Scribd
Upload
67 views

Edillon Case Digest

The document discusses a case where an attorney refused to pay membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the attorney should be disbarred for refusing to pay. The Court found that requiring lawyers to be members of the Integrated Bar and pay dues did not violate their constitutional rights and was within the Court's power to regulate the legal profession.

Uploaded by

BALDO, CHARITY M.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
67 views

Edillon Case Digest

The document discusses a case where an attorney refused to pay membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Supreme Court ruled that the attorney should be disbarred for refusing to pay. The Court found that requiring lawyers to be members of the Integrated Bar and pay dues did not violate their constitutional rights and was within the Court's power to regulate the legal profession.

Uploaded by

BALDO, CHARITY M.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 2

of 2 

In re Edillon
(A.M. No. 1928; 84 SCRA 554 [1978])

Facts:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court
but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issues:
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred due to refusal to pay his membership dues?

Held:
It is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is
hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.

Ratio Decidendi:
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7

All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program - the lawyers. Moreover,
there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution), from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration. Also, it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to
practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary. It is sufficient to state then that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have

Page 1 of 2
of 2 

been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the
authorities holding such are legion. Thus, the Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our
1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

Page 2 of 2

You might also like