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Russia as a mediator in international armed conflicts: the use of mediation and

coercion as an instrument for Russian foreign policy

Author: Paraskevi Palivani

Supervisor: Stefan Hedlund

Uppsala University
Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies
Master Program in Russian and Eurasian Studies
Master Thesis - 30 credit points

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Abstract

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, mediation in armed conflicts have become a
popular way of conflict resolution and a valuable tool for states to promote their interests.
The paper argues that mediation has been instrumentalised by Russia and has been used as a
tool in expanding Russian foreign policy in the Russian Near and Far Abroad. Coercion
through military support is a cornerstone in Russian mediation strategy as it is used to
maximise the leverage over the adversaries in the conflict and secure the best outcome for
both Russia and the party that it supports. The paper will use the realism theory to examine
four different cases where Russia was a third-party mediator, and it will try to shed light on
the interests that Russia pursued through its participation in the mediation as well as the role
of coercion in the Russian mediation strategy.

Keywords: Mediation, Coercion, Russian foreign policy, Realism, Near Abroad, Far Abroad,
Case Study, Georgia-Abkhazia Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, CAR

Word count: 22547

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List of Contents

1. Introduction 5
1.1 Research Structure 7
1.2 Research Questions 8
2. Literature 8
2.1 Effective mediation in conflict resolution process 8
2.2 Mediation and motives 12
2.3 Coercion in mediation 13
3. Theory 14
3.1 Realism 14
3.2 Neoclassical Realism 15
3.3 Offensive realism 16
3.4 Russian foreign policy and theoretical framework 17
3. Methodology 18
3.1 Case Selection 19
3.2 Case Design 20
3.3 Limitations 22
4. Cases 23
4.1 The “Near Abroad” 23
4.1.1 Abkhaz-Georgian conflict: 23
Background of the conflict 23
The Russian role in the conflict and the Russian interests 24
4.1.2 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: 26
Background of the conflict 26
The Russian role in the conflict 28
Russian Interests 29
4.2 The Far Abroad 32
4.2.1 The Syrian conflict 32
Brief background of the conflict 32

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The Russian role in the conflict and the Astana Process 33

Russian Interests 35
4.2.2 The Central African Republic conflict 38
Brief background of the conflict 38
The Russian role in the conflict 40
Russian interests 42
5. Case Analysis 45
5.1 The Russian Interests 45
5.2 The use of Coercion 48
6. Conclusion 50

Reference List 52

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1. Introduction
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been a significant increase in
international mediation. The collapse of the Soviet Union created space for a notable amount
of conflicts over the post soviet space that needed to be addressed immediately in order to
avoid further escalation and maintain security in the region (Svensson and Lundgren, 2015).
In the following years, and especially after 2011, the world witnessed an increase in the
number of armed conflicts, with the centre of them being in countries of the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA). Over the years, Russia has engaged itself as a mediator in many
international conflicts both in post soviet territories in its Near Abroad, where it claims to
own privileged interests, and also in conflicts that are not taking place in its neighbourhood.

Although parties usually proclaim their desire to make peace and reduce conflicts as the
reason for their engagement as mediators in a conflict, usually there are also other motives
behind their involvement which are heavily related to power politics (Carnevalle and Arad,
1996, Touval and Zartman, 2001). International organisations might indeed have more
altruistic motives, but states often use mediation as a foreign policy instrument to address
cost-benefit considerations. Indeed, states can use their role as mediators either for defensive
reasons or as an opportunity to expand their relations with the actors that are involved in the
conflict. Russian foreign policy has evolved considerably in recent years. In the aftermath of
the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russia had to achieve building a legitimate government,
reaching its previous status as an economic and military power, building a new Russian Idea
based in the Russian nation that now has started being more homogenous and maintaining the
security in the region which was torn apart by several conflicts (Shiraev and Khudoley,
2019). Parallel to that, Russia, which under the umbrella of the Soviet Union was enjoying
the status of a superpower actor, experienced the challenge of finding its role in the new
unipolar world as a sovereign state and also maintaining its influence in the post soviet space.
Conflicts during the soviet period were viewed as opportunities to gain more influence; thus,
the US perceived mediation as one way to prevent the expansion of the Soviet Union’s
influence. Maybe this is also the reason why the US dominated in the mediation field over the
Soviet Union. As a superpower, the Soviet Union was able to mediate in several cases, trying
to improve relations with other countries. However, the chances it had were limited in its own

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sphere of influence which included Eastern Europe, China and later on some counties that
depended on Soviet military aid. In recent years and after having overcome at least partly the
domestic issues, Russia has turned its attention to expanding its influence on a more
international scale and regaining its status as a great power actor.

This project seeks to shed light on Russia's motives as a mediator in international conflicts
and how this is related to its foreign policy towards the region or the countries involved in the
conflict. For this reason, a number of cases have been selected representing different regions
and different eras of Russian foreign policy. The paper will examine cases where Russia
acted as a mediator in conflicts in its Near Abroad, the Middle East and Central Africa.
Moreover, the timing of the conflicts differs as it aims to examine different patterns in the
motives and how the Russian foreign policy has been shaped over the years.

The paper will also address the issue of coercion in Russia’s mediation efforts. Although
coercion is often criticised as the not optimal way of mediation, it seems that the use of
military forces has a central role in the Russian mediation behaviour. This is evidence in the
majority of the selected cases where Russia has used its military forces to reach an agreement
between the disputes, putting pressure on both sides and directly or sometimes indirectly
favouring one of the parties. An interesting observation is that the use of coercive mediation
is often present in cases where Russia is biased towards one of the parties. Only in the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh was no threat or direct involvement of the Russian military. With the
examination of four cases, the research is expected to find a strong relationship between
Russia's foreign policy and its behaviour as a mediator. It is argued that Russia is acting
without impartiality and as a biased mediator, often backing the side that favours the Russian
foreign policy objectives. In order to succeed in a conflict resolution with favourable terms
for the side that is biased towards, it is likely that Russia will use military coercion, a method
that has been criticised by the United Nations and also by many mediators and scholars of the
mediation and negotiation studies. The cause of this behaviour is likely rooted back in the
Soviet period when several countries were under the influence of the Soviet Union due to
their dependence on military aid. This paper also hopes to find how the shift in Russian
foreign policy over the years has affected the choice of conflicts in that Russia has been
involved as a mediator. It is expected that in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet
Union when Russia had the need to gather and rebuild, the motives behind the participation in
a conflict resolution as a third party mediator were more defensive. The conflicts that Russia

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chose to be involved in are mostly in its Near Abroad in an attempt to maintain not only the
security in the region but also its influence over the post-Soviet territories. During the Putin
era and after Russia has overcome some of the domestic issues that were emerged by the fall
of the Soviet Union, the choice of the conflicts where Russia is mediating is broader and
includes countries that are not part of the region, such as countries in the Middle East, Africa
and Latin America. The motives behind this participation can be more expansionist, for
example seeking to expand Russian influence, creating partnerships with countries that
challenge the US unipolar world, earning a seat in the table of international world politics and
regaining the status of a superpower.

1.1 Research Structure

First, the paper will briefly discuss the functional role of mediation in conflict resolution and
useful terms of the mediation process such as impartiality, partiality, leverage, acceptability,
biased mediators, etc. In this first part of the paper will also be given an explanation of
coercive mediation and the debate that has existed among the scholars about the use of
coercion in the mediation process. Second, methods on qualitative case study will be
presented. Third, an overview of prior research on the mediator’s motives and its role as a
foreign policy tool. Fourth, there will be a review of the existing theories of realism and most
specific, neoclassical and offensive realism as under the prism of this theories, Russian
foreign policy can be better understand. The paper then will analyse Russia’s participation as
mediator in some selected conflicts, its behaviour towards the disputes and how its
participation is related to the Russian foreign policy towards the region or the countries that
are involved in the conflict. Next, after all the cases will be presented the paper will discuss if
there is a shift in Russian foreign policy objectives from a chronological aspect and how this
is illustrated in the choices of mediating those international conflicts. It will also discuss if
Russia is indeed a biased mediator, using coercive means to achieve a favourable agreement
for the party that it is supporting. Finally, the paper will conclude with suggestions for further
research in questions than can emerge from the results.

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1.2 Research Questions

This thesis will attempt to answer the following:

➢ What are the interests of Russia’s involvement as a third-party mediator in the
selected cases and secondary what is the role of coercion in Russian mediation
efforts?

The above research questions cannot be answered within the field of only one discipline.
Although mediation has been viewed and explained before as a foreign policy instrument,
there are very few studies that try to review the foreign policy objectives of a country through
its mediation strategy and its participation in the conflict resolution process. Moreover, this
thesis is also adding to the existing studies by introducing the use of coercion as a tool in the
mediation process, the rationale behind it and the implications it creates. Thus, the concepts
this thesis discusses include a complex set of topics within the fields of Peace and Conflict
Studies, International Relations and Political Science.

2. Literature

2.1 Effective mediation in conflict resolution process

After the end of the Cold War international mediation has become very common
in conflict resolutions, international crises, and interstate and intrastate wars as the
willingness to engage in the process has significantly increased due to the low costs that are
required in comparison with other means of intervention (Svensson and Lundgren, 2015).
According to Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991) mediation is described as a process of
conflict management where the disputants ask or accept the help of a third party in order to
settle the conflict between them or any other differences. Mediation differs from other forms
of intervention as it is not based on the direct use of force and the aim is not to help one of the

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two disputes to win over the other but to assist in creating a solid ground for communication,
suggest solutions that meet the needs of both sides (Zartman and Touval, 1996).
The United Nations have published a guide for effective mediation in which the key
fundamentals for an effective mediation can be found in preparedness; consent; impartiality;
inclusivity; national ownership; international law and normative frameworks; coherence,
coordination and complementarity of the mediation effort; and finally quality peace
agreements (UN, 2012). Although all those elements are considered important for effective
mediation in the studies of the mediation process, there are three that often are discussed and
stand out, especially when it comes to state mediation. Those are the consent, the impartiality
and the inclusivity.

Mediation is a voluntary process (Bercovitch 1992), and its success depends on both the
disputant's willingness to concede as well as the mediator’s willingness to engage in the
process. The disputants have the right to accept or reject the offer of assistance from the third
party (Ross 1993) and if they accept the outcome of the mediation in non-binding (Bercovitch
1992; Bercovitch 1997; Moore 1996; Smith 1998; Touval and Zartman 1989; Wall and Lynn
1993). There are a plethora of reasons that motivate the parties to accept the intervention of a
third party. Among the most popular are the belief that the mediators might work in favour of
their interests and contribute to a better outcome that would benefit their side over that of
their opponent, the fear that a rejection of the offer will have a negative effect on the relations
with the mediator and of course the belief that the participation of another party provides a
certain degree of security that the final agreement will be respected by all sides (Zartman,
2008).

Impartiality is considered by the United Nations (UN) as the cornerstone of mediation. As

specified by the UN guidance for effective mediation, a mediation that is led by a biased
third-party mediator is often not effective as it can lead to undermining the process and bring
the opposite of the desired results (UN, 2012). Impartial mediators are more credible in
transporting sensitive and crucial personal information, and they are viewed as more
“trustworthy” on the part of the disputants, as to their belief the mediator does not have an
agenda or interests in how the conflict is going to be resolved (Beber 2012). In cases where
mistrust is the leading reason for the conflict, an impartial mediator can be more effective in
building the level of trust that is necessary to archive an agreement (Favretto, 2009). On the
other hand, a significant number of scholars claim that biased mediation is in fact more

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effective in armed conflict resolution (Kydd, 2003; Savun, 2008; Zartman, 2008; Svensson,
2009). Kydd (2003) argues that mediators that are in favour of one of the two sides are more
credible as they share an interest in the outcome. Similarly, Svensson (2009) claims that
biased mediators have unique access to the side they support and, thus the ability to influence
it more. Zartman (2008) believes that impartiality is not an important factor when it comes to
the acceptance of the party from the mediators. Third-party mediators are accepted by the
conflicted parties for their ability to bring acceptable results, and in some occasions, the
relations of the mediator with one of the disputants can be helpful and aid the
communication, the development of ideas and proposals and the conversion of the initial
positions of the parties (Zartman, 2008).

Regardless of the mediator’s partiality or impartiality, power or leverage, as it is often

referred to in the field of mediation studies, is the ability to influence the direction of a party
to a certain direction (Touval and Zartman, 1985). It is essential for the mediator to have a
strong leverage on the conflict to be able to influence and provide the parties with possible
solutions. The extent of the leverage of the mediator depends to a great level on the parties
themselves, as it is they that decide the degree of influence that the mediator can possess. Of
course, the likelihood of producing an agreement acceptable from both sides significantly
increases the leverage of the mediator to the parties ( Zartman, 2008).

Another vital pillar of mediation, inclusivity, refers to what actors, other than the
stakeholders and the conflicted parties, should be involved and represented at the negotiation
table. Such actors are political parties, civil society, women groups, business, youth and
religious actors and other armed actors that might influence the conflict (Paffenholz &
Zartman, 2019). Recent research on the topic has shown that in order for the inclusion to be
effective and able to bring positive outcomes, the involved actors should have the ability to
influence the public opinion. Mediators are encouraged to a high level of inclusivity, but with
a certain degree of caution since, in some occasions, inclusivity might undermine the process.
The participation of multiple actors in peace talks can result in making the process more
complex and also time-consuming as the additional actors may present different positions that
should be negotiated. In addition, many different positions are likely to hide the risk of
potential spoilers (Kew, Wanis St. John, 2008). Parallel, the lack of clear leadership in civil
society groups or movements can complicate their engagement in the process( United
Nations, 2012; Paffenholz, Ross, 2015). One more reason that can generate the exclusion of

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participants, and more specifically of the civil society, from the negotiations, is the
precondition of secrecy under which the talks might be conducted (Kew, Wanis St. John,
2008). Lastly, the selection of a sample that will participate in peace negotiations and also in
decision-making can raise accusations of corruption and lead to opposite than the desired
effects, such as issues of the illegitimacy of the process (Paffenholz, Ross, 2015). Terrorist
groups or groups that have been indicted by the International Criminal Court also fall in a
similar category where their inclusion can be considered very controversial and should be
limited (United Nations, 2012).

It is common that in armed conflicts, the parties that are involved can be extremely adamant
about their initial position. However, the way that this position is formed does not necessarily
highlight the needs and fears of each side. Those who practice mediation often have to search
under the surface for the true needs and the fears of each side and, in doing that, might also
discover a common ground on which they can work on. The mediator can act in three
different roles during the mediation process, as a communicator-facilitator, as a formulator
and as a manipulator (Touval and Zartman 1989).
The role of the communicator-facilitator is rather a passive role where the mediator acts as a
bridge of communication between the two parties. Often, the two adversaries in a conflict
have stopped communicating with each other due to the escalation of violence, and in order
to avoid starting talks directly with each other to save face, they need someone else to
communicate on their behalf. The mediator is there to transfer information between the
parties, arrange meetings, provide the environment for more interaction and build trust
between them (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003).
The persistence of the parties involved in an armed conflict in defending their initial
position and also their reluctance to hear the needs and fears of the other side is often
resulting in the failure to create solutions that meet both their needs. The mediator’s role, in
this case, is to act as a formulator creating and suggesting solutions that can satisfy the needs
of both parties (Touval and Zartman 1989).
The last role of the mediator, which is often related to power politics, is its role as a
manipulator. The aim is to use their position and resources to move the parties into an
agreement. This is a very active role, also known as directive strategies which transform the
mediator into a very active participant who can influence the content and substance of the
negotiation process by motivating the parties or issuing ultimatums (Bercovitch and Lee,
2003). This strategy is the most powerful form of intervention, and although it is considered

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the most coercive of the three (Eriksson, 2019), it is also the most effective and likely to
bring a positive outcome (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991).

UN’s approaches to mediation are characterised by principles that aim to the resolution of a
conflict by liberal means. On the other hand, Russia’s way of mediating is characterised by
“illiberal” means that combine the use of coercion as an entry point that gives Russia the
necessary leverage on the parties to influence them efficiently, combined with diplomacy and
controlled humanitarian aid (Lewis, 2022).The reason that those principles for effective
mediation are referred to here in more detail is that, in most cases, Russia dissociates itself
from them and presents its own model of mediating. By observing Russia in the role of
mediator, the conclusion that is made and will be later justified in the examined cases is that
Russia is not particularly interested in the resolution of the conflicts but in the realisation of
its own interests. In fact, although Russia has served as a mediator in those conflicts, its
actions have not often contributed to the resolution of the conflict but to the opposite result,
fueling the conflict further and occasionally leading to an escalation.

2.2 Mediation and motives

There are several studies on what motivates the mediators to intervene in a conflict.
Humanitarian interests can be some of the reasons, although this motive is considered to be
less likely, and it is usually an initiative coming from individual practitioners that hold less
influence and power than a state or an International Organisation. Carnevalle and Arad
(1996) argue that mediators intervene out of personal interests in the dispute and its
revolution. Touval and Zartman (1985) argue that there is a distinction between what is
called “pure” mediation and mediation that is connected with the state's self-interests. “Pure”
mediation seeks the resolution of a conflict for humanitarian reasons. Pure mediation is
considered to be rare in cases where states intervene in a conflict, as it is believed that the
motives behind their intervention are to serve their interests. Touval and Zartman (2001)
claim that what motivates states to be involved in a conflict as mediators should be examined
from a power politics perspective. They also argue that there are two kinds of interests from
the mediator's point of view; the defensive interest and the expansionist interest.

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From a defensive interest point of view, the conflict between the two actors threatens the
mediator's own interests. This threat can take several forms. For example, a conflict between
two actors might upset a regional balance, provide opportunities for rival powers to intervene
and increase their influence or even disrupt or weaken an alliance if the conflict is between
actors that are allied with the mediator. From an expansionist point of view, a mediator seeks
to extend and increase influence.The results of the conflict are not of significant importance
for the mediator, but the mediation itself is a way to establish closer relations with one of
both parties that engage in the conflict (Touval and Zartman 2001).

Although many scholars have addressed the importance of the mediator’s motivation,
traditionally, the focus is given to the effectiveness of the mediation and the efforts of the
mediating state to the resolution of the conflict. Touval (2003) addresses this issue, and in his
work he discusses an alternative approach to mediation, one that views mediation as foreign
policy. According to this approach, “mediation is seen here as deriving from the mediator’s
perceptions of the international system, from its domestic needs, and from its foreign policy
objectives and strategies. This perspective perceives mediation to be part of foreign and
domestic policy and not a separate activity taking place ‘‘within the context’’ of international
politics.

2.3 Coercion in mediation

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that relies on threats and limited -if any- military use of
force in combination with diplomatic negotiations, also known as carrots and reassurances,
which aims to the resolution of armed conflicts and international war-threatening crises
(Jakobsen, 2016). It is assumed that in violent armed conflicts, coercion, a key element of
William Zartman's model of ripeness theory, could create a hurting stalemate. According to
the hurting stalemate paradigm, parties to a conflict agree to mediation or settlement
approaches after protracted fighting when the only option is to stop spending money and
risking more lives (Zartman, 2000). Coercion is a controversial approach which has been
criticised by many scholars due to its high risks and also limited successful results (Bratton,
2005). Moreover, there is a division in academia pertaining to the ethics of this strategy, as
some view the proactive use of military threats as blackmailing (Jakobsen, 2016). Although
mediation is supposed to be a voluntary process, there are several times when powerful
third-party actors, usually states, have used coercion in order to reach agreements. An

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example of this approach is the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, led by the US, in an attempt
to find a solution to the conflict in Kosovo. In the literature on international mediation there
are several opinions about the use of coercion in the mediation process. Burton and Dukes
(1990) advocate for pure mediation and reject the idea of coercion. On the other hand,
Carvivale (2002), Touval (1982) and Zartman (2000) argue that those strategies are central to
power mediation. In fact, Zartman (2000) recommends the use of coercion as a way to
escalate the conflict into a mutually hurting stalemate, which will press the parties to
negotiate sincerely and reach an agreement. Within the context of mediation, Eriksson (2019)
suggests viewing coercion as behaviour that might assist the mediators in achieving their
aims with the risk though to damage their relations. As mentioned before, the role of the
mediator as manipulator is a coercive strategy which relies on the offer of carrots and sticks
to the parties. In this paper, coercion is viewed mostly in the sense of the use of military force
and not as much as general threats.

3. Theory
This empirical-driven thesis analyses the role of Russia as a mediator and argues that Russia
utilises this role in order to achieve certain objectives of its foreign policy. The empirical
examples this thesis illustrates seek to shed light on the motives and explain Russian foreign
policy and how it has evolved over the years. To better interpret and understand these
examples, it is necessary to incorporate a theoretical framework. This thesis will apply the
theory of realism to analyse Russia’s use of mediation as a foreign policy instrument and the
objectives that it is trying to materialise through it.

3.1 Realism
Realism is considered one of the oldest theories of International Relations, dating back to
Ancient Greece and the Athenian historian and General Thucydides, who attempted to write
about the events of the Peloponnesian war and also to explain the motives behind each party's
behaviour (Rose, 1998). It presents a cynical view of human nature and international
relations, which are conflictual and competitive (Jackson & Sørensen, 2015). Over the years,
the theory of realism has developed, and today there are different variations of the realism
theories, such as classical realism, neorealism, offensive and defensive realism, neoclassical
realism, etc.

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All those subcategories of realism have several elements in common. For example, there is
the common view that the international system is a system of anarchy where there is no
authority above the states powerful enough to enforce agreements or prevent the use of force.
Moreover, they share the view that the role of power is of great significance, and the pursuit
of it is considered the defined feature of realism (Collins, 2013). As Hans Morgenthau, a
leading thinker of the realism theory, argues, ‘Politics is a struggle for power over men, and
whatever its ultimate aim may be, power is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring,
maintaining, and demonstrating it determine the technique of political action’ (1964, p 195).
The states are the primary key factor that matters in the international system as the
international institutions play a less important role than the states. The last element that
realism theories share in common is the assumption that the state is a rational and unitary
actor within the system (Collins, 2013).

Two of the subcategories of realism that both have attempted to define the way that states
have been conducting their foreign policy are neoclassical realism and offensive realism.
Both theories have been used several times in the past by scholars in their attempt to define or
explain Russian foreign policy. Correspondingly, both theories are essential to understanding
the empirical cases' findings.

3.2 Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism is a term that was first introduced by Gideon Rose (1998) and is
considered to be a relatively new approach that combines the best elements from both
neorealism and classical realism. Similarly to Waltz’s (1979) perspective, it acknowledges the
important role of the structure of the international state system and the relative power of
states. At the same time, as Jackson & Sørensen (2013) explain, it borrows elements from
classical realists such as Morgenthau and Kissinger by highlighting the vital role that
leadership plays in the perception of the international system and the creation of foreign
policy. According to Jackson and Sørensen, “neoclassical realism seeks to explain why, how,
and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states—the extractive and
mobilisation capacity of politic-military institutions, the influence of domestic societal actors
and interest groups, the degree of state autonomy from society, and the level of elite or
societal cohesion—intervene between the leaders’ assessment of international threats and

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opportunities and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders
pursue” (2013, p 87). The leadership of each state may react differently in similar
circumstances according to their perception of how this situation can present a threat or an
opportunity to their own pursuit of power or the balance of power. In neoclassical realism,
domestic politics have been added as an element of importance in the external behaviour of a
state. That means that the behaviour of a state in the international arena can be influenced by
both international and domestic politics (Kropatcheva, 2018). Neoclassical realism accepts
the assumption that we also meet in offensive realism, that states are seeking security by
increasing their own power. What has been an addition is that power is not perceived only in
the sense of material power but also in the sense of influence ( Rose, 1998). This new
approach of realism has been used by many scholars in their attempts to explain Russian
foreign policy and it can be an effective theoretical framework for the empirical cases this
thesis presents. The perception that foreign policy is influenced by both domestic and
international politics and also the significant role that the leadership plays will be at the core
in explaining the behaviour of Russia as a third-party mediator and the interests that it
pursuits, especially in the cases where coercion, either in the form of military intervention or
in the form of incognito military aid was used to direct the situation towards a result.

3.3 Offensive realism

According to John Mearsheimer, who is considered one of the leading figures of offensive
realism theory, this theory envisions the world as a place filled with uncertainty where states
should always assume and expect the worst from the other state’s intentions (Mearsheimer,
1993). This is why offensive realists believe that states aim to maximise their power to
protect themselves better from threats, following the assumption that the more powerful a
state is, the more capable it is to secure its own survival. In other words, the more effective
way to ensure their survival is to seek to maximise their power in all areas (Glaser, 2013).
Fear is a central element in how states view other states and how this drives competition and
power maximisation. It has become very notable to the scholars of Russian foreign policy
that Russia has become more aggressive during the years and seeks to maximise further its
influence not only in its Near Abroad but also in areas that do not belong in the traditional
Russian sphere of influence, acting like a rising superpower. It might seem unorthodox to
speak about mediation under the terms of offensive realism, as mediation is considered a soft
power approach to foreign policy. However, what happens when hard power elements are

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introduced to mediation? Is not the use of military means an offensive approach to the pursuit
of power?

3.4 Russian foreign policy and theoretical framework

How can the theory of realism be applied in a study about mediation? As mentioned before,
the thesis reviews mediation as a tool of foreign policy. In that essence, realism is the
theoretical framework for Russian foreign policy and attempts to explain Russia's behaviour
towards the countries of the regions we examine in the empirical examples.
As the literature suggests, the most significant reason a state is likely to be involved in a
conflict as a third-party mediator is for personal interests and motives. Those motives,
according to Touval and Zartman (2001), can have either defensive or offensive/expansionist
character. Touval (2005) takes the research a step further and suggests that mediation itself is
part of a state's domestic and foreign policy. Russia’s foreign policy has evolved and reshaped
many times during the last decades that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Shiraev
and Khudoley (2019) argue, Russian foreign policy has gone through at least three different
phases: accommodation, reorientation, and consolidation.

During its accommodation period, which started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and was active for the first years, Russia was trying to be a key and compliant partner of the
West in global affairs. The reorientation period started in 1996 and went until 2000 and found
Russia reconsidering its foreign policy priorities and gradually starting to turn away from
pro-western policies. The third period, the consolidation period, began in 2000 and is active
to the present day. Russia's main objectives are to seek new partnerships, strengthen Russia’s
security, and challenge western policies when they are against Russian interests (Shiraev and
Khudoley 2019).

Deriving from the above suggestions, this paper views mediation as a foreign policy
instrument used to achieve certain aspirations of Russia’s foreign policy, and coercion works
as a boost towards the realisation of those objectives when mediation is failing or not being
effective and the interests of Russia which seeks to realise through the mediation are
endangered. The empirics illustrate this shift in Russian foreign policy. Within the theoretical
framework, this sequence can be viewed through the prism of neoclassical realism. More

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specifically, in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and also in the cases
where Russia is mediating between countries or parties in its “Near Abroad”, there is
evidence of domestic interests. During the years and towards the present day, Russia has been
involved as a third-party mediator in countries that are not part of the Russian sphere of
influence, making it more expansionist and bold in its mediation strategy and seeking through
it to gain more influence. Moreover, in cases when Russia needs leverage to gain the
necessary leverage for mediating the conflict, Russia has used coercion, either directly or
indirectly, to influence the result of the conflict or to put pressure on the parties to proceed in
an agreement that will terminate the conflict. The shift in Russian behaviour demands the use
of more than one theory of realism as the empirical observations of the cases can be better
explained and understood within the terms of both neoclassical and offensive realism.

3. Methodology
In order to answer the research question, the thesis uses a qualitative approach. The
qualitative approach is commonly used in the field of International Relations as it allows the
researchers to go more in-depth, especially when it comes to individual factors, and it has
abilities to understand different people’s voices, meanings and events (Richardson, 2012).
The method that will be used and applied in this paper is a comparative case study analysis.
The role of the comparative analysis in the context of this thesis is to distinguish the
similarities and differences between the cases and try to reveal if there is a specific pattern in
Russian interests and mediation. The thesis follows a cross-case and over-time analysis.
According to Ragin (1997), cross-case analysis enhances the capacities of the researchers to
understand how relationships may exist among discrete cases, accumulate knowledge from
the original case, refine and develop concepts, and, as Eckstein (2002) adds, build or test
theory. In addition, cross-case analysis allows the researcher to compare cases from one or
more settings, communities, or groups. George and Bennet (2005) have described a case
study as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test
historical explanations that may be generalisable to other events”. Case studies are common
both in the subfields of mediation and negotiation studies as well as in International
Relations, and they have notable advantages in researching complex phenomena and
behaviour ( Bennet, Elman, 2007). This thesis attempts to combine those key concepts and,

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with the help of the theoretical framework and the empirics, shed light on the research
questions.
This empirical-driven thesis is heavily based on the analysis of a number of empirical cases
which seek to investigate the role of mediation as a tool in Russian foreign policy and, in
extension, the role of coercion in favour of the realisation of specific goals of the foreign
policy.

3.1 Case Selection

The time framework from which the empirical cases are chosen includes the years after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and goes towards the present day. The cases that have been
selected for this paper illustrate examples of both interstate and intrastate armed conflict, and
their selection has been based on three criteria. First, as the aim of the research is to shed light
on the reasons Russia mediates in armed conflicts and how that reflects its foreign policy, the
selection is based on examining the role of Russia as a mediator and the motives behind it in
a number of cases that represent different regions. For this reason, I have created two
different categories for the examined cases the Near Abroad and the Far Abroad. In this
thesis, those two categories have both geographic and political natures. Russia’s Near Abroad
refers to countries that are close to Russia and were part of the USSR. The Far Abroad
consisted of countries that were not close to Russia’s neighbourhood, and they were never
been Soviet Republics. As representatives of Near Abroad, I chose the case of the Georgian
and Abkhazian conflict as well as the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh between Azerbaijan and
Armenia. The disintegration of the Soviet Union created instability in the region as many
conflicts emerged in which Russia had one of the leading roles in the mediation between the
parties. Other examples of conflicts in the Russian “Near Abroad” are also the conflicts in
South Ossetia and in Moldova. Georgian- Ossetian conflict has very similar characteristics to
Abkhazia. On the other hand, Nagorno Karabakh is a very unique case, and the reasons why
it is included in the analysis differ from the other cases. The conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan is the only conflict that Russia has mediated in its Near Abroad in which the two
disputants are state actors. Also, it can serve as a deviant case as it is the only one in that
there was no use of coercion or support towards one of the two actors. As the role of coercion
is one of the main objectives of this thesis, this case serves as an example of in which cases
and why Russia might not proceed with its use. Moreover, due to the length of the conflict,
which started in the early 1990s and is still ongoing with many escalations in between, this
thesis will focus mainly on the initial years and until the severe escalation that happened in

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2016. There are two reasons for this. First, an attempt to examine this conflict at its full
length would require much space. In fact, the case of Nagorno-Karabakh could be a subject
for examination of its own. Second, the focus on this period will allow for examining in more
depth how Russia is mediating in its Near Abroad and its interests both in the past and
modern days. That does not mean that those years of the conflict after the Second Karabakh
War will not be mentioned, as they are important for better understanding the conflict's
dynamics.

The Far Abroad includes cases from the MENA region, specifically the Syrian civil war, and
from Africa, with one case from the Central African Republic. The variety of the cases will
provide a better understanding of Russia’s aspirations towards different regions where the
motives might vary.

The second criterion is related to the timeline that this paper is examining. Following a
chronological sequence from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present day, the cases aim to
illustrate the shift in Russian motives and how they are related to its foreign policy, as
Shiraev and Khudoley have described. Thus, the concept of Shiraev and Khudoley’s of
defining Russian foreign policy in different phases is used as a tool to characterise the cases
of this thesis. In this way, and although this is not one of the direct aims of the thesis, the
concept of Shiraev and Khudoley will be tested from the point of mediation as foreign policy.
As we are moving from the early nineties towards the present day, there is evidence of
Russia’s ambition to be further involved as a mediator in conflicts far away from the region
of its influence.

Third, the cases that have been included in this thesis are conflicts that Russia itself acts as a
mediator by its own initiative or as an individual actor and not cases where Russia
participated in mediation efforts that were made within the framework of international
organisations, such as the UN, in which Russia is a permanent member.

3.2 Case Design

The four cases will be divided and presented into two different groups. The first group will
include the cases from Russia’s “Near Abroad”, while the second group will discuss the cases
from the “Far Abroad”. The categorization of the cases into the two groups helps not only in

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better comparing both the two groups with each other but also the individual cases of each
group with each other. Moreover, it serves as a chronological compass as the cases are
presented in chronological order.

For each case, I will provide a brief historical background of the conflict as it is important
knowledge for a better understanding of the conflict and relations between the different
actors. In addition, in the cases of the Near Abroad, background information is important not
only in understanding the conflict itself but also in Russia’s behaviour, claims, and prior
participation, as all the countries/actors that are presented in this group were part of the
Soviet Union and the conflicts were either created during the existence of the Soviet Union or
the dissolution of the Union played a significant role in the outbreak of the violence.
Second, I will present Russia’s involvement in the conflict and the efforts that have been
made for its resolution. In this part of the case, I will discuss both peace-making processes
initialised either by Russia or any other delegation in which Russia participated actively and
also Russia’s behaviour towards the disputants. Third, I will discuss Russian interests that led
Russia to participate in the mediation process. In this part, I will analyse both Russian
possible aspirations and the objectives that Russia eventually achieved from its involvement.

The paper draws on previous research in the fields of conflict resolution and foreign policy.
The material that is used for the background of the cases heavily relies on secondary sources,
and it draws information from previous research. This happens for two reasons: first and as
mentioned before, mediation often occurs away from the light of publicity and the
information about the insights is not always shared or they are limited. The stages of this
process are several, including individual meetings between the mediator and the parties that
aim to establish the conditions and the rules of the negotiation process between the parties
etc. The second reason is that the materials about the cases that are examined are used to
document the cases and give us a better understanding of Russian behaviour in its role as a
mediator. What we are trying to shed light on is not exclusively how Russia mediated in these
conflicts but mainly what these mediation efforts were aiming at and what were the results of
the mediation in terms of the Russian objectives. The attitude Russia held not only as a
third-party mediator but in general towards the parties in conflict can reveal some of the
personal interests Russia has or aims to win but this involvement. Moreover, the thesis will
make use of official statements, interviews and material selected from official Russian
websites, namely the site of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (mid.ru), the President of

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Russia (kremlin.ru) and other news websites. This selection is related to the level of the
analysis as the material will be used in an attempt to analyse the Russian point of view of
state actors over the conflicts and also to underline what is the purpose of the Russian
involvement.

3.3 Limitations
There are certain limitations in the conduction of this research. To start with, when it
comes to the methods used for the conduction of this research, a qualitative approach, if not
used correctly, can lead to subjective conclusions. Maoz (2002) argues that case study
analysis approaches can sometimes be viewed as they lack methodological considerations
and are synonyms for freedom research, meaning that the researcher is deriving from
following an accurate methodological approach and resulting in non-accurate results.
When it comes to the collection of the sources, mediation processes can often occur behind
closed doors, and that means that we can usually have access to the results of the
conversations but not always the process of the talks. In fact, the accessibility to primary
sources are incredibly difficult unless archives are opened. The process in this thesis is of
equal importance as the results of the negotiations as it gives us more insights about what
kind of mediator Russia was, a communicator-facilitator, a formulator or a manipulator, and
perhaps understand better what Russia was trying to achieve by its participation in the
process. Another significant limitation is the lack of knowledge of the Russian language. As
one of the main topics that are being discussed concerns Russian foreign policy, knowledge
of the Russian language would have contributed significantly to finding sources in Russian
and analysing texts or statements of people who have possessed critical roles in Russian
policymaking. Since this is not possible, the collection of the sources was limited to those
available in English. Moreover, due to the unfortunate events of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine and following the sanctions imposed on Russia, many Russian news sites that are
available in English are banned in Western countries. This limits even more the pool of
sources as the selection needs to be done solely by non-Russian websites or by a few sites
that might still be available.

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4. Cases

4.1 The “Near Abroad”

4.1.1 Abkhaz-Georgian conflict:

Background of the conflict

The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, although it officially escalated into a war at the
beginning of the 90s and is considered to be one of the side effects of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, in reality, it has its roots deeper in the past. During the Soviet Union era,
Georgia was one of the three Union Republics which were created in the South Caucasus by
the Soviet Union, with Armenia and Azerbaijan being the other two. Union Republics
consisted of smaller entities, often called Autonomous Republics or regions, and Abkhazia
was the titular nation of one of those Autonomous Republics within the Georgian Republic
Union (Coppieters, 2004). There are scholars who claim that the enmity between the two
parties was, to a certain degree, fueled by the leadership of the Soviet Union in order to
prevent Georgia from pursuing its independence from the Soviet Union. Sayin and
Modebadze (2015) argue that the act of separating Abkhazia from Georgia, declaring it as an
independent Soviet Socialist Republic and later on changing its status to a recognised
autonomous republic as a part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic was a plan
conducted by the Soviet Union with the ambition to have Abkhazia acting like a “hot point”
for Georgia and prevent any aspirations for claiming independence. Furthermore, after the
incorporation of Abkhazia into Georgia, Stalin encouraged ethnic Georgians to migrate to the
region (German, 2006). Over the decades, many tensions between the two parties emerged,
and it was evident that both sides felt a threat over their national identity and culture;
Abkhazia felt that their culture was threatened by Georgianization, and Georgia felt that their
state was threatened by russification, as Russia was supporting separatist groups against
Georgia not only in Abkhazia but also in South Ossetia (Coppieters, 2004).

The situation deteriorated further during the next few years as after the Georgian declaration
of independence in 1991 and the election of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Georgian nationalist, as
president Abkhazs started to feel even more insecure about the future of their national
identity and culture (Coppieters, 2004). Indeed, the tensions between the parties soon
escalated into a war in 1992 after Georgia’s decision to send 3000 troops to Abkhazia in an

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attempt to restore order. Before this decision, the Abkhaz parliament had decided to revert to
the constitution from 1925, a constitution that established the relations between Georgia and
Abkhazia on a treaty basis (Lynch, 2000). Abkhazs, with the military support of Russia and
also a number of volunteers from the region of the North Caucasus, managed to turn the tide
of battle and win the war against Georgia, a result that under different circumstances would
be extremely difficult to achieve due to the large differences in the numbers of the population
of both sides (Sayin and Modebadze, 2015).

The Russian role in the conflict and the Russian interests

As mentioned in the previous part, Russia actively supported the Abkhazian side in the
conflict, providing Abkhazia with the necessary military aid to help them win against
Georgia. In the aftermath of the conflict and after Moscow formalised an agreement for a
ceasefire in 1994, legalising in that way these Russian forces to provide “peacekeeping”
responsibilities and to remain in the region to secure stability and order (German, 2006).
Those peacekeeping operations are a form of coercion or, as Lynch calls it, a form of suasion
(Lynch, 2000). The motives behind Russian involvement in the conflict are multifaceted.
Russia itself justified its involvement in the conflict as an attempt to ensure the safety of the
Russian-speaking minority in the region (German, 2006). Although there is some truth in this
claim, the reasons for the Russian participation in this conflict were more complicated. It
consisted of a combination of political and security interests blended with aspirations for
regional hegemony. Even before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Georgia was a country
that, as Sayin and Modebadze put it, “loved its freedom” (2015) and had feelings of mistrust
towards Russia, feeling that the latter was a threat to their national identity and culture. This
behaviour was causing concerns to the Soviet Union, which had already lost the Baltic States
after the declaration of their independence. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union,
Georgia, alongside other counties, such as Moldova, was against the idea of joining the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and therefore refused the invitation causing the
displeasure of Russia (Lynch, 2000). The Russian support towards the Abhkazs not only
helped the latter win the war against Georgia but simultaneously increased the Russian
leverage on Georgia and eventually forced it to join the CIS, at least until the Russian
invasion of Georgia in 2008 (Lynch, 2000). Russia used military capacities at the beginning
of its peacekeeping phase in order to create pressure and compel Georgia to join the CIS. In
this way, Russia was attempting to ensure its regional hegemony, which had lost its leverage

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over some regions after the fall of the Soviet Union. Busygina (2018) claims that Russia’s
approach to the conflict was an act of “getting up from its knees” and reasserting itself as a
regional and global power.

The reason Russia wanted Georgia to be part of the CIS was not only of political nature but
also had some security interests to fulfil. With Georgia joining, even though forcibly, CIS
Russia was legitimised to have military bases in both Abkhazia and Georgia and also be able
to deploy peacemaking forces to the former, expanding the size of its military forces in the
region (de Waal, 2010). In the two wars in Chechnya, Russia was seeking stability and
security in the Caucasus. The conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia gave Russia the
opportunity to gain access and maintain -or regain- some of its influence in the Caucasus.
Parallel to that, Georgia’s turn to western countries gave another reason to back the
Abkhazian side. According to Filippov (2009), Russia has used the conflict with Georgia as a
means to this broader strategy of keeping political tensions with the US and Europe at the
preferred level. Sayin and Modebadze agree with this assumption and argue that “triggering
territorial disputes in the Former Soviet Republics that try to escape from the Russian ‘sphere
of influence’ has become Moscow’s common practice to regain control over post-Soviet
space. This is part of a long-term strategy the aim of which is to extend Moscow's ‘sphere of
influence’ and draw the post-Soviet countries back into Russia’s orbit. Russia uses frozen
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to stop Georgia’s aspirations to join NATO
and the European Union (Sayin and Modebadze, p 114).

Summarising, the most significant Russian interests that can be detected in the conflict were
a mix of maintaining its influence in a region that until very recently belonged in its sphere of
influence, ensuring the safety of the Russian minorities in the conflicting areas, preventing
other powers, such as the US and the EU, from obtaining influence in the Caucasus,
legitimising the Russian and CIS military bases in both Abkhazia and Georgia and also
enlarging the number of the military forces in the region. Power is a cornerstone in the
realism perspective of international politics, and the maximisation of power is seen as the
only way for the states to maintain their security. Moreover, the interests in Abkhazia were
the evolving communication routes, the oil-bearing railways, the preservation of strategic
frontiers, and the desire culturally to maintain a presence in the Black Sea in Georgia
(Mackinlay, 2002). Considering all of the above, a conclusion that can be made is that
Russian motives despite the offensive character of its action can be considered as a mix of

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defensive and expansionist natures, highly influenced by both international and domestic
politics.

4.1.2 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict:

Background of the conflict

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh dates many years back, and it is considered both an
interstate war and a war of secession. There is a long history of animosity between Christian,
non-Slavic Armenians with Muslim Azeris. The czarist policy, which was trying to preserve
the power of monarchy by promoting jealousy and division among neighbouring ethnic
groups, fuelled further the conflict between the two groups (Harutunian, 2009). This conflict
is one more example of the Soviet Union’s policies towards different ethnic populations
within the borders of another country. Similarly, with the case of Georgia and Abkhazia that
was examined before, the Soviet Union under Stalin encouraged the coexistence of different
ethnic groups within each other's territory to prevent the rise of one of the soviet countries as
an emerging power (Coppieters, 2004). Thus, in the early 20s, the Caucasian Bureau of the
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed the Azerbaijan
authorities to determine the boundaries of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(NKAO). The defined territory included predominantly Armenian villages and excluded the
Azerbaijani population resulting in a territory where the majority of the inhabitants were
ethically Armenians. By the end of the 80s, the Armenian population of the NKAO
constituted over 76% versus 21% of the Azerbaijani population (Mirzayev, 2023). For the
years that the area was under the control of the Soviet Union, both sides were kept in check.
However, a series of violent events erupted even before the fall of the Soviet Union and the
independence of the two adversaries, Armenia and Azerbaijan. With the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the declaration of the region as autonomous, a war broke out between
Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia and Azerbaijan, in which
Armenia managed to claim control of the region and a part of the Azerbaijani territories that
surrounded it (Cornell, 2017). Despite the ceasefire agreement that was achieved in 1994, the
situation has since escalated many times leading to an armed conflict with many casualties
from both sides. One of the most severe escalations of the conflict happened in 2016, leading
to a four-day war. Early in April 2016, the Azerbaijani forces attempted to penetrate the front

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line, causing the Armenian forces to reply by opening fire. This escalation lasted four days
and resulted in a small victory for the Azerbaijani forces, which managed to take back a small
territory that, according to the Armenian President, was no more than 800 hectares. A
ceasefire was accomplished by Russian mediation in Moscow, but the firing resumed only a
few days later (Krylov, 2019).

In September 2020, violence erupted again in the area when battles broke out between
Azerbaijani forces and Armenian separatists, escalating into a full-scale war that lasted
approximately six weeks and remained known as the Second Karabakh War. The adversaries
ultimately reached an agreement to halt hostilities as part of an agreement mediated by
Russia, under which Moscow would send peacekeepers to the area, and Armenia must
gradually return Baku to the areas around Karabakh that it had militarily seized during the
1990s (Losh, 2020). The agreement resulted in a territorial change as Azerbaijan reclaimed
vital areas of the region, such as the Lachin region, where the primary route from
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia is located. In addition, the agreement stated that Russia would
send almost 2,000 peacekeepers for a minimum of five years to oversee the peace accord and
facilitate the repatriation of refugees. Additionally, the Russian forces would provide secure
passage between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia via the Lachin region (The Guardian,
2020). Despite the agreement signed by all actors, since then, several clashes have occurred.
Azerbaijan undertook extensive cross-border attacks into Armenia in 2022, deteriorating the
situation once again. Both parties assigned blame to one another. In particular, Yerevan
claimed that several Armenian towns had been targeted overnight, while Azerbaijan said it
was reacting to Armenia's provocations (Tétrault-Farber, 2022).

Over the years, the casualties have been tremendous for both sides as thousands of people,
both soldiers and civilians, lost their lives during the conflict, and a significant amount of the
population decided to flee the war, creating a massive wave of refugees.The dispute is seen as
frozen throughout the years. However, several scholars disagree with the term frozen conflict
due to the many clashes that have occurred between the two sides from the beginning of the
truce in 1994 since the present day and have led to the deterioration of the relations between
the parties and in the escalation of the violence (Blahova, 2018).

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The Russian role in the conflict

Russia has been a key actor in the issue since the beginning of the negotiations, and it has
assigned itself the duty of working to ensure that the conversation between Baku and Yeveran
continues at the highest level of trilateral talks (Rytövuori-Apunen, 2019). The mediation
efforts made to address the conflict were initiated by the UN and OSCE, which in 1994
established the Minsk group co-chaired by the Russian Federation, France and the US with
the aim to strengthen the ceasefire that had been achieved with Russian aid, conduct
negotiations and help the two countries achieve a conclusion of a political agreement on the
termination of the armed conflict (OSCE, 1995). Even before that, Russia, as a regional actor,
had tried to claim the role of the peacekeeper in this conflict as well as in other conflicts
within the former territories of the Soviet Union (Harutunian, 2009). Traditionally, Russia is
considered to be the strategic ally of Armenia which are both part of the Collective Security
Treaty Organisation (CSTO), meaning that in case of a war on Armenian soil, Russia has to
act in favour of Armenia. This implication certainly makes Azerbaijan more reluctant to
attempt an offensive against Amenia as the former is in favour of maintaining the good
relations that have been built with Russia over the years. Such an action would require the
involvement of Russia and would deteriorate the bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. At the
same time, the Kremlin’s position is difficult as it views Azerbaijan as “ a strategically
important partner for the near and long term” (MID, 2007).

As was previously indicated, Russia is a member of the OSCE and the Minsk Group, which
serves as the main mediator in the dispute and is widely acknowledged by all sides. However,
Russia has made numerous attempts to manage the dispute on its own. The accord reached in
1994 was a success solely made by the initiative of the Russian Federation. Russia has tried
to dominate the mediation efforts concerning a permanent solution that will end the Karabakh
problem. Outside the framework of the Minsk Group, Russia has made its own attempts to
end the fighting permanently, proposing the Common State Plan in 1998, the Kazan Plan in
2011 and the Lavrov Plan in 2015, which are often based on previous plans proposed by the
Minsk Group or other mediators (Gafarli, 2023). However, both failed as a result of the
parties involved in the conflicts being unwilling to reach an agreement.

What is controversial about the Russian role in the conflict is that despite the weapon
embargo that has been applied by other countries in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia has

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been a significant weapon supplier for both countries. Following the military agreements with
Armenia, has supplied Armenia in the past with weapons to maintain military balance with
Azerbaijan. However, in recent years Russia has been one of the leading weapon suppliers for
Azerbaijan, a move that has caused displeasure and insecurity in Armenia (Abushov, 2019).
In order to help Armenia strengthen its military capabilities, Yerevan received a $200 million
loan from Russia in 2016, allaying Armenian concerns (Abrahamyan, 2018). This adds to the
security dilemma of both countries, which view the purchase of weapons as a threat to their
security and acts as an obstacle in any attempt to build mutual trust between the two
countries.

Russian Interests

The Russian interests in the conflict are heavily connected with Russia’s general interest in its
Near Abroad and specifically in South Caucasus. As mentioned in the previous part, the
conflict that broke out in the early 90s has still not found a permanent solution that satisfies
all sides of the conflict. There is a significant shift in the Russian approach to mediating the
conflict that is heavily related to the shifting of Russian interests in the South Caucasus and
the developments in the region.

At the beginning of the conflict, Russia perceived it as an essential instrument for its foreign
policy objectives in the region of its military presence, the Caspian energy development and
the pipeline routes, further expansion of Russian influence, and limitation of western
influence. In the war that started at the beginning of the 90s, Russia supported Armenia using
the conflict to put pressure on Baku and impose conditions that included the joining of
Azerbaijan in the CIS, joint exploration of the energy resources in the Caspian sea as well as
the deployment of a military base. Azerbaijan eventually joined the CIS but refused the
deployment of military bases and the shared exploration of its energy resources (Abushov,
2009). Those resources played a significant role in Baku’s negotiating toolbox as they drew
the interest for energy supplies of other powers in the region, especially the US and the
European Union (Krylov, 2019). Azerbaijan's rich energy resources in the Caspian Sea, as
well as its potential to become a transit corridor between Asia and Europe in the South
Caucasus, heightened US interest in the region and made it essential to ensure stability for
transnational energy companies to invest (Zarifan, 2015).

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The growing interest of the US in the Caucasus was perceived by Russia as a threat to its
own interests, contributing to a less inclined enthusiasm for resolving the conflict. Fear of
other states' intentions is another important element that realism and, more specifically,
offensive realism introduces. A pressured attempt to resolve the conflict would probably
result in the displeasure of one of the two countries and perhaps turn them to the West in
search of other allies (Abushov, 2019). A growing western influence in the region would
result in the minimisation of Russia’s power in its traditional sphere of influence. Thus, the
continuation of the conflict provided Russia with the best possible outcome at the time:
dominance in the region, influence over the two countries, military presence in the base in
Armenia as a result of Armenia's increased reliance on Russia, balanced relations with Bacu,
an increase of weapons trade with both countries, and an environment that was not appealing
to Western economic aspirations due to security instability.

The Russian stance on the conflict started to shift in the 2000s, and Russia has viewed the
resolution of this conflict in a more positive way, as the manipulation of the conflict is not
essential for the realisation of Russian interests in the region. As it is stated in the Concept for
the Russian Foreign Policy, “Russia strongly advocates a political and diplomatic settlement
of conflicts in the post-Soviet space, specifically, Russia works within the existing multilateral
negotiating mechanism to find an inclusive solution to the Transnistrian issue, respecting the
sovereignty, territorial integrity and neutral status of the Republic of Moldova in determining
the special status of Transnistria, to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by working
together with the other States that are co-chairs in the Minsk Group of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and basing on principles set forth in joint
statements by the presidents of Russia, the United States of America and the French Republic
in 2009-2013” (mid.ru, 2016). The reasons for this shift vary. The bandwagoning approach
with Russia that Azerbaijan had consistently adopted since the early 2000s improved
Moscow's trust in Azerbaijan. Moreover, Russia's increased capabilities diminished the value
of the conflict as a resource, and lastly, Kremlin decision-makers increasingly saw the
conflict as a barrier to stronger relations with Azerbaijan today. All of these factors combined
to impact the policy shift over Nagorno Karabakh (Abushov, 2019).

The Russian participation in the conflict has been driven by a mix of geopolitical, economic
and security factors, motivated by the wish not to allow Western rival powers, especially the
US, to gain or further expand their influence over Armenia and especially Azerbaijan. Similar

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to other conflicts that have occurred in the post-Soviet space, Russia finds itself as the
primary mediators as the regional power, aiming to maintain its influence in its Near Abroad
and most of the Post-Soviet states. The reasons that Russia is interested in taking part in the
mediation of the conflict are aligned with its interest in empowering its own relationship with
the two states participating in the conflict, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Rytövuori-Apunen,
2019). Armenia is a country that is heavily reliant on Russia. Being a landlocked country
with strained relations with its neighbours and being cut off from key regional transport and
energy infrastructure has resulted in an economic slowdown, increasing its reliance on
Russian assistance (Sushentsov & Neklyudov, 2020). On the other hand, Azerbaijan’s
economic development, due to the energy resources in the Caspian basin, together with the
good relations that it maintains with its neighbouring countries, is making it more
independent and open to search for alliances that suit better its national interests. That makes
Armenia a loyal ally to Russia in the South Caucasus, if not the only one remained after the
Russian invasion of Georgia. Although Russia has significantly improved its relations with
Azerbaijan and wishes to extend its cooperation further, the latter is a country with strong ties
with Turkey, a country with regional aspirations in the traditional sphere of Russia’s influence
and also a NATO country. Indeed Turkey has been very active in the conflict, supporting
Azerbaijan both in the diplomatic field but also in supplying military support. In Second
Karabakh War, the Armenian side accused the Turkish military forces of supporting
Azerbaijan, resulting in the victories that the Azerbaijani forces succeeded, an accusation that
both Turkey and Azerbaijan denied (Keddie, 2020). The involvement of Turkey in backing
the Azerbaijani side complicates the situation as it brings Russia to the difficult position of
having to balance its position in an attempt to avoid tensions with Turkey, a country with
which Russia has started cooperation in several fields, including the mediation efforts in
Syria through the Astana Process.

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4.2 The Far Abroad

4.2.1 The Syrian conflict

Brief background of the conflict

The Arab spring, which first started in Tunisia, soon expanded to many other Arab
countries, including Syria. What started as anti-government protests requesting democracy,
freedom, and dignity soon developed into a full-scale internal armed conflict after the
regime's attempts to violently suppress the protests that they were calling for President
Assad’s removal (Cengiz, 2020). The parties that are involved in the conflict are the Syrian
government and other opposition groups but also terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State,
which, during the unrest in the region, grew larger and threatened not only the regional but
also the international security. The consequences of the conflict had an international impact,
especially during the first years, affecting not only Syria and the neighbouring countries but
also Europe and other countries. The violence spread rapidly over the country, leading to
thousands of deaths and creating a massive wave of mass migration of people seeking refuge
from the war in other countries.

Despite the multiple attempts made by many international organisations, states and
individuals to resolve the conflict, the conflict is still active, counting almost 12 years of
hostilities. The initiatives for the management of the conflict started the same year, with the
arrival of the Secretary-General of the Arab League in Syria. Almost a year after the start of
the conflict, the UN and Kofi Annan also attempted to achieve a ceasefire and resolve the
conflict by establishing the Geneva I process, where the latter presented his plan of resolving
the conflict. The attempt was proved fruitless, as Assad’s regime and the opposition failed to
agree to the terms. Disagreement also occurred in the UN countries, with Russia disapproving
of the plan and Hillary Clinton’s proposal of immediate removal of president Bashar al-Assad
(Gowan, 2013).

Subsequent attempts to resolve the dispute ended in the same way. Geneva II and III,
initiated by the UN and Lakhdar Brahimi in 2014 and 2016, also failed to bring a positive
outcome due to disunity within the UN and the difficulty among the actors involved in
finding common ground, and similar were the results from the talks in the Vienna meetings in
2015 (Cengiz, 2020).

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The 30th of September 2015, marked a turning point in the history of the conflict, with
Russia’s military intervention turning the tide in favour of al-Assad’s regime by supporting
the government and, under the excuse of fighting terrorism, attacking positions held by the
opposition groups (Ilnicki, 2015). The direct military involvement of Russia in the Syrian war
gave the former the necessary leverage to influence the situation both regionally and
internationally, paving the way for the initiation of the Astana Process, a new circle of peace
talks in the city of Astana, the capital city of Kazakhstan, under the supervision of two
regional actors Turkey and Iran, and of Russia.

The Russian role in the conflict and the Astana Process

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the USSR had a very active presence in the
Middle East and the ties with Syria, although there was a mutual level of suspicion, were
strong with both parties collaborating at different levels, mainly within the military field (
Allison, 2013). Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia held to these treaties to
claim its right to be included and participate in developments in the region. This is evident in
the answer the official representative of the MFA of Russia at that time gave to the media
regarding the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1980. Lukashevich claimed
that the Syrian- Soviet Treaty according to, "in case of emergence of situations threatening
peace and security of one of the Parties or creating a threat to peace or a threat of violation of
peace and security in the whole world the High Contracting Parties will immediately contact
each other for the purpose of coordination of their positions and cooperation in order to
remove a threat emerged and to restore peace" was still in force (mid.ru, 2012).

Moving forward to the contemporary world, Syria and Russia shared common views on the
wider international stage, especially in topics on territorial sovereignty and their shared view
on opposing the regime change of a country that comes from intervention from outside
powers. Syria and Russia have backed each other in opposing the US-led intervention in Iraq.
Moreover, Syria was one of the very few countries that supported Russia’s military
intervention in Georgia (Allison, 2013).

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From the start of the conflict, Russia has been supportive of the Assad regime and framed
the issue as a domestic problem that must be resolved by Syrians themselves without any
foreign interference. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia used its
veto power to block several UN resolutions that were not aligned with Russian interests in the
resolution of the conflict. One of Russia's primary positions has been to keep Assad in power,
condemning any foreign attempts by outside actors to intervene in the situation and influence
changes in the Syrian government. Essentially, with its attitude, Russia was opposing the US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s suggestion of a transitional government without Bashar
al-Assad (Cengiz, 2020). In a question by the press pertaining to the Russian diplomatic
approach to the Syrian crisis, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative replied:
“Russia is not and will not be among those who interfere in other nation's affairs and try to
change governments in place as they think best or teach other peoples how they should build
their future” (mid.ru, 2012). With this statement, Russia indirectly points the finger at the US,
as criticism of any intervention for regime change is one of the main pillars of its rhetoric
against the West generally and the US specifically.

In peace and conflict studies, it is often suggested that the parties involved in an armed
conflict are less likely to proceed in peace talks if they believe they can succeed militarily and
obtain their demands with less possible cost (Zartman, 2001). Usually, they are open in peace
negotiations when the conflict has started mutually hurting both sides and has reached a
stalemate. Similarly, in the case of the Syrian armed conflict, the disputants were reluctant to
halt their military operations and seek a solution through negotiations or participate in peace
talks during the first years of the conflict as they believed they could achieve their goals by
prevailing on the battlefield (Cengiz, 2020). That definitively changed in 2015 with the
Russian military intervention in Syria. Although the military operations that Russia
conducted in Syria were framed by Russia as a war against terrorism, in reality, only a few
positions that were targeted by Russia belonged to terrorists. In contrast, the majority
belonged to opposition groups that fought against al-Assad and his army. This intervention
had a significant impact on the war as it turned the tide in favour of al-Assad’s regime and put
an end to the opposition's aspirations to prevail on the battlefield. Moreover, the direct
involvement of Russia in the war aimed to limit the freedom of Western powers and, more
specifically, the US to act militarily in Syria and or, if they did, at least to force co-ordination
of the military activities between Russia and the US (Rodkiewicz, 2017).

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While the peace processes of other organisations, namely the UN and the Arab League,
continued unsuccessfully to provide with a permanent solution, Russia alongside with Turkey
and Iran, initiated a new circle of peace talks, the Astana process, which was running parallel
with the UN Geneva process and in the beginning aimed not in the permanent resolution of
the conflict but mostly in achieving ceasefire with the introduction of conflict de-escalation
zoned and mechanisms (Tziarras, 2022).

Russian Interests

The Russian interests in the Syrian armed conflict have both international and domestic
character, another element that is often fount in realism. The multiple dimensions of Russian
foreign policy in the Syrian conflict include the Russian perspective of the world politics,
based on the view of multipolarity in international relations, where Russia has equal status
with the West, Russia’s concerns of regime change policies, concerns of expansion of
terrorism with a direct threat to Russia’s Near Abroad and Russia itself. At the same time,
Russia takes into account materialistic pursuits in the region. This case is a perfect illustration
of realism as it includes a plethora of realistic explanation for Russian interests, namely, the
domestic and international motivation, the need of Russia to maximise its power in order to
address new threats from its external environment, such as the sanction that were imposed by
the West, and the fear of the growing influence of Western powers in world politics and their
capability of intervening in domestic politics.

The survival of Assad’s regime, was of the utmost importance for Russia’s materialistic
interests in Syria as many consider it very likely that if Assad was to be replaced or the
opposition was to take control, Russia would lose its Naval base in Tartus as well as
Khmeimim its air base in Latakia. Although in the past, some analysts discarded the
importance that those two bases have for Russia (Allison, 2013), others underline their
importance for Russian interests and Russia's actions regarding the bases have proven the
opposite. The port in Tartus is the only Naval base Russia owns in the Mediterranean Sea,
and it comes with the benefit of giving direct access to the Eastern Mediterranean. It is true
that Tartus in the past had minor importance as a Naval base as it was mainly used by the
Russian forces for maintenance and replenishment (Allison, 2013). However, the Port in
Tartus, as well as the air base in Latakia took a more important role after the Russian

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intervention as they secured Russia’s military presence in the Middle East. Russia has used
the base in Latakia as an electronic eavesdropping facility outside of its Near Abroad and
securing this intelligent network facility is definitely within Russian interests (Çoban, 2021).
Moreover, after Russia managed to expand its ownership over the Tartus Port for 49 years, it
then planned to proceed in expansion and modernization of the naval facilities for both
military and economical reasons as plans had been made for the build of grain hub in the port
which aims to boost Russian presence in the markets of the Middle East (Reuters, 2019). In
the annual special Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, Putin referred to the bases in Syria
stressing that: “ Our military is there in order to secure Russia's interests in this vitally
important region of the world, which is very close to us, and they will be there as long
as it benefits Russia and in pursuance of our international commitments...
and continued,
…So far, they are necessary, they are fulfilling important tasks, including ensuring
Russia's security in that region and ensuring our interests in the economic sphere”
(Putin, 2018).

Besides the economic and international dimension of Russian interests in the conflict,
Russia also has domestic issued pertaining to the security of the region in the Near Abroad
and in Russia. Russia has many times framed its military involvement in Syria as countering
global terrorism but there are also domestic reasons pertaining to Russian security. Both
Lavrov and Putin have addressed the issue of securing national security in the homeland by
fighting terrorism in Syria as there is a significant number of people from Russia’s Near
Abroad that have joined the ranks of the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. In a meeting
with al-Assad Putin admitted that there are at least 4,000 people from former Soviet
territories that fight in Syria against the government's army. Putin made it clear that “we
cannot let these people gain combat experience and go through ideological indoctrination
and then return to Russia” (kremlin.ru, 2015) while in his speech during a visit to the
Russian airbase in Khmeimim he congratulated the armed forces in Syria for their efforts and
emphasised that “once again that here in Syria, you are not only helping the Syrian people
by liberating them from terrorist groups. Here, in Syria, you are defending your home country
by preventing terrorists from reaching Russia and its neighbouring countries”(kremlin.ru,
2020).

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In the political sphere, the Russian interest over the conflict in Syria has a more significant
weight. The regime change in Syria was problematic for Russia not only because the current
regime was important for the realisation of the Russian ambitions but also because Russia
viewed this attempt for regime change as a continuation of the colour revolutions that
emerged in Russia’s Near abroad and which from Russia’s view of point where initiated by
Western powers in an attempt to expand their influence in the Russian Near Abroad (Çoban,
2021). Russian officials have advocated many times about the importance of sovereignty as
well as the importance of not having external intervention in internal affairs while Russian
officials have also accused other powers of being involved in domestic issues. Especially in
the case of Syria in the beginning of the conflict the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been
very critical about any kind of external involvement in the conflict and openly accused other
actors of “interfere in other nations' affairs and try to change governments in place as they
think best or teach other peoples how they should build their future” (Lukashevich, 2012).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union deprived Russia of the superpower title it enjoyed
during the Cold War, leaving it relatively weak to mend its domestic issues. Researchers have
argued that Russia's involvement in the Syrian civil war is actually related to power politics
and Russia's ambitions to emerge as a superpower, equal to the United States, that has the
ability to influence world politics outside of its traditional sphere of influence (Allison, 2013,
Çoban, 2021). The Syrian conflict has in fact been one of the most important conflicts that
have emerged in the contemporary world, with its consequences affecting not only the
country of its origin and the region but also the rest of the world. The relations that Russia
has built with the Syrian government has given the former the leverage that it needs to
influence the confli,ct while the military intervention and the help to the Syrian Army have
put pressure over the opposition to sit at the negotiation table and discuss solutions for the
de-escalation of the conflict and the cease of fire. Russia, through its participation in the
conflict, has gained a loyal ally in the Middle East. Syria might not be among the most
powerful countries in the region but nonetheless is able to give Russia an entry point to
influencing regional politics and international politics. Following the recent developments
after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Syria was one of the first countries that recognise the
independence and sovereignty of Donbas and Luhansk (Reuters, 2022), while Bashar
al-Assad supported the invasion of Ukraine and justified it as a “correction of history”
(Aljazeera, 2022). Moreover, the cooperation between Russia, Turkey and Iran over the

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Syrian conflict within the frame of the Astana conflict have paved the way for further
cooperation between the three countries in other issues, such as energy, economy etc.

Although Russia and Turkey are powers with conflicting interests in many fields, including
the Syrian conflict, and are both competing for regional hegemony, their cooperation in Syria
has brought the two countries closer. Russia, taking advantage of Turkey's bitterness towards
the West, and giving Turkey an equal role in the negotiations in Astana has secured indirect
support, or at least the neutrality of Turkey on other issues. Following the Russian invasion of
Ukraine, Turkey despite the fact that Turkey is a NATO member country was among the
countries that refused to impose sanctions on Russia. Parallel to that, many western countries,
including the US have accused Iran of having agreed to supply the Russian armed forces with
medium range missiles and cheap but effective drones, a sale that will undermine Ukraines
position in the military field (Wintour, 2022).

4.2.2 The Central African Republic conflict

Brief background of the conflict

The Central African Republic (CAR), as well as other postcolonial African countries, has
been struggling with instability since its independence from France in the 1960. The country
is considered one of the poorest in the region, and perhaps in the world, and since its
independence, there have been many coups from several groups that wanted to take power by
force (Sıradağ, 2016). The outbreak of conflict in 2012 although it has been viewed as a
religious conflict between Christian and Muslim groups, in reality is more complex and is a
continuation of previous unresolved conflicts. After the independence from France CAR
struggled with creating public services available to all the population. In fact, the state has
been absent from rural areas outside of the country’s capital. Areas in the north-east of the
country have been marginalised and the inhabitants of these areas have been considered as
foreigners. Despite the fact that CAR has its own state forces (FACA), those were either used
by governments as a way to straighten the grip of power or they have been weakened over the
years by governments which perceived them as a threat to their possession of power. This

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behaviour of the state forces has had severe consequences. FACA had been incapable of
protecting the population or in some cases the population suffered abuse from the state
forces, leading them to create their own defence-group which later became the core of
rebellious groups (Ingerstad, 2014). The presidency of Bozize brought to the surface these
conditions. Bozize based his regime on a group identity, favouring members of his own
ethnic group by giving them positions in the public services, the military and the government,
creating in that way a patrimonial rule in an attempt to tighten his grip on power (Ingerstad,
2014). As mentioned before, during the 63 years of existence of CAR as an independent state,
many governments have been created as a result of a military coup leading the population to
the perception that taking arms is the only way someone can gain influence and gain access to
positions (Sıradağ, 2016). All the above contributed to the creation of several rebel groups in
the country.

The second civil war that started in the CAR in 2012 was a result of all the previous causes.
Seleka, one of the rebel groups, originated from the north- east part of the country, a part
which as mentioned was highly marginalised, marched towards the capital of the country
against the government of Bozize, accusing the government of corruption, incapability to
fulfil promises that made to the people and also failure to implement previous peace
agreements that had ended previous armed conflict in 2007 (Kostelyanets, 2020). In 2013
they managed to occupy the city and force Bozize to flee the country, leaving Djotodia, the
leader of Seleka, as the new president of the CAR and in fact the first president coming from
the Muslim minority. Seleka was a group that relied on the Muslim minorities of the country
and had support from Muslims of neighbouring countries, especially Chad and South Sudan
(Kostelyanets, 2020). The rule of Djotodia was perceived by a large number of the population
as a rule of foreigners and characterised from discrimination of the non Muslim population
and atrocities against civilians. It quickly became even more unpopular than the previous
government (Ingerstad, 2014).

The Anti- Balaka group arose as a direct consequence of the Seleka abuses from a coalition
of self-defence groups that already existed to counter the lack of state security. It drew
Christians from all the country but at the core of these groups were young men, coming from
poor rural areas, who participated in rebel groups with hope of gaining positions or
opportunities to land a job in state institutions (Ingerstad, 2014). Anti-Balaka managed to
take control of Bangui in 2014, while Seleka disintegrated and Djotodia resigned. The

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atrocities continued but this time from the side of Anti-Balaka who started to punish Muslim
civilians as a revenge for Seleka abuses and not even the election of Touadera in 2016
achived to unite the country which was divided between ex Seleka groups in the north and
Anti-Balaka groups in the south.

The Russian role in the conflict

Russia, prior to the conflict, had a minor role in Africa and the CAR. With the dissolution of
the USSR, Russia had withdrawn from Africa, seeking to resolve issues within and close to
its borders. Until 2012, the USA, France, as a post-colonial power, and the UK were the three
powers that had a significant role in conflict resolution in Africa (Duursma, 2017). Several
conflicts in African countries brought Russia an opportunity to return to the continent and
seek to play a more prominent role and in reality, CAR is not the only African conflict where
Russia has tried to play a broker role. Similar aspirations can be found in other regional
conflicts, such as Mali, South Sudan, Libya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, etc., and
Russia has tried to tighten its relations with African countries and with the African Union
(AU). In contrast with other Western and European countries, Russia does not have a
negative colonial legacy in Africa and, in the past, had managed to create some degree of
trust between itself and some of the African countries in which the USSR supported national
liberation movements (Balytnikov et al., 2019). This plays in favour of Russia as there is a
certain degree of trust toward Russian initiatives, or at least more trust than CAR
governments have had towards other countries with a colonial past in the country and the
region.

The beginning of Russian involvement in the conflict started in 2017 with a request by the
CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera to President Putin, asking him to provide military
assistance to FACA. Before this request, a meeting with the Russian ministry of foreign
affairs had occurred (Kostelyanets, 2020). Although CAR had been under a UN arms
embargo, Russia managed to obtain an exception from it. It thus replied to Touadera’s request
by providing small arms and ammunition accompanied by military and civilian instructors to
train FACA (Majchút, 2023). According to President Faustin-Archange Touadera, “Russia
has provided enormous assistance to the Central African Republic in the military sphere,
contributed to training soldiers for the Central African Republic’s armed forces, to

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modernising the Central African army, and to training gendarmes and police. On September
14, 2019, Russia completed the delivery of the second batch of weapons to the Central
African Republic, which covers our small arms needs in full” (kremlin.ru, 2019).

The donation of weapons to the government of CAR gained Russia the leverage that was
needed to effect the conflict and play the role of the broker. Russia in cooperation with
Sudan, with which it shares good relations, managed to establish connections with rebel
groups connected to the conflict through the Sudanish government and initiated talks with
some of these groups and with religious leaders of the country (Kostelyanets, 2020). The
combined efforts of the AU’s Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the CAR and the
Russian-Sudanish initiative supplemented each other, and as a result, a peace agreement was
signed between the parties in 2019. The Russian role was recognised by the AU which
thanked Russia for the assistance, and the latter was granted the status of observer in the AU
initiative (Ali, 2019).

Russia has repeatedly stated that the Russian personnel in CAR are there to train the CAR
forces in several capacities and are not involved in battlefield operations, however, there is
evidence of the presence of private Russian military companies in CAR which besides
military assistance and training are also providing combat support (Elbassoussy, 2022). The
infamous Wagner group has a significant presence in CAR, providing all the services
mentioned before. The Wagner Group is a private military company that has been present in
other conflicts where Russia played the role of mediator, such as the conflict in Syria and
Ukraine, and it has been heavily connected with the Russian intelligence services and the
Kremlin (Eguegu, 2022). The person allegedly behind the partner group is the oligarch
Yevgenii Prigozhin, who is a close associate of President Putin. What is interesting about
Wagner Group and all private military groups in Russia is that they are considered
unconstitutional by Russian Law. However, at the same time, a degree signed by Putin
classifies as secret all information about those that are not employees but cooperating with
the foreign intelligence services of the Russian Federation. That raises suspicions about the
activities of the Wagner Group as it makes it difficult to be under investigation due to the fear
of prosecution (Marten, 2019). This blurred status of private military companies offers Russia
many benefits. However, the most important is that since the personnel of those companies
are not directly employed by the Russian State but are employees of a private company,
Moscow can deny that it is formally involved in any of the operations in those countries

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(Racz, 2020). In CAR, the Wagner group has been welcomed by President Touadera and
mercenaries from this private military group have been used to provide security to the
President as his personal guard (Siegle,2022).

The full role of Wagner Group in CAR is not completely known but what is certain is that it
raises concerns pertaining to its activities. Several news websites and UN experts have
expressed concerns that the Wagner Group in CAR is violating human rights by abusing
civilians, sexually harassing women, men and girls and torturing people (UN, 2021). Despite
the accusation, what is certain is that Wagner Group has accomplished to secure Touadera’s
position for now. Thus, although Russian military forces have not been directly involved in
the battle, there is a deployment of unofficial auxiliary forces which, according to many
witnesses, have been helping the national forces.

Russian interests

During the Soviet Union era, Soviet-African relations were quite strong, with the Soviet
Union playing an essential role in the continent, especially in the military field, as it had
provided political, ideological, and military support to many countries of the continent
(Elbassoussy, 2022). Although the relations between the two actors were challenged after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Russia from Africa, a new
rapprochement has begun, especially under Putin’s presidency.

It is not a generalisation to say that Russian interests in the Central African Republic do not
differ from those that consider other countries of Africa. Over the last few years, Russia has
tried to return to Africa, and it has built ties with many African countries, something which is
also reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved by Vladimir
Putin. According to the concept: “Russia will expand multidimensional interaction with
African States both in bilateral and multilateral settings by improving political dialogue and
promoting mutually beneficial trade and economic ties, stepping up comprehensive
cooperation that serves common interests, contribute to preventing regional conflicts and
crisis situations, as well as facilitate post-conflict settlement in Africa. Promoting partnership
ties with the African Union and sub-regional organisations is an important element of this
policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

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The Russian-African Summit in Sochi in 2019 was one of Russia’s attempts to tighten its
relations with African countries. At the Summit, all countries of Africa were represented, 43
of them by the heads of the country. The Summit aimed to expand Russian and African
cooperation in the political, economic, and security fields as well as cooperation in
environmental protection, Scientific, Technical, Humanitarian, and Information Cooperation
(Declaration of first Russia–Africa Summit, 2019). Similarly, when it comes to the CAR,
Russia’s interests in the country are multifaceted, including political, economic, military, and
security manifestations.

The political and diplomatic field is the one that perhaps has the utmost importance for
Russia. Russia’s expansion of influence in CAR comes in perfect alliance with its aspiration
to regain the status of a great power that was enjoyed during the Soviet time. By mediating
conflicts, Russia has managed to expand its network of allies outside its traditional sphere of
influence. In the case of CAR, the Russian influx of power has a multifacet effect. First,
Russia gains more recognition as a global power capable of influencing countries and solving
problems pertaining to their internal affairs. Second, Russia expands its pool of allies and
ensures support for its decisions. The latter is evident by the fact that CAR is one of the many
countries in which Russia mediated that often follows the Russian line in the UN by voting in
favour of Russia or at least does not vote against it. An example of this is the recent UN
resolution for the territorial integrity of Ukraine which calls for Russia to withdraw from
Ukraine and declare the referendums in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya
illegal under international law. CAR along with 24 more African countries, although it did
not vote against the resolution, chose to abstain (United Nations, 2022). Third, CAR’s
government has shown its appreciation for Russian support by appointing Russians in critical
positions as Russia's assistance by supplying arms to the CAR government at a time when the
UN had imposed an embargo worked positively for Russia's image. It would not be an
exaggeration to say that it might have created a feeling of obligation towards Russia. An
example of this is Valery Zakharov, a Russian diplomat who has been appointed as the
national security advisor to the president of CAR while other Russians have also been taken
positions in the CAR government as advisors (Majchút, 2023). This gives Russia a chance to
influence more the domestic affairs of the country and in extention to play a critical role in
the whole region. Lastly, while Russia is expanding its presence in the region and gaining
more influence, the power of other countries is deteriorating. France has also intervened in

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the conflict, but its efforts to mediate have been viewed by locals as a way for France to
control the domestic affairs of the country in order to achieve its post-colonial interests.

In the economic field, Russia is perceived as one of the leading countries in natural resource
development and exploration (Elbassoussy, 2022). CAR is a country that can provide Russia
with promising economic opportunities as it is rich in minerals and hydrocarbon resources,
something that Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on. Many Russian companies have
been granted mining recognition permits, and Russia itself has received by the government of
CAR prospecting-mining exploration concessions. Taking into consideration that a sizeable
amount of good resources are under rebel control (Goodison, 2019), Russia has an additional
reason to try to mediate and gain access to these areas. Beside the natural resources, Russia is
a country that exports grain, arms, nuclear power and extractives to Africa and thus, it’s
interest is to expand its presence to the African market. Although Russian trade with Africa
had been relatively low compared to other powers, such as China, Russia has exerted an
outsized influence (Pilling et al., 2023).

One of the main interests of Russia globally is its commitment to counterterrorism and in
the case of CAR this is not an exception. Through all these years of internal conflicts and
violence that the country has endured, several terrorist groups have emerged contributing
more to the instability and the fragility of the country. Russia has used the narrative of
countering terrorism in the past, especially in the case of Syria in order to explain its military
activities. In Africa this narrative of countering terrorism has worked in favour of Russia as
many countries that fight against jihadist insurgencies have installed military governments,
though a coup, that are openly sympathetic to Russia and antagonistic towards France (Pilling
et al., 2023). As mentioned before, CAR is a country where the majority of its people are
Christians and the idea of Russia fighting against jihadists can contribute by elevating
Russia’s reputation to CAR’s population. This contribution is not marely a matter of image,
but it also assists Russia to be accepted by the people as an ally of CAR while undermines the
role of other powers and especially France. Russia after all has tried to secure its place in
CAR by employing some soft power technics, such as presence in the CAR media, donations
for schools where children are taught the Russian language, restoration of Orthodox churches
and propaganda (Pilling et al., 2023).

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5. Case Analysis

5.1 The Russian Interests

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of conflicts erupted in Russia’s Near
Abroad, which required immediate mediation. Russia took the role of the central mediator in
those conflicts for both domestic and international reasons. In the case of Georgia, Russia
backed Abkhazia in an attempt to force Georgia to join the CIS and maintain in this way its
military presence in both Abkhazia and Georgia. The protection of the Russian minority in
that area was used in the Russian narrative to justify the reasoning behind its involvement in
the conflict.
The case of Nagorno-Karabakh, although it presents some similarities with other conflicts in
the region, it differs in many aspects, most notably in the Russian approach. The region of the
conflict has no particular interest in Russia. Its interest lies in two countries that are involved
in the conflict. The conflict involved two state actors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where Russia
has strategic and economic interests and cannot risk displeasure from one of the two sides.
In both cases of its Near Abroad, Russia has aimed to monopolise the mediation efforts by
conducting solo attempts to mediate the conflict and by dominating the attempts made by
other organisations in which Russia participated. Another similarity between the two cases is
Russian interest in blocking the further western expansion of influence, which translates to
blocking the US to involve in Russia’s Near Abroad, limiting Russian influence in that way.
In both cases in Russia’s Near Abroad, the two more essential interests for Russia illustrated a
set of both defensive and offensive interests as they aimed to expand their influence in the
region, preserving the status of the regional power and maintaining its regional hegemony in
the area and prevent the expansion of Western countries, most importantly the US, to gain
access in the region of Russia’s influence.

After the re-election of Vladimir Putin as a President of the Russian Federation in 2012,
there has been a significant expansion of Russian mediation in countries that are not part of
the Post Soviet sphere. Russia has tried to establish itself as a critical mediator in conflicts in
the MENA region, Central Africa, and even Latin America. This can be viewed as an attempt
by Russia to expand its influence on the world and regain its status as a global power.
Mediation significantly helped Russia expand the pool of its allies, especially after the

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annexation of Crimea when Russia was isolated by Western countries as part of their
sanctions against aggression toward Ukraine. In Syria and CAR, Russian interests also have
an economic dimension. The Russian economy, which is weakened by economic sanctions
that western counties have imposed has found new markets for its goods. Moreover, the
Middle East and Africa are rich in natural resources and minerals, and the Russian economy
is heavily based on exploiting these elements.

The countries that Russia has chosen to mediate and provide support for the central
government are often countries with similarly minded regimes to Russia’s, especially when it
comes to the way they perceive western involvement in their ruling. Both CAR and Syria are
countries where the central government has authoritarian characteristics and has received
criticism from liberal countries. Russia’s argument of “not being among those who interfere
in other nation's affairs and try to change governments in place as they think best or teach
other peoples how they should build their future” is appealing in countries with more
authoritarian regimes and even creates the feeling that Russia will treat these states as equal
partners without trying to impose its own way of governance or that it will impose regime
change. After all, Russia views most of these conflicts as the expansion of the coloured
revolution, which Russia opposes. This point of view makes Russia a preferred mediator to
conflicts in countries with authoritarian regimes such as Syria and CAR.

The Russian involvement in those conflicts has managed to marginalise any Western powers
from the countries of interest and has created a dependency on the host country from Russia.
In the case of CAR, the influence of France, a post-colonial power in the country,
dramatically decreased while Russia’s increased its popularity and influence. In Syria,
Russia’s military intervention prevented other countries from following a similar path to
avoid conflict with Russia. Both Syria and CAR are in need of Russia’s support in the
military sphere, and Russia has used this need to establish itself as the main ally of those
counties. In addition, Russia has used the conflicts to build good relations with other regional
countries. In Syria, the Astana Process has brought Turkey, Iran and Russia to cooperate
closely to find a solution to the conflict. The cooperation in the Syrian conflict resolution has
opened for Russia new doors of cooperation in other fields with these countries. Especially
Russia and Turkey whose relations had been soured due to supporting opposing sides in the
conflict but also from competition in other fields, worked together and managed to create a
rapprochement to their general bilaterian relations. In the case of CAR, Russia cooperated

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with Sudan and the AU, a coopetation that can pave the way for further Russian involvement
in Africa.

Besides the international aspirations of Russia’s interests in the conflicts in its Far Abroad,
there are also domestic interests in its involvement in the conflicts. Russia has committed in
countering terrorism, and especially the conflict in Syria can fire back in its own borderlines
as many of the fighters who fill the ranks of terrorist groups in the Middle East come from
Russia’s Near Abroad. By addressing the issue in Syria, Russia protects the security close and
within its own borders by fighting these groups away from its own neighbour and not
allowing those fighters to come back with combat experience.

Finally, what we can see from the examination of all four cases an increase in Russian
efforts to maximise its power. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia viewed
the Post-Soviet space as an arena of competition between powers to gain influence and used
all the possible capabilities, including mediation, to preserve its status as a regional power
and maximise its power in its Near Abroad. After overcoming the challenges that were
created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia turned its efforts to increase its influence
in other countries outside of its Near Abroad. The constant pursuit of power makes realism
the best theory for explaining the instrumentalisation of mediation in other countries for the
realisation of Russian foreign policy. The maximisation of power, which is at the core of the
Russian interests in all the examined cases, is a cornerstone in the realism theory and explains
how countries seek to maximise and increase their own power to secure the survival of the
state. The fear of other states' intentions and the assumption that they always have the worst
intention, which is met in offensive realism, is often met in the Russian narrative. Russia acts
with the compass of other countries, especially Western countries, which are responsible for
regime change and for revolutions that might increase the chance of instability both at the
international but also in domestic levels. This threat leads Russia to attempt further to pursue
power in both materialism and in the sense of expansion of influence.

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5.2 The use of Coercion

Pertaining to the use of coercion from the Russian side, in three out of four cases Russia has
used coercive means to gain leverage over one or both of the disputes. In the case of Georgia
and Syria, the coercion was conducted directly by Russia’s military forces while in the case
of CAR, the coercion was concealed and indirect coming from private military companies
with strong ties with Kremlin. In every case though, the goal was one: to create a hurting
stalemate for the parties that were involved in the conflict and force them in that way to
proceed in negotiating a ceasefire or the resolution of the conflict under Russian mediation.
In the cases of Syria and CAR, the coercion played in favour of the state heads while in the
case of Georgia by contrast, its intervention was directed against the central government.
That is strongly connected with the fact that Russian interests were aligned with the
governments of the first two countries. However, in the case of Georgia, the government was
blocking Russian interests such as the participation of Georgia in the CIS and also were
adding more to the possibility of western powers gaining influence in the region. Georgia’s
interest in turning into western powers threatened Russia’s hegemony in the region and this is
once of the most significant reasons of Russia being biased towards Abkhazia. Moreover, in
the two cases in Russia’s Far Abroad, the Russian assistance came after the request of the
central government. Considering the future of the conflicts what is certain is that the use of
coercion gave Russia the leverage that is needed in order to be involved in the peace
processes as a mediator. In Syria and CAR, Russia gained leverage not only in the parties
where the coercion was directed but also in the party that Russia supported. In the parties that
were targeted by Russian coercive means, coercion created a hurting stalemate and a need to
start negotiations to avoid further damage. In the parties that received the support a feeling of
dependency on Russia was created. Moreover, the coercive intervention in the case of Syria
prevented other powers also to intervene directly, feared of possible tensions with Russia.
What all three cases in which Russia used coercive means have in common is that the conflict
was an internal conflict. The adversaries were the central government of the state and rebel
groups and not two states. This was an essential actor in the Russian decision to use coercion
to gain access and leverage to the conflict, as a conflict between states creates more
implications for the use of coercion.

In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the conflict was between two states with which
Russia has and wants to maintain good relations, Russia did not intervene militarily and

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attempted to keep a balance in its diplomatic efforts. Russia chose this route of action in the
case of Nagorno-Karabakh because there is a lot at stake in a conflict between states. First,
intervening militarily in favour of one of the two countries would cause anger in the other
and, in the best-case scenario, would sour the relations with Russia. Second, it would add
further to the instability in the region and might have a spillover effect in the North Caucasus,
a region with already challenging relations with Russia and very close to Russia’s borders.
Third, in the case of military intervention in a conflict between states, there is the danger of
dragging more regional powers into the conflict. Turkey is a country that has supported
Azerbaijan and has backed its armed forces against Armenia, which is not in good terms
since the Ottoman era. Russian support to Armenia would sour the relations between Russia
and Turkey, which was already in tension after the latter shut down a Russian Sukhoi Su-24
close to the Turkish-Syrian borders. Furthermore, Russia and Turkey have tried to make a
rapprochement to their relations, cooperating in various fields, including mediating the
conflict in Syria within the framework of the Astana Process. Moreover, the mountainous
area of Nagorno-Karabakh has no economic or geopolitical interest for Russia. The countries
that are engaged in the fight are where Russia's interests lie, and therefore if Russia chose a
side, that would immediately harm relations with the other side, limiting the Russian ability
to pursue its goals with both sides. Lastly, the use of coercion has been used by Russia in
other conflicts in order to gain leverage and be able to influence the conflict as a powerful
actor. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia already has the leverage needed to influence
both sides. The military cooperation with Armenia through the CSTO and the sale of
weapons to both parties have provided Russia with the negotiating tool to influence both
sides. In the case of Armenia, it has created a strong dependency on Russia. There are two
reasons the CSTO acts as a deterrent to Azerbaijani aggression towards Armenia. An
offensive against Armenia would require Russia to take action to defend Armenia in
accordance with the Treaty, forcing Azerbaijan both having to deal with two countries and
resulting in the loss of one of its primary arms suppliers.
That being said, Russia does not need to use coercion in any of the two countries as the
threat is already there, deriving from the CSTO itself and from the fear of the two countries
deteriorating their relations with Russia.

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6. Conclusion

The conflicts Russia has participated in as a third-party mediator over the years are indeed
linked with the change of interests in Russian foreign policy linked to the maximisation of
power and pursuit of superpower status. Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s
interest was focused on mediating conflicts and crises in its Near Abroad, seeking to establish
security in the area and also ensure its hegemony in the region. The resolution of the conflicts
was not one of Russia's main interests. In fact, there is a failure to find a final solution that
satisfies all of the involved parties in all of the discussed conflicts, resulting in the creation of
frozen conflicts or temporary solutions where peace is fragile and secured only by the
presence of military forces. The Abkhazian- Georgian and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts are
bright examples of the above argument. Both conflicts have not found a permanent solution
despite the fact that they have been active for more than three decades. Russia has been one
of the leading mediators in both conflicts and, in many cases, has created obstacles for other
mediators, such as the UN, to find a solution that will terminate the conflict. In the case of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has also contributed to throwing more fuel into the fire by selling
weapons to both disputants and raising the levels of mistrust between them. This instability in
the countries of Russia’s Near Abroad prevents any of them from rising as a regional power
that can threaten Russia’s regional hegemony and, moreover, prevent external powers from
pursuing economic or political interests in the region.

As Russia started recovering from the fall of the Soviet Union and gained secured regional
power, it turned its interest to a more international scale and is seeking to mediate in conflicts
that will expand or reinforce Russian influence in other regions or countries that were not part
of the Soviet space. The isolation that Russia suffered from Western countries after the
annexation of Crimea stressed the need to create new alliances with countries that are not
under the control of the West or have perceived western interests as hostile to their country.
The use of force gave Russia the leverage that was needed to act as a mediator in the conflicts
and, thus, gains influence in the country and the region of interest. In that way, coercive
mediation has served Russia as a tool for achieving foreign policy objectives. Through the

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mediation processes, Russia has tried to establish itself as a global power and has managed to
marginalise other powers in the countries of interest. Moreover, the influence that has been
gained in the countries of the conflict has played in favour of realising its geopolitical,
military, economic and political aspirations. In the recent development of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, it is evident that Russia has created its own block within the UN vote
countries, which are acting as a shield in resolutions that condemn Russia. Furthermore,
cooperation with countries that Russia has expanded its influence has assured that Russia will
not be isolated from the rest of the world due to the war in Ukraine.

What has become evident in this research is that mediation has served as an excellent
instrument in Russia’s foreign policy toolbox. Further research into the use of mediation as a
foreign policy instrument is needed, and it could provide interesting results. Especially in the
case of Russia, researchers can focus on other countries where Russia acted as a third-party
mediator. An interesting suggestion would be a comparison between the mediation strategies
of the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia. This research could help shed light on how
Russian mediation has developed from the Soviet times and if there are similarities between
Soviet mediation and Russian mediation.

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