Indian Political Science Association

SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND INDIA'S CONCERNS

Author(s): Ganesh Malhotra
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 74, No. 1 (January - March, 2013), pp.
173-178
Published by: Indian Political Science Association
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The Indian Journal of Political Science
Vol. LXXIV, No. 1, Jan.-March, 2013, pp. 173-178

SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE AND INDIA'S CONCERNS

Ganesh Malhotra

The present-day strategic nuances of South China Sea has augmented the conflicts among the claimant
countries of ASEAN,USA and India. China s assertiveness over the question of controlling the sovereignty
of disputed islands is most pronounced. This assertiveness has quite a few reasons. First, it is the economic
reason. This region has vast resources of oil and gas reserves. Secondly, political considerations are there
due to the Taiwan factor. Thirdly, there are the strategic considerations in view of the importance of the
sea route connections. This paper seeks to analyse all these factors in the context of international political
scenario in general and its impact on India and Asia in particular. The main foci of this paper are to analyse
the role and interest of ASEAN countries and India in this dispute. This dispute is one of the important
aspects of China s, as it were, Monroe doctrine.

The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed navigation and over flight and the freedom
sea that is surrounded by China and a few of sea lanes of communication are critical
South East Asian countries. It is bordered strategic interests of these countries.2
by China to the north, by Vietnam to the
Another importance of this area is that it
west, by Peninsular Malaysia to the south
might be a significant source of energy and
west, by Brunei Darussalam and the two
other resources. Conflicting assessments
Malaysian States Sabah and Sarawak to the
have been made of the potential of the South
south, and finally, by the Philippines to the
east.
China Sea as an unexplored source of oil
and natural gas. A 1995 study by Russia's
Dangerous conflict potential Research Institute for Geology of Foreign
Countries estimates that the equivalent of
This area is often portrayed as a theatre
6 billion barrels of oil might be located in
of military tension and dangerous conflict
the Spratly Islands area. On the other hand
potential. A recent proof of the possibility
Chinese media outlets have referred to the
that the territoriaMisputes there could trigger
South China Sea as "the second Persian
conflict could be witnessed in April 2001,
Gulf' and some Chinese specialists have
as a Chinese F-8 fighter plane collided with
asserted that the South China Sea could
a US Navy EP-3 Aries intelligence aircraft
contain as much as 130 billion barrels of oil
over waters that China was claiming, but the
United States considered international1. and in addition to vast potential for natural
gas. Moreover, speculation about possible
Strategic Significance hydrocarbon resources in South China Sea
The significance of the South Chinahas grown. '
Sea conflict is obvious. First the importance The South China Sea is also one of the
of the South China Sea as a strategic richest fishing areas in the world. Important
passageway is unquestioned. It contains coastal populations depend on fishing for
critical sea lanes through which oil andtheir livelihood, and many more people
many other commercial resources flowdepend on the protein that they get from fish
from the Middle East and South East and other seafood caught in the South China
Asia to Japan, Korea and China. Safety
Sea. of

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 174

Zones of Conflict dispute resolution in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea conflict escalated ASEAN and South China Sea Dispute
from early 1970s to mid 1980s as a result
The dispute over the Spratly and Paracel
of a prospect of finding oil and proposal islands
of involves some ASEAN member
200-nautical-mile EEZ in this area. By the
countries, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, the
mid 1950s, British and US oil companies had
Philippines and Brunei. Indonesia is not a
started to show interested in the possibility
claimant to the dispute, but actively involved
of discovering oil in the Spratly area,
in organizing confidence-building measures
however, oil only really became a factor in
with the objective of diffusing tension and
the South China Sea conflict after 1970s.
avoids eruption of any major conflict in the
The prospect of finding oil provided a new
region.4
motive for pursing sovereignty claims, and
made it more acceptable to spend resourcesSince all ASEAN countries are not
on keeping troops and other personnel equally
in involved in the dispute and
these islands. consequently have no equal stakes, there
is not one ASEAN approach to the South
The temptation to be more aggressive
China Sea dispute, even though they may
in pursuing claims in the Spratly Island
all be subscribing to the idea of building
was reinforced when the coastal states
of confidence and engagement of China to
participating in the Third United Nations
contain the dispute and manage conflicts in
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1973
the region.5
(UNCLOS III) started to push for the
creation of so called Exclusive Economic ASEAN countries are in reality divided
Zones (EEZs), where the coastal states over their approach towards China, as well
would have sovereignty rights to exploitas over the way to diffuse tension in the
the marine resources. A proposal of region. Each member country looks at China
200-nautical-mile EEZ became part of thefrom the point of view of their national
United Nations Convention on the Law of interests- weather it perceives China as a
threat or as a source of economic benefit.
Sea that was signed in 1982. It established
that the 200-nautical-mile limit was made to As a result, ASEAN's position on political
and strategic issue vis-a-vis China is rather
apply not only to the sea, but to the sea-bed
weak. To compensate this weakness,
as well, and every coastal state could claim
a continental shelf out to the same limit as ASEAN had often used diplomacy and
tried internationalization of regional issues
the EEZ, regardless of the depth of the sea
and to a maximum of 350 nautical mile if to involve external powers to balance
China's rising power. Such a strategy may
the natural shelf was naturally prolonged
that far. have often accorded the ASEAN a higher
diplomatic profile as in the Cambodian
Beginning from the 1990s South China
conflict in 1980s and early 90s and may
Sea enjoyed a period of de-escalation of have helped it to avert regional tension in
dispute as a result of good interaction of the short term; nevertheless it failed to hide
states in this region. During this period, the
its inherent weakness in dealing with the
general relations between the states in the
regional hegemonist, China.6
region tended to improve. This increased
China understands ASEAN countries
the possibility of conflict management and

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 South China Sea Dispute and India's Concerns 175
differences over itself and takes full that many countries, in and out of ASEAN,
advantage of it to drive further wedge welcome
in their such a United State roie so as to
balance
ranks. This is quite evident from the sharp China. Those who spoke n the issue
divergence between the Philippines and not just the claimant countries but
involved
also Indonesia, Japan and Australia. The
Malaysia over a proposed code of conduct
for its members and China covering a host that Beijing's dispute is only with
assertion
some member
of issues ranging from search and rescue to countries rather than with
joint exploration in the South ChinaASEAN
Sea. as a whole is difficult to reconcile
with the record.7
Since ASEAN countries are not united
in their stand concerning China, all of them, China has treated those ASEAN
individually and collectively, in effect have
members not having sea borders with Ch
gone out of their way to pursue a policy differently
of from those that do, and th
accommodation of Chinese interests on the sought only bilateral agreements with t
issue. disputants.

China surely has its own compulsions to The Outcome: Countless futile meetings
to divert attention away from China's
lay claim to practically the whole of South
China Sea and continue with its creeping continued effort to strengthen its military
occupation, but at the same time ASEAN'scontrol over its possessions and expanding
accommodative approach may also haveits de facto boundaries by barring its
emboldened the former to pursue what theneighbours from fishing in disputed waters
Filipino defence secretary Mercado called
or drilling for oil in waters far away from
'talk and take' policy. Even the limitedChina. In 2007 and 2008, it ever stopped
success ASEAN achieved in engaging BP and Exxon Mobil from drilling in waters
China in various dialogues on the Southoffshore Vietnam.
China Sea issue, like the ASEAN- China
China took into expensive claim to
dialogue.
the South China Sea a notch higher by
South China workshops organized by challenging (in 2009) a US Navy survey
Indonesia and the ARF initiatives, is largely ship, the impeccable, some 75 miles from the
because of the former's accommodation shore of China's Hainan Island effectively
of the latter's essential interests and extending its 12 nautical miles territorial
reservations with regard to national waters to a 200 mile Exclusive Economic
sovereignty and non-interference in the Zone (EEZ). The US maintains that under
internal affairs of other states. The dispute the UN law of the seas, it naval vessels have
between China and ASEAN erupted inthe right of free passage through the EEZ.
to the open after U.S. Secretary of StateIn March, China told senior US officials that
Hillary Clinton, in Hanoi for the annual its sovereignty over the South China Sea
meeting of the 27 nation ASEAN Regional was undisputed and one of the core issues
Forum, offered American support for "athat brooked no compromise.8
collaborative diplomatic process by all
In the absence of any other viable
claimants for resolving the various territorial
alternative, this is possibly the best option
disputes without coercion". that ASEAN can choose to resolve its
In the aftermath, it became obvious security dilemma vis-a-vis modernized

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 176

confident and resurgent China. Such a

exercises with Japan, Indonesia, South
strategy, however, will require ASEAN Korea,
to Philippines and Vietnam. In these
exercises naval vessels, i.e., INS Ranjit,
play a constructive role in the relationship
INSand
between the United States, Japan, India Ranvijay, INS Godavari and Petrol
vessel Sukanya participated.12 At the same
China, the key powers that would determine
the future balance in its dealings time,
withChinese Navy conducted many joint
these key players that ASEAN can exercises
play a with Australian Navy in South
China
constructive role in regional diplomacy andSea. The official sources declared
create a space within which the memberthat these exercise are important because of
countries can pursue their economic and
commercial importance of South China Sea
and its
political developments in a climate of peace sea lanes.13
and stability. ASEAN's close relationship
In 2005, India and Singapore conducted
with India could be particularly stabilizing
number of joint exercises under the name
factor. Above all, it is the ASEAN unity that
SIMBEX 2005.14 India has deliberately
will not only determine its future diplomatic
conducted these joint naval exercises in
profile, but also its ability to handle assertive
order to give impression that India has the
China.
ability to strike in China's traditional area
India's concerns in South China Sea of strategic influence.15 Another purpose of
these exercises is to promote naval ties with
India in April 2000 asserted that India's
Interest extends from Arabian Sea to South other countries in order to improve India's
naval capabilities.
China Sea.9 This view was also straightened
in annual report 1998-99 of Indian Ministry India's involvement in this region
of Defence named as "National Securitywould serve two main purposes. Firstly,
Environment".10 it would help in containing China with
India conducted number of unilateral the help of China's neighbours. Secondly,
and bilateral naval exercises in South China these exercises would bring India closer to
USA and its NATO partners. It would also
Sea in 2000. India sent many warships
increase India's influence in South-east
and naval vessels to Japan, South Korea,
Indonesia and Vietnam for these bilateral Asia as well as a efforts for ensuring energy
security for India.16
exercises. Prominent among these were INS
Rajput, INS Aditya, INS Kora etc. China's Warning to India
India made its appearances in the laterChina has warned India against
years also. In 2004, India deployed many
collaborating with Vietnam over oil and
naval vessels for Surveillance missions gas exploration in the disputed South China
as well as presence in this region.Sea. The The warning comes as reports suggest
that an Indian state-owned oil producer
presence in this region is required to protect
the maritime straits between Malacca strait is about to start joint exploration of gas
and South China Sea. resources despite protests from Beijing, the
official Global Times has reported.
This can be seen as India's projection
in sea water capability." In order to It's a reminder of the dangers that
play a greater role in South China Sea
still exist in the Sino-Indian relationship.
India conducted series of bilateral naval The Chinese media, quoting well known

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South China Sea Dispute and India's Concerns 177

a confrontation.
analysts from domestic university thinkIn the past, China has
demonstrated
tanks, suggest Delhi is being pushed that when
intoit comes to its own
this with the active support of the
backyard, United
particularly the South China Sea,
States. While the Global Times columnist it's very sensitive, sometimes to the point
avoided attributing any malevolence of to
being aggressive. For example, Chinese
Vietnamese intentions, the piece pointedly
fishing vessels have taken to harassing the
referred to the existence since June this 'offending"
year party, while cables where work
of a bilateral agreement between China and
is in progress have been deliberately cut.
Vietnam to settle all such disputes, 'through
So what would the Indian government
negotiations and consultations.17
do if ONGC-Videsh, the contracting
India's Position party in this case, suffered a similar fate
of consistent harassment at the hands
It goes without saying that the most
of clandestine Chinese 'workers'? It's
popular reaction in India would be to simply
questionable whether the Indian Navy could
ignore the Chinese and go ahead with the
project sufficient power in the South China
bilateral arrangement with Vietnam. After
Sea to ward off the Chinese Navy. Nor are
all, if India is considering an agreement with
the Vietnamese in any position to do so. Yet
Vietnam, it would automatically follow that
to come back home after the Chinese have
India considers these waters to be within
taken action would be a serious blow to our
Vietnamese jurisdiction. That seemed
prestige.
to be the position adopted by the Indian
government when Foreign Minister Krishna Yet India would also do well to keep in
told his Vietnamese counterpart Pham mind Binhthat we have a long unsettled border
Minh that India would 'go-ahead' and that with China, one that it's simply not possible
India's position was based on the 1982 UN police. As a result, the Chinese have
to fully
Convention on the Law of the Seas. the option, if they do wish to exercise it,
of intruding several kilometres across the
However, the real test would be if the
'Line of Actual Control.'As the LOAC isn't
rest of the countries involved in the South
demarcated on the ground, both India and
China Sea disputes, such as the Philippines,
China have different perceptions as to its
Malaysia, Brunei or even Taiwan, also
considered these waters to be Vietnamese. If actual alignment. There's clearly room for
creating mischief.
none of them have protested to either India
or Vietnam over the proposed agreement, As a result, what happens next could
then China's case becomes that much hinge on the role and attitude of the United
weaker and would be pure bluster. States, which is the only force capable
of thwarting the Chinese in the South
And what is the legal position of the
China Sea. The US has generally been
United States, Japan and perhaps South
ambivalent over Sino-Indian tensions. Such
Korea? Little has been said publicly of
ambivalence dates back at least as far as
course, when China protests, we always
1962, when Robert Komer, an influential
pay very close attention. But in this case,
National Security Council staff member,
India should also keep in mind the options
available should China decide to take its wrote a memo for President Kennedy that
stated:
protests to the next stage, thereby triggering

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The Indian Journal of Political Science 178

'That it is as much
will in ourto strategic
be unwilling allow China to control
interest to keep up over
a high these waters. Hope, China
degree ofsees the
Sino
Indian friction as it is
light to
of day soonprevent from
and responds for benefit of
spilling over into a large scale war.18
entire international community.

Complicating the Reference

US position is the
fact that it is currently faced
1. People's with
Daily, April significant
4, 2001.
economic, recession while China remains 2. The South China Sea Dispute: "Prospects for Preven
one of the biggest holders of US debt. This tive Diplomacy A special report of the United States
Institute of Peace in March 1995.
at a time when wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
3. Ibid.
have cost the United States hundreds of
4. Ghoshal Baladas, "ASEAN and the South China Sea
billions of dollars. With all this in mind,
Dispute World Focus April 2011.
Indian policy planners would do well to be
5. Ibid.
particularly cautious when dealing with6.the
Rowman Joshua P, "The U.S.- Japan Security All
potentially explosive situation in the SouthAESAN, and the South China Sea Dispute Asian S
China Seas. There's no point in bravado
vey (Vol xiv, no. 3 May/June 2005), p.429.

when we don't have the necessary military

7. Jacob Andrew, "China warns US to stay out of i
dispute". The New York Times, 26 July, 2010.
capacity to take on the Chinese. In the South
China Sea, India should beware. 8. Akyuz Yilmaz, "Export Dependence and Sustainab
of Growth in China and the East Asian Production
India has also made its position on work", South Centre Geneva, Research Paper No.
April 2010, pp. 37.
the South China Sea brutally clear. Amid
9. Fernandes cited in "India Challenges China in
the hype of Clinton's strong words that
China Sea, "Asia Times, 27 April, 2000.
elicited sharp reactions in Beijing, what
10. Kanwal Gmmeet, 'India's National Strategy in
went unnoticed was that India joined 11 clear Environment' www, idsa-india. org
other countries to openly declare that11.
theThapar Vishal, "Navy Deploys Warships in Sout
"South China Sea should remain open for
na Sea, " Hindustan Times, 18 October, 2004.

international navigation". It was an important

12. Editorial, "To improve Ties, Navy Takes South C
Sea Course, " Indian Express, 14 October, 2004.
statement made by MoS for External Affairs
13. The Hindu, 14 October, 2004.
Preneet Kaur at the ASEAN Regional
Forum "retreat" meeting.19 She was making14. Scott Daid, "India's drive for a Blue Water Navy",
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, winter 2007
the response to China's declaration that the 08, Vol. 10, Issue 2.
South China Sea would be an integral part of15. Hong Zhao "India and China: Rivals or Partners in
Beijing's "Core" interest, along with Tiber South East Asia?" Contemporary South East Asia,
and Taiwan.20 India has a strong interest (Vol. 29 No. 1, 2007) p. 130.

to keep the sea lanes of communications 16. Ibid.

free from great power rivalry. Japan, South17. Global Times.

Korea look upon Indian Navy to secure 18. Kalha R. S. , "India's interest in South China Sea",
www. idsa-india. org
safety in their maritime commerce as both
these countries depend, to a large extent, on19. Bagchi Indrani, "India to discuss China with US later
this month ", Times of India, 4 September 2010.
overseas energy supplies which pass through
20. Smith Craig S, "China Reshaping Military to toughen
the Indian Ocean. India has the unique its Muscles in the Region". New York Times, (October
distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to 16, 2002), p. 12.

Mangalore through the sea routes and India

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