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REESE LIBRARY
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IfUNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
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 LOGIC
FROM THE GERMAN

OF EMMANUEL KANT, M. A.
DOCTOR AND LATE REGIUS PROFESSOR OF PURE PHILOSOPHY Iff THX
VNIFERSITY OF KONINGSBERG, AND MEMBER OF THE
ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF BERLIN',

TO WHICH IS ANNEXED

S&etd) of &fe SLtfc anfc SHftrittngg

BY JOHN RICHARDSON,
AUTHOR OF A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE GROUNDS OP PROOF fOR
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, AND INTO THE THEODICY.

JLonuort :

PRINTED FOR W. SIMPK1N AND R. MARSHALL, STATIONERS' COURT,

LUDGATE-STREET.

1819.
 PREFACE
BY THE TRANSLATOR.

IT not augmenting the sciences, but disfiguring

is

them, when their boundaries are allowed to encroach

on one another. For which reason, and as logic is
a science, wherein nothing is fully shewn and
strictly proved but the formal rules of all thinking,
and as we by consequence abstract in it from all

objects of knowledge, as well as from their differ-

ence, our author has left us his logic free from
every extraneous admixture of either ontological,
or anthropological, or psychological, or metaphysi-
cal matter.

Whoever has but a clear and distinct conception

of the proper nature of this science, will soon dis-
cover the great difference between Kant's Logic
and all former treatises on the same subject, not
only by its
being purer and more systematical, but,
for all its scientific strictness ofmethod, by its be-
ing simpler, and divested of many of the tinsel

trappings of mood and of figure. The translator

therefore conceives himself warrantable in present-

ing it to the English public.*

* This
Treatise on Logic, which is intended for a manual for
lectures, is a posthumous work, and it is the editor Gottlob
 PREFACE.

He trusts too, that candid and competent judges

(unfortunately not a very numerous body

in any

nation) will not repudiate, on

a slight review, a

system, which is
purged of much useless, though
ostentatious, scholastic subtilty, and which is now

taught and flourishes in all the jprotestant univer-

sities of Germany. As to his labour (a very secon-

dary consideration), by the way, it will, if it or

any light that he may have thrown on a science
(the critical philosophy), which he has been study-
ing for years both in Germany and at home, shall
hereafter be found to deserve the approbation of
those judges, be amply requited.

Benjamin Fesche (doctor and private teacher of philosophy in

the university of Koningsberg, fellow of the Learned Society
of Francfort on the Oder, disciple, follower, and friend of

Kant) whom we have to thank for having thus faithfully pub-

lished his illustrious master's manuscript. The doctor has
promised us his Metaphysic also, which he likewise has in

manuscript in Kant's own writing, and which, the moment it

comes to hand, the translator intends to turn and to publish :

when we shall have

something systematical and complete of this
incomparably great man's own, and not be any longer troub-
led with scraps, mutilated extracts, and
imperfect quotations,
which cannot convey his sense or spirit, and only serve to de-
ceive the public by giving them a false notion of his method of

philosophising, by leading those totally ignorant of the princi-

ples of his system to prattle superficially of his profound doc-
trine, and by making a mere dogmatic jargon of his sublime
science.
 PREFACE* V

When the arts and the sciences are improved

and enlarged, many more words, than those which
sufficed in their infancy, become necessary, Nulli

unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus ea$

exprimerent .

qucesierunt. The author found the

technical or rather the scientific words and terms of
the German language inadequate to his method of
critical philosophising, and was consequently ob-
liged to coin new ones. The translator of course
is reduced to the same necessity in English; for
that language is not less copious than our vernacu-
lar tongue ;
and circumlocution or a periphrastical
style tends greatly to enfeeble philosophical reason-

ing.

Should any critic, however, or philosopher,

whose province it more immediately is, deign to
suggest words or terms more expressive of the
meaning, than his may be, he, as his sole aim, in,

clothing his author's thoughts in an English dress,

is, render their sense faithfully without any af-
to

fectation of novelty, and to contribute his mite to

propagate and diffuse useful and sublime know-

ledge, will, should this work have the fortune to
survive the present edition, then adopt those more

apposite words and terms with gratitude and plea-

sure ; for he, though in this instance little more
than a mere translator, is far above logomachy, or
a dispute about words.

True logic (saysWatts) does not require along

detail of hard words to amuse mankind, and to puff
VI PREFACE.

up the mind with empty sounds and a pride of false

learning ; yet some distinctions
and terms of art are

necessary to range every conception in its proper

class, and to keep our thoughts from confusion.

Though we may and in fact do syllogize botii

in conversation and in common writings, it is,

like Mr. Jourdain (in Moliere's Bourgeois Gentil-

homme), who spoke in prose for more than forty

years, without
it.
knowing

An acquaintance with the school form of ratio-

cination, however, indispensable to every man
is

not only of science, but of a liberal education. The

world (continues the doctor) is now grown so wise
as not to suffer this valuable science to be engrossed

by the schools. In so polite and so knowing an age,

every man of reason will covet some acquaintance
with logic, since it renders its daily service to wis-
dom and to virtue, and is subservient to the affairs
of common life, as well as to the sciences.

In short, the study of the species of logic con-

tained in this compendium should, in the academi-
cal instruction, precede the study of all philosophy,
a quarantine (so to say), which the disciple,
like

who has a mind to go out of the land of prejudice

and error into the territory of more enlightened
reason and of the sciences, must perform.

be hoped, that Kant's accurate and pro-

It is to

found method of philosophising, a small specimen

 PREFACE. Vll

of which is exhibited in this work,, will meet with a

better reception from our philosophers, than Har-
at the beginning, from our phy-
vey's doctrine did,
sicians. For Hume relates,, that no physician in
Europe, who had reached the age of forty, ever,
to the end of his life, adopted Harvey's doctrine of
the circulation of the blood, and that his practice
in London diminished extremely from the reproach
incurred by this great and signal discovery. So
slow is the progress of truth in every science,, even
when not opposed by either factious or supersti-
tf
tious prejudices I So slow
The growth of what is excellent ; so hard
T'attain perfection in this nether world 1
/'
 CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.

Page
f. Conception of Logic 9
It. Chief Divisions of Logic. Propounding Use of this
Science. Sketch of a History of it - 17
///. Conception of Philosophy in General. Philosophy
considered according to both the scholastic and the
mundane Conception. Essential Requisites and Ends

of Philosophising. The most general and the chief

Problems of this Science. - 25
IV. Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy - 32
y. Cognition in general. Intuitive and Discursive Cog-
nition ; Intuition and Conception) and their Dis-
tinction in particular. Logical and Esthetical Per"
fection of Cognition
- 42
VI. Particular logical Perfections of Cognition.
A. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to Quantity* 52
VII. B. Do. Do. Relation 6?
VIII. G. Do. Do. Quality*. 79
IX. D. Do. Do. Modality 91
.
Probability. Explanation of the Probable. Dis-
tinction of Probability ft om Verisimilitude. Ma-
thematical and Philosophical Probability. Doubt
both subjective and objective. Sceptical, Dogmatical,
and Critical Cast of Mind or Method of Philoso-
phising. Hypotheses 115
b
 CONTENTS.

APPENDIX.

Of the Distinction of theoretical and of practical Cognition 122

LOGIC.
PART THE FIRST.

General Doctrine of Elements.

See* L Of Conceptions - 125
II. of Judgments ~* * - .141
III. of Syllogism - 160

PART THE SECOND.

General Doctrine of Method.

I. the logical Perfection of Cognition by the
Promoting
Definition, Jhe Exposition^ and the Description of
Conceptions. ~ -
197

APPENDIX.
//. the Perfection of
Promdting Cognition by the logical
Division of Conceptions. 209
A Sketch of the Author's Life and Writings by the Trans-
lator. - - . . 216
 .

INTRODUCTION.

I.

Conception of

EVERY thing in nature, as well in the inanimat

as in the animated world, happens or is done ac-

cording* to rules, though we do not always

know
them. Water according to the laws of gra-
falls

vitation, and the motion of walking is performed

by animals according to rules. The fish in the

water, the bird in the air, moves according to rules.

All nature,, in general, is nothing but a coherence of

phenomena according to rules and there is no

;

where any want of rule. When we think we find

that want, we can only say that, in this case, the
rules are unknown to us.

The exercise of our powers too takes place ac-

cording to certain rules, which we observe without

a knowledge of them at first, till we attain it

by degrees by essays and a longer use of our

powers, nay, make them (the rules) so easy to
ourselves at last, that we have great difficulty to
think of them in the abstract. Universal grammar^
for instance, the form of a language in general.
is

But we speak without knowing grammar ; and he,

10 INTRODUCTION.

who speaks without knowing it, has a grammar and

speaks according to rules, of which he is not
sensible.

The understanding in particular, like all other

powers in general, is bound in its

operations to

rules, which we can investigate. Yes, the under-

standing is to be considered as the source and the
faculty of conceiving- of rules
in general. For, as
the sensitivity, or the sensitive faculty (sensuali-

tas*), is the faculty of intuitions, the understanding

isthat of thinking, that is to say, of reducing the

representations of ihe senses to rules. It is there-

fore desirous of looking for rules, and satisfied

when it has found them. Thequestion then is, as

the understanding is the source of rules, on what
rules it
proceeds itself.

For there is not the least doubt, but we can,

neither think, nor use our understanding otherwise,
than according to certain rules. But we can think
of these rules again by themselves, that is, we can
conceive of them without their application, or in
the abstract. What are these rules ?

All the rules, according to which the understand-

ing proceeds, are, cither necessary, or contingent.
The former are those, without which no use of the

understanding \vould be possible; the latter those,

without which a certain determinate use of it would

* As word
the sensuality has degenerated from its original

meaning in our language, we crave leave to substitute the word

Sensitivity to express the intuitive faculty.
 INTRODUCTION. 11

not take place. The contingent rules, which de-

pend upon a determinate object of cognition, are as

manifold as the objects themselves. For example,,
there is a use of the understanding in the mathe-
matics, in metaphysics, in moral philosophy, &c.
The rules of this particular determinate use of the

understanding in the aforesaid sciences are contin-

gent ; because contingent, whether we think of

it is

this or of that object to which these particular rules

have reference.
But, when we set aside all the cognition, which
we must borrow from the objects merely, and reflect
entirely upon the use of the understanding in gene-
ral, we discover those rules of it, which are absolute-
ly necessary inevery respect and without regard-
ing any particular objects of thinking; because
without them we could not think at all. Hence can
they be known a priori,that is, independently of all

experience ; because they comprise, without dis-

tinction of objects, merely the condition of the use
of the understanding in general, whether it (the use)
be pure or empirical. And hence it follows, that
the universal and the necessary rules of thinking in

general can regard form merely, by no means

its

its matter. |dConsequently the science, which com-

prehends these universal and necessary rules, is

merely a science of the form of the cognition of our
understanding, or of thinking. And we can frame
to ourselves an idea of the possibility of a science of

that sort, in the same manner as that of a universal

12 INTRODUCTION.

grammar, which contains nothing more than the

bare form of language in general, without words
that belong to the matter of language.
This science of the necessary laws of the under-
standing and of reason in general, or of (what
amounts to the same thing) the mere form of think-
ing in general, we name Logic.
As a science,, which extends to thinking in all

as the matter of
general,, without regarding objects,

thinking, Logic is,

1, to be considered as the foundation of all the

other sciences, and as the propedeytic (pre-exerci-

tation) of all use of the understanding. But it

cannot, because of its
totally abstracting from all

objects,
2,be an organon of the sciences.

By an organon we understand the direction

how a certain cognition is to be brought about.
But, thereto it is
required, that we previously know
the object of the cognition which is to be produced

according to certain rules. An organon of the sci-

ences therefore is not mere logic, because it

gives to presuppose the exact knowledge of the

sciences, of their objects, and of their sources.
The mathematics, for instance, as a science
which comprises ground the enlarging of the
of our cognition with respect to a certain use of
reason, are an excellent organon. Whereas logic,
as it, universal propedeytic of the use of the
the

understanding and of reason in general, must not be

 INTRODUCTION. 13

made to go into the sciences and to anticipate their

matter, is but a universal art of reason (canonica

Epicuri) to make
cognitions in general suitable to
the form of the understanding, and consequently in
this view onlybe denominated an organon, which
to

however serves, not for the enlarging, but merely

for the judging and the regulating of our know-

ledge.
3. As a science of the necessary laws of think-

ing, withoutwhich laws no use of the understanding

or of reason has place, and which are by conse-

quence the sole conditions, on which the understand-

ing can agree with itself or be consistent, the ne-
cessary laws and conditions of its right use logic,
however, is a canon. And it, as a canon of the un-
derstanding and of reason, must of course not bor-
row principles, either from any science, or from
any experience whatever it must comprehend no-
\

thing but laws a priori, which are necessary and ap-

pertain to the understanding in general.
Some logicians presuppose psychological princi-
ples in logic. But to introduce such principles as
those into it, is just as absurd as to take moral phi-

losophy from life. Were we to take principles

from psychology, that is, from the observations on
our understanding, we should but see how thinking-

goes on, and how

under the various subjective
it is

impediments and conditions; this would conse-

quently lead to the knowledge of merely contin-
gent laws. In logic, however, the inquiry is after,
 INTRODUCTION.

not contingent, but necessary rules; not how we

think, but how we are to think. Hence must the
rules of logic be taken, not from the contingent,
but from the necessary use of the understanding,
which is found in us without all psychology. In

logic we want know, not how the understanding

to

is and thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in

thinking, but how it shall proceed in thinking. It

is to teach us the
right use of the understanding,
that is.* its
O 3 with
use agreeing itself.

the foregoing explication of logic we may

From
derive the other essential properties of this science,
that it is,

4 , a science of
1

reason as to the matter, not

as to the mere form ; because its rules are not
taken from experience, and because it has reason
also for its
object. Logic, therefore, is a self-cog-
nition of the understanding and of reason, not how-
ever as to their faculties with regard to objects, but

entirely as to the form. In logic, we would not

ask, what does the understanding know, and how
much can it know ;
or how far does its
cognition
go ? For that were self-cognition with regard to
its material use, and consequently belongs to meta-
physic. In logic there is but the question, how
does the understanding know itself?
As a rational science, as to both the matter and
the form, logic finally is,

5, a doctrine, or demonstrated theory. For, as it is

occupied, not about the common and, as such, mere-

 INTRODUCTION. 15

Jy empirical use of the understanding and of rea-

son, but entirely about the universal and the neces-

sary laws of thinking in general, it depends upon

principles, a priori, from which all its rules can
be derived and proved to be that, to which all cog-
nition of reason must be conformable.
By being, as a science a priori or as
logic's
a doctrine, to be held a canon of the use of the

understanding, it is
essentially distinguished from
esthetic which, as mere criticism of taste, has not a
canon (a law), but only a norma (a pattern, or rule

merely for judging), which consists in universal

agreement. Esthetic contains the rules of the

agreement of cognition with the laws of the sensi-

tive faculty logic, on the other hand, the rules
;

of the agreement of cognition with the laws of the

understanding and of reason. That has but empi-

rical principles and of course can never be a sci-

ence or a doctrine, provided that we understand by

a doctrine a dogmatical instruction on principles
a priori, in which every thing is known by the un-

derstanding without any other information received

from experience, and which gives us rules, whose
observance yields the desired perfection.

Many, particularly orators and poets, have at-

tempted to reason on taste, but never been able to

give a decisive judgment on it. Baumgarten, the

philosopher, has formed a plan of an esthetic as a
science. But Home has distinguished the esthetic
righter by the appellation of Criticism, as that does
 16 INTRODUCTION.

not give any rules a priori, which determine the

judgment sufficiently, like logic, but takes its rules

a posteriori, and renders the empirical laws, ac-

cording to which we know the more imperfect and

the more perfect (beautiful), more general by com-

parison only.
Logic, then, is more than mere criticism ; it is a
canon, which afterwards serves for a criticism, that
is, for the principle of the judgment of all use of

the understanding in general,, though but of its right-

ness with respect to the mere form, as it (logic) is
as little an organon as universal grammar.
Universal logic, as the propedeytic of all use of
the understanding in general, is distinguished., in
another point of view, from transcendental logic., in
which the object itself is represented as an object
of the bare understanding, whereas universal logic
extends to all objects in general.
If we collect all the essential marks which pertain
to the full determination of the conception of logic,

we must give the following conception of it :

Logic, as to the mere form, but not as to the mat-

a science of reason; a science a priori of the
ter, is

necessary laws of thinking, with regard, not to par-

ticular objects,but to all objects in general ; by

consequence a science of the right use of the under^

standing and of reason in general, not subjective:

]y, that is, not on empirical (psychological) princi-

ples,
how the understanding thinks, but objective-

ly, that is, on principles a priori, how it must think.

 INTRODUCTION, 17

II.

Principal divisions of Logic. Propound-

ing. Use of this Science. Sketch of a
History of it.
LOGIC is divided^
1, into the analytic and the dialectic. The
analytic, by dissecting, discovers all the opera-
tions of reason, which we perform in thinking

in general. It is, therefore,, an analytic of the

form of the understanding and of reason, and
justly named
the logic of truth; because it contains
the necessary rules of all (formal) truth, without
which our cognition is, without regard to the ob-

jects, untrue in itself. It consequently is

nothing
more than a canon of dijudication (of the formal
rightness of. our cognition).
Should merely theoretical and universal doc-
this

trine be used as a practical art., that is, as an orga-

non, it would become a dialectic, a logic of appear-
ance (ars sophistica, disputatoria ) , which arises
from a mere abuse of the analytic, when, accord-
ing to the bare logical form, the appearance of a
true cognition whose marks must however be taken
from the agreement with the objects, consequently
from the matter, is fabricated.
In former times the dialectic was studied with

great diligence* By this art false principles were

 18 INTRODUCTION.

propounded under the appearance of truth, and

it was endeavoured,
conformably to them, to main-
tain thing-s in appearance.
Among the Greeks the
dialecticians were the counsellors and the orators,
who could lead the people as they pleased ; be-
cause the people can be deceived by appearances.
Dialectic, then, was at that time the art of appear-
ance. In logic, it was for a time propounded under
the name of the art of disputation, and so long was
all logic and all philosophy the culture of certain
praters, to fabricate every appearance. But no-
thing can be more unworthy of a philosopher, than
the culture of an art of that sort. In this significa-
tion, therefore, it must be totally exploded; and, in-
stead of it, a criticism of this false appearance in-

troduced into logic.

We shall consequently have two parts of logic :

the analytic, which propounds the formal criteria of

truth ; and the dialectic, which comprises the marks
and the rules, by which we can know, that something
does not agree with them. In this sense the dia-
lecticwould be of great use as a cathartic of the
understanding.
Logic usually divided still,
is

2, into natural or popular, and artificial or sci-en-

tific (logica scholastica).
But this division is improper. For natural logic,
or that of common not logic, but an anthro-
sense, is

as it handles the rules of

pological science, which,
the natural use of the understanding and of reason,
 INTRODUCTION. 19

that are known but in the concrete, of course with-

out consciousness of them in the abstract, has only

empirical principles. Nothing but artificial or

a science of the necessary
scientific logic, then, as

and of the universal rules of thinking, which, inde-

pendently of the natural use of the understanding
and of reason, jnust though they can be found at first

by the observation of that natural useonly,beknown

in the abstract a priori, deserves the name of logic.
3. Yet another division of logic is, that into theo-
retical and practical. But this division too is wrong.
Universal logic, which, as a mere canon, abstracts
from all objects, cannot have a practical part. This,
as practical logic gives to presuppose the knowledge
of a certain sort of objects, to which it is
applied, were
a contradiction in adjecto. Hence may we deno-
minate every science practical logic ; for in every
science we must have a form of thinking. Univer-
sal logic considered as practical, can therefore be

nothing more than a technic of learning in general,

an organon of the scholastic method.

In consequence of this division logic has a dogma
tical and a technical part. The former may be term-

ed the doctrine of elements, the latter that of me-

thod. The practical or technical part of logic is a
logical art that treats of the arrangement and of the
logical terms of art and distinctions, in order there-

by to facilitate the operations of the understanding.

In neither of the parts, however, whether* the

technical, or the dogmatical, must the least attention
20 INTRODUCTION.

be paid, either to the object, or to the subject of

thinking. In the latter reference logic may be
divided,
A, into pure and applied or mixed. In pure
logic we separate the understanding from the other
powers of the mind and consider what it does by
itself.Applied logic considers the understanding
as mixed with the other powers of the mind, which
influence its
operations and give it a false direction,
r
so that it does not proceed according to the law s,
\vhich it knows
be the right ones.
to
In strict propriety, mixed or applied logic must
not be termed logic. It is a psychology, in which

we consider how our thinking usually goes on, not

how it must
go on. At last, indeed, it says what
must be done, in order, under the various subjective
impediments and limitations, to make a right use of
the understanding ; besides, we may learn from it
\vhat promotes the right use of the understanding,
its helps or the correctors of
logical faults and errors.
But it is not propedeytic. For psychology, from
which every thing in applied logic must be taken, is
a part of the philosophical sciences, to which logic
must be the propedeytic.
It is said, that the technic, or the method of con-
structing a science, must be propounded in the ap-
plied logic. But that is in vain, nay, even perni-
cious. In that case we begin to build before we
have materials and give the form, but the matter is
\vanting. The technic must be propounded in
every science.
 INTRODUCTION. 21

Finally with respect to,

5,, the division
of logic into that of the common
and that of the speculative understanding, we have
to observe, that this science can by no means be thus
divided.
Itcannot be a science of the speculative under-

standing. For, as a logic of the speculative cogni-

tion or of the speculative use of reason, it were an
organon of other sciences, and not a mere propedey-
tic, or pre-exercitation, which must extend to all

possible use of the understanding and of reason.

Just as little can logic be a production of common
sense. This sense is the faculty of knowing the
rules of cognition in the concrete. But logic must
be a science of the rules of thinking in the abstract.

The universal human understanding may how-

ever be assumed as the object of logic; and in it we
then abstract from the particular rules of specula-
tive reason, and it is
consequently distinguished
from the logic of the speculative understanding.
As to the propounding of logic, it
may be, either
scholastic, or popular.

It, when it is suitable to the desire for knowledge,

to the capacities and to the culture of those, who
have a mind to treat the knowledge of the logical
rules as a science, is scholastic. But it, when it
descends to the capacities and the wants of
those, who have a
mind, not to study logic as
a science, but to use it in order to enlighten their

understandings, is
popular. In the scholastic
22 INTRODUCTION.

propounding the rules must be exhibited in their

universality, or in the abstract ;

in the popular, on
the other hand, in the particular, or in the concrete.
The scholastic propounding is the basis of the
popular nobody can propound any thing in a
; for

popular way, but he who can do it more profound-

ly also.
To conclude, we here distinguish propounding
from method. By method we understand the way
inwhich a certain object, to whose cognition it is to
be applied., is to be completely known. It must be
taken from the nature of the science itself, and of
course, as an order of thinking thereby determined
and necessary, cannot be altered. Propounding
signifiesnothing but the way of communicating or
delivering one's thoughts to others, in order to ren-
der a doctrine intelligible.
From what we have said of the nature and of the
end of logic, the value of this science and the use of
its
study may be estimated according to a right and
a determinate scale.

Logic is not a universal art of invention or of dis-

covery; not an organ on of truth; nor is it algebra,

by whose assistance hidden truths may be disco-
vered.
Yet it
(logic) is useful and indispensable as a cri-
ticism on cognition ; or for judging, as well of com-

mon, as of speculative reason, in order not to

instruct it, but to render it correct, and to make it

consistent,, or agree with itself. For the logical

 INTRODUCTION. 23

principle of truth is, the agreement of the under-

standing with its own universal laws.
Finally, with regard to the history
of logic, we
shall only mention what follows :

The logic of the present day derives its

origin
from Aristotle's Analytic. That philosopher may
be considered as the father of propounds
logic. He
it an organon, and divides it into analytic and
as
dialectic. His method is very scholastic and ex-
tends to the unfolding of the most general concep-
tions which form the basis of logic ; of which un-

folding, however, there is no use ; because almost

every thing in this case runs into mere subtilties, ex-
cept that the denomination of various operations of
the understanding is taken from it.
Besides, logic, since the times of the Stagyrite,
has not gained much in point of matter; nor can it

do so from its very nature. But it

may gain with re-
spect to accuracy, determinateness, and distinctness.
There are but few sciences, which can attain a per-
manent state, so as not to be altered any more. To
those both logic and metaphysic pertain. Aristotle
has omitted nothing of consequence belonging to the

understanding; we are but more accurate, metho-

dical or orderly in the science of logic.

was believed, that Lambert's Organon would

It

augment logic much. But it contains nothing ex-

cept more subtile divisions which, like all right sub-
tilties, sharpen the intellect, but are of no material

use.
24 INTRODUCTION.

Amongthe modern philosophers there are two,

Leibnitz and Wolf, who have introduced univer-
sal logic.

Malebranche and Locke, as they handle the

matter of cognition and the origin of conceptions, do
not treat of any logic in the proper sense.
Wolfs universal logic is the best we have. Some
have conjoined it with Aristotle's logic, for instance
Reusch.
Baumgarten, a man, who has great merit in this
respect, has concentrated Wolfs logic, and Mayer
made comments on Baumgarten.
Crusius too is numbered among the modern logi-
cians but he did not reflect sufficiently on the na-
;

ture of this science. For his logic contains meta-

physical principles, and consequently passes the
bounds of logic ; besides, he establishes a criterion
of truth, which can be none, and therefore gives in
this respect free scope to all extravagancies.
In the present times there is not one celebrated
logician, and we have no occasion for any new dis-
coveries for logic j because it
comprises the form of
thinking only.
 INTRODUCTION. 25

in.

Conception of Philosophy in general. Phi-

losophy considered according to both
the scholastic and mundane Concep-
the
tion. Essential Requisites and Ends of
Philosophising. The most general and
the chief Problems of this Science.

IT is sometimes difficult 4o explain what is un-

derstood by n science. But the science gains in
point of precision by the establishing of its deter-
minate conception, and many faults, which slip
in when the science cannot be distinguished from
the sciences allied to it, are avoided.

Previously to our attempt to give a definition of

philosophy, however, we must investigate the cha^
racter of the various cognitions themselves, and, as
the philosophical ones belong to the cognitions of
reason, explain, in particular, what is to be under-
stood by the latter.
The cognitions of reason are opposed to the his-
torical cognitions. Those are cognitions from prin-
from data. But a cognition
ciples; these, cognitions
may arise from reason and yet be historical ; when,
for example, a man of letters learns the produc-*
tions of the reason of others, his
cognition of them
is historical.
merely
Cognitions may be distinguished,
D
26 INTRODUCTION.

according to their objective origin, that is, the

1,

only source, from which a cognition is possible. In

this respect all
cognitions are, either rational, or
empirical ;

according to their subjective origin, that is,

2,
the way, in which a cognition can be acquired by
men. Considered under the latter point of view,
the cognitions are, either rational, or historical, in
whatever way they in themselves may have taken

their origin. A cognition therefore may be a cog-

nition of reason objectively, when it is but histori-
cal subjectively.
It is pernicious to know some rational cognitions

merely historically, but indifferent to know others

so. The mariner, for instance, knows the rules of

navigation historically from his tables; and that is

enough for him. But, when the lawyer knows law

historically only, he is rendered very unfit indeed
fora good judge, and utterly so for a legislator.
From the adduced distinction between the objec-
tively and the subjectively rational cognitions, it is
obvious, that one may learn philosophy in a cer-
tain respect without being able to philosophise. By
consequence he, who would become a philosopher,
must exercise himself in making a free and not
merely an imitative and, so to say, a mechanical
use of his reason.
We
have explained the cognitions of reason as
cognitions from principles; and hence it follows*
that they must be a priori. But there are two spe-
 INTRODUCTION. 27'

cies of cognitions, the mathematics and philosophy,

which are both a priori, and yet very considerably
distinct.

It is usually maintained, that the mathematics and

philosophy, as the former treats of quantity,
the
latter of quality, are distinct from one another as

to the object. That is however false. The dis-

tinction of these sciences cannot depend upon the

object; for philosophy extends to every thing
con- 1

sequently to quanta too, and the mathematics do so

likewise, as every thing- has a quantum.
far as

Nothing but the distinct sort of the cognition of

reason or of the use of reason in the mathema-
tics and in philosophy makes the specific distinction
between these sciences. Philosophy is, The cog-
nition of reason from mere conceptions; the ma-

thematics, on the other hand, are, The cognition

of reason from the construction of conceptions.
We construct conceptions when we exhibit them

by intuition a priori, without experience,, or when

we exhibit by intuition the object, which corres*
ponds our conception of it. The mathematician
to

never can use his reason according to mere

concep-
tions the philosopher never his by the construc-
;

tion of conceptions. In the mathematics reason is

used in the ;concrete the intuition however

is not

empirical, but we in this case make for ourselves

a
something priori the object of intuition.
We perceive, that the mathematics have this ad-

vantage of philosophy, that their cognitions are

2 INTRODUCTION.

intuitive; while those of it are but discursive. /Vticl.

the reason of our reflecting* more on quantities in

the mathematics is, that quantities may be con-
structed by intuition a priori ; whereas qualities
cannot be exhibited by intuition.

Philosophy the system of philosophical cog-

is

nitions, or of the cognitions of reason from concep-

tions. That the scholastic conception of this sci-
is

ence. According to the mundane conception, Phi-

losophy is the science of the ultimate ends of hu-
man reason. This sublime conception, gives a dig-
nity, that is, an absolute value, to philosophy. And
it is
really it
only that is of intrinsic value, and

gives a value to other cognitions.

all

It is usually inquired, What is the use of philo-

sophising and its scope philosophy even consi-
dered as a science according to the school con-
?
ception
In this scholastic sense of the word philoso-
phy extends to address only but ; it, relatively to
the mundane conception, extends to utility. In
the former respect philosophy is therefore a doctrine
of address; in the latter, a doctrine of wisdom;
the legislatrix of reason, and the philosopher, in
this view, not the artificer, but the legislator of

reason.
The artificer of reason or, as Socrates names
him, the philodox, endeavours merely after specu-
lative knowledge, without regarding how much the
kaowlcdge contributes to the final end of human rea-
 INTRODUCTION. 29

son ; he gives rules for the use of reason for all

sorts of ends. The

practical philosopher or the

sage, the teacher of wisdom both by doctrine

and by example,, is the philosopher in the proper
sense. For philosophy is the idea of a perfect
wisdom that shews us the final ends of human
reason.
To philosophy in the scholastic sense two things
are requisite :

The one, a sufficient stock of the cognitions of

reason ;
the other, a systematic coherence of these

cognitions, or their conjunction in the idea of a

whole.

Philosophy, not only allows a strictly systematic

coherence, but is even the only science, which
in the proper sense has a coherence of that sort,
and gives all other sciences systematic unity.
But, with regard to philosophy according to the
mundane sense (in sensu cosmicoj, it may be
termed, A
science of the highest maxim of the use
of our reason, provided that we understand by a

maxim, the internal principle of choice between

various ends.
For philosophy, in this signification, is the sci-
ence of the reference of all cognition and of all use
of reason to the scope of human reason, to which,
as the highest, all other ends are subordinated, and
in which they must conjoin to a unity.

The field of philosophy, in this cosmopolitical

sense, may be reduced to the following questions :
30 INTRODUCTION.

f 1. What can we know ?

2. What ought we to do ?

S. What may we hope for ?

4. What is man ?
The first question is answered by metaphysic,
the second by philosophy, the third by religion,

and the fourth by anthropology. But they at bottom

might all be considered as pertaining to anthropo-

logy; because the three first questions refer to the
last one.
The philosopher must therefore be able to deter-

mine,,

1, the sources of human knowledge,

sphere of the possible and the advanta-
%, the

geous use of all knowledge, and finally,

3, the boundaries of reason.
The last is the most necessary, as well as the
most difficult, but about which the philodox gives
himself no trouble.
To a philospher two things are chiefly requisite :

1, culture of his talents, and of address, in order to

use them for all sorts of ends ;

2, habit in the use of all means to whatever ends

hepleases. Both must be united; for without know-

ledge one will never become a philosopher ; but

knowledge alone, unless a proper conjunction of

all cognitions and a unity and an in-
abilities in

sight into their agreement with the highest

ends of
human reason be superadded, will never constitute
the philosopher.
 INTRODUCTION. 31

In general whoever cannot philosophise, cannot

name himself a philosopher. But philosophising
cannot be learned but by exercise,, and by the use
own reason.
of one's
And how should philosophy be susceptible of be-

ing learned ?
-Every philosophical thinker builds,
go to say, his own work upon the ruins of another;
but a work, stable in has never yet been
all its parts,

executed. Philosophy, therefore, as it is not yet

given, cannot be learned. But suppose there were
one extant, nobody, who should learn it, could even
then say, that he is a philosopher ; for his knowledge
of it never could be but subjectively historical.
In the mathematics it is otherwise. This science
may in some degree be learned ; for the proofs in it

are so evident, that every body maybe convinced of

them ;
andmay, on account of its evidence, be,
it

as it were, laid up as a certain and a stable doctrine.

Whoever would learn to philosophise must, on the
contrary, consider all the systems of philosophy as
histories of the use of reason only, and as objects of
the exercise of his philosophic talent.
The true philosopher, therefore, must, as a thinker
for himself, make a free use of his reason, not an
imitative use in a servile manner. But not a dia-

is, such a one as tends to give cogni-

lectic use, that

tions an appearance only of truth and of wisdom.

This the business of the mere sophister; but ab-

is

solutely incompatible with the dignity of the philoso-

pher, as a knower and teacher of wisdom.
32 INTRODUCTION.

For science is of an intrinsic value as an organoa

of wisdom only. But, as such, it is indispensable to
it; so that it may well be maintained, that wisdom
without science is a shadow of a perfection which
we never shall reach.
Who hates science, but does not love wisdom the
lesson that account, is named a
misologist. Misology
commonly arises from a want of scientific knowledge,
and from a certain sort of vanity therewith conjoined.
And sometimes those, who at first cultivated the
sciences with great diligence and success, but in the
end found no satisfaction in all their knowledge, fall

into the fault of misology.

Philosophy is the only science, which can yield

us this internal satisfaction ;
for it closes, so to

say, the scientific circle, and the sciences then ob-

tain first, by it, order and cohesion.
We therefore shall have, for the behoof of the ex-
ercise in thinking for one's self, 01 of
philosophising,
to consider, more the method of our use of reason,
than the propositions themselves, at which we arrive
by it.

IV.

Light Sketch of a History of Philosophy.

IT occasions some difficulty to determine the
bounds, where the common use of the understand-
ing ends and the speculative of it begins or, wheh ;

common cognition of reason becomes philosophy.

Yet there is in this case a pretty sure criterion :

The knowledge of the universal in the abstract is

 INTRODUCTION. CK>

of the universal in the concrete

speculative, that
common, Philosophical cognition isspe-
cognition.
culative cognition of reason, and consequently it
commences when the common use of reason begins
make universal in
to essays in the knowledge of the
the abstract
From this determination of the distinction be-
tween the common and the speculative use of rea-
son, it may be judged what nation made the begin-

ning in philosophising. Of all nations the Greeks

began the first to philosophize. For they began

the first to cultivate the cognitions of reason, not by
the clew of images, but in the abstract instead of ;

which other nations never endeavoured to render

conceptions intelligible to themselves but by images
in the concrete. And there are nations, for instance,
the Chinese and a few Indians, who treat of things

taken merely from reason, such as God, the immor-

tality of the soul, and many the like,

but do not en-
deavour to investigate the nature of these objects
according to conceptions and to rules in the ab-
stract. In case they make no distinction be-
this

tween the use of reason in the concrete and that in

the abstract. Among the Persians and the Ara-
bians some speculative use of reason is to be found ;
but they have taken its rules from Aristotle, of course
from the Greeks. In Zoroaster's Zend-Avesta not
the smallest trace of philosophy is to be discovered.
That holds good of the esteemed Egyptian wisdom
E
3 INTRODUCTION.

which, in comparison of the Greek philosophy, is a

mere trifle.

With regard to the mathematics too the Greeks

are the first that cultivated this part of the cognition

of reason after a speculative scientific method; as

they have demonstrated every theorem from ele-

ments.
But when and where the philosophic spirit first
arose among the Greeks, cannot be properly deter-
mined.
The first that introduced the use of speculative
reason, and from whom the first
steps of the human

understanding to scientific culture are derived, is

Thales, the author of the Tonic sect He, though he
was a mathematician too, is, as the mathematics in

general have always preceded philosophy, distin-

guished by the name of physicus.
Besides, the first philosophers dressed every thing
in images. For poetry, which is nothing but a
dress of thoughts in images, is more ancient, than

prose. Hence were men obliged at first to use, even

with regard to things that are merely objects of pure
reason, the language of imagery and the poetic

style. Pheretzydes is said to be the first author that

wrote in prose.
The Eleatics followed the lonians. The principle
of the Eleatic philosophy and of its founder, Xeno-
'

phanes, is, In the senses there is illusion ; the

source of truth lies in the understanding only/
 INTRODUCTION. 35

Among the philosophers of this school Zeno of

Elea distinguishes himself, both as a man of great
understanding and acumen, and as a subtile dia-
lectician.

Dialectic in the beginning signified the art of the

pure use of the understanding with regard to ab-

stractconceptions separated from all sensitivity.
Hence the many commendations of this art among
the ancients. Afterwards, when
those philosophers,
who totally rejected the testimony of the senses, ne-
cessarily attended to many subtilties, dialectic de-

generated into the art of maintaining and of im-

pugning every proposition. And thus did it become
a mere exercise for the sophisters, who had a mind
to reason on every thing, and studied to give ap-
pearance the colour of truth, to make black white.
For which reason the name of sophist, by which a
man that could speak reasonably and with a proper
knowledge of every subject was understood, is be-
come hated and contemptible, and instead of it the
name of philosopher is introduced.*
At the time of the Ionic school there arose in
Great Greece a manof rare parts, who, not only
erected a school, but formed and accomplished a pro-

ject that never had It is

Pythagoras, who
its like.

was born in Samos. He

founded a society of phi-
losophers, who were united in an alliance with one

*In English we distinguish between a Sophist and a Sophister;

the former was a teacher of wisdom a spe-
in
Athens, the latter is

cious or plausible but a false reasoner. T.

 36 INTRODUCTION.

another by the law of secrecy. He divided his

auditors into two classes; those of acusmatists

(axsoyjux&xoo,
who were allowed to hear only, and
those of acromatists (axwapaSowj), who were permit-
ted to ask questions too.
A few of his doctrines were exoteric., which he
propounded to every body ; the others were secret
and esoteric, destined to the members of his alliance
only, for some of whom he conceived
an intimate

friendship, and separated them entirely from the

rest. He made the physics and theology the vehicle
of his secret doctrines, by consequence the doctrine
of the visible and of the invisible. Besides, he had
various symbols, which in all probability were no-

thing but certain signs serving the Pythagoreans to

communicate their thoughts to one another.
The end of his alliance seems to have been no
other, than to purify religion from popular errors,
to moderate tyranny, and to introduce more loyalty
into states. But this alliance, which the tyrants be-
gan to had been destroyed a little be-
be afraid of,

fore Pythagoras' death, and this philosophical so-

ciety dissolved, partly by the execution, partly by

the flight and number of
the exile of the greater
the allied. The few that remained were novices.
And, as they did not know much of Pythagoras'
particular doctrines, we can say nothing certain and
determinate of them. Many doctrines have since
been ascribed Pythagoras, who was besides an
to

excellent mathematician, but which are certainly

counterfeited.
 INTRODUCTION. 37

The most important epoch of the Greek philoso-

phy commences with Socrates. For it is he, who

gave the philosophic spirit and all the speculative
heads quite a new practical direction And he is
almost the only one among- mankind, whose con-
duct approaches nearly to the idea of that of a sage.
Of his disciples Plato, who occupied himself more
in the practice.! doctrines of Socrates, is the most
eximious ; and of the disciples of Plato, Aristotle

(founder of the peripatetic sect), who on the other

hand improved speculative philosophy.
The Epicureans and the Stoics, who were the
sworn enemies of one another, followed Plato and
Aristotle Those place the chief good in a cheer-
ful heart, which they term voluptuousness; these
found it in the greatnessand the strength of the soul,
by which all the agremens, or sweets of life, maybe
dispensed with.
In speculative philosophy the Stoics are dialecti-
cal; in moral, dogmatical, and shew in their practi-
cal principles,by which they have sown the seeds of
the most sublime sentiments that ever were harbour-
ed,uncommonly great dignity. The founder of the
Stoic schoolis Zeno of Cittium. The most celebrated

men of this school among the Greek philosophers

are Cleanthes and Chrysippus.
The Epicurean school never could acquire the
reputation the Stoics had. But whatever may be
said of the Epicureans, it is certain, that they ob-
served the greatest moderation in enjoyment, and
38 INTRODUCTION.

were the best natural philosophers of all the thinkers

of Greece.
We have still to remark, that the chief Greek
schools bear particular names. The school of
Plato denominated, Academy, from the grove of
is

Academus, in which he taught that of Aristotle, ;

Lyceum ;* that of the Stoics, Porticus (orovj), a

covered passage, from which the word; stoic, is de-
rived ; the school of Epicurus, Horti; because he

taught in gardens. Plato's academy was followed

by three other academies, which were founded by

his disciples. Speusippus founded the first, Arcesi-
laus the second, and Carneades the third.
These academies inclined to scepticism. Both
Speusippus and Arcesilaus were of the sceptical cast
of mind, and Carneades was yet more so. On this
account the sceptics, these acute, dialectic philoso-

phers, were also named academics. The academics

then followed the first
great sceptic, Pyrrho, and
his successors. Their teacher, Plato himself, gave
occasion to that by propounding many of his doc-
trines dialogically, so that reasons pro and contra

were adduced without his deciding on them, though

he was at other times very dogmatical.
we begin the epoch of scepticism from Pyrrho,
If
we have a whole school of sceptics, who are mate-

rially distinguished
in their way of thinking and

*
The Lyceum (AyxsjovJ, says Lucianus de Gymnasiis, is

named from Apollo Luceus, to whom it was sacred. T.

 I

INTRODUCTION". 39

their method from the dogmatists, by their making

it the first maxim of all philosophical us of reason,
To suspend one's judgment notwithstanding the
greatest appearance of truth ; and laying down the
principle, That philosophy
consists in the equili-*

brium of judging, and teaches us to discover illusion.

But nothing more of these sceptics remains, than the
two works of Sextus Empiricus, wherein he has
collected all their doubts.
When afterward passed from the
philosophy
Greeks to the Romans, it was not enlarged ; for the
Romans never were but scholars.
In speculative philosophy Cicero is a disciple of
Plato, in moral a stoic. Epictetus, Antoninus the
philosopher, and Seneca belonged as the most emi-
nent to the stoic sect. There were no teachers of
natural philosophy among the Romans except Pliny
the elder, who has left us a natural history.
Culture disappeared at last
among the Romans
too, and barbarity succeeded, till the Arabians be-

gan, in the sixth and the seventh centuries, to apply

to the sciences and to revive Aristotle. The sciences
and the consideration of theStagyrite in particular,
then recovered themselves in the West, but he was
followed in a servile manner. In the eleventh and
the twelfth centuries the scholastics appeared ; they
explain Aristotle and carry his subtiltiesto infinite.

They occupied themselves about nothing but mere

abstractions. This scholastic method of false phi-

losophising was supplanted at the time of the re-

40 INTRODUCTION.

formation ; and then there were eclectics in philoso-

phy, that is, thinkers for themselves, who acknow-

ledge no school, but seek truth, and adopt it where
they find it.

But philosophy owes its amendment in more mo-

dern times, partly to the greater study of nature,

partly to the conjunction of the mathematics with

the physics. The order, which has been occasion-
ed in thinking by the study of these sciences has
diffused itself over the particular branches of philo-

sophy in the proper sense. Bacon ,is the first and

the greatest natural philosopher of more modern
times. In his researches he treads the path of ex-

perience, and calls the attention to the importance

and the indispensableness of observations and of
experiments to the discovery of truth It is how-

ever difficult to say whence the amendment of spe-

culative philosophy comes. Descartes acquired
not little merit with regard to
by contributing it

much give thinking distinctness by his erected

to

criterion of truth, which he puts in the clearness

and the evidence of knowledge.
Leibnitz, however, and Locke, are to be num-
bered among the greatest and the most meritorious
reformers of philosophy in our times. The latter
endeavours to dissect the human understanding, and
to shew what powers of the mind and what opera-

tions of it
belong to this or to that cognition. But
he has not finished the work of his investigation;

and his procedure is dogmatical, though his works

 INTftODUfcTION. 41

have been productive of this advantage, that philo-

sophers begin to study the nature of the mind bet-
terand more profoundly.
As to the particular dogmatic method of philoso-
phising peculiar to Leibnitz and to Wolf, it is very
faulty. And there is so much illusion in it, that it

isabsolutely necessary to suspend the whole proce-

dure, and, instead of it, to introduce another the
method of the critical philosophising, which con-
sists in this,
'
To
inquire into the procedure of rea-
son itself, to dissect the whole human cognitive fa-

culty, and to try how far its boundaries may ex-

tend/*
In our age the physics are in the most flourishing
state, and there are great names indeed among the
natural philosophers, for instance, Newton. Later
philosophers cannot properly be mentioned at pre-
sent as distinguished and permanent names; be-
cause every thing in this science is, so to say, in a
continual flux. What the one builds up, the other
pulls down.
In moral philosophy we have not made greater

progress than the ancients. But, as to the meta-

physics, it seems as if we were at a loss with regard

* It
may not be improper here to mention, that Kant himself
is the founder of the critical philosophy, a
system, which begins
with a most accurate and a profound philosophy of mind, but

which, though it has obtained long and justly supplanted all

former systems in Germany, is (to the great discredit of our dog-

matising sophists be it told) not yet known in our island ! T.

F
42 INTRODUCTION.

to the investigation of metaphysical truths. At pre-

sent a sort of indifference for this science prevails ;
since many seem to pride themselves in speaking

contemptuously of metaphysical inquiries, as mere

useless brains-beating speculations. And yet me-
laphysic is true philosophy.
Our age is that of criticism, and we must see what
will become of the critical essays of our time with

respect to philosophy and to metaphysic in particu-

lar/

V.

Cognition in general. Intuitive and dis~

cursive Cognition ; Intuition and Con-
ception, and their Distinction in parti-
cular. Logical and Esthetical Perfec-
tion of Cognition.

ALL our cognition has a two- fold reference ; first,

.a reference to the object, secondly, that to the sub-

ject. It, in the former respect, refers to representa-

tion; in the latter, to consciousness, the universal

condition of all cognition or knowledge in the gene-
ral (and which, properly speaking, is a representa-

tion that another representation is in us, T.)..

* Those who do not read German will find Kant's critical

works translated into Latin by professor Borne of Leipsic. But,
as they are very difficult of translation, it were better to study

them in German. They only give this age a just title to be

earned ih$ age of criticism. T.
 INTRODUCTION. 43

In every cognition matter, that the object,

is,

nd form, that is, the way, in which we know the

object, must be distinguished. If a savage for ex-

ample, sees at a distance a house, whose use he

does not know, he has, in the representation before
him, the very same object, as another, who knows
it
determinately to be fitted for the habitation of
men. But, as to the form, this knowledge of the
same object is distinct in both. It with the one is
mere intuition, but with the other at once intuition
and conception.
Thedistinction of the form of cognition depends

upon condition, which accompanies all knowing

a
consciousness. If *I am conscious to myself of the

representation, it is clear; if I am not it is obscure.

As consciousness is the essential condition of
all
logical form of cognitions, logic can occupy it-

self, and must do with clear representations

so,

only, not with obscure ones. We

consider in logic,
not how representations arise, but how they agree
with the logical form. And in general logic cannot
handle mere representations and their possibility.
That leaves to the metaphysics to do.
it It occu-

about the rules of thinking merely, about

pies itself
conceptions, judgments, and syllogisms, as the
means by which all
thinking is performed. It is

true, something precedes before a representation be-

comes a conception. And that we will shew in
its
proper place. But we shall not inquire How re-

presentations arise. Logic indeed treats of kaow-

44 INTRODUCTION.

ing* ; because in it
thinking has place. Representa^
tion however is not cognition, but cognition al-

ways gives to presuppose representation. And this

can absolutely not be explained.* For it would al-

ways be necessary to explain what representation

is
by another representation.
All clear representations, to which only the lo-

gical rules can be applied, may be distinguished

with regard to distinctness and to indistinctness. If
we are conscious to ourselves of the whole representa-
tion, but not of the multifarious that is contained in

it,the representation is indistinct. For the diluci-

dation of the thing, take first an example by inr
tuition :

We discover a country house at a distance. If

we are conscious to ourselves, that the object per-

ceived by intuition a house, we must necessarily is

have a representation of its different parts the

windows, the doors, &c. For, if we did not see the

parts, we could not see the house itself. But we are

not conscious to ourselves of this representation of
its various parts, and hence is our representation of
the object itself an indistinct one.
If we wish to have an instance of indistinctness
in conceptions, the conception of beauty may serve
for the purpose. Every one has a clear conception
of beauty. But various marks occur in this concep-
tion ; among others, that the beautiful must be
. . - - - - - . - - - - - -
ifi _

* Internal determination of the

Except by saying, that it is

mind, in any relation of time, in general. T.

 INTRODUCTION. 45

something that an object of the senses, and that

is

pleases universally. If we cannot disentangle these

and the various other marks of the beautiful our con-
ception of it is never but indistinct.
An indistinct representation the disciples of Wolf
term a confused one. But this epithet is not proper ;
because the opposite of confusion is, not distinct-
ness,, but order. Distinctness is an effect of order,

and indistinctness that of confusion; and every

confused cognition is of course an indistinct one.
But the proposition does not hold conversely ,

not every indistinct cognition is a confused one.

For in cognitions, in which there is no multifarious
to be met with, there is, neither order, nor confu-
sion.

That is the case with all simple representations,

which never become distinct ; not because confu-
sion, but because no multifarious, is to be met with
in them. They must therefore be termed, not con-
fused, but indistinct.
And even in the
composed representations, in
which a variety of marks may be distinguished, the
indistinctness often proceeds from weakness of con-

sciousness, not confusion. There maybe distinct-

ness as to the form, that is to say, I may be con-

scious to myself as to the multifarious in the repre-
sentation ; but as to the matter the distinctness may
decrease the degree of consciousness becomes
when
smaller, though perfect order exists. And that is
the case with abstract representations.
 6 INTRODUCTION.

Distinctness itdelf may be two-fold :

First,, a sensual one. This consists in the con-

sciousness of the multifarious by intuition. We

see, for instance, the galaxy as a whitish streak ;
the rays of light from the single stars in it must ne-

cessarily have entered into the eye. But its

repre-
sentation was but clear, and becomes first
by the
telescope distinct ;
because we now discover the

gingle stars contained in the galaxy :

Secondly, an intellectual one : Distinctness in

conceptions, or distinctness of the understanding.

This depends upon the dissection of the conception
with respect to the multifarious that comprised in
is

it (the conception). There are, for example, con-

tained in the conception of virtue as marks, , the 1

conception of liberty, 2, that of the adherence

to rules (of duty), and 3, that of the overcoming
of the power of the inclinations, when they are re-
pugnant to those rules. When we thus resolve the
conception of virtue into its
single constituents, we
render it distinct to ourselves just by this analysis.
But by this act of rendering distinct we add nothing
to a conception ; we but explain it. Hence are
conceptions amended in distinctness, not as to the
matter, but as to the form.
If we reflect on our cognitions with regard to the
two essentially distinct fundamental capacities or fa-

tuities,those of sensitivity and of understanding,

whence they arise, we shall hit the distinction be-
tween intuitions and conceptions. All our cogni*
 INTRODUCTION. 47

lions,considered in this view, are either intuitions,

or conceptions. The former have their source in
the sensitivity, the power of intuitions ; the latter,
in the understanding, the faculty of conceptions.
This is the logical distinction between the under-
standing and the sensitivity, according to which dis-
tinction this yields nothing but intuitions, that, on
the contrary, nothing but conceptions. Both funda-
mental faculties may however be considered in ano-
ther point of view and defined in another way ; the

sensitivity as a passivity or receptibility, the under-

standing as a spontaneity, or self-active power. But

thismode of explication is metaphysical, not logical.
And the sensitivity is usually named the inferior fa-
culty, the understanding, on the other hand, the

superior ; because the sensitivity gives the mere

materials for thinking, but the understanding dis-

poses of them and reduces them to rules or concep-

tions.

In the distinction between intuitive and discur-

sive cognitions, or between intuitions and concep-
tions, here adduced, the variety of the esthetical and
of the logical perfection of cognition is founded.
A cognition naay be perfect according, either to
laws of the sensitive faculty, or to those of the cogi-
tative ; in the former case it is
esthetically perfect,
in the latter logically so. The esthetical perfection
and the logical therefore are of a discrepant sort;
the former* has relation to the sensitivity, the latter
to the intellect. The logical perfection of cogni-
 48 INTRODUCTION.

tion agreement with the object ; By

depends upon its

consequence upon universally valid laws, and can of

course be judged according to rules a priori. The
esthetical perfection consists in the agreement of
the cognition with the subject, and bottoms upon
the sensitive capacity peculiar to every single per-
son. In the esthetical perfection, then, no objec-

tively and universally valid laws, relatively to which

it would be judged of a priori in a universally valid
manner for all thinking beings in general have place.
If,however, there are universal laws of sensitivity,
which hold good, not objectively, for all thinking be-
ings in general, yet subjectively, for all
humankind,
an which comprises the ground
esthetical perfection,

of a subjectively universal, or a general, compla-

cency, may be conceived. This is beauty what

pleases the senses intuitively and can be the object
of a universal complacence 3 because the laws of
intuition are universal laws of sensitivity.

By this agreement with the universal laws of

the sensitive receptibility the proper self-sufficient
Beautiful, whose essence consists in the mere form
is from the Agreeable^
specifically distinguished
which pleases merely in the sensation by charms or
moving, and can on that account be nothing but the
ground of a mere private complacency.
And it is this essential esthetical perfection, which
comports with the logical perfection, and admits of
being conjoined with it the best of any.
Considered under this point of view the esthetical
 INTRODUCTION. 49

perfection may be advantageous, with regard to that

essential beautiful, to the logical perfection. But it, in

another respect, is
disadvantageous to it, if we con-
sider in the esthetical perfection nothing but the un-
essential beautiful-^the charming or the moving,
which pleases in the mere sensation and refers, not
to the bare form, but to the matter of the sensitivi-

ty.
For charms and moving can spoil the logical
perfection in our cognitions and judgments the most*
In general there always remains between the esthe-
tical and the logical perfection of our cognition a sort

of contest, which cannot be fully put an end to. The

understanding wants to be informed, the sensitivity

to be animated ;
the former desires insight, the lat-
ter capability. Cognitions, if they are to instruct,
must be solid or profound ; they are to entertain,
if

If a propounding is beau-
they must be beautiful.
tiful, but shallow, it may please the sensitivity, but

cannot the understanding ; if it conversely is pro-

found, but dry, it can please the understanding

only, not the sensitivity.

As the want of human nature, however, and the
nd of the popularity of cognition require, that we
should endeavour to unite both perfections, we must

study to furnish those cognitions with an esthetical

perfection, which are in general capable
of it, and
to render a scholastic logically perfect cognition

popular by the esthetical form. But in this endea-

vour to join the esthetical and the logical perfection
in our cognitions \ye must not neglect the following
G
50 INTRODUCTION.

rules : the logical perfection is the basis of

1, that

all other perfections, and therefore must not be

quite postponed or sacrificed to any other ; 2, that

the formal esthetical perfection the agreement of

cognition with the laws of intuition be carefully

considered; because just in it the essential beau-
tiful, which can be the least united with the logical

perfection, consists; 3, that we must be very cau-

tious with charms and moving, by which a cogni-
tion acts upon sensation and obtains an interest for
it; because hereby the attention is so easily drawn
from the object to the subject ; from which then a

very disadvantageous influence on the logical per-

fection of cognition must obviously arise.
In order to make the distinctions, which have place
between the logical and the esthetical perfections of
cognition, still more knowable, not only in the

general, but in various particular points of view,

\ve shall compare them together with regard to the

four chief points of quantity, of quality, of relation,

and of modality, upon which the stress lies in the
judgment on the perfection of cognition.
A cognition is perfect, 1, as to quantity, when it

(a cognition)
is universal ; 2, as to quality, when it

is distinct; 3, as to relation, when it is true; and

4 and lastly, as to modality, when it is certain.
Considered in those points of view, a cognition
is logically perfect, as to quantity, when
(a cogni- it

tion) has objective universality (universality of the

conception or of the rule) 3 as to quality, when it has
 INTRODUCTION. 51

in the concep-
objective distinctness (distinctness
tion) ; as to relation, when it has objective truth;
and finally as to modality, when it has objective

certainty.
To those logical perfections the following estheti-
cal perfections correspond relatively to those four

main points :

1, the esthetical
universality.
This consists in
the applicableness of a cognition to a multitude of

objects, which serve for examples, to which its ap-

plication can be made, and by which it
may also be
used for the purpose of popularity ;

2, the esthetical distinctness* This is the distinct-

ness by intuition, whereby an abstractly formed
conception is exhibited in the concrete by examples,
or illustrated ;

3, the esthetical truth. A merely subjective

truth, which consists but in the agreement of the

cognition with the subject and with the laws of the

appearance of sense, and by consequence is
nothing
more than a universal appearance;
4, the esthetical certainty. This depends upon
what is
necessary in consequence of the testimony
of the senses, that is, what is confirmed by both sen-
sation and experience.
In the perfections just mentioned two parts, mul-
tifariousnessand unity, whose harmonious conjunc-
tion constitutes perfection in
general, always occur.
With the understanding the unity lies in the con-

ception, with the senses in the intuition.

52 INTRODUCTION;

Mere multifariousness without unity cannot satis-

fy us. And hence is truth the chief of all perfec-

tions; because it is,
by the reference of our cogni-
tion to the object, the ground of unity. And even
in the esthetical perfection truth always remains the
conditio sine qua non, the chief negative condition,
\vithout which nothing can please taste universally.
Hence needs nobody hope to make progress in the

belles lettres, if he has not founded his cognition in

logical perfection. And, as well the character, as

the art of a genius, betrays itself in the greatest

possible union of the logical with the esthetical

perfection in general with respect to such knowledge,
as is intended at once to edify and to entertain.

VI.

Particular logical Perfections of Cogni-

tion.
A. Logical Perfection of Cognition as to
Quantity. Greatness. Extensive and
intensive Greatness. Copiousness and
Profoundness or Importance and Ferti-
lity of Cognition. Determination of
the Horizon of our Cognition.
.

THE greatness (or quantum) of cognition may be

taken ina two-fold sense, as, either extensive, or
intensive. The former refers to the sphere of cog-
nition anci consequently consists in its abundance
 INTRODUCTION. 53

and variety (or multifariousness) ; the latter, to its

contents, which regard the great value ( Vielgultig-

keit) or the logical importance and fertility of a

cognition, provided that it is considered as the

ground many and of great consequences ( non

of
multa sed multum).
In the enlarging of our cognitions or in advan-

cing them to perfection, as to their extensive quan-

tum, it is
good to calculate how
a cognition far

agrees with our ends and our capacities. This re-

flection concerns the determination of the horizon
of our cognitions, by which horizon is to be under-
stood, The adequateness of the quantum of all the

cognitions to the capacities and the ends of the

subject.
The horizon may be determined,
.1., according to the faculty or the powers
logically,
of cognition with respect to the interest of the un-
derstanding. We
have here to judge how far we
can go in our cognitions, how far we shall go in
them, and how far certain cognitions serve with a
logical view for means to these or to those princi-
pal cognitions, as our ends ;

2, esthetically, according to taste with regard to

the interest of feeling. Who determines his hori-
zon esthetically, endeavours to accommodate the
science to the taste of the public, that is to say, to
render it popular, or in general to acquire such

cognitions only,asmaybe universally communicated,

5* INTRODUCTION.

and as please the class of the illiterate and in which

they are interested ;

and according- to the utility with

3, practically,

regard to the interest of the will. The practical

horizon, if it is determined according to the influ-

ence^ which a cognitbn has on our morality, is

pragmatical and of the greatest moment*

Thehorizon then concerns the judgment and
the determination of what man can know, of what
he may know, and of what he ought to know.
As to the theoretically or logically determined
horizon in particular and it only can be the mat-
ter in hand in this place we may consider it in,
either the objective,, or the subjective, point of
view.
With regard to the objects the horizon is, either

historical, or rational. The former is much wider

than the latter, immensely great ; for our
nay, it is

historical knowledge has no bounds. Whereas the

rational horizon may be fixed ; it for example
may
be determined to that sort of objects, to which the
mathematical cognition cannot be extended. And
with respect to the philosophical cognition of rea-
son, how far reason can
go in it a priori, without
any experience.
_. .
:

*
KnowledgCj provided that it serves for accomplishing our
is
design, (according to Kant) Pragmatical belongs to wel-
fare. T.
 INTRODUCTION. 55

Relatively to the subject the horizon is, either

the universal and absolute, or a particular and con-
ditional (a private) one.

By the absolute and universal horizon is to be

understood the congruence of the boundaries of
the human cognitions to those of all human perfec-
tion in general. And therefore the question, What
can man,, as man in
general, know ? now occurs.
The determination of the private horizon de-

pends upon various empirical conditions and special

considerations, for instance, of age, of sex, of rank,
of the business or the profession, and
many the
like.
Every particular class of men has, with re-
gard to its
special powers of knowledge, ends and
stations peculiar to
every head in proportion to
it ;

the individuality of its powers and of its station,

its own horizon.
Finally, we may conceive of a
horizon of sane reason and of one of science, which
latter requires principles, in order to determine
according to them what we can know (scientifical-

ly) and what we cannot.

What we cannot know is above our horizon ;

what we need not know or have no occasion to

know, without our horizon. The latter however

tan hold but relatively, with regard to this or to that

particular private end, to the attaining of which

certain cognitions might, not only contribute no-
thing, but even be an impediment. For no cogni-
tion, though we may not always be able to see its
utility, is
absolutely useless in every respect. It is
 56 INTRODUCTION.

therefore both an unwise and an

unjust reproach,
with which great men; who cultivate the sciences
with laborious industry, are
charged by shallow
pates, when they ask, What is the use of doing so?
This question must by no means be put by those
who have a mind to occupy themselves about the
sciences. A
science, suppose it could throw a

light on any one possible matter, were then useful

enough. Every logically perfect cognition is al-
ways of some possible use which, though hitherto
unknown to us, will perhaps be found out by pos-
terity. Hadnothing been ever considered in the
culture of the sciences, but their material gain, their

utility, we should have, neither arithmetic, nor

geometry. Besides, our understanding is so order-

ed, thatit finds satisfaction in the mere insight, and
yet more than in the advantage that arises from it.
This observation was made so early as by Plato.
A man feels his own excellence on the occasion ;
he sees the meaning of having understanding.
Men, who do must envy the brutes.
not see that,
The internal
value, which cognitions are. of by
logical perfection, is not to be compared with their
external value -that in. the application.
As that, which lies without our horizon, if we need
not know it according to our views, as not being

necessary to us, is to be understood in a relative

sense only, by no means in the absolute one, that,
which lies below our horizon, if we should not know
it, as being pernicious to us, is to be so likewise.
 INTRODUCTION. 57

With a view to the enlarging and to the deter-

mining of the boundaries (ihe demarcation) of our

cognition.the following rules are
tobe recommended :

one must,,

1, determine his horizon early, yet not sooner,

than he can do it himself; which commonly does

not happen before the twentieth year;
2, not alter it easily and often (not go from one

thing to another) ;
3, not measure the horizon of others by his own,
nor hold useless that which is of no use to him it :

would be audacious to pretend to determine the

horizon of others ; because one does not sufficiently
know,, either their capacities, or their views;
4, neither extend it, nor limit it, too much. For

he, who would know too much, knows nothing at

last, and who on the contrary thinks some things
do not concern him often deceives himself; as

when, for instance, the philosopher thinks he can

do without history ;
and we should endeavour,
5, previously to determine the absolute horizon
of the whole human race (as to the past and the fu-
ture time), and in particular,

6, to determine the place, which our science oc-

cupies in the horizon of all knowledge. The uni-
versal encyclopedy, as a universal map of the sci-

ences, serves for that purpose ;

7, in the determination of a particular horizon

carefully for what branch of knowledge he

to try
58 INTRODUCTION.

has the greatest capacity and in what he takes the

greatest delight; what is more or less necessary

with regard to certain duties ; what cannot consist
with the necessary duties ; and finally,
8, always to enlarge more than to contract our
horizon.
In general need not be apprehensive from
\ve

the enlarging of the sciences of what d' Alembert is.

For the load does not oppress us, but we are at a
loss for room for our knowledge. Criticism on rea-

son, on history and on historical works, a univer-

sal spirit, which extends to human knowledge in

gross, and not merely in detail, will always dimi-

nish the sphere without lessening the matter. No-
thing but the dross falls from the metal or the baser
vehicle ; the veil, which was necessary for a cer-

tain time,, drops. With the enlarging of natural

history, of the mathematics, &c. new methods

which shorten the old matter and render the great
number of books unnecessary, will be found out.

Upon the discovery of such new methods and prin-

ciples it will depend that we, without clogging the
memory , can find every thing at pleasure with their
assistance. Hence will he, who, like a genius
shall comprise history under ideas, which can al-

ways remain, deserve well of it.

To the logical perfection of knowledge, with re-

gard to sphere, ignorance, a negative imper-

its

fection, or an imperfection of want, which, on ae-

ountof the limits of our understanding, remains. in, r

separable from our knowledge, is

opposed.
 INTRODUCTION* 59

We consider ignorance both under a sub-

may
jective and under an objective point of view.
Objectively taken, ignorance is, either a ma-
1,

terial, or a formal one. The former consists in a

want of historical, the latter^ in that of rational,

cognitions. One must not be quite ignorant in any

branch, but he may by all means limit the histori-

cal knowledge in order to apply the more to the ra-

tional, or conversely.

2, In a subjective sense, ignorance is, either a

learned, a scientific, or a common one. Who dis-

tinctly sees the limits of knowledge, consequently

the field of ignorance, where it
begins the philo-

sopher, for example, who sees and proves how lit-

tle we can know with respect to the structure of
gold for want of the thereto requisite data, is
ig-
norant scientifically., or in a learned manner. He,
on the other hand; who ignorant without per-
is

specting the grounds of the bounds of ignorance

and giving himself any trouble on that account, is
so in a vulgar, not a scientific, manner. Such a
man does not so much as know, that he knows no-
thing For one never can represent to himself his

ignorance otherwise, than by science, like a blind

man, who cannot represent darkness to himself
till he gets eyesight.
The knowledge of one's ignorayce therefore

gives us to presuppose science, and makes one mo*

dest, whereas imaginary knowledge puffs up. So*
crates' ignorance was a commendable one 5 pro*
60 INTRODUCTION.

perly Speaking, a knowledge of his want of know-

ledge, according to his own avowal. Conse-
quently those, who possess a great deal of know-
ledge, and are for all that astonished at the quantum
of what they do not know, cannot be reproached
with ignorance.
In general the ignorance in things, whose know-

ledge goes above our horizon, is inculpable ; and it

may be allowed (though but in the relative sense)
with regard to the speculative use of our cognitive

faculty, provided
that the objects lie, not above our

horizon, but without it. But ignorance is

disgrace-
ful in things, to know which it is
very necessary
and even easy for us.
There is however a between being ig-
distinction

norant of any thing and taking no notice of

it. It is good to take no notice of a great deal of

that which is not good for us to know. Abstracting

is still
distinguished from both. We abstract from
cognitionwhen we take no notice of its applica-
tion, by which means we obtain it in the abstract
and can then consider it the better in the universal
as a principle. Such an abstracting from what
does not belong to our purpose in the knowledge of
a thing is useful and praiseworthy.
Logicians commonly are historically ignorant.
knowledge without determinate bounds
Historical
is
polyhistory ; this puffs up. Polymathy is occupied
in the cognition of reason. Both historical knowledge
and knowledge of reason, extended without determi-
 INTRODUCTION. 6l

nate bounds, may be denominated pansophy. To hia

torical knowledge the science of the instruments of
learning-, philology, which comprehends
a critical

knowledge of books and of languages (literature

and linguistic), belongs.
Mere polyhistory is, so to say, learning, which is
eyclopic, or wants an eye that of philosophy;
and a cyclops of a mathematician, a historian, a
natural historian, a philologer or a linguist, is a scho-

lar, who is great in all these branches, but holds,

that all philosophy onthem may be dispensed with.
The humaniora, by which the knowledge of the
ancients that favours the union of science with taste,

polishes rudeness, and promotes communicability and

urbanity, wherein humanity consists, is understood.
The humaniora then regard an instruction in what
serves for -the culture of taste conformably to the

patterns of the ancients. To them, eloquence,

poetry, the knowledge acquired by reading the clas-
sical authors, and many similar acquirements per-
tain. All this humanistical knowledge may be con-
sidered as belonging to that part of philology, which
is practical, and tends the most to the formation of

taste. But, if we separate the mere philologist from

the humanist, we shall find them to be distinguish-
ed from one another in this, that the former seeks
in the ancients the instruments of learning, the

latter, on the other hand, those of the formation of

taste.

The belles-lettrist or the bell 'esprit is a humanist

62 INTRODUCTION;

according to contemporary patterns in'the livifrg;

languages. He is therefore, not a man of learning?
none but the dead languages are at present
for

learned ones but a mere dilettante (connoisseur)

of the knowledge of taste according td the mode,
\yithout standing in need of the ancients. He might
be named the ape of the humanist The polyhis*
torian most as a philologer be a linguist and a man
of literature,, and as a humanist, a classical scholar

and an expounder of the classics. He, as a phi-

lologist, is cultivated, as
a humanist,, civilized.
With regard to the sciences there are two dege-
neracies of the reigning taste, pedantry and gal-
lantry. The one applies to the sciences for the
school merety, and thereby limits them with respect
to their use ; the other applies to them for nothing
but society or the world and thereby confines them
with .respect to their matter.
Either the pedant, as a man of letters, is opposed
to the man of the world and is a puflfed-up man of
letters without knowledge of the world, that is,

without the knowledge of Communicating his

science ; or he is to be considered as a man of abi-

lity forms only, not as to the es-

in general, but in

sence and the end. In the latter sense he is a picker

of forms ; limited with regard to the substance of

things, he considers nothing but the outside.

He is
the unfortunate imitation, or the caricature, of a man
of a methodical head. Hence may pedantry be de-
nominated the painfulness and the uselew exaetriess
 INTRODUCTION* 6S

or nicety (micrology) in forms. And a form of

the scholastic method out of the school of that sort
is be met with, not only among the learned and in
to

learning,, but among other classes and in other things.

The etiquette, or ceremony of courts, in society-^-
what is it but a hunting after forms ? In the army
it is not quite so, though it seems so. But in con-
versation, in dress, in diet, in religion, much pe-
dantry often reigns.
And exactness in forms suitable to the end pro^

posed profoundness (methodical, scholastic per-

is

fection). Pedantry is then an affected profound-

ness, and gallantry, as a mere courting of the ap-
probation of taste, nothing but an affectation of
popularity. For gallantry endeavours but to render
itself agreeable to the reader and therefore not so
much as to offend him with a hard word.
To avoid pedantry, extensive knowledge, not only
in the sciences themselves, but with regard to their

use, is
required. For which reason nobody but
the man of true erudition can detach himself from

pedantry, which is
always the property of a limited
understanding.
In the endeavour to procure to our cognition the

perfection at once of the scholastic profundity and

of popularity, without committing the above-mention-
ed fault, either of an effected profundity, or of
an affected popularity, we must above all things
look to the scholastic perfection of our cognitio i

the methodical form of profundity and then first

64 INTRODUCTION.

take care how we can render the methodical cog-

nition learned in the school really popular, that is,

go easy and universally communicable to others,

that the profundity may not be supplanted by the

popularity. For, the scholastic perfection, without

which all science were nothing but a toy, must not
be sacrificed for the sake of the popular perfection,
or to please the people
But in order to learn true popularity we must
read the ancients, for instance, Cicero's philoso-
phical writings, the poets, Horace, Virgil, &e. ;

among the moderns, Hume, Shaftesbury, and many

Others ; men, who had great intercourse with the
refined world, without which intercourse it is not

possible to be popular. For true popularity re-

quires much knowledge of the world,
practical
knowledge of the conceptions, of the taste, and of
the inclinations of men, upon which, in the exhi*
bition and even in the choice of fit expressions ade-

quate to popularity, constant attention is to be be-

towed. A condescendence of that sort to the ca-

pacity of the public and to the usual expressions, by

which the scholastic perfection is not undervalued,
but the dress of the thoughts so ordered, as not to
let the scaffold what is methodical and technical
of that perfection be seen (as we draw with a
pencil lines, upon which we write, and then rub
them out), this truly popular perfection of cognition
is in fact a great and a rare perfection, which be-
trays much insight
in science. And it has, besides
 INTRODUCTION. 65

many other merits, this can give a

one, that it

proof of the complete insight into a thing. For the

merely scholastic examination of a cognition leaves
behind the doubt, Whether the examination be not
partial, and whether the cognition itself be of a va-
lue granted it
by every body. The school, like

common-sense, has its

prejudices. The one im-
proves the other. It is therefore important to try a
cognition with men, whose understandings do not
adhere to any school.
This perfection of cognition, by which the cog-
nition is qualified for an easy and a universal com-

munication, might also be termed the external ex-

tension, or the extensive greatness of a cognition*

provided that it (a cognition) is spread externally

among a great number of men.
As there are so many and so various cognitions,
one would do well to make a plan for himself, ac-

cording to which he so orders the sciences, as they

may agree the best with his ends and contribute to
promote them. All cognitions have a certain na-
tural connexion with one another. If, in the endea-

vour after enlarging the cognitions, this their cohe-

rence is not attended to, the result of all great

knowledge will be nothing but a mere rhapsody.

But if one makes a principal science his end and
considers all other cognitions as meanvS only to ac-

complish it, he introduces a certain systematical

character into his knowledge. And in order to go
to work, in the
enlarging of our cognitions, accord-
j
C6 INTRODUCTION.

ing to a plan that is well ordered and suitable to the

end proposed, we must try to learn that coherence
of the cognitions among one another. A guidance
to which given by the architectonic of the sci-
is

ences,, a system according to ideas, in which the sci-

ences, with regard to their affinity and their syste-

matical conjunction, are considered as a whole of

knowledge interesting humanity.

As to the intensive greatness of a cognition, that
is to say, its weight or its great value and
import-
ance in particular, which, as we have already re-
marked, is essentially distinguished from the exten-
mere copiousness, we
sive, the shall make but these
few remarks on it :

-
1, A
cognition, which refers to the greatness, that
is, the whole in the use of the understanding, is to

be distinguished from the subtilty in the small (mi-

crology).
2, Every cognition that promotes the logical per-
fection, as to the form, is
logically important, for
example, every mathematical proposition, every
Jaw of nature distinctly known, every right phi-
losophic explication. The
practical importance
cannot be foreseen, but must be waited for.
3, A cognition maybe difficult without being im-

portant, and vice versa. Difficulty therefore de-

cides neither for, nor against, the value of the im-

portance of a cognition. This depends upon the

greatness or the plurality of the consequences.
The more or the greater consequences a cognition
 INTRODUCTION. 67

is productive of, the more use may bo miu'e of it, the

more important it is. A cognition without weighty
consequences a useless speculation ; the scholas-
is

tic philosophy, for instance, is of this nature.

VII.

B. Logical Perfection of Cognition, as to

Relation. Truth. Material andformal
or logical Truth. Criteria of logical
Truth. Falsity and Error. Appear-
ance, as the Source of Error. Means to
avoid Errors.
TRUTH is a chief perfection of cognition, nay,
the essential and the indispensable condition of all
its perfection. Truth, it is said, consists in the

agreement of cognition with the object. In conse-

quence of this mere nominal definition, our cogni
tion must, in order to holdgood as true, agree with
the object. But we can compare the object with our
cognition in no other way, than by our knowing it.
Our cognition therefore must confirm itself, but
which is not near sufficient for truth. For, as the
object out of us and the cognition in us, we never
is

can but judge whether our cognition of the ob-

ject agrees with the cognition of the object.
Such a circle in explaining the ancients named dia-
lele. Andthe logicians were always reproached
with this fault by the sceptics, who remarked, that
68 INTRODUCTION.

it is with that definition of truth just* as if one

should make a deposition before a court and appeal
to a witness, whom nobody knows but who has a
mind to render himself worthy of belief by maintain-
ing, that he who has called him as a witness, is an
honest man. The accusation indeed is well founded.
Only the solution of the aforementioned problem is

absolutely impossible.
The question here is, Whether and how far there
isa criterion of truth secure, universal, and fit to be
used in the application ? For that is the meaning'
of the question, What is truth ?
To answer this important question, we
be able to
must distinguish that, which in our cognition be-
longs to its matter and refers to the object, from
that which regards the mere form, as that condition,
without which a cognition would in general be no

cognition at all. With respect to this distinction be-

tween the objective material and the subjective
formal reference in our cognition, the above ques-
tion divides into the two particular ones :

1. Is there a universal material criterion of truth ?

and 2. Is there a universal formal one ?

A universal material criterion of truth is not pos-

sible ; it is even contradictory in itself. For, as a
universal criterion that holds for all objects in general,
it would need
totally to abstract from all difference of
them, and yet, as a material criterion, to extend to

very difference, in order to be able to determine

this

whether a cognition agrees directly with that ob-

 INTRODUCTION. 69

ject, to which it is referred, and not with any one

object in general ; by which nothing at all is said.

In agreement of a cognition with that deter-

this

minate object, to which it is referred, material

truth must however consist. For a cognition, which
with regard to one object is true, may with regard
to other Objects be false. It is therefore absurd to

require a universal material criterion of truth,

which must at once abstract and not abstract from all
difference of objects.

But, the inquiry is after universal formal cri-

if

teria of truth, the decision, that there may by all

means be such, is
easy. For formal truth consists

entirely in the agreement of cognition with itself

with total abstraction from all objects whatever and

from all difference of them. And the universal
formal criteria of truth consequently are nothing
but universal logical marks of the agreement of

cognition with itself, or (which is the same thing)

with the universal laws of the understanding and of
reason.
These formal universal criteria, though not suffi-

cient for objective truth, are to be considered as its

conditio sine qua non.

For the question, Whether the -cognition agrees
with itself (as to the form) ? must precede the ques-

tion, Whether it
agrees with the object? And that
is the province of logic.
The formal criteria of truth in logic are,
1, the proposition of contradiction, and.
70 INTRODUCTION.

2, that of sufficient reason.

By the former the logical possibility of a cognition

is determined, by the latter the logical reality.
To the logical truth of a cognition belong,
First, that be logically possible, that is, not re-
it

poignant to ilself. This sign of the internal logical

truth however is only negative; for a cognition,
\vhich is repugnant to itself, is false, but, when it

is not so, not always true ; and,

Secondly, that it be logically founded, that is,

that it have, a, grounds and, b, not false conse-

quences.
This second criterion of the external logical truth,
relative to the logical coherence of a cognition with

grounds and consequences, or of the rationalness of

cognition,
is
positive And the following rules hold

here:
1, From
the truth of the consequence the truth
of the cognition as a ground may be inferred, but

only negatively
: when one false consequence flows
from a cognition, the cognition itself is false. For,
-were the ground true, the consequence would be so
likewise ;
because the consequence is determined by
the ground.
But we cannot conversely when not a
infer :

false consequenqe flows from a cognition, it is

true ; for we can draw true inferences from a false

ground.
2, When consequences of cognition are
all the

true, the cognition also is true. For, were but

 INTRODUCTION. 71

something false in the cognition, a false consequence

too would have place.
the consequence we may then infer a
From
ground, but without being able to determine it.
We can only infer a determinate ground, that it
is the true one, from the complex of all the conse*

quenccs.
The former mode of inference, according to
which the consequence can be but a negatively and
an, indirectly sufficient criterion of the truth of a
cognition, is termed in logic the apagogical (modus
tollens).
This procedure, of which great use is made in

geometry, has the advantage, that we need derive

but one false consequence from a cognition to prove
its falseness. For example, in order to evince, that
the earth is not we
need, without adducing po-
flat,

sitive and direct reasons, but infer and conclude

apagogically, or indirectly, thus: Were the earth

flat, the polestar would be equally high every-

where ; but this is not the case ; therefore the

earth is not flat.

In the other, the positive and direct mode of in-

ference (modus ponens), there occurs the diffi-
consequences cannot be
culty, that the totality of the
known apodictically, and that we therefore are not
led by this mode of illation but to a probable and a

hypothetically true cognition (ahypothesis)according

to the presupposition, that, when many conse-

quences are true, all the others may be so likewise.

72 INTRODUCTION.

We may then lay down here three principles, as

universal merely formal, or logical, criteria of truth;

they are,
1, the principle of contradiction and of identity,

by which the internal possibility of a cognition is

Hetermined for problematical judgments ;
%, the principle of sufficient reason, upon which
the (logical; reality of a cognition depends ; that
it is founded, as matter for assertive judgments ;

3, the principle of the exclusive third (principium

exclusi medii inter duo contradictoria), in which
the (logical) necessity of a cognition is founded ;
that we must necessarily judge so and not other-

wise, that is, that the opposite is false for apo-

dictical judgments.
The contrary of truth is falsehood which, if it is

held truth, is named error. An erroneous judg-

ment (for error as well as truth isonly in the judg-
ment) is therefore such a one, as takes the appear-
ance of truth for truth itself.

How truth is
possible, is, as the understanding
acts here on its essential laws, easily known.
But how error in the formal sense of the word,

that is to say, how the form of thinking contrary

to the understanding is possible, is difficult to be

comprehended, as it is in general not to be compre-

hended how any one power should deviate from its
own essential laws. We can therefore seek the

ground of errors just as little in the understanding

itself and its essential laws, as in the limits of the
 INTRODUCTION. 73

understanding, in which the cause of ignorance,

but by no means that of error, lies. Had we no
other cognitive power, than the understanding, we
should never err. But there lies in us yet another
indispensable source of cognition, the sensitivity ;

which supplies us with matter for thinking and acts

according to other laws, than the understanding
does. But from the sensitivity considered in and
by itself, error cannot arise neither; because the
senses never judge.
The ground of the origin of all error must <*on-

sequently be looked for no where but in the insen-

sible influence of the sensitivity on the intellect or,

more accurately speaking, on judgment. This in-

fluence makes us in judging hold merely subjective

grounds objective ones, and by consequence take

the mere appearance of truth for truth itself. For
therein consists the very essence of appearance
which is on that account to be considered as a

ground for holding a false cognition true.

What makes error possible is therefore the ap-

pearance, according to which the merely subjective

in the judgment is exchanged for the objective.

In a certain sense the understanding too, provi-

ded that it, for want of the requisite attention to that
influence of the sensitivity, is led by the appearance
arising from it to hold merely subjective determina-
of judgment objective ones, or to admit that,
tives

which is not true but according to laws of, the sen-

K
74 INTRODUCTION.

ity, to be
according to
trtie its own laws, maybe
made the author of errors.
Only the fault of ignorance then lies in the limits
of the understanding ; the fault of error we have to
attribute to ourselves. Nature has denied us much
knowledge, she leaves us in the inevitable ignorance
of so much ; yet she does not occasion error. To it
our own propensity to judge and to decide even
when we are not able to do so, because of the limi-
tation of our faculties, leads us.
All error however, into which the human under-
standing can fall, is but partial, in every erro- and
n^ous judgment there must always be something
true. For a total error were an oppugnancy against
the laws of the understanding and of reason.
With regard to what is true and erroneous in our
Cognition, we distinguish an exact from a crude
cognition.
A cognition, when it is
adequate to its object, or
when with respect to its
object not the smallest
er-

it, when errors may be

ror has place, is exact ;
in it

with an impediment to the design, is crude.

This distinction regards the larger or the stricter
determinateness of our cognition, At first it is
sometimes necessary to determine a cognition in a
large? sphere, particularly in historical things. But
in cognitions of reason every thing must be exactly

(stride} determined. In the large determination

it is said, a cognition is determined prater, propter.
 INTRODUCTION. 75

Italways depends upon the purpose of a cognition

whether it shall be crudely or exactly determined.
The leaves a latitude for
large determination still

error, but which may have its determinate bounds.

Error has place especially when a wide determina-
tion is taken for a strict one, for instance, in mat-

ters of morality, in which every thing must be strict-

ly determined. Who do not do so are named, by
the English, latitudinarians.
Prom the exactness, as an objective perfection
of cognition as the cognition in this case is fully

congruent to the object the subtilty as a subjective

perfection of it
may still be distinguished.
A cognition
of a thing, when one discovers in it
what usually escapes the attention of others, is sub-
tile. It consequently requires a higher degree of

attention and a greater exertion of the intellectual

power.
Many blame all subtilty ;because they cannot
attain it. But it in itself does honor to the under-

standing, and is, provided that it is applied to an

object worthy of observation, even meritorious and

necessary. But it, when the same end might be at-

tained with less attention and effort of the under-

standing, than is used, is a useless expense, and we

fall into subtilties, which are difficult, but of no

utility (nugce difficiles).

As the crude is
opposed to the exact, the gross is

to the subtile.

From the nature of error, in whose conception,

76 INTRODUCTION.

as we have already remarked, besides falsity, the

appearance of truth is contained as an essential
mark, the following rule, which is important to the
truth of our cognition, unfolds itself :

In order to avoid errors (and no error is at least

absolutely inevitable, though it may be so relatively

to the cases, in which it is, even at the risk of err-

ing, unavoidable for us to judge) we must endeavour

to discover and to explain the source of them ap-
pearance or semblance. But that few philosophers
have done. They have only endeavoured to de-
termine the errors themselves, without shewing the

appearance, whence they arise. The discovering

and the solving of the appearance, however, is of
much greater service to truth, than the direct shew-
ing of errors themselves, by which their source can-
not be stopped up, nor can the same appearance,
because it is not known, be prevented from leading

again to errors in other cases. For, if we are even

convinced of having erred, there still remains to us,
ifthe appearance itself, which forms the basis of our

error, is not removed,.scruples, little as we can ad-

duce to their justification.

Besides, by explaining the appearance we do the

erring person a sort of equity. For, nobody will

allow, that he has erred without some one appear-
ance of truth, which perhaps might have deceived
one more acute ;
because the stress of the affair

rests upon subjective grounds.

An error, when the appearance is obvious to com-
 INTRODUCTION.

nion sense, is termed an insipidity or

absurdity
The reproach of absurdity always a
is personal
one, which we must avoid, particularly in the cor-
recting of errors.
For to him, who
maintains an absurdity, the ap-

pearance, which forms the basis of this evident

falsity, is -not obvious. This appearance must first
be made obvious to him. If he still continues to
maintain it, he is
insipid indeed ;but then nothing
more can be done with him. He has thereby ren-
dered himself both incapable and unworthy of all

farther instruction and refutation. For we cannot,

properly speaking, prove to a person that he is ab-
surd ; in this case all reasoning were in vain. When
we prove the absurdity we speak no longer to the
erring person, but to the rational man. Then,
however, the discovery of the absurdity (deductio
ad absurdwri) is not necessary.
An insipid error may likewise be named such a
one as nothing, not so much as even appearance,
serves it for an excuse as a gross error is that,
;

which evinces ignorance in common cognition or a

want of common attention.

Error in principles is
greater than that in their
application.
An external mark or an external test of truth is

the comparison of our own judgments with those of

others j because that which is
subjective is not in-
herent in the same way in all others, by consequence
the appearance may be thereby explained. Hence
 INTRODUCTION.

isthe incompatibility of the judgments of others

with ours to be considered as an external mark of
error, and as a hintto investigate our
proceeding in
judging, but not immediately to reject it on that
account.For we may perhaps be right in the thing
and wrong in the manner only, that is, the pro-

pounding,
Common-sense is in itself too a touchstone, to
discover the faults of the artificial use of the under-

standing, that is to say, to put one's self right in

thinking or in the speculative use of reason by com-
mon-sense, when the common understanding is used
as a test for the purpose of judging of the Tightness
of the speculative.
Universal rules and conditions of avoiding error
in general are., l,To think for one's self, 2, To
conceive one's self in the place of another, and 3,

Always to think consistently with one's self. The

maxim of thinking for one's self may be distinguish-
ed by the denomination of the enlightened way of

thinking; that of putting one's self, in thinking, in

the place of another, the enlarged ; and that of

always thinking consistently with one's self, the

consequential or solid.
 IMTRODUCTION. 79

VIII.

C. logical Perfection of Cognition as to

Quality. Clearness. Conception of a
Mark in general. Various sorts of
Marks. Determination of the logical
Essence of a Thing. Its Distinction
from the real Essence. Distinctness 9 a
higher Degree of Clearness. Estheti*
cal and Logical Distinctness. Discre-
pance between analytic and synthetic
Distinctness.

THE human cognition is on the side of the un-

derstanding discursive that is, ;
it is
acquired by
means of representations, which make a ground of
cognition of that which is common to several thing*,
consequently by means of marks, as such. We
know things then by marks only.
A mark is in a thing which makes up a part
that,
of its
cognition ; or (what amounts to the same) a

partial representation, provided that it is consider-

ed as a ground of cognition of the whole represen-
tion. By consequence all our conceptions are
marks and all
thinking is
nothing but a represent-
ing by means of marks.

Every mark may be considered in two points of

view:
80 INTRODUCTION.
\

First, as a representation in itself; and

Secondly, as belonging, as a partial conception,
to the whole representation of a thing,, and thereby
as a ground of cognition of this thing itself.
All marks, considered as grounds of cognition,
are of a twofold use ; either of an internal, or of an

external. The internal use consists in derivation,

in order to cognise the thing itself by marks, as its

grounds of cognition. The external consists in

comparison, provided that we can compare a thing
with other things by means of marks according to
the rules of identity and of distinction.*

Among the marks there are many specifical dis-

tinctions, in which the following classification of

those are founded :

1, Analytic or synthetic marks. Those are par-

tial conceptions of the actual conception (which we

form to ourselves in this conception), these, par-

tialones of the merely possible whole conception

(which must consequently be first formed by a syn-

thesis of several parts). The former are all con-

ceptions of reason, the latter may be those of ex-

perience.
2, Co-ordinate or subordinate. This division of
marks regards their connexion beside or under one
another.
The marks, if each of them is represented as an

* Not but distinction or difference is the contrary

diversity,
of identity or sameness; diversity is that of similitude or like-
ness. Many of our authors confound these contraries. T.
 INTRODUCTION. 81

immediate mark of the thing, are co-ordinate ; and,

if one mark is
represented only by means of ano-
ther in the thing-, subordinate. The conjunc-
tion of the co-ordinate marks so as to amount to the
whole of the conception is named an aggregate;
the conjunction of the subordinate ones, a series*
That, the aggregation of the co-ordinate marks,
makes up the totality of the conception, but which,
with regard to synthetic empirical conceptions,
never can be completed
The series of subordinate marks falls, a parte
ante, or on the side of the grounds, upon insolvable

conceptions, which cannot on account of their sim-

plicity be farther dissected a parlepost. or with
; it,

respect to the consequences, on the other hand, is

infinite because we have a highest genus, but not
.

a lowest species.
Withthe synthesis of every new conception in
the aggregation of co-ordinate marks the extensive
or diffused distinctness increases in the same manner
as with the farther analysis of the conceptions in
the series of subordinate marks the intensive or

deep distinctness does. This sort of distinctness,

as it
necessarily serves for the profundity or solidity
of cognition, is
chiefly the business of philosophy
and, particularly in metaphysical perquisitions, car-
ried to the highest pitch.

3, Affirmative or negative marks. By those we

know what the thing is, by these what it is not.
The negative marks.serve to keep us from/errors.
 INTRODUCTION.

Hence are they when it is

impossible to err unneces-
sary, and necessary and of importance in those

cases only, when they keep us from an important

error, into which we may easily fall. For instance,
with regard to the conception of a being like God,,
the negative marks are very necessary and of mo*
ment
f By affirmative marks we have then a mind to un-
derstand something; by negative ones (to which all
marks whatsoever may be turned) only not to mis-
understand or only not to err in it, even should we
learn toknow nothing of it.
4,Important and fertile or empty and unim-
portant marks.
A mark important aud fertile when it is a
is

ground of cognition of great and of numerous con-

sequences, partly with regard to its internal use (the
use in the derivation.) provided that it is sufficient,
iu order to know by it a great deal of the thing
itself; partly with regard to its external use (the
use in the comparison) provided that it serves to

know, as well the similitude of a thing to many

other things, as its diversity from many others.
Besides, we must here distinguish the logical im-
portance and fertility from the practical utility.

5, Sufficient and necessary or insufficient and

contingent marks.
A mark, provided that it suffices always to dis-

tinguish the thing from all other things, is suffi-

cient j otherwise it is insufficient, as, for example,

 INTRODUCTION. 83

the mark of barking of the dog. But the sufficiency

of marks, as well as their importance, is to be de-
termined in a relative sense only, with reference to
the ends, which are intended by a cognition.

Necessary marks finally are those, which must

always be to be met with in the thing represented.
Such marks are termed and stand op-
essential too,

posed to the unnessential and contingent, which

may be separated from the conception of the thing.
But between the necessary marks there is yet a
distinction.

Some of them belong to the thing as grounds of

other marks of the very same thing ; others again
as consequences only of other marks.
The former are primitive and constitutive marks
(essentialia in sensu strictissimo ) ; the latter are
denominated attributes (consectaria, rationata),
and pertain likewise to the essence of the thing,
but only with a proviso, that they must first be de-
rived from those its essential parts; as, for instance,
the three angles in the conception of a
triangle
from the three sides.
The unessential marks also are of a twofold sort ;

they regard either internal determinations of a

thing (modi), or its external relations. For ex-

ample, the mark of learning denotes an internal
determination of man ; being a master or a servant,

only an external relation of him.

The complex of all the essential parts of a thing,
or the sufficiency of its marks as to co-ordination
or subordination, is the ssence (complexus notarum
84 INTRODUCTION.

primitivarum, interne conceptui dato siifficien-

tium ; s complexus notarwn, conceptum aliquem
primitive constituentiumj .

But in this definition we must by no means think

here of the real essence or the essence of nature of
things, which we never can know. For, as logic
abstracts from all the matter of cognition, by conse-

quence from the thing itself, in this science nothing

but the logical essence of things can possibl} be on

the carpet, And this we can easily know. For
hereto belongs nothing farther than the knowledge
of all the predicates, with regard to which an ob-

ject isdetermined by its conception; whereas to

the real essence of the thing (esse rev the knowledge
of those predicates, upon which, all that belongs as
a determinative to its essence depends, is required,
If we chuse, for instance, to determine the logical
essence of a body, we have no occasion to seek for
the data to this in nature ; we need but turn our re-
flection to the marks which, as essential parts (cofc
stitutiva, rationes), originally constitute its funda-
mental conception. For the logical essence is no-

thing but The first fundamental conception of ajl

the necessary marks of a thing (esse conceptusj.
The first step of the perfection of our cognition,
as to quality, is then the clearness of the cognition.
The distinctness is a second step, or a higher degree
of clearness. This consists in the clearness of the

marks.
In the first place, we must in general distinguish

here the logical distinctness from the estheticaJL

 INTRODUCTION. 85

The former depends upon the objective, the latter

upon the subjective, clearness of the marks. That

is a clearness
by conceptions, this a clearness by in-
tuition. The latter species of distinctness consist^
then in a mere vivacity and intelligibleness, that is
to say, in a mere clearness by examples in the con^

crete (for many things that are not distinct may be

intelligible, and conversely, many things that are
difficult to be understood, because they refer back
to remote marks, whose connexion with intuition is

not possible but by a long series, may be distinct).

The objective distinctness often occasions sub-
jective obscurity, and conversely. Hende is the

logical distinctness seldom possible but to the dis-

advantage of the esthetical, and, vice versa, the
esthetical distinctness by examples and likenesses,
which are not quite adequate, but taken according
to a certain analogy only, is often hurtful to the

logical. And examples in general are not

besides,
marks, and belong, not as parts to the conception,
but as intuitions for the use of the conception

only. A distinctness by examples (the mere intel-

ligibleness) is
therefore of quite another sort, than
the distinctness by conceptions as marks. Perspi-
consists in the conjunction of both, the esthe-
cuity
ticor popular, with the scholastic or logical, dis-
tinctness. For, by a perspicacious head we under-
stand the talent of a luminous exhibition of abstract
and of profound cognitions, suitable to the capa-
city of common-sense.
86 INTRODUCTION.

In the second place, as to the logical distinctness

in particular, it, if all the marks,, which collectively
taken make up the whole conception., have reached
clearness, may be named a complete one. A con-
ception, on the other hand, may be completely dis-

tinct,,with regard to the totality either of its co-

ordinate, or of its subordinate marks. The exten-

sively complete or sufficient distinctness of a con-
ception, which is also termed the amplitude, con-
sists in the total clearness of the co-ordinate marks.

The total clearness of the subordinate marks con-

stitutes the
intensively complete distinctness the

profundity or solidity.
The former species of the logical distinctness
may be denominated the external, the latter the in-
ternal completeness of the clearness of the marks.
This can be obtained from the pure conceptions of
reason only, and from arbitrarious conceptions, but
not from empirical ones.
The extensive greatness or quantum of distinct-
ness, provided that it is not abundant, is named

precision. The amplitude and the precision toge-

ther make up the adequateness (cognitienem,
qua rem adcequat); and in the intensively adequate
in the profundity
cognition conjoined with the
extensively adequate one in the amplitude and
the precision, the consummate perfection of a

cognition (consummata cognitionis perfectio} (as

to quality) consists.
Since it is the business of logic (as we have al-
 INTRODUCTION. 87

ready remarked) to render clear conceptions distinct,

the question now is, In what manner it does so.
The
logicians of the Wolfian school place all the
rendering of cognitions distinct in their mer.e dis-
section. But all distinctness does not depend upon
the analysis of a given conception. It thereby

arises with regard to those marks only, which are

thought of in the conception, but by no means with
regard to the marks, which are first added to the
conception as parts of the whole possible concep-
tion.

That sort of distinctness, which arises, not by the

analysis, but by the synthesis of the marks, is

syn-
thetic distinctness. And there is
consequently an
essential distinction between the two propositions :

To form a distinct conception and, To render a con-

ception distinct.
For, when we form a distinct conception, we begin
with the parts and proceed from them to the whole.
In this case no marks yet exist j we obtain them
first
by means of the synthesis. From this synthe-

ticprocedure then the synthetic distinctness arises,

which, as to the matter, enlarges the conception by
that, whichsuperadded to it as a mark in the (pure
is

or empirical) intuition. Both the mathematician

and the natural philosopher use this synthetic pro-

cedure in rendering the conceptions distinct. For

all distinctness of the
properly mathematical, as well
us of all other empirical, cognition, depends upoa
88 INTRODtCTlOH.

an enlargement of it of this sort by a synthesis of

the marks.

But,when we render a conception distinct, our

cognition by no means increases, as to the matter,
by this mere dissection* The matter remains the
same ; only the form is altered by our doing nothing-
but distinguishing better, or learning to know with
a clearer consciousness that, which
the given
lies in

conception. As by the mere colouring of a map

nothing more is added to the map itself; so by the
mere clearing-up of a given conception by Irceans
of the analysis of its marks, the conception itself is

not increased in the least.

The making of objects distinct belongs to the

synthesis, the making of conceptions distinct, to the

analysis. In the latter the whole precedes the parts,
in the former the parts precede the whole. The
philosopher renders* none but given conceptions dis-
tinct. Sometimes one proceeds synthetically, even
when the conception, which he has a mind to ren-
der distinct in this manner, is already given. This
has often place in empirical propositions, provided
that we are not satisfied with the marks already con-
tained in a given conception.
The analytic procedure., in order to beget dis-
tinctness, about which procedure only logic can be
occupied, is the first and the chief requisite in ren-

dering our cognitions distinct. For the more dis^

tinct our cognition of a thing is, the stronger and

 INTRODUCTION* 89

the more efficacious can be.

Only the analysis
it

must not go so far, as at last to occasion the object

itself to vanish,

Were we conscious to ourselves of all that which

we know, we could not but be astonished at the
multitude of our cognitions.
As to the objective value of our cognition in
general, the following degrees, according to which
it (our
cognition) can be increased in this respect,
maybe conceived:
REPRESENTING something to one's self, is the first

degree of cognition or knowledge ;

Representing to one's self with consciousness or

PERCEIVING (percipere) something, the second ;*
KENNING' (noscere) f something, or represent-
ing to one's self something in comparison of other
things as to identity, as well as to distinction, the
third ;

Kenning with consciousness, that is, COGNISING

(cognoscerej something, the fourth. The brute
kens objects, but does not cognize them.
UNDERSTANDING (intelligerej, that
is, cognising

by the understanding by means of conceptions, or

conceiving of something, is the fifth. This is very

* Should not or receiving into the empiri-

APPREHENDING,
cal consciousness have a place here and precede perceiving ? T.

f Must not we use Kenning here, in order to distinguish be-

tween this degree of cognition and the highest degee of holding
true. Knowing (scirc j ? or what other word have we in Eng-
lish ? T.
M
$0 INTRODUCTKm.

from comprehending.
distinct We
can conceive of
many things, though we cannot comprehend them,
for example, a perpetuwn mobile, whose impossi-
bility is shewn in the mechanics.

Cognising something by reason, or PERSPECTIN&

fperspicerej or having an insight into it, is the sixth.
We reach this in few things, and our cognitions
grow fewer and fewer, the more we advance them
towards perfection in point of value.

COMPREHENDING something, that is, cognising it

by reason a priori, in the degree sufficient to our

purpose, is the seventh and the last. For all our

Comprehending is but relative, that is to say, suffi-
cient for a certain purpose ; we comprehend no-

thing absolutely. Nothing more than what the

mathematician demonstrates can be comprehended;
for instance, that the lines in the circle are pro-
all

portional. And yet he does not comprehend how

it
happens, that so simple a figure as a circle has
these properties. Hence is the field of conceiving
or of the understanding in general much greater,
than that of comprehending or of reason.
 INTRODUCTION' 91

IX.

Logical Perfection of Cognition as to

Modality. Certainty.
.
Conception of
Holding-true in general. Modes of
Holding-true :
Opining , Believing,
and Knowing. and Per-
Conviction
suasion. Reserving and Suspending a
Judgment. Previous Judgments. Pre+
judices, their Sources and their chief
Sorts.

TRUTH an objective property of cognition;

is

the judgment, by which something is represented

as true (the reference to an understanding and
therefore to a particular subject), is
subjective, a
holding-true.
HOLDING-TRUE is in general of a twofold nature :
a certain and an uncertain. The certain holding-
true or certainty, is conjoined with the conscious-
ness of necessity; the uncertain, on the other hand,
or uncertainty, with that of contingency, or of the

possibility of the contrary. The latter again is,

either subjectively as well as objectively insufficient,
or objectively insufficient, but subjectively suffi-
cient. That is termed opinion -,
this must be named
belief.

There are consequently three sorts or modes of

92 INTRODUCTION.

holding-true : opining-, believing, and knowing.

The first is a problematical, the second an assertive,
and the third an apodictical,
judging. For, what
we merely opine we in judging hold with conscious-
ness but problematical; what we believe,, assertive,

jnot as objectively necessary, however, but as sub-

jectively so (valid for one's self only); and what we
know, a^odictically certain, that is, universally and
objectively necessary (valid for every body) even ;

suppose the object itself, to which this certain hold-

ing-true refers, were a merely empirical truth. For

this distinction of the
holding-true according to the
three modes just mentioned concerns nothing but
the judgment with regard to the subjective criteria
of the subsumption of a judgment under objective
rules.*
Our holding immortality true, for instance, is
merely problematical, if we but act as if we were
immortal; but assertive, provided we believe, that
we are so; and it were apodictical if we all knew,
that there is a life after the present.
Between opining, believing, and knowing, then,
there is a material distinction, which we shall here

explain more closely and more at large.

1. OPINING, or holding-true on a ground of

cognition, neither subjectively, nor objectively suf-

ficient, may be considered as a previous judging,

Sirbsumpting is
? ranking under a given rule (easvg
T.
 INTRODUCTIDN. 93

(sub conditione suspensiva ad interim}, which can-

not well be dispensed with. We
must opine before
we assume and maintain, but be aware of holding
an opinion more than a mere opinion In all our

cognising we for the most part begin with opining.

Sometimes we have an obscure presagement* of
truth ; a thing seems to us to contain marks of
truth ; we are sensible of its truth before we cog-
nise with determinate certainty.
it

But when has mere opining place ? Not in any

of the sciences that contain cognitions a priori; by

consequence neither in the mathematics, nor in the

metaphysics,, nor in the ethics, but in empirical
cognitions only, in the physics, in psychology, and
such like; for it is a palpable absurdity to think of

opining a priori. And in fact nothing would be

more laughable, than to opine only in the mathe-
matics. In them, as well as in the metaphysics
and in moral philosophy, the object is either to know,
or not to know. Hence can matters of opinion
never be but objects of a cognition of experience,
which cognition is possible in itself, but impossible
to us only from the empirical limitations and condi-
and according to the
tions of our cognitive faculty

degree of it depending upon them, which we pos-

sess. The ether of the modern natural philoso-

* The literal translation is Presension, but the Translator pre-

fers sagement as referring more to the understanding, by which
only we can discover truth. T,
y* INTRODUCTION.

phers, for example, is a mere matter of opinion.

For of this, as of every opinion in general, what-
ever it
may be, we perspect, that the contrary may
perhaps be proved : Our
holding-true case in this

is therefore objectively, as well as

subjectively, in-
sufficient, though it, considered in itself, may be
rendered complete.
2. BELIEVING, or holding-true 'on a ground
which is
objectively insufficient, but subjectively
sufficient, has reference to objects, with regard to
which we can, not only know nothing, but opine
nothing, nay, not so much as pretend probability,
but be merely certain, that it is not contradictory
to think of such
objects in the manner we do. The
rest a free holding-true, which is not necessary
is

but with a practical view

given a priori; conse-
quently a holding-true of that which we assume on
moral grounds in such a manner, as to be certain,
that the contrary never can be proved.*

* a
Believing is not a particular source of cognition. It is

sort of incomplete holding-true with consciousness, and dis-

tinguished, when considered as limited to a particular sort of

objects (credibilia or those of belief only), from opining, not

by the degree, but by the relation, which it as a cognition bears

acting. The merchant, for instance, in order to make a bargain,
niust not merely opine, that there is something to be gained by
it, that is, that his opinion is sufficient for the undertaking at a

venture. We have theoretical cognition (of the sensible), in

which we can attain certainty, and with regard to all that
which we can name human cognition this must be possible* We
have similar certain cognitions totally priori in- practical laws;
 INTRODUCTION. 95

, Matters of belief then are, I/ not objects of em-

pirical cognition. Hence can tbe historical belief,

but these al-e Bounded in a supersensible prnciple (liberty), as a

i'ut practical reason
principle of practical reason,
in ourselves,

is a causality with regard to an object likewise supersensible, the

chief good, which is not possible in the sensible world by our

power, yet nature as the object of our theoretical reason must har-
monize with it ; for it is necessary, that the consequence or ef*
feet of this idea should be met with in the sensible world. We
ought therefore to act in order to realize this end.
We find in the sensible world traces of a wisdom of art ; and
we believe, that the Cause of the world works with moral wisdom
too for the chief good. This is a holding-true, which is sufficient

to acting, that is, a belief. We stand in no need of that for

acting, according to moral laws, for they are given by practical

reason only; but we stand
need of the assumption of a Su-
in

preme Wisdom for the object of our moral will, to which we,
besides the mere rightfulness of our actions, cannot avoid direct-

ing our ends. This is

objectively not a necessary reference of
our arbitrament, yet the chief good is subjectively necessarily
the object of a good (every human) will, and the belief in its

attainableness is
necessarily presupposed for it.

Between the acquisition of a cognition by experience (u pos-

teriori) and by reason (tt priori) there is no mean. But be-
tween the cognition of an object and the mere presupposition of
its possibility, there is a mean, either an
empirical ground, or a
ground of reason to assume its possibility with reference to a ne-

cessary extending of the field of possible objects beyond those,

whose cognition is
possible to us. This necessity does not obtain
but when the object is cognised as practical and practically neces-
sary for, to assume any thing in behalf of the mere
by reason ;
enlargement of theoretical cognition, is always contingent. Thi*
practically necessary presupposition of an object is that of the

possibility of the chief

good as the object of the arbitrament, by
consequence that of the conditions of this possibility (God, li-
96 INTRODUCTION.

commonly so named, not be termed belief, in the

proper sense, and as such be opposed

*
to knowing
and immortality). This is a subjective necessity, to as-
berty,
sume the reality of the object on account of the necessary deter-
mination of the will. This is the casus extraordinarius t without

which practical reason cannot maintain itself with regard to its

necessary end, and the favor necessitatis iii is of use to it here

its own judgment. It can acquire no object logically, but only

oppose what impedes it in the use of this idea which pertains to

it
practically.
This belief is the necessity of assuming the objective f eality of
a conception (of the chief good), that is, the possibility of its ob-

ject as an object of the arbitrament necessary d priori* When we

consider actions only, we have no occasion for this belief. But if
we have a mind to reach by actions the possession of the end

possible by them, we must assume, that this end is

quite possi-
ble. I can only say, that I find myself necessitated by my end
according to laws of liberty to assume a chief good in the world
as possible, but I can necessitate nobody else by grounds (belief
is free)*

The belief of reason consequently can never extend to theoreti-

cal cognition ; for in it the objectively insufficient holding-true is

merely opinion. It is merely a presupposition of reason with a

subjective, but absolutely necessary practical, view. The mind-
edritss according to moral laws leads to an object of the arbitra-

ment determinate by pure reason. The assuming of the at*

fainableness of this object and consequently of the reality of the

cause of its attainableness is a moral belief, or a holding-true,

which is free and necessary with a moral view ^p the completion

of its ends.

Fides is, properly speaking, faith in pacto, or a subjective

confidence in one another, that the one will keep his word to the
other faith and belief. The former, when the pactum is made,
the latter, when it is to be concluded.
 IHTEODUCTION. 97

because it may itself be a knowing. Holding-tru*

on testimony distinguished, neither as to the de-
is

gree, nor as to the species, from holding- true by

one's own experience.
Nor are matters of belief, II, objects of the cog-
nition of reason (cognition a priori), either of the-
oretical cognition, for example,, in the mathematics

and the metaphysics, or of the practical^ in moral

philosophy.
Mathematical truths of reason may be believed
on testimonies,, because error in this case, partly is
not easily possible, partly can be easily discovered;
but they cannot be known in this manner. Philoso-

phical truths of reason, on the other hand, cannot

be so much must be only known ;
as believed; they
for philosophy does not admit of mere persuasion.

And, as to the objects of the practical cognition of

reason in moral philosophy in particular, the rights
and the duties, a mere belief can just as little have
place. We must be quite certain whether some-
thing is
right or wrong, consonant to duty or con-
trary to it, licit or illicit. In moral things nothing
can be done at a venture ; nothing resolved on at
the risk of infringing the law. For instance, it is
not enough for a judge merely to believe, that one
accused of having committed a crime has committed

According to analogy practical reason is (so to say) the pro-

miser, man, the proiniesarjr, the good expected from the act,

\\wprommum.
N
98 1KTRODUCTIOK.

it. He must know it

(juridically), or he is not in-
fluenced by conscience.
III. Only the objects, the
holding-true of which
is necessarily free, that is to
say, not determined by
grounds of which are objectively independ-
truth,
ent of the nature and of the interest of the subject,
are matters of belief.
Hence does belief afford, because of the merely

subjective grounds, no conviction, which may be

communicated and commands universal assent, like
the conviction which proceeds from knowing. I

only can be certain of the validity and of the immu-

tability of my practical belief in the truth of a pro-
position, or the reality of a thing is that which,
with regard to me, only supplies the place of a cog-
nition, without being itself a cognition.

He, who does not assume that, which it is im-

possible to know
but morally necessary to presup-

pose, is morally unbelieving A want of moral in-

:

terest always forms the basis of this sort of incre-

dulity. The
greater the moral mindedness of a
man is, the firmer and the more lively will his be-
lief be in all that, which he finds himself forced

from the moral interest to assume or presuppose

in a practically necessary view.
3. KNOWING fscirej is
holding-true on a ground
of cognition, which is both objectively and
subjec-
tively sufficient, or certainty, accordingly as it is
founded, either in experience (one's own, as well
as that of others communicated), or in reason, is
 INTRODUCTION. 99

cither empirical, or rational: This distinction con-

sequently refers to both the sources, experience and

reason, from which all our knowledge is drawn.

The rational certainty (or rather the certainty of

reason) is
again, either mathematical, or philoso-
phical ;
that is intuitive, this discursive.

The mathematical certainty is named ETIDENCE;

because an intuitive cognition is clearer, than a

discursive one. Though the mathematical and the

philosophical cognitions of reason are in themselves

equally certain, the species of certainty is distinct
in them.

Theempirical certainty is an original one., pro-

vided that we are certain of something from our own

experience, and a derived one, if we are so by the

experience of others; the latter is
usually deno-
minated the historical certainty.
The rational certainty (or rather the certainty of

reason) distinguished from the empirical bytheconrs

is

sciousness of the necessity that is conjoined with it; it

istherefore an apodictical certainty, whereas theem-

pirical is but an assertive one. We

are rationally cer-
tain of what we would have perspected a priori, of
course without all experience. Hence may our cogni-
tions regard objects of experience, and yet their cer-
tainty be at once empirical and rational, provided
that we cognise an empirically certain proposition
from principles a priori.
Certainty of reason of every thing we cannot
have ; but, when it is possible for us to have it,
we must prefer it to the empirical certainty.
 100 INTRODUCTION.

Ail certainty is either a mediate, or an imme-

diate one, that is to say, it either requires a proof,
or capable and stands in need of none.
is
Though
3o much in our cognition is certain but mediately,
that is, only by a proof, there must be something

indemonstrable, or immediately certain, and all our

cognition must set out from immediately certain pro-
positions.
The proofs, upon' which all the mediate certainty
of a cognition depends, are either direct, or indi-
rect, apagogical. When we prove a truth by its
grounds, we give a direct proof of it; and when we
from the falsity of the contrary infer the truth of
a proposition, an apagogical. But if the latter
shall hold good, the propositions must be contradic-
torily or diametrically opposed
to one another. For
two propositions but contrarily opposed to one ano-
ther may be both false. A proof, which is the

ground of mathematical certainty, is termed a DEMON-

STRATION, and that, which is the ground of philoso-
phical certainty, an ACROMATICAL proof. The essential
parts of every proof in general are its matter and
its form
; or the argument and the consequence.*

By a SCIENCE the complex of cognition, as a sys-

Utn, is to be understood. Jt is opposed to the com-

mon cognition, that is, the complex of cognition,
as a mere aggregate. A system depends upon an
idea of the whole, which precedes the parts ; in

* That
argument, which is the principal ground of perspect-
ting the truth of a proposition, is named, by logicians, the
Hcrvvt probandi. T.
 IHTRODUCTIOX. 101

the common cognition, on the other hand, or in the

mere aggregate of cognitions,, the parts precede the
whole. There are historical sciences and science^
of reason.
In a science we know
the cognitions only,
often
but not the things represented by them ; conse-

quently there may be a science of that our cogni-

tion of which not a knowing.
is

The universal result of what has been said of the

nature and of the species of holding-true is. That
all our cognition is either logical, or practical.

When we know, that we are divested of all sub-

jective grounds and yet that the holding-true is suffi*
cient, we are CONVINCED logically, or on objective
is
grounds (the object certain).
The complete holding-true on subjective grounds,
however, which in a practical view are equal to ob-

jective ones, is likewise conviction, only not logi-

cal (it is certain), but practical (I am certain).
And thispractical conviction or moral belief is
often firmer than all knowing. In knowing we listen,
to contrary grounds, but in believing we do not,
because in it
objective grounds are not concerned,
but the moral interest of the subject is.*

* This the belief of reason, whicb

practical conviction then is

only, in the proper sense, must be named a belief and as such

opposed to knowing and to all theoretical and logical conviction

in general; because never can be raised to knowing. Whereas

it

the belief common!) termed historical must, as we have already

observed, not be distinguished from knowing ; because it, as a

species of theoretical or logical Iroldiag-true, nray itself be 9
102 INTRODUCTION.

To conviction PERSUASION, a holding-true on

insufficient grounds, which we do not know whe-
ther they are merely subjective or objective at the
game time, stands opposed.
Persuasion often precedes conviction. are We
conscious to ourselves of many cognitions but in
such a manner, that we cannot judge whether the
reasons of our holding-true are objective, or sub-

jective. We therefore must, in order to be able

from mere persuasion to reach conviction, first re-
flect, that is, see to what cognitive power a cogni-

tion belongs, and then investigate, that is, prove

whether the reasons are sufficient, or insufficient,
with regard to the object. Many rest satisfied with

persuasion, some reflect, but few investigate.

Whoever knows what pertains to certainty does
neither easily confound persuasion and conviction,
nor allow himself to be persuaded. There is a de-
terminative to approbation, which determinative is

composed of both objective and subjective grounds,

and this mixed effect the greater number of man-
kind do not disentangle.

Though every persuasion, as to the form (for-

knowing. We can assume an empirical truth on the testimony

of others with the same certainty, as if we had attained it by
facts of our own experience. In the former sort of empirical
knowing, as well as in the latter, there issomething fallacious.
The historical or mediate empirical knowing depends upon the
certitude of the testimonies. To the requisites of an unexcep-

tionable witness sufficient capacity and integrity belong.

 INTRODUCTION. 103

maliterj is, if an uncertain cognition seems by it

to be certain, false, it, as to the matter (materia-

liter), may be true. And thus is it distinguished
from opinion, which, if it is held certain, is an un-
certain cognition.
The sufficiency of holding-true (in believing)
may be put to the test either by betting, or by

making oath. To
the former comparative, to the
latter absolute, sufficiency of objective reasons is

necessary, instead of which however, when they

do not exist, an absolutely subjectively sufficient

holding-true is valid or holds good.

Weoften use the phrases, To yield to one's judg-

ment; to reserve, to suspend or to give up one's

judgment. Those and similar phrases seem to de-

note, that there is

something arbitrarious in our
judging, by our holding something true, because
we have a mind to do so. The question here there-
fore is, Whether volition have an influence on our
?
judgments
The will has no influence on holding-true imme-
diately ; otherwise it were very absurd. When it is
said, We believe willingly what we wish, it
signi-
fiesbut our good wishes, for instance, those of the
father with regard to his children. Had the wHl
an immediate influence on our conviction of what we
wish, we
should be constantly forming chimeras of
a happy state, and would then hold them always
true. But the will cannot contest
convincing proofs,
which are contrary to our wishes and our inclina-
tions.
.HH' INTRODUCTION,

But, as far as the will either excites the under-

standing to the investigation of a truth, or withholds
it from it, we must grant it
(the will) an influence
i>n the use of the understanding, and by conse-
quence mediately on conviction itself, as it
depends
BO much upon the use of the understanding
But as to the suspending or reserving of our judg-

ment in particular, it consists in the intention not

to allow a merely previous judgment to become a
determining one. A'PREVI. us JUDGMENT is a judg-
ment, by which I represent to myself, that there are
more reasons for the truth of a thing, than against
it, but that these reasons do not suffice to a deter-

mining or definitive judgment, by which we decide

directly for truth. Previous judging then is a
judg-
ing merely problematical with consciousness.
The reservation of a judgment may take place
with a twofold design either to seek for the rea-
;

sons of the determining judgment or in order ne- .

ver to judgfr. In the former case the suspension of

the judgment is named a critical one ( suspensio ju-

dicii Indus; atoria) ; in the latter, a sceptical. For

the sceptic disclaims all judging; whereas the true
philosopher,, if he has not sufficient reasons for
holding something true., but suspends his judgment.

Tosuspend judgment according to maxims,

one's
an exercised judgment, which is not found but at an
advanced age, is required. The reservation of our
approbation is in general a very difficult thing,
desirous of
partly because our understanding is so
 INTRODUCTION/ 105

enlarging itself and of enriching itself with know-

ledge by judging, parti} because we have always a

greater propensity to certajn things, than to others.
But whoever has been often obliged to retract his ap-
probation and is thereby grown prudent and circum-
spect does not bestow it so quickly, for fear of
being under the necessity of retracting his judgment
afterward. This retraction is
always a mortifica-
tion, and a reason of being diffident of all other

knowledge.
We
have still to notice here that, to let one's

judgment remain in dubio, and to let it remain in

suspense, are not identical. In this we always take*
an interest in the thing ; but in that
not always it is

suitable to our end and our interest to decide whe-

ther the thing is true or not.
Previous judgments are very necessary, nay, in-

dispensable to the use of the understanding in all

meditation and all investigation For they serve to
guide it in them and to furnish it with various
means
When we meditate on an object we must always
judge previously and, as it were, get the scent of
the cognition we are tp acquire. And if one's ob-
jects are inventions and discoveries, he must al-

ways make a previous plan for himself; else his

thoughts are employed at random. Hence may be

conceived by previous judgments maxims for the in-

vestigation of a thing. They might be named an-

ticipations too; because one anticipates
hisjudg-
106 , INTRODUCTION.

thing before he knows what must determine

merit of a
it. Such judgments are therefore of great utility ;
and even rules how to judge of an object previously
might be given.
Prejudices must be distinguished from previous
judgments.
Previous judgments; if adopted as principles,
are PREJUDICES. Every prejudice is to be consi-
dered as a principle of erroneous judgment, and not

prejudices, but erroneous judgments arise from pre-

judices. The false cognition, which arises from a
prejudice, must therefore be distinguished from its
source, the prejudice. The bodement of dreams,
for example, is in itself not a prejudice, but an er-
ror, which arisesfrom the received general rule :

What falls out according to expectation a few times,

does so always or is for ever to be held true. And*
this principle, from which the bodement of dreams
flows, a prejudice.
is

Prejudices are sometimes true previous judg-

ments only their serving us for principles or for
;

determining judgments, is wrong. The reason

of this illusion is to be looked for in subjective

grounds' being falsely held objective ones, from a

want of reflection that must precede all
judging.
For, though we may assume several cognitions, for

instance, the immediately certain propositions, with-

out investigating them, that is, without proving the
conditions of their truth, we judge of nothing with-
out reflecting, that is to say, without comparing a
 INTRODUCTION. 107

'cognition with the cognitive faculty (the sensitivity

or the understanding) whence it must needs arise.
IF we assume judgments without this reflection,
which even necessary when no investigation has
is

place, prejudices, or principles For judging for sub-

jective reasons, Falsely held objective ones, arise

thereFrom.
The principal fountains oF prejudices are, imi-
tation,, custom or assuetude, and inclination.
Imitation has a universal influence on our
judg-
ments; For it is a strong reason to hold true that,
which others have given out to be so. Hence Mie
prejudice, What every body does is right. As to
the prejudices, which arise From custom, they can.
be extirpated lay length oF time only, by the un-
derstanding, stopped and detained by little and lit-
tle in
judging by contrary reasons; by the under-
standing's being thereby brought by degrees to an
opposite way oF thinking. But iF a prejudice oF
custom originates in imitation too, it is difficult to

cure the person who is filled with it. A prejudice

From imitation may likewise be named, a propen-
sion to the passive use oF reason or to the me-
chanism oF reason, instead oF its (reason's) spon-
taneity under laws.
Reason an active principle, which must take
is

nothing From the authority of others, not even,

when its pure use is concerned, From experience.
But the indolence oF a great many makes them
chuse rather to tread in the Footsteps oF others, than
108 INTRODUCTION. I

to take the trouble of exercising their own intellect-

ual faculties.Such men never can be but copies of

others, and were every body of this sort, the world
would remain for ever upon the same spot without
making farther progress. It therefore is
highly ne-
cessary and important not to confine youth, as it is

usually done, to mere imitating.

There are so many things, which contribute to
accustom us to the maxim of imitation and thereby
to make reason a soil fertile in predudices ! To
such aids of imitation pertain,
1. FORMULES, which are rules, whose expres-
sion serves for a pattern for imitation. Besides,

they are very useful for the purpose of ease in in-

tricate propositions, and therefore the most acute

endeavour to find out rules of this sort.

2 SAYINGS,or aphorisms, which express a preg-

nant sense with so great precision, that it seems the
sense cannot be comprised in fewer words. These say-

ings (dicta}, which must always be taken from others,

to whom a certain infallibility is ascribed, serve, be-
cause of this authority, for a rule and a la-w. The
dicta of the bible are denominated xar' so%r y
sayings. y

3. SENTENCES, or propositions, which, as pro-

ductions of a mature judgment, recommend them-
selves and often, by the energy of the thoughts they

contain, maintain their credit for centuries.

4CA.VONS, which are universal didascalic pro-
positions that serve for a basis to the sciences,, and
express something well digested and sublime. That
 INTRODUCTION. 109

they may please the more, they may be expressed

in a sententious manner, and,

5. PKOVERBS, or adages, which are popular

rules of common-sense, or expressions of its
popu-
lar judgments. As such merely provincial propo-
sitions serve none but the vulgar for sentences and
canons, they are not used among those of a more
liberal education.

From the aforesaid three universal sources of

prejudices, and especially from imitation, many par-

ticular prejudices have their issue. We
shall here

touch on the following only, as the most common

ones :

I.
Prejudices of authority. Under this head may
be ranked,
a, the prejudice arising from the authority of
a person. When we, in things that depend upon
experience and upon testimonies, build our know-

ledge upon the authority of other persons, we can-

not on that account be accused of any prejudice;
for things of this sort the authority of a
in

person must, as we cannot experience every thing;

ourselves and embrace it own understand-
with our

ing, be the foundation of our judgments. But, when

we make the authority of others the ground of our

holding-true with regard to cognitions of reoson,

we assume these cognitions on a mere prejudice.
For truths of reason hold anonymously ; relatively
to them the question is, not Who said it, but What
is said (non
quis, sed quid)? It is. of no conse-
 110 INTRODUCTION.

quence whether a cognition be of a noble extrac-

tion or not; but yet the propension to the preju-
dice arising from the authority of great men is very

common, partly because of the limitation of one's

own insight,, partly
from a desire of imitating that,
which described to us as great. Besides, the au-
is

thority of the person serves to flatter our vanity in

an indirect manner. As, for instance, the subjects
of a potent despot are proud of being treated all

may consider himself so

alike by him, for the least
far equal with the greatest, as both of them' are no-

thing in comparison of the illimited power of their

ruler; the admirers of a great man judge them-
selves equal, if the merits, which they may possess
among themselves, are to be considered as insignifi-
cant in comparison of his pre-eminence. Hence do
the highly finished extolled great men feed the pro-

pensity to the prejudice of the authority

of a person
not a little on more than one ground.
b_, The prejudice arising from the authority of a
multitude. To this prejudice the populace in par-
ticular are inclined. For they, not being able to
judge of the merits, abilities, and knowledge of a

man, rather abide by the judgment of a multitude,

on the presupposition that, What every body says
must be true. Yet this judgment has reference
with them to nothing but historical things; in mat-
ters of religion, in which they themselves are in-

terested, they rely upon the judgment of the learned.

It is remarkable, that the ignorant are in general
 INTRODUCTIONS 111

prepossessed in favor of learning, and that the learn-

ed, on the other hand, are so in favor of common-
sense.
When all the endeavours of a man of letters, after
he has pretty well gone through the circle of the
sciences, do not afford him the proper satisfaction,
heat last grows diffident of learning, particularly
with regard to those speculations, in which the

conceptions cannot be rendered sensible, and whose

foundation is not solid, as, for example, in the me-
taphysics. But, as he thinks the key to truth in cer-
tain objects must be to be found somewhere, he,
after having looked for it so long in vain in the

way of the scientific investigation, seeks it in com-

mon-sense.
But this very fallacious; for when the
hope is

cultivated faculty of reason can effectuate nothing

with regard to the cognition of certain things, the
uncultivated will certainly do it just as little. Every
where in the metaphysics the appeal to the decisions
of common-sense is quite inadmissible , because in
them no case can be exhibited in the concrete. But
in moral philosophy it is not so. In it not only all
the rules can be given in the concrete, but practical
reason reveals general more- clearly and
itself in

rightly by the organ of the common use of the un-

derstanding, than by that of the speculative. Hence
does the common
understanding often judge rightei:
of matters of morality, than the speculative.
112 INTRODUCTION. <

c. The prejudice of the authority of tfte age.

In this class of prejudices the prejudice of antiquity
is one of the
principal ones. We
no doubt have
reason to judge favourably of antiquity; but it is

only a reason for a moderate reverence, whose

bounds we but too often pass, by our making the
ancients, so to say, treasurers of cognitions and of
the sciences,, raising the relative value of their wri-

tings to an absolute one., and trusting ourselves blind^

ly to their guidance. To esteem the ancients so

excessively is, to reduce the understanding to its

years of infancy and to neglect the use of one's own
talent. And we would lie under a great mistake if
we should believe/ that all the ancients wrote in so
classica manner, as those, whose writings have
reached us, have done. As time sifts every thing,
and as nothing but that, which is of an intrinsic
value, preserved, we may presume, not without
is

reason, that we possess no writings of the ancients

but the best.
There are several reasons for the begetting and
the maintaining of the prejudice of antiquity.
When something exceeds expectation according
to a universal rule, one at first wonders at it and

then this wondering often passes to admiration.

That is the case with regard to the ancients, when
we find in them something that, considering the

circumstances of the time in which they lived, we

did not look for. Another reason lies in this cir-
 INTRODUCTION. 113

cumstance, that the knowledge of the ancients and

of antiquity shews learning and having read much;
which, common and insignificant as the things that
have been drawn from the study of the ancients
may be in themselves, always procures respect.
A third reasonis, the gratitude we owe the ancients
for having broken the ice for us to much knowledge.
For which it should seem equitable to hold them in

particular veneration, but whose measure we often

exceed. A
fourth reason finally is to be sought in
a certain envy of one's contemporaries. Whoever
cannot cope with the moderns, praises at their ex-
pense the ancients to the skies, that the moderns
may not be able to raise themselves above him.*
The prejudice of novity is the contrary to that
The authority of antiquity and the prejudice in its
favor fell now and then particularly at the begin-
;

ning of the century before the last, when the cele-

brated Fontenelle declared for the moderns. With
respect to cognitions susceptible of enlargement, it
is
very natural for us to put more confidence in the
moderns, than in the ancients. But this judgment
has only a foundation as a mere previous judgment
If we make it a determining one, it becomes a pre-

judice.

* This last reason seems quite applicable to our author's

own enemies, and envy to be the only secret spring of their
impotent opposition. But, as this venerable old man is now
sunk into the grave, " will drop her snakes, and stern-
Envy
eyed Fury's self will melt." T.
P
114 INTRODUCTION.

2, Prejudices from self-love, or logical egotism,,

according to which one holds the agreement of his

own judgment with the judgments of others an un-
necessary criterion of truth. They, as they mani-
fest themselves by a certain predilection to what rs

a production of one's own understanding, for in-

stance,, one's own system, are opposed to the pre-

judices of authority.
Whether is it
good and adviseable to let preju-

dices remain, or even to favor them ? It is asto-

nishing, that in our age such questions, especially

this one with regard to favoring prejudices, should

still be put. Favoring one's prejudices, is just as

much one with a good view. To leave
as deceiving
be done; for
prejudices untouched, however, may
\vho can occupy himself about discovering and about

removing the prejudices of every body? But

\vhether it is not adviseable to labour at their extir-

pation with all one's might? is another question.

Old and rooted prejudices are difficult to be over-

come; because they exculpate themselves and are,

as it were,, their own judge. And letting prejudices
remain endeavoured to be excused by saying, that
is

mischief would be occasioned by their extirpation.

But, admitting this mischief; it (this extirpation)
will be productive of great good hereafter.
 INTRODUCTION; 115

X.

Probability. Explication of the Proba*

bill ties. Distinction of Probability
from Verisimilitude. Mathematical and
Philosophical Probability. Doubt both
and objective. Sceptical, Dog-
subjective
matical, and Critical Way of Think-
ing or Method of Philosophising. Hy-
pothesis.

THE doctrine of the knowledge of the probabili-

ties which are to be considered as an approximation

to certitude, belongs to the doctrine of the certainty

of our knowledge.

By PROBABILITY,, a holdiug-true on insufficient

grounds, but which have a greater relation to suffi-
cient ones, than the grounds of the contrary, is to be
understood. By this explication we
distinguish pro-
bability from mere VERISIMILITUDE or likelihood, a

holding-true on insufficient grounds, provided that

they are greater, than the grounds of the contrary.
The ground of holding-true may be either ob-
jectively, or subjectively, greater, than that of the

contrary. Which of the two it is cannot be found

out but by comparing the grounds of holding-true
with the sufficient grounds ; for then the grounds of

holding-true are greater, than those of the contrary

116 INTRODUCTION.

can be. In probability the ground of holding-true

therefore holds objectively, in verisimilitude,, on the
other hand, only subjectively. Verisimilitude is

only a greatness of persuasion, probability an ap-

proximation to certainty. Probability must always
have a scale. For, as we are to compare the insuffi-
cient grounds with the sufficient ones, we must
know how much is
requisite to certainty. But no
scale is necessary to mere verisimilitude ; because
in it we compare the insufficient grounds, not with
the sufficient ones, but with those of the contrary.
The points (momenta) of probability may be
either homogeneous, or heterogeneous. If they
are the former, as in the mathematical cognition,

they must be numbered ; if the latter, as in the phi-

tesophical, pondered, that estimated according to
is,

the effect; but this after removing the impediments

in the mind. The latter yield no relation to certain-

ty,but only the relation of one verisimilitude to ano-

ther. Kfence it follows, that the mathematician only
can determine the relation of insufficient grounds
to the sufficient holding-true. For, in the philoso-
phical cognition, probability cannot be estimated on
account of the heterogeneity of the grounds; in it
the weights, so to say, are not all stamped. In
strict propriety, it can therefore be said but of the

mathematical probability, that it is more than the

half of certainty.
Much has been said of a logic of probability. But
jt is not possible ; for, when the relation of the inj-
 INTRODfFCTHW. lit

sufficient grounds to the ground cunnot be

sufficient

mathematically weighed, no rules are of any assist-

ance. And no universal rules of probability what*
ever can be given, except that the error does not

happen on one side, but a ground of agreement

must be in the object; as also that, when two op-
posite sides err in both an equal number and an

equal degree, the truth lies in the middle.

DOUBT is a contrary reason for holding-true of a
mere impediment to it, which may be either sub-
jectively, or objectively considered. Doubt is some-
times taken subjectively as a state of an irresolute

mind, and objectively as the knowledge of the in-

sufficiency of the reasons for holding-true. In the
latter respect it is named an OBJECTION, that is, afi

objective reason of holding a cognition held true

false.

A merely subjectively valid contrary reason for

holding-true is a SCRUPLE. As to it, one does not
know whether the impediment to holding-true is

grounded objectively, or but subjectively, for in-

stance, only in inclination, in custom, and suchlike.
We doubt without being able to explain ourselves
and determinately with regard to the reason of
doubting and without being able toperspect whether
this reason lies in the object itself, or but in the sub-

ject. If itbe possible to remove such scru-

shall

ples, they must be raised to the distinctness and the

determinateness of an objection. For certainty is
brought to distinctness and to completeness by Ob-
118 INTRODUCTION.

jections and nobody can be certain of a thing un-

less contrary reasons, by which it can be determined
how far one is from the truth or how near it, are

assigned. And it is not enough merely to answer

every doubt ; it must be resolved too, that is, it
must be made comprehensible how the scruple
arose. If thatnot clone, the scruple is only put
is

off, but not removed ; the seed of doubting still re-

mains. In many cases indeed we cannot know
whether the impediment to holding-true in us ha*

subjective or objective grounds, and consequently

cannot remove the scruple by discovering the false
appearance; because we can compare
our cogni-
tions, not always with the object, but often with one
another only. It is therefore modest not to offer

one's objections but as doubts.

There is a principle of doubting, which consists
*
in themaxim, to treat cognitions with the view of
rendering them uncertain and of shewing the im*
possibility of coining at certainty/ This method of
philosophising is the sceptical cast of mind, or
SCEPTICISM. It is
opposed to the dogmatic way of
'
thinking, or DOGMATISM, which is, a blind confi-
dence in the faculty of reason's enlarging itself
a priori by mere conceptions, barely from the
seeming success."
Both methods, when they become universal, are
faulty For there is much knowledge, with respect
to which we cannot proceed dogmatically; and
scepticisai, on the other hand, by its giving
over all
 INTRODUCTION. 119

affirmative cognition, baffles al! our efforts to ac-

quire the possession of a knowledge of the certain.

But pernicious scepticism is, the sceptical
as this

method, provided that nothing farther is understood

by it, than the mode of treating something as uncer-
tain and of reducing it to the greatest uncertainty in

the hope of thus tracing truth, is both useful and

suitable to the end proposed. This method then is.,
correctly speaking, a mere suspension of judging.
It is very useful to the CRITICAL procedure,
by
which '
that method of philosophising, whereby we
investigate the sources of our assertions or of our
objections and the grounds upon which they de-

pend/ is to be understood ; a method, which af-

fords ahope of coming at truth.

In the mathematics and the physics scepticism
has not place. Only that cognition, which is
neither mathematical, nor empirical, pure philoso-

phy, could have occasioned it. Absolute scepti-

cism gives out every thing for appearance, It

therefore distinguishes appearance from truth and of

course must have a mark of distinction ; consequent-

ly presuppose a knowledge of truth ; by which it

contradicts itself.

We have already noticed of probability, that it

is a mere approximation to certainty. And that
is likewise the case with hypotheses in particular,

by which we can never an apodictical

arrive at,

certainty in our knowledge, but always sometimes a

greater, sometimes a smaller degree of probability
only.
120 INTRODUCTION.

A HYPOTHESIS is A holding
of the judgment of the
truth of aground true for the sake of the sufficiency
of the consequences ; or, shorter, The holding of a

presupposition true as a ground.

All holding true in hypotheses is
consequently
founded in the presupposition's
being sufficient, asa
ground, to explain other cognitions, as consequences.
For in that case we infer the truth of the ground
from that of the consequence. But, as this mode of
inference, as above-mentioned, cannot give a suf-
ficient criterion of truth and lead to an apodictical

certainty but when

the possible consequences of
all

an assumed ground are true, it is obvious that, as

we never can determine all the possible conse-
quences, hypotheses always remain hypotheses,
that is, presuppositions, at whose full certainty we
never can arrive. The probability of a hypothesis,
however, may, when all the consequences, which

have hitherto occurred to us, can be explained on

the presupposed ground, increase and raise itself to
an analogon of certainty. For in such a case there
is no reason why we should suppose, that all the
possible consequences cannot be explained from it.
In this case we therefore submit to the hypothesis,
as if it were quite certain, though it is not so but
by induction.
And yet something must be apodictically certain
in every hypothesis ;

I. The of the presupposition itself.

possibility
When, for example, we suppose a subterraneous
fire for the explication of
earthquakes and of vol-
 INTRODUCTION. 121

canos ; of that sort must be possible, if not

a fire

just as flaming as an ardent body.

1

,
But for the be-
hoof of certain other phenomena to make an ani-
mal of the earth, in which the circulation of the
internal fluids causes the heat, is to erect a mere
fiction and not a hypothesis. For realities may be
feigned, but not possibilities ; these must be certain.
2. The
consequence. The consequences must
flow right from the assumed ground ; else the hy-

pothesis becomes a mere chimera.

3. The unity. an essential requisite of a
It is

hypothesis, that it be but one and stand in need of

no subsidiary hypotheses for its support. If in a hy-

pothesis are we
under the necessity of calling in.
the assistance of several other hypotheses, it there-

by loses very much of its

probability For the more
consequences that may be inferred from a hypo-
thesis there are, the more probable it is ; the fewer,
the more improbable. The
hypothesis of Tycho
de Brahe, for instance, did not suffice to the ex

planation of many phenomena he therefore used ;

several new hypotheses for the purpose of comple-

ting .
1

In this case it may be conjectured, that the

adopted hypothesis cannot be the genuine ground.

Whereas the Copernical system is a hypothesis,
from whici) every thing that is intended to be ex.

plained by it (so far as it has hitherto occurred to

us) may be explained. In it we have no occasion
of subsidiary hypotheses.

There are sciences, which do not allow of hypo-

123 INTRODUCTION.

theses; as, for example, the mathematics and the

metaphysics. But hypotheses in natural philosophy
are both useful and indispensable.

APPENDIX.
Of the Distinction of theoretical and of
practical Cognition*
A cognition is denominated practical in contra-

distinction to not only the theoretical, but the spe-

culative cognition.
Practical cognitions either are,
1. Imperatives and in this view opposed to the
itheoretical cognitions ; or comprise,
2. the grounds to possible imperatives, and are
in this view opposed to the speculative cognitions.

By IMPERATIVE in general every proposition that

expresses a possible free action, by which a certain
end is to be realized, is to be understood. Every
cognition, which contains imperatives, is
then,
PRACTICAL and to be termed so in contradistinc-

* The distinction made, in the critical philosophy, between

what practical and what belongs to the praxis, must be well
is

attended to. We consider something theoretically when we have

in view that only, which pertains to a thing, but practically,

when we reflect on what ought to pertain to it through liberty.

Theory is, Principles of procedure represented in the general;

Praxis, Application to cases occurring in experience. A phy-
sician, for instance, when he endeavours to cure his patients ac-

cording to his theory, exercises the praxis of medicine. T.

 INTRODUCTION,

tton to the theoretical cognition. For THEORETI-

CAL cognitions are such as express, not what must
be and ought to be, but what is ; consequently
have for their object, not an acting, but a being of
an existing.
Jf on the contrary we oppose the practical c'ognit
tions to the speculatives ones, they may be theoret-

ical too,provided that imperatives- can be deduced

from them They are then, considered in this re?-
spect, as to the value (in polentia) or objectively^

practical. By SPECULATIVE cognitions we under*

stand those, from which no rules of conduct can be
derived, or which comprise no grounds for possible

imperatives. In theology, for_example, there are a

great number of the like

merely speculative propo-
sitions. Speculative cognitions of that sort then are
always theoretical ; but not conversely ; every
theoretical cognitionnot speculative ; it may,
is

considered under another point of view, be at the

same time practical.

Every thing tends at last to the practical ; and

the practical value of our cognition consists in this
tendence of all that which is theoretical and of all
speculation with regard to their use. This value
however is not an inconditional one but when the
end, to which the practical use of the cognition is
directed, is an inconditional end. MORALITY is the
only inconditional and ultimate end (scope), to
which every practical use of our cognition must
finally be referred, and we on that account denomi-
124 IK1RODUCTION.

nate morality the absolute practical. And that part

of philosophy, which has morality for its object,
must therefore be, by way of eminence, named
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY ; though every other philo-
sophical science may always have its practical part,
that is, may contain a direction to the practical use
of the erected theories for realizing certain ends.
And thus much with regard to cognition, as pre
paratory to the study of logic. We now proceed to
logic itself, a dry, but a short science.
 PART THE FIRST.

General Doctrine of Elements.

SECTION THE FIRST.

Conceptions.

Conception in general and its Distinction

from Intuition.
ALL Cognitions, that is, representations referred
with consciousness to an object, are either intui-
tions, or conceptions.
An intuition is a single, a conception a univer-
sal (per notas communes) or reflected-on (disur-
siva), representation..
The cognition or knowledge by conceptions ii
termed thinking (cognitio discursiva) or cogitation.
Scholion I. The opposed to the in
conception is

tuition ; for that, as aforesaid, is a universal repre-

sentation or a representation of that which is com-

* and a very
Very little
reflection, slight knowledge of logic
will suffice to shew the fault of treating Perception hi this section
of the Doctrine of Elements instead of Conceptions, T.
126 LOGIC.

mon to several objects, consequently a representa-

tion, provided that it can be contained in various
ones.
2. It is mere tautology to speak of universal or
of common conceptions; a fault, which origi-
nates in a wrong division of conceptions into uni-

versal, and single.

particular, Not the concep-
tions themselves, but their use, can be thus divided.

2.

Matter and Form of Conceptions.

Matter and form are to be distinguished in every
conception. The object is the matter of the con-

ception j the universality, its form.

3.

Empirical and Pure Conceptions.

A conception is either an empirical, or a pure
(intellectualis) one. A
pure conception is one,
which is not taken from experience, but arises, as
1

to the matter too, from the understanding .

An idea is a conception of reason, whose object

cannot be met with in experience.*

*
Asour language far too vague a sense is affixed to the
in

word Idect, the following gradation of representation used in the

critical philosophy will shew its proper and original Platonic
meaning :
Representation, that is, internal determination of
 CONCEPTIONS. 127

Scho. I. An
empirical conception arises out of the
senses by the comparison of the objects of experi-

ence, and obtains by the understanding merely the

form of universality. The reality of these
concep-
tions depends upon actual experience, whence they,
as to their matter, are drawn. But, whether thera
are pure conceptions of the understanding, which,
as such, entirely spring from the intellect inde-

pendently of all experience, meta physic must inves-

tigate.
2. The
conceptions of reason, or ideas, can lead
to no real objects at all ; because all these must be

comprehended But they

in a possible experience.

serve to guide the understanding by means of rea-

son with regard to experience and to the use of its

our mind any relation of time, in general, is the genus. Under

in

it Perception, a representation with consciousness, ranks. Sen-

sation is a perception, which refers to the subject only, as the
modification of his state; Cognition, an objective perception.
This is either Intuition or Conception* The former has an imme-
diate reference to the object and is
single ; the latter, a mediate

one, by means of a mark, which may be common to several

things, A conception is, as mentioned in the text, either

empirical, or pure, and a pure conception, provided that it has its

origin in theunderstanding only (not in the pure image of the

sensitive faculty)
is
styled a Notion. A conception from notions,
fthich surmounts the possibility nf the reach of experience, is

termed an Idea, or a conception of reason. To one accustomed

to this accurate distinction it must be insupportable to hear the

representation of the ted colour named an idea ; it cannot so

much as be named a notion, or a conception of the understand-

ing (See Kant's Criticism un pure Reason). T.

 128 LOGIC.

rules in full perfection, and to shew,, that all possi-

ble things are not objects of experience, and that
the principles of its possibility do not hold of things
in themselves, nor even of objects of experience as

things in themselves (in se).

An idea contains the archetype of the use of the
understanding, for instance, the idea of the uni-
verse, which must be necessary, not as a constitutive

principle for the empirical use of the understanding,

but as a regulative one in behalf of the
thorough co-
herence of the empirical use of our intellect. It is
then to be considered as a necessary fundamental

conception, in order either to complete objective-

ly.,
or to consider the intellectual operations, of subor-
dination as interminate or unbounded. And an
idea cannot be obtained by composition ; for in it
the whole is before the
part. Yet there are ideas,
to which an approximation has place. That is the
case with the mathematical ideas, or those of the
mathematical generation of the whole, which are
materially distinguished from the dynamical ones
that are heterogeneous to all concrete conceptions';
because the whole is distinct from these conceptions^
not as to quantity (as in the mathematical concep-

tions), but as to quality.

We cannot furnish any theoretical idea with ob-

jective reality or prove the objective reality of any

theoretical idea, but the idea of liberty ; because it
is the condition of the moral law whose reality is,
so to say, an axiom. The reality of the idea of God
cannot be proved but by it
(liberty) and therefore
 CONCEPTIONS.

with a practical view only, that is, so to act, as if

there were a God ; consequently for this jpurpose
only.
In all sciences, especially those of reason, the
idea of the science is its universal sketch or contour ;

of course the sphere of all the cognitions that be-

long to it. Such an idea of the whote, the first

thing we have to look for and to consider in a sci-

ence, is architectonic, as, for example, the idea of

the science of law.
The idea of humanity, that of a perfect com-

momv^alth, that of a happy life, that of many other

things, is
wanting to most men. Many men have
no idea of (to use the common expression) whit
they would be at; hence do they proceed accord-
ing to instinct and to authority.

4.

Conceptions given (& priori or a posteriori}

and factitious Conceptions.
.

All conceptions are, as to the matter, either

given,
or factitious ones. The former are either a given
priori, or a posteriori.
All empirical conceptions, or those
given a poste-
riori, are named conceptions of experience ; those

given a priori, notions.

Scho. I. The form of a conception as a discur-
sive representation, is
always factitious.
R
130 LOGIC.

5.

Logical Origin of Conceptions.

The the mere form,,
origin of conceptions, as to
depends upon reflection and upon abstraction from
the difference of the things betokened by a certain

representation. And consequently the question.

What operations of the understanding constitute a

conception, or (which amounts to the same thing)

belong to the begetting of a conception from given
representations ? naturally occurs here.
Sch.o, I, As universal logic abstracts from all the

matter of cognition by conceptions, or from all the

matter of thinking, it cannot weigh the conception
but with regard to its form, that is, but subjective-
ly 5 not how determines an object by a mark, but
it

how it can be referred to several objects. Univer-

sal logic by consequence has to investigate not the

source of conceptions, not how conceptions arise

as representations, but how given representations
become conceptions in thinking; it is 'all one whe-
ther these conceptions contain any thing either
taken from experience, or fictitious, or taken from
the nature of the understanding. This logical ori-

gin of conceptions the origin as to their mere form

consists in the reflection,by which a representa-
tion common. to several objects (conceptus com-
munis) arises, as that form, which is
require^
to judgment. In logic therefore nothing but
 CONCEPTIONS. 131

the distinction of reflection is considered in the

conceptions.
2. The origin of conceptions with respect to their
matter, according to which a conception is either

empirical/ or arbitrable, or intellectual, it is fhe

province of metapliysic to consider.

6.

Logical Acts of Comparison, of Reflection >

and of Abstraction. (
The logical acts of the understanding, by which
conceptions as to their form are engendered, are,
1, the comparison, or the comparing of repre-
'

sentations with one another jn relation to the unity

of consciousness;
2, the reflection, or reflecting how various re*

presentations may be comprehended in one con-

sciousness; and, finally,
3, the abstraction, or the separation of all that

by which the given representations are distinguished

from one another.
Scho. 1.In order to form conceptions from re-

presentations, then, we must be able to compare,

to reflect, and to abstract; for these three logical

operations of the understanding are the essential

and the universal conditions of the engendering of
every conception in general. We see, for exam-
ple, a birch, a lime, and an oak. When we first

compare these objects together we mark, that they

 132 IOGIC.

arc different from one another in

respect to the
trunk, the arms, the branches, the leaves, and ab-
stract from their siz, their figure, &c. ; ifi this
manner we obtain the conception of a tree.
% The word abstraction is not always used right
(in German) in logic. We must say, not to ab-
stract,but to abstract from, something. When, for
instance, we think of the red colour only of scarlet
cloth, We abstract from the cloth ; if we abstract
from the colour too and conceive of the scarlet as a
substance in general, we abstract from still more
determinations, and our conception is thereby be-
come yet more abstract. Forthe greater the number
of the differences of things left out of a conceptidn,
or the greater the number of the determinations in
it abstracted from, is, the more abstract the con-
ception. Hence should abstracting conceptions, in
strict propriety, be termed abstracting oes, that is
to say, conceptions, in which several abstractions
occur. The
conception of body, for instance, Is,
piroperly speaking, not an abstract conception;
for,from body itself we can by no means abstract,
eke we Jhoufd not have a conception of it. But,
ia order to have it, we must by all means abstract
from the size, the colour, the rigidity or the fluidity,
iit a word, from all the special determinations of

particular bodies. The most abstract conception

is that, which has nothing in common with any
thing distinct from it It is the conception of sornev
tiling ; for nothing is distinct from rt, and of course
lias not any thing in common with it.
 CONCEPTIONS.

3. Abstraction but the negative condition, on

is

which universally Valid representation can be gene-

rated comparison and reflection are the positive
;

conditions. For no conception is produced by ab-

straction ; this but finishes that and confines it witb*
in its determinate bounds.

7.

Matter and Sphere of Conceptions.

EVERY conception, as a partial one, is contained
in the representation of things; but, as the ground
of cognition, that is, the mark, these things are
contained under it. In the former respectively
conception has matter ; in the latter, a sphere.
The matter and the sphere of a conception bear
one another a converse -relation. The more a
conception contains under it, the less it contains in
itself, and vice versa.
Scho. The universality, or the universal validity
of a conception, depends upon the conception's

being, not a partial one, but a ground of cognition.

8.

Greatness of the Sphere of Conceptions.

THEsphere of a conception is the greater, the
greater the number of things that rank under it and
can be thought of by it is.
Scho. As it is said of a in general, that
ground
IS* 10GIC.

it contains the
consequence under it; it may like-
wise be said of a conception that it, as a ground of

cognition, contains under it all those things, from

which it been obtained by means of abstraction^
has
for in stance v the conception of metal contains gola>

silver, copper, &c. under it For, as every concep-

tion, asa universally valid representation, comprises
that which several representations of different things
have in common, all these things,, which are in this
view "contained under it, may be
represented by it.
And just that constitutes the utility of a conception.
The greater the 'Wumber of things that can be re-
presented by a conception is, the greater its sphere.
The conception of body, for example, has a greater
sphere, than that of metal
1 < :

9. ; ;00 B iSil;

Superior and Inferior Conceptions*

Conceptions, if they have under them other
conceptions, 'which in relation to them are itamed
inferior ones, are denominated superior ones. A
marjt of a mark, a remote mark, is a superior con-

ception ; a conception, in respect to a remote mark,

an inferior one.
Scho. As superior and inferior conceptions are
so termed but respectively, the very same concep-

tion, taken in various references, may be at once a

superior and an inferior one. The conception of
i

man, for instance, is, in respect to the conception of

 CONCEPTIONS. 135

centaur, a superior, but, in respect to that of animal,

an inferior one.

10.

Kind (genus} and Sort (species}.

A superior conception is, relatively to its inferior,
named genus y an -
inferior, relatively to its superior,

species.
Generic and special conceptions are, like supe-
rior and inferior ones, distinguished, not as to their

nature, but with regard to their relation to one ano-

ther ft ermine a quo, or ad quod) in the logical

subordination.

11.

Highest Genus and lowest Species.

That genus, which is not a species, is the highest
(genus summumnon est species); and that species,
which is not a genus, is the lowest (species, qua non
est genus, est infimaj.

According to the law of continuity, however,

there can be neither a lowest, nor a
proxime
species.
Scho. If we
conceive of a series of several con*
ceptions subordinated to one another, for example,
iron, metal, body, substance, thing, we
may obtain
higher and higher genera; for every species is al-
ways, to be considered as a genus with regard to
136 LOGIC.

its inferior
conception, for instance, the conception
of a man of learning- with regard to that of a philo-

sopher, till we at last arrive at a genus that cannot

be a species again. And one of that sortwe must
finally reach; because there must at last be a
higher conception, from which, as such, nothing
ca<o be farther abstracted without the whole con-

ception's vanishing. But in the whole series of

species and of genera there no such thing as a

is

fowest conception or a lowest species, under which

no other conception or species is contained; be-
cause one of that sort could not possibly be detei*-
nmied. For, if we have a conception, which we
apply immediately to individuals, specific distinc-
tions, either which we dp not notice, or to which we

pay no attention, may exist with respect to it.

There are no lowest conceptions but comparatively

for use, which have obtained this signification, as it

were, by convention, provided that we are agreed

not to go deeper in a certain matter.

Relatively to the determination of the special

and of the generic conceptions, then, this universal
faw-^There is a genus that cannot be any more a
species; but there are no species but what may be-
come genera again holds good,

12.

Larger and stricter Conceptions. Alter-

nate Conceptions.
A is also named a larger an
superior conception ;

inferior, a stricter or narrower.

 .'.

CONCEPTIONS. 137
.
J .orlsS
Conceptions, which have the same sphere, are
distinguished by the name of alternate ones.

<n&3
j 3
en
Relation of the inferior to the superior, of
the larger to the stricter, Conceptions.
The inferior conception is not contained in the
superior; for it contains more in itself than the su-
perior ; but is contained under it ; because the
superior contains the ground of cognition of the
inferior.

Again, the one cognition is larger than the other,

not because it contains more under it for we can-
not know that but because it contains under it the
other conception and still more than it.

14.

Universal Rules relative to the Subordina-

tion of Conceptions.
With regard to the logical sphere of conceptions
it, c 11
-
u
the following rules hold
i u :

J, What agrees with or is

repugnant to the su-

perior conceptions, likewise agrees with or is re-

pugnant to all the inferior ones, which are contain-
ed under those ; and,
2, conversely, What agrees with or is
repugnant
to all inferior conceptions, likewise
agrees with or is

repugnant to their superior ones.

 138 LOGIC.

Scho. Because that, in which

things agree, flows
from their universal properties, and that, in which
they are different, from their particular ones, we
cannot conclude that, What agrees with or is repug-
nant to an inferior conception, likewise
agrees with
or is repugnant to other inferior conceptions, which

belong with it to a superior one. Exempli gratia,

we cannot conclude, that that, which does not agree
with man, does not with angels neither.

Ufi
15.

Conditions of the Origin of superior and

of inferior Conceptions: logical Ab-
straction and Determination.

By continued logical
abstraction higher and

higher conceptions arise; and, on the other hand,

by continued logical determination lower and lower
ones. The greatest
possible abstraction yields the
highest or the most abstract conception that one,
from which no farther determination can be thought
of as away. The highest finished determination
would yield a thoroughly determined conception
(conceptum omnimode deter minatum), that is, a
conception^, to which no farther determination can
be conceived to be added.
Scho. As single things only or individuals are
thoroughly determined, cognitions as intuitions only,
but not as conceptions, can be thoroughly deter-
mined ; in regard to the latter the logical deter-
 CONCEPTIONS. 139

niinatiori never can be considered as finished

(fi II
n. MS
wj.
15
/?
i
10.

of Conceptions in the Abstract and in

the Concrete.

Every conception may be used both universally

and particularly (in abstracto and in concrete!).
The inferior conception is used in the abstract

relatively to its superior ; the superior, in the con-

crete relatively to its inferior.
Scho. 1. The words, abstract and concrete, refer
not so much to the conceptions in themselves (for

every conception an abstract one), as to their use*

is

And this may again have different degrees, accordr

ingly as a conception is treated, now more, then
less, abstractedly or concretely, id est, accordingly
as sometimes more, sometimes fewer, determinations
are either omitted, or superadded. By the abstract
use a conception comes nearer the highest genus,

by the concrete, on the other hand, nearer the in-

dividual.
2. Which
use of conceptions, the abstract or the
concrete, the
is
preferable ? Nothing can be de-
cided on this point. The value of the one is not to
be estimated less, than that of the other.
By very
abstract conceptions we cognise in
many things
little; by very concrete ones, in few things much ;
consequently what we gain on the one side we lose
on the other. A conception, whicfy has a great
140 LOGIC,

sphere, is so very useful, as it can be applied to

many things; but then there is the less contained
in it. In the conception of substance, for instance,
we do not conceive of so much, as in that of chalk.
3. The art of
popularity consists in hitting the
relationbetween the representation in the abstract
and that in the concrete in the same
cognition ;
therefore between the and their exhi-
conceptions
bition, whereby the maximum of cognition, with
regard as well to the sphere as to the matter is

attained,

!
 141

GENERAL DOCTRINE OP ELEMENTS,

SECTION THE FIRST.

Judgments.
17.

Explication of a Judgment in General.

A JUDGMENT is the representation of the unity
of the consciousnes of various representations or
the representation of their relation provided that

they make up a conception.

18.

Matter and Form of Judgments.

Matter and form pertain to every judgment as its
very constituents. The matter consists in the cog-
nitions, which are given and conjoined in the
unity
of consciousness in the judgment; the form of the

judgment, in the determination of the way in which

the various representations, as such, belong to one
consciousness.

19.

Object of logical Reflection the mere

Form of Judgments.
As logic abstracts from every real or objective
distinction of cognition,can occupy itself as little
it

about the matter of judgments, as about that of

conceptions. It consequently has to consider

 142 LOGIC.

merely the distinction of judgments with regard to

their bare form.

20.

Logical Forms of Judgments : Quantity,

*
Quality, Relation, and Modality
The distinctions of Judgments \vith respect to
their form may be reduced to the four main points
of quantity, of quality, of relation, and of modali-

ty, with regard to which just as many various sorts

of judgments are determined.

St.

Quantity of Judgments : Universal, par-

ticular,^ single.
As to quantity, judgments are either universal,
or particular, or single; accordingly as the subject
in the judgment is either quite included in the

notion of the predicate, or excluded from it, or but

*
Relatively to the distinction of judgments as to their mere
form the following questions occur : How many representations
are Are they exhibited as conjoined
compared with the unity ?

or not? What sort of conjunction is it? With what degree

of holding-true is this conjunction conceived of? The two
first regard the internal
properties of judgments, the two last
the relations to one another, and of the judgments to the cogni-
tive faculty. T.
f Our author would rather have these judgments, when used
in
metapliysic, termed Plurative. See his reasoning on this sub-
ject in the 20th paragraph of his PROLEGOMENA turned by the
Translator.
 JUDGMENTS. 143

in part included in it, in part excluded from it. In

the universal judgment the sphere of one concep-
tion is
comprehended quite .within that of another;
in the particular a part ofone conception is com-
prehended under the sphere of another; and ia the
single a conception, which has no sphere at all, is
consequently comprehended merely as a part under
the sphere of another conception.
Scholion Single judgments, as to the form, are
I.

to be esteemed in the use equal to universal for in ;

both the predicate holds with regard to the subject

without exception. For example, in the single pro-

position, Caius is mortal, an exception can have

place just as little, as in the universal one, All men
are mortal. For there is but one Caius.
2. Withrespect to the universality of a cogni-
tion, a real distinction between general and univer-
sal propositions has place, but which does not con-
cern logic. General propositions axe those which
contain something of the universal of certain ob-

jects and therefore not sufficient conditions of the

subsumption, for instance, the proposition, Proofs

must be made in a solid manner ; universal proposi-
tions are such, as maintain something of an object
universally.
3. Universal rules are either analytically, or syn-

thetically universal. Those abstract from the dis-

tinctions ; these attend to them and of course
determine with regard to them. The more simple
an object is cogitated, the sooner analytical univer-
sality in consequence of a conception is possible.
 144 LOGIC.

4. When universal propositions,

* *
without know.
ing them cannot be perspected in
in the concrete,

their universality, they cannot serve for a rule, and

consequently cannot hold lieuristically in the ap-

plication, but are only problems for the universal
grounds of that which is first known in particular
cases. For example, tlie proposition, Whoever has
no interest in lying and knows the
truth, speaks
truth ;
not
this proposition to be perspected in
is

its universality; because we cannot know the limi-

tation to the condition of the disinterested person

but by experience ; namely, that men can lie from
interested motives ; which lying proceeds from their
not adhering firmly to morality. An observation
that teaches us to know the frailty of human na-
-

ture.

5. Of particular judgments it is to be noticed

that, ifthey shall be capable of being perspected by
reason, and therefore have a rational, not merely
an form, the subject must
intellectual (abstracted)

be a larger (latior) conception, than the predicate.

Let the predicate be always
-_^.
O > the subject =
|_1, thus:
.

it isa particular judgment; for something belong-

not b that flows from rea-
ing to a is b, something
sonBut let it be thus:
 JUDGMENTS. 145

every a, at least when it is less than b, but not when

greater, can be contained under b ; by consequence

it is but fortuitously particular.

Quality of Judgments :
Affirmative, nega-
''
tive, in definite.

As judgments are either affirmative,

to quality,

or negative, or indefinite. In an affirmative or

positive one the subject is thought of under the

sphere of a predicate ; it, in a negative, is placed
without the sphere; anil, in an indefinite, put with-
in the sphere of a conception, which lies without the

sphere of another conception.

Scho. 1. The indefinite judgment shews not
only that a subject is not contained under the sphere
of a predicate, but that it lies without its sphere
somewhere in the indefinite sphere; this
judgment
therefore represents the sphere of the predicate as
limited.

Every possible thing is either A, or not A. If

we say, Something is not A, exempti gratia, The
human soul is not mortal. Some men are not li-
terati. This is an indefinite judgment. For by it

it is determined
beyond the definite sphere of A
not to what conception the object belongs, but that
it
belongs to the sphere without A, which is, pro-
perly speaking, not a sphere at all, but the border-
ing of a sphere on the indefinite or bounding itself.

T
146 LOGIC.

Though the exclusion is a negation, the limitation

of a conception a positive operation.
is Hence are
bounds positive conceptions of limited objects.
2. Accordingto the principle of the exclusion of every
third (exclusi tertii) the sphere of one conception
is, relatively to another, either exclusive, or inclusive.
Rut, as logic has to do merely with the form of the

judgment, not with the conceptions as to their matter,

the distinction of the indefinite from the negative

judgments does not appertain to this science.

3. In negative judgments the negation always

affects the copula ; in indefinite, not the copula,

but the predicate is affected by it ; which circum-

stance is
expressed the best in Latin.

23.

Relation of Judgments: Categorical, hy-

pothetical, disjunctive.
As to relation, judgments are eithei categorical,
pr hypothetical, or disjunctive. The given repre-
sentations in a judgment are subordinated to one
another in the unity of consciousness either as the

predicate to the subject, or as the consequent to the

antecedent* or as a member of the division to the
divided conception. By the first relation categori-
cal judgments are determined, by the second hypo-

thetical,, and by the third disjunctive.

 JUDGEMENTS. 147

Categorical Judgments.
In these the subject and the predicate make up
their matter ; the form, by which the relation (of

agreement or of disagreement) between the subject

and the predicate is determined and expressed, is
termed the copula.
Scho. Categorical judgments make up the matter
of other judgments ; but from this we must not think,
as several logicians do, that both hypothetical and
disjunctive judgments are nothing more than
differ-

ent dresses of categorical ones, and can therefore

be all reduced to them. All the three judgments de-
pend upon essentially distinct logical functions of
the understanding, and consequently must be dis-

cussed according to their specific distinction.

25.

Hypothetical Judgments.
The
matter of these consists of two judgments,
which are connected together as antecedent and
consequent. The one of these judgments, which
contains the ground, is the antecedent (priusj ; the

other, which stands in the relation of consequence

to that, theconsequent (posterius); and the repre-
sentation of this sort of connexion of both
judg-
ments together forming the unity of consciousness
148 LOGIC.

is named the consequence, which makes up the

form of hypothetical judgments.
Scho. I. What the copula is to categorical judg-
ments, the consequence is to hypothetical ones,
their form.
2, Some think
easy to transform a hypotheti-
it

cal proposition to a categorical. But it is not prac-

ticable ; because they are quite distinct by their

very nature. In categorical judgments nothing is

problematical, but every thing assertive ; whereas

in hypothetical ones, the consequence only is asser-

tive or positive. In the latter we may therefore

connect two false judgments together for in this ;

case the whole affair is the tightness in the con-

nexionthe form of the consequence ; upon which
the logical truth of these judgments depends.
There is an essential distinction between these two
propositions All bodies are divisible, and, If all
:

bodies are composed, they are divisible. In the

former the thing is maintained directly it in the ;

latter is maintained on a problematically expressed

condition only.

26.

Modes of Connexion in hypothetical Judg-

ments Modus ponens and Modus tolkns.
:

The form of connexion in hypothetical judg-

ments is twofold the laying dawn (modus ponens)
:

and the annulling f modus tollensj.

 JUDGMENTS. 149

I. Whenthe antecedent or ground is true, the

consequent determined by it is likewise true. This

is denominated the modus
ponens ;
%. When the consequent is false, the antece-
dent or ground is likewise felse ; the modus fallens.

27.

Disjunctive Judgments.
A judgment, when the parts of the sphere of a

given* conception determine one another in the

whole or to a whole as complements, is
disjunc-
tive.

28.

Matter and Form of disjunctive

/ Judg-
>x C5

ments.
The several given judgments, of which the dis-

junctive judgment is composed, constitute its mat-

ter, and are named the members of disjunction or

opposition. lathe disjunction itself, that is, in the

determination of the relation of the various judg-
ments, as members of the whole sphere of the di-
vided cognition excluding one another, the form of
these judgments consists.
Scho. All disjunctive judgments then represent
various judgments as in the commerce of a sphere
and do not produce any judgment but by the limi-
tation of the other with whole sphere ;
regard to the
they consequently determine the relation of every
150 LOGIC.

judgment to the whole sphere, and thereby the

relation, which these members of disjunction have
to one another. Not one member in this judgment
therefore determines another but with a proviso,
that all the members are in commerce as parts of a
whole sphere of cognition, without which nothing
in a certain reference canbe thought of.

29.
.

Peculiar Character of disjunctive

*/ Judg*
i/O
merits.
The
peculiar character of all disjunctive judg-
ments, whereby their specific distinction, as to
the point of relation, from the others, in particular
from the categorical ones, is determined, consists
in this, that all the members of disjunction are pro-

blematical judgments, of which

nothing else is
thought, than that they, as parts of the sphere of
a cognition, each the complement of the other to
the whole (complementum ad totum), taken toge-
ther, are equal to that sphere. And hence it foh
lows, that the truth must be contained in one of
these problematical judgments or (what amounts to
the same thing) that one of them must hold asser-

tively because besides them the sphere of cogni-

;

tion comprehends nothing more on the given con-

ditions and the one
opposed to the other ; by con-
is

sequence they only, and but one of them, can be

true.
 JUDGMENTS. 151

Scho. In a categorical judgment the thing, whose

representation is considered as a part of the sphere

of another subordinate representation, is consi-
dered as contained under this its superior con-

ception ; consequently in the subordination

of
the spheres here the part of the part is com-

pared with the whole. But in disjunctive judg-

ments we go from the whole to all the parts taken
together. What contained under the sphere of a
is

conception, is likewise contained under ay

one of
the parts of this sphere. Accordingly the sphere
must be first divided. When we, for instance,
form the disjunctive judgment, 'a learned man is
either a mere historian, or a philosopher, or a ma-

thematician/ wedetermine by it, that these con-

ceptions, as to the sphere, are parts

of the sphere
of the learned, but by no means parts of one ano-
ther, and that they, collectively taken, are com-

plete.
of
That judgments, not the sphere
in disjunctive

the divided conception, as contained in the sphere

of the divisions, but that which is contained under
the divided conception, as contained under one of
the members of division, is considered, the following
scheme of the comparison between categorical and
the matter more
disjunctive judgments may render
intuitive :

In categorical judgments, x is what is contained

under b, and likewise under a ;
 152 toaic.

In disjunctive ones x, contained tinder a, is con-

tained under either b > or c, and so on ;

# j

The division in
disjunctive judgments therefore
shews not the co-ordination of the parts of the whole
conception, but all the parts of its
sphere. In
these judgments we cogitate many things by one
conception ; one thing
in those, by many con-
ceptions, for example, the definite by all the marks
of co-ordination.

30.

Modality of Judgments :
Problematical,
assertive, apodictical.
As to modality, by which point the relation of
the whole judgment to the cognitive faculty is de-
termined, judgments are either problematical, or
assertive, or apodictical. The problematical ones,
are accompanied with the consciousness of the
mere possibility, the assertive with that of the rea-

lity, and the apodictical with that of the necessity

of judging.
Scho. I. The modality consequently shews the
way only, in which something is maintained or de-
nied in a judgment whether nothing is nwle out
:

with regard to the truth or the untruth of a judg-

ment, as in the problematical judgment, The soul
 JUDGMENTS.

may be immortal or whether something; is deter-

;

mined with regard to it, as in the assertive judg-

ment, The soul is immortal ; or whether the truth
of a judgment is expressed with the dignity of ne-

cessity, as in the apodictical judgment, The soul

must be immortal. This determination of the

merely possible or actual or necessary truth conse-

quently concerns the judgment itself only, by no
means the thing, which is judged of.
2. In problematical judgments, which may be
said to be those, whose matter is given with the

possible relation between the predicate and the sub-

ject, the subject must always have a smaller sphere,
than the predicate.
3. Upon the distinction between probable and
assertive judgments the true distinction between
judgments and propositions depends, which dis-
tinction, with regard to those, was formerly made

falsely in the mere expression by words, without

which we could not judge In a judgment
at all.
the relation of various representations to the
unity
of consciousness is conceived of
merely as proble-
matical; in a proposition, on the other hand, as
assertive. A
problematical proposition is a contra-
diction inadjecto Ere we have a proposition, we
must judge ; and we judge of much that we cannot
make out, but which we must do the moment we
determine a judgment as a proposition. It is how-
ever good to judge problematically before we as-

sume the judgment as assertive, in order to prove

y
154. LOGIC.

it in this" way. And it is not always necessary to

our purpose to have assertive judgments.
%

31.

Expoundable Propositions.
Propositions, in which both an affirmation
and a

negation are comprised, but in an occult manner,

so that the affirmation is made distinctly, but the

negation cryptically, are expoundable.

Scho. In the expoundable proposition (for in-

stance), Few men are learned, there lies, 1,

but in
a hidden manner, the negative judgment, Many
men are not learned; and, 2, the affirmative one,
Some men are learned. As the nature of expound-
able propositions depends entirely upon conditions
of language, on which we can express laconically
two judgments at once, the remark, that there may
be in our language judgments, which must be ex-
not to logic.
pounded, belongs to grammar,

32.

Theoretical and practical Propositions.

Theoretical propositions are those, which refer to
an object and determine what belongs or does not
belong to it ;
ones 3 again, those, which
practical
the necessary con-
express the action, whereby, as
dition of an object, this object is
possible.
Scho. Logic has to handle practical propositions
 JUDGMENTS. 155

as to the form only, which in this respect are

op-
posed to the theoretical ones. Practical propositions
as to the matter, and in this view distinct from

speculative ones, belong to moral philosophy.

33.

Indemonstrable and Demonstrable Propo-

sitions.

Demonstrable or evincible propositions are those

capable of proof; those not so are named indemon-
strable.

Immediately certain judgments are indemonstra-

ble,, and therefore to be considered as elemental

propositions.

34.

Principles.
Immediately certain judgments a priori may be
termed fundamental propositions or positions, pro-
vided that other judgments can be evinced by them,
but they themselves cannot be subordinated to any
other judgment. They on that account are deno-
minated principles (beginnings).

35.

Intuitive and Discursive Principles :

Axioms and Acroams.

Principles are either intuitive, or discursive. The
156 LOGIC.

former may of course be exhibited by intuition,

or immediate representation, and are named axioms;
the latter cannot be expressed but by conceptions,
and may be distinguished by the appellation of
acroams.
36.

Analytic and Synthetic Propositions.

Those propositions, whose certainty depends upon
the identity of the conceptions (of the predicate
with the notion of the subject), are analytical.
Those, whose certainty is not founded in that iden-

tity, must
be named synthetical.
Seho. I. To to which the conception of
every x,

body (a 4- b) belongs, extension (hi) also belongs ;

is an example of an analytic proposition.

To every x, which the conception of body

to

(a 4-
b) belongs, attraction (c) too belongs is an ;

example of a synthetic one. The synthetic propo-

sitions increase the cognition rnaterialiter ; the ana-

lytic ones, merely formaliter. Those comprehend

determinations; these, nothing but logical predi-
cates.

2, Analytic principles, being discursive, are not

axioms. Nor are synthetic ones neither, but when
intuitive.

37.

Tautological Propositions.
The identity of the conceptions in analytic
judg-
ments may be either an explicit or an implicit one.
 JUDGMENTS. 157

In the former case the analytic propositions are

tautological.
Scho Tautological propositions are virtually
I.

empty, or void of consequence; for they are of no

use whatever. Such is, for instance, the tautolo-
gical proposition. A man is a man. For if we can
say nothing more of a man, than that he is a man,
we know nothing more of him at all.*
Whereas propositions are not
implicitly identical
void of consequence or useless ; for they render the

predicate, which lies infolded (implicite) in the con-

ception of the subject, clear by development (ex-
plicatio).
2. Propositions void of consequence must be dis-
tinguished from those void of sense, which are so
because they regard the determination of what is

commonly named occult qualities.

38.

Postulate and Problem.

A postulate a practical immediately certain
is

proposition, or a principle, which determines a

possible action, whereby it is

presupposed, that the
way of performing it is
immediately certain.

* Some modern German

philosophasters have had the assu-
rance to lay clown the tautological proposition, 'I am I/ as a prin-

ciple, from which all science and all human knowledge must be
derived. T.
158 ,
LOGIC.

Problems are demonstrable propositions that re-

quire a direction or a rule for their solution, or those

that express an action, whose" way of being per-
formed is not immediately certain.
Scho. I. There may be theoretical postulates too
for the behoof of practical reason. Such as those
of the existence of God, of moral liberty, and of a
future world, which are theoretical hypotheses ne-

cessary in a practical view.

2. To a problem there belong, the question,
I,

which contains what is to be performed, 2, the

resolution, which comprises the manner, in which

what is be performed can be done, and, 3, the de-
monstration, that, when we shall have proceeded
in such a manner, what is required will be per-
formed.

39.

Theorems, Corollaries, Lemmas, and

Scholia.

Theorems are theoretical propositions capable

and standing need of a proof ; Corollaries and
in

consectaries, immediate consequences of a prece-

ding proposition ; propositions not na-
Lemmas,
tive in the science, in which
they are presupposed
as evinced, but taken from other sciences ; Scholia,
mere illustrative
propositions, which consequently do
not belong as members to the whole of the
system.
Scho. The thesis and the demonstration are es-
 JUDffMEKTS. 1,59
*

sential and universal points of every theorem. The

distinction between theorems and corollaries
may
besides be placed in this, that these are immediately
concluded, but those drawn from immediately cer-
tain propositions by a series of consequences.

40.

Judgments of Perception and Experience.

A judgment of perception is merely subjective;
an objective judgment from perceptions is a judg-
ment of experience.
Scho. A
judgment from mere perceptions is
hardly possible but by one's representation's being
expressed as a perception. In perceiving a steeple,
we perceive the red colour on it ; but cannot say,
it is red. For
were not only an empirical judg-
this

ment^ but a judgment of experience, that is, an empi-

ricaljudgment, by which we obtain a conception of
the object. For example, In touching a stone we feel
warmth ; is a judgment of perception ; the stone
is warm, on the other hand, a judgment of experi-
ence. In the latter, what is
merely in the sub-

ject must not be considered

as belonging to the ob-

ject; for a judgment of experience is the percep-

tion, whence the conception of the object arises, for

instance, Whether luminous points move in the

moon, or in the atmosphere, or in the eye of the be-
holder.
160 LOGIC.

General Doctrine of Elements.

.

SECTION THE THIRD.

Syllogisms.
41.
.

Syllogism in .general*
BY syllogising we understand that function of

thinking, by which one judgment is derived from

another. A syllogism (or an argumentation) in ge-
neral is consequently the deduction of one judgment
from another.

Immediate and Mediate Syllogisms.

All syllogisms are either immediate, or mediate.
An immediate syllogism ( consequentia imme-
diata) is the deduction of one judgment from ano-
ther without an intermedial judgment. A syllo-
gism, when, besides the conception, which judg-
a
ment contains, other conceptions are used for the
purpose of deriving a cognition from them, is me-
diate.
 SYLLOGISMS. 161
i

43.

Syllogisms of the Understanding, of Rea-

son, and of Judgment.
Immediate syllogisms are stiled syllogisms of the

understanding too ; whereas all mediate ones are

those either of reason, or of judgment. We shall
here treat of the immediate ones first.

/.
Syllogisms of the Understanding.

44.

Peculiar Nature of the Syllogisms of the

Understanding.
The essential character of all immediate syllo-

gisms and the principle of their possibility consist en-

tirely in an alteration of the mere form of the judg-
ments: while the matter of the judgments (the sub-

ject and the predicate) remains invariably the same.

Scholium I. By the form, only and by no means
by the matter of the judgments' being altered in the
immediate syllogisms, these syllogisms are distin-

guished from all mediate ones, in vfhich the judg-

ments are distinct as to the matter too ; because a
new conception as an intermedial judgment, or as a
middle term,, must survene in order to iafer tlie one
judgment from the other. When, for example,, we
argue,, All men are mortal ; therefore Caius. is mor-
tal. This is not an immediate syllogism. For we,
* '...'
x
162 LOGIC.

for the inference, stand in need of the intermedial

judgment, Caius is a man; but by this new con-

ception the matter of the judgments is altered.
2. An intermedial
judgment, it is true, may be
thrown in the
syllogisms of the understanding too;
but then it is
merely tautological. As, for instance,
in the immediate syllogism: All men are mortal;
some men are men ; therefore some men are mor-
tal. The middle term is a tautological proposition.

45.

Moods of the Syllogisms of the Under-

standing.
The syllogisms of the "understanding go through
all the classes of the logical functions of
judging,
and are consequently determined in their principal
moods or forms by the points of quantity, of quality*
of relation, and of modality. Upon that the fol-

lowing division of these syllogisms depends :

46.

I .
Syllogisms of the Understanding (with
regard to the Quantity of Judgments J
per Judicia suhalternata.
In these syllogisms of the understanding both the

judgments are distinct as to quantity, and the parti-

cular judgment is deduced from the universal agree-
ably to the principle : The inference of the particu-
 SYLLOGISMS. 163

lar from the universal holds fab universali ad par-

ticulars valet consequential .

Scho. A judgment, when it is contained under

another, is termed subaltern example, par-

; as, for

ticular judgments under universal ones (Every man

is fallible ; some man is fallible. No man is infal-

lible; some man is not infallible. T.).

47.

2. Syllogisms of the Understanding- (with

regard to the Quality of Judgments} per
Judicia opposita.
In syllogisms of the understanding of this form
the alteration regards the quality of the judgments
considered with respect to opposition. As this op-
position may be a threefold one, it
yields the parti-
cular division of the immediate syllogising by con-

tradictorily opposed judgments, by contrary v and by

subcontrary ones.
Scho. Syllogisms of the understanding by equi-

pollent judgments cannot in strict propriety be

named syllogisms ; for no consequence has place
in them ; they are rather to be considered as a mere

substitution of the words,which denote the very

same conception, by which means the judgments
themselves remain unaltered even as to the form.
Not all men are virtuous, for instance, and. Some
men are not virtuous. Both judgments express the

very same thing.

1 64 LOGIC.

48.

a. Syllogisms of the Understanding per

Judicia contradictorie oppo&ita.
In syllogisms of the understanc^ng by judgments
which are contradictorily opposed to one another,
and, as such,, constitute the genuine pure opposi-

tion, the truth of the one of the contradictory judg-

ments is inferred from the falsity of the other, and
conversely. For the genuine opposition, which
has 'place in these syllogisms, contains neither
more, nor less, than what belongs to opposition.
Agreeably, to the principle of the exclusive third
both repugnant judgments cannot be true; but

they can just as little be. both false. When there-

fore the one is true, the other is false, and con-
versely (All logic is the same repetition some lo-

gic is not the same repetition. T,).

49.

b. Syllogisms of the Understanding per

^Judicia contrarie opposita.
Contrarily opposed judgments are those, the one
of which is universally affirmative, the other uni-

versally negative. As the one of them expresses

more, than the other, and as in, what it expresses
more, than the mere negation of the other, the fal-
sity may lie, they never can be both true, but
 SYLLOGISMS. 1'65

may be both false. With regard to these con-

trary judgments then, the inference of the falsity

of the one from the truth of the other holds ; but
not conversely (Every enlightened man is divested
of prejudices ; no enlightened man is divested of

prejudices. T.).

50.

c.
Syllogisms of the Understanding per
Judicia subcontrarieopposita.

Subcontrarily opposed judgments are judgments,

the one of which affirms or denies particularly what
the other denies or affirms particularly.
As they may be both true, but cannot be both
false, only the following conclusion holds with re-
gard to them When the one of these propositions
:

is false, the other is true ; but not

conversely.
Scho, In the subcontrary judgments no pure
strict
opposition obtains ; for it is not denied or af-
firmed of the same objects in the one what is affirm T
ed or denied of the other. Exempli gratia, in the

syllogism: Some men are learned; therefore some

men are notJearned that, which is denied in the
latter judgment, is not maintained of the same men
in the former.
166 IOGIC.

51.
*
3. Syllogisms of the Understanding (with
regard to the Relation of Judgments)
per Judicia conversa, sive per Cower-
sionem.
Immediate T
8} Hogismsby conversion regard the
relation of judgments and consist in the transposi-
tion of the subject and of the predicate in both judg-
ments ; so that the subject of the one judgment is
made the predicate of the other, and conversely

(thus, No virtue is vice

; no vice is virtue. T.) .

52,

Pure and Altered Conversion.

In conversion either the quantity of the judg-
ments is altered, or it remains unaltered. In the
former case the converted (conversum) is as to

quantity distinct from the converting (convertentej,

and the conversion is termed an altered one (con-
versio per accidens); in the latter case the con-
is named a
version pure one (conversio simpliciter
tails) (Take example, Every A is B; some
this

B is A. No A is B ; some B is not A Every A is

B^ every B is A. Some A is not B ; some B is not
A. T.).
53.

Universal Rules of Conversion.

Relatively to the syllogisms of

the understanding

by conversion the following rules hold:

 SYLLOGISMS. 167

Universally affirmative judgments cannot be

1.

converted but per accidens ; for in them the predi-

cate is a larger conception, and consequently some
of it
only is contained in the conception of the

subject.
2. But all
Universally negative judgments maybe
simpliciter converted ; for in them the subject is

taken out of the sphere of the predicate. Just so

are,
All particularly affirmative propositions sim-
3.

pliciter convertible; for in these judgments a part

of the sphere of the subject is subsumpted under the

predicate, by consequence a part of the sphere of

the predicate may be subsumpted under the subject.
Scho. In universally affirmative judgments the
1.

subject, as it is contained under the sphere of the

predicate, is considered as a contentum of the pre-
dicate. We therefore cannot argue, for instance,

but thus, All men

consequently some
are mortal ;

of those contained under the conception of mortal

are men. But the reason of universally negative
judgments' being simpliciter convertible is, that two
conceptions universally repugnant to one another,
repugn one another in the same sphere.
2. Several universally assertive judgments may
be simply converted. But the ground of that lies

not in their form, but in the peculiar quality of their

matter; for example, the judgments: All that

which is immutable is necessary, and All that which
is
necessary is immutable.
168 . tosic.

54.

4.
Syllogisms of the Understanding (with
regard to the Modality of Judgments}
per Judicia tfontraposita.
The form of the immediate syllogism by contra-
position consists in that metathesis of the judgments,
by which the quantity remains the same, but the
quality is altered. These syllogisms, by their turn-

ing an assertive judgment to an apodictical one, re-

gard nothing but the modality of judgments.

55.

Universal Rule of Contraposition.

With regard to contraposition the following uni-

versal rule holds :

All universally affirmative

judgments may be sim-
ply contraposed. For, when the predicate, as that
which contains the subject under it, consequently
the wh61e sphere, is denied, a
part of it, that is, the
subject, must likewise be so (Every A is B, may be
thus contraposed, I, Every non B is non A; 2, No
non B is A. T.).
I. The metathesis of
(Scho judgments by conver-
sionand that by contraposition then are so far op-
posed to one another, as that alters the quantity
only, this nothing but the quality, T.),
 SYLLOGISMS. 16 J
(

(2. These forms of immediate syl log-isms refer

merely to categorical judgments. T.).*

11. Syllogisms of Reason.

56.

Syllogism of Reason in General.

A syllogism of reason
the knowledge of the ne-
is

cessity of a proposition by the subsumption of its

condition under a given universal rule.

57.

Universal Principle of all Syllogisms of

Reason.
The universal principle, upon which the validity
of syllogising by reason depends,
all
may be deter-
minately expressed in this formula :

* While we have the alteration of the bare form of the

judg-
ments in these syllogisms in view, and while their matter re-
mains the same, no other affinity of two hypothetical judg-

mentS) than what consists in changing the hypothesis and the

thesis, is cogitable. For instance, If there is fire, there is

smoke ;
and if there is smoke, there is fire. But there
can be no affinity between a disjunctive and another judg-
ment. In disjunctive judgments there is neither quantity nor

quality to be considered. As the relation, which they bear one

another, is that of two conceptions, the objective validity of the
one of which excludes that of the other, it allows of no logi-
cal distinction. T.
170 LOGIC.

What ranks under a condition of a rule, ranks

under the rule itself.

Scho. The
syllogism of reason premises a uni-
versal rule and a subsumption under its condition.
We thereby cognise the conclusion a priori not in
the single, but as comprehended in the universal
and as necessary on a certain condition. And this,

that every thing ranks under the universal and is

determinable by universal rules, is the very princi-

ple of rationality or of necessity.

08.

Constituents of a Syllogism of Reason.

To every syllogism of reason the following three

essential parts belong :

1, a universal rule, which is named the major

proposition ;

2, the proposition, by which a cognition is sub-

sumpted under the condition of the universal rule,

and which is denominated the minor proposition
(and sometimes the assumption) ; and,
3, the proposition, which either affirms or denies
the predicate of the rule of the subsumpted cogni-

tion, isnamedtheconclusion (or inference or illation).

The two first
propositions conjoined are termed
the premises. ,

(For instance, Every thing composed is mutable

(major); bodies are composed (minor); ergo bo-
dies are mutable (conclusion). T ).
 SYLLOGISMS.

Scho. A rule is an assertion or a universal condi-

tion. The relation of the condition to the assertion,

that is to say, how this ranks under that, is the ex-

ponent of the
rule.

By the subsumption we mean,, the knowledge

that

the condition has place (somewhere).

The consequence is, the conjunction of that which

has been subsumpted under the condition with

1

the assertion of the rule.

59.

Hatter and Form of Syllogisms of Reason.

The matter of syllogisms of reason consists in

the premises ; the form, in the conclusion, provided

that comprises the consequence.
it

Scho. I. In every syllogism of reason then

the truth of the premises must be first proved, and
then the Tightness of the consequence* In the re-

pudiation of a syllogism of reason never the con-

or the consequence,
clusion, but either the premises,
must always be the first rejected.
In every syllogism of reason the conclusion
.

the premises and the conse-

is given the moment
quence are.
172 LOGIC.

60.

Division of the Syllogisms of Reason (as

to Relation} into categorical, hypotheti-

cal, and disjunctive.

All rules (judgments) contain objective unity of
the consciousness of the multifarious of cognition ;

consequently a condition, on which one cognition

belongs with another to one consciousness. Only
three conditions of this unity are cogitable either
as the subject of the inherence of the marks,, or as
the ground of the dependence of one cognition

upon another, or as the conjunction of the parts in

a whole (logical division ) There can therefore be
but just as many sorts of universal rules (proposi-
tiones majoresj, by which the consequence of one
judgment from another is obtained. And in that
the division of all
syllogisms of reason into cate-
gorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive, is founded.
Scho. I. The syllogisms of reason can be di-
vided neither as to quantity for every major is

a rule, by consequence something universal

nor as to quality for it
equipollent whe-
is

ther the conclusion is affirmative or negative i

nor as to modality for the conclusion is

always ac-
companied with the consciousness of necessity, and
of course has the dignity of an apodictical proposi-
tion. Nothing therefore but the relation, as the

only possible ground of division (fundamentum di-

visionisj of the syllogisms of reason, remains.
 SYLLOGISMS.

2. logicians bold
the categorical syllogisms
Many
of reason only ordinary ;
and all the others extra*
ordinary. But it is without foundation and false.
For all these three species are productions of equally

right functions of reason, and which functions are

alike essentially distinguished from one another.

61.

Proper Distinction between categorical,

hypothetical, and disjunctive Syllogisms
of Reason.
That which is distinctive in these three species of

syllogism* the major proposition.

lies in In cate-

gorical syllogisms the major is a categorical propo-

sition ; in hypothetical ones, a hypothetical or pro-

blematical one; and in disjunctive, a disjunctive.

62.

Categorical Syllogisms of Reason.

In every categorical syllogism there are three

principal conceptions (termini ) :

1, the predicate in the conclusion ;

which con-
ception is denominated the major term; because it

has a greater sphere than the subject ;

* Whenever Syllogism we always un-

is
simply mentioned,
derstand by it a syllogism of reason or a ratiocination. T.
174 LOGIC.

2, the (subject) in the conclusion, whose concep-

tion is named the minor term ; and,
3, an intermedia] mark, which receives the appel-
lation of the middle term (and sometimes of the ar-

gument) because by it a cognition

; is
subsumpted
under the condition of the rule.
Scho. I. This distinction of the terms has not

place but in categorical syllogisms ; because they

only conclude by means of a, middle term ; in the
others, but
by the subsumption of a proposition re-
presented problematically in the major and asser-
tively in the minor.

(2. The
three propositions are stiled the proxime

matter; the three terms, the remote; and the major

and the minor, the extremes. T.).

63.

Principle of categorical Syllogisms of

Reason.
The principle, upon which both the possibility
and the validity of all
categorical syllogisms depend,
is this :

What agrees with the mark of a thing, agrees

with the thing itseJf ; and what is repugnant to the
mark of a thing, is
repugnant to the thing itself

(nota notce est nota rei ipsius ; repugnans nota,

repugnat rei ipsi).

Scho. From the principle just laid down the Dic-

tum de omniet /ZM//O may be easily deduced, and it
 SYLLOGISMS. 175

can therefore hold as the first principle neither for

syllogisms of reason, nor for categorical ones in
particular.
The generic and the special conceptions are uni-
versal marks of all the thing's that rank under them.

Consequently the rule,, What agrees or is repugnant

to the genus or the species, agrees or is repugnant

to all the objects that are contained under the ge-
nus or the species, holds. And this rule is the very
Dictum de omni et nullo.

64.

Rules for the Categorical Syllogisms of

Reason.
From the nature and the principle of categorical
syllogisms the following rules for them flow :

In every categorical syllogism neither more,

1.

nor fewer terms, than three, can be contained ; for

in it we must conjoin two conceptions (the subject
and the predicate) by an intermedial mark.
2. The premises must not be all negative (ex purls

negativis nihil sequitur ); for the subsumption in

the minor proposition, as it expresses, that a cogni-
tion ranks under the condition of the rule, must be
affirmative.

2. Nor
must all the premises be particular pro-
positions neither (ex puris particularibus nihil se-
quitur) ; else there were no rule, that is, no uni-
versal proposition, whence a particular cognition
could be inferred.
4. The conclusion always follows the weaker
 176 LOGIC.

part of the premises, that is, the negative and the

particular proposition in the premises, as it is named

the weaker part of the categorical
syllogism ( cvn-
clusio sequiturpartem debilioremj.
Hence if,

5, one of the premises is a negative proposition,

the conclusion must likewise be negative; and,

6, if one of the premises is a particular proposi-

tion., the conclusion also must be particular;

7) In all categorical syllogisms the major must be

a universal, the minor a particular, proposition ;

and hence it follows :

8, and finally, that the conclusion must relatively

to quality follow the
major, but, relatively to quan-
tity,the minor proposition.
Scho. That the conclusion must always follow the

negative and the particular proposition in the pre-

mises, is
easy to be perspected.
If we make the minor proposition particular and
say, Some is contained under the rule ; we can say
in the conclusion nothing but that the predicate of

the rule agrees with some ; because we have not

subsumpted any more under the rule. And when
we have a negative proposition for the rule (the

major), we must make the conclusion too negative.

For, when the major proposition says, Of all that
which ranks under the condition of the rule some
one predicate must be denied ; the conclusion must
likewise deny the predicate of that (the subject),
which has been subsumpted under the condition of
the rule.
 SYLLOGISMS. 177

65.

Ptire and impure categorical Syllogisms

of Reason.
A categorical syllogism is pure or simple when in
it neither an immediate consequence is intermixed,
nor the legitimate order of the premises altered, (for
instance, Those, who are guilty of pious frauds,
cannot be acceptable to God j therefore hypocrites
cannot be acceptable to him otherwise it is termed
;

an impure or a complex one (ratiocinium impurum,

s* hybridum).
66.

Impure Syllogisms of Reason by the Meta-

thesis of the Propositions. Figures.
Those syllogisms which arise from the transpo-
sition of the propositions and in which therefore the

order of these not the legitimate one, are to be

is

considered as impure. This case occurs in what is

commonly named the three last figures of the cate-

gorical ratiocinations.

67.

Four Figures of Syllogisms.

By figures those four
modes of syllogising, whose
distinction is determined by the particular disposi-
tion of the premises and of their conceptions, are to

understood.
 178 LOGIC.

68.

Determinative of their Distinction by the

various Disposition; of the middle Term.

The middle term, upon whose disposition the

great stress of the business depends, may occupy

either 1, in the major proposition the place of the

subject and in the minor that of the predicate ; or 2,

in both the premises the
place of the predicate ; or

3, in both the place of the subject; or 4, and finally,

in the major proposition the place of the predicate

and the minor that of the subject.

in By these
four cases the distinction of the four figures is de-
termined. Let S denote the subject of the conclu-
sion, P its predicate, and M. the middle term ; the
scheme of these four figures may be thus erected :

M P
S M
 SYLLOGISMS. 179

And, as that must be the universal rule of all cate-

gorical syllogisms in general, it is obvious, that the

first
figurethe only legitimate one, which form*
is

the basis of all the others, and to which they, if

they shall have validity, must be reduced by the

metathesis of the premises.
Scho. The tirst figure may have a conclusion of

every quantity and of every quality. In the other

figures there are but conclusions of a certain form ;

some moods of them are here excluded. That
shews, that these figures are not perfect, but that
there are in them which pre-
certain restrictions,
vent the conclusion's being in all the moods, as in
the first figure (thus, All that which is rational is a

spirit ;
the human soul is rational ; therefore the hu-
man soul is a spirit or (take this instance of a ne-

gative syllogism) Nothing immutable can be mea-

sured by time, the duration of God is immutable ;

ergo the duration of God cannot be measured by

time. T.)

70.

Condition of the Reduction of the three

last Figures to the first One.

The condition of the validity of the three last

figures,
on which a right or legitimate mode of ra-

tiocinating is
possible in each of them, is, That the
middle term obtain in the propositions a place,
180 LOGIC.

whence their order may arise by means of im-

mediate consequences according to the rules of the
first figure.Hence have we the following rules for
the three last figures :

71.

Rule of the second Figure.

In the second figure the minor stands right, the

major must therefore be converted so that it may

remain universal. That however
not possible is

but when it
(the major) universally negative ; but
is

it, if affirmative, must be contraposed. In both

Cases the conclusion is
negative (sequitur partem
debiliorem.)
Scho. The rule of this figure is, That, to which
the mark of a thing is repugnant, is repugnant to
the thing itself. Here we must convert and say,
That, to which a mark is
repugnant, is repugnant
to this mark ; or we must convert the conclusion
thus, That, to which the mark of a thing is
repug-
nant, the thing itself is
repugnant to ; consequently
it is
repugnant to the thing (For example, Nothing
perishable simple ; of course nothing simple is
is

perishable; the human soul is simple; therefore

the human soul is not perishable. The question
here is not what is said, but what is indispensa-
bly necessary to be thought if there shall be a right

consequence, The illative or conclusive capacity

of the argumentation
evidently consists in the sim-
 SYLLOGISMS. 181

ply converted member in italics, by whose inser-

tion, however, the syllogism itself is rendered re-

dundant. T.).

72.

Rule of the Third Figure.

In the third figure the major stands right; by

consequence the minor must be converted; yet so

fhat an affirmative proposition may result from it.
This however is not possible but when the affirma-
tive proposition is
particular ; consequently the con-
clusion is
particular.
Scho. The rule of this figure is,, What agrees or
isrepugnant a mark,, agrees or is repugnant to
to

some things, under which this mark is contained. We

must first say agrees or is repugnant to all that which
:

iscontained under this mark (For instance, All men

are sinners; men
are rational beings; conse-
all

quently some rational beings are men; therefore

some rational beings are sinners. Which reason-
ing is not regularly consequential but by means of
the conversion per accidens in italics. T.).

73.

Rule of the fourth Figure.

When in this
figure the major universally ne-
is

gative, it
may be simply converted ; and in the
same manner the minor as particular ;
consequently
the conclusion is
negative. Whereas
the major,
if it is
universally affirmative, cannot be converted
 182 LOGIC.

but pei\ accidens or contraposed ; the conclusion

therefor* is either particular, or negative.
>
If the

conclusion is not converted either a metathesis of

the premises, or a conversion of both of them, must
take place.
Scho. In this figure we syllogize thus, pre- The
dicate adheres to the middle term, this to the sub-

ject (of the conclusion), consequently

the subject to
the predicate which however is not the case, but
;

its converse follows. In order to render that possn

ble, themajor must be made the minor, and vice

versa, and the conclusion converted ; because in
the former alteration the minor is turned to the ma-

jor term (The negative syllogism must run

thus:

No dunce is learned consequently no learned man

;

is a dunce; some learned men are pious; conse-

quently some pious men are learned ; therefore some

pious men are not dunces. Affirmative syllogisms

in this figure are not possible ; they, when attempt-
ed to be framed, all run into the first figure, conse-

quently are useless, and have properly been long-

repudiated. T.).*

* The ancient logicians and the scholastics used their utmost

endeavours to find out all the possible moods of syllogizing in
these four figures, which they distinguished by strange words,

whose meaning is
easily gathered from these lines :
 SYLLOGISMS. 183

74.

Universal Result of the three last Figures.

From the adduced rules for the three last figures
it is obvious,
1, that there is a universally affirmative conclu-
sion in neither of them, and that the conclusion is

either negative or particular ;

2, that in each of them an immediate consequence,

not explicitly shewn, but which must be implied, is
intermixed ; that consequently,
3, all these three last modes of syllogizing must,

Asserit A, negat E ; verum universaliter ambo.

Asserit I, negat O ; sed particulariter ambo.

Whoever has a mind to admire the diligent and to regret the

fruitless labours of the ancients, will see the moods and the

figures amply discussed in Watts's Logic and in Kanie's Art of

Thinking. But the former author errs when he says (page 259)
that the consonants are neglected and that t/iefour vowels A t E,
/, O
t only are regarded iu the artificial words. A proof of the
contrary of this assertion, however, is, that in Cesare and Fes-
tino t for instance, the first consonants, C and F, shew to what
form of syllogism of the first figure that of the second figure is
to be reduced,and consequently point out the natural order of
the conceptions, in which the knowledge of the conclusion is

begotten. The
consonant, syllables of both words
s,
in the first

and every where else, denotes the simple conversion of the judg-
ments ; the p, in Darapti and Fefapton the conversion per ac-
cident; them, in Camestres, the metathesis. That then the
doctor either seems to have ignored or, what is more probable,
has but over-looked. T.
184 LOGIC.

as no pure syllogism can have more than three terms,

be named not pure, but impure syllogisms (rat.
hyb.J*
75.

2. Hypothetical Syllogisms of Reason .

A hypothetical ratiocination is, as above-men-

tioned, a syllogism that has a hypothetical proposi-
tion for its major. It therefore consists of two pro-

positions, an antecedent and a consequent; in it

we argue according to the modus either ponens, or

toltens.
Scho. 1. Hypothetical syllogisms then have no

* It is, says our author in his treatise on The false subtilty of

the four syllogistic Figures, easy to discover the first occasion of
this subtilty. He, who first wrote a syllogism in three lines below
one another, considered it as a chess-hoard and tried what would
be the result of the transposition of the places of the middle

term, and was as much surprised when he perceived, that a ra-

tional sense was produced, as a person that discovers an ana-

gram is. It is just as childish to be over-joyed with the one, as

with the other, especially as it is
forgot, that nothing new in

point of distinctness, but only an indistinctness is introduced.

But it is the lot of the human understanding either to be anx-

iously inquisitive and to fail on impertinencies, or to catch rashly

at objects too great and to build castles in the air. The one half
of the multitude of thinkers chuse the number 666, the other
either the origin of animals and of plants, r the mysteries of

Providence. The error, into which both classes fall, is, ac-

cording to the difference of their heads, of a very different

sort. T.
 SYLLOGISMS. 18.5

middle term, and nothing is shewn in them but the

consequence of one proposition of another. In

their major consequence of two propositions,
the
the former of which is a premiss, the latter a con-

clusion, is
expressed. The minor is a transforma-
tion of the problematical condition in a categori-
cal proposition (Thus, If A is, B is ;.
A is; there-
fore B is. And, If A is, B is ; but B is not ; ergo
A is not T,).
2. Fromthe hypothetical syllogism's consisting
but of two propositions,, without having a middle

term, it
may be seen, that it is, accurately speak-
ing, not a syllogism of reason, but rather an im-
mediate consequence evincible from an antecedent
and a consequent, as to either the matter or the
form (consequentia immediata demons trab His [ex
antecedents et consequente"] v el quoad mater iam
vel quoad formamj.

Every syllogism of reason must be a proof. Now

the hypothetical syllogism carries in it the ground
of proof only or the argument. Consequently it is

clear, that it cannot be a syllogism of reason,

76.

The Principle of hypothetical Syllogisms.

The principle of the ground : A ratione ad ra-
tionatum ; a negations rationati ad negationem
rationis, valet consequentia, is the principle of hy-

pothetical syllogisms.
186 LOGIC.

77.

3. Disjunctive Syllogisms of Reason.

In these the major is a disjunctive proposition
and consequently, as such, must have members of
division or disjunction.
In disjunctive syllogisms we argue either from
the truth of the one member
of disjunction to the

falsity of the others, or from the falsity of all the

members except one to the truth of this one. That
is done by the modus ponens forponendo tollentem},
this by the modus tollcns (or tollendo ponentem).
Scho. 1. Allmembers of disjunction, one
the

excepted, taken together, make up the contradic-

tory opposite of this one.Consequently a dicho-
tomy, according to which when the one of them is
true the other must be false and vice versa, has

place here (The universal form of this syllogism is,

What is A, is either B, or C ; A
is not 13 ; it is

therefore C. T.).
2: All disjunctive ratiocinations of more than two
members of disjunction then are, properly speak-
ing, polysyllogistic. For a true distinction can be
but bimembris, and the logical division is nothing
more than bimembris ; but the membra subdivi-
dentia are put among the membra dividentia for
the sake of brevity.
 SYLLOGISMS. 187

78.

Principle of the disjunctive Syllogisms.

It is the principle of the exclusive third : A ne-

gatione unius contradictorie oppositum ad ajfir-

mationem alterius ; a positions unius ad nega-
tionem alterius valet consequentia.

79.

Dilemma.
A dilemma (argumentum utrinqucz feriens. T.^
is a hypothetically disjunctive syllogism,, or a hy-

pothetical argument, whose consequent is a dis-

junctive judgment. The hypothetical proposition,

whose consequent is disjunctive, is
the major pro-

position ; the minor affirms, that the consequent

(per omnia membra) is false, and the conclusion,
that the antecedent is so. (A remotione conse-

quentis ad negationem antecedents valet conse-

quentia).
Scho. (The universal form of a dilemma, tri-
lemma, tetralemma, or how many members of di-
vision soever there may be, is this, If A is either B,
or C, or D is; but neither B, nor G, nor is ; there- D
fore A is not. T.) The ancients valued the dilemma
much and named it the syllogismus cornutus. They
knew how to put an opponent to straits by men-
tioning every thing that he could possibly have re-
course to, and then refuted it all to him. In every
188 LOGIC.

opinion he adopted they pointed out many difficul-

ties to him. But it is a sophistical artifice not to re-
fute propositions
directly, but to point out
difficul-

ties; which artifice may be used in many,, nay, in

most things.
If we chose immediately to declare false every
thing, in which there are an easy
difficulties, it is

play to reject every thing. It is

good to shew the

impossibility of the contrary but it is somewhat il-

;

lusory when the incomprehensibility of the contrary

is held its
impossibility. The dilemmas therefore,
though consequential, are very captious or en-

snaring. They may be used not only to defend

true propositions, but to impugn true ones by diffi-

culties started against them.

SO.

Formal and cryptical Syllogisms ofReason.

A syllogism of reason in due* form (ratiocinlum
formate) is a syllogism which not only contains every
thing requisite as to the matter, but is properly
and completely expressed as to the form* The
cryptical syllogisms are opposed to the formal
ones.

All those, in which either the premises are dis-

placed, or one of them is omitted, or the middle

term only conjoined with the conclusion, may be
considered as cryptical or hidden. A syllogism of
the second sort, in which one of the premises is not

expressed but reserved in the mind, is a defective

 SYLLOGISMS. 189

(an imperfect or a mutilated) one, or an enthy-

raeme (syllogismus truncatus). That of the third

sort, is a contracted syllogism.

(Scho. Let me give you these instances of an

enthymeme Anthony is a
:
profligate ; therefore

Anthony must be despised. Whoever has com-

mitted murder must die. The soul is indivisible,

for it does not

occupy any space
-
9 is an example of
a contracted syllogism. T.).

III. Syllogisms of Judgment.

81.

Determining' and Reflecting Judgment.

The faculty of Judgment is twofold the deter- ;

termining and the reflecting. The former goes

from the universal to the particular ;
the latter, from
the particular to the universal : This is but of sub-

jective validity ; for the universal, to which it

pro-
ceeds from the particular, is nothing but an empiri-
cal, a mere analogon of the logical, universality.

82.

Syllogisms of (the reflecting) Judgment.

They are certain argumentative modes of arriving
at universal conceptionsfrom particular ones. They
therefore are functions not of the determining,
but of the reflecting judgment; and consequently

they determine not the object, but the way of

thinking of it, in order to obtain the knowledge of it.
190 LOGIC,

83.

The Principle of these Syllogisms.

The principle, in which the syllogisms of judg-

ment are founded, is this., That many do not agree

in one without a common ground, but that what be-

longs to many in this way is necessary on a common

ground.
Scho, As the syllogisms of judgment bottom upon
that principle, they cannot be held immediate ones.

84.

Induction and Analogy the two Species

of Syllogism, of Judgment.
Judgment, whilst it
proceeds from the particular
to the general, in order to gather general judgments
from experience, of course not a priori, infers
either from many all things of a sort, or from many
determinations and properties, in which things of
the same sort agree, the others, provided that they

pertain to the same principle. The former species

of inference is named the by induction,
syllogism
the latter that according to analogy.
Scho. Induction then infers a particulari ad
I.

universale according to the principle of rendering

(empirically) universal : What agrees to many

Ana-
things of a species, agrees to the
rest too.

resemblance
logy infers the total from the particular
 SYLLOGISMS.

of two things, according to the principle of speci-

fication Things of a sort, of which we know many
:

agreeing marks, agree in the other marks that we

know in some things of this sort, but do not perceive
in other things. Induction extends the empirically

given from the particular to the universal with

regard to many objects analogy, on the other hand,

;

the given properties of a thing to several of the very

same thing. One in many, therefore in all : induc-
tion ; many in one (that is in others too), therefore
the rest in it: analogy. For example, the argu-
ment for immortality, from the complete unfolding
of the predispositions of nature of every creature,
is a syllogism according to analogy.
In the syllogism according to analogy, however,
the identity of the ground (per ratio) is not required,
We conclude according to analogy nothing but ra-
tional inhabitants of the moon, not men. And we
cannot conclude according to analogy beyond the
tertium comparationis.
2. Every syllogism of reason must yield necessity.
Hence are induction and analogy not syllogisms of
reason, but logical presumptions or empirical syllo-

gisms; and by induction we obtain general, but not

universal propositions.
3. These syllogisms of judgment are useful and
indispensable for the purpose of enlarging our cog-
nition of experience. But, as they afford empirical
certainty only, we must use them with great cau-
tion,
iril
193 LOGIC.

85.
.

Simple and Compound Syllogisms of

Reason.
A ratiocination when it consists of but one syllo-

gism, is
simple ; when of several syllogisms, com-
pound.*
86.

Polysyllogistic Ratiocination.
A compound syllogism, in which the various syl-

logisms are conjoined not by mere co-ordination,

but by subordination, that is, as grounds and as

consequences, is termed a concatination of syllo-

gisms (ratiocinatio poh/syllogistica).

87.

Prosyllogisms and Episyllogisms.

In the series of compound syllogisms we may argue
in a twofold way, either from the grounds down to
the consequences, or from these up to those. The
former is done by episyllogisms ; the latter, by

prosyllogisms.
An episyllogism, in the series of syllogisms, is that

syllogism, whose premiss the conclusion of a pro-

is

syllogism of course of a syllogism, which has the

premiss of the former for its conclusion.

*
A compound syllogism, whose premises are contracted syllo-
gisms, goes under the denomination of Epichireme. T.
 SYLLOGISMS. 193

Sorites.

A syllogism consisting of several abridged syllo-

gisms producing one conclusion, is named a so-
rites (orheap), which may be either progressive, or
regressive (Goclenian), accordingly as we ascend
from the more proxime to the more remote grounds
or descend from the more remote ones to the more

proxime,
89.

Categorical and Hypothetical Sorites.

The progressive as well as the (retrograde or) re-
gressive sorites may again be either categorical, or
hypothetical. That consists of categorical proposi-
tions as a series of predicates ; this, of hypotheti-

cal ones as a series of consequences,

90.
\

Fallacy. Paralogism. Sophism.

A syllogism, which, though it has the appearance
of a right one for it, is false in point of form, is

termed a fallacy. A syllogism of that nature, when

one deceives himself with it, a paralogism ; and
is

when he endeavours to deceive others with it, a so-

phism.*

* There Kant in the treatise aforementioned, yet ano-

is, says
ther use of the syllogistic art :
by means of it to puzzle the ques-
1 94 LOGIC.
,
i

Scho. The ancients occupied themselves much

about the art of framing sophisms. Hence
are there many of them ; for instance, the so-

jrfiismct figures dictionis, in which the middle term

is taken in a different sense ; the sophisma a dicto
secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, wherein the

necessary limitation is omitted ; (the fallacia acci-

dentis, in which one decides with regard to the es-

sential properties of a subject according to some-

thing merely accidental sophisma amliguitatis

;

vel amphibolic, by which four terms are concealed

in a syllogism ; non causa pro causa, or the as-

signing of a false cause (post hoc, ergo propter

hoc) sophisma sensus compositi et divisi or the
;

falsifying of the context, when two expressions are

used in a different signification ; sophisma ignora-
tionis elenchi, thatmistaking the question, or
is,

the merely pretended contrary conclusion (qui-

proquo) sophysma polyzeteseos, or the insidious
;

questioning; sophisma heterozcteseos, or the in-

difference obtained by importunity; and finally the

assuming of a false argument (sophisma falsii

medii s. fallacia non causa ut causcej, wherein the
is
consequence faulty. T.).

tion so as to get the better of the in a learned contest..

unwary
But, as this use belongs to the gymnastics of the learned (an
art which may otherwise be very useful, but does not contribute
much to the advantage of truth), I shall pass it
by in silence. T.
 SYLLOGISMS. 195

91.

Leap in Syllogising.

A
leap (saltus) in syllogising or proving
is the

conjunction of the one premiss with the conclusion,

so that the other is left out. A leap of this sort,
when any body may easily add the wanting premiss
in thought, is
regular (legitimus] ; but, when the
subsumption is not clear, irregular (illegitimus).
In it a remote mark is connected with a thing with?
out an intermedial niark.

Petitio Principii. Circulm in Probando.

By begging the question (pet. prin.) we under-

stand assuming, for the purpose of an argument,
a proposition as an immediately certain one, though
it
requires a proof. And one, when he lays the
proposition, which he has a mind to prove, as a
foundation to its own proof, is
guilty of a circle in
proving.
Scho. Acirclein proving is often difficult to be detect-
ed ;
and this fault is
usually committed the oftenest

just when
the proofs are difficult. (Would it not, for

example, were the scriptures to be proved to be the

word of God by the authority of the church, and the
authority of the church to be proved by the scrip-
tures as the word of God be a glaring circle ? T.).
196 LOGIC.

93.

Probatio plus et minus probans.

A proof may prove too much, as well as too lit-
tle. It, in the latter case, proves a part only of

what is to be proved, but, in the former, extends to

what is false.

Scho. A
proof that proves too little may be true,
and consequently is not to be rejected. But, does it

prove too much ? it proves more than is true ; and

that is then false. For instance, the proof against
'
suicide, That whoever has not given life, cannot
take it away/ proves too much ; for, on this ground,
we could not kill any animal. It is therefore false.
 PART THE SECOND.

General Doctrine of Method.

94.

Manner and Method.

ALL cognition or knowledge and a whole of it

must be conformable to a rule. (Want of rule is

want of reason). And this rule is either that of

manner (free), or that of method (coactive).

(Scholion. Manner (modus aestheticus) is, in

propounding, that conjunction of one's thoughts,
which has no other standard, than the feeling of the
unity in the exhibition. T.).

95.

Form of Science. Method.

Cognition, as science, must be arranged after a

method. For, as aforesaid, a science is a whole of

cognition as a system and not merely as an aggre-

gate. It therefore requires a cognition,
which is
to
systematical, consequently disposed according
digested rules.
 198 LOGIC.

96.

Doctrine of Method its Object and i

End.
As the doctrine of elements in logic has the ele-
ments gtnd the conditions of the perfection of a cog-
nition for its matter ; the doctrine of method, as the
other part of logic,,
has to treat of the form of a sci-

ence in general, or of the way of proceeding in

order to connect the multifarious of cognition in a
science.
97.

Means of Promoting the logical Perfec-

tion of Cognition.

The doctrine of method must shew the way, in

which we attain the perfection of cognition. Now
the most essential logical perfections of cognition
consist in its
profundity and sys-
distinctness., its
tematical order, so as to make up the whole of a
science. The doctrine of method therefore has

chiefly to point out the means, by which these per-

fections of cognition are promoted.

98.

Conditions of the Distinctness of Cog-

nition.

The distinctness of cognitions and their conjunc-

tion in a systematical whole depend upon the dis-
 METHOD. 199

tinctness of the conceptions with regard to what is

contained as well in them as under them.

The distinct consciousness of the matter of con-

ceptions is
promoted by their exposition and their
definition ; the distinct consciousness of their sphere,
on the contrary, by their logical division. We
shall first handle the means of promoting the dis-

tinctness of conceptions with respect to their matter.

I, Promotion of the logical Perfection of Cog*-

nition by the Definition, the Exposition, and the

Description of Conceptions.

99.

Definition.
A definitiona sufficiently distinct and adequate
is

conception (conceptus rei adequatus in minimis

terminis ; complete determinatusj.
Scho. A definition only is to be considered as a
logically perfect conception; for in it the two most
essential perfections of a conception, distinctness and
the completeness and the precision in distinctness

(the quantity of distinctness), are united.

100.

Analytic and Synthetic Definition.

All definitions are either
analytical, or synthetical.
The former are those of a given conception \ the
latter, those of a factitious one.
200 LOGIC.

101.

Given and Factitious Conceptions a priori

and a posteriori.

The given conceptions of an analytic definition

are so either a priori, or a posteriori ; and the fac-
titious ones of a synthetic definition are so formed

likewise.
102.

Synthetic Definitions by Exposition or

by Construction.
The
synthesis of the factitious conceptions, from
which the synthetic definitions arise, is either that
of exposition (of phenomena),, or that of construc-
tion. The latter is the synthesis of conceptions ar-
bitrarily formed, the former that of those formed
is, from given phenomena, as their
empirically, that
matter (conceplus factitii vel a priori vel per syn-
thesin empiricam). The mathematical conceptions
ate the arbitrariously formed ones.
Scho. All definitions of the mathematical concep-
tions and if definitions could
always have place in
empirical conceptions of the conceptions of expe-
rience must then be synthetically framed. For,
as to the conceptions of the latter species, for

example, the empirical conceptions of water, of fire,

of air and such like, we have not to dissect what lies
in them, but to learn to know by experience what be-
 METHOD.

iong-s to them. All empirical conceptions must

therefore be considered as factitious ones, but whose
synthesis is
empirical, not arbitrable.
lioiiqoono','

103. v

Impossibility of empirically synthetic De-

finitions.
As the synthesis of the empirical conceptions is
not arbitrable, but empirical, and as such never can
be complete (because we may discover more and
more marks of a conception by experience), they
cannot be defined.
Scho. None
but the arbitrable conceptions then
are capable of being defined. Such definitions of
them as are not always possible, but necessary, and
as must precede all that which is said
by means of
an arbitrable conception, might be named declara-
tions, provided that we declare our thoughts by
them or give an account of what we understand
by
a word. And that is the case with mathematicians-

104.

Analytical Definitions by the Dissection

of Conceptions given a priori or a poste-
riori.

No given conceptions, whether given a prior*

or a posteriori, can be defined but by analysis Foi
2 c
 LOGIC.

given conceptions cannot be made distinct but when

their marks are rendered successively clear. If all
the marks of a given conception are rendered clear,
the conception is completely distinct and if it does ;

not comprise too many marks, it is precise, arid

from this a definition of the conception arises.
Scho. As we cannot be certain by any trial
whether we have exhausted all the marks of a given

conception by a complete analysis, all

analytic de-
finitions are to be held uncertain.

105.

Expositions and Descriptions.

All conceptions therefore cannot be defined, nor
must they be so.

There are approximations to the definition of cer-

tain conceptions, which approximations are partly

expositions, partly descriptions.
The expounding of a conception consists in the
coherent (successive) representation of its marks
provided that they are found by analysis.
The description of a conception is its
exposition,
provided that it is not precise.
Scho. 1. We can expound either a conception,
or experience. The former is done byJ analysis,
,
, f , :-:..
the latter by synthesis.
2. Exposition therefore has not place but with

regard to given conceptions, which are rendered

distinct by it; thereby it is
distinguished from de-
 M.ETHOD, 203

duration, which is a distinct representation of fac-

titious
conceptions.
As is not always possible to make the analysis
it

complete; and as a dissection in general must,, ere

it becomes complete, be incomplete ; an incomplete
a definition, is a true and a
exposition,, as part of
useful exhibition of a
conception. A definition
never remains here but the idea of a logical per-
fection which we must endeavour to reach.

Description cannot take place but with respect

3.

to conceptions empirically given. It has not any

determinate rules and contains nothing but the ma-

terials for definition.

106,

Nominal and Real Definitions.

By mere nominal definitions we understand those

definitions, which contain the signification that we

have chosen to give a certain name arbitrarily, and
which therefore denote nothing but the logical being
of objector serve .merely to distinguish it from
its

other objects. Real definitions, on the other hand,

are those definitions, which suffice to the cognition
of the object, in point of its internal determina-

tions, asthey shew the possibility of it

(the object)
from internal marks.
Scho. I. When a conception is
internally suffi-
cient to distinguish a thing, it is so
certainly
externally; but it, when not internally sufficient,
204 LOGIC.

may nevertheless be externally so in a certain refer-

ence, namely, in the comparison of the definite

with other things. But the illimited external suffi-
is not
ciency possible without the internal.
Objects of experience admit of merely nominal
2.

1 he
definitions. logical nominal definitions of given
conceptions of the understanding are taken from an
attribute or adjunct; the real definitions,
again,
from the essence of the thing, from the first ground
of possibility. The latter therefore comprehend,
what always belongs to a thing, its real essence.
Merely negative definitions cannot be named real
ones; because negative notes may, just as well as
affirmative ones, serve for the distinction of a
thing
from other things, but cannot for the cognition of
a thing as to its internal possibility.
In moral philosophy real definitions must al~

ways be sought for ; and all our endeavours must be

directed to that object. In the mathematics there
are real definitions; for the definition of an arbi-
trable conception is
always real.

3. A definition, when it
gives a conception, by
which the object can be exhibited a priori in the

concrete is
genetical ; all the mathematical defini-
tions are of this nature.

107.

Chief Requisites of Definition.

The essential and the universal requisites of the

perfection of a definition in general, may be cons:-

 METHOD 205

dered under the four main points of quantity, of

quality, of relation, and

of modality ;

1, as to quantity, with regard to the sphere of

a definition, a definition and a definite (definitum)
must be alternate conceptions, and consequently a
definition neither wider, nor narrower, than its

definite ;

2, as to quality, a definition must be an ample as

well as a precise conception.

3, as to relation, a definition must not be tauto-

logical ; that is, the marks of a definite must, as

its
grounds of cognition, be distinct from it; and
finally,
marks must be necessary
4, as to modality, the
and therefore not such as are added by experience.
Scho. The That
the generic concep-
condition,
tion and the conception of the specific distinction

(genus and differentia specificaj* must make up

the definition, holds but relatively to the nominal de-
finitions in the comparison, and not to the real ones
in the deduction.

108.

Rulesfor the Proving of Definitions.

In proving definitions four operations are to be

* The words, distinction and are usually con*

difference,

founded, even in philosophical works. In a correct style how-

ever, the former is never used but when treating of the objects
aad of the operations of the understanding, the latter, but when
cf those ef sense. T.
206 LOGIC.

performed ; it must be investigated whether a de-

finition,,

1, considered as a proposition,, is true ;

2, as a conception, distinct ;

3, as a distinct conception, ample ; and,

4, as an ample conception, determinate, that is,

to the thing itself.

adequate

109.

Rules for the Framing of Definitions.

Thevery same operations, which are requisite
to the proving of definitions, are to be performed

in the framing of them. To this end then I, seek

true propositions, seek those, relatively to whose
2,

predicate we do not always presuppose the concep-

tion of the thing, 3, collect several of them and com-

pare them with the conception of the thing itself

whether they be adequate ; and 4 and finally, see
whether the one mark does not lie in the other, or
is not subordinated to it.

Scho. 1. It is hardly necessary to mention, that

these rules hold relatively to analytical definitions

only. As in that ease we never can be certain of

the analysis' having been complete, we must set

forth a definition as an essay only, and but as if it

were a definition. With this limitation we may use

it as a distinct and a true conception and draw co-
rollaries from itsmarks. We
may say, That, to
which the conception of the definite agrees, the de-
 METHOD 20?

fmition agrees to, but, as the definition does not

exhaust the whole definite, not conversely.
2. Using* the conception of the definite in the de-

finition or laying; the definite as a foundation in

;

the definition, is defining; by a circle (circulus in

definiendo ) .

We now come to treat of the means of promo-

ting;
the distinctness of conceptions with respect to
their sphere.
II. Promotion of the Perfection of Cognition
by the logical Division of Conceptions.

110.

Conception of the Logical Division.

Every conception contains under it a multifari-

ous, provided that it is and provided

concordant ;

that it is distinct also. The determination of a con-

ception with regard to all the possible representa-
tions, which are contained under it with a proviso
that they are opposed to one another, that is, dis-

tinct from one another, bears the name of the logi-

cal division of the conception. The superior con-
ception is termed the divided conception (divisum),
and the inferior conceptions are termed the members
of division (membra dwidentia)
Scho. 1. To dissect a conception and to divide
it are therefore very distinct operations. By the
dissection of a conception we see what is contained
in it
{by analysis); by the division we consider what
 LOGIC.

is contained under it. In this case we divide the

sphere of the conception, not the conception itself.

The division is therefore so far from being a dissec-
tion of a conception, that the members of division
rather contain more in them, than the divided con-

ception.
2. We ascend from inferior to superior
concep-
tions and may afterwards descend from these to in
ferior ones by division.

in.

Universal Rules of the logical Division*

In every division of a conception care must be

taken,
1, tliat the members of division exclude one ano-
ther or be opposed to one another ; that
they,
2, rank under a superior conception (conceptum
cwnmunum), and that they,

3, collectively taken, make up the sphere of the

divided conception or be
equal to it.

Scho. The members of division must be separated

from one another not by a mere
contrary, but by a
contradictory, opposition.

Codimsion and Subdivision.

The various divisions of a
conception, which
are made with various views, are distinguished by
 METHOD. 209

thename of codivisions and the division of the

;

members of division is denominated a subdivision.

Scho. 1. A subdivision may be continued to in-

definite ; but it
may be comparatively finite. A. co-

division goes likewise to indefinite, especially in con-

ceptions of experience; for who can exhaust all the

relations of conceptions ?
2. A codivision may be said to be a division
according- to the variety of the conceptions of the
same object (the points of view), and a subdivision
that of the point of view itself.

113.

Dichotomy and Polytomy.

A division into two members goes under the ap-
pellation of dichotomy ; but it, when consisting of
more than two, takes the name of polytomy.
Scho. I. All polytomy dichotomy is
is empirical ;

the sole division according to principles a priori ;

By consequence the only primitive one. For the

members of division must be opposed to one ano-
ther and the contrary of every A is nothing more
than non A.
2.
Polytomy, as in it a knowledge of the object
is requisite,cannot be taught in logic. But dicho-
tomy requires the principle of contradiction only,
without knowing the conception, which we have a
mind to divide, as to the matter. Polytomy stands
in need of intuition ; either intuition a priori, as in
2 D
210 LOGIC.

the mathematics (for example, the division of conic

sections), or empirical intuition, as in the descrip-

tion of nature (physiography). Yet the division ac-
cording to the principle of the synthesis a priori
has Trichotomy ; I, the conception, as the condition,
2, the conditionate, and, 3, the deduction of the lat-
ter from the former.

J14.

Various Divisions of Method.

As to method itself, in particular, in the elabora-

tion and treatment of scientific cognition, there are

several chief species of it, which we shall here ad-

duce according to the following division :

115.

I. Scientific or Popular Method.

The scientific or scholastic method is distin-

guished from the popular in this, that it sets out

from fundamental and elemental propositions ; the
latter,again, from usual and interesting ones. That
aims at solidity or profundity, and therefore removes

every thing foreign ; this has entertainment in view.

Scho. These two methods then are distinguished
as to the species, and not as to the mere propound-
ing ; and popularity in the method is
consequently
distinct from that in the propounding.
 METHOD, 21 1

116.

2. Systematical or Fragmentary Method.

The systematical is opposed to the fragmentary
or rhapsodistical method. When one has thought
according- to a method, and when his method is then

expressed in the propounding and the transition

from one proposition to another distinctly made and
delivered, he has treated a cognition systematically.
Whereas, though one has thought after a method,
but not arranged the propounding methodically,
such a method is rhapsodistical.
Scho. The
systematical propounding is opposed
to the fragmentary, just as the methodical is to the

tumultuary, Who thinks methodically may pro-

pound either systematically, or in a fragmentary

way. The propounding, externally fragmentary,
but methodical in itself, is aphoristical.

1 17
IT
3. Analytic or Synthetic Method.
The analyticmethod .is contradistinguished to the
synthetic. That begins with the conditionate and the
founded and proceeds to the principles (a principi-
atis ad principia) ; this, on the other hand,
goes
from the principles to the consequences or from the
simple to the compound. The former may be de-
nominated the regressive (retrograde), the latter
the progressive, method.
212 LOGIC.

Scho. The analytic method is usually named

the heuristical or that of invention or discovery, and
the synthetic that of instruction. To the end of po-
pularity the analytic method is more adequate ; but
to that of the scientific and systematical elaboration
of cognition the synthetic, more so.

118.

4. Syllogistic or Tabellary Method.

The former is that method, according to which a
science is propounded in a series or concatenation
of syllogisms. The latter, that, according to which
a system that is
already finished is exhibited in its

whole cohesion.

119.

5. Acroamatic or Erotematic Method.

The method, when one teaches only, is acroama-
tical but, when the questions too, erotematical.
;

The latter may be divided into the dialogical or So-

cratical and catechetical, accordingly as the ques-
tions are directed either to the understanding, or

merely to the memory.

Scho. One cannot teach erotematically but by
the Socratic dialogue, in which both master and
scholar must question and answer one another reci-

procally; so that it seems in it as

if the scholar

were himself the master. This dialogue instructs

 METHOD. Q13

by means of questions, by making the disciple ac-

quainted with his own principles of reason, and by
calling; and fixing his attention to them. But one
cannot teach by the common mode of catechising;
he can only interrogate about that which he has
taught acroamatically. Hence is the catechetic me-
thod adapted to empirical and historical knowledge

only; but the dialogic, to cognitions of reason.

120.

Meditation.

By it reflection or methodical thinking or cogi-

tation is understood. Meditation must accompany
allreading as well as all learning ; and to it it is re-
quisite, that we should make previous inquiries,
and then put our thoughts in order or methodize
them, that is, conjoin them after a method.
 .

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 APPENDIX.

A SKETCH OP THE
O8 j

AUTHORS LIFE AND WRITINGS

lo'tnj.,

BY THE TRANSLATOR.
rfT >

De mortuis nil nisi verum.

EMMANUEL KANT was born Koningsberg, the

in

metropolis of the kingdom of Prussia, on the twen*

ty-second day of April in the year one thousand
seven hundred and twenty-three* ; of low extrac-
tion; but his parents, though obscure, were both
virtuous and industrious.
His father (descendent of a Scotch family that spell
theirname with a C) was a saddler in a very small
way ; our hero, consequently, not nursed in the silk-
en lap of affluence, but himself tlie sole architect

of his fortune.

* See xliii of the Preface to the second edition of his

page
Criticism on pure Reason.
QI6 APPENDIX.

" Let high Birth triumph ! What can be more great?

Nothing but Merit in a low estate.

He was taught to read and to write at a free*

school j received, at the expense of his maternal
uncle, a shoemaker, the rudiments of his academi-
cal education at Frederic's College; and, in the year
one thousand seven hundred and forty, went to the

university in his native city, where he was entirely

bred, and from which, as he in his Anthropology
informs us, he never travelled farther than to Pil-

law once by water.

The early part of his life, like that of the lives of
most men of deep learning and abstract science,
having been passed in hard study and close applica-
tion, yields but few materials and little variety of in-
cident for the biographer.
His was originally intended for the church, stu-

died divinity accordingly, and took orders.

His regular academical course finished, he began
the world as a private tutor in a clergyman's family,
and was afterwards appointed a titulargovernor to
count Kaiserlingk's children ; for, as we have been

told, he had not the care of any of thenr, though

nobody could be more capable of forming tender

minds, or of instilling into them the principles and
the love of wisdom and of virtue. Yet " the great-
est abilities are not only not required for this office,
but render a man less fit for it."
As he was of a mild and amiable disposition, of
 APPENDIX. 217

equal temper or good-humour, modest, of great

equanimity, affable, well-bred, or of polished man-
ners, cheerful, an agreeable facetious companion,
fond of conviviality, <e of the feast of reason and of
the flow of soul," and, from extensive reading
and an uncommonly retentive memory, possessed
of an inexhaustible fund of anecdote, the count and
the countess, amiable, elegant in manners, culti-
vated and enlightened themselves, in whose society ^
as well as in that of modest women in general, he
took great delight, were naturally desirous of his
entertaining and instructive conversation, conceived
a friendship /or him, generously became his patrons,
and gave him that sinecure, partly with a view of
enjoying the pleasure of his excellent society (fbr
Kant was the vital principle or the enlivener of every
society), partly that he might have sufficient leisure
to cultivate his rare talents, his extraordinarily ac-

tive, vigorous, penetrating, and comprehensive

mind.
And he did not eat the bread of idleness or
bury
his talent, but prosecuted his studies with
unwearied
attentionand indefatigable diligence. Having se-
dulously gone over the whole circle of the sciences
and made himself master of them all, he found the
mathematics and pure philosophy (logic and meta-

physic) the most congenial to his cast of mind; and

gave up the profession of theology, as a sphere too
confined for the active exertion of his mental energy,
for hiswide range and great depth of thought.
2E
 AFPtNDIX.

j^.
His custom wasto employ the morning and fore-
noon in
study and writing-, to withdraw early in the
evening from society, and to amuse himself for an
hour or two in
reading sometimes history, memoirs
and sometimes biography,
travels, voyages and
poetry, now and
then a play, by way of relaxation,
and even a good novel, such as Sir Charles Grandi-
son, a work which he often read and praised much.
Hehad an exquisitely delicate and a very correct taste
for the fine arts, but neither a turn nor leisure for

the acquirement of
superficial accomplishments.
In the year one thousand seven hundred and
fifty-
six he took the degree of Master of Arts,*
opened
a class, and gave public lectures on the mathema-
matics, on logic, and on the metaphysics. His de-
livery was both easy and graceful ; he possessed the
art not only of
commanding the attention of his au-
ditors, but of impressing his doctrines in
deeply
their minds; and his lectures on moral
philosophy
and on moral religion in particular were highly in-

teresting and sublime.

In that situation, however, he, for all his talents
both natural and acquired, was
long eclipsed by a
man of very inferior parts, whose name does not
deserve to be here mentioned. But Kant's time
was not lost ; for his talents
were continually ex-
panding themselves, and he was constantly rumi-

* In
Germany the degree of M. A. is a much
- ,
_

greater dignity
among the learned, than it is with us.
 APPENDIX 219

nating 'on his new

system. It was (to use a some-

what florid allegory) a solar eclipse. And he, like

the sun, shone forth at last in his full meridian

His opponents " hid their diminished

splendour.
heads," and their opinions and doctrines were dis-
persed, and vanished like vapour. He alone illu-
minates the world with his beneficent rays.
At length our philosopher was called to fill the
chair of wisdom, a station which his superior abili-
ties talents had so long merited, and which he
and
afterwards graced so much and dignified. He, in
the year one thousand seven hundred and seventy,
was created doctor and regius professor of pure
philosophy in the university of Koningsberg.
And, in the year one thousand seven hundred
and Royal Academy of Sciences of
eighty-six, the
Berlin chose him one of their members. They no
doubt intended to confer a mark of honor on the
professor; but it was soon found, that his being a
fellow of their society, celebrated
though it justly is,
redounded to their honor.
Having now reached the summit of his ambition*
and wishing for nothing more than leisure to digest
"
his critical system, gain the heights of science
to

and of virtue/' he refused several places of emolu-

ment and other dignities that were offered him.
So early as the year seventeen hundred and forty-
seven he published his coup d'essai, THOUGHTS ON
THE TRUE ESTIMATION OF THE LIVING POWERS; TOGE-
THER WITH A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE POWER OP
220 PREFACE

BODIES IN GENERAL ; in which, he, by repudiating,

at theage of foiir-and-twenty, the thoughts of these

celebrated men, Leibnitz, Wolf, Bulfinger, the two

Barnoullis, Herman and others, proves himself to

be the most acute metaphysician and the ablest na-
tural philosopher of his time. His motto
(from is

Seneca), Nihil magis prcestandum est quam ne

pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregen%,
pergentes, non qua eundum sed qua itur,
No name, however famous, should it oppose the
discovery of truth, is (says he) to be held of any va-
lue ; the track of reason is the only one for us to
follow in.

That invective and personal at tacks are not Kant's

weapons the reader will see from these his con-
cluding words : I have succeeded in perceiving a
few errors in Leibnitz's theory, it is true, yet I am
one of this great man's debtors ; for I should have
effectuated nothing without the clue of the excellent
law of continuity, for which we have this immortal
discoverer to thank, and which is the
only means of
finding the way out of this labyrinth. In short

though the matter has fallen out in my favor, the

share of honor that remains to me is so small, that
I am not afraid of Ambition's demeaning herself so
far as to grudge me it.
Both this work and his subsequent publications
will shew, that the
discovery of the latent truth
after which the greatest masters of human know-

ledge sought long in vain has been reserved for him.

 APPENDIX* 221

His GENERAL PHYSIOGONY AND THEORY OP THE

HEAVENS, or an Essay on the Constitution of the me-
chanical Origin of the Universe according to New-
ton's Principles, appeared in the year one thousand
seven hundred and fifty-five. In which work he
evinces his profound astronomical knowledge, coa-

jectures, with great probability, that there are be-

yond Saturn's orbit other planets more and more ec-
centric than Saturn, by consequence nearer and
nearer the cometary property, and thus foretells, on
theoretical grounds, what Herschel discovered six-

and-twenty years after with the assistance of the te-

lescope, the existence of Uranus (the Georgian
planet or Herschel) and its satellites. Kant's theory
with regard to Saturn's ring too is confirmed by
Herschel's recent discoveries.
Itcannot but be interesting to men of science to

compare the construction of the heavens, which one

great man hasperceived, so to say, with the teles-
copic eye of his mind, according to the Newtonian
laws from the original birth of the celestial bodies,
with the construction of the heavens as another

great man has exhibited it according to telescopic

observations.
This publication, being rather dry and abstruse,
was but little known at first ; the celebrated Lam-
bert accused of having taken advantage of this
is

circumstance; and that not without reason ; for the

very same theory of the systematical constitution of
the universe, of the
galaxy, of the nebula, &c. is
 APPENDIX,

advanced in his Cosmological Letters, which he

published in the year seventeen hundred and
sixty-
one,,and with which he made so great a figure.
Kant himself, in one of his works, says, that the
agreement of the thoughts of this ingenious man
with those which I communicated to the public six-
teen years ago, which agreement is to be perceived
in the very smallest strokes, increases
pre- my
sumption, that this delineation will hereafter re-
ceive more confirmation. Sic redit ad dominum,
4c.
In the year one thousand seven hundred and

sixty-three he presented the public with THE ONLY

POSSIBLE ARGUMENT FOR THE DEMONSTRATION OF
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. In this treatise, which is
one of his
dogmatical works (for even Kant was
only a dogmatist till he reached the transcendental
station in his later work, CRITICISM ON PURE REA-

SON); in this extremely recondite treatise, wherein

nothing but an argument (or ground of proof) in
support of the demonstration of the existence of the
Deity is pretended to, the greatest acuteness or
subtility, and all that which is
possible to be per-
formed by mere conceptions and by the theoretical
mode of proof of the existence of that Being, will
be found ; inwhich speculative field nothing apo-
dictically certain on this head can possibly be con-
contained.
He here does not allow but of the possibility of
two methods of proof of the existence of the All suffi-
 APPENDIX. 223

cient Being, the Ontological and the cosmological.

When exactness and completeness are in
logical
hand, the former mode of proof is the better, but,
when comprehension to the common just concep-
tion, liveliness of impression,, beauty, and the power
of moving the moral springs of human nature are

so, the preference is to be granted the latter.

But, as that proof is not to be found in this un-

beaten path (the theoretical or speculative field),
we must turn to the broad highway of practical

reason, or, in other words, have recourse to the

moral argument ; for, as God
a moral being, the
is

proof of his existence can only be a moral one.

Though it is absolutely necessary to convince one's
self of His existence, it is not
equally necessary
that it should be demonstrated. Indeed it is not,
for want of intuitive data, susceptible of that strict-

ness which is
requisite to the evidence of mathema-
tical demonstration. Nor can it
by any effort of
the speculative use of our reason be confuted nei-
ther.

The teteological contemplations interspersed in

thiswork are highly interesting and
edifying, and
have a great tendency to corroborate (the minds of
men in general) in the belief in the Eternal Bein\
Kant's later doctrine and more profound sentiments
on this the most important of all
subjects are to be
found in the aforementioned Criticism and in his
other systematical works, wherein he,
by rendering
essential service to moral science, to the true en*
224 APPENDIX.

lightening of the human mind, and by consequence

to the cause of truth and of virtue, proves himself
a great benefactor to mankind.
He, in the year seventeen hundred and seventy,
excited the attention of the thinking part of the pub-
lic by his inaugural dissertation, DE MUNDI SENSI-
BILIS ATQUE INTELLTGIBILIS FoRMA T PlllNCIPHS ;

the most remarkable phenomenon in the philosophic

hemisphere since Newton's PHILOSOPHISE NATURA-

LIS PitiNCipiA MATHEMATICA, It may be said, with

great truth, that, in this work of Kant, which com-

prises the creative architectoric idea and complete
foundation of his future system, the profundity of a
Newton, the acumen of a Leibnitz, the solid argu-
mentation of a Hume, and the systematic arrange-
ment of a Wolf conspire to render it perfect. It
alone entitles his statue to distinguished niches in
the temples of Science and of Fame. "Others
are fond of Fame, but Fame is fond of him."
He had attained the age of fifty-eight ere his CRI-
TICISM ON PURE REASON made its first
appearance
in the year one thousand seven hundred and
eighty-one. This, the most abstract profound meta-
physical work that ever was written, and which the
Germans, by way of eminence, name, The Criti-
cism, unquestionably the triumph of intellect.
is

It comprehends, in one octavo volume of eight

hundred and eighty-four close-printed pages, his
whole theoretical system, the complete investigation
of the
procedure of the sensitive faculty, of the un-
derstanding, and of the faculty of reason itself.
 APPENDIX. 825

In the wings of all false speculative philosophy

it

that attempts to soar above the sphere of possible

experience are effectually clipped. Tn it the doc-

trines of materialism, of atheism, of free thinking

jncredulity,
and of unthinking superstition, all of
which may be universally pernicious to society,
as well as those of idealism and of scepticism,
which are dangerous more especially to the schools
and can hardly be ever communicated to the public

in general, are quite overthrown.

This single publication, abstracting from his other
works (Metaphysic of Morals ; Criticism on Judg-
ment ; Criticism on practical Reason ; &c. ; all

masterpieces), distinguishes this perspicacious me^

taphysician and subtile philosophical critic
as both

the ornament of his native country, and the pride

of the republic of letters.* And history informs
us, that Nature, though bountiful to the human
race, not so lavish of her favors, as to produce a
is

man of such supereminence of mental powers every

century.
His METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF THE PHYSICS
were published in the year seventeen hundred and

eighty-six.They contain the pure principles of

Somatology. The metaphysic of corporeal nature
treated of 5 then the mathematics are applied
is first

to the doctrine of bodies, which cannot become na-

tural
philosophy but by them. In this inimitable

* The late
professor Beck of Rostock informed me, that Kant
bad made himself so much master of his subject before he
printed this Criticism, that he neither corrected nor transcribed
the manuscript of it, but sent it sheet
by sheet as he wrote it to
ihepres*. 2 F
226 APPENDIX,

treatise he has fully exhausted the subject of

metaphysical somatology.
The table of the categories (not those of Aristo-
tle, that trifling puerile enumeration of predicates,*

but his own) he has used as the only scheme for the

completeness of a metaphysical system.

He has reduced these (what he with modesty
names) elements to four heads Under the first of :

which, motion, as a pure quantum, is considered as

to its composition, without any qiiality of what is

moveable, and this head is denominated Phorono-

my; under the second it (motion), as belonging to
the quality of matter, is considered under the name
of an originally motive power, and hence is this
head distinguished by the appellation of Dynamics ;
under the third, matter with that quality is consi-
dered by its own motion in relation to itself, and this
head is termed the Mechanics ; and under the fourth,
the motion or the rest of matter is determined merely
with reference to the mode of representation, or
modality, and the title of this head is Phenomeno-
logy-
On this great work, perhaps the most profound
of all his works, none but men of science, of deep
science,and the few who reason, can venture to
pronounce; to all others it will seem a mere galli-
rnatia. This little octavo book of but one hundred
and fifty-eight pages proves its eminent author to be
the only man that ever possessed mathematical and

* Amieus Aristotdts, sed magis arnica veritas.

 APPENDIX.

de-
metaphysical knowledge united in the highest
gree, and that ever discursively reflected (philoso-
phised) profoundly on the mathesis.
And thus much as to the first writings of this
prince of mathematicians and of philosophers. A
complete description or review of all his systemati-
cal works would alone fill a thick volume. But
what has been here said may suffice to shew, that
they are extant in Germany, and, it is to be hoped,
will induce those, who do not think themselves al-

ready too knowing to stand in need of more know-

ledge, to study them. The task indeed is not easy,
but it will reward the labour abundantly.*
Kant is the founder of the CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY,
so named from other systems or
to distinguish it

modes of philosophising, till it shall be universally

allowed, that there cannot be but one (true) philo-
sophy. As this vast system, the rich harvest of the
constant study, reflection, meditation, and Hercu-
lean labour of some fifty years, and which embraces
the whole sphere of philosophy, is now taught in
all the protestant universities of
Germany, and but

To study this system effectually, it may be advisable to fol-

low the plan, which Descartes holds so indispensable to the at*

taining of right insights, and which is this To forget, during

:

the study of a new doctrine, all the conceptions that one may
have formerly acquired relatively to the same subject, and to
set out on the road of truth without any guide but mere sane

reason.
228 APPENDIX.

little known Great Britain and Ireland,

yet in it

cannot be improper to give a

slight conception of it

in this place.

It is, then, a new method of philosophising,

which, distinct from all former methods, is founded
in a most accurate dissection of the whole
faculty of
cognition, determining the utmost bounds of this

faculty, and denominated TRANSCENDENTAL PHILO-

SOPHY; from which mental anatomy all true philo-
sophy must set out.
This modern method of philosophising has quite
choked the weeds of all former systems and (to con-
tinue the figure) cleaned the
ground of intellectual
research. This assertion may seem somewhat ex-
aggerated to those not much conversant in such per-
quisitions as these j but the destruction of all false
systems is
accomplished by just reasoning
infallibly
founded in an accurate and a deep philosophy of
mind.

* It is
interesting to know, that Hume's hint relative to the

conception of the connexion of cause and of effect was what first

roused Kant from what he calls a dogmatic slumber of many

years, and gave occasion to this total reform in philosophy, by

means of which reform that celebrated man's doubt, on which
neither Reid, nor Beat tie, nor Oswald, nor Priestly, nor any of
their followers, could ever throw the least light, is
fully resolved,
not however with the aid of common-sense that they extol so

much, but with that of pure reason after the method of the criti-
cal philosophising.
 APPENDIX. 229

Whoever reads Kant's transcendental philosophy

(contained in fyis Prolegomena

to the Metaphysics*

and in his Criticism on pure Reason) with the re-

quisite degree of attention and of reflection must
allow, that his reputation of being the ablest ana-
tomist that ever dissected the human mind is firmly
established. He seems even to have fully exhausted
his subject, and left
nothing material for us todo,
but to read, to understand, to admire, and to be

grateful for his inestimably precious labours.

This profound transcendental philosophy is not
only the most sublime, hut the most useful of afl
sciences. Were it not laid as a foundation, no me.

taphysic at all were possible, we could recur to no-

thing for first
principles, never reach, in the philo-
sophic field, beyond empirical science, which, like
the bust in La Fontaine's fable, has a fine head.*
but no brains.
It is however the most difficult and the most ab-

stract of all science ; for what can be more so, than

the reflex act of the mind, the turning of the intel-
lectual eye inwards on its own operations ? A little
learning is a dangerous thing ; drink deep or taste
not of the Pierian spring. There shallow draughts
intoxicate the brain, and
drinking deep sobers us
again.
Beautifully and justly said by Pope ; for superfi-

* Tranglated into
English by the author of this Sketch, and
soon be published.
xv ill
230 APPENDIX.

cial knowledge elates or puffs up, but profound (by

shewing the very limited stretch of oar faculties,
and that the most cultivated reason cannot, with re.
gard of humanity, advance a
to the essential ends

single step farther, than the most common under-

standing) abates our pride or arrogance, and tea-
ches us modesty and humility.
In this admirable system (in his Criticism on
Judg-
ment) quite a new theory of taste, of the beautiful,
and of the sublime, of both nature and art, is ad-
vanced and the doctrine of teleology, or of
;
philo-
sophical ends, handled after the most masterly me-
thod.
In the Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Mo-
rals, the Criticism on practical Reason, and the
Metaphysic of Morals, he treats of his system of
moral philosophy which he divides into ethics and
law, and is the first that lays down pure principles
of morality. ''

In those incomparable works it is

clearly evinced,
that the Heteronomy of the arbitrament (that is,
the dependence upon laws of nature, to follow some
one incentive or inclination, when the will gives it-
self not the law. but the direction for the rational
observance of pathological laws) never can com-

prise the universally legislative form, and not only

cannot be the basis of any obligation, but is,

though the action, which results from the maxim

of heteronomy, should be legal, even contrary to
the principle of pure practical reason, conse-

quently to the moral mindedness.

 APPENDIX.

All the matter of practical rules ever depends

upon subjective conditions, which yield nothing it

but a conditional universality for rational beings,

and all those conditions turn on the pivot of the
principle of one's own happiness. The principle of

happiness may afford maxims, but, even were the

universal happiness the object, never can
\
such
ones, asare'fit for laws of the will.
All the possible determinatives of the will are
either merely subjective, and therefore empirical,
or objective and rational; either external, or in-
ternal.

The following are all principles of heteronomy :

education (according to Montaigne), the constitu-
tion (afterMandeville), the physical sense (ac-
cording to Epicurus), the moral sense (after Hutche-
son), perfection (according to the Stoics and Wolf,)
and the willof the Deity (after Crusius and other

theological moralists). All material principles are

totally unfit for the supreme moral law.

In the aforementioned works it is likewise
proved,
that the Autonomy (the universal self-legislation)
of the will is the only principle of all moral laws
and of the duties suitable to them. The maxim of
self-love (prudence) advises merely ; but the law
of morality commands. Is there not however a
great distinction between what is advisable for us
to do, and what we are obliged to do? It is difficult

and requires a knowledge of the world to know how

to act on the principle of heteronomy -,
but quite
232 APPENDIX.

easy to the most common understanding know to

how to act on that of autonomy. In a word, The

formal practical principle of pure reason is the only

possible principle fit for practical laws (which make

a duty of actions) and for the principle of mora-

lity in general.*

* This new human

system, which is really the victory of

reason, the author of this Sketch takes the liberty of recom-

mending once more to the notice of the learned. In a politi-
cal point of view our insular situation is
highly advantageous to
us, but in a literary and scientific one, very hurtful. This,
however, were our literati less supine, not (what foreigners per-

haps not unjustly accuse them of being) so proud, and less na-
tional, might be obviated. Does not the commonwealth of
learning embrace the whole world ? Whatever conquests are
made in thekingdom of truth, they belong to humanity in ge-
neral. The Germans are as well acquainted with our literature
as we ourselves, and do it the justice to admire it. But it is

not so with us; we in general know but little of theirs, and are

totally ignorant of their best philosophical works. For, un-

fortunately, nothing but the very refuse of the productions of
the German press, with a few exceptions, is
transplanted to our
island. Formerly publishers and printers were men of letters,
could judge for themselves, and were interested in science. It

were well worth a British philosopher's while to learn German for

the sole purpose of studying the critical philosophy ; for that

language, as it is a key to more science than either Greek or

Latin, would certainly repay him fully for his time and labour.
Mean-while, if I am fortunate enough to be instrumental to-
wards transplanting the genuine seeds of that philosophy to this
country, I shall enjoy the consciousness of contributing essen-
tially to the dissemination of real science, and therefore of not
 APPENDIX. 233

Arid in The
Religion within the Bounds of bare
Reason, a signally sublime publication, there is
taught a purified philosophical doctrine worthy of
the notice of enlightened rational beings. Kant,
in this work, shews, that the New Testament, ex-
plained agreeably to established moral principles,
contains a pure moral religion. No other can pos-
sibly stand the test of time or have a right to have
its issue in the catholic or universal religion of man.
Nothing but ignorance or monkish superstition can
furnish confessors in the cause of any other form of

belief; and this none but those influenced by sel-

fish views and sectaries and bigots, or blind zea-
lots,, who are or unwilling to listen, to the
all deaf,

sacred dictates of reason or obligations of morality,

can possibly deny.

Many divines by profession and all theological

moralists, as they are heteronomists,, make a use of
reason that perverts it, and thereby, though not in-

tentionally, subvert morality.* But the author of

having travelled in vainer of not being altogether a passive or

useless member of society.
*
By theological moralists we understand those who, previ-
ously assuming the existence of God, derive the moral law im-
mediately from his will; by which procedure the universal self-
power of pure practical reason is quite destroyed.
legislative
The moral theologist, on the other hand, on its indispensable
condition, liberty, unfolds the moral law out of the universal
reason of man, and postulates God and immortality as abso-
 APPENDIX.

the great work under review distinguishes himself

as not only a strict autonomist but a pure rationa-
list in matters of belief, or a moral theologist, and
as the justest and most profound reasoner, as well
as the most consequential and systematical writer of

any of those, who have ever treated of the subjects

of morality and of religion.
The critical philosophy perhaps has had more ex-
positors, commentators,, and epitomists during the
space of twenty years, than the Platonic and the
Aristotelian systems united have had during many
centuries. It unquestionably fixes a grand epoch in
both the annals of science and the history of the

progress of the human understanding. And every

unprejudiced and competent judge will join us with

pleasure in paying this grateful tribute of praise

f(
(that envy dare not flattery call") 'to the manes
of the matchless founder of this noble system That :

he, being undoubtedly the father of metaphysic as

a science, and the discoverer as well as the first
teacher of the doctrine of pure morality, and as no
other man ever left
posterity so valuable a legacy,

lately necessary conditions of the possibility of its fulfilment.

The Ethics do not extend beyond the reciprocal duiies of man

and by themselves even without the idea of the Supreme
subsist

Being, but iufallibly lead to,

the very sublimation of morality,

Religion, whose essence, subjectively considered, consists in the

maxim of discharging our moral duties as Divine command-
ments, and which crowns all morality.
 APPENDIX. 235

has a just right to be held the luminary of the learn-

ed world, and to bear the palm of science unrivalled

perhaps for ever.

If it is a fact, that, objectively considered, there
cannot be but one (true) philosophy, and it is a
stubborn fact, that Kant's method of critical philo-

phising has totally overthrown all former philosophi-

cal systems, can any one, unacquainted with it,

venture to dignify himself with the title of philoso-

pher, in the proper sense of the word ? If he pre-

sumes so to do, itmust be through a happy igno-
rance indeed, and an overweening self-flattery.
t(
Seest thou a man wise in his own conceit ? There
ismore hope of a fool, than of him/'
From what has already been said of Kant's tem-
per or disposition of mind it may be easily gathered,
that he, as to his manners or behaviour, was by no
means a cynic, or a snarling churlish teacher of vir-
tue, and, though he was in some essential points a
stoic, had not the least taint of severity or morose-

ness. The austerity of the anachorfte was not an in-

gredient in his composition, and be neither lived in

a tub like the currish Diogenes, nor secluded him-
self from the
world like a torpid monk, but habitually
frequented the best company, of which he was the
tc
very soul, and well aware, that happiness and

* The or the followers of Diogenes, derived their

Cynics,
name from the suburb of Athens called the Cynosarges, in which

they taught.
236 APPENDIX.

true philosophy are of the social still, and smiling

kind." Besides, he was constantly visited by all
,

persons of rank, all travellers of distinction, as

by
well as by all men of eminence in every line, whose
admiration he, by his hospitality, by his great know-

ledge of the world, and by his rich and edifying

conversation on every topic, never failed to excite,
from whom he always received the tribute of due
esteem, and who were all proud of having had an
opportunity of seeing and of conversing with so dis-
tinguished a character.
That our sublime master could sometimes unbend
his mind in writing too, the following is a specimen :

That the husband is destined to rule and the wife

to obey, we, were not sufficiently pointed out
it

by nature, have St. Paul's authority for maintain-

ing. I, says Kant, in one of his miscellaneous

works, would, in the language of gallantry (yet not

without truth), say, that the wife should rule and
the husband govern. The conduct of the husband
must shew, that he has the welfare of his wife above
all things at heart. know the situa-
But, as he must
tion of his affairs better, and how much money he can
afford to spend, he, like a dutiful minister, first

complies with the orders of his monarch, who thinks

of nothing but pleasure and perhaps wishes to build
a palace only that at present there is no money in
;

the treasury, that certain more pressing wants must

be supplied, &c. ; so that her majesty may do what-
ever she pleases, but on this condition only, that her
minister shall furnish her with the means.
 APPENDIX. _ 237

And this biographical incident, as it evinces a

noble independence of spirit, as well as a manly
and inflexible firmness of mind that characterises
the practical philosopher,, and betrays a zealous cham-

pion in the cause of truth,, morality, and religion,

we conceive, deserves to be here recorded : The
present king of Prussia's father and predecessor,
by the instigation of a clerical hypocrite, sent for
Kant, and desired, that he would retract some sen-
timents expressed in his work on moral religion.
Your majesty (answers he) may dispose of my per-
son as you please. J am your majesty's faithful,

obedient, respectful, and dutiful subject and ser-

vant. But no power on earth can control my
thoughts or has a right to compel me to recant a
single sentiment on any subject that flows from my
reason or to deny or even but to conceal what I
deem truth. To the honor of the absolute monarch
be it related, No farther interruption was ever given,
to the free publication of all the works of the Prus-
sian Socrates.
His having led a single life adds another illustri-
ous instance to lord Verulam's remark relative to
bachelors :
Certainly the best works, and those of
greatest merit for the public, have proceeded from

the unmarried or childless men. All Kant's pursuits

were obviously of a metaphysical or intellectual na-

ture. He devoted himself to the sciences entirely

and to literature. But we, even in this light Sketch,

have had a proof of his having made his more par-

238 APPENDIX.

ticuJar addresses to Philosophy, '

the fair/' whom
lie
certainly has elevated to the very throne of
reason.

Notwithstanding a very delicate constitutional

frame of body (for he was by no means gifted with
corporal qualities as with those of the mind),* and
a passed in laborious study and intense medita-
life

tion, he, by means of going to bed early, and of

rising betimes, of constant occupation, of temper-

ance^ of regular exercise on foot, of tranquillity
of mind, and of cheerful society, retained the use
of his mental faculties, his intellectual activity and

vigour, almost unimpaired till the age of seventy,

and had attained the advanced period of life of
eighty years and upwards before he, on the twelfth
day of February in the year one thousand eight
hundred and four, was seized with an apoplexy
that occasioned his speedy dissolution, and number-
ed bis freed spirit with the purified spirits that live
for ever.

* He was of a or chest so narrow as

little stature, his thorax
scarce to leave room for the play of his lungs, and, when walk-
ing alone, in a thoughtful mood, stooped very much, especially
^ the decline of life. The portrait sketched by Hopwood,
which is the frontispiece to this work, is the copy of an en-
graving by Lips of Weimar from an original painting, a striking
likeness of Kant at the age of seventy-one, by Wernet of Berlin.
f The only circumstance peculiar to Kant's diet, is, that he
nwde but one meal a day, his dinner; a habit, which, by the

way, we do not think conducive to longevity*.

 APPENDIX.

While Kant stood upon the verge of this world,

Death, that king of terrors to the guilty, was not
armed with thing terrific, but the prince of
any
peace, to him. He made the awful transition from
time to eternity, corporeal earthly scene to
from this

the intelligible world, with philosophical serenity

or composure of mind, with the dignity peculiar to
a wise man, with the calmness, fortitude and resig-
nation of a virtuous mind deeply penetrated with a
firm belief of reason in the Supreme Intelligence,
and in a future state, the life spiritual, or the pro-
" Vir-
longation of our moral existence to infinite.

tue alone has majesty in death."

On that melancholy occasion the whole city of

Koningsberg, lamenting the decease of so excel-

lent a man, by which they conceived that they sus-
tained a national and an irreparable loss, went into

deep mourning, and people of all ranks and of all

ages in town and from the neighbourhood, bewail-
ing this sad catastrophe and with settled sorrow in.

their countenances, flocked promiscuously to his

interment, which was more like the
pompous sepul-
ture of a proud emperor, than the plain funeral of
an humble philosopher.
Soon after that mournful event a fine medal in

honor of his great worth and uncommon endow-

ments was struck in Berlin ; it has on the one side
his image and name with the year of his nativity, and
on the reverse Pallas is
represented sitting and
holding an owl in her right hand, with this motto,
240 APPENDIX.

Altius volantem arcuit ; an allegorical designation

of his having marked out proper boundaries to the
field of empirical science, determined the
sphere of
speculative philosophy, or restrained the merely
speculative use of reason to the objects of possible
experience.

-" What boots it o'er thy hallo w'd dust

To heap the graven pile or laurePd bust ?

Since by thy hands, already rais'd on high,

We
see a fabric tow'ring to the sky."

The true criticism on his moral character, as well

as the most sublime panegyric that can be made
on him, is, That he earnestly and stedfastly en-
deavoured to practise what he professed, to make
the moral law, the great comprehensive rule of

duty, the spring of his actions. For, his life was.,

so to say, a comment or illustration to his pure doc-

trine, and almost exemplified it, or was led as

nearly up to consequently he, by precept and

it,

by example, came as near the idea of a sage, or

of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps
the frailty inherent in the human nature allows.
So that he gives us a conspicuous proof of the fea-
is ca-
sibility of acting (as far perhaps as a mortal

pable of acting) on pure moral principle ; by his

active, useful, and immaculate life he teaches us
how to live, by his invaluable instruction and moral
lessons how to grow wiser and better, and by his
 APPENDIX. 241

memorable death how to die. Quid virtus et

quid sapientia possit, utile proposuit nobis ex-

emplar Kanten.
The way to excel unquestionably is,, optima
quccque exempla imitandum proponere, yet it,
et

in strict propriety, is not the conduct of any man,

how good soever it
may be, but the moral law it-

self by which we should strive to direct our actions

or to regulate our lives. Not the conduct of man
as it is, therefore, but the idea of what it ought
to be, can be a pattern for imitation, or set up as

the standard of moral judgment or comparison.

But, as we in general are neither so good nor so

bad as our friends or our enemies usually represent

us, as the virtue or moral goodness of the best of us
is but relative, for absolute perfection does not fall,

to the lot of man in this transitory life, as no hu-

man portrait can be painted without some shade,

we have made every possible inquiry among those
"
envious of Kant's well-earned fame and hating
1
that excellence they cannot reach,' (for he had no
other enemies, but was esteemed and beloved by
every body who was acquainted with him) to find
out a spot in his reputation, or character in the

opinion of the world, and all that they can lay

to

his charge is, that his economy bordered on ava-

rice, or sordid parsimony. But even this imputa-

tion his friends deny, say it is an aspersion, and
maintain, that his rigid frugality or strict economy
in early life was the effect of urgent necessity, but

2 H
242 APPENDIX.

that, at a later 4
when
possessed of the
period, he,
means, did not suffer his increase of fortune to con-
tract or to harden his heart (for an ample fortune
is sometimes apt to contract and to harden the

heart), but, so far from wanting brotherly love,

was generous on proper occasions, beneficent to
the honest industrious poor, not however " before
men, to be seen/' out of vanity or ostentation,
but from a sense or motive of duty, bestowed his
f<
charity in private, denied them nothing but his
name/' and were not only laid
that his principles
down in his head, but written and settled in his
heart. For, as he was a man of a good heart, his
benevolence was active, and his sympathy or fel-

low-feeling warm, but regulated or go-

always
verned by his understanding, always ruled by hi^
reason, which superior faculty it was the study of
his whole life to cultivate, and exercise freely
to

on all subjects and on all occasions, to the utmost

of his power. O Virum Sapientia sua simplicem,
et Simplicitate sua sapientem ! O Virum utilem
sibi, suis, Reipublicce, et humano Generi !

In easy to foretell, that a grateful pos-

fine, it is

terity, edified and enlightened by the

critical philo-

sophy, and not biassed by the jealousy or rivalry

but too prevalent among contemporary authors,

will, when Kant's illiberal opponents and their

shall be buried in utter ob-

superficial writings
livion, and time shall have allayed envy, embalm
 APPENDIX. 243

him in their remembrance, and, actuated by a

ge-
nerous emulation only, not fail of acknowledging
his great merit, of doing his invaluable works full

justice, and of bearing his memory due respect

THE END.
 ERRATA.
P. 10 1. 30 after faculty insert T. [p. 12 1. 29 after as it, insert

as p. 16 1. 22 read Logic is a science of reason not as to the mere form,

but the matter; 1. 28 and 29 for on read according to p. 30 1. 22 and 23
there should not be a paragraph p. 34 1. 24 read Pherecydes of Syros

p 33 1. 7 read (TTQa, p. 48 1. 10 after general insert a comma p. 58 1. 18

qfter methods insert a comma 1. 24. after genius insert a comma p. 59

1. 7 after branch insert a comma p. 73 1. 29 read which anderase the com-
ma after of p. 76 1. 14/or is read are p. 85 1. 25 after both insert of
p. 931.28 read preaagement p. 94 1. 15 after rest insert in this p. 100
1. 30 readperspecting p. 108 1. 10 read prejudices p. 117 1. 23 after our-
selves insert distinctly p. 125 1. 5 insert a star after Conceptions p. 132
I. 17 read abstract p. 133 1. 19 erase the comma after being p. 135.1. 8.

erase the comma after distinguished p. 162 5 after in inset t in p. 174i

1.

1. 1 read the subject (in the conclusion) p. 177 1. 9 after him ; insert T.)

p. 212 1. 17 for the read he p. 216 1. 17 for His read He p. 204 1. 24

after concrete insert a comma
205 1.9 after conception insert a semi-
p.
colon 1. 11 after tautological insert a comma p. 206 1. 17 for be read
are p. 222 1. 23 read subtilty 1. 30 read All-suffi p. 223 1. 1 after Be-
ing insert a colon and read Cosmological p. 244 1. 11 read Kant's p. 22S
'. 4 read Bernoulli is 1. 9 insert a comma after eundum p. 222 1. 10 after
dominum dele the comma p. 240 1. 9 after hands dele the comma p. 233
1. 27 after hand, read nnfolds the moral law, on its indispensable condition

liberty, out &e. p. 234 1. 24 after man insert a ^comma p. 183 1. 16 read

Kaims'

Hamblin, Printer, Garlick-hiH.

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