Province. One of the demands

imposed by the chief of the bandits was that he and his followers

should be taken into the array of Shantung Province. This was an unusual

feature of the agreement reached with the bandits but I suppose at the

time it was unavoidable in the judgment of the Governor. He felt

responsibility both for the incident and the bringing about of

the safe release of the captives. I believe it was stated in a report

later that in less than two months the chief of the bandits who was

appointed by the Governor as the commander of the reorganized brigade

was executed for insubordination.

This serious incident involving the lives and safety

 \V'
Koo, Wellington

of travelers on the train had arisen evidently out of the unsettled

political condition in China in general and particularly in the part

where the Tientsin-Pukow express train had to traverse. Disbanded

soldiers wandered in the wilderness in the vicinity of the railroad,

resorting to brigandage and banditry as a measure to call the

attention of the provincial authorities to their own desperate condition.

And the Government, functioning as a regency government, with no president,

found itself faced with a very serious situation. It was most unfortunate

that the incident took place. It was not only sincerely deplored in China

but created a most unfavorable impression abroad. For the purpose of

doing what could be done to ameliorate such an unfavorable impression

abroad, as well as in consideration of the need to render justice to the

foreign visitors to China, the incident was settled in the way I have

described.
Negotiations with Soviet Russia, 1923-1924: C. T. Wang Signs the Draft
Agreement, March 1924

The negotiations with Soviet Russia in 1923-24 were carried out

for the purpose of restoring diplomatic relations between China and

Soviet Russia. This was an objective which was very much desired by

Moscow. The Soviet representative was Mr. Karakhan, who came to China as
c
a special envoy. Soviet Russia had previously sent Mr. Joffe to the

Far East; his mission to Peking has been described in one of the previous

interviews. He had been sent to the Far East as a special envoy not

only to seek the restoration of diplomatic relations with China but

evidently also to undertake negotiations with Japan in connection with the

problems between Soviet Russia and that country, particularly the

Japanese occupation of the Maritime Province and the Sakhalin Island,

which had followed the Japanese claim that hundreds of Japanese nationals

had been massacred there. In China, Mr. Joffe's overall objective

had been to work out with China a plan of what he called co-operation

between the two countries. His mission did not achieve the purpose which

Moscow had formulated; nevertheless he remained in China for quite a

long period. Thus his mission in Peking failed, just as his mission in

Japan to which he went secretly also failed.

He was replaced by Mr. Karakhan. Karakhan as Deputy Commissar of

Foreign Affairs in Moscow had issued two declarations in 1919 and 1920

directed to China which announced a very liberal policy and denounced all

the unequal treaties concluded by Czarist Russia with China including

extraterritoriality and the Russian concessions on the Chinese territory.

His name was therefore not unknown to the Chinese public. When he

arrived in China he was given a very warm reception at Harbin by the Chinese

Director-General of the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as by the local

populace in general. Even before his arrival he attempted to reach a

settlement with Marshal Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, evidently with a view

to the recovery of Russia's vested interests in the Chinese Eastern

Railway. Soviet Russia was then troubled by the activities of the White

Russians in Manchuria as well as in Siberia and Korea. The General-Manager

of the Chinese Eastern Railway was himself a White Russian, an able

manager who had been in China for many years and knew the Chinese people

and the Chinese situation, but who was not trusted by Soviet Russia. It

was one of Karakhan's motives to come to an agreement with Marshal Chang

Tso-lin with a view to removing this White Russian and replacing him

with a new general-manager to be designated by Moscow. Failing in his

first attempt in Mukden, Karakhan came to Peking, where he was also

given a cordial welcome not so much by the government as by the public.

The faculty and student body of Peking University, which was then known

as the center and stronghold of the Chinese intellectuals, and radicals,

organized receptions and dinners in Mr. Karakhan's honor. Thus it was

in flying colors that he appeared in Peking toward the end of 1923.

However, as far as I remember, he was not given any official reception

by the Waichiaopu or by any other department or ministry of the

Government. There were no diplomatic relations between the two

countries, in fact it was the chief objective of Mr. Karakhan's mission

to re-establish diplomatic relations with China.

 Informing the Waichiaopu of his arrival as special plenipotentiary

for the purpose of negotiating an agreement on what was called the

general principles to guide the relations betwen the two countries,

he practically made it a condition, however, that before negotiations

were undertaken China should agree to the restoration of formal diplo­

matic relations with Soviet Russia. Now/China, had already been much

upset at that time by the activities of the Russians in Outer Mongolia,

who had taken a series of measures highly prejudicial to the interests

of China/ ^hich had resulted in practically alienating this territorial

entity from the Chinese Republic. There had been an attempt to destroy

and eliminate Chinese interests in Outer Mongolia and the Chinese

position in that part of China, More than 1,000 Chinese merchants and

workers had been deported from Outer Mongolia, and the Chire se

Commissioner and the garrison which he brought with him had been also

expelled. Such measures had caused great dissatisfaction not only in the

Chinese Government but on the part of the Chinese people. There were

consequently two reasons for the Chinese Government not to open the

negotriations sought by Mr. Karakhan: China's own condition in regard

to the question of Outer Mongolia; and Mr. Karakhan's condition that

China should agree in advance to establish relations. Both became

a sort of obstacle to the opening of the negotiations. From my point of

view the deadlock on Outer Mongolia could have been cleared up by some

official declaration on the part of Soviet Russia recognizing China's

sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and disclaiming the measures which had

been adopted in Outer Mongolia to the detriment of China's position,

but there was a great deal of hesitation on the Russian side. Many

months later Moscow tried to explain away the activities in Mongolia

as those of White Russians led by General Semenov. Meanwhile in China

Mr. Karakhan made speeches reassuring the Chinese people of Soviet

Russia's friendly relation to China and even declaring that China, with

the friendly cooperation and assistance of Soviet Russia, would become

an important factor for the maintenance of peace in Eastern Asia and

would be able to liberate herself from the shackles to her sovereignty

such as extraterritoriality and the other features of the unequal

treaties which were then still in force between China and the other

Western countries and Japan.

The delay in the opening of the negotiations was much criticized

and opposed by the articulate Chinese public opinion, which emerged

mainly from the student body in Peking University. The Chancellor of

this great citadel of Chinese learning was Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei who was then

the acknowledged leader of the so-called "Liberal Movement". It was

onlyafter the election and inauguration of Ts'ao K'un to the presidency

and the setting up of the first Cabinet under him that the Government

was in a position to arrange for the opening of negotiations. The first

was the appointment of Dr. C. T. Wang as Chinese Commissioner with

plenipotentiary powers to negotiate with Mr. Karakhan as the plenipoten­

tiary of Soviet Russia. On March 26, 1926 when General Huaqgwas foreign

minister Dr. Wang had been made head of the Russo-Chinese Negotiations

Commission. Dr. Wang was recommended by Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i, the Prime

Minister and by Mr. W. W. Yen, then Minister of Agriculture and Commerce

in Mr. Sun's Cabinet. Sun was a good friend of Dr. Wang's. He had

been foreign minister himself ten years before, and I had been his

counselor in the Ministry. Dr. Yen had also been foreign minister several

times before me, and now had the status of a sort of elder statesman.

This was the background of Dr. Wang's appointment, which was notified to

Mr. Karakhan by Dr. Wang himself in pursuance of the decision of the Foreign

Ministry. The correspon^clence took place between the two plenipoten­

tiaries and not through the Waichiaopu: Mr. Karakhan's position being

that of a plenipotentiary to negotiate for re-establishment of diplomatic

relations, having no diplomatic standing other than that. When the

credentials were drawn up I took special care to see that they were properly

worded. It was made clear in these credentials that Dr. Wang had the

full power to negotiate a draft agreement for the government's approval

or disapproval; in other words, his credentials were worded in the

usual form for a diplomatic negotiator. Whatever agreement he would be

able to negotiate with his counterpart would be subject to approval by

the Government.

The negotiations were duly inaugurated. Dr. Wang was assisted

by a staff, partly composed of members of the Foreign Ministry whom

I designated, including the Chief of the First Section in the Division

of Political Affairs in the Ministry - Mr. Chao Chuan. Although he

had been with me on my staff at the Peace Conference and in London he

also knew Dr. Wang and was well liked by him. Most of Dr. Wang's

staff were picked by himself and were not of the regular diplomatic

service. The negotiations went on for a considerable period. There

 \U

were few regular reports, hardly any in writing from Dr. Wang, but I

kept myself informed through Mr. Chao Chuan from time to time.

It was not until one day in March early in the morning that

Mr. Chao Chuan came to my house and told me that a draft agreement had

just been signed by Dr. Wang and Mr. Karakhan in the old RussianEmbassy

where Mr. Karakhan was living. Mr. Chao was not able to tell me the

precise contents of the signed agreement nor was he able to telldefinitely

whether the signature was in full or only in initials. As far as he

could make out, it was a full signature. I asked about the circumstances

in which the agreement was signed by both representatives. He said

the meeting started before daylight and dinner was given in honor of

Dr. Wang and after dinner the talks were resumed, and they went on till

nearly daybreak when the draft agreement was concluded with the signing

by the two representatives. Immediately after signing champagne was

served and Mr. Karakhan drank a toast to the inauguration of friendly

relations between the two countries and directing his glass to Dr. Wang

as "the future premier of China".I

I had always known - and it had always been known in the

political world - that Dr. Wang had political ambition and was a first

class politician. But my immediate reaction was that this act of signing

without first reporting to me as Foreign Minister in accordance with the

usual procedure, so that I could submit the agreement to the cabinet as

a whole, appeared an act of negligence on the part of Dr. Wang as the

Chinese representative. That was not the only point on which I was
9
anxious. I wanted to know the contents of the draft agreement, in what

terms it was worked out, and whether there was anything in the signed

agreement which would be prejudicial to China's national interest. I

immediately telephoned Dr. Wang to ask him if what I had been told was

correct, that the agreement had already been signed. If so, I asked him

to at once send me a copy. I told him what the usual procedure was, not

only for China but for any other country, in the case of the conclusion

of an international treaty or agreement. I did not mince words in

telling him that if he had signed the agreement without having referred

the draft text to the Government for consideration and final approval,

it was an act of negligence on his part. Upon hearing this statement,

he said it was not signed but initialled. I said that if he had merely

initialled it, that would have been within his right, but I said I

wanted to see the text of it. He said it was being copied and that it

would take some time before he could send me a copy.

At my request Mr. Chao brought me an unofficial copy. Dr. Wang

did not bring one until one or two days later. Upon closely examining

the contents of the signed agreement which was called an agreement on

general principles to guide the relations between the two countries, for

the conclusion of a more comprehensive treaty and for the settlement of

several outstanding questions between Soviet Russia and China. I found

to my great disappointment and dissatisfaction several articles which

Dr. Wang should not have accepted and which could have been revised without

much difficulty from the Soviet representative if he had referred the

O-fr-'-
unsigned draft to the Foreign Ministry for consultation and for proposals

to amend the text. There were several provisions, but in order not to

make the situation too difficult for Dr. Wang, I summarised the most
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important under three headings. The first was the question of the

treaties affecting Outer Mongolia. The agreement provided for the

abrogation of all treaties which Czarist Russia had concluded with China

and with other powers concerning China. This wording left out the

treaties and agreements Soviet Russia had made with what it called

Independent Outer Mongolia. By specifying the treaties of the Czarist

regime, it implicitly gave recognition to treaties between Soviet

Russia and Outer Mongolia. That to me was an important concession China

could not lightly make.

The second point concerned the withdrawal of Soviet Russian

troops from Outer Mongolia. It was the presence of these troops which

supported what Soviet Russia considered as the independence of Outer

Mongolia. The withdrawal of troops had been discussed, but the relevant

provision of the draft agreement was that Soviet Russia would withdraw

its troops as soon as conditions for such withdrawal were agreed upon

by China. In other words China, by recognizing that there were to be

conditions to the withdrawal, put herself entirely at the mercy of

Soviet Russia, who might find China’s conditions entirely unacceptable and

thereby perpetuate the presence of the Russian troops. Moreover I did

not like the implication of this particular clause which seemed to be that

the presence of Soviet troops was legitimate and that Soviet Russia

had the right to propose conditions before agreeing to withdraw them.

The third point related to the buildings and landed property of

 \V
the Russian Catholic missions in China. In its third provision the

agreement stated that all such landed property belonging to the Catholic

Church would be turned over to the Soviet Government. As I knew that

under the treaty system foreign missions, religious missions and

missionaries, were not legally permitted to own land in the interior of

China, and as I knew also that the Government had no record showing how

much property the Russian Catholic Church owned in China, and where or how

extensive its holdings were, it would be a most troublesome obligation

for China to carry out. It would be greatly objected to by the provin­

cial authorities.

These were the main points which I considered it necessary to

revise. Without taking it upon myself to express the position of the

Government, I submitted a report to the Cabinet together with a copy

of the complete text of the agreement signed by Dr. Wang and Karakhan.

One might digress to ask what personal motive Dr. C. T. Wang had

in thus prematurely reaching agreement with the Russian plenipotentiary.

It was the general impression in virtually all circles that Dr. Wang had

practically separated himself or alienated himself from the Southern

political circles headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the prospect of political

career with the Southern political forces was rather limited. He was

known to be desirous and ambitious in playing his part in the Peking

Government just as, for example, Dr. Wang Ch'ung-hui and General

Huang Fu, who were also at the time active in Peking. Anyone who had

a political ambition wanted to participate in political activities in

Peking and wanted to be the foreign minister and then the premier. I
think this impression at the time was not far from the truth, because

Dr. Wang had been seeking support from General Feng Yd-hsiang, an

ambitious general seeking to gain political power and to dominate China,

which for the powerful warlords in that period was also a common

ambition. At the dinner given in honor of Dr. C. T. Wang at the Russian

Embassy when the treaty was signed. General Feng was the next important

guest present. General Feng at the time had been seeking the friendship

of Soviet Russia and it had always been known that Dr. Wang and General

Feng were close friends just as General Feng and W. W. Yen were good

friends, though Dr. Yen was not as close to General Feng as Dr. Wang

was. Dr. Wang and General Feng were both Christians - General Feng had

been baptized also. Moreover a certain Pastor Liu, who was a very

devoted associate and supporter of General Feng, had worked very hard to

bring Dr. Wang and General Feng together and weld them into a sort of

political bloc. Politically, Dr. Wang, Dr. W. W. Yen, and Mr. Sun Pao-

ch’i belonged to one group; Sun Pao-ch'i was closely related to Dr. Yen

- for Mrs. Yen was Sun's sister and it was Sun who sponsored their

marriage. This was why Dr. Yen and Mr. Sun had strongly recommended

Dr. Wang to me. I had no reason for objection to Dr. Wang's appointment

since we had known each other for many years, although Dr. Wang played

a great deal of politics at the time of the Versailles Peace Conference.

Speaking generally. Dr. Wang was an able man; of course, he did

not receive any particular training in diplomacy, but that did not matter

to W. W. Yen when he made the recommendation. He was not a Doctor of

Philosophy. When in the United States on a special mission in 1918

 ]11

together with Mr. Kuo T'ai-ch’i and Mr. Eugene Ch'en, he had always

been reported in the newspapers as "Doctor". That was a usual complimentary

title which the American public was always ready to confer on any foreign

statesman. I think that later he may have received some honorary degrees,

but he had no academic doctorate at all. The same is true with Dr. W. W. Yen

and Dr. Alfred Sze; neither of them had worked for and obtained a doctoral

degree at any college or any university, but they were known as Dr. Yen

and Dr. Sze. In the Chinese Foreign Service, as a tradition from the

old days showed, the one important consideration which the authorities

had in mind was that the diplomat should have as qualification the ability

to speak foreign languages. If one had been partly educated abroad and

had obtained an academic degree from an occidental university, that was

all that was required. The idea that a diplomat should have at least

a basic knowledge of international law and diplomatic history did not

enter into the minds of the high authorities.

In short, I accepted the recommendation of Dr. Wang as pleni­

potentiary in spite of the fact that I knew he was not fully trained for

carrying on negotiations of such importance as those with Soviet Russia.

The negotiations were taking place in Peking; I expected that he would

keep me informed very closely. But as it turned out, he did not see

that he had the duty of keeping the Foreign Minister or the Foreign

Ministry closely in touch. Long before he signed the agreement, it had

been my desire to find out from him or from the members of the Foreign

Ministry who were on his staff how things were getting aiong. In that

epoch it was a general idea - and from my personal point of view it was
a deplorable idea - on the part of the Chinese political aspirants

always to seek the support and assistance of some foreign power. Whether

those aspirants were warlords with large military forces or civilians

with political ambitions, this became a sort of general practice, which

personally I deplored.
 |V\
KoOj Wellington

Negotiations with Soviet Rfeasia: The Cabinet Rejects the Wang/Karakhan

Agreement

When the report was submitted to the Cabinet all my colleagues were

most indignant, first, at -the -fact that Dr. Wang had practically not

paid attention to the fact that he had been representing a government, which

he had thus slighted. In the second place, they saw great objection to the

three points which I had pointed out in my report. The Minister of War

objected particularly to the two clauses regarding Outer Mongolia. I

remember that Mr. Wang Klo-min, the Minister of Finance, took strong

objection to two points. One was in connection with the return of the

Russian Catholic church property to the Soviet government. Wang K^-min’s

opinion on this point - the third point I had raised •* was strongly

supported by the Minister of the Interior.

However, Wang K*o-min had even stronger objection to the clause relating

to the disposal of the Boxer Indemnity. Among the unequal treaty provisions

renounced by the Soviet government in the declarations of 1919 was the

Boxer Indemnity, of which Czarist Russia had a very substantial share.

It was for that reason that a provision was included in the draft agreement

to confirm the renunciation by Soviet Russia, but this provision stipulated

that the money left after taking care of the obligations secured on the indemnity

would be employed for purposes to be designated by Soviet Russia; my

impression is that a committee was to be set up and was to be composed of an

equal number of members from both sides. Mr. Wang K'o-min objected most
Koo, Wellington

strongly to giving Soviet Russia the whole say in allocating the remitted

funds. He criticized Dr. Wang for having accepted the clause without

consulting him as Minister of Finance, since this was a matter which fell

within the domain of the Minister of Finance. Mr. Wang K'o-min proposed,

with the support of the Minister of War, that Dr. Wang should be dismissed at

once and a commission of inquiry set up to investigate into his action.

X took a moderate view. I said what Dr. Wang did was not in accordance

with his credentials and his act was one of gross negligence; I went on to

say that as regards what should be done, he should not be allowed to

continue in his capacity, that in fact so far as he was concerned his mission

had been completed and that now it was up to the Government to repair the

mistake which hehad made. While he should be released of his duty, it should

be made clear that further negotiations would be turned over to the

Waichiaopu, which would continue the work with the Soviet representatives.

As regards the commission of investigation, which in the Chinese official

world was usually looked upon as an act of punishment and disgrace for the

subject to be investigated, I said that it should be dispensed with, not

so much for out of sympathy for Dr. Wang as in consideration of China's

international position. I also said that the mistake was a serious one but

not beyond repair, for China could stand very firmly on the ground that

Dr. Wang's signature was not authorized; he had exceeded his power and his

act was one of gross negligence, whichjwas universally recognized as a justifi­

able cause for refusing to recognize the instrument signed. I concluded

that the case should be handled in such a manner as not to hurt China's
Koo, Wellington

prestige abroad: it would not be desirable to subject Dr. G* T. Wang to dis­

ciplinary measures in addition to releasing him of his commission because

it should be remembered that only yesterday he was still a high representative

of the government, calling for all tfee respect not only from the Soviet

representative but from the Diplomatic Body and the general public; if he

became overnight a subject of disciplinary investigation, the impression

would be created that any Chinese high functionary, especially a plenipo­

tentiary, could be reduced within twenty—four hours almost to the position

of a plain citizen, with a dark shadow thrown upon him.

I was rather surprised that neither Premier Sun Pao-ch’i nor Dr.

W. W. Yen said much to defend Dr. C. T. Wang. It was in March 1924, and

Ts’ao K’un had already been inaugurated as president. But in the course

of the Cabinet meeting at the request of Sun Pao-ch’i the term mien-chih

ch’a-pan (to be dismissed and subjected to investigation) proposed by

Wang K’o-min was deleted from the mandate issued by the government. Of

course I agreed to Sun Pao-ch’i’s request because, I said, >the case should

be handled in a moderate way. It was simply stated in the mandate that the

negotiations conducted between the High Commissioner and Mr. Karakhan should

be handed over to the Waichiaopu, which would hereafter continue the

negotiations and that Dr. Wang’s mission was terminated with any apparent

probing.

When the mandate was published it must have been a shock to Mr.

Karakhan, who lost no time in addressing the Waichiaopu with a demand that
Koo, Wellington

the Chinese Government declare its acceptance of the agreement within forty-

eight hours on the ground that it had been duly signed by the Chinese

commissioner with plenipotentiary powers. I found this communication to he

unwarranted especially since Mr. Karakhan coupled it with a threat that,

if he failed to receive a satisfactory reply within the time stated, China

would have to bear all the consequences. In my reply I pointed out the reasons

why the Chinese Government declined to accept the draft agreement above

Dr. Wang*8 signature; I said that in signing Dr. Wang had exceeded his powers;

I asked the Soviet representative to re-examine Dr. Wang^s credentials, in

which it was clearly stated that anything he negotiated should be reported

to the government and should be subject to the approval of the government.

Mr. Karakhan again pressed the Waichiaopu for a favorable reply. I stood

firm with the approval of the Government. The three or four points which my

report emphasized were of such importance that none of my colleagues in the

Cabinet raised voice in defense of any of those agreed to by Dr. Wang.

Though Dr. Wang’s draft agreement was not definitely supported by Dr.

Sun Yat-sen and the Southern Government, it did secure the support of high

military authorities in the provinces. Moreover the propaganda apparatus of the

Soviet mission, with the co-operation of Dr. Wang’s political circles, began

to make its effect felt. Peking University sent a mission to the Waichiaopu

asking for an interview with me. I remember that the head of the group

was Li Ta-chao; he was the spokesman of a group of about eight or ten

professors and students of Peking University. Li’s main point was that the

agreement reached between Dr. C. T. Wang and Mr. Karakhan was the best in China’s
Koo, Wellington

diplomatic history; he wanted to knew for what reasons the government had

objected to this agreement and had not approved it. It was not difficult

for me to explain the objection which the Government had to the agreement.

I explained to them the different points and emphasized that the question

of Outer Mongolia was a matter of Chinafs sovereignty over that area and of

China's territorial integrity, which should not lightly be encroached upon.

In carrying on the negotiations, Dr. Wang had had no right to recognize

implicitly that Outer Mongolia was no longer a part of China's territory

by failing to include in the renunciated treaties those which Russia had

concluded with China or with any other party in regard to Outer Mongolia. The

reply Professor Li Ta-chao gave was a shock to me. He said that the people

of Outer Mongolia could look forward to a better life even if Outer Mongolia

should be under Soviet domination and control. His reply was so emotional

that I thought he had lost all his sense of propriety. So I turned to him and

said that of course he could express and hold whatever personal view he liked

but I, as Foreign Minister of the Chinese Republic, had the duty to see to it

that China's territory and sovereignty were kept intact and were not

encroached upon by any foreign Power. Considering Professor Li's statement,

I said he and I stood on opposite sides and therefore there was no use for

me to continue to discuss the matter with him. So, 1 asked to be excused

and arose. The so-called representatives of the University and of the

student world were probably under the persuasion and instigation of the

Soviet mission and Dr. Wang's entourage.

Certainly, there was a political background to this episode at least

on the part of Mr. Karakhan and Dr. C. T. Wang because I received a telegram
Koo, Wellington

from the leading generals and governors of different provinces under the

Chinese Government in Peking, including General Wu P^i-fu, who was then con­

sidered to be the leader of North China at least from the military point of

view and the chief supporter of President Ts'ao K'un's regime. The

circular telegram was endorsed by Ch'i Hsi-yuan and other Governors of

the lower Yangtze, Szechwan, Honan, and Shantung, etc. The sending of this

telegram was evidently at the instigation of General Wu P'ei-fu, but behind

him was Dr. C. T. Wang. The telegram gave much the same grounds as those

advanced by the representatives headed by Li Ta-chao, namely, that this was

the first agreement which showed that China was able to get recognition as a

nation on an equal footing with a foreign power. The telegram posed the

same question; since this was the best agreement China had ever had, what assu­

rance I had that it could be improved upon? I was rather annoyed but didn't

feel embarrassed at all because I was perfectly certain of the solid grounds

which were unanimously approved by the Cabinet and even the Prime Minister

and W. W. Yen, who originally recommended Dr. C. T. Wang/ but didn't say a

word in defense of Dr. Wang's conduct.

The only course which X could and did follow was to bring the matter

before President Ts'ao K'un. Although he himself was not familiar, as he

openly acknowledged time and again, with diplomacy, foreign policy, and

diplomatic questions, he thoroughly understood the position of the Cabinet

and of the Waichiaopu in regard to this draft agreement and he said th&t he

was one hundred per cent in agreement with the views of the Cabinet and the

Foreign Office. He said that General Wu P'ei-fu, who did not know how the

had been going on, had no right to express his views because
negotiations
Koo, Wellington

he was not familiar with the nature of the case; he said he was angry at Wu

because of Wu^ trying to interfere in the affairs of the Government, which

did not concern him; he said that he was sending his personal representative

that same day to see Wu and tell him to shut up. This representative was

one of Ts^o K'un^ strong supporters and personal followers and was a

friend of General Wu P'ei-fu; he was sent by a special train and came back within

two days. The President then told me that General Wu P'ei-fu understood the

situation and promised not to say a word about the matter from that time on.

It was evident that the idea of sending telegrams to criticize the

Waichiaopu and of upholding the agreement and so forth was all done at

the instigation of the Soviet mission, Dr. Wang^ commission, and the

Kuomintang servants in Peking. Their course must have been dictated by

a far greater consideration, the political purpose of overthrowing the

government at Peking and seizing political power themselves. On the other

hand, the Waichiaopu and in this case, the Cabinet, looked at the question

entirely from the point of view of China’s prestige, without any political

consideration involved in it. The question of mixing politics in foreign

relations had been a curse to China for many decades, more particularly

since the inauguration of the Republic.

Mr. Karakhan1s attempt at first to intimidate the Waichiaopu by

addressing a strong protest with a demand for an answer within 48 hours

was not successful. I was not impressed by his protest because I felt
Koo, Wellington \i

that not only were the points agreed upon by Dr. Wang of great significance

to China but also the ground on which Mr. Karakhan based his protest was

not well-founded. He evidently misread Dr. Wang's credentials, for Dr.

Wang did not have he power to sign the agreement, as Mr. Karakhan claimed.

The impasse remained and as I remained firm Mr. Karakhan for the first few

days devoted himself to bringing about pressure from the Chinese public and

to propaganda and publicity, and apparently Mr. C,.T. Wang and his

supporters were working together with Mr. Karakhan to this end. But I was

not disturbed by the apparently deliberate propaganda and publicity carried on

in the Chinese press, and so Karakhan changed his strategy to one of

conciliation and negotiation.

Koo, Wellington

Negotiations with Soviet Russia; The Bomb Incident and the Settlement of
May 31, 1924

But the revised agreement was not to be signed without one very

unexpected incident which showed the extent to which those who upheld

the Karakhan-Wang agreement resorted to influence my view and bring

pressure upon me to change my stand. That was the incident of a bomb

explosion in my house.before the secret negotiations were started. Possibly

Mr. Karakhan felt to obliged to suggest negotiations, cince the bomb inci­

dent passed without inducing any change in my attitude. Thus the incident

itself was c£ no great significance from my point of view, but it is worth­

while to relate it as I experienced it.

About a week or ten days after the Karakhan-Wang agreement was signed,

I had to attend a lunch party given by Mr. Sun Pao-ch'i, the Premier, at

his official residence. When I came back, as was my habit I hastened to

my study in my house to see whether there were any important telegrams or

dispatches to sign: it was the practice of the Foreign Office to send

important telegrams, either incoming or outgoing, and other urgent

communications to my house whenever I was not at the Foreign Ministry. Upon

entering my study with my eyes directed towards my desk, my attention

was drawn to a very strange looking article on my desk. It looked to me more

like a piece of raw iron rod, about three inches in diameter and a few

inches in height. On the outside it was cylindrical, and a slip of red

paper on the object stated "Respectfully presented to the Chinese Foreign

Minister". @n the left hand side it said that the donor was the Archaeolo­

gical Institute of Nanyang, Honan, and just to the right of my name, the
Koo, Wellington
(Vs
object was described as an ancient seal cast in white gold of the ChHng

dynasty. I lefted the object very carefully with two hands and the

heavy weight of it impressed me a-e something of an extraordinary character.

I had never seen a bomb, nor did I take it as a bomb, but I felt that this

miB t be some very ugly thing. There was a little glass tube on the top

of it. I immediately sent for my chief butler Mr. Ts’ui. When he

appeared I told him to take this away carefully and throw it into the little

artificial lake in ray garden at the Iron Lion. Street (T'ieh-shih-tzu

Hu-t’ung), and I warned him that it might be dangerous so that he should

carry it carefully and throw it into the water gently. He went away with

the object and in a few seconds there was a terrific explosion. I felt

at once that it must have come from that object so I rushed out to the place

and I was stopped by the major domo. He had heard the noise and said

something must have exploded at the main gate. I said no^ it must have

been in the direction of the lake. When I approached the main Chinese

building and entered into the foreign style part of the house, the place

was filled with fumes, and there were two men. One was lying flat on the

floor, one in the pantry and another one just in the room next to it. There

was a hole in the room and a hole in the table and my cook,who had been out­

side the pantry peeling potatoes in the garden near the porch, was

yelling that he was bleeding. I thought one of the two men on the floor

must be dead. My major domo said he would at once telephone to the main

police station. I stopped him. I said, "Telephone at once to the

Peking Union Medical College for an ambulance and for some doctors to

come. After that telephone to the police." Within a few minutes both
Koo, Wellington i

the doctor and the ambulance and police chief accompanied by another

policeman arrived. The two men on the floor were taken away. One of them had

both his hands blown off and was bleeding on the floor. The other one was

unconscious. The cook on the terrace was injured by broken glass on his

face and hands.

While the police were looking around I asked one of the maidservants

what had happened. She said that when Ts^i, the butler, came with this ob­

ject in his hands, he yelled to everybody to come and see this precious

object. He said it was written on the outside "White gold", that the

master had asked him to throw it away carefully but he said why should it

be thrown away because it must be worth a great deal. He wanted to know if

there was a seal inside of the Ch!ing dynasty. So putting the bomb on a

wooden table on the porch, he tried to open it with one of the carving

knives. As he opened it, it exploded. I was sorry for these servants

who were injured, and I felt that the one who was told to drop it carefully

into the lake did not follow my advice. He was one of the two men lying

flat on the floor. The other one who had lost his hands was the one who

was holding the bomb as the chief butler was trying to open it with a

knife.

When I had first seen the ugly object - the bomb - on my desk I had asked

the doormen - there were doormen for many high officials in Peking - how

it had arrived and how it had appeared on my desk. One doorman said that the

bomb was brought to my house in a package the evening before, after dark.
Koo, Wellington 14&

Two young men had brought it w&o said that it was a piece of antiquity

of great value and something the Minister would like to have; when the

doorman asked them for their address they declined to tell him and rushed

away. He, therefore, brought this package to one of my secretaries named

Mr. N. C. Young, who was staying in my house. Mr. Young then opened the

package and told the doorman to leave the ugly thing on my desk because I

would want to know who it was who gave this present to me. That was how it

had arrived on my desk. It was a very crude thing and a time bomb. The

police chief very heartily congratulated me because the thing would have

exploded in twenty minutes. It was put there shortly before I returned;

if I had remained at the desk the thing would have got me.

The police chief considered this incident as an outrage which

naturally reflected on his reputation as an able police chief, responsible

for the maintenance of peace and order in the capital and for the safety

of the members of the Government. Orders were given to carry out an

investigation. He reported to me almost daily on the progress of the in­

vestigation. After about ten days he came and made a personal report to me

and said he had a clue. Two students suspected of having something to do

with the bomb incident were questioned, and from them it was learned that this

bomb was made locally in a glass smith’s shop outside Hatamen. The two

students were from Peking University. They had admitted,without directly

affirming that they had something to do with it, that they did the ordering

and supervising at the instigation of some people higher up, and they did

not want to reveal whom. The police chief said he was convinced that this
Koo, Wellington

incident had been engineered by some Chinese politicians and suspected

one of my political rivals chiefly concerned in the negotiations with

the encouragement of Mr. Karakhan. He wanted to take steps to clear

up the whole case by accusing Dr. C. T. Wang and Mr. Karakhan. I told

him to give up that idea. But, he said, it might or might not be absolutely

true. It was all circumstantial, but the two young students1 words probably

had some truth in them. I said any steps taken to enlarge and expand

the significance of this incident would not help the situation at all, and

furthermore the incident should not be allowed to prejudice the negotiations

for a final settlement of the deadlock. He tried to argue with me that he

was responsible, that it was a dastardly act, that two men were very seriously

injured, and that thesafety of a cabinet minister was at stake, but I

persuaded him to keep all the details in the record but that it would be

better to release the two students. Apparently they were the instruments and

it was not their intention to do it. They did something which they said

they had been told to do.

With a great deal of reluctance the police chief finally accepted my

view, but he insisted that he should continue to post four guards to

protect me wherever I went. Four police guards, each armed with a carbine

was not very edifying or necessary. They used to stand on each side of

the car, andattracted a great deal of attention. So after a week I

telephoned the police chief to recall two of them. After about two

weeks I insisted upon his recalling the other two. One of them, who, I

was told, was an excellent marksman, asked to stay and enter in my employ.

I took him in and he remained with me until two years ago. He stayed with
 J I
Koo, Wellington \A

me from 1924 till 1960, thirty six years, and now with his savings has

become one of the shareholders of the new Peking Restaurant in Washington.

It is very hard to say who was responsible for planting the bomb.

I have nothing definite to prove that it was Dr. C. T. Wang, though he

was highly suspected by the police chief. Personally I am inclined to think

Dr. C. T. Wang was not involved in the incident himself; it was possible that

some of his political supporters, including members of the Karakhan mission,

who had a more far-reaching objective and policy in China than the mere

conclusion of an agreement relating to the Sino-Soviet relations, might have

had a hand in the incident. The two students involved in the incident

were, as I mentioned before, from Peking University. They were young men;

I don1t remember their names although they were reported to me. I felt

convinced that these two men, as they said, were told to order the bomb

and it was not their intention to do it. Of course at that time some

of the Communist agents were working among the student body in Peking.

The incident at once left me with a feeling that it had something

to do with the Sino-Soviet negotiations, that it had to do with the stand

which I took, especially in view of the campaign of attacks directed against

me on the part of the "intellectual" world and the press aggravated by the

telegrams pouring in from the provinces criticising the Waichiaopu's refusal

to recognize what they considered to be a properly signed document. The

incident however did not lead me to revise my attitude and I think it was
Koo3 Wellington
b

shortly after that that Karkhan sent his secretary to the Waichiaopu to

inquire about my safety and health.

Mr. Karakhan had heard that I was confined to bed with a high

temperature; though his secretary1s mission was to convey his inquiries about

my health and his best wishes, at the same time the secretary said he

thought that Mr. Karakhan and I myself should try to get together and talk

things over: although this suggestion was made without Mr. Karakhan^

knowledge he, the secretary, felt that Mr. Karakhan would be disposed to

talk over the situation. As I was really confined to my bed with a high

temperature, I said X would be glad to see him if he would come

to my house, which was really what Mr. Karakhan through his secretary had

suggested as an alternative. Mr. Karakhan came to my house and appeared to

try to be reasonable and wanted to know what were the real objections I had tot

this agreement; while asserting that he could not agree to any extensive al­

terations, he was ready to hear what I had to say. I remember that not

wishing to engage in negotiations at my bedside, I told him there were

serious points which required revision and that those could not be

discussed briefly for they required very full discussion. He went

away without indicating what he would do but I had the impression that he

was anxious to solve the deadlock which had arisen. Through his secretary

again he wanted to know the viewpoint of the Foreign Office in writing, and

without committing himself to any revision, he said he would be glad to

know the objections the Chinese Government had and any proposal which it would

make. This was done. Then, feeling personally restrained from asking

for an appointment at the Waichiaopu, he sent his secretary and a series

 Koo, Wellington i li

of informal negotiations began between his secretary and one of my

secretaries assisted by the personnel of the Department of Political

Affairs in the Ministry. Drafts of the revised texts of the objectionable

articles in the agreement were exchanged between the foreign Office and

the Soviet mission. The principal sentence concerned, as I stated before, thre<

points. Two related to the question of Outer Mongolia, namely, the safeguard

of Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia and the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from that territory. The third one was in connection with the church

property, buildings and landed estate of the Russian Catholic Churches in

China.

The question of the administration of the Russian portion of the

Boxer Indemnity - the main objection of the Minister of Finance, Wang K'o«

min - was not one of the points of discussion, because it was to be disposed

of by a commission composed of Chinese and Soviet representatives. The

Chinese were to have the majority of the membership, but all the decisions

were only to be taken by unanimous vote. The chairman of the Commission

was to be one of the Chinese representatives. I did not consider that the

arrangement was too .objectionable because China^ representation constituted

the majority so that, as far as China^ prestige was concerned, that was not

an unfavorable situation. If I remember correctly, there was one point

I did not agree; that was the provision of unanimity for any decision of

the Commission. The Commission was practically at the dictation of the

Soviet representatives as regards to the allocation of the funds for

educational and philanthropic purposes. But no decision could be taken

without concurrence of the Chinese members.

Koo, Wellington

The other three points were really of great importance. Mr. Karakhan

finally yielded on all these three points and agreed to the proposed

revision. The revised points were made

of notes. This was a formula proposed by Mr. Karakhan evidently to save the

Soviet representatives face: the draft agreement remained the same as

signed but was modified by the exchange of notes. It was expressly stated

that the notes exchanged formed a part of the draft agreement and had the

same sort of validity as the agreement itself. Thus final agreement

was reached on the three points upon which I had insisted from the very

beginning. It remained only to set a date - May 31, 1924 ~ for Mr.

Karakhan to call at the Foreign Ministry to sign the revised agreement.

One interesting feature in connection with the indirect negotiations was

that they had been conducted secretly. That was practically a condition which

Mr. Karakhan imposed for the negotiations of the revised points. As I

understood it he particularly wanted to keep the negotiations confidential

in view of the position he assumed immediately after he and Dr. Wang signed

the agreement, and I raised no objection. Moreover the matter had aroused

so much public attention that it had become a political issue in the country.

The signing of the exchange of notes took place at the Waichiaopu

an May 31, 1924, and the news was released immediately afterwards. The

news turned out to be a pleasant surprise for the press and the public because

they appreciated the fact that the efforts which the Waichiaopu had been making

succeeded in the end in gaining the main points which the government

considered to be of great significance. Mr. Karakhan shook hands with me

Koo, Wellington

on the signing evidently satisfied with the result, and friendly relations

were assured between us personally and diplomatic relations were thus formally

inaugurated.

Normal relations were now established between China and Soviet

Russia. Mr. Li Chia~ao was appointed Charge d’Affaires in Moscow. Although

Mr. Karakhan had been named ambassador to China, the Chinese Government

did not wish to appoint a full ambassador to Moscow because the agreement

which had been reached and signed was one on general principles to guide

negotiations which would ultimately lead to the settlement of many out­

standing questions. So confused was the situation in North China that,

though the agreement was concluded in Peking between the Chinese

Government and the Soviet Government, the authorities in Manchuria, while

nominally pledging their allegiance to the government, were in fact acting

independently as if Manchuria was not a part of the Chinese Republic.

The question of the Chinese Eastern Railway was considered by both the

Soviet Government and the Manchurian authorities as of great importance.

Mr. Joffe at first and later Mr. Karakhan in the capacity of the official

representative of the Soviet Government each tried to reach some kind of

solution with Marshal Chang Tso-lin with a view of regaining control of

this great and important railway in Manchuria, which borders on Soviet

territory. Moscow was anxious to make an arrangement not only for the

purpose of regaining control over this important line of communication

but also - and probably more especially - for the purpose of preventing

the management headed by Ostroumov from utilizing the activities of the

White Russians against the Soviet Government. The efforts of the Soviet
Koo, Wellington
} )

representatives to secure Marshal Chang Tso-lin1s recognition of the Peking

agreement failed, and a separate, independent agreement was made on

September 20, 1924 with Marshal Chang Tso-lin at Mukden. This question

was not settled in Peking as Mr. Karakhan, perhaps seeing that the

authority of the Chinese Government over Manchuria was only nominal, did

not wish to enter into any agreement which might not be acceptable to the

Manchurian authorities.

I mention this only to indicate how confused and complicated the whole

political situation in China was at the time. Looking back from today,

I see this period in Peking was a very turbulent and disturbed one in

China1s political history. Apart from the complexities of internal

politics and foreign intrigues, here was the introduction of a new factor

- the presence of a Soviet mission trying to carry out a major policy

from Moscow. All this created an exceptionally confused picture in

Peking and in North China in general.

Koo, Wellington

G7. The Rendition of Weihaiwei Discussed

The rendition of Weihaiwei first became a concrete possibility at

the Washington Conference when Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour of

the British Delegation made a declaration at one of the closing

sessions of the Conference, promising to return the leased territory

of Weihaiwei to China. Mr. BalfourJs only condition was that the

rendition would be effected in an orderly manner by an agreement as

to the manner and details of rendition between representatives to be

appointed by the two governments. At the meetings of the Far

Eastern Committee, which was established to consider questions

relating to China, the Chinese delegation had presented, as one of

her desiderata, a claim for the restoration of all leased territories

back to China, such as Dairen or Port Arthur, which Japan had taken

over from Russia, Wei-hai-wei, and Kwang-chou-wan, which was leased

to France. China had argued that these territories were infringe­

ments on Chinese territorial integrity, and were also centers of

spheres of influence claimed by different powers in China. However

the discussion that actually took place on the committee did not give

at the time much prospect for early realization of China1s hopes for

retrocession. So the voluntary declaration on the part of Great

Britain to return the leased territory of Wei-hai-wei to China

was certainly welcome.

Why did Great Britain take the initiative to return Wei-hai-wei?

Koo3 Wellington

On July 1898 it had been secured on lease of 25 years. The purpose

of the British demand was to counterbalance the leased territories

of Port Arthur and Dairen which lie on opposite sides of the Gulf of

Chihli. In that period there was great rivalry between Great

Britain and Russia to extend their interests and their spheres of

influence in China. Following the Sino-Japanese War in 1894 to 1895,

the attempt of China to work for recovery of the Liaotung Peninsula,

Marquis Li Hung-chang was sent to Russia to conclude a secret treaty

of alliance, a so-called "casus treaty". Under the guise or pretext

of being an ally to China, Imperial Russia sought and obtained a

special position in north China, particularly in Manchuria, including

the right tc build the Chinese Eastern Railway from the borders of

Russia down to the Gulf of Pei-chih-li, with special rights to

establish the "railway police" in the "railway zone". Within the

territory on each side of the railway was the lease of Dairen and

Port Arthur. The situation in China was so precarious that at the

time there was a great deal of talk in European capitals of the im­

pending dismemberment of China. I remember there was Lord Beresford1

book which had for its title "The Breakup of China." It was then

that Great Britain, to counterbalance and counteract the rapid

penetration of Russia in Manchuria and North China, considered it

necessary to seek the lease of Wei-hai-wei from China. My memory

seems to tell me that the lease of Wei-hai-wei was fixed for as long

a term as the lease of Port Arthur and Dairen which was for 25

years. So in early 1922 the 25-year period was approaching its ter­

mination date as agreed upon tn the original lease. That was one
Kooj Wellington

reason that led Great Britain to make a virtue out of necessity.

Another reason was that China’s rejection of the Versailles

Treaty and the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the Versailles

Treaty notwithstanding President Wilson’s insistence^ led to a great

deal of enhanced sympathy and enthusiasm for China's cause in America.

The Washington Conference was looked upon by the American public

as a gathering to do justice to China after she had jbeen disappointed

and, according to many American friends of China, betrayed by President

Wilson with regard to the Shantung problem. The British declaration

was therefore very well timed and it was not only favorably received

by China but also by public opinion in the United States. It was a

typical act of British foresight and wisdom in diplomacy.I * * * 5

I remember it appeared to take the French by surprise because

the French was then in occupation of Kwangchowan. Following the

British declaration at the closing session, Mr. Albert Sarraut,

on behalf of the French delegation, the next day, attempted to redeem

its unfavorable position in comparison with Great Britain by making

a similar declaration pledging the rendition of the Kwangchoywan Bay.

Even at the time, the French delegation did not create nearly as
5
favorable an impression as the British delegation because it was felt

that the French had not only been inspired by the British delegation

but had been more or less forced to make such a move. Although the

nature of the French declaration was similar to that of

Great Britain, 1 and my colleagues, while welcoming the declaration,

Koo, Wellington

Zv
were apprehensive that the French would not prove to be very

willing at heart to effect the rendition, and that French would in

all probability try to delay it as long as possible. Events

proved that apprehension to be well founded. France on one pretext

or another put off the question until the fortunes of the Second

World War so turned against her that China was able to seize it

without any agreement with France.

Great Britain proposed that the negotiations to return Wei­

haiwei should take place in China. The first steps were taken by

Dr. W. W. Yen as Foreign Minister soon after the Washington Conference

ended. But it was not until I succeeded him as Foreign Minister that

concrete steps were taken to start the negotiations. In September

1922 China appointed Mr. M. T. Liang, one of the early returned student

from the U.S., and a former Commissioner of Foreign Affairs in Tient­

sin. He was made commissioner, with two assistant commissioners, two

technical advisers and a secretarial staff. The British Government

appointed a delegation consisting of Mr. Bertram Giles of the

Foreign Office, a representative from the Colonial Office, and another

from the Admiralty. Negotiations were first held in Weihaiwei.

Several points proved to be difficult for agreement. Mr. M. T. Liang

was asked to returned to Peking for consultation, as it was much easier

to enable him to keep in contact with the Waichiaopu for consultation

and instructions. Then the negotiations were transferred to Peking

on the suggestion of Mr, Liang, in accordance with the instructions

of the Waichiaopu. They were resumed there in March 1923 and a

Koo, Wellington

provisional agreement between the two parties was reached and a final

draft was effected. But this draft agreement had always been under­

stood to be in the nature of recommendations to the respective govern­

ments of the negotiators for consideration and approval.

When the draft agreement was examined by the department concerned

in the Foreign Office and by myself personally, it was found that

several modifications were necessary. The chief difficulty arose out

of the question of Liu-kung Island, the island of Wei-hai-wei, which

had been used by the British Navy as a summer resort. That was only

one of its purposes: much more important, it was used as a base for

the provisioning and stationing of the British Naval Fleet in North

China, just as Shanghai served, quite apart from the commercial

and business and political considerations, also as a base for the

British naval squadron along the Yangtze River and the coast. Now

Article 2 provided for the return of Wei-hai-wei to China but also

saw the right of Great Britain to use Liu-kung Tao as a sanatorium

summer resort for the use of the British navy for a period of ten

years with optional renewal by the British Government until

both governments agreed the loan of the island should terminate,

at which time the land and the buildings would be returned to the

Chinese Government. I considered this article to be very important

because, if the rendition was to be achieved completely, Liu-kung

Tao, which lies opposite Wei-hai-wei and controls the Bay, would also

revert to China and be controlled by her navy. As the article was

drafted, the loan to the British navy might - and at all events would
Koo, Wellington

turn out to be a permanent one because its termination would depend

upon the agreement of the British Government. I wanted the loan to be

renewable only if both governments should agree, so that, in other

words, unless there were some special reason, China would be free to

terminate the loan at the end of the ten**year period if she so

wished.

M. T. Liang was greatly impressed, as perhaps all the Chinese

people were, by the voluntary offer made by Great Britain to return

Wei**hai«wei with all its nearby territories; he felt undoubtedly

that the loan of the island to Great Britain as a sanatorium summer

resort for the British navy was of no great consequence. He argued

and discussed with me about the matter, and he saw it as a gesture

of appreciation and gratitude with no grave implications. He

did not perceive its bearing on China*s national policy of recovering

all the lost territories. Although Liu-kung Tao is a very small piece

of territory, its strategic position is very important. As a piece of

Chinese territory, no matter how small it is, it should not be

voluntarily left to be loaned to a foreign Power; this might create

a precedent which would be followed by other countries such as France

/ ‘J i
in regard to Kwang-ch^w-wan or eventually Japan in regard to Port

Arthur and Dairen. This point proved to be a stumbling block.

It was at this stage that the negotiations were taken out of the

hands of the commissioners; on instructions from London, Sir Ronald

Koo, Wellington

Macleay took up the negotiations directly with me. Evidently the

Admiralty in London preferred the original draft, especially since it

had been freely agreed to in the negotiations between the two commis­

sioners. I could not fail to think that the British Admiralty insisted

upon the point for the same reasons that China refused to agree to

it. Finally, after much debate. Sir Ronald Macleay and I agreed

to revise the article. The debate was a friendly one; nevertheless,

both sides saw the significance of the question and stood adamant

for quite a long time.

I took the stand that since Great Britain was sincere in her
i f
intention to return the leased territory of Wei-hai-wei, including

Liu-kung Tao, to China and there was no condition made in the

declaration in Washington, ChinaTs consent to loan the island to

Great Britain for a ten-year period was already an unusual gesture

of good will and friendly manifestation to Great Britain. Sir Ronald

could not accept the formula which X proposed, namely, that the loan

of Liu—kung Tao would be renewable by mutual agreement between the

two governmencs, in other words, the Chinese formula was in nature

just contrary to the British requirements that Britain^ unilateral

request would suffice to renew the loan. I recall that it was finally

agreed at his suggestion, that, if both governments could not agree

on the renewal of the loan of the island at the end of a ten-year

period, the matter should be referred to arbitration. As to what

should be done if the two governments could not agree on the renewal

of the loan, that could be taken up at the end of the ten-year period.
Koo, Wellington 7^

Why should we trouble ourselves now, I said, because no one on either

side could foresee what the situation would be then. With the world

as it was, if everything were favorable, China and Great Britain might

become not only friends but even allies within the ten-year period.

Then, not just Liu-kung Tao but some other portion of territory

might be used with China*s consent by the British Navy. So, I

insisted on leaving that question aside with the understanding that

China had always looked upon Great Britain as a friend and took it

for granted that Great Britain likewise considered China and

the Chinese people to be friends of Great Britain.

The signing of the Draft Agreement was postponed as a result of

the sudden fall of the Government late in 1924. The retrocession of

Weihaiwei was not finally achieved until a second series of conver­

sations had been held between the British minister and the then

Foreign Minister in 1930.

Koo, Wellington

G8. The Settlement of the Wanhsien Incident

The Wanhsien Incident was a case where the British naval authorities

stationed on the Yangtze River took rather high-handed action entirely

unwarranted either by the facts of the case or by the rules of inter­

national law. Briefly the incident on August 29, 1926 consisted of

the following facts. While a British steamer of, I think, the

Butterfield & Swire Company running between Shanghai and Wan-hsien

on the Yangtze River was anchored near Wan-hsien, two sampans

occupied by a group of officers and soldiers of General Yang Sen!s

forces, who were transporting with them a shipment of silver dollars,

I suppose^for the payment of certain soldiers on the Yangtze River,

approached the ship. When the captain of the ship, the name of which

was the Wan-liu, saw the sampans approaching he suddenly ordered

the ship to turn and sail away. Since the ship was in that part of

the Yangtze River where the waters were very turbulent - these waters

were known as the Yangtze rapids - the waves stirred ; up by the ship

suddenly upset the boat; the men fell into the river and lost their

lives, and also the shipment of silver.

This was a straw that broke the camel*s back because previously

several incidents of a similar kind had occurred, levying a high toll

of lives among the soldiers of General Yang Sen, who was the local

military leader. He had demanded redress from the local British

Koo, Wellington

consulate but with no result. So, when this incident occurred General

Yang Sen ordered the detention of two ships of the same company at Wan­

hsien, I suppose as a retaliatory measure and also as a means of putting

pressure upon the British company and upon the British consular

authorities to settle the previous cases as well as this one. The names of

two ships were Wanhsien and Wantung. The Admiral of the British Yangtze

squadron at once took the matter in his own hands; he had one of his patrol

boats started, and he himself went to his gunboat named Cockchafer. He

did so in order to force General Yang Sen to release the detained ships.

According to the Chinese version, the British Admiral ordered the

opening of fire on Wan-hsien. According to the British version, General

Yang Senxs forces fired first. Whoever fired first, as the subsequent

correspondence, especially the note from the Chinese Foreign Office

indicated, was immaterial in the circumstances, because the British

ships went there with their guns mounted apparently with the hostile

intention to force the release of the ships. The gunfire frcm the

British boats caused a great deal of damage and about one thousand

civilians lost their lives in addition to the soldiers who were drowned,

A great deal of property was destroyed by fire in the town of Wanhsien.

This was a wanton action on the part of the British naval authorities and

was contrary to the principles and usage of international law. It was

necessary in the circumstances to lodge a protest. Such cases had occurred

previously, but the way in which they were handled had been rather

ineffective, because, in the first place, the statement of facts was not
Koo, Wellington
2

always very clear and, secondly, those cases had usually been dealt

with not on the basis of the principles and rules of international

law, which should have governed the relations between nations, but in

accordance with the local practice where the gravity of the case in the

light of international law was not fully appreciated. And this kind

of reaction on the Chinese side had been recognized by the foreign

co ramunities as a matter of course.

There, X found it necessary to lodge a protest - a protest which

was carefully prepared and which was based first on a statement of the

actual facts and then on international law which should guide such matters.

I also found it necessary to have the story published so that the outside

world would understand what the case was about, and should know the facts

of this unusual and surprisingly wanton action on the part of foreign

naval authorities stationed in China. The presence of the foreign naval

authorities on the Yangtze River, of course, was sanctioned by treaty,

but that fact itself did not warrant high-handed actions on their

part. Even in time of war, an unfortified city or town should not be

bombarded, according to international law. Dr. Wunsz King (Chin Wen-szu)

included this note of protest in his collection of diplomatic documents

[Wunsz King: Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo*s Foreign Policy] for the very

reason that this note set an example of how such cases should be handled

by China and showed that such cases should not be treated as ordinary

difficulties between Chinese and foreign authorities.

The Wan-hsien Incident took place on September 5, 1926; my note of

protest was dated November 2 the same year. The incident occurred during
koo, Wellington

my predecessor Admiral Tsai TIing-kan,s tenure. Admiral Tsai resigned

when Admiral Tu reorganized his Cabinet in the first part of October.

Admiral Tu himself resigned as Premier in my favor, retaining his naval

portfolio, and I went back to the Foreign Office and became. Soncurrently

Premier and Foreign Minister. It was during my tenure that I had to con­

tinue to deal with this case. As I have just said, I found it necessary

to set the case in its proper light and to bring out the main facts of the

case, its significance, and the responsibility of the British naval authorities

in the matter in accordance with international law. This note of protest

relating to the unlawful bombardment of Wan-hsien by the British warships

was quite a lengthy document - perhaps one of the longest documents in

Chinese diplomatic history up to that time. As I asked the British

minister Sir Ronald Macleay to convey the contents of this note to his

government, it must have taken some time for him to send the reply to me.

Meanwhile negotiations were carried on locally between the British consul

and the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Ichang, and Yang

Sen agreed to release the two captured beats, leaving the question of

compensation for loss of life and property until a full investigation 'had

been made.
Koo, Wellington
1 |D

G9. The Termination of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865

In 1926, the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 had already lasted for sixty

years. According to Article 46 of the treaty, it could be revised at the

expiration of every ten-year period, beginning from the date of the ex­

change of ratifications. The date of ratification was October 27, 1866.

t- V£ y* * *
On April 16 1926 wh«n Dr. W. W. Yen*3 Cabinet had aot been restored the

Foreign Office as a matter of course communicated to the Belgian

minister in Peking, notifying Belgium of the decision of the Chinese

Government to terminate this treaty and to enter into negotiations for a

new treaty on the basis of equality and reciprocity. This had been the

policy of the Chinese Government since the time of the Peace Conference in

Paris when the most important of China’s series of memoranda was the

one which asked for the revision of the unequal treaties. The notification

to Belgium in April called for a reply which came in due course, and which

conveyed the decision of the Belgium Government to concur in the idea

although it pointed out according to Article 46 of the treaty it was only

Belgium which had the right to ask for a revision; reserving the point,

Belgium was disposed to enter into negotiations for a new treaty. However

the point at issue became centered upon the desire of Belgium to have

assurance from the Chinese Government that pending the negotiations to con­

clude a new treaty the then existing old treaty would continue to be in
a
force; whereas on the Chinese side it was considered important tha£ time

should be set for the negotiation of the new treaty. In any case China

took the stand that six months should be engugh for the negotiation and

conclusion of the new treaty. Belgium insisted on an assurance that the

Koo, Wellington
Z"
old treaty should be in force until the new treaty took effect. This went

on without concrete results, and the attitude of the two parties appeared

to be irreconcilable.

When X went back to the Foreign Office it fell to my lot to continue

handling this^case. Insofar as the principle was concerned there was no

doubt that it should be adhered to in fact, since China*8 policy from the

Paris Peace conference on had always been to regard the revision of the

unequal treaties as a national policy. Therefore when I went back to

the Foreign Office in the second part of October I took charge of this ques­

tion personally. In order to break the deadlock I proposed that there

should be a modus vivendi after October 27, 1926 which was the date of the

expiration of the sixth 10-year period. The modus vivendi was to carry

on the essential provisions of the old treaty for the time being but I

insisted on fixing a definite period for the conclusion of the new treaty;

if at the end of the six month period the new treaty was still not completed

the modus vivendi would terminate and China would treat Belgian nationals in

China and conduct her relations with Belgium in general on the basis of

the principles of international law.

This was found to be unacceptable by Belgium and they proposed in

turn that the modus vivendi should continue until a new treaty was completed

Failing this, Belgium, having reserved her position with regard to Article

46, by which Belgium alone had a right to propose the revision of the

treaty, made it clear to China that she would refer the case to the

International Court of Justice for an interpretation of this article on the

grounds that both China and Belgium had accepted the so-called

compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court. In fact Belgium had

initiated proceedings in the International Court at the Hague. China

Koo, Wellington
l\

did not respond to the notification from the Court and Belgium for the

time being did not press the case since negotiations were still going

on in Peking. When the date closed and Belgium repeated her intention to

press the case at the Hague it was clear that this was meant to be a threat

on the part of Belgium. I was however fully convinced that although the

language of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 was clearly unilateral in the

sense that only Belgium could ask for a revision at the end of each 10

year period, despite the clarity of its language it could not stand up to

the then current opinion in the world of international jurists. The

principle of rebus sic stantibus in international law had been receiving

attention, and gathering support amongst the international jurists espe­

cially since the Paris Peace Conference. In fact one of the main reasons

for which China presented her memoranda for the revision of the unequal

treaties was that conditions prevailing at the time when those treaties were

made had changed, and the changed conditions made those treaties out of

date and called for their revision in accordance with current conditions.

When the Belgian government finally appeared to be insistent that either

the old treaty, or a modus vivendi incorporating the important provisions

of the old treaty, should continue indefinitely until the proposed new

treaty was definitely concluded and put into force, there was no course left

to China except to carry out its intention of terminating the old treaty.

This I was determined to do and so I submitted a petition to Marshal Chang

Tso-lin accompanied by a draft presidential mandate explaining the cause of

the negotiations and reasons for the proposed termination of the old treaty
Koo, Wellington
n ■i7

and also a statement of the rules by which the relations between China

and Belgium and the protection of Belgian nationals in China should be

conducted. Marshal Chang therefore on November 6, 1926 promulgated the

mandate terminating the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865, together with a

set of the proposed regulations. This was a shock to the Belgian Govern­

ment. But it was unavoidable because after nearly half a year,s negotiation

to start negotiations for a new treaty, Belgium remained adamant in her

attitude,which was that the treatment of Belgians should continue to be

based on the old treaty or on the proposed modus vivendi which in

essence still accorded favorable treatment to Belgian nationals in

China. The motive behind this attitude was evident especially after the

Belgian Government proposed that she would be satisfied to terminate the

old regime whenever any of the four countries Great Britain, the

United States, France, and Japan, had agreed to terminate its current

treaties with China with regard to consular jurisdiction and extra-gerri-

toriality. The basic point at issue was that Belgium wanted to continue

the regime of extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction, and had not

evidenced any earnest and sincere intention to complete the negotiations

for a new treaty within a six month period before the termination date of

the ten-year period of the old treaty.

The official abrogration of the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 was a landmark

in Chinese diplomatic history because it was the first time that an unequal

treaty was declared completely abrogated by China in the face of the open

and official opposition of the other party in the treaty. It was necessary

to do so not only because China had a good case in international law on

the principle of rebus sic stantibus but it was also necessary to set
Koo, Wellington
iff

a precedent to prove China^ determination to act in order to begin to bring

an end to the regime of unequal treaties from which China had suffered

for a century. The political situation - so far as the Chinese Government

in Peking was concerned - began to deteriorate rapidly. Belgium found

herself in a helpless condition and did not appear to have decided as to

what she should do. In fact she could do nothing by way of retaliation.

There was also no special reason for her to do so because along with the

presidential mandate terminating the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 another

mandate was issued ordering the provincial authorities to take measures

for the protection of the life and property of Belgian nationals in China,

and that so far as Belgium trade was concerned, it was to be treated on the

basis of the most favored nation clause.

After the act of abrogation the question was left in abeyance by

Belgium and when the Northern Military Expedition launched by the Kuomintang

was brought to a successful conclusion in 1928 the Belgian minister approached

the Chinese Government in Nanking after Marshal Chang Tso-lin passed

inconspicuously, evaporated. The agreement reached between the Chinese Foreign

Office and the Belgian Legation was somewhat surprising because it accepted

what the Chinese Government in Peking had steadily refused namely that

a modus vivendi was agreed to in which one of the clauses provided that the

consular jurisdiction and extra-territorial protection which had been

enjoyed by Belgian nationals for the past 60 years x^ould be continued

until over one half of the treaty powers which had been enjoying the same

had agreed to relinquish it. This left Belgium in a particularly simple

condition as regards the special regime of extra-territoriality because

she did not have to assume any responsibility for pressing for these

special privileges and left this thorny problem to the other powers.

This course of action impressed me as being quite contrary to the

?-
policy of Peking this sense. I had been anxious to breakthe vicious

circle by an initiative which would set an example to the other powers that

China was determined to terminate as early as possible the unequal

treaties, whereas the course of policy and action adopted in Nanking seemed

to temporize with the situation by putting the matter off until half

the foreign powers had agreed to it. This difference in the attitude and

policy of the Chinese government in Peking and the Chinese government in

Nanking on this question is not easy to understand in that the policy of

doing away with unequal treaties as early as possible was a policy based

upon the nation-wide public sentiment in China. As it has been made clear,

Belgium still held on to Art. 46 of the old treaty by which she claimed to

be solely entitled to ask for revision of the treaty, and this was clearly

one of the conspicuous provisions of inequality between the signatory

powers. The official statement of the Chinese Government in Peking in

1926 had concluded with the following words:

...to insist upon its interpretation of the aforesaid article on

the one hand, (Art.46 of the treaty), and on the other hand to

undertake the conclusion of the treaty of equality and neu­

trality, would:.to say the least seem irreconcilable from the

point of view of consistency. In these circumstances China

feels constrained to declare the treaty of November 2, 1865

as terminated. She is confident that an impartial review

of her action which takes into account of the feelings of

 Koo, Wellington

an entire nation resolutely aspiring to a place to which

she is justly entitled would not justly attribute to China

the responsibility of this momentous decision.

Yet the Foreign Office in Nanking agreed to prolong the substance of

the principle provisions in the old treaty namely, that which concerned

extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction.

At the time when the treaty of November 22, 1928 was published,

the public was surprised but did not understand why until the Legislative

Yuan in Nanking took up the matter and asked for the presence of the

Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T, Wang, to explain. He was not able to give

any satisfactory answer and Mr. Hu Han-min, President of the Legislative

Yuan, personally reprimanded him for ignorance and carelessness. Mr.

Hu Han-min evidently had been following the matter of negotiations in

Peking and did not expect that the Foreign Office in Nanking would yield

to the Belgian demand. From Dr. Wang*s reply, he seemed to have felt that

it was a victory for China. I-suf^pose that on the face of it the

I 'X/r'i 'f t d
Belgian- agreetnent to terminate the treaty and accept a temporary provi­

sional agreement, a modus vivendi, until the other powers who still were

enjoying the privileges c£ the unequal treaties had agreed to relinquish them.

He must have considered that as a sufficiently satisfactory result.

The agreement clearly showed that Belgium wanted in every sense to

retain her special privileges in China. By insisting on such a clause,

F- *
Belgium passed the burden to other nations. When Belgium proposed that she

would likewise give the special privileges up when any of the four Powers
Koo, Wellington

had given them up it was following a vicious circle; if every nation

adopted the same attitude, China could never escape this vicious circle.

I suppose that, in agreeing to this Belgian formula, the Foreign Office did

not fully understand the significance of it, nor had the Foreign Office

followed closely or studied the course of negotiation in Peking. But Mr.

Hu Han-min had done so. In reprimanding Dr. C. T. Wang, Hu Han-min

r— - ^ k. e
brought out that what the Foreign Office wr Baking had done, in effect,

was to continue the special regime of extraterritoriality.

After the proceedings of the Legislative Yuan were made public

the Chinese press and public opinion were very critical of the action

taken by the Foreign Office in Nanking. But what the Foreign Office

did was an accomplished fact, and nothing else could be done to remedy

it so far as Belgium was concerned. This agreement left Belgium practically

in the same position after the abrogation of the Belgian treaty as before.

Though the recovery of the customs and tariff autonomy was formerly agreed

to by the Washington Powers, including Belgium, and promulgated on January

1, 1929, the question of the termination of the extraterritorial regime in

China suffered a delay in achievement. It was not until China had

< V!
joined the Allied in 1941 in World II that the question again was discussed

on the initiative of Great Britain and the United States. The treaty with

the United States was signed in Washington in January 1943, and the treaty with

Great Britain in Chungking on the same day, thereby terminating the principal

provision of inequality in the old unequal treaties and re-establishing

China’s full autonomy in regard to her jurisdiction over foreign nationals

on Chinese territory
Boxer Indemnity Refund; China Foundation

During my tenure of the foreign portfolio was established

The Board of Trustees for the Promotion of Chinese Culture and Education.

The setting up of the Board marked the beginning of close cooperation

between China and the United States for the advanced education of Chinese

students in the United States. Originally in 1908 Mr. T'ang Shao-i

as special envoy of the Chinese government succeeded in concluding an

agreement with the United States Government for the remission of a

portion of the Boxer Indemnity allocated to the United States. The total

amount then remitted was $12,000,000. The exact figure is $11,951,121.76.

The agreement was signed on Decemeba: 28, 1908. It was this money which

enabled the Chinese Government to establish Tsinghua College for the

preparation of students to be sent to the United States for advanced

education. As a result of this friendly and generous gesture on the part

of the United States, scores of Chinese students, having completed

their preparatory work at Tsinghua were sent to the United States and

educated in various universities and colleges, supported entirely from

funds thus made available and supervised by a Chinese director who

established his office in Washington and attended to the disbursement of

their monthly allowance. In 1924 Congress passed an act authorizing the

remission of the balance of the United States portion of the Boxer Indemnity

left after paying all the claims which had been presented to the United

States for satisfaction. The amount remitted in 1924 was $6,137,552.90.

The agreement concluded between China and the United States relating to

this portion of the remitted sum provided for a joint board of trustees

of whom ten were to be Chinese and five were to be Americans. The United

States Government appointed Professor Monroe of Columbia University to

proceed to Peking for the purpose of working out and concluding a definite

agreement with the Chinese Government.

Since I was at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs it fell to my

lot to discuss the matter with the assistance of Dr. P. W. Kuo, who was

then President of Southestern University. A draft agreement was worked

out and I presented to the Cabinet for consideration and approval. It was

unanimously passed by the Cabinet, and as usual in such matters it was

passed on to the President who issued the necessary mandate for promulgating

the agreement, which provided for the constitution of a board of trustees.

The members of the Board were duly appointed by the two governments. I

think the American members were proposed by the American legation, I

suppose on the instructions of the United States government. Among the

Chinese members of the Board of Trustees were Dr. Hu Shih, Dr. Kuo, Dr.

Y. C. Chou, former President of Tsinghua, and Mr. Fan Yuan-lien. I

don’t remember whether Mr. Chiang Monlin was also one of them. The

board functioned well. Its principal task was not simply the allocation

of the funds for Chinese educational and cultural purposes but it had to

see to it that the funds received periodically from the American government

were safely invested. I remember after I left the Foreign Office, I

served on the Board and sat on the Finance Committee of which the

American member was Mr. Bennett, manager of the International Bank in

Peking.

Before 1928 the Board of Trustees used to meet in Peking. The

Board functioned regularly, without a hitch, until after the success of

the Northern Expedition, and the National Government in Nanking became

the sole Chinese government in the country. A difficult question arose

and it was one which was pressed by the new Ministry of Education

and the Ministry of Finance. It was urged that the large amount of funds

in the care of the Board of Trustees should not be exclusively invested in

United States securities, that is in American bonds and stocks listed on

the New York stock market, but that it should partially be invested in

Chinese government bonds and other Chinese securities, which it would

be unfair to exclude. Another question which caused a great deal of

discussion and difficulty was that whereas the Board of Trustees in

accordance with the agreement concluded between the Chinese,and the

U.S. Government was in fact a fiduciary body, self-perpetuating, and

free from governmental control either in China or in the U.S.j the

National Government in Nanking took the position that since this body

was handling public funds, it should come under the control and super­

vision of the Ministry of Education. There was also criticism of the

fact that the Chinese composition of the Board was made up largely of

Chinese statesmen or educators of the North, of the old government in

Peking. As a compromise measure, a portion of the membership was revised

and educators of the Kuomintang were admitted. But the desire of the

Ministry of Education to have a controlling voice in the Board was found

to be objectionable, as being not in conformity with the letter and

spirit of the agreement.

In due course the Board was reorganized, and it moved its

seat to the United States after the loss of the mainland. It was then

named the China Foundation, the present body, with its work remaining
much the same but with its resources greatly curtailed: all the funds

which had been invested in Chinese government securities or in securities

of the companies in China such as the Shanghai Power and China Real

Estate, securities which were all in Chinese currency, became worthless

practically overnight, because of the rapid depreciation of the fa-pi,

the national Chinese currency. The annual meeting of the Board usually

were held in the Chinese Embassy in Washington, attended by the members

the
of the Board and also by myself as representative of/Chinese Foreign

Minister and by a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Education. I

was elected a member of the Board after I retired from the diplomatic

service, about 1956, and today I am still a member of the Board, serving

my second term of five years.

Today the China Foundation is entrusted not only with the funds

left over by the Board of Trustees, funds which had greatly diminished

in value because of the losses arising from investment in Chinese

government and private securities. It also has other funds under its

charge such as the Tsinghua College Capital Fund, and also the Fan

Yuan-lien Foundation Fund. One of the regrettable things is that while

the original idea of investing part of the funds in Chinese public and

private securities was a proper idea, though much against the views of

the board of Trustees as it was then constituted, the outcome of these

Chinese investments has been very unsuccessful and disappointing. It

was unforeseeable at the time.

 In the case of the remaining portions of the Boxer Indemnity, the

American precedent was followed by Great Britain, France, Holland,

Belgium, and Japan, but the arrangements were different in each case. In

the case of the Japanese remission, the whole administration was put in

the hands of the Japanese Foreign Office although the money was to be

spent on educational and cultural purposes in China in much the same way

as the United States portion of the indemnity remitted to China. The

Minister of Education tried to control the remitted funds, particularly

the Tsinghua Fund, on the grounds that originally the budget of Tsinghua

College could be carried out only after approval by the Minister of Educa­

tion, and that the President of Tsinghua College was appointed by the

Ministry of Education. That was one of the headaches of Dr. Mei, who

was a member of the China Foundation while remaining concurrently

president of Tsinghua College even after the loss of the Mainland. It

also presented a very difficult problem for Dr. Hu Shih as Director of

the China Foundation. Finally a compromise solution was found and approved

by the China Foundation: a substantial portion of the income deriving from

the Tsinghua fund in the custody of the China Foundation would be turned

over to the Ministry of Education in Taiwan, and also a large number of

scholarships and fellowships for Taiwan University, for the Teachers’

College, and I think for the College of Agriculture and Forestry would

be approved by the China Foundation each year as the Director presented

recommendations. This compromise is still in force now.

On one ground was criticism not only from the Ministry of Education
in Taiwan but also from educational circles in Taiwan and the U. S.

Personally I doubt that the criticism was much justified, although it was

a fact that particularly fellowships and scholarships for research were

allocated to a number of Chinese scholars, who were mostly in this country

and who were personally known, either to Dr. Mei, Dr. Hu Shih or Dr.

T. F. Tsiang, but the award of these fellowships and scholarships was

carefully made and the qualifications were rather stiff; and the fact

that the recipients came from a limited circle was probably due to the

fact that they were personally known to the Director or to the other

educators on the Board. There was a great deal of disappointment and

misunderstanding resulting from the policy of the China Foundation.

The situation faced by the China Foundation was difficult after the loss

of the mainland, because so many of the professors of Tsinghua University

and also some of the scientists who had come to the United States for

refuge found themselves in great difficulties. In order to help them , I

think there was some preference shown toward them. This was a natural

sentiment because men like Dr. Mei, Dr. Hu Shih, and Dr. T. F. Tsiang

knew them personally; their sympathy was all the keener because they knew

that these people, who were in financial difficulties, were qualified and

excellent scholars in their specialized fields. Therefore, they made

the awards mainly in favor of this class of people without any conscious

policy of restriction or discrimination. It was just as natural for those

who remained outside the circle to feel that they had not received equal

treatment. This was the special situation which gave rise to criticism.

When the criticism became loud and pressure grew from the Ministry of
 T
,/•

Education in Taiwan, the members of the China Foundation

took consideration of them, and it has tried in recent years to

enlarge the sphere of allocation so as to take in not only students

from educational institutions in Taiwan, but also worthy

applicants outside the limited circles known to the members

of the Foundation.
Koo, Wellington

Raid on the Russian Embassy, April 1927

[Rewritten and subject to Dr. Koo's checking -- JDS]

On April 6, 1927, when I was Premier and Foreign Minister, Chinese

military police invaded the Russian Embassy and confiscated a large

number of secret papers. The order for the raid came from Marshal

Chang Tso-lin, and was carried out by the An-kuo-chun police under

the direction of the Foreign Affairs Department at Marshal Chang’s

headquarters.

I recall that it created quite a sensation at the time, but neither

the Foreign Office nor the Kuo-wu-yuan was informed about the plans

before they were carried out.

After the raid had taken place I was informed only indirectly. I

considered it a most unusual move, the Russian Embassy being, after

all, part of the diplomatic corps. I tried to find out how it all came

about, and learned that the order had been given to the garrison commander

and through him to the police chief and the chief of the military police.

These three concerted their action and raided the embassy. I felt quite

upset when I learned of the news, and I took up the matter with the

headquarters of Marshal Chang and with the chief of the military police

which carried out the raid. I recall that they explained to me that

they had not informed the Foreign Ministry because they felt certain

that we would have objected to it, and that it would have embarassed

the Foreign Ministry.

Indeed, I would have and did object to the raid, and in my note to

the Russian Embassy I made clear that the Foreign Ministry had had no
previous knowledge of it. In fact, during this whole period I strove

to maintain a semblance of orderly government, with respect for law

and established procedures, but the behavior of the warlords made this

difficult.

(It was at the same time that Li Ta-chao [?] , who was inside the

Russian Embassy, was arrested without the knowledge of the government.

Later, he was sentenced to death. Also,the editor of the Peking

was
Daily News, Shao arrested [?] and executed.)

There are several erroneous reports concerning the raid which I should

like to rectify. The first concerns Col. Wu Chin, who, as director of

the Foreign Affairs Department of the An-kuo-chun, was instrumental

in carrying out the raid, and who apparently consulted with William J.

Oudendyk, Dutch Ambassador and doyen of the diplomatic corps, prior to

the execution of the raid. It has been said that Wu was Vice Minister

of Foreign Affairs at this time. The fact is that Wu was not in the

Foreign Ministry nor was he in any way connected with the Foreign

Ministry. My Vice Minister was Wang Ying-t'ai, who succeeded me in

June as Minister of Foreign Affairs. At that time Wu Chin became

Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Wu Chin was never my ^ice Minister.

It has also been reported that the Russian Foreign Minister made

a long distance call to me the morning after the raid. This could not

be true. ( Often what appeared in the press came from Russian rather than

from Chinese sources. The Russians were experts in publicity and propaganda.)

Finally, there has been speculation that the raid prompted my resignation

as Premier and Foreign Minister in June. However, the reason I resigned

was because Marshal Chang overturned the Constitution and established a

sort of revolutionary government.

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Koo, Wellington n1

fi L
Some Reflections on the Failure of Democratic Government in China from
1912 to 1928

There were several reasons for the failure. Personally I

think in the first place there was no deeprooted tradition in China for

representative government. Although in early history it had been clearly

stated in our classical books that "Heaven speaks as the people speaks,"

this explicit statement of the fundamental principle of government simply

remained as a sort of theoretical precept for government. In the

legendary period of our history, government was said to have been run on more

democratic lines, in the sense that the position of the chief of state was

not hereditary like Emperor Yao, Emperor Shun and Emperor Yu. Each of

the earliest rulers, on reaching an age when he felt he should retire,

chose someone to take his place and himself abdicated. But after Yu,

as we all know, beginning with Emperor Txang, the throne became heredi­

tary and the Chinese governmental system from that time on has become a

unitary state with the chief of state at the head of the nation with unlimited

powers. The emperor ruled at the head of^the state and as such he was

superior to all other people in the empire although from time to time there

was a system of the censorate where the ministers of the censorate had the

recognized bright of memorializing directly to the emperor, not only

impeach higher officials of the realm but even to criticize the conduct

of the emperor himself. That was really an exceptional feature. Whether

the advice rendered or the criticism levelled at the throne would be favorably

received depended upon the personality of the emperor himself. Some

enlightened ones saw the point and would revise the imperial policy
Kooa Wellington

accordingly but some of the more strongminded and less enlightened emperors
f'
would often take this as an offense and we know from history that in a number

of cases, the censor who incurred the ire of the throne by his direct criticism

was punished, sometimes even deprived of his life. Therefore I think so far

as democratic institutions or representative government were concerned there

was no tradition in China. And tradition in China counted very greatly.

In short the splendid precepts embodied in the Chinese classics were not

implemented by the setting up of regular institutions. After China

became a monolithic political entity with the emperor on the throne ruling,

theoretically, not only with unlimited power in administration, but with

absolute power even over the life and property of all the people in the

realm, there was hardly any occasion where the people were given an

opportunity to express their will. The teachings of Confucius and Mencius

made it very clear. "The people is the foundation of a nation." If the

people had a sufficient amount of food and clothing then the nation was

well provided. If the people were rich then the nation on the whole was

rich. But those were precepts, theories, which had never been fully imple­

mented. I think there was no practice along the lines of representative

democracy, because of the Chinese political system did not lend to it.

It was very difficult for any popular group to exert its influence in

a regular institutional manner.

There was another reason and I consider it very important.

Koo, Wellington

While in the villages of China, especially among the farmers there was

a certain amount of democratic sentiment in the sense that locally such

projects as road building, construction of bridges, local charities, were

undertaken by the people under the leadership of members of the gentry, the

educated class, the effect of it was highly localized. There was no such

foundation as..we see for American democracy in the town meeting in North

America where the roots of democratic government are really deeply planted.

Nor was there any development in that direction since the inauguration of

the Republic in China. For the overthrow of the Dynasty and the inauguration

of the republic overturned the system of orderly government as far as it

had existed through the centuries and saw the emergence of the epoch of

the warlords. Now, the country was split up in various spheres of political

influence under their respective military chiefs. That was true even of the

part of China which was under the rule of the Kuomintang, within which there

were a number of groups headed by military chieftains, and more so in the North

where each warlord tried to strengthen his military power in order to impose

its will over as large an area as possible eventually with the purpose

of dominating the whole of China. In other words, the imperial idea of China

had the strength of such a long tradition that warlords were never able

to understand what really democracy was or should be even though they were

living under the Republic. I have previously described my conversation with

President Yuan Shih-k’ai when I was his secretary in the early years of the

Republic. Yuan, having questioned me closely on the significance of the

word "republic," was highly skeptical that the Chinese people could ever

be public-spirited enough to allow a genuine republic to be brought into

existence. From that interview I gathered that President Yuan Shih-k^i^

 Koo, Wellington

although a patriot in the sense that he was most jealous of China*s

sovereign rights in conducting foreign relations, especially with Japan,

had no idea of what a democracy really consists of. His mentality I think

was representative of the attitude of practically all the leaders of China at

the time with very few exceptions, such as a few intellectuals who had studied

abroad, travelled, and observed how democracy in the West was conducted.

I also think that the lack of mutual tolerance and appreciation

of the principle of the freedom of speech wane at the bottom of China*3

difficulty in developing systematically a democratic government. An

experience I had during the World War will confirm my analysis. It was

when, as Chinese Ambassador in London I went back to China in 1942 in connec­

tion with the British Parliamentary Goodwill Mission. At the time the ques­

tion of the relinquishment of extraterritoriality in China had been raised

by Great Britain and the United States in the form of an offer to

negotiate the concluding treaty on a principle of equality. The treaty

with the United States was being negotiated in Washington but that with Great

Britain was negotiated in Chungking. I was not participating in the

negotiations between the British minister Sir Horace Seymour and the Foreign

Minister Dr. T. V. Soong. They hit a snag, namely the question of the

recovery of Hongkong. According to both Sir Horace Seymour, who came to visit

me, and Dr. T. V. Soong, that was for China a sine qua non. Without

Great Britain giving up Hongkong no treaty would be signed. The deadlock was

prolonged and there was some anxiety, particularly on the part of the British

Minister. One day a meeting was called of practically all the Cabinet
Koo, Wellington

the heads of the four other yuan, and two or three of the leaders of the

party organization, such as Ch*en Kuo-fu, Chu Chia-hua, Wang Shih-chieh.

It was a meeting attended by about 25 personages and presided over by the

Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek], He gave his views, announced the purpose of

the meeting, which was to discuss the question of the treaty with Great Britain,

particularly the question of Hongkong and said that China must stand firm on

it and no treaty should be signed. This was at the end of 1942. When he asked

for the views of a few elder statesmen like Mr. Yil Yu-jen, Dr. Sun Fo, Dr.

Wang Ch*ung-hui, they all supported the Generalissimo^ position as the only

policy to pursue.

Then he called on me to express my opinion, since I had come

back recently from London. I made a fairly comprehensive report which I had

done as a matter of fact to the Generalissimo privately the night before but

I repeated the essential points: I had had conversations in England with

Mr. Churchill, Mr. Anthony Eden, and two or three important members of the

cabinet, with Lord Crampton the Commonwealth Minister, with leaders of the

banking world and of the universities,(for instance, with the Warden of one

of the colleges in Oxford) and then with the leaders of the China Association

which was a very influential body in regard to relations between China and Great
Sue i\ j* <; )
Britain, and finally with leaders of the newspaper world, Mke the editors

of the Morning Post, the Times, and the Daily Mail: my overall impression

after these meetings was that Great Britain was prepared to return Hongkong

to China - that was a foregone conclusion. The only question these men raised

was, Why should China insist on its being done during the War? As Mr. Churchill

put it to me, Great Britain and China were in a life and death struggle with

our common enemies; we should devote all our attention on winning the
Koo, Wellington

war first and when the war was won. Great Britain would not change her mind,

but would give back Hongkong with only one condition, that its handing over

should be an orderly procedure. There were some points of detail such as

how it should be handed over and the question of the obligations to the

civil servants and others should be taken care of, and that was all Great

Britain was thinking about. As far as the principle and the general question

of handing over they fully agreed. X told the Generalissimo that my own view

was that we should conclude this treaty. It was meant to be a token of

goodwill on the part of Great Britain and the United States in handing back

extraterritoriality which was a thorn in our side, and which had been a popular

claim for so long. They wanted to make a present as a friendly gesture, so it

would be rather awkward for us to refuse to conclude the treaty because

Hongkong was not included. As far as I could gather - and my impression was

quite clearcut - Hongkong would be handed back to China after the war was

won.

I was the only one who did not agree with the Generalissimo, and

he at once showed an expression of displeasure. He turned across the table

and said, "Hongkong must be handed over" and then he said "The meeting is

adjourned, the meeting is adjourned." It closed on a very unpleasant note.

After we filed out and was in the next room, going toward an exit, Dr. Wang,

Mr. Wu T1 ieh-ch^ng and Dr. Sun Fo one after the other patted my shoulder

and said "Do^t worry about it, we all agree with you. Our views are

exactly the same as yours." I said, ,?Why then did you say you agree with

the other view. Why « " "You know," he said, "the Generalissimo does not
 h J
Koo, Wellington

like to be contradicted at a meeting." "In that case," I said, "why did

he call a meeting?" "We all are with you," he said, "we’ll work on it."

This is only one incident. I do not attribute it to a special

characteristic on the part of the Generalissimo: it has been the common feeling

among all the Chinese leaders. In China there is no tolerance of criticism

or opposite views at any public meeting. This was probably due to two facts.

One was that traditionally a younger man should show deference to an old

man and was not supposed to contradict the views of an old man. Secondly,

one should not out of politeness and discipline openly oppose the views of

another one of higher authority. That was the Chinese psychology. With

these two factors shaping the psychology of the people, there was no custom

or pattern whereby freedom of speech could be recognized as a basic principle

or still less, whereby the views of the majority should prevail. When there

are divergent views in a meeting and each person participating in the meeting

is convinced of the correctness of his view, the practice of discussion and

debate is used in order to bring out the truth of the situation or to reach

a compromise; that was not the pattern in China. Democratic decisions are

made not on the basis of the views of one or two persons but on the basis of th(

views of the majority or, if possible, on the basis of compromise - there

should be mutual tolerance of opposing views and an understanding of the

principles of democracy; again, these were qualities we had not cultivated

and which we could not find in our tradition. It takes time to train the

people. In any public meeting or closed meeting, usually three or four

speakers would speak all at once and it was difficult for the chairman to try
Koo, Wellington

to maintain order unless he was a very strong chairman and insisted on some

kind of orderly discussion.

In recent years the proceedings in the Legislative Assembly

have become much more orderly ~ much more orderly than the proceedings

of the old Parliament in Peking. I attended Parliament meetings several times

and often there were five or six members speaking at the same time while the

Speaker was doing his utmost to maintain order. In recent years the

Legislative Yuan has got more experience, especially after it moved to

Taiwan. In the second place, the Legislative members have had more con­

fidence for their tenure of office has practically become life-long. The

third factor, I think, is that the organization of political parties has not
wi, p ^ cr c * *•■ * J * ;a
been as thoroughly efficient as it should, be*. With the exception of the

Kuomintang, other political parties were a sort of society organized by

politicians such as the Progressive Party - the Chin-pu-tang - organized

by Yuan Shih-k1ai. The members of this party were from different groups and

they joined the party for one single purpose, namely, to oppose the opposition

party - in this case, the Kuomintang. At that time Yuan Shih-k’ai was to

obstruct the Kuomintang*s control of Parliament. Another factor was that a

representative *s concept of his duty in the legislature - whether he was a

member of the Lower House or a senator - was not always true to his function

as a spokesman of the people. In the earlier years of the Republic - even

in later years - most of the members of Parliament - whether of the Senate

or of the House - considered their position and its prerogatives as political

weapons. According to the constitution they enjoyed the right to vote, the
Koo, Wellington 1
[ V1)

power of impeachment of higher officials, even of the President and the Vice

President, the right of approval or disapproval of the Premier and the

appointment of the members of the Cabinet; they exercised these political

weapons mostly for the purpose of advancing either their political or

their personal interests; they did not realize that these rights conferred

upon Parliament formed a necessary part of an orderly constitutional government.

That tendency on the part of the members of Parliament to use their consti­

tutional prerogatives as political weapons has served to discredit as well

as to obstruct the orderly functioning of parliamentary a« wel4-~as legisla­

tive institutions.

Another factor was that the appreciation on the part of the

members of the government from the President down of the legitimate functions

of Parliament was rather minimal. The President or the Premier did not

appear to me to have a thorough grasp of the legitimate part which Parliament

was to play in the government and which should be respected by the executive

branch of the government. They did not see Parliament as a constitutional body,

which under the constitution had the right to do certain things such as to

approve the nomination of Cabinet members or to approve financial measures

presented by the Cabinet. It was due to a lack of understanding or comprehen­

sion of this legitimate role of Parliament that led to frequent in fact almost

constant and chronic conflict between Parliament on one side and the Cabinet

on the other. There was also conflict between Parliament and the President^

Office. As I have shown this triangular conflict time and again proved to be

the cause of the disintegration of governments in Peking. To give me a

concrete illustration in the case of Dr. C. H. Wang^ Cabinet, in which I

Koo, Wellington

was Foreign Minister, Parliament claimed for the submission by President

Li Yuan-hung of the nominees to the Cabinet, but Dr. Wang refused to do so to

the last because of Parliament^ objection to two Cabinet members - the

Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Communications - both of whom

were representatives of Marshal Wu P^i-fu. It was very much the same

situation which arose at the time when Mr. Sun Pao-chH’s Cabinet members

were appointed and the appointment had to be approved. But at that time

there was such effective bargaining between the representatives of the

President^ Office and Parliament that the appointment was finally approved.

Usually some groups - and there were many in Parliament, even in the

Lower House - would make some claims on the prospective Cabinet ministers

usually in the form of recommending some relatives or friends for

appointment in the ministries. The promises so made regarding the appointing

of high-ranking officials were often left unexecuted, thus causing immediate

hostile reaction from some of the political groups in Parliament. Even the

refusal to accept recommendations for appointment to minor posts would often

lead to unexpected hostility on the part of Parliament toward the particular

ministers concerned. It appeared to me that it was the prevalent attitude

on the part of the heads of the ministries to insist on turning down en.bloc

all recommendations, which were considered unnecessary. In my own case, as

I have described earlier, I found no difficulty in getting along with

Parliament; in fact, Parliament always welcomed me. Even when I went to

Parliament not in my personal capacity but as a representative of my Premier,

I took it as a matter of course that, if the Cabinet ministers were asked to

appear before Parliament to answer questions, they should do their best to

respond. If some Parliament members made some recommendations for some

minor appointments, I did not find it difficult to accept one or two of

these recommendations concerning some minor posts with wei- i.,en, or lower
KOO, Wellington / V
7

echelon rank. After all, the Parliamentarians were not too ungrateful; if you

treated them as political friends, they would not make unnecessary trouble.

But the general run of my political colleagues - some of them were my very

close friends and some of them had also been educated abroad - did not appear

to be able to understand that Parliament was a necessary part of the whole

system of government and its position was assured under the Constitution.

Rather „they looked upon it as a sort of nuisance. On one occasion I remember

the parliamentarians being openly called "Pigs". In any constitutional govern­

ment, a member of the government should not indulge in emotions, but should

keep a cool head, see things as they are, face reality. In saying this I

am trying not to criticize some of my colleagues but only to point out why

there was so much friction, so many difficulties in the running of the

government, and why democratic institutions and representative government

did not function well in China.

The points I have mentioned indie ate.-some of the root causes of the

failure. Time and again it has occurred to me that in our basic education, es­

pecially in the lower grades, primary school and lower middle school, not only

the principle but also the practice of representative government should be

taught to young people, so that as they grow up they would understand and

accept as part of the normal procedure that, whether at a private gathering,

a public meeting, or in discussions in a council, freedom of speech and

the right of objection should be recognized and that where honest differences

of opinion exist, there is always a way of finding a workable compromise.

Koo, Wellington
1

Democratic governments, it seems to me, are really based for their successful

functioning upon effective compromise. Neither the majority nor, still

less the minority,could force their views upon the nation and the people.

If the majority always rely on their votes and steam-roller through their

own proposals without considering the views of the minority, even though

legally in accordance with democracy they cannot last very long - there

will always appear discontent and dissatisfaction. This is a problem which

I pondered over many times, a problem which I expressed above in the form of

a question as to why democratic government has failed so far in China. The

factors I have mentioned may not be all embracing but account to a large

extent for the lack of success so far.

There was one more thing - the lack of understanding of the

importance of government by law. The sense of a guiding law is not yet quite

deep-rooted enough in the people to facilitate the establishment and func­

tioning of representative government. I could give two illustrations, the

first of which indicates the want of appreciation of the importance of a

respect for law on the part of those in power. I was authoritatively

told after the election to the committee the I

was made a member, that the results of the voting did not matter very much.

They were revised so that those who either on account of age or by virtue of

the importance of the position they occupied in the government should be

elected to the committee were specially assigned so many votes. In two

or three cases when the elder statesmen or important military chiefs whose

presence on the committee was very much needed for political purposes had

been omitted, they were brought back and put in the list and those who

received a large number of votes and therefore came high in the list of
Koo, Wellington
IVi
of successful candidates were pushed - some of them even pushed off the list.

That was often done. Those who were responsible did not consider that as

anything wrong: from a political point of view it was a very wise thing to do.

That indicated their lack of appreciation of the importance of the law.

It was not surprising that the people had no more conception of what respect

should be given to law. When I was Premier the third time, in 1924, a distant

relative of mine came up specially from Shanghai to see me. He had a small

bank in Shanghai. He himself had been for over twenty years the Chinese

manager of the Russo-Asiatic Bank and after he left he organized a Chinese

bank. This friend of my father^ and ray family I received very cordially.

He told me that the purpose of his trip to Peking was to see me and ask me

to do a favor for him. I asked him what it was. He said many a private

Chinese bank in China had the right to issue banknotes and these banknotes

were circulated all over China. He said he wanted to get the right of issuing

for his bank and came to me for this privilege. I said the Premier^

Office did not handle that; he should apply to the Minister of Finance according

to the existing regulations. But I said it would be rather difficuTt because

only a few weeks earlier the Cabinet on my proposal had taken a decision to

stop making further grants of the privilege of issuing banknotes because it

was pregnant with abuses. In any case he should apply to the Minister of

Finance for consideration. His answer was he knew it was against regulations

to get it now, and that was the reason why he had come to me. I said that

was the situation, the Government had made the decision to pursue the policy

of stopping further grants. He said: "You are a returned-student from

abroad, you are really unfamiliar with Chinese life and ways Chinese. How

can you run the government!" I said I might be unfamiliar with these ways
Koo, Wellington

but I was telling him what the law was. He said: "I know the law does not

easily allow that, that's why I came to you for a personal favor!" Now that

explains exactly the attitude of the! people. Law or no law, you must chiang

ch1ing mien. It impressed me very greatly because he is not alone. His

psychology is representative of the psychology of the people at large.

Such are the ba sic problems of why the democratic system in China

has so far not succeeded. But we need not despair; it is a matter of time and

training. The people must be taught to understand the few fundamental

principles of democracy. Unless we as a nation should decide to leave the

path of democracy and revert to the path of autocratic government I think the

step should be taken to educate the people in that direction. Democracy

cannot be born overnight and I do not think the experience China had during

the last fifty years in facing the problems of democratic government is unique

to China because of China's particular conditions, but I believe it is general

in Asia and even in Africa. There is no question that government of the people,

by the people, for the people, is the most important principle, but it is not

so simple as it appears. Even with the legendary tradition of the will

of the people as being something which should be taken into important

consideration by the rulers of China, to run a democracy, and to accept a

democracy, are practical questions, not just academic questions on which to

make speeches. To make it effective requires sound training, discipline,

and practical experience.

Koo, Wellington

Conflict between the Three Branches of Government in Peking, 1912-1928

Even under President Yuan Shih-k'ai the Provisional Constitution

or the Constitutional Compact defined the powers of the executive and the

legislative. The President had great power, but he was subject to the

control of Parliament in certain respects. His nomination of the premier

and of the Cabinet ministers had to be approved by Parliament; the

budget of the government had to be submitted to Parliament for discussion

and approval; the treaties the government concluded with foreign countries

had to be ratified by Parliament.

In practice, the chief executive seemed to be disposed to leave

Parliament on the side as much as possible and to be rather reluctant to

recognize the powers which the constitution or the Provisional Constitution

conferred upon Parliament. There was perhaps some justification for

that because at that time Parliament did not always act in objective

manner and often sought to utilize its constitutional prerogatives to

bring pressure upon the executive. One common way that Parliament

used to press the government to accept certain of its claims was to withhold

or to delay its approval of the President's appointment of the Premier

or the Cabinet ministers. The working relations between the executive

branch of the government and the legislative branch were often found to

be rather in difficulty. Private interests came into play, that is the

interests of the two groups - the Kuomintang in Parliament on the one

Koo, Wellington

side and the Peiyang group led by the President on the other. Time

and again these two groups came into conflict. Such conflict was

found to be insoluble because basically the President tried to preserve

the prerogatives of the executive in order to have as much freedom of

action as possible. On the other hand, the Kuomintang as a political

party naturally was insistent, in the name of Parliament, in exerting

its influence and in exercising its constitutional power.

In the very first year of the Republic T'ang Shao-i was able to

carry on the government for only one month. Personally, he and Yuan

were sworn brothers and had always worked together. Before the

Republic, when Yuan Shih-k’ai was Viceroy of Chihli and Grand Councillor,

T’ang Shao-i was Governor of the province of which Mukden was the capital.

At that time T’ang Shao-i was known, like Mr. Hsu Shih-ch’ang to be the

prot£g£ of General Yuan Shih-k’ai. But as soon as T'ang Shao-i became

premier under President Yuan Shih-k'ai the two men could not see eye to

eye on the question as to how the government should be run. Mr. T'ang's

appointment was understood to be one of the conditions of settlement

between the North and the South. As premier under the provisional

constitution, Mr. T’ang Shao-i claimed to exercise certain powers which

belonged to the office of premier. That is to say, he had. the right

to make recommendations to the President, who, as the constitutional

chief of the state, was bound to approve them. The first question which

arose and which caused first disagreement, then the resignation of

Mr. T'ang as Premier within a month of his appointment, was in regard

to the selection and appointment of the Governor of Chihli province.

Koo, Wellington

I mention this again merely as an illustration of the

difficulties which arose from the very beginning of constitutional govern­

ment of the Republic. Mr. T’ang's resignation meant of course the triumph

of President Yuan Shih-k'ai. Parliament continued to exert its influence

under the leadership of Mr. Sung Chiao-jen, who had been Minister

of Agriculture and Commerce in Mr. T'ang's Cabinet. But the resignation

of Mr. T'ang created an irreparable breach between the Kuomintang and

the northern party headed by President Yuan Shih-k'ai. This breach

was the main cause of Sung Chiao-jen's assassination and untimely

death; this breach also led to what President Yuan Shih-k'ai called

the revolt of the Parliament. Eventually, Parliament was dissolved, and

civil war broke out again. The whole episode showed clearly that

President Yuan Shih-k'ai had no confidence in Parliament and was

suspicious all the time of the objectives of the Kuomintang in the

North. As I tried to indicate earlier, the conflict was fundamentally

due to the irreconcilable backgrounds of the two parties. President

Yuan Shih-k'ai was nurtured in the tradition of the dynasty and had

exercised great powers without restraint except in the last resort

the auttority of the Emperor. On the other hand, the Kuomintang as a

political party sought to bring about parliamentary government and assert

its legitimate authority under the provisional constitution. The leaders

of the two sides found themselves irreconcilable because there was such

a fundamental conflict between their objects and purposes. Furthermore

as I had been repeatedly told my friends, President Yuan Shih-k'ai

had never been to central China, or still less, to south China - he

Koo, Wellington

had never got beyond the Yangtze River. He was unfamiliar with

the conditions and the sentiments of the people in dentral or south

China. He was still less familiar with the basic principles of

parliamentary government. The Kuomintang, on its part, was still

flushed with a feeling of success in the revolution. As the only

organized political party in the country, it naturally aspired to gain

political power and rule China. It was, therefore, not unnatural

that the two sides found it practically impossible to work together.

While Parliament was in session, there was always a friction

between the government on one side and Parliament on the other. And

sometimes, as in later years, the friction became a triangular

development, that is to say, there was friction not only between

Parliament and the President's Office: since the President and the

Cabinet did not always see eye to eye in their respective relations to

Parliament there was also friction between the president's Office and the

Cabinet. So this triangular system worked with friction and sometimes

with insoluble difficulties.

There were variations to the system. Chao Ping-chun's Cabinet,

for example, was entirely compatible with or friendly to the president.

In such cases the president was able to take a strong stand and act

as his own premier and appoint the cabinet ministers according to his

own preference, generally, among his own supporters. Then of course

the friction between the president's office and the Cabinet did not
Koo, Wellington
1
tr 1

arise, and beiiaffle friction between the Parliament one one side and the

government as a whole on the other, that is to say, the executive

government with the president at its head. But this was rather an ex­

ception. Whenever a development of that kind took place it was generally

to the dislike of Parliament, because undei* the Provisional Constitution

the premier had to appear in Parliament and answer questions just as

sometimes his colleagues in the Cabinet had to also. Even when questions

were addressed directly to the president regarding certain of his

actions, it was the premier who as representative of the president would

have to appear and answer questions.

Parliament could make it very uncomfortable for a premier

it disliked. When Mr. Lu Cheng-hsiang became premier after T'ang's

resignation on June 29, 1912, I was in close touch as one of the secre­

taries in the Foreign Office, as well as secretary to the President's

office. Mr. Lu had never received a forensic training. He had been

a career diplomat and had been particularly known for his fine sense of

diplomatic tact and for a thorough knowledge of protocol. He had not

been trained at all in parliamentary government. He went to Parliament

with great reluctance and iferarens simply as a constitutional obligation ;.

I [ f : ■ i ,i tv k* tW. f*i t 1 t 7 < A -t' K» J t 5 u V ij «• tf> •
.w«nt -there. He must have been over-awed by the atmosphere of

the House of Representatives - hundreds of members. He went as the spokes­

man of President Yuan Shih-k'ai; he was not at all popular with the

members of Parliament and they from the very start gave him a rather

unfriendly welcome. I was not present but it was published in the

Koo, Wellington

papers that he did not answer the questions put to him, but tried to

evade them, which was not unlikely because he did not wish to commit

himself. His- presence there was involuntary. I recall the day when the

President had to urge him to appear in Parliament. His unsympathetic

reception by the House of Representatives was not caused so much by

their dislike of Mr. Lu as a person: it was just that he was unable

to deal with the situation in the House of Representatives as a poli­

tical leader or a statesman would have done in Parliament, for example

in any of the Western countries. The House of Representatives felt

greatly dissatisfied just as Mr. Lu himself found it greatly to his

own disliking; they called him "vulgar", even though he was a refined

gentleman and most polite in speech and conduct, very quiet and

scholarly in appearance, though not strong physically, and a man of few

words who always looked very thoughtful. But I suppose the

characterization of "p1i-su-pu-k1 an" might apply to his speech

in Parliament though not to his person. His speech in Parliament was

quite out of place and did not answer the purpose. Parliament had

expected of him a speech characteristic of a great statesman, appearing

before the representatives of the people in order to defend his

policy, but although he had lived abroad for many years, and had been

educated largely in Europe, first in France and Russia, he had not

acquired either the knowledge or experience of a European statesman

who would be brave enough to fight a political battle and fire a speech

in defense of his policy at a parliamentary audience. His experience

was confined mainly to the old school of diplomacy where tete-a-tete

Koo, Wellington

negotiations demanded all the skill of an experienced diplomat.

He had attended the Second Peace Conference at the Hague where as

China's representative he made his reputation but the Hague Conference

was not one at which great political questions were at stake or at which

lively debates were held; it followed the conference in 1899 and was

called to work out an agreement on the compulsory arbitration and

peaceful settlement of international disputes. In short, the Hague

Conference was devoted to the high idea of peace but did not call

for a lively defence of any country's national interests. It is true

that he did make some speeches at the conferences which were, so far as

China was concerned, practically unprecendented in China s international

relations, and his French was flawless. But as a statesman he did

not have the experience of facing large popular bodies nor did he ever

have ifeE experience as a forensic orator. So his encounter with

Parliament was not very happy. President Yuan Shih-k'ai saw the

point: on Lu's own insistence President Yuan soon accepted his

resignation and appointed his own man, Mr. Chao Ping-chun, to

succeed him. When President Li Yuan-hung took charge of the

President's Office, the conflict between the organs of government

was of another kind. Li was a different sort of man from Yuan

Shih-k'ai in temperament and nature. He was more the people's

friend. He was simple and rather democratic in his bearing and his

speech. He was far from being an authoritarian, as President Yuan

Shih-k'ai was. He was disposed to vacillate when an important decision

had to be taken. He himself had no strong convictions or a firm opinion

but he had a great disposition to act on his own initiative. He was

easily influenced by his entourage especially by his political friends.

Therefore during his time as President the friction arose not so much

as a triangular event but more as a struggle between Parliament

Koo, Wellington

on one hand and the Cabinet on the other. In fact it became a friction

between Parliament and the President on account of the attitude of

the Cabinet, or between the Cabinet and the President because of his

leaning toward Parliament. This was true particularly when he was

president in 1922. Unfortunately Li Yuan-hung was too easily swayed

by one fact or another because he had no great convictions. From one

point of view he was an ideal man to be the head of a parliamentary

system of government because he was somewhat more democratic as a

person than almost any leader of the North or the South, but his lack

of a good education and want of adequate experience in administration

became a handicap to him. The constant friction between the three

organs of the government in Peking was a common feature of the govern-

ment-s in the North, and explained why Parliament was dissolved more

than once, and why the Provisional Constitution was revised.

The old political situation in China was thus greatly complicated

by the constant conflict between the three organs, at the back of

which lay the suspicions and rivalry and the intrigues of the

political parties in China including various factions headed by

warlords in different parts of the country. All these factors really

accounted for the period of political instability which always

resulted in open hostilities and civil war. If one should try to enumerate

the number of civil wars one would be surprised to realize how numerous

they were during the short period from the first year of the republic

to the completion of the Northern Expedition with the occupation of

Peking by the Kuomintang Army. Even during the Kuomintang rule with its

seat of government in Nanking a number of armed revolts took place

Koo, Wellington

which did not help to promote peace and security in the nation.

I have already given an account of my experience with the

Cabinet under President Li Yuan-hung, with Dr. Wang Ch’ung-hui as

Prime Minister, an experience which was not too pleasant because of the

conflict with Parliament which resulted in the arrest of Lo Wen-kan and

the downfall of the Cabinet. As far as I can recall, neither with

President Ts'ao K'un nor before his election to the presidency when I

was head of the Regency Cabinet was there much conflict with Parliament.

This was in 1923. The Peiyang party and the leaders of Parliament were

all busy negotiating about the terms of cooperation in order to elect

Ts'ao K'un to the presidency. That was a question in which personally

I took no part and about which I was not informed. After Ts'ao K'un-"

was elected and inaugurated as president. Parliament was sitting and

practically the same friction immediately arose, not so much between

the Cabinet and Parliament as between Parliament and the President's

Office. Speaker Wu Ching-lien of the House of Representatives had been

active in negotiating terms of cooperation to elect Ts'ao K'un to the

presidency and also in preparing for the organization of the Cabinet

with himself as Prime Minister. But the latter question was evidently

not at all to the taste of the Paoting clique or of the Chihli clique,

that is of the Peiyang party as a whole. Even before the election

difficulties had arisen because of Mr. Wu Ching-lien's overriding

attitude. The Paotin^clique, in order to counterract his influence

in Parliament, started several what they called "Parliamentarians'

Clubs" in Peking so as to draw to themselves as many members of Parlia­

ment as possible and thus assure themselves of a sufficient number of

votes to elect Ts'ao K'un to the presidency without having to comply

Koo, Wellington

with the exacting demands of Wu Ching-lien. In this case it was the

frustration of Wu Ching-lien’s wish to be Prime Minister that

largely provoked Parliament's conflict with the President.

r: • ' . fe: ; > - i ■ 1 ', ) r ^ ■- ^

Cabinet Meetings

The methods of administration in Peking I found to be

relatively simple. The Cabinet held its regular meetings usually three

times a week in my experience always in the morning on Tuesdays,

Thursdays, and Saturdays. Generally speaking there were three

categories of questions the Cabinet had to take up for consideration

and decision. One category consisted of proposed or draft mandates

presented by the President for the Cabinet to act upon such as for

example communications from Parliament for either answer or communica­

tions the President proposed to address to Parliament for advice. The

second category consisted of those questions brought up by the Premier

or his office. They usually consisted of communications dealing with

special questions from the provinces from the heads of different provin­

cial administrations. The third category consisted of questions or

reports presented by the different ministries in Peking. With the

exception of the questions proposed by the President relating to

Parliament, not much discussion, still less debate, took place in

the Cabinet meetings. Most of the business of these meetings consisted

of routine matters, such as the appointment of magistrates in the

provinces, or of governors or military commanders of different ranks.

As a rule each ministry would submit a report and proposals for these

appointments and it was the general tradition that matters falling within
 2^
Koo, Wellington

the exclusive competence of each ministry would be decided in

accordance with the suggestions of the different ministries concerned.

For example if the Foreign Minister proposed the nomination of a person

as Chinese minister to any particular country, or as commissioner of

foreign affairs in the provinces, usually the Foreign Minister’s

proposal would be accepted without any discussion at all. The same thing

would apply to the various appointments to the armed forces, at

least in the lower ranks, which were proposed by the Minister of War,

or to the appointment of the commissioner of finance in the provinces

by the Minister of Finance. There would be some discussion in relation

to questions put to the President by Parliament, how they should be

replied, whether they should be replied in writing or whether someone

would be sent to appear in person. Similarly, questions concerning

China's relations with one of the important countries or questions

relating for example to the political situation in the South would

normally call for some discussion; but as a rule very little discussion

took place. It was understood as a tradition that each minister would

be responsible for the affairs of his own ministry and this understanding

was usually respected by all the cabinet members.

The cabinet meetings were attended only the Premier and the

ministers, or the acting ministera. No minutes of discussion or debate

were ever made out. Only the decisions were recorded. The record of

decisions as well as the draft mandates based on the decisions would be

submitted to the President's Office, sometimes by the Premier when he

went to report personally, but more often by the secretary-general of

 56}
Koo, Wellington

the Cabinet.

On rare occasions the President would call a meeting of the Cabinet

in his office. This might be suggested by the Premier himself or by

the President on his own initiative. At such meetings the President

would preside and a question would be discussed and in my experience

the discussion was always very free. Although, in a discussion on

military questions, the heads of the civilian departments would

rarely participate, when there were questions of foreign policy or

foreign relations or the political situation in the country, the

discussion would be very general and often every Cabinet minister

would express his views. Such meetings in the President's Office

were rare and they took place only when some really important question

arose for discussion and decision.

Whenever a new treaty was to be signed the matter would be

reported fully to the Cabinet and later to the President. Before

the treaty could be signed, the Cabinet had to approve its contents;

then, the treaty was reported to the President for approval in order

that full power could be given either to the foreign minister or to

the Chinese minister or the special envoy for that purpose. This,

I suppose, has been the usual practice with all countries.

Financing the Ministries

My experience of the financial conditions in the ministries

was limited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance.
Koo, Wellington
:)>s

In the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it had no special income

until later years when the consulates abroad were empowered to

issue ch1ien-cheng, or license of shipment. There was a set of regula­

tions by which the consular representatives abroad, collected a

certain amount of money when issuing such licenses. A fixed charge

was set for each license of shipment which covered a corresponding

amount of goods. The consular representatives abroad remitted the

revenues derived from ch *ien-cheng as well as from passport visa in

later years, together with monthly reports, to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, which in turn had to report this to the Office of the Controller

and later to the Auditing Department. In other words, in the later

years at Peking the Ministry of Foreign Affairs derived revenue from the

proceeds collected from issuing either visas and passports or licenses

of shipment.

From my own experience with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

I recall that the Ministry had an annual budget, including an estimate

of the annual requirement and an estimate of the revenue to be derived

from the issuance of passport visas and shipping certificates. In

fact, each ministry had to report to what was called the Auditing

Department, which belonged to the Premier's Office and which was in

charge of the drafting of the budget for the following year. Usually

the budget was drafted with the co-operation of the representatives of

each ministry. At the end of the year whatever surplus there was in each

ministry had to be turned in to the treasury under the fiscal regulations.

 Koo, Wellington

X don t know whether in the days of Peking any such surplus left over

could be retained by each ministry. I understood that it could be.

There was a tradition that certain ministries were considered

to be well-off and others were considered to be impoverished ministries.

The politicians, or specially professional politicians, usually liked

to have been appointed to a well-off ministry rather than to a poor

one. The poor ministries were the Ministry of Education, the Ministry

of the Navy, to a larger extent the Minister of Justice, and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was

considered to be a poor one although in later years it had its revenue

derived from those two sources through the consulates. But

sometimes the consulates were not paid regularly and yet they had to

remit regularly unless they were specially authorized to retain a part

of the revenue collected from the scenes to defray the expenses tern-
X
porarily. he well-off ministries were generally known to be the

Ministry of Communications, which had control of the railways which

were revenue-producing enterprises, and the Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Finance however had to raise enough funds to

pay the expenses of the government, which it did with great

difficulty and in my tenure was certainly a poor ministry. There

was no particular source of revenue except the customs surplus, which

was still under the control of the Government. Other revenues such as

the taxes remitted from the Ch'ung-wen-men [Taxation Bureau] which

Koo, Wellington

had once been a source of revenue to the Ministry of Finance.

The revenue from Ch'ung-wen-men was formerly the special source of

revenue for the Imperial Palace. When the Republic was established

that revenue was naturally assigned to the President's Office. But

in later years whichever military leader was in control of North

China would seize the Ch'ung-wen-men revenue for their own purposes.

So, when I was Minister of Finance even the Ch'ung-wen-men revenue was

not available to the central government. Not only would the

military leader in power seize that revenue but he would often

impose a surtax--so as to increase the revenue for him. Thus

the central government became poorer because of encroachment by the

military leaders into its sources of revenue. Of course this is only

one of the reasons: the provinces had long stopped to remit revenue

to the central government.

There had previously been several forms of taxes provided by the

provinces. Under the dynasty ti kTu, ch'ien liang, ts'ao liang, —

all forms of land tax -- had to be remitted to the central government

until the time of the Taiping Rebellion when the remittances became

rather irregular but they were kinds of revenue which the central

government insisted upon having. At that time the viceroys or the

governors of the provinces were given special power to raise the revenue

through a transit tax (likin) which was levied for the special

purpose of suppressing the Taiping Rebellion but which was continued

to the very last day of the dynasty and kept up even in the republic.

The financial administration and the fiscal regulations under the

dynasty so far as I know were relatively simple. The provinces

were required to remit ch'ien liang, or ts'ao liang, which were

Koo, Wellington

kinds of tax money - ts'ao liang in lieu of the tributary rice.

Sometimes they remitted rice, to be subsequently converted into

money which was called ts'ao p'ing. Later the two sources

of revenue for the central government were from the salt tax -

the Liang-huai yen yun ssu and the Ch'ang-lu yen yun ssu. They were

great revenue producing organs. But in the later Ch'ing Dynasty and

in the early years of the Republic, the remittances became rather

irregular - they were usually seized by the local, provincial

authorities. Thus the only reliable form of revenue to the

Republican Peking government were the surplus revenue from the

Customs, and the Salt Gabelle, which was monopolized by the state

and remitted to the central government.

Official Salaries

As for the payment of the officials in the central government

in Peking, the official pay was the same throughout the different

ministries and the Cabinet and varied only in accordance with the

rank. The salaries were based upon a set of regulations whose basic

principle was that each official should be paid according to the rank

to which he belonged. The regulations governing the classification of

officials contained four levels, namely, t'e-jen, or the specially

appointed, to which belonged the premier, Cabinet ministers, special

envoys, and governors of the provinces; chien-ien, or the selected;

chien-jen, or appointment made on the recommendation of the responsible

department; wei-jen, or appointments made by the different ministries

directly without reference to the Cabinet or, still less, to the

president. Under the Kuomintang government, there is hsuan-jen,

which is above t *e-jen, and in this case, the Party has to make the
Koo, Wellington
is!
z/'

recommendation to the president and the president makes the

appointment. Hsuan-jen is the highest level in the Kuomintang

government, but it did not exist in the Peking government. In

the Peking government the president was elected by Parliament,

and the president, as the chief executive, did not belong to any

particular level. In the Peking government, salaries were unified.

Officials belonging to the t1 e*• ]en level were all paid the same

amount of salary. Within the other three levels there were different

steps.

In the case of diplomatic envoys in my personal experience

they were paid higher thatn the metropolitan officials. In the

early years of the Republic for example, kung-shih (ministers to

foreign countries) were chien-ien, and were paid $1800 a month. That

was the salary fixed in the days of the Manchu dynasty. Envoys were

divided into two classes, called i-teng-ch1ing-ch}ai (first class

envoys) which was a rank equivalent to an ambassador, and erh-teng-

ch1ing-ch1ai (second class envoys) which was equivalent to a minister.

The first class envoy had a salary of 1800 taels and the second

class envoy 1200 taels. In those days there were different kinds

of taels. This was kuan p1ing. Kuan p1ing was worth one dollar fifty

cents. Therefore converting 1200 taels into dollars would work out to be

$1800. This salary remained the same throughout the Ch'ing dynasty

to the early years of the Republic and as far as I can recall it remained

the same even under the Kuomintang rule until recent years.
Koo, Wellington

The ministers, t *e-jen, in the Peking government were all

paid $1,000 a month salary, with the vice-ministers, chien-jen, having

two grades of $800 and $600. But there never was any regulation governing

the amount of allowance which each office was to enjoy. Some of those

ministries which had a revenue of their own in the days of the Republic

allowed a certain latitude in the salaries of the ministers, the vice

minister, and the sometimes even the heads of the departments. There

were so-called special fees or special supplement (t1e-pieh-ching-t1ieh).

Those ministries which drew no revenue of their own depended entirely on

the Ministry of Finance for their regular pay and expenses. In the

case of the Foreign Ministry, there was no fixed amount of special

allowance. It depended upon the Minister himself but usually his enter­

tainment of foreign ministers and foreign guests was arranged and

paid for by the Ministry, and of course he had his car and chauffeur.

In the case of the Ministry of Communications, I understood that the

Minister of Communications had his household expenses taken care of by

the ministry, usually not passed officially but with the good offices of

whoever was in charge of the financial side of the ministry. What

happened when I was in the Foreign Ministry in the early years of the

Republic was that President Yuan at the festival time, either the

Dragon Boat Festival or the Mid-Autumn Festival, particularly toward

the end of the year, would send $1000 to the Minister as a sort of

special allowance from the President's Office. I knew it because even

in my time as secretary to him, at the end of the year, not during the

two festivals, he would send a month's salary specially for the New Year.

So I knew that the minister and the vice ministers each would get a

special grant from the President's Office.

Koo, Wellington q

The funds of the President's Office were budgeted from the

government which was usually quite liberal. The President's personal

salary was fixed, I believe at $50,000 or $100,000. The President's

Office did not come under the regulations governing the organization

and appointment of officials and were thus outside the official

system. The members of the President's Office were appointed directly

by the President and did not enjoy the same status: they were not

considered to be kuan (regular officials). In the second place

he was free to increase or reduce his own staff, and usually out of

political considerations he would appoint a number of advisers and they

were also unlimited in number. Thus his office was usually given

a generous amount, usually budgeted according to the proposal of the

President. I suppose that certain provinces whose heads were his

particular.supporters would at the end of the year - it was a custom

handed down from the days of the Ch'ing dynasty - would remit certain

sums to the President as a token of their loyalty and support.

Irregular Practice in the Provinces

Opportunities for irregular practice were naturally not confined

to the highest ranks of officialdom. The following incident will show

something of how the taxes were collected ..and how tax collectors were

able to gain by their special procedure. In the earliest years of my

service in Peking, when I was secretary of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, I bought a brass bed stand in Tientsin to furnish my home in

Peking. As I was in a hurry I took the bed with me on the train. When

I arrived at Ch*ung-wen-men I brought this bed with me to the

Ch'ung-wen-men Customs office. The train was full of people - many

Koo, Wellington H-

of whom were farmers or poor people carrying bundles or produce from the

farm to get passed by the tax office. When my turn came I showed the

receipt for the amount I paid in Tientsin, and asked to pay the regular

tax for bringing the bed into the city. After calculating, the man

told me to pay a certain sum, something between seven to eight dollars.

"How is it calculated?" I asked.

"That's the regular rate," he said.

"What is the rate?"

"Three percent plus one special supplementary."

"If it was three percent," I said, "why should there be an addi­

tional one percent?"

"That is usual." He told me to look at the notice board and

I saw there "Three percent plus one." I asked him for the printed

regulations. He said he couldn't find a copy.

"Who authorized the rate?" I asked him. "If the regulation

is three percent, why should there be an additional one percent?"

"It is always done that way."

"How did you arrive at that sum?"

"According to the regular way." I asked him what the regular

way was; he said I could work it out myself. So I did. First they

converted dollars into taels, then they collected the tax in taels.

He told me the rate was $1.35. Therefore $180 converted at the rate

of $1.35 per tael gave something like 140 taels. Three percent

of 140 taels would be 5.20 taels, I calculated, which would be

$7.03, which was less than his sum. So I told him his calculation was

wrong.

"No, no," he said, "When you convert back into dollars, the rate
 Koo, Wellington

is $1.50 per tael. That is the Customs rate." So $1.35 was the

market tael rate while $1.50 was the "Customs rate". I said the rate

should be uniform regardless of which rate they used, and asked who

was responsible.

"The Chief of the Bureau," he said, "the Chief is not here

right now."

"Who is acting then?"

He is busy," he replied. I said I could wait. After I had

waited for a while, the man in charge came out. He asked me

who I was and I told him. I said I wanted to see the regulation and

find out on whose authority the extra one percent was added on. And I

asked on whose authority they used the two different standards, which,

instead of benefiting the taxpayer was only benefiting his own office.

So he said I could just pay whatever I thought fair. I said I could

pay one extra percent but only by whatever particular standard he

wanted to use.

This incident gave me a great deal of insight into the func­

tioning of the Chinese tax bureau. When I went back to the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs I told some of my colleagues of the incident. The

Chief of the General Affairs Section said: "You didn't have to bother

at all. Usually we can get by without paying anything at all." I

told him that was not the point. It was only one incident; but that

such a practice should prevail right at the gates of Peking I thought

very discouraging.
Koo, Wellington

One person that came to see me was the very wealthy owner

of several industries both in Hongkong and Taiwan. One of his

factories made wooden boards from lumber for building. Another was a

dairy, a modern dairy for making icecream. He also had a textile

factory. He told me he could understand why, when he wanted to order

goods from abroad for importation into Taiwan, it was necessary for

him to get a letter of credit to the seller, but he said in order to get

a letter of credit he had to deposit a hundred percent tax, no matter

what the amount was. Meanwhile he would have to wait for a while, and

would not get any benefit from this interval. The letter of credit

itself usually required the payment of a very small fee. In order to

tide over the interval of whatever it might be, from two to five months,

he could not employ the capital but he said the capital was required by

the Bank of Taiwan. What was more discouraging, he said, was that

when goods arrived they were not immediately cleared; it would depend

upon the leisure of the customs inspector. Often machinery and goods

would arrive and be left on the dock for days and weeks without even

getting the proper customs inspection. They not only tied up the

capital but every day interest had to be paid on whatever loan he

had got from the financial quarters. He said some of the goods were

perishable and yet stayed in the hot sun. I told him he should bring

his problem to the higher authorities. It would not cost him

anything. It was only a matter of administration. He said he did.and

did not get any results. Well, I said, I didn't understand.

Koo, Wellington

It probably had become a customary practice. The businessmen

and merchants were men of wealth and these inspectors, junior officials,

were poorly paid and they expected some sort of outside income. Now

that did not right away occur to me. It is all a matter of running the

government on a business basis. I remember it was President Theodore

Roosevelt who introduced the slogan of conducting the government as

if it was conducting a business corporation. Then every cent would be

accounted for.

Irregular Practice at the Foreign Office

Those were more or less open and known practices. Of course there

were a number of secretive irregular practices which prevailed in certain

ministries and amounted to extra-legal sources of revenue. The

two cases following will serve as illustrations.

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs more than once it

was recommended to me by a minister in Japan to sell Chinese

government property which used to be the seat of the Chinese Resident-

General's office in Seoul in Korea. When China was still Korea's su­

zerain, the office of the Resident-General was located right in the

center of Seoul from where as Resident-General Yuan Shih-k'ai had

exercised great influence over the Imperial family in Korea, especially

over the Dowager Empress. Some Japanese business companies applied

to buy the land because of its excellent situation in the heart of

Seoul. It still belonged to the. Chinese government and under the Re­

public it became the seat of the consulate-general. It was an attractive

Koo, Wellington

office and I remember it was highly recommended to the Ministry to

sell this land and then with the money, or part of the money, to

buy a very respectable house, away from the center of the city, for the

consulate-general. It was said that the prospective buyer was willing

to give a special sum in addition to the regular official price for the

deal. I turned it down, two or three times. Because while the

proposition was attractive - the Foreign Ministry needed the money to

extend the consular service and so forth - it would have been a blow to

the sentiment of the Chinese community in Korea. For the sake of our

prestige among the Korean people it was highly valuable. But the

Japanese had no way of forcing us to sell it.

I have mentioned in connection with the wireless negotiations

in 1922 a second irregular offer made to me as foreign minister.

A Japanese company, I think the Mitsui Company, and the Federal Wireless

Company of the United States were both seeking a concession to build

a wireless stati n in Peking. The Japanese approached the Ministry of

the Navy in Peking and the Federal Wireless Company approached the

Ministry of Communications. The policy of the government was to have

one station but internally the question was complicated by rivalry

between the Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Communications.

It was clear that some importance was attached to the concession

by both Japan and the United States; I thought not only for the sake

of prestige but also for the chance to make a start into wireless

communications in Asia that both the Japanese and American ministry

were so persistent in their requests. Then one day the representative