MILITARY STRATEGY

PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES,
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Also by John M. Collins
Military Geography: For Professionals and the Public
Special Operations Forces
America's Small Wars
Military Space Forces
Green Berets, SEALs, and Spetsnaz
U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985
U.S. Defense Planning: A Critique
U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1960-1980
American and Soviet Military Trends
Imbalance of Power (with Anthony Cordesman)
Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices
MILITARY STRATEGY
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES,
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

John M. Collins

With a Foreword by
General Robert C Kingston, USA (Ret.)

Potomac Books
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 2002 by Potomac Books, Inc.

Published in the United States by Potomac Books , Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced
in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief
quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

Maps by Jay Karamales.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Collins, John M., 1921-
Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives / John M. Collins; with a foreword by
Robert C. Kingston.—1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes Index.
ISBN 1-57488-430-1 (alk. paper)
1. Strategy. I. Title.
U162.C643 2002
355'.03—dc21
2001037843

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper that meets the American National Standards
Institute Z39-48 Standard.

Potomac Books, Inc.

22841 Quicksilver Drive
Dulles, Virginia 20166

First Edition

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
 To
Successive Commandants of the National War College
1968-73

Lieutenant General John E. Kelly, United States Army,

who changed all my life goals as I neared age fifty,
when he made me Director of Military Strategy Studies,
and
Lieutenant General John B. McPherson, United States Air Force,
who thereafter directed me to organize and serve as
Chief of a politico-military Strategic Research Group.
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents

List of Figures x 5. The Primacy of Policy 47

List of Tables x Basic Policy Attributes 47
List of Maps xi Civil-Military Policies 49
Foreword xiii Foreign vs. Domestic Policies 51
Acknowledgments XV Military vs. Nonmilitary Power 52
Prospectus 1 Strategic Bead-Stringing 53
Key Points 53
1. Overview 3
Strategic Hierarchy 3 Part II
Strategic Processes 5 Fundamentals of Military Strategy
Strategic Summation 8
6. Strategic Starting Points 59
Part I Strategic Building Blocks 59
The Framework of Military Strategy Strategic Schools of Thought 61
Elemental Alternatives 62
2. National Security Interests 13 Politico-Military Assumptions 64
Basic Attributes 13 Strategic Paths and Pitfalls 65
Universally Valuable Interests 14 Key Points 67
Variably Valuable Interests 16
Conflicts of Interest 18
7. Fundamentals of Deterrence 71
Key Points 18
The Dynamics of Deterrence 71
Causes of Conflict 72
3. Foreign and Domestic Threats 21
Principles of Deterrence 73
The Conflict Spectrum 21
Deterrent Theories and Concepts 75
Strategic Guidance 22
Key Points 77
Enemy Military Power 23
Intelligence Estimates 25
Net Assessments 28 8. War-Fighting Fundamentals 81
Threat Assessments 30 Principles of War 81
Key Points 31 Premier War-Fighting Policies 85
War-Fighting Theories and Concepts 88
4. Basic Security Objectives 35 Conflict Termination 91
National Security Objectives 35 Key Points 93
National Military Aims 36
Military Roles and Missions 39 9. Fundamentals of Military Preparedness 99
Strategic Centers of Gravity 4l Readiness vs. Sustainability 99
Key Points 44 Principles of Preparedness 99

vii
CONTENTS

Present Preparedness 102 Traditional Deterrence 157

Future Preparedness 106 Traditional War Fighting 159
Key Points 106 Nuclear Warfare Nexus 161
Traditional Warfare Fulcrum 162
10. Fundamentals of Arms Control 109 Key Points 162
Arms Control Aims 109
Quantitative Restrictions 109
15- Insurgency Strategies 167
Qualitative Limitations 113
The Nature of Insurgencies 167
Negotiating Techniques 115
Revolutionary Warfare 168
Compliance Problems 116
Counterrevolutions 173
Key Points 117
Resistance Movements 174
Traditional Warfare Nexus 175
Part III Key Points 177
Specialized Military Strategies
11. Counterproliferation Strategies 123 16. Counterinsurgency Strategies 181
Causes of Proliferation 123 The Nature of Counterinsurgency 181
Intelligence Indicators 126 Anti-Underground Strategies 182
Counterproliferation 127 Counterguerrilla Strategies 186
Current Outlook 130 Pacification Programs 189
Key Points 130 Prescriptions for Success 190
Key Points 190
12. Nuclear Warfare Strategies 133
The Nature of Nuclear Warfare 133
Nuclear Arms Control 135 17. Sociopolitical Terrorism 193
The Nature of Sociopolitical Terrorism 193
Nuclear Deterrent Strategies 136
Atypical Terrorists 193
Nuclear War-Fighting Strategies 140
Nuclear War Termination Strategies 142 Typical Terrorist Organizations 194
Terrorist Tools 194
Key Points 143
Terrorist Targets and Tactics 196
Sponsorship and Support 200
13. Biological and Chemical Warfare
Key Points 200
Strategies 145
Biological and Chemical Weapons 145
Biological and Chemical Arms Control 147 18. Counterterrorism Strategies 205
Biological Warfare Strategies 148 The Nature of Counterterrorism 205
Chemical Warfare Strategies 149 Participants and Control 205
Needs for Creative Concepts 151 Overarching Issues 206
Key Points 151 Deterrent Dilemmas 207
Defensive Counterterrorism 208
14. Traditional Forces and Strategies 155 Offensive Counterterrorism 211
Complementary Force Contributions 155 Democratic Constraints 213
Comparative Force Postures 156 Key Points 215

viii
 CONTENTS

19- Nonlethal Warfare Strategies 219 22. Strategic Stepping-Stones 257

The Nature of Nonlethal Warfare 219 Creative Environments 257
Political Warfare 220 Strategic Education 258
Economic Warfare 222 Strategic Research 260
Technological Warfare 224 Key Points 263
Psychological Warfare 227
Cybernetic Warfare 230 Part V
Key Points 232 Applied Strategies
23- Balkan Tar-Babies 267
20. Coalition Warfare Strategies 237
Politico-Military Backdrop 267
Collective Security Incentives 237
Peacekeeping in Bosnia 268
Collective Security Choices 238
Peacemaking in Kosovo 275
Compatibility Prospects 239
Strategic Critiques 282
Formal and Informal Coalitions 240
Intervention Checklist 285
Command and Control 242
Key Points 287
Respective Contributions 243
Requirements for Review 244
24. Final Reflections 291
Key Points 245

Appendix A. Strategic Terminology 293

Part IV
Appendix B. Abbreviations 309
Keys to Strategic Superiority
Appendix C. A Bookshelf for Military
21. Strategic Trailblazers 251 Strategists 311
Illustrative Role Models 251
Coveted Characteristics 253 Index 319
Composite Requirements 254 About the Author 333
Key Points 254

ix
 Figures

1. Six-Step Strategic Planning Process 6 4. Cellular Underground Organizations 171

2. The Conflict Spectrum 22 5. Sample Clearinghouse Advertisement 262
3. Deterrent Meets of Homeland Defense 137

Tables

1. Strategic and Tactical Hierarchy 4 14. NBC Weapon Possession and Programs 124
2. Typical Security Interests 14 15. Factors That Affect Nuclear Weapon
3. Typical Elements of Military Power 23 Effectiveness 134
4. Typical Statistical Summaries 24 16. Biological Warfare Agents 146
5. Net Assessment Types and Topics 29 17. Chemical Warfare Agents 147
6. National Security Interests and Complementary 18. Characteristics of Classical Insurgency 168
Objectives 36 19. Typical Resistance Movements in the Twentieth
7. National Security Objectives and Basic Military Century 175
Aims 37 20. Counterinsurgencies Compared with Traditional
8. Typical Military Functions 40 Conflicts 182
9. Polarized Politico-Military Policy Options 48 21. Counterinsurgencies Compared with Classical
10. Strategic Building Blocks 60 Insurgencies 183
11. Deterrent Techniques Connected to Causes of 22. Typical PSYWAR Techniques 229
Conflict 76 23. Diversified Coalition Characteristics 237
12. Typical War-Fighting Options 88 24. Comparative Purposes in Bosnia 271
13. Conflict Termination Related to Postwar 25. Comparative Purposes in Kosovo 278
Prospects 92

x
 Maps

1. The Former Yugoslavia and Neighboring 4. IFOR-SFOR Areas of Responsibility 276

Countries 268 5. Kosovo and Vicinity 277
2. Bosnia and Herzegovina 270 6. KFOR Areas of Responsibility 281
3. Bosnian Boundaries Prescribed by the Dayton Peace
Agreement, 1995 274

xi
This page intentionally left blank
 Foreword

S tars fell on the National War College Class of

1969, of which I was a member; John Collins
was my faculty adviser. Five out of seventy-four lieu-
subsequently became the first Commander in Chief
of U.S. Central Command, which included nineteen
Southwest Asian and Northeast African countries
tenant colonels and naval commanders eventually within its Area of Responsibility. Distinctions be-
reached four-star rank. Two became combatant tween net assessments and threat assessments, the
commanders in chief, another was SHAPE'S Chief value of strategic centers of gravity, tradeoffs be-
of Staff, then Deputy Commander. Four military stu- tween military and nonmilitary power, and princi-
dents and one faculty member became lieutenant ples of military preparedness are just a few of the
generals or vice admirals. Nearly twenty more gradu- many topics that could have provided everybody
ates wore one or two stars before they retired. with a better education than we actually received.
All were experienced tacticians and most knew I particularly like the intervention checklist that con-
a lot about operational art in 1968, but military cludes Chapter 23. Armed with such insights, I could
strategy formulation generally was a foreign field. have participated more effectively in the JCS "tank"
The National War College unfortunately did little to during debates about strategic courses of action and
correct that deficiency, despite a mission statement explained complex matters more easily in testimony
that promised to prepare students "for the exercise before Congress.
of joint and combined high-level policy, command This compendium, which I read in draft, reached
and staff functions and for the planning of national print three decades too late to benefit the National
strategy." The brief strategy course lacked a text. War College Class of 1969, but twenty-first century
The only book that every student was obligated to students of military strategy in the United States and
read from cover to cover was Bernard Brodie's 1959 abroad should benefit immensely from the vast array
treatise, Strategy in the Missile Age, which investi- of intellectual tools between its covers. Politico-
gated a small sliver of the conflict spectrum. Supple- military problem solvers who use the following
mental readings barely scratched the surface of pages as litmus papers to test options before they
other important subjects, and few stressed funda- reach decisions should make fewer strategic mis-
mentals. takes than predecessors who, by and large, lacked
What the Class of 1969 needed most was a com- ready references for such purposes.
prehensive textbook like Military Strategy. The
chapter on coalition warfare strategies would have General Robert C. Kingston
helped me immensely before I took charge of the United States Army (Retired)
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in 1981 and

Xlll
This page intentionally left blank
 Acknowledgments

T he thirty-two-year gestation of this document

began in 1969, when Lieutenant General John
E. Kelly, then-Commandant of the National War Col-
Correspondence from five four-star U.S. officers
expressed strong support for the project at its onset
in the summer of 1998: General Henry H. Shelton,
lege (NWC), told me, "You are now Director of Mili- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Dennis
tary Strategy Studies." My response was, "Sir, I can't J. Reimer, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral Jay L. John-
even spell strategy," to which he replied, "Neither son, Chief of Naval Operations; General Michael E.
can anyone else. Go make a name for yourself." Ryan, Air Force Chief of Staff; and General Charles
The 1969 NWC military strategy syllabus was my C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Each
first stab, followed by a primer entitled Strategy designated a contact to represent his interests.
for Beginners, which received nine rejection slips Nine highly valued advisors dissected the entire
before the Naval Institute Press published it in 1973 first draft, or most of it, page-by-page. Colonel Jim
as Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices. That Kurtz, a politico-military purist who formerly di-
book has been out of print for more than two de- rected the J-5 Policy Division for the Joint Chiefs of
cades but, with the publisher's permission, I have Staff, kept me honest every foot of the way. So did
clipped, reshuffled, and repasted many snippets Army Lieutenant General Dick Trefry and Air Force
herein, along with extracts from some of my other Brigadier General Walter Jajko, along with Army
writings that first saw light as Congressional Re- Colonels Scot Crerar, Bob Killebrew, Glenn Harned,
search Service (CRS) issue briefs and reports. and Ed Bruner, all of whom possess extensive high-
My appreciation for military strategy has im- level joint service policy, plans, and operational ex-
proved somewhat since 1973, but not nearly enough perience that they have embellished since retire-
to write a book on that subject without professional ment. Steve Bowman and Bob Goldich specialize in
help from assorted authorities who could, without foreign affairs and national defense at CRS. Their
compassion, critique the table of contents and every individual and collective input, which covered the
draft chapter before publication. I therefore sought full spectrum of strategic subjects in depth, im-
and received invaluable insights from many knowl- proved the final product by several orders of mag-
edgeable individuals whose relevant experience nitude.
ranged from no less than fifteen to more than thirty General Wayne Downing, a savvy past Com-
years. Each received the folio wing guidance: "Please mander in Chief of U.S. Special Operations Com-
tell me what is wrong, what you would add, and mand (USSOCOM), was my sounding board con-
what you would subtract. Did you easily find your cerning counterterrorism and military infrastructure
way from Point A to Points B, C, and D, or does the protection. Lieutenant General Bill Yarborough,
sequence require adjustment? Is the writing clear? who sold President John F. Kennedy on special oper-
Are there too many endnotes or not enough? Can ations in 1961, was a peerless source of information
you recommend better sources to cite? Be brutally about insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and psy-
frank, because I'd rather hear bad news before chological warfare. Army Colonels Ed Phillips and
rather than after publication." "Taffy" Carlin, with Air Force Colonel Greg Tribon,

XV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

dissected such topics for USSOCOM. Colonel Jim Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat, in his ca-
Kraus, who accumulated a wealth of first-hand pacity as President of National Defense University
knowledge about military operations in Bosnia and (NDU), conferred on me the honorary title of Distin-
Kosovo, sanded the Tar-Baby case study. guished Visiting Research Fellow and provided a
I shamelessly solicited input from former col- pass with which to invade the premises during non-
leagues at CRS, who furnished otherwise unobtain- duty hours. The NDU Library staff provided flawless
able facts and invaluable advice, as countless end- assistance, as they previously did when I was strug-
notes indicate: Richard Best, intelligence; Steve gling to write Military Geography.
Bowman, biological and chemical warfare, Bosnia Major General Tom Wilkerson (USMC, Ret.) gave
and Kosovo; Marjorie Browne, United Nations; Ray great aid and comfort while I sought a publisher.
Copson and Carl Ek, Africa; Steve Daggett, military Don McKeon, my long-term contact at Brassey's,
budgets; Zack Davis and Bob Shuey, proliferation convinced his bosses that the product was worth-
and counterproliferation; Karen Donfried, Ireland; while. Senior Assistant Editor Don Jacobs gave the
Charlie Doyle, Posse Comitatus; Susan Fletcher, draft a keen going over, then passed it to Julie Wrinn,
Kyoto Treaty; Bob Goldich, military manpower; who managed copyediting, typesetting, proofread-
Stuart Goldman, USSR and Russia; Paul Gallis, West- ing, printing, and binding. Jane Graf and Allyson
ern Europe; Dick Grimmett, military assistance; Bolin took the book to market. I am eternally grateful
Steve Hildreth, national and theater missile defense; to Brassey's entire crew, which was a pleasure to
Shirley Kan, China; Julie Kim and Steve Woehrel, work with.
Bosnia and Kosovo; Jon Medalia and Amy Woof, Finally, if it were within my power, I would
strategic nuclear topics; Lois McHugh, humanitarian award my bride Swift the world's highest decora-
matters; Clyde Mark and Al Prados, Middle East; tion, because she has kept the Collins family afloat
Larry Niksch, East Asia; Rinn Sup Shinn, Korea; Nina for more than fifty years while I stared at blank
Serafino, counterinsurgency; Stan Sloan, NATO; sheets of paper wondering what words to write. I
Marsha Smith, space; and Maureen Taft-Morales, salute her, along with all the rest.
Latin America. Dianne Rennack, my junior partner in
a previous incarnation, furnished information about JOHN M. COLLINS
economic sanctions and was a multipurpose fact Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow
finder par excellence. National Defense University

xvi
 Prospectus
It doesn't make any difference how well chickens
are cooked if they aren't worth cooking to begin with.
Frank Perdue
Television Ad
Late 1980s

M ajor General Samuel Koster, while serving as

Superintendent of the United States Military
Academy at West Point in 1970, was asked why,
• To provide a textbook for use by students
of military strategy
• To provide a handbook for use by politico-
after nearly 200 years of nationhood, U.S. Armed military policy-makers, strategists, and
Services seldom sired strategic thinkers comparable planners
to Prussian Major General Carl von Clausewitz, • To enhance public appreciation of military
whose intellectual breadth and depth enabled him strategy
to write his incomparable tome entitled On War
early in the nineteenth century.1 "We're more inter- Military Strategy, unlike its companion piece
ested in the 'doer' than the thinker" was that two- Military Geography? deals primarily with arguable
star educator's reply.2 theses, antitheses, and syntheses rather than physical
Armed forces ashore, aloft, and afloat, however, science and facts. Part I focuses on national security
seldom do as well as they should unless skilled strate- interests, threats, objectives, and policies that form
gists think. Men of action who are organized and the framework of military strategy. Part II concen-
trained to employ technologically superlative trates on strategic building blocks, schools of
weapon systems under adverse conditions may win thought, theories, concepts, principles, and other
every battle but nonetheless lose wars unless the fundamentals. Part III spotlights assorted military
overarching schemes they support are sound. That strategies across the conflict spectrum from warfare
happened to U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam (1965- with weapons of mass destruction to nonlethal com-
73) where, to paraphrase Frank Perdue, "the tactical bat. Part IV suggests ways to develop talented ind-
chickens they cooked perfectly weren't worth cook- ividuals and produce a ceaseless supply of innovative
ing from strategic standpoints." Similar shortcom- ideas with which to solve strategic problems. Part
ings have been commonplace around the world V puts principles into practice with a case study that
throughout recorded history. critiques competing strategies in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Present strategists and their successors thus and Kosovo. Each chapter terminates with key
might benefit from a comprehensive document that points, which final reflections reinforce. Historical
consolidates, synthesizes, and discusses inputs, precedents threaded throughout illuminate options
options, and outputs, then provides historical per- that worked well or poorly in the past, together with
spectives. This smorgasbord of interrelated topics reasons why. Appendix C, a bookshelf for military
accordingly seeks to fulfill a threefold purpose: strategists, recommends supplemental readings.

1
MILITARY STRATEGY

The resultant compendium could have been enti- • Countless wage earners in the aircraft busi-
tled Politico-Military Strategy, because foreign and ness alone lost jobs or faced extensive
domestic policies strongly influence or decisively layoffs
shape military strategies in principle and practice • Dire straits afflicted hotels, restaurants,
from start to finish. Experience amassed over several shops, and other activities that depend on
millennia suggests that "school solutions" appro- tourist trade
priate for every occasion are nearly nonexistent. • Anti-Islamic "hate crimes" that assailed inno-
Presentations therefore encapsulate many options cent Muslims and their mosques helped ter-
but champion none. Each reader must maintain an rorist recruiters make a case for holy war
open mind and ascertain for himself or herself what (Jihad)
makes sense in given situations. • President George W. Bush, in response,
* * * * * * * * * * * sought to put Osama bin Laden out of busi-
This treatise already had been typeset when ness "dead or alive," successfully solicited
transnational terrorists toppled both towers of the large-scale global support for his campaign
World Trade Center in Manhattan and collapsed against terrorism, announced objectives that
part of the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, with "are not open to negotiation or discussion,"
devastating political, military, economic, and psy- and launched operations to achieve those
chological effects around the world as well as within aims.
the United States, where perpetrators succeeded
beyond their wildest dreams: Neither those events nor subsequent develop-
ments invalidate chapters in this book that concern
sociopolitical terrorism, counterterrorism, and asso-
• Round-the-clock television and radio broad-
ciated topics. On the contrary, Military Strategy
casts, coupled with banner headlines in all
provides contexts that should help readers better
major newspapers and periodicals, trum-
understand events as they unfold and simultane-
peted terrorist "triumphs"
ously clarifies relationships with all other forms of
• More dead littered landscapes than at Antie-
national security.
tam after the bloodiest one-day battle of the
U.S. Civil War NOTES
• The Dow Jones Industrial Average plum- 1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans, by Mi-
meted 685 points when the U.S. Stock Ex- chael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
change reopened on September 17, 2001 ton University Press, 1976).
2. Ward Just, Military Men (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
• Major U.S. airlines and commercial aircraft 1970), 24.
industries faced bankruptcy unless they re- 3. John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Profession-
ceived enormous bailouts als and the Public (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1998).

2
 1. Overview
I keep six honest serving men,
(they taught me all I knew);
their names are What and Why and When
and How and Where and Who.
Rudyard Kipling
Just-So Stories
"The Elephant's Child"

N o nation can flourish long in competitive envi-

ronments without satisfactory ways to pro-
mote and protect bedrock interests and prerequi-
ons are beginning to expand the conflict spectrum
far beyond past confines. Needs for competent mili-
tary strategists will multiply if trends toward com-
sites that flow therefrom. Strategists who strive to plexity continue to accelerate.1
ensure sufficient security at acceptable costs know-
ingly or not employ Kipling's six honest serving STRATEGIC HIERARCHY
men in their quest to match meaningful ends with Strategies and tactics influence almost every field of
measured means while minimizing risks: human endeavor, whether it be football, lovemak-
ing, or bank robberies. Those that nation states and
• "What" and "Why" correspond to perceived coalitions customarily employ occupy a complex
requirements (ends) hierarchy, with national strategies at the pinnacle
• "How, When, and Where" indicate optional and military tactics at the base. Table 1 depicts, and
courses of action (ways) accompanying texts describe, elementary relation-
• "Who" concerns available forces and re- ships.
sources (means)
National Strategies
The rapid pace of political, economic, demo- Governmental officials at the apex develop, and
graphic, social, scientific, and technological Chiefs of State approve, national strategies and plans
changes imposes unprecedented challenges. Needs designed to achieve national objectives. Key consid-
for innovative deterrent, war-fighting, and conflict erations include such diversified subjects as agricul-
termination concepts followed the first use of nu- ture, armed forces, commerce, economics, crime
clear weapons in August 1945. Politico-military prevention, ecology, education, energy, finance,
policy-makers and strategists have barely scratched governmental operations, health, housing, informa-
perplexing problems associated with military opera- tion, international relations, justice, labor, public
tions in space, a medium quite unlike land, sea, welfare, and transportation. Policy guidelines in
and air. Rogue states and nongovernmental groups each case commonly take national purposes, life
armed with biological and cybernetic warfare weap- styles, ethics, laws, and values into account.

3
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 1
Strategic and Tactical Hierarchy
Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary
Focus Participants Policies Input Output
National National Objectives Chief of State; National Policies National Power National Plans
Strategies Governmental
Advisers
National Security National Security Chief of State; National Security Suitable National National Security
Strategies Objectives Security Advisers Policies Power Plans
National Military National Military Chief of State; National Military Military Power National Military
Strategies Objectives Military Advisers Policies Plans
Regional Regional Foreign Ministers; Foreign Policies Diplomacy; International
Strategies Objectives Ambassadors Economic Levers Accords
Theater Military Regional Military Defense Ministers; Unilateral or Unilateral or Unilateral or
Strategies Missions CINCs Coalition Policies Coalition Forces Coalition Plans
and Ops
Operational Art Subordinate Subordinate Joint or Uniservice Joint or Uniservice Joint or Uniservice
and Tactics Military Missions Military Policies Forces Plans and Ops
Commanders

National Security Strategies Regional Strategies

Politico-military specialists at the highest levels de- Chiefs of State appoint, and direct the activities of,
velop, and Chiefs of State approve, national security foreign ministers and ambassadors, who galvanize
or grand strategies and plans that apply suitable multipurpose strategies within given geographic re-
forms of national power during peacetime as well as gions abroad. Those emissaries use all instruments
war to achieve national security objectives despite to promote their nation's interests, support friends,
foreign and domestic threats. Such strategies em- favorably influence neutrals, and undermine per-
ploy diplomatic, economic, psychological, cyber- ceived enemies. Diplomacy, often accompanied by
netic, technological, and other implements, of economic incentives or sanctions, normally takes
which armed forces may be the most or least useful. precedence. Primary outputs comprise treaties and
other international accords, which may be explicit or
National Military Strategies tacit, with short-, medium-, or long-term implications.
Defense ministers (who may be civilians), together
with senior generals and admirals, develop strate- Theater Military Strategies
gies that employ armed forces to achieve national Defense ministers and regional commanders in chief
military objectives, given guidance from and subse- (CINCs), frequently in concert with allied counter-
quent approval by Chiefs of State. Attendant proce- parts, develop theater military strategies (sometimes
dures occupy two distinctive but interrelated called "grand tactics") to accomplish military mis-
planes, one abstract, the other concrete. The former sions that underpin regional objectives during
is peopled with strategic philosophers ad theoreti- armed combat or under conditions other than war.
cians, the latter with policy-makers and planners National military and theater military strategies are
who assess situations, weigh alternative courses of identical in nations that deploy no armed forces
action, and recommend implementing resources. beyond their borders.

4
 OVERVIEW

Joint policies and plans unilaterally orchestrate STRATEGIC PROCESSES

military operations by all land, sea, air, and space There would be no need for strategies or tactics of
forces within given theaters when no partners are any kind if national interests were self-satisfying,
present. Coalition strategies, which are infinitely which seldom is the case. Policy-making and plan-
more complex, coordinate forces from two or more ning therefore should ideally proceed through a six-
countries, given guidance from and approval by con- step process, much of which is nonmilitary (Figure
tributors who may or may not be equally influential. 1). Step 1 specifies national interests. Step 2 ap-
praises opposition. Step 3 concentrates on politico-
Operational Art and Tactics military objectives, the attainment of which would
Generals and admirals who command major forma- safeguard interests despite all obstacles. Step 4 de-
tions (such as divisions, carrier battle groups, and vises strategies designed to achieve those objectives
expeditionary air wings) practice operational art, in concert with policy guidelines. Step 5 allocates
which implements theater military strategies. Cam- resources to cover requirements without incurring
paigns predominate if armed combat occurs. Tacti- intolerable risks. Step 6 ascertains whether allotted
cians at lower levels arrange and maneuver smaller assets are sufficient to support preferred concepts
units in relation to each other and the enemy. Battles and, if not, identifies alternatives.
and engagements predominate, if armed combat Few strategists quibble about the sequence of
occurs.2 Steps 1-3 (ends and threats thereto), but whether
Joint task force QTF) commanders and their staffs Step 4 (ways) should precede Step 5 (means) in-
prepare plans for, and employ armed forces from, cites disputes. One school, which asserts that im-
more than one military service to accomplish opera- poverished strategies are impotent, allocates re-
tional and tactical missions. Combined joint task sources first, formulates plans to fit, then assesses
forces (CJTFs) perform analogous functions for co- risks that result from insufficient forces or budgetary
alitions. Uniservice organizations, in contrast, deal shortfalls. Members of a second school prefer to
exclusively with land, sea, air, amphibious, or put strategy formulation first, then request imple-
space forces. menting forces and funds, because plans predicated
on insufficient resources cannot achieve essential
The Primacy of objectives. Both views are correct, but this survey,
Strategy Over Tactics mindful that the six-step process is iterative instead
Strategies, operational art, and tactics constitute in- of linear, emphasizes connections between ways
terdependent links. Weaknesses anywhere could be and ends rather than ways and means.
ruinous, but requirements for sound strategies come
first, because members of armed forces that function Step 1: Specify National Interests
impeccably bleed and die for naught if the overarch- When Alice in Wonderland plaintively asked the
ing concepts they support are defective. British the- Cheshire Cat, "Would you tell me, please, which
oretician Basil H. Liddell Hart, in Thoughts on War, way I ought to go from here?" she received the
announced that after-action reports as a rule "should following response: "That depends a good deal on
deal kindly with mistakes of execution natural to where you want to get to." A clear sense of national
anyone in the fog and tension of war, and reserve purposes predicated on specific interests in order
caustic criticism for errors of conception . . . in the of importance similarly must underlie meaningful
[strategist's] plan, which is based on his apprecia- strategies, plans, programs, and operations. National
tion of the problem."3 security interests, which are highly generalized ex-

5
MILITARY STRATEGY

Figure 1
Six-Step Strategic Planning Process

pressions of wants and needs, may seek to expand ent perils indeed determine what, if anything,
a State's jurisdictions, maintain the status quo, or should and could be done in order of priority to
merely preserve independence and territorial integ- safeguard security interests against present and pro-
rity with traditional lifestyles, fundamental institu- jected threats, both foreign and domestic.
tions, values, and honor acceptably intact.4 Intelligence communities first estimate enemy
capabilities (what opponents could do, if so in-
Step 2: Appraise Opposition clined), then try to divine intentions (what course
Military strategists who lack accurate, timely intelli- of action enemies seem most likely to elect). Assess-
gence are like blindfolded boxers, who can neither ments that compare friendly with enemy situations
foresee impending disaster nor win except by acci- thereafter enable senior politico-military officials to
dent. The nature, imminence, and intensity of appar- prioritize perceived threats.5 Margins for error usu-

6
 OVERVIEW

ally are slim at every stage, because some pieces and Prague (1968), but failed to prevail during a
of each puzzle almost always fit imprecisely while decade of guerrilla warfare in rural Afghanistan
others are missing. Policy-makers and strategists (1979-89).
consequently work with factual fabrics that at best Assumptions, which are presumed to be true
are full of holes, and at worst are holes around which in the absence of contrary proof, fill informational
intelligence analysts have woven bits of fabric. chasms when facts are unavailable. Wishful thinkers
try to assume problems away, whereas pessimists
Step 3: Identify Key Objectives cause costs to skyrocket. Well-schooled policy-
National security decision-makers who don't know makers and planners, who shun those polarized ap-
what needs to be done can't sensibly plan how to proaches to strategic problem solving, consciously
do it. Properly prioritized short-, mid-, and long- articulate assumptions and subject them to constant
range objectives that last from a few weeks to a scrutiny, so conjectures will correspond with facts
decade or more thus are indispensable. as closely as possible when operations begin.
Goals that concentrate on primary pressure
points called "strategic centers of gravity" are prefer- Step 5: Allocate Resources
able to aims that lack a sharp focus.6 Contrast the National security and military strategists, in collabo-
overriding U.S. purpose throughout the Civil War, ration with logisticians and budget specialists, com-
which was to preserve the Union, with vacillating pare resource requirements with present and pro-
objectives in Vietnam (1955-75), and it becomes jected capabilities to confirm or deny the feasibility
clear that the former provided an infinitely superior of strategic and tactical plans. Trade-offs between
platform for strategic planning. ends and means are not always obvious, because
costs, risks, and other imponderables commonly
Step 4: Formulate Strategies cloud crucial issues.
Strategy formulation is the art and science of op- Budgetary costs associated with any military
tions. Selections that suit one leader or nation may strategy are easy to calculate compared with politi-
be faulty under different conditions. National secu- cal, psychological, and opportunity costs, which
rity strategists, within policy guidelines, conse- may be equally or more important. U.S. strategies
quently pick theories and concepts they believe that emphasized attrition in Vietnam created pro-
would best apply national power to satisfy objec- gressively greater involvement than President Lyn-
tives. The most successful practitioners tailor every don B. Johnson could justify to the American people
plan to meet specialized needs, for strategies cannot or Congress, but costs already incurred encouraged
be transferred from one time period to another with- continuation until public support collapsed. Reper-
out precise appreciation for changes that transpire cussions undercut U.S. interests in military power
in the interim. French and British strategists, oblivi- and curtailed national military options for more than
ous to that fact, tried to refight World War I from a decade, beginning about 1968.7
static defensive positions in May-June 1940, and Assessors with access to the same intelligence
thereby enabled Hitler's highly mobile forces to frequently perceive different risks, because they
overrun all of West Central Europe in six weeks. have different personalities, temperaments, inclina-
Neither can strategies be transplanted from place tions, social backgrounds, and experience. Proclivi-
to place unless situations are similar. Heavy-handed ties for risk taking additionally differ markedly. A 60
Soviet forces, for example, quickly crushed urban percent chance of success might tempt professional
rebellions in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), poker players to plunge ahead, but prudent strate-

7
MILITARY STRATEGY

gists who deal with weapons of mass destruction when they pretend that gaps between ends
would find those odds unattractive, because the and means don't exist
stakes are sky-high.
Military strategists in any case should be cautious,
Step 6: Reconciliations lest corrective actions boomerang. Security interests
Step 5 terminates strategy formulation and firms up seldom disappear just because strategists adjust
force requirements if aspirations and assets seem their goals. Telescoping objectives and tinkering
consistent. Step 6 offers alternatives, singly or in with strategies is less likely to stir up political storms
some combination, if unacceptable risks occupy the than requesting more resources, but the Law of
breach between ends and means:8 Diminishing Returns strictly limits benefits. Trim-
ming "fat" can curtail current and future capabilities
if careless surgeons cut into "muscle." Political, eco-
• Reduce Waste caused by institutional, orga-
nomic, and psychological power are poor substi-
nizational, procedural, or cultural ineffi-
tutes for firepower when quick results are essential,
ciencies
while habitual bluffing is bound to be a loser. Finally,
• Compress or Discard Objectives, as the
overoptimization stifles flexibility, as demonstrated
United Nations did in Korea after Chinese
during early stages of the Cold War, when the U.S.
"volunteers" intervened en masse
strategy of Massive Retaliation failed to solve the
• Reshape Strategies, as Japan did when it
full range of national security problems.9
switched from offense to defense after Al-
lied power in the Pacific basin surged dur-
ing World War II STRATEGIC SUMMATION
• Mobilize More Assets, as President Frank- Former French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau
lin D. Roosevelt did in 1942 after Japanese once proclaimed that "War is much too serious to
raiders hit Pearl Harbor leave to generals." A corollary pronouncement
• Decrease Reliance on Military Power, might read, "National security is much too serious to
which Stalin did when he insidiously swal- leave entirely to civilians," because politico-military
lowed nine countries in Central Europe dur- affairs are intertwined in peacetime as well as war.
ing the 1940s Military strategy indeed is a game that anyone in
• Bluff, as Hitler did in 1936 when he uniform or mufti can play, but only gifted partici-
marched into and annexed the Rhineland pants win prizes. There are games within games,
with embryonic armed forces that the and all are related. Every game is played simultane-
Treaty of Versailles prohibited ously on a global or regional board. There is no limit
• Produce a Miracle, which U.S. magicians to the number of players, who may participate singly
pulled out of a hat in 1945 when they un- or form teams, but who is on which side often is
veiled Little Boy and Fat Man, the first atom ambiguous. No two players start with pieces of the
bombs same quantities and qualities. Every player places
• Withdraw, because the cause isn't worth different values on his own pieces compared with
the cost, as French decision-makers did in those of opponents, partners, and neutrals. Whole
Vietnam (1954) and Algeria (1962) piles of pieces, not just one at a time, shift suddenly
• Practice Self-Delusion, which U.S. defense in any direction at anyone's whim, without regard
decision-makers habitually do in peacetime for mutually agreeable rules. Players, pieces, values,

8
 OVERVIEW

and rules moreover are subject to unannounced 2. FM100-7, Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Oper-
ations (Washington: Headquarters U.S. Army, May
change, and such games, of course, never end.
1995); ST 3-0, Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
National security interests, threats, and objec- U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Octo-
tives, in summation, form the framework within ber 2000); Milan N. Vego, Operational Warfare,
which policies, strategies, operational art, and tac- NWC 1004 (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000).
3. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London:
tics fit like pieces in a jigsaw puzzle. The main aim
Faber and Faber, 1944), 136.
of the game is to match realistic ends with measured 4. Strategy and National Interests: Reflections for the
means, minimizing risks in the process but, as Carl Future (Washington: National Strategy Information
von Clausewitz explained in his classic, On War, Center, 1971).
"We should admit that scientific formulas and prob- 5. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1965); John M. Collins,
lems are not under discussion. . . . Everything in "Essentials of Net Assessment," in U.S.-Soviet Mili-
strategy," he concluded, "is very simple, but that tary Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-
does not mean that everything is very easy."10 1980 (Washington: McGraw-Hill Publications,
Well said. Modern military strategists ply their 1980), 3-14.
6. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York:
trade in volatile environments that are fraught with Praeger, 1967), Chapter XXI, "National Object and
more uncertainties, complexities, and ambiguities Military Aim"; Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
than Clausewitz imagined. Cultural restrictions, bu- trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,
reaucratically constrained resources, and demands NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 595-97,
617-19.
for disquieting compromises are commonplace.
7. Neil Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers (New
Chapters that follow expand every notion in this York: Quadrangle Books, 1971); Tom Wells, The War
overview to furnish aspiring strategists with the in- Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (Berkeley:
tellectual tools they need to start fast and com- University of California Press, 1994).
8. General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to
pete proficiently.
Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), 28-29; Charles
F. Bunnell, Jr., Ends andMeans—The Military Com-
NOTES ponent (Washington: Strategic Research Group, Na-
1. A compilation of views is contained in George Ed- tional War College, 1972), 12-16.
ward Thibault, ed., The Art and Practice of Military 9. General Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet
Strategy (Washington: National Defense Univer- (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959).
sity, 1984). 10. Clausewitz, On War, 178.

9
This page intentionally left blank
 PARTI

THE FRAMEWORK OF
MILITARY STRATEGY
This page intentionally left blank
 2. National Security Interests
Some men see things as they are and say, why;
I see things that never were and say, why not.
Senator Robert F. Kennedy
Campaign speech, 1968

P residential candidate Robert Kennedy, a

dreamer who took pity on the underprivileged,
believed he was honor-bound to combat injustice
Superpower interests cover all seven continents,
every ocean, and an overarching envelope loosely
called aerospace. Lesser states and subnational
and defend the defenseless wherever found. Coun- groups usually concentrate on local or regional inter-
terparts early in the twenty-first century similarly ests. Political, economic, military, social, ideologi-
see a surplus of causes that make stoics weep. Popu- cal, religious, moral, and emotional motivations
lation explosions greater than Malthus imagined in commonly are evident. "Nuclear winter," which
his pessimistic estimates 200 years ago plague al- emerged as a strategic issue in the 1980s, and the
ready impoverished countries. Politically-induced December 1997 Kyoto Treaty on global warming
famines that starve infants, nursing mothers, and the involved environmental interests.2
infirm along with sturdy opponents are common-
place in many African and Asian countries. Ethnic, Dictatorial vs. Democratic Interests
religious, and cultural conflicts butcher innocent Not many nations formally enunciate security inter-
bystanders. Mass emigrations to escape resultant ests, but senior officials certify them implicitly or
miseries frequently engulf luckless neighbors. explicitly, by actions and in public or private pro-
Chiefs of State and their politico-military advisers nouncements. Autocrats and cabals generally are
nevertheless must root national security interests able to do as they see fit with scant concern for
firmly in reality or ends and means fail to match. popular support, whereas democratic governments
No nation, not even the United States of America, generally require communal approval. Irreconcil-
possesses sufficient assets to feed, clothe, house, able differences of opinion otherwise may cause
and police the whole world. Sensible priorities thus disastrous rifts, which happened in the United States
are imperative. after Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap launched
his psychologically successful Tet Offensive in Feb-
BASIC ATTRIBUTES ruary 1968. Johnson and Nixon Administrations
National security interests are highly generalized thereafter found it impossible to defend perceived
expressions of a nation's wants and needs, espe- interests that were at odds with those of a majority
cially those that concern protection for its people, in Congress and across the country.3
territory, traditional lifestyle, institutions, and val-
ues. Whoever compiles the list for any given country Permanence Versus Perishability
makes monumentally important decisions, because A few elemental interests are timeless, but British
interests form the foundation for national security Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple Palmerston
objectives, policies, strategies, and programs.1 didn't have it quite right in 1848 when, in a speech

13
MILITARY STRATEGY

before the House of Commons, he implied that all UNIVERSALLY VALUABLE

"interests are eternal and perpetual."4 History in fact INTERESTS
repeatedly records substantial change on short Every country has intrinsic interests in survival and
notice. security against all enemies, foreign and domestic
Countries dissatisfied with existing power rela- (Table 2). Most also entertain enduring interests in
tionships tend to abandon the status quo. Apathetic military power, credibility, and freedom of action.
"have not" nations that come under the influence Other interests of variable importance only occa-
of charismatic leaders may suddenly aspire to afflu- sionally receive high priorities.
ence. "Have" nations under similar spells may sud-
Table 2
denly want more, as President Saddam Hussein con- Typical Security Interests
firmed when he redefined Iraq's regional interests
in the early 1980s, soon after he came to power.5 Universally Important Variably Important
The Soviet Union's collapse caused U.S. security Survival Peace
interests to shift so sharply that the 1991 National Homeland Defense Stability
Domestic Tranquility Prosperity
Security Strategy of the United States flatly stated, Military Power Ideology
National Credibility Geostrategic Position
"We have entered a new era, one whose outline Freedom of Action Morality
would have been unimaginable only three years
ago. . . . We face new challenges not only to our
security, but to our ways of thinking about se- National Survival
curity."6 Nations routinely risk war to ensure interests in
survival, which are invariably vital in every sense of
Prioritization that word. Victors nowadays normally offer more
Responsible citizens everywhere are willing to spill lenient terms to the vanquished than Assyria, Babylo-
blood, spend billions, and accept high risks when nia, and Carthage received in ancient times, but Sir
crucial interests clearly are at stake. Few Americans, Winston Churchill didn't count on humane treat-
for example, complained when President John F. ment from Nazi Germany when he addressed the
Kennedy publicly ordered Nikita Khrushchev to re- House of Commons on May 13, 1940, soon after his
move Soviet nuclear-capable ballistic missiles from appointment as Britain's wartime Prime Minister.
Cuba in October 1962 or face dire consequences "You ask, What is our aim? I can answer in one
that could have led to mass casualties on both sides. word: Victory—victory at all costs, victory in spite
Popular support for combat in Korea during the of all terror, victory however long and hard the road
previous decade conversely was muted in the may be; for without victory there is no survival."7
United States, because the cause was poorly articu- "Victory at all costs" unfortunately may be too
lated and many military men as well as civilians high a price to pay in the Age of Nuclear and Biologi-
questioned whether that unpopular "police action" cal Warfare (BW) Weapons, because liberal employ-
was worth the cost in lives and money. ment of such munitions could decimate populations
Humanitarian and other less compelling interests and inflict uncontrollable, long-lasting effects. "Win-
may merit the use of armed forces, but not of armed ners" would be so difficult to differentiate from "los-
force. National security policy-makers consequently ers" that survivors of large-scale nuclear attacks on
need to put interests in priority before they decide key cities indeed might envy the dead, as Herman
whether military power is the most appropriate Kahn predicted.8 Unprecedented casualties also
instrument. would accompany cataclysmic BW assaults.

14
 NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Nations nearing defeat occasionally may survive Domestic Tranquility

by capitulating before recuperation becomes impos- U.S. Founding Fathers established a Constitution in
sible, whereas resistance that culminates in national 1789, partly to "insure domestic Tranquility." That
suicide guarantees irrevocable ruin. The United universal interest becomes vital if severe internal
States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, for turmoil makes effective governmental and military
example, divided Hitler's Third Reich after that shat- operations impossible until reconciliation, accom-
tered country surrendered unconditionally at the modation, or oppressive countermeasures control
end of World War II, but West Germany recovered dissent. President Lincoln in Springfield, Illinois on
quickly, became NATO's strongest European mem- July 17, 1858 put domestic tranquility requirements
ber, and reunited with East Germany after the Iron in bold relief when he told attendees at the Republi-
Curtain came down in 1990. Japan involuntarily un- can State Convention that "A house divided against
derwent tremendous political and cultural transfor- itself cannot stand." Abe's observation remains
mations after its defeat in 1945, yet emerged as an sound today. Nations that fail to dampen dissidence
economic superpower within a few decades. effectively indeed invite civil disobedience that may
range from demonstrations to secessionist move-
Homeland Defense ments, incipient insurgencies, even full-scale civil
Concern for security against external aggression that wars. Adverse consequences are costly at best, and
seriously threatens homelands depends to great de- at worst tear countries apart.
grees on geographic circumstances. Russian Tsars,
their Soviet successors, and current occupants of Military Power
the Kremlin, exposed to real and imagined pressures Impressive deterrent and combat capabilities often
from powerful adversaries along lengthy frontiers, enable possessors to impose their will on rivals with-
have put a premium on defense of Mother Russia for out fighting and improve prospects for favorable
several centuries, whereas the Continental United outcomes if armed conflicts erupt. The psychologi-
States, isolated by oceans and flanked by friendly cal impact of obvious military superiority not only
countries, has been free from invasion since January comforts friends, but enhances opportunities to in-
8, 1815, when British troops lost the Battle of New fluence their conduct and the demeanor of neutrals
Orleans. No adversary yet possesses sufficient air- as well.10
borne and amphibious assault, naval air power, and Nations that lack sufficiently strong armed forces
transoceanic logistical capabilities to seize, secure, on the contrary can neither fulfill interests in survival
expand, and sustain sizable lodgments on U.S. shores. and homeland defense nor support foreign policies
Soviet long-range Tu-95 Bear bombers and nu- to best advantage. Those that rely heavily on allies
clear-tipped missiles that could strike urban targets cannot perpetually assume that assistance will be
anywhere in the United States greatly intensified assured during crises. Japan, for example, has
U.S. interests in homeland defense from the mid- counted on U.S. military power since World War II,
1950s until Cold War confrontations ceased thirty- but can safely continue to do so only as long as
five years later. President George W. Bush subse- basic security interests of both countries coincide.
quently pursued a trustworthy shield to counter
increasingly potent ballistic missiles in the hands National Credibility
of present and potential enemies, although success Credibility often requires clearly evident military ca-
remains elusive and opposition at home and abroad pabilities and the will to employ them wherever and
remains strong.9 whenever necessary. That quality is indispensable

15
MILITARY STRATEGY

for any nation that seeks respect from friends and regional or worldwide. Values depend on the pro-
neutrals as well as foes. Support for every other clivities of national leaders who, if they are wise,
security interest is a by-product. recurrently review lists to ascertain which entries
U.S. interests in credibility increased by orders remain valid and which are obsolete. Samples dis-
of magnitude immediately after World War II, when played on Table 2 (p. 14) and summarized below
American military power became a Free World bul- are illustrative.
wark against the spread of Communism. Quests for
credibility motivated President Lyndon B. Johnson
Peace
in 1965 to assert that "If we are driven from the
Fewer armed conflicts would infect this world if
field in Vietnam, then no nation can ever have the
true peace devoid of hostile intent in international
same confidence in American promises, or in Ameri-
relations were a universal interest, but not every
can protection."11 See-sawing, however, soon cast
nation or subnational group shares that aspiration.
doubts about U.S. resolve, which plummeted after
Soviet leaders from Lenin at least through Yuri An-
the United States abandoned its Vietnamese ally
dropov saw no prospect of such benign relations
early in 1973.
until socialism triumphed. "Peaceful coexistence,"
Credibility rebounded with scintillating perfor-
as they practiced it, "exclude[d] war, and primarily
mances during Operations Just Cause (Panama,
world war, as a means of settling interstate dis-
December 1989-January 1990)12 and Desert Storm
putes," but politico-military struggles with non-
Qraq, January-February 1991),13 then sagged badly
Communist countries otherwise were constant.16
after bloody battles with warlord Mohammed Farah
Altruistic nations generally espouse interests in
Aideed's motley mobs made President Clinton with-
peace as a matter of principle, whereas aggressive
draw all U.S. forces from Somalia in March 1994.14
governments take advantage of peace while they
Political restraints rather than requisite military
prepare for war. Peace becomes particularly impor-
power have shaped a spotty record ever since.
tant when adversaries perceive a lot to lose and
little or nothing to gain from war. General of the
Freedom of Action Army Omar N. Bradley, when he was Chairman of
Armed forces that lack strategic initiative must react
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, identified peace as a salient
rather than act. "The battle of wills," in the words
U.S. interest for that reason shortly after the Soviet
of French General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, "comes
Union detonated its first nuclear device in 1949,
down to a struggle for freedom of action."15 Freedom
because even limited strife between rivals armed
of the seas, for example, was at stake when U.S.
with weapons of mass destruction might unexpect-
leathernecks and blue jackets defeated Barbary pi-
edly escalate out of control to the detriment of neu-
rates off the coast of Tripolitania (now Libya) nearly
trals as well as combatants.17
two centuries ago. Freedom of action in space be-
came a crucial U.S. interest as soon as the Soviet
Union launched Sputnik I into a low Earth orbit on Stability
October 4, 1957. Countries satisfied with current power relationships
profess interest in stability (the status quo), primar-
VARIABLY VALUABLE ily to preserve existing balances at acceptable
INTERESTS costs.18 That condition is most easily achievable if
Variable security interests that supplement the uni- Parties A and B find it mutually acceptable, Party A
versal core may be strategic or tactical, active or is so superior that Party B deems accommodation
passive, positive or negative, immediate or deferred, more attractive than competition, or Party B is too

16
 NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

passive or impoverished to alter equations signifi- Ideology

cantly. Ideological interests frequently lead to political, cul-
Adversarial states may maintain the same relative tural, even military collisions.23 The United States,
position at ever higher levels throughout prolonged which helped defeat the Central Powers during
arms races, but that process incurs increased costs, World War I to "keep the world safe for democracy,"
international tensions, and risks. U.S. strategists, for currently focuses on democratic reforms through-
example, strained unsuccessfully to assure a stable out the world.24 Communism sprouted in Europe
U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance predicated on policies during the 1840s, started to expand after the Russian
variously dubbed "parity," "sufficiency," and "essen- Revolution in 1917, then spread worldwide before
tial equivalence" because, as Secretary of Defense all countries save China, North Korea, Cuba, and
Harold Brown ruefully observed, "When we build Vietnam chose other forms of government. Militant
they build; when we cut they build."19 The practical fascism, which reached its zenith under Adolf Hitler
value of resultant Soviet quantitative superiority was and Benito Mussolini, still has scattered adherents.
questionable, but the psychological value was incal- Theocracies, presently typified by regimes in Iran,
culable. Afghanistan, and Algeria, are closely akin to ideolo-
gies and serve similar purposes, which are primarily
Prosperity to perpetuate control over indigenous populations.
The prosperity of every developed nation on this Totalitarianism or authoritarianism, differenti-
increasingly interdependent planet depends to ated by a greater degree of autocracy in the former,
some degree on foreign raw materials and markets. may accompany almost any ideological interest ex-
Persian Gulf petroleum, for example, is so important cept democracy. Absolute monarchies and "benevo-
to many countries that U.S. leaders in 1974-75 lent dictatorships" occasionally enjoy foreign and
openly contemplated military action if manipula- domestic support, but most despots are unpopular
tions by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting at home, abroad, or both.25
Countries (OPEC) threatened to "strangle" the indus-
trialized world.20 A multinational coalition defeated Geostrategic Position
Iraq in 1991, mainly to maintain free-flowing Middle World powers attach particular importance to geo-
East oil supplies. The uneven distribution of key met- strategic position when they deploy armed forces
als and minerals similarly stimulates contentious in- abroad for offensive, defensive, or deterrent pur-
terests that likely will magnify as soon as scientists poses. Three examples that span widely separated
devise cost-effective ways to tap such resources in time periods are representative.
Antarctica, on ocean floors, and in space.21 Access to open water became a consuming Rus-
Prosperity as a rule contributes to domestic tran- sian aspiration late in the seventeenth century when
quility in democratic countries, but not necessarily Peter the Great was Tsar because, as Admiral of
in dictatorships, where kingpins commonly line the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov
their own pockets and pay bully boys a comparative explained much later, "History patently confirmed
pittance to keep poverty-stricken common people that without a strong fleet Russia could not take
under control. President Mobutu Sese Seko, who its place among the great powers."26 Security for
fleeced Zaire (now the Congo) of riches worth sev- lifelines of empire prompted Britain to establish a
eral billion U.S. dollars during a corrupt thirty-three- strong presence at naval choke points from Gibraltar
year reign (1965-98), may hold the world's record through Suez to Singapore in the nineteenth cen-
in that regard, despite fierce competition from other tury. U.S. interests in strategic position centered
famous despots.22 on sites from which to contain Soviet expansion

17
MILITARY STRATEGY

throughout the Cold War (1946-1989). More than the reasons that made him give it are no longer
1,700 American military installations, picked primar- valid."30 The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia cared little
ily to ensure early warning of impending Soviet at- for human rights,31 which have been an explicit
tack and block the most likely land, sea, and aero- aspect of U.S. foreign policy since President Jimmy
space avenues of advance, eventually speckled the Carter's Administration.32 Serbs and Croatians in
Canadian arctic, NATO Europe, and the eastern edge Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as Serbs and Albanians
of Asia.27 in Kosovo practiced "ethnic cleansing" in the 1990s,
a course of action that the International Criminal
Morality Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia considered felo-
Humanitarianism led numerous nations to sign sev- nious33 (see Chapter 23 for details).
eral Hague and Geneva conventions that outlaw bar-
baric practices in combat and prescribe how prison- CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
ers of war should be treated.28 A Geneva Protocol Many of the world's politico-military problems can
subsequently forbade the employment of chemical be traced to international and intranational conflicts
and biological warfare weapons and many signator- of interest that need not be rational. Status quo and
ies further approved a convention that prohibits the change are incompatible. Overemphasis on prosper-
development, production, and stockpiling of BW ity can sabotage interests in military power. Free-
and toxin munitions.29 dom of action may collide with peace and stability.
Moral and emotional interests, however, may be U.S. economic interests in Persian Gulf petroleum
admirable or evil, depending on perspectives. Reli- have conflicted sharply with moral and emotional
gious interests, perhaps the epitome of morality, interests in Israel since 1948. Similar inconsistencies
have motivated many of the most vicious wars on seem almost endless. Nations pay penalties when-
record. Niccolo Machiavelli, who believed that ends ever foreign policy specialists and military strategists
justify almost any means, advised Cesare Borgia that fail to put interests in proper priority; security objec-
"A wise leader cannot and should not keep his word tives, concepts, plans, programs, and operations
when keeping it is not to his advantage or when otherwise are like castles built on sand.

KEY POINTS
National security interests are logical starting points for all politico-military strategies.
Political, military, economic, social, ideological, moral, and emotional motivations all are
important.
Despots determine security interests and assign priorities with far greater independence than
democratic leaders, who must pay greater attention to legal and ethical constraints, as well as
public opinion.
Most elemental interests are subject to reinterpretations when circumstances change.
Survival is the only invariably vital interest.
The value of other interests varies from time to time and place to place.
Conflicts of interest cause most of the world's politico-military problems.
Nations pay penalties whenever foreign policy specialists and military strategists fail to reconcile
or successfully override conflicting interests.

18
 NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

NOTES Nam," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United

1. Bernard Brodie, "Vital Interests: By Whom and How States, Book II (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
Determined?," Strategy and National Interests: Re- ing Office, 1966), 794.
flections for the Future (Washington: National Strat- 12. "An Auspicious Comeback in Panama," Chapter 4 in
egy Information Center, 1971), 11-24. Commando Operations (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life
2. Susan R. Fletcher, Global Climate Change: Sum- Books, 1991).
mary of the Kyoto Protocol, Rpt. No. RL 30692 13- General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, April Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992); HRH Gen-
11, 2001, updated routinely); Jonathan Schell, "The eral Khlid bin Sultan, Desert Warrior (New York:
Fate of the Earth," New Yorker, February 1, 1982, Harper Collins, 1995).
47-113; February 8, 48-109; and February 15, 45- 14. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down (New York: Atlan-
107; Carl Sagan, "Nuclear War and Climatic Catastro- tic Monthly Press, 1999); Military Operations in So-
phe: Some Policy Implications," Foreign Affairs, malia: A Message from the President of the United
Winter 1983/84, 257-92, 293-317. States Transmitting a Report on the Military Opera-
3. Literature devoted to divergent interpretations of tions in Somalia (Washington: U.S. Government
U.S. interests during the Vietnam War is voluminous. Printing Office, 1993).
See, for example, P. Edward Haley, Congress and 15. General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to
the Fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia (Ruther- Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), 35.
ford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1982); 16. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. I (Moscow: Prog-
Melvin Small, Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves (New ress Publishers, 1970), 771; Leo Gruliow, ed., Cur-
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988). rent Soviet Policies: III. The Documentary Record
4. Charles W. Freeman, Jr., The Diplomat's Dictionary of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Af-
(Washington: National Defense University Press, termath (New York: Praeger, 1957), 36-37; article
1994), 186. by Observer, "For the Liquidation of Colonialism and
5. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear (Berkeley: Univer- The Triumph of Peace," Pravda, October 24, 1964.
sity of California Press, 1998); Elaine Sciolino, The 17. Congress, House, Unification and Strategy, Armed
Outlaw State (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1991). Services Committee, Doc. No. 600, 81st Cong., 2d
6. National Security Strategy of the United States sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
(Washington: The White House, August 1991), 1. March 1, 1950), 14.
See also National Military Strategy (Washington: 18. For various perspectives concerning status quo, see
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1992), Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th
1; General Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 40-44,
My American Journey (New York: Random House, 92-94.
1995), Chapter 17. 19. Fred Charles Ikle, "The Idol of Stability," The Na-
7. Sir Winston S. Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears tional Interest (Winter 1986-1987), 75-79; Suzy
(New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941), 276. Platt, ed., Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quo-
8. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, tations Requested from the Congressional Research
NJ: Princeton University Press, I960), Chapter 2. Service (Washington: Library of Congress, 1989), 80.
9. President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for 20. Congress, House, Oil Fields As Military Objectives:
the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace (Washington: A Feasibility Study, prepared for the Special Sub-
U.S. Government Printing Office, February 18,1970), committee on Investigations of the Committee on
125-26; Report of the Commission to Assess the International Relations by the Congressional Re-
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (the search Service, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington:
Rumsfeld Commission), July 15, 1998; Stephen Hil- U.S. Government Printing Office, August 21, 1975).
dreth and Amy Woolf, National Missile Defense, Is- 21. Ben Bova, "Moonbase Orientation Manual I: Trans-
sue Brief 10034 (Washington: Congressional Re- port and Manufacturing," Analog (June 1987), 65-
search Service, June 2001, updated periodically). 70, 77, 80-87; Gregg E. Maryniak, "Living Off the
10. For distinctions between force and military power, Land: The Use of Resources in Space," in America
see Edward N. Luttwak, "Perceptions of Military Plans for Space (Washington: National Defense Uni-
Force and U.S. Defense Policy," Survival, January/ versity Press, 1986), 53-80.
February 1977, 2-8. 22. Sean Kelly, America's Tyrant: The CIA and Mobutu
11. President Lyndon B. Johnson, "The President's News of Zaire (Washington: American University Press,
Conference on July 28, 1965; Why We are in Viet- 1993).

19
MILITARY STRATEGY

23. Insights concerning ideologies are contained in 28. Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Inter-
James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men (New national Agreements of the United States in Force
York: Basic Books, 1980); Eric Hofer, The True Be- on January 1, 1990 (Washington: U.S. Government
liever (New York: Harper, 1951). Printing Office, 1990), 369-75.
24. A National Security Strategy for a New Century 29. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements
(Washington: The White House, December, 1999), (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
2, 3, 25-27, 34, 38-39, 41, 44-45, 47. Agency, 1982): 9-18, 120-31.
25. Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New 30. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago: University
York: Harcoutt, Brace and Jovanovich, 1973); Jeanne of Chicago Press, 1985).
Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," 31. Chanrithy Him, When Broken Glass Floats: Growing
Commentary, November 1979, 34-45; Michael Up Under the Khmer Rouge (New York: W. W.
Levin, "How to Tell Bad from Worse," Newsweek, Norton, 2000).
July 20, 1981, 7. 32. Dilys M, Hill, ed., Human Rights and Foreign Policy:
26. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Principles and Practices (New York: St. Martin's
Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, Press, 1988); Louis Cingranelli, ed., Human Rights:
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 66-83, 124-26, Theory and Measurement (New York: St. Martin's
133-55; the quotation is on 66. Press, 1988).
27. United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Over- 33. Bosnia War Crimes: The International Criminal
seas Military Installations, prepared for the Senate Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and U.S. Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congres- Rpt. 96-404F, coordinated by Steven Woehel (Wash-
sional Research Service, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Wash- ington: Congressional Research Service, April 23,
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1979). 1998, updated regularly).

20
 3. Foreign and Domestic Threats
"The Duke is seven feet, nine inches tall, and . . . in his
prime," a tosspot gurgled. "His hand is cold enough to
stop a clock, and strong enough to choke a bull, and
swift enough to catch the wind. He breaks up minstrels
in his soup, like crackers."
James Thurber
The Thirteen Clocks

N ational security interests would be self-

satisfying if human relations were eternally se-
rene, but military strategists must constantly con-
Intelligence communities grapple with Ques-
tions 1,2, and 3. Net assessors ponder Question 4.
Chiefs of State and their politico-military advisers,
sider foreign and domestic opposition. Intelligence who deal with Question 5, appraise the imminence,
estimates, net assessments, and threat assessments intensity, and seriousness of short-, mid-, and long-
that objectively evaluate and prioritize challenges range threats, then assign priorities.
are preferable to inflated, one-sided findings like
those of the drunkard cited above. Accurate answers THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM
to five questions are required: Threats span a conflict spectrum that begins with
bickering just above normal peacetime competition
• How much military power of what kinds and culminates in the most violent wars conceivable
does each adversary possess and where is it (Figure 2).1 Intranational and international enemy
deployed? options of low, mid, or high intensity range from
• What courses of action are open to each ad- nonlethal political, economic, technological, cyber-
versary, given its current and projected netic, and psychological warfare (PSYWAR) through
posture? insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, and terrorism to
• What course(s) of action is each adversary traditional military, nuclear, biological, chemical,
likely to adopt, given apparent motives, op- and radiological conflicts. Overlaps and interlocks
portunities, vulnerabilities, inhibitions, and are commonplace. Guerrilla warfare behind the
historical precedents? lines, for example, greatly assisted Soviet traditional
• What are enemy prospects for success, operations against Nazi Germany and might accom-
given the assets and liabilities of friendly pany a general nuclear conflagration with equal
armed forces? effectiveness. Propaganda, disinformation, other
• What enemy threats seem most important, forms of PSYWAR, and deception have utility, re-
given the comparative value of security inter- gardless of conflict types and intensities.2
ests involved? The spectrum of conflict creates a spectrum of

21
MILITARY STRATEGY

Figure 2
The Conflict Spectrum
Relative Conflict Intensities
1
Low Mid High

Unrestrained Global Wars

Unrestrained Regional Wars
Endemic NBCR Terrorism3
Limited Global Wars
Limited Regional Wars
Unrestrained Local Wars
Insurgencies (Phases III)2
Local NBCR Terrorism3
Violent Conflicts
Limited Local Wars
Insurgencies (Phases I and II)2
Traditional Warfare
Terrorism
Narco Conflicts
Some Coups d'Etat

Nonviolent Conflicts
Political Warfare
Economic Warfare
Technological Warfare
Psychological Warfare
Cybernetic Warfare
Some Coups d'Etat

Crises
Subcrises
1
Biological, chemical, radiological, political, economic, technological, psychological, and cybernetic warfare, plus terrorism and
insurgencies, may augment nuclear and/or traditional conflicts of any intensity.
2
Phase I and II insurgencies generally feature undergrounds and guerrillas, whereas large military or paramilitary formations normally
dominate during Phase III.
3
NBCR is the acronym for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological warfare.

strategic problems that are increasingly difficult to until negotiators meet their demands. Cybernetic
categorize. Most professional observers considered assaults began to cause consternation before the
unrestrained nuclear warfare unlikely when the twentieth century closed.5 Threat assessments thus
United States and the Soviet Union were the only are immeasurably more complex than those in the
antagonists so armed, but uncertainties soared in relatively recent past.
1998 when India and Pakistan backed volatile claims
to Kashmir with newly acquired nuclear weapons.3 STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
Osama bin Laden, a multimillionaire Saudi Arabian Lieutenant General (later General) Robert C. King-
expatriate who for several years formulated and ston, in his capacity as the first Commander in Chief
funded transnational terrorist activities from a pro- of U.S. Central Command in 1984, was concerned
tected perch in Afghanistan, gave new meanings about Soviet intentions toward Persian Gulf oil-
to the term "strategic unpredictability."4 Risks will producing states. When asked, "Are you getting
skyrocket if, as many pundits predict, nuclear and enough intelligence?" he answered, "I don't know.
biological weapons vest small groups with powers I only know what I'm getting. What's going on that
to cripple large urban centers or hold them hostage I don't know?" General Howell Estes III, Kingston's

22
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

counterpart at U.S. Space Command 14 years later, cover several consecutive years are preferable, be-
expressed similar sentiments when queried about cause they reveal which currents are strong, which
the possible proliferation of intercontinental ballistic are weak, which are shifting, and which are steady.
missiles among unfriendly nations: "You get the feel- Experienced strategists request assorted displays
ing that there's more going on than we know about. "6 that aggregate foreign armed forces organization-
Intelligence specialists, whose task is to deter- ally, functionally, and regionally, since each presen-
mine what's going on, patrol the pre-conflict and tation affords uniquely useful insights (Table 4).8
conflict spectrum in search of pertinent informa- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ar-
tion, but do so most effectively only if military strate- mored vehicles, combat aircraft, and surface ships
gists furnish sharp requirements and keep them con- are easier to count than biological and chemical
stantly informed about ongoing plans. Otherwise, warfare (BW, CW) dispensers. Guerrillas, who wear
they must assume what lines of inquiry are most no uniforms, shun fixed bases, and conduct surrepti-
important and establish priorities without fully un- tious operations, are far harder to quantify than or-
derstanding the problems they seek to solve.7 thodox armed forces. Underground organizations
that furnish them with administrative and logistical
ENEMY MILITARY POWER support are even less conspicuous, because mem-
Military intelligence communities estimate how bers are local civilians who occupy small cells that
much manpower, firepower, mobility, and staying seldom if ever make direct contact with each other.9
power of what quality is readily available to rival High and low calculations, based on conflicting and
military, paramilitary, and irregular forces and how often inaccurate information, thus may differ mark-
tightly each possessor ties them together (Table 3). edly (U.S. estimates of North Vietnamese and Viet
Similar assessments concern friends and fence- Cong personnel strengths varied by as much as
straddlers who could reinforce either side. 300,000).10

Quantitative Considerations Qualitative Considerations

Statistical snapshots taken at particular points in Raw strength figures can be dangerously deceptive,
time are soon overtaken by events. Summaries that as evidenced during World War II, when vastly out-

Table 3
Typical Elements of Military Power

Manpower Firepower Mobility Integrating Factors

Manpower Pools Quantities Vehicles Roles & Missions
Active Forces Performance Airlift Organizations
Ready Reserves Production Rates Sealift
R&D Programs Spacecraft Policies
Traditions Strategies
Temperament of Staying Power Tactics
Intellect Supply Doctrines
Education Small Arms Maintenance
Training Crewed Weapons Transportation Command/Control
Experience Armor Construction Communications
Vigor Artillery Storage Intelligence
hyiiociloc
Hardiness Ivlloollco
Distribution Overarching
Attitudes Munitions Evacuation
Armed Aircraft Imperatives
Adaptability Medical Care Political Will
Discipline Surface Combatants Services
Submarines Leadership
Morale
Loyalty

23
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 4
Typical Statistical Summaries
Organizational Summaries Functional Summaries Regional Summaries

Armies Deep strike Europe

Navies Ballistic missile defense Southeast Asia
Air Forces Air defense Southwest Asia
Amphibious forces Ground combat Northern Africa
Military space forces Aerial combat Subsaharan Africa
Merchant Marines Aerial reconnaissance Latin America
Special operations forces Naval surface warfare
Paramilitary forces Submarine warfare Atlantic Ocean
Terrorist groups Antisubmarine warfare Pacific Ocean
Amphibious warfare Indian Ocean
Special operations
Border security Space
Internal security
Space operations
Airlift
Sealift

numbered Japanese Armed Forces fought with a • Logistical abilities to deploy, maintain, sus-
ferocity that ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand), tain, and otherwise serve armed forces wher-
British, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, Indian, Filipino, ever they may be located
and U.S. antagonists did not initially anticipate. Iraq's • Recent relevant experience, especially con-
huge military machine, which boasted half a million frontations with or armed combat against
men at the onset of Operation Desert Storm in Janu- worthy opponents
ary 1991, conversely folded so fast that one wag
quipped, "It was like being in the Super Bowl, but Criteria listed above raise legitimate questions
one team was bush league!" about China's military behemoth, which is the
Military strategists consequently seek intelli- world's largest. Practical experience since 1953,
gence concerning qualitative as well as quantitative when combat ceased in Korea, has been confined
characteristics of foreign armed forces. Key indica- to artillery bombardments of Nationalist Chinese-
tors include: held Quemoy and Matsu islands (1950s), the subju-
gation of primitive Tibet (1959), altercations along
• Basic attributes of military manpower pools, borders with the former Soviet Union and India
especially attitudes toward military service (1960s), and a bigger brouhaha with Vietnam that
and amenability to discipline ended in embarrassment (1970s). Nuclear-tipped
• Recruiting standards, which determine the Chinese ballistic missiles can reach the United
intellectual and physical characteristics of States, but Beijing's ground forces early in the
volunteers and conscripts twenty-first century still lack sufficient air support,
• Progressive education and training programs mobility, and logistical capabilities to project and
that convert junior officers and enlisted per- sustain military power far inside neighboring Russia
sonnel into military professionals or India. The Chinese Navy ousted Vietnamese
• Present and projected technological charac- forces from the Paracel Islands in 1973 but, despite
teristics of weapon systems, munitions, recent improvements, is poorly prepared to conduct
equipment, and supplies large-scale amphibious operations against Taiwan.

24
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

Quantitative and qualitative assets, in short, are not All armed forces must keep pace with events or
yet well matched.11 become outmoded, but budgetary and bureaucratic
Military strategists generally should question all- stumbling blocks are common. Basil H. Liddell Hart
inclusive assessments, because the quality of large was right when he wrote, "the only thing harder
armed forces rarely is uniform. Iraq and Iran, for than getting a new idea into the military mind is to
example, respectively prize Republican and Revolu- get an old one out."14 The U.S. Army fought tena-
tionary Guards that are several cuts above average ciously to retain horse cavalry in 1940. The last
compared with run-of-the-mill formations in those large "blue water" surface naval battle took place
countries. It seems unlikely that all former Soviet off Kyushu on April 6-7,1945, yet fifty years elapsed
Spetsnaz (estimated active strength between 12,000 before U.S. naval policies, doctrines, plans, and pro-
and 30,000) were equally proficient, because grams officially began to emphasize littoral warfare
"cream of the cream" cannot be mass-produced. as well as open ocean combat.15 The United States
The same could be said about North Korean Special Air Force (USAF) for many years insisted that air-
Operations Forces, which reportedly number plane pilots must command ICBM wings and still
about 100,000.12 resists unmanned aerial vehicles, partly because
It always is wise to put qualitative findings in large inventories would drastically reduce the num-
perspective. A drumbeat of complaints, beginning ber of USAF officers.
about 1998, contended that insufficient funds for
training and logistical support, coupled with multi- Leadership and Political Will
ple humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, and other Nearly every politico-military confrontation ulti-
nontraditional duties, had dulled the cutting edge of mately becomes a contest between opposing wills,
U.S. Armed Forces since their brilliant performance in which one side or the other bends or breaks.
against Iraq less than a decade earlier. Such allega- Military power thus demands strong leadership at
tions remain correct, but U.S. quality nevertheless every command level and the political determina-
outclasses potential opponents and America's mili- tion to employ armed forces in support of national
tary machine hardly deserves a "hollow" label like security interests whenever authentic requirements
the one that Army Chief of Staff General Edward arise. Carl von Clausewitz claimed that physical and
C. (Shy) Meyer pinned on its post-Vietnam War psychological factors constitute "an organic whole
predecessor in May 1980 before Presidents Carter which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable. . . . One
and Reagan began to rebuild all military services.13 might say that the physical seems little more than
the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the
Integrating Factors precious metal, the real weapon, the finely honed
Modern military power depends primarily on team- blade."16
work rather than individual prowess or impressive
inventories. Strategists therefore need to know INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
whether foreign armed forces are equal to, exceed, Intelligence analysts everywhere interpret available
or are less than the quantitative and qualitative sum facts about all aspects of national power that foes,
of their parts. Roles, functions, missions, organ- friends, and neutrals possess, fill in blanks with as-
izational structures, policies, strategies, tactics, doc- sumptions, then put findings in context with past,
trines, command/control lash-ups, and inter- present, and portending situations. Short-, mid-, and
operable communications typify many topics that long-range estimates thereafter indicate what op-
demand exploration. tions seem open to particular countries, coalitions,

25
MILITARY STRATEGY

or subnational groups at particular times and places such as accelerated U.S. rearmament after the Japa-
and which courses of action each seems most likely nese attack on Pearl Harbor; and precipitous demo-
to elect. Margins for error are considerable, because bilization, such as hasty U.S. retrenchment after
pieces of such puzzles almost always are missing or most American wars.
incomprehensible, even under best-case conditions. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemi-
cal, and radiological programs made it immensely
Foreign Military Capabilities more difficult to estimate foreign military capabili-
Intelligence communities produce capability esti- ties than in decades past, when only a few nations
mates that focus attention on what foreign armed were so armed and their identities were well known.
forces could do if so desired (deter, attack, defend, Several scoundrels now possess "probable" or "sus-
deceive, reinforce, withdraw) without regard for pected" holdings that are matters for conjecture.18
intentions or probabilities of success. Offensive op- Estimative problems will increase by orders of mag-
tions that the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact might have nitude if, as widely predicted, transnational terror-
elected late in the Cold War are illustrative:17 ists, religious extremists, disgruntled ethnic groups,
drug cartels, and criminal syndicates beg, borrow,
• Assault the United States with strategic nu- steal, or buy even a few NBCR weapons.
clear weapons Inexpensive cybernetic tools and tactics that be-
• Invade Western Europe with little warning, came widely available during the 1990s enable na-
using air and ground forces in East Ger- tions, subnational groups, even freelance individuals
many, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to shut down poorly protected computers that be-
• Support traditional military operations with long to adversaries or, if they wish, steal, erase,
theater nuclear and chemical weapons tar- corrupt, or manipulate codes and data. Nonlethal
geted against NATO's armed forces, airfields, but potentially crippling options include abilities
ports, command/control centers, and logisti- to deny military commanders crucial information
cal installations during crises, misdirect missiles in flight, and alter
• Challenge NATO for air supremacy over con- electronically transmitted orders.19
tested areas
• Challenge NATO's navies in the North Atlan- Foreign Military Intentions
tic and approaches thereto Estimates that identify probable courses of enemy ac-
• Reinforce initial efforts with active forces in tion must precede the formulation of meaningful mili-
the Soviet Union and Central European satel- tary plans, because the most dangerous military capa-
lite states bilities imaginable constitute dangerous threats only
• Mobilize additional combat power if accompanied by determination to employ them.
Russia and the United States, for example, retained
Elemental capabilities like those outlined above more than enough nuclear weapons to atomize each
rarely change rapidly for better or worse, but intelli- other many times over after the Cold War ended, but
gence analysts must remain alert, because cataclys- rational employment appears improbable as long as
mic exceptions occasionally occur. Causes include each retains strong retaliatory capabilities.
political upheavals (especially coups); public opin-
ions that flip-flop from "hawkish" to "dovish" or Perplexities
vice versa; traumatic defeats typified by the French Intentions, which are subjective states of mind, gen-
disaster at Dien Bien Phu; prodigious mobilization, erally are difficult to divine. Most intelligence com-

26
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

munities therefore monitor numerous indicators Mao thus were surprised when President Truman,
(NATO's catalogue once contained more than 700 backed by the United Nations, decided to defend
items20) and assign weights, because values vary con- South Korea one day after North Korean forces
siderably. On-site intelligence agents who watched swarmed across the 38th Parallel in June 1950.
Iraqi Armed Forces cross the Kuwaiti border in Au-
gust 1990, for example, were clueless about their Opportunities
ultimate objective, which might have been Saudi The search for enemy intentions even so is by no
Arabian oil fields.21 Analysts at distant assessment means hopeless. Political demagogues and dictators,
centers could only speculate whether Iran massed who are secretive in most respects, paradoxically
troops and aircraft near the Afghan frontier to do are prone to propagandize. Lenin let the world
battle with or merely intimidate Taliban forces that know where Communism was headed when he
reportedly had massacred Shiite civilians at Mazar-e wrote What Is to Be Done? before the Russian Revo-
Sharif early in September 1998.22 lution erupted in 1917.25 Hitler outlined his aims in
Even documents purloined from opponents' Mein Kampf(\925).26 Mao's collected works were
closely guarded, limited access files may be suspect equally revealing.27
because, as Sherman Kent sagely observed in his classic Behavior patterns help intelligence analysts iden-
textbook Strategic Intelligence, none ever proclaim: tify enemy intentions, provided they interpret
trends correctly. Ultranationalistic radicals like
"I am notthe offbeat thoughts and recommen- those who ran amok in pre-World War II Japan
dations of a highly placed but erratic adviser; should have warned observers to expect the worst.28
I am not a draft from high headquarters in- Soviet leaders called themselves revolutionaries, but
tended solely as a basis for discussion; I am their proclivity for risk-taking was low throughout
not one of those records of decisions which the Cold War, except for altercations over Berlin in
will be rescinded orally the next day, or 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.29 Kim II
pushed under the rug and forgotten, or nib- Sung, who was President of North Korea from 1948
bled to death by disapproving implementers. until his death in 1994, hoped to reunify that divided
. . . / am authoritative and firm; I represent nation under Communist rule,30 but avoided a full-
an approved intention and I am in effect."7* scale war after 1953 despite strident rhetoric and
intimidating military capabilities. He declined to re-
Relevant documents indeed may not exist. A Sep- invade the Republic of Korea when most U.S. long-
tember 1947 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs haul airlift and sealift forces were needed to deploy
of Staff to Secretary of State George C. Marshall and sustain military operations in Southeast Asia
concluded that, "from the standpoint of military (1965-72) and again during U.S. operations to eject
security, the United States has little strategic interest Iraq from Kuwait (1990-91), probably because obvi-
in maintaining the present troops and bases in Ko- ous risks seemed to outweigh obtainable gains.
rea." President Harry Truman in April 1948 an-
nounced that warfare in Korea would not constitute Cautionary Notes
a U.S. casus belli and, in a January 1950 speech Strategic intelligence specialists enjoy greater ad-
before the National Press Club, Dean Acheson (Mar- vantages than tactical counterparts, because they
shall's successor as Secretary of State) outlined a generally have more time to study situations and
defense perimeter that excluded Korea. Key leaders reach conclusions concerning foreign military capa-
in Congress concurred.24 Kim II Sung, Stalin, and bilities, limitations, intentions, and vulnerabilities,

27
MILITARY STRATEGY

plus insights concerning personal idiosyncrasies of It often is useful to compare third parties as well.
parties in power. A labyrinth of special security War between India and Pakistan or Arabs and Israe-
classifications nevertheless may keep left hands lis, for example, could involve other nations.
from knowing what right hands are doing. Every
estimator is opinionated to some degree, efforts at Purposes and Products
objectivity notwithstanding. Best-case estimates as- Net assessors juxtapose Blue side data from friendly
sume problems away, worst-case estimates magnify files with matching information about the Red side
them, both warp reality, and built-in biases tend to from intelligence estimates to calculate balances of
create blind spots. "Lowest common denominator" power,34 or what the Soviet Union and its associates
approaches to intelligence production can cause called the "correlation of forces."35 Comprehensive
genuine disagreements to disappear in clouds of assessments contend with the full range of relevant
collective wisdom, compromise, and politically ex- military and nonmilitary factors. Cogent economic
pedient consensus. considerations, for example, include natural re-
Savvy politico-military policy-makers and strate- sources, raw materials, and defense industries. Com-
gists seek second and third opinions when hard partmentalized appraisals concentrate on organiza-
evidence is tenuous or open to divergent interpreta- tions, functions, demographics, and other
tions. That process is cost-effective, despite redun- specialized topics (Table 5). Scientific and techno-
dant efforts and extra expense, because it helps logical assessments seek to ascertain how well Blue
them determine which rationales make the most weapon and support systems compare with Red
common sense before they make decisions. Assis- counterparts. The ultimate purpose in every in-
tance by outsiders also can help keep intelligence stance is to rate relative strengths, weaknesses,
estimates "honest." Team A versus Team B debates problems, and opportunities.
in 1976 did a lot to sharpen official U.S. insights Assessments that trace trends are preferable to
concerning Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and snapshots. Those that forecast outcomes give some
intentions. Teams C, D, and E in some instances feel for probabilities, but prudent strategists treat
might be beneficial.31 Military strategists in any case them cautiously, because predicting winners and
should remain acutely aware that the best available losers is a tricky proposition based on abilities to
intelligence estimates may be fallible, and fashion devise plausible scenarios (what if one country or
alternative plans for immediate use if prognostica- coalition did this, at this time and place, with these
tions prove wrong. So doing preserves operational aims in mind, using these forces and tactics to exe-
flexibility and, if armed combat occurs, can save cute this strategy, and this was the response?). Even
precious lives. if input on both sides were precise, the frictions
and fog of war—fear, fatigue, confusion, unforeseen
NET ASSESSMENTS events—could confuse cause-effect relationships
Twenty-five centuries ago, Sun Tzu advised, "Know and cast doubt on judgments buttressed by compu-
your enemy, know yourself; in a hundred battles, terized war games.36
you will never be in peril."32 He overstated his case,
but net assessments that dispassionately compare Assessing Statistical Asymmetries
Blue sides with Red (friends with foes) nonetheless Military net assessments, like intelligence estimates,
are needed to conclude which is better able to pro- commonly start with statistics, because historical
mote its interests despite opposition by the other.33 records confirm that armed forces rarely win wars

28
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

Table 5
Net Assessment Types and Topics
Typical Focus Typical Topics
Diagnostic Assessments Diagnostic Assessments
Countries North Korea vs. South Korea
Coalitions NATO vs. Warsaw Pact
Regions Southeast Asia; Persian Gulf
Time Periods Present; Future
Organizational Land, Sea, Air, and Space Forces
Functional General & Special Purpose Forces
Side-by-Side Blue Side Red Side
Aircraft Aircraft
Submarines Submarines
Tanks Tanks
Head-to-Head Blue Side Red Side
Aircraft Air Defense
Submarines ASW Forces
Tanks Antitank Weapons
Demographic Military Manpower
Scientific/Technological Research and Development
Military-Industrial Complex Production Potential

Dynamic Assessments Dynamic Assessments

Portray Trends U.S.-Soviet Balance, 1946-1989
Predict Outcomes War Games; Computer Simulations

against much larger opponents who are comparably which has twenty-two players, not eleven as author-
or more proficient. Quantitative superiority, equal- ized. The Blue side has no second string. The Red
ity, and inferiority, however, may have positive, nega- team's coach then piles on his third string, which has
tive or neutral effects, depending on circumstances. thirty-three players, not twenty-two. Guess who gets
Adding ICBMs and SLBMs to swollen inventories, for steamrolled?38 Substitute U.S. Armed Forces for the
example, might enhance deterrence, but reliable Blue team and Soviet adversaries for the Red, and it
Blue defenses would better offset Red superiority in becomes clear why 1,000 MiG-21 fighter aircraft, first
ballistic missiles if deterrence failed.37 deployed in 1956, remained active as late as 1982. The
same could be said for nearly 20,000 Soviet T-54 and
Active Forces T-55 tanks, the first of which saw service in 1947.
Numbers nonetheless do count. Soviet military strat-
egists, who sanctified V. I. Lenin's contention that Reserve Components
"quantity has a quality all its own," therefore retained Relatively small active armed forces as a rule lack
obsolescent weapon systems that U.S. counterparts much operational flexibility if they face numerically
would have slated for early retirement. Two well superior foes on even one broad front (much less
matched football teams illuminate the Kremlin's ra- two or more), and cannot tolerate lengthy wars of
tionale: Paramedics cart star players off the field early attrition. Many nations therefore rely extensively on
in the first quarter. Referees cannot enforce the rules, reserve components to save money and conserve
so the Red side reinforces with its second string, manpower in peacetime.

29
MILITARY STRATEGY

"Bean counters" consequently scrutinize enemy The best net assessments, like intelligence esti-
mobilization machinery to ascertain how quickly mates, frequently seem fallible when seen in that
units and individual replacements might reinforce light. Fortunate strategists consequently consult
active-duty components and how long they could more than one oracle before finalizing security
remain mobilized without seriously disrupting civil- plans, implementing costly programs, and initiating
ian routines. Israeli Armed Forces earned high marks operations that might prove imprudent.
for abilities to man ramparts in record time with
large numbers of skilled reserves during wars in
THREAT ASSESSMENTS
1956, 1967, and 1973, the most lengthy of which
Military threats occupy at least eight categories:
lasted one month, but chaos could ensue if future
global and regional; short-, mid-, and long-range;
call-ups deprived the economy of essential civilian
low-, mid-, and high-intensity; receding, expanding,
workers for lengthy periods. Pluses thus might out-
and steady; national, multinational, and subnational;
weigh minuses on some occasions and vice versa.
military and nonmilitary; lethal and nonlethal; nu-
clear, biological, chemical, radiological, traditional,
Assessing Qualitative Asymmetries and unconventional. When perceived threats are
Qualitative asymmetries are more difficult to assess hydraheaded, wise Chiefs of State and their advisers
than quantitative equivalents, whether analysts com- couple comparative capabilities with probable
pare Blue and Red components "side-by-side" or courses of enemy action, establish priorities accord-
offensive and defensive forces "head-to-head," as ing to imminence and intensities, then concentrate
shown on Table 5 (page 29). Enemy aircraft speeds, on the greatest hazards.40
service ceilings, combat radii, payload capacities, Some such choices might stump Solomon. The
reliability, and readiness, for example, often are sub- most demanding mission of U.S. Armed Forces at
jects for speculation. Indeed, technical specialists the onset of the twenty-first century was to "deter
cannot always reach a consensus even after they and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-
inspect captured material. border aggression in two distant theaters in over-
lapping time frames."41 President Clinton's national
security team concluded early on that major regional
Composite Assessments contingencies of that magnitude most likely might
Net assessments, which customarily are shot full of
erupt in Korea and the Middle East. The key question
assumptions, seldom tell the truth, the whole truth,
in such event was: Which requirement should take
and nothing but the truth, no matter how hard their
precedence if U.S. and allied assets prove insuffi-
architects try. Systems analysis "Whiz Kids" who
cient to cope with both concurrently?
worked for Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
Complexities of that sort make threat assess-
in the 1960s consequently postulated "various sets
ments at the national level more an art than a sci-
of assumptions, ranging from optimistic to pessimis-
ence. Policy-makers and strategists must do the best
tic," then, in the absence of facts, assigned "a range
they can with imprecise intelligence estimates and
of capabilities" regarding Soviet pluses and minuses.
net assessments, solicit advice from voices of experi-
Their motto was, "It is Better to Be Roughly Right
ence, elect the option that seems most appropriate,
Than Precisely Wrong," for "all the facts will never
and adjust when situations change.
be in, and in the meantime decisions have to be
made on the best information available."39

30
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

KEY POINTS
• The conflict spectrum spans the full range of potential national security threats
• Intelligence communities perform most effectively only if customers furnish strategic guidance
• Military power available to friends and neutrals as well as foes strongly influences military intelli-
gence estimates, net assessments, and threat assessments
• Military power depends on quantitative and qualitative characteristics of armed forces, together
with integrating factors such as roles, functions, organizational structures, policies, strategies,
tactics, doctrines, and command/control procedures
• The most dangerous enemy capabilities imaginable constitute dangerous threats only if accompa-
nied by intentions to implement them
• The purpose of intelligence estimates is to identify what courses of action are open to foreign
armed forces and which option(s) they likely will elect
• Net assessments compare the capabilities and intentions of friendly, enemy, and neutral armed
forces to reveal relative strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and opportunities
• The best intelligence estimates and net assessments are fallible, because the data upon which
they predicate findings are incomplete
• Savvy Chiefs of State and their politico-military advisers habitually prioritize threat assessments

NOTES search Service, September 18, 1987) and Statistical

1. Julian Lider, Military Theory: Concept, Structure, Trends, 1980-1989, with Dianne Rennack, Rpt. 90-
Problems (Aldershot, UK: Gower, 1983), 170-85. 401 RCO 9 (August 6, 1990).
2. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Sce- 9. Andrew R. Molnar et al., DA Pamphlet 550-104, Hu-
narios (New York: Praeger, 1965), 37-195, 218. man Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in
3. Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kash- Insurgencies (Washington: Headquarters, Depart-
mir Dispute (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994). ment of the Army, September 1966), 17-35, 101-
4. Vernon Loeb, "A Global, Pan-Islamic Network," 07.
Washington Post, August 23, 1998, Al, A24-A25. 10. Benjamin Burton, Fair Play: CBS, General West-
5. Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infra- moreland, and How a Television Documentary
structures, Report of the President's Commission on Went Wrong (New York: Harper & Row, 1988); T. L.
Critical Infrastructure Protection, October 1997,15- Cubbage, "Westmoreland vs. CBS: Was Intelligence
20, 23, 27-31, and Appendix A; Report of the De- Corrupted by Policy Demands?" Intelligence and Na-
fense Science Board Task Force on Information tional Security, March 3, 1988, 118-80.
Warfare-Defense (IW-D) (Washington: Office of the 11. Selected Military Capabilities of the People's Repub-
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Tech- lic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section
nology, November 1997). 1305 of the FY 97 National Defense Authorization
6. "Interview With Lt. Gen. Robert C. Kingston," Act from the Secretary of Defense (April 1997).
Armed Forces Journal, July 1984, 72; "Washington 12. Major William H. Burgess, III, ed., Inside Spetsnaz:
Whispers," U.S. News & World Report, August 10, Soviet Special Operations, A Critical Analysis (No-
1998, 10. vato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990); Defense White Paper,
7. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, NJ: 1997-1998 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Re-
Princeton University Press, 1965), 3-65, 180-84, public of Korea, 1998), 50.
209-20. 13. General Frederick J. Kroesen, "What Is Hollow?"
8. For quantitative trends over twenty consecutive Army, February 1999, 9. General Edward C. Meyer
years, see John M. Collins with Bernard Victory, U.S./ discussed "hollowness" during hearings before the
Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1970- Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed
1979, Rpt. 87-839 S (Washington: Congressional Re- Services Committee. See National Defense Funding

31
MILITARY STRATEGY

Levels for Fiscal Year 1981, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 29. Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation:
May 29, 1980, 18. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan
14. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1985).
Faber and Faber, 1944), 115. 30. Rinn-Sup Shinn, North Korea: Policy Determinants,
15. The Maritime Strategy, supplement to U.S. Naval Alternative Outcomes, U.S. Policy Approaches, Rpt.
Institute Proceedings, January 1986. Superseded by 93-612F (Washington: Congressional Research Ser-
From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the vice, June 24, 1993); Robert G. Sutler, Korea-US.
21st Century, a White Paper (Washington: Depart- Relations: Issues for Congress, Issue Brief 92068
ment of the Navy, September 1992); Forward . . . (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
From the Sea (Washington: Department of the March 21, 1994).
Navy, 1994). 31. National Intelligence Estimates A-B Team Episode
16. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Concerning Soviet Strategic Capability and Objec-
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton tives. Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
University Press, 1976), 184-85. ligence, Subcommittee on Selection, Production, and
17. NATO-WARSAW Pact: Conventional Force Bal- Quality, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, U.S. Gov-
ance: Papers for U.S. and Soviet Perspectives Work- ernment Printing Office, February 16,1968); Richard
shops, Supplement B (Washington: General Ac- Pipes, "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth," Com-
counting Office, 1988), 87-88. mentary, October 1986, 25-40; Alexander George,
18. Robert D. Shuey, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical "The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign
Weapons and Missiles: The Current Situation and Policy," American Political Science Review, Septem-
Trends, Rpt. RC 30699 (Washington: Congressional ber 1972, 751-85.
Research Service, January 5, 2001). 32. Sun Tzu, The An of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
19- Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infra- (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84.
structures, 7, 14; James Adams, The Next World War 33. John M. Collins, "Essentials of Net Assessment," in
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998). U.S.-SovietMilitary Balance, Concepts and Capabil-
20. The U.S. European Command furnished watchlist ities, 1960-1980 (Washington: McGraw-Hill Publica-
statistics on November 18, 1977. For related indica- tions, 1980), 3-14.
tors, see Field Manual (FM) 30-102, Opposing Forces 34. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th
Europe (Washington: Department of the Army, No- ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), 167-223,
vember 8, 1977), 2-26 through 2-32. 327-50.
21. General Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My 35. G. Shakhazarov, "On Problems of Correlation of
American Journey (New York: Random House, Forces in the World," Strategic Review, Fall 1974,
1995), 459-71. 109-14; Ellen Jones, Correlation of Forces in Soviet
22. Dana Priest, "Iran Poises Its Forces on Afghan Bor- Military Decisionmaking (a paper delivered at the
der," Washington Post, September 5, 1998, Al, A22. Bicentennial Conference, Section on Military Studies,
23. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, xxii. International Studies Association, Charleston, SC,
24. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas November 10, 1978).
MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown, 36. Clausewitz, On War, 119-23; John Keegan portrays
1978), 538-42; General Matthew B. Ridgway, The the effects of friction in The Face of Battle (New
Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., York: Viking Press, 1976).
1967), 10-13. 37. United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of
25. Vladimir I. Lenin, What Is to Be Done?, trans. S. V. Reference for Congress, Senate Committee on Armed
and Patricia Utechin, ed. S. V. Utechin (Oxford, UK: Services, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Gov-
Clarendon Press, 1963). ernment Printing Office, January 1976), 21-26.
26. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim 38. "Bean Counting," correspondence from the author
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943). to Hon. Patricia Schroeder, Chairperson, Defense
27. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 4 vols. (Beijing: Burden Sharing Panel, House Armed Services Com-
Foreign Languages Press, 1965). mittee, March 4, 1988.
28. Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics (London: Eyre & 39. Robert S. McNamara, Statement before the Senate
Spottiswoode, 1958), 251-62; Harolds. Quigleyand Armed Services Committee on the FY1969- 73 De-
John E. Turner, The New Japan: Government and fense Program and 1969 Defense Budget (January
Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 22, 1968), 43; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne
1956), 29-43. Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense

32
 FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC THREATS

Program, 1961 -1969 (New York: Harper & Row, National Intelligence Council for publication by the
1971), 68. National Intelligence Board, December 2000).
40. Global Trends 2015: Dialogue About the Future 41. A National Security Strategy for a New Century
with Nongovernment Experts, NIC 2000-02 (Wash- (Washington: The White House, December 1999),
ington: paper prepared under the direction of the 19-

33
This page intentionally left blank
 4. Basic Security Objectives
Purpose is the central ingredient of power. Powerful
people and organizations have a strong . . . sense of
purpose, [which] is worth 80 IQ points.
Michael Eisner
Strategy and Business

M ichael Eisner hit the nail on the head. Basic

security objectives, which indicate what must
be done to safeguard essential interests despite for-
Prerequisites for Approval
Autocrats commonly determine national purposes
independently, whereas democratic governments
eign and domestic threats, underpin the formulation must pay more attention to the wants, needs, and
of policies, strategies, plans, and programs that indi- aspirations of people they serve. Chief executives
cate how to do it. National security policy-makers who hope to avoid acrimonious disputes take public
and military strategists consequently must keep cru- opinion into account before rather than after cri-
cial goals in sight day and night. Failure to do so ses occur.
can needlessly intensify perils, waste lives, squander Solid approval even so may evaporate if situa-
resources, and perhaps court defeat. tions turn sour, as President Lyndon B. Johnson
Prewar, intrawar, and postwar objectives, like discovered during the Vietnam War. Congress and
the interests they seek to assure, may be global, most concerned citizens approved when his an-
regional, or functional, major or minor, positive or nounced purpose was to contain the spread of Com-
negative, immediate or deferred. Optimum results munism in Southeast Asia, but the Tonkin Gulf Reso-
consistently ensue only if political purposes, military lution of August 7, 1964, which passed by a vote
aims, and implementing missions mesh well and of 88-2 in the Senate and 416-0 in the House, was
focus appropriate power on strategic centers of fast forgotten after U.S. body bags began to accumu-
gravity. late. Widespread dissent continued until U.S. ground
forces completed their withdrawal in 1972.2
NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Chiefs of State, assisted by trusted lieutenants, pro- Typical Objectives at the Top
mote objectives they believe would serve national Samples from the rich menu of broad, enduring
security interests best, bearing in mind that strong national security objectives appear on Table 6. Each
institutions, economies, and social systems often entry opens with a verb that denotes necessary
are more important than military power.1 Aims action. Every such list should be realistic and inter-
that seek to balance budgets, reduce tax burdens, nally consistent, which Table 6 in some respects is
curb inflation, and promote other domestic pro- not. "Avoid Confrontations" and "Oppose Oppres-
grams thus bump into those that demand strong sors," for example, are mutually exclusive ways to
armed forces. protect interests in peace. "Encourage Capitalism,"

35
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 6
National Security Interests and Complementary Objectives
Selected Security Interests Sample Security Objectives

Homeland Defense Deter or Defeat Invasions

Protect People and Production Base
Retrieve Lost Territory
Improve Recuperative Powers
Peace Avoid Confrontations
Oppose Oppressors
Promote Peacekeeping
Promote Democracy
Promote Human Rights
Stability Neutralize Imperialistic Regimes
Depose Rogue Leaders
Prevent NBC Proliferation
Isolate Transnational Terrorists
Minimize Refugee Problems
Prosperity Eliminate Poverty
Encourage Capitalism
Encourage Free Trade
Conserve Natural Resources
Preserve Global Environments
Prevent Inflation or Recession
Domestic Tranquility Eliminate Causes of Insurgency
Suppress Crime
Eliminate Illicit Drug Traffic
Improve Education
Raise Living Standards
Military Power Modernize Armed Forces
Maintain Force Sufficiency
Create Strong Coalitions
Foster Technological Innovation
Promote Arms Control

a companion of security objectives that promote then raging in Afghanistan, encouraged domestic
democracy and free trade, contributes to economic agitation, and precluded potentially beneficial arms
chaos instead of prosperity in post-Soviet Russia.3 control accords with the United States.4
High-level objectives seldom exist in vacuums.
Soviet divisions, for example, could have crushed NATIONAL MILITARY AIMS
Poland in the 1980s, when Lech Walesa and his Well-crafted national military aims complement na-
"counterrevolutionary" labor union Solidarity were tional political objectives, which they support (Ta-
pains in the Kremlin's posterior, but the Politburo ble 7). Each should be unambiguous, consistent,
spurned that objective because brutal suppression attainable with available armed forces, and flexible
almost certainly would have alarmed NATO, de- enough to accommodate change when circum-
prived the USSR of much needed hard currency, stances require. Two topics merit particular atten-
prevented completion of a Soviet pipeline into West- tion: standards of success and the value of mili-
ern Europe, risked a lengthy conflict like the one tary victory.

36
 BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Table 7
National Security Objectives and Basic Military Aims
Selected Security Objectives Sample Military Aims

Deter Aggressors Avoid Provocations

Deploy Superior Power
Instill Fear of Reprisal
Deceive Opponents
Demoralize Opponents
Defeat Aggressors Destroy Enemy Armed Forces
Confine Collateral Damage
Occupy Enemy Territory
Pacify Insurgents
Eradicate Terrorist Sanctuaries
Ensure Force Sufficiency Improve Land Force Mobility
Improve Littoral Warfare Posture
Perpetuate Superior Air Power
Improve Missile Defense Capabilities
Improve CW and BW Defenses
Strengthen Information Dominance
Create Strong Coalitions Promote Compatible Doctrines
Improve Joint/Combined Training
Promote Interoperable Materiel
Strengthen Security Assistance
Obtain or Retain Base Rights Abroad
Foster Technological Progress Improve Requirement Forecasting
Improve Program Management
Shorten Acquisition Times
Improve Cross-Service Applicability
Decrease Costs
Improve Recuperative Powers Strengthen Reserve Components
Improve Mobilization Procedures
Improve Mass Casualty Care
Invigorate Civil Defense
Tighten Military-Industrial Ties

Standards of Success Armed Forces." When that task was complete, Ike
Clearly stated military aims not only tell recipients wrote, "The mission of this Allied force was fulfilled
precisely what to do, but constitute achievement at 0241 local time, May 7, 1945."5
standards with which to measure success. Problems The Reagan Doctrine, in contrast, simply sought
arise in both regards when goals are too vague for to assist anti-Communist insurgents and resistance
strategic concept formulation and planning. movements around the world.6 Its basic aim in the
U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff on Feb- 1980s was to help friends help themselves, but help
ruary 12, 1944 left no room for anything less than them do what was seldom transparent. Help them
unconditional surrender when they directed Gen- overthrow oppressive governments? Achieve mili-
eral Dwight D. Eisenhower to "enter the continent tary victory? Avoid defeat? Compel reforms? Pro-
of Europe and . . . undertake operations aimed at mote negotiated settlements? All of the above? Such
the heart of Germany and the destruction of her imprecision eventually caused Congress to curtail

37
MILITARY STRATEGY

covert activities and invoke stringent restrictions on Victory Without War

funds for counterrevolutionary Contras, who strug- Sun Tzu, in his essays on The Art of War circa 500
gled to unseat the Communist Sandinista Govern- B.C., asserted that "to subdue the enemy without
ment in Nicaragua.7 fighting is the acme of skill. . . . Thus a victorious
army wins its victories before seeking battle." Liddell
Values of Military Victory Hart said essentially the same thing more than two
Basil H. Liddell Hart, whose writings on strategy are millennia later: "The true aim is not so much to seek
renowned, was wont to remind readers that one battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous
must make sharp distinctions between national se- that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its
curity objectives and military aims, because "history continuation by a battle is sure to achieve [that
shows that gaining military victory is not in itself objective.]"11
equivalent to gaining the objective of policy." When The United States to those ends amassed over-
armed combat occurs, "policy has too often been whelming land, sea, air, and amphibious forces near
governed by the military aim—and [victory] has the most likely battleground during the Cuban mis-
been regarded as an end in itself, instead of merely sile crisis of October 1962 and prepared to support
a means to an end."8 Those insightful words apply them along sea lines of communication that reached
to cold and lukewarm as well as heated conflicts. only ninety miles across the Florida Strait. Soviet
adversaries on the other hand were poorly disposed
Victory Without Peace to mass (much less sustain) traditional combat
U.S. statesmen and military strategists demonstrated power several thousand miles from home bases.
Liddell Hart's points conclusively during World War Nikita Khrushchev blustered, but backed down
II, when their preoccupation with military victory without firing a shot.12 NATO's armed forces, being
largely ignored political implications. General Eisen- geographically disadvantaged and configured pri-
hower, reminiscing about his experiences as Su- marily for deterrence and defense rather than offen-
preme Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces sive combat, similarly found discretion to be the
in Europe, revealed that the "future division of Ger- better part of valor when Soviet troops well behind
many did not influence our military plans for the the Iron Curtain savaged anti-Communist recalci-
final conquest of [that] country." Berlin, he acknowl- trants in East Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and
edged, "was politically and psychologically impor- Prague (1968).13
tant as the symbol of remaining German power" in
April 1945, but he decided that "it was not the War Without Victory
logical or the most desirable objective for the forces War without victory, the precise opposite of victory
of the Western Allies."9 without war, involves armed conflicts that Chiefs of
Short-sighted (mainly U.S.) concessions at the State, by mutual consent, terminate on compromise
Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences mean- terms before either side emerges a clear winner.14
while redrew political maps in ways that helped Overly ambitious military aims are unacceptable un-
the Soviet Union acquire superpower status, settled der such conditions.
Stalin in Central Europe, and ushered in the Cold General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, an old
War on the Kremlin's terms. The Iron Curtain that centurion who saw "no substitute for victory," dis-
separated East from West in 1946 remained firmly covered that fact of life the hard way in 1950-51 dur-
in place and prevented true peace for more than ing wintry combat with Chinese "volunteers" in fro-
forty years.10 zen Chosin. He surreptitiously petitioned Congress

38
 BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

after the Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly rejected his MILITARY ROLES AND MISSIONS
recommendations to bomb sanctuaries in Manchu- Armed forces everywhere organize, equip, and train
ria, blockade the Chinese coast, and unleash Chiang to perform broad, enduring roles.19 Senior military
Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese forces on Taiwan to commanders employ forces to accomplish strategi-
fight on the Chinese mainland. President Harry Tru- cally significant missions and perform functions
man on April 9, 1951 finally fired his five-star com- that support national security objectives and na-
mander for insubordination because, as he put it, "I tional military aims.20 Resultant responsibilities gen-
was left with one simple conclusion: General Mac- erate distinctive force posture objectives.
Arthur was willing to risk general war. I was not."15
Military Roles and Functions
Victory at Excessive Cost Each military service is optimized to function most
Pyrrhus of Epirus, a kinsman of Alexander the Great, effectively on land, at sea, in the air, in space, or
reportedly lamented, "One more such victory and in some combination of geographic environments
we are undone," after he defeated Roman adversar- (Table 8). Important responsibilities occasionally in-
ies at Heraclea and Asculum in 297 B.c.16 Substitutes terlock and overlap, but well-crafted roles neverthe-
for victory ever since then have been attractive un- less determine which Service should be authorized
less crucial interests were at stake and cost-benefit to employ personnel and materiel for given pur-
ratios were favorable. poses:
U.S. military involvement in Vietnam (1965-73)
dramatically demonstrated the penalties for pursu- • The primary role of every army is to con-
ing military aims despite exorbitant expenditures of duct prompt and sustained operations on
political capital, time, money, materiel, and young land. All organize, equip, and train forces to
lives. Ho Chi Minh, his successors, and Viet Cong deter or defeat enemy ground forces and, if
insurgents steadfastly aimed to unite that nation un- necessary, seize, secure, occupy, and govern
der Communist rule. All really were willing to "pay hostile territory.
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup- • The primary role of all naval forces is to con-
port any friend, oppose any foe"17 to safeguard their duct prompt and sustained operations at sea
vital interests. U.S. leaders, whose security interests and along littorals. All organize, equip, and
and supporting objectives paled by comparison, train forces to deter or defeat enemy navies,
really were not. control essential sea lines of communica-
General William C. Westmoreland, who headed tion, and furnish sealift.
U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam from • The primary role of all land-based and naval
June 1964 until June 1968, later observed that, "A air forces is to achieve air superiority. All ad-
lack of determination to stay the course, to react ditionally organize, equip, and train forces
with meaningful moves to the enemy'sflagrantviola- to conduct reconnaissance missions and in-
tions of solemn international agreements demon- terdict enemy landlines of communication.
strated in Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos that Some furnish land forces with air transporta-
the alternative to victory is defeat."18 President Rich- tion as well as close air support.
ard M. Nixon and Congress, however, found defeat • The primary role of military space forces
preferable to mounting casualties, open-ended mon- early in the twenty-first century is to pro-
etary costs, and domestic disorders that were rip- vide reconnaissance, surveillance, early warn-
ping the United States asunder. ing, communications, navigation, and

39
MILITARY STRATEGY

weather forecasting support for armed by U.S. military personnel (other than the Coast
forces on Earth. Future roles almost cer- Guard) in "search, seizure, arrest or other similar
tainly will include offensive and defensive activities. . .unless otherwise authorized by law."21
combat.
Military Missions
Some land forces occasionally participate in am- Implementing missions, unlike national security ob-
phibious operations, some air forces assist in sea jectives and military aims, direct armed forces to
control, some naval forces conduct inflight refuel- undertake particular tasks at particular times and
ing, but not every nation assigns every function that places. Properly composed instructions that tell
Table 8 depicts. Only a few nations for example commanders what to do, but not how to do it,
possess enough economic and technological preserve initiative.
wherewithal to deploy military space capabilities.
Soviet Border Guards and Internal Security Troops, Strategic Missions
which together totaled more than 800,000 in the Military missions of strategic significance generally
mid-1980s, were larger than most armies, whereas cover large regions or blanket the globe. President
assorted restrictions prohibit direct participation Truman's Outline Command Plan in the aftermath

Table 8
Typical Military Functions
Land Forces Naval Forces Air Forces Space Forces
Combat Functions
Offensive Combat X X X
Air Defense X X X
Missile Defense X X X X
Airborne Operations X X
Amphibious Operations X
Antisubmarine Warfare X
Unconventional Warfare X X X
Counterinsurgency X X X
Counterterrorism X X
Coastal Security X
Internal Security X

Combat Support
Functions
Intelligence X X X X
Communications X X X X
Psychological Operations X X
Electronic Warfare X X X
Inflight Refueling X
Search and Rescue X X

Service Support Functions

Airlift (Long Haul) X
Sealift (Long Haul) X
Spacecraft Launch/Recovery X
Logistics X X X
Civil Affairs X
Meteorological X X X
Navigation X X X

Nonmilitary Functions
Humanitarian Assistance X X
Disaster Relief X X
Civic Works X

40
 BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

of World War II instructed newly activated U.S. sensitive to adverse public opinion at home and
European Command to occupy Germany, support abroad, withdrew all U.S. troops before they fully
U.S. national policy for Europe, and plan for a accomplished any mission.25
general emergency. He concurrently told U.S. Pa-
cific Command to secure sea and air lines of com- STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY
munication across the Pacific Ocean and protect Strategic centers of gravity, according to Clause-
the United States against attacks from that quarter. witz, are "the hub of all power and movement, on
Six other commanders in chief received equally which everything depends. That is the point
specific assignments.22 against which all energies should be directed."
The Kremlin during the Cold War issued analo- The fundamental task as he saw it is "to identify
gous missions to the commanders of five continental the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible
and two oceanic theaters. Four Groups of Forces trace them back to a single [decisive objective]."26
headquartered in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslo- National and regional centers of gravity may be an-
vakia, and Hungary shared responsibilities for Cen- imate or inanimate, tangible or intangible, perma-
tral Europe. Comparable missions went to Border nent, semipermanent, or transitory.
Guards and Internal Security Troops, plus sixteen
Military Districts that, on call, were scheduled to National Centers of Gravity
become army groups called "fronts" inside the So- Capital cities, key individuals, and collective esprit
viet Union.23 typify national strategic centers of gravity. Crucial
economic elements of military power also qualify.
Operational and Tactical Missions Allied armed forces to wit repeatedly attacked Nazi
Missions at successively lower levels focus ever German ball bearing plants, hydroelectric dams, and
more sharply, are mainly operational or tactical petroleum production installations during World
rather than strategic in nature, and areas of re- War II.27
sponsibility range from regional to local. Military
space forces, for example, might be told to verify Metropoli
the presence or absence of nuclear weapon facili- Metropoli that house political, administrative, indus-
ties at Site C in Iraq or help forecasters predict trial, commercial, financial, cultural, and telecom-
weather conditions over the Strait of Hormuz munication facilities frequently constitute strategic
next Wednesday. centers of gravity. Small countries and city-states
like Singapore are especially vulnerable. Cuba could
Mission Creep hardly function if Havana fell. Panama capitulated
Statesmen and strategists consistently need to guard quickly after U.S. Armed Forces seized control of
against "mission creep" which, if uncontrolled, may its capital in January 1990 during Operation Just
incrementally create unreasonable requirements.24 Cause. Resistance likewise crumbled the following
U.S. policy-makers in Somalia belatedly rediscovered August when Iraqi armored columns overran Ku-
that the road to hell can be paved with best inten- wait City, an oasis in otherwise desolate territory.
tions when they switched from humanitarian assis- Capital cities often are centers of gravity, even in
tance to peacemaking and nation building in the countries that disperse vital assets over large areas.
summer of 1993. Subsequent shootouts between France and Germany both put Paris in that category
U.S./UN Armed Forces and enraged mobs beholden during both World Wars. The Soviet Union might
to fugitive warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed made have collapsed if Nazi invaders had invested
the new mission so dubious that President Clinton, Moscow in 1941, but not in 1942, because many

41
MILITARY STRATEGY

governmental offices, crucial defense industries, both possible and easy."33 Strategists may encourage
and perhaps 2,000,000 people by then had dis- affection or foment disaffection among adversaries
persed to the Ural Mountains, Western Siberia, and to perform that feat. The hearts and minds of com-
Central Asia.28 Seoul changed hands four times in mon people generally are the center of gravity in
1950-51, because North and South Korea both saw either case.
that war-torn city as a center of gravity.29 Hitler, who had scant concern for hearts and
minds, perhaps lost World War II because he brutal-
"Kingpins" ized rather than embraced anti-Soviet Ukrainians
"Kill the head and the body will die," an ancient who initially welcomed his panzer spearheads with
axiom, applied perfectly when Chiefs of State per- flowers and open arms.34 The Kremlin needed re-
sonally led troops into battle, because those "king- pressive internal security measures throughout the
pins" were rallying points for friends and prime Cold War to keep minorities under control in most
targets for foes. Wars often ceased when they fell; Soviet Socialist Republics, which were geographi-
William the Conqueror, for example, won the Battle cally, linguistically, and culturally separate from the
of Hastings in 1066 after King Harold of Wessex Slavic core. Inhabitants therein expressed prefer-
took an arrow in the eye. ence for freedom as soon as President Mikhail Gorba-
Key individuals still can constitute strategic cen- chev relaxed restraints.35 North Vietnamese and Viet
ters of gravity. Direct, discriminating, and economi- Cong forces lost the battle for hearts and minds in
cal operations to eliminate rival leaders are the es- South Vietnam and took a terrible drubbing during
sence of every coup d'etat.30 The U.S.-Soviet military the Tet offensive of February 1968, but mounting
balance might have developed quite differently if casualties that intensified domestic discontent
the project manager, chief scientists, and other throughout the United States gave them a great psy-
prime movers of Project Manhattan had met un- chological victory.36 Problem solvers in Hanoi there-
timely ends before they perfected the first atom after tailored campaigns to tighten screws on the
bomb31 or if Admiral Hyman Rickover had disap- true center of gravity, which was U.S. national will,
peared in the early 1950s, when he alone was press- until they emerged victorious.37
ing the development of U.S. nuclear-powered sub-
marines.32 Regional Centers of Gravity
Great gains, however, normally entail great risks. Regional centers of gravity may lie within friendly
Historical records include many ill-considered assas- or enemy boundaries. Centers also may migrate,
sinations, such as those of Julius Caesar, Abraham which happened during the Second Punic War
Lincoln, and Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz when legions led by the great Roman general Scipio
Ferdinand. A U.S. decision to hit the "God Emperor" Africanus sailed across the Mediterranean Sea to
Hirohito in the midst of World War II might have Carthage. Hannibal followed to defend his home-
provoked a fight to the finish with Japan. Strategists land, which had become key terrain. His defeat at
therefore would be well advised to think problems Zama and destruction of the Carthaginian power
through before they pick "kingpins" as centers of base in 202 B.C. eliminated Roman fears that he or
gravity. any successor might reinvade Italia?*

Hearts and Minds Continents as Centers of Gravity

Lenin once wrote that "the soundest strategy is to Whole continents sometimes constitute regional
postpone [military] operations until the moral disin- centers of gravity. The Monroe Doctrine on Decem-
tegration of the enemy renders . . . a mortal blow ber 2, 1823 proclaimed that lands in the Western

42
 BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Hemisphere "are not henceforth to be considered lunar libration points L4 and L5, which respectively
as subjects for future colonization by any European inscribe circles 60 degrees ahead of and 60 degrees
powers."39 U.S. strategists, who saw Europe as the behind the Moon in its orbit. Military space forces
overarching center of gravity during World War II, theoretically could loiter indefinitely at either loca-
accorded that continent top priority until Nazi Ger- tion without expending precious fuel if, as com-
many capitulated,40 then prolonged that precedence puter calculations indicate, the gravitational pull of
throughout the Cold War, because the Free World Earth and Moon actually cancel each other. Abilities
would have experienced serious trouble if the Soviet to linger would confer unprecedented advantages,
Union had added Western Europe's immense power because armed forces positioned so favorably could
base to its own. easily launch offensive operations in any direction
and, being atop the "gravity wells" of Earth as well
Coalitions as Centers of Gravity as Moon, could defend effectively against adversar-
Clausewitz claimed that "as a principle . . . if you ies on the bottom.44
can vanquish all your enemies by defeating one of
them. . .that must be the main objective."41 Liddell Opposing Opinions
Hart disagreed when he asserted that "it is more Most commentators believe that national security
fruitful to concentrate first against the weaker part- objectives, complementary military aims, and imple-
ner[s,]" and thereby turned Clausewitzian center of menting missions should focus on centers of grav-
gravity theories inside out.42 Both theses bear close ity.45 At least one well published analyst, however,
inspection, because neither seems to be invari- believes that "critical vulnerabilities and centers of
ably applicable. gravity . . . rarely exist." He further contends that
The United States and the Soviet Union assuredly "by looking for a silver bullet . . . planners may ig-
were strategic centers of gravity as Cold War leaders nore other, more modest but more realistic, objec-
of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Each alliance would tives, or may oversell their plans as being potentially
have retained incredible military power if all lesser more effective than is the case. Arguably this is
members had capitulated, whereas neither alliance what happened in Desert Storm, where [the U.S.-
could have lasted long without superpower partici- led coalition] flawlessly executed plans aimed at
pation. The coalition that ejected Iraqi Armed Forces critical vulnerabilities and centers of gravity, yet
from Kuwait in 1991 conversely balked in 1998, still had no decisive outcome." Allied ground forces
because only the United States (by far its most pow- concentrated on Iraq's Republican Guard, Allied air
erful member) favored the use of force when Sad- forces on Iraqi infrastructure, and Allied navies kept
dam Hussein refused to let UN teams inspect sus- Iraq from exporting petroleum, but "nothing [they]
pected biological and chemical weapon facilities. did forced Saddam Hussein out of power or made
Lack of political rather than military support from him change his basic attitudes."46
Arab allies left U.S. policy-makers and strategists Even so, there seems to be a valid explanation
with two unattractive options: take action alone and (if not an excuse) for that outcome. Coalition leaders
risk condemnation or rely entirely on sanctions to fully understood that "kingpin" Saddam Hussein was
change Saddam's mind.43 a genuine center of gravity but, as JCS Chairman
General Colin L. Powell later recalled, "his elimina-
Centers of Gravity in Space tion was not a stated objective," mainly for political
Centers of gravity in space someday may outrank reasons.47 Lesser centers that were primarily of oper-
terrestrial counterparts. The most commanding lo- ational or tactical rather than strategic importance
cations in the entire Earth-Moon System may be accordingly had to suffice.

43
MILITARY STRATEGY

KEY POINTS
• National security objectives, subordinate military aims, and implementing missions underpin the
formulation of politico-military policies, strategies, plans, and programs
• Properly crafted national military aims should be precise, clearly expressed, and consistent with
security interests and objectives as well as available military power
• Properly crafted national security objectives take political, economic, geographic, cultural, legal,
and moral as well as military matters into account
• Precisely stated military aims not only tell commanders what to do, but constitute achievement
standards with which to measure success
• Military victories that nullify political objectives rarely are beneficial
• Land, sea, air, and space forces organize, equip, and train to perform broad, enduring roles and
functions
• Strategically significant military missions at the highest levels generally cover large regions or
blanket the globe
• Military missions at lower levels are mainly operational or tactical rather than strategic in nature,
and areas of operation are regional or local
• Strategic centers of gravity afford a sharp focus for national security objectives, complementary
military aims, and implementing missions

NOTES sional Action, 1981-1989, Rpt. Nr. 89-61 IF (Wash-

1. George C. McGhee, ed., National Interests and ington: Congressional Research Service, November
Global Goals (Lanham, MD: University Press of 1, 1989).
America, 1989). 8. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York:
2. Neil Sheehan et al., The Pentagon Papers (New York: Praeger, 1967), Chapter XXI, "National Object and
Quadrangle Books, 1971), 242-78; Tom Wells, The Military Aim," quotations on 351.
War Within: America's Battle Over Vietnam (Berke- 9. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 396.
ley: University of California Press, 1994). 10. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins
3. Robert J. Samuelson, "Global Capitalism, R.I.P.?," of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
Newsweek, September 14, 1998, 40-42. ton University Press, 1972); Fraser Harbut, The Iron
4. Nicholas G. Andrews, Poland 1980-81: Solidarity Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the
Versus the Party (Washington: National Defense Uni- Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
versity Press, 1985); Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, 11. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
Gorbachev, and Reform (New York: Cambridge Uni- (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77, 87;
versity Press, 1990). Liddell Hart, Strategy, 365.
5. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade 12. James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revis-
in Europe (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), 138, ited (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); Robert
225, 397; General Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Un-
Six Great Decisions (New York: Longmans, Green, classified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban
and Co., 1956), 229. Missile Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).
6. William R. Bodie, "The Reagan Doctrine," Strategic 13- Wolfgang H. Kraus, "East Germany (June 1953)" and
Review, Winter 1986, 21-29; George Liska, "The Leonard Bushkoff, "Hungary (October-November
Reagan Doctrine: Monroe and Dulles Reincarnate," 1956)," both in Challenge and Response in Interna-
SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 1986, 83-98. tional Conflicts, ed. Doris M. Condit and Bert H.
7. Nina M. Serafino and Maureen Taft-Morales, Contra Cooper, Jr., et al., vol. II, The Experience in Europe
Aid: Summary and Chronology of Major Congres- and the Middle East (Washington: Center for Research

44
 BASIC SECURITY OBJECTIVES

in Social Systems, American University, March 1967), 27. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey: European War
457-96, 529-78; Harry Schwartz, Prague's 200Days: (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
The Struggle for Democracy in Czechoslovakia 1945-1947), especially No. 2, "Overall Report," No.
(New York: Praeger, 1969). 3, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German
14. Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, "On War, War Economy," and No. 64A, "The Impact of Allied
Political Objectives, and Military Strategy," Parame- Air Effort on German Logistics."
ters, December 1983, 2-10. 28. Alexander Werth, Russia At War, 1941-1945 (New
15. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), 213-24, 235, 241.
Macmillan Co., 1963), Chapter 24, "Vae Caesar." The 29. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 71-76, 237-53,
quotation is on 397. 384, 443.
16. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclo- 30. Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (New York: Alfred A.
pedia of Military History: From 3,500 B.C. to the Knopf, 1969).
Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 66. 31. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb
17. President John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, Janu- (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986).
ary 20, 1961. 32. Francis Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy:
18. General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports The Discipline of Technology (Annapolis, MD: Naval
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976), 490. Institute Press, 1989).
19- The broad roles and general functions of U.S. military 33- Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Na-
services are contained in Title 10, United States Code: val Quotations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
Section 167, Special Operations Forces; Section 3062, 1966), 311.
Army; Section 5062, Navy; Section 5063, Marine 34. Werth, Russia at War, 599-618, 790-800.
Corps; Section 8062, Air Force; and Title 14, Coast 35. Gary L. Guertner, "Competitive Strategies and Soviet
Guard. For amplifications, see Department of De- Vulnerabilities," Parameters, March 1988, 26-36;
fense Directive 5100.1: Functions of the Department Steven J. Woehrel, Soviet Union: An Assessment of
of Defense and Its Major Components (Washington, Recent Republic and Local Elections, Rpt. No. 90-
September 25, 1987), 10-21. 355F (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
20. Responsibilities of the nine U.S. unified combatant July 20, 1990).
commands are contained in Unified Command Plan, 36. Don Oberdorfer, Tet! (New York: Doubleday and
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (Washing- Co., 1971).
ton: The White House, September 29, 1999). 37. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: Ameri-
21. Title 10, United States Code, Sections 375 and 379; ca's Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University Press
Title 18, Section 1385, "Use of Army and Air Force of Kentucky, 1984); Harry Summers, On Strategy: A
As Posse Comitatus." See also, Charles Doyle, Use of Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:
the Military to Enforce Civilian Law: Posse Comita- Presidio Press, 1982).
tus Act and Other Considerations, Rpt. 95-964S 38. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipto Africanus: Greater Than
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Sep- Napoleon (New York: Biblo andTannen, 1971), 123-
tember 12, 1995). 203.
22. Walter S. Poole, The History of the Unified Com- 39. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the
mand Plan, 1946-1993 (Washington: Joint History United States, 5th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Winston, 1965), 210-11.
Staff, February 1995), 12-13, 127-29. 40. Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept
23. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command
Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (New
1979), 173-226; Soviet Military Power (Washington: York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), 11-47.
U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1987), 63-70. 41. Clausewitz, On War, 596-97, 617.
24. Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunder- 42. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London:
stood?".^'^ Force Quarterly, Summer 2000,112-15. Faber and Faber, 1943), 60.
25. Robert B. Oakley, "An Envoy's Perspective," Joint 43. John M. Goshko, "U.S. Stands Alone in Seeking Force
Force Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 44-55. Against Iraq," Washington Post, September 21,
26. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael 1998, A16.
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 44. G. Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Englewood
University Press, 1976), 595-97, 617-19. Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 57, 58, 60-61, 86-87.

45
MILITARY STRATEGY

45. Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey, "Centers of 47. General Colin L. Powell and Joseph R. Persico, My
Gravity and Strategic Planning," Military Review, American Journey (New York: Random House,
April 1988, 27-33. 1995), quotation on 490. See also 491, 524, 526-27.
46. Mark Cancian, "Centers of Gravity Are a Myth," U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1998,
30-34.

46
 5. The Primacy of Policy
There is an eternal dispute between those who
imagine the world to suit their policy, and those who
correct their policy to suit the realities of the world.
Attributed to
Albert Sorel
Respectfully Quoted

I llinois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, speaking to

the Los Angeles Town Club on September 11,
1952, asserted that "The really basic thing in govern-
mountains, deserts, cities), at sea (surface, subsur-
face), along littorals, in Earth's atmosphere, and
in space.1
ment is policy. Bad administration, to be sure, can
destroy good policy, but good administration can Policies Compared with
never save bad policy." His sage observation has Commitments
major national security implications, because na- Policies differ essentially from commitments, which
tional security policies not only govern objectives make governments take action in response to speci-
(ends) and resource allocations (means), but con- fied conditions. Collective security policies, for ex-
strain acceptable courses of action (ways) and other- ample, loosely link communities of nations that have
wise shape politico-military strategies, whether in- common wants and needs, whereas Article 5 of
stigators freewheel or take real world conditions the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that "an armed
into account. attack against one or more [members] . . . shall be
This chapter describes basic policy attributes, considered an attack against them all," and thereby
then concentrates on three of the pivotal options obliges each signatory to take "such action as it
that Table 9 depicts: civil-military control (who calls deems necessary, including the use of armed force."
the shots), relationships between foreign and do- The United States, which has no security contract
mestic policy (which receives most resources); and with Israel, supports that nation's independence
relative ranks of military and nonmilitary power and territorial integrity as a matter of policy, but
(which options take precedence). incurs no commitment.

BASIC POLICY ATTRIBUTES Stability vs. Change

National security policies, which reflect cultural National security policies are relatively stable as a
contexts, vary from time to time and place to place. rule, but reversals occasionally occur on short notice
Unlike commitments, they incur no obligations. Pol- without any alteration in national interests, as pre-
icies also differ from military doctrines, which stan- viously militaristic Japanese policy-makers con-
dardize offensive and defensive procedures under firmed when they embraced a pacifist constitution
various conditions on land (in the arctic, jungles, shortly after atom bombs devastated Hiroshima and

47
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 9
Polarized Politico-Military Policy Options

Polarized Control Options Civilian Control or Military Control

Central Control or Diffuse Control
Polarized Foreign Policy Options Foreign Policy or Domestic Policy
Military Power or Nonmilitary Power
Global Influence or Regional Influence
Lead or Follow
Risk Management or Risk Avoidance
Collective Security or Unilateral Action
Security Assistance or Laissez Faire
Arms Race or Arms Control
Polarized Force Development Options Unified Services or Separate Services
Quantity or Quality
Balanced Forces or Dominant Service
Conscripts or Volunteers
Active Forces or Reserve Forces
Revolutionary or Evolutionary
Basic Research or Applied Technology
Innovative or Proven Systems
Polarized Resource Allocation Options Forward Presence or Power Projection
Guns or Butter
Cyclical Cutbacks or Continuity
Plentiful Funding or Skimpy Funding
Early Acquisition or Deferred Acquisition
Polarized Force Employment Options No Time Limits or Tight Time Limits
Strike First or Retaliate
Decisive Force or Gradual Escalation
Firepower or Maneuver
Destruction or Dislocation
Deep Strike or Close Combat
Overt or Covert
Few Civic Duties or Many Civic Duties

Nagasaki.2 President Lyndon B. Johnson and his suc- technological competence, budgetary priorities,
cessor Richard M. Nixon both believed that U.S. traditions, ideologies, habit patterns, beliefs, laws,
security would suffer if Communists won the Viet- ethics, and cherished values are a few among many
nam War, but the former Americanized that conflict cogent considerations. Intelligence estimators, net
from 1965 through 1968 as a matter of policy, assessors, and strategists who endeavor to deter-
whereas the latter adopted a policy called Vietnam- mine which among many options opponents most
ization immediately after he entered office on Janu- likely will pick thus try to worm their way inside
ary 20, 1969.3 enemy minds.4
History confirms that cultural influences on secu-
Cultural Contexts rity policies are deeply rooted phenomena. Auto-
Politiciomilitary cultures strongly influence predis- cratic Assyria fathered bloodthirsty guidelines that
positions to accept or reject particular policies. democratic Athens found anathema. Imperial Rome
Geopolitical settings, attitudes toward armed forces adopted prescriptions that commercially inclined
and their employment, bureaucratic institutions, Phoenicia rejected, and ancient China took an en-

48
 THE PRIMACY OF POLICY

tirely different tack.5 Subnational and nongovern- the following July; Challe and Zeller were jailed
mental organizations as well as nation-states still for fifteen years; Salan and Jouhaud received death
elect idiosyncratic policy guidelines in response to sentences in absentia; senior subordinates were ca-
ever-evolving cultural circumstances. shiered without pensions; and many less culpable
participants suffered early retirements.9
CIVIL-MILITARY POLICIES
The most elemental of all national security policies Civilian Control in Autocracies
specifies whether civilian or military leaders at the The Soviet system of supercentralized control over
highest levels exert centralized or decentralized its military machine has served as a model for many
control over armed forces. Excessive political con- autocratic Chiefs of State. Occupants of the Kremlin
trol can undermine military effectiveness. Insuffi- preserved that policy for seven decades, because
cient political control invites coups d'etat and leaves they remembered that the Russian Revolution
military leaders free to pursue objectives that may erupted when much of the Baltic Fleet mutinied
conflict with important national interests. and the cruiser Aurora opened fire on the Tsar's
Winter Palace in Petrograd.10 Policies and programs
Military Control designed to obviate "counterrevolutionary" upris-
Armed forces that function as autonomous power ings thus enjoyed consistently high priorities.
centers rather than as servants of the State endanger
dictatorships as well as democracies, because all Preemptive Purges
too often they determine what roles military power Stalin preemptively squelched any possible rebel-
should play in society, decide where and when to lion in 1937-38 when he arrested, convicted, and
employ it, topple governments with which they executed, or imprisoned nearly 43,000 commis-
disagree, then repress political opponents to retain sioned officers who conceivably might have chal-
control.6 Military regimes installed without benefit lenged his rule, including close friends of long-stand-
of free elections dominated Latin America until de- ing. Axed combatant commanders reportedly
mocracies began to blossom late in the twentieth included three out of five marshals, fourteen of six-
century7 and continue to speckle Africa, where teen military district commanders, eight out of nine
weak or repressive regimes beg to be replaced.8 fleet admirals and admirals in the next lower grade,
Disaffected factions that favor military control fifty of fifty-seven corps commanders, 154 of 186
sometimes instigate insurgencies and coups, even division commanders, and a slew of brigade com-
in nations that traditionally transfer political power manders. Barely half of all colonels and above re-
by peaceful means. French Generals Maurice Challe, mained unscathed after the bloodletting ceased,
Raoul Salan, Edmond Jouhaud, and Andre Zeller in some simply because they were far removed from
the spring of 1961, for example, demanded that Moscow.11
President Charles de Gaulle renege on his offer to Those merciless purges, which shook the Soviet
grant Algeria independence. The Organisation de military establishment to its foundation, eliminated
I'Armee Secrete (OAS), perhaps 40,000 strong with the officer corps as a possible source of competition
18,000 paratroopers and legionnaires at the core, for Stalin's political crown, but combat capabilities
seized Algiers on April 22d without firing a shot, plummeted. Heavily outnumbered Finnish defend-
but the coup quickly collapsed because all four lead- ers outclassed substandard Soviet adversaries from
ers lost heart when few other military formations November 1939 until March 1940, when sheer mass
rallied round their flag. Algeria gained independence finally overwhelmed them.12 The Generalissimo's

49
MILITARY STRATEGY

counterproductive policy nevertheless persisted un- Civilian Control in Democracies

til Nazi invaders put Soviet survival at stake in June Most democratic countries prefer decentralized
1941. Stalin soon thereafter released and rehabili- control over their armed forces. The U.S. model,
tated perhaps one fourth of all officers that kangaroo which has served reasonably well for more than
courts had incarcerated, because he desperately two centuries, reflects the Constitution, subse-
needed professional help to save Mother Russia. quent legislation, implementing directives, and
long-standing traditions that segregate political
Intrusive Control from military authority. Executive and Legislative
Increasingly restrictive organizational arrangements Branches of the Federal Government share national
that might have inspired Big Brother in George security responsibilities so no "man on horseback"
Orwell's horror story entitled 1984 prevented mili- might easily amass enough military power to con-
tary meddling in Soviet political affairs. Communist duct a successful coup.16
Party control mechanisms subjected all ranks to con-
tinuous scrutiny, rewarded informants, punished Key Restrictions
miscreants, and thereby ensured strict compliance George Washington, Andrew Jackson, Zachary Tay-
with stringent rules. Political officers at every eche- lor, Ulysses S. Grant, and Dwight D. Eisenhower
lon after February 1956 overrode military command- were professional soldiers before they became Presi-
ers in many regards that included responsibilities dent of the United States. President Jimmy Carter
for combat readiness.13 was a Navy careerist. Several others wore uniforms
Not even Marshal Georgy K. Zhukov, a charis- for a few years,17 but no military person of any rank
matic Hero of the Soviet Union several times over, has ever occupied the Oval Office while on active
was immune from punitive action. Nikita Khrush- duty (President Eisenhower resigned his lifetime
chev, in his capacity as First Secretary of the Commu- five-star commission to avoid possible accusations
nist Party, made him Minister of Defense in 1955 of impropriety).
and a full-fledged member of the ruling Presidium Authoritarian German regimes attacked neigh-
in June 1957, then sacked him four months later, bors twice in the twentieth century (1914, 1939)
partly because Zhukov's resistance to political con- using strategies that an elite General Staff with oper-
trol allegedly violated "Leninist principles concern- ational as well as planning powers produced.18
ing the administration of the armed forces" and Those performances fostered phobias in the United
partly because Khrushchev's cronies complained States, which framed the National Security Act of
that Zhukov was "heading for a military coup 1947 to safeguard the nation against all foes, includ-
d'etat."14 ing U.S. Armed Forces, which perchance could
threaten cherished freedoms if unfettered. That doc-
Autocratic Control Appraised ument, revised, updated, and codified in Title 10,
Political strangleholds just described virtually obvi- U.S. Code, prohibits the appointment of any individ-
ated military rebellions, but liabilities otherwise out- ual as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Deputy
weighed assets. Soviet-style political controls dis- SECDEF, or Under Secretary "within 10 years after
rupted military chains of command; insidious relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of
surveillance fostered paranoia, because friends and a regular component of an armed force." Second
informers were indistinguishable; quests for confor- lieutenants and ensigns are just as ineligible as gener-
mity inhibited innovation; and subordinates hesi- als and admirals.19 Congress granted General of the
tated to take initiative without prior permission.15 Army George C. Marshall a special dispensation in

50
 THE PRIMACY OF POLICY

September 1950, but expressly stipulated that "after Democratic Control Appraised
[he] leaves office . . . no additional appointments of Decentralized civilian control of armed forces com-
military men shall be made."20 plicates national security planning. Elected officials
and appointees, many of whom lack military experi-
Diversified Power Centers ence, span a political spectrum from far left to far
The Chief Executive exercises high-level politico- right. Resultant inefficiencies sometimes spill blood
military functions in most democratic as well as and waste money unnecessarily, but the system
totalitarian countries, but the U.S. Constitution de- works reasonably well on balance and military mega-
liberately separates those responsibilities. Article II, lomaniacs rarely threaten democracy.
Section 2 designates the President as "Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy . . . and of the Militia FOREIGN VS. DOMESTIC POLICIES
of the several States, when called into the actual International and intranational policies compete for
Service of the United States." Article I, Section 8 top priority, but a reasonable balance is mandatory,
empowers Congress to declare wars and "provide because excessive attention to domestic matters may
for the common Defense" by raising and supporting jeopardize objectives abroad, while excessive atten-
regular armed forces plus a militia. Section 8 also tion to foreign affairs may invite trouble on the home
prescribes rules.21 Cabinet officers who share na- front. Heavy investments in military power that de-
tional security responsibilities report directly to the prive the domestic sector of resources seldom are
President. Members of the National Security Coun- sustainable over long hauls, except in police states
cil (NSC) since 1947 have been duty bound to that brutally discourage dissent and in countries that
"assess and appraise [U.S.] objectives, commit- receive substantial subsidies from outsiders. U.S. and
ments, and risks . . . in relation to ... actual and Soviet stances are instructive in such respects.
potential military power," then advise him "with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and U.S. Priorities
military policies."22 Obligations to "provide for the common defense
Congress, cast in the role of resource allocator [and] promote the general welfare," as stipulated
and critic, does not prepare national security poli- in the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution, are as valid
cies and plans per se, but its budgetary powers today as they were when signatories put pen to
and oversight authorities strongly influence the size, paper on September 17, 1787. Most Presidents and
shape, characteristics, and capabilities of U.S. Armed Congress in peacetime, however, have reversed that
Forces, together with concepts for their employ- sequence with public approval.
ment.23 Subcommittees concentrate on regional in-
terests around the world. International operations, Pre-World War U
human rights, narcotics, and terrorism attract con- President Theodore Roosevelt devoted serious at-
tinuing attention. Military concerns include readi- tention to international as well as internal affairs
ness, personnel, strategic nuclear and air-land from 1901 to 1909 but, with time out for World
forces, seapower, research, development, installa- War I and its immediate aftermath, domestic matters
tions, and facilities. Statutes that restrict presidential dominated for the next thirty years during six con-
war powers,24 covert operations,25 and security assis- secutive Administrations (William H. Taft, Woodrow
tance to countries that violate human rights26 addi- Wilson, Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, Herbert
tionally constrain national security policies and mili- Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt well into his sec-
tary strategies. ond term). Strategically significant military activities

51
MILITARY STRATEGY

throughout those three decades, all small-scale and prosperity, reinforce our democratic ideals and val-
low-profile, were confined to pacification programs ues, and enhance our security."32
in the Philippines, gunboat diplomacy in China, and
punitive expeditions against Mexico's Pancho Villa,
plus peace enforcement duties in Colombia/Pan-
Soviet Priorities
President Nixon during U.S. involvement in Vietnam
ama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicara-
warned protesters and congressional budget cutters
gua.27 Financially (but not intellectually) impover-
not to "pose a false choice between meeting [U.S.]
ished U.S. military strategists nevertheless more than
responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of
earned their pay between 1919 and 1938 by explor-
our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall
ing problems that U.S. and Allied Armed Forces soon
meet neither."33 Soviet leaders from Joseph Stalin
would face in real-life theaters of operation through-
through Konstantin Chernenko, oblivious to that
out the world.28
reality, largely ignored their nation's domestic needs
until 1985, with devastating effects.
Cold War
The Kremlin's Cold War claim to superpower
Foreign policy overshadowed U.S. domestic policy
status depended mainly on mammoth armed forces
during most of the Cold War (1946-1989). The
that demanded immense resources, but troubles
United States, in its capacity as leader of what was
brewed in the 1980s, because the economy stag-
widely known as the "Free World," sought to con-
nated while military costs soared. Mikhail Gorba-
tain the spread of Communism wherever it en-
chev, newly installed at the peak of the Soviet polit-
croached in whatever guise. Deterrence and defense
ico-military pyramid, thus found himself in a "no-
against Soviet aggression retained high priorities
win" position: the U.S.-Soviet military balance would
even after opposition to the Vietnam War generated
gradually favor the United States and its allies unless
acrimonious debates about the proper balance be-
reforms strengthened the civilian economy; divert-
tween international and domestic needs.29
ing funds from Soviet Armed Forces risked a military
rebellion and might lead to social upheavals by a
Early Post-Cold War
populace with appetites for better living standards.
U.S. foreign policies remained assertive early in the
Gorbachev gambled on Glasnost (openness) and
twenty-first century, despite the Soviet demise. Pres-
Perestroika (restructuring) programs that included
ident George Bush visualized a "New World Order,"
economic conversions, unilateral force reductions,
established in concert with a community of allied
unprecedented arms control agreements, and with-
nations that shared U.S. interests.30 President Bill
drawal from Afghanistan after a decade of incon-
Clinton, his successor, early on admitted that the
clusive combat. Intolerable strains consequently
United States "cannot solve every problem, [but]
caused the Soviet Union to collapse.34
will serve as a fulcrum for change and a pivot point
for peace."31 His commitment to that course was
steadfast despite close attention to economic inter- MILITARY VS. NONMILITARY
ests, as noted in the 1998 version of A National POWER
Security Strategy for a New Century: "At this mo- Foreign policies, which specify national roles within
ment in history, the United States is called upon to international communities, help shape military strat-
lead—to organize the forces of freedom and prog- egies. Military capabilities contribute abundantly to
ress; to channel the unruly energies of the global each country's political clout. Close connections
economy into positive avenues; and to advance our thus are indispensable.

52
 THE PRIMACY OF POLICY

Military Power Predominates advisers produced "a clear political policy." Unjusti-
Military power has figured prominently in foreign fiable gaps otherwise might open between ends and
relations since ancient Egyptian, Hyksos, Hittite, and means. Madeleine Albright, who then was U.S. Am-
Assyrian leaders relied on armed forces to amass the bassador to the United Nations and subsequently
world's first empires.35 Persian monarchs, Alexander served as Secretary of State, asked in frustration,
the Great, and Roman caesars, followed by ana- "What's the point of having this superb military that
logues in Arabia, Central Asia, and the Orient, did you're always talking about if we can't use it?" His
likewise.36 Britain, France, and Spain relied less on response restated his original requirement: "Set
coercion to accumulate huge holdings in the Ameri- tough policy goals first."38
cas, Asia, and Africa, but employed "muscle" liber-
ally to defend their colonies.37 Force or threats of STRATEGIC BEAD-STRINGING
force in this day and age remain valid alternatives The full significance of national security policies
if other measures fail to achieve foreign policy objec- emerges when politico-military strategists string
tives. Past and present despots like Joseph Stalin them together like beads. High-quality concepts and
and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein seem to under- plans, however, ensue only if implementing forces
stand no other language ("The Pope! How many receive harmonious guidelines. NATO's deterrent
divisions does he have?" is the former's widely strategy, which denied Warsaw Pact opponents any
quoted quip, delivered during French Premier Pierre hope of quick victory at acceptable cost during the
J,aval's visit to Moscow in May 1937). Cold War, successfully knitted together nonprovo-
cation, containment (rather than rollback), collec-
Nonmilitary Power Predominates tive security, economy of force, forward defense,
Nonaggressive nations normally employ military controlled escalation, nuclear second strike, and an
power to further foreign policy objectives only when option to use nuclear weapons first if the Kremlin
diplomatic and economic leverage fail to achieve triggered a traditional war.39 U.S. bead-stringing
required results. Crucial considerations even then throughout the Vietnam War conversely featured
concern cost-benefit ratios. JCS Chairman General stringent policy constraints and repeated flip-flops,
Colin L. Powell in February 1993, for example, pub- which made it impossible to sustain any strategy
licly opposed the commitment of U.S. Armed Forces that might have preserved South Vietnam as an inde-
in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the President and his pendent nation.40

53
MILITARY STRATEGY

KEY POINTS
Politico-military policies are basic ingredients of strategy.
National security policy-makers, who establish objectives, allocate resources, and limit military
courses of action, provide the focus for strategic concepts and plans.
Policy options contain many alternatives between polarized extremes.
National security policies normally are stable, but occasionally change on short notice.
Politico-military cultures strongly influence predispositions to accept or reject particular policy
options.
The most elemental national security policy specifies civilian or military control of armed
forces.
Excessively centralized civilian control tends to undermine military effectiveness; excessively
decentralized civilian control complicates strategic planning.
The winner of competition between foreign and domestic priorities receives most national
resources.
Foreign policies help shape military strategies; military power contributes to foreign policy
clout.
Despots tend to rely heavily on military power; nonaggressive nations tend to emphasize diplo-
matic and economic leverage in the absence of imminent threats.
Excessive emphasis on domestic matters may jeopardize objectives abroad; excessive emphasis
on foreign affairs may invite trouble at home.
Bold foreign policies unaccompanied by adequate military power encourage serious gaps
between ends and means.

NOTES 3. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New

1. U.S. joint and uniservice doctrines cover almost ev- York: David McCay Co., 1969), Chapters VIII, IX;
ery conceivable circumstance. Foundation docu- U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy
ments include Joint Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Joint for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard M.
Operations (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Nixon, President of the United States (Washington:
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993); Field Manual (FM) 3-0, U.S. Government Printing Office, February 18,
Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1970), 68-72.
June 14, 2001); Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Basic 4. American Military Culture in the Twenty-First
Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Century (Washington: Center for Strategic & Inter-
2 vols. (Washington: Department of the Air Force, national Studies, February 2000); Ken Booth, Strat-
1992); From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service egy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and
for the 21st Century, a White Paper (Washington: Meier, 1979); Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic
Department of the Navy, September 1992) and For- Culture," Comparative Strategy, vol. 10, 1991,
ward. .. From the Sea (1994), both address the U.S. 3-23.
Navy and Marine Corps. 5. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History
2. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Western World, 3 vols. (New York: Funk &
of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: Wagnalls, 1954), especially the chronicles that pre-
Random House, 1970); William Manchester, Ameri- cede each chapter; Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and
can Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Bos- trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford Univer-
ton: Little, Brown, 1978), 488-501. sity Press, 1963); Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K.

54
 THE PRIMACY OF POLICY

Fairbank, eds., Chinese Ways of Warfare (Cambridge, 16. Russell Weigley, "The American Military and the Prin-
MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1-26. ciple of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,"
6. For takeover tactics, refer to Edward N. Luttwak, Journal of Military History, vol. 57, issue 5 (October
Coup d'Etat (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969). 1993), 27-58.
7. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., The 17. William A. DeGregorio, The Complete Book of U.S.
Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin Presidents: From George Washington to Bill Clin-
America, rev. and updated ed. (Wilmington, DE: ton, 5th ed. (New York: Wings Books, 1997).
Scholarly Resources, 1997); Abraham F. Lowenthal 18. Walter Goerlitz, History of the German General
and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Staff, 1657-1945. trans. Brian Battershaw (West-
Latin America, rev. ed. (New York: Holmes and port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975; reprint of the
Meier, 1986). 1953 ed., published in New York by Praeger); Trevor
8. William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, 1998); and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs,
Samuel Decalo, Psychoses of Power: African Per- NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977).
sonal Dictatorships (Boulder, CO: Westview 19. Sections 133(a) and 134(a), Title 10, United States
Press, 1989). Code; Public Law 95-140, "Defense Department—
9. Contexts are contained in Robert B. Asprey, War in Deputy and Under Secretaries of Defense, Position
the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, vol. II (Gar- Changes" (October 21, 1977).
den City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1975), 903-31; 20. Public Law 81-788, September 18, 1950.
James R. Price, "Algeria, 1954-1962," in Challenge 21. Overviews are available in Samuel P. Huntington,
and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. Ill, The Expe- The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics
rience in Africa and Latin America, ed. D. M. Condit of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: the
and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington: Center Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1959); Allan R.
for Research in Social Systems, American University, Millett, The American Political System and Civilian
April 1968), 177-203. Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective,
10. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Mershon Position Papers in the Policy Sciences, no.
Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, 4 (Columbus: The Mershon Center of Ohio State
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), 124-26. University, April 1979).
11. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment 22. Section 402, Title 50, United States Code; John
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 182- Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the Na-
213, 427-31, 450-53. tional Security Council from Truman to Bush (New
12. Allen F. Chew, "Beating the Russians in the Snow: York: Morrow, 1991).
The Finns and the Russians, 1940," Military Review, 23. Wallace Earl Walker, "Congressional Resurgence and
June 1980, 38-47; Fighting the Russians in Winter. the Destabilization of U.S. Foreign Policy," Parame-
Three Case Studies, Leavenworth Papers No. 5 (Fort ters, September 1988, 54-67.
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General 24. War Powers Resolution of 1973, P.L. 93-148, 87 Stat.
Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, December 555; "War Powers of Congress and the President—
1981), 17-30. Veto," Congressional Record, November 7, 1973,
13. Michael J. Deane, Political Control of the Soviet S20093-S20116; The War Powers Resolution: Rele-
Armed Forces: A Conflict of Interests (New York: vant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, Sub-
Crane, Russak and Co., 1977); Eugene D. Betit, Politi- committee on Arms Control, International Security,
cal Control of the Soviet Armed Forces: The Commit- and Science of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
tee of People's Control, unclassified (Washington: 100th Cong., 2dsess. (Washington: U.S. Government
Defense Intelligence Agency, 1978). Printing Office, May 1988).
14. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The 25. Intelligence Authorization Actfor FY1990-91, Rpt.
Last Testament, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Bos- No. 101-174, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (Senate Select
ton: Little, Brown, 1974), 13-15; Otto Preston Cha- Committee on Intelligence, September 18, 1989), 6-
ney, Jr., Zhukov, rev. ed. (Norman: University of 9, 18-33; Richard F. Grimmett, Covert Actions: Con-
Oklahoma Press, 1996), 397-465. gressional Oversight, Issue Brief 87208 (Washington:
15. Thomas W. Wolfe, The Military Dimension in the Congressional Research Service, March 23, 1989).
Making of Soviet Foreign and Defense Policy (Wash- 26. Title 22, United States Code, Section 2151n, "Human
ington: RAND Corporation, October 1977). Rights and Development Assistance."

55
MILITARY STRATEGY

27. John M. Collins, America's Small Wars: Lessons for New Thinking for Our Country and the World, up-
the Future (Washington: Brassey's [U.S.], 1991), 91- dated ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1988); Lieuten-
92, 95-96, 101-10, 213, 214-15, 216-20. ant General William E. Odom, The Collapse of the
28. Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University
of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command Press, 1998).
Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington: 35. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclo-
Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, pedia of Military History: From 3,500 B.C. to the
I960), 11-47. Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993),
29. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, Global Ri- 1-147.
vals: The Forty-Year Contest for Supremacy Be- 36. Fred McGraw Donner, The Early Islamic Conquests
tween America and the Soviet Union (New York: (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981);
Vintage Books, 1988); John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies Erik Hildinger, Warriors of the Steppe: A Military
of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar History of Central Asia, 500 B.C. to 1,700 A.D. (New
American National Security Policy (New York: Ox- York: Sarpedon, 1997); Robert Marshall, Storm from
ford University Press, 1982). the East: From Ghenghis Khan to Kublai Khan
30. National Security Strategy of the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
(Washington: The White House, August 1991); 37. See, for example, Byron Farwell, Queen Victoria's
Stanley R. Sloan, The U.S. Role in a New World Order: Little Wars (New York: Harper & Row, 1972);
Prospects for George Bush's Global Vision, Rpt. 294 Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Com-
RCO (Washington: Congressional Research Service, plete History of the Legendary Fighting Force (New
March 28, 1991). York: HarperCollins, 1991).
31. President Bill Clinton, Address to the 48th Session 38. General Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My
of the United Nations General Assembly, September American Journey (New York: Random House,
27, 1993. 1995), 576-77.
32. A National Security Strategy for a New Century 39. NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, Belgium: NATO
(Washington: The White House, October 1998). Information Service, any issue in the late 1970s to
Quotation on iv. the mid-1980s).
33- Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: 40. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: Ameri-
Nixon, 1969 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing ca's Military Role in Vietnam, Lexington: University
Office, 1971), 434. of Kentucky Press, 1984; Robert S. McNamara with
34. Ilya Zemtsov and John Farrar, Gorbachev: The Man Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and
and the System (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Time Books, 1995).
Publishers, 1989); Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika:

56
 PART II

FUNDAMENTALS OF
MILITARY STRATEGY
This page intentionally left blank
 6. Strategic Starting Points
Glendower. I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
hut will they come when you do call
for them?
William Shakespeare
Henry IV, Pan I

S trategies designed to achieve politico-military

objectives are endlessly variable. Each demands
different armed forces, incurs different costs, and
are part art and part science, lean heavily on assump-
tions whenever facts are unavailable.

runs different risks. Any given strategy "may be the Strategic Theories
best possible in certain situations and the worst Intellectual pioneers in every field of endeavor de-
conceivable in others," according to General velop theories that must be validated by trial and
d'Armee Andre Beaufre, who accumulated a wealth error or calculations. Their hypotheses, which ex-
of practical experience during his lengthy tenure pand the knowledge base with no particular applica-
as a strategic theoretician, planner, and practitioner tions in mind,3 sometimes have serendipitous spin-
for France.1 offs with awesome implications. Albert Einstein's
Proficient national security policy-makers and Special Theory of Relativity, the outgrowth of basic
military strategists, like Hotspur, are well aware scientific research, for example, unexpectedly
that "spirits from the vasty deep" come at required paved the way for nuclear weapons.
times and places only if the call is compelling. They Creative thinkers since the Stone Age have left
therefore develop a range of innovative options a legacy of creative ideas that successors continue
designed to solve particular problems under given to enrich.4 The earliest on record was Sun Tzu,
conditions, then select the course of action they whose writings circa 500 B.C. profoundly influ-
believe most likely would elicit desired responses enced unconventional warfare in the twentieth
from friends, enemies, and fence-straddlers. Those century (Mao Zedong was his most prominent dis-
who skillfully employ strategic building blocks, ciple).5 Niccolo Machiavelli made a lasting mark
schools of thought, and other fundamentals gener- on strategic skullduggery when he penned The
ally enjoy the most consistent success. Prince in 1513 (Lenin latched onto his ideas 400
years later).6 Carl von Clausewitz, Alfred Thayer
STRATEGIC BUILDING BLOCKS Mahan, and Giulio Douhet respectively influence
Strategic planners, knowingly or not, use theories, U.S. land, sea, and air strategies to this very day.7
principles, policies, doctrines, and concepts as intel- Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie's unfulfilled quest for a
lectual building blocks (Table 10 summarizes re- general theory of power control left a target for
spective attributes).2 Integrating processes, which ambitious innovators to shoot at.8

59
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 10
Strategic Building Blocks
Strategic Strategic Security Military Strategic
Theories Principles Policies Doctrines Concepts
Properties Hypotheses Truths Guidelines Convictions Options
Purposes Open New Control Regulate Standardize Solve
Options Quality Applications Procedures Problems
Sources Imagination Historical National Practical Syntheses
Experience Preferences Experience
Styles Speculative Declarative Directive Instructive Applicative
Producers Intellectual Politico-Military Top Politico-Military Top Military Strategic
Pioneers Scholars Officials Officials Planners

Strategic Principles The Kremlin's policy of "peaceful coexistence,"

Strategic principles are self-evident truths that polit- which Nikita Khrushchev articulated at the 20th
ico-military scholars have distilled from historical Communist Party Congress in February 1956, once
studies over several millennia, but not all lists are typified entries in the latter category. That form
alike. Entries expressed in one or two words (sur- of politico-military conflict, redesignated "detente"
prise, security, simplicity) are subject to dissimilar about 1972, employed psychological warfare, sub-
interpretations and, unlike some laws of physics, version, and disinformation programs on a grand
economics, and natural sciences, are neither immu- scale in efforts to undermine non-Communist re-
table nor invariably applicable. Experienced strate- gimes around the world.9 Countervailing U.S. poli-
gists nevertheless use principles as checklists to help cies drew sharper boundaries between war and
control the quality of theories, policies, doctrines, peace, respected the spirit as well as the letter of
concepts, and plans (whether Proposal A violates laws, fought "fairly" in accord with traditional
the Principle of Surprise and, if so, what difference "rules," and found "dirty tricks" repugnant. Respec-
does it make is a typical question). Chapter 7 ad- tive platforms for strategic competition thus differed
dresses Principles of Deterrence, Chapter 8 dis- markedly in most respects.
cusses Principles of War, and Chapter 9 deals with
previously unexplored Principles of Preparedness. Military Doctrines
Military doctrines standardize strategic, operational,
Security Policies tactical, and logistical procedures in peacetime as
Top civilian and military leaders review national well as war under offensive, defensive, and benign
security policy options (a few of which appear on conditions. Doctrinal tenets, which are products of
Table 9 page 48), pick those that best serve stated practical experience, indicate that certain behaviors
purposes, then promulgate guidelines that officially produce best results for land, sea, air, amphibious,
affect almost every military strategy. Some policies, and space forces in given environments. Military
such as those that regulate military personnel re- doctrines, unlike policies, are instructive rather than
cruitment standards and relations with civilian con- directive in nature. Conformance is not required if
tractors, pertain to relatively narrow functions, common sense dictates otherwise.10
whereas many have overarching ramifications. Each armed service establishes a doctrinal frame-

60
 STRATEGIC STARTING POINTS

work within which many subordinate doctrines re- Navies and air forces exist primarily to transport
side.11 Some address military operations in distinc- troops to scenes of action and support them after
tive regions (arctic, equatorial, wet, dry, rural, arrival. Land power will bring conflicts to conclu-
urban, level, mountainous, and so on).12 Others con- sion and thereafter occupy enemy territory if re-
cern distinctive functions, such as antisubmarine quired.
warfare, close air support, and counter-insurgency.
Maritime School
Strategic Concepts Continental methods of operation are fairly foreign
Strategic concepts, unlike theories, seek to solve to the Maritime School, whose members have a
specific problems. Formulation responsibilities rest global reach. Many devotees favor the teachings of
with politico-military planners who fold relevant Alfred Thayer Mahan, who preached that control of
theories, principles, policies, and doctrines into vari- high seas and littorals determines decisions ashore.16
ous theses calculated to achieve security objectives The basic objective is to dominate critical sea lanes
effectively and efficiently despite perceived opposi- and choke points that channelize forces afloat. Sur-
tion. Decision-makers, after weighing pluses and mi- face ships, submarines, and amphibious forces then
nuses, bless what appears to be the best option. can master land masses by blockades or the selective
Antiballistic missile concepts, for example, projection of power inland.
might rely mainly on point defenses or contemplate
area defenses that feature boost phase, mid-course,
or terminal intercepts using weaponry based on Aeronautical School
land, at sea, in space, or in some combination. Rela- The Aeronautical School was founded in 1921 by
tive risks, costs, and technological complexities Giulio Douhet, whose disciples now are legion.17
strongly influence inclinations to accept or reject Their fundamental beliefs are, first, that air power
any course of action under consideration.13 unaided can be decisive; second, that given a free
hand air power could make protracted combat obso-
STRATEGIC SCHOOLS OF lete; and third, that control of the air and the destruc-
THOUGHT tion of the enemy's war-making potential, primarily
Continental, maritime, air, space, and special opera- population centers and industrial bases, are the most
tions forces embrace military cultures and strategic important missions. Air support for ground forces
schools of thought that cause them to view strategic rates a much lower priority.
problems from different perspectives. The follow-
ing summaries deliberately oversimplify salient char- Astronautical School
acteristics to emphasize dissimilarities.14 Members of the embryonic Astronautical School
promote innovative strategies, tactics, and force
Continental School postures that complement those of land, sea, and
Adherents of the Continental School, who are direct air.18 Their central theme is still indistinct, but space
strategic descendants of Clausewitz, tend to com- strategists believe that armed forces positioned at
partmentalize the globe into theaters of operation, lunar libration points L4 and L5, 60 degrees ahead
regional areas of responsibility, and local zones of and behind Earth's moon in its orbit, could dominate
action. They contend that the defeat (even destruc- the entire Earth-Moon System. If so, they may adapt
tion) of enemy armed forces, mainly by manpower- Halford J. Mackinder's Heartland Theory with words
intensive armies, is the ultimate object of war.15 much like these:19

61
MILITARY STRATEGY

Who rules circumterrestrial space commands Sequential and Cumulative

Planet Earth; Strategies
Who rules the Moon commands circumterres- Sequential strategies comprise successive steps,
trial space; each contingent on those that precede, until they
Who rules L4 and L5 commands the Earth- reach the final objective. Typical linkages include de-
Moon System. fensive operations, followed by counteroffensives
when circumstances permit. Cumulative strategies,
Special Operations School in contrast, constitute concurrently conducted ac-
The Special Operations School is populated by small tions, none individually decisive, that eventually cre-
teams distinctively prepared to perform overt, co- ate crushing results.24 Strategic bombardments and
vert, and clandestine missions that orthodox armed naval campaigns against enemy merchant ships are
forces could not accomplish as well, if at all. Its illustrative. The Soviet Union used cumulative tech-
members, who mix force with fraud and finesse, niques in a different vein during the 1940s when, one
offer decision-makers scalpels rather than sledge by one, Stalin incarcerated nine countries behind the
hammers for sensitive deterrent, persuasive, coer- Iron Curtain. No single loss seemed shattering to Free
cive, and war-fighting purposes.20 World leaders, but the Kremlin absorbed most of
Central Europe before NATO blocked further en-
croachments.
Unifying School Sequential and cumulative strategies usually are
Inquisitive thinkers seek a Unifying School of strate- mutually reinforcing, as U.S. Armed Forces demon-
gic thought that could weld Continental, Maritime, strated during World War II when they pursued
Aeronautical, Astronautical, and Special Operations two interrelated courses of action against Japan.
Schools together more tightly than joint military Sequential campaigns island-hopped across the Pa-
doctrines have yet been able to do. Parallel searches cific Ocean toward Tokyo, while cumulative cam-
for superior ways to integrate all forms of military paigns aimed at Japan's economy simultaneously
and nonmilitary power proceed along similar lines.21 severed air and sea lines of supply and communi-
Military strategists meanwhile must sift claims from cation.25
separate schools throughout planning and program-
ming processes. Direct and Indirect Strategies
Military strategies, like music, can be played in two
ELEMENTAL ALTERNATIVES keys.26 Most employ both in favored combinations
National purposes, styles, values, and geographic but the major key, which accentuates direct uses
circumstances often govern military strategies. Swit- offeree, has dominated since Cain killed Abel. Com-
zerland and Sweden, for example, made neutrality pellence still outranks posturing and persuasion
stick during World Wars I and II, because no nation when security interests are intense and time is
coveted their territories. Embattled Belgium along short.27 A lighter touch that incurs lower costs and
Germany's line of march tried the same tack and risks even so may sometimes achieve objectives at
was swallowed both times.22 Insular Britain banks least as well. Indirect strategies that rely less on
primarily on sea power while France, just across the brawn and more on brain power literally or figura-
English Channel, looks landward. Military strategists tively replace frontal assaults with flank attacks, per-
nevertheless normally pick and choose from a tanta- haps accompanied by deception and covert opera-
lizing menu of elemental alternatives.23 tions.28

62
 STRATEGIC STARTING POINTS

Military strategists should remain aware that im- lor of Germany's Third Reich in January 1933. First,
prudent reliance on direct or indirect approaches he repudiated the Versailles Treaty, reinstated com-
invites trouble. Adolf Hitler's greatest triumphs, for pulsory military service in violation of its provisions,
example, were bloodless ones between 1933 and and began to build a Luftwaffe (Air Force). Next,
1939, when he glued diplomacy, psychological war- he reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland with a
fare, subversion, bravado, geopolitics, science, and token force in March 1936 (French leaders merely
military capabilities into an offensive strategy that protested to the impotent League of Nations). Hitler
recognized no distinct boundary between war and annexed Austria precisely two years later and, in
peace. Reckless overemphasis on armed force after October 1938, acquired Czechoslovakia's Sudeten-
France fell in 1940 eventually led to Nazi Germany's land when British and French appeasers signed the
defeat by numerically superior U.S., Soviet, and Brit- Munich Pact. Bin Volk, ein Reich, ein Fiihrer (one
ish opponents who were able to mass far greater people, one nation, one leader) became more than
military power. a Nazi slogan at that point.31

Active and Reactive Strategies Maneuver and Attrition Strategies

Freedom of action is a universally cherished security Attrition strategies aim to wear rivals down, then
interest. Active strategies that open and exploit op- wear them out, whereas physical and intellectual
portunities consequently are preferable to reactive maneuvers curtail enemy abilities to employ avail-
strategies that respond to enemy overtures. Offen- able power advantageously. Almost all military oper-
sive armed forces, which attack at times and places ations of high, mid, or low intensity bank on both,
of their choosing, enjoy great advantage according but purposes, policies, doctrines, and circum-
to Sun Tzu, because if the enemy "does not know stances cause balances to differ.
where I intend to give battle he must prepare in a Some coalitions and individual nations habitually
great many places. And . . . those I have to fight in rely on massed manpower and materiel to quash
any one place will be [relatively] few. For if he antagonists no matter how long it takes.32 U.S.
prepares to the front his rear will be weak, and if Armed Forces and their allies successfully empha-
to the rear his front will be fragile. If he prepares sized attrition techniques against the Axis Powers
to the right his left will be vulnerable," and vice in Europe for six long years (1940-1945) before
versa. "And when he prepares everywhere he will they finally emerged victorious. Less muscular bellig-
be weak everywhere."29 Those wise words pertain erents and subnational groups such as insurgents
equally well to nonlethal offensives for deterrent and terrorists employ ceaseless pinpricks to erode
and defensive purposes. U.S. Massive Retaliation and enemy will.33 Nonviolent attrition can wear down
Flexible Response strategies, for example, ceded will to resist until opponents decide to accede. That
initiative to the Soviet Union throughout the Cold technique helped passive resistance specialist Ma-
War, yet accomplished bedrock objectives without hatma Gandhi rid India of British rule in 1947 and
firing a shot, because accompanying threats backed Martin Luther King, Jr. to advance civil rights in the
by nuclear capabilities restricted rational courses of United States, largely because public opinion in each
enemy military action.30 instance precluded the liberal use of firepower by
Active strategies sometimes enable militarily opposing armed forces and police.34
weak nations to impose their will on powerful oppo- General d'Armee Andre Beaufre likens offensive
nents whose passivity encourages assertiveness, as and defensive military maneuvering to options that
Hitler demonstrated soon after he became Chancel- fencers favor: feint, thrust, follow through, parry,

63
MILITARY STRATEGY

riposte, disengage. All ultimately aim to gain, regain, South Korean ground forces from expanding pro-
or deprive enemies of freedom of action.35 "Decapi- portionately or developing strong offensive capabili-
tation" strategies that short-circuit command and ties, encouraged a one-sided arms race that by the
control systems, for example, aim to leave rival 1990s vested smaller North Korea with almost twice
armed forces leaderless and confused, while so- as many men on active duty, more than twice as
called "horizontal escalations" that unexpectedly many main battle tanks, five times as many self-
widen the scope rather than the intensity of conflict propelled artillery pieces, five times as many surface-
seek to overcommit adversaries and shift strategic to-surface missiles, and immense quantitative superi-
centers of gravity.36 ority in many other weapon categories. Approxi-
mate qualitative parity prevailed, but resultant mili-
Arms Control vs. Arms tary imbalances gave shudders to the Government
Competition in Seoul, which is barely twenty-five miles south of
President Woodrow Wilson included general disar- the Demilitarized Zone.39
mament as one of the Fourteen Points in his peace
proposal of January 8, 1918. The League of Nations
later incorporated that aim in its Covenant. Interests
POLITICO-MILITARY
in arms control intensified manyfold after nuclear
ASSUMPTIONS
Fallacious assumptions, whether tacit or con-
weapons emerged in 1945.37 Adversaries need not
sciously stated, can sabotage military strategies just
profit equally if compromise solutions benefit all
as surely as enemy actions.40 Seasoned planners con-
concerned, but pacts seldom last long if any signa-
sequently scrutinize all identifiable assumptions
tory feels slighted.
carefully and prepare backup positions for those
Arms control strategies are most attractive when
that seem shaky. The dozen listed below illustrate
costs of competition and risks of war seem exces-
a wide range of sensitive issues:
sive. Several purposes are prominent: improve posi-
tions vis-a-vis opponents; preserve the status quo;
make adversarial relationships more predictable • The absence of direct military threats does
(verification capabilities and confidence-building (not) greatly reduce the importance of
measures are very important); conserve resources; armed forces as foreign policy instruments
save money; and prevent dangerous technological • The United States should (not) be the
developments. The world might have been safer in world's "policeman"
the last regard if arms controllers had prohibited • Competition for scarce natural resources
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles will (not) culminate in armed combat
(MIRVs), which caused U.S. and Soviet strategic nu- • Warning time before war erupts will (not)
clear warhead inventories to expand exponentially be ample and unambiguous
starting in 1970. Both sides thereafter intensified • War in region A will (not) spread to or in-
costly but fruitless searches for effective ballistic volve forces from regions B and C
missile defenses.38 • Transnational terrorists will (not) obtain and
Arms competition strategies often pay off hand- employ nuclear weapons
somely when one side cannot or will not keep pace, • National survival is (not) the only interest
which happened in Korea after an uneasy truce that justifies heavy casualties
settled over that war torn peninsula in 1953. U.S. • Public support for Plan A will (not)
military assistance policies, which discouraged strengthen despite present opposition

64
 STRATEGIC STARTING POINTS

• Policy-makers can (not) emphasize nonmili- makers, who routinely expended billions of rubles
tary missions indefinitely without undercut- to expand and improve that shield, deprived offen-
ting combat capabilities sive programs that could directly endanger U.S. se-
• National will is (not) steadfast and allies will curity; and 3) Soviet air defenses never degraded
(not) stand firm U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities predicated on
• Foreign flag merchant ships will (not) be ICBMs and SLBMs.43
available for use whenever required
• Meaningful multilateral arms control accords Strategic Mismatches
are (not) obtainable under current conditions Well-conceived strategies closely connect threats,
objectives, policies, tactics, forces, and other strate-
STRATEGIC PATHS AND PITFALLS gies. Unrealistic requirements and discontinuities
Sun Tzu counseled, "What is of supreme importance within or between any of those categories cause
in war is to attack the enemy's strategy."41 The main risks to soar and increase prospects for failure, as
aim is to pit off-beat capabilities against vulnerabili- the following vignettes reveal.
ties, and thereby nullify enemy plans, programs, and
operations. Consistently successful practitioners em- Strategy-Threat Mismatches
phasize asymmetrical approaches, shun strategic The simplistic U.S. strategy called Massive Retalia-
mismatches, and spurn extremist solutions. They tion, which raised the specter of nuclear devasta-
concurrently guard against reprisals, because conse- tion, conserved money, manpower, materiel, and
quences akin to Newton's Third Law of Motion apply: may have deterred a head-on collision with the So-
to every action there is an equal counteraction. viet Union, but it left many crucial interests uncov-
ered. U.S. Armed Forces in the 1950s and early 1960s
Asymmetrical Strategies braced for worst-case outbursts that never occurred,
Asymmetrical strategies employ ingenious capabili- while insidious foes who featured subversion, chica-
ties, perhaps in exotic combinations, that adversar- nery, and low-intensity conflicts scored consistently
ies are poorly prepared to defeat.42 No nation now without tripping nuclear triggers. Stalin and his suc-
is well-prepared to deter or defend against biological cessors consolidated control over Central Europe,
warfare assaults. Transnational terrorists generally Mao took charge in China, and Communist-kindled
render traditional armed forces irrelevant. Cyber- conflagrations menaced other East Asian countries
netic warfare specialists conceivably could "disarm" from Korea to Malaya. The United States, in short,
military giants who rely excessively on computers. was well-prepared to deter nuclear attacks, but
Atypical strategies that succeed not only outfox could not counter ambiguous aggression without
rival armed forces, but invalidate enemy invest- using nuclear mallets to drive tacks.44
ments. U.S. nuclear deterrent capabilities, for exam-
ple, began to depend much more on ballistic mis- Objective-Policy Mismatches
siles and much less on aircraft in the early 1960s. Israel's widely acclaimed counterterror tactics may
Relatively few B-52 bombers nevertheless were able be among the world's best, but its repressive strat-
to exploit Soviet fixations on homeland defense for egy amplifies Arab animosities and creates terrorists
the next quarter century with three beneficial ef- faster than air strikes and hit teams can kill them.
fects: 1) Soviet air defenders needed to cover ap- Questionable policies include illegal construction of
proaches from every direction, whether the U.S. settlements in Israeli-occupied territories, autocratic
bomber fleet was large or small; 2) Soviet decision- control over Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem, and

65
MILITARY STRATEGY

reprisals that surpass the Old Testament prescrip- while minimizing U.S. casualties.48 Strategy-force
tion of an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Sus- connections in every instance were unrealistic.
pected terrorists may be shot on sight, arrested with- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who sub-
out charge, detained without trial, and deported sequently served President George W. Bush, con-
without proof. Innocent persons suffer when troops cluded that the two MRC strategy unreasonably
demolish or seal suspected homes and hideouts. overstretched available resources. His testimony be-
Severe restrictions on domicile, movement, employ- fore Senate and House Armed Services Committees
ment, and free speech, plus rights of assembly and on June 21, 2001 therefore recommended less ro-
association, make Arab inhabitants second-class citi- bust forces that could "defeat the efforts of any
zens. Internal security consequently remains an elu- adversary to achieve its objectives by force or coer-
sive Israeli objective with no solution in sight after cion," concurrently repel "attacks in a number of
more than fifty years of savage conflict.45 [other] critical areas, and also be capable of conduct-
ing a limited number of smaller-scale contingen-
Strategy-Force Mismatches cies." Whether a skeptical Congress will fund suffi-
NATO's Armed Forces essentially served as a "trip- cient assets to accomplish those scaled down but
wire" for nuclear weapons when Massive Retaliation nevertheless ambitious aims was uncertain when
prevailed. Requirements for credible defensive capa- this book went to press.49
bilities increased severalfold when the Atlantic Alli-
ance embraced a Flexible Response strategy in 1967, Strategy-Tactics Mismatches
but deployments scarcely changed. U.S. Army con- Viet Minh insurgents after World War II pursued a
tingents assigned to Allied Forces Central Europe still revolutionary war strategy that cost-effectively de-
consisted of two corps that totaled five divisions plus feated France in 1954.50 Ho Chi Minh and his hench-
support. U.S. Air Force, Europe (USAFE) listed men, who thereafter struggled to reunify North and
twenty-one tactical fighter squadrons before and South Vietnam, met U.S. Armed Forces and their
after the shift. Allied contributions also remained allies head-on in 1965 with traditional military tac-
constant. Either the pre-1967 aggregate was larger tics that blighted the countryside, devastated urban
than needed for a trip wire or the post-1967 aggregate centers, and caused casualties to skyrocket on both
was insufficient for defense. A marked strategy-force sides. Communists scored a sweeping psychological
mismatch was evident in at least one event.46 victory during their Tet Offensive of February 1968,
U.S. military strategy in the 1960s called for forces but virtually destroyed Viet Cong guerrilla units and
that could fight full-scale wars with the Soviet Union undergrounds in the process. Heavy attrition contin-
and the People's Republic of China at the same time, ued for seven more years, until South Vietnam capit-
yet have enough left over to handle a lesser contin- ulated in 1975. Greater patience (normally a revolu-
gency (2V2 wars in popular parlance). That aspira- tionary war hallmark) coupled with prudent tactics
tion, which shrank to l x /2 wars in 1969, required abili- might have consolidated the two countries under
ties to meet a major attack by the USSR or China, ass- Communist rule at far less cost over a longer
ist allies against non-Chinese aggression in Asia, and period.51
contend with a small conflict elsewhere. Ambitions
by 1980 demanded assets able to cope concurrently Strategy-Strategy Mismatches
with one major and one minor contingency.47 The NATO's strategy for the defense of Western Europe
Clinton Administration's Bottom-Up Review in 1993 required rapid reinforcements and resupplies from
required forces sufficient to fight and win two major the United States if Soviet Armed Forces and their
regional conflicts (MRCs) "almost simultaneously" Warsaw Pact associates invaded. Specific require-

66
 STRATEGIC STARTING POINTS

ments existed in 1984 to "move six Army divisions, rent and combat capabilities always are incompati-
60 tactical fighter squadrons, and one Marine Am- ble, that maneuver always should take precedence
phibious Brigade (MAB)—all with initial support— over attrition, or that budgets always should dictate
to their combat positions within 10 days."52 Mer- strategies, as some commentators contend (the se-
chant ships had to transport virtually all heavy cargo, lection of the best alternative during Robert S. McNa-
but neither U.S. nor allied naval strategies empha- mara's days as Secretary of Defense invariably re-
sized early control over essential sea lines of commu- volved around "the most appropriate economic
nication. Best estimates of arrival were measured in criterion," according to one critic54).
months, by which time the war might well have "Either/or" strategies that arbitrarily exclude Op-
been over. Debates raged, but continental and mari- tion A at the expense of B or vice versa usually lack
time strategies remained mismatched until the Cold flexibility. Great Britain, France, and Germany paid
War ended.53 terrible penalties when their military strategists over-
emphasized offensive operations during World War
Extremist Strategies I, despite technological innovations that made fron-
Excessive reliance on any strategic theory, princi- tal assaults against machine guns and massed artillery
ple, school of thought, policy, concept, or elemental suicidal. French strategists deified defense two de-
alternative invites avoidable problems. Pat solutions, cades later and suffered early defeat. Mismatched
whether simple or complex, warrant close inspec- strategies that disregard fundamentals or apply them
tion. There is little evidence, for example, that deter- poorly invite avoidable problems and risk failure.

KEY POINTS
• Strategic theoreticians pave the way for superior concepts and plans
• Principles distilled from historical study can foster strategic quality control
• Policy guidelines fundamentally influence military strategies
• Military doctrines distilled from practical experience standardize ways to perform various func-
tions and operate in distinctive environments
• Concepts that integrate relevant theories, principles, policies, doctrines, and forces comprise the
centerpiece of every strategic plan
• Continental, maritime, air, space, and special operations schools of thought may be most or
least appropriate in any given situation
• Sequential strategies, which take consecutive steps, and cumulative strategies, which constitute
concurrently conducted actions, usually are reinforcing
• Direct strategies normally emphasize force; indirect strategies stress finesse
• Active strategies that open and exploit opportunities are preferable to reactive strategies that
respond to enemy overtures
• The balance between attrition and maneuver strategies depends on objectives, policies,
doctrines, and circumstances
• Arms control strategies can sensibly confine costs and risks
• Asymmetrical strategies pit off-beat capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities
• Mismatched strategies that disregard fundamentals or apply them ineptly invite avoidable prob-
lems and risk failure

67
MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES 11. Note 1, Chapter 5 identifies foundation doctrines of

1. General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to U.S. Armed Services.
Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), 11-15, 44-46, 12. Geographically oriented military doctrines are typi-
135-38. Quotation is on 13. fied by Field Manual 30-70, Basic Cold Weather Man-
2. Major General L. B. Holley, Jr., "Concepts, Doctrines, ual, April 1968; Field Manual 90-3/Fleet Marine Force
Principles: Are You Sure You Understand the Manual 7-27, Desert Operations, August 19, 1977;
Terms?," Air University Review, July-August 1984, Field Manual 90-5, Jungle Operations, August 16,
90-93; Yehoshafat Harkabi, Theory and Doctrine in 1982; Field Manual 90-6, Mountain Operations, June
Classical and Modern Strategy, Working Paper No. 30, 1980; Field Manual 90-10, Military Operations
13 (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center, Octo- in Urbanized Terrain, August 15, 1979; and Field
ber 1981). Manual 90-13, River Crossing Operations, Septem-
3. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "Eccles Strategy on Strat- ber 30, 1992, all published by the Department of
egy," Naval War College Review, Summer 1977, the Army. See also U.S. Navy Cold Weather Hand-
12-14. book for Surface Ships (Washington: Chief of Naval
4. Assorted anthologies include Thomas R. Philipps, Operations, Surface Ship Survivability Office, May
ed., Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Clas- 1988); Air Force Doctrine Document 45, Aerospace
sics (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Edward Weather Operations (Washington: Department of
Meade Earle, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: Mili- the Air Force, August 31, 1994).
tary Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton, 13. Conceptual disputes about ballistic missile defense
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1943); Peter Paret, are not new. See Charles Benson, "Deterrence
ed., Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli Through Defense," National Review, March 9,1971,
to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer- 254-59; Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
sity Press, 1986); George Edward Thibault, ed., The (Washington: Office of Technology Assessment,
Art and Practice of Military Strategy (Washington: 1985), 139-70.
National Defense University, 1984). 14. Distillations are available in Wylie, Military Strat-
5. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith egy, 37-75.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), espe- 15. Clausewitz, On War, 75, 77, 90.
cially 66-71, 96-101. 16. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Naval Strategy Compared
6. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago: University and Contrasted With the Principles and Practices
of Chicago Press, 1985). of Military Operations on Land: Lectures Delivered
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael at the Naval War College ... between the Years
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 1887 and 1911 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
University Press, 1976); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The 1975).
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 17. Douhet, The Command of the Air; Alexander P. De-
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1969); Giulio Douhet, Seversky, Victory Through Air Power (Garden City,
The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (Wash- NY: Garden City Publishing Co., 1943).
ington: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Government 18. John M. Collins, Military Space Forces: The Next
Printing Office, 1983). Fifty Years (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's,
8. Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A Gen- 1989), 41-71.
eral Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: 19. G. Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Englewood
Rutgers University Press, 1967). Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 57, 58,60-61,86-87.
9- Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies—//: The For the original Heartland Theory, see Halford J.
Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History,"
and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1957), 36- Geographical Journal, vol. XXIII (1904), 421-44
37; Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezin- and modifications in his Democratic Ideals and Real-
formatsia (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984); ity (London: Constable & Co., 1919).
Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinforma- 20. General Peter J. Schoomaker, Special Operations
tion: An Insider's View (New York: Pergamon-Brass- Forces: The Way Ahead (MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Spe-
ey's, 1985). cial Operations Command, March 1998); SOP Vision
10. For various views of doctrine, see Donald M. Snow 2020 (MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Special Operations Com-
and Dennis M. Drew, Introduction to Strategy, (Max- mand, January 1997).
well AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 21. Dissimilar searches for a unifying school of strategic
1982), 89-105. thought are found in Wylie, Military Strategy, 65-

68
 STRATEGIC STARTING POINTS

111 and Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of 32. Russell F. Weigley argues that attrition always has
War and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Har- been The American Way of War: A History of United
vard, 1987). States Military Strategy and Policy (New York:
22. Bertil Haggman and Judi McCleod review the risks Macmillan, 1973).
and costs of neutrality in Defense of Freedom: Politi- 33. Mao Tse-Tung, Basic Tactics (New York: Praeger,
cal Options (Toronto: Mackenzie Institute, 1988). 1966).
23. Ken Booth, "New Challenges and Old Mind-sets. . .," 34. Penderel Moon, Gandhi and Modern India (New
in The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies, York: W. W. Norton, 1969); Martin Luther King, Jr.,
and Mind-sets, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen (New York: Ox- Why We Can't Wait (New York: Harper & Row,
ford University Press for the Stockholm International 1963), especially Chapter 5, "Letter From Bir-
Peace Research Institute, 1987), 39-65; Julian Lider, mingham Jail."
"Towards a Modern Concept of Strategy," Coopera- 35. Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 36-41.
tion and Conflict, vol. XVI, no. 4 (1981): 217-35; 36. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger described
Edward B. Atkeson, "The Dimensions of Military horizontal escalation in Annual Report to the Con-
Strategy," Parameters, vol. 7, no. 1 (1977): 41-52. gress, Fiscal Year 1983 (Washington: Department
24. Wylie, Military Strategy, 23-29. of Defense, February 8, 1982), 1-14, 1-15, 1-16. See
2 5. The War Reports of General of the Army George C. also Joshua M. Epstein, "Horizontal Escalation: Sour
Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, and Notes of a Recurrent Theme," International Secu-
Fleet Admiral Ernest J, King (New York: J. B. Lip- rity, Winter 1983/84, 19-31.
pincott, 1947), 209-46, 331-39, 384-400, 437-52, 37. Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, eds., A
514-57, 585-617, 660-92. Documentary History of Arms Control and Dis-
26. Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy, 26-30, 42-44, armament (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1973).
107-30, 134-35. For pros and cons, see Donald G. Brennen, Arms
27. Thomas C. Schelling describes compellence in Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security
and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University (New York: G. Braziller, 1961).
Press, 1966), 69-91. 38. Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of De-
28. Basil H. Liddell Hart unveiled his "strategy of the fense Decision Making (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,
indirect approach" in The Decisive Wars of History: 1975).
A Study of Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1929) and 39. Larry A. Niksch, "South Korea," Fighting Armies, ed.
elaborated in Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, Richard Gabriel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1967). See also Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military 1983), 133-34; Taek-Hyung Rhee, U.S.-ROK Com-
Power?" International Security, Spring 1980, 3-35; bined Operations: A Korean Perspective (Washing-
Charles W. Walter, "Interposition: The Strategy and ton: National Defense University Press, 1986), 26-
Its Uses," Naval War College Review, June 1970, 28; The Military Balance, 1998-1999 (London:
72-84. Brassey's, for the International Institute of Strategic
29. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 98. Studies, 1998), 185-88.
30. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles introduced Mas- 40. Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy
sive Retaliation in a speech before the Council on (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press,
Foreign Relations in New York City on January 12, 1965), 279-89.
1954 and clarified his remarks in "Policy for Security 41. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 11-IS.
and Peace," Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXII (April 1954), 42. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsoi, Unre-
353-64. General Maxwell D. Taylor articulated the stricted Warfare (Beijing: People's Liberation Army
original rationales for Flexible Response in The Uncer- Literature and Arts Publishing House, February
tain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1999).
1959). For NATO's adaptation, see Secretary of De- 43. See all nine annual editions of Soviet Military Power
fense Casper W. Weinberger, Improving NATO's (Washington: Department of Defense, U.S. Govern-
Conventional Capabilities: A Report to the United ment Printing Office, September 1981 through Sep-
States Congress (Washington: Department of De- tember 1990).
fensejune 1984), 1-19;J. MichaelLegge, TheaterNu- 44. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
clear Weapons and the NA TO Strategy of Flexible Re- Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), 1-
sponse (SantaMonica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1983). 20, 316-61.
31. Robert T. Elson, Prelude to War (New York: Time- 45. Ian Lustick, ed., Palestinians Under Israeli Rule
Life Books, 1976), 184-211. (New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1994); Rashid

69
MILITARY STRATEGY

Khalid, Palestinian Identity (New York: Columbia 50. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina (1946-1954)," in Chal-
University Press, 1997); Jacob M. Landau, The Arab lenge and Response in International Conflict, vol.
Minority in Israel, 1967-1991: Political Aspects I, The Experience in Asia, ed. D. M. Condit, Bert H.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Cooper, Jr., et al. (Washington: Center for Research
46. The Military Balance, 1966-67 and subsequent edi- in Social Systems, American University, February
tions. 1968), 237-69.
47. President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for 51. Literature on the Vietnam War is voluminous. A syn-
the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace (Washington: opsis is available in Timothy Lomparis, "Giap's
U.S. Government Printing Office, February 18,1970), Dream, Westmoreland's Nightmare," Parameters,
128-29; Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Depart- June 1988, 18-32.
ment of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981 52. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual
Ganuary 20, 1980), 98, 99, 118. Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1985 (February 1,
48. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, memorandum to se- 1984), 175.
lected addresses, The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for 53- The Maritime Strategy, a special supplement to U.S.
a New Era (September 1,1993), amplified by Report Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986. See also
on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington: Office of David S. Sorenson, "Getting Back to Europe: Strategic
the Secretary of Defense, October 1993), 1-13- Lift Needed Now More Than Ever," Parameters, June
49. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chair- 1990, 64-74.
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Hugh Shelton, 54. James M. Roherty, Decisions of Roberts. McNamara
Defense Strategy Review, testimony before the Sen- (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press,
ate Armed Services Committee, June 21,2001; Rowan 1970), 71-72.
Scarborough, "2-War Plan Outdated, Rumsfeld Tells
Panel," Washington Times Qune 22, 2001), A4.

70
 7. Fundamentals of Deterrence
Croesus said to Cambyses: That peace was better
than war, because in peace the sons did bury their
fathers, but in wars the fathers did bury their sons.
Francis Bacon, 1625
Apophthegms, New and Old

N obody since Croesus (circa 525 B.C.) has more

clearly or succinctly stated the case for deter-
rence, which supports interests in peace.1 Deterrent
assaults on enemy intentions leave enemy capabili-
ties unscathed. Strategists seek answers to three key
questions: Who deters whom from making what
strategists endeavor primarily to convince adversar- impermissible moves by what means with what mo-
ies that aggression of any kind is the least attractive tivations at what times in what situations? What
of all alternatives. Deterrence secondarily aims to countermoves will deterees most likely make? What
discourage unwelcome escalation and the continua- counter-countermeasures seem advisable?3
tion of ongoing conflicts that deterers or their allies Deterrent failures are obvious.4 Communism, for
prefer to terminate. A tertiary purpose, seldom example, made great gains during the 1950s when
enunciated but nonetheless important, is to dis- U.S. Armed Forces enjoyed a nuclear monopoly,
suade friends and the unaffiliated from pursuing because abilities to deter cataclysmic combat were
courses of action that could adversely affect the powerless to prevent piecemeal encroachments. Is-
deterer's valued interests. rael predicated deterrence on repeated demonstra-
Pioneers in this esoteric field relied heavily on tions of military superiority after it won indepen-
game theories, which are too abstruse for most na- dence in 1948, but undaunted Arab antagonists
tional security policy-makers and military strategists. nevertheless fought two more major wars (1967,
This study, in partial compensation, summarizes 1973) in futile attempts to retrieve lost territory and
prevalent causes of conflict, then reviews principles establish an Islamic state.
and concepts that practitioners might find useful. Precise reasons for deterrent successes often
are difficult or impossible to prove, since self-
THE DYNAMICS OF DETERRENCE deterrence rather than threats or promises fre-
Deterrence has utility across the national security quently is the decisive factor. Deterees may never
spectrum from normal peacetime competition to have intended to take proscribed actions, may have
unrestrained war with weapons of mass destruc- concluded that financial costs would be excessive,
tion.2 Deterrent dynamics, unlike those of passive or may have refrained simply because predicted
avoidance, feature threats, promises, or acts, not gains appeared too small. No deterer knows for sure
necessarily military in nature, that pledge punish- why suicidal terrorists, who fear no retaliation, have
ment if deterees perform forbidden deeds and per- never unleashed nuclear weapons that many sus-
haps offer rewards if they abstain. Psychological pect they possess.5

71
MILITARY STRATEGY

CAUSES OF CONFLICT find little to lose and perhaps something to gain by

There is no one best way to prevent political, eco- striking first. Lengthy preparations precede preven-
nomic, psychological, technological, cybernetic, or tive wars, whereas threatened parties preempt on
military conflicts, because nationalism, imperialism, short notice to attenuate attacks they feel are
jurisdictional disputes, ideological, religious, and en- imminent.
vironmental disagreements, avarice, poverty, injus- Reciprocal and intensifying fears are conceiv-
tice, and revenge are just a few among many motiva- able: Side A, who suspects B's motives, prepares to
tions.6 Five causes that have little in common are attack. B, in response, does likewise, even though
representative: unprovoked aggression; provoked its leaders originally entertained no such intention.
aggression; preemptive and preventive wars; regret- A's fears thus become reinforced. The spiral stops
table blunders; and catalytic conflicts. only if A and B both cool off or one opens fire.9

Unprovoked Aggression Regrettable Blunders

Unprovoked aggression has been a common cause Miscalculations, misperceptions, accidents, and
of armed conflict since pastoral and agricultural soci- other regrettable blunders sometimes cause sense-
eties first clashed several thousand years ago. Quests less conflicts. Reasons range from erroneous intelli-
for hegemony, territorial aggrandizement, cultural gence estimates and net assessments through un-
dominance, economic self-sufficiency, and greed, sound assumptions to false warnings, bravado, and
perhaps in some combination, prompted most such irrational behavior.10 Ambiguous, ambivalent, and
wars.7 Opportunities generally look most inviting intentionally misleading signals also may trigger
when victims are militarily weak, are otherwise un- wars. Hitler, for example, did not believe that Britain
prepared to resist effectively, and perhaps seem pre- and France would declare war when his troops in-
disposed to appease. Transnational terrorist attacks vaded Poland in September 1939, because both
against targets in neutral countries fit into the last countries acquiesced when he brazenly reoccupied
category. the Rhineland (1936), annexed Austria, then swal-
lowed Sudetenland (both 1938).11
Provoked Aggression
Shooting wars in response to perceived provoca- Catalytic Conflicts
tions erupt when one or more adversaries believe Catalytic conflicts are altercations that one nation
that armed combat is a tolerable (even desirable) or subnational group deliberately foments between
way to resolve disputes. Weapons of mass destruc- two or more others to suit its own purposes. A
tion have dampened enthusiasm in some quarters, hostile China, hoping to emerge as the world's only
but aggravations still instigate international aggres- superpower, hypothetically might have catalyzed
sion and likely always will. Some amalgamation of an ongoing U.S.-Soviet Cold War crisis by striking
political, economic, and social grievances, real or the United States with nuclear-tipped submarine-
imagined, most often provokes insurgencies, coups launched ballistic missiles, the true source of which
d'etat, and other intranational conflicts.8 would have been virtually unverifiable. Potentates in
Teheran, hoping to eliminate archrivals in Baghdad,
Preemptive and Preventive Wars similarly might unleash a devastating anthrax or
Preemptive and preventive wars, occasionally called smallpox epidemic in Washington, D.C. during acri-
"anticipatory retaliation," explode when politico- monious disputes between the United States and
military decision-makers on one side believe a show- Saddam Hussein about Iraq's multifaceted biological
down surely will occur sooner or later, and therefore weapon programs.

72
 FUNDAMENTALS OF DETERRENCE

Catalysis need not culminate in a shooting war. if promised rewards or punishments seem logical.
Israeli agents masquerading as anti-Western extrem- Put simply, you'd ignore me if, in the course of
ists, for example, sabotaged Anglo-American installa- some minor tiff, I said, "Cross that line and I'll scuff
tions throughout Egypt in the summer of 1954 as your shoe shine." You'd scoff if I threatened to
one attempt to delay the impending British depar- shoot, unless I'm a known psychotic. But if I said,
ture from Suez, obviate U.S. rapprochement with "Take one more step and I'll bloody your nose,"
Egyptian President Gamal Nasser's new govern- you'd have to ask yourself seriously, "Is what I want
ment, and thereby strengthen Israel's position at important enough to risk a broken beak?"
his expense.12 Deterrent strategies also are shaky if bold recipi-
ents rightly or wrongly suspect a bluff. British at-
PRINCIPLES OF DETERRENCE tempts to deter Argentina's occupation of the Falk-
Theoreticians and planners who aim to deter con- land Islands failed in 1982, precisely because
flicts succeed most consistently when they use decision-makers in Buenos Aires never believed that
sound principles to guide their research and review Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher would wage war
results.13 There are no hard and fast rules like Ber- over those frigid wastelands, despite repeated assur-
noullian numbers and Boyle's Law of Gases, but ances to the contrary.14
military strategists can't go far wrong if they heed
Principles of Deterrence described below. Principle of Uncertainty
Deterrence predicated on uncertainties is the fall-
Purpose Preparedness back position if credibility for any reason seems
Credibility Nonprovocation unattainable.15 The U.S. nuclear strategy of Mutual
Uncertainty Prudence Assured Destruction, which promised to pulverize
Pain Publicity the Soviet Union provided Soviet Armed Forces
Pleasure Paradox struck first, must have made decision-makers in
Moscow' wonder whether counterparts in Washing-
Principle of Purpose ton D.C. really would risk national suicide regard-
Conflict prevention is the basic objective, but deter- less of provocation, but they couldn't afford to take a
rent strategists must specify politico-military pur- chance. The nuclear-armed French .Force deFrappe,
poses more precisely before they can focus effec- which was much smaller than its U.S. counterparts,
tively on any given center of gravity, because each performed a similar function.16
demands different treatment. Schemes crafted to
forestall naked aggression do little to discourage
Principle of Pain
insidious operations and piecemeal encroachments.
Painful penalties commonly underpin deterrent de-
Needs to extend a deterrent umbrella over partners
mands. Bloodthirsty threats, such as those associ-
create special problems. So do time limitations—
ated with nuclear "balances of terror,"17 occupy one
how soon deterrence must take effect and how long
pole with political, economic, and psychological
it must last often determine the optimum course
pressures at the other. Promises to punish aggres-
of action.
sors severely and concurrently keep them from
achieving key objectives are complementary op-
Principle of Credibility tions calculated to make reckless enemy leaders
Credible deterrence, which raises costs of aggres- think at least twice before they initiate impermissi-
sion unacceptably high, generally is achievable only ble acts.18

73
MILITARY STRATEGY

Principle of Pleasure than huge active contingents; and remote rather

Blandishments sometimes make antagonists aban- than forward basing. The proper mix is a matter of
don undesirable tacks. Yasser Arafat momentarily judgment, depending on circumstances.22
renounced terrorism in December 1988 and recog-
nized Israel's right to exist in return for "substantive
dialogues" between senior U.S. officials and the Pal-
Principle of Prudence
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara based U.S.
estine Liberation Organization (PLO).19 Insurgents
nuclear strategy on the supposition that "it is the
often respond positively to reforms that alleviate or
clear and present ability to destroy the attacker as
eliminate ideological, cultural, religious, economic,
a viable twentieth century nation and an unwavering
or social grievances. Rewards may also deter allies,
will to use these forces in retaliation to a nuclear
other associates, and neutrals more readily than pu-
attack upon ourselves or our allies that provides
nitive threats. Prospects of additional U.S. aid, for
the deterrent, and not the ability partially to limit
example, encouraged Egyptian President Anwar as-
damage to ourselves."23 He may have been right,
Sadat to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.20
but no standoff between evenly matched disputants
is eternally certain, because one side sooner or later
Principle of Preparedness almost always dominates. The Principle of Prudence
Perpetual preparedness is one price of peace any-
consequently recommends military shields and civil
where that virulent threats exist, because nothing
defenses that could reduce casualties, limit damage,
tempts opportunists as conclusively as opponents
and make enemies pay dearly if, all efforts to the
with their guards down. Robust defenses and retalia-
contrary, war supersedes peace.
tory capabilities as a rule reduce risks, but policy-
makers and resource allocators who lack much insti-
tutional memory repeatedly learn hard lessons too Principle of Publicity
late. The poorly armed, poorly equipped, badly out- Neither fear of punishment nor promise of reward
numbered "Battered Bastards of Bataan" (1942) and is possible if deterers keep relevant capabilities and
benighted Task Force Smith in Korea (1950) bought intentions a secret. Policy-makers and strategists
time with their blood because deterrence failed, as therefore must determine what information they
unready U.S. Armed Forces did at the onset of several should transmit to whom, how to do it, and when.24
previous wars.21 That failing is by no means confined The U.S. Department of Defense in the 1980s, for
to the United States, as military tombstones bear example, advertised Stealth aircraft abilities to pene-
mute testimony in many other countries. trate enemy airspace undetected and return un-
scathed, but guarded technological details that
Principle of Nonprovocation could expedite enemy abilities to duplicate such
Military postures that rivals consider dangerously feats.
provocative can cause deterrence to collapse just Communicators may convey messages directly
as surely as unpreparedness. Strategists who hope or indirectly, verbally or nonverbally, officially or
to avoid that impression therefore shun "use 'em unofficially, formally or informally, explicitly or im-
or lose 'em" forces that must strike first or risk plicitly, publicly or privately, clearly or ambigu-
ruin. They additionally favor deployments that de- ously, just once or repeatedly. Pronouncements by
emphasize weapons of mass destruction and empha- senior officials generally carry greater weight than
size some or all of the following deterrent options: off-the-cuff comments by subordinates. Public fo-
defense rather than offense; ready reserves rather rums are more apt to reinforce deterrence than pri-

74
 FUNDAMENTALS OF DETERRENCE

vate remarks. Dramatic weapon demonstrations as sile tests and large-scale maneuvers in sensitive ar-
a rule are more convincing than dialogues. eas. Free and easy on-site observation and inspection
help verify various accords that constrain the quan-
Principle of Paradox tity and quality of rival armed forces. Forbidden
Shooting wars occasionally can best assure peace, zones and restrictions on research may also limit
if armed conflict now discourages overconfidence potentially threatening activities.28
among foes, encourages friends, and thereby fore-
stalls future combat.25 President Harry S Truman had
that paradoxical principle implicitly in mind when
Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping, a United Nations (UN) specialty,29
he chose to side with the Republic of Korea after
interposes nonviolent armed forces between bellig-
Communist troops swarmed south in 1950.26 A sec-
erents by mutual consent to maintain a truce or
ond paradox confirms that vigorous defense of pid-
otherwise deter hostilities. Mandates often pre-
dling interests produces disproportionately large de-
scribe the contingent's duties, size, composition,
terrent benefits whenever so doing convinces
arms, dispositions, legal status, and impose various
predators that assaults against high-value objectives
preconditions that usually include a time limit.
would be foolhardy.
Prowess at diplomacy, negotiations, mediation, and
arbitration is more important than military power,
DETERRENT THEORIES AND
because enforcement plays little or no part.30
CONCEPTS
Peacekeepers have kept the lid on conflicts
Strategists tailor theories, concepts, and plans to
around the world for many years, but abilities to do
suppress specific causes of conflict. Threats, prom-
so are not limitless. Deterrence, for example, failed
ises, and actions may play independent or comple-
catastrophically when Sierra Leonean rebels
mentary roles. Latitude for intellectual innovation
breached a fragile cease-fire in May 2000, ran amok,
is almost limitless, because few techniques are multi-
amputated limbs from innocent bystanders, and
purpose, some are contentious, and schemes that
held nearly 500 UN peacekeepers hostage.31
aim to deter catalytic conflicts, terrorism, and cyber-
netic warfare are embryonic at best.27 Most of Table
11 is self-explanatory, but confidence-building Demonstrations
measures, peacekeeping, demonstrations, decep- Demonstrations, separate and distinct from garden
tion, tripwires, reciprocity in kind, and irrational variety shows of force, send psychological signals
acts bear embellishment. designed to deter opponents from initiating, contin-
uing, or escalating conflicts of any kind. Displays
Confidence-Building most often feature specific capabilities that deterers
Confidence-building measures, a form of arms con- could put into play if deterees refuse to desist.
trol, promote deterrence provided A and B in good Invitations for high-ranking enemy officials to ob-
faith both agree to limit the likelihood of conflicts serve military maneuvers that unveil impressive
caused by apprehension, miscalculation, or misun- capabilities transmit deterrent threats indirectly.
derstanding. Information exchanges, "hot lines" be- NATO's contingency plans once called for a low-
tween top decision-makers, and other communica- yield nuclear "shot across the bow" if the Warsaw
tions improve abilities to anticipate problems and Pact invaded West Germany, according to General
take corrective actions in time to short-circuit crises. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. when he was Supreme Allied
Typical disclosures include advance notice of mis- Commander, Europe.32

75
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 11
Deterrent Techniques Connected to Causes of Conflict
Deterrent Unprovoked Provoked Preemptive, Regrettable Catalytic
Techniques Aggression Aggression Preventive Wars Blunders Conflicts
Threats
Retaliation X X
Reciprocity in Kind X X
Continued Conflict1 X X
Escalation X X
Promises
Rewards X X
Reforms2 X
Actions
Diplomacy X X X X X
Confidence-building X X
Crisis Management X X X X
Peacekeeping X X X
Posturing3 X X
Demonstrations4 X X
Deception X X X
Tripwires X X
Irrational Acts5 X X
1
lntrawar deterrence.
Insurgencies, resistance movements, coups d'etat.
3
Shows of force, reinforcements.
4
Symbolic and exemplary displays.
5
"Brinkmanship" and games of "chicken."

Deception and Disinformation election never developed, but deceitful claims con-
Sun Tzu asserts that "All warfare is based on decep- tinued to strengthen Soviet deterrent powers for
tion."33 Deterrent strategies calculated to conceal several years despite pronounced U.S. superiority
truth and publicize lies are no exception. Scams that in deliverable nuclear weapons.36
increase ambiguity strengthen deterrence through
uncertainty. Those that build faith in erroneous be- Tripwires
liefs foster false credibility. The basic purpose in ei- The term "trip wire" connotes a largely symbolic
ther case is to misrepresent capabilities, intentions, armed force that customarily is positioned in an
or both in ways that make deterees pause.34 allied country as visible indication of support. The
Nazi defenders deployed in the Pas de Calais nation to which that token, but highly valued, con-
moved much too late to meet Allied landings in tingent belongs presumably would respond vigor-
Normandy on June 6, 1944, because Hitler feared ously if enemies attacked it. One truncated U.S.
that dummy armored divisions armed with full- Army division deployed between Seoul and the Ko-
scale inflatable "toys" would soon make the main rean Demilitarized Zone, for example, adds credibil-
crossing from England to France.35 Soviet strategists ity to deterrence despite modest combat capabili-
in August 1957 (two months before Sputnik, their ties, because its presence astride a high-speed
first space satellite, flew) began to boast about invasion route signals U.S. intent to honor treaty
a "super-long-distance intercontinental multi-stage commitments if Communist troops once again head
ballistic missile" that U.S. Armed Forces could not south.37 The Kremlin and Fidel Castro used one so-
yet duplicate. The dangerous "missile gap" that called Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba to invigorate
became a serious issue during the I960 presidential deterrence through uncertainty from the early

76
 FUNDAMENTALS OF DETERRENCE

1960s through the 1970s. President Carter in 1979 known or suspected capabilities (British experi-
publicly found that small force "not acceptable," ments with anthrax in 1944 left Scotland's Gruinard
but took no action to remove it.38 Island uninhabitable for 100 years).41 Possibilities of
self-deterrence also are omnipresent, because the
Reciprocity in Kind unpredictable effects of BW agents could backfire
Fear of reciprocity in kind was one basis for mutual mercilessly against employers.
deterrence after the United States and Soviet Union
became charter members of an "Atomic Club" in Irrational Acts
1949. No country well equipped to retaliate in kind The "rationality of irrationality" comes into play
has been seriously subjected to CW assaults since when conniving strategists consciously strive to
1918, mainly because masks and protective clothing strengthen deterrence through uncertainty by
impair military performance. Collective protection promising retribution that only lunatics would imple-
for armed forces and civilians is inconvenient as well ment.42 Unequivocal commitments, automatic re-
as expensive, and decontamination requirements— sponses, and other illogical concepts that seemingly
including those for rivers of wash water—can be- leave deterers little or no choice are typical. A recent
come astronomical.39 President Franklin D. Roose- record speckled with eccentric acts makes irrational
velt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill strategies most plausible. Bravado may buttress un-
fortified deterrence during World War II with an certainties, if not underdone or overdone, but those
ominous promise of immediate reprisals in kind if who bluster too often or not at all benefit least.43 Na-
Nazi Germany and Japan employed lethal chemicals tions willing to run the greatest risks emerge victori-
against the Allies.40 ous without resort to war, but deterrence is bound
Intolerable consequences similarly discourage to fail if both sides play hazardous games of "chicken"
biological warfare (BW), provided both sides boast and press "brinkmanship" until they collide.44

KEY POINTS

Deterrent strategies strive to discourage aggressors from initiating, escalating, or continuing con-
flicts and to forestall other unwanted actions by friends and neutrals as well as enemies
Threats, promises, rewards, and punishments are typical deterrent instruments
Reforms, crisis management, shows of force, demonstrations, confidence-building measures,
deception, tripwires, reciprocity in kind, and irrational acts are typical deterrent techniques
Strategic theoreticians and practitioners succeed most consistently when they use Principles of
Deterrence to steer research and shape plans
Unprovoked and provoked aggression, preventive and preemptive wars, accidental, and catalytic
conflicts require dissimilar deterrent strategies
Credible deterrence predicated on clearly evident conflict dominance capabilities is most persuasive
Deterrence predicated on uncertainty is the fallback position if credibility is unattainable
Nothing tempts aggressors as conclusively as poorly prepared opponents
Neither threats of punishment nor promises of reward deter unless employers publicize relevant
capabilities and intentions
Deterrent failures are obvious, but it is difficult (often impossible) to prove which ploys suc-
ceeded in the past

77
MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES dium of Interstate and Intrastate Conflict, 1720 to

1. Most literature addresses nuclear deterrent theories 1985, ORAE Rpt. No. R95 (Ottawa, Canada: Depart-
and concepts developed in the 1950s and 1960s, but ment of National Defense, November 1985).
basic tenets have wide applicability. Glenn H. Snyder 9. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 104-6.
cites several seminal articles in Deterrence and De- 10. Ibid., 110-11; David Abshire and Brian Dickson,
fense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Prince- "War by Miscalculation: The Forgotten Dimension,"
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 9n, 10-30, Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1983, 114-24.
225-38; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, De- 11. William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World
terrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (Boston:
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968), 1011, 1016-19,
1974), 9-104; Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile 1021, 1127-30.
Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 12. Clyde R. Mark, The "Lavon Affair" (Washington:
264-304; Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revis- Congressional Research Service, December 21,
ited," World Politics, January 1979, 289-324. 1972).
2. Naval Studies Board, Commission on Physical Sci- 13. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Deterrence: An
ences, Mathematics, and Applications, National Re- Overview" in Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence,
search Council, Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence 21-24; John M. Collins, "Principles of Deterrence,"
(Washington: National Academy Press, 1997); Robert Air University Review, November-December 1979,
G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deterrence and De- 17-26, rebuttals, July-August 1980, 77-84, and re-
fense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Envi- considerations, January-February 1981, 91-92.
ronment (Washington: National Defense University 14. Douglas Kinney, National Interest, National Honor:
Press, 1999). The Diplomacy of the Falkland Islands Crisis (New
3. The Nature of General War, HI-1537-BN (Croton-on- York: Praeger, 1989).
Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, November 5,1971), 5 15. Herman Kahn christened uncertainty "the residual
(Chart 2). fear of war" in Thinking About the Unthinkable
4. John J. Mearsheimer reviews five deterrent failures (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), 129. Henry A.
in Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Kissinger elaborated in The Necessity for Choice
University Press, 1983); John Orme surveys eight in (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1962), 53-58.
"Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International Thomas C. Schelling devoted a full chapter to "the
Security, Spring 1987, 96-124. threat that leaves something to chance" in The Strat-
5. NBC deterrent problems at the end of the twentieth egy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
century parallel those that Neil C. Livingstone and Press, I960), 187-203.
Joseph D. Douglas assessed in CBW: The Poor Man's 16. Michael Harrison, The Reluctant Ally: France and
Atom Bomb (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Atlantic Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univer-
Policy Analysis, February 1984) and Brian M. Jenkins sity Press, 1981).
addressed in "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?," Orbis 17. Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror,"
(1985): 507-15. Foreign Affairs, January 1959, 211-34.
6. Geoffrey Blaney, The Causes of War (New York: Free 18. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punish-
Press, 1973); R. J- Rummel, Understanding Conflict ment, Research Monograph No. 1 (Princeton, NJ:
and War, vol. 4 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Center of International Studies, Princeton University,
1979), 241-315; John C. Stoessenger, Why Nations January 2, 1959).
Go to War, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 19. Edward Cady, David B. Ottaway, and John M.
1978); Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Goshko, "U.S., in Shift, Agrees to 'Substantive Dia-
Landscape of Global Conflict (New York, Metropoli- logue' with PLO," Washington Post, December 15,
tan Books, 2000). 1988, Al, A42, A44.
7. R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclo- 20. Ellen B. Laipson, Egypt: U.S. Foreign Assistance
pedia of Military History: From 3,500 B.C. to the Facts, Issue Brief IB85060 (Washington: Congres-
Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993); sional Research Service, May 5, 1988).
Major General J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of 21. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., Ameri-
the Western World, 3 vols. (New York: Funk & Wag- ca's First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: Univer-
nails, 1954). sity Press of Kansas, 1986).
8. Michael Howard, "The Causes of War," Wilson Quar- 22. F. Mike Miles, Soviet Military Doctrine: Meeting the
terly, Summer 1984, 90-103; G. D. Kaye, D. A. Grant, Criteria for a Defensive Orientation?, Rpt. No. 89-
andE.J. Edmond, Major Armed Conflict: A Compen- 56IF (Washington: Congressional Research Service,

78
 FUNDAMENTALS OF DETERRENCE

October 3, 1989); Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments 34. Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, eds., Stra-
and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," Inter- tegic Military Deception (New York: Pergamon
national Studies Quarterly, March 1982, 37-56. Press, 1981), 3-30; Michael J. Handel, "Intelligence
23. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Statement and Deception," Journal of Strategic Studies, March
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 1982, 122-54.
the FY 1969-73 Defense Program and the 1969 35. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception
Defense Budget, February 1, 1968, 47. Campaign (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2001);
24. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 239-58; Roy Hoopes, "World War II's Master of Deception,"
Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Retired Officer, January 1986, 36-41.
Peace (Jerusalem, Israel: Program for Scientific Trans- 36. Charles H. Donnelly, United States Defense Policies
lation, 1966) 124-31. in 1959, House Committee on Armed Services, 86th
25. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Ha- Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 78-81; Snyder, ing Office, May 27, I960), 10-11, 14-16; United
Deterrence and Defense, 33-40. States Defense Policies in I960 (May 26, 1961), 10-
26. President Harry S Truman, Years of Trial and Hope 11, 20-21; United States Defense Policies in 1961
(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), 339-40. (June 7, 1962), 13-14.
27. Theresa C. Smith, Trojan Peace: Some Deterrence 37. Larry A. Niksch, South Korea: Should the U.S. With-
Propositions Tested, Vol. 19, Book 2, Monograph draw?, a paper prepared for a conference on United
Series in World Affairs (Denver: University of Denver, States Policy Toward the East Asian/Western Pacific
Graduate School of International Studies, 1982), 5- Region (New York: Institute of Asian Studies, St.
52,63-84; R. Wagner Harrison, "Deterrence and Bar- John's University, November 17-18, 1989).
gaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 38. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Mis-
1982, 329-58. sile Crisis (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989),
28. John Borawski, ed., Confidence-Building Measures 120; "Text of the President's Speech on U.S. Re-
for Crisis Stability (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, sponse to Soviet Military Force in Cuba," New York
1986); William Lynn, "Confidence-Building Mea- Times, October 2, 1979, A18.
sures," in Preventing Nuclear War: A Realistic Ap- 39. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare,
proach, ed. Barry Blechman (Bloomington: Indiana vol. II, "CB Weapons Today" (New York: Humanities
University Press, 1985), 24-52. Press, Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
29. See especially former United Nations Secretary-Gen- tute [SIPRI], 1973).
eral Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: 40. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace- and Deterrence: "The World War II Experience,"
keeping, A Report . . . Pursuant to the Statement International Security, Spring 1984, 3-35.
Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security 41. Department of Defense Biological Defense Pro-
Council on 31 January 1992, 6-10, 29-36. gram, Report to the House Committee on Appropria-
30. Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: Pergamon tions, May 1986; John Hubner, "The Hidden Arms
Press for International Peace Academy, 1984), 21- Race," San Jose Mercury News, Sunday Supplement,
41, 54-59. April 15, 1984, 13.
31. Carl Ek, Sierra Leone: Background and Issues for 42. Herman Kahn describes the rationality of irrationality
Congress, Rpt. No. RL30367 (Washington: Congres- in On Thermonuclear War, 2d ed. (New York: Free
sional Research Service, November 8, 1999) and Press, I960), 291-95.
Sierra Leone: Failed Peace?, Rpt. No. RS20578, May 43. John McDonald, Strategy in Poker, Business, and
11, 2000. War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 28-34, 70-
32. Strategic Weapons Proposals, Hearings Before the 74; Barton Whaley, Strategem: Deception and Sur-
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Pt. I, 97th prise in War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for Inter-
Congress, 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government national Studies, 1969).
Printing Office, 1981), 73-74. 44. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 291-95; Bertrand
33. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith Russell, Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare (New
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66. York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), 30-31.

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 8. War-Fighting Fundamentals
A study of the laws of war is necessary. . . . To learn these is
no easy matter and to apply them is even harder; some officers
are excellent at paper exercises and theoretical discussions in
the war colleges, but when it comes to battle there are those
who win and those who lose.
Mao Zedong
On the Study of War
1936

U nion General William Tecumseh Sherman

knew that "war is hell" long before his blue-
clad divisions blighted a nfty-mile-wide swath be-
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Strategic trailblazers tacitly paid homage to Princi-
ples of War many centuries before Carl von Clause-
tween Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia, on their witz compiled the first formal list in an 1812 memo-
march to the sea in November-December 1864.' randum for Prussia's Crown Prince Friedrich
Woeful strategies make war even worse. The rigid Wilhelm.3 Current collections vary in length and
Western Front that ran from Flanders to the Alps composition (most U.S. catalogues contain nine4).
during World War I defied frontal assaults for more The dozen described below, drawn from foreign
than four years. Millions died and millions more and domestic compilations, are slanted to serve se-
were maimed, because combat began for no sensi- nior politico-military policy-makers and strategists,
ble reason and terminated long after the best possi- rather than practitioners of operational art and
ble outcome was a Pyrrhic victory.2 tacticians.
Contemporary strategists can do better, as Mao
was well aware, if they select wisely from war- Purpose Surprise
fighting principles, theories, policies, and concepts Initiative Security
that cover every conceivable contingency from start Flexibility Simplicity
to finish during low-, mid-, and high-intensity con- Concentration Unity
flicts on land, at sea, in Earth's atmosphere, and in Economy Morale
space. Open options variously emphasize eager or Maneuver Time
reluctant resort to armed conflict; offense or de-
fense; maneuver or attrition; power projection or Principle of Purpose
forward deployments; destruction or dislocation; in- Decisive, attainable political objectives and comple-
stantaneous or incremental escalation; and few or mentary military aims selected to satisfy valid na-
many self-imposed limitations, including those that tional security interests form the foundation for mili-
concern collateral damage and casualties, weapons tary missions and strategic concepts. All should be
of mass destruction, and covert or clandestine consistent, clearly articulated, prioritized, and pref-
operations. erably directed against the enemy's strategic center

81
MILITARY STRATEGY

of gravity. Plans and operations at every level should oboe players often were idle, twelve violins played
contribute to attainment; none should be contra- identical notes, and horns repeated passages that
dictory. strings had previously played. He concluded that
Experienced national security decision-makers the composer "could have finished that opus long
regularly review all purposes to ensure that they before he died, if he had eliminated superfluous
remain sound, because those expressed at the onset instruments." Every music lover, however, knows
of war are subject to repeated alteration when emo- that diversification and redundancies made Schu-
tions run high and unforeseen events unfold. U.S. bert's opus a masterpiece.
objectives, for example, flip-flopped four times dur- Armed forces, like orchestras, cherish flexibility.
ing the first full year of armed conflict in Korea. The Planning for certitude in fact may be the most griev-
initial aim was to survive a North Korean invasion ous of all military mistakes, because no one can
(June-August 1950); then to reunite North and consistently forecast the time, place, scope, tenor,
South Korea (September-November 1950); next to intensity, and course of events. Purposes, policies,
survive a Chinese invasion (December 1950-March and procedures may change unexpectedly on one
1951); and finally to restore the status quo ante- or both sides. Preferred concepts and capabilities
bellum (April 1951-July 1953).5 may prove fallible. Players with only one plan thus
run serious risks, for they have no fallback position
Principle of Initiative if rivals nullify their only scheme.8
Offensive operations, which enable wielders to act A spectrum of long-, mid-, and short-range strate-
rather than react at times and places of their choos- gies affords the best insurance against injurious sur-
ing, are the best way to gain and retain initiative prise. U.S. contingency plans in the 1970s and early
while depriving adversaries of equal advantage. Suc- 1980s, for example, viewed the People's Republic
cesses result in freedom of action, which inspires of China from three perspectives: 1) China is
friends, demoralizes foes, opens opportunities to friendly; 2) China is hostile; and 3) China remains
exploit enemy vulnerabilities, and thereby controls neutral.9 Relationships early in the twenty-first cen-
the course of events. tury might be described as 4) China steers an inde-
Skillful strategists defend only until offensive op- pendent course that selectively welcomes and re-
tions appear or reappear. Fabius Maximus Verruco- sists U.S. overtures.
sus Quintas the Cunctator (Delayer) harassed Hanni-
bal for several years during the Second Punic War Principle of Concentration
and avoided decisive encounters long enough for Abilities to concentrate overwhelming strength
Roman legions to gain strength. Victory, however, against vital enemy weakness expedite the attain-
arrived only after Scipio Africanus finally inaugu- ment of decisive results, whether the strategic cen-
rated an offensive strategy that defeated Carthage ter of gravity be hostile armed forces, national will,
on its home ground in 202 B.C.6 Russian resistance industrial capacity, a capital city, the hearts and
to Napoleon Bonaparte between June and October minds of common people, undergrounds that sup-
1812 and Soviet delaying actions from June 1941 port guerrilla operations, or a charismatic leader.
until November 1942 simply bought time until de- The side that possesses initiative has a huge advan-
fenders could mount conclusive counterattacks.7 tage, because it can focus power on known objec-
tives while rivals dissipate energies preparing for
Principle of Flexibility uncertain contingencies.
An inane efficiency expert who attended Franz Schu- Quantitatively (even qualitatively) inferior forces
bert's Unfinished Symphony observed that four may prevail, provided they concentrate while dis-

82
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

tracted opponents divide. Sun Tzu described that not recuperate, then follow lines of least resistance
phenomenon with these words: "If I am able to use en route to ultimate objectives.13 Failure to pursue
many to strike few at the selected point, those I deal can have costly, long-term consequences. Whether
with will be in dire straits." Insurgent and resistance General Eisenhower's broad front strategy in au-
movements have repeatedly put that principle into tumn 1944 unnecessarily prolonged war in Western
practice with considerable success ever since.10 Europe by giving disorganized German forces time
to regroup remains a controversial topic many de-
Principle of Economy cades later.14
Even superpowers have finite resources, so concen-
tration at decisive times and places commonly re- Principle of Surprise
quires economies of force elsewhere. Politico- Surprise does not vouchsafe success, but it vastly
military strategists establish priorities that allot mini- improves prospects. Secrecy, speed, deception, dis-
mum essential efforts and resources to secondary information, originality, and audacity can produce
endeavors. The Principle of Economy, for example, results that far exceed efforts expended and thereby
prompted the U.S. and British decision to defeat alter balances of power to great advantage. Shocked
Nazi Germany before turning full attention toward foes need not be caught wholly off guard, but only
Japan during World War II.11 grasp the full significance of their predicament too
Prudent strategists take pains to avoid concur- late to respond effectively. Distraction (a psycholog-
rent combat with two or more powerful adversaries, ical phenomenon) and disruption (a physical func-
because they may not be able to economize any- tion) deprive rivals of initiative. Freedom of concep-
where without incurring outrageous risks. Hitler, tion and freedom of action accordingly become
who deliberately opened Eastern and Southern twin casualties.15
Fronts before he won in the West, belatedly learned Military surprise, such as the sneak attack on
that hard lesson to his nation's sorrow. Lean German Pearl Harbor,16 immediately comes to mind, but non-
forces in North Africa, Italy, and along the Atlantic military forms sometimes have immense military
Wall fought tenaciously, but were too few and fi- implications. Political surprise of the first order oc-
nally lost.12 curred in 1989, when unexpected termination of
the Cold War upended long-standing U.S. and NATO
Principle of Maneuver strategies.17 Japan experienced shocking economic
Maneuverability, which amalgamates mobility with surprise after its political leaders signed a tripartite
agility, makes it possible to shift fluidly from one pact with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in Septem-
strategic mode to another and readily redeploy ber 1940, because President Franklin D. Roosevelt
armed forces. Employers can concentrate, disperse, immediately embargoed much-needed scrap metal
or disengage various forms of national power and petroleum shipments, then froze all Japanese
smoothly and rapidly to expand successes, abridge assets in the United States.18 Technological surprise
failures, exploit opportunities, and block vulnerabil- "made potential enemies cringe in fright," according
ities. Strategically significant flank attacks, horizon- to Nikita Khrushchev, when Sputnik /, a basketball-
tal or vertical envelopments (the latter from air or sized Soviet space satellite, unexpectedly began to
space), turning movements, and infiltrations that orbit Earth.19
avoid enemy strengths are preferable to figurative
or literal frontal assaults. Principle of Security
Astute strategists strive to maintain physical and Nations and subnational groups, like prize fighters,
intellectual momentum, so faltering opponents can- must protect themselves at all times. Security, the

83
MILITARY STRATEGY

flip side of surprise, preserves power and reduces take operations aimed at the heart of Germany and
probabilities that foreign and domestic enemies the destruction of her Armed Forces."21 That march-
might jeopardize strategic plans, programs, or oper- ing order remained firm until armed conflict ceased.
ations. Physical security shields populations, infra-
structures, resources, and armed forces, increases Principle of Unity
freedom of action, and concurrently reduces vulner- The British Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947 formally
abilities as well as risks. Positive intelligence pro- approved a Principle of War called "Co-operation,"
grams concerning enemy capabilities and intentions based on team spirit and good will.22 Most military
guard against surprise. So do counterintelligence doctrines, however, promote Unity of Command,
successes that dilute rival espionage efforts and ex- because central sources of authority are better able
pose subversion. to assign responsibilities, promulgate policies, estab-
The Principle of Security by no means encour- lish procedures, issue guidance, approve plans, set
ages timidity. On the contrary, bold offensives that standards, supervise implementation, and settle dis-
move too fast for enemies to react effectively were ruptive disputes.
popular before horse cavalry began to run rings Disparate sources of policy and fragmented com-
around foot soldiers in ancient times. General mand arrangements invite dilemmas. No master
George S. Patton, Jr. rewrote record books in 1944 plan, for example, ever integrated U.S. and South
when his armored columns, with "air cavalry" and Vietnamese efforts. Commander in Chief, Pacific,
French resistance forces protecting open flanks, headquartered in Hawaii, was responsible for the air
sped from Brittany past Paris to Germany's western war. COMUSMACV conducted ground operations.
gateway in just fifty-five days, an operational feat of The U.S. Ambassador in Saigon handled diplomatic
huge strategic significance.20 matters. Nearly forty South Vietnamese organiza-
tions engaged in rural reforms in 1966. The resul-
Principle of Simplicity tant patchwork made it impossible for U.S. Armed
The military acronym KISS (keep it simple, stupid), Forces and their allies to prosecute the Vietnam War
which originated in the misty past, remains apropos, most effectively.23
because the most complex theories and concepts
can be couched in understandable terms. A simple Principle of Morale
book entitledE=MC1, for example, long ago enlight- Clausewitz estimated that armed conflict is mainly
ened the author's grammar school son about Albert "composed in equal parts of physical and moral
Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity. Strategic con- causes and effects. One might say that the physical
cepts expressed lucidly and concisely reduce oppor- seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the
tunities for misinterpretations and decrease pros- moral factors are the precious metal, the real
pects for confusion in the fog of war. weapon, the finely honed blade." Napoleon Bona-
General William C. Westmoreland, who received parte, in his 115 Maxims, likewise noted that "The
ambiguous guidance as long as he was Commander moral is to the material as three to one."24
in Chief, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam War, whether hot or cold, tests the will of civil-
(COMUSMACV), must have envied the crystal-clear ians as well as armed forces. Sturdy morale is impera-
directive that U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of tive in times of great trouble, because all is lost if
Staff furnished General Eisenhower in February the urge to compete withers. Compelling purposes,
1944: "You will enter the continent of Europe and, leadership, discipline, and unflagging belief in a
in conjunction with other United Nations, under- cause nurture such laudable traits as loyalty, elan,

84
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

esprit de corps, confidence in capabilities, and te- ate risks and estimate costs before they knowingly
nacity. Pain and privation may do likewise, witness violate any of the foregoing principles, because re-
Britain's gritty stand in 1940 during the Blitz by cords show that winners by and large took heed,
Hermann Goring's Luftwaffe and subsequent Ger- while losers—discounting those who clearly were
man stoicism after Allied air forces began carpet out of their league—by and large did not.
bombing cities throughout the Third Reich.25

Principle of Time PREMIER WAR FIGHTING POLICIES

Premier war-fighting policies prescribe basic condi-
The acronym METT (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, and
tions under which nations apply military power to
Time) reminds national security decision-makers
achieve objectives. Relative priorities of force and
that relentless and irreplaceable time, which usually
finesse, preferences for offensive operations com-
favors one side, constrains nearly every military
pared with defense, and peacetime deployment pat-
course of action. Savvy strategists consequently try
terns are universally important.
to determine whom time will benefit most, then
shape concepts and plans accordingly.26
Time in some regards seemed unimportant to Force vs. Finesse
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant who, while still Heavy-handed Chiefs of State, especially those in a
in the Wilderness on his way to Spotsylvania and hurry, tend to favor direct approaches and free use
Cold Harbor, announced his intention "to fight it of armed force. Military strategies, plans, and opera-
out on this line, if it takes all summer."27 Tenacity tions take precedence over all other foreign and
similarly marked U.S. military performance during domestic policy instruments. Adherents, however,
World Wars I and II, then in Korea, but public oppo- would do well to heed H. L. Mencken's admonition
sition to protracted war in Vietnam for questionable that "There is always an easy solution to every hu-
causes still makes the U.S. Government reluctant to man problem—neat, plausible, and wrong," be-
engage in lengthy armed conflicts unless obviously cause over-reliance on brute strength leaves little
vital interests are involved. That impatient attitude room for games of intellectual judo that might mate
toward time, which preemptively closes options, ends and means equally well or better at less cost.
puts U.S. strategists at a decided disadvantage when Strategists who prefer a lighter touch selectively
pitted against persistent antagonists.28 apply political, economic, technological, psycholog-
ical, cybernetic, and military power in consonance
Composite Utility with Sun Tzu's belief that "to subdue the enemy
Not all Principles of War are invariably relevant (Con- without fighting is the acme of skill. "30 Special opera-
centration and Economy compete for attention). Val- tions professionals who "think small" occasionally
ues vary with situations (offensive strategies may surmount obstacles that those who "think big"
benefit most from Surprise, defensive strategies from never could scale. SS Hauptsturmfuhrer (Captain)
Security). Some respected authorities seriously Otto Skorzeny proved that point twice in little more
doubt that such precepts have practical utility.29 than a twelvemonth, first when he rescued heavily-
Principles of War, like Principles of Deterrence guarded Benito Mussolini, Italy's deposed 7? Duce,
(pp. 73-75), nevertheless comprise convenient from atop Gran Sasso Mountain deep in the Apen-
checklists with which to appraise strategic policies, nine Mountains (September 1943), then when his
concepts, plans, and operations. National security actions toppled Nicholas de Nagybanya Horthy, the
policy-makers and military strategists should evalu- side-switching Hungarian Regent (October 1944).

85
MILITARY STRATEGY

Both operations were strategically important, be- between August 1, 1914 and November 11, 1918,
cause Mussolini remained the titular head of a Ger- when an armistice finally stopped the slaughter.34
man-dominated Fascist Government in northern
Italy, and Hungary, which previously prepared to Overemphasis on Defense
defect from the Axis, remained Hitler's pawn until Fortified points and lines, typified by the Iron Cur-
World War II ended in Europe.31 tain that separated Central from Western Europe
A reasonable balance between force and finesse, throughout the Cold War, have strategic utility.35 So
however desirable it may be, is difficult to maintain do buffer zones and bastions, such as those that the
in the United States, where erratic mood swings Soviet Navy once maintained for its ballistic missile
coupled with frequent philosophical changes submarines in the Barents Sea and the Sea of
among senior officials in the Executive Branch and Okhotsk.36 Most military strategies and supporting
in Congress make consistent strategies elusive. Mili- force postures contribute to defense, but overem-
tary power received scant consideration between phasis (or total dependence, as some zealots pro-
World Wars I and II, figured prominently from the pose37 ) reduces flexibility. NATO's member nations,
late 1940s through the late 1960s, sagged in the for example, promised Warsaw Pact opponents that
1970s after public opposition to the Vietnam War "none of our weapons will ever be used except in
brought that trend to a screeching halt, then revived response to attack."38 That declaratory policy al-
during the 1980s. Willingness to use armed forces lowed Communist troops to quash rebellions in East
for humanitarian and peacekeeping missions soared Germany (1953), Hungary (1956) and Czechoslova-
after the shooting war with Iraq in January-February kia (1968) without worrying that NATO might in-
1991, while inclinations to engage in armed com- tervene.39
bat declined.32
Offensive Defense
Offense vs. Defense Schizophrenic policies that are offensively defensive
Policy decisions determine whether any country or give intelligence analysts fits, because true intents are
coalition basically adopts an offensive or defensive difficult to divine. The Brezhnev Doctrine, for exam-
posture. The choice has far-reaching ramifications ple, rejected self-determination and reserved rights
for, as Sun Tzu observed, "Invincibility lies in the to conduct offensive operations in defense of Social-
defense; the possibility of victory in the attack."33 ism wherever it faltered.40 That policy justified Soviet
Overemphasis in either event is inadvisable, because aggression in Afghanistan (1979-1989) and fostered
offensive and defensive capabilities are complemen- Cold War fears that, under duress, occupants of the
tary, like swords and shields. Kremlin might order preemptive, damage-limiting,
nuclear strikes to help defend Mother Russia. Soviet
Overemphasis on Offense spokesmen denied such plans, but their long record
A good offense is the best defense in some circum- of duplicity made disclaimers suspect.41 Senior offi-
stances, but a deadly liability under less favorable cials in Moscow expressed similar reservations about
conditions. Devotees of the World War I doctrine NATO's deterrent and defensive strategy, which em-
dubbed offense a outrance (attack relentlessly and phasized deep counteroffensive strikes.42
outrageously) stubbornly pitched endless waves of
cannon fodder into awesome defensive firepower Defensive Offense
and field fortifications for more than four years. Defensively offensive strategies that could confer
Many million dead and wounded littered battlefields decisive advantage are future possibilities. Put sim-

86
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

ply, offensive and defensive operations have alter- East Asia. That collection included cantonments,
nately reigned supreme since the Stone Age. Defense airfields, seaports, supply depots, maintenance
occupied the top spot throughout World War I, but shops, troop training areas, gunnery ranges, commu-
offense rebounded during World War II, nailed down nication centers, electronic listening posts, early
first place with the advent of nuclear weapons in warning sites, quarters, and dependent support
1945, and has occupied that perch ever since. The facilities. Well over half of all such holdings (two-
first country to couple sound (not necessarily im- thirds of those in Europe) have closed, curtailed
pervious) ballistic missile defenses with modest of- activities, or assumed standby status since the Soviet
fensive capabilities will enjoy peerless capabilities Union collapsed. Commensurate reductions in U.S.
until other nation-states duplicate that feat or offen- deterrent and quick-reaction combat capabilities
sive breakthroughs once again reverse the cycle. followed.45
Whether resultant leverage would serve interests in
peace or aggression depends on national security pol- Power Projection
icies of the possessor.43 Military strategies that project expeditionary forces
from positions in central reserve to cope with dis-
Peacetime Deployment Patterns tant "come-as-you-are" contingencies create unique
Policy-makers in nations that have extensive security requirements. Airborne and amphibious assault
interests well beyond their own borders must de- capabilities sufficient to seize lodgments in hostile
cide whether to deploy sizable armed forces abroad territory, then secure footholds until reinforcements
or maintain most at home ready to project the arrive, often (not always) are essential. Needs fre-
proper mix of military power on short notice when- quently exist for enough transportation to move all
ever and wherever needed. Decisions to adopt ei- follow-on combat and support personnel, weapons,
ther option strongly influence the size, shape, and equipment, and accompanying supplies from home
characteristics of implementing armed services. stations to areas of operation on tight schedules,
unload rapidly under primitive conditions if neces-
Forward Presence sary, then sustain operations as long as directed.
Forward deployments put war-fighting forces in Prepositioned stocks sometimes lighten initial loads,
position to help friends and defuse budding crises but those located ashore are sitting duck targets,
before they balloon. Continuous presence ashore floating depots are hard to maintain in tip-top condi-
at the invitation of allies assures access to useful tion, and usefulness in either case is nil unless secure
infrastructure, but is costly and may breed burden- transfer sites are conveniently located.
sharing disputes (the House Committee on Armed Diminished forward presence, plus policy obli-
Services activated a Defense Burden Sharing Panel gations to cope with two major regional contingen-
in the 1980s for that reason). Offshore deploy- cies that overlap, put unrealistic demands on U.S.
ments, which are less visible, generate perpetual long-haul airlift and sealift in the early 1990s. An
debates by vociferous proponents of land- and sea- exhaustive study that took into account Operations
based air power about the value of "being there" Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and several exacting
(physical presence) versus "being nearby" (virtual scenarios emphasized needs to reach "hot spots"
presence).44 anywhere around the world before aggressors
U.S. Armed Forces in the 1980s were ensconced could "overrun key objectives" and build combat
at nearly 1,700 large and small installations on for- power before they "caused unacceptable attrition
eign soil, mainly in Europe and along the edge of to U.S. forces, politically fractured the coalition [if

87
MILITARY STRATEGY

any], or ravaged occupied territory." Whether U.S. tried to gain strength, regroup, and mount counter-
mobility assets will satisfy those policy aims in the offensives.48
foreseeable future is problematic.46
Strategic Attrition
WAR-FIGHTING THEORIES AND Sieges and blockades, which epitomize attrition, are
CONCEPTS among the most static forms of warfare. Their pur-
Most writings about war-fighting theories and con- pose is to sap well-defended enemies by deprivation
cepts pertain to operational and tactical options over long periods, rather than root them out quickly
(Table 12), but military strategists who think big can at greater risk. Tactical sieges traditionally concen-
adapt a good deal. Brief expositions below address trate on points and small areas (castles once were
maneuver warfare, attrition, escalation, and de-esca- typical targets). The Soviet blockade of Berlin, re-
lation, then note the impact of policy restraints. lieved by a massive U.S. airlift in 1948-49, exempli-
fies operational usage.49
Table 12 Strategic sieges commonly occur on grander
Typical War-Fighting Options scales. Blockades ashore and afloat have been favor-
Offense Defense
ite instruments since ancient times. The United
States Navy, in accord with President Lincoln's Ana-
Penetrations Positional Defense
Standoff Attacks Mobile Defense conda Policy, began to quarantine the Confederacy
Envelopments Forward Defense on April 19, 1861. Constriction cut off almost all
Infiltration Defense in Depth
Surgical Operations Buffers and Barriers Confederate seaborne commerce before the Civil
Interdiction Bastions War ended, despite daring blockade runners like
Sieges Scorched Earth
fictional Rhett Butler of Gone With the Wind fame.50
Armed forces might similarly strangle opponents in
space, perhaps adapting techniques the U.S. Pacific
Strategic Maneuvers Fleet applied against Japan during World War II.51
Practically all tactical maneuvers have strategic util- Mao Zedong and associate Lin Biao hoped to encir-
ity when writ large.47 The principal difference is cle enemy cities with rural revolutionary bases, then
perspective. Allied armies and air forces, for exam- overcome industrial powers from strategic spring-
ple, maneuvered at will after they burst from the boards in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.52 Terrorists
Normandy beachhead in July 1944, but from strate- aim to put target governments and their citizens in
gic standpoints the advance was a frontal assault on states of strategic siege. Successes in that regard are
Germany for ten consecutive months until May 8, starkly demonstrated in Washington, D.C., where
1945. Any Soviet attempt to seize Western Europe police and protective barriers increasingly safeguard
would have essentially been a straightforward thrust treasured monuments and national institutions at
between the Baltic Sea and the Alps toward the the expense of public access.
Atlantic coast, no matter now many operational and
tactical maneuvers campaign planners devised to Escalation
expedite progress. Allied Command Europe (ACE) Escalation entails competitions in risk taking and
prepared to conduct locally significant delaying ac- resolve. Escalation may begin before armed conflict
tions, but NATO's politically motivated forward de- commences (twenty of the forty-four rungs on Her-
fense policies forbade operations that would pur- man Kahn's original escalation ladder were in the
posely trade German territory for time while ACE "peacetime" crisis category).53 Offensive and defen-

88
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

sive belligerents thereafter may intensify combat, puter dependent armed forces and societies any-
broaden the scope, or both. Available power, which where in the world.58
need not be military, imposes the only physical
constraint, although concern that rivals might over- Gradual Escalation
react customarily limits incentives. Fainthearted Gradual escalation is often confused with flexible
war-fighters who face stalwarts usually lose in any response, but in fact is exceedingly rigid.59 U.S. pol-
case. icy-makers and strategists verified that truism to per-
fection in Vietnam by increasing pressures in such
Vertical Escalation small increments that recipients were able to adapt
Vertical escalation, which is most common, in- in much the same way that cancer patients learn to
creases violence and perhaps speeds up tempos. live with pain that would be intolerable if inflicted
Characteristic techniques reinforce committed instantaneously.
forces, mobilize more combat power, employ or
threaten to employ weapons of mass destruction, De-escalation
strike targets previously declared "off limits" (such Unilateral de-escalation transpires when excessive
as urban centers and privileged sanctuaries), and risks and costs lead Side A or Side B to believe that
reduce intervals between major offensive opera- less aggressive operations would better serve its
tions. security interests, whereas reciprocal retrench-
ments normally necessitate inducements, conces-
Horizontal Escalation sions, and conciliation. Meaningful gestures may be
Horizontal escalation, which supplements or sup- implicit or explicit, large or small, practical or sym-
plants the vertical variety, spreads conflicts geo- bolic, expressed in words or deeds. The gradual
graphically.54 Employers who possess sufficient re- U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam (1969-1972) was a
serves and mobility forces instigate actions in one classic case of de-escalation to curb domestic dissent
or more regions that are well removed from the and reduce casualties.
main battleground. Some initiatives are diversions, Overtures that do not decrease military capabili-
while others are decisive. The Athenian expedition ties include cooling-off periods, prisoner of war ex-
to Sicily during the Peloponnesian War (415-413 changes, and the replacement of officials that ene-
B.C.), for example, remained a "side show," whereas mies despise. Military commanders in any event
Scipio's excursion across the Mediterranean Sea should remain alert while opponents de-escalate,
moved "center stage" from Rome to Carthage during because supposedly friendly signals sometimes
the Second Punic War (204-202 B.C.).55 mask hostile intentions. Hitler, for example, tried
Protagonists who rely on allies or proxies can hard to mollify British Prime Minister Winston
escalate horizontally at little cost, which Stalin tried Churchill while Hermann Goring's Luftwaffe pre-
to do in 1942 when he prematurely urged U.S. and pared to bomb London and other English cities.60
British associates to open a second front in France.56
Adversaries short on military means but skilled at Policy Restraints
psychological warfare also can spread conflicts far Brutes do battle without compunction. Ancient As-
and wide, as Ho Chi Minh's henchmen did at the syrians, who amassed a mighty empire by storming,
Paris peace table during the Vietnam War, with dev- sacking, and demolishing cities throughout the
astating effects in the United Nations and the United Fertile Crescent, behaved so badly for several hun-
States.57 Cybernetic warriors can play hob with com- dred years that a coalition of Medes and Chaldeans

89
MILITARY STRATEGY

eventually obliterated Nineveh in 612 B.C., then erad- timely fashion. . . to the appropriate subcommittees
icated the rest of the nation.61 Ghenghis Khan, who of the Congress. . . . " The Oversight Act of 1980
ran roughshod across Eurasia in the 13th century retained and refined those requirements.66
A.D., believed "The greatest pleasure is to vanquish
your enemies and chase them before you, to rob them Assassination Restraints
of their wealth and see those dear to them be bathed Several U.S.-sponsored or tacitly approved plots that
in tears, to ride their horses and clasp to your bosom culminated in successful, attempted, or suspected
their wives and daughters."62 The Japanese "Rape of assassinations during the 1960s and early 1970s
Nanking" and Pol Pot's butchery in Cambodia repre- prompted congressional complaints.67 President
sent large-scale atrocities in modern times.63 Gerald R. Ford in 1976 responded with Executive
Cruel practices have by no means disappeared, Order 11905, which declared that "No employee
but multilateral conventions, arms control accords, of the United States Government shall engage in, or
and other international laws currently restrict the conspire to engage in, political assassination"—a
conduct of "civilized" states during armed combat.64 term that has never been officially defined. President
U.S. national security policy-makers additionally im- Reagan's Executive Order 12333, which remains in
pose severe unilateral restraints on military strate- effect, additionally forbids "anybody acting on be-
gists, of which the following four are illustrative. half of the United States Government" and decrees
that "no agency of the Intelligence Community shall
War Power Restraints participate in or request any person to undertake
Disapproval of the Vietnam War prompted Congress activities forbidden by this Order."68 Those pro-
to pass the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which scriptions never were intended to protect terrorists,
circumscribes the President's authority to introduce but narrow interpretations thus far have made "up
U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities or potentially hos- close and personal" hits impolitic, although U.S.
tile situations without a declaration of war or spe- policy-makers publicly approve "drive-by" cruise
cific statutory authority and specifies withdrawal missile attacks on suspected locations, such as the
after sixty days unless Congress extends the dead- August 1998 assault on Osama bin Laden's hideout
line. Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton respec- in Afghanistan.69
tively disregarded that edict during conflicts in Gre-
nada (1983), Panama (1989-1990), the Persian Gulf Unrealistic Restraints
(1990-1991), and Kosovo (1999), partly because A U.S.-led coalition in January-February 1991 took
the Supreme Court has never ruled on constitution- just six weeks to defeat Iraq at the cost of 147
ality, but U.S. politico-military strategists neverthe- U.S. combat fatalities. Photographic records of that
less must take war powers provisions into account.65 pristine triumph, repeatedly televised internation-
ally in living color, left the unrealistic impression
Covert Operations Restraints that U.S. Armed Forces could invariably employ pre-
Congressional condemnation of the "secret war in cision-guided munitions with pinpoint accuracy in
Laos" and other covert actions led to the Hughes- densely populated places, even if enemy leaders
Ryan Amendment of 1974, which forbade the CIA deliberately intermingle military targets with non-
to expend foreign assistance funds for any purpose combatants.70 Hypersensitive opinion-makers in the
"other than activities intended solely for obtaining United States have considered collateral damage and
necessary intelligence, unless and until the Presi- casualties socially unacceptable ever since, and U.S.
dent finds that each such operation is important to leaders remain extremely reluctant to launch opera-
the security of the United States and reports, in a tions that place American lives at risk.71

90
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

CONFLICT TERMINATION Inducements

Conflict termination, the ultimate form of de-escala- Unacceptable casualties and damage, budgetary
tion, occurs when one side capitulates or with- costs, shrinking resources, exhaustion, and pros-
draws, belligerents arrange mutually agreeable pects of stalemate or defeat are strong incentives
terms, or outsiders impose a settlement.72 Termina- to terminate unwanted wars. Nations normally try
tion is relatively easy to achieve when victory, how- to conclude one conflict before they become em-
ever denned, is decisive, but can be difficult when broiled in others. Additional inducements include
both sides fight for limited ends with limited means. diminishing domestic support and international dis-
Cessation becomes incredibly complex when com- approval. Public dissent rather than battlefield fail-
batants with asymmetrical vulnerabilities assign ures, for example, prompted the Nixon Administra-
vastly different values to respective objectives, as tion to withdraw from Vietnam. Secretary of
commonly is the case when nations clash with Defense Caspar Weinberger later listed as one of
subnational groups.73 his six preconditions for future U.S. intervention
"some reasonable assurance that we will have the
Inhibitions support of the American people and their represen-
Every war indeed must end, but inducements must tatives in Congress."78 French Minister of Interior
exceed inhibitions before authorities take serious Francois Mitterand, a few days after fighting started
steps to terminate.74 Insistence on idealistic or ideo- in Algeria, announced that, "the only negotiation is
logically motivated objectives (defeat evil; convert war," but President Charles de Gaulle granted every
disbelievers) makes it much easier to start a war rebel demand seven years later, with overwhelming
than to stop it. Struggles in such cases often continue approval of the French people.79 Serious attempts
long after rational cost-benefit relations cease to ex- to terminate wars, in short, most commonly arise
ist. Both sides may take turns escalating, which hap- when one or both sides reevaluate objectives, con-
pened when U.S. and Chinese Communist forces clude that the cause is no longer worth continued
fought from mid-1951 to mid-1953 trying to improve costs, and decide to settle for less than they would
positions marginally.75 Fear of defeat may have simi- like, because peace seems preferable to further hos-
lar effects, if winners demonstrate scant compassion tilities whether they win or lose.
and losers spread atrocity tales to stiffen resistance.
"Enjoy the war; the peace will be terrible" was Termination Techniques
Reichsminister Joseph Goebbel's slogan, while Hit- Blurred distinctions between war and peace have
ler's "scorched earth" proclamation of March 19, caused conflict termination treaties to fall from favor
1945 directed the faithful to destroy all infrastruc- since World War II. No legal document has ever
ture in the Third Reich so no enemy could enjoy ended any transnational terrorist, insurgent, or resis-
the fruits of victory.76 tance movement; losers usually just fade away.80
Horizontal escalation by definition creates two The most common techniques used to terminate
or more generically linked but widely separated con- orthodox conflicts currently are surrender, imposed
flicts that rival powers may have to extinguish indi- settlements, compassion, and reconciliation.
vidually. That condition, which pertained at the end
of World War I, eventually required the Allies to Surrenders
conclude six treaties: Versailles (with Germany), St. Side A may maintain unbearable pressures or escalate
Germain (with Austria), Trianon (with Hungary), until Side B capitulates. That course was popular in
Neuilly (with Bulgaria), Sevres and later Lausanne the distant past, when unconditional surrender termi-
(with Turkey).77 nated most conflicts and defeated people were dis-

91
MILITARY STRATEGY

patched or enslaved. The U.S. Civil War and World have not yet raised a white flag. U.S. Armed Forces,
War II culminated in unconditional surrender, but vic- for example, spared terrified Iraqi troops who franti-
tors in each case were benevolent. Conditional sur- cally scrambled to escape annihilation along the so-
renders involve considerable give-and-take if losers called "Highway of Death" between Kuwait City and
retain enough strength to drive hard bargains.81 Basra during Operation Desert Storm. President
George Bush, speaking from the Oval Office on Feb-
Imposed Settlements ruary 27, 1991, announced that, "Iraq's Army is de-
Outsiders occasionally impose termination terms or feated. Our military objectives are met. I am pleased
otherwise encourage cessation of hostilities. Presi- to announce that at midnight tonight, Eastern Stan-
dent Eisenhower short-stopped the British-French- dard Time, exactly one hundred hours since ground
Israeli invasion of Egypt well before that coalition operations commenced and six weeks since the start
achieved its strategic objective, which was to regain of Operation Desert Storm, all U.S. and coalition
control of the Suez Canal after President Gamal forces will suspend offensive combat operations."84
Abdel Nasser nationalized it on July 26, 1956.82 The
United Nations since its inception in 1946 has re- Reconciliations
peatedly applied political, economic, and military Terminations predicated on compromise are tricki-
pressures to terminate wars, with varying degrees est. The timing and other conditions of cease-fires,
of success. Assorted regional associations, such as boundary disputes, the disposition of territories,
the Organization of American States and the Eco- force withdrawals, prisoner exchanges, and repara-
nomic Community of West African States have tions are cogent considerations.85 Conciliation de-
done likewise.83 pends to great degrees on communications that min-
imize misunderstandings.86 Domestic politics almost
Compassion always play important roles, and often determine
Compassionate combatants may stop mauling oppo- what concessions key officials, various elites, and
nents who clearly are beaten and ready to quit, but the populace will accept.87

Table 13
Conflict Termination Related to Postwar Prospects
Conflict Termination Postwar Prospects
Outcomes Terms Control Opponents Profit From Opponents Lasting Peace Prospects
1
Victory No Surrender N/A Variable Variable2
Unconditional Surrender Fine Variable1 Variable3
Conditional Surrender Good Variable1 Variable4
Compromise Favor Self Good Good Poor
Impartial Fair Fair Good
Favor Rival Poor Poor Poor
Stalemate None Poor Poor Poor5
Defeat Benevolent Poor Good Good
Malevolent Nil Poor Poor
1
Good if loser's infrastructure remains reasonably intact. Otherwise fair to poor, depending on damage and casualties.
Exterminating losers ensures lasting peace between belligerents, but resultant regional power balances may be unstable.
3
Depends on the victor's postwar deportment.
4
Depends on conditions imposed and the victor's postwar deportment.
Exhaustion and other factors may cause peace to persist for some indefinite period after a stalemate.

92
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

Outcomes moreover may kindle a new conflict to reshape re-

The likelihood of lasting peace depends largely on gional balances of power.
the way winners treat losers (Table 13). Unsettled Enlightened statesmen and politico-military strat-
issues and harsh terms tend to impair postwar pros- egists therefore try to frame terms that build "golden
pects. History is rife with wars fought to regain bridges" instead of "brick walls." Conflicts terminate
lost territories, as demonstrated in Alsace-Lorraine, most favorably when triumphant powers emphasize
which traded hands from France to Germany and reconciliation and losers in the long run profit al-
back again in 1871, 1919, 1940, and 1945. Austria, most as much as winners. Reconstruction in the
Prussia, and Russia (later Nazi Germany and the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War is exemplary, carpet-
Soviet Union) repeatedly partitioned Poland. True baggers notwithstanding.88 The Marshall Plan, which
peace imposed by force is a rare exception to the worked miracles in Western Europe,89 and U.S.
general rule, because compellence leaves a residue benevolence toward Japan after World War II were
of resentment. Tranquility is assured if victors evis- even shinier. Those compassionate performances
cerate the vanquished, but they frequently destroy have led more than one comedian to say, "It's better
valuable spoils of war in the process. Bystanders to lose a war with the United States than to win!"

KEY POINTS
• Principles of War for strategic purposes demand different slants than those that pertain to opera-
tional art or tactics, but
• Almost all tactical war-fighting options have strategic utility when writ large
• Politico-military policies and international laws prescribe basic conditions under which nations
apply military power to achieve war-fighting objectives
• Over-reliance on force leaves little room for games of intellectual judo that might mate ends and
means equally well at less cost
• Strategies that overemphasize offense, defense, maneuver, or attrition usually are inadvisable,
because immoderation as a rule increases risks
• Strategies that emphasize forward deployments at or near "hot spots" improve crisis response
capabilities
• Strategies that project military power abroad from bases in the home country increase require-
ments for long-haul airlift, sealift, and forceable entry forces
• Vertical escalation intensifies conflicts physically or psychologically; horizontal escalation broad-
ens the scope
• Unilateral de-escalation occurs when risks and costs become excessive; inducements, conces-
sions, and conciliations encourage reciprocal de-escalation
• Wars end when one side capitulates or withdraws, belligerents come to mutually agreeable
terms, or outsiders impose a settlement
• The likelihood of lasting peace depends on the way winners treat losers

93
MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES 12. Percy Ernest Schram, Hitler: The Man and the Mili-
1. Burke Davis, Sherman's March (New York: Random tary Leader (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971),
House, 1980). 202.
2. John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Al- 13. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New York:
fred A. Knopf, 1999). Praeger, 1967), 340-42, 348-50.
3. John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History of 14. Roland G. Ruppenthal, "Logistics and the Broad
the Principles of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Front Strategy," in Command Decisions, 419-27;
Press, 1982). For offbeat views, see Russell W. Glenn, David Irving, The War Between the Generals (New
"No More Principles of War," Parameters, Spring York: Congdon & Lattres, 1981), 267-88.
1998, 48-66. 15. Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for De-
4. Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General fense Planning (Washington: Brookings Institution,
Nathan F. Twining (1957-60) discusses Principles of 1982); Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, Strategic
War in Neither Liberty nor Safety: A Hard Look at Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities
U.S. Military Policy and Strategy (New York: Holt, (New York: National Strategy Information Center,
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), 198-225. JCS Chair- 1982); Liddell Hart, Strategy, 340-42.
men General Colin L. Powell (1989-93) and General 16. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold
John M. Shalikashvili (1993-96) discuss Principles Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill,
of War in Joint Pub. 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. 1981).
Armed Forces (Washington: National Defense Uni- 17. National Security Strategy of the United States
versity Press), November 11, 1991, 21-35 and Janu- (Washington: The White House, August 1991), 1-6;
ary 10, 1995, III-l to III-9. National Military Strategy of the United States
5. James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Ko- (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
rean War: Policy and Direction, the First Year January 1992), 1-5.
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 18. Jerome B. Cohen, Japan's Economy in War and
1972); The Record on Korean Unification, 1943- Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Docu- sota Press, 1949), Chapter 3-
ments (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- 19. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The
fice, I960), 15-22, 86-126. Last Testament, ed. and trans. Strobe Talbott (Bos-
6. Brian Cavan, The Punic Wars (New York: St. Martin's ton: Little, Brown, 1974), 47.
Press, 1980), 115-61; Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipio 20. General George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It
Africanus: Greater Than Napoleon (New York: (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947), 99-
Biblo and Tannen, 1971), 123-203. 137; Staff Sergeant Mark Murphy, "Patton's Air Cav-
7. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon alry," World War II in the Air: Europe, ed. Major
(New York: Macmillan, 1966), 739-861; Alexander James F. Sonderman (New York: Bramhall House,
Werth, Russia At War, 1941-1945 (New York: E. 1963), 270-75.
P. Dutton & Co., 1964), 131-581. 21. Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command. The
8. Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A Gen- United States Army in World War II: The European
eral Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Theater of Operations (Washington: U.S. Govern-
Rutgers University Press, 1967), 83-85. ment Printing Office, 1954), 53.
9. For background, see President Richard M. Nixon, 22. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety, 221, 225.
U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s (Washington: U.S. 23. General Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War: America's
Government Printing Office, February 18, 1970), Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington: University
140-42; (February 25, 1971), 105-9; (February 9, Press of Kentucky, 1984), 193-96; Colonel Harry
1972), 26-37; (May 3,1973), 16-25; Barton Gellman, Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context
"Reappraisal Led to New China Policy," Washington (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Post, June 22, 1998, Al. Army War College, 1981), 87-96.
10. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith 24. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 98; Rob- Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
ert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in University Press, 1976), 184-85. Napoleon's 115
History (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1975). maxims appear in Thomas R. Philipps, ed., Roots of
11. Louis Morton, "Germany First: The Basic Concept Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics (Westport,
of Allied Strategy in World War II," in Command CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 407-39-
Decisions, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (New York: 25. Philip Ziegler, London at War, 1939-1945 (New
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959), 11-47. York: Alfred Knopf, 1995); David Irving, The De-
94
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

struction of Dresden (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 40. S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the International Obli-
Winston, 1963). gation of Socialist Countries," Pravda, September
26. Ajay Singh, "Time: The New Dimension in War," 26, 1968, 4. An English translation appeared in The
Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1998, 124-29; Regi- Current Digest of the Soviet Press, October 16,
nald Bretnor, Decisive Warfare: A Study in Military 1968, 10-12.
Theory (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1969), 41. For various views, see D. T. Yazov, "On Soviet Mili-
72-98. tary Doctrine," Journal of the Royal United Services
27. Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, in a dispatch Institute (RUSI), Winter 1989, 4; Henry Trofimenko,
from Spotsylvania Courthouse to Army Chief of Staff "The Theology' of Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1977, 510;
Henry W. Halleck, May 11, 1864. Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet
28. Frederick M. Downey and Steven Metz, "The Ameri- Strategic Thought," International Security, Fall
can Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Param- 1978, 152, 153; Benjamin S. Lambeth, How to Think
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30. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 77, 79. 42. New Technology for NATO: Implementing Follow-
31. Glenn B. Infield, Skorzeny:Hitler's Commando (New on Forces Attack (Washington: Office of Technology
York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 29-45,65-77; Charles Assessment, U.S. Government Printing Office, June
Foley, Commando Extraordinary (New York: G. P. 1987), 49-52, 103-8.
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American Political Culture and Strategic Planning," Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Virtual Overseas Presence:
Parameters, September 1988, 38-39. Air Force Redefines the Strategic Security Landscape"
33. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, 85. and Commander Christopher M. Wode, "Beyond
34. Jack L. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Mili- Bombers Vs. Carriers," both in Armed Forces Jour-
tary Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 nal, April 1995, 12, 29-30; Michael W. Smith and
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael Henry L. Eskew, Cost and Capability Differences in
Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Of- Land-Based and Sea-Based Tactical Aviation
fensive in 1914," in Makers of Modern Strategy: (Washington: Center for Naval Analyses, February
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret 1995).
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 45. Pete Williams announced the first wave of U.S. base
510-26. closings abroad in Pentagon Briefing (Washington:
35. Martin H. Bryce, Forts and Fortresses (New York: News Transcripts, Inc., July 30, 1991). See also
Facts on File, 1990); Ian Hogg, The History of Fortifi- Peter Grier, "The Flags Come Home," Air Force,
cation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981). October 1991, 32-35; Additional U.S. Overseas
36. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a Bases to End Operations, News Release (Washing-
World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), ton: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
193-203; Jan S. Breemer, "The Soviet Navy's SSBN [Public Affairs], August 18, 1994). Updated infor-
Bastions," RUSI Journal, Winter 1989, 33-39. mally by author.
37. Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, eds., The Founda- 46. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to
tions of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Martin's Congress (Washington: Department of Defense,
Press, 1990); Johan Galtung, "Transarmament from April 1992), Appendix E and 24-29 of Annex F;
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Research, vol. 21, no. 2, (1984), 127-39. ment of Defense, January 23, 1992), vol. I, Conclu-
38. NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons sions and Recommendations, Unclassified Execu-
(Brussels, Belgium: NATO Information Service, tive Summary.
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Praeger, 1957); Richard Lettis and William E. Morris, liam S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boul-
The Hungarian Revolt, October 23-November 4, der, CO: Westview Press, 1985).
1956 (New York: Scribner, 1961); Harry Schwartz, 48. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger reviews rea-
Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in sons for NATO's rigid defense policies in Improving
Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger, 1969). NATO's Conventional Capabilities: A Report to the

95
MILITARY STRATEGY

United States Congress (Washington: B.C. Depart- Control, International Security, and Science of the
ment of Defense, June 1984), 10-11. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 100th Con-
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50. E. W. Carter III, "Blockade," U.S. Naval Institute 66. Intelligence Authorization Actfor FY1990-91, Rpt.
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in Mao Tse-Tung and Lin Piao: Post Revolutionary ers, an Interim Report of the Senate Select Commit-
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York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 25. and Keith A. Dunn, eds., Conflict Termination and
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the Earliest Times to the Close of the Middle Ages Negotiating Peace: War Termination As a Bargain-
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62. James Charlton, ed., The Military Quotation Book Press, 1983); How Wars End, a special edition of
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 92. The Annals of the American Academy of Political
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Holocaust of World War II (New York: Basic Books, 73. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and
1997); Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New
Power, and Genocide in Cambodia Under the York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 220-22.
Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale 74. Ibid., 222-23; Ikle, Every War Must End, 9, 12.
University Press, 1998). 75. General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New
64. Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other Inter- York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 185-225.
national Agreements of the United States in Force 76. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the
on January 1, 1990 (Washington: U.S. Government Third Reich (Greenwich, CT: Crest Books, 1962),
Printing Office, 1990), 369-75; Arms Control and 1432-33.
Disarmament Agreements (Washington: U.S. Arms 77. William L. Langer, ed., An Encyclopedia of World
Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982), 9-18, History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern (Boston:
120-31. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968), 977-79, 1085-86.
65. The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, 78. "Excerpts from Address of Weinberger," New York
Correspondence, Reports, Subcommittee on Arms Times, November 29, 1984, 5.
96
 WAR-FIGHTING FUNDAMENTALS

79. David and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of 84. Powell, My American Journey, 519-23.
a Socialist Revolution (Berkeley: University of Cali- 85. Pillar, Negotiating Peace; Craig and George, Force
fornia Press, 1970). Mitterrand's quotation is from and Statecraft, 227-29.
Ikle, Every War Must End, 12. 86. George H. Quester, "Wars Prolonged by Misunder-
80. Quincy Wright, "How Hostilities Have Ended: Peace stood Signals," in How Wars End (Annals), 30-38;
Treaties and Alternatives," and Paul Seabury, "Provi- Liddell Hart, Strategy, 371.
sionality and Finality," both in How Wars End, 51- 87. lkle,Every WarMustEnd, 59-105;RobertRothstein,
61, 96-104. "Domestic Politics and Peacemaking," Robert Randle,
81. Ikle, Every War Must End, 38-58; Paul Kecskemeti, "The Domestic Origins of Peace," and Morton H. Hal-
Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and De- perin, "War Termination As a Problem in Civil-Military
feat (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). Relations," all in How Wars End (Annals), 62-95.
82. Kenneth Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War (New 88. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished
York: McGraw Hill, 1969), 333-700. Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row,
83. Sydney D. Bailey, ed., How Wars End: The United 1988; J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruc-
Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict, tion (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1937).
1946-1964, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University 89. "The Marshall Plan and Its Legacy: The 50th Anniver-
Press, 1982); David M. Morriss, "From War to Peace: sary," Foreign Affairs, Commemorative Section, vol.
A Study of Cease-fire Agreements and the Evolving 76, no. 3 (May-June 1997), 157-221; Harry B. Price,
Role of the United Nations," Virginia Journal of In- The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithaca, NY:
ternational Law, vol. 36 (Summer 1996), 801-931. Cornell University Press, 1955).

97
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 9. Fundamentals of Military Preparedness
When your weapons are dulled . . . neighboring
rulers will take advantage of your distress.
And even though you have wise counsellors,
none will be able to lay good plans.
Sun Tzu
The Art of War

S uperb military strategies are advantageous only if

armed forces are properly organized, equipped,
and trained to implement them successfully wher-
tainability are mutually indispensable components
of military preparedness, because rapidly deploy-
able forces that lack staying power risk early defeat,
ever, whenever, and however required for as long whereas durable forces that arrive too late are use-
as necessary in peacetime and in war. Quantitative less.1 Armed forces unfortunately cannot become
and qualitative considerations include military roles, equally prepared for every eventuality. Nuclear, bio-
functions, and missions, active and reserve force pos- logical, chemical, traditional, and unconventional
tures, manpower, materiel, education, training, infra- warfare are distinctive. Military operations other
structure, technologies, modernization programs, in- than war, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assis-
dustrial capacities, and other facets of military tance, disaster relief, drug interdiction, andnoncom-
power. Efforts to satisfy present demands when re- batant evacuation, demand different skills. So do
sources are scarce may sacrifice future proficiency. uniservice, joint, and coalition endeavors.
Military preparedneses moreover is situation spe-
cific. Weak U.S. Armed Forces, for example, were PRINCIPLES OF PREPAREDNESS
adequate before World War II erupted in Europe, Excessive attention to military preparedness yields
since no enemy directly endangered the United armed forces that are unnecessarily expensive. A
States and capacities for rapid expansion were pro- satisfactory balance between competing national
digious. Incomparably stronger U.S. forces subse- needs therefore is advisable. Nine Principles of Mili-
quently outclassed Vietnamese opponents in most tary Preparedness, analogous to Principles of Deter-
measurable respects, but initial preparedness for rence and War described in Chapters 7 and 8, could
orthodox rather than unorthodox combat was a help planners, programmers, and budgeteers fash-
minus instead of a plus. ion versatile forces at reasonable costs.

READINESS VS. SUSTAINABILITY Principle of Purview

Readiness connotes immediate abilities to conduct Postulation: Armed forces perform best when
military operations. Sustainability determines how prepared to fulfill characteristic roles and
long operations can last before casualties and the functions.
lack of consumables (munitions, fuel, food, repair Characteristic roles fundamentally shape military
parts) render units ineffective. Readiness and sus- readiness and sustainability requirements. Armies

99
MILITARY STRATEGY

prepare to operate primarily on land, air forces General George Washington on September 15,
above land, navies on, under, over, or from the sea, 1780, told Congress that, "Our object ought to be
amphibious forces along littorals, and space forces . . . a good army rather than a large one." Practical
within Earth's circumterrestrial envelope or be- limits nevertheless exist, because small armed forces
yond. Characteristic combat and support functions are less able to control extensive territory, cannot
influence preparedness requirements within each absorb heavy casualties as easily, and possess less
military service. Reasonable overlaps enhance flex- flexibility when unforeseen contingencies arise.
ibility, but revised roles and functions become es- Rapid operating tempos and lengthy forward de-
sential whenever interservice competition gener- ployments require larger establishments than rou-
ates undesirable redundancies.2 The most recent tine operations at or near home stations.
U.S. reviews, for example, did not resolve Army and
Air Force disputes about primary responsibility for
Manpower Levels
theater missile defense,3 battlefield interdiction,4
Authorized personnel ceilings limit the number of
and close air support.5
divisions, air wings, naval ships, and other military
units that a nation could field at or near full strength.
Principle of Regional Peculiarity Assigned personnel equal authorizations in the ab-
Postulation: Armed forces perform best when
sence of conscription only if recruiting programs
prepared for employment in particular geo-
attract enough entry-level volunteers and retention
graphic regions.
programs keep commissioned, warrant, and enlisted
Every Area of Responsibility (AOR) is geographi-
pay grades at prescribed levels. Units that are re-
cally unique in terms of physical and cultural geogra-
quired to commence operations at full strength must
phy. Armed forces expressly prepared for employ-
be authorized overstrengths in peacetime, because
ment in any given environment normally function
some personnel invariably are ill, on leave, AWOL,
less well elsewhere until they complete time-con-
in transit, incarcerated, or in school. Legal waivers
suming, often costly, transitions. They not only must
may eliminate others, such as single parents, HFV-
become familiar with new friends, enemies, terrain,
positive individuals, conscientious objectors, and
climate, demographic patterns, cultures, and social
females who are pregnant or suffer postpartum
situations, but also tailor "weapons, equipment, cloth-
depression.
ing, and supplies to suit new conditions. Frigid
climes, for example, require parkas, insulated boots,
lined sleeping bags, skis, snowmobiles, low-viscosity Weapons, Equipment, and Supplies
lubricants, and hot meals with high caloric contents, Fully manned units perform optimally only if they
none of which are suitable in the tropics. Exotic dis- possess all authorized weapons, equipment, and re-
eases that decimate poorly prepared troops in equa- pair parts. Mundane items like dump trucks, fork
torial rain forests are absent in deserts. Lowlanders lifts, field kitchens, hospital beds, power generators,
who enter high altitude AORs on short notice suffer and encryption devices count. Quantitatively ready
from oxygen deprivation (hypoxia) until they adapt.6 forces additionally must possess enough supplies
to sustain operations until replenishments become
Principle of Quantitative available. Needs differ for each type unit, each class
Sufficiency of supplies, each mission, and each AOR. Ground
Postulation: Armed forces perform best when forces, for example, consume more fuel and less
force levels and assigned missions are com- ammunition during fluid offensive warfare than they
patible. do in defensive positions.7

100
 FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Principle of Qualitative Superiority and minimizes the weaknesses of each com-

Postulation: Armed forces perform best when ponent.
personnel, weapons, equipment, and supplies Active and reserve components (AC, RC) are
are superior to those of the most capable oppo- complementary. A few small countries such as Israel
nents. and Switzerland rely mainly on reserves,8 but over-
Preparedness requires professionally competent emphasis on either asset usually wastes money and
personnel and technologically competitive materiel. impairs preparedness. Readiness moreover suffers
Outnumbered forces must maintain a significant when RC receive missions for which AC are better
qualitative edge in both respects or risk failure. qualified, and vice versa.9
The optimum mix varies service by service. Re-
Competent Personnel serve airlifters, who routinely hone requisite skills
Reduced readiness is the penalty for failure to attract at civilian occupations, can answer calls on short
and retain well-disciplined personnel who can as- notice, whereas reserve ground combat forces gen-
similate essential military instruction. Selection pro- erally cannot. Active armies consequently are prefer-
cesses that impose high standards at the onset are able when missions demand assured availability and
imperative, because inculcation is time-consuming rapid responsiveness to cope with contingencies
and expensive. Basic flight training for one U.S. pi- that erupt abruptly and terminate quickly. Army
lot, for example, consumed about a year and cost reserves, in contrast, serve best when used during
more than $1 million in the late 1990s. It takes a prolonged operations to expand or reconstitute
decade to develop well-seasoned noncommissioned AC capabilities with individual and unit replace-
officers. Flag-rank commanders and high-level logis- ments, communications, intelligence, and logisti-
ticians take twice that long. Efforts to retain the most cal support,
promising, productive, and experienced individuals
consequently deserve a high priority. Principle of Compatibility
Postulation: Armed forces perform best when
they prepare to participate in joint and com-
Competitive Technologies bined operations.
Simple, yet qualitatively superior, weapons and Land, sea, air, amphibious, and space forces
equipment facilitate training, contribute to sustain- must work smoothly with each other and with
ability under combat conditions, and enable armed allies. Uniservice, joint, and combined policies,
forces to achieve objectives more expeditiously strategies, doctrines, and tactics thus are impera-
with fewer casualties than otherwise would be tive. More than 100 documents prescribe joint per-
possible. Prerequisites include research and devel- sonnel, intelligence, plans, operations, logistics,
opment communities whose occupants create reli- and command/control doctrines for U.S. Armed
able, state-of-the-art implements that average mili- Forces. Sixty-some publications serve similar pur-
tary personnel can master with reasonable effort poses for NATO.10
and industrial plants can mass-produce at reason- Interchangeable or interoperable weapon sys-
able costs. tems, equipment, and supplies are just as important
as compatible processes. Research, development,
Principle of AC-RC procurement costs, and logistical burdens soar un-
Complementarity less high-volume items like rifle ammunition, air-to-
Postulation: Armed forces perform best when surface missiles, and assorted repair parts suit more
the active-reserve mix maximizes the strengths than one military service. Dangerous problems arise

101
MILITARY STRATEGY

when uninational forces cannot communicate easily challenge is to preserve strategic, operational, tacti-
with each other, much less with coalition partners.11 cal, and technological superiority, prevent block
obsolescence, and revise war reserve stocks without
Principle of Installations endangering day-to-day preparedness.14
Postulation: Armed forces perform best when
diversified installations simplify training and Principle of Resource Sufficiency
support. Postulation: Armed forces perform best when
Ready, sustainable armed forces require home resource allocations enable them to imple-
bases where they can adequately prepare to accom- ment prevalent military strategies effectively.
plish assigned missions. U.S. Armed Forces in 2001 Military preparedness is an expensive proposi-
occupied more than 3,000 major and minor proper- tion, especially in the absence of conscription.
ties in all fifty states and territories.12 Several con- Readiness and sustainability lapse when unreason-
tained huge tracts for training (Nellis Air Force Base ably low force levels and insufficient funds create
northeast of Las Vegas is only slightly smaller than great gaps between ends and means. Indeed, any
Connecticut). Armed forces everywhere demand nation that sets its sights too high and pursues poli-
supply and maintenance depots. Other installations cies that defy successful implementation with avail-
perform such assorted functions as administrative able power may at best lose influence because of
support, professional military education, communi- public embarrassment and at worst lose wars.15
cations, hospitalization, research, and development. Wary resource allocators nevertheless recognize
Nations with regional or global responsibilities re- that unnecessarily large military budgets can under-
quire similar assets abroad. Strategically situated U.S. cut rather than strengthen national security. Occu-
outposts that girdled the globe during the Cold War pants of the Kremlin, who failed to grasp that cogent
peaked at 1,700. Sharp retrenchments during the fact, literally bankrupted the Soviet Union by the
early 1990s cut costs considerably, but drastically late 1980s and thereby caused the collapse of its
reduced operational flexibility.13 Armed Forces along with the nation.16

Principle of Foresight PRESENT PREPAREDNESS

Postulation: Armed forces are best prepared Widespread readiness and sustainability shortcom-
when decision-makers take future as well as ings indicate that few nations consciously honor the
current requirements into account. foregoing Principles of Preparedness or any others.
Foresighted national security decision-makers, Strategic, operational, personnel, materiel, logisti-
whose mission is to prepare forces for uncertain cal, and budgetary problems described below are
futures, seek insights from cycles, patterns, trends, illustrative.
intelligence estimates, threat assessments, and war
games. Associated assumptions concern potential Illogical Objectives
opponents and probabilities of war; conflict types, History records many instances in which qualita-
intensities, and durations; warning and reaction tively superior armed forces defeated much larger
times; the responsiveness of reserves; the availability foes, but politico-military strategists who establish
of allies; consumption rates for expendables; and objectives for which force levels are unrealistically
industrial capacities. Results determine likely force low create preparedness problems and implicitly
modernization requirements, together with the best accept unnecessarily shaky calculated risks. Hitler
tradeoffs between research, development, acquisi- ultimately lost World War II because his superlative
tion, operations, and maintenance accounts. The military machine was too small to achieve simultane-

102
 FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

ous victories on eastern, western, and southern gencies arose, say, in Korea and the Persian Gulf
fronts, given adversaries whose combined resources depends heavily on dubious assumptions. Probabili-
were vastly greater. British strategist Basil H. Liddell ties appear best only if warning times before War
Hart summed up Hitler's predicament with these One were measured in weeks; if essential ports and
words: "Once America's strength developed, and airfields remained in friendly hands; if prepositioned
Russia survived to develop hers, the . . . only uncer- stocks were adequate and conveniently located; if
tainties were—how long it would take, and how War Two started after War One deployments were
complete [the debacle] would be."17 complete; if War One was brief; if U.S. casualties
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the and equipment losses were light; and if U.S. allies
early 1960s proclaimed a 2V2-war strategy that could made meaningful contributions in both cases, while
best be described as ludicrous, given postulated re- enemies received little or no assistance. Wrenching
quirements for relatively small U.S. non-nuclear questions concerning which war should take pri-
forces, in conjunction with allies, to defeat the So- ority otherwise would arise, and slighted friends
viet Union, China, and simultaneously douse a would be righteously outraged.
"brushfire." President Nixon, in efforts to "harmo-
nize doctrine and capability," scaled back to a IVa- Operations Other Than War
war strategy that called for assets able to handle Rapid-response deployments enhance readiness in
Soviet or Chinese aggression and concurrently cope some respects during military operations other than
with one lesser contingency.18 "One-plus" capabili- war (MOOTW), but long-term pluses and minuses
ties even so proved unattainable, according to De- depend mainly on primary roles and missions. Some
fense Secretary Harold Brown who, a decade later, military formations selectively improve prepared-
conceded that, "We have never acquired the agility ness, while others lose their cutting edge.23
or mobility." Resource allocators instead settled "for
a lower level of combat-readiness" and "economized MOOTW Pluses
(some would say scrimped) on the nuts and bolts Armed forces gain practical experience during mili-
needed to sustain a non-nuclear conflict... for more tary operations other than war when they perform
than a relatively short period of time. And our allies logistical and communications tasks for which they
have been even more cavalier."19 are organized, equipped, and trained. Operation Re-
Unrealistic U.S. ambitions continue. Defense Sec- store Hope (December 1992-May 1993) gave U.S.
retary Les Aspin's Bottom-Up Review of 1993 re- Air Mobility Command real-world, real-time oppor-
quired abilities to fight and win two major regional tunities to demonstrate global reach and upgrade
conflicts nearly simultaneously with a high probabil- austere airports in distant Somalia.24 U.S. Army engi-
ity of success, while minimizing American casual- neers who helped restore Nicaragua after Hurricane
ties.20 Even he, however, admitted that his efforts Mitch hit in November 1998 rebuilt washed-out
merely rationalized what President Clinton's de- roads, replaced a flooded hospital with a clinic, pro-
fense budget would buy.21 The 1997 Quadrennial vided stricken communities with medical care, and
Defense Review declared that "the United States advised the Ministry of Health regarding epidem-
now and for the foreseeable future [must] be able ics.25 Special Operations Forces (SOF) possess as-
to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggres- sorted capabilities that dovetail with "peacetime"
sion in two distant theaters in overlapping time needs better than bullets and bayonets. Psychologi-
frames."22 cal operations (PSYOP) programs that mold public
Whether U.S. Armed Forces, much reduced dur- opinion and civic actions that elevate the lot of
ing the 1990s, could comply if concurrent contin- common people facilitate the attainment of national

103
MILITARY STRATEGY

objectives. That happened in Haiti, where fewer • Rapid OPTEMPO increases strains on mili-
than 1,200 SOF personnel became benefactors and tary manpower and materiel
de facto governors in more than 730 communities • Rapid OPTEMPO increases the expenditure
from 1994 into 1995.26 Some combat forces enjoy of repair parts and supplies
comparable advantages. Explosive ordnance dis- • Rapid OPTEMPO increases budgetary re-
posal units and land mine clearance teams, for exam- quirements
ple, accrue experience that they could not replicate • Rapid OPTEMPO impedes training and other-
during routine training.27 wise impairs preparedness if prolonged (ex-
cessively slow OPTEMPO may do likewise)
MOOTW Minuses
Military operations other than war nevertheless de- More than ninety "named" operations consumed
grade preparedness in crucial respects. Cargo air- greater efforts by ever fewer U.S. Armed Forces
craft that repeatedly fly food, clothing, and medical during the 1990s, not counting innumerable small
supplies from Point A to Point B, land, unload, and deployments. Well over half involved substantial
return find little opportunity to practice low-level operations for combat, peacekeeping, and humani-
navigation, aerial delivery techniques, and assault tarian purposes. A dozen were active when the new
landings or participate in joint airborne training with millennium began: Joint Falcon and Eagle Eye in
paratroopers. They also pay a price in terms of wear Kosovo; Deliberate Forge, Joint Forge, and Deter-
and tear, deferred depot maintenance, and availabil- mined Forge in Bosnia; Northern Watch, Southern
ity to handle unexpected crises elsewhere. Airborne Watch, Desert Spring, and Arabian Gulf Maritime
early warning and control (AWACS) aircraft that Intercept Operations related to Iraq; Multinational
look for and try to track illicit narcotics flights across Force and Observers in the Sinai; Laser Strike and
the Caribbean Sea have little time to practice battle other counterdrug operations in the Western Hemi-
management, their primary mission. Army combat sphere.29 That hectic pace, accompanied by large-
troops take longer than other forces to recover after scale reliance on reserve components and repeated
lengthy MOOTW operations (several months on the family separations, impinged on many aspects of
average), particularly when divisions unavoidably military preparedness, including abilities to recruit,
suspend battalion- and brigade-level training be- retain, and train qualified personnel.
cause large numbers deploy while the rest remain
at home stations.28 Personnel Issues
Preparedness falters unless training programs invest
draftees and volunteers with essential skills, profes-
Peacetime Operating Tempo sional military education programs develop leaders
Six axioms illuminate relationships between peace- at every level, and enlightened personnel policies
time operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and readiness: retain highly qualified officers, NCOs, and specialists
who represent valuable investments. Intangibles
• OPTEMPO increases when military missions also count, according to British Major General J. F.
expand, if force levels remain constant or C. Fuller, because "Neither a nation nor an army is
decrease a mechanical contrivance, but a living thing, built
• OPTEMPO increases when force levels de- of flesh and blood and not of iron and steel. . . . The
cline, if military missions remain steady or more mechanical become the weapons with which
subside at slower rates we fight, the less mechanical must be the spirit

104
 FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

which controls them."30 Key considerations include females ground masculine gears, because men did
attitude, morale, esprit de corps, a strong sense of double duty to fill blank files.34 Resultant military
belonging, and team play. Females and homosexuals preparedness issues are disputatious.
in uniform both raise disciplinary and extremely
emotional issues in such regards, with results that Homosexuals
directly affect male bonding and unit cohesiveness. Many homosexuals have been fearsome warriors,
including Alexander the Great, who amassed a
Servicewomen mighty empire and won eternal fame. Others faced
Hippolyte, queen of the Amazons and daughter of shame or, like British brevet Major General Hector
Ares, the Greek god of war, led a mythological race "Fighting Mac" Macdonald, were literally hounded
of warrior women that Homer cited in the Iliad. to death when their proclivities became public
Legendary Jeanne d'Arc, the seventeen-year-old knowledge.35 Animosities continue, because few
Maid of Orleans, gave France short-lived but never- countries have bridged the cultural gap that pres-
theless stunning victories over English adversaries ently prevails.
in 1429 during the Hundred Years' War. Women in A head-on collision between U.S. pro-con fac-
the Soviet Union and several other countries saw tions occurred in January 1993 when President Clin-
combat during World War II, when the male ton, despite long-standing traditions and advice from
manpower pool was insufficient and national sur- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officially announced his
vival was at stake. Israel briefly considered, then intent to tolerate homosexuality in U.S. Armed
discarded, similar usage.31 Forces.36 No one knows how many homosexuals
The United States at the onset of the twenty- still serve quietly "in the closet," but vocal outsiders
first century was the only major military power that have caused constant turmoil ever since. Outraged
recruited women en masse as a matter of policy colleagues who harass known or suspected "cul-
rather than expediency. The average percentage at prits" continue to make banner headlines, despite
that time approximated 15 percent (17-18 percent repeated reevaluations, "sensitivity" training, and
in the Air Force, 5-6 percent in the Marine Corps).32 jurisdictional disputes that reached the Supreme
Related policies and practices pitted women's-rights Court.37 Whether deep-seated social issues involved
advocates against defenders of tradition. Countless are susceptible to coercive and legal solutions re-
complaints about harassment and male abuses of mains to be seen. Military preparedness meanwhile
power occasionally culminated in acrimonious tri- experiences adverse effects of uncertain but report-
als.33 Rising expectations concurrently caused U.S. edly sizable proportions.38
servicewomen to complain about a "glass ceiling"
that allegedly impeded rapid promotions, banned Materiel Issues
land combat billets, and reserved choice assign- Improperly maintained materiel neither works as
ments for men. Males, in turn, resented political well nor lasts as long as it should. Preventive mainte-
agendas, social engineering, and "gender-norming" nance is especially important when weapons and
that, as they saw it, undermined military prepared- equipment are subject to hard usage under harsh
ness and capabilities. Orders from female officers conditions. Wind-blown grit, for example, fouls en-
and NCOs made macho men chafe. Most objected gines and abrades all moving parts in desert climes.
to inconsistent physical standards that gave women Helicopters are particularly delicate, but all aircraft,
high marks, despite obvious fitness and strength motor vehicles, crew-served weapons, small arms,
deficiencies. Pregnant and otherwise undeployable and electronics tend to malfunction in the absence

105
MILITARY STRATEGY

of constant, intensive care. Ships, aircraft, and other breathtaking rates. Murphy's Law furthermore pre-
major items that miss scheduled overhauls gradually dicts that, "If anything can go wrong it will." Future
become unreliable. military preparedness consequently depends pri-
Incremental upgrades may substantially extend marily on farsighted policy-makers and strategists
the life spans of proven systems, vest them with with penchants for conceptual and postural flexibil-
greater reliability, and restore their technological ity. Their multifaceted mission is to evaluate observ-
edge. Aging weapon systems and equipment never- able trends; estimate what capabilities might be
theless require replacement when maintenance be- most useful fifteen to twenty years hence, given
comes disproportionately frequent and costly, mean anticipated threats; harness evolutionary and revolu-
times between failures shorten significantly, acci- tionary technologies in innovative ways; alter mili-
dent rates increase, and block obsolescence looms. tary education, training, and the industrial base ac-
The precipitous qualitative decline of hardware cordingly; then tailor existing institutions to
that Russia inherited from the USSR, caused by bud- orchestrate uniservice, joint, and coalition opera-
getary neglect for political, economic, and social tions under envisaged conditions.40
reasons, serves as an object lesson for national secu- The dust bins of history are loaded with losers
rity decision-makers who fail to preserve, upgrade, whose 20/20 hindsight encouraged them to refight
or replace materiel. Deployments remain quantita- past wars against antagonists who forged ahead.
tively impressive, but non-nuclear capabilities that The defeat of club-wielding cavemen by Neolithic
buttressed Soviet claims to superpower status enemies armed with spears perhaps was first. The
ashore, aloft, and afloat disappeared in less than a quick victory of fast-moving German forces over
decade.39 Revitalization likely will take longer. French defenders, who in May 1940 occupied fixed
positions reminiscent of World War I, was among
FUTURE PREPAREDNESS the most famous, but by no means the last. National
Military superiority is perishable in a world wracked security policy-makers and military strategists
by fundamental changes that exacerbate existing should bear those debacles in mind and act accord-
security problems and create new concerns at ingly, lest they add to the list.

KEY POINTS
Superb military strategies are advantageous only if armed forces are properly organized,
equipped, and trained to implement them successfully
Readiness and sustainability are inseparable needs, because forces that lack staying power risk
early defeat, while those that arrive too late are useless
Principles of Preparedness could help planners, programmers, and budgeteers fashion versatile
forces at reasonable costs
Strategists who establish objectives for which force levels are unrealistically low create prepared-
ness problems and implicitly accept shaky calculated risks
Military operations other than war selectively improve the preparedness of most support forces
and degrade most combat capabilities
Rapid operating tempo impedes training and otherwise impairs preparedness if prolonged
(excessively slow OPTEMPO may do likewise)

106
 FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Personnel preparedness considerations include attitude, morale, esprit de corps, team play, and
other intangibles as well as education and training
Preventive maintenance, regular overhauls, incremental upgrades, and timely replacement of mil-
itary materiel benefit readiness and sustainability
Future military preparedness depends primarily on farsighted policy-makers and strategists who
estimate what capabilities might be most useful fifteen to twenty years hence, then foster flexi-
ble plans and programs

NOTES gress (Washington: Office of the Secretary of De-

1. Unpreparedness can be costly. See, for example, fense, April 1992), Appendices F and G; Certain
Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, eds., Ameri- Victory (Washington: Office of the Chief of Staff,
ca's First Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence: University U.S. Army, 1993), Chapter 2.
of Kansas Press, 1986). 8. Nathaniel Lorch, Shield ofZion: The Israeli Defense
2. Title 10, United States Code, Section 153 (b) obli- Forces (Charlottesville, VA: Howell Press, 1991).
gates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 9. Debates about the mix of active and reserve compo-
review roles and functions at least once every three nents are not new. See Robert L. Goldich, U.S. Army
years. See Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Roles and Combat-to-Support Ratios: A Framework for Analy-
Functions of the Armed Forces, a Report to the Secre- sis, Rpt. 89-386F (Washington: Congressional Re-
tary of Defense (Washington: Office of the Chairman, search Service, June 26, 1989). See also Goldich and
Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 28, 1989); General David F. Burrelli, Combat-to-Support Ratios in the
Colin L. Powell, Roles, Missions, and Functions of U.S. Armed Forces: A Review and Summary of Se-
the Armed Forces of the United States, February lected Studies, memorandum for the Senate Armed
1993 and his memorandum to the Secretary of De- Services Committee (Washington: Congressional Re-
fense, Comments on the Commission on Roles and search Service, May 15, 1985).
Missions of the Armed Forces Report "Directions 10. Joint Pub. 1-01.1, Compendium of Publications
for Defense," July 24, 1995. (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
3. Theater Missile Defense (Washington: Department Staff, April 23,1999); a spokesman for the Director of
of the Army, Roles and Missions Directorate, 1995); Operational Plans & Interoperability (J-7) furnished
Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak, updates and Allied Joint Publication statistics in Janu-
Presentation to the Commission on Roles and Mis- ary 2001.
sions of the Armed Forces (Washington: U.S. Govern- 11. "Interoperability," Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia
ment Printing Office, January 1995), 157-83. (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
4. Deep Battle (Washington: Department of the Army, of Staff, July 16, 1997), 352-54; NATO Logistics
Roles and Missions Directorate, November 15,1994); Handbook, 3d ed. (Brussels, Belgium: Senior NATO
McPeak, Presentation to the Commission on Roles Logisticians' Conference Secretariat, October 1997),
and Missions of the Armed Forces, 31-101. Chapter 17, "Standardization and Interoperability."
5. Close Air Support/Fire Support (Washington: De- 12. For a partial list, see Guide to Military Installations
partment of the Army, Roles and Missions Director- Worldwide: More Than 300 Major Bases, Posts and
ate, January 10, 1995); McPeak, Presentation to the Stations, a supplement to the Army Times, Navy
Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Times, and Air Force Times, November 2000.
Forces, 103-22. 13- More U.S. Overseas Bases to End Operations (Wash-
6. John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Profession- ington: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [Pub-
als and the Public (Washington: National Defense lic Affairs], October 22, 1993).
University Press, 1998; republished by Brassey's, 14. Representative outlooks include Project 2025
1998), Chapter 6, "Regional Peculiarities," 93-136. (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
7. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm typify National Defense University, May 1992) and Paul
ground force sustainability requirements. See Con- Bracken, "The Military After Next," Washington
duct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Con- Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 154-74.

107
MILITARY STRATEGY

15. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Committee, Subcommittee for Military Readiness
Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: and Management Support (Washington: General Ac-
Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 139-40. counting Office, May 24, 1999).
16. Lieutenant General William P. Odom, The Collapse of 29. U.S. Participation in Military Operations, 1990-
the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University Present (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint
Press, 1998). Chiefs of Staff, September 1999).
17. Basil H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World 30. Major General J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Dis-
War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), 711-13. eases and Their Cure (Harrisburg, PA: Military Ser-
18. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy vice Publishing Co., 1936), 13-
for Peace, a Report to the Congress by President 31- Martin van Creveld, "Why Israel Doesn't Send
Richard Nixon (Washington: U.S. Government Print- Women Into Combat," Parameters, vol. 23, no. 1
ing Office, February 18, 1970), 128-29. (Spring 1993), 5-9.
19. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Re- 32. Selected Manpower Statisticsfor FY1999 (Washing-
port, Fiscal Year 1981 (Washington: Office of the ton: Directorate for Information Operations and Re-
Secretary of Defense, January 1980), 98-99, 118. ports, Washington Headquarters Services, Office of
Quotation on 99- the Secretary of Defense).
20 Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense [to se- 33- Melissa S. Herbert, Camouflage Isn't Only for Com-
lected addressees,] Subject: The Bottom-Up Review, bat: Gender, Sexuality, and Women in the Military
accompanied by The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for (New York: New York University Press, 1998);
a New Era, September 1, 1993- Amplified by Report Sidney J. Freedberg, Jr., "Taking Aim at GI Jane,"
on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, 1-13. National Journal, March 14, 1998, 590-91; Thomas
21. Minutes from a press conference convened by Leon E. Ricks, "General's Case Raises Worries on Harass-
Panetta, Les Aspin, and Laura d'Andrea Tyson to dis- ment," Washington Post, April 5, 2000, Al, A9.
cuss the Penny-Kasich bill, November 19, 1993; 34. Stephanie Gutman, The Kinder, Gentler Military:
John T. Correll, "The Bottom-Down Review," Air Can America's Gender-Neutral Fighting Force Still
Force, December 1993, 2; Kim R. Holme and Baker Win Wars? (New York: Scribners, 2000); Geoffrey
Spring, "Aspin's Defense Review: Top-Down, Not Norman, "Babes in Arms," Men's Health, vol. 11, no.
Bottom-Up," Armed Forces Journal, August 1993, 5 (Jime 1996), 50-52; "Women in Combat? Insights
39-40. Worth Repeating," Marine Corps Gazette, vol. 81,
22. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Wash- no. 11 (November 1997), 73-74.
ington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 35. Byron Farwell, Eminent Victorian Soldiers: Seekers
1997), 12. of Glory (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 294-98.
23. Commander Rame Hemstreet, Small Worlds Mis- 36. General Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My
sions: The Impact of Military Operations Other American Journey (New York: Random House,
Than War on Combat Readiness (Washington: Na- 1995), 546-47, 563-64, 570-74.
tional War College, May 10, 1999). 37. High Court Again Sidesteps "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
24. Ibid., 13-14. Controversy, First Amendment Center Home Page,
25. Major Jeffrey R. Eckstein, "A Short and Successful May 12, 1997; Appeals Court Upholds Military
Operation," Army, September 1999, 67-70. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy, Cable Network News
26. USSOCOM Pub. 1, Special Operations in Peacetime (CNN), September 24, 1998.
(MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Special Operations Command, 38. For balanced views, see David F. Burrelli and Charles
January 1996), 2-24 to 2-27. Dale, Homosexuals and U.S. Military Personnel Pol-
27. Hemstreet, Small Worlds Missions, 30; Gregory L. icy: Current Issues, Rpt. RL30113 (Washington: Con-
Bier, Stanley W. Grzyb, and M. Merrill Stevens, Un- gressional Research Service, March 17, 1999).
derstanding and Expanding the United States Mili- 39. Lieutenant General William P. Odom, The Collapse
tary Role in Humanitarian Demining Operations, of the Soviet Military; Stewart D. Goldman, Russian
Landpower Essay Series No. 98-3 (Washington: Asso- Conventional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Col-
ciation of the United States Army, June 1998). lapse? Rpt. 97-820-F (Washington: Congressional Re-
28. Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other search Service, September 4, 1997).
Than War on the Services Varies, GAO/NSIAD-99- 40. Admiral William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War
69, a report submitted to the Senate Armed Services (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000).

108
 10. Fundamentals of Arms Control
Can't anybody here play this game?
Casey Stengel
First Manager of the New York Mets
Outraged remark, 1962

N ations traditionally amass military power to

protect strategic interests and support foreign
policies. Intemperate competitions, which often en-
measures may increase rather than curb costs. Suc-
cesses strengthen stability and foster the following
strategic objectives:2
sue, foster quantitative and qualitative arms races
that not only deplete resources, talents, and energ- • Prevent lopsided military balances
ies, but guarantee ever-greater violence if armed • Enhance defensive capabilities
conflicts erupt. Proficient arms controllers advance • Reduce offensive capabilities
assorted alternatives designed to discourage military • Alleviate international tensions
one-upmanship without undermining required • Improve threat predictions
capabilities.1 • Forestall accidental conflicts
Commentators with polarized opinions make • Reduce risks of surprise attack
strong cases for and against arms control. All such • Minimize devastation if deterrence fails
contentions, however, miss the mark, because his- • Contain costly escalation
torical records reveal that results since World War • Preserve selected environments
II have been less helpful than optimists hoped and
less harmful than pessimists feared. One fact even QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS
so seems irrefutable: poorly qualified players unin- Quantitative restrictions reduce, retard, or preclude
tentionally abet opponents more often than not, the deployment of selected armed forces, weapon
whereas arms controllers who know how to play systems, and munitions. Cuts, caps, and bans estab-
complex games of give and take can usefully com- lish ceilings that may be as high or as low as advo-
plement military power ashore, aloft, afloat, and cates prefer and adversaries will accept. Counter-
in space. proliferation strategies aim to confine or preclude
horizontal spreads.*
ARMS CONTROL AIMS
Arms controllers, unlike arms accumulators, aim to
Force Level Limitations
verifiably limit numbers, types, technological char-
War fighters, who feel most comfortable with mili-
acteristics, locations, and uses of major military for-
tary superiority, are suspicious of strategies that limit
mations, armaments, and stockpiled munitions. Ad-
force levels, but carefully calculated, effectively
vocates concurrently strive to trim military budgets,
but recognize that steps to replace or redeploy pro- "Chapter 11 covers nuclear, biological, chemical warfare,
vocative forces and implement other risk-reduction and radiological (NBCR) counterproliferation strategies.

109
MILITARY STRATEGY

monitored covenants sometimes serve national in- nents are poorly prepared to compensate. Mutual
terests. Soviet leaders, for example, prized massive force-reduction proposals designed to decrease non-
military deployments, but nevertheless ratified sev- nuclear deployments on both sides of the Iron Cur-
eral arms control pacts that included numerical re- tain, for example, long foundered because Soviet
straints. contingents repositioned in European Russia could
regenerate combat power more rapidly than U.S.
Idealistic Disarmament counterparts could return from bases in the United
General and complete disarmament was the goal in States and elsewhere overseas.6 At least two precon-
1928 when sixty-three nations ratified the Kellogg- ditions consequently should precede deep reduc-
Briand Pact. That idealistic edict, which obliged sig- tions: reasonable abilities to verify compliance and
natories to renounce war as an instrument of na- alternative means to maintain security if treacherous
tional policy, failed in practice because it contained rivals renege.
no provisions for enforcing compliance. The League
of Nations in 1932, following a decade of prelimi- Force Caps
nary discussions, convened a World Disarmament Force caps can prevent expensive, risky, and per-
Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Its keystone haps unrewarding arms races when militarily sig-
proposal, contained in the so-called Hoover Plan, nificant reductions appear impractical or impossi-
visualized the progressive elimination of offensive ble. Pacts that prohibit expansion are preferable to
weapons, but major participants watered it down those that codify planned deployments and thereby
to a toothless statement of principles.3 Pragmatic permit signatories to increase holdings until they
arms controllers, with those failures firmly in mind, reach stipulated ceilings, which happened twice in
currently conclude that Utopian injunctions of any rapid succession when U.S. and Soviet arms control-
kind could be undesirable as well as unattainable lers concluded Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and
in a dangerous world where predators abound.4 II. First, the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement allowed
Soviet ICBM silo construction to proceed on sched-
Unilateral Reductions ule. The SALT II Treaty of 1979 then entitled both
Unilateral slashes that do nothing to redress unfavor- sides to expand multiple independently targetable
able balances normally are inadvisable, but may be reentry vehicle (MIRV) inventories considerably.7
cost-effective and safe under favorable conditions. Negotiators should guard against pernicious side
NATO's deterrent powers, for example, remained effects to the best of their abilities, because force
rock solid when President Carter removed 1,000 caps can stimulate destabilizing attempts to fill
obsolescent nuclear weapons from Western Europe power vacuums. The Washington Naval Treaty of
in 1979. President Reagan recalled 1,400 more in 1922 and a follow-on conference in London, for
1983, even though Moscow refused to reciprocate.5 example, established a 5 to 3.5 ratio between U.S.
and Japanese battleships. Aircraft carriers, which
Deep Force Reductions rapidly replaced dreadnoughts thereafter, could
Deep reductions normally demand discretion, be- conduct surprise attacks at vastly greater ranges,
cause temptations to retain unauthorized forces as but initially were less survivable. The side that struck
cushions can be strong and surreptitious violations first thus gained great advantage.8
might confer decisive military advantage on cheaters
after all participants reach low levels. Relative Force Freezes
power balances moreover may rapidly become lop- Arms control moratoriums, which freeze forces or
sided if one party rearms unexpectedly and oppo- other militarily valuable assets at present levels, usu-

110
 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMS CONTROL

ally are acceptable only if adversaries possess ap- weapons, it is reasonable to hope that we may also
proximately equal capabilities. Some participants preclude the use of other weapons adaptable to
otherwise must accept protracted (perhaps perma- mass destruction. When a man learns to say 'A' he
nent) inferiority accompanied by chronic risks. can, if he chooses, learn the rest of the alphabet
Arms controllers can elect various alternatives. too."12 Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, who had other
The aforementioned Washington Treaty officially ideas, dashed those altruistic hopes when he refused
"froze" U.S., British, and Japanese fortifications, na- to say "A." The Soviet Union vetoed the Baruch
val bases, maintenance facilities, and coastal de- Plan, detonated its first nuclear device in 1949, and
fenses throughout the Pacific Basin.9 Nuclear freeze thereby precipitated the most perilous arms race
proposals were popular during the Cold War. Mora- in history.
toriums that follow force reductions in any case are
preferable to freezes that preserve high levels. Nuclear-Free Zones
Neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact accepted Polish
Absolute Bans Prime Minister Adam Rapacki's 1957 proposal to des-
Absolute bans, which prohibit selected weapon sys- ignate a nuclear-free zone in Europe, because both
tems, are more stringent than force caps or freezes, espoused strategies that depended heavily on nu-
because even one sighting constitutes a violation. clear firepower. A Latin American nuclear-free zone,
The Seventh Book of Manu, published in Sanskrit inforce since 1967, heldfastonly after Argentina and
circa 700 B.C., forbade weapons with barbed, poi- Brazil cancelled robust programs. No non-African na-
soned, or flaming points many centuries before the tion is party to an African nuclear-free zone treaty
Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1863 legally out- (France and the People's Republic of China, but not
lawed weapons that cause "unnecessary suffering." the USA, USSR, or UK, signed protocols). Only one
Article XXIII of Hague Regulation IV (1907) concen- nuclear-free zone has ever been established in a re-
trated on venomous weapons, plus unspecified gion where nuclear arms previously were accept-
arms, projectiles, or materials that included saw- able: New Zealand did so unilaterally in February
toothed bayonets and hollow-point bullets,10 but 1985, when its newly installed Labour Party posted
arms controllers as yet have been able to proscribe coastal waters "Off Limits" to nuclear-armed war-
few weapons of strategic importance. The Anti-Bal- ships. Nuclear-free zones in empty Antarctica, space,
listic Missile Treaty of 1972, which allows token and on ocean floors have fared well thus far, but fu-
defenses, is subject to dispute at this writing.11 ture international competition eventually may invali-
U.S. economist and financier Bernard Baruch date them. Biological, chemical, and radiological
tried and failed to outlaw nuclear weapons in 1946 warfare-free zones remain nonexistent.13
when he presented the United Nations with a
fourteen-point plan that, if adopted, would have Counting Rules
"entrusted all phases of the development and use Figures don't lie, but liars figure and rascals warp
of atomic energy" to an International Atomic Devel- military statistics to their advantage if unwary rivals
opment Authority. Proposed penalties stigmatized allow. Arms controllers consequently should define
as international crimes the possession of weapon- categories precisely and establish clear counting
grade nuclear materials and the manufacture or pos- rules before force level bargaining begins. Failure to
session of nuclear armaments of any kind. "Devilish" do so invites avoidable misunderstandings, prolongs
nuclear programs, he concluded, take mankind back processes, and leaves legal loopholes that may cause
"not merely to the Dark Ages but from cosmos to serious acrimony concerning actions that violate the
chaos. If we find a suitable way to control atomic spirit, if not the letter, of concluded pacts.

Ill
MILITARY STRATEGY

Common Complexities U.S. B-ls and B-52s, along with Soviet Bears and
Number crunching can be incredibly complex. Para- Bisons, constituted heavy bombers, including many
military forces, such as Soviet Internal Security in "moth balls" or cannibalized for repair parts. So
Troops (MVD) and Border Guards (KGB), share did smaller warplanes armed with air-launched mis-
many characteristics with standard military forma- siles that could strike targets 600 km (325 nm) away.
tions. Reserve components are more important than Variants configured for in-flight refueling, reconnais-
regulars in Israel, Switzerland, and Sweden. Full sance, antisubmarine warfare, and other "nonstrate-
strength divisions train as teams, whereas skeletons gic" purposes were exempt only if Functionally Re-
that consist primarily of commanders and staffs can- lated Observable Differences (FRODs), such as no
not function until inductees or reservists fill blank bomb bay doors or missile pods, indicated that bom-
files. Whether forces with such disparate capabili- bardment was impossible.14
ties should count the same is questionable.
Multipurpose aircraft, missiles, and artillery that Traditional Force Counting Problems
can deliver nuclear, chemical, and traditional muni- Counting questions also plague officials who seek
tions may occupy more than one category. Modern to control traditional weapons. What criteria, pray
and obsolescent weapon systems vary in value. So tell, should bound a database for main battle tanks?
do modifications that outperform standard models, Weight? Caliber of the primary weapon? Type of
much like stock racing cars run faster than commer- armor? The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Eu-
cial automobiles with the same external features. rope (CFE) counted tracked or wheeled armored
Dissimilar organizational structures further compli- vehicles that "weigh at least 16.5 metric tonnes
cate equations. The U.S. Department of Defense, unladen weight [18.2 short tons] and which are
for example, relies extensively on civilians to sup- armed with a 360-degree traverse gun of at least 75
plement military personnel, whereas Soviet Armed millimeters calibre." Armor with the same size gun
Forces routinely used troops to operate railroads but lesser weight occupied a separate category
and harvest crops. called "heavy armament combat vehicle." The CFE
Treaty lumped tube artillery with all mortars and
Nuclear Counting Problems multiple rocket launchers of 100 mm or larger.
Nuclear arms controllers trapped in that maze strug- Counting rules concerning many other •weapons
gle to concoct mutually acceptable databases. SALT were equally convoluted.15
II negotiations stalled repeatedly, because Soviet
spokesmen insisted that the term "strategic" should BW and CW Counting Problems
embrace all nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention counts
able to strike the other's homeland, whereas U.S. microbial and other biological agents plus toxins
participants contended that forward-based systems only if quantities and types "have no justification
ashore and afloat were "tactical." Both sides eventu- for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful pur-
ally recognized intercontinental ballistic missiles poses." Those loose definitions leave great latitude
(ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles for interpretation.16
(SLBMs), and heavy bombers as strategic nuclear- The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention explic-
delivery vehicles, but arguments continued until dis- itly prohibits toxic agents and precursors that can
putants decided what fit in each category. Land- cause death, temporary incapacitation, or perma-
based ballistic missiles able to reach 5,500 kilome- nent harm to humans or animals. It also bans offen-
ters (about 3,000 nautical miles) counted as ICBMs. sive (but not defensive) uses of riot control agents,

112
 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMS CONTROL

which produce short-lived sensory irritations or disa- Effective restrictions are elusive during research,
bling physical effects. Most illegal agents, however, because it is difficult to detect secretive pioneering
have industrial, agricultural, research, pharmaceuti- programs, identify security implications from
cal, protective, or domestic law enforcement appli- sketchy data, and predict enemy prospects of suc-
cations, which the treaty condones. Different con- cess in given time frames. Promising programs are
trols over production, stockpiling, and transfers hard to suppress after production starts, because the
pertain to each class. No international agreement most serious technological problems have already
controls incendiaries, such as napalm and white been solved, applications have been proven, finan-
phosphorus.17 cial investments have become large, and potential
beneficiaries urge early deployment. Prime times
QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS for arms control consequently occur during experi-
Qualitative constraints in many respects are more mental stages, when confidence in weapon system
elusive than quantitative controls. National security reliability is low. Optimum opportunities occur
policy-makers and military strategists perpetually de- when technological problems are extensive, ex-
bate whether to restrict technological progress and, penses are extravagant, and feasibility is uncertain
if so, what measures would achieve desired objec- regardless of cost. The United States and Soviet
tives most effectively. Union concluded the ABM Treaty of 1972 under
those conditions.19
Whether to Control Technology
Military hard-liners disapprove any curbs, firm in What Technology to Control
their conviction that national security depends Arms controllers have long sought to clamp lids
on technological supremacy at every level. Their on antisatellite systems, particle beams, high-energy
prescriptions, however, would guarantee cost- lasers, fast-trajectory ballistic missiles tipped with
ineffective, open-ended competition. Counselors at MIRVs, and other innovative weapon systems
the opposite pole prefer to restrain all technologies which, if perfected, might radically alter military
that conceivably could fuel arms races, though that balances of power. Munitions that reduce distinc-
course of action not only would penalize stabilizing tions between nuclear and traditional warfare, such
and destabilizing weapon systems alike, but would as extremely low yield fission warheads, enhanced
block economic development and dual-purpose en- radiation weapons, and fuel-air explosives, have
terprises. Commercial airliners and stealth bombers, been or still are candidates for restriction.
for example, use similar computers and micropro- Technological characteristics that cause intense
cessors. Identical launch vehicles and space satel- anxiety typically include range, accuracy, lethality,
lites serve military and civilian purposes. Compro- and reliability, but size and weight sometimes are
mise solutions consequently seem sensible most central considerations. The 1922 Washington Naval
often.18 Treaty, for example, forbade signatories to deploy
capital ships larger than 35,000 tons and limited
When to Control Technology gun calibers to 16 inches or less. U.S. arms control-
It is theoretically feasible to confine emerging tech- lers got gas pains in the mid-1970s, when the Soviets
nologies at six stages: research, development, test, deployed huge SS-18 ICBMs armed with eight to ten
evaluation, production, and deployment. Prospects high-yield warheads apiece a full decade before MX
in practice, however, are bleak before development Peacekeeper missiles vested Strategic Air Command
begins and after evaluation is complete. with comparable capabilities.20

113
MILITARY STRATEGY

Revolutionary developments attract most atten- lessons: unverifiable arms control agreements are
tion, but arms controllers might also curb evolu- precarious; tacit understandings are less reliable
tionary modernization programs that transform than treaties; and failure to anticipate and prepare
performance dramatically over time. The first U.S. for realistic contingencies constitutes inexcusable
F-4 Phantom fighter/attack aircraft in 1962 looked negligence.
essentially the same as the last model that came
off assembly lines eleven years later, but much- Partial and Threshold Test Bans
improved engines, avionics, armaments, ordnance, U.S. arms controllers applied those lessons when,
and maneuverability gave the final version vastly with Soviet counterparts, they concluded the Partial
improved capabilities.21 M-1A1 Abrams main battle Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, which prohibits
tanks, which resembled the M-ls they superseded, nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, in space,
possessed much greater firepower and survivability, and under water. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty of
because designers replaced the original 105mm gun July 1974 forbade subterranean nuclear explosions
with a 120mm model, added depleted uranium that exceed 150 kilotons. Those durable pacts
armor and ammunition, thermal imaging sights, and solved many environmental problems, but signato-
a controlled environment for their crews.22 ries who cannot legally conduct practical experi-
ments must validate nuclear weapon systems using
How to Control Technologies computer simulations. They also must speculate
Arms control agreements that interrupt or preclude about crippling side effects, such as communication
experimentation during proof of principle or proto- blackouts caused by nuclear blasts in space, because
type stages make it difficult (perhaps impossible) few have been properly probed.24
for technologists to perfect experimental weapon
systems or selected components. Pacts that forbid
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
testing after weapons deploy inhibit modernization.
Fjfforts to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban
Several test bans since the 1950s have sought to
Treaty (CTBT) that covers nuclear explosives for
confine nuclear capabilities. Some have been suc-
constructive* as well as destructive purposes have
cessful, while others have flopped, as the following
foundered since the 1950s, largely because military
vignettes confirm.
liabilities seem to outweigh benefits. Smaller, safer,
more dependable nuclear weapon stockpiles alleg-
Tacit Test Moratorium edly would be impossible to create and maintain if
The United States, which abided by the uninspected
all testing ceased. Only 26 of 44 countries with on-
nuclear test moratorium of 1958, was caught flat-
going nuclear programs of any kind had ratified the
footed when the Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated
CTBT when the United States Senate rejected it on
that "gentlemen's agreement" with a spectacular
October 13, 1999.25
series of atmospheric explosions in 1961. JCS Chair-
man General Nathan F. Twining complained that
"Innovators actively explored peaceable uses of nuclear
U.S. Armed Forces "lost Pacific bases for nuclear explosives from the late 1950s into the 1970s. The U.S. Atomic
testing, lost the trained nuclear teams, lost the moti- Energy Commission in the late 1950s proposed Project Plow-
vation in nuclear laboratories, and lost the capacity share which, if approved, would have used nuclear munitions
to expedite the excavation of an alternative to the Panama
for producing meaningful and up-to-date plans."23
Canal, perhaps through Nicaragua. Other proposals included
His remarks in retrospect seem overstated, but that the rapid construction of harbors in Alaska and operations to
unhappy experience revealed at least three useful loosen Canadian petroleum embedded in oil tar sands.

114
 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMS CONTROL

NEGOTIATING TECHNIQUES to give and take craft acceptable fallback positions

Politics, ideologies, cultures, institutions, and lead- before they tip their hand. Seasoned participants
ership styles strongly influence negotiating tech- avoid self-imposed deadlines that might make them
niques.26 Objectives, team play, and tactics vary con- miscalculate and give rivals leverage with which to
siderably. Open societies operate differently than extract last-minute concessions (frantic U.S. efforts
autocracies. Personalities or procedures sometimes to conclude treaties before summit meetings were
dominate. Delegations address issues sequentially commonplace during the Cold War).29
or simultaneously in confrontational or cooperative
ways. Proclivities to compromise may be strong or Fine Print
weak. Public opinion is crucially important in some Pitfalls frequently accompany "agreements in princi-
countries, but almost inconsequential in others.27 ple." Wary negotiators consequently give little
ground without some positive response, particularly
Agreed Guidelines when antagonists might construe conciliatory ges-
Experienced arms controllers agree that negotia- tures as lack of resolve. Those determined to avoid
tions should feature unambiguous objectives, care- dangerous sins of omission or commission insist that
fully crafted agendas, bold gambits, unflagging atten- treaty texts precisely define the meaning of every
tion to detail, and great patience. Negotiators significant word, phrase, and punctuation mark. Pro-
sometimes wrangle for weeks, even months, over fessional interpreters and translators who are famil-
the phraseology of subordinate clauses. Optimal re- iar with political jargon and military terminology
sults additionally demand bright debaters with long are particularly helpful.30
institutional memories.
Institutional Memories
Unambiguous Objectives Negotiators who study rival track records and histor-
Clearly conceived, consistent arms control aims are ical contexts within which arms control debates
obligatory. Strategists and tacticians otherwise can- take place are best able to emerge victorious. Andrei
not devise sensible negotiating positions. Senior of- Gromkyo, who said "nyet" to seven U.S. presidents
ficials who disagree, as U.S. Executive and Legisla- while he served as Soviet Foreign Minister for
tive Branches often do, should resolve bureaucratic twenty-eight consecutive years (1957-1985), had
and political disputes behind closed doors before an institutional memory second to none. The Soviet
negotiations begin, because undisguised bureau- Union retained one delegation from 1972 to 1979,
cratic power struggles help antagonists achieve the period it took to conclude a SALT II Treaty,
their goals.28 whereas U.S. leaders switched chief negotiators six
times and repeatedly replaced senior support staff.31
Agendas and Gambits Assaults on slipshod U.S. performance began to
Arms control negotiators never should permit oppo- erupt for those reasons before President Carter
nents to shape agendas unilaterally, because the side signed that pact.32
that does so determines what topics to discuss, when
to discuss them, and thereby gains great initiative. Perennial Disputes
Assertive opening moves that put adversaries on the Arms controllers argue endlessly concerning the im-
defensive are more desirable than timid gambits, portance of military superiority, bargaining chips,
which leave little room for bargaining. Rigid negotia- and linkage. A few short paragraphs adequately illus-
tors stand pat regardless, while opponents prepared trate the most prevalent disagreements.

115
MILITARY STRATEGY

Importance of Military Superiority capacity as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist

President Ronald Reagan's arms controllers were Party, in May 1972 signed the SALT I Interim Agree-
convinced that they had to strengthen U.S. offensive ment while U.S. bombers pummeled his North Viet-
nuclear forces before Soviet spokesmen would seri- namese allies, because the nuclear balance took pre-
ously consider mutual reductions. Lieutenant Gen- cedence. Arms controllers who belong to the
eral Edward L. Rowny, shortly before his confirma- second school refuse to negotiate with antagonists
tion as chief of the U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction who engage in such nefarious practices as aggres-
Talks (START) delegation in 1981, summarized that sion and human rights abuse. President Lyndon B.
view in one sentence: "Either [the Soviets] come Johnson postponed the opening session of SALT I
down of their own volition . . . or we have to go in 1968 after Soviet Armed Forces crushed Czech
up in order to convince them they have to come resistance. The U.S. Senate postponed ratification
down."33 The notion that successful negotiations of the SALT II Treaty at President Carter's request
depend on military superiority or parity, however, after Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December
is not invariably correct, as the Soviet SALT I team 1979.38 Neither school is consistently satisfactory.
demonstrated conclusively in 1972, when it drove
hard bargains even though the U.S. nuclear triad COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS
possessed far greater capabilities.34 Strategists, tacticians, and technologists ceaselessly
search for reliable ways to confirm compliance with
Importance of Bargaining Chips arms control accords. They also dispute the best
"Bargaining chips" are present, projected, or pro- way to deal with violators.39
posed weapons that are worth less to possessors
than to opponents who, for real or imagined rea- Confidence-Building Measures
sons, make momentous arms control concessions Confidence-building measures (CBMs) include "hot-
to cap, reduce, preclude, or eliminate them.35 Soviet lines" (point-to-point communications between
leaders in the early 1980s, for example, agreed to national leaders), risk-reduction centers (clear-
deep cuts during START, partly because they feared inghouses for information exchange), and prior noti-
that U.S. decision-makers otherwise would abrogate fication of missile test launches, military maneuvers,
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and deploy and other potentially provocative activities. Most
highly publicized "Star Wars" missile defense sys- CBMs still in effect were originally devised to reduce
tems that had barely begun gestation.36 Bargaining East-West tensions during the Cold War, but the pre-
chips unfortunately may become "necessities" if at- cepts are applicable to other situations.40
tempted tradeoffs fail. That happened in 1983, when
NATO offered to forego the deployment of nuclear- Verification Procedures
capable Pershing II and ground-launched cruise mis- Perfect verification may be impossible, even with
siles, then installed them because Moscow refused the most intrusive forms of inspection.41 Confidence
to eliminate SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 counterparts.37 in abilities to detect serious violations before hazard-
ous situations develop consequently is the main aim.
Importance of Linkage Dual benefits thereby derive: expectation of discov-
Two schools of strategic thought debate whether ery discourages flagrant infractions; early warnings
to link arms control with other foreign policy and allow time for reflective responses.42
military issues. The first focuses each agenda on a Satellite sensors, other national technical means,
single security problem. Leonid I. Brezhnev, in his on-site inspections, espionage agents, and informa-

116
 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMS CONTROL

tion exchanges all help intelligence communities rope knew for many years that Nazi Germany was
collect clues. Skilled analysts nevertheless must eval- illegally massing military power in violation of the
uate incomplete, often ambiguous evidence and fill Versailles Treaty, but all remained passive until Hit-
blank spots with inferences when hard facts are ler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939.44 Lesser
unavailable. Sensors in space can count ICBM silos, deviations that offenders refuse to correct on re-
bombers on air bases, surface ships in port, and quest generally deserve rebukes, because they could
armored vehicles in motor pools, but cannot deter- be attempts to test enemy verification capabilities
mine whether any given installation produces chem- or resolve. Indeed, they might be the only indication
ical warfare agents or Pharmaceuticals. Assessments of covert violations on grand scales that could dan-
are additionally complex, because investigators gerously disturb existing military balances unless
must evaluate nonevents as well as events to prove challenged as soon as discovered.45 Muteness never-
or disprove cheating. Adverse political repercus- theless may be the best response to perceived viola-
sions follow "false positives" that unjustly accuse tions if complaints could compromise sensitive
innocent parties of serious violations, while "false sources of information or the political benefits ob-
negatives" that overlook genuine skullduggery may tainable from inaction seem to exceed incurred
lead to gross inequities.43 risks. Active countermeasures, in ascending order
of severity, include "bribery," political or economic
Response to Violations sanctions, treaty abrogations, and military retali-
Verification is useless unless aggrieved governments ation.46
take appropriate counteractions. Every nation in Eu-

KEY POINTS
• Arms controllers limit numbers, types, technical characteristics, locations, and uses of military
formations, armaments, and stockpiled munitions
• Unambiguous objectives, carefully crafted agendas, and meticulous attention to detail facilitate
successful negotiations
• Caps, cuts, and bans establish quantitative ceilings that may be as high as advocates prefer and
adversaries accept
• Deep force reductions demand discretion, because cheaters could gain great advantage
• Arms control pacts that freeze forces at current levels are preferable to those that permit signato-
ries to increase holdings until they reach higher ceilings
• Treaties that prohibit weapons of mass destruction are exceptionally difficult to conclude if per-
ceived enemies already are so armed
• Arms controllers who fail to establish precise, mutually agreeable counting rules invite legal
loopholes and potentially dangerous misunderstandings
• Qualitative restraints often are elusive, because intangible considerations are extremely complex
• Prime times to control weapon system technologies occur before practicality has been proven
and financial investments become large
• Reliable abilities to verify and enforce compliance with arms control accords are imperative

117
MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the United

1. Fundamental considerations are contained in James States Representative, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, June
E. Dougherty, How to Think About Arms Control 14, 1946", in The International Control of Atomic
and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak, & Energy: Growth of a Policy, Department of State
Co., 1973); Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halp- Publication 2702 (Washington: U.S. Government
erin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twenti- Printing Office, 1946).
eth Century Fund, 1961). 13. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts
2. Donald Brennen, "Setting and Goals of Arms Con- and Histories of Negotiations, 20-30, 52-88, 107-
trol," in Arms Control, Disarmament, and National 17; "Big Flap Down Under," Time, February 18,1985,
Security, ed. Donald G. Brennan (New York: George 48-49; "Storm Signals Fly for U.S. in South Pacific,"
Braziller, 1961), 19-22, 30-31; Arms Control and U.S. News & World Report, March 4, 1985, 31-33.
National Security: An Introduction (Washington: 14. SALTIIAgreement: Vienna, June 18, 1979, Selected
Arms Control Association, 1989), 10-15. Documents No. 12B (Washington: Department of
3. Baron Philip Noel-Baker, The First World Disarma- State, Bureau of Public Affairs, July 1979), 10-12,
ment Conference, 1932-1933 and Why It Failed 19, 56, 60-63.
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1979). 15. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Eu-
4. Ken Booth, "Disarmament and Arms Control," in rope. English translation (Washington: Department
John Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy, vol. I, of State, November 19, 1990), 3-4.
Theories and Concepts, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes 16. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts
& Meier, 1987), 140-57. and Histories of Negotiations, 129.
5. Melissa Healy, "NATO Tallies Its Obsolete Nukes," 17. Lisa Tabassi, ed., OPCW[Organization for the Prohi-
Defense Week, January 14, 1985, 13, 16. bition of Chemical Weapons]: The Legal Texts (The
6. Mark M. Lowenthal, The CFE Treaty: Verification Hague: TMC Asser Press, 1999), 3.
and Compliance Issues, Issue Brief 91009 (Washing- 18. Christopher Lamb, How to Think About Arms Con-
ton: Congressional Research Service, 1991). trol, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Cliffs,
7. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), 241-43.
and Histories of Negotiations, 6th ed. (Washington: 19. Ibid., 239-40; Albert Carnesale and Richard N. Haass,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament "Lessons Learned from Superpower Arms Control,"
Agency, 1990), 150, 261. Washington Quarterly, Summer 1987, 31-33.
8. Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., and Abram N. Shulsky, 20. Voluminous volumes during the Cold War annually
"From Arms Control to Arms Reductions, The Histori- contained U.S. candidates for control, beginning in
cal Experience," Washington Quarterly, Summer Fiscal Year 1978. For the most comprehensive, see
1987, 59-73. U.S. Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 Arms Control Im-
9. U.S. Congress, Building up of the United States pact Statements, Joint Committee Print of the Senate
Navy to the Strength Permitted by the Washington Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Com-
and London Naval Treaties, Hearings . . . on S. 51, mittee on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d sess. (Wash-
January 7, 8, 9, 1932, Senate Committee on Naval ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).
Affairs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- 21. Marcelle Size Knaack, Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force
fice, 1932). Aircraft and Missile Systems, vol. l,Post World War
10. The Law of War and Dubious Weapons (Stockholm, II Fighters, 1945-1973 (Washington: Office of Air
Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research In- Force History, 1978), 264-85.
stitute (SIPRI), 1976), 1-75; Leon Friedman, ed., The 22. Christopher Foss, ed., Jane's Armour and Artillery,
Law of War: A Documentary History, vol. I (New 1990-1991 (Alexandria, VA: Jane's, 1990), 139-44.
York: Random House, 1972), 192-93, 249-50, 318; 23. General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor
Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament (New York: Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and
Pantheon Books, 1976), 226-54. Strategy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
11. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts 1966), 136-39.
and Histories of Negotiations, 155,181; Stephen Hil- 24. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts
dreth and Amy Woolf, National Missile Defense, Issue and Histories of Negotiations, 37, 184.
Brief 10034 (Washington: Congressional Research 25. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Treaty Doc. 105-
Service, January 16, 2001), updated periodically. 28,105th Cong., 1st sess., September 23, 1997; Jona-
12. "The United States Proposals for the International than E. Medalia, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive
Control of Atomic Energy, Presented to the United Test Ban Treaty, Issue Brief 92099 (Washington:

118
 FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMS CONTROL

Congressional Research Service, December 1999) 36. President Ronald Reagan, "It Was 'Star Wars' Muscle
and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con, That Wrestled Arms Race to a Halt," Los Angeles
Rpt. No. RS20351, October 19, 1999. Times, July 31, 1991, B5; START, Treaty Doc. 102-
26. Lamb, How to Think About Arms Control, Disarma- 20, 102d Cong., 1st MSS., November 25, 1991.
ment, and Defense, 166-71. 37. Stanley R. Sloan, NATO Nuclear Forces: Moderniza-
27. For some contrasting styles, see Igor Lucas, "Manag- tion and Arms Control (Washington: Congressional
ing U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Initiatives: Do We Speak Research Service, October 24, 1983).
the Same Language?," Comparative Strategy, vol. 6, 38. Paul Johnson, "Arms Control and Managing Linkage,"
no. 2 (1987), 164-84; William W. Tombaugh, "Some Survival, September/October 1986, 431-44.
Thoughts on Negotiating with the North Vietnam- 39- For various overviews, see Allan R. Krass, Verifica-
ese," National Security Affairs Forum, National War tion: How Much Is Enough? (Philadelphia: Taylor
College (Spring/Summer 1975), 49-58; Sondra and Francis for Stockholm International Peace Re-
Snowdon, "How to Negotiate With the Japanese," search Institute [SIPRI], 1985); Seymour Melman,
U.S. News & World Report (September 28, 1987), ed., Inspection for Disarmament, (New York: Co-
BC-10. lumbia University Press, 1958).
28. M. Scott Davis, "Negotiating with Ourselves," For- 40. John Borawski, ed., Avoiding War in the Nuclear
eign Service Journal, November 1985, 29-33; Ray- Age: Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stabil-
mond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: ity (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986); Stanley
Some Lessons from SALT," International Security, R. Sloan and Mikaela Sawtelle, Confidence-Building
Spring 1977, 22-23. Measures and Force Constraints for Stabilizing
29. Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New East-West Military Relations in Europe (Washing-
York: Harper and Row, 1964), 238-53. ton: Congressional Research Service, August 30,
30. Ibid.; Lucas, "Managing U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Ini- 1988).
tiatives: Do We Speak the Same Language?," 169- 41. Lewis A. Dunn and Amy A. Gordon, On-Site Inspec-
76, 179-80. tion for Arms Control Verification: Pitfalls and
31. Strobe T. Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT Promise (Washington: Science Applications Interna-
II (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), passim. For tional Corporation, May 1989).
Soviet SALT II negotiating techniques, see Joseph 42. Jerome Wiesner, "Introduction to Arms Control," in
G. Whelan, U.S. Congress, Soviet Diplomacy and Arms Control and Verification: The Technologies
Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for That Made It Possible, ed. Kosta Tsipis et al. (New
U.S. Diplomacy, House Foreign Affairs Committee York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986), xiii.
Print, vol. I (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 43. Admiral Noel Gayler, "Verification, Compliance, and
Office, 1979), 443-548. the Intelligence Process" and William E. Colby, "The
32. Roger P. Labrie, ed., SALT Hand Book: Key Docu- Intelligence Process," both in Arms Control Verifi-
ments and Issues, 1972-1979 (Washington: Ameri- cation: The Technologies That Made It Possible,
can Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 3-13.
1979), 667-704. 44. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German
33. U.S. Congress, Nomination of Edward L. Rowny, Army and the General Staff, 1807-1945 (Engle-
Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 192-52.
Relations, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: U.S. 45. Verification: The Critical Element of Arms Control
Government Printing Office, 1981), 23, 33. (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
34. John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT [I] Agency, March 1976), 4-5, 28, 30.
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983). 46. Ibid., 7-8, 28-30; Lamb, How to Think About Arms
35. Thomas C. Schelling, "A Framework for Evaluation Control, Disarmament, and Defense, 140, 143-46.
of Arms Control Proposals," Daedalus, Summer
1975, 194-98.

119
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 PART III

SPECIALIZED
MILITARY STRATEGIES
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 11. Counterprolif eration Strategies
It's not the size of the dog in the fight,
It's the size of the fight in the dog.
Apt Aphorism
Anonymous

S mall nations and subnational groups, like

scrappy little dogs with sharp teeth, could inflict
grievous wounds with even one primitive nuclear
tion. Actual or possible possession commands re-
spect, augments influence in regional (even global)
affairs, increases bargaining leverage at conference
explosive or a few radiological, biological, or chemi- tables, reduces military reliance on allies, and fosters
cal weapons. Large nations so endowed might do national pride.
likewise. Current aspirants include insecure or out- The urge to replicate becomes almost irresistible
law states, terrorists, religious extremists, and if adversaries possess capabilities that decisively al-
rancorous ethnic groups whose aquisition pros- ter military balances. The United States and the So-
pects are improving despite global nonproliferation viet Union formed the original Nuclear Club in 1949,
norms, diplomacy, export constraints, security as- four years after Americans detonated the first atom
surances, and arms control accords. bomb. Membership doubled as Great Britain and
So-called "weapons of mass destruction" France acquired small nuclear arsenals to avoid im-
(WMD)* are proliferating at different rates and pose pressions at home and abroad that they depended
different threats in different regions (Table 14).1 entirely on the United States for protection. China
Wise strategists consequently treat causes and symp- began to accumulate nuclear weapons in the 1960s,
toms case-by-case, because solutions that make after Sino-Soviet relations soured.2
sense in some situations are inane in others. Coun- Insecurity remains the most common motivation
terproliferators need to know what motivates each among nations that feel threatened by unfriendly
offender to acquire weapons of mass destruction neighbors. Insufficient manpower, real or imagined
before they can formulate meaningful plans. A rea- provocations, and political isolation contribute.
sonable feel for research, development, and deploy- Pakistan, for example, never could match India's
ment trends reveals how fast unfettered programs non-nuclear military machine, which contains twice
progress and simplifies prognoses. as many active forces and could mobilize immensely
more reserves. Some Arab states deployed chemical
CAUSES OF PROLIFERATION warfare (CW) weapon systems to offset Israel's un-
Interests in security, power, prestige, and economy, announced but suspected nuclear capabilities.
often in some combination, spark WMD prolifera- Burma and Ethiopia apparently procured CW muni-
tions to cope with separatists and other insurgents.3
Several other nations have allegedly used chemical
*Nuclear weapons cause mass destruction. Radiological, bi-
ological, and chemical warfare weapons may cause mass casual- agents in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Cambodia,
ties, but leave terrain and infrastructure intact. Kurdistan, Laos, and Yemen since the 1970s.4

123
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 14
NBC Weapon Possession and Programs
(January 2001)
Nuclear Weapons Biological Weapons Chemical Weapons Longest Range Missile
NATO
France Confirmed Ended Ended SLBM
United Kingdom Confirmed Ended Ended SLBM
United States Confirmed Ended Confirmed ICBM
Former USSR
Kazakstan Ended Suspected Suspected SRBM
Russia Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed ICBM
East and South Asia
China Confirmed Suspected Confirmed ICBM
India Confirmed None Confirmed MRBM
Pakistan Confirmed Suspected Suspected MRBM
North Korea Suspected Suspected Confirmed IRBM
South Korea Ended None Confirmed SRBM
Taiwan Ended Suspected Suspected SRBM
Thailand None None Suspected None
Vietnam None None Suspected SRBM
Middle East
Egypt None Confirmed Suspected SRBM
Iran Seeking Suspected Confirmed MRBM
Iraq Seeking Confirmed Confirmed SRBM
Israel Confirmed Suspected Confirmed MRBM
Syria None Seeking Confirmed SRBM
Africa
Ethiopia Seeking Seeking Suspected None
Libya Ended Ended? Confirmed MRBM
South Africa Ended None Suspected Ended
Latin America
Argentina Ended None None None
Brazil Ended None None None
Key: Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM)—3,400 miles (5,500 kilometers)
Intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)—1,850-3,400 miles (3,000-5,500 kilometers)
Medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM)—625-1,850 miles (1,000-3,000 kilometers)
Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM)—less than 625 miles (1,000 kilometers)
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles—about 2,500 miles (4,000 kilometers)
Source: Robert Shuey, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: The Current Situation and Trends, Rpt. Nr. RL30699
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, January 5, 2001).

Predators whose ambition is to project offensive suitcase-sized nukes to achieve sociopolitical pur-
military power beyond their borders covet nuclear, poses, but counterproliferators cannot count on
biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) weap- straight-line projections of that trend.
ons with which to cow opponents who cannot re-
ciprocate in kind and to act as force multipliers if Nuclear Weapon Proliferation
important objectives prove unobtainable without A 19-kiloton (KT) demonstration shot atop a 100-
resort to armed combat. Iraqi President Saddam Hus- foot tower at a desert test site near Alamogordo,
sein presses such programs with those motives in New Mexico, ushered in the Nuclear Age shortly
mind.5 Terrorists thus far have refrained from using after daybreak on July 16, 1945. That astounding

124
 COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES

detonation, equal to 19,000 tons of TNT, made Dr. J. but intelligence sources confirm a sizable stockpile.
Robert Oppenheimer, the Chief Scientist of Project North Korea probably hoards a handful. Iraq, Iran,
Manhattan, mutter a line from the Sanskrit epic and Libya lag well behind, but clearly intend to
Bhagavad Gita: "I am become Death, the shatterer follow suit. The Nuclear Club would surge from
of worlds." Fat Man and Little Boy, the first and only eight to twelve members if they succeed.9
atomic bombs ever exploded in combat, obliterated
huge areas within Hiroshima and Nagasaki three The Prognosis
weeks later (August 6th and 9th, 1945) with yields Probabilities that nuclear combat will occur for the
that approximated fifteen and twenty-three KT re- first time since August 1945 loom larger than fearful
spectively.6 Japan capitulated quickly. observers would like to believe, because some late-
comers and candidates are sworn enemies (India
The First Surge (1949-1997) vs. Pakistan, Israel vs. Arab states). Some involve
Al Jolson, who starred in The Jazz Singer (the autocratic leaders with aggressive records. All pos-
world's first "talking" picture), bragged, "You ain't sess suitable delivery vehicles. The U.S.-Soviet Cold
seen nothin' yet!" His boast would have pertained War standoff thus seems stable in retrospect and
even better to the arms race that accelerated sharply the "Doomsday Clock" that U.S. atomic scientists
after Soviet scientists ended the U.S. nuclear monop- reset repeatedly during those trying times has by
oly in 1949. Fission weapon inventories multiplied no means stopped ticking.
rapidly and, by the early 1950s, both superpowers
began to deploy thermonuclear (fusion) munitions Radiological Weapon Proliferation
with wallops measured in millions rather than thou- Simple, inexpensive radiological munitions lack the
sands of tons apiece.7 blast and heat properties of traditional nuclear arma-
Nuclear proliferation nevertheless proceeded at ments, but shaped-charge explosives release a cloud
a much slower pace than President Kennedy pre- of powdered plutonium oxide or depleted uranium
dicted in March 1963, when he anticipated that that could render large urban areas radioactively
fifteen to twenty-five nations would join the Nuclear uninhabitable for many years. Relatively easy pro-
Club within the next decade.8 Confirmed members duction and deployment processes make such arms
in fact remained five (USA, USSR, Britain, France, increasingly attractive to developing nations and
China) for more than thirty years. Belarus, Ka- subnational groups (including transnational terror-
zahstan, and Ukraine inherited ICBMs and atomic ists) that lack the facilities and expertise to produce
bombs when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, fission or fusion weapons.10
but Moscow retained operational control until all
three recipients dismantled those arsenals. Argen- Biological Weapon Proliferation
tina, Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and pre- The "popularity" of biological warfare (BW) weap-
sumably Taiwan discontinued promising nuclear ons magnified immeasurably during the twentieth
weapon programs. century.11 Ten nations surely or probably possess
significant capabilities early in the twenty-first cen-
The Second Surge (1998-) tury, including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and
The second proliferative surge started in 1998 when pugnacious North Korea. None, however, causes
India announced that it had converted prototype greater anxieties than Iraq, where President Saddam
devices into workable nuclear weapons. Pakistan Hussein systematically foils efforts to determine the
soon duplicated that feat. Israel remains undeclared, status of suspected BW programs.12

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MILITARY STRATEGY

Chemical Warfare Proliferation chemists, and pharmacists sometimes supplement

History's first poison gas attack flopped on January homegrown talent, but experts need not cross inter-
31, 1915 in East Prussia's Masurian Lake District, national borders to help, because computers and
because chemical warfare (CW) agents became facsimile machines freely transfer essential informa-
nearly inert in sub-zero temperatures, but a cloud tion around the globe. BW and CW development
of chlorine inflicted 15,000 British casualties near processes both employ dual-use materials that can
Ypres, Belgium less than three months later.13 All serve harmless and harmful purposes equally well.
major powers employed CW weapons before World Neither needs conspicuous facilities. Field testing
War I was over, with such horrifying effects that can easily be camouflaged as a civilian activity such
the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banned further use as crop dusting and is difficult to detect at night.
and discouraged acquisition. Few confirmed cases Unmarked biological and chemical munitions are
occurred thereafter until Fascist Italy bedeviled indistinguishable from high-explosive bombs and
barefoot Ethiopians with mustard gas in 1936. Sad- artillery shells. Stringent structural defenses and
dam Hussein's use of chemicals during the 1980- round-the-clock security measures invariably seek
1988 war with Iran, threats to do so during Opera- to prevent unauthorized use, foil thieves, frustrate
tion Desert Storm in 1991, plus the subsequent intrusion, and repel armed raiders. Secretiveness
dousing of Kurdish and Shiite dissidents make Iraq tends to rouse suspicions, but neither confirms nor
the most menacing nation. denies NBCR activities.14

Delivery Vehicle Proliferation Unique R&D Clues

Various delivery vehicles can attack targets with Nuclear/radiological, biological, and chemical
nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical weap- weapon R&D programs not only differ remarkably
ons from locations on land, at sea, or in the air, from each other, but from all other military research
whichever is most appropriate. WMD proliferators and development. Intelligence communities never-
who possess ballistic missiles create the greatest theless are hard-pressed to confirm proliferation and
anxieties (Table 14), because credible defenses ap- estimate the rapidity of progress.
pear infeasible for the foreseeable future, but cruise
missiles and tactical combat aircraft also cause Nuclear/Radiological R&D Indicators
grave concerns. All nuclear reactors produce plutonium,15 an activity
that requires conspicuous facilities, a large labor
INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS force, extensive radiation shielding, and radiates
Successful counterproliferation starts with intelli- great heat. Other tip-offs include nitric acid and
gence estimates that accurately indicate which NBC telltale radioactive isotopes of xenon, krypton, io-
threats are incipient, which are ripening rapidly, dine, and argon. Uranium enrichment likewise is
and which are mature. Hard data are difficult to hard to conceal. Gas diffusion and centrifuges,
acquire, because WMD proliferators try to mask which demand huge facilities and corrosion-
their programs at every stage of research, devel- resistant materials, expel heat into the atmosphere
opment, production, storage, distribution, and or nearby streams. Calutron plants and smaller gas
deployment. diffusion installations both require specialized mate-
rials and parts that few neophyte proliferators
Communal R&D Clues possess.16
Few first-generation proliferators proceed indepen- Less infrastructure is necessary if proliferators
dently. Imported nuclear physicists, industrial buy or steal test results, fissile feedstocks, even fin-

126
 COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES

ished munitions. Opportunities are open, because CW agent production involves no "signature"
it is difficult to safeguard thousands of nuclear weap- equipment and essential facilities easily masquerade
ons that are scheduled for, are undergoing, or have as commercial chemical complexes. Caches mea-
completed dismantlement in Russia. Smugglers sured in tons are far more conspicuous than minus-
might circumvent controls in anticipation of rich cule amounts of BW, but there is no visual way to
rewards.17 identify unmarked packages in bulk storage or to
differentiate chemical from traditional munitions
Biological Warfare R&D Indicators (cylinders that contain Soman, for example, look
Biological warfare agents are living microorganisms, like those filled with compressed air).21 On-site veri-
viruses, rickettsias, bacteria, protozoa, fungi, and fication teams search unsuccessfully for stockpiled
derivative infectious materials that cause fatal or CW agents if proliferators manufacture ingredients
incapacitating diseases in people, livestock, or vege- in separate facilities for use in binary munitions,
tation. Most toxins are poisonous byproducts of met- which contain two nonlethal chemicals that unite
abolic processes, although some are synthetic.18 and become toxic only when en route to targets.22
Nearly all equipment and supplies needed to
mass-produce BW agents are commercially available NBC Deployment Indicators
through legitimate channels. Processes are excep- Signs that proliferators intend to deploy nuclear,
tionally difficult to detect, partly because each agent biological, or chemical weapons include unique
is virtually indistinguishable from natural pathogens, command and control arrangements; organizational
partly because BW and commercial vaccine plants innovations; the procurement of specialized trans-
employ similar equipment and materials. Labora- ports and other equipment; pertinent strategies, tac-
tory-sized facilities can generate products so quickly tics, and doctrines; unique military education and
that intelligence collectors look fruitlessly for refrig- training, such as targeting techniques and troop
erated storage vaults, which once were required safety; and logistical support, especially esoteric
but no longer are needed to preserve BW agents construction, supply, and maintenance. Detection
before they fill bombs, missile warheads, spray of such indicators, however, may follow rather than
tanks, and artillery shells—a process that is easily precede first employment. None, for example,
concealed.19 warned Japan before U.S. B-29 bombers ravaged
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Chemical Warfare R&D Indicators
Mustard gas and phosgene are easy to produce with- COUNTERPROLIFERATION
out specialized materials or elaborate facilities, be- Conceptual disputes, plus the absence of attractive
cause essential technologies have evolved very little options, paint a bleak future for military operations
since World War I. Precursor chemicals needed to designed to prevent the spread of mass destruction
manufacture nerve agents in contrast are commer- weapons. The field therefore remains wide open
cially scarce, few civilians processes are readily for innovative strategists, who will be enshrined
transferable, and proliferators must master cyana- forever if they solve proliferation problems.
tion or alkylation reactions, depending on the type
agent under development. Those who plan to pro- Disputes About Desirability
duce agents solely for immediate use nevertheless Two schools of thought recommend drastically dif-
can shorten R&D times considerably if they sacrifice ferent strategies to prevent or confine proliferation.
long shelf life, safety, and sound waste disposal prac- The first, fathered by French General Pierre Gallois
tices.20 and fostered by Raymond Aron, suggests that the

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MILITARY STRATEGY

uncontrolled spread of WMD might strengthen de- Option 1: Intelligence Collection

terrence by reducing gains for aggression.23 The sec- Photographic and radar-imaging sensors high over-
ond school, which boasts many more subscribers, head depict activities on Earth's surface in exquisite
concludes that the spread of NBC weapons would detail, along with complementary "eavesdropping"
increase the incidence of "brinkmanship" and wars equipment able to record all kinds of electronic
by miscalculation, encourage escalation, and other- transmissions. Seismic and acoustic "listening posts"
wise destabilize international relations.24 Compro- report precise times and approximate locations of
misers contend that nations should feel free to prolif- nuclear tests, except perhaps those of sub-kiloton
erate essentially defensive weapon systems that yields. Space satellites in proper position can detect
decrease vulnerabilities without endangering rivals, the characteristic double flash of light from any nu-
but skeptics remind them that the purpose of some clear explosion above land or water.
arms is ambiguous and open to unhappy interpreta- "Spies in the sky" discovered a secret chemical
tions. Soviet leaders, for example, viewed U.S. Stra- warfare plant in Libya during the 1980s, then pin-
tegic Defense Initiatives as thinly veiled attempts pointed probable nuclear weapon projects in North
to acquire nuclear first-strike capabilities and their Korea,28 but limitations nevertheless are consider-
Russian successors implicitly concur.25 able. Dual-use technologies make it difficult (often
impossible) to identify illicit enterprises. Not even
Nonmilitary Options U.S. Armed Forces own enough satellites and aircraft
Nonmilitary disincentives embrace "carrots and to maintain constant vigilance over every probable
sticks" in various combinations. Some kibitzers proliferator, and the best they have are not always
claim that current possessors could discourage pro- good enough. Space satellites equipped with state-
liferation if they drastically reduced (preferably of-the-art radar-imaging sensors, for example, failed
abandoned) WMD inventories and thereby served as to find subsurface power lines that linked the nu-
role models.26 Rebutters, who believe that idealistic clear site at Tarmiya, Iraq with a distant substation.29
technique would allow cheaters to become military Clandestine on-site inspectors occasionally
superpowers, cite the Nuclear Nonproliferation might corroborate clues that standoff "detectives"
Treaty as a more pragmatic approach. Negative tac- discover and fill in blank spots. Decision-makers
tics include political ostracism, economic sanctions, nevertheless display little enthusiasm for this ap-
withdrawal of foreign aid, test bans, "open skies" proach, because attempts to infiltrate laboratories,
policies that permit aerial reconnaissance, on-site production plants, or storage facilities in search of
inspections, and other confidence-building mea- specimens would be extremely hazardous, pros-
sures. Neither nonmilitary enticements nor punish- pects for success would be poor, and political penal-
ments, however, have worked well thus far.27 ties for failure could be grim.

Military Options Option 2: Security Guarantees

The dearth of solid intelligence concerning surrepti- Some strategists suggest that security guarantees,
tious proliferation programs severely restricts mili- such as U.S. promises to extend a "nuclear umbrella"
tary countermeasures, few of which hold much over allies,30 could keep friends from deploying
promise. Uncertainties regarding probabilities of weapons of mass destruction. Assurances, however,
success and cheerless consequences of failure ac- did not keep Britain and France from acquiring nu-
company all seven options outlined below, which clear capabilities in the 1950s, when the United
probably are the best of a discouraging lot. States possessed overwhelming nuclear superior-

128
 COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES

ity, nor have they notably inhibited proliferation concerns did not resurface for several years,31 but
since then. nuclear proliferation sites buried in bedrock would
be much harder to destroy. Direct hits on active
Option 3: Blockades North Korean nuclear reactors might contaminate
Nations concerned about NBCR proliferation could Seoul with radioactive fallout within a few hours,
install blockades and conduct aerial interdiction op- then cover southern Japan the next day. No such
erations to tighten economic sanctions or to deprive effects occurred during the Israeli air raid on Iraq,
culprits of raw materials, technological expertise, because the demolished reactor was inactive, while
and finished products they need to create and manu- aerial bombardments during Operation Desert
facture delivery vehicles as well as munitions. Pru- Storm avoided fissile stockpiles and left reactor
dent leaders even so ponder such measures carefully cores intact.32
before they proceed, because blockades on land or Biological and chemical warfare facilities pose
at sea are costly. Cordons installed for counterprolif- different problems. "Shell games" make constantly
eration purposes could last weeks, months, even moving installations extremely hard to find. Wind
years, and international laws consider blockades to directions and velocities would determine the ex-
be acts of war. Protracted sieges moreover might tent of collateral damage and civilian casualties dur-
evoke defiance by adversaries and antagonize legiti- ing aircraft and missile strikes on BW and CW plants
mate merchants. anywhere. Responsible parties could anticipate po-
litically and morally counterproductive repercus-
Option 4: Eliminate Key Personnel sions if many innocents were killed, infected, or
Key scientists, technologists, and program managers contaminated.33
who participate in the development, production,
and deployment of first-generation NBCR weapons Option 6: Sabotage
epitomize "strategic centers of gravity," because Demolition experts skilled at sabotage might cost-
progress would slow significantly or stop in their effectively wreck NBCR weapon facilities, supplies,
absence. Most, however, are civilians who ply their and products, given reliable intelligence about clan-
trade in "peacetime," and therefore constitute ille- destine infiltration and exfiltration routes, physical
gitimate targets according to international law, al- layouts, vulnerable points, and installation security.
though they could influence future military capabili- An eleven-man demolition team in possession of
ties as much as or more than uniformed soldiers, filched floor plans, for example, hit Hitler's heavy
sailors, and airmen do during wars. water plant near Vermork, Norway during World
War II. That audacious act denied Nazi Germany its
Option 5: Air Strikes main source of deuterium oxide, the only moderator
Aerial bombardment might be an acceptable option then available for uranium-fueled reactors. One
once or twice, but domestic support (much less crafty agent soon thereafter set charges that sank a
international approval) for repeated strikes might be ferry loaded with all heavy water previously
hard to muster. Minuses moreover often outweigh produced.34
pluses, as the following illustrations confirm. The good news is that modern saboteurs, with
The Israeli Air Force bombed an Iraqi nuclear far superior technology at their disposal and benefits
reactor under construction on bare ground south derived from far more intensive training, should be
of Baghdad in June 1981. Success upset Saddam able to challenge those spectacular performances
Hussein's timetable so seriously that international during any stage of NBCR weapon development,

129
MILITARY STRATEGY

production, or storage. The bad news is that auspi- received direct foreign technical assistance, and
cious conditions would be uncommon and partici- benefited from massive foreign procurement. Iraqi
pants could expect no mercy if captured. biological and chemical warfare R&D programs re-
ceived outside assistance without interruption dur-
Option 7: Invasion ing that same period.35
A powerful invasion force could cancel embryonic Ten countries have terminated nuclear, biologi-
or infant WMD proliferation projects in any country, cal, or chemical warfare programs (Table 14, page
but Option 7 seems inadvisable unless foreign and 124), but political persuasion and economic sanc-
domestic opinion is favorable, solid support from a tions thus far have failed to forestall threatening
strong coalition is forthcoming, springboards in WMD proliferation in Iraq and other hot spots around
neighboring states are available, and heavy civilian as the world. Unscrupulous possessors could use such
well as military casualties on both sides are accept- weapons for coercive purposes and, if combat occur-
able. Political and economic costs are additional con- red, inflict unprecedented casualties on hapless civil-
siderations. That combination of preconditions ians as well as rival armed forces. Outraged victims
seems improbable, except in extenuating circum- then would ask, "Why didn't counterproliferators
stances. take positive actions to prevent catastrophes?"
Formidable problems unfortunately plague all
CURRENT OUTLOOK seven military courses of action profiled above. All
Intelligence communities determined that Saddam are risk-laden. Some seem infeasible. That depress-
Hussein had initiated nuclear weapon projects in ing outlook behooves national security policy-
the early 1980s, but senior recipients of repeated makers and planners to improve NBCR deterrent
warnings dallied for nearly a decade, by which time techniques and to burnish war-fighting abilities for
Iraqi programs worth $7-10 billion employed more immediate application if preventive measures fail.
than 20,000 people (7,000 scientists and engineers), Chapter 12 covers nuclear strategies, while Chapter
included two major uranium enrichment plants, 13 addresses biological and chemical warfare.

KEY POINTS
Insecure nations, outlaw states, terrorists, religious extremists, and rancorous ethnic groups seek
to possess nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons
Sworn enemies, some of whom are unstable and exhibit aggressive tendencies, increase the
likelihood of NBCR combat
A few noted strategists believe that proliferation strengthens deterrence by increasing risks and
reducing gains from aggression
Most strategists believe that the spread of NBC weapons is extremely destabilizing and increases
the likelihood of wars by miscalculation
Successful counterproliferation demands intelligence estimates that accurately indicate which
NBCR threats are incipient, which are ripening rapidly, and which are mature
Sound intelligence is hard to acquire, because proliferators mask programs at every stage of re-
search, development, production, storage, and deployment
Political persuasion and economic sanctions thus far have failed to forestall the most threatening
trends

130
 COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGIES

• Serious questions concerning probabilities of success and consequences of failure make most
military countermeasures unattractive
• That bleak outlook amplifies needs for new ways to deter NBCR proliferation and for
war-fighting strategies if deterrence fails

NOTES tive, Occasional Page 29 (Muscatine, IA: Stanley

1. Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington: Foundation, February 1982), 17-30.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1996); 11. Stephen Rose, "The Coming Explosion of Silent
George J. Tenet, Statement by Director of Central Weapons," Naval War College Review, Summer
Intelligence before the Senate Committee on 1989, 6-29.
Armed Services Hearing on Current and Projected 12. Michael Dobbs, "Soviet-Era Work on Bioweapons
National Security Threats, February 2, 1999, Still Worrisome," Washington Post, September 12,
passim. 2000, Al, A26; Barton Gellman, "A Futile Game of
2. William Epstein, "Why States Go—and Don't Go- Hide and Seek," Washington Post, October 11,1998,
Nuclear," Annals of the American Academy of Polit- Al, A42-A43 and "Arms Inspectors 'Shake the
ical and Social Science, March 1977, 17-28. Tree,'" October 12, 1998, Al, A16-A17.
3. Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruc- 13- Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall, The American
tion in the Middle East (London: Brassey's UK, Heritage History of World War I (New York: Simon
1991); Elisa D. Harris, "Chemical Weapons Prolifera- and Schuster, 1964), 88, 107-8.
tion in the Developing World," Defense Yearbook, 14. Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Un-
1989 (Washington: Brassey's, 1989), 69, 75-76. derlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washing-
4. Edward M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Urbana: Uni- ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, December
versity of Illinois Press, 1989), 89-119. 1993), 37-38, 50-52, 100-2, 164-65.
5. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the 15. For characteristics of nuclear reactors, see Nuclear
Middle East, 60-81, 95-102. Proliferation and Safeguards, vol. II, Part One
6. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atom Bomb (Washington: Office of Technology Assessment, June
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Chuck Han- 1977), Appendix (Technical Description of Fuel Cy-
sen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New cle Facilities and Evaluation of Diversion Poten-
York: Orion Books, 1988), 11, 14, 21. tial), 72-101.
7. Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hy- 16. David Albright, "A Proliferation Primer," Bulletin of
drogen Bomb (New York: Touchstone Books, 1996). the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, 16-22.
For U.S. and Soviet tests through 1962, see DA Pam- 17. David Hoffman, "Cure for Russia's Nuclear 'Head-
phlet 39-3, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, rev. ache' Proves to Be Painful Crisis: Spotty Data Hobble
ed. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Bid to Secure Bomb Material," Washington Post, De-
February 1964), 672-81b. cember 26, 1998, Al and "Idled Arms Experts in
8. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Russia Post Threat: Many Take Talents to Developing
John F. Kennedy, 1963 (Washington: U.S. Govern- States," December 28, 1998, Al.
ment Printing Office, 1964), 280. 18. The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare,
9. For a survey that amalgametes several official vol. II, CB Weapons Today (New York: Stockholm
sources, see Robert D. Shuey, Nuclear, Biological, International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1993),
and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: The Current 37-41, 42-43, 61-72.
Situation and Trends, Rpt. No. RC 30699 (Washing- 19- Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of
ton: Congressional Research Service, January 5, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks
2001). (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Au-
10. Victor L. Issraelyan, "Radiological Weapons: Possible gust 1993), 9-11, 38; Technologies Underlying
New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Weapons of Mass Destruction, 50-51, 99-106;
Victor L. Issraelyan and Charles C. Flowerree, Radio- Stephen Rose, "The Coming Explosion of Silent
logical Weapons Control: A Soviet and U.S. Perspec- Weapons," 7, 9.

131
MILITARY STRATEGY

20. Steven R. Bowman, Chemical Weapons Convention: 28. William C. Rempel and Robin Wright, "Libya Plant
Issues for Congress, Issue Brief 94029 (Washington: Found by Vigilance, Luck," Los Angeles Times, Janu-
Congressional Research Service, January 12, 1999), ary 22, 1989, 1, 22; "Concern Rises About DPRK
8-10. Nuclear Program," Foreign Broadcast Information
21. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruc- Service, FBIS-EAS-91-043-A, March 5, 1991, 8.
tion, 16-27; Proliferation of Weapons of Mass De- 29. David Kay, who headed several International Atomic
struction, 10-11, 36. Energy Agency (IAFA) inspections in Iraq: a presenta-
22. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruc- tion at the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
tion, 38-51, 103, 105; Bowman, Chemical Weapons nology, Gaithersburg, MD, May 15, 1992; Technolo-
Convention: Issues for Congress, 8-10; The Problem gies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, 169.
of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. II, 3-6, 30. Caspar W. Weinberger addressed the long-standing
308. U.S. nuclear umbrella for NATO in Improving
23. General Pierre Gallois, The Balance of Terror: Strat- NATO's Conventional Capabilities: A Report to the
egy for the Nuclear Age, foreword by Raymond Aron United States Congress (Washington: Department of
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961); Kenneth N. Waltz, Defense, June 1984), 10. The Nixon Doctrine speci-
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Bet- fied a nuclear shield for other U.S. friends in U.S.
ter, Adelphi Papers 171 (London: International Insti- Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace
tute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1981); Bruce (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Feb-
Bueno de Mesquita, "An Assessment of the Merits of ruary 25, 1971), 13-14.
Selective Nuclear Proliferation, "Journal of Conflict 31. Glenn Frankel, "Iraq Said Developing Nuclear Weap-
Resolution, June 1982, 283-306. ons," Washington Post, March 31, 1989, Al; James
24. Richard N. Rosecrance, ed., The Dispersion of Nu- P. Wootten and Warren H. Donnelly, Israeli Raid
clear Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New York: into Iraq, Issue Brief 81103 (Washington: Congres-
Columbia University Press, 1963), 21-26, 293-314. sional Research Service, July 2, 1981).
25. Soviet Propaganda Campaign Against the U.S. Stra- 32. Mark Hibbs and Margaret Ryan, "Experts Say U.S.
tegic Defense Initiative (Washington: U.S. Arms Con- Weapons Can't Destroy DPRK Nuclear Facilities,"
trol and Disarmament Agency, August 1986); David Nucleonics Week, April 7, 1994, 15.
Hoffman and Charles Babington, "ABM Issue Unre- 33. Leon Sloss, "Deterring the Acquisition, Exploitation,
solved As Summit Ends," Washington Post, June 5, and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in The
2000, Al, A10; Peter Baker, "No Deal Soon on Missile Niche Threat: Deterring the Use of Chemical and
Defense Plan, Russia Says," Washington Post, Sep- Biological Weapons, ed. Stuart E. Johnson (Washing-
tember 6, 2001, Al. ton: National Defense University, 1997), 95-121.
26. George H. Quester, "Nuclear Proliferation: Linkages 34. Dan Kurtzman, Blood and Water: Sabotaging Hit-
and Solutions," International Organization, Au- ler's Bomb (New York: Henry Holt, 1997). For demo-
gumn 1979, 548-53. lition techniques, see FM 5-25, Explosives and De-
27. Zachery S. Davis, Nonproliferation Regimes: A Com- molitions (Washington: Department of the Army,
parative Analysis of Policies (Washington: Congres- March 1996) and Commando Operations (Alexan-
sional Research Service, April 1, 1991); George H. dria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1991), 98-109, "The Art
Quester, "Reducing the Incentives to Proliferate," of Blowing Things Up."
Annals of the American Academy of Political and 3 5. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruc-
Social Science, March 1977, 72-81. For the original tion, 168-69.
"Open Skies" proposal, see Public Papers of the Pres-
idents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower,
1955 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1959), 715.

132
 12. Nuclear Warfare Strategies
Don'tcha worry, honey chile,
Don'tcha cry no more.
It's jest a li'l ole atom bomb
In a li'l ole limited war.
It's jest a bitsy warhead, chile
On a li'l ole tactical shell,
And all it's gonna do is blow us all
To a li'l ole limited hell.
Anonymous
Tactical Nukes

~i\^~nockout artist Joe Louis, who was famous for tries. "Winners," unable to withstand incomparable
A^his shuffle rather than fancy footwork, repeat- casualties and damage, might fare little better
edly put opponents on the canvas because they than "losers."1
could neither run far nor hide from his figurative
atom bombs. Bantamweight nations endowed with Nuclear Explosive Characteristics
nuclear weapons possess incomparably greater Nuclear and traditional high explosives both pro-
destructive capabilities.* Military strategists conse- duce blast waves in air and shock waves if detonated
quently need to know about the nature of nuclear below ground or underwater. Differences, however,
warfare, which is fundamentally different than tradi- are greater than similarities, because fission weap-
tional combat. They then can turn their attention ons are thousands and fusion weapons millions of
to a complex array of deterrent, war-fighting, and times more powerful. Both emit searing heat and
conflict termination options. blinding light called thermal radiation. Both dis-
charge transient rays in the form of initial nuclear
THE NATURE OF NUCLEAR radiation and, if activated on or near Earth's surface,
WARFARE deposit radioactive particles far from the burst point
Premeditated instigation of a nuclear war with any (measurable fallout that lasts weeks, months, or
opponent prepared to retaliate in kind would in- years may drift downwind thousands of miles). The
volve serious soul-searching, because a single large- distance that any given weapon transmits injurious
scale nuclear exchange could endanger far distant effects depends on its yield calculated in kilotons
nonbelligerents as well as combatants, while even (KT) or megatons (MT) and additional variables that
a few "primitive" weapons could cripple small coun- Table 15 displays.2

"Chapter 14 links nuclear warfare with traditional combat.

Nuclear Casualties
Chapter 15 connects nuclear warfare with domestic and trans- Nuclear casualty estimates are iffy, because each
national terrorism. battleground is unique and assumptions in lieu of

133
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 15 apiece. Appraisals predicated on a wider range of

Factors That Affect Nuclear Weapon assumptions quadrupled those counts, which
Effectiveness
climbed across graphs almost vertically.4 Modern
Timing of attacks (day or night, weekday or weekend) weapon systems with lower yields, greater accura-
Magnitude of attacks (full-scale or limited)
Targets (counterforce or countervalue) cies, and single-shot hard target kill probabilities
Type bursts (air, space, surface, subterranean, or would cause fewer civilian casualties if aimed at
underwater)
Weapon accuracies (yards or miles; meters or missile silos, but consequences would still be cata-
kilometers) clysmic. The most optimistic estimates foresaw in-
Weapon yields (kilotons or megatons)
Warning times (minutes, hours, or days) finitely greater grief in the aftermath of Soviet as-
Active defenses (types and effectiveness) sured destruction assaults on a series of U.S. urban
Local topography (rugged or open terrain)
Weather (calm or windy, cloudy or clear) centers such as New York, Chicago, and Los
Winds aloft (prevailing directions, seasonal variations) Angeles.5
Soil (dry or wet; loose or compact)
Vegetation (forested, grassy, or bare)
Military deployments (concentrated or dispersed)
Relevant military training (extensive or scanty) Deferred Medical Implications
Demographic distribution (concentrated or scattered) Experience in Japan indicates that some deferred
Civil defense shelters (blast or fallout; natural or man-
made) medical miseries would arise within a day or two
Civil defense training (extensive or scanty) after the onset of any nuclear war, others after sev-
eral years. Radiation, the principal culprit, attacks
the central nervous system, lymphoid tissue, gastro-
facts complicate most equations. Two conclusions intestinal tracts, and reproductive organs. Humans
even so are certain: a rain of traditional explosives exposed to 1,000 REM or more all die within a few
would be required to kill and wound the same num- weeks at most. Perhaps three fourths expire if hit
ber of humans that one nuclear burst could incapaci- with half that amount. Those who survive custom-
tate instantaneously; casualties caused by nuclear arily need to convalesce for more than a year.* Early
radiation would continue to mount long after com- symptoms usually include nausea, vomiting, and
bat ceased. fatigue, followed by fever, diarrhea, emaciation,
delirium, and convulsions. Wounds heal slowly and
Immediate Medical Implications secondary infections increase among survivors, be-
Most nuclear warfare scenarios promise mass casual- cause severe radiation takes its toll on white blood
ties that would immediately overwhelm medical cells and makes immune systems malfunction. Leu-
facilities. The few centers that specialize in severe kemia and abnormal numbers of cataracts, along
burn cases would be swamped with requirements with increased bone marrow, lung, kidney, thyroid,
that surpass capacities by many orders of magnitude, and breast cancers, crop up decades later.6
even in the best-equipped countries. Rapid triage
would be required to maximize care where it might
pay off most, a particularly trying task with regard
Nuclear Devastation
Allied aircraft loaded with iron bombs and incendia-
to nuclear radiation, because similar symptoms ac-
ries lambasted Hamburg, Germany six times be-
company lethal and lesser doses.3
Rosy predictions in the mid-1970s anticipated
800,000 fatalities and innumerable injured in desper- *Roentgens measure radiation doses; RADs measure ab-
sorbed radiation doses; REMs (roentgen equivalent mammal or
ate need of emergency treatment if Soviet Armed man) measure the biological effects of radiation on human
Forces hit all 1,041 U.S. ICBM silos with 1 megaton beings.

134
 NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGIES

tween July 24 and August 3, 1943, with results that ena disrupt transmissions, while others render
residents called die Katastrophe.7 Japan felt incom- equipment inoperable. Intense ionization of Earth's
parably greater shocks two years later, because one atmosphere not only weakens high frequency (HF)
atomic bomb apiece immediately reduced Hiro- radio and search radar signals, but makes them skip
shima and Nagasaki to piles of rubble. erratically, as demonstrated in August 1958 when
U.S. megaton-sized TEAK and ORANGE test shots,
Blast Damage detonated above Johnson Island in the central Pa-
Blast waves that emanate from nuclear air and sur- cific, degraded transmissions for several hours
face bursts cause the most direct damage. Effects throughout a region several thousand miles in diam-
therefrom not only radiate much farther than those eter. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) surges toward
that accompany traditional explosions but are in- ground at terrific speeds, then attacks electronic
comparably more potent. Overpressures shove air systems on land, at sea, and in the air. Ruinous,
outward from the fireball in every direction; re- widespread damage likely would result, because few
flected energies generally increase compression sev- lightning arresters, power shunting switches, and
eral times when shock waves hit solid objects; un- other protective devices could respond fast enough
derpressures then reverse air flow during a suction to save solid state circuits, which may be a million
phase. The resultant effects bend over, around, and times more vulnerable than vacuum tubes. Damage
envelop everything in their path.8 would be impossible to predict or control. Comput-
Targets most vulnerable to blast include institu- ers deprived of memories, for example, could oblit-
tional, industrial, commercial, administrative, and erate national and local records of all kinds; paralyze
residential structures, motor vehicles, locomotives, communication links, power transmission facilities,
rolling stock, aircraft, and ships. The radii of severe, and public utilities; misdirect missiles in flight; make
moderate, and light damage vary with weapon avionics malfunction; and detonate time-fused muni-
yields, distances from ground zero, intervening ob- tions prematurely.10
stacles (natural or man-made), the sturdiness of ob-
jects engulfed, and defensive measures (if any). Peak NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
overpressures greater than 25 pounds per square Havoc at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with
inch (psi) generate winds far more violent than the seemingly insurmountable defensive problems, ele-
worst tornadoes, but compression and suction to- vated arms control to a lofty level. "Ban the bomb"
gether create devastating effects at much lower lev- wasn't peacenik propaganda in the mid-1940s; it
els. Three psi, for example, severely damage un- was official U.S. policy. The Truman-Attlee-King
shielded aircraft, while 5 psi wrecks brick houses Declaration of November 15, 1945 recommended
beyond repair. Nuclear blasts that rupture furnaces "the elimination from national armaments of atomic
and natural gas lines, short-circuit electrical circuits, weapons and all other major weapons of mass de-
break water pipes, and block streets with rubble struction." It further advocated "effective safeguards
make fearsome fires hard to extinguish. Populations by way of inspection and other means to protect
deprived of food, water, shelter, and electrical complying states against the hazards of violation
power suffer severely.9 and evasions." A Soviet resolution dated December
27, 1945 expressed similar sentiments.11
Ruinous Radiation Bernard Baruch, on behalf of the United States
Initial radiation from nuclear explosions in space Government, on June 14, 1946, more specifically
can paralyze electrical equipment. Some phenom- proposed that an International Atomic Develop-

135
MILITARY STRATEGY

ment Authority under auspices of the United Na- the dead. . . . We must elect World Peace or World
tions be entrusted with the ownership, manage- Destruction."
ment, research, and development of all nuclear Even aggressive nations depend on deterrence to
activities and possess powers to control, inspect, avoid nuclear war until they are ready, but optional
and license associated projects that might be "poten- ways of achieving that objective remain controver-
tially dangerous to world security." A vigorous arms sial after five decades of debate. Quirky concepts
race ensued after the Soviet Union vetoed the Bar- and various views about offensive and defensive
uch Plan and detonated a nuclear device on August force requirements compete for top billing.
29, 1949.12
Nuclear arms controllers have strained ever since Searches for Stability
to retard or prevent further nuclear proliferation, Deterrent theoreticians, policy-makers, and plan-
inhibit the spread of related raw materials and tech- ners strive to achieve strategic stability.16 That elu-
nologies, restrict or prohibit testing, restrain, freeze, sive state, the nuclear deterrent equivalent of Nir-
or reduce weapon deployments, establish nuclear- vana, is attainable under two diametrically different
free zones, and cut costs. Some successes have been conditions: 1) nations that could nuke opponents
sustained and spectacular. Antarctica became nu- without risking destruction decline to do so; 2) no
clear-free in 1959, followed by space and Latin nation could nuke another without risking destruc-
America in 1967. More than eighty-five nations tion. The United States occupied Category 1 from
signed the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. Strategic 1945 through the late 1950s, when no competitor
Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements later could threaten its survival. Category 2 relationships
slashed U.S. and Soviet long-range inventories sub- with the USSR pertained thereafter, because U.S.
stantially. Both countries in May 1988 ratified an and Soviet Armed Forces both deployed nuclear
INF Treaty that eliminated their intermediate-range retaliatory forces that could inflict intolerable retri-
nuclear forces.13 bution after suffering a savage first strike. J. Robert
Politico-military stumbling blocks nevertheless Oppenheimer likened them to scorpions in a bot-
inhibit solutions to potentially grave problems, and tle—both would die if one stung the other.
likely will continue to do so for the foreseeable
future. Deeper START reductions, for example, re- Deterrent Effects of Defense
mained beyond reach when President Clinton and Policies and programs designed to defend home-
Russian President Vladimir Putin first discussed pos- lands against nuclear attacks are exceedingly contro-
sibilities in June 2000.14 Nuclear deterrent and war- versial. One faction firmly believes that antiaircraft,
fighting strategies accordingly remain fashionable. antimissile, civil defense, dispersion, site hardening,
and other protective measures strengthen deter-
NUCLEAR DETERRENT STRATEGIES rence, whereas dissenters disagree (Figure 3 pres-
Bernard Brodie in The Absolute Weapon, his ground- ents a tree of pro-con arguments).
breaking book about nuclear strategy, concluded
that deterrence had become the main military mis- Negative Views of Defense
sion. Armed forces, as he saw it in 1946, could "have U.S. civilian theoreticians shaped three distinctive
almost no other useful purpose."15 Bernard Baruch, schools of negative thought in the 1950s. One
speaking before the United Nations General Assem- viewed the deterrent value of homeland defense
bly that same year, solemnly announced that, "We through a philosophical prism, another took a tech-
are come to make a choice between the quick and nological tack, while the third cited arms control

136
 NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGIES

Figure 3
Deterrent Effects of Homeland Defense
A Tree of Arguments
Root Branch Branch Branch Branch Fruit of
One: Two: Three: Four: the Tree
Basic Domestic International Probability
Effects Attitudes Behavior of War

Tensions and
Foe responds in
reciprocal fear Bad: Defense
kind; self-fulfilling Limb One
make war is dangerous
prophecies operate
more likely
Anxiety
increases
bellicosity,
suspicion
Policies are
Situation
firm; appeasement Good: Defense
stabilized; Limb Two
less likely; is deterring
war less likely
foe deterred
Defense
increases
anxieties
Concessions, Tensions Good: Defense
unilateral initiatives, reduced; is arms-race Limb Three
arms controls; foe war less likely dampening
Anxiety reciprocates
increases
desire to
avoid war Possessor loses
confidence in Situation
Bad: Defense
deterrent; vacillates; destabilized; Limb Four
is demoralizing
enemy provocations war more likely
Defense encouraged
has an
effect on
public
anxieties Foe responds Situation
defensively; destabilized; Bad: Defense Limb Five
creates crises, war more likely is aggressive
is overconfident
War becomes
thinkable;
aggressiveness
encouraged
Foe deterred;
becomes Situation Good: Defense Limb Six
conservative; stabilized is stabilizing
provocations cease
Defense
allays
anxieties
Fears of failure are Tensions dimin-
decreased; tensions ish; arms race Good: Defense Limb Seven
decrease; foe de-escalates; is pacifying
Relaxation en- reciprocates war less likely
courages trust,
willingness
to explore
Possessor over-
alternatives Probability of
confident, gullible,
ultimate Bad: Defense
Magi not-minded, Limb Eight
showdown is delusive
passive; foe builds
is increased
for takeover

Adapted from a diagram in Arms Control and Civil Defense, edited by D.G. Brennan, The Hudson Institute, 1963.

137
MILITARY STRATEGY

and costs.17 Patrons of School "A" contended that a ile of the prewar society; the latter would
"balance of terror" based on mutual vulnerability be a pitiful remnant that would contain few
would best preserve deterrence by making meaning- traces of the prewar way of life."18
ful victory impossible. Prospects of prodigious casu-
alties were central to the concepts. Any move to Effects of Defense on Extended
mitigate the threat of reciprocal suicide would be Deterrence
counterproductive. School "B," less certain that de- U.S. promises to extend a "nuclear umbrella" over
fense is intrinsically undesirable, believed that im- allies during the Cold War lacked credibility in the
pervious protection is unattainable, since saturation absence of homeland defense. Britain consequently
attacks could overload any system. School "C" con- acquired seaborne capabilities to help hedge its
tended that a porous shield indeed might increase bets. French President Charles de Gaulle formulated
casualties and devastation by inviting intemperate a force defrappe in the 1950s, because he felt sure
assaults. Stability, if attainable at all, would be at that no U.S. President would sacrifice New York to
some stratospheric level. Costs incurred for dubious save Paris after Soviet Armed Forces brought nu-
improvements in deterrent power thus would be clear-tipped ballistic missiles to bear on the United
unconscionable. Many politico-military strategists States.19
still subscribe to one of those schools.
Effects of Defense on Stability
Positive Views of Defense Deterrent strategists who believe in homeland de-
Proponents of homeland defense concede that mu- fense must determine what to shield without dis-
tual vulnerability might strengthen deterrence, but rupting stability. Prelaunch protection for land-
only if opponents cooperate, a dubious proposition based weapon systems tends to strengthen stability,
at best. Leaving vital interests in survival unpro- because so doing suggests planned employment
tected would be morally impermissible, in their only for a second strike. The absence of safeguards
judgment. Leak-proof defenses indeed may be un- conversely could be provocative, since first-strike
achievable at any cost, but porous protection at the forces need no shield. Defenses for nuclear forces
very least would complicate enemy tactics, prevent plus the population, primary institutions, and pro-
unmitigated disasters, and diminish fears regarding duction base could indicate attempts to survive
accidental or nuisance attacks. Imperfect safeguards a first strike with strong elements of national
might also enhance postwar prospects, as Herman power intact.
Kahn explained in I960:
Assorted Deterrent Concepts
"Both very sensitive and very callous individu- Maximum, minimum, and compromise nuclear de-
als should be able to distinguish (and choose, terrent concepts, accompanied by different force
perhaps) between a country which survives postures and costs, compete for primacy. Each has
a nuclear war with, say, 150 million people claimed ascendancy at one time or another, but
and a Gross National product of $300 billion none seems likely to occupy the top spot perma-
a year, and a nation that emerges with only nently under all conditions.
50 million people and a GNP of $10 billion.
The former would be the richest and fourth Minimum Deterrence
largest nation in the world, and one which Minimum and Finite Deterrence, the cheapest and
would be able to restore a reasonable facsim- least complex of all options, are predicated on the

138
 NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGIES

proposition that nuclear combat would be an unmit- rence, Mostly Finite Deterrence, and Partial Damage
igated disaster for all belligerents. Proponents there- Limitation afford increasingly greater reliability and
fore see no need for numerous war-fighting weapon flexibility than Minimum Deterrence. Counterforce
systems and decry homeland defense on grounds as Insurance introduces "modest" war-fighting capa-
that mutually vulnerable populations encourage sta- bilities better able to discourage nuclear blackmail
bility. They believe that the most durable nuclear than any of those options, allegedly without incur-
deterrent is a "balance of terror" that holds cities ring prohibitive costs or appearing as provocative
on both sides at risk.20 as Maximum Deterrence.23
Critics claim that Minimum Deterrence lacks
credibility even as a declaratory policy, because it Deterrent Force Requirements
is based on threats that would be suicidal if imple- The size and composition of nuclear retaliatory
mented by any nation that spurns counterforce capa- forces required for deterrent purposes depends on
bilities and disregards homeland defense. Dr. Don- the nature and magnitude of threats that they face.
ald G. Brennan, a prominent disbeliever who held Some nations need extensive and variegated deploy-
sway at Herman Kahn's Hudson Institute, coined the ments, while others can sensibly settle for simple
acronym "MAD" for Mutual Assured Destruction, arrangements.
which he believed to be "almost literally mad."21
Force-Sizing Standards
Maximum Deterrence The nuclear force-sizing scale ranges from inferiority
Maximum Deterrence at the opposite end of the to superiority, with parity midway between. Compa-
strategic spectrum banks on abilities to win a nu- rable statistical strengths are less important than
clear war if required. Its prophets, who value flexi- corresponding capabilities. Marked preponderance
bility and freedom of action, prescribe quantitatively may be essential in some regards, but inferiority is
and qualitatively superior retaliatory forces with acceptable, provided it does not weaken deterrent
first-strike capabilities, foolproof early warning sys- powers militarily or psychologically.
tems, survivable command centers, and the best Sufficiency, which tolerates asymmetries that
possible protection for cities. Resultant war-fighting leave stability undisturbed, probably is the most ra-
postures are robust, but expensive and complex. tional standard for, as President Nixon explained to
Detractors claim that associated first-strike charac- Congress in 1971, "There is an absolute point below
teristics could prompt antsy opponents to preempt, which our security forces must never be allowed
would precipitate an endless arms race with those to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or
who hope to maintain a prudent balance, and cause at that level, our defense forces protect national
costs to spiral upward unnecessarily, because con- security adequately. Below that level is one vast
siderably fewer resources and less money would undifferentiated area of no security at all."24 He
ensure more than enough deterrence.22 might have added that excessive nuclear deploy-
ments raise costs unnecessarily and perhaps deprive
Compromise Concepts competing requirements of essential resources.
A procession of compromises amplify Minimum De-
terrence, compress Maximum Deterrence, borrow Retaliatory Force Composition
peculiarities from one or both, and inject original Retaliatory forces that implement deterrent strate-
ingredients. Concepts that Herman Kahn enunci- gies must be able to accomplish assigned missions
ated in I960 may still be worth review. Finite Deter- after nuclear-armed enemies attack. Two function-

139
MILITARY STRATEGY

ally different weapon systems that decrease collec- Opening Gambits

tive vulnerabilities, increase flexibility, complicate Huge benefits would accrue from a first strike at
rival planning, and minimize prospects of technolog- the onset of any nuclear conflict or from first use
ical surprise are preferable to any monad. Triads, of nuclear weapons in traditional combat. Second-
quadrads, and pentads may buttress deterrence strike counterpunches accordingly must rapidly
somewhat better, but the practical value of invest- overcome initial disadvantages.
ments declines with each layer. Mirror-image de-
ployments seldom are necessary. High-tech, affluent First-Strike Policies
sea powers, for example, may rely mainly on highly Nuclear war-fighters who believe that a good of-
survivable missile-launching submarines, while land fense makes the best defense rephrase an ancient
powers emphasize delivery systems ashore.25 axiom to read, "Do unto others before they do unto
you." Major General Orville Anderson's public pro-
Possible Lessons Learned nouncements in favor of preventive war cost him
All U.S. and Soviet nuclear deterrent concepts and his job as Commandant of the Air War College in
force postures after the early 1960s left yawning September 1950. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations
gaps between ends and means. None reduced force Admiral Robert Carney and Air Force Vice Chief of
levels or restrained costs significantly until the Cold Staff General Muir Fairchild, who wanted to squelch
War was almost over, but mutual deterrence per- the Soviet Union while the United States still pos-
sisted for thirty years. Three possible lessons emerge sessed overwhelming nuclear superiority, neverthe-
from that experience: less beat that same drum with impunity four years
later.27 General Curtis E. LeMay and other early Com-
• National leaders who fully appreciate the manders in Chief of U.S. Strategic Air Command
horrific nature of nuclear warfare are fairly (SAC) preferred first-strike policies that would
easy to deter, regardless of techniques em- shock, disorganize, and demoralize opponents, and
ployed. thereby pave the way for quick victory.28 They never
• Risk-takers who disregard the nature of nu- received permission, because preventive and pre-
clear warfare may be difficult or impossible emptive operations are laden with political liabilities
to deter, regardless of techniques employed. and look unattractive after enemy forces acquire
• Deterrent techniques that incorporate nu- sizable nuclear capabilities.
clear war-fighting capabilities would serve
national security interests best if preventive Second-Strike Policies
measures fizzle. The ability of truncated second-strike forces to per-
form assigned missions in chaotic postattack envi-
NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING ronments after absorbing the effects of nuclear blast,
STRATEGIES heat, and radiation would depend largely on enemy
Seasoned national security decision-makers are targeting priorities, the number of survivors, their
acutely aware that carefully crafted deterrent strate- states of training, and contingency plans. Launch-on-
gies may fail and prepare to cope if that happens. warning policies could safely maximize retaliatory
Nuclear war-fighting policies that specify opening capabilities only if infallible intelligence sources
gambits, target selections, and homeland defense confirmed the source, magnitude, and probable im-
strongly influence force requirements, costs, and pact areas of enemy nuclear attacks in progress,
outcomes.26 notified national command authorities in time for

140
 NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGIES

them to transmit permission, and enough minutes psi), and the U.S. triad became a de facto pentad
remained for recipients to react effectively.29 when nuclear-armed air- and sea-launched cruise
missiles entered active service.
Targeting Policies
Targeting policies shape the nature of nuclear war. Countervalue Targeting
They also dictate the numbers, types, and attributes Countervalue targeting concentrates on urban cen-
of weapon systems needed to execute stated strate- ters, industries, resources, and institutions that con-
gies. Counterforce strategies embrace active, pas- stitute the fabric of enemy society. The principal
sive, offensive, and defensive measures calculated intent is to deprive opponents of cherished posses-
to degrade rival military capabilities. Countervalue sions and staying power, break their spirit, and con-
strategies aim to obliterate civilian enterprises and tinue punishment until they quit. Force require-
undermine national will. ments are less demanding and costs are lower than
those connected with Counterforce, because pri-
Counterforce Targeting mary targets are static and relatively "soft."
Counterforce targeting, which concentrates on en- Countervalue operations nevertheless sound a
emy nuclear delivery systems, associated defenses, sour note, since they disregard age-old advice from
nerve centers, and weapon stockpiles, seeks to dis- Sun Tzu, who contended that, "The worst policy is
arm opponents as quickly as possible. First-strike to attack cities."31 Ethical considerations aside, there
force requirements are simple and fairly inexpensive is good reason to agree, because assaults on metro-
as long as opponents possess few nuclear-capable poli would destroy assets that both sides need to
forces, all at known locations, all static, and none recuperate and deprive "winners" of spoils that
well-shielded. Complexities and costs rise when en- could embellish their postwar power base.
emy inventories increase, superhard shelters dot
landscapes, and mobile weapon systems supple- Amalgamations
ment or replace those in fixed positions. General Counterforce and Countervalue operations are com-
Curtis E. LeMay explained resultant problems this plementary. Counterforce-plus-avoidance strategies
way in 1968: The U.S. "strategy of Counterforce was spare important military targets located inside cities,
basically defensive, [but] there was a catch to it. To whereas counterforce-plus-bonus strategies deliber-
get most of the enemy forces on the ground we ately maximize collateral casualties and damage.32
would have to attack first," and "our force would Policy-makers at the pinnacle must determine the
have to be much larger than it is now."30 proper mix.
U.S. Counterforce capabilities, for example, re-
lied entirely on manned bombers from 1945 until Defensive Options
1959, when the first single-shot Atlas ICBMs and Surveillance screens that cover every avenue of
Polaris submarines became operational. Antisubma- enemy approach, responsive command, control,
rine warfare hunter-killer teams soon began to and communication systems, interceptor aircraft,
sprout. Land- and sea-launched ballistic missiles and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) guard against en-
laden with MIRVs blossomed to handle a plethora emy cruise missiles as well as manned bomber
of aiming points in the Soviet Union. U.S. ICBMs attacks. The best shields, however, are porous, and
eventually acquired single-shot kill probabilities reliable ballistic missile defenses remain technologi-
against Soviet missile silos (some of which could cally infeasible at this writing. Passive defenses thus
withstand overpressures that approximated 10,000 are imperative.

141
MILITARY STRATEGY

Protection for Retaliatory Forces nuclear weapons is to be somewhere else when

The number of nuclear delivery vehicles deployed they detonate. City evacuation consequently re-
before combat begins is less important than those ceived serious consideration in the United States
left in mission-capable condition after being at- and the Soviet Union during the Cold War,34 but it
tacked. Second-strike policies multiply prelaunch soon became clear that inhabitants caught in the
survivability problems severalfold, as evidenced by open would suffer more casualties than if they
the plight of static U.S. ICBMs after Soviet counter- stayed home. One U.S. skeptic predicted "the big-
silo capabilities began to pose insufferable threats. gest rush hour in history, and probably the last."
Nuclear strategists in the Pentagon and at SAC First-strike strategies theoretically would allow ag-
Headquarters scrutinized thirty proposed basing gressors to evacuate selected urban centers before
modes that included open and covered trenches, nuclear combat began, but few citizens could sur-
launch sites submerged along the continental shelf vive long, even in mild weather, if nuclear reprisals
or dug deeply into bedrock, a "drag strip," and a smashed the cities they left and eradicated sources
"race track." The latter concept called for 200 road- of sustenance.35
mobile ICBMs, each to circle constantly or wander
randomly among twenty-three hardened launch NUCLEAR WAR TERMINATION
sites along a fifteen to twenty mile oval at one of 200 STRATEGIES
self-contained installations. No foe could conduct a Nuclear wars could subside spontaneously, but start-
successful nuclear first strike without simultane- ing may be much easier than stopping. The British
ously smashing most of the 4,600 shelters, since Ministry of Defence, in a 1954 White Paper, envis-
bogus transports and safe havens made it impossible aged "a period of broken-backed warfare . . . during
for satellite sensors to tell which targets were coun- which both sides would seek to recover their
terfeit. The "racetrack" and all other outlandish pro- strength, carrying on the struggle in the meantime
posals were stillborn, because they invited satura- as best they might."36 U.S. Admiral Robert B. Carney
tion attacks on the United States, were impractical, concurred. "With the passing of that initial phase,"
excessively expensive, and would have taken years he opined, "tough people would carry on across
to complete.33 the radioactive ashes and water, with what weapons
are left."37
Belligerents in any case would do well to
Population Protection pose and postulate answers to key questions that
No country endangered by nuclear weapons can concern cease-fire, truce, or armistice arrange-
safely disregard civil defense. Nations that concen- ments, "sideshows" that involve allies, postwar
trate a high percentage of their citizens in capital disarmament, and political settlements.38 The prime
cities such as Seoul, Pyongyang, Baghdad, Da- prerequisite would be to maintain contact with
mascus, Riyadh, and Teheran are among the most enemy representatives who have the authority,
needy, because a few well placed explosions would abilities, and inclination to conclude nuclear hostil-
wipe out much of the populace along with industrial ities. Target lists that aim to "decapitate" oppo-
capacities, telecommunication nodes, and cheri- nents by eradicating national nerve centers appear
shed institutions. nonsensical when seen in that light. Nuclear war
Well-stocked shelters in residential areas and termination requirements on the contrary would
workplaces would provide some protection against better be met by actions that spare capital cities,
blast, heat, and radiation, provided warning times alternative seats of government, and interconnect-
were adequate, but the best passive defense against ing telecommunications.39

142
 NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGIES

KEY POINTS
Even a few nuclear weapons could cause incomparable casualties and damage in large countries
and cripple small ones
The basic aim of nuclear deterrent strategies is to ensure a standoff called "stability," so no
rational national leader could be tempted to strike first
National leaders who fully appreciate the nature of nuclear war are much easier to deter than
risk-takers who are ignorant of or ignore related perils
The deterrent value of homeland defense is subject to serious dispute, whereas homeland
defense is an undeniable war-fighting asset
Force-sizing policies that call for "sufficiency" and stress essential military capabilities instead of
statistical strengths are preferable to all other standards
First-strike strategies give war-fighters great advantage; second-strike strategies designed to deter
are relatively risky and expensive
Numerous, well-protected enemy nuclear delivery systems make counterforce strategies a
complex and costly proposition
Countervalue strategies invite retaliation in kind and could culminate in the destruction of assets
that "winners" as well as "losers" need to recuperate.
"Decapitation" strategies that kill enemy leaders or sever communications with them might
make it difficult or impossible to terminate disastrous nuclear combat

NOTES 6. DA Pamphlet 39-3, The Effects of Nuclear Weap-

1. Herman Kahn describes a series of hurdles in On ons, 577-626.
Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- 7. Martin Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg (New
versity Press, I960), Chapter 2. York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983).
2. DA Pamphlet 39-3, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 8. DA Pamphlet 39-3, The Effects of Nuclear Weap-
rev. ed. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- ons, 102-20.
fice, February 1964), 1-27, 473-75. 9. Ibid., blast, 149-70,196-274, 316-50; thermal radia-
3. Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear tion, 63-115.
Weapons Detonations (Washington: National Acad- 10. Ibid., radioactivity, 502-31.
emy of Sciences, 1975); The Fallen Sky: Medical 11. Frederick S. Dunn and William T. R. Fox present
Consequences of Thermonuclear War, ed. for Physi- passionate pleas for arms control in The Absolute
cians for Social Responsibility by Saul Aronow et al. Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, ed. Ber-
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1963). nard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
4. United States and Soviet City Defense: Considera- 1946), 13-17, 169-203. Quotation on 13.
tions for Congress, prepared by the Congressional 12. "The United States Proposals for the International
Research Service, Senate Document 94-268, 94th Control of Atomic Energy, Presented to the United
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Print- Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the United
ing Office, September 30, 1976), 19-26. For a hypo- States Representative, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, June
thetical account of casualties from a U.S. attack on 14, 1946", in The International Control of Atomic
the Kozelsk ICBM field 180 miles southwest of Energy: Growth of a Policy, Department of State
Moscow, see John Barry and Evan Thomas, "Drop- Publication 2702 (Washington: U.S. Government
ping the Bomb," Newsweek, June 25, 2001, 28-30. Printing Office, 1946).
5. The Effects of Nuclear War (Montclair, NJ: Allenheld, 13. Three-page summaries of many agreements, negotia-
Osmun & Co., for the Office of Technology Assess- tions, and proposals are available in Amy Woolf,
ment, U.S. Congress, 1980), 15-46. Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A

143
MILITARY STRATEGY

Catalog of Recent Events, Rpt. RL30033 (Washing- 68. For elaboration, see Richard L. Garwin, "Launch
ton: Congressional Research Service, January 4, Under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?,"
1999). International Security, Winter 1979-1980, 116-39;
14. David Hoffman, "Arms Control Reverts to a Waiting Robert G. Bell, Launch on Warning: Pros and Cons
Game," Washington Post, June 6, 2000, Al, A23. (Washington: Congressional Research Service, July
15. Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, 76. 7, 1976).
16. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Prince- 30. LeMay, America Is in Danger, 83, 116.
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 303-4; 31. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
Yehoshafat Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 78.
Peace (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Trans- 32. LeMay, America Is in Danger, 66-68.
lation, 1966), 48-50. 33- ICBM Basing Options: A Summary of Major Studies
17. Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy to Determine a Survivable Basing Concept for
of Technology (Cambridge, MA: Dunellen, 1970), ICBMs (Washington: Office of the Deputy Under Sec-
115-16. retary of Defense for Research and Engineering [Stra-
18. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 13-20. Quotation tegic and Space Systems], December 1980); The MX
on 19- Weapon System: Issues and Challenges (Washing-
19. Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, Tome II ton: General Accounting Office, February 12,
(Paris: Institut Charles de Gaulle), 524-25. 1981), 38-39.
20. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 7-16. 34. N. M. Titov et al., Civil Defense, ed. and trans. G. A.
21. Donald R. Brennen, quoted in Extension of Remarks Cristy, Document ORNL-7R-2845 (Oak Ridge, TN:
by Representative John G. Schmitz, Congressional Oak Ridge National Laboratory, July 1975), v, vii,
Record, September 13, 1971, E9439. 25-28; Leon Goure, Soviet Civil Defense in the
22. Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 274-80. 1970s (Coral Gables, FL: Center for Advanced Inter-
23. Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, viii-x, 4-27. national Studies, University of Miami, September
24. President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for 1975), 50-56.
the 1970s: Building for Peace (Washington: U.S. 35. "Warnke Against Civil Defense Program," Defense/
Government Printing Office, February 25, 1971), Space Daily, November 30, 1978, 136; Ward Sinclair
167. and Warren Brown, "Evacuation Could Bring Huge
25. John M. Collins, Strategic Nuclear Delivery Systems: Traffic Jam," Washington Post, April 2, 1979, Al.
How Many? What Combinations?, Rpt. No. 74-177F 36. Statement on Defence, Command Paper #9075, Pre-
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, Octo- sented by the Minister of Defence to Parliament (Lon-
ber 7, 1974) and U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Op- don: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, February 1954),
tions: A Framework for Analysis, Issue Brief 77046, 5. For comments, see Brodie, Strategy in the Missile
November 2, 1983. Age, 160-65.
26. For seminal studies on nuclear warfare, see The Abso- 37. Admiral Robert B. Carney, speech delivered in Cin-
lute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. Ber- cinnati, OH on February 21, 1955, quoted in Brodie,
nard Brodie and Eilene Galloway explored influences Strategy in the Missile Age, l60n.
on land and naval strategies in The Atom Bomb and 38. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Ha-
the Armed Services, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 204-20 and
(Washington: Legislative Reference Service, May The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
1947). University Press, I960), 53-80.
27. General Curtis E. LeMay, America Is in Danger (New 39. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Re-
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968), 59, 64-65, 84, 117. port, Fiscal Year 1982 (Washington: Office of the
28. Bernard Brodie discusses preventive and preemptive Secretary of Defense, January 19, 1981), 41-42.
wars in Strategy in the Missile Age, 227-48.
29. "Sec. Brown: 'Launch on Warning or Launch Under
Attack' 1," Defense/Space Daily, November 11,1977,

144
 13. Biological and Chemical
Warfare Strategies
The [Black Death], which was probably bubonic plague,
came out of the East in 1347 . . . and carried off a quarter
of the population of Europe. Its influences on society
were catastrophic.
Major General J. F. C. Fuller
A Military History of the Western World
Chronicle 16, Volume I

A ggressors gifted with biological warfare (BW) hance operational flexibility during any form of
jLJLagents even more virulent than the medieval armed conflict. Precise target locations would not
Black Death lack powers to destroy hardware or be necessary, because agents blanket the landscape,
real estate, but could exterminate or incapacitate then seep into nooks and crannies like water seeking
human beings along with livestock and kill or con- the lowest level. Bonuses not obtainable from nu-
taminate crops on calamitous scales. Chemical war- clear or conventional explosives include no urban
fare (CW) agents are somewhat more manageable, rubble, no tree blow-down, and no other obstacles
but all types could cause mass casualties. It therefore that could impede friendly ground forces.
seems surprising that so few creative thinkers cur-
rently tackle biological and chemical warfare prob- BW Weapon Systems
lems with anything like the intellectual intensities Military strategists generally find biological warfare
that Cold War theoreticians applied to nuclear strate- an unattractive form of combat, because most effects
gies starting in 1945. Urgent needs still exist for are delayed and unpredictable. Some BW agents
military theories, concepts, policies, doctrines, tac- cause lengthy, debilitating diseases from which
tics, plans, and programs designed to deter and deal stricken humans usually recover, while others, such
with such malevolence.*1 as anthrax, botulism, ebola, hemorrhagic fever,
plague, and smallpox, frequently are fatal. A third
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL class blights sources of sustenance (Table 16).2
WEAPONS Most BW agents are best dispensed as aerosols,
Traditional armed forces have fought most wars but the integration of aerial delivery vehicles with
since the Stone Age. Future conflicts could be ex- compatible munitions poses complex engineering
clusively nuclear. Unique BW and CW capabilities problems. Microbial pathogens and toxins, for ex-
could greatly amplify psychological shock and en- ample, last only a few hours when exposed to heat
and low humidity inside bombs, missile warheads,
"Chapter 17 links biological and chemical warfare with spray tanks, and artillery shells. Unstable agents
domestic and transnational terrorism. cannot tolerate sharp strains associated with projec-

145
MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 16
Biological Warfare Agents
Humans Livestock Crops
Viruses Smallpox (30) Hoof & Mouth (5-85)
Hemorrhagic Fever (80-90) Poultry Plague (90-100)
Ebola(50-100) Avian Influenza (?)
Encephalitis (5-60) Rinderpest (15-95)
Hepatitis (1) Swine Fever (95-100)
Influenza (1) Mad Cow Disease (100?)
Rickettsias Tularemia (10-60) Heart Water (50-60)
Typhus (10-40)
Q-Fever (0-4)
Spotted Fever (20-60)
Bacteria Anthrax (20-100) Anthrax (40-80) Corn Blight
Plague (30-100) Brucellosis (5) Rice Blight
Cholera (10-80) Glanders (50-100)
Glanders (50-100)
Typhoid (4-20)
Salmonella (?)
Protozoa Amoebic Dysentery Coccidiosis (?)
Malaria
Sleeping Sickness
Fungi Valley Fever (0-50) Aspergillosis (50-90) Cereal Mildew
Lumpy Jaw (50-90) Cereal Rust
Corn Rust
Potato Blight
Rice Blast
Toxins Botulism (95-100)
Ricin (?)
Staph Infections (?)
Mycotoxicosis (?)
Figures in parentheses estimate the percent of fatalities in untreated cases. Wide fluctuations reflect different strains and degrees of
resistance. Well-nourished populations are less susceptible to some diseases than impoverished people. Proper treatment would reduce
rates dramatically, but no nation is well-prepared to cope with epidemics.

tile flights. The principal challenge therefore is to CW Weapon Systems

maintain potency throughout storage, delivery, and CW weapons include incendiaries such as napalm,
dissemination.3 smokes, assorted riot control agents, and herbi-
Genetic engineers seek to tailor biological agents cides, of which the Vietnam-era Agent Orange is
that act rapidly and are reasonably controllable. One most notorious.5 This text deals exclusively with
aim is to increase the virulence and immunity of lethal and incapacitating agents, none of which are
selected viruses, furnish them with prolific vectors, designed to damage materiel, although corrosive
program them to multiply as required, then die after chemicals may do so unless cleaned off quickly.
completing a specified number of cell divisions. Fu- Nonpersistent aerosols and vapors include blood
ture BW threats could be mind-boggling if experi- agents, asphyxiants, and nerve gasses, the most vola-
mental psychotoxins that induce fear, fatigue, de- tile of which linger no more than a few minutes
pression, or severe mental disorders supplement even on calm days, whereas persistent vessicants
current incapacitants.4 and thickened nerve agents laid down as liquids

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 BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

Table 17
Chemical Warfare Agents
Symbol State Odor Persistency
Nonpersistent
Blood Agent
Hydrogen Cyanide AC Vapor Peach Few Minutes
Asphyxiant
Phosgene CG Vapor Newly Mown Hay Few Minutes
1
Nerve Agents
Tabun GA All Aerosol Odorless Minutes
Sarin GB or Odorless Hours
Soman GD Vapor Odorless Hours
Persistent2
Nerve Agents3
Soman (Thickened)4 GD(T) Oily Liquid Odorless Days/Weeks
Agent VX VX Oily Liquid Odorless Days/Weeks
Vesicants
Mustard HD Oily Liquid Garlic Days/Weeks
Lewisite L Oily Liquid Geranium Days/Weeks
Mustard-Lewisite HL Oily Liquid Garlic Days/Weeks
1
Nonpersistent nerve agents are so lethal that protective clothing is essential, because small droplets may mingle with aerosols or vapor.
2
AN persistent agents are least tenacious in warm, windy, rainy weather.
3
AII persistent CW agents are toxic on unprotected skin, but lethal doses are much larger than those required to kill by inhalation.
Thickened Soman remains lethal for long periods under arctic-like conditions, but less so than in temperate climates.

remain hazardous to human health for several days, ration brought about by strenuous exertion, for ex-
even weeks (Table 17). CW delivery vehicles com- ample, increases vapor intake and reduces abilities
monly include aircraft, missiles, artillery, mortars, to hold breath while masking. Perspiration pro-
rocket launchers, and hand-laid chemical land motes blisters. Prolonged exposure to relatively low
mines.6 toxic levels can disable personnel just as surely as
Casualties occur when victims inhale, ingest, or fleeting encounters with larger doses.
absorb CW agents. Mustard mixed with Lewisite
sears eyes first, then nasal passages, throat, lungs, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL
and exposed skin. Fast-acting hydrogen cyanide (of- ARMS CONTROL
ten used for gas chamber executions) makes it im- The number of potential enemies armed with BW
possible for human bodies to consume oxygen car- and CW weapons made many statesmen nervous
ried by red blood cells, whereas delayed-reaction enough to emphasize arms control immediately
phosgene attacks respiratory tracts. Tabun, Sarin after World War I, when the 1925 Geneva Protocol
and Soman, which last somewhat longer in free prohibited usage. The Biological Weapons Conven-
states, induce neuroparalysis in the absence of an tion of 1972, which will wither away if current
immediate antidote. Amounts required to incapaci- trends persist,7 obligated signatories to "destroy, or
tate or kill usually vary with concentration densities, divert to peaceful purposes . . . all [BW] agents,
dosage times, individual sensitivities, temperatures, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of deliv-
and physical activities of those afflicted. Rapid respi- ery." The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention,

147
MILITARY STRATEGY

which imposed similar restrictions on CW activities, ently if Saddam Hussein had seized Kuwait, then
mandated on-site inspections and penalties for coun- promised to strike Saudi Arabian cities with BW-
tries that fail to comply.8 One glance at Table 14 capable Scuds unless the U.S.-led coalition dissolved
(page 124) nevertheless confirms that, counterpro- and allowed him to retain ill-gotten gains. That threat
liferation constraints notwithstanding, BW- and CW- would have been credible, given defective defenses
capable nations still abound, of which some are against Iraqi missiles.10
extremely hostile toward perceived adversaries near Threats to destroy enemy BW installations and
and far. Current numbers will increase if unfulfilled stockpiles or retaliate in kind offer faint hope of
programs in progress reach fruition. success, partly because it is very difficult to find
lucrative targets. Elusive Iraqi Scuds and many BW
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE facilities, for example, escaped unscathed through-
STRATEGIES out Desert Storm, despite their positions on flat
Pressing needs exist for creative BW strategies, be- terrain that is almost devoid of vegetation or other
cause deterrent and war-fighting concepts are defi- natural cover.11 Future tricksters situated on rough
cient. Requirements would remain urgent if prolif- topography covered with forests would find it eas-
eration ceased, because unprincipled possessors ier to fool any adversary. Military strategists more-
already retain appalling capabilities that they could over could anticipate politically as well as morally
employ at times and places of their choosing. unfortunate repercussions if successful attacks in-
discriminately covered friends and noncombatants
BW Deterrent Techniques with poisonous clouds. Fear that biological warfare
Deterers with little compunction or whose survival may backfire hence may offer the best incentives
is at stake might credibly announce intentions to for potential deployers to refrain.
"go nuclear" if opponents initiate biological warfare,
but threats of that sort would be less believable
under most other conditions. If, as unconfirmed
Biological Combat
No nation has ever fought a war in which biological
reports indicated, U.S. officials so warned Iraq dur-
weapons played a prominent part, but urgent needs
ing the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991, Saddam
for BW war-fighting techniques clearly exist if the
Hussein probably was unimpressed, because senior
following assumptions are even close to correct:
U.S. officials seem much more reluctant to wreak
havoc than their World War II predecessors (Gen-
eral Curtis E. LeMay reaped ridicule in the mid-1960s • The proliferation of BW weapons will con-
when he advocated bombing Vietnam "back to the tinue, despite preventive measures
Stone Age"9). The first nuclear detonation in combat • Deterrent techniques will remain deficient
since 1945 moreover would set an imprudent prece- • Rash leaders, coupled with resultant possibil-
dent, and could provoke the first nuclear exchange ities for miscalculation, make biological war-
in history if opponents could reciprocate in kind. fare increasingly likely
Non-nuclear forces that fail to deter traditional • Observable sickness would be the earliest
conflicts seem no more likely to discourage biologi- indication that BW agents have infected hu-
cal warfare. Aggressors indeed might decide that BW mans, livestock, and crops until better warn-
campaigns would increase their leverage without ing devices become available
raising risks significantly. Operation Desert Storm, • Casualties could overwhelm available medi-
for example, might have culminated quite differ- cal services

148
 BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

• Damaged crops would take months or years attractive until scientists and technologists open
to replenish much better BW options.

BW Offensive Options CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

Biological weapons are not well adapted for offen- Chemical warfare strategies, which have undergone
sive use on battlefields, because wholesale delivery many modifications since 1915, are more mature
poses huge problems, incubation periods are mea- than BW counterparts. Some characteristics are simi-
sured in days or weeks, and required results would lar, but those that differ demand unique treatments.
be hard to synchronize with nuclear, traditional, or
chemical operations. Attacks even so could be timed
to take effect on or about any given date. Natural
CW Deterrence
Most students of the subject doubt that chemical
epidemics normally start slowly and usually can be
warfare deterrent strategies should rely heavily on
confined (AIDS and influenza are two prominent
threats to retaliate with nuclear or traditional weap-
exceptions), whereas biological warfare agents
ons, for reasons already described. Abilities to re-
would afflict all or most of a population almost simul-
spond in kind, however, look promising, because
taneously. Flight to avoid contagious neighbors and
no country with extensive offensive capabilities has
infected cadavers could quickly broadcast diseases
suffered CW attacks since 1918.16
far beyond their original borders.12
The explanation is simple: chemical warfare be-
stows few assured benefits on initiators, who face
BW Defensive Options reciprocal risks, reduced capabilities, and expense.
Neither active nor passive BW defenses hold much Masks impair breathing, obstruct vision, and muffle
promise at this moment.13 Shocking casualties could communications. It takes several minutes for well-
occur if even a few enemy aircraft or missiles leaked trained individuals to don cumbersome suits that
through a sophisticated but pervious screen, which are subject to rips and act as impromptu saunas in
clearly can happen. A teenage German daredevil, warm weather. Fatigue sets in fast. Time to complete
for example, penetrated Soviet air defenses unde- routine tasks, like loading trucks and digging fox-
tected on May 28, 1987, buzzed Lenin's tomb, then holes, may double or triple. Troops wearing gloves
landed just off Red Square; an adventurous pilot fumble with rifle sights, toggles, switches, and dials
crash-landed a light plane on the White House lawn that demand tactile dexterity. Personnel need "sani-
in September 1994.14 tized" shelters to work, eat, sleep, relieve bladder
Mass vaccinations to protect civilian populations and bowels, or merely blow noses. Extensive CW
as well as military personnel against particular BW operations could overload supply and maintenance
threats appear impractical and, if accomplished, systems. Tons of decontaminants (bleach slurries,
probably would prompt enemies to elect equally absorbent powders, detergents) and something like
effective substitutes. Subtle genetic alterations 200,000 gallons of wash water per armored division
might make agents of choice resistant to customary would be required after each attack that dispensed
innoculations.15 persistent agents. Expectation of retaliation in kind
Biological warfare accordingly seems most attrac- consequently dampens temptations to initiate chem-
tive to megalomaniacs who care little for human life ical combat against opponents who are organized,
even in their own country. Most military strategists equipped, and trained to give as good as they get
meanwhile find other forms of armed combat more or better.17

149
MILITARY STRATEGY

Chemical Combat Detection Defenders need near real-time detec-

Chemical warfare agents have never been decisive, tion devices to warn forces downwind of chemical
even when disseminated wholesale during World attacks, differentiate agents, measure intensities,
War I. National security policy-makers and military predict persistencies, and tell commanders when
strategists currently possess vastly improved CW to signal "all clear." Instigators, who must safeguard
capabilities, but nonetheless would be well advised against capricious wind shifts and avoid self-inflicted
to weigh offensive advantages against defensive disad- casualties while traversing contaminated terrain,
vantages carefully before they decide to initiate chem- have identical demands. Instruments range from
ical combat against rivals who are likewise armed. simple litmus-type papers to ultrasensitive alarms
that detect chemicals in the air, but few items de-
Offensive CW Options ployed at the turn of the twenty-first century dis-
The offensive utility of chemical warfare weapons criminate among CW threats or measure concentra-
is considerable, given a wide variety of potential tions very accurately.19
delivery vehicles. U.S. intelligence analysts in the
1980s, for example, concluded that each Soviet BM- Individual Protection Individual protection
21 battery of eighteen forty-tube 122mm rocket against chemical warfare agents starts with custom-
launchers (now owned by Russia) could bombard fitted masks designed to filter out known vapors
enemy positions with 720 rounds of nonpersistent and aerosols. The best have voice transmitters, de-
Sarin or hydrogen cyanide in a single 20-second vices that enable wearers to sip beverages, and tubes
salvo, reload, and replicate that strike 10 minutes that facilitate mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Com-
later. Short-range cruise missiles containing thick- plete encapsulation against vesicants and nerve
ened Soman could contaminate targets 180 miles agents includes hood, suit, socks, shoes, and gloves
distant without endangering aircraft or crews.18 made of impervious materials. Antidotes adminis-
Volatile agents that disperse quickly are well- tered expeditiously reduce deaths from nerve agents
suited for surprise attacks against troop concentra- that are inhaled or absorbed.
tions, strong points, and command centers, because Forces that fight in full ensemble regrettably lose
defenders must don full protective regalia until they 30-60 percent effectiveness almost immediately
identify the threat, "while assault forces who know and deteriorate rapidly thereafter, even under ideal
what agent is involved need no gear save gas masks. conditions. Constant wear of protective clothing
Lethal agents laid down as liquids can restrict ave- to cover all contingencies is impractical. Standing
nues available to poorly prepared opponents, pro- procedures that specify reduced states of readiness
tect the flanks of friendly ground forces, and saturate spell trouble if troops are caught by surprise. The
enemy logistical installations along with ports, air- price paid in stress and diminished combat capabili-
fields, and surface ships at sea. ties consequently is high.20

Defensive CW Requirements Collective Protection Sterilized shelters are es-

Most modern armed forces are reasonably well-pre- sential, because individuals who remove masks or
pared to defend against unstealthy aircraft. Sound loosen clothing even momentarily during chemical
missile defenses, however, await scientific break- combat otherwise could become casualties. Collec-
throughs and abilities to intercept artillery projec- tive accommodations ashore and afloat feature
tiles in flight appear improbable, given the most toxic-free command posts, communication centers,
optimistic long-range forecasts. Passive defenses ac- medical facilities, maintenance shops, assorted
cordingly bear heavy burdens. other installations, and "citadels" aboard surface

150
 BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

ships. CW filters, pumps, and other defensive de- pose few decontamination problems, but irregular
vices protect some vans, tanks, and infantry fight- shapes like aircraft cockpits take much longer to
ing vehicles. scrub. Soviet Armed Forces during the Cold War
Shortcomings nevertheless are extensive. Venti- fielded a mobile "car wash" with truck-mounted jet
lating systems are especially vulnerable. Inflatable engines on a turntable to facilitate hot air drying.
shelters, seemingly ideal for fluid warfare, are sub- Difficult cases demand bleach slurries, absorbent
ject to punctures; permanent structures are expen- powders, and detergents that damage metal, rubber,
sive and infeasible for mobile forces; tanks and self- and electronics unless cleaners take precautions.22
propelled gun carriages cannot replenish ammuni- Flexibility was lacking during Operation Desert
tion without risking chemical contamination; casual- Storm, because U.S. water-based decontamination
ties endanger doctors, nurses, and other patients systems intended for use in Europe were unsuitable
unless medics scrub them before admittance. R&D in the arid Middle East.23
specialists labor to reduce the list of such liabilities,
but successes thus far have come slowly.21 Cleanup
Cleanup crews can "sanitize" flatlands, including
Medical Care airfields, by broadcasting neutralizers, turning
First aid is the first order of business after any ground with bulldozers, and burning vegetation, al-
chemical attack. Requirements vary with degrees though forces downwind must guard against fumes
of surprise, states of training, human failures, and in the latter event. Labor, implements, materials, and
faulty equipment, such as leaky masks, garments, tactical situations limit how much can be reasonably
and collective shelters. Most afflicted personnel purged from rough topography if such action be-
must make their own diagnoses and treat them- comes necessary.
selves if medics are too few to handle mass casual-
ties. Nerve agent antidotes, which have debilitating NEEDS FOR CREATIVE CONCEPTS
side effects, could reduce combat power during No nation presently is well-prepared to deter or deal
crises if injected needlessly. effectively with biological warfare threats that may
be more ominous than those associated with nuclear
Decontamination weapons. Chemical warfare problems are more lo-
Armed forces can "fight dirty" for brief periods, but calized and better understood, but shortcomings
soon must remove persistent chemical agents from could tip regional balances of power in favor of
doused troops, arms, equipment, supplies, and im- ruthless wielders. Proper employment in any case
portant properties or accept increased attrition ac- requires creative strategies coupled with high-prior-
companied by decreased combat effectiveness. ity programs developed expressly to eliminate
Soap and water suffices for personnel, provided they prominent gaps and improve existing offensive and
gingerly remove polluted clothing. Slick surfaces defensive BW/CW capabilities.

151
MILITARY STRATEGY

KEY POINTS
BW and CW warfare weapons that can incapacitate or kill humans and animals also can
contaminate or kill crops on calamitous scales, but do not destroy hardware or real estate
Some BW agents cause widespread debilitating diseases, others frequently are fatal, while a third
class blights sources of sustenance
Military strategists generally find biological warfare unattractive, because many agents are
unstable and most effects are delayed, uncontrollable, and unpredictable
Lethal and incapacitating CW agents are better understood, somewhat more manageable, and
their effects are comparatively localized
BW- and CW-capable nations still abound, despite international arms control conventions
Biological warfare threats may be more ominous than nuclear weapons, but deterrent, offensive,
and defensive strategies have barely begun to incubate
CW capabilities are well suited for offensive missions that other armed forces cannot
accomplish equally well
Armed forces prepared to retaliate in kind are best able to deter chemical warfare, because they
confront aggressors with reciprocal risks, reduced abilities, and expense
Individual and collective protective measures make CW operations an inconvenient form of
warfare for attackers and defenders if each deploys chemical weapons
Persistent CW agents make postattack cleanup a hazardous, time-consuming, costly process

NOTES cides Used in Vietnam (Washington: National Acad-

1. Stuart E. Johnson, ed., The Niche Threat: Deterring emy Press, 1994).
the Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons 6. Ali, Rodriques, and Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biologi-
(Washington: National Defense University Press, cal Defense Guidebook, 36-74; The Problem of
1997). Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. II, 33-35,
2. For tutorials, see The Biological-Chemical Weapon 42-43, 47-48.
Warfare Threat (Washington: Central Intelligence 7. Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Statement by the
Agency, 1998), l-22;JavedAli, Leslie Rodriques, and United States to the Ad Hoc Group of Biological
Michael Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Weapons Convention States Parties (Washington,
Guidebook (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information D.C.: Office of International Information Programs,
Group, 1998), 92-126; Abram S. Benenson, ed., Con- U.S. Department of State, July 25, 2001), Web site
trol of Communicable Disease Manual, 16th ed. http://usinfo.state.gov, with transcript, Mahley
(Washington: American Public Health Association, News Conference on Biological Weapons Protocol.
1995). The Problem of Chemical and Biological 8. The Arms Control Reporter (Cambridge, MA: Insti-
Warfare, vol. II, CB Weapons Today (New York: tute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, updated
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SI- monthly); Chem-Bio Weapons & Defense Monitor
PRI), 1973), 37-41, 42-43, 61-72. (Washington: Exchange Monitor Publications, pub-
3. Ibid. lished biweekly).
4. Charles Pillar and Keith Yamamoto, Gene Wars (New 9. General Curtis E. LeMay with MacKinlay Kantor, Mis-
York: William Morrow, 1988); Macha Levinson, "Cus- sion With LeMay: My Story (Garden City, NY: Dou-
tom-Made Biological Weapons," International De- bleday, 1965), 565.
fense Review, November 1986, 1615. 10. JohnJ. Arquilla, Constraints on Regional Deterrence
5. Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Science, After the Cold War, RR-466-A/AF (Santa Monica, CA:
Veterans and Agent Orange: Health Effects of Herbi- RAND Corporation, August 1993), 8-9, 16, 17, 19.

152
 BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

11. Thomas A. Keany and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War 17. FM 21-40, Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear De-
Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, fense (Washington: Department of the Army, Octo-
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), 78- ber 15, 1977), Chapter 5 and Appendix B.
90, 137, 138; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's 18. Charles J. Dick, "The Soviet Chemical and Biological
Biological Programme," Arms Control, December Warfare Threat," Royal United Services Institute
1993, 229-71. (RUSI), March 1981, 48; A. F. Graveley, "Defense or
12. William C. King, IV, Biological Warfare: Are U.S. Deterrence? The Case for Chemical Weapons," RUSI,
Armed Forces Ready?, Land Warfare Papers No. 34 December 1981, 14; Gary Eifried, "Russian CW: Our
(Washington: Association of the U.S. Army, October Achilles' Heel in Europe", Army, December 1979,25.
1999), 1-14; Office of Technology Assessment, Pro- 19. All, Rodriques, and Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biologi-
liferation of Mass Destruction Weapons: Assessing cal Defense Guidebook, 165.
the Risks (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 20. Ibid., 197-206.
Office, August 1993), 53-54. 21. FM 21-40, Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear De-
13- King, Biological Warfare, 15-24. fense, 5-33 through 5-36; Eylert Haup, "DSK: NBC
14. "Mathias Rust," Collier's Yearbook, 1987; "Pilot Protection in the German Navy," National Defense,
Crashes Small Plane on White House Lawn," Facts May-June 1984, 88, 91-92, 94, 96.
on File Yearbook (1994), 657-58. 22. All, Rodriques, and Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biologi-
15. Biological Warfare, vol. 4 (Washington: Defense Nu- cal Defense Guidebook, 181-86; Dick, "The Soviet
clear Agency, Summer 1994), iii, 72-78; Robert Har- Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat," 51; K. G.
ris, "Towards a Theory of Biological Deterrence," Benz, "NBC Defense: An Overview," International
World Outlook, Summer 1990, 95-102. Defense Review, Part II, Detection and Decontami-
16. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, "Chemical Weapons nation, February 1984, 164.
and Deterrence: The World War II Experience," 23- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to
International Security, Spring 1984, 3-35, 36- Congress (Washington: Department of Defense,
54. April 1992), Q9.

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 1 4. Traditional Forces and Strategies
Tradition: A historical line of conventions, principles,
and attitudes characteristic of a school [or] social group;
a long-established custom or practice.
Webster's New World College Dictionary
4th Edition

T raditional warfare, which has been in vogue for

eons, spurns nuclear, biological, chemical, and
radiological (NBCR) weapons, yet otherwise spans
occupy (even govern) hostile territories for pro-
longed periods. They routinely perform assorted lo-
gistical functions for expeditionary air forces and
the conflict spectrum from minor engagements to naval elements ashore. Major elements of the United
combat on the scale of World War II. Military lexi- States Marine Corps, for example, leaned heavily on
cons commonly call such strife "conventional," but the U.S. Army for support when committed far from
that term is a misnomer, because innovative strate- salt water during World War I (1917-1918), in Korea
gies, tactics, plans, and operations produce best (1950-1953), and in Vietnam (1965-1971).2 Armies
results. So-called "general purpose forces" that additionally perform internal security missions in
perform traditional roles, functions, and missions many countries. Debilitating deficiencies even so
ashore, afloat, aloft, and in space also are mislabeled, are evident, because armies rely extensively on sis-
because respective responsibilities are specialized. ter services for aerial reconnaissance, surveillance,
Deterrent and war-fighting concepts and plans con- and firepower as well as long-haul airlift and sealift.
sequently must integrate their efforts creatively;
Sea Power Peculiarities
COMPLEMENTARY FORCE The foremost naval functions have eternally been
CONTRIBUTIONS to exercise command over selected seas, to ensure
Armed forces that engage in traditional warfare are that critical sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
far more diversified and costly in compilation than remain open for friends but not for foes, and to
NBCR counterparts. Roles, functions, and missions project naval power against hostile shores.3 No truly
are much more diversified. All military services con- new responsibility has emerged in the last 2,500
tribute offensive, defensive, and deterrent capabili- years, but modern missiles and aircraft launched
ties, but none can bear every burden alone.1 from platforms afloat can strike targets several hun-
dred miles inside hostile territory. Sea control facili-
Land Power Peculiarities tates international commerce, an essential element
Armies are the largest, most versatile military com- of national power and prosperity. Permanent or in-
ponent in most countries, primarily because human- termittent offshore presence near hot spots puts
ity, treasured institutions, industries, and the most naval forces in position to respond expeditiously if
easily accessible resources are located terrestrially. crises occur. Only navies and merchant marines can
Ground forces are best able to seize, secure, and deploy, redeploy, and sustain massive armed forces

155
MILITARY STRATEGY

in foreign countries overseas.4 Sea power, like land gational satellites help armed forces locate them-
power, nevertheless exhibits glaring limitations. selves precisely anywhere on Earth. Military
Top-of-the-line naval combatants are the most costly communicators routinely route long-range signals
of all military hardware and, except for those with through relay stations in circumterrestrial space.7
nuclear propulsion, expend fossil fuels at prodigious Unrestricted access, however, is scarcely assured.
rates. Transit times for the speediest ships are mea- Cybernetic assaults already are feasible. Additional
sured in weeks over long distances. Naval forces vulnerabilities will arise as soon as enemies deploy
moreover perform most administrative and logistical lethal antisatellite (ASAT) weapons and will persist
functions at vulnerable installations ashore. until technologists perfect countermeasures.

Air Power Peculiarities Synergistic Capabilities

Aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, strategic bom- Armed combat normally involves two or more mili-
bardment, interdiction, close air support for land tary services, perhaps from two or more nations,
forces, and resupply became air force roles and that can be most effective only if teamwork prevails.
functions before World War I ended on November Joint/combined policies, doctrines, plans, and oper-
11, 1918.5 Offensive counter-air operations retain ations that integrate and synchronize the input from
top priority, because failure to establish and main- all contributors create synergistic capabilities that
tain air superiority can have calamitous conse- are much greater than the sum of separate parts,
quences. Hitler's Luftwaffe, for example, paved the because common actions focus on common objec-
way for panzer spearheads on June 22, 1941, when tives. Combined strengths accordingly offset indi-
it destroyed approximately 1,800 Soviet aircraft be- vidual weaknesses, provided implementing com-
tween dawn and dusk. Defenders, deprived of air manders practice what harmonizers preach.8
cover, suffered demoralizing defeats on every front
during the first week of war.6 Air forces unfortu- COMPARATIVE FORCE POSTURES
nately are no more able to escape shortcomings Military balance sheets, which measure the combat
than land and sea services. Most land-based aircraft power available to competing countries or coali-
still rely on elaborate installations that may not be tions, are tricky to compile, because data almost
conveniently located or politically accessible, re- always are incomplete and reliability varies consider-
quire extensive logistical support during lengthy ably. Results sometimes are suspect, because ap-
operations, and perform better when targets are praisers for various reasons may slant findings to
situated on bare, level terrain rather than in moun- create preferred impressions. Pentagon publica-
tains or woodlands. tions entitled Soviet Military Power9 and the
Kremlin's rebuttals dubbed Whence the Threat to
Space Power Peculiarities Peace,10 for example, emphasized enemy assets and
Modern armed forces have become increasingly de- slighted enemy liabilities. All net assessments and
pendent on multifaceted space operations since the threat assessments even so start with quantitative
Soviet scientific satellite called Sputnik electrified and qualitative comparisons.
the world in 1957. Intelligence functions feature
reconnaissance, surveillance, missile warning, tar- Quantitative Balances
get acquisition, tracking, nuclear detonation detec- British Admiral Horatio Nelson, a naval wizard dur-
tion, poststrike assessments, signal interception, ing the Napoleonic Wars, noted that "numbers anni-
mapping, meteorological information, and verifica- hilate." His conclusion is not completely correct, but
tion of compliance with arms control accords. Navi- few war-fighters question the value of quantitative

156
 TRADITIONAL FORCES AND STRATEGIES

superiority, which enables possessors to absorb States, Britain, France, and lesser European allies.14
heavy casualties without becoming ineffective and General Hideki Tojo, in his capacities as Premier, Min-
affords flexibility available from no other source. ister of War, and Army Chief of Staff, took on China,
The war-fighting balance in West-Central Europe the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Australia,
was badly skewed throughout the Cold War, be- New Zealand, and assorted associates along Asia's
cause the Warsaw Pact deployed many more divi- southern rim.15
sions, tanks, and tactical aircraft than NATO did.11
Readily available reinforcements from Poland and Beneficial Balances
European Russia far outnumbered NATO counter- Costly efforts to match opposing armed forces statis-
parts. General Bernard W. Rogers, when he was tically or technologically are militarily meaningless
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, doubted that when the practical value of superiority in any given
NATO could hold the line very long against a con- category is neutral, immaterial, or negative.16 NATO,
certed Soviet offensive without employing nuclear for example, felt no need for more men under arms
weapons, which "would invite at least as much dev- when the twenty-first century opened, even though
astation" on defenders as on invaders.12 Russian personnel strengths still exceeded a million,
because dilapidated weapons and low morale made
Qualitative Balances it difficult for Russia to subdue tiny Chechnya, much
Badly outnumbered but qualitatively superior armed less menace Western Europe.17 The best military
forces sometimes prevail. British Prime Minister balances, which concentrate on required capabili-
Winston Churchill, in a speech before the House of ties rather than mirror images, enable nations to
Commons on August 20, 1940, paid tribute to the implement chosen strategies, accomplish missions,
Royal Air Force (RAF) with these stirring words: and satisfy objectives without wasting resources.
"Never in the field of human conflict was so much
owed by so many to so few." Valiant RAF fighter TRADITIONAL DETERRENCE
pilots won the Battle of Britain, because short-range Strategic theories and concepts that traditional
German escorts based in France were unable to armed forces employ to prevent unwanted wars
protect Goring's vulnerable bombers against British remain skimpy compared with literature that deals
interceptors that ground controllers vectored from with nuclear deterrence.18 Policy-makers, planners,
English airdromes using tips that the world's first and practitioners nevertheless agree that obvious
early warning radar network provided. That triumph abilities to make aggression unattractive and willing-
caused Hitler to cancel Operation Sea Lion (the ness to act decisively if provoked are cornerstones.
planned German invasion of Britain) and preserved Advantageous deployments, periodic demonstra-
the British Isles as a springboard for the Allied inva- tions, and partnerships that augment military power
sion of Normandy in June 1944.13 contribute, but intangibles make it difficult to deter-
Strategists who routinely rely on qualitative su- mine how much of what is required under spe-
premacy to offset numerical inferiority even so can cific conditions.
expect some rude surprises, because good large
forces generally defeat good small ones. Over- Incalculable Force Requirements
whelming weight more than any other factor First-rate armed forces contribute to deterrence, but
crushed the best that Germany and Japan had to offer degrees to which they do so are arguable. Congress,
during the Second World War, when both nations for example, appropriated about $1 trillion to im-
illogically bit off more than they could chew: Hitler prove, operate, and maintain the U.S. military estab-
tangled simultaneously with the Soviet Union, United lishment during President Reagan'sfirstAdministra-

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MILITARY STRATEGY

tion, but members of the House Armed Services deterrence fails. Tiny "tripwires" nevertheless can
Committee remained perplexed after they held hear- serve useful purposes under favorable conditions.
ings to determine how much deterrence those dol- Soviet Armed Forces could have swamped the U.S.
lars bought. One witness doubted that anybody in Berlin Brigade any time the Kremlin gave a green
the U.S. intelligence community knew. "A whole light, but so doing would have risked a nuclear
lot was bought, paid for, and deployed before 1981," war with NATO. The deterrent value of that minute
he explained. "A lot of that trillion bucks is still contingent consequently was immense compared
in the pipeline. It may influence deterrence in the with its combat capabilities.21
future, but it has not yet." Only one group can Case-by-case assessments are essential, because it
authoritatively tell whether taxpayers got their is difficult to determine beforehand what advantages
money's worth, he continued: "The Politburo in permanent presence will provide. U.S. on-site forces
Moscow, and for some reason or other they helped maintain equilibrium in Europe throughout
aren't talking."19 the Cold War and continue to do so in Korea,
National security policy-makers and military whereas Saddam Hussein began to mount opera-
strategists, who nonetheless must try to calculate tions against Iraqi Kurds and Shiite minorities before
how much of what is needed for traditional deter- any U.S. forces returned home after Operation De-
rence, consequently tend to make conservative deci- sert Storm.22 Host nation restrictions still dilute the
sions. President Richard M. Nixon couched require- deterrent and war-fighting abilities of U.S. Armed
ments as follows in a commencement address at Forces in Saudi Arabia—Defense Minister Prince Sul-
the U.S. Air Force Academy on June 4, 1969: "I do tan bin Abdul-Aziz on December 31, 1998, publicly
not consider my recommendations infallible. But if declared that if the United States should ask permis-
I have made a mistake, I pray that it is on the side sion to launch air strikes against Iraq from Saudi
of too much and not too little. If we do too much, bases, "We will not agree."23
it will cost us our money. If we do too little, if may
cost us our lives."20 Power Projection
Deterrent strategies crafted to defuse budding con-
Force Deployment Options tingencies before they balloon demand fast-reflex
Permanent, large-scale presence near present and forces that are ready to fight on arrival. Proven abili-
potential trouble spots is expensive in terms of ties to assemble the proper mix of military power
manpower, materiel, and money, while distant "fire on short notice and project it wherever required
brigades" reduce responsiveness. The best deterrent can give aggressors pause, as demonstrated in Au-
strategies consequently couple forward deploy- gust 1990 when U.S. Armed Forces swooped into
ments with reinforcements that can answer 911 Saudi Arabia from distant departure bases, first to
calls rapidly. Optimum combinations take the immi- establish a tripwire between Kuwait and Persian
nence, intensity, and nature of perceived threats Gulf oil fields farther south, then to build a
into account. bulwark.24
Significant liabilities even so limit leverage.
Permanent Presence Power projection may aggravate rather than
Large garrisons permanently deployed at strategic dampen incipient crises if opponents detect prepa-
locations are best able to demonstrate resolve, pre- rations, interpret them correctly, and take counter-
vent power vacuums, preserve regional balances, actions quickly. Political restraints sometimes dimin-
contain incipient threats, and defend vigorously if ish the deterrent value of forces based in foreign

158
 TRADITIONAL FORCES AND STRATEGIES

countries, because they can launch out-of-area expe- Clear Intentions

ditions only if host nations concur. U.S. logisticians, Potent traditional capabilities provide a powerful
for example, had to resupply Israel from the United deterrent only if accompanied by indisputable inten-
States rather than from Western Europe during the tions to employ them if provoked. Vacillation not
Yom Kippur War of 1973, because most NATO only undercuts credibility but weakens deterrence
members found continued access to Arab petroleum through uncertainty. Serbian President Slobodan Mi-
more important than Israel's security. Portugal al- losevic consequently felt free to savage Albanian
lowed landings in the Azores, but no other ally let rebels who sought to separate Kosovo from Greater
U.S. cargo ships and transport aircraft use its facil- Serbia in 1998-1999, because frequent threats by
ities.25 the United States and NATO to take military counter-
measures proved empty until March 24, 1999-27
Periodic Demonstrations
Large-scale military maneuvers, exercises, rapid de-
TRADITIONAL WAR-FIGHTING
ployments, reserve call-ups, and other demonstra-
Traditional war-fighting requirements differ in many
tions that periodically offer visible proof of impres-
respects from those of deterrence. Policy-makers
sive capabilities make all but the most wooden-
must decide what volitional limitations to approve,
headed opponents wonder whether the price of
while military strategists decide how to proceed if
aggression would be excessive. Deterrent failures
nuclear warfare overlaps.
paradoxically may do likewise. The Democratic Peo-
ple's Republic of Korea, for example, has long been
able to strike south in great strength with little or Volitional Limitations
no warning, but Kim II Sung learned a hard lesson in General Nathan F. Twining, while Chairman of the
1950-1953 when, after spectacular early successes, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1957-1960), longed for the
North Korea would have ceased to exist without good "old days [when] war was war and peace was
massive military intervention by Chinese "volun- peace." No one asked, "Is this a 'limited war,' or a
teers."26 He and Kim Jong II, his successor, have 'general war,' or a 'total war'?" before the inconclu-
avoided a decisive Shootout with South Korea ever sive collision in Korea. "Americans did what was
since, although two splendid opportunities arose necessary to win." U.S. joint doctrine still declares
when traditional U.S. forces were heavily committed that, "If deterrence fails, then our single objective
elsewhere: first during massive U.S. involvement in is winning the nation's wars. When we fight, we
Vietnam (1965-1972), then during Operations De- fight to win."28
sert Shield and Desert Storm (1990-1991). There nevertheless are valid reasons for restric-
tions when "winning" seems too costly in terms of
Collective Security irreplaceable lives and precious resources. Astute
Alliance systems, including multinational coalitions strategists in such circumstances scale back political
under UN and other international banners, can sig- objectives, military aims, participating forces, weap-
nificantly lighten deterrent force requirements and onry, targets, and areas of operation, singly or in
financial burdens of each member state. They also some combination.29 Bargaining, which may be im-
strengthen political will and furnish useful infra- plied or explicit, manipulates promises, threats,
structure, provided mutual interests are at stake, all counterthreats, proposals, counterproposals, offers,
are of one mind concerning politico-military courses assurances, and concessions. One criterion, how-
of action, and geographic situations are favorable. ever, remains constant: negotiated settlements in-

159
MILITARY STRATEGY

variably involve terms that both sides are willing nicians, pursued Communist aims in Angola alone,
to accept.30 according to U.S. intelligence estimates.34
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by
Limited Ends definition are taboo during traditional wars, al-
Limited wars demand mutual willingness to settle though practical applications are apparent. General
for less than any belligerent would like without Twining believed that if the United States Air Force
undercutting crucial security interests. Compro- had "dropped one A-bomb on a tactical target during
mises replace unconditional surrender as the ulti- the Korea War. . . there might have been no Chinese
mate objective. President Truman, for example, invasion.. . ."35 Low-yield nuclear detonations might
abandoned efforts to reunify Korea after China inter- have sealed off mountain passes along the Ho Chi
vened, but steadfastly sought to contain Commu- Minh Trail and obliterated Communist base areas in
nism and preserve the South Korean Government. isolated locales many miles from the nearest urban
Choosing goals calls for special caution when foes centers in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The nu-
possess weapons of mass destruction, because rash clear genie nevertheless has remained in the jug
decisions risk disasters.31 since 1945, partly because abstinence is less ambigu-
ous than limitations on allowable yields and employ-
Limited Means ment practices, and partly because nuclear combat
Strategists who strive to circumscribe the scope and might become commonplace if any belligerent
severity of war limit means as well as ends. Defensive, broke the long-standing moratorium.36
support, and advisory troops are less provocative
than offensive combat power. Confrontations be- Limited Methods
tween proxies are apt to be less incendiary than Duels designed to limit armed combat have been
clashes between principals. Air and naval forces dis- scarce since about 980 B.C., when Israeli King Saul
engage more easily than those on the ground. Multi- bet that little David could defeat the Philistine giant
national alliances make it difficult for dominant na- Goliath, who promised, "If he be able . . . to kill
tions to take actions that partners disapprove. me" in one-on-one, winner-take-all combat, "then
Twenty Free World countries contributed to the we will be your servants: but if I prevail. . . then ye
United Nations Command during the Korean War.32 shall be our servants, and serve us." David's victory
Their presence blurred the edges of a struggle be- prevented a pitched battle between opposing ar-
tween the United States and China, which stead- mies, for "when the Philistines saw their champion
fastly clung to the fiction that its contingents south dead, they fled."37
of the Yalu River were "volunteers." Soviet training Modern Chiefs of State, who deal with much
teams, service troops, surface-to-air missile crews, greater complexities, tend to disregard military ad-
and interceptor aircraft pilots later flooded the Nile vice that they fear might conflict with political re-
Delta to protect Moscow's massive investments in quirements in sensitive situations. Wrangling with
military aid to Egypt, but Leonid Brezhnev let Arab Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara over ways
clients lose their Six-Day War with Israel in 1967 to block Soviet sea lines of communication in the
rather than furnish offensive reinforcements.33 Cuba Caribbean Sea nearly cost U.S. Admiral George An-
at the height of the Cold War was a de facto Soviet derson his job as Chief of Naval Operations during
surrogate in several African countries that overlook the Cuban missile crisis (he failed to receive a sec-
maritime lines of communication—25,000 Cuban ond two-year term).38 Policies that President Lyndon
combat troops, plus 6,000-7,000 advisers and tech- Johnson imposed on U.S. military operations in

160
 TRADITIONAL FORCES AND STRATEGIES

Southeast Asia (1965-1972) violated virtually every devastating in compilation. The trick is to keep limi-
Principle of War to avoid provoking China or the tations and risks within reason until rival govern-
Soviet Union and to promote peace talks with Ha- ments reach mutually agreeable settlements that
noi.39 Military strategists at such times earn their need not be equitable.
pay only if they devise strategic options that work
acceptably well despite severe restrictions. NUCLEAR WARFARE NEXUS
Nuclear nations, whose members are expanding,
Limited Arenas might be tempted to use weapons of mass destruction
Limited wars generally are confined geographically. rather than engage in protracted traditional combat
The United States Navy, which supported Chinese or accept defeat.44 Military strategists, in concert with
Nationalist defenders on beleaguered Quemoy Is- practitioners of operational art, accordingly should
land in the early 1950s, freely transferred cargo from review related problems and devise fresh solutions in
transport ships to Taiwanese landing craft that came light of technological developments.
under fire only after they crossed an imaginary line
three miles offshore. U.S. Seventh Fleet in turn never Perceived Problems
attacked installations on the Chinese Communist Theater nuclear weapons in the early 1950s made
mainland.40 Those arrangements were satisfactory, threatened countries reconsider military doctrines,
but sanctuaries are more easily recognized if de- tactics, and standing operating procedures. Skeptics
marked by national boundaries, lines of latitude and questioned whether traditional land and amphibious
longitude marked on everyone's maps, or clearly forces in particular could survive on nuclear battle-
defined terrain features such as roads, railroads, fields, much less accomplish essential missions.
large streams, and seashores. The Yalu River, which
separates China from Korea, was a logical place Proposed Solutions
for UN forces to stop in November 1950, because The United States Army, whose only nuclear-capable
crossing that "Rubicon" would have initiated a adversary then was the Soviet Union, planned to
new conflict.41 disperse self-contained combat battalions three to
City limits sometimes serve well. Rome escaped five miles apart on a nonlinear battlefield to a depth
unscathed in June 1944, because Allied and Axis of 100 miles or more, each prepared to move for-
leaders declared Italy's ancient capital an open city.42 ward, laterally, or backwards like chess pieces. The
Paris enjoyed equal status before German occupa- intent was to assemble requisite forces rapidly at
tion troops took possession in May 1940, but es- critical times and places, deliver decisive blows,
caped destruction in August 1944 only because Gen- then separate. "Mass for combat, scatter to survive"
eral Dietrich von Choltitz courageously refused to became the formula for victory.45
follow directives from his Fiihrer, who wanted to Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, an amphibious
incinerate that beautiful city.43 warfare expert who witnessed nuclear tests at Bikini
Lagoon in June-July 1946, advised the Commandant
Risk Control of the Marine Corps that "a small number of atomic
Limited war strategists, like tightwire walkers, pur- bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now
sue a ticklish trade. Excessive audacity by either organized, embarked, and landed." A naval board
side risks showdowns that neither wants. Excessive the following December concluded that "the an-
timidity invites adversaries to extort concessions swer lies in a wide dispersion of our attack force,
that individually seem inconsequential, but can be a rapid concentration of our landing force by means

161
MILITARY STRATEGY

other than small boats or amphibians and thereafter bution were unreliable. So were the aircraft upon
maintaining close contact with the enemy."46 Heli- which amphibious doctrine depended in the 1950s.48
borne assault troops, coupled with carrier-based and
vertical takeoff/landing (VTOL) aircraft for fire sup-
port, became prescribed centerpieces. Colonel Rob-
Present Prospects
Revolutionary changes have alleviated or eliminated
ert E. Cushman, Jr., a future Commandant, opined
most of the shortcomings just described. Technolog-
that resultant capabilities would "cut down the
ical improvements in the mill promise further im-
danger from that of disaster to that of calculated
provements. Military strategists as a result might
risks."47
realistically reconsider discarded options to deter-
mine whether present and impending ways to
Practical Impediments shoot, move, communicate, and sustain might make
Serious obstacles arose when U.S. Armed Services
modern armed forces more viable if nuclear and
tried to put those principles into practice. Abilities
traditional warfare overlap.
to control quick concentrations, strikes, and dispers-
als on envisaged scales were nonexistent. Neither
the Army's target acquisition systems nor its direct TRADITIONAL WARFARE FULCRUM
fire weapons could cover three- tofive-mileintervals Traditional deterrent and war-fighting strategies de-
between isolated combat battalions. Artillery was mand far greater versatility than those that feature
quantitatively and qualitatively unable to compen- nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Tradi-
sate. Theater nuclear weapons would have endan- tional forces, like symphony orchestras, perform
gered defenders almost as much as foes, if used to best when they possess alternative means to attain
take up the slack. Enemy forces consequently might required ends. Land, sea, air, amphibious, and space
have been able to operate with considerable impu- forces bereft of multiple options can neither cope
nity in the voids, perhaps even surround and elimi- with known problems nor contend with unantici-
nate each "island." Logistical vulnerabilities loomed, pated contingencies most effectively. Flexibility, in
because supply lines that depended on aerial distri- short, is the fulcrum.

162
 TRADITIONAL FORCES AND STRATEGIES

KEY POINTS
No military service is best suited for all purposes under all conditions
Traditional deterrent and war-fighting strategies offer far greater flexibility than those that
feature nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons
Traditional military capabilities in large measure reflect how well land, sea, amphibious, and air
forces mesh
Well-balanced traditional forces enjoy much greater freedom of action than those that
excessively rely on land, sea, or air power
Highly capable, clearly visible forces that are permanently positioned to block aggression are
better able to bolster deterrence than those that appear intermittently
Deterrence additionally benefits from strong expeditionary forces that are initially self-sufficient
and ready to fight on arrival
Potent capabilities contribute most to deterrence only if accompanied by obvious will to
employ that power if provoked
Qualitative superiority can offset quantitative inferiority up to some undefinable point, but good
large forces generally defeat good small ones
Limited wars demand willingness to settle for less than any combatant would like
The trick is to keep limitations and risks within reason until rival governments reach agreeable
settlements that need not be equitable
Unique strategic and tactical problems would arise if traditional and nuclear warfare overlap

NOTES AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1998); Andrew G.

1. Martin Blumenson, "Of Land Powers and Sea Pow- B. Vallence, The Air Weapon: Doctrines of Air-
ers" and Sir Julian Corbett, "Inherent Differences in power Strategy and Operational Art (New York:
the Conditions of War on Land and on Sea," both in St. Martin's Press, 1996); John Gooch, ed., Air-
The Art and Practice of Military Strategy, ed. George power: Theory and Practice (Portland, OR: F.
Edward Thibault (Washington: National Defense Uni- Case, 1995).
versity Press, 1984), 36-41, 169-72. 6. Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air Force Since 1918
2. Allen R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the (New York: Stein and Day, 1997), 110-114; Alan
United States Marine Corps, rev. ed. (New York: Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict,
Macmillan, 1991), 287-318, 475-517, 559-606. 1941-1945 (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
3. Excerpts from "Alfred Thayer Mahan," ed. Allen 1965), 44-76.
Westcott, 103-5, 114-17; Sir Julian Corbett, "Some 7. Paul B. States, Space and National Security (Wash-
Principles of Maritime Strategy," 161-74; and Admi- ington: Brookings Institution, 1987), 45-72; Thomas
ral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. C. Brandt, "The Military Uses of Space," in America
Gorshkov, "The Sea Power of the State," 224-32, Plans for Space (Washington: National Defense Uni-
239-44,248-54, all in Thibault, The Art and Practice versity Press, 1986), 81-91.
of Military Strategy. 8. Joint Pub. 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of
4. Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The History the United States and Joint Pub. 0-2, Unified Action
and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New York: Mor- Armed Forces lay the foundation for U.S. joint doc-
row, 1974); Michael H. H. Evans, Amphibious Opera- trine (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint
tions: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore (Washing- Chiefs of Staff). Joint Pubs. 1-0, 2-0, 3-0, 4-0, 5-0, and
ton: Brassey's, 1990). 6-0 respectively address Personell and Administra-
5. David R. Mets, The Air Campaign: John Warden tion, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, and
and the Classical Airpower Theorists (Maxwell C4 Systems.

163
MILITARY STRATEGY

9. Soviet Military Power (Washington: U.S. Govern- on Armed Services, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (Washing-
ment Printing Office, nine editions between 1981 ton: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), 49-51.
and 1990 (none in 1982); Military Forces in Transi- Quotation on 50.
tion (Washington: Department of Defense, 1991). 20. "Address at the Air Force Academy Commencement
10. Whence the Threat to Peace? (Moscow: Military Exercises in Colorado Springs, Colorado," Public Pa-
Publishing House, USSR Ministry of Defense), 1st pers of the Presidents of the United States: Nixon,
ed., January 1982; 2d ed., July 1982; 3d ed., Au- 1969 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
gust 1984. 1971), 436.
11. Statistics are contained in John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet 21. The U.S. Berlin Brigade's predicament is pungently
Military Balance, 1980-1985 (Washington: Perga- described in Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influ-
mon-Brassey's, 1985), 260-63. ence (New Haven: CT: Yale University Press,
12. Quotation is from "General Bernard W. Rogers," 1966), 47.
Armed ForcesJournal, September 1983,80. See also 22. Alfred B. Prados, The Kurds of Iraq: Status, Protec-
General Bernard W. Rogers, "Raising the Nuclear tion and Prospects, Rpt. 94-423F (Washington: Con-
Threshold," Defense, June 1984, 2, 4-6; NATO: Can gressional Research Service, May 12,1994); Kenneth
the Alliance Be Saved?, Report of Senator Sam Nunn Katzman, Iraq: Marsh Arabs and U.S. Policy, Rpt. 94-
to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 97th 320F (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Print- April 13, 1994).
ing Office, 1982), 2-3. 23. "Saudi Not to Allow Use of Territory for Iraq Attacks,"
13. Richard Hough, The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Reuters News Wire, (December 31, 1998, 00:55
Air Battle of World War II (New York: W. W. AET).
Norton, 1990); Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion 24. Lieutenant General William G. ("Gus") Pagonis, Mov-
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957). ing Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics
14. Trevor N. Depuy, A Genius for War: The German from the Persian Gulf War (Boston: Harvard Busi-
Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood ness School Press, 1992), 6-7, 95-140; Gulf War Air
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 253-99; Barrie Pitt, Power Survey, vol. V, A Statistical Compendium
The Battle of the Atlantic (New York: Time-Life and Chronology (Washington: U.S. Government
Books, 1977). Printing Office, 1993), Chapter 3 summarizes person-
15. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall nel strengths, strike aircraft arrivals, airlift, and sealift.
of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 (New York: 25. Insight Team of the London Sunday Times, The Yom
Random House, 1970), 34-284. Kippur War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.,
16. United States/Soviet Military Balance: A Frame of 1974), 423-27.
Reference for Congress, Senate Committee on Armed 26. T. R. Fehrenbach, The Kind of War (New York:
Services, 94th Cong., 2dsess. (Washington: U.S. Gov- Macmillan Co., 1963); Roy E. Appleman, United
ernment Printing Office, January 1976), 21-26. States Army in the Korean War: South to the
17. Lieutenant General William P. Odom, The Collapse of Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington: U.S. Gov-
the Soviet Military (New Haven, CT: Yale University ernment Printing Office, I960).
Press, 1998); Stuart D. Goldman, Russian Conven- 27. Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia and Kosovo: U.S. Mili-
tional Armed Forces: On the Verge of Collapse? Rpt. tary Operations, Issue Brief 93056 (Washington:
97-820-F (Washington: Congressional Research Ser- Congressional Research Service, April 1999).
vice, September 4, 1997). 28. General Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor
18. Recent writings include Naval Studies Board, Com- Safety: A Hard Look at U.S. Military Policy and
mission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Ap- Strategy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
plications, National Research Council, Post-Cold War 1966), 102-14, 118. Quotations on 104-5.
Conflict Deterrence (Washington: National Academy 29. Early writings include: Robert Endicott Osgood, Lim-
Press, 1997); Gary L. Guertner, Robert Haffa, Jr., ited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chi-
and George Questor, Conventional Forces and the cago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Henry A.
Future of Deterrence (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 20, 132-202, 224-33. More recently, see Christopher
1992). M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Lim-
19. What Have We Gotfor $1 Trillion?, Hearings Before ited War in American Foreign Policy (New York:
the Defense Policy Panel of the House Committee Columbia University Press, 1994); Major General

164
 TRADITIONAL FORCES AND STRATEGIES

Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower in Limited War, rev. 40. Henry A. Kissinger, Necessity for Choice: Prospects of
ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994). American Foreign Policy (New York: Anchor Books,
30. Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Prince- Doubleday & Co., 1962), 63.
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), 308, 312- 41. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 132-33, 134, 135.
14, 334; Thomas C. Schelling, "Bargaining, Commu- 42. Martin Blumenson, Mark Clark (New York: Condon
nication and Limited War," Journal of Conflict &Weed, 1984), 213-16.
Resolution, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 1957) and Arms 43. Alistair Home, To Lose a Battle: France, 1940 (Bos-
and Influence, 131-45, 19-203, 215-20. ton: Little, Brown, 1969), 94, 381-94, 561-64, 573;
31. Robert McClintock, The Meaning of Limited War Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, 7s Paris Burn-
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), 205. mg.?(New York: Pocket Books, 1965), 25-29,79-80,
32. For land, sea, and air forces under the UN banner in 195-97, 275-80, 301-3, 316-20.
Korea see Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Korean 44. Kissinger, Necessity for Choice, 78-101.
War Almanac (New York: Facts on File, 1990), 45. General Willard C. Wyman, "Highlights of Army Doc-
288-91. trine, "Armor, March-April 1958,16; Lieutenant Col-
33. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab- onel A. J. Bacevich, The PentomicEra: The U.S. Army
Israeli Wars, 194 7-19 74 (New York: Harper & Row, between Korea and Vietnam (Washington: National
1978), 237-38. Defense University Press, 1986), 67-68,104-5,115-
34. Soviet Military Power, 3d ed., April 1984, 17; Lieutenant Colonel Jerry M. Sollinger, Improving
123-24. U.S. Theater Nuclear Doctrine (Washington: Na-
35. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety, 117. tional Defense University Press, 1983), 15.
36. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 131-35. 46. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and
37. Old Testament, 1 Samuel 17. For analyses, see Major Purpose: A Developmental History of the United
General Yigal Yadin, The Art of Warfare in Biblical States Marine Corps, 1900-1970 (Washington: His-
Lands, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: International Publishing tory and Museums Division, Hq. U.S. Marine Corps,
Co., 1963), 265-67. 1973), 71-72.
38. David Detzer, The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 47. Colonel J. D. Kittle, "Amphibious Warfare," Marine
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1979). Corps Gazette, June 1954, 19; Colonel Robert E.
39. Rationales are available in Neil Sheehan et al., The Cushman, Jr., "Amphibious Warfare Tomorrow,"
Pentagon Papers (New York: Quadrangle Books, Marine Corps Gazette, April 1955, 30-34.
1971). 48. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 68, 70, 117-18.

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 15. Insurgency Strategies
If a man does not keep pace with his companions,
perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer.
Let him keep step to the music which he hears,
however measured or far away.
Henry David Thoreau
Walden, XVIII, 1854

I nsurgents defy established authorities and invad-

ers for political, ideological, economic, social, re-
ligious, ethnic, or cultural reasons.1 All march to
level effects that unfold unpredictably. Trends to-
ward ever greater complexity are evident.

different drummers than those whose mission is to

deny them success, but not all forms of insurgency Classical Insurgencies
are of equal interest to military strategists. Conspira- Insurgent concepts, policies, plans, programs, and
torial coups d'etat usually succeed or fail too quickly employment practices are so unlike those associated
for national security policy-makers and planners to with traditional warfare that untutored onlookers
shape outcomes.2 Abilities to stop spontaneous up- fail to identify any rules at all, but patterns are per-
risings seem equally slim, as demonstrated during ceptible (Table 18). Traditional conflicts, which em-
the Russian Revolution of 1917, a political time phasize military power, normally ignite abruptly to
bomb that exploded in Petrograd, then gained irre- capitalize on surprise, whereas the transition from
versible momentum almost immediately.3 peace to war during most insurgencies is almost
This chapter concentrates on three types of in- imperceptible, because instigators at the onset pos-
surgency that are similar in every respect save oppo- sess little clout, and thus must inch their way onto
nents: revolutionary wars; counterrevolutions; and center stage. Belligerents and nonbelligerents tradi-
resistance movements, which aim to oust occupying tionally remain separate and distinct, while combat-
powers. Concluding discussions address insurgent ants and noncombatants intermingle during insur-
support for traditional military operations.4 gencies that admit no front lines or rear areas. Some
insurgencies feature passive resistance,5 but mass
military insurrections, which are more common,
THE NATURE OF INSURGENCIES recognize few restraints. Newsworthy acts of sabo-
Insurgencies arguably are the most agile, sophisti- tage, ambushes, shootouts at barricades, assassina-
cated form of conflict. Opportunistic practitioners tions, abductions, and hostage seizures attract most
with infinite persistence and unstructured ap- attention, even though political, economic, social,
proaches to problem-solving thrive on chaos that and psychological instruments are more important
they deliberately engender. Skilled craftsmen gain than armed force. Insurgents in any event benefit
leverage from second-, third-, even fourth- and fifth- more from protracted confrontations than incum-

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MILITARY STRATEGY

Table 18 become increasingly complex and incidents likely

Characteristics of Classical Insurgency will increase, if pronounced trends early in the
• Three stages are evident: preparation, progressive twenty-first century are any indication.7
expansion, and culmination
• Preparations commonly are covert or clandestine
• Organizations typically include full-time cadres and Cross-Purpose Insurgencies
part-time auxiliaries
• Cellular structures foster tight security Revolutions, counterrevolutions, and resistance
• Initial overtures usually are low-key and insidious movements that proceed concurrently at cross-
• Both sides seek support from or acceptance by the
same population purposes may introduce additional complications.
• Primary battlefields thus lie within human minds French irregulars with Allied assistance, for exam-
• There are no noncombatants or neutrals in the
traditional sense ple, uniformly opposed Nazi occupation forces and
• Belligerents mingle with bystanders the puppet government in Vichy from mid-1940
• All must choose sides or accept dangerous
consequences until August 1944. Some continued to fight for nine
• Military and paramilitary battlefields lack sharply more months, but whether Gaullists or Communist
defined boundaries
• Operations commonly are protracted competitors would rule France in the aftermath
• Politico-military strategies employ finesse as well as generated bitter disputes until General Charles de
force
• Psychological offensives are more important than Gaulle finally consolidated control after World
military power War II ended in Europe.8 Communist and non-
• Subversive activities take precedence over head-on
collisions Communist factions fought each other for eventual
• Psychological operations precede, accompany, and control of Yugoslovia9 and the Philippines10 during
follow armed combat
• Inexpensive paramilitary forces possess sharp teeth the same general time frame.
and short logistical tails
• Political victory, however defined, invariably is the
main aim REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
• Ends invariably justify means Revolutionary wars, which may be predominantly
• Complexities continue to increase
urban or rural, occasionally crop up in sophisticated
countries, but spawn most often in impoverished,
underprivileged societies. The classical aim is to
bent governments, because they have a lot less to convince a majority of the population that insurgent
ilose and ._i_ • to
_, i everything «._ 6
A gain programs are preferable to those of the ruling re-
gime, which allegedly disregards their needs and is
New Wave Insurgencies powerless to protect misguided adherents. Support-
Characteristics described above have become less ing objectives and implementing actions variously
clean-cut since religious fanatics, aggrieved ethnic seek to isolate governments from constituents and
groups, criminal gangs, clans (such as those that vie foreign countries, ruin their credits, overextend
for ascendancy in Somalia), and other nongovern- their resources, perhaps replace social structures,
mental groups began to compete with nation-states and ultimately seize power.11
in the post-Cold War world. "Good guys" and "bad
guys" are more difficult to distinguish. Many of them Grievances
conduct offbeat operations to achieve unorthodox Revolutions rarely plague countries where the popu-
objectives. Drug cartels in Colombia, for example, lace is too tired, hungry, downtrodden, and fearful
would rather control illicit narcotics traffic than re- to rebel.12 Instead, they flourish most often where
place the Government in Bogota, which suffers from the will to revolt replaces passive acceptance of
king-sized bureaucratic headaches. Conditions will flagrant injustice. Emotional causes such as freedom,

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 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

human rights, and equal opportunity need not be Guidance

realistic or attainable, provided people are willing Dreams without direction are useless. Blind passion
to die for them. Idealistic Chinese students who may bind headless multitudes together temporarily,
demanded democratic reforms knew that success but charismatic leaders must fan the fires of revolu-
was unlikely, but defiantly disregarded authorities tion and focus frustrations to generate maximum
who told them to cease and disperse. The People's power. Influential idealists and other fellow travel-
Liberation Army on June 3-4, 1989, killed hundreds lers, whom Lenin called "useful idiots," often assist.
in Beijing's Tiananmen Square and wounded or ar- Hard-core adherents need not be numerous, accord-
rested thousands more.13 Dedicated revolutionaries ing to T. E. Lawrence, whose guerrillas ran rings
moreover disdain time. Ho Chi Minn and his succes- around Turkish troops in the Arabian Desert during
sors in Hanoi, for example, fought from 1945 to World War I—rebellions, he opined, "can be made
1975 until they finally reunified Vietnam on Commu- by 2 percent active in a striking force, and 98 per-
nist terms, despite staggering casualties and incalcu- cent passively sympathetic."19
lable damage.14 Some prophets and exponents of revolutionary
Tribal rivalries remain the root of many uprisings war put thoughts on paper, others are warriors,
in Africa, where only five out of thirty-two states while a gifted few wield sword and pen equally
(Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania, and Tuni- well. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels theorized that
sia) avoided at least one violent change of government corrupt governments must be razed and replaced.20
between 1963, when President Sylvanus Olympio of Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky put those postu-
Togo was assassinated, and 1997, when President Mo- lations into practice.21 Mao Zedong, who shaped
butu Sese Seko fled Zaire one leap ahead of Laurent and implemented strategies suitable for China's
Desire Kabila's bloodthirsty guerrillas.15 Unpopular peasantry, composed classic treatises on protracted
regimes in any case invite insurgencies if they can't war and guerrilla warfare while he confronted
control exploitable frictions between rich and poor, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government.22 Ho Chi
old and young, peasants and proletariat, adversarial Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap adapted Mao's
ethnic groups, and antagonistic religions.16 politico-military doctrines to suit circumstances
The Declaration of Independence by colonial when they accosted the duly elected Government
North Americans espoused the right of self- of South Vietnam.23 Fidel Castro and Che Guevara
determination as its cause. "We hold these rules to slanted similar concepts for use in rural Latin
be self-evident," its signatories asserted, "that all America before they ousted Cuban dictator
men are created equal, that they are endowed by Fulgencio Batista.24 Brazilian firebrand Carlos Mari-
their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that ghella blazed the way for urban guerrillas every-
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of where about that same time.25
happiness. . . . That whenever any form of govern-
ment becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Organizations
right of the people to alter or to abolish it." All fifty- Revolutionary organizations are like icebergs. Para-
five signers thereby did "pledge to each other our military guerrillas and a few direct action auxiliaries
lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor."17 That are merely the visible tips of vastly larger covert
historic document has inspired oppressed peoples and clandestine undergrounds that plan, control,
the world over since 1776, starting with the French and sustain insurrections. Together, they com-
Revolution, which began on July 14, 1789, when prise a team that rarely works well without close
mobs stormed the Bastille.18 collaboration by all participants.

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MILITARY STRATEGY

Undergrounds and Auxiliaries high-level leaders with limited appreciation for local
Most undergrounds consist of a hard-core cadre that peculiarities are poorly positioned to determine
recruits, indoctrinates, and trains personnel for its what tools and techniques might be most useful at
own purposes and for guerrilla groups. Additional any given time or place. Excessive centralization
duties involve intelligence production, counterintel- also reduces the ability of cell chiefs to attack targets
ligence, munitions manufacture, transportation, of opportunity and make other time-sensitive deci-
communications, and fund-raising. Many part-time sions. Vulnerabilities burgeon, because frequent
auxiliaries who lead otherwise normal lives perform meetings and increased communication require-
special tasks (such as surreptitious message deliver- ments make cabals unnecessarily conspicuous
ies and newspaper printing) and special assignments (whether access to the Internet will exacerbate or
(such as sabotage and assassination). Sympathetic cure that problem remains uncertain). Succession
lawyers defend accused revolutionaries in courts of can pose prickly problems if "kingpins" become
law. Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) experts in the casualties. Most groups accordingly favor "steering
perception management business circulate peti- committees" that prescribe policies, concepts, pro-
tions and feed stories to members of the news me- cedures, and priorities, but let subordinate cells act
dia. They also spread rumors designed to brighten on their own initiative.
rebel images and discredit the government. Threats,
intimidation, coercion, and emotional stress all help Guerrilla Groupments
create converts when logic and inducements fail. The term "guerrilla," which means "little war," en-
Revolutionary propaganda holds a heavy advantage, tered military lexicons in the early 1800s, when
because rebels are judged by promises, not what Spanish and Portuguese guerrilleros helped Well-
they produce, while incumbents must run on ington drive Napoleon Bonaparte's forces from the
their records.26 Iberian Peninsula back into France.28 Paramilitary
Cellular structures enhance security (Figure 4). bands specialize in sabotage, hit-and-run raids, and
Rudimentary undergrounds commonly open with ambushes, but seldom try to hold terrain against
a multipurpose nucleus that seldom exceeds ten determined opposition. Guerrillas, like under-
individuals, and may be somewhat smaller. The least grounds from which they draw strength, emphasize
successful self-destruct or stagnate at that stage, political education and issue awareness. They habit-
while others mature as multifaceted syndicates with ually assign high priorities to agitation and propa-
numerous offshoots. Groups grow by adding cells ganda, because victory is obtainable only if they
instead of expanding those extant to minimize com- enlist mass support for insurgent causes.29
promise. Intermediaries called "cutouts" separate Guerrillas generally establish bases and conduct
"chiefs" from "Indians" and cells from each other, so operations within geographical areas of responsibil-
prisoners who crack under interrogation can furnish ity where they live. Units that deploy farther afield
captors with few lucrative leads. Some organizations need intelligence from regional commanders who
perform support tasks step-by-step in series to keep are intimately familiar with local terrain, customs,
cells small. Cell 1 might buy material to make muni- and enemy activities.30 Organizational structures
tions, while Cell 2 manufactures components, Cell usually parallel those of regular armed forces, tai-
3 assembles weapons, and Cell 4 disseminates fin- lored to suit available manpower pools and preva-
ished products.27 lent situations. Fidel Castro, for example, employed
Tight control from top to bottom decreases du- squads, platoons, and companies,31 whereas Mao
plication of effort but forfeits flexibility, because mustered undersized formations that, for propa-

170
 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

Figure 4
Cellular Underground Organizations

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MILITARY STRATEGY

ganda purposes, he called battalions, regiments, and and other disorders that are cheap to produce and
divisions.32 Captured weapons, equipment, and sup- costly to counter. Unchecked operations eventually
plies reduce needs for elaborate logistical depots. become so disruptive and responses so repressive
that afflicted populations tend to endorse revolu-
Revolutionary Phases tionary programs rather than endure continued
Mao Zedong pursued a three-phase revolutionary chaos.
strategy during China's protracted war against Ja-
pan: Strategic Defensive; Preparation for Counter-
Phase II: Expansion
offensive; Strategic Counteroffensive. Different
Guerrilla warfare gains momentum during Phase II.
phases proceeded concurrently in different parts of
Small, mobile groups rely on raids to secure arms,
the country. When rebels ran into stiff resistance,
ammunition, medical supplies, and radios while ci-
they changed tactics or retrenched, then rejuve-
vilian sympathizers furnish food, clothing, shelters,
nated.33 Undergrounds and guerrillas around the
and a steady stream of current intelligence concern-
world subsequently adapted Mao's concepts to suit
ing governmental capabilities, intentions, plans, and
revolutionary requirements in vastly different envi-
ongoing operations.
ronments. Preparation, Expansion, and Culmination
Mao, a master of simulation and dissimulation,
best describe the three phases associated with most
heeded Sun Tzu, his mentor many times removed.34
modifications.
"Avoid the solid," he advised, and "attack the hol-
low." Guerrillas, he continued, should "withdraw
Phase I: Preparation
when [a stronger enemy] advances; harass him
Underground activities dominate during Phase I,
when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue
which lays the foundation for expansion. Insurgents
him when he withdraws. "35 Discreet insurgents who
first recruit cadres, investigate social class struc-
disperse to survive and concentrate to fight at times
tures, identify complaints, and accumulate intelli-
and places of their choosing thus may be outnum-
gence files needed to formulate propaganda themes
bered ten to one, yet incessantly pit ten against one
and plans. To gain support, they infiltrate and sub-
during minor engagements that create demoralizing
vert grassroots organizations such as schools, clubs
results in compilation.
(including Boy Scouts and Campfire Girls or equiva-
lents), unions, cooperatives, business associations,
police, armed forces, intelligence communities, and Phase HI: Culmination
governmental offices at every level. Activists estab- Classical insurgents during Phase III seek conclusive
lish new cliques where few or none exist and attack victory. Traditional armed forces augment guerrillas
those that resist. No institution that grants contact in efforts to defeat government troops decisively and
is too ostentatious or too obscure. Success ensures thereby culminate conflict on their own immutable
access to, and influence over, ranks and files. terms. Stubborn negotiators, who steadfastly pursue
Rebel leaders, when ready, labor to establish a parallel paths that lead toward victory, tend to com-
system of "dual power," wherein a subversive promise only when so doing undercuts opponents,
shadow government vies with duly constituted au- fosters favorable public opinion, otherwise supports
thority for control. Coercion goes hand-in-glove revolutionary programs, or deflects impending de-
with persuasion. Well-organized insurgents begin to feat.36 New wave insurgencies in contrast rarely re-
sponsor widespread boycotts, black markets, insidi- quire decisive shootouts. Iranian revolutionaries, for
ous rumor campaigns, demonstrations, strikes, riots, example, toppled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi

172
 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

in January 1979 without engaging his vaunted numbered much more than 2,000 lightly armed
armed forces.37 men, compelled the Cuban Government to capitu-
late in December 1958 after a few Phase II engage-
Outside Support ments.41 The U.S. Civil War opened on April 12,
Insurgencies sometimes succeed without any out- 1861 when Confederate forces fired on the tiny
side assistance, but material and moral support in Federal garrison at Fort Sumter, South Carolina. Un-
the form of military education, training, advice, dergrounds and guerrillas played strategically insig-
PSYOP, logistical gifts, funds, and/or armed forces nificant roles throughout that four-year Phase III
gives rebels a great boost. Patrons, however, must conflict, which terminated on April 9, 1865 when
determine whether pluses outweigh minuses before General Robert E. Lee surrendered to General Ulys-
they decide to contribute. Consider, for example, ses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.42
the Iraqi Liberation Act, which President Clinton
signed on October 31, 1998. It vested him with COUNTERREVOLUTIONS
discretionary authority over $97 million in military Some insurrections produce results that satisfy con-
aid for use by factions that hope to unhorse Iraqi cerned populations. Others prompt counterrevolu-
President Saddam Hussein. The Fiscal Year 1999 tions designed to restore the original government
Defense Appropriations Bill reportedly included and social order or replace them with substitutes
funds with which to shape related public opinion that most citizens consider palatable. Strategies, tac-
in Iraq and neighboring countries; organize, equip, tics, forces, and techniques are indistinguishable
and train a liberation army; then progressively ex- in most respects from those that revolutionaries
pand territories under opposition control.38 Skepti- employ.
cal General Anthony C. Zinni, then Commander in
Chief of U.S. Central Command, told the Senate Soviet Experiences
that arming any of the ninety-one opposition groups Occupants of the Kremlin, long before and during
could be destabilizing. The Turkish Government, the Cold War, rejected rights of national self-
which perennially confronts Kurdish separatists determination. Associated policies, eventually en-
along its borders, agreed.39 Dissenters conversely shrined in the Brezhnev Doctrine, opposed counter-
contend that relatively small U.S. investments could revolutions anywhere in the Socialist sphere and
reap large benefits, because Iraqi countermeasures promised swift retribution for infractions.43 That
would be costly in terms of money, manpower, adjudication justified repressive actions on four
materiel, time, and effort, whether would-be "libera- occasions: three inside the "Soviet Empire," plus
tors" won or lost. one on its periphery.

Offbeat Approaches Successes in Central Europe

National security policy-makers and military strate- The first clash occurred in East Berlin, where anti-
gists should remain aware that not all revolutionaries Communist rioters on June 17, 1953 hurled brick-
mimic Mao's three classical phases. Aung San Suu bats and Molotov cocktails at Soviet tanks before
Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize recipient, advocates troops crushed their brief rebellion.44 Hungarian in-
and practices nonviolent defiance of the brutal mili- surgents surfaced in October 1956, when Premier
tary junta that governs Myanmar (Burma). Phase I Imre Nagy repudiated the Warsaw Pact and pro-
is an overt operation; Phases II and III play no part claimed an independent, neutral nation. Soviet
in her plans.40 Castro's guerrilla bands, which never Armed Forces routed mostly leaderless mobs after

173
MILITARY STRATEGY

internal security agents abducted, then executed, to defeat the Sandinistas in battle became moot after
Nagy and Pal Maleter, his Minister of Defense.45 1984 when Congress, which had been ambivalent
Warsaw Pact troops from the Soviet Union, Poland, from the beginning, forbade "assistance of any kind,
Hungary, and Bulgaria converged on Czechoslovakia either directly or indirectly, to any person or group
in August 1968, deposed Prime Minister Alexander engaging in an insurgency or other act of rebellion
Dubcek, and reestablished a cooperative Commu- against the Government of Nicaragua."49
nist government.46 NATO protested vigorously in The infamous Iran-Contra affair ensued when
each instance, but never threatened to intervene frustrated officials in the U.S. National Security
militarily, because risks of nuclear war seemed unac- Council sought to outflank that congressional in-
ceptable. junction. First, they sold TOW antitank missiles to
Iran at inflated prices, then illegally funneled surplus
Failure in Afghanistan funds to their Contra clients. Cover-up efforts failed
Catastrophic failure followed those three successes and heads rolled when facts surfaced,50 but severe
when Leonid Brezhnev invoked his own doctrine sanctions coupled with Sandinista economic inepti-
on Christmas Eve 1979 after Mujahideen insurgents tude and war costs caused Nicaragua's GNP to dive
in neighboring Afghanistan put Moscow's puppet and inflation to soar. Mediation efforts by a collo-
regime at risk. The ensuing conflict lasted longer quium of Central American nations culminated
than the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany, with internationally supervised elections on Febru-
but "victory" remained elusive despite awesome ary 26, 1990, which counterrevolutionaries won
Soviet military power and merciless tactics. The So- decisively.51
viet rear guard withdrew on February 15, 1989 after
Mikhail Gorbachev concluded that ends and means RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
were badly mismatched.47 Anticolonial sentiments inspired many resistance
movements in the twentieth century. Military occu-
Sandinista Experiences pation motivated most of the remainder (Table 19).
Anastasio Somoza's family rode roughshod over Nic- All possessed popular support. All copied revolu-
aragua and lined their pockets with ill-gotten gains tionary strategies, tactics, and techniques, but no
for forty years until 1978, when the Inter-American operations progressed beyond Phase II, save those
Commission on Human Rights and the United Na- during Mao's struggle to eject Japanese invaders
tions General Assembly censured atrocities they at- (1935-1945) and Ho Chi Minh's efforts to free Indo-
tributed to Anastasio Junior's National Guard. That china from France (1946-1954).52
despot, bereft of politicomilitary support, fled on Resistance movements commonly become
July 17, 1979, one step ahead of left-leaning Sandini- thumb-in-the-eye, knee-in-the-groin, winner-take-all
sta insurgents who launched their final offensive contests that would sicken the Marquis of
from sanctuaries in Costa Rica.48 Queensbury. Compassionless Mau Maus butchered
Foreign policy problems cropped up almost im- neutral and intolerant countrymen along with Brit-
mediately between the anti-Communist Reagan Ad- ish landholders and livestock in Kenya (1952-
ministration and Marxists in Managua, who received 1960).53 One group of Croatian sadists, who sided
arms, equipment, supplies, and advice from Cuba with Hitler's henchmen in Yugoslavia during World
and the Soviet bloc. Whether U.S. military aid might War II, chopped off noses, ears, breasts, and limbs,
have enabled counterrevolutionary Contra guerrillas poured salt into wounds, and buried or burned vic-

174
 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

Table 19
Typical Resistance Movements in the Twentieth Century
Resist Colonial Rule Resist Military Occupations
Europe Europe
Ireland vs. Britain (1916-21) Poland vs. Nazi Germany (1939-44)
Cyprus vs. Britain (1954-58) France vs. Nazi Germany (1940-44)
Norway vs. Nazi Germany (1940-45)
Belgium vs. Nazi Germany (1940-44)
Denmark vs. Nazi Germany (1940-45)
Netherlands vs. Nazi Germany (1940-45)
USSR vs. Nazi Germany (1941-44)
Yugoslavia vs. Nazi Germany (1941-44)
Greece vs. Italy, Nazi Germany (1942-44)
Asia Asia
Philippines vs. United States (1899-1902) China vs. Japan (1934-45)
India vs. Britain (1942-47) Burma vs. Japan (1942-45)
Indochina vs. France (1945-54) Philippines vs. Japan (1942-45)
Indonesia vs. Netherlands (1946-49) Tibet vs. China (1951-60)
Malaya vs. Britain (1948-60)
Middle East Middle East
Israelis vs. Britain (1945-48) Arabs vs. Ottoman Turks (1916-18)
Africa Africa
Southwest Africa vs. Germany (1904-07) Boers vs. Britain (1899-1902)
Morocco vs. Spain (1921-26) Ethiopia vs. Fascist Italy (1937-41)
Kenya vs. Britain (1952-60)
Northern Rhodesia vs. Britain (1953-64)
Algeria vs. France (1954-62)
Congo vs. Belgium (1957-60)
Portuguese Guinea vs. Portugal (1959-74)
Angola vs. Portugal (1961-75)
Mozambique vs. Portugal (1964-75)

tims alive. Ante Pavelic, their leader, once bran- TRADITIONAL WARFARE NEXUS
dished a wicker basket filled with gouged out eye- Insurgents in the midst of traditional wars often act
balls. "You Germans use bullets," his spokesman as "force multipliers" that delay, deceive, disorga-
boasted, "but we use hammers, clubs, ropes, fire, nize, and otherwise disrupt enemy military opera-
and quicklime. It's less expensive."54 tions. Undergrounds and guerrillas not only furnish
Proclivities to compromise are low during such regular armed forces with invaluable intelligence,
high stakes endeavors, as they are during revolution- but make life miserable for adversaries along vulner-
ary wars and counterrevolutions, because resistance able lines of communication and in lightly defended
leaders who waver lose the confidence of people rear areas. 55
whose support they seek to enlist. Outlooks conse-
quently appear pessimistic for statesmen and well- Subversive Activities
meaning mediators whose mission is to craft peace Foreign correspondents with Spanish Nationalist
accords that all belligerents seem likely to honor. General Emilio Mola Vidal in November 1936 asked

175
MILITARY STRATEGY

which of his four converging columns would be in area security requirements before and after that mo-
the vanguard when he captured Madrid. My "Fifth mentous event deprived German frontline divisions
Column," he replied, which was composed of sub- of much needed arms, equipment, supplies, and at
versives, espionage agents, saboteurs, and rabble- least 100,000 men.59
rousers already inside the city. Similar accomplices
infested Bilbao, Cartegena, Gijon, Santander, and
Tight Surface-to-Air Ties
Valencia. Missions in each instance were to infiltrate
OSS Detachment 101, which consisted of a small
policy-making machinery and news media, foment
U.S. nucleus and 10,000 Kachin tribesmen, killed
disaffection, undermine morale, and otherwise as-
more than 5,000 Japanese soldiers and severed en-
sist or obviate traditional military operations against
emy supply lines in northern Burma during World
key cities. Successes contributed significantly to
War II. Linkage with Allied ground forces was nearly
Generalissimo Francisco Franco's victory.56 Fifth
nonexistent, but Detachment 101 fed the Tenth U.S.
Columns subsequently arranged flower-strewn
Air Force with precise information concerning the
welcomes for Hitler's Storm Troopers in the Rhine-
size, location, dispositions, and movement of enemy
land (1936), Austria (1938), and the Sudetenland
troops that aerial observers could not find in dense
(1938).57 Comparable subversion assisted Soviet
jungles. Unique search and rescue capabilities re-
takeovers in several countries between the Baltic
trieved scores of air transport crews that Japanese
and Black Seas shortly after World War II subsided.58
gunners shot down as they flew from India to China
and back again across the Himalayan "Hump."60
Coordinated Combat
Guerrillas and regular armed forces have been com-
plementary on many occasions. Linkages are tight in Intentionally Loose Ties
some instances, intentionally loose in others. Light Lawrence of Arabia operated independently from
touches sometimes accomplish more than heavy 1916 through 1918 along a line that ran from Medina
hands. National security policy-makers and military near the Red Sea to Damascus, partly by choice,
strategists must decide which tack to take. but primarily because his guerrilla war against the
Ottoman Turks "was so odd and far away that coy
Tight Surface-to-Surface Ties Authority left us to ourselves. We had no base ma-
Partisans who jeopardized German lifelines in Euro- chinery, no formal staff, no clerks, no government,
pean Russia during World War II habitually in- no telegraphs, no public opinion, no troops of Brit-
creased operational tempo immediately before and ish nationality." Contact between Lawrence's le-
during Soviet ground combat offensives. Saboteurs gions and General Sir Edmund Allenby's expedition-
on the night of June 19-20, 1944, demolished more ary forces was nil. When peace came, Lawrence's
than 10,000 targets that ran through and around the will-o'-the-wisp Arab guerrillas had killed, wounded,
Pripet Marshes. Main efforts severed all rail lines or worn out about 35,000 Turks; captured an equal
that served the Third Panzer Army, which Marshal number; imposed immense static security burdens
Georgy Zhukov attacked the next day. German Army along the Hejaz Railroad; and occupied 100,000
Group Center, engaged in a titanic struggle with square miles of Turkish territory at minimal cost to
the First, Second, and Third White Russian Fronts, themselves. That "side-show of a side-show," which
collapsed a week later, partly because there was no deliberately avoided armed combat whenever possi-
way to deliver supplies fast enough in sufficient ble, almost won the Middle East war without ma-
quantities to sustain high-pressure combat. Rear- jor battles.61

176
 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

KEY POINTS
Insurgencies demand fundamentally different treatment than traditional warfare
Insurgencies originate most often in societies where flagrant injustices, real or imagined, inflame
the populace and inspire rebellion
Strong rebel leaders normally must focus the energies of emotional masses who are willing to
die for political, ideological, economic, social, religious, ethnic, or cultural causes
Underground cells plan, control, and sustain insurrections from havens inside urban or rural
communities
Guerrillas generally conduct paramilitary raids, ambushes, and sabotage within areas of
operation that they know well
Psychological offensives normally are more important than armed combat
Insurgent strategies often proceed from Phase I (Preparation) through Phase II (Expansion) to
Phase III (Culmination) but, except for Phase I, rebels alter that sequence to suit circumstances
Foreign patrons who furnish material and moral support give rebels a great boost, but must
decide beforehand and periodically review whether benefits outweigh liabilities
Insurgents tend to compromise only when so doing undercuts opponents, fosters favorable
public opinion, otherwise promotes their programs, or deflects defeat
Insurgents who delay, deceive, disorganize, and disrupt enemy operations sometimes augment
traditional military capabilities at crucial times and places

NOTES 6. Sir Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World

1. For a concise review of valuable references, see Rob- Strategy, 1945-1969 (New York: Taplinger Publish-
ert T. Bunker, "Unconventional Warfare Philoso- ing Co., 1970), 16-18, 19-20, 21-22; Robert Taber,
phers," Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 10, no. The War of the Flea (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1965),
3 (Winter 1999), 136-49. 45-46, 57.
2. Edward N. Luttwak, Coup d'Etat (New York: Alfred 7. Comments on a draft of this chapter by U.S. Special
A. Knopf, 1969). Operations Command, September 1999.
3. Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution (New York: 8. Charles B. McDonald, "France (1940-1944)," in Con-
Alfred A. Knopf, 1990). dit, Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Inter-
4. Robert S. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla national Conflicts, vol. 2, 112-50; Blake Erlich, Re-
in History, vol. I and II, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday sistance: France 1940-1945 (Boston: Little,
& Co., 1975); Doris M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et Brown, 1965).
al., eds., Challenge and Response in International 9. Earl Ziemke, "Yugoslavia (1941-1944)," in Condit,
Conflicts (Washington: Center for Research in Social Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna-
Systems, American University), vol. 1, The Experi- tional Conflicts, vol. II, 320-51; Ronald H. Bailey,
ence in Asia (February 1968); vol. II, The Experience Partisans and Guerrillas (New York: Time-Life
in Europe and the Middle East (March 1967); vol. Books, 1978), 74-151.
Ill, The Experience in Africa and Latin America 10. Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New
(April 1968); Supplement, Dominican Republic, York: Harper and Row, 1972), 6-9; Robert Ross
Haiti, Laos (September 1968). Smith, "The Philippines (1946-1954)," in Condit,
5. For passive resistance precepts, see Penderel Moon, Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna-
Gandhi and Modern India (New York: Norton, tional Conflicts, 474-507.
1969); Martin Luther King, Jr., Why We Can't Wait 11. John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary
(New York: Harper & Row, 1963), especially Chapter War," in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machia-
5, "Letter From Birmingham Jail." velli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton,

177
MILITARY STRATEGY

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 815-62; Mao, On Protracted War, 2d ed. (Beijing: Foreign
Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, Languages Press, I960) and On Guerrilla Warfare,
1945-1969, 4, 5-6, 25. trans, and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith
12. Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: (New York: Praeger, 1961).
Princeton University Press, 1970); Eric Hofer, The 23. Ho Chi Minn, On Revolution: Selected Writings,
True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass 1920-1966, ed. Bernard Fall (Boulder, CO:
Movements (New York: HarperCollins, reissue Westview Press, 1984); General Vo Nguyen Giap,
1989); Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New People's War, People's Army (New York: Praeger,
York: Grove Press, 1963); Clarence Crane Brinton, 1962).
The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random 24. Roland E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdez, eds., Revo-
House, 1966). lutionary Struggle, 1947-1958: Selected Works of
13. For a recount of actions at Tiananmen Square, see Fidel Castro, vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Update: How the Hard- 1972), especially 155-59, 341-449; Che Guevara,
liners Won," New York Times Magazine, November On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1961).
12, 1989. 25. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guer-
14. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina (1946-1954)" and "South rilla (Vancouver, Canada: Pulp Press, 1974).
Viet-Nam (1956-1963)," in Condit, Cooper, et al., 26. The Organizer's Manual (Boston: O. M. Collective,
Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, vol. undated); Andrew R. Molnar et al., Undergrounds
I, 237-69, 321-75; Asprey, War in the Shadows, in Insurgency, Revolutionary, and Resistance War-
vol. II, 977-1391. fare (Washington: Special Operations Research Of-
15. John Reader, Africa: A Biography of the Continent fice, American University, November 1963); DA Pam-
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998). phlet No. 550-104, Human Factors Considerations
16. Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, of Undergrounds in Insurgencies (Washington:
1945-1969, 6, 8-9; Taber, The War of the Flea, Headquarters, Department of the Army, September
II, 13-14. 1966).
17. Vincent Wilson, Jr., ed., "The Declaration of Indepen- 27. Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, 2d ed. (Lon-
dence," in The Book of Great American Documents, don: Museum Press, 1953), 53-74; Molnar, et al.,
3d ed. (Brookville, MD: American History Research Undergrounds in Insurgency, Revolutionary, and
Associates, 1993), 11-19- Resistance Warfare, 52-54; Human Factors Consid-
18. William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French erations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, 19-28.
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, re- 28. Asprey, War in the Shadows, vol. I, 125-34; Leroy
print 1990). Thompson, Ragged War: The Story of Unconven-
19. T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," Army tional and Counter-revolutionary Warfare (Lon-
Quarterly and Defense Journal, October 1920; re- don: Arms and Armour Press, 1974), 7-14.
printed in Stanley and Rodelle Weintraub, eds., Evo- 29. General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare, trans. A. S.
lution of a Revolt: Early Postwar Writings of T. E. Pallis (New York: Praeger, 1965).
Lawrence (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 30. Franklin M. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare
University, 1968), 100-19. Quotation on 119. (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1967).
20. Karl Marx, Capital, The Communist Manifesto and 31. Guevara, On Guerrilla Warfare, 38.
Other Writings, ed. Max Eastman, with an unpub- 32. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 71-87.
lished essay on Marxism by Lenin (New York: Mod- 33. Mao, On Protracted War, 43-65.
ern Library, 1932), 315-55; Robert C. Tucker, ed., 34. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
The Marx-Engels Reader (New York: Norton, 1978). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66-71.
21. Stefan T. Possony, ed., Lenin Reader (Chicago: H. 35. Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare, 46.
Regnery, 1966), especially 310-498; Vladimir Il'ich 36. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New
Lenin, What Is to Be Done?, trans. S. V. and Patricia York: David McKay, 1969), 77-87.
Utechin, ed. S. V. Utechin (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 37. John T. Stempel, Inside the Iranian Revolution
1963); Dimitrii A. Volkogonov, Trotsky: The Eternal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).
Revolutionary, trans, and ed. Harold Shukman (New 38. H.R. 4655, The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (PL 105-
York: Free Press, 1996). 338), passed by the House of Representatives on
22. Mao Zedong, Chairman Mao Tse-tung on People's October 5,1998, by the Senate on October 20,1998,
War (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967). Also, and signed by President Clinton on October 30,

178
 INSURGENCY STRATEGIES

1998; Kenneth B. Katzman, Iraq's Opposition Move- tian, Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family (New
ments, Rpt. 98-179F (Washington: Congressional Re- York: Random House, 1985), 34-118.
search Service, updated March 2,1999); John Lancas- 49. James P. Seevers, "Key Congressional Actions,"
ter, "U.S. Gives Go-Ahead to Iraqi Opposition," Annex B to John M. Collins, America's Small Wars:
Washington Post, January 14, 2001, Al, A22. Lessonsfor the Future (Washington: Brassey's [U.S.],
39. Vernon Loeb, "General Wary of Plan to Arm Groups 1991), 256-58.
in Iraq" and Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Builds Sup- 50. Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds., The Iran-
port for Ouster of Saddam," Washington Post, Janu- Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (The Na-
ary 29, 1999, A19, A22; Scott Peterson, "Iraqi Dissi- tional Security Archive Document) (New York:
dent Groups Called Part of the Problem," New Press, May 1993).
Washington Times, December 2, 1998, A15. 51. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 191-320,348-79;
40. Aung San Suu Kyi, Freedom from Fear and Other Robert F. Turner, Nicaragua v. United States: A Look
Writings, ed. Michael Aris (New York: Penguin at the Facts (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987).
Books, 1995). For perspectives, see Bertil Lintner, 52. Michael Lindsay, "China (1927-1937)" and "China
Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since (1937-1945)"; Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina (1946-
1948 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994). 1954)," all in Condit, Cooper, et al., Challenge and
41. John Heins, "Cuba (1953-1959)," in Condit, Cooper, Response in International Conflicts, vol. I, 30-68,
et al., Challenge and Response in International 138-77, 238-69.
Conflicts, vol. Ill, 435-61. 53. Robert Ruark, Something of Value, reprint (New
42. Shelby Foote, Civil War: A Narrative, 3 vols. (New York: Buccaneer Books, 1991); Doris M. Condit, "Ke-
York: Random House, 1974). nya (1952-1960)," in Condit, Cooper, et al., Chal-
43. S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the International Obli- lenge and Response in International Conflicts, vol.
gation of Socialist Countries," Pravda, September Ill, 270-311.
26, 1968, 4. Reprinted in The Current Digest of the 54. Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas, 87, 104-13.
Soviet Press, October 16, 1968, 10-12. 55. Russell Miller, The Resistance (New York: Time-Life
44. Stefan Brant, The East German Rising, 17th June Books, 1979).
1953, trans. Charles Wheeler (New York: Praeger, 56. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York:
1957); Wolfgang H. Kraus, "East Germany (June Harper & Brothers, 1961), 317, 446-47, 470, 480,
1953)," in Condit, Cooper, ed. al., Challenge and 591-92, 602.
Response in International Conflicts, vol. II, 458-96. 57. Robert T. Elson, Prelude to War (New York: Time-
45. David Pryce-Jones, The Hungarian Revolution Life Books, 1976), 185-211.
(New York: Horizon Press, 1969); Leonard Bushkoff, 58. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a
"Hungary (October-November 1956)," in Condit, World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963),
Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna- 193-203.
tional Conflicts, vol. II, 530-78. 59. DA Pamphlet 20-240, Rear Area Security in Russia:
46. Harry Schwartz, Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines
for Democracy in Czechoslovakia (New York: (Washington: Department of the Army, July 1951),
Praeger, 1969). 1, 2, 13-35.
47. Joseph J. Collins, The Soviet Invasion of Afghani- 60. Lieutenant General William R. Peers and Dean Brelis,
stan: A Case Study in the Use of Force in Soviet Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's
Foreign Policy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, Most Successful Guerrilla Force (Boston: Little,
1986); David C. Isby, War in a Distant Country, Brown, 1963).
Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance (New York: 61. Weintraub, Evolution of a Revolt, 100-19- See also
Sterling Publishing Co., 1989). T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph
48. Robert A. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition: The (Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing, 1938).
United States and Nicaragua (Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press, 1987), 49-187; Shirley Chris-

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 16. Counterinsurgency Strategies
I know of two types of warfare: mobile warfare and
positional warfare. I never heard of revolutionary war.
General Charles de Gaulle
Quoted by Bernard B. Fall
Street Without Joy

F rench Armed Forces had been actively engaged

against Viet Minh undergrounds and guerrillas
for several years when General de Gaulle chastised a
THE NATURE OF
COUNTERINSURGENCY
Indigenous governments mount counterinsurgency
subordinate with that snide remark in 1950. Widely operations to forestall or defeat insurrections,
shared scorn for revolutionary warfare doctrine was whether rebel motives be anticolonial (nationalists
still in vogue1 when President Rene Coty, Premier vs. Britain in Malaya, 1948-19604); secessionist
Joseph Laniel, Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, (Eritrean separatists vs. Ethiopia, 1961-19935); re-
General Henri Navarre (Commander in Chief, Indo- formist (Iranian radicals vs. Mohammed Reza Shah
china), Major General Rene Cogny (who com- Pahlavi, 1978-19796); reactionary (Taliban funda-
manded French troops in Tonkin), and Colonel mentalists vs. Islamic moderates in Afghanistan,
Christian de Castries (on-site commander) presided 1994-19987); ideological (Viet Cong Communists
over the debacle at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, vs. embryonic democracy in South Vietnam, 1955-
which terminated French suzerainty in Southeast 19758); or some combination thereof. Invaders em-
Asia.2 Algerian freedom fighters won their war for ploy analogous techniques against resistance move-
independence from France (November 1954-March ments (undergrounds vs. Nazi Germans throughout
1962), partly because callous counterinsurgent occupied Europe, 1940-19459).
forces antagonized common people, whose good
will was essential.3 Common Characteristics
Latter-day Chiefs of State and their advisers who There is no one best way to cope with all forms of
fail to appreciate the unique nature of revolutionary insurrection,10 but the foremost requirement should
warfare, counterrevolutions, and resistance move- be to eradicate root causes and thereby reduce in-
ments are apt to make equally expensive mistakes, centives for uprisings to flower. Contributory pro-
because political, economic, social, psychological, grams, based on first-rate intelligence, feature some
and military operations are mutually dependent. Ir- combination of coercion and persuasion designed
resolute or irresponsible policy-makers can prevent to justify national and local governments as the only
or squander military victories, whereas myopic gen- legitimate sources of authority, eradicate under-
erals who ignore the primacy of nonmilitary pro- ground infrastructures, squelch subversion, sepa-
grams make meaningful triumphs impossible. rate insurgents from sources of sustenance, and

181
MILITARY STRATEGY

protect loyal segments of the populace against dep- they become robust, and abide by few rules. Coun-
redations by rebels. termeasures, in contrast, are initially reactive, rela-
tively large-scale, costly endeavors. "Ins" possess
Counterinsurgencies Compared luxurious resources but, unlike "Outs," must protect
with Traditional Conflicts people and property, plus the political, economic,
Counterinsurgencies share few characteristics with and military trappings of national power that in-
traditional warfare, and therefore demand different clude industrial facilities, farmlands, communica-
techniques (Table 20). Body counts on battlefields tion nodes, command posts, logistical installations,
are less important than battles for human hearts and lines of communication, and information repositor-
minds. Brutal tactics that quash the symptoms of ies. Legal, moral, and ethical constraints limit per-
insurrection but leave noxious causes intact may missible courses of action in democratic countries.11
suppress rebellions for long periods, but strategists
who hope to heal national wounds employ armed ANTI-UNDERGROUND STRATEGIES
force primarily as a shield behind which benevolent Insurrections, like cancer, can be countered best if
programs give disaffected people genuine prospects detected and treated early. Enlightened rulers ad-
for liberty, justice, security, and prosperity. Outsid- dress grass-roots causes before malignancies appear.
ers who hope to govern occupied territories peace- Governments that tarry invite subversion and, if cor-
fully pursue comparably benevolent policies. rective strategies fail, guerrilla warfare may flourish.

Counterinsurgencies Compared Tailored Intelligence

with Insurgencies Incipient threats demand integrated political, mili-
Insurgents advocate radical change, whereas coun- tary, economic, social, and psychological counter-
terinsurgents aim to preserve or restore internal measures that capitalize on incumbent credits and
stability. Both seek voluntary support from or, at exploit insurgent liabilities, but radicals on the
worst, passive acceptance by, the populace, be- fringe of respectability are hard to recognize and
cause neither can achieve or retain control indefi- preliminary evidence is subject to assorted interpre-
nitely if most citizens oppose their programs (Table tations. Strategic dilemmas commonly develop,
21). Beyond that, however, respective characteris- because drastic crackdowns could damage the re-
tics are asymmetrical at the onset. gime's reputation, while prolonged leniency could
Will-o'-the-wisp rebels nearly monopolize initia- encourage full-fledged rebellions.
tive during early stages of any insurrection. Small Counterinsurgency operations consequently de-
groups break cover and attack targets where and mand descriptive and predictive intelligence con-
when they choose, seldom defend territory after cerning undergrounds, auxiliaries, and proclivities

Table 20
Counterinsurgencies Compared with Traditional Conflicts
Traditional Conflicts Counterinsurgencies

Initial Threats Obvious Ambiguous

Basic Objectives Military Victory Internal Stability
Decisive Strategies Direct Indirect
Decisive Power Military Sociopolitical
Technological Superiority Telling Trivial
Decisive Action Defeat Enemy Forces Ensure Popular Support
Conflict Duration Variable Protracted

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 COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

Table 21
Counterinsurgencies Compared with Classical Insurgencies
Insurgencies Counterinsurgencies
Interests Radical Change Status Quo
Basic Objectives Replace Authority Preserve Authority
Infrastructrures Relatively Meagre Extensive
Tangible Resources Few Many
Armed Forces
Regular Forces None in Phase I or II Yes
Security Forces None Yes
Police None Yes
Guerrillas Phases II and 111 No
Allied Forces Sometimes Sometimes
Operations Mainly Covert Mainly Overt
Legal, Moral Restraints Few Many*
Terrorism Usually Acceptable Usually Taboo*
Financial Costs Low High
Popular Support Crucial Crucial
*ln democratic countries

of the populace to assist or resist insurgents. Military rules, because due processes and constitutional safe-
and civilian intelligence communities accumulate guards seem excessively restrictive. The British High
insights concerning insurgent hierarchies, strate- Commissioner during anticolonial uprisings in Ma-
gies, tactics, successes, and failures, together with laya, for example, promulgated emergency regula-
reasons therefor. They also amass basic data about tions that vested police with authority to detain
races, creeds, customs, cultures, and other demo- suspects for two years without trial, to search with-
graphic matters that might motivate rebels to defect. out warrants, and banish suspected subversives.
Police, who are familiar with residents and routines, Other nations under siege by insurgents have re-
as a rule are better suited than armed forces to stricted rights of free speech and assembly, banned
compile dossiers on known and suspected dissi- publications, outlawed renegade organizations, and
dents, their domiciles, families, friends, movements, issued scrips or altered currencies to frustrate re-
methods of operation, and current activities. Intelli- bel financiers.13
gence agents most easily insinuate themselves into Agreeable lines between subversion and legiti-
insurgent cells when undergrounds launch large- mate public opposition to governmental policies
scale recruitment programs, because opportunities nevertheless are hard to draw. Law-abiding citizens
to do so diminish thereafter.12 everywhere resent widespread arrests, preventive
detention, mandatory death penalties for rebels who
Velvet Glove Operations bear arms, harsh prison terms for lesser offenses,
Executive, legislative, and judicial operations that and the suspension of habeas corpus. Banned orga-
emphasize finesse instead of force promote public nizations tend to reappear under deceptive banners.
safety and public welfare. Complementary programs Public trials that turn into sounding boards for insur-
in each category feature law enforcement, reforms, gent causes often discredit the State and disillusion
and civic actions. constituents.14

Law Enforcement Realistic Reforms

Nascent insurgencies often tempt the most benevo- Force frequently fails to curb insurrections unless
lent government officials to bend or break legal coupled with reforms. Sandinista outcasts prevailed

183
MILITARY STRATEGY

in Nicaragua, even though President Somoza's elemental causes of insurgencies and rebel leaders
Guardia National and security forces maintained who refuse to abandon their objectives for any rea-
military superiority from start to finish. Ruthless son. Religious fanatics bent on establishing a theo-
French troops clearly outclassed insurgents in Alge- cratic state in Algeria during the late 1990s and illicit
ria, but finally lost that war. Counterinsurgency strat- narcotics cartels that strive to convert Colombia
egies that aim to manage rather than resist positive and Peru into criminal communities are illustrative.17
change offer greater flexibility. Typical reforms re- Reforms moreover usually fail whenever insurgents
apportion political influence, enhance economic can control outcomes. Land redistribution pro-
opportunities, dampen social discontent, control grams, for example, flop if recipients risk torture,
corruption, and terminate uncivilized practices. Suc- death, or both as the penalty for acceptance.
cesses rally loyal factions, convert fence straddlers,
preempt rebel causes, and reduce the insurgents' Civic Actions
reservoir of recruits.18 The fundamental aim of civic actions for counterin-
Reforms indeed shortstopped rampant civil dis- surgency purposes is to improve living conditions
obedience in the United States during the late 1960s of poverty-stricken people. Public works and ag-
and early 1970s, when radicals collectively called ricultural projects take top priority. Civil and mili-
the "New Left" preached revolutionary replacement tary engineers construct houses and schools; build,
of the "Establishment." Students for a Democratic upgrade, and repair roads that lead to and from
Society (SDS), who opposed racial discrimination, markets; install electricity; and dig water wells in
poverty, conscription, and U.S. involvement in the backward regions. Sanitation specialists expand and
Vietnam War, promoted "participatory democracy." modernize waste-disposal facilities to reduce the
Its wild-eyed Weatherman Faction and militant Black incidence of insects and rodents that transmit infec-
Power proponents openly advocated violence. "Off tious diseases. Doctors, nurses, and paramedics pro-
the pigs" (kill police) was one popular slogan. Draft vide medical and dental care where such services
dodgers chanted, "Hell no, we won't go," and pub- previously were inadequate or nonexistent (proper
licly destroyed registration cards. "Burn, baby, burn" instruction drastically reduces mortality among in-
was the rallying cry of rioters who torched Watts fants and their mothers in underdeveloped na-
(a suburb of Los Angeles), downtown Washington, tions).18
D.C., and other cities in 1968. Dissenters provoked Ramon Magsaysay, first as Secretary of National
pitched battles with police during the 1968 Demo- Defense, then as President of the Philippines in the
cratic national convention in Chicago,16 but U.S. 1950s, played civic actions like Artur Rubinstein
national security decision-makers never advocated played grand pianos, as a few of his actions indicate:
cluster bombs or napalm to suppress any of those
uprisings. The reviled "Establishment" instead put • Greedy landlords fleeced impecunious peas-
teeth into civil rights legislation, substituted an All- ants in land courts until Magsaysay directed
Volunteer Force for conscription, cut U.S. casualties military judge advocates to furnish free legal
in an unpopular war, and incrementally exited Viet- assistance
nam. Widespread disturbances soon ceased, be- • Usurers put tenant farmers permanently in
cause the New Left lacked compelling causes and debt until he liberalized rural credit
public support disappeared. • Magsaysay promulgated new laws that au-
Accommodations unfortunately are impossible thorized sharecroppers 70 percent of the
between governments that are willing to tackle the yields they produced

184
 COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

• He resettled landless peasants in Pampanga occupied Europe during World War II. Cold-blooded
Province, an erstwhile stronghold of Hukba- killers executed citizens wholesale in retaliation for
lahap (Huk) Communists sabotage and other subversive acts.21 The most infa-
mous incident occurred in June 1942, when hit
Civic actions, in short, helped turn impending squads killed or incarcerated 10,000 innocents
defeat into victory. Tycoons and ultraconservatives (largely intelligentsia), liquidated the population of
disapproved, but their disparagement did not dim Lidice, and leveled that village after Czech assassins
Magsaysay's popularity with common people slew Reinhard Heydrich, the "Butcher of Prague,"
throughout the Philippines. Huk insurgents, who who was Reichsprotektor of Bohemia and Moravia,
lacked public approval, laid low from 1955 until Deputy Chief of the Gestapo, and commanded the
President Ferdinand Marcos's second term in 1972, Sicherheitsdienst (Security Forces called SD).22
when political corruption, economic crises, crum- Such tactics drastically reduced underground ef-
bling social structures, and human rights abuses fectiveness, but Nazis responsible for criminal mis-
helped them stage a brief comeback.19 conduct paid a high price after Germany surrend-
Benevolence nevertheless has limitations. Civic ered. An International Military Tribunal in 1947
actions in regions under insurgent control seldom sentenced a dozen policy-makers to death by hang-
pay large dividends, because rebels not only reap ing and handed harsh prison sentences to seven
related benefits but try to take credit. Program man- more (Heinrich Himmler committed suicide to avoid
agers moreover must make sure that left hands know indictment; Hermann Goring killed himself hours
what right hands are doing. Economists in South before his scheduled execution). Subsequent trials
Vietnam, for example, established price controls on severely punished many subordinates.23
pork to guard against the ravages of inflation, but
set ceilings so low that producers refused to market Argentine Atrocities
their products.20 Argentina's military junta dissolved parliament, im-
posed martial law, ruled by decree, and viciously
Iron Fist Operations suppressed political opponents among their own
Iron fists complement velvet gloves nicely against people during a "dirty war" that lasted from 1977
undergrounds and auxiliaries, provided prac- to 1983. Ultraconservatives, convinced that savage
titioners avoid excessive force and obey laws of the measures were required to excise a "Communist
land. Governments that punish groups instead of conspiracy," spirited several thousand alleged left-
individuals, treat captives cruelly, or otherwise ists (including Catholic clergy) into secret prisons
abuse civil rights may subdue insurgencies for long from which few emerged alive. Torture and other
periods, but simultaneously tarnish images they atrocities were commonplace. Perpetrators mur-
hope to brighten at home and abroad. Strategies dered "subversive" mothers immediately after they
that Nazi Germany, Argentina, and the U.S.-led coali- gave birth, then passed newborn babies to ideologi-
tion in Vietnam once employed to repress or eradi- cally reliable parents. Two decades later, affiliates
cate insurgent infrastructures are edifying in such of an organization called "Mothers of the Plaza de
regards. Mayo" still sought countless "desaparecidos," who
had disappeared without a trace.24
Nazi German Reprisals Argentine countersubversion tactics that fea-
Nazi German Gestapo agents and SS troops remorse- tured blunt force did little to endear the junta to
lessly used reprisals to rein in resistance throughout its constituents. Atrocities, coupled with a chaotic

185
MILITARY STRATEGY

economy (inflation exceeded 900 percent), caused turing, or eliminating the Viet Cong Infrastructure
that group to collapse soon after it instigated and [VCI]."28
lost a disastrous war with Britain over the barren Phoenix accomplished its mission. Statistical
Falkland/Malvinas Islands.25 The Argentine Commis- data are subject to dispute, but by 1972 several
sion on Human Rights accused ring leaders of crimi- thousand members of the VCI who once controlled
nal acts and Raul Alfonsin, who won the 1983 presi- hamlets, villages, and interconnecting routes
dential election, convened courts that sentenced throughout South Vietnam had defected, fled, been
them to long prison terms for multiple murders, captured, or were killed. The People's Revolution-
abductions, and assorted barbarisms. Pardons for ary Party probably lost fifteen members for every
many in 1990 excluded former Army Chief of Staff new recruit. Occasional atrocities, such as those
Major General Carlos Suarez-Mason, dubbed "El Se- that characterized operations in Nazi-occupied Eu-
nor de Vida y Muerte" (the Lord of Life and Death), rope and junta-ruled Argentina, unquestionably oc-
because Alfonsin believed that premature release curred, but none reflected official policies. One CIA
would set "a very bad precedent" favoring "those participant explained lapses this way: "It gets pretty
who would try to install authoritarian regimes in damn intense. Sometimes we made mistakes, we
Argentina."26 went in the wrong direction, we screwed up, but
there was no evil intent." Congressional hearings in
U.S. Phoenix Program 1971 seemed to confirm his contention, despite lu-
President Ngo Dinh Diem's secret police (Cong An) rid testimony to the contrary.29
virtually eradicated the Communist Party in newly
created South Vietnam following the 1954 cease- COUNTERGUERRILLA STRATEGIES
fire, but that truncated shadow government re- Counterinsurgency strategists must engage enemy
gained strength after his assassination in 1963. Un- undergrounds, auxiliaries, and guerrillas concur-
derground organizations by mid-decade probably rently if insurgents gain enough strength to mount
counted 80,000-150,000 full- and part-time mem- locally or nationally significant paramilitary opera-
bers who variously engaged in political agitation, tions. Flexible concepts are advisable, because each
propagandized, collected intelligence, established requirement is unique.
covert communication networks, developed logisti-
cal complexes, extorted taxes, executed uncoopera- Optional Approaches
tive local leaders, and unleashed terrorist attacks Offensive military operations aim to close with and
designed to discredit the Government of South Viet- defeat guerrilla formations. Defensive operations
nam (GVN).27 President Nguyen Van Thieu in July seek to safeguard civilian communities within se-
1968 therefore officially welcomed the U.S. Phoenix lected territories. Strategies that borrow bits from
program, which was to advise, support, and assist both approaches may favor the first, the second, or
Pbuong Hoang, its GVN counterpart. Specific indi- neither, but all opt to seal off external support so
viduals, such as Communist Party officials and key that foreign sympathizers cannot substantially rein-
cadre, constituted top priority targets. The Phoenix force guerrilla capabilities with arms, equipment,
charter explicitly prohibited "assassinations or other supplies, and funds.
violations of the rules of land warfare," but regular
army units, paramilitary formations, and police were Search and Destroy
"entitled to use such reasonable military force as Search and destroy strategies directed against insur-
[was] necessary to obtain the goals of rallying, cap- gent armed forces strive to gain, retain, or regain

186
 COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

initiative, deny opponents freedom of action, com- (1952-1960), because search and destroy sweeps
pel them to react rather than act, and separate guer- were hopeless against guerrillas in jungle hideouts
rillas from sources of sustenance. Success, however, that bordered contested areas (it cost the equivalent
is by no means assured, because irregulars who play of $28,000 to kill one insurgent in 1955, of whom
hide and seek are difficult to find, fix, and fight to something like 5,000 remained at large). Actions
the finish. to restore stability in Nairobi, the capital city, and
General William C. Westmoreland mounted mas- throughout white-held highlands came first, fol-
sive search and destroy missions against Viet Cong lowed by steps to reconstitute governmental control
guerrillas and North Vietnamese infiltrators in South over Kikuyu tribal reserves, which were analogous
Vietnam, beginning with Operation Starlight in Au- to nineteenth-century American Indian reservations.
gust 1965, when U.S. Marines decimated the 2d Viet Military mop-ups ceased in November 1956, after
Cong Regiment near Chu Lai. Soon thereafter, he which indigenous police assumed full responsibility
directed the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division "to for internal security.31
seek and destroy the enemy force in Pleiku Prov-
ince." Close combat that pitted one U.S. brigade Hold and Harass
against three North Vietnamese regiments in the la Strategies that overemphasize search and destroy
Drang Valley ensued in mid-November.30 Sweeps on operations leave key areas uncovered while counter-
grander scales continued but, despite meticulous insurgents chase elusive foes. Strategies that rely
plans, the percentage that ran guerrillas to ground excessively on clear and hold operations allow guer-
was small compared with efforts expended. Such rillas to gain strength undisturbed, then strike where
expeditions often wearied airmobile troops to no and when least expected. Hold and harass concepts,
avail, while enemy foot soldiers familiar with escape which borrow from both, call for implementing
routes eluded cordons, led counterinsurgents on forces to seize, secure, and expand key areas, yet
wild goose chases, then reoccupied abandoned po- badger opponents often enough to keep them off
sitions as soon as pursuers departed. balance.

Clear and Hold Separate Guerrillas from Outside

Clear and hold strategies, which orient on friendly Support
population and production centers instead of enemy Guerrillas who receive extensive outside assistance
armed forces, aim to "sanitize" the most important may prosper, whereas otherwise they would perish.
sectors first, then expand like oil slicks until they Counterinsurgent strategists accordingly endeavor
control all key areas. Counterinsurgents do battle to isolate them from the outside world to the great-
where they choose, under conditions most favor- est extent possible, but few find it easy to do so.
able to themselves. Successes isolate guerrillas from Strong border guards are essential along lengthy
indigenous supporters and create secure environ- frontiers, unless topographic features limit access
ments within which governments can promote po- to a few points inland and along coasts. Politically
litical, economic, and social programs designed touchy problems arise whenever powerful nations
to strengthen ties with neutrals and disaffected nourish insurgencies or guerrillas establish sanctuar-
citizens. ies inside neighboring countries.
Successive commanders in chief of Britain's East Remote and insular locations are easiest to iso-
Africa Command relied mainly on clear and hold late. Chinese Communists, hidden from most for-
operations during Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya eign news media and buttressed behind the Himala-

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MILITARY STRATEGY

yan wall, decimated rebels in Tibet (1956-1960) prevail only if force ratios favor them by at least 10-
while frustrated Free World leaders wrung their to-1, because they must defend crucial urban cen-
hands.32 Insurgents who unsuccessfully sought to ters, industrial infrastructures, essential lines of com-
unseat Indonesian President Sukarno and oust the munication, and vulnerable bases. Experience, how-
Communist Party from that archipelago in 1958- ever, proves that great quantitative superiority is not
1961 received little foreign aid.33 It is infinitely more universally required. Seasoned military strategists
difficult to seal off outside support when battle- consequently view such contentions warily until net
grounds abut sympathetic neighbors. Massive U.S. assessors compare qualitative strengths and weak-
and allied efforts, for example, failed to stop North nesses on both sides. Relevant factors include topog-
Vietnam from furnishing Viet Cong insurgents with raphy, climate, vegetative cover, the number and
wholesale supplies and reinforcements.34 location of core areas, firepower, mobility, commu-
nications, training, morale, and leadership.
Primacy of Land Power
Counterguerrilla operations rely mainly on land Ratios in Yugoslavia (1941-1944)
power. Naval spheres of influence during such con- Force ratios in Yugoslavia from summer 1941 until
flicts seldom extend far from coastal and inland wa- autumn 1944 never favored Axis invaders by much
terways. Fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters rou- more than 2-to-l (perhaps 450,000 vs. fewer than
tinely insert, redeploy, and extract ground forces, 200,000 guerrillas). Italian divisions disposed along
supply isolated outposts, conduct psychological op- the Dalmatian coast from Slovenia to Albania were
erations, and augment the firepower of units in close spiritless, while German divisions were under-
contact, but scarce, fleeting targets dilute other strength and poorly equipped. Most of their officers
doctrinal applications. Counterinsurgents generally and NCOs were middle-aged, few had seen combat
achieve air superiority by default, because rebels since 1918, and counterinsurgency training was nil.
rarely possess many aircraft. The absence of guerrilla Nevertheless, they crushed all opposition in 1943,
"heartlands" and industrial installations greatly re- partly because Communist partisans under Josip
duces benefits obtainable from strategic bombing. Broz Tito and monarchist Chetniks under Colonel
Interdiction missions also pay smaller than average Draza Mihailovic wasted energy fighting each other.
dividends, because vulnerable observers find it dif- Impoverished guerrilla bands that thereafter lived
ficult to distinguish "good guys" from guerrillas, hand-to-mouth gained strength only after Italy capit-
even if they fly low and slow (under 1,500 feet at ulated on September 9, 1943, withdrew its nineteen
no more than 125 knots).35 divisions, and allowed insurgents to seize huge
stocks of arms and supplies. A few additional
Requisite Force Ratios Wehrmacht divisions even so plugged the gap until
Counterguerrilla force requirements are difficult to October 1944, when Soviet Armed Forces overran
calculate, because the resilience of rebel bands and Belgrade and threatened to sever German escape
their abilities to replenish combat losses may vary routes.36
radically within any given country or area of respon-
sibility. Body counts (which commonly include non- Ratios in Indochina (1946-1954)
combatants) and numbers of captured weapons sel- Force ratio requirements are by no means one-sided.
dom make credible progress indicators for similar Tenacious guerrillas may win by not losing, but they
reasons. generally need great quantitative superiority to
Some theorists claim that counterinsurgents can achieve military victory against otherwise well-

188
 COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

matched opponents. French Union Forces, for ex- an antiquated legal code and boosted the school
ample, were only slightly more numerous than Viet population from 16,000 to 100,000 between 1917
Minh guerrillas in Indochina from 1946 through May and 1920, while halving costs. Similar civic actions
1954 (basically 1-on-l), according to Bernard Fall, helped suppress insurgencies in the Dominican Re-
a keen student of that conflict. "The real surprise," public.38 Wisecracking U.S. Army soldiers in Viet-
he observed, "was not that the French were de- nam, who fifty years later quipped, "Grab 'em by
feated, but that it took eight years for [that] to hap- the balls, their hearts and minds will follow," had
pen."37 Wrong. That war might have lasted many to relearn the hard way that lasting gains demand
more years if French "crapshooters" hadn't bet a politico-military collaboration.39
bundle on one cosmic roll of the dice and thrown
snake eyes at Dien Bien Phu.
Politico-Military Team Play
Governmental organizations that participate in paci-
PACIFICATION PROGRAMS fication include foreign equivalents of most U.S.
Pacification programs implement policies and prac-
Cabinet-level departments. Economic ministries
tices that are responsive to, and involve participa-
fight inflation and encourage private enterprise. Ag-
tion by, a majority of the people in any nation that
ricultural ministries promote crop improvement and
insurgents infest. Successes, which ensure the legiti-
animal husbandry programs. Ministries of education
macy of national and grass-roots governments, si-
endeavor to reduce illiteracy, broaden intellectual
multaneously discredit insurgents and brand them
perspectives, and otherwise develop well-informed
as criminals unworthy of support.
electorates. Military forces and civilians share most
other public welfare responsibilities, of which the
Principles in Practice following are representative:
Coercive practices may deter or crush rebellions,
but democratic governments generally favor strate-
gies that mingle force with finesse. Armed services, • Military and civilian intelligence communi-
paramilitary formations, and police conduct tacti- ties track enemy policies, plans, programs,
cally offensive albeit strategically defensive opera- force postures, operations, and key indi-
tions against undergrounds and guerrillas. Strategi- viduals
cally offensive pacification programs aim to • Military and civilian counterintelligence com-
eliminate root causes of insurgency and thereby re- munities seek to foil subversives, saboteurs,
store governmental authority at national, regional, and espionage agents
and local levels. • Military and civilian PSYOP specialists seek
Members of the United States Marine Corps, who to influence the behavior of friendly, enemy,
implicitly understood those demands, covered and neutral audiences at home and abroad
themselves with glory battling guerrillas in the Carib- • Military and civilian personnel receive, con-
bean between 1915 and 1934. Long-term stability, trol, tend, and resettle refugees, while oth-
however, would have been elusive without comple- ers try to rehabilitate defectors
mentary pacification programs that received little • Military and civilian construction teams
publicity. Gyrenes in Haiti, for example, established build, rebuild, repair, and maintain urban
a gendarmerie and augmented meager infrastructure and rural infrastructure
with much-needed roads, sanitation facilities, hospi- • Military and civilian medics practice preven-
tals, and telecommunication links. They also revised tive and curative medicine, particularly in re-

189
MILITARY STRATEGY

gions that otherwise would lack proper Attainable goals, actions that permanently deprive
health support insurgents of voluntary public support, and reforms
designed to prevent the resurrection of rebel causes
Consolidation and Coordination are prescriptions for success. The side that wins the
Armed force and pacification programs are parts people eventually wins the war.
of one package that can be fully effective only if Classical insurgents generally "negotiate" only to
overseers point all participants in the same direction publicize victories, avoid debacles, or open promis-
at the same time to avoid wasteful duplication and ing psychological fronts. Counterinsurgent strate-
avoidable gaps. No amount of money can compen- gists seated at conference tables consequently serve
sate for serious institutional imperfections, as U.S. their country best when they scrutinize insurgent
strategists discovered in Vietnam, where poorly agendas carefully and remain aware that seemingly
coordinated activities floundered for several years innocuous concessions could uncover vital inter-
with everyone and no one in overall charge short ests. Patience is imperative, because overly ambi-
of President Lyndon B. Johnson.40 tious projects and false expectations of early victory
undermine confidence and the will to persist,
PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SUCCESS whereas beleaguered governments prepared for
Insurgencies are primarily political, social, and psy- protracted war are better able to tolerate temporary
chological operations in which military power plays reversals and may triumph more rapidly than lead-
tactically offensive but strategically defensive roles. ers anticipate.41

KEY POINTS
There is no one best way to defeat all forms of insurrection, but experienced counterinsurgent
strategists consistently attack causes as well as symptoms
Governments that abuse civil rights may suppress insurgencies for long periods, but they
simultaneously strengthen rather than weaken rebel causes
Combat operations and pacification are inseparable parts of one package
Actions to eradicate insurgent undergrounds demand timely, detailed intelligence concerning
key individuals and their current activities
Counterguerrilla strategies that combine search and destroy with clear and hold operations
generally are superior to those that overemphasize either polarized approach
Counterinsurgents strive to separate guerrillas from their power base in the populace and from
foreign sources of support
Civic actions and reforms often encourage loyal factions to rally, convert fence straddlers, and
cause insurgents to defect, but rarely thrive in areas that rebels control
Factors that influence military force levels needed to defeat insurgencies include geographic
environments, weapons, equipment, training, morale, and leadership
Savvy counterinsurgents negotiate warily, because rebels who agree to parley normally have
ulterior motives and seldom compromise
Patience is imperative, because counterinsurgency is a protracted process; disappointments
await participants who expect early gratification

190
 COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES

NOTES 14. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and

1. Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Practice, 65-66.
Indochina, 1946-1963, 3d rev. ed. (Harrisburg, PA: 15. Roger Darling," Analyzing Counterinsurgency, "Mili-
Stackpole, 1963), 352-53- tary Review, June 1974, 54-55, 58-59.
2. Bernard B. Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (Philadel- 16. Massimo Teodori, ed., The New Left: A Documentary
phia, PA: Lippincott, 1966). (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); The Politics of Pro-
3. Alistair Home, A Savage Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 test, A Report Submitted by Jerome H. Skolnick, Di-
(New York: Viking, 1978). rector, Task Force on Demonstrations, Protests, and
4. Donald MacKay, The Malayan Emergency, 1948- Group Violence, to the National Commission on the
60: The Domino That Stood (Washington: Brass- Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington: U.S.
ey's, 1997). Government Printing Office, 1969); Price M. Cobbs
5. Dan Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the and William H. Grier, Black Rage (New York: Basic
Eritrean Revolution (New York: Red Sea Press, Books, 1968); Milroad I. Popov, "The American Ex-
1997); Roy Patman, Even the Stones Are Burning treme Left: A Decade of Conflict," Conflict Studies,
(New York: Red Sea Press, 1998). no. 29 (December 1972), 1-19.
6. James A. Bill, The Shah, the Ayatollah, and the 17. Joshua Sinai, "A Conflict Resolution-Based Counterin-
United States (New York: Foreign Policy Associa- surgency Strategy for Resolving Protracted Rebel-
tion, 1988). lions," SO/LIC News, National Defense Industrial As-
7. For insights concerning the Taliban, see Kenneth sociation, vol. 8, no. 2 (December 1998), 4.
B. Katzman, Afghanistan: Current Issues and U.S. 18. Molnar, Human Factors Considerations of Under-
Policy Concerns, Rpt. 98-106F (Washington: Con- grounds in Insurgencies, 269-76; Michael J.
gressional Research Service, April 13, 1999). Wagner, Hershey Bar Diplomacy: The Employment
8. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and of Military Forces in Humanitarian Operations, 3d
Techniques of the National Liberation Front of ed. (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, 1994).
South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966) 19. Robert Ross Smith, "The Philippines (1946-1954),"
and War, Peace, and the Viet Cong (MIT Press, in Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., et al., eds.,
1969). Challenge and Response in International Conflicts,
9. Russell Miller, The Resistance (New York: Time-Life vol. I, The Experience in Asia (Washington: Center
Books, 1979). for Research in Social Systems, American University,
10. Mark Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The February 1968), 476-78,494-95,496,501-2; Edward
CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong Geary Lansdale, In the Midst of Wars (New York:
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), Chap- Harper and Row, 1972), 47-49, 75-76; David Joel
ter 27, "Theories of Revolutionary Warfare"; Roger Steinberg, The Philippines: A Singular and Plural
Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View ofCoun- Place (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 99-130.
terinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964); Noel Bar- 20. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 74-79-
ber, The War of the Running Dogs: The Malayan 21. For graphic evidence, see Miller, The Resistance,
Emergency, 1948-1960 (New York: Weybright and 114-25; Ronald H. Bailey, Partisans and Guerrillas
Talley, 1972). (New York: Time-Life Books, 1978), 104-13.
11. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory 22. Callum MacDonald, The Kitting of Reinhard Hey-
and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), 5-16; Rob- drich: The SS "Butcher of Prague" (New York: Da
ert Taber, The War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Capo Press, 1998).
Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: Lyle Stu- 23. Robert H. Jackson, The Case Against the Nazi War
art, 1965), 18-21. Criminals (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1946) and The
12. Andrew R. Molnar discusses intelligence require- Nilrnberg Case (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947).
ments in DA Pamphlet 550-104; Human Factors 24. Donald C. Hodges, Argentina's "Dirty War": An In-
Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies tellectual Biography (Austin: University of Texas
(Washington: Special Operations Research Office, Press, 1991); Amaranta Wright, "Children of a Dirty
American University; U.S. Government Printing Of- War: Argentina Struggles With the Legacy of a Horri-
fice, September 1966), 233-51. ble Crime," U.S. News & World Report, December
13. Ibid., 261; The Emergency Regulation Ordinance, 7, 1998, 34-36.
1948, With Amendments Made Up to 31 March 25. Douglas Kinney, National Interest, National Honor:
1953 (Kuala Lumpur: Federation of Malaya; Govern- The Diplomacy of the Falklands Crisis (New York:
ment Press, 1953), 3-11. Praeger, 1989).

191
MILITARY STRATEGY

26. Cynthia Gorney, "Argentine Atrocities Described," 33- Genevieve Collins Linebarger, "Indonesia (1958-
Washington Post, March 29,1988, A14; "Argentina," 1961)," in Condit, Cooper, et al., Challenge and
Collier's Yearbook, 1987, 1988, 1989. Response in International Conflict, vol. I, 402-38.
27. Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 3-55; Dale 34. John Prados, The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh
Andrade, Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and Trail and the Vietnam War (New York: John Wiley
the Vietnam War (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, & Sons, 1999).
1990), 1-13. 35. Dennis M. Drew, "U.S. Airpower Theory and the
28. Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 59-146; Wil- Insurgent Challenge: A Short Journey to Confusion,"
liam Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Journal of Military History, October 1998, 809-32.
Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen Year 36. Earl Ziemke, "Yugoslavia (1941-1944)," in Condit,
Involvement in Vietnam (New York: Contemporary Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna-
Books, 1989), 244-51, 280-81. tional Conflicts, vol. II, The Experience in Europe
29. Colby with McCargar, Lost Victory, 330-34; Moyer, and the Middle East, 320-51; DA Pamphlet 20-243,
Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, 235-78, quotation German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans
on 365; U.S. Assistance Programs in Vietnam, 22d (1941-1944) (Washington: Department of the
Report, together with Separate and Additional Views, Army, August 1954), 17, 20-27, 36-38, 44-45, 50-
U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government 52, 64-69.
Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 37. Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina (1946-1954)," in Condit,
Office, 1972). Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna-
30. Admiral U. S. G. Sharp and General William C. West- tional Conflicts, vol. I, 238-69, quotation on 265.
moreland, Report on the War in Vietnam: As of 30 38. Rayford W. Logan, "Haiti (1918-1920)" and Siegfried
June 1968, Section II, Report on Operations in Garbuny, "Dominican Republic (1916-1924)," both
South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968 (Wash- in Condit, Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), in International Conflict, Supplement (September
109-10; Lieutenant General Harold G. Moore and 1968), 2-57; Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dol-
Joseph L. Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once... and lar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921
Young: la Drang—The Battle That Changed the (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964),
War in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1992). 269-387.
31. Doris M. Condit, "Kenya (1952-1960)," in Condit, 39. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New
Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Interna- York: David McKay, 1969), 145-61.
tional Conflict, vol. Ill, The Experience in Africa and 40. Richard A. Hunt, Pacification: The American Strug-
Latin America, 270-311; Fred Majdalany, State of gle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds (Boulder, CO:
Emergency: The Full Story of Mau Mau (Boston: Westview Press, 1995); Thomas W. Scoville, Reor-
Houghton Mifflin, 1963). ganizing for Pacification Support (Washington:
32. William C. Johnstone, "Tibet (1951-1960)," in Con- Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1982); Robert
dit, Cooper, et al., Challenge and Response in Inter- Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reac-
national Conflict, vol. I, 536-57; John Kenneth tion in Southeast Asia, rev. ed. (HarperColophon
Knaus, Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Books, 1970), 451-53.
Tibetan Struggle for Survival (New York: Public 41. Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam, 77-87, 176-78;
Affairs, 1999). Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 77-78.

192
 17. Sociopolitical Terrorism
Al ain't selliri excuses. . .
Al's sellin' whiskey.
Attributed to Frank Nitti
Al Capone's "Enforcer"

S carface Al Capone, like fictional Godfather Vito

Corleone, made customers an offer they couldn't
refuse when he promised broken bones, bombs in
Ronald Reagan in March 1981, because his rampage
purposely put only one senior U.S. official in peril
(wild shots wounded three others).3 Osama bin
miscreant cabarets, and sudden death to repeat of- Laden clearly qualified after he declared a Jihad
fenders who refused to buy his bootleg booze. Fear- (Holy War) against the United States in February
ful retailers far beyond Al's headquarters in Cicero, 1998.4 Malicious assaults on a few isolated schools,
Illinois became true believers as soon as his goon churches, or synagogues constitute common crime,
squads began to gun down defiant entrepreneurs whereas methodical attempts to outlaw abortion,
and destroy their property. recast educational systems, or combat religious be-
Sociopolitical terrorists, who murder, maim, and liefs using identical tactics constitute sociopoliti-
demolish indiscriminately rather than selectively, cal terrorism.5
make Capone seem kindly by comparison. Their Domestic terrorism originates within and is di-
purpose is to inspire such widespread fear and con- rected against one country or bloc. Hitler's Gestapo
fusion within afflicted countries that national lead- discouraged dissent in Germany and in occupied
ers must make a no-win decision: capitulate or lose territories. "Papa Doc" Duvalier'sTonTonMacoutes
popular support. Increasingly sophisticated weap- kept the lid on dissidents inside Haiti. The KGB and
ons, a profusion of lucrative targets, and innovative its predecessors performed similar functions inside
tactics greatly enhance the capabilities of each suc- the Soviet Union and its satellite states.6 Transna-
cessive generation.1 tional terrorists, in contrast, strike without warning
anywhere in the world, then return to distant sanctu-
THE NATURE OF aries. Air transportation makes freewheeling attacks
SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM particularly attractive. All terrorists commonly ex-
Louis de Saint-Just, a Jacobin who lopped off many ploit mass news media (especially television) to en-
heads during the French Revolution before a guillo- sure that the widest possible audience receives the
tine decapitated him in turn, firmly believed that full psychological impact of their sociopolitical mes-
"Violence in itself is neither rational nor lawful, but sages almost instantaneously.
there's no better way of making people respect
reason and law."2 Not all violence, however, in- ATYPICAL TERRORISTS
volves terrorism, and not all terrorists employ pub- Typical terrorists don't exist, because hereditary
lic, impersonal, repetitive violence to accelerate so- characteristics, personalities, occupations, life-
ciopolitical change. John W. Hinckley, Jr. was not styles, motivations, and methods vary remarkably.
a terrorist when he tried to assassinate President Pragmatists mingle with madmen, idealists with

193
MILITARY STRATEGY

mercenaries, true believers with opportunists.7 Bra- that range from simple to complex, depending on
zilian firebrand Carlos Marighella, in Minimanual personnel strengths and operational requirements.
of the Urban Guerrilla, his textbook on terrorism, It generally is hard to join, because paranoid mem-
prized offensive spirit, initiative, stamina, and capac- bers recruit selectively, are exceedingly suspicious
ities to dissemble. He also lauded individuals who of outsiders, and use stringent tests to weed out
are amoral, adventurous, action-oriented, brave, weaklings along with phonies; some groups, for
cool, clever, creative, idealistic, imaginative, patient, example, order aspirants to commit a random mur-
and patriotic in some sense.8 der. Disengagement is even more difficult for those
Terrorists generally believe that cherished ends who decide to quit, since death is the usual sentence
justify any feasible means. Attacks on innocent men, for defectors.12
women, and children make sense when seen in that
light, because intimidated populations tend toward TERRORIST TOOLS
capitulation if security forces cannot protect them. Nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological
Terrorists who sound tocsins before they assault weapons would give sociopolitical terrorists great
seldom weep if officials disbelieve or disobey their powers13 but, at the turn of the twenty-first century,
warnings. Zionist Menachem Begin, who led Irgun most groups still favor rugged, reliable implements
guerrillas against British rule in Palestine, for exam- that cell members can employ adroitly with mini-
ple, told British officials on July 22, 1946 that his mum training. Exotic tools analogous to those that
organization was about to blow up the King David fictional James Bond featured in his capacity as
Hotel in Jerusalem, then disclaimed responsibility Agent 007 are rare exceptions.
for 136 dead and wounded because they disregarded
his heads up (Begin later served as Israeli Prime Preferred Weapons
Minister, 1977-1983).9 Stocks in trade include small arms and automatic
"Personnel officers" who recruit terrorists as a weapons with silencers. "Snooperscopes" simplify
rule avoid mentally unstable, impulsive individuals night sniping. Explosives range from relatively prim-
whose motives are personal rather than sociopoliti- itive to sophisticated devices equipped with minia-
cal and whose actions are uncontrollable. Many ide- ture, remote, delayed detonators. Some cells possess
alists, however, welcome martyrdom for spiritual small, self-contained, highly destructive, easily con-
or religious reasons.10 Kozo Okamoto, a fanatical cealed antiaircraft missiles. Mobility means include
member of the Japanese Red Army QRA) group that long- and short-haul public transportation systems
killed twenty-eight and injured sixty-seven more at as well as privately owned automobiles, aircraft, and
Lod Airport near Tel Aviv in May 1973, displayed a motorboats.14
death wish before and after he made this romantic Technologists provide constant improvements.
statement during his trial: "When I was a child, I Assault rifles and automatic pistols currently accom-
was told that when people died they became stars. modate armor-piercing ammunition that can pene-
. . . We three Red Army soldiers wanted to become trate protective vests and lightly armored limou-
Orion when we died. . . . As the revolution goes sines. "Gas guns" project incapacitating or lethal
on, how the stars will multiply!"11 aerosols. Terrorists can camouflage plastic explo-
sives such as Semtex into seemingly benign objects,
TYPICAL TERRORIST such as suitcases and children's toys. Water-based
ORGANIZATIONS slurry and emulsion explosives defy vapor pressure
Terrorist organizations, like insurgent undergrounds detectors. Search and disposal problems multiply
that Chapter 15 describes, favor cellular structures when terrorists use four or five switches in different

194
 SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM

combinations to trigger any given device. Booby the equivalent of "several Chernobyls" in Europe if
traps, for example, may respond to tilt, tremble, sufficiently provoked.18
pressure, or release. Barometric, acoustic, and light- Sociopolitical terrorists, whose specialties are
sensitive charges may detonate on command.15 "propaganda by deed" and "theater in the round"
"How To" books make it easy for terrorists to on grandiose scales, "want a lot of people watching,
improve commercial armaments and concoct muni- not a lot of people dead," according to one re-
tions, as a quick scan of any Delta Press catalogue spected school of thought. Their leaders surely must
indicates. The Anarchist Cookbook, in its twenty- understand that even a well-handled nuclear hoax
ninth printing since 1971, contains well-illustrated could pay huge propaganda dividends if it spread
chapters that cover various weapons, explosives, panic among senior officials as well as ostensibly
and electronics for anyone who wants to build si- imperiled populations, but self-restraint thus far has
lencers for submachine guns or make cacodyl, a prevailed for reasons that remain obscure.19 There
virulent amalgam of arsenic and methyl for use in nevertheless is scant cause for complacency, be-
Molotov cocktails. Other titillating titles promise cause racial, ethnic, religious, tribal, and ideological
greater breadth and depth: Improvised Munitions fantatics who commit mass murders without com-
Handbooks (three volumes); Assorted Nasties; and punction fuel trends toward increased violence.20
OSS/CIA Assassination Device: Plansfor a .22 Cali- President Bill Clinton in his annual address to the
ber Cigarette Lighter.16 Computer users need not United Nations General Assembly on September 21,
visit a library, because the Internet is a wide-open 1999, indeed deplored "hot-blooded hatreds and
textbook. stone-cold hearts" which, "—when married to ad-
vanced weaponry and terrorism—threaten to de-
Nuclear Weapons stroy the greatest potential for human development
Unscrupulous state sponsors who share terrorist in history, even as they make a wasteland of the
aims are potential sources of easily concealed, porta- soul."21
ble nuclear weapons, but increasingly attractive al-
ternatives exist. Unclassified documents outline ba- Biological Weapons
sic technologies. Porous controls, black markets, The list of biological warfare (BW) agents is long
and impecunious possessors of essential expertise (see Table 16, page 146), but degrees of lethality,
in several countries open additional opportunities transmission problems, logistical difficulties, anti-
for terrorists to buy, steal, or otherwise acquire fis- dotes, and treatments limit the number of mass-
sile materials, finished components, and know-how casualty producers that terrorists might employ suc-
with which to fashion crude nuclear weapons. Even cessfully. Relatively few people, for example, would
low-grade radiological materials, such as cobalt-60, be afflicted if terrorists laced food with lethal salmo-
strontium-90, and cesium-137 in lieu of plutonium nella at a well-attended Shriners' convention. It
or highly enriched uranium, could wreak local would take several tons of highly toxic ricin to infest
havoc if wrapped around traditional munitions and fifty square miles, whereas a few pounds of conta-
incendiary devices.17 Terrorists who lack nuclear gious aerosols with a wider downwind spread could
capabilities of any kind might create widespread kill or incapacitate far more people under identical
radioactive fallout if, Kamikaze-style, they crashed conditions. BW authorities currently believe that
a light plane loaded with explosives into a nuclear anthrax and smallpox constitute the most danger-
power plant or otherwise sabotaged poorly ous threats, followed by tularemia, pneumonic
protected commercial reactors. Serbia in the early plague, and hemorrhagic fever. Crude atomic
1990s, for example, reportedly threatened to create bombs wielded by terrorists could wreak local

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MILITARY STRATEGY

havoc but, as one BW pundit put it, smallpox supplies. Cooking kills most pathogens, but raw and
(which killed perhaps 300 million unimmunized improperly stored foods invite finagling.26 Practical
humans in the twentieth century) could quickly problems accordingly restrain BW terrorism some-
engulf the globe. Rapid intercontinental transporta- what, but trends toward increased violence coupled
tion systems and the absence of adequate vaccine with improved technologies make prospects seem
since scientists controlled that scourge make small- bleak.27
pox most menacing.22
"Agro-terrorists" could assault crops and live- Chemical Weapons
stock. Veterinarians are most fearful of mad cow Chemical warfare (CW) agents are easier to produce
disease; foot and mouth disease, which afflicts cat- than nuclear weapons and easier than BW munitions
tle, hogs, and sheep; infectious swine fever, for to deliver, despite meteorological sensitivities.28 The
which no vaccine exists; and a deadly variant of world received a wake-up call on March 20, 1995,
avian influenza, which caused the U.S. Department when Aum Shinrikyo thugs in Tokyo released home-
of Agriculture to kill $63 million worth of chickens made sarin (a lethal nerve agent) inside five subway
during a six-month-long outbreak in the 1980s. BW trains at fifteen widely separated stations. Vapors
laboratories have developed other agents designed killed twelve, hospitalized nearly 1,000, traumatized
to decimate fruits, grains, and vegetables. Some pro- thousands more, and sent psychological shock
duce toxins that endanger humans who ingest them. waves throughout Japan.29 Similar incidents on stu-
The United States is painfully vulnerable, because pefying scales are pragmatic possibilities.
selective livestock breeding drastically reduces di-
versity, high concentrations on fewer farms facili- TERRORIST TARGETS
tate the spread of contagious diseases, and many AND TACTICS
seed stocks originate in foreign countries under Terrorism epitomizes a strategically indirect ap-
loosely controlled conditions.23 proach that enables individuals and small groups to
Intelligence analysts doubt that any nation as yet exert great influence at minimal cost. Perpetrators
has furnished terrorists with biological agents, but assault neutral nations as well as known enemies
renegade groups beholden to no government con- whenever so doing serves useful purposes. Factions
ceivably could pilfer them from poorly guarded that favor a Palestinian homeland, for example, have
stockpiles or produce their own instruments, per- often attacked European countries sympathetic to
haps with assistance from unscrupulous pharmacol- Israel.
ogists or scientists who underpinned BW programs
in the former Soviet Union.24 Members of the Aum Tempting Targets
Shinrikyo cult nevertheless discovered that mass dis- Calamities would occur in large cities if commercial
semination is difficult, when they released botulin and computer traffic ceased for long periods, sky-
toxin and anthrax in densely populated central scraper ventilation systems failed, perishable prod-
Tokyo during the early 1990s, yet failed to create any ucts spoiled, and chaotic conditions encouraged
casualties.25 Ultraviolet rays devitalize most agents, looters. Information storage and transfer sites, com-
which can't survive exposure to sunlight; explosive munication centers, transportation nodes, petro-
devices sterilize them; aerosols that cling to dust chemical plants, electrical power and water distribu-
particles in damp air are too large to inhale, while tion systems present tempting targets. Symbolically
those in excessively dry air shrivel and die. Filtration significant structures, such as the U.S. Capitol, the
and chlorine reduce dangers to municipal water White House, the Supreme Court building, the Pen-

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 SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM

tagon, the Washington Monument, and the Library ised freedom for Algeria.32 Viet Cong (VC) terrorists
of Congress (all in Washington, D.C.), are particu- elevated assassination to a much broader plain when
larly appealing, because demolition would make they murdered more than 6,000 province chiefs,
thunderous sociopolitical statements. The same is judges, policemen, and lesser functionaries between
true for embassies, military compounds, and ships 1959 and 1964. VC "death squads" additionally
in harbors. Prominent public figures who oppose slaughtered educators who taught pupils to love
terrorist programs also run high risks. Chiefs of their country and resist Communism. Executioners
State, their advisers, senior military commanders, often disemboweled and decapitated family mem-
influential members of the news media, educators, bers along with perceived offenders to ensure that
other opinion shapers, police, and judges are poten- no witnesses missed their message.33
tial bull's-eyes.
Abduction
Tried and True Tactics It is much harder to abduct closely guarded moguls
Terrorists strive to attract and retain attention with than to hit marks with telescopic rifles or with poi-
high-profile acts that shock public sensibilities. soned pellets at point-blank range. Abductions, how-
Tried and true tactics emphasize assassinations, ever, can enrich terrorist coffers, publicize causes,
abductions, hostage-takings, hijackings, and demoli- and spur authorities to free imprisoned compatriots.
tions, separately or in some combination. Techno- Italy's Red Brigades, whose constituents had lost
logical progress is opening a sixth option: cyber- faith in existing institutions, kidnapped Christian
netic terrorism (see Chapter 19, page 210). Democrats and pillars of Italian society. They
snatched former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978,
Assassination convened a "people s tribunal," condemned him to
Assassination, defined herein as premeditated mur- death as an enemy of the proletariat, riveted world
der for sociopolitical purposes, is a direct, discrimi- attention for fifty-four days, then dumped his bullet-
nating, economical way to achieve potentially deci- ridden body in an abandoned automobile when the
sive results. Secret Service agents in the White Government refused to release thirteen incarcerated
House on New Year's Eve 1980 collared a female terrorists. Brigadier General James L. Dozier, the
tourist with a pistol in her purse and a demented highest ranking U.S. officer at NATO's headquarters
intruder harmlessly accosted Queen Elizabeth in her in Verona, Italy, narrowly escaped harm after Red
Buckingham Palace boudoir in July 1982,30 but it Brigade goons grabbed him in December 1981. Ab-
generally takes proficient planners and gimlet-eyed ductors, who blamed Dozier for "American massa-
killers with exceptional expertise to penetrate pro- cres in Vietnam," held him subject to "proletarian
fessional security systems, accomplish strategically justice" for forty-two days, before a massive man-
important missions, and escape unscathed. hunt found the General in a secret "people's prison"
"Termination" techniques vary considerably. and Italian counterterrorist teams retrieved him
Georgi Markov, a Bulgarian defector who opposed safely.34
the dictatorial regime in Sofia, died in London on The Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), which
September 11, 1978 when an assassin lanced him never numbered more than ten members, put an
with a ricin-coated umbrella tip.31 Frederick For- altruistic spin on abduction when they spirited
syth's novel The Day of the Jackal described in great newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst from her Berke-
detail how a skilled sniper might have assassinated ley, California, apartment on February 4, 1974. Their
French President Charles de Gaulle after he prom- ransom note demanded that her wealthy father fur-

197
MILITARY STRATEGY

nish $70 worth of food to "all people with welfare Movement for the Liberation of Arabistan (currently
cards, Social Security pension cards, food stamp called Khuzestan) fared less well when affiliated
cards, disabled veteran cards, medical cards, parole terrorists stormed the Iranian Embassy in London
or probation papers, and jail or bail release slips." on April 30, 1980. Six heavily armed thugs, who
Expenditures would have totaled at least $250 mil- quickly overwhelmed four British and twenty-five
lion (may be twice that much) in California alone. Iranian occupants, demanded regional autonomy for
The SLA initially accepted his counteroffer of $2 Khuzistan Province (which abuts Iraq at the head
million, then promised to turn Patty loose within of the Persian Gulf), plus freedom for ninety-one
seventy-two hours if he donated $4 million more. He prisoners by noon the next day. Two such deadlines
agreed, but the gang soon got a grand propaganda and several days passed while police and media
bonus, because "brainwashed" Patty joined its representatives sought to resolve the crisis peace-
ranks, voluntarily renounced her birthright, took fully, until frustrated terrorists on May 5 finally killed
the revolutionary name Tania, participated in a bank a hostage and heaved his body out the front door.
robbery that netted the SLA $ 10,600, sprayed a store Three elite Special Air Service (SAS) teams soon
front with machine-gun bullets, and eluded capture thereafter swept through the building and, during
until September 1975.35 an eleven-minute battle, killed five gunmen, cap-
tured the sixth, and rescued all hostages, only a few
Hostage-Taking of whom were wounded.37
Sociopolitical terrorists who accumulate hostages
en masse hope to use them as human "bargaining Hijacking
chips" with which to extort desired concessions. Skyjackings peaked at about eighty per year be-
Techniques are similar to those associated with ab- tween 1969 and 1972, with mixed results before,
ductions, except hostage-takers rarely move victims during, and after that period. Shia fundamentalists
from known locations, whereas kidnappers usually fared well in June 1985, when they skyjacked TWA
transport them surreptitiously to safe houses. Flight 847, a Boeing 727 en route from Athens to
Radical "students" beholden to the Ayatollah Beirut, then offered to exchange 108 hostages for
Khomeini seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 700 prisoners that Israel captured in southern Leba-
November 4,1979. They forthwith released thirteen non three years earlier. That deal fell flat and the
hostages who were female or black, but retained terrorists eventually turned all hostages loose (save
fifty-three others for 444 days pending receipt of one murdered in midair), but they went scot-free
an official U.S. apology for previously supporting and got a propaganda bonanza from the resultant
Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, deportation of the media circus.38 The Popular Front for the Liberation
ailing Shah to face trial in Iran, and return to Iran of Palestine (PFLP), a splinter group of the Palestin-
of billions that he allegedly had stashed abroad. The ian Liberation Organization (PLO), fared poorly after
U.S. Government never met those demands, but the it commandeered three airliners over international
protracted stalemate publicly weakened President airspace on September 6, 1970. Two landed at Daw-
Jimmy Carter and his Administration. Khomeini con- son Field northeast of Amman, Jordan, the third in
trastingly strengthened his position politically and Cairo. PFLP pirates diverted the fourth transport to
psychologically by holding all fifty-three hostages Jordan three days later, terrorized passengers and
until Ronald Reagan replaced Carter as President on crew, then blew all four aircraft to smithereens
January 20, 1981.36 while commentators and television cameras beamed
The Libyan-based Democratic Revolutionary their rampage around the world. Those forays back-

198
 SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM

fired badly, because "Black September" ensued. eighteen sailors, two Army soldiers, and sixty French
King Hussein's Arab Legion battled Palestinian radi- paratroopers in their Beirut barracks on October 23,
cals in Jordan, Syrian tanks intervened, and Israel 1983-43 Timothy McVeigh, a right-wing militiaman,
made compensatory countermoves along its de killed 168 and injured 850 in the most deadly on-
facto frontiers. U.S. and Soviet intervention on be- slaught inside the United States when he gutted
half of respective clients seemed conceivable. The Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
dust settled short of a full-scale war on September on April 19, 1995.44 A fanatical attack on the U.S. Air
29, after which surviving PFLP terrorists released Force compound at Khobar Towers near Dhahran,
the last six hostages in exchange for seven guerrillas Saudi Arabia, left nineteen dead and 500 wounded
in Western Europe and twelve Arabs in Israel.39 on June 25, 1996.45 Twin assaults on U.S. embassies
Hijackers prey on cruise ships and railway trains in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
as well as aircraft. The Italian liner Achille Lauro initially left eighty-one dead and more than 1,700
netted Palestinian terrorists more than 400 hostages wounded on August 7,1998.46 Lesser calamities have
in October 1988.40 Radicals who sought indepen- been legion, slaughters continue, and terrorists
dence for Molucca (formerly a Dutch colony but armed with weapons of mass destruction could
legally part of Indonesia since 1949) confiscated a make past tolls seem minuscule.
train for twelve days in 1976. A second spectacular Explosions that cause few fatalities can saddle
started on May 23, 1977, when one group of terror- cities with gigantic costs and grievous confusion,
ists stopped an express in northeast Holland and as terrorists demonstrated on February 26, 1993,
herded forty-nine hostages into first-class com- when they hit the 110-story twin-tower World Trade
partments. Conspirators simultaneously snared 110 Center in New York City during business hours.
teachers and pupils in a nearby elementary school, Blast effects killed six persons and injured more
but sent 106 of them home when a virus sickened than 1,000 when an enormous device detonated in
the children. Ringleaders insisted that the Nether- the subterranean parking garage, but that was barely
lands support Moluccan separatism, liberate twenty- the beginning. A crater several stories deep and 200
one prisoners, and promise safe passage for all, in- feet wide threatened to topple the entire structure.
cluding themselves. The resultant standoff, which Electrical short circuits and inoperable elevators
lasted three weeks, terminated when counterterror- trapped 50,000 employees and thousands more visi-
ists killed six hostage-holders and broke both tors for hours in pitch black, smoke-filled stairwells.
sieges.41 A humongous traffic jam tangled lower Manhattan
when police cars, fire engines, and ambulances tried
Demolitions to converge on the scene. Perhaps 350 businesses,
Terrorists always have displayed a penchant for banks, brokerage houses, law firms and other ten-
demolitions. The most fatalities ever recorded oc- ants were displaced for at least a month. Revenues
curred on June 23, 1985, when Sikh extremists blew lost during that period totalled more than $ 1 billion,
329 humans to bits in an Air India jet over the according to off-the-cuff calculations. Lloyds' of Lon-
Atlantic Ocean. A suitcase bomb that Libyan baggage don and a consortium consequently faced huge lia-
handlers loaded aboard Pan Am Flight 103 obliter- bility, property, and business interruption claims.
ated 259 passengers over Lockerbie, Scotland, in New York City police investigated 364 bomb threats
December 1988 and debris killed eleven more inno- during the first five days after the blast (five or six
cents on the ground.42 Buildings also are vulnerable. per day was normal) and anxieties rippled all the
Suicidal bombers slaughtered 220 U.S. Marines, way to the U.S. Pacific coast.47

199
MILITARY STRATEGY

Nightmare Scenarios Cost-effective largesse generally includes training

The World Trade Center debacle could have been facilities, instruction, difficult-to-detect arms, intelli-
much worse. No terrorist group took credit or stipu- gence, and safe havens to which transnational terror-
lated what the U.S. Government must do to avoid ists return when their missions are complete. Most
recurrences. Imagine what might have happened patrons also furnish false documents that mask the
if the explosive charge had contained radioactive true identities of surrogates (plastic surgeons in
material or instigators had orchestrated similar Czechoslovakia reportedly altered facial features to
events in rapid succession across the country. They make hit men unrecognizable during the Cold War).49
might, for example, have demolished the pyramid- The former Soviet Union, some of its Warsaw Pact
shaped Transamerica Building in San Francisco on surrogates, Afghanistan, Algeria, Cuba, Iran, Iraq,
Day Two, followed by Chicago's Sears Tower on Lebanon, Libya, North Korea, and Syria typify coun-
Day Three, then promised continued destruction tries that once organized, equipped, and directed
on a grand scale if the President of the United States transnational terrorist activities, or do so now.50
refused to comply with demands A, B, C, and D Sociopolitical terrorists who lack state sponsors
before their nonnegotiable deadline elapsed. No or other affluent sympathizers generally finance
showdown on such a scale has ever arisen anywhere their operations with ill-gotten gains from criminal
in the world, but such scenarios give counterterror- activities such as bank robberies, embezzlements,
ists nightmares. kidnappings, expropriations, counterfeiting, illicit
drug deals, and fraudulent "tax" collections akin
SPONSORSHIP AND SUPPORT to Mafia "protection" rackets. Profits range from
State sponsorship and support for de facto proxies picayune to prodigious. One Argentinean group in
can telescope the time it takes terrorists to become April 1974 established a ransom record that may
proficient and affords flexibility for professionals. never be beaten: $14,200,000 in return for Victor
Benefactors who provide operational bases as well E. Samuelson, an Exxon Oil Company executive it
as expertise and funds are particularly valuable.48 held captive for 144 days.51

200
 SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM

KEY POINTS
• Sociopolitical terrorism, which epitomizes a strategically indirect approach, enables individuals
and small groups to exert great influence at minimal cost
• Terrorists aim to cause anguish so intense and widespread that authorities cannot cope, and con-
sequently comply with their demands
• Massacres make sense to domestic and transnational terrorists, who believe that the ends they
cherish justify any feasible means
• Typical terrorists don't exist, because pragmatists mingle with madmen, idealists with mercenar-
ies, true believers with opportunists
• Tightly knit terrorist organizations, which are exceedingly suspicious of outsiders, screen
recruits carefully and kill defectors
• Most groups still favor simple, rugged, reliable weapons that members can employ well with
minimal training
• Ruthless terrorists could employ nuclear and radiological munitions or dispense biological and
chemical weapons more liberally
• Tempting targets include prominent public figures, economically important nerve centers, mili-
tary compounds, ships in harbors, and symbolically significant structures
• Tried and true tactics emphasize assassinations, abductions, hostage-takings, hijackings, and
demolitions
• State sponsorship, funds, safe havens, and other forms of support can telescope the time it takes
terrorists to become proficient and facilitate transnational operations

NOTES 5. John M. Collins, "Definitional Aspects," in Political

1. For overviews, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Asym- Terrorism and Energy: The Threat and Response,
metric Warfare Versus Counterterrorism: Rethink- ed. Yonah Alexander and Charles K. Ebinger (New
ing CBRN and CIP Defense and Response (Washing- York: Praeger, 1982), 1-14.
ton: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6. Hitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and SS Security Ser-
September 2000); Walter Laquer, The New Terror- vice in the Nazi Revolution (New York: Oxford
ism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction University Press, 1996); Bernard Diederich and Al
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Bruce Burt, Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictator (London:
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gol- Bodley Head, 1970); Robert Conquest, The Great
lancz, 1998); Martin Shubik, "Terrorism, Technol- Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford Univer-
ogy, and the Socioeconomics of Death," Compara- sity Press, 1991).
tive Strategy, October-December 1997, 399-414. 7. Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assess-
2. Louis de Saint-Just, Oeuvres Choisies (Paris: Avant- ment for the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's
propos de Dionys Mascolo, 1968), 327. Press, 1999), 17-56; Laqueur, The New Terrorism,
3. William A. DeGregorio, The Complete Book of U.S. 90-104; Konrad Kellen, Terrorists: What Are They
Presidents: From George Washington to Bill Clin- Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World
ton, 5th ed. (New York: Wings Books, 1997), and Actions, RAND Note N-1300-SL, prepared for
651-52. Sandia Laboratories (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpo-
4. Bernard Lewis, "License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin's ration, November 1979), 2-6, 34, 39.
Declaration of Jihad," Foreign Affairs, November/ 8. Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guer-
December 1998, 14-19. rilla (Vancouver, Canada: Pulp Press, 1974), 2-5.

201
MILITARY STRATEGY

9. Menachem Begin, The Revolt: Story of the Irgun search, National Defense University, 1999), 21-25;
(New York: Henry Schuman, 1951, 212-30. Mark G. Kortepeter and Gerald W. Parker, "Potential
10. Laqueur, The New Terrorism, 81-90, 127-55. Biological Weapons Threats," Emerging Infectious
11. Patricia Steinhoff, "Kozo Okamoto," Asian Survey, Diseases, Special Issue, vol. 5, no. 4 (July-August,
vol. 16, no. 9 (September 1976), 830-45. 1999), 523-27, plus additional articles devoted to
12. Kellen, Terrorists: What Are They Like?, 35-44, 51- anthrax and smallpox; Richard Preston, "The
52, 56-63, 65-66; Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists Demon in the Freezer," New Yorker, July 12,
of Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World 1999, 44-61.
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), 3-16. 23. Judith Miller, "Administration Plans to Use Plum Is-
13. Assessing the Threat, First Annual Report to the Presi- land to Combat Terrorism," New York Times, Sep-
dent and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess tember 22, 1999, 1; Bioterrorism May Be Threat to
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism In- U.S. Agriculture (Columbus: Ohio State University,
volving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Santa Monica, http://www.osu.edu, posted August 10, 1999).
CA: RAND Corporation, December 15, 1999); Jona- 24. Cams, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, 17-19, 32, 35-
than B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist 38; Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohaz-
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cam- ard: The Chilling Story of the Largest Covert Biologi-
bridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). cal Weapons Program in the World, Told from the
14. Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in An Unstable Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Random
World (New York: Routledge, 1994), 26-54; Jimmie House, 1999), 270-76. Judith Miller, "U.S. Told to
C. Oxley, "Non-Traditional Explosives: Potential De- Spend More to Neutralize Soviet Germ Scientists,"
tection Problems," in Technology and Terrorism, ed. New York Times, December 10, 1999, 14.
Paul Wilkinson (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 30-47. 25. "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?," Emerg-
15. Wayne Biddle, "It Must Be Simple and Reliable," Dis- ing Infectious Diseases, Special Issue, 513-16.
cover, Special Report on the Technology of Terror- 26. Cams, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes, 21-23, 38; Ned
ism Qune 1986), 22-31. Dolan, BW Research ([email protected], July
16. William Powell, The Anarchist Cookbook (New 28, 1999).
York: L. Stuart Press, 1971); Catalogue, vol. 37 (Eldo- 27. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorist Targeting: Tactics,
rado, AK: Delta Press, Ltd., 1998), especially 3-14, Trends, and Potentialities," in Wilkinson, Technology
29-31, 42-43, updates available on the Internet, and Terrorism, 14-19.
http://www.infogo.com/delta. 28. Javed Ali, Leslie Rodriques, and Michael Moodie, U.S.
17. John B. Roberts, II, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?," Chemical-Biological Defense Guidebook (Alexan-
American Spectator, July/August 2000, 36-39; dria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1998), 138-50.
Stanley S. Jacobs, "The Nuclear Threat As a Terrorist 29. "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" 513-16.
Option," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 10, 30. "Intruder Talks to Queen in Her Bedroom At Palace,"
no. 4 (Winter 1998), 150-156; Cameron, Nuclear New York Times, July 12, 1982, A5; Facts on File
Terrorism, 131-34, 143. Yearbook (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1982),
18. Vince Cannistraro and Robert Kupperman, "U.S. 513-14.
Must Measure Possibility of Terrorism," Christian 31. Facts on File Yearbook (1978), 748-49; Laqueur,
Science Monitor, March 2, 1993, 19. The New Terrorism, 163.
19. Jacobs, "The Nuclear Threat As a Terrorist Option," 32. Frederick Forsyth, The Day of the Jackal, reissue ed.
156-60; Brian Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" (New York: Bantam Books, 1982); also a 1973 movie,
Orbis, Fall 1985, 507-15, quotation on 511. same title, starring Edward Fox.
20. Bruce Hoffman and David Claridge, "The RAND- 33. Major General Edward Lansdale, "Vietnam: Do We
St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Understand Revolution?," Foreign Affairs, XLIII, no.
and Noteworthy Domestic Incidents, 1996," Terror- 1 (October 1964), 81; Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-
ism and Political Violence, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer nams: A Political and Military A nalysis (New York:
1998), 135-180; Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism, 77- Praeger, 1963), 360; Denis Warner, The Last Confu-
130. cian (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 137.
21. Bill Sammon, "Clinton Decries 'Scarred' Century," 34. Walter N. Lang, The World's Elite Forces: The Men,
Washington Times, September 22, 1999, Al. Weapons, and Operations in the War Against Ter-
22. W. Seth Cams, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The rorism (London: Salamander Books, 1987), 112,
Illicit Use of Biological Agents in 20th Century 137-39; Richard Drake, TheAldo Moro Murder Case
(Washington: Center for Counterproliferation Re- (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

202
 SOCIOPOLITICAL TERRORISM

35. Albert Perry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat 45. WilliamJ. Perry, Force Protection: Report to the Pres-
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), 342-64; Patricia ident and Congress on the Protection of U.S. Forces
Campbell Hearst and Alvin Moscow, Patty Hearst: Deployed Abroad (Washington: Department of De-
Her Own Story (New York: Avon, mass market pa- fense, September 15, 1996).
perback ed., 1988). 46. Alan Cooperman, "Terror Strikes Again," U.S. News
36. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encoun- & World Report, August 17, 1998, 10-17.
ter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1986); 47. World Trade Center Bombing: Terror Hits Home,
Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime and
Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis (New Haven, CT: Yale Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary,
University Press, 1986). House of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st sess.
37. Lang, The World's Elite Forces, 132-33. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
38. Clutterbuck, Terrorism in An Unstable World, 178. March 9, 1993); related accounts in the New York
39. Major General James Lunt, Hussein of Jordan (New Times between February 27 and March 3, 1993.
York: William Morrow, 1989), 131-43. For context, 48. Laqueur, The New Terrorism, 156-83.
see Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Bos- 49- Ernest Evans, Calling a Truce to Terror (Westport,
ton: Little, Brown, 1979), 609-31. CT: Greenwood Press, 1979, 43-46; Leroy Thomp-
40. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism, Politics, and Law: The son, Ragged War: The Story of Unconventional and
Achille Lauro Affair, trans. S. J. K. Greensleeves Counter-revolutionary Warfare (London: Arms and
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Armour Press, 1994), 315-16.
Lang, The World's Elite Forces, 146-47. 50. For state sponsorship during the Cold War, see Claire
41. Lang, The World's Elite Forces, 122-24. Sterling, The Terror Network: The Secret War of
42. Rodney Wallis, Lockerbie: The Inside Story (New International Terrorism (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
York: Praeger, 1999); Clutterbuck, Terrorism in An and Winston Reader s Digest, 1981); Uri Ra'anan et
Unstable World, 167-68. al., eds., [he Hydra of Carnage: International Link-
43. Report of the DoD Commission on Beirut Interna- ages of Terrorism (Lexington, MA): Lexington
tional Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, com- Books, 1986).
monly called The Long Report (Washington: Depart- 51. Perry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat,
ment of Defense, December 20, 1983). 266-67.
44. Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, April
19, 1995, Final Report (Stillwater, OK: International
Fire Service Training Association, November 1996).

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 18. Counterteirorism Strategies
"I don't think they play at all fairly, "Alice began,
in a rather complaining tone . . . "and they don't
seem to have any rules in particular: at least, if
there are, nobody attends to them—and you
have no idea how confusing it is. . . . "
Lewis Carroll
Alice in Wonderland

C ounterterrorism is confusing, precisely be-

cause there aren't many rules in particular. Op-
ponents, like the ethereal Cheshire Cat, appear and
for people, selected assets, and lines of communica-
tion. Tier Two actively responds to terrorist attacks.
Tier Three puts terrorists and their sponsors on the
disappear at will. "Off with its head," the Queen defensive.1 Auspicious campaigns at all three levels
cried, but no one knew quite where to chop. The feature centralized planning, decentralized execu-
executioner claimed that "you can't cut off a head tion, timely intelligence, meticulous training, and
unless there's a body to cut it off from," the King interagency (preferably international) teamwork.
believed that "anything with a head could be be- Advanced technologies facilitate otherwise infeasi-
headed, " and the grinning cat faded from view while ble missions, but flexible policies and proficient
disputes continued. Debates about the best ways to personnel with a flair for improvisation are more
combat sociopolitical terrorism also remain unre- important.
solved. This primer explores conflicting rationales
to help sharpen issues and facilitate cost-effective PARTICIPANTS AND CONTROL
tradeoffs between avoidable vulnerabilities and per- Counterterrorists must identify and evaluate threats,
fect protection, which probably is unattainable. manage crises, assess postattack situations, cope
with consequences, and counterattack or strike first.
THE NATURE OF Military and civilian participants typically include
COUNTERTERRORISM intelligence agents and analysts, police, firefighters,
Policies, plans, programs, and operations designed
rescue squads, teams that disarm explosives, special-
to deter and combat terrorism occupy three comple-
ists who dispose of hazardous materials (HAZMAT),
mentary tiers.* Tier One provides passive protection
and power projection forces.
*U.S. practitioners reserve the term "counterterrorism" for
offensive measures and call defensive measures "antiterrorism." Dictatorial Regimes
The term "combating terrorism" embraces both, but those
Armed services, paramilitary formations, and secret
definitions are not widely accepted elsewhere. This treatise
refers to offensive and defensive counterterrorism for simplici- police commonly perform counterterrorism func-
ty's sake. tions for dictatorial regimes. Soviet leaders relied

205
MILITARY STRATEGY

heavily on the Committee for State Security (KGB), 17,000 law enforcement agencies, 32,000 fire de-
which kept close tabs on every facet of life in all partments, 8,000 emergency medical services, and
fifteen Soviet Socialist Republics and thereby dis- various other affiliates.4 All countries require well-
couraged domestic dissent. KGB personnel also pro- orchestrated command/control systems that inte-
tected senior Communist Party officials, secured key grate civil and military capabilities from top to bot-
installations (such as nuclear storage sites), patrolled tom. Wasteful redundancies otherwise occur and
lengthy Soviet frontiers to intercept intruders, nur- conflicting requirements labeled "foreign," "domes-
tured a network of informants inside the Ministry tic," "law enforcement," and "homeland defense"
of Defense to prevent military coups, and monitored slip through jurisdictional cracks.5
the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), which fur- Experience indicates that counterterrorists nor-
nished a pervasive national police force.2 mally perform best when executives at the top of
the pyramid synchronize strategic policy guid-
Democratic Governments ance, plans, research-development-procurement
Counterterrorism is foremost a law enforcement programs, and budgets. Centralized training ensures
function in most democratic countries. Paramilitary uniform standards while saving time, money, and
gendarmeries or their functional equivalents assist instructors. Too tight a rein, however, inhibits initia-
in nearly every nation save the United States, which tive, fosters inflexibility, and risks regrettable deci-
traditionally disapproves military power as a domes- sions, because directors far from ongoing actions
tic security instrument, except under exigent cir- cannot be universally well informed or keep abreast
cumstances. Federal laws and Department of De- of fast-moving situations, no matter how closely they
fense regulations forbid U.S. Armed Forces (other communicate with commanders on the scene. Se-
than the Coast Guard) to participate directly in nior officials thus are well advised to delegate
search, seizure, and arrest operations or otherwise operational control and tactical decisions to trusted
act as a posse comitatus for law enforcement pur- subordinates.
poses, except as authorized expressly by the Consti-
tution or Congress. The Department of Justice rules OVERARCHING ISSUES
that such restrictions apply only within the United Three overarching issues strongly influence deter-
States but, at this writing, Secretaries of Defense rent, defensive, and offensive strategies: fixed ver-
have approved only one exception: the 1990 appre- sus flexible policies; violence versus nonviolence;
hension of Panamanian strong man General Manuel and preemption versus response. Prescribed ap-
Noriega during Operation Just Cause.3 proaches determine whether counterterrorism
strategies are predominantly active or reactive, fa-
Orchestration vor force or finesse, and make it easy or hard for
A mind-numbing array of U.S. players practice terrorists to predict implementing operations.
counterterrrorism at home and abroad. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Federal Emergency Fixed Versus Flexible Policies
Management Agency (FEMA) lead the national list Inflexible counterterrorist policies are undesirable,
of forty some elements that deal with domestic ter- because crises that superficially seem similar in most
rorism. The Department of State and Central Intelli- respects often are fundamentally different. Exces-
gence Agency (CIA) exercise responsibilities over- sive flexibility not only complicates decision making
seas. State and local government participants, who when emergencies leave little time for deliberation,
numbered about 2,000,000 in 1999, populated but opens opportunities for unscrupulous acts.

206
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

Insufficient Flexibility groups that lack patron states. Ill-conceived sanc-

Declaratory policies that prohibit concessions under tions against nation-states may cause more prob-
any conditions might strengthen deterrence by lems than they solve at home and abroad. Experi-
promising terrorists that their objectives are un- enced leaders therefore weigh each case on its
achievable, but rigidity rules out responses that merits, determine what combination of "carrots"
might be wiser in some situations. Refusal to ransom and "sticks" appears most appropriate, then craft
the Director of Central Intelligence or Chairman of strategies and tactics accordingly.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, could jeopar-
dize national security secrets on a catastrophic scale. Preemption Versus Retaliation
It also would take senior decision-makers with steel Counterterrorists may preempt, if intelligence re-
nerves to ignore reports that terrorists had seeded ports indicate that terrorist attacks are imminent, or
any skyscraper with a nuclear weapon. initiate preventive strikes, if policy-makers conclude
that terrorists eventually will attack. Both options
Excessive Flexibility invoke the right of self-defense. Both offer great
Excessive flexibility can be just as detrimental as military advantage. Retaliation, in contrast, forefeits
too little. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and initiative, but poses fewer public relations prob-
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, for example, denied any lems. Hot pursuit while culprits are clearly identifi-
items on the U.S. Munitions List to countries that, able best assures approval at home and abroad, but
according to the Secretary of State, sponsored terror- does nothing to prevent the havoc that terrorist
ism.6 Freewheeling Marine Corps Lieutenant Colo- already have wreaked.
nel Oliver North, in direct violation, nevertheless
negotiated illicit arms sales to Iran with blessings DETERRENT DILEMMAS
from President Reagan's National Security Adviser Counterterrorists, unlike nuclear strategists, can test
Robert C. McFarlane and his successor Vice Admiral theories and refine concepts by trial and error, but
John M. Poindexter, partly because they hoped that the dynamics of deterrence still defy full understand-
so doing might encourage Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini ing. No one at this writing can convincingly explain
to help free hostages whom Shiite Muslim hench- why sociopolitical terrorists use awesome capabili-
men held in Lebanon. That ploy boomeranged ties so sparingly or are so circumspect about escala-
badly: captors not only kept all pawns for several tory opinions that conceivably could include nu-
more years,7 but resultant scandals shook the Reagan clear, biological, chemical, or radiological (NBCR)
Administration to its foundations when news weapons.
hounds, congressional hearings, and the final report Political, economic, and social reforms designed
of independent prosecutor Lawrence E. Walsh re- to alleviate or eliminate root causes of conflict rarely
vealed that anti-Communist Contra guerrillas in Nic- sway sociopolitical terrorists, who generally de-
aragua received profits derived from those illegal mand concessions too great for afflicted govern-
transactions.8 ments to accept. Radicals motivated by religious
fundamentalism and deep-seated ethnic animosities
Violence Versus Nonviolence defy intimidation. Nothing seems to faze suicidal
Firepower is suitable and feasible in many situa- fanatics who welcome death. Combative Counterter-
tions, but invites adverse political repercussions if rorists promise swift retribution, but strong rhetoric
targeting intelligence is inadequate. Political pres- unintentionally increases the prestige of terrorist
sures and economic sanctions are pointless against groups and may provoke rather than discourage

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MILITARY STRATEGY

attacks.9 Flexible strategies that selectively apply tomatic fire extinguishers, and other protective de-
offensive and defensive countermeasures conse- vices.11 Scouts secure intersections and defiles along
quently seem to bolster deterrence best. hazardous routes before caravans with armed es-
corts fore and aft speed by.
DEFENSIVE COUNTERTERROR1SM
Defensive countermeasures strive to discourage ter- Public Safety
rorist acts and to mitigate damage and casualties Comparable protection for common people is im-
if deterrence fails. Faultless intelligence and broad practical. Barricades and stringent security checks
spectrum strategies are required, because conven- shield some public buildings, but shopping malls,
tional, NBCR, and cybernetic threats pose markedly supermarkets, theaters, tourist Meccas, sport stadi-
different problems. ums, cathedrals, schools, and other centers that at-
tract large crowds comprise attractive targets. No
Passive Defense nation is well prepared to cope with mass casualties
Passive measures comprise the bedrock upon which in the aftermath of terrorist attacks that employ
defensive counterterror strategies rest. Plans, pro- NBCR weapons. Biological warfare agents for which
grams, and operations invariably seek to shield very neither antidotes nor cures are available might be
important persons (VIPs), strengthen public safety, worst, because victims could communicate conta-
safeguard nationally valuable infrastructure, and en- gious diseases countrywide, even worldwide, be-
hance cybernetic security. fore symptoms appear.12
Public education programs that inform rank-and-
VIP Protection file military personnel as well as civilians about ter-
Terrorists who specialize in surgical strikes threaten rorist tactics and enlighten them about "street
to assassinate or abduct military and civilian VIPs. smart" countermeasures consequently are impor-
The best-protected luminaries live and work with- tant. Experience indicates that low-key but routine
in walled compounds on large, well-illuminated, involvement by news media, schools, colleges, and
heavily guarded grounds where state-of-the-art anti- "think tanks" could pay big dividends. Careless
intrusion devices include visible light and infrared campers, for example, set countless wild fires that
surveillance cameras that ceaselessly project sharp cost the United States Government about $ 1 billion
images on closed-circuit television sets. Redundant per year in the 1950s, before "Smokey Bear" cam-
communications serve heavily armed, highly trained paigns dramatically reduced accidental incinera-
rapid reaction forces.10 tions, preserved valuable timber, and coincidentally
Security-conscious VIPs select random departure saved $17 billion during the next three decades.
times, routes, destinations, and points of debarka-
tion whenever they leave sanctuaries by automobile, Infrastructure Protection
helicopter, boat, or on foot and disseminate "classi- High-value infrastructures that invite terrorist at-
fied" schedules only to those subordinates who ab- tacks require adequate physical security, because
solutely need to know. Wheelmen who excel at they form the foundation of modern societies. Key
combat driving commonly chauffeur heavily ar- components include governmental, industrial, com-
mored yet agile limousines replete with bulletproof mercial, and military assets, plus interconnecting
glass, an inner carapace (turtle shell) of laminated transportation and telecommunication links. Close
composite materials, explosion-proof fuel tanks, au- collaboration between public and private sectors is

208
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

essential.15 Shrines, monuments, and other cultural to ascertain the readiness of counterterror
icons also are potential targets.14 teams and defensive facilities
• Work closely with local law enforcement
Military Installations Command posts, bar- agencies and, if in a foreign country, with
racks, ports, airfields, and logistical depots typify host nation counterterror specialists
installations that armed forces must defend against
terrorist attacks without compromising military Civilian Installations Civilian infrastructure is
missions. Experienced counterterrorists accord- harder to protect, because fewer courses of action
ingly take several precautions that have universal are open. Embassies and consulates must remain
applicability:15 where they are well able to represent respective
governments. Installations that provide electrical
• Regularly reevaluate intelligence estimates power, light, water, and petroleum products to in-
concerning the types, imminence, and inten- dustrial, commercial, agricultural, financial, and resi-
sities of terrorist threats dential consumers not only occupy fixed positions,
• Use findings to educate assigned military per- but rarely can restrict access routes, designate sur-
sonnel (plus dependents, if any) and train rounding areas "Oft Limits," or establish defenses
counterterror teams in-depth. Neither owners nor users can adequately
• Locate garrisons and outlying facilities in se- protect isolated facilities, such as water reservoirs,
cluded areas to the greatest extent possible, radio relay stations, and bridges along arterial routes.
consistent with essential missions Inexpensive countermeasures include corporate
• Harden structures, install shatterproof glass, vulnerability surveys, reductions in force at risky
and secure perimeters to strengthen local sites, and crisis reaction cells, whose members rec-
security ommend policies, develop defensive plans, and su-
• Surround cores with concentric exclusion pervise implementation.I6 Stringent airport security
zones to reduce dangers from standoff measures have drastically reduced hijackings and
attacks shootouts at terminals since the 1970s.17
• Restrict access routes, and protect points of No country, however, can safeguard all assets
entry with guard posts in depth and heavy- equally well at home and abroad. Most U.S. embas-
duty barriers sies, consulates, and cultural centers remain vulnera-
• Maintain security force manning levels com- ble to vehicule-borne explosives, because a vast ma-
mensurate with perceived threats; avoid stul- jority (including prestigious posts in London, Paris,
tifying periods of guard duty, which de- and Rome) are 100 feet or less from busy thorough-
crease alertness fares. The United States Government could close
• Establish flexible standing operations proce- shop in the most dangerous foreign countries, ac-
dures (SOPs) and rules of engagement credit envoys regionally, and ensconce them cen-
(ROE) trally at safer locations,18 but abilities to promote
• Assign sectors of responsibility, then repeat- U.S. foreign policies would suffer. Defenders also
edly rehearse optional responses to each could fortify Capitol Hill, the Pentagon, the State
type of threat, assess performances, and re- Department, official residences, national landmarks,
fine procedures and other potential targets. The nation, however,
• Conduct frequent, unannounced inspections would pay a heavy price, because budgets would

209
MILITARY STRATEGY

balloon, America's image as a free society would sag Active Defense

under siege, and terrorists would thereby achieve Active defenses feature hostage rescue operations
strategically significant bloodless victories. Painful and actions to disarm explosives that terrorists em-
compromises thus seem inevitable. place. Both missions are among the trickiest that
counterterrorists or any other forces ever perform.
Cybernetic Security
Concerns for cybernetic security are intensifying at Rescue Hostages
logarithmic rates, given boundless dependence on Hard-liners consider hostages expendable, and
telecommunications, computers, and the World thereby render them valueless for bargaining pur-
Wide Web. Multiple points of entry, coupled with poses, but most national leaders are more com-
inexpensive but nevertheless sophisticated intru- passionate. Nonviolent options include diplomatic
sion techniques, invite sociopolitical terrorists to overtures, prolonged debates, and political, eco-
acquire, destroy, transform, or manipulate critical nomic, or social payoffs. Force, which completes
information and codes with devastating effects that the package, almost always takes precedence if hold-
could ripple through or across national infrastruc- ers harm hostages.
tures. Laptop computers and telephone connections Assorted variables determine suitable tactics and
to any Internet Service Provider enable assailants to tools. Hostages, for example, might be one, few,
conduct electronic reconnaissance surveys, locate or many; healthy, sick, or sedated; cooperate with
security loopholes, breach "firewalls," then insert rescuers or resist, if the so-called Stockholm Syn-
viruses that obliterate passwords, delete files, and drome compels them to sympathize with captors.21
invade emergency service sites. Physical attacks and Loose rules of engagement seldom work well if
cybertage (electronic sabotage) conducted concur- safety is essential. It makes a difference whether
rently against key military and civilian targets con- terrorists vacillate or show resolve, hold hostages
ceivably could undercut all forms of national in known or unknown, single or multiple, static or
power.19 mobile sites that are large or small, heavily or lightly
Defenses against cybernetic attacks are woefully defended, near or far, aloft, afloat, or ashore in do-
deficient at the turn of the twenty-first century. Vic- mestic, foreign, friendly, or hostile territory where
tims seldom could discern intrusions during early final approaches are open or covered.
stages, much less respond in time to escape serious Flexible strategies are invaluable, because pa-
injury. Contributing factors include incomplete ap- tience is preferable on some occasions, while speed,
preciation of cybernetic threats, legal impediments, surprise, and physical prowess take precedence un-
and reluctance to share politically, economically, der different conditions.22 The July 1976 Israeli suc-
and militarily sensitive information. Acceptable pro- cess in Uganda and fruitless U.S. efforts to extricate
tection awaits centralized operation centers that are prisoners from Tehran in April 1980 both involved
organizationally and technologically prepared to long-distance raids into hostile lands, but Baader-
collect information about the nature and extent of Meinhof and Palestinian hijackers conveniently con-
cybernetic attacks, determine implications, and im- centrated hostages at Entebbe International Airport,
plement appropriate countermeasures before dam- whereas Iranian revolutionaries scattered captives
age becomes extensive.20* throughout the U.S. Embassy compound in the
midst of a metropolis.23 Hanafi radicals with rela-
*For additional discussion, see section entitled Cybernetic tively modest demands released 134 pawns in Wash-
Warfare in Chapter 19. ington on March 11,1977, at the behest of ambassa-

210
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

dors from Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan, whereas British trade status, close bothersome enemy embassies to
Special Air Service (SAS) teams had to storm the prevent misuse of diplomatic immunity, deny pass-
Iranian Embassy in London on May 5, 1980 after ports and visas to or deport individual suspects,
negotiations with hard-core Marxist-Leninist coun- interrupt ongoing education and training programs,
terrevolutionaries broke down.24 or abrogate treaties. Political countermeasures of
greatest severity might sever relations, even with-
Neutralize Explosives draw recognition, which would deprive offenders
Ordnance disposal teams aim to seize, disarm, de- of rights normally available under the offended na-
stroy, or otherwise neutralize explosive devices that tion's laws. Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) spe-
terrorists hide within buildings. Searchers who rum- cialists conduct concurrent campaigns that expose
mage through rooms may give terrorists time to culprits to public censure, incite international com-
detonate munitions before they arrive, even if intelli- munities to curb connections with offending na-
gence reports pinpoint locations. Demolition ex- tions, encourage dissident groups to overthrow
perts fortunate enough to find concealed explosives renegade governments, and otherwise seed uncer-
before they blow cannot always neutralize foreign tainties in terrorist camps.
models that may be armed and fused differently than
domestic counterparts.25 On-site defenders, booby Censorship and Ostracism
traps, and anti-tampering devices compound their Trees that fall in forests may frighten campers
dangers. Chances of success hence are slim. nearby, but don't make enough noise to scare any-
body beyond earshot. The most atrocious terrorist
OFFENSIVE COUNTERTERRORISM acts similarly would lack strategic significance if
Offensive counterterrorism normally amalgamates television, radio, and newspaper reporters refused
political and economic power with some sort of to transmit substantive and symbolic messages far
armed force. Impeccable intelligence is the key in and wide. Counterterrorists would like to deny op-
any case, because poorly informed counterterrorists ponents that privilege, but prospects are nearly nil
can neither find elusive foes nor accurately identify for two reasons: censorship is anathema in societies
patrons who provide sanctuaries and support. that value freedom of the press; and banner head-
lines and captivating broadcasts help members of
Nonviolent Options the news media climb promotion ladders.26
Political, commercial, and financial pressures, cen- Chiefs of State and their spokesmen give price-
sorship, and ostracism may put terrorists on the less publicity to sociopolitical terrorists with whom
defensive or reduce their offensive options without they meet, but benefits sometimes outweigh liabili-
resort to violence. All generally require great pa- ties, because ostracism eliminates opportunities for
tience over lengthy periods of time, because expec- productive dialogue. President Clinton in October
tations of early success are seldom assured. 1994 therefore lifted the official ban on U.S. Govern-
ment contacts with Sinn Fein, the provisional politi-
Political Pressures cal wing of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which
Political pressures applied to avenge terrorist atroci- periodically employed terrorist tactics in efforts to
ties and prevent repetition span a spectrum of possi- separate Northern Ireland from the United King-
bilities. Rungs on that escalation ladder include steps dom. Clinton then dined with Sinn Fein President
to suspend normal relations with states that subsi- Gerry Adams at the White House in efforts to broker
dize transnational terrorism, revoke favored nation a peace agreement. Adams and British Prime Minis-

211
MILITARY STRATEGY

ter Tony Blair discussed IRA demands at 10 Downing Some (maybe most) counterterrorists similarly con-
Street in December 1997 (the first such meeting tend that "the only good terrorist is a dead one."
since David Lloyd George negotiated with IRA guer- Lethal force, as they see it, is quick, cost-effective,
rilla chieftain Michael Collins in 1921), after which and eternally deters each dead terrorist. They cite
Adams helped draft a historic power-sharing pact the Principle of Military Necessity, which invokes
that the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland ap- "the right to compel submission of the enemy with
proved on May 22, 1998.27 the least possible expenditure of time, lives, and
money."28 Their message to terrorist kingpins is
Economic Sanctions unmistakable: "Desist, or we will hunt you down
Economic sanctions under favorable conditions can wherever you try to hide and kill you without
exert painful pressures on nations that nurture ter- compunction."
rorists. Restrictions on trade (especially boycotts Lethal force clearly is allowable when counterter-
and embargoes), foreign assistance, technology rorists catch small fry red-handed. Chiefs of State,
transfers, export credits, tourism, capital transac- however, are reluctant to hire headhunters as mat-
tions, and access to commercial facilities (including ters of national policy, because so doing might ex-
ports and airfields) are among the most common pose them to counterattacks in kind, martyred ter-
penalties. Severe limitations nevertheless are evi- rorists might serve their cause better dead than alive,
dent. Economic blockades are theoretically possi- and replacements might be more dangerous than
ble, but frequently flounder because key countries top dogs they supplant. Terrorism in such cases
won't forego profits or fear retaliation. Mind- would intensify instead of subside.29
boggling legal tangles commonly allow individuals
and nongovernmental organizations to escape pro- Blast Terrorist Bases
secution if they traffic with terrorist states. Do U.S. "Drive-by shootings" that blast terrorist bases may
businessmen, for example, break laws when they be politically embarrassing, if intelligence reports
deal with Arab states that underwrite violence-prone falsely identify targets. Saudi Arabian expatriate
"freedom fighters" whose sociopolitical aim is an Osama bin Laden, for example, allegedly bankrolled
independent Palestine? Reliable answers to such transnational terrorist groups whose members de-
questions are nonexistent. molished U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar
es Salaam, Tanganyika, on August 7,1998. President
Violent Options Clinton on August 20th authorized simultaneous
The most direct, decisive, expeditious ways to eradi- cruise missile strikes against his hideout in Afghani-
cate terrorism involve violence. Actions to eliminate stan and the Al Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant on the
ringleaders, eviscerate terrorist groups, exact retri- outskirts of Khartoum, Sudan. The latter, according
bution, and punish patron states are among the most to U.S. intelligence analysts, produced Empta, a pre-
popular options. Only Courses One and Two require cursor for VX nerve agents, with technological assis-
skilled counterterrorists, but all demand timely, ac- tance from Iraq.30
curate intelligence. The attack that demolished Al Shifa facilities was
a tactical success but a public affairs disappoint-
Kingpin Killings ment. Osama bin Laden's involvement proved un-
"The only good Indian is a dead Indian" was General proveable. Sudanese officials, who swore that the
Philip H. Sheridan's oft-quoted comment when plant manufactured nothing but medications, en-
Comanche Chief Toch-a-way said, "Me good Indian." joyed a propaganda bonanza when they invited for-

212
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

eign news media representatives to inspect the rub- were among their most infamous exploits before
ble. The well-respected international Organization political and legal reforms knocked props from be-
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons contra- neath their programs. Many members were killed,
dicted State Department testimony that Empta is a incarcerated, or recanted until nothing remained
"substance not used in [any] commercial applica- except a few impotent splinters.34
tions," and anonymous diplomats in Khartoum testi-
fied that Iraqis in cahoots with the Sudanese Govern- Attack Patron States
ment indeed were developing chemical agents, but Sovereign states that shelter and sustain transna-
at another location nearby.31 tional terrorists deserve reprisals, but reasonable
proof of complicity often is hard to acquire and
Eviscerate Terrorist Groups prudent counterterrorists avoid provoking powerful
Intelligence needed to eviscerate terrorist groups adversaries that could bite back. U.S. Armed Forces,
is scarce, because paranoid cells are practically for example, never tried to quash camps where the
impenetrable by outsiders. Leaders take pains to Soviet Union and its East European satellite states
conceal their identities, move frequently, disregard trained terrorists,35 because so doing might have
geographic frontiers, and plan each action meticu- precipitated World War III. Retaliation against less
lously. Skillful sleuths rely on interagency and inter- potent opponents may produce negative or am-
national cooperation, since no single source mo- biguous as well as positive results, depending on
nopolizes leads concerning terrorist command circumstances.
structures, memberships, movements, and methods Rancorous relations between the United States
of operation. and Libya began about 1970, when Mu'ammar al-
Most target dossiers are flawed and findings have Qadhafi evicted the U.S. Air Force from Wheelus
short shelf lifes, but counterterrorists nevertheless Air Base, assisted revolutionary groups around the
have eradicated a number of notorious groups since globe, encouraged transnational terrorism, tried to
the 1970s. The tiny Symbionese Liberation Army, topple pro-Western neighbors, and established
which kidnapped and converted newspaper heiress close ties with the Soviet Union.36 Proven and al-
Patricia Hearst to its cause, lasted barely six months leged provocations peaked with the terrorist bomb-
(November 6,1973-May 17,1974) before "General" ing of a night club in Berlin. More than 100 U.S.
Donald DeFreeze and five companions roasted to aircraft retaliated against five target areas near Trip-
death following a shootout with FBI agents and Los oli and Benghazi on April 15, 1986, despite objec-
Angeles police. All three survivors, including Patty tions by France and Spain, which refused overflight
(aka Tania) Hearst, eluded capture until the follow- rights. Those raids, which lasted eleven minutes,
ing year.32 The Baader-Meinhof gang ran amok in have made Libyan terrorism more circumspect ever
West Germany for more than a decade beginning since, but lessons learned remain ambiguous, be-
about 1969, then disintegrated because diligent cause U.S. officials still don't know for sure why
counterterrorists had killed the most militant or put Qadhafi chose not to respond with untraceable
them behind bars.33 Red Brigades in Italy brutally attacks.37
assaulted "reactionary" politicians, police, journal-
ists, and industrialists during approximately that DEMOCRATIC CONSTRAINTS
same period. The high-profile murder of former Legal, moral, and cultural considerations strongly
Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978 and the abduction constrain counterterrorist activities in democratic
of U.S. Army Brigadier General James Dozier in 1981 countries. Key issues include civil liberties, allow-

213
MILITARY STRATEGY

able courses of punitive action, and the disposition William S. Cohen, in testimony before the Senate
of detained terrorists. Costs calculated in terms of Armed Services Committee on September 16, 1999,
operational flexibility sometimes are severe. justified selective infringements with these words:
"We need greater intelligence . . . here at home.
That is going to put [the U.S. Government] on a
Civil Liberties
collision course with rights of privacy. And it's some-
Amendment I to the U.S. Constitution promises free-
thing that democracies have got to come to grips
doms of speech, the press, peaceful assembly, and
with. . . . How much are we willing to give up in the
the right "to petition the Government for a redress
way of intrusion into our lives?"41 The first terrorist
of grievances." Amendment IV guards against "un-
attack that causes casualties and damage on unprec-
reasonable searches and seizures." A Posse Comita-
edented scales likely will clear minds rapidly in
tus Act forbids the U.S. Army to enforce laws within
that regard.
the United States38 but, at the behest of the President
and the Attorney General, that Service began to
collect domestic intelligence when civil rights and Legal Dispositions
anti-Vietnam War demonstrations surged in the late Public trials followed by the imprisonment or execu-
1960s, because workloads exceeded FBI capacities. tion of sociopolitical terrorists respect due pro-
Army surveillance files in scores of data banks even- cesses, but conceptual disputes and sluggish bureau-
tually covered 100,000 individuals and virtually ev- cracies impose stumbling blocks in free societies.
ery dissenting organization from far right to far left, International conventions ostensibly regulate crimi-
of which the following are representative: the Ku nal jurisdictions of contracting States, yet foreign
Klux Klan; the John Birch Society; the American nations rarely extradite fugitive felons on request
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); the National Associa- (a judicial procedure) or deport them (an executive
tion for the Advancement of Colored People procedure), unless doing so seems to satisfy their
(NAACP); the Southern Christian Leadership Confer- best interests.42 Members of the Palestine Liberation
ence; the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith; Front (PLO), for example, strained U.S. diplomatic
the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy; relations with Egypt and Italy after PLO gunmen
Clergy and Laymen Concerned About the War; and hijacked the Achille Lauro cruise ship in October
the National Organization for Women (NOW). 1985, murdered a crippled American passenger, and
Those practices ceased in 1971, after investigative dumped him overboard. The terrorists surrendered
reporters engendered public outrage and Congress to authorities in Cairo, who figuratively washed their
clamped on a lid.39 hands of the matter, then put the culprits aboard
Calls for Draconian countermeasures that an Egyptian airliner bound for Algeria. Four U.S.
threaten individual and organizational freedoms re- Navy F-14 Tomcat fighters intercepted that flight in
surfaced in the late 1990s when the specter of terror- international airspace and force it to land in Sigo-
ists armed with nuclear, biological, chemical, or nella, Sicily, whereupon the Italian Government re-
radiological weapons caused increasing concerns. leased the key felon without trial and favored the
The ACLU and other civil libertarians contend that rest with lenient sentences.43 Jurisdictional dis-
roving wiretaps, secret court orders that authorize agreements and legal loopholes likely will continue
intelligence agents to trace telephone calls or obtain to complicate proper disposition of apprehended
business records, and expanded internal security terrorists until foreign and domestic lawmakers en-
roles for U.S. Armed Forces represent unwarranted act legislation that leaves less opportunity for
assaults on the Constitution.40 Secretary of Defense interpretation.

214
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

KEY POINTS
• Counterterrorism benefits from centralized preparation and decentralized operations
• Counterterrorism is foremost a law enforcement function in most democratic nations
• Legal, moral, and cultural constraints strongly influence Counterterrorism in democratic
countries
• Timely, accurate intelligence is invariably indispensable
• Rigid Counterterrorism policies that prohibit concessions under any conditions may rule out sen-
sible actions in crucial situations
• Counterterrorists, unlike nuclear strategists, have not yet devised widely accepted deterrent
concepts
• Personnel security programs provide poorer protection for the public than for VIPs, because
financial costs and inconvenience are excessive
• Civilian infrastructure is much harder to protect than military installations
• Terrorist attacks, including cybertage (electronic sabotage), could undercut all forms of national
power
• Cybernetic and infrastructure protection demand close collaboration between public and private
sectors
• Hot pursuits are more easily justified than delayed counterattacks or preemptive strikes, because
terrorists are clearly identifiable
• Counterterrorists who grapple daily with complex problems understand that sound, simple solu-
tions are rare

NOTES tion of the Posse Comitatus Act and Chapter 18

1. For overviews, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Asym- of Title 10, U.S. Code (Washington, Office of the
metric Warfare Versus Counterterrorism: Rethink- Chief Counsel, Maritime and International Law Divi-
ing CBRN and CIP Defense and Response (Washing- sion, U.S. Coast Guard, December 22, 1989; Secre-
ton: Center for Strategic and International Studies, tary of Defense Dick Cheney, memorandum entitled
September 2000); Karl A. Segar, The Anti-Terrorism Modification ofDoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Coop-
Handbook (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1990); Neil eration with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
C. Livingstone, The Cult of Counterterrorism: The December 20, 1989; Charles Doyle, Use of the
"Weird World" of Spooks, Counterterrorists, Adven- Military to Enforce Civilian Law: Posse Comitatus
turers, and the Not Quite Professionals (Lexington, Act and Other Considerations, Rpt. No. 95-964S
MA: Lexington Books, 1990). (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Sep-
2. John Barren, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Agents tember 12, 1995).
(New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1974), 80-85, 4. Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Re-
451-53; Amy W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Depart- sponse Teams Is Unclear, letter report to congres-
ments in the Soviet Armed Forces," ORBIS, Summer sional requesters, GAO/NSIAD-99-110 (Washington:
1984, 257-80; Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, The General Accounting Office, June 21, 1999); Ron
Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Laurenzo, "GAO: Time to Reassess Guard Anti-Terror
Press, 1979), 218-22. Teams," Defense Week, July 6, 1999, 1.
3. Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385, "Use 5. Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow,
of the Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus"; "Catastrophic Terrorism: Tackling the New Danger,"
Title 10, United States Code, Sections 375 and 379; Foreign Affairs, vol. 77, no. 6 (November-
Legal Memorandum: The Extraterritorial Applica- December 1998), 82-83.

215
MILITARY STRATEGY

6. Export Administration Act, 100 Stat. 853 at 874 May Be Billions," Atlanta Journal and Constitution,
(P.L. 99-399), January 1986; Omnibus Diplomatic July 4, 2001, 8.
Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, HR 4151, 16. Critical Foundations, 93-99; Brooks McClure, "Cor-
August 27, 1986. porate Vulnerability—and How to Assess It," in Polit-
7. Clyde R. Mark, Lebanon: U.S. Hostages, An Overview ical Terrorism and Energy, ed. Yonah Alexander
and Chronology, February 10, 1984-December 27, and Charles K. Ebinger (New York: Praeger,
1991, Rpt. No. 92-398F (Washington: Congressional 1982), 209-27.
Research Service, April 7, 1992). For reminiscences, 17. John D. Baldeschwieler, "Explosive Detection for
see Terry Anderson, Den of Lions: Memoirs of Seven Commercial Aircraft Security" and Paul Wilkinson,
Years (New York: Crown Books, 1993); Brian Kee- "Designing an Effective International Aviation Secu-
nan, An Evil Cradling: The Five-Year Ordeal of a rity System," in Technology and Terrorism, ed. Paul
Hostage, 1st American edition (New York: Viking, Wilkinson (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 81-122; Clut-
1993). terbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World, 194-206.
8. Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds., The Iran- 18. Thomas W. Lippman, "Report on Terrorism Suggests
Contra Scandal: The Declassified History, The Na- Closing Some U.S. Embassies," Washington Post, Jan-
tional Security Archive Document (New York: New uary 9, 1999, A14; Vernon Loeb, "U.S. Spent $3 Bil-
Press, May 1993). lion to Protect Embassies," Washington Post, July
9. Brian M. Jenkins, Fighting Terrorism: An Enduring 23, 2001, A20; Eli Lake, "$5 Billion Eyed for Embassy
Task (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, Febru- Security," Washington Times, July 30, 2001, A13-
ary 1981), 4-5; NeilC. Livingstone, "Terrorism: What 19. Critical Foundations, 15-20, A2-A7; Anthony For-
Should We Do?," in This World, Fall 1985, 62; Conor ster, "Hi-Tech Terrorists Turn to Cyber Warfare,"
Cruise O'Brien, "Thinking About Terrorism," Atlan- Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1999, 46-49.
tic, June 1986, 9-10; John M. Oseth, "Combatting 20. Critical Foundations, 27-33, 89-91, A2-A10.
Terrorism: The Dilemmas of a Decent Nation," Pa- 21. Leo Ettinger, "The Effects of Captivity," and Thomas
rameters, Spring 1985, 68. Strantz, "The Stockholm Syndrome," in Victims of
10. Neil Livingstone, The Complete Security Guide for Terrorism, ed. Frank M. Ochberg and David A. Soskis
Executives (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), 73-93,
Brian M. Jenkins, Terrorism and Personal Protec- 149-63.
tion (Boston: Butterworth Publishers, 1985); Richard 22. Walter N. Lang, The World's Elite Forces (New York:
Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable World (New Salamander Books, 1987), 18-85, 114-47; Leroy
York: Routledge, 1994), 83-86. Thompson, The Rescuers: The World's Top Ten Anti-
11. Roger Davies, "Protective Technology for VIP Limou- Terrorist Units (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1986),
sines," Intersec: The Journal of International Secu- 19-54.
rity, June 1991, 51-52. 23. William Stevenson, 90 Minutes at Entebbe (New
12. John Donnolly, "CIA Sees Threat in Global Diseases," York: Bantam Books, 1976); Charles Beckwith and
Boston Globe, June 20, 2000, 1; Jessica Stern, "Is Donald Knox, Delta Force (New York: Harcourt
That an Epidemic—or a Terrorist Attack? A Lethal Brace and Jovanovich, 1983), 187-300.
Weapon We Must Learn to Recognize," New York 24. Facts on File Yearbook, 1977, 192, 396, 711; Doug
Times, October 16, 1999, 19; Secretary of Defense Campbell, "SAS Dares and Wins: A Raid That
William S. Cohen, "Preparing for a Grave New Worked," Soldier of Fortune, September 1980,
World" [no pun intended], Washington Post, July 26-29.
26, 1999, A19. 25. Optional ways to arm and fuse nuclear munitions are
13- Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infra- contained in Chuck Hanson, U.S. Nuclear Weapons:
structures, (Washington: Commission on Critical In- The Secret History (New York: Orion Books 1988),
frastructure Protection, October 13, 1997), 3-6. 225-27. See also Tony Capaccio, "Commando Role
14. Arthur Santana, "Monuments Are Found Vulnerable in Countering Nukes Will Grow," Defense Week, De-
to Attack," Washington Post, July 2, 2000, Al, A8. cember 20, 1993, 5.
15. Force Protection: Global Interests, Global Responsi- 26. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Un-
bilities, Report to the President and Congress (Wash- conventional Warfare in the Next Century (Wash-
ington: Secretary of Defense, September 15, 1996), ington: Brassey's [U.S.], 1990), 107-8.
especially Secretary Perry's cover letter; basic report, 27. Karen Donfried, Northern Ireland: The Peace Pro-
6-10,14; and Annex A, 24-68; Bonne Chance, "Bases cess and the IRA Cease-Fire of August 31, 1994,
Weigh Terror Risk, Security Costs: Bill for Upgrades Rpt. 96-763F (Washington: Congressional Research

216
 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES

Service, September 10, 1996) and Northern Ireland: 17 and "The International Linkages: What Do We
The Talks Process as Prelude to the April 1998 Peace Know?" in Hydra of Carnage: International Link-
Agreement, Rpt. 98-542 (Washington: Congressional ages of Terrorism, ed. Uri ra'anan et al. (Lexington,
Research Service, May 25, 1998). MA: Lexington Books, 1986), 8-9, 11.
28. Morris Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land War- 36. P. Edward Haley, Quddafi and the United States
fare (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), Since 1969 (New York: Praeger, 1984); Daniel P.
313-14. See, for example, Robert F. Turner, "In Self- Bolger, Americans at War: An Era of Violent Peace,
Defense, U.S. Has Right to Kill Terrorist bin Laden," 1975-1986 (Novzto, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 169-
USA Today, October 26, 1999, 17A. 89, 383-441.
29. Stuart Taylor, Jr., "Is the Assassination Ban Dead?" 37. David Turndoff, "The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Forceful
National Journal, November 21, 1998, 2758-59; Response to Terrorism," Brooklyn Journal ofInter-
Harry Levins, "Military Experts Debate Moral Ramifi- national Law, vol. 14, no. 1 (1988), 187-221; Freder-
cations of Killing Leaders," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, ick Zilian, Jr., "The U.S. Raid on Libya—and NATO,"
August 3, 2001, 10. ORBIS, Fall 1986, 499-524; Anthony Cordesman,
30. Clyde Mark and Ted Dagne, Terrorist Attacks on U.S. "After the Raid: The Emerging Lessons from the At-
Embassies in Africa: Aftermath and U.S. Retalia- tack on Libya," Armed Forces Journal, August
tion, Issue Brief 98042 (Washington: Congressional 1986, 355-60.
Research Service, September 16, 1998). 38. See Note 3.
31. Facts on File, vol. 58, no. 3013 (September 3, 1998), 39. S. Kept. 94-755: Supplementary Detailed Staff Re-
608-9 and no. 3018 (October 8, 1998), 710. ports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
32. Albert Parry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Arafat Americans, Final Report, Book III, Senate Select
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), 361-62. Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
33. Julian Becker, Hitler's Children: The Story of the Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong., 2d
Baader-Meinhof Terrorist Gang (Philadelphia: Lip- sess., April 23, 1976, 785-834.
pincott, 1977). 40. National Commission on Terrorism, Final Report,
34. Raimondo Catanzaro, ed., The Red Brigades and June 5, 2000.
Left-Wing Terrorism in Italy (New York: St. Martin's 41. Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, Sep-
Press, 1991); Richard O. Collin and Gordon L. Freed- tember 17, 1999, A7.
man, Winter of Fire: The Abduction of General 42. David Freestone, "International Cooperation Against
Dozier and the Downfall of the Red Brigades (New Terrorism and the Development of International Law
York: Dutton, 1990). Principles of Jurisdiction," in Terrorism and Inter-
35. Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey, Re- national Law, ed. Rosalyn Higgins and Maurice Flory
marks Before the Symposium on Terrorism and (New York: Routledge, 1997), 43-67.
Industry: Threats and Responses (Washington: Stan- 43. Facts on File Yearbook (New York: Facts on File
ford Research Institute and the Center for Strategic Publications, 1986), 29, 518-19.
and International Studies, October 14, 1985), 3-5,

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 19. Nonlethal Warfare Strategies
Military affairs, in the broad sense, can seldom
be taken up in isolation. . . .And that is why a
general theory of strategy must, I believe, be
a theory of power in all its forms, not just a
theory of military power.
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie
Military Strategy

P olitical, economic, technological, psychologi-

cal, and cybernetic means of waging nonlethal
warfare commonly supplement armed force in pur-
lethal capabilities more effectively than their prede-
cessors. Only Grade A students of such subjects,
however, pick the best possible blends by choice
suit of national security objectives and replace mili- instead of by chance.
tary power when conditions are favorable.* Future
quests for victory indeed may take place mainly on THE NATURE OF
nonviolent battlefields, if prognostications by Chi- NONLETHAL WARFARE
nese Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansui are even Machiavelli theorized about nonlethal warfare half
close to correct. High-intensity conflict, as they see a millennium ago.2 Hitler put theories into practice
it, "is now escaping from the bounds of bloody with spectacular success in the 1930s, before armed
massacres and exhibiting a trend toward low casual- force replaced finesse as his forte.3 Stalin, who spe-
ties, or even none at all ... and there is almost no cialized in insidious actions, subsequently annexed
domain which does not have warfare's offensive or dominated most of Central Europe without resort
pattern."1 to large-scale shootouts.4 Creative thinkers since
Parallel views are widespread in the Western then have explored innovative techniques that, cou-
World. Whether those contentions are premature pled with heretofore nonexistent cybernetic war-
or pundits overstate their case remains to be seen, fare, add exotic complexities. The trick is knowing
but present-day politico-military policy-makers and which option(s) will reap the greatest advantages
strategists are consciously melding lethal and non- under what conditions.
Nonlethal warfare objectives typically aim to en-
feeble foes at home and abroad under Cold and Hot
"Chapter 19 excludes tactically rather than strategically sig-
nificant nonlethal weapons, such as stun guns, water cannons, War conditions:5
nonpenetrating projectiles (rubber bullets), irritants, calm-
atives, tranquilizers, adhesives ("stickums"), antitraction agents • Shake public confidence in rival
("slickums"), combustion modifiers, metal embrittlements, spe- governments
cialty foams, thermal barriers, odiferous substances, high-
• Separate rivals from their friends and allies
powered microwaves, low-energy lasers, particle beams, strobe
lights, holographs, infrasound, ultrasound, and other acoustic • Disrupt rival command, control, and commu-
devices. nication systems

219
MILITARY STRATEGY

• Separate rivals from foreign raw materials litical, economic, and/or military countermeasures
and finished products against any aggressor, offers opportunities to do so
• Underminerivalfinancialstructures at the highest levels, because Chapter V authorizes
• Cripple rival corporations at home and the five permanent members (originally USA, USSR,
abroad UK, France, and Nationalist China) to veto any res-
• Alter perceptions, attitudes, and behavior of olution they disapprove, even if all others vote
friends, foes, and neutrals favorably.7
• Deprive rivals of accurate information and The Soviet Union exercised veto privileges forty-
feed them misinformation three times before January 10, 1950, when its
• Deny rivals benefits from technological spokesman, Jakob Malik, stalked out and stayed
breakthroughs away after the Security Council refused to oust Na-
tionalist China. That rash move made it impossible
Prospects normally are most favorable when em- for Stalin to reject UN resolutions that in rapid suc-
ployers maximize shock effects at the onset. Success cession condemned North Korea's invasion of South
is less likely if early achievement of objectives is Korea in June 1950, and authorized a United Nations
essential, important allies disapprove, or adversaries Command to intervene. Malik returned on July 27,
believe that costs of compliance would outweigh but to no avail, because the General Assembly rather
benefits. Nonlethal warfare is least effective against than the Security Council in October 1950 author-
risk-taking autocrats, who not only enhance their ized UN operations north of the 38th Parallel after
reputations by resisting but hope to win by not General MacArthur's amphibious landings at Inchon
losing.6 outflanked Communist forces farther south. No per-
manent member of the Security Council since then
POLITICAL WARFARE has relinquished its veto powers even momentarily.8
Political warfare practitioners manipulate interna-
tional relations offensively and defensively to Foster Strategic Flexibility
strengthen their stance and sap opponents. They Implicit and explicit agreements may favor one
typically may cancel state visits, restrict cultural in- party or distribute benefits among two or more, but
terchanges, boycott international athletic events, ab- all bear close scrutiny, because short-term advan-
rogate treaties, recall ambassadors, close embassies tages sometimes become long-term liabilities. The
to prevent misuse of diplomatic immunity, deny Soviet-German nonaggression pact of August 23,
entry to or deport offensive officials, sever diplo- 1939, for example, gave each signatory great latitude
matic relations and, if additional clout is required, to carry out nefarious plans without interference by
withdraw recognition, which deprives transgressors the other. Hitler's armed forces poured into Western
of legal rights. Adroit moves with potent military Poland one week after Foreign Ministers V. M. Molo-
implications enable political warriors to block en- tov and Joachim von Ribbentrop affixed their signa-
emy diplomatic initiatives, foster flexibility, facilitate tures. Stalin's troops occupied the remainder of that
surprise attacks, and defang defeated foes. country, then annexed parts of Finland, the Baltic
States, Galicia, western Belorussia, and northern Bu-
Block Enemy Initiatives kovina.9 Both sides achieved short-range objectives
Political warriors covet abilities to block vexatious at minimal costs, but Stalin's euphoria turned sour
enemy initiatives. The United Nations charter, when Nazi invaders violated the nonaggression
which empowers the Security Council to order po- agreement and drove spearheads deep into the So-

220
 NONLETHAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

viet Union on June 22, 1941. Two years elapsed Special Envoy Suburo Kurusu finally arrived in Hull's
before Soviet troops launched strategically signifi- office. Strategic as well as tactical surprise was close
cant counteroffensives after they turned the tide to complete.14
at Stalingrad.10
Defang Defeated Enemies
Deceive Adversaries Decrees that aim to defang defeated enemy forces
"All warfare is based on deception," according to by political means are a fairly recent phenomenon.
Sun Tzu.11 Maybe not, but clever strategists made Victors who impose severe terms on the vanquished
good use of deceit long before he made that observa- sow seeds of future conflict if they relax vigilance
tion and their descendants do so today. The mytho- and lose control, whereas benevolent winners who
logical Trojan horse that infiltrated Troy facilitated rehabilitate as well as disarm losers are more likely
a world-famous infiltration circa 1184 s.c.12 General to nurture true peace. Relationships that followed
George S. Patton, Jr.'s fictitious First U.S. Army World Wars I and II are instructive in such regards.
Group, which deployed in East Anglia 3,128 years
later, led German defenders to conclude that Allied Destructive Constraints
cross-channel attacks would concentrate on the Pas The Treaty of Versailles, which emasculated Germa-
de Calais, which was more accessible than West- ny's military establishment after World War I,
ern Normandy.13 stripped away huge territorial holdings in Europe
Political deceit can be just as devastating, as Japa- plus all colonial possessions, required staggering
nese diplomats demonstrated immediately before reparations, and robbed that nation of its self-
the raid that wrecked Pearl Harbor and put a huge respect.15 General Hans von Seeckt, who served as
proportion of the United States Navy out of commis- de facto chief of an illegal German General Staff
sion on December 7, 1941. The first supersecret from 1920 until 1926, observed the 100,000-man
segments of a fourteen-part message from Foreign Army personnel ceiling but, in violation of treaty
Minister Shiganori Togo to unwitting Ambassador provisions, almost immediately created cadres for
Kishisaburo Nomura in Washington left Tokyo on rapid expansion, organized 20,000 paramilitary aux-
December 6, when Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's iliaries, covertly established a high-quality military
carrier task force was already close to Hawaii. U.S. education system, and conducted "paper maneu-
signals intelligence specialists by the next morning vers" to exercise commanders and staffs. Iron men
had intercepted, deciphered, translated, and dissem- drilled with wooden weapons and trucks that simu-
inated all fourteen transmissions, the last of which lated tanks during his tenure. The League for Air
declared that "it is impossible to reach an agreement Sports trained glider pilots who later crewed
through further negotiations." Alarm bells, how- Luftwaffe aircraft. The German Navy illicitly laid
ever, really began to ring only after separate corre- keels for three "pocket battleships" that exceeded
spondence from Togo told Nomura to deliver the the 10,000-ton treaty limit and secretly constructed
complete packet, preferably to Secretary of State submarines in Finland, the Netherlands, and Spain.16
Cordell Hull, "at 1:00 PM on the 7th, your time" Covert violations became overt on March 16,
(8:00 AM at Pearl Harbor, where the first attack wave 1935, when Hitler repudiated arms restrictions that
hit a few minutes earlier). All of that transpired the Treaty of Versailles imposed, then revived the
on Sunday, which was not a duty day for the U.S. Great General Staff, the Kriegsakademie (War Col-
diplomatic corps or Armed Forces. Pearl Harbor lege), and universal military service, despite per-
was already in ruins when Ambassador Nomura and functory complaints from Britain, France, and a

221
MILITARY STRATEGY

toothless Allied Control Commission. More than foreign investments. Those that engage in aggres-
1,000,000 German warriors wore military uniforms sion, spurn democracy, align themselves with ene-
before Hitler invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, mies, violate human rights, sponsor terrorism, deal
with almost as many in reserve. Appeasers finally in illicit drugs, and proliferate weapons of mass de-
stood fast, but it was too late to avoid catastrophic struction are open to countermeasures that deny
combat in Europe.17 goods, services, and funds if they refuse to rectify
or forswear obnoxious behavior.21
Constructive Constraints
Allied powers occupied West Germany from 1945 Commercial Sanctions
until 1955, when the former enemies officially be- Market manipulations, embargoes, boycotts, prohib-
came friends. Restrictions on the Bundeswehr, over itive tariffs, foreign aid annulments, and asset sei-
which NATO thereafter exercised operational com- zures enable economic warriors to attack targets
mand, established 495,000 as the manpower ceiling from unexpected angles. Implementing actions typi-
and strictly limited offensive weaponry, especially cally limit, suspend, cancel, or deny licenses and
armored vehicles. Nuclear, biological, and chemical procurement contracts, abrogate or reduce trade
capabilities were verboten.18 U.S. troops occupied agreements, curtail or terminate attractive quotas,
Japan from 1945 until 1952. Article IX of that na- and withhold or withdraw most favored nation trade
tion's post-World War II constitution declared that status. Confiscations not only prevent antagonists
"the Japanese people forever renounce war as a from exchanging stock shares for merchandise but
sovereign right of the nation. . . . Land, sea, and air enable sanctioning governments to oust managers
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be who deal with enemies.22
maintained. The right of belligerency of the State Positive and negative techniques are available.
will not be recognized." Pacifism remains fashion- Soviet strategists, for example, employed foreign
able more than fifty years later.19 aid offensively throughout the Cold War. More than
thirty recipients eventually relied almost exclusively
ECONOMIC WARFARE on the USSR for modern military hardware. Long-
Economic warriors primarily wield commercial and term loans in lieu of grants generated perpetual
financial weapons against adversarial countries, co- dependence by recipients and paved the way for
alitions, nongovernmental organizations, corpora- base rights, access to military facilities, and political
tions, and individuals. They also coerce friends as penetration.23 America's Mutual Defense Assistance
well as neutrals whenever incentives and cajolery Act of 1951 (the Battle Act) conversely cut off U.S.
fail to produce required results. Economic warfare assistance to countries that furnished the Soviet
rucksacks contain assorted sanctions, preclusive Union and its Warsaw Pact partners with arms, mu-
purchases, export/import controls, and blacklists.20 nitions, military equipment, and other "strategically
significant" items, unless commercial sanctions
Economic Sanctions clearly would impair U.S. national security.24
No adversary is self-sufficient in every respect. All
need access to markets, resources, and capital. Na- Financial Sanctions
tions that are most vulnerable to economic sanctions Financial sanctions focus on investment restrictions,
depend extensively on external sources of raw mate- credit cancellations, fiscal cutoffs, freezes, seizures,
rials, finished products, or both, suffer from rampant liquidations, suspensions of payment, unannounced
inflation, and would become insolvent absent heavy devaluations, and malicious manipulations of for-

222
 NONLETHAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

eign exchange rates. Economic warriors who influ- also issued warrants that authorized owners and
ence international financial institutions such as the masters with clean bills of health to purchase provi-
World Bank cast negative votes when offenders re- sions, fuel, and insurance from sources that the
quest grants, loans, or credit. Other means designed United States and Britain largely controlled. Mer-
to disrupt the financial stability of targeted states chantmen that departed without a navicert or war-
include incitements to capital flight, monetary spec- rant in their possession were subject to interception
ulation, refusal to underwrite investments, counter- at sea, followed by search in an Allied port, a costly,
feiting, finagling with foreign exchange reserves, time-consuming procedure, even if captors discov-
and hampering abilities to acquire hard currencies, ered no contraband.
especially U.S. dollars.25 Export controls are less effective when neutral
nations abut offenders with whom they normally
Preclusive Purchases trade or enemies control sea routes thereto. Lever-
Wealthy governments and coalitions occasionally age then depends on degrees to which neutrals rely
buy crucially important products at prices that ene- on friendlies for sustenance, abilities of adversaries
mies are unwilling or unable to pay. That option to pay, and relative power positions of belligerents
was worth every penny the Allied Powers spent on and bystanders at any given time. Shipments to Nazi
Iberian wolframite (tungsten) ore during World War Germany from and through Sweden, for example,
II, when aggressive sanctions might have driven flowed freely until the tide turned in favor of Allied
Spain's pro-Nazi Generalissimo Francisco Franco Armed Forces and Third Reich coffers became bare.
into the Axis camp. Spain and Portugal both ex-
panded production in response to increased de- Blacklists
mands, but preemptive purchases by 1943 drasti- Greedy companies, corporations, and carriers that
cally reduced Nazi Germany's ability to produce put profits before national security risk the commer-
electrical contacts, tenacious steel alloys for armor cial equivalent of suicide if powerful countries or
plate, armor-piercing ammunition, and high-speed coalitions blacklist them because they patronize en-
cutting tools, because Hitler had no alternative other emies. The United States not only maintained a do-
than overworked wolframite mines in Austria.26 mestic list during World War II, but one for Latin
America as well. Britain did likewise for the United
Economic Controls Kingdom, Commonwealth members under Allied
Allegedly neutral nations that traffic with aggressors control, and uncommitted countries in Europe.28
are subject to commercial and financial sanctions,
whereas governments that unwittingly give aid and Pragmatic Expectations
comfort are not. Export/import controls and black- Pragmatic national security policy-makers and mili-
lists stand guard in such cases.27 tary strategists understand that economic warfare
alone seldom solves foreign policy problems. Allies
Export/Import Controls and neutrals normally must cooperate, unless insti-
The United States and Britain imposed "paper block- gators nearly monopolize banned products. Guilty
ades" to discourage traffic between neutral seaports parties moreover must be vulnerable to sanctions.
and the Axis Powers during World War II. Respec- The UN Security Council, for example, froze Afghan
tive consuls at key locations furnished ship captains funds and other financial resources in November
with navigation certificates (navicerts) that ap- 1999 to make the Taliban Government expel trans-
proved cargoes, routes, passengers, and crews. They national terrorist Osama bin Laden, but rulers of

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that already impoverished nation, who worry little nificant biological and chemical warfare stockpiles.
about the welfare of common people, steadfastly Well-conceived economic pressures, in brief, can
refuse to comply.29 Lenient policy-makers limit "stra- contribute considerably to deterrence and help con-
tegic materials" to items of obvious military value, fine carnage if armed conflicts occur.34
such as arms, munitions, computers, petroleum
products, and scarce minerals, whereas hardliners
contend that almost all consignments are strategic.
TECHNOLOGICAL WARFARE
Technological warfare, which connects science
North Korean Chief of State Kim Jong II, for exam-
with strategies, operational art, and tactics, en-
ple, never needed to shift much time, money, and
deavors to make rival armed forces uncompetitive,
effort from military preparedness to agriculture in
preferably obsolete. Technological surprise occurs
the late 1990s, because compassionate outsiders al-
when innovations burst on the scene without warn-
leviated severe food shortages in his destitute
ing or deploy more rapidly than intelligence analysts
country.30
estimate. Victorious challengers unveil technologi-
Pernicious side effects sometimes injure friends
cal superiority so pervasive and pronounced that
and onlookers worse than they hurt intended tar-
adversaries can neither cope nor catch up.35
gets.31 The Clinton Administration, in response to
Abilities to predict whether friendly (much less
complaints that U.S. wheat farmers would lose sales
enemy) experiments will succeed, and if so when,
worth $250,000,000, shelved sanctions designed to
are fallible at best. A shortsighted study entitled
punish India and Pakistan after both nations deto-
Technological Trends and National Policy in 1937
nated nuclear devices in May 1998.32 The United
overlooked nuclear weapons, which eight years
Nations in December 1996 initiated petroleum-for-
later terminated World War II. Doctor Vannevar
food exchanges with Iraq, because commercial and
Bush, who directed the Office of Scientific Research
financial restrictions reportedly were depriving
and Development during World War II, missed the
blameless Iraqi civilians of adequate nourishment
mark widely in December 1945 when he told the
and medical supplies. That humanitarian move un-
Senate Committee on Atomic Energy that interconti-
fortunately strengthened Saddam Hussein, who con-
nental ballistic missiles were "impossible." Skeptics
vinced hungry people that foreigners rather than
in 1961 doubted that astronauts would soon land
his regime were responsible for their plight, and it
on the moon and return safely, but the Apollo 11
weakened sanctions designed to squelch his nefari-
crew did so before the decade ended.36 Today's
ous weapon programs.33
intellectual giants, armed with infinitely sharper
Economic warfare pluses nevertheless often out-
R&D tools, make mind-boggling breakthroughs con-
weigh minuses, even when desired results remain
ceivable in breathtaking time. Being ahead thus is
elusive. North Korean military power, for example,
crucially important in technological fields that could
might be immeasurably greater if unfettered by inter-
decisively alter military balances.
national sanctions for the last half century. Saddam
Hussein still ruled Iraq with an iron hand when
this book went to press, but multinational export/ Pathways to Superiority
import restrictions in 1990 surely undercut that Two diametrically different, yet complementary, re-
country's combat capabilities before Operation De- search, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E)
sert Storm erupted. Subsequent trade embargoes paths point toward superiority. One is marked "In-
have made it infinitely more difficult for his regime cremental Progress," the other "Quantum Leaps."
to perfect nuclear weapons or amass militarily sig- Overemphasis on either is inadvisable.37

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Incremental Progress is time to prevent them from breeding." Aircraft

Incremental progress slowly but steadily modern- carriers, for example, "stood out as clearly as bil-
izes deployed arms and equipment to maintain pre- liard balls on green felt" when viewed from space,
eminence or eliminate troublesome quality gaps. according to Apollo 11 astronaut Michael Collins.41
Aviators understand that even a slight superiority Recommended replacements include sophisticated,
in target-acquisition capabilities and air-to-air missile but relatively inexpensive, autonomous land crawl-
ranges enables interceptor aircraft to detect and ers, airmobile drones, assorted submersibles, and
destroy intruders that are faster and more maneuver- small orbiting satellites, plus millions of tiny sen-
able.38 Increases in nuclear warhead yields amplify sors, emitters, and micro-projectiles.42
lethality considerably, even when accuracies remain Offense and defense have taken turns on top
constant. The single-shot kill probability of each since the Stone Age. Only the timing of the next
335-kiloton Mark 12-A warhead atop U.S. Minute- flip-flop is unpredictable. "Star Wars" programs sim-
man III ICBMs approximated 48% against moder- ilar to those that President Reagan initiated in March
ately hard Soviet silos (4,000 psi), compared with 198343 could total several trillion dollars when all
35% for 170-kiloton Mark 12 predecessors.39 Nazi components are perfected and deployed, but re-
Germany lost the Battle of Britain between July and sults would be cost-effective, because nuclear-capa-
October 1940, largely because Luftwaffe bombers ble possessors could present nuclear aggressors
lacked adequate escorts. Messerschmitt ME-109s two options: desist or commit suicide. They would
carried barely enough fuel to fly from France to in fact be able to impose their will without fighting,
England and back, while twin-engined ME-11 Os an achievement that Sun Tzu called "the acme of
were sluggish compared with Royal Air Force (RAF) skill" twenty-five centuries ago.44
Super-marine Spitfires and Hawker Hurricanes. Both
sides took a shellacking before daylight bombard-
Prudent Compromises
ment ceased, but Britain survived.40 The same
Modest technological improvements commonly be-
Luftwaffe proved superior the following summer,
come obsolescent soon after and sometimes before
when it swept Stalin's primitive Air Force from
deployment, whereas quantum leaps delay useful
the skies.
upgrades indefinitely. Competitors who wait too
long for elevators marked "Decisive Military Advan-
Quantum Leaps
tage" may lag dangerously behind those who climb
Quantum leaps, which emphasize technological pi-
technological stairs one at a time. Wise competitors
oneering, aim to render enemy military capabilities
consequently recognize that temporary solutions to
irrelevant. Technological warriors who take that
present problems and ambitious programs that
path engage in speculative projects that are truly
promise future superiority are inseparable parts of
revolutionary. RDT&E and procurement costs range
the same package.
from modest to immense, as the following vi-
gnettes indicate.
One traditional warfare study in 1992 noted that Technological Shortcuts
precision-guided munitions already could destroy Phase I (basic research) of the RDT&E process
virtually any visible target, and consequently con- probes for scientific truths. Phase II (applied tech-
cluded that "while it may not be time to slay . . . nologies) translates findings into practical programs.
sacred cows," such as armored vehicles, manned Phase II falls flat if Phase I fizzles. Costs of creativity
aircraft, and major surface combatants, "it probably lamentably are high in terms of talent, resources,

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MILITARY STRATEGY

foresight, and funds. Bureaucratic, institutional, doc- were skilled technologists. Von Braun personally
trinal, and industrial impediments have lengthened presided over or inspired extraordinary achieve-
lead times considerably since the 1950s.45 Even the ments from 1946 until he retired in 1972 as Deputy
most competent technological warriors therefore Associate Administrator for Planning at the National
seek outside assistance that might help them avoid Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).48
blind alleys, bypass bottlenecks, perfect counter-
measures, and expedite deployments. Nations and Purloin Technology
subnational groups that lack high-tech R&D capabili- Most nations that covet technological superiority
ties must rely mainly on purchases, espionage, thiev- pay espionage agents to expedite progress. Ameri-
ery, or the largesse of patrons. ca's nuclear weapon monopoly lasted only four
years, partly because U.S. and British spies passed
Purchase Technology secrets to Soviet R&D specialists, who detonated a
Legitimate purchases invigorate research and devel- fission device on August 1949, much sooner than
opment, but governmental "salesmen" must recon- the U.S. intelligence community predicted. A Soviet
cile commercial interests with reasonable controls thermonuclear explosion followed precisely two
that safeguard national security.46 Computers, soft- years later, just 9 months and 12 days after the
ware, encryption devices, and other dual- or multi- United States tested its first hydrogen bomb. Julius
purpose items that foreign armed forces might find and Ethel Rosenberg in 1953 received death sen-
useful are most controversial, but technological tences for treason. Donald Maclean, Kim Philby, and
transfers that involve written instructions and oral Guy Burgess, who fed the Kremlin vital information
advice may be equally inadvisable. Loral Space and about U.S. nuclear programs and employment poli-
Communications Ltd. and Hughes Electronics Cor- cies from perches in the British Foreign Office and
poration, for example, became subjects of a criminal military intelligence service (MI6), defected to the
investigation shortly after their representatives told Soviet Union before they could be caught.49 Clan-
Chinese clients why a Long March (Chang Zheng) destine quests to acquire U.S. nuclear know-how
missile booster exploded on its launch pad in Febru- have proliferated ever since. China, for example,
ary 1996, because critics claimed that such informa- reportedly tried to extract neutron and miniaturiza-
tion might enable China to improve the perfor- tion technologies from Lawrence Livermore, Los
mance of closely related East Wind (Dong Feng) Alamos, and Sandia Laboratories during the late
ICBMs.47 1990s.50
Friends as well as enemies tend to purloin tech-
Commandeer Technology nological secrets when so doing seems to suit their
Wernher von Braun and his team of rocket scientists best interests. Jonathan Jay Pollard, a U.S. citizen
sired Nazi Germany's V-2 weapon system, which who worked for naval intelligence, received a life
became the antecedent of every land-based ballistic sentence in 1986, soon after the FBI nailed him for
missile and space launch vehicle. That incomparable passing masses of classified information to the Israeli
cadre surrendered to U.S. troops at the end of World Bureau of Scientific Relations (his wife served five
War II and, after scrupulous screening, 127 "wiz- years for espionage). Less well publicized Israeli
ards" arrived in the United States, together with 100 connivings have involved militarily useful semicon-
V-2 missiles, priceless records that totaled fourteen ductor chips, electronic timing devices called kry-
tons, and visionary aims of incalculable value. The trons, optical image processors, and "green salt," a
Soviet Union scavenged a larger lot, but only a few uranium compound.51

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 NONLETHAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

Dangers of Overdependence White Propaganda

Overdependence on any given technology may be White propaganda disseminates information for
foolhardy if companion capabilities cannot compen- which purveyors are fully accountable. The U.S.
sate sufficiently for its shortcomings. Armed forces Information Agency (USIA) throughout the Cold
that forget how to read maps and use sextants could War was obligated by law "to promote a better
regret those deficiencies if enemies destroy Global understanding of the United States in other coun-
Positioning System satellites. Solid-state circuitry tries" and routinely publicized "policies promul-
packed into the smallest feasible space is a million gated by Congress, the President, the Secretary of
times more vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse State, and other officials associated with foreign af-
than antiquated vacuum tubes, because miniature fairs."53 Occupants of the Kremlin openly trumpeted
components cannot tolerate high currents. Eaves- propaganda from 1917 until the Soviet Union col-
dropping devices are useless against opponents who lapsed in 1991. Two newspapers (Pravda and Iz-
communicate mainly by word of mouth or in writing vestia), two periodicals (New Times and Interna-
rather than by radios or telephones. Penchants for tional Affairs), Tass news service, Novosti Press,
computers that lack less sophisticated backup sys- and Radio Moscow parroted Communist Party lines.
tems invite disasters. The World Peace Council (about 140 branches), the
World Federation of Trade Unions (which boasted
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE maybe 200 million members), the International Or-
Strategic psychological warfare (PSYWAR) primarily ganization of Journalists, other fronts, and promi-
concerns the planned use of propaganda and rumors nent fellow travelers routinely assisted.54
to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and
behavior of hostile governments and nongovern- Gray Propaganda
mental groups on grand scales. Opening salvos com- Gray propaganda, whose source is concealed, is
monly land during "peacetime" and, if armed com- well-suited to feed enemies misleading information,
bat erupts, psychological warriors continue to float trial balloons, and disseminate messages that
support politico-military objectives as long as neces- recipients believe come from close friends rather
sary after hostilities cease. Mass communications than outsiders. U.S. psywarriors during Operation
enable skilled practitioners to attack targets far be- Urgent Fury (October-November 1983) for the lat-
yond military areas of operation.52 ter reason led residents of Grenada to believe that
Spice Island Radio beamed messages from the Orga-
Words and Pictures as Weapons nization of Eastern Caribbean States instead of U.S.
Propagandists use words and pictures as nonlethal Armed Forces.
weapons to exploit successes, minimize failures,
and make the most of mixed results. Some target Black Propaganda
specific audiences via television, radio, movies, the- Black propaganda falsifies sources. Discovery can be
ater, the World Wide Web, newspapers, magazines, politically embarrassing, even compromise crucial
and books, while others orate from podiums, pul- policies and plans, but spectacular successes are
pits, and soap boxes wherever crowds congregate. possible. Covert U.S. actions to evict Guatemalan
Rumor-mongers seed thoughts throughout the body President Arbenz Guzman in June 1954 culminated
politic, as opposed to particular groups. White, gray, quickly and cost-effectively in a nearly bloodless
and black propaganda all may deal in fraudulent victory, largely because the bogus Voice of Libera-
data, but differ in most respects. tion made 150 ragtag rebels and a few antiquated

227
MILITARY STRATEGY

aircraft seem far larger and more capable than they Detailed intelligence analyses direct psychologi-
actually were. The Guatemalan high command capit- cal warfare professionals toward targets that simulta-
ulated in the face of seemingly certain defeat, al- neously seem to be vulnerable (exploitable weak-
though its Armed Forces could have repulsed the nesses are evident), susceptible (ways to exploit
invaders easily if ordered to counterattack.55 those weaknesses are evident), and consequential
(successful exploitation promises rich rewards).
Groups that appear vulnerable to rumors and propa-
Rumor Campaigns
ganda unfortunately may not be susceptible, while
Rumors, unlike propaganda delivered directly to
those that seem susceptible often lack enough clout
handpicked audiences, spread as unpredictably as
to make psychological offenses worthwhile. Pros-
oil slicks. Details may disappear during that process,
pects generally are best among urban intelligent-
but embellishments tend to sharpen original mes-
sia, especially governmental decision-makers and
sages after repeated retellings.56 German and British
opinion-shapers who constitute strategic centers
PSYWAR practitioners both used rumors advanta-
of gravity.58
geously before and during World War II. One story,
originally planted in a Parisian bistro, alleged that an
PSYWAR Themes
English tourist driving through Bavaria had collided
PSYWAR themes, tailored to support strategic objec-
with a wood and canvas "tank" mounted on a
tives, seek to divide, convert, or consolidate public
Volkswagen chassis. That canard, which soon ap-
opinion and promote specific responses. Aggressors
peared in a reputable motor magazine, then in a
commonly advocate self-serving arms control agree-
classified War Office intelligence summary, sup-
ments to create false hopes for peace and interna-
ported pacifist contentions that Britain need not
tional stability. Themes that encourage divisiveness
rearm in 1938. Psywarriors in neutral capitals after
typically try to capitalize on ethnic antagonisms,
the debacle at Dunkirk (May-June 1940) convinced
religious animosities, racial rancor, social caste sys-
gullible agents that Britain planned to defeat inva-
tems, and economic inequalities. Themes that deal
sion forces with walls of fire in coastal waters. That
with domestic disloyalty and the dubious allegiance
falsehood caused the German Navy to sheath experi-
of allies urge enemies to switch sides or surrender.
mental barges with asbestos and visions of flaming
Hitler, for example, might have purged top levels
surf must have given designated assault troops a bad
of the Nazi hierarchy and weakened war efforts after
case of the shakes.57
Rudolf Hess parachuted into Scotland with peace
proposals on May 10, 1941, if British broadcasts
PSYWAR Targets had announced that other senior Nazi officials were
Relationships between PSYWAR stimuli and re- about to defect.59 NATO's propagandists likewise
sponses are erratic, because urban and rural, literate might have done more to drive wedges between
and illiterate, military and civilian, male and female, Soviet Armed Forces and their Warsaw Pact part-
old and young audiences react differently. So do ners, whose ranks were loaded with reluctant
leaders and followers, haves and have-nots, skeptics conscripts. 60
and true believers. Influences that affect target selec-
tions within any given area of interest include politi- PSYWAR Techniques
cal peculiarities, "pecking orders," economic condi- PSYWAR propaganda and rumors are intrinsically
tions, religious preferences, ethical values, and neither true or false, good or bad. Information, disin-
folkways. formation, and distraction programs enlighten, de-

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ceive, or confuse, depending on objectives. Shrewd / choose it to mean—neither more nor less." "The
psychological warriors think big, keep messages question is," said Alice, "whether you can make
simple, and are consistent as well as persistent. Adolf words mean so many different things." "The ques-
Hitler, who appealed to gut feelings of the German tion is," huffed Humpty-Dumpty, "which is to be
people, understood those prescriptions perfectly Master—that's all."
when he penned Mein Kampf: "All effective propa- The Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB)
ganda has to limit itself to only a few points and to to that end disseminated disinformation, even when
use them like slogans until even the very last man "peaceful coexistence" was in full flower. No pro-
is able to imagine what is intended. . . .6l grams have ever exceeded its scope, which em-
ployed smear tactics, false alarms, oversimplified
Information slogans, statements out of context, misleading com-
Fanatical Japanese troops, hungry for news during parisons, skewed cause/effects relationships, and
World War II, snapped up Allied leaflets that reliably other logic traps on a global scale (Table 22).65 KGB
reported their increasingly desperate situation and propagandists routinely planted bogus stories that
blamed incompetent commanders for human-wave gained legitimacy after reputable foreign news agen-
assaults that sacrificed them senselessly. Nearly cies repeated them endlessly. U.S. and allied defend-
20,000 surrendered, a pittance compared with ers frequently unmasked frauds, but refutations sel-
wholesale German and Italian capitulations, but that dom received as much publicity as phony reports
figure otherwise might have been closer to zero.62
Truth also can be a potent weapon in peacetime.
Indeed, it was the most prominent U.S. instrument Table 22
Typical PSYWAR Techniques
during the Cold War, when USIA beamed sixty-two
themes on seven subjects to recipients on every • Quicksand Big lies, "popularized" by Dr. Joseph
Goebbels, Hitler's Minister of Propaganda, make
inhabited continent.63 antagonists struggle to refute damaging allegations
PSYWAR specialists who deal in unclassified • Halo and Horns Perpetrators paint themselves as
saints, opponents as sinners. "We are progressive,
facts nevertheless should assess the predilections they are reactionary" is one popular theme
of target audiences carefully before they proceed, • Baited Hook Phony claims fool gullible observers.
The Soviet Constitution, for example, falsely promised
because truth seldom sways true believers.64 Chi- freedom of speech, press, and worship
nese governments that cling to Communist ideolo- • False Label Misrepresentation distorts the meaning
of words. Totalitarian governments, for example, call
gies, for example, still disregard democratic themes themselves "People's Democratic Republics"
that have prompted change for more than fifty years. • Albatross Pejorative adjectives around the necks of
innocent nouns can discredit persons, ideas, and
Concerted psychological campaigns thus far have actions. "Dirty dollars" and "puppet politicians" are
failed to overcome ethnic, cultural, and religious illustrative
• Bandwagon Charlatans claim that "all the good
animosities that make peace seem unlikely in Bosnia- guys are doing it," so everybody who wants to be a
Herzegovina and Kosovo after UN peacekeepers "good guy" should join the group
• Time Machine Inverting the sequence of past
withdraw. events can mislead audiences concerning causes and
effects
• ABC Slogans like "ban the bomb" and "power to the
Disinformation people" promote oversimplified solutions to complex
Lewis Carroll, in his satire Through the Looking problems
• Court Room Smear tactics tar judges, juries, and
Glass, explained the essence of disinformation ex- judicial systems, while insisting on changes in venue.
quisitely: "When / use a word," Humpty-Dumpty SOURCE: Robert S. Byfield, The Fifth Weapon (New York, The
said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what Bookmailer, 1954)

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MILITARY STRATEGY

and the tightly controlled Soviet news media were cease-fire that followed on January 27, 1973 rid the
virtually invulnerable to counterattacks in kind.66 region of U.S. military combat power, but left Com-
munist power in place, with predictably adverse
Distraction results.71 Psychological warfare was decisive.
PSYWAR experts excel at intellectual judo and
games of one-upmanship designed to muddle minds, Democratic Restrictions
confuse issues, and keep opponents off balance. Political, cultural, and practical factors restrain psy-
Patience is a virtue; impatience is a sin. Nonlethal chological warfare options in every country,72 but
weapons include obstruction, procrastination, legal most notably in democracies. "Propaganda," for ex-
monkey wrenches, and Roberts' Rules of Order. ample, has pejorative connotations in the United
Sharp, unanticipated policy switches alternately States, where "disinformation" is a dirty word. Inves-
raise enemy hopes, then dash them. tigators ferret out and publicize black programs.
Sportsmanlike peacemakers are wide open to Freedom of speech gives enemies information with
such assaults. Communist negotiators in Korea be- which to concoct themes that concern political
gan to play physical and semantic tricks on U.S. scandals, economic woes, crime, and drug abuse.
counterparts during the first session in July 1951, PSYWAR even so complements U.S. military capabil-
when Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, the UN's chief ities nicely on occasion.
delegate, sank out of sight in a seat that had short
legs, while North Korean General Nam II glowered CYBERNETIC WARFARE
down from a chair a foot or so higher. Participants Cybernetic knights armed with computers instead
ultimately signed an armistice agreement after 575 of lethal weapons selectively or indiscriminately at-
wearisome meetings and countless battlefield casu- tack information terminals, networks, and reposito-
alties, but the war of words at Panmunjom continues ries to acquire useful facts and disable, disrupt, or
unabated five decades later.67 spoof opponents. Destructive and instructive com-
The first Vietnam War ended in 1954 on terms puter viruses, Trojan horses, trapdoors, and worms
that bisected the country when France capitulated.68 constitute cyberwar ammunition. Offensive, defen-
"Talks about talks" to settle the second Vietnam War sive, and deterrent policies, strategies, doctrines,
began in Paris on May 10, 1968, where the shape of tactics, and techniques still are in formative stages,
the table (like the height of chair legs at Panmunjom) but the "infosphere" has already become an environ-
assumed huge psychological proportions.69 Palaver- mental medium commensurate with land, sea, air,
ing continued until October 1972, when Henry A. and space.73
Kissinger, the chief U.S. delegate, jubilantly an-
nounced that "peace is at hand. . . . What remains Cyberwar Schools of Thought
to be done can be settled in one more negotiating Information dominance vastly improves the speed
session. . . ,"70 The coveted covenant nevertheless and confidence with which military commanders at
was elusive. Frustration replaced euphoria well be- every level can complete what U.S. Air Force Colo-
fore peace talks collapsed on December 14. Commu- nel John R. Boyd called "OODA Loops" that sequen-
nist propagandists screamed "aggression" when U.S. tially observe enemy activities (O), orient on situa-
aircraft launched massive attacks against Hanoi and tions (O), decide what to do (D), and act accordingly
Haiphong four days later; adverse world opinion (A).74 Many senior officers consequently value cyber
blossomed; antiwar sentiments revived in the warfare as a "force multiplier" that enables wielders
United States; and Congress cut funds. The fragile to launch asymmetrical, unattributable attacks in

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"peacetime" as well as war. The first (and thus far the routed railway trains, rescheduled airline flights,
only) acknowledged test during combat occurred erased credit records, altered stock exchange sta-
in 1999, when U.S. Armed Forces successfully as- tistics, turned off computerized water taps, and
saulted Yugoslav air defense command and con- blacked out urban centers.77
trol systems.75
Insurgents, terrorists, common criminals, rene- Attractive Offensive Options
gade corporations, egomaniacal "hackers," and Computer viruses take advantage of standardized
other nongovernmental zealots who have little or no software, message formats, and data links to infil-
traditional military power to multiply set cyberwar trate networks, then replicate like contagious dis-
sights mainly on national infrastructures, rather than eases. "Trojan horses," which piggyback on enemy
rival armed forces. Some nation-state strategists also files, lie dormant and difficult to detect until human
champion that school of thought, firm in their con- handlers tell them to extract information, delete
victions that societal disruptions on a grand scale files, or alter stored data. "Bacteria," sometimes
would undermine enemy military capabilities indi- called "rabbits," reproduce exponentially until they
rectly and simultaneously weaken civilian will to occupy all processor capacity, memory, and disc
resist.76 storage space. Individuals who carelessly share pro-
Neither of those polarized approaches is suffi- grams, even work stations, hasten the spread.
ciently flexible to satisfy all purposes under assorted "Worms" that travel from computer to computer
conditions. Chiefs of State and their politico-military and across network connections cause no mischief,
advisers for that reason likely will elect blends that but they carry codes that do. Defenders must safe-
take particular circumstances into account. guard assets against all kinds of incursion, because
the most insidious viruses mount dissimilar assaults
Cyberwar Targets simultaneously.78
Military command, control, communications, com- Denial of Service (DOS) attacks, unlike viruses,
puter, and intelligence (C4I) networks contain pro- flood the Internet with illegitimate message traffic.
fuse target arrays, the disablement or disruption of Sharply focused versions cause specific terminals
which would immeasurably amplify the fog of war to "crash," because they can't handle the influx of
and correspondingly impede timely, accurate deci- packets that are improperly matched, arrive out of
sion-making in enemy camps. Successful offensives sequence, or simply overload receivers. "Smurf' of-
could shut down intelligence sensors, block access fensives, in contrast, flood entire networks, regard-
to data storage facilities, and sever electronic con- less of size or bandwidths, until they innundate inno-
nections between commanders and subordinates. cent bystanders along with intended targets.
Cybernetic warriors could incapacitate communica- Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) assaults ema-
tion relays in space faster and at far less cost than nate clandestinely from many sites on several differ-
currently envisioned antisatellite (ASAT) systems or ent networks. Perpetrators first infiltrate a slew of
pass signals through those way stations to make unwitting hosts, assume their identities, turn their
computerized weapons malfunction on Earth. computers into unwitting accomplices called Zom-
Governmental installations, commercial tele- bies, then install malicious programs that they acti-
communications, financial institutions, public utili- vate at will. Defenders consequently find it difficult
ties, and emergency services are a few among many to identify and disable offensive machines, much
attractive civilian infrastructure targets. Chaos less intercept innumerable packets that crisscross
would reign if widespread cyberwarfare attacks mis- countless paths.79

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Cyberwar Benefits and Liabilities powers nor non-state actors express much interest
Offensive cyber warriors obtain huge benefits, be- in cybernetic arms control at this moment.83 Legal
cause they determine the battlefields where info differentiations between combatants and noncom-
wars will be fought and strike without warning. batants remain muddy.84
Their operations leave targets physically intact and Poorly prepared defenders already must reckon
directly cause no collateral damage or casualties. with anonymous cyber warriors, who are almost
Acquisition costs, logistical support, and basing re- immune to military reprisals and allow no privileged
quirements are minuscule compared with tradi- sanctuaries. Confrontations between nations could
tional weapon systems. escalate unpredictably.85 Russia in September 1995,
Potentially serious liabilities nevertheless are evi- for example, flatly stated that it "retains the right
dent. Employment doctrines and rules of engage- to use nuclear weapons first against the means and
ment are rudimentary at this stage.80 So are defensive forces of information warfare, and then against the
countermeasures.81 Thousands conceivably could aggressor state itself." Continued cyber attacks in
die if hackers interrupted food, water, fuel, and such event might make crisis management and early
power distribution systems for long periods or bol- termination of hostilities impossible.86
lixed emergency medical services. Police and fire- Highly computerized countries (especially the
fighters would perform poorly if fooled. The validity United States) possess the greatest cyberwar capabili-
of damage assessments proved speculative in Sep- ties, but paradoxically are most vulnerable. Their na-
tember 1999, when Russian cyber warriors pene- tional security policy-makers and military strategists
trated Pentagon firewalls. Whether they gained ac- consequently should think problems through thor-
cess to classified information is anybody's guess, oughly before they open Pandora's Box any wider.87
despite interagency investigations.82 Neither great

KEY POINTS
Political warfare consistently reinforces military power, and vice versa
Cagey diplomatic deals often foster military flexibility and facilitate surprise attacks
Statesmen who impose harsh terms on the vanquished but appease violators invite renewed
warfare
Sanctions are most effective when friends and neutrals cooperate
Sanctions that injure innocents more than guilty parties are hard to maintain
Being ahead technologically is crucially important in fields where breakthroughs could deci-
sively alter military balances
Incremental improvements that ensure current technological superiority and innovations that
promise future supremacy are essential parts of one package
Psychological warriors use words as weapons
The most lucrative PSYWAR targets are vulnerable, susceptible, and consequential
The most influential psychological warriors selectively employ truthful information and
disinformation
Cybernetic warfare is more cost-effective and harder to counter than most forms of lethal conflict
Highly computerized countries that possess the greatest cyberwar capabilities also are most
vulnerable

232
 NONLETHAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

NOTES d'Este, Pattow.A Geniusfor War (New York: Harper-

1. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unre- Collins, 1995), 593-94.
stricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics 14. Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept: The Untold
in the Age of Globalization, trans. Foreign Broadcast Story of Pearl Harbor (New York: McGraw-Hill,
Information Service (Beijing: PLA Literature Arts Pub- 1981), 466, 483-87, 502; Howard W. French, "Pearl
lishing House, February 1999), Chapter 7, "Ten Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show," New
Thousand Methods Combined As One: Combinations York Times, December 9, 1999, A3.
That Transcend Boundaries," 195-222. 15. Fred L. Israel, ed., Major Peace Treaties of Modern
2. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Bonda- History: 1648-1967, vol. II (New York: Chelsea
nella, trans, by Mark Musa (New York: Oxford Uni- House Publishers, in association with McGraw-Hill
versity Press, 1998) and Discourses, ed. Bernard Book Co., 1967), 1235-1534, especially 1288-
Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker (New York: Viking 1311, 1348-80.
Press, 1985). 16. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German
3. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood
Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (Greenwich, CT: Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 181-222; Shirer, The
Crest Books, 1962), Book Three, "The Road to Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 167-262.
War," 385-823. 17. Dupuy, A Genius for War, 223-52; Shirer, The Rise
4. Saul Bernard Cohen, Geography and Politics in a and Fall of the Third Reich, 263-790.
World Divided (New York: Random House, 1963), 18. London and Paris Agreements, Department of State
193-203; Malcolm Macintosh, Evolution of the Publication 5659 (Washington: Department of State,
Warsaw Pact, Adelphi Papers, No. 58 (London: Insti- November 1954); Catherine M. Kelleher, "Funda-
tute for Strategic Studies, June 1969). mentals of German Security: The Creation of the
5. Robert S. Byfield, The Fifth Weapon (New York: The Bundeswehr—Continuity and Change," in The Bun-
Bookmailer, 1954), 9-10, 19, 22. deswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo
6. Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive (London: Macmillan, 1990).
Diplomacy As an Alternative to War (Washington: 19. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991), 3-14, MacArthur, 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown,
67-84; Stephen Biddle and Wade Hinkle, Using Coer- 1978), 497-506.
cive Force More Effectively, Background QDR Brief 20. Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York:
for OSD/SO/LIC (Washington: Institute for Defense Prentice-Hall, 1952); David L. Gordon and Royden
Analyses, March 7, 1997). Dangerfield, The Hidden Weapon: The Story of Eco-
7. United Nations Charter, Chapter V, Article 27, Para- nomic Warfare (New York: Harper & Brothers,
graph 3. 1947).
8. Security Council Resolutions S/1501, June 25, 1950, 21. For lists of U.S. laws that authorize, require, and
S/1511, June 27, 1950, and S/1588, July 7, 1950; waive sanctions, see Dianne E. Rennack and Robert
Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peacekeeping, D. Shuey, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. For-
1946-1967, vol. 2, Asia (London: Oxford University eign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current
Press, 1970), 159-64; General J. Lawton Collins, War Law, Rpt. 97-949 (Washington: Congressional Re-
in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea search Service, September 21, 1999), 10-22.
(Boston: HoughtonMifflinCo., 1969), 9-24,148-49. 22. Ibid., 5-6; The Economics of National Security, vol.
9. Alexander Werth, Russia At War, 1941-1945 (New XV, Economic Warfare and Economic Intelligence
York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1964), 40-65; Cohen, (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Geography and Politics in a World Divided, 193- 1958), 11-12, 17-19.
203- 23- The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed
10. Alan Clark, Barbarossa: The Russian-German Con- in Great Power Policy?, A Report to the House Com-
flict, 1941-1945 (New York: William Morrow and mittee on International Relations by Joseph G. Whe-
Co., 1965), 3-273. lan and William B. Inglee, 95th Cong., 1st sess.
11. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66-69. 8,1977), 68-74; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Soviet
12. Homer, The Iliad, trans. Robert Fagles (New York: Arms Trade: Patterns for the 1980s," Armed Forces
Penguin Books, 1998). Journal, Part One, June 1983, 96-97,100,102,103-
13. Roger Hesketh, Fortitude: The D-Day Deception 105 and Part Two, August 1983, 34-35, 38, 40-41,
Campaign (Woodstock, NY: Overlook, 2000); Carlo 44, 69.

233
MILITARY STRATEGY

24. The Economics of National Security, 17-19. 39. Electronic System Division, General Electric Co. pro-
25. Wu, Economic Warfare, Chapters 4 and 5. duced the Missile Effectiveness Calculator that an
26. The Economics of National Security, 12-13. analyst used to compute single-shot kill probabilities
27. Ibid., 4-5, 6-8, 9-10. for Minuteman III, using criteria in John M. Collins,
28. Ibid. 8-9. U.S.-Soviet Military Balance, 1980-1985 (Washing-
29. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267, ton: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 175.
October 15, 1999, effective November 15, 1999. 40. Basil H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World
30. Wu, Economic Warfare, 10-13; Larry A. Niksch, War (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1971), 87-108.
North Korean Food Shortages: U.S. and Allied Re- 41. Michael Collins, Resources, Technology, and Future
sponses, Rpt. 97-551 F (Washington: Congressional Space Battlefields, a conference paper (Washington:
Research Service, May 30, 1997). Center for Strategic and International Studies sympo-
31. Rennack and Shuey, Economic Sanctions to Achieve sium, October 27-29, 1987), 3, 14-16.
U.S. Foreign Policy Goals, 1-9- 42. Project 2025 (Washington: Institute for National
32. Barbara LePoer et al., India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May
and U.S. Response, Rpt. 98-570 F (Washington: Con- 1992), 54-61, 78-79, quotation on 85.
gressional Research Service, November 24, 1998) 43. U.S. "Star Wars" programs opened with "President's
and Jeanne Grimmett, Nuclear Sanctions: Section Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense,"
102(b) of the Arms Control Export Act and Its Appli- New York Times, March 24, 1983, 20.
cation to India and Pakistan, Rpt. 98-486 A (Wash- 44. Jack Swift, "U.S.: Strategic Superiority Through SDI,"
ington: Congressional Research Service, September Part I, Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily, vol. XTV,
21, 1999). no. 223 (November 18, 1985), 17-18.
33. Lois McHugh, Iraq: Humanitarian Needs, Impact 45. Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Science and
of Sanctions, and the "Oil for Food" Program, Rpt. Defense: Some Critical Thoughts on Military Re-
98-570 F (Washington: Congressional Research Ser- search and Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
vice, August 13, 1998) and Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: University Press, 1965), 19-27.
Oil-for-Food Program, Rpt. RS2022S (Washington: 46. International Transfer of Technology: An Agenda
Congressional Research Service, June 4, 1999). of National Security Issues, Committee Print, pre-
34. For positive views, see David E. Weekman, "Sanc- pared by the Congressional Research Service for the
tions: The Invisible Hand of Statecraft," Strategic House Subcommittee on International Security and
Review, Winter 1998, 39-45. Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International
35. Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strategy Relations, 95th Cong., 2d sess., February 13, 1978.
of Technology (Cambridge, MA: Dunellen, 1970), 47. Shirley A. Kan, China: Possible Missile Technology
1-20, 55. Transfers from U.S. Satellite Export Policy—Back-
36. Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan 2000 ground and Chronology, Rpt. 98-485 F (Washing-
(OPLAN 00) (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Atlantic Command, ton: Congressional Research Service, November 3,
September 20, 1999); George Heilmeier, "Guarding 1999).
Against Technological Surprise," CongressionalRec- 48. Frederick I. Ordway, III, and Michell Sharpe, Rocket
ord, June 22,1976, S10139; Thomas K. Adams, "Radi- Team (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); Wernher
cal Destabilizing Effects of New Technologies," Pa- von Braun and Frederick I. Ordway, III, History of
rameters, Autumn 1998, 99-111. Rocketry & Space Travel (New York: Thomas Y.
37. Fred E. Saalfeld and John F. Petrik, "Disruptive Tech- Crowell, 1966), 106-119, 140.
nologies: A Concept for Moving Innovative Military 49. David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet
Technologies Rapidly to Warnghters," Armed Forces Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Ha-
Journal International (May 2001), 48-52; Joseph ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994); Ronald Radosh
L. Bower and Clayton M. Christensen, "Disruptive and Joyce Milton, The Rosenberg File (New Haven,
Technologies: Catching the Wave," Harvard Busi- CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Verne W. Newton,
ness Review (vol. 73, no. 1, January-February The Cambridge Spies: The Untold Story of Maclean,
1995), 43-53; Clayton M. Christensen, The Innova- Philby, and Burgess in America (Lanham, MD: Madi-
tor's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause son Books, distributed by National Book Network,
Great Firms to Fail (New York: Harper Business, an 1993).
imprint of HarperCollins, 2000). 50. Shirley A. Kan, China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S.
38. Possony and Pournelle, The Strategy of Technology, Nuclear Weapon Data, Rpt. RL30134 (Washington:
30, 38, 39. Congressional Research Service, February 7, 2000)

234
 NONLETHAL WARFARE STRATEGIES

and China's Technology Acquisitions: Cox Commit- 61. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim
tee's Report—Findings, Issues and Recommenda- (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), Chapter VI,
tions, Rpt. RL30220, June 8, 1999. "War Propaganda;" Lieutenant General William
51. Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story P. Yarborough, "The Power of Persuasion: Some His-
of Jonathan}. Pollard, the American Who Spied on torical Vignettes," Special Warfare, Spring 1998,
His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed 24-26.
(New York: Harper and Row, 1989); Edward T. 62. Allison B. Gilmore, You Can't Fight Tanks with Bay-
Pound and David Rogers, "An Israeli Contract with onets: Psychological Warfare Against the Japanese
a U.S. Company Leads to Espionage," Wall Street Army in the Southwest Pacific (Lincoln: University
Journal, January 17, 1992, 1; Charles Babcock, of Nebraska Press, 1999).
"Computer Expert Used Firm to Feed Israel Technol- 63. Field Support Requests: Summary and Themes 1-7
ogy," Washington Post, October 31, 1986, Al, A24. (Washington: U.S. Information Agency, May 1986).
52. Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough and Stan- 64. Holt and van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Oper-
ley Sandier, "Psychological Operations," in Interna- ations, 35-38.
tional Military and Defense Encyclopedia, ed. Colo- 65. Paul W. Blackstock, The Strategy of Subversion (Chi-
nel Trevor N. Dupuy et al. (Washington: Brassey's cago: Quadrangle Books, 1964); Byfield, The Fifth
[U.S.], 1993), 1445-70; Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psy- Weapon, 7-51.
chological Warfare, 2d ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan 66. Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinforma-
and Pierce, 1954); Robert T. Holt and Robert W. tion: An Insider's View (New York: Pergamon-
van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations Brassey's, 1985); Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, I960), 17-72. Offensive), Hearings before the House Subcommit-
53. Public Law 80-402 [H.R. 3342], 62 Stat. 6; Title 22, tee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee
United States Code, 1431-42, approved January 27, on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington:
1948, known as the United States Information and U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980); Shultz and
Education Exchange Act of 1948, as amended. Godson, Desinformatsia.
54. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. and Roy Godson, Desinfor- 67. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, How Communists Ne-
matsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New gotiate (New York: Macmillan, 1955); William H.
York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), 20, 25-31; "The Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean
Soviet Press," World Press Review, June 1986, 8; Military Armistice Negotiations (New York:
Wallace Spaulding, "Communist Fronts in 1985," Praeger, 1958). For terms of the treaty, see Major
Problems of Communism, March/April 1986, Peace Treaties of Modern History: 1648-1967,
72-78. 2657-2688.
55. Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala (Aus- 68. Major Peace Treaties of Modern History: 1648-
tin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 161-177. 1967, 2689-2708.
56. Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology 69. Sir Robert Thompson, No Exit from Vietnam (New
of Rumor (New York: H. Holt and Co., 1947); York: David McKay, 1969), 76-87.
S. Schlachter and H. Burdick, "A Field Experiment 70. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Press Conference,
on Rumor Transmission and Distortion, "Journal of October 26,1972; "Talks At Impasse, Kissinger Says,"
Abnormal and Social Psychology (May 1955), Washington Post, December 17, 1972, Al, A6.
363-69. 71. Larry A. Niksch, Issues and Agreement in the Paris
57. John Baker White, The Big Lie (New York: Crowell, Negotiations on Vietnam, January 1972-January
1955), 1-10, 28-29. 1973 (Washington: Congressional Research Service,
58. Holt and van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Oper- April 2, 1973).
ations, 49-69. 72. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare, 48-61; Holt and
59. Hans Speier, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered," van de Velde, Strategic Psychological Operations,
in Propaganda in War and Crisis, ed. D. Lerner 41-48.
(New York: G. W. Stewart, 1951), 485. 73. For overviews, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt,
60. Daniel N. Nelson, Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact eds., Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the
and the Issue of Reliability (Boulder, CO: Westview Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corpora-
Press, 1984); Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Warsaw tion, 1997), especially 1-22; James Adams, The Next
Pact: The Question of Cohesion (Ottawa, Canada: World War: Computers Are the Weapons and the
Department of Defence (ORAE), vol. I, February Front Line is Everywhere (New York: Simon &
1984; vol. II, November 1984). Schuster, 1998); Edward Waltz, Information War-

235
MILITARY STRATEGY

fare: Principles and Operations (Boston: Artech Hard to Pin Down," Washington Times, January 10,
House, 1998). 2000, A20.
74. Air Force Manual 2025, Information Operations: A 80. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations
New War-Fighting Capability (Washington: Head- (Washington: Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
quarters United States Air Force, December 11, of Staff, October 9, 1998).
1996), Chapter 2. The first written reference to 81. "U.S. Forces Need Rules of Engagement for Cyber-
OODA probably appears in Colonel John R. Boyd's war, Admiral Says," Aerospace Daily, July 5, 2000,
unpublished paper "Patterns of Conflict," (Decem- 1; "DoD Secretary Creates Own Joint Task Force on
ber 1986), 5, within a collection called^! Discourse Information Warfare Defense," Inside the Pentagon,
on Winning and Losing, August 1987. Contact December 24, 1999, 3.
Marine Corps University's Research Center at Quan- 82. "We're in the Middle of a Cyber War," Newsweek,
tico, VA (http://www.mcu.mil/MCRCweb/archive5a September 20, 1999, 52.
.html). 83. An Assessment of International Legal Issues in In-
75. David Fulghum, "Yugoslavia Successfully Attacked formation Operations (Washington: Department of
by Computers," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Defense, Office of General Counsel, May 1999),
August 23, 1999, 31-32. 48-49.
76. Robert J. Bunker, Information Operations and the 84. Ibid., 6-25, 32-34, 41-47; Commander Byard Q.
Conduct of Land Warfare (Washington: Institute of Clemmons and Major Gary D. Brown, "Cyberwarfare:
Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, Ways, Warriors and Weapons of Mass Destruction,"
October 31, 1998), 10-11. Military Review, September-October 1999, 35-45.
77. JohnArquilla, "The Great Cyberwar of 2002," Wired, 85. David Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of In-
February 1998, 122-27. formation Age Technologies: Avoiding Pitfalls, Seiz-
78. Steve Steinke, "Moron Attacks," Network Magazine, ing the Initiative (Washington: National Defense
April 2000, 1; Ralph Roberts, Computer Viruses University Press, April 1996).
(Greensboro, NC: Computer! Books, 1988), 17-29; 86. Stephen J. Cimbala, "Nuclear Crisis Management and
Eugene H. Spafford et al., Computer Viruses: Deal- Information Warfare," Parameters, Summer 1999,
ing With Electronic Vandalism and Programmed 123-27, quotation on 119-
Threats (Arlington, VA: ADAPSO, 1989), 7-30. 87. James Adams, "Virtual Defense: The Weakness of a
79. Brian Martin, Have Script, Will Destroy (Lessons in Superpower," Foreign Affairs (May/June 2001), 98-
DOS), Hacker News Network, February 11, 2000; 112.
Anick Jesdanun, " 'Denial of Service' Attack Proves

236
 20. Coalition Warfare Strategies
True it is that politics
makes strange bedfellows
My Summer in a Garden
Fifteenth week
Charles Dudley Warner, 1870

B irds of a feather normally flock together. Na-

tions and subnational groups on the contrary
often establish long- or short-term ties to preserve
COLLECTIVE SECURITY INCENTIVES
Governments must determine whether collective
security serves their purposes better than nonalign-
peace, win wars, or pursue other purposes despite ment (no ties to any other nation), complete neutral-
incompatible philosophies, policies, and values.1 ity (never take sides on international issues), or se-
Coalitions vary remarkably (Table 23) but, regard- lective neutrality (occasionally take sides). Those
less of characteristics, each member of every coterie able to achieve objectives at acceptable costs with-
must make strategically momentous decisions that out incurring obligations generally go it alone. So
concern the compatibility of partners, the merits of do pariahs who have no useful friends. Most others
formal versus informal mergers, command/control tend to coalesce.
arrangements, and respective contributions. For-
eign policies, domestic politics, ideological links,
Nonalignment and Neutralism
perceived threats, geographic circumstances, antici- Countries pay no penalty for nonalignment or
pated benefits, probable liabilities, personalities, neutrality, provided they are able to cope single-
and other diversified factors affect the formation,
handedly with serious threats. Weak nations willing
configuration, cohesion, utility, and longevity of ev- to withdraw from world affairs may remain aloof
ery coalition. Periodic reviews to ensure that origi- only if no acquisitive neighbor covets their territory
nal judgments remain valid are imperative.2 or powerful guardians discourage aggression against
them.3 U.S., British, French, and Soviet Armed
Table 23
Forces occupied Austria from 1945 until 1955, but
Diversified Coalition Characteristics
that tiny state remained nonaligned for the rest of
De Jure Or De Facto
Large Or Small the Cold War, partly because neither NATO nor the
Simple Or Complex Warsaw Pact believed its real estate was vital, partly
Weak Or Strong
Local Or Regional
because neither wanted Austria within the other's
Loose Or Tight sphere of influence.4
Formal Or Informal
Overt Or Covert
Bilateral Or Multilateral
Voluntary Or Involuntary The Case for Collective Security
Short-term Or Long-term Well-conceived collective security arrangements en-
Patronage Or Partnership
courage the development of common strategic

237
MILITARY STRATEGY

concepts, the publication of common plans, and the aggression anywhere called on the League of Na-
generation of common preparations for coordinated tions for help after World War II erupted. Few
action against common enemies. Obvious benefits mourned when that inept organization vanished of-
include larger armed forces with greater capabili- ficially on April 19, 1946.6
ties, intelligence exchanges, maneuver room, base
rights, overflight permission, and access to local United Nations
labor. Intangibles like goodwill and mutual under- Pragmatists who shaped the United Nations learned
standing are equally (often more) important. Every useful lessons from those experiences. Member
quid, of course, has a quo. Historical records suggest states furnish unarmed observers, "police forces,"
that leaders who promise no more than they can and large military formations with offensive combat
deliver, but produce a little extra whenever possi- capabilities that have helped maintain or restore
ble, do a lot to cement close relationships. All should peace at selected trouble spots around the world
amiably accept implicit as well as explicit rules from since 1948. The UN peacekeeping record has been
the start, so that little is left to imagination when admirable in many respects, but institutional, bu-
moments of truth arise.5 reaucratic, and budgetary limitations are severe. All
five permanent members of the Security Council,
COLLECTIVE SECURITY CHOICES which is the only organ that can order peacekeeping
Two supranational coalitions have sought to ensure or peacemaking operations, must approve every res-
or restore world peace. The League of Nations was olution. Consensus is by no means assured, because
a washout between 1920 and 1946. The United how many actions of what kind to take in which
Nations has reaped mixed results ever since. Sover- sovereign states raise contentious issues. Funds are
eign states consequently tailor bilateral and multilat- sufficient to cover only a small fraction of all cases
eral lash-ups as required to satisfy specific needs that request UN assistance. Ad hoc planning pre-
and exert greater control. dominates, pending activation of a permanent mili-
tary staff to replace the Security Council's dysfunc-
League of Nations tional Military Staff Committee. Some nations,
President Woodrow Wilson and other idealists who including the United States, are reluctant to put
conceived the League of Nations concluded that troops under UN command. Early solutions to such
the world community in concert could deter armed thorny problems seem unlikely.7
aggression by any single country. The unified front
that they envisioned invariably failed to materialize International Coalitions
in the clutch, because a working majority of member Nation-states create bilateral and multilateral coali-
states never agreed on who the enemy was and tions to ensure favorable balances of power and
what action, if any, the League should take. Required thereby attain local, regional, hemispheric, or global
commitments were more binding than most sover- objectives more rapidly and at less cost than other-
eign states were willing to make. Japan invaded wise would be possible. Countries that hope to dom-
Manchuria with impunity (1931); a bloody war be- inate or strongly influence decisions tend to co-
tween Bolivia and Paraguay raged in the Chaco alesce with coequal or lesser powers. Less sturdy
(1932-1935); Mussolini ravaged and annexed primi- states normally align primarily for protection, but
tive Ethiopia (1935-1936); Hitler's troops illegally may possess potent leverage if coalition leaders
reoccupied the Rhineland (1936); then seized Aus- value cohesion.8
tria and Czechoslovakia (1938). No victim of Axis Relatively weak states that bandwagon with bul-

238
 COALITION WARFARE STRATEGIES

lies ordinarily lose freedom of action and risk domi- 1991), but U.S. leaders and their European allies
nation by their "benefactors," but opportunists who locked horns repeatedly because they viewed vital
hop on bandwagons sometimes share otherwise un- interests from different perspectives. Formidable
obtainable bonanzas. Benito Mussolini did so on military formations east of the Iron Curtain directly
June 10, 1940, when he declared war on France, endangered the survival and independence of West-
which Hitler's blitzkrieg was rolling up like a rug. ern Europe, but not North America. Those geo-
Stalin belatedly attacked Japan on August 8, 1945, graphic circumstances made it difficult for NATO
just one week before Emperor Hirohito told his to formulate mutually agreeable strategies in the
people that World War II was over. Cost-benefit mid-1960s, when Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs able to
ratios in each case were favorable.9 strike the United States made European members
question whether any U.S. President would risk a
COMPATIBILITY PROSPECTS full-scale nuclear exchange to ensure their survival.12
Experienced politico-military policy-makers and
strategists are acutely aware that prospects for com-
patibility vary from good to poor. Probabilities are
Ideological Persuasions
Desperate nations with few potential partners may
best when security interests, objectives, strategic
coalesce with countries that champion detestable
concepts, ideological convictions, reliability, and
ideologies. Winston Churchill demonstrated that
ethics are harmonious. Coalitionists can anticipate
phenomenon with his famous statement that, "If
trouble whenever their views and those of colleagues
Hitler invaded Hell, I should at least make a favorable
differ sharply in even one of those categories.
reference to the devil in the House of Commons."13
Most Americans reviled the Soviet Union throughout
Politico-Military Purposes
the 1920s and 1930s for many valid reasons, but
Common purposes pertained during Operations
despotic Stalin became "Uncle Joe," a valued U.S.
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, when the United
ally, in the midst of World War II.14 The United States
States, solidly backed by UN Security Council Reso-
supported several unsavory Chiefs of State during
lutions, persuaded thirty other countries to thwart
Cold War with the Soviet Union simply because
aggression after Iraq seized Kuwait in August 1990.
they were antiCommunist. Rafael Trujillo (Domini-
National pride, prestige, and cultural problems
can Republic), Anastasio Somoza (Nicaragua),
caused squabbles, but basic objectives (defend Saudi
Fernando Marcos (the Philippines), and Mohamad
Arabia; defeat Saddam Hussein; free Kuwait) never
Reza Shah Pahlavi, who occupied Iran's Peacock
were in doubt.10
Throne, were prominent.15
Cross-purposes occur when strategists prompt
partners to perform functions unrelated to the co-
alition's rationale. Only one NATO ally (Portugal) Reliability
granted U.S. transport aircraft overflight or landing Coalitions that remain intact only by dint of coercion
rights to and from Israel during the Yom Kippur War are notoriously unreliable. Cold War occupants of
in 1973; others feared that if they did so outraged the Kremlin could so attest, because it took repeated
Arabs might deny them much-needed petroleum.11 applications of force to keep rebellious non-Soviet
members of the Warsaw Pact in line. Stalin dis-
Strategic Perspectives patched tanks to quell antiCommunist riots in East
Common purposes prevailed during NATO's German (1953). His successors dealt harshly with
lengthy confrontation with the Warsaw Pact (1949- Hungarian mutineers (1956), then crushed Czecho-

239
MILITARY STRATEGY

Slovakia in 1968, when Moscow's "puppet" govern- main informal. Coalition architects choose formal
ments tried to defect.16 or informal ties, depending on governing factors
Few coalition members relish unreasonably high and requirements.
risks or cling to losing sides if acceptable alternatives
are available. King Victor Emmanuel Ill's war-weary Alliance Treaties
Italian Government, with such thoughts in mind, The Law of Diminishing Returns imposes practical
first ousted Mussolini, then surrendered in Septem- limits on the size of each alliance and the number
ber 1943, after which Nazi Germany conducted de- that each nation can sensibly instigate or join, taking
laying actions alone in the Apennines. Hungarian political, economic, military, and geographic consid-
Regent Miklos Horthy de Nagybanya in October erations into account. Treaties to which any nation
1944 likewise tried to negotiate a separate peace, is party moreover should be consistent. The League
which would have allowed a Soviet tidal wave to of Nations Covenant, for example, claimed that no
pour into Central Europe, but alert Nazis incarcer- signatory to the General Treaty for the Renunciation
ated him before his plan took effect, then installed of War could lawfully enter, or remain in, an offen-
a more compliant government.17 sive alliance. Articles 52 and 103 of the United Na-
tions Charter contain similar stipulations.19
Scruples
Machiavelli counseled that "a wise leader cannot Authentic Needs
and should not keep his word when keeping it is The optimum size of any alliance system inherently
not to his advantage or when reasons that made depends on national purposes and perceived
him give it are no longer valid."18 Unscrupulous threats. Countries that confine their interests to a
leaders before and since have used accomplices as single region normally need belong to no more than
cat's-paws, buffers, and pawns. Disciples in the one coalition. Great powers with global ambitions
Kremlin gave evidence, when they sacrificed third- or responsibilities may find several alliances useful,
country assets throughout the Cold War to attain but nevertheless should concentrate on key require-
Soviet ends or frustrate Western adversaries. The ments because "pactomania" almost always is coun-
best way to avoid lamentable experiences is to re- terproductive. Some observers during the Cold War
view the records of prospective partners before accused U.S. statesmen of collecting allies like post-
forming any relationship, but ostensibly reliable al- age stamps, whether partners were strategically
lies even so may renege. That happened in 1975, well-situated or not, strong or weak, developed or
when U.S. politico-military policy-makers aban- undeveloped.20
doned their Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian
comrades who had battled Communist aggression Bilateral Alliances
for many years. Bilateral alliances, which minimize disputes con-
cerning policies, plans, operations, and force pos-
FORMAL AND INFORMAL tures, are most manageable. Organizational struc-
COALITIONS tures and coordination are comparatively simple.
All alliances are coalitions, but not all coalitions are Both parties even so must work to maintain smooth
alliances. The latter require treaties that, according relations, much like spouses in successful marriages.
to international law, are legally binding on every All eggs in one basket moreover is risky business, be-
member. Signatories consequently need to craft cause bilateral coalitions dissolve if one member de-
terms with great care. Tacit partnerships, in con- fects, and collapse if one suffers defeat. States that
trast, imply mutual responsibilities, but linkages re- belong to more than one pact must decide which as-

240
 COALITION WARFARE STRATEGIES

sociates to support, if enemies attack more than one Treaty terms that specify basic obligations pre-
friend or "friends" attack each other (rancorous rela- cisely leave least room for misinterpretation, but
tions between Greece and Turkey, for example, have sacrifice flexibility and demand repeated revisions
repeatedly given NATO cause for concern). as situations evolve. Excessively loose stipulations
allow signatories immoderate autonomy. Signatories
Multilateral Alliances of the North Atlantic Treaty, which takes an interme-
Multilateral alliances offer more flexibility, but dis- diate tack, agree that "an attack against one or more
putes usually multiply. Sovereign states often squab- of them . . . shall be considered an attack against
ble over control. Weak partners may be more trou- them all," but the text does not stipulate specific
ble than they are worth, unless they contribute badly responses at particular times and places. Each mem-
needed assets, such as strategic location. Efficiency, ber simply takes "such action as it deems necessary,
even effectiveness, becomes increasingly elusive as including the use of armed force."24 Individual con-
membership swells.21 NATO for those reasons tributions remain matters for consultation. Germany
weighed benefits and liabilities at length before it furnished most land power during the Cold War, the
admitted Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic United States and Great Britain most forces afloat.
on March 12, 1999.22 Their armed forces, which Iceland contributed bases and facilities, but no mili-
were organized, equipped, and trained to suit tary formations.
Warsaw Pact purposes, may take a decade or more
to recast in NATO's mold, but two geopolitical
pluses apparently outweighed all minuses: those
Informal Coalitions
Informal coalitions, like formal alliances, may be
three countries provide springboards in Central Eu-
bilateral or multilateral, long- or short-term, rigidly
rope from which to mount and sustain military oper-
structured or free form. Many tacit, even extempora-
ations in the Balkans and beyond; their territory
neous, partnerships have enjoyed great longevity.
would comprise a useful buffer zone between East-
No security treaty commits the United States to safe-
ern and Western Europe if relations with Russia ever
guard Israel against external threats, but tight emo-
turn sour.
tional and moral ties have outlasted four Arab-Israeli
wars and endless disputes since 1948, when the
Treaty Terms
Truman Administration recognized that nation
Every alliance should serve a clear purpose within
within minutes after it proclaimed independence.
recognizable geographic confines. The North Atlan-
tic Treaty, crafted in 1949 for deterrent purposes,
identifies its main aim as the "capacity to resist Mercenaries
armed attack" against the territory, armed forces, Niccolo Machiavelli 500 years ago warned Chiefs of
ships, or aircraft of any member in Europe, North State about the dubious value of mercenaries, whom
America, Eurasia, Turkey, the North Atlantic Ocean, he considered disloyal, poorly disciplined, and sub-
or the Mediterranean Sea. Stated terms disregard ject to defection when nations need them most.25
internecine conflicts, subversion, and peripheral The absence of legal obligations nevertheless need
civil wars. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal not make "hired guns" unreliable. The legendary
Assistance (Rio Pact), which covers most of the French Foreign Legion and Gurkhas in the British
Western Hemisphere, addresses indirect as well as army are prominent exceptions,26 along with Monta-
direct aggression and, "in the case of conflict be- gnards, Nungs, and Cambodians who fought shoul-
tween two or more American States," pledges to der-to-shoulder beside U.S. Army Special Forces in
maintain or reestablish peace and security.23 Southeast Asia.27

241
MILITARY STRATEGY

Surrogates (CINCs). Principal participants determine how

National or subnational surrogates sometimes do much authority high commands may exercise over
"dirty work" for patrons with whom they have little forces from their countries. Some prefer semiauton-
in common beyond beliefs that "the enemy of my omous components, whereas others favor central
enemy is my friend," because all concerned hope control. Coalition members must resolve serious dis-
to achieve cherished objectives that otherwise agreements to the satisfaction of all concerned or
might be unattainable. Symbiotic partnerships even anticipate potentially dangerous disagreements at
so are lopsided, because sponsors remain aloof inopportune moments.
while de facto proxies suffer casualties and take
much of the blame for failures. Patrons benefit most Major Military Commands
when they synchronize politico-military operations Major military commands that control combat and
and least when surrogates pursue cross-purpose support forces within assigned areas of responsibil-
agendas.28 Benefactors in Moscow indeed must have ity (AORs) generally perform operational and tacti-
been miffed when Fidel Castro sided with Argentine cal rather than strategic functions. The choice of
insurgents despite contrary Soviet intents, then as- commanders in chief, organizational structures, and
sisted Eritrean "freedom fighters" against the Ethio- provisions for proper liaison all are important.
pian Government, which the Kremlin favored.29
There are no hard and fast formulas for counter- Commanders in Chief and Staffs
proxy warfare, because each case is unique. Na- Coalition commanders in chief establish policies,
tional security policy-makers and military strategists set standards, prepare operational plans, and direct
must decide whether to oppose subsidizers, surro- their implementation in peacetime and in war. Can-
gates, or both in operational areas or their home- didates ideally should possess political as well as
lands. The prime prerequisite is accurate intelli- military acumen; enjoy the confidence of political
gence concerning patron-proxy relationships and supervisors; deal with them tactfully and diplomati-
respective vulnerabilities.30 cally; and be capable arbiters. The best-qualified
officers display command presence, sound judg-
COMMAND AND CONTROL ment, and superior decision-making abilities in trou-
Bilateral coalitions experience command and con- blesome times. Deputy CINCs, preferably from dif-
trol problems, even if both parties are friends of ferent countries and different services, should
long standing whose racial, linguistic, ethical, and complement commanders. Similar prescriptions
cultural characteristics are nearly identical.31 Com- apply to subordinate commanders and coalition
manders and staffs are acutely concerned at every staffs. All perform best when they cultivate close
level that employs land, sea, air, amphibious, or professional and personal relationships with allied
space forces from more than one country, because colleagues. There is no place for ethnocentric arro-
complexities multiply logarithmically when diversi- gance.
ties increase.
Unity of Command
High Commands Coalitions organize assigned armed forces in confor-
Coalitions sometimes, but not always, integrate high mance with situations. Unity of command is prefera-
commands that formulate grand strategies, prepare ble but not essential, provided collaboration is close,
broad plans, and allocate resources to subordinates, continuous, and comprehensive, as disparate allies
given guidance from respective governments, then demonstrated during Operations Desert Storm and
issue instructions to military commanders in chief Desert Shield. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

242
 COALITION WARFARE STRATEGIES

who headed U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), Foreign Aid

took charge of U.S., British, and French contingents Foreign aid takes many forms: money, weapons,
in and adjacent to objective areas. His Royal High- equipment, supplies, advice, education, training,
ness Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan of Saudi construction, and services furnished free of charge
Arabia led a Joint Arab Islamic Force.32 Integration or paid for in cash, on credit, even by barter, perhaps
is unnecessary whenever one nation furnishes all at favorable rates over lengthy periods of time.
forces within any given AOR, or allied sectors are Leases and loans are allowable. Short-, mid-, and
noncontiguous. Japan, for example, continued to long-term programs tailored to suit each worthy
operate independently in East Asia and the Pacific recipient are essential, because some need tactical
Basin after it joined far-distant Germany and Italy instruction more than hard currency, while others
as part of the Axis Powers during World War II. need infrastructure more than materiel. Multiyear
Organizations in any event should ensure the apportionments, carefully prioritized, consistently
smoothest possible transition from peace to war in applied, and coupled with effective control mecha-
the shortest possible time. nisms, regularly reap best results.34

Objectives
Coordination Techniques
Foreign aid administrators variously endeavor to pre-
Sawy CINCs maintain tight liaison with foreign asso-
serve or improve regional balances of power, ad-
ciates to facilitate vertical and horizontal coordina-
vance ideological principles (democracy, Commu-
tion. General Schwartzkopf accordingly sent 109
nism), ensure access to foreign bases or facilities,
small teams from CENTCOM's Army Special Opera-
guarantee continued dependency of client states or,
tions Task Force to assist Saudi General Sultan,
in the case of sales, alleviate balance-of-payment
whose Joint Arab Islamic Force represented twenty-
problems. Status quo powers generally assist junior
three nations with disparate languages, customs,
partners in ways that enhance deterrence, defense,
religions, arms, equipment, doctrines, and capabili-
self-reliance, and internal stability, while predators
ties. Each team conducted individual and unit train-
give coalition partners greater offensive capabili-
ing that emphasized tactics, fire coordination, air
ties.35 Those roles, however, may reverse on short
support, minefield breaching, maintenance, and
notice. Soviet and Cuban logistical support, for ex-
medical evacuation. Each team additionally installed
ample, helped Sandinista insurgents oust Nicara-
radio links and, after armed combat began, con-
guan President Anastasio Somoza in 1979, then fur-
trolled U.S. air strikes, 'which simplified targeting
nished the newly installed Sandinista Government
and reduced the likelihood of casualties from
with the wherewithal it needed to fend off U.S.-
"friendly" fire by coalition partners.33
backed Contras.36

RESPECTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS Objections

Affluent and needy members of security coalitions Skeptics object to most foreign aid, which they con-
ceaselessly debate respective roles, which are not tend may encourage commitments not otherwise in-
subject to simple calculations. Military and eco- tended, detract from the donor's military readiness,
nomic assistance strengthens weak partners who permit autocrats to quash legitimate opposition in-
are willing but unable to contribute as much as allies side their own countries, and widen gaps between
would like. Equitable burden-sharing ensures that rich and poor through waste, fraud, and abuse. Assis-
no member, large or small, carries disproportion- tance, they assert, too often becomes thinly veiled
ately large loads. bribery or de facto rent and seldom provides enough

243
MILITARY STRATEGY

political clout and regional stability to make it cost- beside U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam routinely re-
effective. Critics additionally claim that rising expec- quired long-haul transportation, logistical support,
tations breed resentment, unless benefactors meet and financial subsidies. Their contributions were
beneficiaries' expanding demands expeditiously.37 commendable, but costs to the United States were
Enlightened policies make the best rebuttals. considerable.40
Burden-sharing that is calculated entirely in con-
Burden-Sharing crete terms discounts intangibles. Critical terrain,
President John F. Kennedy, in his Inaugural Address maneuver room, infrastructure, local labor forces,
on January 20, 1961, "let every nation know, and shared intelligence surely count. So should com-
whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay parative exposure to peril. The Federal Republic of
any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, sup- Germany long played host to an immense concentra-
port any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival tion of foreign armies and air forces that intermingled
and success of liberty." President Richard M. Nixon, with densely packed populations and industrial sites.
in his State of the World message less than a decade Its people repeatedly suffered severe property dam-
later (January 1970), declared that "America can- age during peacetime maneuvers and would have
not—and will not—conceive all the plans, design sacrificed civilian lifeblood and national treasure dur-
all the programs, execute all the decisions and un- ing any war with the Warsaw Pact.41 National security
dertake all the defense of the free nations of the policy-makers and military strategists consequently
world." Those polarized pronouncements confirm should build comprehensive cases before they allege
that even the richest country in history can question that certain partners fail to bear their fair share, be-
its input to any coalition. cause false accusations weaken coalitions.
Facile burden-sharing formulae indeed are non-
existent. Quantifiable considerations include ratios REQUIREMENTS FOR REVIEW
between each coalition member's abilities to con- Historical experience confirms requirements to re-
tribute and actual contributions (gross domestic view coalitions, lest they quietly outlive their useful-
products vs. defense budgets, population profiles ness. Multinational alliances established to fight
vs. military manpower, and so on).38 Skilled statisti- World War II, as well as those assembled for combat
cians may assign relative weights and rank countries in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, dissolved
accordingly, but raw comparisons are deceptive and soon after shooting stopped and situations stabi-
attempts to redress perceived wrongs can become lized. Many Cold War partnerships, in contrast, per-
acrimonious. NATO's members in May 1978, for sist unchanged.42 Nearly all seem overripe for review
example, generally agreed to increase defense to reconfirm or redefine the purpose and scope of
spending by 3% annually in real terms. Several of those retained, scrap the rest, and determine
them failed to meet that objective but, even if all had whether new affiliations would be advisable.
complied, there was no assurance that respective NATO, the most complex coalition of all time,
capabilities would increase proportionately, be- has been assessing requirements since July 1990,
cause no document specified how additional funds because present challenges are quite different from
were to be spent.39 those it faced before the Soviet Union collapsed.
Few countries can project military power far The primary military mission, which is "to guarantee
beyond their borders, however capable they may the security and territorial integrity of member
be close to home. Those who cannot reach distant states," remains unchanged. Article 5 of the North
theaters alone need help from coalition partners. Atlantic Treaty still specifies that "an attack against
Two first-rate South Korean divisions that fought one or more of them in Europe or North America

244
 COALITION WARFARE STRATEGIES

shall be considered an attack against them all." • Should NATO place a lid on membership or
NATO's new strategic concept, consecrated in the embrace all that clamor for acceptance?
November 1991 Rome Declaration on Peace and • Should NATO extend security guarantees to
Security, nevertheless acknowledges that "the Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, which are far
threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack . . . no removed from power centers in Western
longer provides the focus." On the contrary, remain- Europe?
ing risks "are multi-faceted in nature and multidirec- • Where, for what purposes, under what cir-
tional." Salient concerns include transnational ter- cumstances, and to what extent should
rorism and the proliferation of nontraditional NATO apply military power beyond the bor-
weapons coupled with political, economic, social, ders of member states?
ethnic, and religious rivalries.43 Strategic questions • Should NATO intervene militarily if war
such as those listed below await firm answers: should erupt between members (such as
Greece and Turkey)?
• Should U.S. military contributions to NATO • Under what circumstances should NATO
be proportionately greater, less, or remain intervene militarily when internal conflicts
essentially the same as they have been since afflict its members? Corsican, Basque, and
1949? Kurdish separatists currently raise such
• Should Canada and Iceland continue to par- issues in France, Spain, and Turkey
ticipate? respectively.44

KEY POINTS
• Governments must decide whether collective security serves their purposes better than
nonalignment or neutrality
• Supranational coalitions that seek to preserve or restore world peace experience severe
institutional, bureaucratic, and budgetary problems
• Bilateral and multilateral coalitions with less ambitious aims consequently
are common
• Prospects for success are best when coalition members share security interests, objectives,
strategic concepts, ideologies, and ethics
• Unity of purpose is hard to maintain when coalition leaders prompt partners to perform
functions unrelated to the coalition's rationale
• Alliance treaties are legally binding, whereas tacit partnerships merely imply mutual
responsibilities
• The Law of Diminishing Returns imposes practical limits on the size of every coalition and the
number of alliances any nation can sensibly maintain
• Bilateral lash-ups minimize disputes about policies, plans, and operations, whereas multilateral
accords usually offer more flexibility but complicate coordination
• Military unity of command is preferable but not essential, provided collaboration is close,
continuous, and comprehensive
• Equitable contributions by coalition members are not subject to simple calculations

245
MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES Dennis Mack, Mussolini (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

1. Maurice Matloff described one set of strange bedfel- 1982), 234-35, 246, 250; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion
lows in The United States Army in World War II: and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1972), 394-98.
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943- 10. Norman Friedman, Desert Victory: The War For Ku-
1944, (Washington: Center for Military History, wait (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991).
United States Army, 1994), 1-8. For a coalition made 11. Lester A. Sobel, ed., Israel and the Arabs: The Octo-
up of competitors who disliked each other, see Diana ber 1973 War (New York: Facts on File, 1974), 104.
Preston, The Boxer Rebellion: The Dramatic Story 12. Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNa-
of China's War on Foreigners That Shook the World mara before the Senate Armed Services Committee
in the Summer of 1900 (London: Waker & Co., on The Fiscal Years 1969-73 Defense Program and
2000). the 1969 Defense Budget, February 1, 1968, 27-32.
2. Ken Booth, "Alliances," in Contemporary Strategy: See also, Daniel S. Papp, The Soviet Perception of
Theories and Concepts, ed. John Bayles et al., vol. the American Will (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
1, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987), 258- Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January
76; Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. 30, 1979).
Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 13. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. Ill,
Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Wiley and Sons, 1973), 249-277. 1950), 370.
3. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers 14. Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia: Russian-
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 30- American Relationsfrom Earliest Times to Our Day
45, 47-49, 248-54; George Uska, Nations in Alli- (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950), 239-
ance: The Limits of Independence (Baltimore: Johns 334.
Hopkins Press, 1968), 202-54; Bruce George and 15. Ibid., 335-46; John M. Collins, America's Small
Laurel David Lister, "Considerations for a 'Weak' Na- Wars: Lessonsfor the Future (Washington: Brassey's,
tion in Choosing Partners for an Alliance," Jane's 1991), 77-78, 147-48, 177-78, 197-98.
Defence Weekly, October 12, 1985, 789, 791. 16. Stefan Brant, The East German Rising, 17th June
4. William B. Bader, Austria between East and West, 1953, trans. Charles Wheeler (New York: Praeger
1945-1955 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 1957); David Pryce-Jones, The Hungarian Revolution
Press, 1966). (New York: Horizon Press, 1969); Harry Schwartz,
5. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, "A Critical Evaluation of Prague's 200 Days: The Struggle for Democracy in
U.S. Strategy," lecture delivered at the National War Czechoslovakia (New York: Praeger, 1969).
College, December 20, 1970. 17. Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (New York:
6. George J. Lankevich, series ed., Partners for Peace: Time-Life Books, 1978), 48-54; Ernest C. Helmreich,
International Cooperation Towards Peace in the Hungary (New York: Praeger, 1957), 366-69.
Twentieth Century; Gary B. Ostrower, The League 18. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans, and ed.
of Nations: From 1919 to 1929 and George Gill, Thomas C. Bergin (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Da-
The League of Nations: From 1929 to 1946 (Garden vidson, 1947), 51-52.
City, NY: Avery Publishing Group, 1996). 19- Clive Parry, John P. Grant et al., eds., Encyclopaedic
7. John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Mili- Dictionary of International Law (New York:
tary Operations (New York: Brassey's, 1998); Colum Oceana Publications, 1986), 17.
Lynch, "Overhaul of UN Peacekeeping Is Urged," 20. JohnSpanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing Inter-
Washington Post, August 24, 2000, A18; Betsy Pisik, national Politics, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart
"Panel Hits UN on Military Planning," Washington and Winston, 1975), 83; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alli-
Times, August 24, 2000, Al, A9- ances and National Security," Perspectives in De-
8. Roslyn L. Simowitz, The Logical Consistency and fense Management, Autumn 1973, 15-24.
Soundness of the Balance of Power Theory, Mono- 21. William H. Riker, "The Size Principle," and Karl W.
graph Series in World Affairs, vol. 19, book 3 (Den- Deutsch and Morton W. Kaplan, "The Limits of Inter-
ver: University of Denver, Graduate School of Inter- national Coalitions," both in Alliance in Interna-
national Studies, 1982). tional Politics, ed. Julian R. Friedman et al. (Boston:
9. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, Allyn and Bacon, 1970), 261-67. For multilateral alli-
NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17-33, 147-80; ances that mainly involve small states, see Leslie H.

246
 COALITION WARFARE STRATEGIES

Brown, "Regional Collaboration in Resolving Third- Operations Task Force during Operations Desert
World Conflicts," Survival, May/June 1986, 208-20. Shield and Desert Storm; Captain Chadwick W.
22. Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels, Belgium: Storlie, "The Liaison Coordination Element: Force
NATO Headquarters, September 1995); Stanley R. Multiplier for Coalition Operations," Special War-
Sloan and Steven Woehrel, NATO Enlargement and fare, Spring 1999, 40-46.
Russia: From Cold War to Cold Peace, Rpt. 95-5948 34. Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, May U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World, a paper
15, 1995). by the Regional Conflict Working Group submitted
23. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1988 to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
[not yet superseded], Joint Committee Print, vol. V, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May
Treaties and Related Material, Senate Committee on 1988), 32-33, 48-53.
Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign 35. Elliot L. Richardson, "The Case for Security Assis-
Affairs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Of- tance to Other Nations," News Release (Washington:
fice, December 1989), "North Atlantic Treaty," 363- Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Af-
66; "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assis- fairs], March 30, 1973); Larry Q. Nowels, Foreign
tance," 293-298. Aid: Answers to Ten Frequently Asked Questions
24. Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1988, (Washington: Congressional Research Service, Au-
364. gust 21, 1986).
25. Machiavelli, The Prince, 33-38. 36. Morris Rothenberg, "The Soviets and Central
26. Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Com- America," in Central America: Anatomy of Conflict,
plete History of the Legendary Fighting Force (New ed. Robert S. Leiken (New York: Pergamon Press,
York: Harper Personal Library, 1992); Byron Farwell, 1984), 131-36, 139-44.
The Gurkhas (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984). 37. Senator Frank Church, "A Farewell to Foreign Aid,"
27. Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Washington Post, November 7, 1971, Bl, B4; Karen
Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 1956-1975 (New DeYoung, "Generosity Shrinks in an Age of Prosper-
York: Dell, 1985). ity," Washington Post, November 25, 1999, Al, A31.
28. Philip Towle, "The Strategy of War by Proxy," RUSI 38. For quantifiable indicators, see Caspar W. Wein-
Journal, March 1981, 21-26; Victor H. Krulak, "The berger, Report on Allied Contributions to the Com-
Strategic Limits of Proxy War," Strategic Review, mon Defense, a report to the U.S. Congress (Wash-
Winter 1994, 52-57; Richard Shultz, Jr., "Soviet Use ington: Department of Defense, March 1985).
of Surrogates to Project Power in the Third World," 39. Stanley R. Sloan, Defense Burden-sharing: U.S. Rela-
Parameters, Autumn 1986, 32-42. tions with NATO Allies and Japan (Washington:
29. Mark N. Katz, "The Soviet Cuban Connection," Inter- Congressional Research Service, June 24, 1988), 12-
national Security, Summer 1983, 88-112. 14; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Defense Burden Shar-
30. William J. Taylor, Jr., and James J. Townsend, "Soviet ing: A Brief Scorecard on Our Major Allies (and Our-
Proxy Warfare," in Strategic Requirements for the selves)," Armed Forces Journal, October 1982, 64,
Army to the Year 2000, eds. Robert K. Kupperman 66, 68, 70, 72, 90.
and William J. Taylor, Jr. (Lexington, MA: Lexington 40. United States Security Agreements and Security
Books, 1984), 214-25. Commitments Abroad, Part 6, Republic of Korea,
31. For U.S. and British debates about command author- Hearings before the Subcommittee on United States
ity, see Forrest C. Pogue, The United States Army in Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of
World War II. The European Theater of Operations: the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st
The Supreme Command (Washington: U.S. Govern- Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Print-
ment Printing Office, 1954), 36-45. ing Office, February 1970, 1532-74.
32. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a 41. Burden-Sharing: The Benefits, Costs, and Risks of
Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 373-374; Collective Security, Special Report (Washington: As-
HRH General Khalid bin Sultan, Desert Warrior sociation of the United States Army, October 22,
(New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 189-216, with 1982); Robert W. Komer, "How to Get Less from
command relationship charts on 244-48. the Allies," Washington Post, October 22, 1982, 21.
33. Conversation in June 1998 -with Colonel James W. 42. For U.S. treaties in force, see Legislation on Foreign
Kraus, who commanded CENTCOM's Army Special Relations Through 1988, 293-511.

247
MILITARY STRATEGY

43. Senator William V. Roth, Jr., NATO in the 21st Cen- 44. William Drozdiak, "U.S., European Allies Divided
tury (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Assembly, Over NATO's Authority to Act," Washington Post,
September 1998), quotations on 63, 68; Stanley R. November 8, 1998, A33.
Sloan, The United States and European Defense,
Chaillot Papers 39 (Paris: Institute for Strategic Stud-
ies, April 2000).

248
 PART IV

KEYS TO
STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY
This page intentionally left blank
 21. Strategic Trailblazers
Thinking is the hardest work there is,
which is the probable reason why so
few people engage in it.
Henry Ford
Interview
February 1929

T he arrogant Philistine giant named Goliath,

"whose height was six cubits and a span" (at
least 8 feet 11 inches, maybe more), wore a brass
Strategic Theoreticians
Strategic pioneers create theories, concepts, and
other intellectual tools for use by doers who prepare
helmet, a coat of mail, carried a sword, and bran- overarching plans and conduct implementing opera-
dished an iron-tipped spear. He disdained little Da- tions. The written legacy includes works by such
vid, armed with a sling and five smooth stones from luminaries as Antoine Henri Jomini, Basil H. Liddell
a nearby brook, until Swish!—the first shot dropped Hart, Giulio Douhet, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Ber-
him in a heap, then he literally lost his head. One nard Brodie, the world's first nuclear strategist. Sun
shot, one kill.1 The moral of that tale might be, "Who Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Herman Kahn, who
Thinks Wins." made admirable contributions that still influence
Creative thinkers are scarce, no matter what their offensive, defensive, and deterrent schemes, repre-
occupation. Strategic trailblazers are no exception. sent three different countries and time periods.
One common characteristic nevertheless is evident,
despite diversified origins, upbringing, interests, ap- Sun Tzu
titudes, races, creeds, education, professional expe- Sun Tzu, who put strategic thoughts on paper in
rience, and temperaments: all are problem-solvers China circa 500 B.C., is history's first theoretician in
who, like Alexander the Great, cut Gordian knots that sparsely populated field. His concise treatise,
that inferior techniques never could unravel. entitled The Art of War, is the soul of simplicity,
transcending time and place. No one in the twenty-
ILLUSTRATIVE ROLE MODELS five centuries since has had a better feel for strategic
Some politico-military strategists in uniform and interrelationships, considerations, and constraints.
mufti are strictly theoreticians, others are prac- Steadfast admirers on every continent except Ant-
titioners, while a handful of switch-hitters wield arctica still revere Sun Tzu, quote him at length,
pens as well as swords. Ten thumbnail sketches and consider him a relevant tutor.2
below identify role models in each category who
flourished during different periods in different envi- Carl von Clausewitz
ronments, addressed distinctive segments of the Clausewitz, who had little formal education, joined
conflict spectrum, and displayed unique styles. Addi- the Prussian Army at age twelve, quickly won a
tional candidates qualify, but brilliant strategic stars commission, and served seventeen years as a staff
have never been numerous. officer. His deathless reputation, however, derived

251
MILITARY STRATEGY

not from campaigns against enemies but as Director and the Indus River. His holdings were larger and
of the Kriegsakademie (War College), where he lasted longer than any before, partly because his en-
wrote his magnum opus On War, which was pub- lightened policies placated defeated peoples and
lished posthumously in 1832. That classic continues made elaborate coalitions possible.5
to influence more students of strategy than any book
before or since, with the possible exception of Sun Napoleon Bonaparte
Tzu's thirteen essays.3 Napoleon Bonaparte, who was Emperor of France
and Supreme Commander of the Grande Armee for
Herman Kahn fifteen years, is renowned primarily as a peerless
Extroverted Herman Kahn was a citizen-soldier practitioner of operational art, but he strategically
whose three years of military service during World melded diplomacy and military power in ways that
War II terminated at the grade of sergeant. His educa- confounded opponents until his gigantic reach ex-
tion emphasized mathematics and physics, which ceeded his grasp in 1814. He employed universal
seem odd starting points for a military theorist, but conscription (levees en masse) to wage war on un-
he built a towering reputation in the 1960s with precedented scales, played opponents one against
such seminal works as On Thermonuclear War, another to isolate each politically, and thereby facili-
which delved deeply into that topic. On Escalation: tated the defeat of numerically superior foes.6
Metaphors and Scenarios, still a standard textbook,
covers the entire conflict spectrum.4 George C. Marshall
General of the Army George C. Marshall participated
Strategic Practitioners in Allied policy-making conferences at Casablanca,
A second group of politico-military strategists per- Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. He was a princi-
form practical feats on land, at sea, in the air, and pal military adviser to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt
surely will do so in space, but never publish theories and Harry Truman during World War II and a key ar-
or concepts for enthusiasts to study. Thucydides, chitect of Allied global strategies (Winston Churchill
Hannibal, Genghis Khan, and Admiral Isoroku Yama- called him the "organizer of victory"). The Marshall
moto, who masterminded Japanese naval victories Plan thereafter helped reconstruct war-ravaged Eu-
early in World War II, are a few of the famous names rope and concomitantly stemmed the spread of Com-
that left indelible marks. The trio selected for exem- munism west of Stalin's Iron Curtain.7
plification spotlights Cyrus the Great, Napoleon Bo-
naparte, and General of the Army George C. Mar- Creative Practitioners
shall, who respectively served ancient Persia, Strategic theorists who practice what they preach
postrevolutionary France, and the United States dur- are rare indeed. Frederick the Great, French Marshal
ing its early days as an international power. Hermann Maurice de Saxe, V.I. Lenin, Vietnamese
General Vo Nguyen Giap, and space visionary
Cyrus the Great Wernher von Braun typify the few who qualify. The
Cyrus the Great, whose reign ended almost 200 years selected four represent continental, naval, aeronau-
before Alexander's conquests began, was the pro- tical, and revolutionary warfare schools of thought
genitor of all strategic practitioners. He mopped up during the twentieth century. Two of them (Billy
the Medes in 559 B.C., subjugated Babylon as de- Mitchell and Admiral Sergei Gorshkov) excelled de-
scribed in the Book of Daniel, then pieced together spite concerted counteractions by powerful oppo-
a prototype Persian Empire between the Aegean Sea nents in their own countries.

252
 STRATEGIC TRAILBLAZERS

Andre Beaufre cal kingdoms before he became Chairman of the

General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, who was the youn- Chinese Communist Party and a hard-bitten field
gest officer on the French General Staff in 1935, commander (Sun Tzu was his mentor several times
later became Deputy Commander in Chief of French removed). Mao fathered fundamental concepts of
forces in Indochina, commanded troops in Algeria, revolutionary and guerrilla warfare, then proved
led the French corps that assaulted Suez in 1956, and their worth in battle against Japanese invaders and
subsequently occupied senior posts within NATO. Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang troops. Students of
Liddell Hart called his Introduction to Strategy "the those subjects consider the Selected Works of Mao
most comprehensive and carefully formulated trea- Tse-Tung to be required reading.11
tise on strategy. . .that has appeared in this genera-
tion—and in many respects surpasses any previ- COVETED CHARACTERISTICS
ous treatise."8 "Scouts," whose mission is to earmark potentially
talented military strategists by design instead of by
Sergei Gorshkov accident, look for coveted characteristics that aca-
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. demic transcripts, personal histories, resumes, fit-
Gorshkov took command of the Soviet Navy in 1956, ness reports, and other personnel records rarely
when it was a coastal defense force. He produced reveal. Graduate degrees and war college diplomas
a first-class "blue water" navy during the next thirty merely indicate that possessors have been exposed
years, despite strong opposition by superiors who to relevant instruction. Personal interviews fill some
preferred land power and the absence of naval tradi- gaps, but are not foolproof. Promising candidates
tions in a nation that lacked ice-free access to open need not exhibit all attributes described below, but
oceans. Gorshkov's The Sea Power of the State ex- they cannot lack many.12
pressed strategic concepts and implementing force
postures that gave U.S. opponents a bad case of Intelligence
jitters well before he retired.9 Native intelligence is indispensable. No reliable sta-
tistics are available, but nearly every strategic wizard
Billy Mitchell is a genius in the broadest sense of that word, which
Highly decorated Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, a Webster's New World Collegiate Dictionary defines
flamboyant and vociferous proponent of airpower, as "great mental capacity and inventive ability; espe-
expounded his views in print, on speaker's plat- cially great and original creative ability at some art
forms, and eyeball-to-eyeball with star-studded dis- or science." Each is just as innovative in his or her
believers. He conceived vertical envelopment (para- own way as Thomas A. Edison and Alexander Gra-
chute assaults) in 1918 and proposed that General ham Bell, even though their outputs are intangible
Pershing prepare a division for such purpose. Three rather than material.
years later he demonstrated the potency of bombers
against battleships. A court-martial convicted him Intellectual Activism
of insubordination in 1925, but World War II vindi- Much of the world's wit lies permanently fallow or
cated his strategic visions.10 is wasted on underachievers, whereas freethinking
strategists possess inquisitive minds. They under-
Mao Zedong stand that Uncle Remus was right when he warned,
Mao Zedong concentrated on political thought, so- "It ain't the things you don't know what gets you
cial studies, and the military history of China's classi- in deep trouble. It's the things you knows for sure

253
MILITARY STRATEGY

what ain't so!" Their search for fundamental truths in social sciences for more than twenty-five years
therefore features enlightened skepticism that and left indelible marks on several levels of strate-
makes them challenge all premises, attack all shibbo- gic thought.
leths, and explore all identifiable alternatives. They
sift opinions from pole to pole, aware that nobody Tenacity
is invariably right or wrong, then discard junk and Tenacity is a prized trait, because strategic trailblaz-
retain intellectual jewels. ers often suffer multiple failures during their search
for transcendental ideas. Self-confident searchers ex-
plore multiple avenues until they find the right route
Analytical Acumen to success, whereas impatient pioneers are prone
Analytical acumen is a coveted characteristic, be-
to quit prematurely.
cause facts require interpretation before full mean-
ings emerge. Gifts of discernment and sound judg-
ment are indispensable when national security
Salesmanship
Innovative strategists who are not Chiefs of State
policy-makers and military strategists seek reliable
or their trusted advisers must be supersalesmen
answers to subjective questions like, "How much
if they expect to enlist the support of skeptical
is enough?" and "How great is the risk?" Successful
superiors. Priceless theories and concepts other-
military strategists, like chess players, minimize rash
wise gather dust. Admiral Gorshkov, to wit, whee-
acts only if they anticipate several sequential enemy
dled and cajoled until he got his way, whereas Billy
moves and shape optional responses accordingly.
Mitchell's abusive frontal assaults reaped outrage
until senior officers cashiered him.
Broad Knowledge Base
Most superlative politico-military strategists are gen- COMPOSITE REQUIREMENTS
eralists whose professional knowledge base is ex- No catalog of characteristics could ever be complete
ceedingly broad. They acquire depth as required without reminding readers that strategy formulation
from the detailed wisdom of experts in relevant is an intricate act. Masters possess all or most of
disciplines. Herman Kahn's fame, for example, the attributes described in this brief chapter, but
might have been confined to some esoteric subject, consistent success additionally demands generous
such as theories of gaming, if math and physics had injections of a priori apperception, divine revela-
remained his fortes. Instead, he ranged far and wide tion, intuition, and God-given common sense.

254
 STRATEGIC TRAILBLAZERS

KEY POINTS

Brilliant military strategists have never been numerous

Some politico-military strategists are theoreticians, others are practitioners, while a handful of
switch-hitters wield pens as well as swords
Strategic pioneers create theories, concepts, and other intellectual tools
Strategic practitioners incorporate theories and concepts into offensive, defensive, and deterrent
plans
Switch-hitting strategists, a rare breed indeed, are theorists who practice what they preach
Scouts in search of potentially sharp strategists should concentrate on candidates who are smart,
inquisitive, imaginative, skeptical, open-minded, persistent, and articulate
A review of strategic role models in each category nevertheless reveals that personal
characteristics, education, and practical experiences vary considerably
Aptitudes and problem-solving abilities constitute the most common threads
Common sense is the quintessential requirement
Who thinks, wins

NOTES 1943-1945 (New York: Viking, 1966, 1973); Leo-

1. The Holy Bible, First Book of Samuel, "David and nard Mosley, Marshall: Hero for Our Times (New
Goliath." York: Hurst Books, 1982).
2. Sun Tzu, The An of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith 8. General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), Liddell Hart's
3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael quotation is on page 10.
Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 9. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G.
University Press, 1976); Michael I. Handel, Sun Tzu Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis,
& Clausewitz Compared (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Stra- MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
tegic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1991). 10. Brigadier General William Mitchell, diary entitled
4. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, From Start to Finish of Our Greatest War, ed. and
NJ: Princeton University Press, I960) and On Escala- published posthumously as Memoirs of World War
tion: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: I (New York: Random House, I960), vertical envel-
Praeger, 1965). opment views on 268; Burke Davis, The Billy Mitch-
5. Harold Lamb, Cyrus the Great (Garden City, NY: ell Affair (New York: Random House), 1967.
Doubleday, I960); Royal Persia: A Commemoration 11. Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung (London: Lawrence
of Cyrus the Great and His Successors on the Occa- and Wishart, 1954-56); Robert Payne, Portrait of a
sion of the 2500th Anniversary of the Founding of Revolutionary: Mao Tse-Tung (New York: Albard-
the Persian Empire (London: British Museum, 1971). Schuman, 1961).
6. Jay Luvaas, ed., Napoleon on the Art of War (New 12. A slightly different version of coveted characteristics
York: Free Press, 1999); Peter Paret, "Napoleon and originally appeared in John M. Collins, Grand Strat-
the Revolution in War," in Makers of Modern Strat- egy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval
egy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Institute Press, 1973), 222-25.
Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 123-42.
7. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, vol. 2, Ordeal
and Hope, 1939-1942; vol. 3, Organizer of Victory,

255
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 22. Strategic Stepping-Stones
'Tis Education forms the common mind;
Just as the twig is bent the tree's inclined.
Alexander Pope
Moral Essays, Epistle I
1733

S tepping-stones to strategic superiority start with

intuitive, insightful minds and other attributes
that Chapter 21 describes, but full development of
rected approaches that specify what tacks to take
are "the kiss of death." The world would still be
waiting for Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity if
innate potential demands environments conducive initiation of that multipurpose project had hinged
to creativity, progressive politico-military education, on instructions from wheelers and dealers who are
incisive research techniques, and a wealth of practi- preoccupied with "practical matters."
cal experience. Front-runners seize and maintain Enlightened overseers, even in closed societies
intellectual initiative, which facilitates freedom of such as a Communist China, eschew any need for
action in strategic arenas. strategic trailblazers to justify, defend, support, or
parrot official policy.5 On the contrary, they encour-
CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTS age unconventional experimentation, prize opin-
Niccolo Machiavelli penned The Prince and Dis- ions that "rock the boat," and tolerate repeated false
courses on the family farm near San Casiano during starts, because intellectual pioneers are apt to be
a period of idleness after the Medici ousted him timid if punishment is the reward for failure.
from his Florentine office in 1512.1 Alfred Thayer Learned senior officials also understand that strict
Mahan wrote The Influence of Sea Power Upon deadlines discourage creative thought—neither
History while he was cloistered at the U.S. Naval Beethoven nor any other virtuoso could have prom-
War College (1886-1893).2 Mao's strategic concepts ised to compose a masterpiece for the House of
took shape during the 1930s in a cave near Bao'an Habsburg by 1530 hours on a Friday afternoon.
at the end of the Long March, while his army re-
grouped, reinforced, resupplied, and retrained far Unregimented Regimens
from the worries of war.3 Most towering strategic Clock-punchers limit their productivity to rigidly
theorists before and since similarly enjoyed intellec- budgeted schedules, while drudges nailed to desks
tual freedom and tranquil opportunities to think.4 become brain-dead. Strategic geniuses, who shun
either regimen, generally immerse themselves in
Intellectual Freedom projects more or less continuously, wherever they
Strategic theorizing is to strategic planning as basic may be. They make contact with progressive ideas
scientific research is to applied technology. Creative at odd intervals in bedrooms or baths, at breakfast,
thinkers, whose aim is originality, flourish best un- on buses, and in bars. Day in and day out, they rack
der conditions that encourage flights of fancy. Di- up more fruitful hours than regimented counter-

257
MILITARY STRATEGY

parts, but at paces tailored to suit their tempera- and Giap.6 Pertinent tutelage nevertheless could
ments. give the most gifted performers a flying start and
progressively embellish their competence.
Prolific Contacts
Most of the old masters conceived innovative ideas Conspicuous Deficiencies
in isolation, but few distinguished theorists do so Civilian academic communities the world over
today, because scopes have expanded exponentially award undergraduate and graduate degrees in politi-
and problems have become immeasurably more cal science and related fields that focus on interna-
complex. The importance of formal and informal tional relations. Several hundred colleges in the
team play thus has magnified manyfold since Sun United States currently address such disciplines.7
Tzu and Clausewitz produced strategic showpieces. Many other nations offer similar courses of instruc-
Security classifications, which strategic planners tion. The pool of foreign policy aspirants accord-
treasure, stultify theoreticians. Trailblazers who syn- ingly is large.
thesize and expand ideas acquired from passive at- U.S. senior service colleges, in contrast, survey
tendance at, or active participation in, assorted open so many subjects in one academic year that none
forums consequently flower most profusely. Rigor- have time to explore strategic theories and concepts
ous peer reviews during incubation stages are advis- in depth across the conflict spectrum, much less
able, provided they avoid enforced compromise and develop alternatives. Penetrating reviews in the late
committee solutions, which thwart creativity just 1980s revealed shortcomings8 that stubbornly per-
as surely as castigation. Critique sessions and reac- sist.9 Professional military education systems in most
tions to "trial balloons" serve best when they air foreign countries encountered comparable afflic-
opposing opinions and expose weak arguments, but tions during the latter half of the twentieth century,
leave originators free to adopt or disregard advice with one prominent exception: the Voroshilov
as they see fit. Academy of the Soviet General Staff in Moscow em-
ployed active-duty marshals, generals, and admirals
Continuity as faculty, the student body embraced junior gener-
Professional theoreticians and concept formulators als, and instruction lasted two years.10 That august
should welcome periodic acquaintanceships with institution produced many notable products, of
"the real world" to broaden perceptions, identify which Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskiy's
unsolved problems, and broaden knowledge bases. Soviet Military Strategy was just one.11
Extensive experience nevertheless suggests that in-
novative strategists who stray from "ivory towers" Corrective Actions
too long may lose their magical touch. A self-sustaining core of superlative politico-military
strategists (not a Prussian General Staff-style corps
STRATEGIC EDUCATION with operational responsibilities12) requires well-
Some of history's most eminent military strategists rounded career patterns and progressive education
had no formal education of any kind, while others programs that repeatedly expose handpicked stu-
garnered degrees unrelated to the profession of dents to topics of increasing complexity. The identi-
arms. Self-instruction and practical experience pre- fication, selection by competitive examination, and
pared such luminaries as Alexander, Hannibal, his initial development of young officers who show
nemesis Scipio Africanus, Julius Caesar, Genghis great promise should start at an early stage13 and
Khan, Suleiman the Magnificent, Jomini, Douhet, culminate at a national center for strategic studies.

258
 STRATEGIC STEPPING-STONES

The Charter so students can absorb maximum informa-

The charter for such a center, according to Admiral tion in minimum time
William J. Crowe, Jr., when he was Chairman of the • Conduct classroom instruction and lead stu-
Joint Chiefs of Staff, should concentrate on the roots dent debates that dissect strategic principles
of national security strategies, contemporary inter- and practices across the conflict spectrum
national systems, worldwide trends, and judgments
that concern where, when, and how to employ
The first National War College staff and faculty
armed forces most effectively.14 Courses on the evo-
(1946-1947), which featured a mix of towering the-
lution of strategic thought, followed by comparative
oreticians and practitioners, might well serve as a
analyses of past, present, and proposed concepts,
model. Major General Alfred Gruenther, the Deputy
could comprise additional cornerstones.15
Commandant, had been General Eisenhower's Dep-
uty Chief of Staff during World War II. He later
The Commandant
became the first Director of the U.S. Joint Staff, then
The commandant, who sets policies, precedents,
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).
and standards for the recommended center, also
George F. Kennan, his civilian counterpart, con-
picks faculty members, shapes research programs,
ceived the U.S. Cold War concept of containment
and supervises implementation. Irreducible creden-
at the National War College, then penned "The
tials should include:
Sources of Soviet Power," which Foreign Affairs
published anonymously in 1947.16 Dr. Bernard Bro-
• A national (preferably international) reputa-
die wrote the original works regarding nuclear strat-
tion sufficient to attract and retain top talent
egy.17 Dr. Sherman Kent's treatise entitled Strategic
• Proven competence as a politico-military
Intelligence became a globally acclaimed text-
strategist
book.18 Major General Lyman L. Lemnitzer suc-
• Demonstrated interest in, and aptitudes for,
ceeded General Gruenther, then became Army
education (neither attribute would be ade-
Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
quate without the other)
and SACEUR. Lieutenant General Andrew J.
• Thorough familiarity with national security
Goodpaster, who briefly was Commandant, later
decision-making processes at home and
wore four stars as SACEUR, but the stature of re-
abroad
placements has been less imposing ever since.19
The Faculty
Faculty members must possess similar qualifications Tenures
to command the respect of student bodies that con- The initial cadre and General Goodpaster left the
sist of generals, admirals, other senior officers drawn National War College after one academic year. Gen-
from all military services, and high-ranking civilians. eral Lemnitzer watched the classes of 1948 and 1949
The faculty's mission, given guidance from the com- graduate, then departed. Those terms were too short
mandant, should be to: to make indelible marks. Five-year tenures might
be a reasonable minimum for the recommended
• Customize curricula for resident, correspon- center's commandant as well as faculty. Longer
dence, refresher, and cram courses terms predicated on laudatory performance would
• Prepare instructional materials that synthe- allow supervisors to retain the best and periodically
size the full range of opinion on each topic, weed out the rest.

259
MILITARY STRATEGY

STRATEGIC RESEARCH and limit scenarios to no more than three; some

Professional military education and related research prefer a single trunk with multiple offshoots.22 Pos-
are inseparable. No national center for strategic stud- tulations predicated on generally agreed trends,
ies could become a fountainhead of strategic knowl- such as the quintet below, generate the fewest argu-
edge without access to a constant stream of innova- ments:
tive theories and concepts that resident intellectuals
and outsiders produce. Problems range from com-
• Asymmetrical strategies likely will enable
paratively simple to incredibly complex as investiga-
nongovernmental groups to compete ever
tors feel their way into the future using traditional
more effectively with nation-states
and nontraditional techniques.
• Technologies of military significance likely
will continue to accelerate at hypersonic
Present Problems paces
Official and freelance think tanks produce truck- • Natural resources likely will become increas-
loads of thoughtful reports, but few dreamers, here- ingly scarce in a world that likely will be-
tics, and gadflies in their employ have probed strate- come increasingly interdependent
gic frontiers since Herman Kahn held sway at the • Racial, ethnic, religious, and territorial rival-
Hudson Institute in the 1960s. Sample topics that ries, coupled with population explosions
cry for concerted exploration include reliable ways and increasing economic gaps between
to deter terrorism, halt the proliferation of nuclear, "haves" and "have-nots," likely will lead to
biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) weap- armed conflicts of regional, even global,
ons, and defend against cybernetic warfare. National gravity
security issues connected with global pollution and • Traditional armed forces and terrorists likely
resource despoliation pose other thorny problems. will employ NBCR weapons within the fore-
Under what conditions, pray tell, should aggrieved seeable future
nations use armed force to handle sovereign states
that wantonly raze rain forests, use petroleum for
economic warfare purposes, divert precious water
Nontraditional Techniques
French General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, a creative
resources that neighbors desperately need, pillage
thinker who also was a skilled practitioner, several
fisheries along continental shelves, carelessly dis-
decades ago claimed that strategists should discard
pose of hazardous waste, or otherwise injure neigh-
hypotheses based on precedents and probabilities.
bors, even international communities?20
"No artist," he noted, "has ever painted a picture
by following a complete set of theoretical rules."23
Future Problems Beaufre may have been a bit hyperbolic, but futurists
Strategic researchers need to anticipate problems Alvin and Heidi Toffler reinforced his sentiments
before crises arise, an intimidating task at best. Alter- with these words: "We believe that the promise of
native visions of the future comprise the starting the twenty-first century will evaporate if we con-
point,21 but the reliability of assumptions that shape tinue using the intellectual weapons of yesterday.
optimistic and pessimistic projections decreases It will vanish even faster," they continued, "if we
with the distance that seers peer into the future. ever forget" Leon Trotsky's admonition that "You
Experienced strategists consequently tend to con- may not be interested in war, but war is interested
fine their outlooks to fewer than twenty-five years in you."24

260
 STRATEGIC STEPPING-STONES

Nonlinear Outlooks ent knowledge bases quickly and cost-effectively.

Real life is messy, but most military strategists re- Specialized clearinghouses could feed research facil-
main fond of linear cause-and-effect relationships ities at a national center for strategic studies. U.S.
that introduce order into otherwise disorderly situa- Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) indeed
tions. Chaos theories, in contrast, deal with frictions activated a prototype in January 1994.29
that exert disproportionately large influences over Data collection campaigns, unclassified from
almost every aspect of human life.25 Hectic prepara- start to finish, solicit contributions from active, re-
tions, uncooperative weather, unexpected casual- serve, and retired military personnel, plus selected
ties, last-minute mission changes, and fear often civilians (Figure 5 is illustrative). Conduits include
make armed combat an iffy proposition, as Clause- telephonic connections, professional publications
witz explained in his classic On War.26 that routinely reach targeted audiences, "snail mail,"
Complexity theorists study interactions among e-mail, and the World Wide Web.
elements on the edge of chaos, between order and USSOCOM's initial advertisement posed the fol-
confusion, a dynamic, unstable environment that lowing questions: "How many times have you or
displays both characteristics. Proponents of that dis- your people had a better way of doing a job than
cipline contend that locally unpredictable occur- current procedures dictate? When was the last time
rences are structured, coherent, and cohesive when someone in your unit said, 'If I were a general for
viewed from broader perspectives. Their mission is a day, I'd. . . ?' Well, here's your chance to change
to discern behavioral patterns despite the clutter, the world. The only limits to this process are your
determine how local turmoil affects "big pictures," imagination and creativity."30 Strategic researchers
improve predictability, and thus enable adaptive or- operate on a different plane, but similarly keep re-
ganizations to manipulate disorder more effectively quests simple, because polished input is less impor-
than presently is possible.27 tant than seminal ideas. Oral communications, skele-
Military strategists are just beginning to connect ton outlines, and legibly scribbled foolscap are
chaos and complexity theories with war, which is in- preferable to lengthy papers, provided they capture
herently chaotic, complex, dynamic, and nonlinear. the essence. Prodigies who cannot write or lack free
Concerted applications of those intriguing intellec- time consequently could participate. Clearinghouse
tual tools might enable current and future researchers staffs should also accept anonymous offerings from
to attack crucial problems from radically different di- individuals who are forbidden to express advocative
rections than their predecessors. Fresh insights con- or provocative views in public.
ceivably could create conceptual "force multipliers" No-holds-barred brainstorming produces a few
that consistently rather than hapazardly vest military jewels buried beneath piles of junk. Each clearing-
formations with combat capabilities equal to more house consequently must sift every batch in search
than the sum of their parts, so that 1+1=2.5 or 3.28 of useful thoughts, giving open-minded consider-
ation to "far out" flights of fancy before they accept
Unconventional Outreach or reject submissions. A wide variety of knowledge-
The finest strategic research institutes permanently able critics should embellish or rebut the best contri-
employ, and maintain intermittent contact with, butions, because audience participation ensures sec-
only a tiny fraction of the world's innovative talent. ond- and third-generation refinements. Decision-
Outreach programs designed to tap the broadest makers ultimately approve or reject strategic op-
possible spectrum of opinion, then screen, synthe- tions that clearinghouse staffs package with pro-con
size, and refine responses, thus could expand pres- appraisals for their convenience.

261
MILITARY STRATEGY

Figure 5
SAMPLE CLEARINGHOUSE ADVERTISEMENT
 STRATEGIC STEPPING-STONES

KEY POINTS
• Environments conducive to creativity feature intellectual freedom, tranquil opportunities to
think, unregimented regimens, and prolific contacts
• Directed approaches, strict deadlines, security classifications, punishment for failure, and needs
to support official policies inhibit strategic trailblazers
• Strategic education gives the most gifted strategists a flying start and progressively embellishes
their competence
• Many civilian colleges confer degrees in political science, but no war college specializes in
military strategy
• Every major military power could benefit greatly from a national center for strategic studies
• The evolution of strategic thought, strategic processes, comparative analyses of past, present,
and proposed concepts, and politico-military trends would make solid cornerstones for such
centers
• The stature of tenured commandants and faculty should command the respect of handpicked
senior officials who study strategy under their supervision
• No national center for strategic studies could comprise a cutting edge without constant access
to innovative theories and concepts
• The best strategic research centers mingle traditional and nontraditional techniques
• Strategic clearinghouses that tap the broadest possible spectrum of opinion could expand
present knowledge bases quickly and cost-effectively.

NOTES Macmillan, 1998); Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Mod-

1. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Bonda- ern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age
nella, trans. Mark Musa (New York: Oxford Univer- (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
sity Press, 1998) and Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick, 7. Peterson's Guide to 4 Year Colleges (Princeton, NJ:
trans. Leslie J. Walker (New York: Viking Press, Peterson's, 1998), 1174-75.
1985). 8. Professional Military Education, Hearings before
2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power the Panel on Military Education of the House Armed
Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Hill and Services Committee, HASC 100-125,100th Cong., 1st
Wang, 1969). and 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
3. Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Brigadier Office, 1991); Report of the National Defense Uni-
General SamuelB. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961). versity Transition Planning Committee (The Long
4. A slightly different version of creative environments Committee), submitted to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs
originally appeared in John M. Collins, Grand Strat- of Staff, August 25, 1989.
egy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval 9. Lieutenant General Richard Chilcoat, "The Revolu-
Institute Press, 1973), 226-31. tion in Military Education," Joint Force Quarterly,
5. See, for example, Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Summer 1999, 59-63; Lieutenant General Leonard
Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, ed. and trans. For- D. Holder and Williamson Murray, "Prospects for
eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (Beijing: Military Education," Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 18
PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Febru- (Spring 1998), 81-90.
ary 1999). 10. Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed
6. Alan Axelrod and Charles Phillips, The Macmillan Forces of the USSR (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
Dictionary of Military Biography (New York: 1979), 331-32, 354-56.

263
MILITARY STRATEGY

11. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet National Security/21st Century, September 15,
Military Strategy, ed. Harriet Fast Scott (New York: 1999), 133-39.
Crane Russack, 1968). 22. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Future Shock (New York:
12. Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Bantam Books, 1970), The Third Wave (New York:
Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Bantam Books, 1980), and War and Anti-War: Sur-
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977). vival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (New York:
13. Major Kelly C. Jordan and Major Thomas Goss, "Pro- Little, Brown, 1993); Steven Metz, Armed Conflict
ducing Strategists for the 21st Century," Army, June in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution
1999, 45-49; General John R. Galvin, "What's the andPost-Modern Warfare (Carlisle Baracks, PA: U.S.
Matter with Being a Strategist?" Parameters, March Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April
1989, 2-10. 2000).
14. Admiral Crowe's proposals appear in Professional 23. General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduction to
Military Education, 1401 - 31. Strategy, trans. Major General R. H. Barry (New York:
15. John M. Collins, "How Military Strategists Should Praeger, 1965), 44-46.
Study History," Military Review, vol. LXIII, no. 8 24. Toffler, War and Anti-War, 252.
(August 1983), 31-44. 25. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New
16. Mr. X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet York: Penguin, 1988).
Power," Foreign Affairs, July 1947, 566-82. 26. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael
17. Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, University Press, 1976), 119-21.
Brace, 1946). Bernard Brodie and Eilene Galloway 27. M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Sci-
explored possible influences on land and naval strate- ence at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York:
gies in The Atom Bomb and the Armed Services, Touchstone Books, 1993).
Public Affairs Bulletin No. 55 (Washington: Legisla- 28. Colonel Glenn M. Harned, The Complexity of War:
tive Reference Service, May 1947). The Application of Nonlinear Science to Military
18. Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton, NJ: Science, a research paper (Quantico, VA: Marine
Princeton University Press, 1965). Corps War College, June 9, 1995); Lieutenant Colo-
19. Directory of National War College Graduates, 1999 nel Robert P. Pellegrini, The Links between Science
(Washington: NWC Alumni Association, April 1999). and Philosophy and Military Theory: Understand-
20. Connections between environmental aggravations ing the Past; Implications for the Future (Maxwell
and armed force are not new. See Robert Leider, AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air Power Studies,
From Choice to Determinant: The Environmental June 1995).
Issue in International Relations (Washington: Stra- 29. Brigadier General William F. (Buck) Kernan,
tegic Research Group, National War College, Febru- "USSOCOM Creates Clearinghouse for New Ideas,"
ary 15,1972). Susan A. Fletcher addresses contempo- Special Warfare, April 1994, 21. Night Flier and
rary problems in International Environment: Full Mission Profile, published respectively by
Current Major Global Treaties, Rpt. No. 96-884ENR USSOCOM's air and naval component commands,
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, No- contained similar notices about the same time.
vember 5, 1996). 30. Ibid.
21. New World Coming: American Security in the 21st
Century (Washington: United States Commission on

264
 PARTV

APPLIED STRATEGIES
This page intentionally left blank
 23. Balkan Tar Babies
Brer Rabbit butted, but his head stuck in de tar.
Now Brer Rabbit's two fists, his two behind
foots, an his head wuz all stuck in de Tar-Baby.
He push an he putt, but de more he try to get
unstuck-up, de stucker-up he got. Soon Brer
Rabbit is so stuck up he can't scarcely move
his eyeballs.
Joel Chandler Harris
"De Tar-Baby"
Uncle Remus

W ily Brer Rabbit, a peerless con artist, escaped

that predicament when his gullible captors
fell for a phony story, but peacekeepers and peace-
POLITICO-MILITARY BACKDROP
Occupants of lands that constituted Yugoslavia dur-
ing most of the twentieth century have seldom en-
makers stucked-up in contested territories that once joyed centralized self-government. Romans, Ostro-
belonged to Yugoslavia haven't been that lucky. The goths, Bulgars, Venetians, Byzantines, Ottomans,
cold-hearted foes they face are shrewd, calculating, Austrians, and Hungarians held sway at various times
tenacious, thumb-in-the-eye, knee-in-the-groin polit- until World War I terminated. Each left indelible
ico-military brawlers who never give up gracefully marks that continue to nurture intense political,
and rebound repeatedly after defeats. ethnic, religious, linguistic, and social animosities
This case study of ongoing operations that within arbitrarily imposed boundaries that make lit-
opened in the 1980s applies factors that previous tle practical sense.'
chapters synopsized. It first reviews tragic events
that originally motivated the United Nations to inter- Cultural Crazy Quilt
vene, then methodically compares competitive se- Orthodox Christian Serbs and Roman Catholic
curity interests, objectives, force postures, policy Croats are prominent among more than fifteen dis-
options, and interactions of all parties involved. Con- tinctive entities. They have repeatedly crossed
cluding critiques summarize strategic successes and swords with each other as well as with Albanian
failures, contrast principles with practices, and and Slavic Muslims who, with good reason, distrust
speculate about probable outcomes after interven- them both. Serbians, who use a Cyrillic alphabet,
ing armed forces withdraw. The ultimate aim is to speak a different language than Croatians, Sloveni-
demonstrate techniques that might have helped UN, ans, and Albanians, all of whom prefer Latin letters.
U.S., and NATO strategists prepare better estimates Countless dialects further complicate communica-
of the situation and cost-benefit evaluations before, tions. The greatest diversification prevails in Bosnia-
rather than after, they embraced Tar-Babies in Herzegovina, which remains a hotbed of rivalries
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. rather than a melting pot, but antagonisms else-

267
MILITARY STRATEGY

where are intense. Bitter feuds, much like those in Community (now the European Union) failed to
the 1880s between hillbilly Hatnelds and McCoys, stop mass murders, gang rapes, widespread destruc-
keep fighting spirits bright when inhabitants aren't tion, concentration camps, evictions, and other
battling invaders.2 forms of "ethnic cleansing" that caused a tidal wave
of refugees to swamp several European nations. That
Tito's Fragile Federation chain of events motivated nine United Nations Secu-
Josip Broz, better known as Tito, glued those diversi- rity Council Resolutions that established, deployed,
fied factions together in 1946 to form the Socialist enlarged, and expanded the responsibilities of a
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, which in- blue-helmeted UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
corporated Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, in 1992. Battalions occupied key positions from
Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Map 1). He Croatia through Bosnia to Macedonia, while recon-
ruled that fragile lash-up with an iron fist and naissance troops patrolled connecting routes.6
quashed latent nationalism for thirty-four years, but
a crumbling economy caused tensions to mount PEACEKEEPING IN BOSNIA
before he died in May 1980. Vicious power struggles Bosnia's dire straits and uncertain future compelled
ensued thereafter, partly because the Yugoslav Con- the United Nations, European members of NATO,
stitution of 1974 prescribed collective leadership and the United States to make an elemental decision
rather than a clear-cut line of succession.3 in 1992: do nothing or do something. The determi-
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 nation to do something in that nearly landlocked
forcibly reasserted control over autonomous Ko- country (Map 2) created dilemmas concerning what
sovo, a rebellious province whose Albanian majority to do, how to do it, who should do it, and what
has always balked at governance by Belgrade. Brief factors should define success. Security interests, ob-
skirmishes occurred when Slovenia seceded from jectives, policies, strategic courses of action, and
the Serb-dominated federation in 1991. Macedonia risk-benefit ratios all came into play.
opted out without incident, but breakaway Croatia
temporarily lost a big chunk of territory to Serb Comparative Interests
rebels within its boundaries before seven months Security interests of the Bosnian Government and
of civil war ceased in January 1992. Serbian residents its Muslim majority were truly vital, because the
of Bosnia, with assistance from Belgrade, seized survival of each was at stake (Table 24). That newly
three fourths of that would-be country from Croats independent country would cease to exist if Serbian
and Muslims the following May, then besieged Sara- and Croatian enemies subdivided its territory or if
jevo, its capital city.4 one winner took all and evicted or eradicated objec-
Recognizable front lines and rear areas were non- tionable ethnic groups. Lust for power motivated
existent, because the civilian mix in most neighbor- Serbs and Croats alike, both of whom valued peace
hoods was bewildering. Five heterogeneous armed and stability only on their own terms. The former
factions that totaled perhaps 170,000 intermingled: yearned to establish a greater Serbia. Croats, who
the Bosnia-Serb army; Bosnia-Serb irregulars; Croat were somewhat less ambitious, hoped to hold what
defense forces; Bosnia-Croat irregulars; and Bosnian they had and clutch whatever they could in Bosnia-
Muslims. Nearly twenty self-serving warlords, who Herzegovina.
controlled several hundred to several thousand com- The United Nations, the United States, and
batants apiece, made matters even more confusing.5 NATO's European members feared that warfare
Mediation by the United Nations and the European would spread beyond Bosnia, perhaps beyond for-

268
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

Map1

269
MILITARY STRATEGY

Map 2

270
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

Table 24 seize most of Bosnia and convert it into an "ethni-

Comparative Purposes in Bosnia cally clean" province under his jurisdiction. Croatia
Serbs Croats Muslims initially sought to incorporate adjoining parts of
Interests
Bosnia but, after brutal battles with Islamic Bosnians,
Survival X reluctantly settled for a federation of eight cantons,
Power x x of which Muslims would govern half, contingent
Objectives on recovery of territory from Serbian rivals who
Control Most of Bosnia x
Control Bits of Bosnia x occupied about two thirds of the country by
"Cleanse" Bosnia x X 1994.
Avoid Defeat X
Preserve Noncombatants X UN, U.S., and NATO's European decision-makers
UN NATO generally agreed on several goals that, if achievable,
would satisfy respective security and humanitarian
Interests
Peace x x interests. Efforts to stop ethnic cleansing, keep
Stability X X
armed combat from spilling into adjacent countries,
Compassion X X
and terminate conflict quickly implicitly led the list.
Objectives
Stop Ethnic Cleansing X X Less urgent aims sought to preserve peace once it
Prevent Conflict Spread X X was established, repatriate refugees, alleviate priva-
Terminate Armed Combat X X
Preserve Peace X X tion, help rebuild Bosnia's war-ravaged infrastruc-
Repatriate Refugees X X ture, apprehend war criminals, and punish them
Alleviate Privation X X
Rebuild Bosnia X X appropriately.
Catch War Criminals X
Punish War Criminals X X
Policy Options in Bosnia
Observers in late summer 1992 speculated that Serb
leaders would talk any time, anywhere, at any level,
because they basically had what they wanted, but
evidence at hand also indicated that Milosevic in-
tended to continue intense pressures if and when
mer Yugoslavia if the flood of refugees overtaxed palavering commenced. The President of Bosnia-
neighboring states. They therefore espoused inter- Herzegovina conversely found proposed cease-fires
ests in peace and regional stability. The televised and partition plans unpalatable, because acceptance
plight of hungry, homeless victims who feared for would split his country.7 Croats, whose objectives
their lives inspired strong humanitarian interests. were less hidebound, were willing to fight when
conditions seemed favorable and back off when they
Comparative Objectives did not.
Offensive, defensive, and counteractive aims that Unimpeachable humanitarian motives under-
promoted the cherished interests just described pinned urges to intercede, but potentially adverse
ranged from egomaniacal to altruistic, with assorted repercussions counseled caution. Policy-makers in
shades between. Bosnian Muslims sought to avoid the United Nations, the United States, and Western
defeat until help arrived, because that was the only European countries consequently reviewed risks,
way to ensure survival. Serbian President Milosevic's costs, and possible outcomes carefully before they
equally unswerving objectives were aggressive: decided to intervene in strength. Cheerless charac-

271
MILITARY STRATEGY

teristics and poor prospects accompanied all but Option 4: Shepherd Truck Convoys
the first of eight options outlined below. The rest, UN Resolution 770 (August 13,1992) recommended
which formed a rude escalation ladder with un- "all measures necessary" to guarantee safe delivery
evenly spaced rungs, required increasing amounts of food and medical supplies from Sarajevo Interna-
of military power. tional Airport to needy communities throughout
Bosnia-Herzegovina.11 Route security, however,
Option 1: Police a Negotiated Settlement posed grave risks, because spiraling escalation
A negotiated settlement acceptable to all belliger- seemed likely if soldiers "riding shotgun" got hit.
ents would have satisfied every coveted security and Serbs who surrounded the airport might massacre
humanitarian objective. Hopes, however, were dim, the tiny UN contingent (1,400 men 200 miles from
because one or more parties for various reasons the nearest reinforcements) or hold some hapless vil-
rejected every proposal as time dragged on from lage hostage.12 The United States, Britain, and France
1992 into 1995, with few signs that expectations on August 24, 1992 consequently shelved plans to
would improve.8 shepherd truck convoys.13

Option 2: Withdraw UNPROFOR Option 5: Expand Peacekeeping

Compassionate bystanders deplored bloodshed Peacekeeping, by definition, involves nonviolent ef-
(some called it genocide) in Bosnia. Canadian Major forts of a military force, interposed between belliger-
General Lewis MacKenzie, soon after he re- ents by mutual consent, to maintain a truce or other-
linquished command of UN peacekeepers in Sara- wise discourage armed conflict until true tranquility
jevo, saw "no military solution... no way that inter- can be restored. Intermingled combatants and non-
vention will do anything but escalate the fighting combatants, the absence of front lines, and general
and more people will be killed." U.S. General John intransigence, however, had frustrated UN "peace-
R. Galvin, who was NATO's Supreme Allied Com- keepers" from the first day of insertion in 1992,
mander when battles began, expressed similar senti- because they found no peace to keep and, in fact,
ments: "If there's a political way to stop all this, feared for their lives. Expanded missions accord-
then that's the way to do it without sinking into a ingly seemed questionable until all belligerents re-
morass of military operations that have no end."9 spected a cease-fire.
Senior U.S. military officials concurred.10 Nonin-
volvement would have abandoned every expressed Option 6: Level the Playing Field
objective, but proponents of withdrawal were pre- UN Resolution 713 imposed an arms embargo
pared to accept that penalty. against all former Yugoslavian states on September
25, 1992.14 Results froze military imbalances of
Option 3: Reduce UNPROFOR power, because Serbia had previously inherited
Vulnerabilities most of the armor, artillery, and other heavy weap-
Redeployment of widely scattered United Nations ons that once belonged to Tito's army.15 Influential
peacekeepers to fewer, more defensible sites would members of Congress believed that the United States
have made UNPROFOR more secure, but its abilities could prevent an early Serb victory, and thereby
to accomplish assigned missions would have plum- encourage a negotiated settlement, if it unilaterally
meted. "Bad guys" would have enjoyed greater free- shipped arms to the Muslim-led Bosnian Govern-
dom of action and Bosnian noncombatants clearly ment.16 Skeptics, however, feared that independent
would suffer. U.S. actions to "level the playing field" could have

272
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

adverse repercussions. Rifts with U.S. allies might tion for any of them.19 Sarajevo and Tuzla experi-
have resulted. Cooperation by Croatia, which owned enced repeated shellings. NATO bombed Serb em-
all seaports along the Adriatic coast, was not assured. placements around Sarajevo in May 1995 to relieve
Serbian forces not only controlled all airfields and pressures on the airport, whereupon Serb soldiers
supply lines in Bosnia, but might have redoubled seized more than 300 UN peacekeepers and tempo-
efforts to "win" before consignments arrived. rarily held them hostage. The worst European massa-
cre since World War II left 7,000 dead at Srebrenica
Option 7: Isolate Bosnian Battlegrounds in July 1995.20 Then, the very next month, Croats
Actions to isolate Bosnian battlegrounds from out- and Muslims in concert overran most of western
side assistance seemed attractive at first glance, but Bosnia and handed Serb adversaries their first major
drawbacks were daunting. Economic sanctions defeat. That setback set the stage for serious peace
proved insufficient. Blockades required collabora- negotiations, which had proved elusive during the
tion by six neighbors of former Yugoslavia: Austria, previous three years.
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania.
Success was by no means assured, even if all com- Dayton Peace Agreement
plied, because the landscape had been littered since Opportunities to police a negotiated settlement, the
World War II with concealed bunkers that, in con- policy option that UN, U.S., and NATO European
formance with Tito's national defense concepts, officials preferred, opened on November 25, 1995,
contained weapon and munition caches. when signatories of peace accords that conferees
drafted in Dayton, Ohio agreed to "recreate as
Option 8: Impose Peace quickly as possible normal conditions of life" in
Military operations by a UN-U.S.-NATO coalition war-torn Bosnia. Provisions of particular interest to
could have terminated large-scale combat and rid military strategists were:21
Bosnia-Herzegovina of the most antagonistic intrud-
ers. Estimated force requirements unfortunately • Bosnia-Herzegovina remained an indepen-
ranged from a few divisions to one or more field dent state that retained Sarajevo as its capi-
armies (200,000 ground troops were mentioned tal and contained two semiautonomous
most often), plus complementary airpower. The "entities" (Map 3)
most sanguine assessments predicted widespread • The predominantly Muslim-Croat Federation
property damage along with extensive casualties of Bosnia-Herzegovina comprised approxi-
among belligerents and noncombatants. Prolonged mately 51 percent of its territory
occupation after hostilities ceased seemed likely. • The predominantly Bosnian-Serb Republic of
Opponents of Option 8 accordingly outnumbered Srpska comprised approximately 49 percent
proponents by many to one. • Boundaries in each instance generally coin-
cided with cease-fire lines
Darkness Before Dawn • Peacekeepers were to patrol a narrow
Conditions in Bosnia as of midsummer 1992 got buffer zone between the two "entities" and
worse before they got better.17 UN Security Council secure a corridor within the Gorazde salient
Resolutions 824 and 836 in May and June 1993 • All armed forces "not of local origin" were
prescribed "safe havens" atBihac, Gorazde, Srebren- to withdraw from Bosnia-Herzegovina within
ica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zepa,18 but outmanned out- thirty days, except for peacekeepers
gunned UNPROFOR troops provided little protec- • All indigenous forces were to remain within

273
MILITARY STRATEGY

Map 3

274
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

designated locations and demobilize assets mandate expired on December 20, 1996. The origi-
that prescribed facilities could not nal intent was to withdraw in June 1996, but pru-
accommodate dence extended that deadline indefinitely, subject
• All armed civilian groups were to disband to biannual review. Approximately 19,300 troops
• All refugees had the right to return home from thirty-four nations (4,300 U.S.) still performed
without risk of harassment, intimidation, or routine security missions in 2001, with no end in
persecution for ethnic, religious, or political sight.23
reasons
International Police Task Force
Implementation and Stabilization Neither IFOR nor SFOR was responsible for law
An ancient proverb, often attributed to Homer, and order. The Dayton Peace Agreement instead
notes that "there is many a slip 'twixt the cup and requested, but did not prescribe, an International
the lip." Needs consequently existed for impartial Police Task Force (IPTF), which was much too small,
armed forces that could guarantee immediate com- slow to arrive, poorly qualified, insufficiently
pliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement, then equipped, and underfunded. Its mission was simply
stabilize reconstituted Bosnia-Herzegovina until its to help restructure local police, many of whom had
nascent government became strong enough to main- committed war crimes. IPTF as late as mid-2001 still
tain internal security without extensive outside totaled a paltry 1,830 from 45 countries, replete
assistance. with disparate languages and questionable skills that
made it difficult to deal with large-scale crime and
Implementation Force human rights violations. "The top 10 percent [of
UN Security Council Resolution 1031 on December the 60-man U.S. contingent] were fantastic," accord-
15, 1995 authorized a multinational, NATO-led Im- ing to one observer, "but the bottom 10 percent
plementation Force (IFOR) to replace UNPROFOR made your eyes water." Incompetence and corrup-
and mandated it to maintain the cease-fire, control tion were commonplace. Other contributions, most
key landlines and airspace, monitor the movement of them much smaller (1 man from Estonia, 2 from
of weapons and equipment into approved canton- Tunisia, 3 apiece from the Czech Republic and Ice-
ments, inspect those sites periodically, and exercise land), were comparable.24
other military responsibilities within Bosnia-Herze-
govina for one year. Eighteen of nineteen NATO na- PEACEMAKING IN KOSOVO
tions, plus eighteen other countries, contributed a Peacekeepers had barely stabilized Bosnia before
total of 54,000 troops, which accomplished most the kettle boiled over in Kosovo, a landlocked prov-
missions handily (Iceland provided medical sup- ince in southernmost Serbia (Map 5). Orthodox
port). U.S., British, and French forces, which carried Christian Serbs, who call that contested region the
the biggest burdens, occupied politically- rather than cradle of their civilization, have collided for centu-
militarily inspired areas of responsibility, with re- ries with largely Islamic Albanians, who trace their
spective headquarters at Tuzla, Banja Luka, and occupancy to pre-Roman Illyrium more than 2,000
Mostar (Map 4).22 years ago.25

Stabilization Force Prewar Situation

UN Security Council Resolution 1088 approved a Albanian residents boycotted the 1991 census, but
NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) when IFOR's reasonably reliable estimates indicate that they then

275
MILITARY STRATEGY

Map 4

276
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

MapS

277
MILITARY STRATEGY

constituted more than 80 percent of almost Table 25

2,000,000 Kosovars, whereas Serbs comprised Comparative Purposes in Kosovo
Before, During, and After Operation Allied Force
fewer than one tenth. The province was nearly au-
tonomous from 1974 until 1989, when Serb Presi- UN NATO Russia Serbs KLA
dent Milosevic revoked that privilege and cracked Interests
down on dissenters. Defiant Albanians seceded in Power X X X
Peace X X X
1991, established their own parliament and, after Stability X X X

the Dayton accords in late November 1995 dashed Credibility X X X X X

Respect X X X X X
their hopes for independence, launched a classic Compassion X X X

insurgency with the newly formed Kosovo Libera- Objectives

tion Army (KLA) as the cutting edge. The brutal Control Kosovo X X X X
Cleanse Kosovo
Serbian backlash that began early in 1998 drove Stop Ethnic Cleansing X X
X X

Kosovo's embryonic government into exile and Prevent Conflict Spread X X X

Alleviate Privation
swamped nearby nations with refugees.26 Cause Regional Turmoil
X X
X X
The United Nations, aghast at human suffering Promote Tranquility X X X

Split NATO*
and fearful that armed conflict would engulf neigh- Solidify NATO* X
X

boring states, called for a cease-fire on March 31, Russian Participation

Full Partnership X
1998 and imposed an arms embargo that applied to Junior Partnership X
Kosovo as well as the rest of Serbia. The UN, at Defang Serbia X X X
Win War
the behest of six Contact Group countries (United Exert Regional Influence X
X

X X X
X X
X
States, Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and Italy), Repatriate Refugees** X
Maintain Law and Order** X
made additional demands on September 23d, still to Rebuild Kosovo** X
no avail. NATO threatened air strikes the following Apprehend War Criminals X
Punish War Criminals X
month, but deferred when Milosevic agreed to com-
ply with both UN Resolutions. He reneged, how- Primarily during Operation Allied Force
* Primarily after Operation Allied Force
ever, and in March 1999 disregarded a peace pro-
posal that French, British, U.S., Russian, and
European Union negotiators drafted at Rambouillet, Liberation Army sought increased assistance from
France.27 Cross-purposes at that point left the UN NATO with which to win its war. Proclivities for
and NATO with two polarized options: put up or compromise in each case remain exceedingly low
shut up. Security interests, objectives, and policies, (Table 25).28
plus courses of action open to Serb and Albanian Less-compelling interests in peace, regional sta-
protagonists, shaped Operation Allied Force. bility, and compassion motivated the UN and NATO
much the same as they did in Bosnia, but concerns
Comparative Purposes about their own credibility overshadowed that list,
Serbs and the KLA both viewed power as a vital because the world might become more dangerous
interest. Supporting objectives ensured vicious com- if they failed to subdue economically- and militarily-
bat, because both sought control over Kosovo and backward Serbia. They decided to commit armed
both had regional aspirations beyond that belea- forces, since success would keep the conflict from
guered province. Serbia hoped that stubborn resis- spreading, terminate ethnic cleansing, allow human-
tance would weaken NATO's will to persevere and itarian programs to flourish, facilitate the repatria-
thereby split the Atlantic Alliance, while the Kosovo tion of refugees, and relieve Serbian pressures on

278
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

neighboring states.29 NATO's solidarity was essen- Ground Combat Operations

tial. General Wesley K. Clark, in his capacity as Su- Ground combat operations, including hit-and-run
preme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), de- raids to harass Serb forces in Kosovo, looked a lot
clared that "the cohesion of the Alliance was more less inviting.33 Numbers bandied about indicated
important than any single target we struck. . . ."30 that it might take 100,000-200,000 troops to clear
Russia, which wanted a piece of the action, Kosovo (approximately eight divisions), plus
sought respect as a regional power31 and opposed 100,000 for rear-area security and support during a
military action against Slavic Serbia, for which it felt lengthy war of attrition. More would have been
compassion. Its spokesmen, like those who repre- needed to subdue the rest of Serbia.34
sented China, stuck thorns in NATO's side in 1998 Casualty estimates ran high, assembly times
and limited options open to the UN Security Coun- would take months, the few staging bases that could
cil, of which both were members. Occupants of the accommodate contemplated forces were widely
Kremlin nevertheless shared important interests scattered, and most access routes were rudimentary.
and objectives with the United Nations and NATO. Romania and Bulgaria were remotely located,
They therefore became collaborators as soon as the Greece and Hungary were reluctant, Montenegro
crisis began to heat up. and Macedonia forbade NATO troops to transit their
sovereign territory, and hard-won stability would
NATO's Policy Options have been endangered if Bosnia became a spring-
NATO's politico-military policy-makers might have board. Albania was obliging, but ports and airfields
opted for survival of the fittest, in consonance with in that poverty-stricken country were primitive. The
Charles Darwin's opus On the Origin of Species by best road from Tirana inland was a logistician's night-
Means of Natural Selection, but they never seri- mare that led through mountainous terrain where
ously considered letting nature take its course, saboteurs could pick and choose from scores of
because doing so would have deserted every secu- bridges and tunnels that, if badly damaged, would
rity aim that Table 25 depicts. Realistic options be costly and time-consuming to restore. New con-
reduced basic debates to complete reliance on struction would require cuts in bedrock, trestles,
airpower versus air-ground operations in assorted culverts, and retaining walls. Detours would de-
combinations. mand lengthy delays.

Air Combat Operations Operation Allied Force

Exclusive employment of land- and sea-based combat NATO's decision-makers, with those facts in mind,
airpower appeared attractive for several reasons. It picked airpower to implement Operation Allied
was immediately available and spectacular successes Force.35 Bombing began on March 24, 1999, where-
against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm sug- upon Serb adversaries accelerated ethnic cleansing
gested to some senior officials that all objectives in Kosovo.36 NATO's policy-makers never resolved
might be achievable a few days after bombardment arguments about targeting priorities and incremen-
began, with minimum casualties among NATO's tal escalation before Milosevic and his cronies
armed forces and the least possible collateral dam- capitulated.
age. Ethnic cleansing, they contended, would stop
as soon as havoc compelled President Milosevic to Targeting Priorities
negotiate seriously. Reconciliations then could com- SACEUR's first priority targets consisted of Serbian
mence, and resettlements could proceed apace.32 forces inside Kosovo, even though they were well-

279
MILITARY STRATEGY

hidden, heavily defended against air attacks, and of- mit humanitarian organizations to minister unhin-
ten benefited from ground fog and clouds that dered; and let NATO-led peacekeepers ensure com-
masked targets and made flying risky in mountainous pliance. The main differences were that Russia
terrain. His three-star air component commander, in helped draft provisions and an international protec-
contrast, never considered Serb ground forces to be torate with NATO at its core invited non-NATO
a center of gravity. "Body bags coming home from nations to participate.40
Kosovo" wouldn't bother Milosevic a bit, he opined. Why wily Milosevic finally found acquiescence
Go straight for the gut, he recommended. Let leaders preferable to continued resistance is speculative.
in Belgrade wake up in ruins after the first strike. Re- Mounting damage and evidence that NATO would
sultant operations first favored one, then the other. persist, coupled with UN sanctions and the loss
Aircrews received instructions to remain above of Russian support, probably contributed. Russian
15,000 feet in any case, which reduced vulnerabili- Envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finnish President
ties to Serb air-defense weapons but degraded the Martti Ahtiaari may have convinced him that the
accuracy of some precision-guided air-to-surface offer they transmitted on June 3 was the best he
munitions during frequent periods of foul weather.37 would ever get. He may even have believed it wise
to cut current losses, retain power at all costs, and
Escalation Control try to recoup later.41
NATO's air campaign escalated cautiously, primarily
for political reasons designed to sustain Alliance Postwar Situation
cohesion despite assorted sensitivities.38 Phased at- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244,
tacks first concentrated on Serbia's Integrated Air which on June 10 reaffirmed Serbia's sovereignty
Defense System and command/control apparatus, and territorial integrity, established postwar goals
then on scattered Serb ground forces within Ko- that aimed to cope with humanitarian crises, create
sovo. Milosevic's military-industrial infrastructure, a climate conducive to peace in Kosovo, and achieve
news media, and most other strategic targets were a durable settlement. Progress in such regards re-
taboo until NATO's nineteen member nations au- mains uneven at this writing.42
thorized assaults at a summit meeting on April 23,
1999, a month after the bombing started (blase Serb- Kosovo Force (KFOR)
ians conducted business as usual and jubilant The Kosovo Force (KFOR) under NATO's command
crowds held rock concerts in downtown Belgrade originally numbered nearly 50,000 troops, of which
not long before that meeting). NATO's North Atlan- ten percent or so deployed in Albania, Macedonia,
tic Council expressed increasing concern for collat- and Greece. That peak strength, however, soon
eral damage and civilian casualties as its attrition sagged to about 37,250. Those in Kosovo occupy
strategy progressed.39 U.S., British, French, German, and Italian Areas of Re-
sponsibility that include contingents from other na-
Serb Capitulation tions. Russia requested, but did not receive, its own
Round-the-clock pummeling continued for seventy- AOR. Some of its troops share the U.S. sector, along
eight days. It terminated on June 10, 1999 after with forces from Poland, Greece, Ukraine, the United
Milosevic began to comply with terms that looked Arab Emirates, and Lithuania. Other Russian troops
much like NATO's original demands: withdraw all are deployed mainly in French and German domains
Serbian military, paramilitary, and police forces from (Map 6) with a few in U.K. and Italian sectors.43
Kosovo; allow refugees to return home safely; per- KFOR successfully monitored, verified, and en-

280
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

Map 6

281
MILITARY STRATEGY

forced the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Ko- War Crimes Resolution
sovo, but demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation UN Security Council Resolution 808 on May 25,
Army hit snags. Many members still bear undeclared 1993 established the International Criminal Tribunal
arms. Kosovar-Albanian guerrilla bands continued for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the first such
to conduct cross-border raids into Serbia proper as body to prosecute war criminals since post-World
well as within Kosovo. Substantial numbers report- War II trials in Nurnberg and Tokyo. ICTY initially
edly belong to criminal groups that terrorize trauma- charged a good many low- to mid-level Bosnian
tized citizens and fill power vacuums.44 Serbs, Croats, and Muslims with genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.49 Then, on May
27, 1999, ICTY indicted Serb President Slobodan
Refugee Repatriation
Milosevic for similar atrocities in Kosovo. Imprison-
Nearly 1,000,000 Albanians fled Kosovo by June
ment followed. The Yugoslav Cabinet on June 23,
1999, according to the UN High Commissioner for
2001 agreed to extradite him. Incarceration in Sche-
Refugees (UNHCR). Several hundred thousand more
veningen detention center and trial at The Hague
wandered within that wretched province. Most re-
in the Netherlands followed.50
turned to ravaged communities, where they became
charity cases unable to survive the coming winter
STRATEGIC CRITIQUES
without food, clothing, and shelter that UNHCR fur-
After-action reports that praise or condemn peace-
nished. Perhaps 240,000 Kosovar Serbs, who justifi-
keeping in Bosnia and peacemaking in Kosovo
ably feared Albanian retribution, simultaneously
cover strategic, operational, tactical, and logistical
took flight. Their absence likely will be prolonged,
aspects.51 This critique summarizes strategic suc-
because conditions conducive to peaceful coexis-
cesses and shortcomings, then offers a checklist
tence have not begun to develop.45
that might help national security decision-makers
determine whether military intervention in future
Law and Order foreign disputes is appropriate.
Military police, who specialize in crowd control,
constabulary operations, and the apprehension of Strategic Successes
criminals, are shorthanded in Kosovo.46 So are Multi- Successes enshrined in politico-military post-
national Specialized Units (gendarmeries). The mortems often reflect political, bureaucratic, institu-
United Nations, which possesses no civilian police, tional, or doctrinal biases. Wishful thinking some-
recruited fewer than half the number needed. Some times kindles questionable conclusions. One might,
were inept and most knew next to nothing about for example, challenge assertions by the U.S. Depart-
alien cultures in Kosovo. The so-called Kosovo ment of Defense that the buildup of NATO ground
Protection Corps, which consists mainly of present combat power near Kosovo, visible preparations
and former members of the KLA, caused more prob- for the deployment of additional forces, and public
lems than it solved.47 Combat troops that are orga- discussions about their possible use "undoubtedly
nized, equipped, and trained to apply overwhelm- contributed to Milosevic's calculations that NATO
ing force are poorly prepared and ill-disposed to would prevail at all costs."52 Successes listed below
maintain law and order in chaotic Kosovo, but do stick to rock-solid facts that no reputable assessment
so by default in accord with UN Security Council has sought to refute:
Resolution 1244, until a United Nations Interim
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) becomes fully • Stopped systematic ethnic cleansing in
operational.48 Bosnia

282
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

• Stopped ethnic cleansing by Serbs in adversarial groups whose irreconcilable goals have
Kosovo fractured along ethnic, religious, and cultural fault
• Stabilized Bosnia and reduced violence in lines. The best that peacekeepers in Bosnia and Ko-
Kosovo sovo can hope to do under those conditions is treat
• Rid Kosovo of Serbian military, paramilitary, symptoms, while the causes of conflict remain ready
and police forces to re-erupt the moment pacifiers depart.53
• Conducted one of the most precise military
campaigns in history Asymmetrical Interests
• NATO remained resolute under pressure The United Nations and NATO apparently paid scant
• Suffered no Allied casualties during armed attention to the Law of Asymmetrical Interests be-
combat with Serbia fore they dispatched troops to the Balkans. None
• Minimized civilian casualties and collateral expressed urgent national security concerns. In-
damage in Serbia stead, they pitted nonvital interests in regional
• Terminated armed combat on UN and peace, stability, and human rights against intense
NATO terms quests for politico-military power, which motivates
• Kept warfare from spreading to neighboring Serb, Croatian, and Albanian aggressors. Incentives
states to persevere over the long haul consequently re-
• Degraded Serb military capabilities to some main imbalanced.
debatable degree
• Repatriated many refugees, then ministered
to them Misplaced Priorities
• Repaired a good deal of damage in Bosnia The United Nations and NATO sought to halt hu-
and Kosovo manitarian disasters. That basic objective was self-
• Brought Serbian President Milosevic and a satisfying in Bosnia, where ethnic cleansing ceased
few other war criminals to trial after the Dayton Peace Agreement took effect in
November 1995, but bloodlettings intensified in
Kosovo after peacemakers intervened, because
Strategic Shortcomings NATO's air campaign neither deterred atrocities
Several strategically significant shortcomings vio- nor defended intended victims. Political aims and
late one or more Principles of War, Principles of military mission priorities thus were sorrowfully
Preparedness, or both. Disregard for historical mismatched.
precedents, asymmetrical interests, misplaced pri-
orities, shortsighted planning, failure to apply air-
Inflexible Plans
power against a decisive center of gravity, risky
Admiral J.C. Wylie's wise words that "planning for
commitments, incoherent areas of responsibility,
certitude is the greatest of all military mistakes"54
and the absence of a realistic exit strategy are
escaped NATO's North Atlantic Council, whose
prominent.
members never approved Plans B and C for use if
Plan A failed to achieve required results in reason-
Historical Precedents able time. Operation Allied Force initially "focused
Top-level politico-military decision-makers evidently on brief, single-dimensional combat," according to
misconstrued or lightly regarded historical prece- the joint force commander on the scene. "Lack of
dents that determined probabilities of success be- the credible threat of ground invasion probably pro-
fore the United Nations and NATO sought to placate longed the air campaign," but NATO's only ap-

283
MILITARY STRATEGY

proved option remained "more of the same . . . with them to do so despite "substantial levels of peace-
more assets. "55 time engagement as well as multiple smaller-scale
contingency operations,"59 such as Bosnia and Ko-
sovo. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the
Airpower Restraints
Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 1999 nevertheless
NATO's nineteen nations comprised a committee
told Congress that they "could not have continued
that reduced every strategic decision to its lowest
the intense campaign in Kosovo" if required to quell
common denominator. Having decided to rely solely
aggression by North Korea and Iraq.60 Many critics
on airpower, they imposed restraints that made opti-
contend that U.S. combat operations in North Korea
mum employment impossible. Campaigns that pi-
or Iraq would have created the same effect. NATO's
lots called "Rolling Blunder" instead of "Rolling
peacekeeping/peacemaking expedition in the Bal-
Thunder" produced no sensible pattern, because
kans almost certainly would have disintegrated if
decision-makers never agreed on a strategic center
U.S. participation ceased at any stage.
of gravity, the destruction or disruption of which
would expedite the accomplishment of agreed
objectives. Areas of Responsibility
Serb defenders often may have known in ad- Military areas of responsibility in Bosnia bear no
vance the time that particular targets were about resemblance to that country's political boundaries
to be hit, because NATO's strike aircraft, which (Map 3, page 274). Split responsibilities avoid the
lacked compatible encryption devices, communi- appearance of favoritism to any indigenous faction,
cated over clear channels. Damage inflicted on but complicate civil-military relationships, because
Serbian Armed Forces reportedly was a lot less than occupation forces must deal with more than one
original estimates indicated.56 Gradual escalation al- domestic jurisdiction. The deployment of forces
lowed enemies ample time to adjust.57 Concerns for from some countries to more than one AOR in Ko-
civilian casualties and collateral damage left lucra- sovo violates unity of command. French forces pa-
tive targets "off limits." NATO's reluctance to accept trol hotter spots than those of the United States,
a single casualty among its military personnel further which currently is the world's sole military super-
impeded mission accomplishment. Retired U.S. Ma- power (Map 5, page 277).
rine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper
summed up that syndrome as follows: "Those who
Exit Strategy
take an oath to defend others were held out of
The United Nations had no realistic exit strategy
harm's way while the very people they were to
when it earnestly embraced two Balkan Tar Babies
defend were in many ways viewed as 'expendables.'
in 1992. Neither did NATO when it intervened. The
What does this say for the Western warrior ethic
June 1996 deadline set for withdrawal from Bosnia
when future contingencies arise?"58
was extended, then disappeared. No departure date
has ever been prescribed for Kosovo. There was
Concurrent U.S. Requirements no plan to oust Milosevic or ensure self-sustaining
President Clinton's National Security Strategy for regional peace after peacekeepers depart at some
a New Century stipulated that U.S. Armed Forces distant date. General Wesley Clark, the outgoing
"for the foreseeable future. . . must have the capabil- SACEUR, surmised that occupation forces would
ity to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, be required at least until a democratic government
cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in emerges in Belgrade. General Klaus Reinhart,
overlapping time frames." Said document expected KFOR's commander in March 2000, predicted five

284
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

to ten years.61 The patience of peacekeepers and precise objectives and ways to accomplish them;
the taxpayers who support them could wear thin reasonable assurance of public support; military ac-
somewhat sooner, given non-vital interests at stake. tion as a last resort; and continual readjustments
as required.66 Those preconditions received mixed
reviews, because authoritative rules may not always
Causes of Conflict Unresolved be advisable. The following checklist, which recog-
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo continue to fester,
nizes that each case is unique, features questions
because the causes of conflict remain unresolved.
rather than answers.
Vojislav Kostunica achieved a landslide victory dur-
ing Serbian presidential elections on September 24,
2000 and deposed Slobodan Milosevic awaits trial National Interests
for malfeasance in office at this writing, but Serbian Military intervention in the absence of highly valued
radicals still lust for regional power. Albanian ex- (not necessarily vital) interests is difficult to justify.
tremists harbor opposing aspirations in a climate The advisability of armed action is most evident
that features appalling economic conditions and when strong political or economic interests are at
rampant crime.62 stake. Humanitarian and intangible interests such as
Macedonia came under fire in March 2001.63 national credibility may muster immediate support,
Other tinderboxes abound. "There is no military but are much harder to sustain. Relevant questions
solution," according to Brigadier General Kenneth in such regards could include:
Quinlan, the U.S. Commander in Eastern Kosovo.
"The military's job here is to provide time and space"
• Which compelling national interests are
for statesmen to establish true peace, which could
involved?
take a very long time.64 Winner-take-all armed com-
• Are they compatible with those of potential
bat and ethnic cleansing could spread uncontrolla-
allies?
bly, unless NATO maintains a politically and eco-
• Which of them are worthfightingfor?
nomically unattractive protectorate with strong U.S.
• What price is the nation willing to pay in
participation. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who
lifeblood and treasure?
on April 11, 2001 saw "no end point," accordingly
assured the European Community that "We came
in together and we will come out together. "65 Threats to National Interests
The most important lesson learned from Balkan Decision-makers who hope to avoid "wrong wars at
Tar-Babies thus may be found in Samuel Butler's wrong times with wrong enemies cannot rationally
Hudibras, penned in 1663: "Look before you ere take military action until they consider alternatives,
you leap; for as you sow, ye are like to reap." appraise probable risks, and prioritize each per-
ceived threat. Those processes demand intelligence
estimates that evaluate enemy intentions, capabili-
INTERVENTION CHECKLIST ties, and limitations. Relevant questions in such re-
Decisions to intervene militarily in altercations such
gards could include:
as those that still plague Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Kosovo call for subjective judgments. Former Secre-
tary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger prescribed • Which threats menace national interests
"six major tests to be applied when we are weighing most severely?
the use of U.S. combat forces abroad": the presence • Which of those threats seem susceptible to
of "vital" U.S. or allied interests; clear intent to win; mainly military solutions?

285
MILITARY STRATEGY

• How would enemy cultures, capabilities, Contingency Plans

and geography affect operations? National security planners balance interests, objec-
• How would enemies likely react to military tives, and available power against risks and costs,
intervention? taking policy guidance into account, as they search
for feasible, suitable, and politically acceptable solu-
Political Aims and Military tions to intervention problems. Contingency plans
Missions reduce prospects of injurious surprise if crises ex-
Political aims and military missions prescribe what plode unexpectedly. Relevant questions in such re-
armed forces must do to satisfy national interests gards could include:
despite perceived threats. They are best developed
in collaboration to ensure compatibility. Sound ob- • Where, when, how, and in what strength
jectives not only seek a better situation than pre- should intervention take place?
vailed before intervention, but must be achievable • What force mix is required, and which
in acceptable time at permissible costs. Relevant forces should phase in first?
questions in such regards could include: • How could allied forces best divide the
"workload?"
• Are political aims clearly expressed and mil- • Are Plans B and C on tap if Plan A fails to
itarily attainable? produce required results?
• Are allied objectives harmonious?
• Would accomplishment of proposed mis- Resource Allocation
sions solve the most serious problems? The best laid strategic plans are valid only if ends
• What political, military, and economic costs (desired outcomes) and means (forces and funds)
would accompany failure? match reasonably well with enough in reserve to
cope if other threats loom large. Resource allocators
Strategic Policy Guidelines must reduce requirements, add assets, or both if
Some strategic policies simplify the accomplish- shortfalls create unwarranted risks. Relevant ques-
ment of political aims and military missions, while tions in such regards could include:
others introduce complications. Neither lenient nor
strict guidelines are constantly preferable. Early • Are allocated resources ample for the cur-
rather than last-resort use of armed force, for exam- rent contingency?
ple, occasionally quells crises before they become • Could remaining resources successfully
intractable. Relevant questions in such regards handle other likely crises?
could include: • How many reserve component forces of
what kinds are required?
• Are proposed policies compatible with po- • How could allies best contribute? Would
litical aims and military missions? they?
• Which policy restrictions could be safely
relaxed? Public Support
• What costs are acceptable in terms of casu- Public support in democratic countries ideally
alties and collateral damage? should precede rather than follow military interven-
• Should statesmen impose time limits on tion, but that is not always possible. Prior approval
proposed military operations? moreover may be transitory. Statesmen therefore

286
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

must rally and sustain support that is not spontane- • Are enemies more or less skillful at informa-
ous. Compelling interests, sensible objectives, and tion warfare?
reasonable prospects for timely success assist offi-
cial salesmen. Relevant questions in such regards Recurrent Reappraisals
could include: Military intervention, no matter how innocuously it
begins, may escalate unexpectedly. Original ratio-
• Has the Chief of State lucidly explained the nales may be overtaken by unforeseen events. Expe-
purpose of intervention? rienced Chiefs of State and their advisers therefore
• Are those purposes compelling enough to scrutinize pertinent factors repeatedly after they
retain public approval? barge in to ascertain whether soldiers, sailors, air-
• To what extent should unfavorable world men, and marines lay their lives on the line for
opinion influence decisions? legitimate reasons.

KEY POINTS

• Hard and fast rules that prescribe when military intervention is advisable cannot be universally
applicable, because every contingency is unique
• Historical precedents, such as centuries-old ethnic, religious, and cultural animosities in Bosnia
and Kosovo, strongly influence probabilities that military intervention will succeed or fail
• Peacekeeping operations are improvident unless all belligerents, by mutual consent, agree to re-
frain from armed conflict
• Peacekeeping and peacemaking operations seldom reach satisfactory conclusions if the interests
of aggressors are more intense than those of interventionists
• Peacekeeping and peacemaking operations normally are inconclusive unless termination terms al-
leviate causes as well as symptoms of conflict
• Peacemakers who concentrate power against strategic centers of gravity accomplish objectives
most efficiently as well as effectively
• Exclusive reliance on any form of combat power usually is inappropriate, because land, sea, air
amphibious, and space capabilities are synergistic
• Prudent interventionists prepare Plans B and C for implementation if preferred Plan A cannot
produce required results in reasonable time
• Resource allocators commit cardinal sins if they leave little in reserve to cope with other impor-
tant contingencies that may erupt
• Peacekeeping operations for which there is no realistic exit strategy are not perpetually
supportable

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MILITARY STRATEGY

NOTES 359-62; The Military Balance, 1991-1992 (London:

1. Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Jour- International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991),
ney Through Yugoslavia, Twentieth Century Clas- 96-97.
sics, reprint (New York: Penguin Books, 1995); For 16. See, for example, S.21 and related bill H.R. 1172,
time lines, see Zeljan Suster, Historical Dictionary January 4, 1995. President Clinton vetoed them on
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, European August 11, 1995.
Historical Dictionaries, No. 29 (New York: Scare- 17. Steven Woehrel, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Former
crow Press, 1999). Yugoslavia: Chronology of Events, June 1, 1994-
2. DA Pamphlet 550-99: Yugoslavia: A Country Study, July 16, 1995, Rpt. No. 95-823F (Washington:
ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington: Federal Research Congressional Research Service, July 18, 1995) and
Division, Library of Congress, 1992), 69-88. Chronology of Events, July 19, 1995-May 31,
3. Ibid., 42-58, 200-10. 1996, 1-6.
4. Laura Silber and Allen Little, Yugoslavia: Death of 18. UN Security Council Resolution 824, May 6, 1993,
a Nation (New York: TV/Penguin Books, 1996). prescribed six safe havens. Resolution 836, June 4,
5. The Situation in Bosnia and Appropriate U.S. and 1993, extended UNPROFOR's mandate to include
Western Responses, Senate Armed Services Commit- all six.
tee Hearing, August 11, 1992, Reuters transcript, 19. Major General Michael Rose describes the exasperat-
13-15, 19, 42-44, 52. ing circumstances in Fighting for Peace: Bosnia
6. Marjorie Ann Browne, Yugoslavia: UN Security 1994 (London: Harvill Press, 1998).
Council Resolutions: Texts and Votes—1991 -1992, 20. David Rhode, End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of
Rpt. No. 92-659F (Washington: Congressional Re- Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World
search Service, October 28, 1992), 61-76, 79-114, War II (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998).
119-28, 135-36, 143-50. 21. Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, Fact Sheet
7. The Situation in Bosnia and Appropriate U.S. and (Washington: Department of State, December 11,
Western Responses, 24, 40-41, 47, 48, 53-54. 1995); Bosnia Peace Accord and NA TO Implementa-
8. For assorted peace proposals considered and dis- tion Force: Questions and Answers, Rpt. No. 95-1186F
carded in 1993, see Steven Woehrel, Bosnia- (Washington: Congressional Research Service, March
Hercegovina's Partition and U.S. Policy, Rept. Nr. 8,1996), 1-10. For full text of the Dayton peace agree-
93-904F (Washington: Congressional Research Ser- ment, see State Department web page at www.state.
vice, September 24, 1993). gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/index. html.
9. The Situation in Bosnia and Appropriate U.S. and 22. Steven R. Bowman, Bosnia: U.S. Military Opera-
Western Responses, 41, 50-51; "No Military Quick tions, Issue Brief 93056 (Washington: Congressional
Fix," interview with General John R. Galvin, USA Research Service, March 2000), 1-4; Bosnia Peace
Today, August 10, 1992, 7. Accord and NATO Implementation Force: Ques-
10. Michael R. Gordon, "Limits of U.S. Role," New York tions and Answers, 12-22.
Times, August 11, 1992, 6; Barton Gellman, "Defense 23. History of the NATO-Led Stabilization Force (SFOR)
Planners Making Case Against Intervention in Yugo- in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SFOR (Joint Forge) Fact
slavia," Washington Post, June 13, 1992, A16. Sheet (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Headquarters, Octo-
11. UN Resolution 770, in Marjorie Ann Browne, Yugo- ber 1, 1999); SHAPEJOC Assessment Report, January
slavia: UN Security Council Resolutions: Texts and 7, 2001.
Votes—1991-1992, 115-16. 24. Julie Kim, Bosnia: Civil Implementation of the
12. The Situation in Bosnia and Appropriate U.S. and Peace Agreement, Rpt. No. 96-177F (Washington:
Western Responses, 16-17, 36, 41, 42, 45, 51-52; Congressional Research Service, January 16, 1997),
Daniel Benjamin, "Hatred Ten Times Over," Time, 25-32; Colum Lynch "Misconduct, Corruption by
August 17, 1992, 25. U.S. Police Mar Bosnia Mission," Washington Post
13- Trevor Rowe, "Allies Drop Plans for Military Role in (May 29, 2001), Al, All.
Bosnia," Washington Post, August 25, 1992, Al. 25. Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, 1st Harper
14. UN Resolution 713, in Marjorie Ann Browne, Yugo- Perennial ed. (New York: HarperCollins, by arrange-
slavia: UN Security Council Resolutions: Texts and ment with New York University Press, 1999).
Votes—1991-1992, 9-12. 26. Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Pol-
15. James Gow, "The Remains of the Yugoslav People's icy, Issue Brief 98041 (Washington: Congressional
Army," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1992, Research Service, August 19, 1998).

288
 BALKAN TAR BABIES

27. Ibid.; Julie Kim, Kosovo Review and Analysis of 1999), 3-4; Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Cam-
Policy Objectives, 1998-June 1999, Rpt. RL30265 paign," 45.
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, July 40. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,
21, 1999), 3-5, 6, 7. 8-9; Kim, Kosovo Review and Analysis of Policy
28. For apparent KLA objectives, see "Balkan Futures," Objectives, 1998-June 1999; 5-6; appendices to UN
Weekly Global Intelligence Update (Austin, TX: Security Council Resolution 1244, June 10, 1999-
STRATFOR.COM, March 20, 2000), 1, 2. 41. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,
29. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 10-12; Woehrel, "Why did Milosevic Agree to With-
to Congress (Washington: Offices of the Secretary draw His Forces from Kosovo?" in Kosovo Lessons
of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Learned, 7-9.
Staff, January 31, 2000), 1-17. 42. Kim, Kosovo Review and Analysis of Policy Objec-
30. Erin Q. Winograd, "Clark Says Air Campaign Wasn't tives, 1998-June 1999, 6-9.
Slowed by Coalition Requirements," Inside the 43. Ibid., 8; Steve Bowman, Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Mili-
Army, August 9, 1999, 2. tary Operations, Issue Brief 10027 (Washington:
31. Stuart D. Goldman, "Russia's Goals during the Ko- Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2000), 6,
sovo Conflict," in Kosovo Lessons Learned, Memo- 7, 8; COMKFOR Situation Report, January 2001.
randum to Hon. William Roth (Washington: Congres- 44. Bowman, Kosovo: U.S. and Allied Military Opera-
sional Research Service, Septembers, 1999), 11-14. tions, 8; Steven Woehrel and Julie Kim, Kosovo and
32. Elaine M. Grossman, "U.S. Military Debates Link be- U.S. Policy, Issue Brief 98041 (Washington: Congres-
tween Kosovo Air War, Stated Objectives," Inside sional Research Service, April 19, 2000), 4, 5.
the Pentagon, April 20, 2000, 1, 6-9. 45. Woehrel and Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, 3-4, 8-9.
33. Doyle McManus, "Clinton's Massive Ground Invasion 46. Colonel Don M. Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The
That Never Was," Los Angeles Times, June 7,2000,1; Case for a Constabulary Force," Army, June 1998,
Colonel Edward F. Bruner, Kosovo: Possible Ground 14-16; David Wood, "Are MPs the Force of Choice?
Force Options, Rpt. Nr. RS20188 (Washington: Con- Army Times, March 27, 2000, 15.
gressional Research Service, May 4, 1999). 47. Woehrel and Kim, Kosovo and U.S. Policy, 4.
34. Patrick Theros, "Ground War Fog," Washington 48. Matthew Cox, "You Call This Soldiering?" Army
Times, April 18, 1999, B3; Dana Priest, "A Decisive Times, March 27, 2000, 14, 15.
Battle That Never Was," Washington Post, Septem- 49. Margaret Mikyung Lee, Raphael Perl, and Steven
ber 19, 1999, Al, A30. Woehrel, Bosnia War Crimes: The International
35. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Re- Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
port, 78-79. U.S. Policy, Rpt. 96-404F (Washington: Congres-
36. Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo (Wash- sional Research Service, April 23, 1998).
ington: Department of State, 1999). 50. R. Jeffrey Smith, "Yugoslavia Moves to Extradite Milo-
37. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, sevic," Washington Post, June 24, 2001, Al, A19; R.
21 -24; John A. Tirpak, "Short's View of the Air Cam- Jeffrey Smith, "Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic for
paign: What Counted Most for NATO's Success in Trial by War Crimes Tribunal," Washington Post,
the Balkans Was the Reduction of Strategic Targets, June 29, 2001, Al, A26.
Not 'Tank Plinking' in Kosovo," Air Force Magazine, 51. For a cross section, see General Wesley K. Clark,
September 1999, 43-47; Dana Priest, "Tension Grew Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Fu-
With Divide Over Strategy," Washington Post, Sep- ture of Combat (New York: Public Affairs, 2001);
tember 21, 1999, Al, A16. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report;
38. John F. Harris, "Berger's Caution Has Shaped Role Admiral James O. Ellis, A View from the Top, briefing
of U.S. in War" and William Drozdiak, "NATO's Cau- by Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe,
tious Air Strategy Comes Under Fire," both in Wash- who commanded Joint Task Force Noble Anvil dur-
ington Post, May 16, 1999, Al, A24, A26. ing Operation Allied Force; Ivo H. Daalder and Mi-
39. Colonel Edward F. Bruner, "Application of Force: Es- chael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save
calate or Overwhelm?" in Kosovo Lessons Learned, Kosovo (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000);
4-6; Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen- Walter N. Anderson, Peace Without Honor: Endur-
eral Henry H. Shelton, Joint Statement on the Kosovo ing Truths, Lessons Learned, and Implications for
After Action Review, (Washington: Office of Assistant a Durable Peace in Bosnia, Land Warfare Papers
Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), October 14, No. 33 (Arlington, VA: Association of the United

289
MILITARY STRATEGY

States Army, September 30, 1999); Dr. Carl Mueller, Disengagement Plan in Event of Major War," Inside
Operation Allied Force: Air Strategy Comments the Pentagon, September 7, 2000, 1.
(Maxwell AFB, AL: School of Advanced Air Power 61. "General Says U.S. Troops in Balkans Indefinitely,"
Studies, April 29, 1999). Washington Times, February 18, 2000, A4; Yann
52. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Re- Tessier, "Peacekeepers May Be in Kosovo 10 Years
port, 11. or More," Washington Times, March 18, 2000, A9.
53. Dusko Doder, "Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds," 62. Steven J. Woehrel, Serbia and Montenegro: Current
Foreign Policy, vol. 21 (Summer 1993), 3-23. Situation and U.S. Policy, Rpt. No. RL30371 (Wash-
54. Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A Gen- ington: Congressional Research Service, November
eral Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: 13, 2000); Curt Tarnoff, The Federal Republic of
Rutgers University Press, 1967), 85. Yugoslavia: U.S. Economic Assistance, Rpt. No.
55. Ellis, A View from the Top, slides 7, 11. RS20737 (Washington: Congressional Research Ser-
56. John Barry and Evan Thomas, "The Kosovo Cover- vice, January 8, 2001) and Kosovo: Reconstruction
up," Newsweek, May 15, 2000, 22-26. and Development Assistance, Rpt. No. RL30453, Au-
57. Joseph Fitchett, "Clark Recalls 'Lessons' of Kosovo," gust 18, 2000.
International Herald Tribune, May 3,2000,1; Elaine 63- Louise Branson, "It's Only a Lull in the Balkans
M. Grossman, "Ralston Sees Potential for More Wars Drama," Washington Post, April 15, 2001, B2; Gen-
of Gradual Escalation," Inside the Pentagon, Septem- eral Wesley K. Clark, "Don't Delay in Macedonia,"
ber 16, 1999, 1; William M. Arkin, "Smart Bombs, Washington Post, March 20, 2001, A27; Peter Finn,
Dumb Targeting," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Macedonians Shell Rebel Positions," Washington
May/June 2000, 46-53; John T. Correll, "The Use of Post, March 23, 2001, A19-
Force: Gradual Escalation—Supposedly Dead After 64. Sean D. Naylor, "Gunfighters and Guerrillas," Army
Vietnam—Is Staging a Comeback," Air Force Maga- Times, April 20, 2001,14-18. The Quinlan quotation
zine, vol. 82, no. 12 (December 1999), 37-39- is on 16.
58. Jeffrey Record, "Gutless Giant?" Commentary, U.S. 65. Alan Sipress, "Balkans Uprisings Condemned," Wash-
Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2000, 2; Tom ington Post, April 12, 2001, A27; Elaine Monaghan,
Bowman, "Cost of War: A New Accounting," Balti- "Powell Affirms Role in Balkans," Washington Times,
more Sun, March 22, 2000, 2A. Lt. Gen. Van Riper April 12, 2001, A13.
is cited in Elaine M. Grossman, "For U.S. Commander 66. For Defense Secretary Weinberger's speech, plus
in Kosovo, Luck Played Role in Wartime Success, nine other official views, see Steven Daggett and
Inside the Pentagon, September 9, 1999, 1, 12-13. Nina Serafino, The Use of Force: Key Contemporary
59. A National Security Strategy for a New Century Documents, Rpt. No. 94-805F (Washington: Congres-
(Washington: The White House, December 1999), 19. sional Research Service, October 17, 1994).
60. Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,
120-21; Elaine Grossman, "Pentagon Crafts Balkan

290
 24. Final Reflections
And one final warning to those of you
who are on the threshold of your careers
as strategic planners. After all your plans
have been perfected, all avenues explored,
all contingencies thought through, then
ask yourself one final question:
"What have I overlooked?"
Philip A. Growl
"The Strategist's Short Catechism," in
The Art and Practice of Military Strategy

D amon Runyon shrewdly observed that races

may not always be to the swift nor battles
to the strong, but that's the way to bet. Optimum
approach, is predicated on convictions that sea-
soned as well as neophyte strategists who are famil-
iar with fundamental theories, concepts, principles,
military power, however, is obtainable only if cre- schools of thought, historical experience, and as-
ative thinkers survey strategic forests instead of tacti- sorted practices are apt to overlook less than col-
cal trees, challenge entrenched assumptions, subor- leagues who favor informal techniques. Conscious
dinate special interests, estimate what capabilities consideration of national security interests, threats,
might be most useful given present and projected objectives, alternatives to military power, and other
threats, then paint geostrategic pictures that states- relevant factors indeed is the best way to make ends
men and commanders in chief can use to guide and means match consistently well regardless of
military operations of all kinds in peacetime as well missions. Bullets on the following page recapitulate
as war. ten crucially important points that appeared at the
This entire tome, which features a structured end of previous chapters.

291
MILITARY STRATEGY

TEN CRUCIAL POINTS RECAPITULATED

• The value of most national security interests varies significantly from time to time and place to
place
• The most dangerous enemy capabilities imaginable constitute dangerous threats only if accompa-
nied by hostile intentions
• Nothing weakens deterrence and encourages aggressors more surely than poorly prepared oppo-
nents
• Excessive reliance on force leaves little room for intellectual judo that might mate ends with
means equally well or better at less cost
• Military victories achieved at the expense of important political objectives may weaken rather
than strengthen national security
• Excessively centralized civilian control tends to undermine military effectiveness; excessively de-
centralized civilian control may undermine political aims
• Foreign policies help shape military strategies; military power imposes practical limits on foreign
policies
• Nuclear strategies that aim to "decapitate" governments may eliminate the only enemy leaders
authorized to terminate mutually disastrous combat
• Limited wars demand mutual willingness to settle for less than complete fulfillment of cherished
objectives
• Prudent strategists prepare Plans B and C for implementation if preferred Plan A cannot produce
required results in reasonable time

292
 Appendix A
Strategic Terminology

abduction The kidnapping of individuals or armed forces Armies, navies, air forces, am-
groups for sociopolitical purposes. phibious forces, and space forces that are orga-
active components Military organizations that nized, equipped, and trained to accomplish na-
serve national governments full time. See also re- tional security missions. Law enforcement and
serve components paramilitary forces occupy other categories. See
also armed force; law enforcement; paramilitary
aggression The unprovoked initiation of politi-
cal, military, paramilitary, economic, technologi- arms control Explicit or implicit international
cal, psychological, or cybernetic warfare weapons agreements that govern the numbers, types, char-
to achieve objectives. See also first strike acteristics, deployment, and employment of partic-
aim See national security objectives ular armed forces and armaments. See also arms
alliance Any coalition codified by a treaty that limitations; disarmament
is legally binding on every member. See also coali- arms limitations Agreements to restrict quanti-
tion; collective security tative holdings of, or qualitative characteristics of,
antiterrorism Defensive counterterrorism. See specific armaments and weapon systems. See also
also counterterrorism; terrorism arms control; disarmament
AOR See area of responsibility assassination Premeditated murder of selected,
applied research The innovative use of basic usually prominent, individuals for political, ideo-
scientific knowledge to solve technological prob- logical, cultural, or religious reasons.
lems; the exploitation of strategic theories to cre-
assumptions Suppositions concerning current
ate innovative concepts. See also basic research
situations and future events, presumed to be true
area of operations Territory within which in the absence of contrary evidence.
armed forces perform assigned missions. Such
plots may lie within another organization's area assured destruction Highly reliable abilities to
of responsibility. See also area of responsibility inflict unacceptable damage on any individual ad-
area of responsibility Territory within which versary or combination of adversaries, even after
a military commander exercises authority over, absorbing a savage nuclear first strike.
and is accountable for, all activities by armed asymmetrical warfare Conflict during which
forces under his or her control. See also area of opposing sides employ different strategies, tac-
operations tics, and weapons. Otherwise weak adversaries,
armed force The employment of military or for example, might gain great advantage from bio-
paramilitary formations for offensive, defensive, logical or cybernetic assaults against opponents
or deterrent purposes. See also armed forces who possess traditional military superiority.

293
APPENDIX A

attrition strategies Concepts that call for pro- fic to and from a country, coalition, or geo-
tracted operations designed to degrade rival capa- graphic area. Such sieges constitute acts of war
bilities and gradually erode enemy will. when initiated in peacetime
auxiliaries Part-time participants in insurgenc- burden-sharing Contributions to coalitions by
ies and resistance movements who perform spe- members whose inclinations and abilities may
cial functions and undertake special missions for vary considerably. Typical considerations include
undergrounds. See also underground money, manpower, materiel, and intelligence, to-
bargaining chips Present, projected, or pro- gether with such intangibles as maneuver room,
posed weapons that are worth less to possessors infrastructure, labor pools, and respective risks.
than to opponents. Adversaries sometimes make BW See biological warfare
momentous arms control concessions to cap, re-
duce, terminate development of, prevent deploy- calculated risks The deliberate acceptance
ment, or eliminate such items. of gaps between ends and means, because
dangerous enemy actions seem unlikely.
basic intelligence Facts about political, eco-
See also risks
nomic, military, social, cultural, geographic, scien-
tific, technological, biographic, and other charac- campaign A series of theater-level military ac-
teristics of a country. See also intelligence; tions that may or may not be strategically signifi-
strategic intelligence cant. See also battle; war
basic research All efforts to embellish knowl- capabilities Abilities to take particular actions
edge about natural environments and scientific against particular opponents at particular times
phenomena; the development of innovative strate- and places. See also intentions
gic theories. See also applied research; strategic
capability plans Concept formulations that
theories
seek to solve strategic, operational, or tactical
battle A tactical collision between opposing problems using existing armed forces and other
armed forces. See also campaign; war existing assets. See also requirement plans
biological warfare The use of living organisms catalytic conflict War between two countries
(such as bacteria and viruses), toxic agents de- or coalitions that a third party maliciously insti-
rived from dead microorganisms, and plant- gates.
growth regulators to produce lethal or nonlethal
casualties among humans, livestock, or plants; de- cell A small compartment, usually part of a
fenses against such attacks. See also chemical larger organization (single-cell structures are rare),
warfare whose members engage in clandestine or covert
activities. See also compartmentation
black propaganda Public information deliber-
ately disseminated in ways that conceal the true center of gravity See strategic center of gravity
sponsor and purportedly identify a false source. chemical warfare The use of asphyxiating, poi-
See also gray propaganda; propaganda; white pro- sonous, or corrosive gases, flames, aerosols, liquid
paganda sprays, and various smokes to produce lethal or
blockade Prolonged severance of land, sea, nonlethal casualties among humans and livestock,
and/or air lines of communication to prevent the kill crops, or damage materiel; defense against
passage of commercial shipments and military traf- such attacks. See also biological warfare

294
 APPENDIX A

circumterrestrial space A region that abuts collateral casualties and damage Physical
Earth's atmosphere at an altitude of about 60 harm that nuclear, biological, chemical, radiologi-
miles (95 kilometers) and extends to about cal, and traditional weapons incidentally inflict on
50,000 miles (80,000+ kilometers). Most military persons and property collocated with, or adjacent
space missions currently are confined therein. See to, military targets. Such effects may be welcome
also space or unwanted, depending on circumstances.
civic action Political, economic, and social pro- collective security Bilateral and multilateral
grams undertaken to strengthen the internal secu- alignments that involve two or more partners
rity of a nation-state or territory. Typical projects who strive to accomplish respective deterrent, of-
involve public works, construction, health, sanita- fensive, or defensive objectives at reduced risk
tion, communications, agriculture, education, and and costs. See also alliance, coalition
training. See also civil affairs. combating terrorism See counterterrorism; ter-
civil affairs Interactions of specially organized, rorism
equipped, and trained armed forces with govern- combat power See military power
ments, nongovernmental groups, and populations
combined (forces; operations) Military activi-
in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas before, dur-
ties that involve armed forces from two or more
ing, after, or in lieu of other military operations.
nations. See also joint (forces; operations); unified
Civil affairs may perform governmental functions
operations
in occupied countries or when indigenous author-
ities are unable or unwilling to do so satisfacto- command and control An arrangement of
rily. See also civic action facilities, equipment, personnel, and procedures
used to acquire, process, and disseminate informa-
civil defense Shelters and other passive mea-
tion that commanders and staffs need to plan and
sures designed to minimize casualties and damage
direct military operations.
from enemy attacks on population centers and
production bases; emergency steps to repair or re- commitments See national security commit-
place vital utilities and facilities. ments

clandestine operations Activities conducted compartmentation Internal security arrange-

so secretly that no one but sponsors, planners, ments that make it possible for personnel to
and implementers know of their existence. See know about colleagues and activities elsewhere in
also overt operations; covert operations their organization only if leaders furnish informa-
tion on a need-to-know basis. See also cell
coalition A formal or informal, long- or short-
term, rigidly structured or free form partnership concepts See strategic concepts
of two or more nations. See also alliance; collec- confidence-building Arms control measures de-
tive security signed to reduce international tensions and help
Cold War Mainly nonviolent conflict between control crises. Representative initiatives include
the United States, the Soviet Union, and their re- telecommunication "hot lines," risk-reduction cen-
spective allies from 1946 until 1989-1990; any ters, and prior notification of potentially provoca-
prolonged period of rancorous international rela- tive maneuvers.
tions that confines armed conflict to minor inci- conflict spectrum A continuum of hostilities
dents and skirmishes. that ranges from nonviolent warfare to the most

295
APPENDIX A

violent form of global (eventually intergalactic) revolutions. See also counterrevolution; insur-
combat. gency; pacification; resistance; revolutionary war
constabulary A military or paramilitary police counterintelligence Information gathered and
force that occupying powers or other outsiders activities conducted to safeguard classified infor-
employ to maintain law and order, mainly mation from foreign agents and to guard against
throughout rural regions (villages, hamlets, and in- subversion, sabotage, and assassinations. See also
terspaces) in foreign countries. See also gendar- intelligence
merie
counterproliferation All measures designed to
contingency An event that politico-military au- prevent the spread of particular weapons and de-
thorities anticipate might occur or that erupts un- livery vehicles, especially those that contribute to
expectedly. See also contingency plans and opera- nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological war-
tions fare capabilities. See also proliferation
contingency plans and operations Prepara- counterrevolution Operations that losers and
tion to deal with anticipated events and thereby associates conduct against the winners of success-
reduce probabilities of injurious surprise; actions ful insurgencies. See also insurgency
in case such events occur. See also contingency
counterterrorism Deterrent, offensive, and de-
conventional See traditional (forces, opera- fensive measures, both active and passive, de-
tions, warfare, weapons) signed to deter, diminish the effects of, or defeat
terrorism. See also antiterrorism; terrorism
core area Any strategically significant territory
the seizure, retention, destruction, or control of countervalue strategies War-fighting concepts
which would give adversaries a marked or deci- that call for the destruction or neutralization of
sive advantage. enemy population centers, industries, resources,
and high-value institutions. See also counterforce
cost-effectiveness A condition that matches
strategies.
ends with means in ways that create maximum
capabilities at sensible (preferably minimum) ex- coup d'etat Brief violence or bloodless action
pense by a small, conspiratorial group to overthrow a
government and seize political power.
costs Prices paid, or to be paid, in terms of
money, other resources, time, politico-military covert operations Activities that conceal the
penalties, and other intangibles. identity of sponsors and facilitate plausible denial
of involvement if perpetrators are detected and
counterforce strategies War-fighting concepts
accused. See also clandestine operations; overt op-
that concentrate on the destruction or neutraliza-
erations
tion of enemy armed forces and military infra-
structure. See also countervalue strategies credibility Clear evidence that adversaries not
only can but will convert threats and promises
counterinsurgency Political, economic, social,
into actions if required.
military, and paramilitary measures that indige-
nous governments and associates or occupying crisis A national or international emergency
powers use to forestall or defeat counterrevolu- with adverse security implications. See also crisis
tions, insurgencies, resistance movements, and management

296
 APPENDIX A

crisis management Emergency actions that po- saults, and attrition. Military power most often
litico-military leaders take to control events that predominates. See also indirect approach
could jeopardize important national interests or disarmament The disposal of all or specified
prevent the attainment of crucial objectives. armed forces and armaments as a result of unilat-
cumulative strategies Concepts that call for a eral initiatives or international agreements. See
collection of individual, random actions that seem- also arms control; arms reduction
ingly are unrelated, but in sum create synergistic
disinformation Propaganda deliberately calcu-
results. See also sequential strategies
lated to deceive a particular audience. See also de-
CW See chemical warfare ception; propaganda
cybernetic warfare Electronic operations that doctrine See military doctrine
selectively or indiscriminately attack computer ter-
economic assistance Money, supplies, equip-
minals, networks, and repositories, then acquire
ment, advice, education, training, infrastructure
data and disable, disrupt, or spoof opponents; op-
construction, and other nonmilitary aid, provided
erations that deter and defend against such activi-
free of charge or paid for by cash, credit, or bar-
ties. See also information warfare
ter. The main purpose is to strengthen allies and
decapitation Operations designed to kill key en- other friends. See also humanitarian assistance;
emy leaders, destroy their command and control military assistance; security assistance
systems, or both.
economic power The sum total of a nation's
deception Measures designed to mislead ene-
commercial, financial, industrial, and other capa-
mies by manipulation, distortion, or falsification
bilities that contribute to the production, distribu-
of evidence. Successes induce reactions prejudi-
tion, and consumption of goods and services. The
cial to enemy interests. See also disinformation
share that is, or could be, devoted to national se-
defensive concepts and operations See strate- curity matters is most important to politico-mili-
gic defense tary policy-makers and strategists. See also mili-
deployment See force deployment tary power; national power; political power
detente Words and actions that formally or in- economic sanctions Commercial and financial
formally reduce international tensions. punishments, undertaken unilaterally or multilater-
deterrence Steps taken to discourage deterrees ally, to convince opponents that they should
from initiating unwelcome actions and to inhibit cease undesirable practices or otherwise bow to
escalation if they disregard. Promises of punish- the wielder's will. See also economic warfare
ment and reward both may contribute. economic warfare The purposeful manipula-
development See research and development tion of trade, foreign aid programs, financial trans-
actions, and other tools that influence the produc-
diplomacy Skill in furthering foreign policy ob-
tion, distribution, and consumption of goods and
jectives during peacetime and in war, especially
services with the intent to coerce or weaken ad-
the settlement of disputes and the development
versaries. See also economic sanctions
of mutually satisfactory agreements through repre-
sentations, negotiations, and other dialogue. employment See force employment
direct approach Any security strategy that liter- ends See national security objectives; military
ally or figuratively features brute force, frontal as- missions

297
APPENDIX A

escalation A deliberate or unpremeditated in- foreign policy The fundamental philosophy,

crease in the scope or intensity of any type con- implicit and explicit propositions, and strategies
flict. See also horizontal escalation; vertical esca- that focus the international relations of every na-
lation tion-state.
estimates See intelligence estimates; strategic es- forward presence Strategies that deploy armed
timates forces near potential hot spots to deter aggres-
sion, help defuse budding conflicts and,
expeditionary forces Any military force de-
if that fails, to terminate combat quickly on favor-
signed to operate in foreign countries.
able terms. See also power projection
fifth column Covert or clandestine groups that
freezes See force freezes
infiltrate a country or form therein, usually before
armed combat begins, to conduct subversive, sab- functions See military functions
otage, and other special operations. gendarmerie A national paramilitary police
first strike The first offensive move of a war. force that indigenous governments employ to
See also aggression; first use; second strike maintain law and order, mainly throughout rural
regions (villages, hamlets, and interspaces). See
first use The initial employment of any capabil-
also constabulary
ity in wartime. One side, for example, might be
the first to employ nuclear weapons during tradi- general-purpose forces See traditional forces
tional combat. See also first strike and warfare

flexibility Capabilities that afford a range of op- general war Armed conflict of global propor-
tions and facilitate smooth transitions when situa- tions, during which the survival of one or more
tions change. world powers is in jeopardy.
graduated response Incremental applications
force deployment The procurement and dispo-
of national power that allow enemies time to ad-
sition of military materiel and organizations; the
just between each escalatory step. Sometimes
movement to areas of operation and subsequent
called "piecemealing."
positioning of armed forces therein. See also
force employment grand strategy The art and science of employ-
ing national power to achieve national security
force employment The strategic, operational,
objectives under all circumstances. Favored instru-
or tactical use of armed forces. See also force de-
ments include force, threats of force, diplomacy,
ployment
economic pressures, psychological operations,
force freezes Arms control moratoriums that subterfuge, and other imaginative means. See also
maintain armed forces or other militarily valuable military strategy; national strategy
assets at present levels. See also arms control
gray propaganda Public information dissemin-
forces See armed forces ated in ways that do not specifically identify any
foreign aid Aid to an ally or other associate for source. See also black propaganda; propaganda;
political, economic, humanitarian, and/or security white propaganda
reasons that may be altruistic or self-serving. guerrillas and guerrilla warfare Predomi-
See also economic assistance; humanitarian assis- nantly indigenous insurgent or resistance groups
tance; military assistance; security assistance that conduct paramilitary hit-and-run operations

298
 APPENDIX A

against regular armed forces, other irregulars, or tiveness of friendly counterparts. See also cyber-
noncombatants. See also insurgency; resistance netic warfare; information systems
guidance See planning guidance infrastructure Organizations, fabrications, facili-
homeland defense See strategic defense ties, and installations that control and support ci-
vilian, military, paramilitary, law enforcement, or
horizontal escalation An increase in the subversive activities.
scope, but not necessarily the intensity, of any
conflict. See also escalation; vertical escalation instability See strategic stability

hostage Any person or property illegally held insurgency Protracted, organized efforts by in-
captive or in peril until redeemed, rescued, or vol- digenous groups to overthrow the established or-
untarily released. See also hostage rescue der (not necessarily a government), seize power
by subversive and coercive means, and sometimes
hostage rescue Diplomacy, negotiations, sanc-
(not always) alter social systems. Political, ideolog-
tions, and armed action, singly or in some combi-
ical, economic, social, religious, ethnic, and cul-
nation, to secure the safe release of persons or
tural motivations are common. See also counter-
property held for redemption. See also hostage
revolution; resistance
humanitarian assistance Disaster relief and
insurrection See counterrevolution; insur-
other aid designed to alleviate privation and suf-
gency; resistance
fering, especially food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, sanitation, utilities, and rudimentary surface intelligence The official interpretation of infor-
transportation. mation after professional analyses. See also basic
intelligence; information; strategic intelligence
incidents Brief, small-scale armed clashes at the
lower end of the conflict spectrum. See also lim- intentions The determination of a country or
ited war; war coalition to employ capabilities in specific ways
at particular times and places. See also capabil-
indirect approach Any strategy that literally or
ities
figuratively features envelopments, flank attacks,
and intellectually innovative maneuvers. Political, interdiction Military operations to prevent or
economic, psychological, and cybernetic pres- impede enemy use of selected areas or routes.
sures often take precedence over armed force. interests See national interests; national secu-
See also direct approach rity interests
information Knowledge; unprocessed facts joint (forces; operations) Military activities
and reports, regardless of type or derivation, that that involve armed forces from two or more mili-
analysts can convert into intelligence. See also in- tary services. See also combined (forces; opera-
telligence tions); unified operations
information systems The methodical collec-
law enforcement (forces; operations) Police,
tion, processing, transmission, dissemination, and
gendarmeries, constabularies, border guards,
storage of knowledge by automated and manual
coast guards, and other organizations designed to
means.
maintain order within particular countries or terri-
information warfare Actions to degrade en- tories in accord with national, and sometimes in-
emy information systems and preserve the effec- ternational, legal mandates.

299
APPENDIX A

limited war Armed encounters, exclusive of in- military balance The comparative combat
cidents, during which one or more major powers power of competing countries or coalitions. See
or their proxies voluntarily exercise various types also military power; military posture; strategic
and degrees of restraint to prevent unmanageable balance
escalation. Objectives, forces, weapons, targets, military doctrines Tenets that standardize stra-
and operational areas all are subject to restriction. tegic, operational, tactical, and logistical proce-
See also incidents; war dures under offensive, defensive, and benign con-
lines of communication Land, sea, air, and ditions. Military doctrines, unlike policies, are
space routes essential to the conduct of national instructive rather than directive in nature. See
security affairs, especially the deployment, rede- also national security policies
ployment, and logistical support of armed forces. military forces Regular, active, and reserve
linkage An arms control policy that addresses land, sea, air, and space forces of a nation, the pri-
force limitation and reduction issues in context mary purposes of which are to deter, defeat, or
with other politico-military problems, rather than otherwise deal with the full range of armed ag-
in isolation. gression wherever and whenever required. Sec-
LOC See lines of communication ondarily, they perform law enforcement missions
as directed. See also armed forces; law enforce-
logistics The design, development, acquisition, ment; paramilitary forces
storage, movement, distribution, maintenance,
and evacuation of military materiel; the medical military functions Tasks that land, sea, air,
care of military personnel; the construction, main- and space forces routinely perform in confor-
tenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; mance with their roles. Some tasks are uniservice,
and the acquisition or furnishing of services. while two or more services share others. Aerial in-
terdiction, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence col-
long-range plans Any plan that covers a pe- lection, and psychological operations are typical.
riod more than ten years in the future. See also See also military missions; military roles
mid-range plans; short-range plans
military missions Instructions to particular
means See resources armed forces that clearly indicate actions required
mercenaries Paid proxies. See also proxy at particular times and places in particular situa-
warfare tions. See also military functions; military roles
mid-range plans Any plan that covers a period military operations other than war The em-
three to ten years in the future. See also long- ployment of armed forces for nation-building,
range plans; short-range plans peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster re-
military aid See military assistance lief, and other benign or benevolent purposes.
Some definitions include counternarcotic opera-
military assistance Money, weapons, equip-
tions and counterterrorism in this category.
ment, supplies, advice, education, training, con-
struction, services, and other aid provided free of military policies See national security policies
charge or paid for by cash, credit, or barter. The military posture The strength, disposition, and
main purpose is to improve the military capabili- preparedness of armed forces to accomplish as-
ties of allies and other friends. See also economic signed missions despite particular opposition. See
assistance; security assistance also military balance; military power

300
 APPENDIX A

military power A compilation of capabilities re- other and the enemy. Battles and engagements
lated to the military balance between particular predominate, if armed combat occurs. See also
countries or coalitions. Ingredients include num- battle; engagement; military strategy; operational
bers, types, and organizational structures of art
armed forces; technological attributes of weapons
missions See military missions
and equipment; discipline, morale, pride, confi-
dence, elan, loyalty, and hardiness of personnel; MOOTW See military operations other than war
education, training, and combat experience; readi- narco conflict Hostilities associated with mili-
ness and sustainability; command and control ar- tary and law enforcement operations designed to
rangements; and leadership. Military power is use- reduce (preferably eradicate) the production and
less unless accompanied by national will to use it distribution of illegal drugs.
appropriately. See also military balance; national
power; national will national interests Highly generalized expres-
sions of a nation-state's compelling wants and
military preparedness The readiness of armed
needs. Survival, security, peace, prosperity, and
forces to accomplish particular missions on short
power are representative. See also national secu-
notice and sustain operations as long as neces-
rity interests
sary. See also readiness; sustainability
national objectives Fundamental purposes to-
military requirements Assets needed to ac-
ward which nation-states direct policies and ex-
complish national security objectives and military
pend energies. See also national security objec-
missions. See also military resources; requirement
tives
plans
military resources Money, manpower, and national policies Positive and negative procla-
raw materials needed to develop, operate, and mations, public and private, that guide govern-
maintain ready, sustainable armed forces that pos- mental officials in pursuit of national objectives.
sess required capabilities. See also military require- See also national security policies
ments national power The sum total of any country's
military roles Broad, enduring purposes that present and projected capabilities derived from
differentiate armies, navies, air forces, and space political, economic, military, social, scientific,
forces. Requirements to conduct prompt and technological, and informational resources in con-
sustained operations ashore, aloft, or afloat are text with geographical circumstances. See also
typical. See also military functions; military mis- military power
sions national security Measures taken by a country
military strategy The art and science of em- to safeguard interests and achieve objectives de-
ploying armed forces (not necessarily armed spite foreign and domestic threats of any kind.
force) under all conditions to attain national secu- Strong institutions, economies, and social systems
rity objectives during peacetime and in war. See often are more important than military power.
also military tactics; operational art national security commitments Formal or in-
military tactics The detailed employment of formal promises to assist allies and other friends
military formations, including the arrangement under general or specific conditions. Resultant ob-
and maneuvering of units in relation to each ligations may be qualified or unqualified.

301
APPENDIX A

national security interests Interests that are nonproliferation See counterproliferation

primarily concerned with preserving a state from
nuclear-free zone A geographic area where nu-
harm. See also national interests; vital interests
clear weapons are prohibited by international
national security objectives Aims that are pri- agreement.
marily concerned with shielding national interests
objectives See national objectives; national secu-
from foreign and domestic threats. See also na-
rity objectives
tional objectives
offensive concepts and operations See ag-
national security policies Guidelines for attain-
gression, counteroffensive; strategic offensive
ing national security objectives. See also national
policies operating tempo The pace of military opera-
tions, which intensifies when missions increase,
national security strategy See grand strategy
available forces decrease, or both. Unreasonably
national strategy The art and science of em- rapid or slow OPTEMPOs impair preparedness, if
ploying national power under all circumstances prolonged.
to achieve national objectives. See also national
power; national security strategy operational art Military plans and operations
that implement military strategies at theater level.
national will The proclivity of a government Campaigns predominate if armed combat occurs.
and its people to support politico-military poli- See also campaign; military strategy; military
cies, strategies, and operations despite intense, tactics
sustained pressures.
operations other than war See military opera-
nation-building Activities of a developing coun-
tions other than war
try, unilaterally or with outside assistance, to cre-
ate or strengthen popular acceptance of political, OPTEMPO See operating tempo
economic, legal, social, and other institutions and overt operations Activities conducted openly,
thereby enhance internal security. without any attempt to conceal the identity of
net assessments The dispassionate comparison the sponsor or participants. See also clandestine
of competing countries or coalitions to ascertain operations; covert operations
which seems best able to achieve its objectives pacification Counterinsurgency operations that
despite opposition by the other. See also threat aim to establish or reestablish national and grass-
assessments roots governments that are responsive to, and in-
nongovernmental groups Civilian associa- volve participation by, indigenous populations.
tions, foundations, multinational businesses, and See also counterinsurgency
other organizations whose members may approve paramilitary (forces; operations) Land, sea,
or oppose strategic policies, plans, and opera- and air forces, such as constabularies, gendarmer-
tions. ies, and border guards, that perform internal secu-
nonlethal warfare The use of political, eco- rity functions and supplement regular armed
nomic, social, technological, psychological, and forces as required; guerrillas and other irregulars
cybernetic "weapons" to achieve national security that use quasi-military tactics and techniques. See
objectives. Military forces may deploy to impress also armed forces; guerrillas and guerrilla warfare;
opponents, but armed combat is taboo. law enforcement; military forces

302
 APPENDIX A

parity A condition that pertains when the capa- political sanctions Diplomatic punishments,
bilities of particular armed forces and weapon sys- undertaken unilaterally or multilaterally, to con-
tems are approximately equal in effectiveness to vince opponents that they should cease undesir-
those of enemy counterparts under comparable able practices or otherwise bow to the wielder's
conditions. See also sufficiency; superiority will. See also political warfare
peace Domestic and international relationships political warfare The malicious manipulation
characterized by the absence of hostile activities of international relations to discredit, coerce, de-
and intent. See also war ceive, defang, or otherwise degrade enemy influ-
peace enforcement See peacemaking ence and power.

peacekeeping Nonviolent efforts of armed posture See military posture

forces, interposed between belligerents by mutual power See economic power; military power; na-
consent, to maintain a truce or otherwise discour- tional power; political power
age hostilities. See also peacemaking power projection Strategies that dispatch expe-
peacemaking Military efforts to prevent armed ditionary forces from positions in central reserve
conflict in a specified locale or to terminate ongo- to cope with distant contingencies. See also for-
ing hostilities by force. See also peacekeeping ward presence
perception management Overt, covert, or preemptive war Armed conflict initiated be-
clandestine employment of deception, controlled cause decision-makers believe that enemy attacks
disclosures, military demonstrations, psychologi- are imminent. See also preventive war
cal operations, and psychotropic agents to influ- preparedness See military preparedness
ence and exploit the emotions, thoughts, and mo-
preventive war Armed conflict initiated be-
tives of targeted governments, groups, and
cause decision-makers believe that enemy attacks
individuals in ways that help users achieve objec-
are inevitable and delays would magnify risks. See
tives. See also psychological warfare
also preemptive war
planning guidance Policies, assumptions, direc-
principles of deterrence A checklist, distilled
tions, decisions, and instructions that help shape
from historical experience, that skilled strategists
strategic, operational, and tactical concepts.
consider when they formulate concepts designed
plans See capability plans; contingency plans; to keep foes, friends, and neutrals from adopting
long-range plans; mid-range plans; requirement unwelcome courses of action. See also principles
plans; short-range plans of preparedness; principles of war
policies See military doctrines; national poli- principles of preparedness A checklist, dis-
cies; national security policies tilled from historical experience, that skilled plan-
politico-military The integration of foreign and ners, programmers, and budgeters consider dur-
domestic policies with military strategies. ing efforts to deploy ready and sustainable armed
political power A nation's abilities to promote forces. See also principles of deterrence; princi-
foreign and domestic policies and achieve na- ples of war; readiness; sustainability
tional objectives using diplomatic inducements principles of war A checklist, distilled from
and coercion as instruments. See also economic historical experience, that skilled strategists con-
power; military power; national power sider when they formulate concepts designed to

303
APPENDIX A

achieve offensive and defensive objectives during also perception management; propaganda; psy-
conflicts of any kind. See also principles of deter- chological operations
rence; principles of preparedness PSYOP See psychological operations
priorities See strategic priorities PSYWAR See psychological warfare
programming A process that appraises op-
purpose See national security interests; national
tions, then selects a mix of military organizations,
security objectives
weapons, and equipment with which to imple-
ment strategic plans, within limits prescribed by Pyrrhic victory Any triumph that incurs ruin-
available funds and other resources. See also stra- ous costs. See also victory
tegic plans R&D See research and development
proliferation The spread of particular weapons readiness The ability of armed forces to per-
and delivery vehicles, especially those that pos- form assigned missions on short notice wherever
sess nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological and whenever required. See also military pre-
warfare capabilities. See also counterproliferation paredness; sustainability
propaganda Any form of communication that rebellion An armed uprising against an incum-
directly or indirectly influences the opinions, emo- bent government or other established authority.
tions, attitudes, or behavior of enemies, neutrals, See also insurgency; resistance
and friends at home and abroad in ways that suit
reforms Political, economic, social, institu-
the sponsor. See also black propaganda; gray pro-
tional, and other renovations designed to
paganda; propaganda of deeds; psychological op-
strengthen the security of nation-states beset by
erations; psychological warfare; white propaganda
internal dissension.
propaganda of deeds Armed actions, espe-
requirement plans Concept formulations that
cially terrorist attacks, that seek to influence the
seek to solve strategic and tactical problems using
opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of tar-
armed forces and other assets. Authors count un-
geted audiences. See also propaganda
available resources, without which stated objec-
proxy warfare A form of limited war in which tives would be unachievable. See also capability
sponsors who seek to reduce costs and risks rely plans; military requirements
on de facto or de jure surrogates to accomplish
research and development Explorations, ex-
selected missions.
perimentations, validations, engineering, tests,
psychological operations The planned use of and evaluations that create new military materiel.
propaganda to induce or reinforce the attitudes See also applied research; basic research
and behavior of enemy, friendly, and neutral audi-
requirements See military requirements
ences in ways that facilitate the accomplishment
of security objectives during peacetime and in research See applied research; basic research
war. See also propaganda; psychological warfare resistance Organized efforts by undergrounds,
psychological warfare The planned use of psy- auxiliaries, guerrillas, and sympathizers to impor-
chological operations to induce or reinforce en- tune and, if possible, oust occupying powers. See
emy attitudes and behavior in ways that facilitate also auxiliaries; guerrillas and guerrilla warfare; in-
the accomplishment of security objectives. See surgency; underground

304
 APPENDIX A

resources See military resources shows of force military operations taken to in-
retaliation Military responses to offensive en- fluence opponents, allies, or neutrals in desired
emy actions. See also aggression; first strike; first ways without resort to armed combat.
use space The universe and all of its contents,
revolutionary warfare See counterrevolution; except Earth and its atmosphere. See also circum-
insurgency terrestrial space
risks The danger of disadvantage (even defeat) stability See strategic stability
that results from gaps between ends and means.
strategic area See core area
See also calculated risks
roles See military roles strategic balance The comparative power of
two competing countries or coalitions, taking po-
rules of engagement Authoritative directives
litical, economic, military, and other relevant fac-
that permit armed forces to instigate combat with-
tors into account. See also military balance
out further orders under specified conditions and
limit permissible actions thereafter. strategic center of gravity Any crucially impor-
sanctions See economic sanctions; political tant objective, the achievement of which prom-
sanctions ises a favorable conclusion to any given campaign
or war. Typical examples include capital cities,
sanctuaries Geographically distinctive territor-
key leaders, crucial industries, and enemy will.
ies within which one or more belligerents allow
opponents to rest, regroup, resupply, and retrain strategic concepts Judgments concerning ways
without fear of attack. that armed forces might best perform respective
second-strike Retaliation after an aggressor ini- functions and accomplish assigned missions, tak-
tiates armed hostilities. See also aggression; first ing relevant theories, facts, assumptions, and poli-
strike; first use cies into account. See also strategic theories

security See national security strategic defense Concepts and forces de-
signed primarily to protect a nation's people and
security assistance Foreign aid provided pri-
production base against armed attacks. See also
marily to improve the ability of allies and associ-
strategic offense
ates to resist internal or external aggression or
contribute more effectively to a coalition. See strategic education Systematic instruction that
also economic assistance; humanitarian assis- imparts knowledge concerning the evolution of
tance; military assistance strategic thought; the framework of modern mili-
sequential strategies Concepts that call for a tary strategy, with particular attention to politico-
series of discrete steps, each carefully planned military relationships; prominent theories, con-
and appraised in terms of required results. Strate- cepts, and other fundamentals; rationales that un-
gists usually must reshape consequent plans if derpin specialized strategies across the conflict
any stage fails to materialize or is altered substan- spectrum; interfaces with nonmilitary forms of na-
tially. See also cumulative strategies tional power; and strategic research techniques.
short-range plans Plans that cover periods no strategic intelligence Evaluated, integrated, in-
more than two years in the future. See also long- terpreted information required for the develop-
range plans; mid-range plans ment of national security objectives, policies, strat-

305
APPENDIX A

egies, plans, and programs. See also basic of opponents, overall or in particular categories.
intelligence; intelligence See also parity; sufficiency
strategic mobility Abilities to shift armed surrogate warfare See proxy warfare
forces and supplies rapidly from home bases to
susceptibility The proclivity of particular tar-
and between distant theaters of operation.
geted audiences to respond favorably to particular
strategic offense Concepts and forces designed psychological operations. See also vulnerability
primarily to destroy an enemy's war-making capa-
sustainability The ability of armed forces to
bilities or degrade them until opposition col-
perform assigned missions effectively as long as
lapses. See also strategic defense
necessary wherever and whenever required. See
strategic principles See principles of deter- also military preparedness; readiness
rence; principles of preparedness; principles of
tactics See military tactics
war
targets people that belligerents plan to kill, cap-
strategic research Efforts to expand the strate-
ture, or influence; property that they plan to
gic knowledge base and thereby expedite the de-
seize or destroy; areas that they plan to control or
velopment of creative theories and concepts. See
deny; countries, areas, organizations, groups, and
also applied research; basic research
individuals against which intelligence and counter-
strategic stability A state of equilibrium that intelligence personnel direct activities.
encourages prudence by opponents who contem-
technological warfare Ceaseless efforts to pro-
plate aggression, because none possess significant
duce qualitatively superior materiel that confers
advantage.
decisive military advantage over adversaries. See
strategic theories Conjecture concerning inno- also technological surprise
vative ways that armed forces might perform par-
technological surprise The perfection of po-
ticular functions or accomplish difficult missions.
tentially decisive military materiel that deploys un-
See also strategic concepts
expectedly or more rapidly than enemy intelli-
strategy See grand strategy; military strategy; gence analysts anticipate. See also technological
military tactics; national strategy; operational art; warfare
tactics
terrorism Public, repetitive violence or threats
subversion Insidious, mainly psychological, op- of violence to achieve sociopolitical objectives
erations intended to undermine the morale, disci- by inspiring widespread fear among people not
pline, loyalty, and will of populations and other- present at the scene. The ultimate aim is to dis-
wise degrade popular support for incumbent rupt national routines so severely that compliance
regimes. with terrorist demands seems preferable to fur-
ther disorder. See also counterterrorism; terrorist
sufficiency A condition that pertains when mili-
tary capabilities are neither unduly excessive nor terrorist Anyone who practices terrorism, re-
inadequate to achieve objectives. See also parity; gardless of motive. See also terrorism
superiority
theater of operations A major politico-military
superiority A condition that pertains when mili- or geographic area (such as Western Europe or
tary capabilities are markedly greater than those the Middle East) for which military commanders

306
 APPENDIX A

in chief prepare plans and conduct operations. verification Reconnaissance, surveillance, and
See also area of responsibility on-site inspections that seek to confirm or deny
theories See strategic theories compliance with arms control agreements.

threats The capabilities, intentions, and actions vertical escalation An increase in the intensity
of perceived enemies that currently endanger na- of any conflict. See also escalation; horizontal es-
tional interests and objectives or seem likely to calation
do so. victory The achievement of objectives during
threat assessments The dispassionate compari- battles, campaigns, and wars. Ultimate triumph
son of foreign and domestic perils to determine terminates hostilities. See also Pyrrhic victory
which seem most imminent and intense. Deci- vital interests Interests that involve national
sion-makers then establish priorities that concen- survival, including the preservation of assets that
trate on the greatest perceived hazards. See also make survival meaningful. See also national secu-
net assessments rity interests
traditional forces and warfare Armed forces vulnerability Weaknesses of any kind that ene-
and methods of operation that exclude nuclear, mies could exploit by any means; the susceptibil-
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons. ity of particular targeted audiences to psychologi-
tripwire A small, vulnerable, but symbolically cal warfare. See also susceptibility
significant deterrent force positioned in a friendly war Declared or undeclared combat of strategic
foreign country that adversaries threaten. Owners significance that exposes one or more nations to
advertise intents to retaliate if their token contin- defeat. See also battle; campaign; incidents;
gent is attacked. peace; warfare
underground An illegal organization that sur- warfare The use of lethal and nonlethal instru-
reptitiously plans and controls an insurgency or ments, perhaps in combinations, to degrade, dam-
resistance movement; conducts covert or clandes- age, or defeat adversaries. See also cybernetic
tine operations, such as subversion, sabotage, and warfare; economic warfare; information warfare;
terror; and provides guerrillas with administrative nonlethal warfare; political warfare; psychological
and logistical support. See also auxiliaries; guerril- warfare; technological warfare.
las and guerrilla warfare
weapons of mass destruction Nuclear explo-
unified operations The terms "joint" and sives; biological, chemical, and radiological muni-
"combined" do not intrinsically connote unity of tions, which destroy nothing but cause wide-
command. That condition pertains at national and spread casualties among exposed humans,
international levels only when national or coali-
livestock, and crops.
tion leaders confer full responsibility and author-
ity on one commander in chief. The Principle of white propaganda Public information dissemin-
Cooperation otherwise predominates. See also ated in ways that identify the sponsor. See also
combined (forces; operations); joint (forces; oper- black propaganda; gray propaganda; propaganda
ations) will See national will

307
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 Appendix B
Abbreviations

AC active component MT megaton

AOR area of responsibility MVD Ministry of the Interior (USSR)
ASAT antisatellite NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
BMD ballistic missile defense NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
BW biological warfare NBCR nuclear, biological, chemical, and
CIA Central Intelligence Agency radiological
CINC commander in chief NCO noncommissioned officer
CW chemical warfare OODA observe, orient on, decide, act
DOS Denial of Service PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
BMP electromagnetic pulse
PSYOP psychological operations
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
PSYWAR psychological warfare
FEMA Federal Emergency Management
Agency RC reserve component
GNP gross national product R&D research and development
GVN Government of Vietnam RDT&E research, development, test, and
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile evaluation

IFOR Implementation Force SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander,

Europe
IFTF International Police Task Force
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
SFOR Stabilization Force
KGB Committee for State Security
(USSR) SLA Symbionese Liberation Army

KFOR Kosovo Force SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army SLOC sea line of communication

KT kiloton SOF Special Operations Forces

MIRV multiple independently targetable SOP standing operating procedures

reentry vehicle START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
MOOTW military operations other than war UK United Kingdom

309
APPENDIX B

UN United Nations USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner yc yjet Cong
for Refugees
VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
U.S. United States WMD weapons of mass destruction

310
 Appendix C
A Bookshelf for Military Strategists

T his bookshelf for military strategists emphasizes

foundation documents. Many citations, there-
fore, date back decades or more. For additional de-
Griffith, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1963).

tail, see endnotes that terminate each chapter, foot- WORKS ABOUT MASTERS
notes, and bibliographies that accompany the many Theodore Ayrault Dodge, Caesar: A History of
references cited below, and the Air University Li- the Art of War Among the Romans Down to the
brary Index to Military Periodicals, 1963-2000, End of the Roman Empire, With a Detailed Account
distributed on CD-ROM by EBSCO Publishing, Pea- of the Campaigns of Gains Julius Caesar (New
body, MA 01960. York: De Capo Press, 1995).
Frederick the Great, on the Art of War, ed. by
MASTERWORKS Jay Luvaas (New York: Free Press (Macmillan &
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Co.), 1966).
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Basil H. Liddell Hart, Scipio Africanus: Greater
Princeton University Press, 1976). Than Napoleon (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992).
Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Paul Ratchnevsky, Genghis Khan: His Life and
Dino Ferrari (Washington: Office of Air Force His- Legacy, trans. Thomas Nivison Haining (New York:
tory, 1983). Blackwell Publishing Co., 1993).
Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Robert B. Strasser, ed., The Landmark Thucyd-
Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Westport, CT: Green- ides:A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian
wood Press, 1974). War (New York: Free Press, 1996).
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, ed. Peter Bonda-
nella, trans. Mark Musa (New York: Oxford Univer- ANTHOLOGIES
sity Press, 1998) and Discourses, ed. Bernard Crick, Edward Mead Earle, ed., Makers of Modern
trans. Leslie J. Walker (New York: Viking Press, Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to
1985). Hitler (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea 1943).
Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Hill Arthur F. Lykke, ed., Military Strategy: Theory
and Wang, 1969). and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army
Mao Tse-Tung, On Protracted War, 2d ed. War College, 1989).
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, I960) and On Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy:
Guerrilla Warfare, trans, and with an introduction Military Thought from Machiavelli to the Nuclear
by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961). Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. 1986).

311
APPENDIX C

George Edward Thibault, ed., The Art and Prac- Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence (Princeton,
tice of Military Strategy (Washington: National De- NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965).
fense University Press, 1984).
Security Objectives
OTHER OVERVIEWS Marc Cancian, "Centers of Gravity Are a Myth,"
Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1998,
University Press, 2000). 30-34.
Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unre- Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, "On
stricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics War, Political Objectives, and Military Strategy,"
in the Age of Globalization, trans. Foreign Broad- Parameters, December 1993, 2-10.
cast Information Service (Beijing: PLA Arts Publish- Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d rev. ed. (New
ing House, February 1999). York: Praeger, 1967), Chapter XXI, "National Object
Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Military Aim."
and Peace (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard, Steven Metz and Frederick M. Downey, "Centers
1987). of Gravity and Strategy Planning," Military Review,
Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, April 1988, 27-33.
Soviet Military Strategy, ed. Harriet Fast Scott, 3d
ed. (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1968).
Politico-Military Policies
FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New
STRATEGY York: Holmes and Meier, 1979).
Security Interests Joseph Collins, American Military Culture in
Bernard Brodie, Strategy and National Interests: the Twenty-First Century (Washington: Center for
Reflections for the Future (Washington: National Strategic & International Studies, February 2000).
Strategy Information Center, 1971). Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State:
George C. McGhee, ed., National Interests and The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
Global Goals (Lanham, MD: University Press of (Cambridge, MA: the Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
America, 1989). versity, 1959).
Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture,"
Threats Comparative Strategy, vol. 10, (1991), 3-23.
Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Allan R. Millett, The American Political System
Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable," World and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical
Politics, vol. 31, no. 1 (October 1978), 14-20. Perspective, Mershon Position Papers in the Policy
John M. Collins, "Essentials of Net Assessment," Sciences, No. Four (Columbus: the Mershon Center
in U.S.-SovietMilitary Balance: Concepts and Capa- of Ohio State University, April 1979).
bilities, 1960-1980 (Washington: McGraw-Hill Pub-
lishers, 1980), 3-14. FUNDAMENTALS OF MILITARY
Global Trends 2015: Dialogue About the Future STRATEGY
with Nongovernment Experts, NIC 2000-02 (Wash- Introductions
ington: paper prepared under the direction of the General d'Armee Andre Beaufre, An Introduc-
National Intelligence Council for publication by the tion to Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965).
National Intelligence Board, December 2000). Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, Introduc-

312
 APPENDIX C

tion to Strategy (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Michael Howard, "The Causes of War," Wilson
Command and Staff College, 1982). Quarterly (Summer 1984), 90-103.
Richard G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, Deter-
Geomilitary Schools of Thought rence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological and
John M. Collins, Military Geography: For Profes- Chemical Environment (Washington: National De-
sionals and the Public (Washington: National De- fense University Press, 1999).
fense University Press, 1998; reprinted, Brassey's, Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: To-
1998). ward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ:
Sir Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Princeton University Press, 1961).
Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, John G. Stossenger, Why Nations Go to War
1982). (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978).
Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and
Reality (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1942). War-Fighting Fundamentals
David R. Mets, John Warden and the Classical John I. Alger, The Quest for Victory: The History
Air Power Theorists (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: of the Principles of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Air University Press, 1996). Press, 1982).
G. Harry Stine, Confrontation in Space (Engle- Roger Beaumont, Horizontal Escalation: Pat-
wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981). terns and Paradoxes, Stratech Studies Series (Col-
lege Station: Center for Strategic Technologies,
Texas A&M, 1993).
Theories and Concepts Richard K. Belts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for
Henry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy Defense Planning (Washington: Brookings Institu-
(New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, tion, 1982).
1965). Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, ed., The Foun-
Colonel Glenn Harned, USMC, The Complexity dations of Defensive Defense (New York: St. Mar-
of War: The Application of Nonlinear Science to tin's Press, 1990).
Military Science (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Uni- Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig, ed.
versity, June 5, 1995). Strategic Military Deception (New York: Per-
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A gammon Press, 1981).
General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, Russell W. Glenn, "No More Principles of War,"
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967). Parameters, Spring 1998, 48-66.
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. ed., Maneuver Warfare:
Fundamentals of Deterrence An Anthology (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993).
Geoffrey Blaney, The Causes of War (New York: Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and
Free Press, 1973). Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965).
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, Strategic Mili-
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959), tary Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities (New
264-304. York: National Strategy Information Center, 1982).
Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deter-
rence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and War Termination Fundamentals
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn, ed., Con-
1974). flict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion,

313
APPENDIX C

Persuasion, and War (Boulder, CO: Westview Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin,
Press, 1987). Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth
"How Wars End," a special edition of The Annals Century Fund, 1961).
of the American Academy of Political and Social Kosta Tsipis et al., ed., Arms Control and Verifi-
Science (November 1970). cation: The Technologies That Make It Possible
Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End (New (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).
York: Columbia University Press, 1971).
David M. Morris, "From War to Peace: A Study
SPECIALIZED MILITARY
of Cease-fire Agreements and the Evolving Role of
STRATEGIES
the United Nations," Virginia Journal of Interna-
Counterproliferation
tional Law, vol. 36 (Summer 1996).
Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis, ed.,
Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives
Fundamentals of Military on Counterproliferation (Washington: National De-
Preparedness fense University Press, 1995).
Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation
from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge, UK: Cam- of Mass Destruction Weapons: Assessing the Risks
bridge University Press, 1979). (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, Au-
Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, ed., gust 1993) and Technologies Underlying Weapons
America's First Battles: 1776-1965 (Lawrence: of Mass Destruction (December 1993).
University of Kansas Press, 1986). Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weap-
Rame Hemstreet, Small Worlds Missions: The ons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers 171 (Lon-
Impact of Military Operations Other Than War don: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
on Combat Readiness (Washington: National War Autumn 1981).
College, May 10, 1999).
Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, Moving
Nuclear Warfare
Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics
Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon:
from the Persian Gulf War (Boston: MA: Harvard
Atomic Power and World Order (New York:
Business School Press, 1992).
Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1946).
DA Pamphlet 39-3: The Effects of Nuclear Weap-
Fundamentals of Arms Control ons, rev. ed. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Donald G. Brennan, Arms Control, Disarma- Office, February 1964).
ment, and National Security (New York: G. Brazil- The Effects of Nuclear War (Montclair, NJ: Al-
ler, 1961). lenheld, Osmun, & Co., for the Office of Technology
Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, ed., Assessment, 1980).
A Documentary History of Arms Control and Dis- Leon Goure, War Survival in Soviet Strategy
armament (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1973). (Coral Gables, FL: Center for Advanced International
Fred Charles Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New Studies, University of Miami, 1976).
York: Harper and Row, 1964). Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Prince-
Christopher Lamb, How to Think About Arms ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, I960).
Control, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and For-
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988). eign Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957).

314
 APPENDIX C

Biological and Chemical Warfare Michael H. H. Evans, Amphibious Operations:

Javed All, Leslie Rodrigues, and Michael The Projection of Power Ashore (Washington: Brass-
Moodie, U.S. Chemical-Biological Defense Guide- ey's, 1990).
book (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Toward a Maritime
1998). Grand Strategy: Paradigm for a New Security Envi-
The Biological Chemical Warfare Threat (Wash- ronment," Strategic Review, Spring 1993, 7-19.
ington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1998). Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The
Robert Harris, "Toward a Theory of Biological History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New
Deterrence," World Outlook (Summer 1990), 952- York: Morrow, 1974).
102. B. Mitchell Simpson, ed., The Development of
The Problem of Chemical and Biological War- Naval Thought: Essays by Herbert Rosinski
fare, 6 vol. (New York: Swedish Institute for Peace (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1977).
Research (SIPRI), 1973).
Insurgency
Traditional Warfare Robert S. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guer-
Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The rilla in History, 2 vol. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday
Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign & Co., 1975).
Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., ed.,
1994). Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict
Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Land- (Washington: Center for Research in Social Systems,
scape of Global Conflict (NY: Metropolitan American University, vol. I, February 1968; vol. II,
Books, 2000). March 1967; vol. Ill, April 1968; Supplement, Sep-
Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Chal- tember 1968).
lenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Martin van Creveld, ed., The Encyclopedia of Rev-
Chicago Press, 1957). olutions and Revolutionaries: From Anarchism to
Clark G. Reynolds, Command of the Sea: The Zhou Enlai (New York: Facts on File, 1996).
History and Strategy of Maritime Empires (New Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New
York: Morrow, 1974). York: Grove Press, 1963).
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton,
in Limited War, rev. ed. (Novato, CA: Presidio NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).
Press, 1994). Andrew R. Molnar et al., Undergrounds in Insur-
Andrew G. B. Vallence, The Air Weapon: Doc- gency, Revolution, and Resistance Warfare (Wash-
trines of Air-power Strategy and Operational Art ington: Special Operations Research Office, Ameri-
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). can University, 1963).
Robert Taber, War of the Flea: A Study of Guer-
Naval Strategies rilla Warfare Theory and Practice (New York: Lyle
Merrill L. Bartlett, ed., Assault from the Sea: Stuart, 1965).
Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983). Counterinsurgency
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Center of Military History, U.S. Army, Reorganiz-
G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (Annapolis, ing for Pacification Support (Washington: U.S. Gov-
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976). ernment Printing Office, 1982).

315
APPENDIX C

Doris M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr. ed., Neil C. Livingstone, The Complete Security
Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict. See Guide for Executives (Lexington, MA: Lexington
section on Insurgency for a full citation. Books, 1989).
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Neil C. Livingstone, The Cult of Counterterror-
Theory and Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964). ism: The "Weird World" of Spooks, Counterterror-
Alistair Home, A Savage Peace: Algeria, 1954- ists, Adventurers, and the Not Quite Professionals
1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1978). (Lexington, MA: Levingston Books, 1990).
Major General Edward Geary Lansdale, In the Brian M. Jenkins, Terrorism and Personal Pro-
Midst of Wars (New York: Harper and Row, 1972. tection (Boston: Butterworth Publishers, 1985).
Mark Moyer, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The Karl A. Sagan, The Anti-terrorism Handbook
CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1990).
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French Nonlethal Warfare
View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, David Alberts, The Unintended Consequences
1964). of Information Age Technologies: Avoiding Pitfalls,
Seizing the Initiative (Washington: National De-
Terrorism fense University Press, April 1996).
Gavin Cameron, Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Athena's
for the 21st Century (New York: St. Martin's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information
Press, 1999). Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997).
Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism in an Unstable The Economics of National Security, vol. XV,
World (New York: Routledge, 1994. Economic Warfare and Economic Intelligence
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Vic- (Washington: Industrial College of the Armed
tor Gallancz, 1998). Forces, 1958).
Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coer-
and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Ox- cive Diplomacy As an Alternative to War (Washing-
ford University Press, 1999). ton: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).
Albert Perry, Terrorism from Robespierre to Robert T. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde, Stra-
Arafat (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976). tegic Psychological Operations (Chicago: Univer-
Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing sity of Chicago Press, I960).
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons Klaus Knorr and Oskar Morgenstern, Science and
(Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2000). Defense: Some Critical Thoughts on Research and
Paul Wilkinson, ed., Technology and Terrorism, Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
London: Frank Cass, 1993). Press, 1965).
Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare,
Counterterrorism 2d ed. (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1954).
Critical Foundations: Protecting America's In- Stefan T. Possony and J. E. Pournelle, The Strat-
frastructure (Washington: Commission on Critical egy of Technology (Cambridge, MA: Dunellen,
Infrastructure Protection, October 13, 1997). 1970).
Force Protection: Global Interests, Global Re- Edward Waltz, Information Warfare: Principles
sponsibilities, Report to the President and Congress and Operations (Boston: Artech House, 1998).
(Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Yuan-li Wu, Economic Warfare (New York:
September 15, 1996). Prentice-Hall, 1952).

316
 APPENDIX C

Coalition Warfare Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making

Ken Booth, "Alliances," in Contemporary Strate- of America's Bosnia Policy (Washington: Brookings
gies: Theories and Concepts, ed. John Bayles et al., Institution, 2000).
vol. I, 2d ed. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987). Admiral James O. Ellis, A View from the Top, a
Julian R. Friedman et al., ed., Alliance in Interna- briefing by Commander, Joint Task Force Noble
tional Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970). Anvil during Operation Allied Force, undated (Sep-
Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John tember 1999).
D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in Internal Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action
Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Report, report to Congress (Washington, Offices of
Wiley and Sons, 1973). the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ith- Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 2000.
aca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). Karl Mueller, Operation Allied Force Air Strat-
egy Comments, a briefing (Maxwell Air Force Base,
STRATEGIC RESEARCH AL: School of Advanced Air Power Studies, April
Paul Bracken, "The Army After Next," Washing- 29, 1999).
ton Quarterly, Autumn 1993, 154-174. Major General Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace:
John M. Collins, "How Military Strategists Should Bosnia, 1994 (London: Harvill Press, 1998).
Study History," Military Review, vol. LXIII, no. 8 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A
(August 1983). Journey Through Yugoslavia, Twentieth Century
Professional Military Education, Hearings be- Classics reprint (New York: Penguin Books, 1995).
fore the Panel on Military Education of the House
Armed Services Committee, HASC 100-125, 100th STUDY AIDS
Cong., 1st and 2d sess. (Washington: U.S. Govern- R. Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Harper Ency-
ment Printing Office, 1991); Report of the National clopedia of Military History: From 3,500 B.C., to the
Defense University Transition Planning Commit- Present, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993).
tee (The Long Committee), submitted to the Chair- Charles W. Freeman, Jr., The Diplomat's Diction-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 25, 1989. ary (Washington: National Defense University,
Project 2025 (Washington: Institute for National 1994).
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, May Major General J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History
1992). of the Western World, 3 vol. (New York: Funk &
Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-war: Sur- Wagnalls, 1954), especially the chronicles that pre-
vival At the Dawn of the 21st Century (Boston: cede each chapter.
Little, Brown, 1993). Clive Parry, John P. Grant, et al., ed., Encyclopae-
dic Dictionary of International Law (New York:
BALKAN TAR-BABIES Oceana Publications, 1986).
General Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War:
Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat (NY:
Public Affairs, 2001).

317
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 Index

ll/2 or 2Vz war strategy, 66, 103. armed forces sions; military preparedness;
See also major regional contin- active-reserve relationships, 29- military roles
gencies 30, 101 arms control, 293
air power peculiarities, 39, 40, agendas, 115
abductions 156 bans, 111
Brig. Gen. James Dozier, 197 civil vs. military control, 49-51 bargaining chips, 116
Patricia Hearst, 197, 198, 213 deterrent value of, 157-58 biological and chemical warfare,
Skorzeny excels at, 85-86 force ratios for counterinsur- 18, 147-48
terrorist tactics in, 197-99 gency, 188-89 confidence-building measures,
See also hostages functions during counterinsurgen- 116
Acheson, Dean, on Korea, 27 cies, 188 Conventional Forces in Europe
Achille Lauro hijacking, 199, 214 future preparedness of, 102, 106 (CFE) Treaty, 112
active strategies, 63 geographic influences, 100 counting complexities, 111-13
aeronautical school of thought, 61 homosexuals in, 105 disarmament, 64, 110
air defenses, porous, 235 interdependence of, 155-56, force caps, 110
air power in Kosovo, 279, 284 162 freezes, 110-11
Albright, Madeleine, urges interven- land power peculiarities, 39, 40, Geneva Conventions, 18
Hague Conventions, 18, 111
tion in Bosnia, 53 155
linkage, 116
Algeria military balances, 156-57
mutual reductions in Europe,
De Gaulle grants independence and operating tempos, 104
110
to, 49, 91 power projection, 87-88, 158-59
negotiating techniques, 115-16
French counterinsurgency in, presence overseas, 87, 158
nuclear-free zones, 111
181 qualitative considerations, 23-25,
objectives, 109, 115
alliance treaties, membership and 30, 100-01, 113-14, 157
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks,
terms, 240-41 quantitative considerations, 23, 110, 112, 115, 116
amphibious operations during nu- 28-30, 100, 112-13, 156-57 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,
clear war, 161-62 resource allocations, 102 116, 136
Anderson, Adm. George, dispute responsiveness to change, 25 technological controls, 113-14
with McNamara, 160 sea power peculiarities, 39, 40, test bans and moratoriums, 114
Anderson, Maj. Gen. Orville, preven- 155-56 unilateral reductions, 110
tive war advocate, 140 servicewomen, 105 verification, 116-17
Andropov, Yuri, on peaceful coexis- space power peculiarities, 39, versus arms competition, 64
tence, 16 40, 156 See also counterproliferation;
AOR. See areas of responsibility teamwork in, 25 nuclear arms control
Arafat, Yasser, temporarily re- U.S. Cold War deployments, 87, Aron, Raymond, on proliferation,
nounces terrorism, 74 102 127
areas of responsibility, 293 U.S. contingency force require- Aspin, Les, Bottom-Up Review,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 274, 275 ments, 87-88, 103 103
Kosovo, 280-81, 284 value of obsolescent forces, 29 assassination
Argentina, counterinsurgency in, See also coalition warfare; mili- Aldo Moro, 197
185-86 tary functions; military mis- "kingpin" targets, 42, 78-79, 82

319
INDEX

assassination, continued proliferation, 124, 125 Brodie, Bernard

Phoenix program, 186 R&D installations as poor targets, National War College faculty
President Reagan, 193 148 member, 259
Reinhard Heydrich, 185 research and development, 127 strategic trailblazer, 136, 251
terrorist tactic, 197 terrorism, 195-96 broken-back warfare, nuclear sce-
U.S. prohibitions, 90 Weapons Convention, 112 nario, 142
assumptions blockades Brown, Harold
denned, described, 7, 293 in Bosnia, 273 IVz war deficiencies, 103
influence on net assessments, 30 as counterproliferation option, on Soviet buildups, 17
influence on strategic research, 129 Broz, Josip (Tito), forms modern
260 and Cuban missile crisis, 160 Yugoslavia, 268
politico-military samples, 64-65 denned, 294 budgets
astronautical school of thought, 61 as type of attrition warfare, 88 influence strategies, 7
asymmetrical strategies, 65 Blair, Tony, dialogue with Irish Re- McNamara's cost-effectiveness
attrition strategies, 63 publican Army, 212 criteria, 67
Aum Shinrikyo, use of biological Bosnia-Herzegovina burden-sharing, 294
and chemical agents, 196 blockades in, 273 in coalitions, 87, 243, 244
Aung An Suu Kyi, 173 Colin Powell on, 53 Bush, President George Herbert
combatants, 268 Walker
Baader-Meinhof Gang, 213 Dayton Peace Agreement, disregards War Powers Resolu-
ballistic missile defense, strategic 273-75 tion, 90
significance of, 87, 128 ethnic cleansing, 268 New World Order, 52
bargaining chips, 116 Implementation Force, 275, 276 terminates Desert Storm, 92
Baruch, Bernard, and nuclear arms interests of, 268-69
control, 111, 135-36 International Police Task Force, capabilities, foreign, intelligence es-
bastions, Soviet submarine, 86 275 timates of, 25-28
Battle of Britain negotiated settlement as early op- Carter, President James Earl, Jr.
preserves springboard for tion, 272 (Jimmy)
Normandy invasion, 157 peacekeeping prospects, 272 and hostages in Teheran, 198
technological factors, 225 peacemaking force requirements, human rights advocate, 18
Beaufre, General d'Armee Andre 273 theater nuclear reductions, 110
freedom of action as aim, 16, policy options, 271-73 Castro, Fidel
63-64 route security, 272 guerrilla organizations, 170-72,
strategic trailblazer, 59, 253, 260 U.N. arms embargo, 272-73 173
Begin, Menachim, as Irgun terrorist, U.N. safe havens, 273 and Soviet patrons, 242
194 U.S. objectives towards, 271 casualty avoidance, U.S. and NATO,
biological warfare (BW) war begins in 1992, 268, 273 280, 284
agents, 127, 145-46, 148-49, Bottom-Up Review, 103 catalytic conflicts, 72-73, 294
195-96 Boyd, Col. John, OODA loops, 230 causes of conflict, 72-73
and arms control, 18, 147 Bradley, Gen. Omar, interest in related to war termination,
attributes, 145 peace, 16 92-93
and Aum Shinrikyo, 196 Braun, Wernher von, trailblazer in unresolved in Kosovo, 283, 285
catalytic conflicts, 72 space, 226 center of gravity. See strategic cen-
consequences of, 148-49 Brennen, Donald G., coins acronym ters of gravity
credible and incredible threats, MAD, 139 CFE (Treaty on Conventional
148 Brezhnev, Leonid Forces in Europe), counting
defense against, 149, 151 counterrevolutionary doctrine, problems, 112
defined, 294 86, 173-74 chaos theories, 261
delivery vehicles, 145 limits support for Arab clients, chemical warfare
deterrence, 77, 148 160 agents, 146-47, 150
genetic engineering, 146 brinkmanship, 77, 128 arms control, 147-48

320
 INDEX

decontamination, medical care, on strategic centers of gravity, collective security, case for, 237-
and cleanup, 151 41, 43 38. See also coalitions
defensive measures, 150-51 as strategic trailblazer, 9, 251-52 command and control
delivery vehicles, 147, 150 Clemenceau, Georges, on war, 8 in coalitions, 242-43
detection, 150 Clinton, President William J. (Bill) in counterterrorism, 205-6
deterrence, 149 attacks terrorist installations, 212 in insurgencies, 169-71
individual and collective protec- deplores terrorism, 195 in terrorism, 194
tion, 150-51 dialogue with Irish Republican See also civil-military control
proliferation, 123, 124, 126 Army, 211 commitments, compared with poli-
research and development, 127 disregards War Powers Resolu- cies, 47
retaliation in kind, 149 tion, 90 complexity theories, 261
and terrorism, 196 Iraqi Liberation Act, 173 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,
unique attributes of, 145, 146-47 national security strategy, 52 114
weapons convention, 112-13 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, concepts. See strategic concepts
China, military strengths and weak- 136 confidence-building measures, 75,
nesses, 24 coalitions, 237 116
Choltitz, Gen. Dietrich von, de- Axis alliance, 243 conflicts of interest, 18
clares Paris open city, 161 bilateral and multilateral treaties, conflict spectrum, 21-22, 295-96
Churchill, Prime Minister Winston 240-41 conflict termination
against chemical warfare, 77 burden-sharing, 87, 244, 294 in counterinsurgencies, 190
coalition partners, 239 case for collective security, deescalation, 89
lauds RAF, 157 237-38 inducements, inhibitions, terms,
victory is Britain's aim, 14 commanders in chief and staffs 91-93
city evacuation, civil defense op- in, 242 in limited wars, 160
tion, 142 compatibility prospects within, in nuclear war, 142
civic action, counterinsurgency 101-2, 239-40 Treaty of Versailles, 117, 221
coordination within, 243 World War II, 15, 222
technique, 184-85
deterrent value of, 159 See also deescalation
civil defense, nuclear warfare op-
foreign aid to, 243-44 Congress
tion, 142
high commands, 242 civil-military control, 50-51
civil-military control
in Korean War, 160, 220 forbids aid to Contras, 174
civilian control in autocracies,
League of Nations, 63, 238 Iraqi Liberation Act, 173
49-50
in limited wars, 160 restrains covert operations, 90
civilian control in democracies, major military commands, Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 35
50-51 242-43 War Powers Resolution, 90
military control, 49 and nonalignment/neutralism, 237 Contact Group, membership, 278
Soviet system, 49-50 optimum size of, 240 contingency plans
U.S. system, 50-51 periodic reviews of, 244-45 intervention checklist, 286
Civil War, insurgency by separatist in Persian Gulf War, 242-43 major regional contingencies, 66,
states, 173 purposes of, 239, 241 87, 103, 284
Clark, Gen. Wesley K. reliability of, 239-40 NATO in Kosovo, 283-84
air power priorities in Kosovo, surrogates in, 240, 241-42 threat assessment, 30
279-80 treaties, 240-41 U.S. plans for China, 82
NATO's cohesion is critical, 279 unity of command, 242-43 continental school of thought, 61
occupation forces for Kosovo, See also North Atlantic Treaty Or- Contras, 174, 207, 243
284 ganization; United Nations Conventional Forces in Europe,
Clausewitz, Carl von Cohen, William S., on intelligence counting problems, 112
and continental school of for counterterrorism, 214 counterforce targeting, 141
thought, 61 collateral casualties and damage, counterinsurgencies, 181, 296
on national will, 25 295 in Argentina, 185-86
on physical vs. moral factors, 84 concerns in Kosovo, 280, 284 civic actions, 184-85

321
INDEX

counterinsurgencies, continued centralization vs. decentraliza- schools of thought, 230-31

clear and hold strategies, 187 tion, 206 targets, 231
compared with insurgencies, civilian installation security, terrorism and counterterrorism,
182, 183 209-10 210
compared with traditional con- civil liberties restraints, 214 Cyrus the Great, as strategic trail-
flicts, 182 control mechanisms, 205-6 blazer, 252
force ratios, 188-89 cybernetic security, 210, 232
French in Algeria, Indochina, 181 deterrent dilemmas, 207-8 Dayton Peace Agreement, 273-75
hold and harass strategies, 187 disarming of explosives, 211 "decapitation" strategies, 64, 142
intelligence, 182-83 "drive-by shooting," 212 deception
law enforcement, 183 economic sanctions, 212 deterrent technique, 76
Malaya, 183 fixed vs. flexible policies, 206-7 missile gap, 76
Nazi German atrocities, 185 hostage rescues, 210-11, 214 political warfare, 221
New Left, 184 intelligence in, 213, 214 in Normandy, 76
outside support, 187-88 Iran-Contra affair, 207 and surprise, 83
pacification programs, 189-90 Israeli strategy and tactics, 65-66 Declaration of Independence, revo-
prescriptions for success, 190 killing of terrorist leaders, 212 lutionary document, 169
primacy of land power in, 188 legal considerations, 206, 214 deescalation, 89. See also conflict
with reforms, 183-85 military installation security, 209 termination
search and destroy strategies, political countermeasures, 211 defense
186-87 preemption vs. retaliation, 207 against chemical warfare agents,
Soviet-Cuban support for Sandi- and public safety, 208 150-51
nistas, 243 U.S. and Soviet participants, civil defense, 142
termination of, 190 205-6 defensive offensives, 86-87
unity of effort, 189-90 violence vs. nonviolence, 207 and deterrence, 74
counterproliferation strategies, 296 and VIP protection, 208 of homeland, 15, 138
air strikes, 129 See also terrorism against nuclear warfare, 74,
countervalue targeting, 141 136-38
blockades, 129
covert operations, congressional re- offensive defensives, 86
disputes about desirability,
straints on, 90 purposes, 83-84
127-28
credibility Sun Tzu evaluates, 86
intelligence indicators, 126-27
national security interest in, De Gaulle, Charles
intelligence collection, 128
15-16 force defrappe, 138
invasion of offending states, 130
Principle of Deterrence, 73 frees Algeria, 49, 91
nonmilitary options, 128 Croatia ignorant of revolutionary war,
Nonproliferation Treaty, 128, 136 resistance movement in World 181
prognosis for, 130 War II, 174-75 versus communist insurgents dur-
sabotage, 129-30 interests in Bosnia, 268, 271 ing World War II, 168
security guarantees, 128-29 Cuba demonstrations, deterrent tech-
See also proliferation missile crisis, 38 nique, 75, 159
counterrevolutions, 173, 296 Soviet surrogate, 160, 242 deterrence, 71, 297
Soviet operations in Afghanistan, Soviet tripwire in, 76-77 of biological warfare, 77, 148
174 cumulative strategies, 62 of chemical warfare, 149
Soviet operations in Europe, 86, Cushman, Col. Robert E., on am- compared with avoidance, 71
173-74, 239-40 phibious operations during nu- credibility in, 73
See also counterinsurgencies clear war, 162 by deception and disinformation,
counterterrorism, 205, 296 cybernetic warfare, 230, 297 76
Achille Lauro hijacking, 199, 214 benefits and liabilities, 232 and defense, 74
attack patron states, 213 countermeasures, 232 by demonstrations, 75, 159
attack terrorist bases, 212-13 innovative capabilities, 26 extended deterrence, 138
censorship and ostracism, offensive options, 231 NATO's policies for, 53
211-12 participants, 231 by nonprovocation, 74

322
 INDEX

by nuclear threats, 148 ends and means, 3, 5, 8 Gallois, Gen. Pierre, on prolifera-
by permanent presence, 158 See also resource allocation tion, 127
from power projection, 158-59 escalation Galvin, Gen. John R., about inter-
Principles of Deterrence, 73-75 controlled in Kosovo, 280 vention in Bosnia, 272
and publicity, 74-75 ladder, 88-89 Gandhi, Mahatma, on passive resis-
purposes of, 71 vertical, horizontal, and gradual, tance, 63
rewards as incentives to, 74 64, 89, 91 Geiger, Lt. Gen. Roy S., on amphibi-
success hard to prove, 71 See also deescalation ous operations during nuclear
techniques for (summarized), 76 Estes, General Howell, III, on intelli- war, 161-62
theories of, 75-77 gence requirements, 22-23 Geneva Conventions, on arms con-
traditional requirements for, 157 ethnic cleansing trol, 18
tripwires, 76-77 in Bosnia, 268, 271 geography
by uncertainty, 73, 77 in Kosovo, 279, 283 in Cuban missile crisis, 38
vacillation deflates, 159 extended deterrence in homeland influence on preparedness, 100
by wars, 75 defense, 138 influence on strategies, 62
See also nuclear deterrence as national security interest,
Diem, Ngo Dinh, against Viet Cong, Fairchild, Maj. Gen. Muir, preven- 17-18
186 tive war advocate, 140 Germany
direct strategies, 62-63 Fall, Bernard, on French vs.Viet contribution to NATO, 244
disinformation Minn force ratios, 189 in Treaty of Versailles, 117, 221
contributes to surprise, 83 female service members, disputes Gorbachev, Mikhail, reforms desta-
as deterrent technique, 76 concerning, 105 bilize USSR, 52
Soviet specialty, 229-30 fifth columns, in Spain, 176 Gorshkov, Fleet Adm. Sergei G.
doctrines. See military doctrines Flexible Response on Soviet naval needs, 17
domestic tranquility as universal in- compared with gradual escala- strategic trailblazer, 253, 254
terest, 15 tion, 89 gradual escalation, in Vietnam and
Dominican Republic, U.S. counter- Kosovo, 89, 280, 284
NATO's shortcomings in, 66
insurgency, 189 Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., tenacity of,
flexibility, principle of, 82
Douhet, Brig. Gen. Guilio, aeronau- 85
force defrappe, 73, 138
tical school of thought, 61 grand strategy, 4, 298
Ford, President Gerald R., forbids
Dozier, Brig. Gen. James L., abduc- grand tactics. See operational art
assassination, 90
tion of, 197 Gromyko, Andrei, institutional mem-
foreign aid
Duvalier, "Papa Doc," domestic ter- ory of, 115
objectives and objections,
rorism of, 193 Guatemala, U.S. PSYOP feat in,
243-44
227-28
economic warfare South Korean forces in Vietnam, guerrillas
blacklists, 223 499 assist traditional forces, 172
export/import controls, 223 foreign policies in European Russia, 176
limitations and successes, 223-24 compete with domestic policies, organizations, 170, 172, 173
OPEC oil embargo, 17 51 outside support for, 187-88
preclusive purchases, 223 military power supports, 52-53 Guzman, Arbenz, PSYOP defeat of,
sanctions, 222-23 Soviet priorities, 52 227-28
Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D. U.S. priorities, 51-52
broad front strategy, 83 forward presence, value of, 87-88, Hague Conventions, 18, 111
directive from Combined Chiefs 103, 158 Haig, Gen. Alexander M., Jr., on nu-
of Staff, 37, 84 freedom of action clear "shot across the bow,"
resigns commission, 50 benefits, 16, 63-64, 82, 83 75
in Suez crisis, 92 security interest, 16 Haiti, U.S. counterinsurgency in,
electromagnetic pulse, 135 Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C., on impor- 189
Elizabeth II, and intruder in bou- tance of morale, 104 Hearst, Patricia, abduction and ter-
doir, 197 functions. See military roles and rorist activities of, 197, 198,
BMP, effects of, 135 functions 213

323
INDEX

Heydrich, Reinhard, "Butcher of rence, 74-75. See also cyber- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Prague," 185 netic warfare Treaty, 136
hijackings as terrorist tactic, INF Treaty, 136 intervention checklist, 285-87. See
198-99 insurgencies, 299 also Weinberger
Hitler, Adolf in Africa, 169 IRA. See Irish Republican Army
appeasement undermined deter- in Burma, 173, 176 Iran
rence of, 72 causes, 168-69 in catalytic conflict, 72
deceived in Normandy, 76 cellular organizations, 169-70, Iran-Contra affair, 174, 207
and domestic terrorism, 193 171 hostages rescued in London, 198
Mein Kampf, 27 classical characteristics, 167-68 hostages held in Teheran, 198
nonaggression pact with USSR, command and control in, 169-72 Iraq
220-21 compared with traditional con- in catalytic conflict, 72
and nonlethal warfare, 219 flicts, 182 Desert Storm termination, 92
overcommitted German Armed Declaration of Independence as, Iraqi Liberation Act, 173
Forces, 83, 102-3, 157 169 See also Saddam Hussein
repudiated Treaty of Versailles, during traditional conflicts, 176 Irish Republican Army, U.S.-British
117, 221 French Revolution, 169 dialogues with, 211-12
skill in indirect strategy, 63 increasing complexities of, 168 Israel
"hollow" armed forces, 25 Mao Zedong's Phases I-III, counterterrorism strategy, 65-66
homeland defense as universal inter- 172-73 reliance on reserves, 30
est, 15 motives, 181 in technological espionage, 226
homosexual service members, dis- objectives, 168 terrorism by and against, 194
putes concerning, 105 opposing each other, 168
Hoover Plan for world disarma- outside support, 173 Japanese Red Army, attacking LOD
ment, 110 psychological warfare, 170 Airport, 194
horizontal escalation, 64, 89 Soviet/Cuban support for Sandi- Johnson, President Lyndon B.
complicates conflict termination, nistas, 243 interest in credibility, 16
91 subversion of, 175-76 public approval sours, 35
second front in World War II, 89 undergrounds, 170, 171 Vietnam policies, 48, 160-61
hostages See also counterinsurgencies; Joy, Vice Adm. C. Turner,
in Teheran, 198 resistance Panmunjom negotiator, 230
ransoms for, 197-98, 200 intelligence
rescues of, 197, 210-11 counterinsurgency, 182-83 Kahn, Herman
terrorist tactics, 197-98 counterterrorism, 213, 214 on defense against nuclear weap-
UN peacekeepers in Bosnia, 273 of enemy capabilities, 23-26 ons, 138
Hukbalahaps (Huks), Philippine in- enemy intentions, 26-27 escalation ladder, 88-89
surgents, 185 estimates, 6-7, 25-28 on nuclear victory, 14
human rights, conventions regard- proliferation indicators, 126-27 as strategic trailblazer, 252
ing, 18 proliferation site inspections, 128 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 110
in psychological warfare, 228 Kennedy, President John F.
ideology, as national security inter- qualitative military considera- on burden-sharing, 244
est, 17 tions, 23-25, 30 on nuclear proliferation, 125
IFOR. See Implementation Force quantitative military considera- Kent, Sherman
Implementation Force, 275, 276 tions, 23,28-30 on enemy intentions, 27
indirect strategies, 62-63 second opinions advisable, 28 National War College faculty
Indochina strategic guidance, 22-23, 260 member, 259
French counterinsurgency in, strategic vs. tactical, 27-28 Kenya, Mau Mau insurgency, 187
181 technological espionage, 226 KFOR. See Kosovo Force
French vs. Viet Minn force ratios, technological forecasting, 224 Khmer Rouge, genocide in Cambo-
188-89 intentions dia, 18
See also Vietnam War difficult to divine, 26-27 Khobar Towers, terrorist attack at,
information warfare, and deter- related to deterrence, 159 199

324
 INDEX

Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah Kosovo Liberation Army McNamara, Robert S.

and hostages in Teheran, 198 demilitarization of, 282 2l/2 war strategy, 103
U.S. arms sales to, 207 formation of, 278 assessing Soviet capabilities, 30
Khrushchev, Nikita police responsibilities of, 282 cost-effectiveness criteria, 67
peaceful coexistence, 60 disputes Adm. Anderson, 160
sacks Marshal Zhukov, 50 launch-on-warning nuclear retalia- spurns nuclear defense, 74
Kim Il-Sung, deterred, 27, 159 tory policy, 140-41 MacKenzie, Maj. Gen. Lewis, op-
Kim Song-Il, deterred, 159 Lawrence, T. E. poses intervention in Bosnia,
King, Martin Luther, Jr., and passive active vs. passive insurgents, 169 272
resistance, 63 operations in Arabia, 176 Mackinder, Halford J., heartland the-
"kingpins," as strategic centers of League of Nations ory applied to space, 61-62
gravity, 42 disarmament aim, 64, 110 MAD. See Mutual Assured De-
Kingston, Gen. Robert C, on intelli- impotence of, 63 struction
gence requirements, 22 LeMay, Gen. Curtis E. Magsaysay, Ramon, counterinsur-
Kissinger, Henry A., Vietnam War bomb "back to Stone Age," 148 gency techniques, 184-85
negotiations, 230 preventive war, 140 Mahan, Capt. Alfred Thayer, 257
Korea. See Korean War; North Ko- Lenin, Vladimir maritime school of thought, 61
rea; South Korea on importance of national will, major regional contingencies, U.S.
Korean War 42 requirements, 66, 87-88, 103,
decision to resist invasion, 27, 75 on peaceful coexistence, 16 284
U.N. coalition in, 160, 220 quantity is a quality, 29 Malaya, British counter-insurgency
Koster, Maj. Gen. Samuel, "doers" on "useful idiots," 169 in, 183
overshadow thinkers, 1 writings reveal intentions, 27 Malik, Jakob, leaves UN Security
Kosovo Libya, terrorism and counterterror- Council, 220
air power option, 279-80 ism, 213 manpower. See military manpower
air power restraints, 280, 284 Liddell Hart, Basil H. Mao Zedong, 257
areas of responsibility in, 280- on centers of gravity for coali- disciple of Sun Tzu, 59
81, 284 tions, 43 encircle cities concept, 88
causes of conflict unresolved, on military conservatism, 25 guerrilla organizations of, 170,
285 predicted Allies would defeat 172
collateral casualties and damage, Axis, 103 strategic trailblazer, 253
280, 284 on primacy of strategy over tac- three-phase insurgent strategy,
concurrent U.S. contingency re- tics, 5 172-73
quirements and, 284 on victory, 38 writings reveal intentions, 27
ethnic cleansing in, 279 limited war, 299-300 Marcos, Ferdinand, and Huks, 185
exit strategy from, 284-85 allowable methods and means, Marighella, Carlos, on beneficial ter-
geographic isolation of, 279 160-61 rorist attributes, 194
gradual escalation in, 280-84 allowable objectives, 160 maritime school of thought, 61
ground combat force require- geographical restrictions, 161 Marshall, Gen. George C.
ments, 279 nuclear nexus, 161-62 Congress waives eligibility re-
law and order in, 282 Lin Biao, encircle cities concept, 88 quirements for, 50-51
misplaced priorities in, 283 linkage, arms control technique, strategic trailblazer, 252
prewar situation, 275, 278 116 Marshall Plan, promotes postwar
refugee repatriation, 282 Lincoln, Abraham, on domestic tran- peace, 93
security interests, 278-79, 283 quility, 15 Massive Retaliation
strategic shortcomings, 283-85 strategic shortcomings, 65
strategic successes, 282-83 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas, and war tripwire featured, 66
war criminals, 282 without victory, 38-39 Mau Mau, Kenyan insurgents, 187
war termination, 280 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 257 mercenaries, value of, 241
Kosovo Force, NATO command, on mercenaries, 241 Meyer, Gen. Edward C. (Shy), on
280-82 on morality, 18, 59, 240 "hollow" Army, 25

325
INDEX

military bases, related to prepared- military operations other than tried for war crimes, 282
ness, 205 war, 99, 103-4 undeterred by bluster, 159
military doctrines, 300 objectives influence, 102-3 MIRVs, proliferation of, 64, 113
basic attributes, 60-61 personnel issues, 104-5 mission creep, in Somalia, 41
compared with policies, 47 Principle of Deterrence, 74 missions. See military missions
compatibility required, 101 Principles of Preparedness, Mitchell, Brig. Gen. William (Billy),
military education. See strategic ed- 99-102 strategic trailblazer, 253, 254
ucation roles and functions influence, Mobutu Sese Seko, impoverishes
military functions. See military roles 99-100 Congo, 17
and functions situations influence, 99 Moluccan separatist hijackings, 199
military manpower, preparedness military roles and functions, 39, 40, Monroe Doctrine, regional center
of, 100, 101 155-56, 300, 301 of gravity, 42-43
military materiel, preparedness of, air power, 156 morality
100, 101 counterinsurgency, 188 Machiavelli's views, 18, 59, 240
military missions, 40-41, 300 influence preparedness, 99-100 in national security interest, 18
intervention checklist, 286 synergistic attributes, 156 Moro, Aldo, assassination of, 197
mission creep, 41 See also military missions multiple independently-targetable
See also military roles and func- military strategies, 291, 301 reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 64,
tions active and reactive, 63 113
military objectives arms control vs. arms competi- Mutual Assured Destruction, 73
influence on preparedness, tion, 64 deterrent concept, 139
102-3 asymmetrical options, 65 Mutual Force Reductions in Europe,
related to national security objec- attrition, 63-64 110
tives, 35-36 building blocks of, 59-61
standards of success, 37-38 creative environments, 257-58 Napoleon Bonaparte
See also national security objec- on physical vs. moral factors, 84
direct and indirect, 62-63
tives strategic trailblazer, 252
extremist strategies, 67
military operations other than war, Nasser, Gamal Abdel
Flexible Response inconsistenc-
300 Israeli dirty tricks against, 73
ies, 66
preparedness for, 99, 103-4 nationalizes Suez Canal, 92
geographical influences, 62, 100
military policies national security commitments,
mismatches, 65-67
brutality, 89-90, 174-75, 185-86 compared with policies, 47
sequential and cumulative, 62
conflict termination, 91-93 national security interests, 5-6, 13,
strategic vs. tactical maneuvers,
erratic U.S. shifts, 86 301
88
force vs. finesse, 85-86 in Bosnia, 268, 271
forward presence, 87 types described, 3-5 changeability of, 13-14
offense vs. defense, 86-87 See also military policies; strate- coalitions, 239
power projection, 87-88 gic trailblazers; strategy conflicts of interest, 18
risk avoidance, 90, 284 military tactics, 301 freedom of action, 16, 63-64, 82,
War Powers Resolution, 90 compared with strategy, 4, 5, 88 83
See also military strategies military technologies, basic require- geostrategic position, 17-18
military power, 300-301 ments, 101. See also technolog- ideology, 17
elements of, 23-25 ical warfare intervention checklist, 285-86
importance of will, 25 Milosevic, Slobodan in Kosovo, 278-79, 283
in national interest, 15 capitulates in Kosovo, 280 morality, 18
supports foreign policies, 52-53 disregards Rambouillet peace pro- NATO's interest in oil, 159
military preparedness posals, 278 peace, 16, 93
active/reserve relationships, 101 no plan to oust, 284 priorities, 13, 14
elements of, 99 objectives in Bosnia, 271 prosperity, 17
future requirements for, 102, 106 resists secessions, 268 public support, 13
geographic influences on, 100 revokes Kosovar autonomy, 268, stability, 16-17, 136, 138
materiel issues, 105-6 278 survival, 14-15

326
 INDEX

national security objectives, 302 net assessments, 30 reliance on nuclear weapons,

arms control, 109, 115 best balances defined, 157 157
in Bosnia, 271 purpose and types, 28, 29 theater nuclear bargaining chips,
centers of gravity, 7, 41-43 second opinions preferable, 30 116
and conflict termination, 91, 92 U.S. and Soviet, 156 treaty review requirements,
contexts constrain, 35, 36 New Left, 184 244-45
counterinsurgencies, 181 Nicaragua, Contras vs. Sandinistas, treaty terms, 241
Eisenhower's directive, 37, 84 174, 207, 243 U.S. vs. European interests, 239
insurgent aims, 168 Nixon, President Richard M. North Korea, special operations
intervention checklist, 286 1V2 war requirement, 103 forces, 25. See also Kim II-
in Korean War, 82 on burden-sharing, 244 Sung; Korean War
in Kosovo, 278-79 force sufficiency, 139, 158 nuclear arms control
limited war, 160 Vietnam policy, 48 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
nonlethal warfare, 219-20 nonlethal warfare, 302 Treaty, 113, 116
and preparedness, 102-3 increasing importance, 219 Baruch proposal, 111, 135-36
Principle of War, 81-82 limitations, 220 counting problems, 112
public opinion, 35 objectives, 219-20 MIRVed Soviet ICBMs, 64, 113
purposes and types, 35-36 passive resistance as, 63 nuclear-free zones, 111, 156
standards of success, 37-38 See also cybernetic warfare; eco- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
typical examples, 36 nomic warfare; political war- (SALT), 110, 112, 115, 116
victory, 38-39 fare; psychological warfare; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
World War II vs. Vietnam War, technological warfare (START), 116, 136
84 Normandy invasion testing, 114
national security policies, 47, 302 Battle of Britain made possible, theater nuclear weapons, 110,
basic attributes, 60 157 116
Brezhnev Doctrine, 86, 173-74 pre-invasion deception, 76 Nuclear Club, members, 123, 125.
casualty avoidance, 280, 284 North Atlantic Treaty Organization See also proliferation
nuclear deterrence
civil-military, 49-51 admits former Warsaw Pact
Cold War lessons, 140
counterterrorism, 206-7 states, 241
disputed value of defense,
cultural contexts, 48-49 air power restraints in Kosovo,
136-38
foreign vs. domestic, 51-52 280, 284
extended deterrence, 138
human rights, 18 burden-sharing, 244
force-sizing standards, 139
intervention checklist, 286 Cold War deterrent policies, 53
maximum deterrence, 139
limited war, 159-61 Cold War reinforcement require-
minimum deterrence, 138-39
stability and change, 47-48 ments, 66-67 Mutual Assured Destruction, 73,
national security strategies. See Conventional Forces in Europe 139
grand strategy (CFE) Treaty, 112 obligatory objective, 136
national strategies, 3, 4, 302 defensive policy limitations, 86 retaliatory force composition,
National War College, first faculty, exit strategy for Kosovo, 284 139-40, 141
259 Flexible Response inconsisten- stability as key objective, 136,
national will, 25, 42, 84 cies, 66 138
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty forward defense requirements, See also nuclear warfare
Organization 88 nuclear warfare
negotiations inflexible plans for Kosovo, bonus effects from bombers, 65
counterinsurgencies, 190 283-84 casualties, 133-34
guidelines, 115-116 interests in Bosnia, 268, 271 civil defense, 142
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, interests in oil, 159 collateral casualties and damage,
110, 115, 116 nuclear shot across the bow, 75 134
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, policy options in Kosovo, counterforce vs. countervalue tar-
116, 136 278-79 geting, 141
about Vietnam, 230 Rapacki Plan, 111 decapitation, 142

327
INDEX

nuclear warfare, continued OSS Detachment 101, in Burma, preemptive and preventive wars,
effects, 133-35 176 303
first-strike policies, 140 causes, 72
launch-on-warning policies, pacification, as counterinsurgency counterterrorism, 207
140-41 technique, 189-90 nuclear inadvisability, 140
Massive Retaliation, 65, 66 Palestine Liberation Organization, preparedness. See military pre-
missile gap (I960), 76 hijackings, 198-99, 214 paredness
NATO's reliance, 157 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, on prepositioned stocks, pluses and mi-
response to biological warfare, permanent interests, 13-14 nuses, 87
148 Panmunjom, negotiations at, 230 presence, deterrent value of, 87,
retaliatory force protection, 142 Partial Test Ban treaty, 114 158
second-strike policies, 140-141 Patton, General George S., Jr. preventive wars. See preemptive
Strategic Defense Initiative, 128 breakout from Normandy beach- and preventive wars
traditional warfare nexus, 161-62 head, 84 Principle of Military Necessity, 212
war termination, 142 deception before Normandy inva- Principles of Deterrence, 73-75
See also nuclear deterrence; nu- sion, 221 Principles of Preparedness, 99-102
clear weapons peace Principles of War, 81-85
nuclear triad, 139-40, 141 preparedness promotes, 74 proliferation
nuclear weapons as national security interest, 16 causes, 123-24
Hitler's program crippled, 129 war termination terms influence, delivery vehicles, 124, 126
MIRVs complicate arms control, 92-93 NBCR weapons, 124-26
64,113 peaceful coexistance, Soviet policy, status in 2001, 124
proliferation, 124-25 16, 60 See also counterproliferation
research and development indica- peacekeeping, 303 propaganda, black, gray, and white,
tors, 126-27 in Bosnia, 268, 272 227-28
terrorism, 195 deterrent technique, 75 psychological operations, 227, 304
U.S.-Soviet balance, 17 peacemaking, 303 audiences, 227, 228
in Bosnia, 273 democratic restrictions on, 230
in Kosovo, 279-80 in Haiti, 103-4
OAS, opposes Algerian indepen-
Pearl Harbor attack, deception in, information, 229
dence, 49
221 See also propaganda; psychologi-
Okamoto, Koso, 194
personnel. See military manpower cal warfare
OODA loops, 230
Philippines, counterinsurgency in, psychological warfare
OPEC oil embargo, 17
184-85 counterterrorism, 211
open cities, 161 Phoenix counterinsurgency pro- disinformation, 76, 83, 229-30
"open skies" counterproliferation gram, 186 negotiations, 230
proposal, 128 PLO hijackings, 198-99, 214 purposes, 227
Operation Allied Force, 279-80 political warfare rumor campaigns, 228
operational tempos, 104 counterterrorism, 211 techniques, 228-29
Oppenheimer, J. Robert deception, 221 themes, 228
quotation at Alamogordo, 125 options, 220-22 See also propaganda; psychologi-
"scorpions in a bottle," 136 Soviet-German nonaggression cal operations
Organisation de 1'Armee Secrete, pact, 220-21 public opinion
opposes Algerian indepen- Soviets lose UN veto, 220 intervention checklist, 286-87
dence, 49 war termination terms, 91-93 U.S. during Vietnam War, 35
Organization of Petroleum Export- posse comitatus, U.S. legal re- underpins objectives, 35
ing Countries, oil embargo, 17 straint, 206 Putin, Vladimir, defers START, 136
Osama bin Laden Powell, Gen. Colin L., opposes in- Pyrrhic victory, 304
declares holy war, 193 tervention in Bosnia, 53 nuclear war, 14
funds frozen, 223 power. See military power; national Vietnam, 39
hideout attacked, 212 power World War I, 81
terrorist activities, 22 power projection, 158-59, 303 See also victory

328
 INDEX

Qadhafi, Mu'ammar al-, and terror- proclivities to accept, 7-8, 27 sequential strategies, 62
ism, 213 U.S. avoidance policies, 90, 284 Serbia
Qiao Liang, Col., on nonlethal war- Rogers, Gen. Bernard W., on Cold capitulates in Kosovo, 280
fare, 219 War balance, 157 inherits Tito's armed forces, 272
qualitative attributes roles. See military roles and func- interests and objectives in
difficult to assess, 30 tions Bosnia, 268-71
factors, 23-25 Roosevelt, Franklin D., deters chem- servicewomen, influence on com-
value of obsolescent forces, 29 ical warfare, 77 bat capabilities, 105
Rowny, Lt. Gen. Edward L., START SFOR. See Stabilization Force
radiological weapons negotiator, 116 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, revo-
proliferation, 125 in Kosovo, 278, 279, 280 lutionaries oust, 172-73
terrorism, 195 and Rambouillet proposal, 278 Skorzeny, Capt. Otto, World War II
Rambouillet peace proposals, for See also Soviet Union operations, 85-86
Kosovo, 278 SLA. See Symbionese Liberation
ransoms, for hostages, 197-98, 200 sabotage, counterproliferation op- Army
Rapacki, Adam, nuclear-free Europe tion, 129-30 Somalia, mission creep in, 41
proposal, 111 Saddam Hussein Somoza, Anastasio, Sandinistas oust,
rationality of irrationality, deterrent as example of catalytic conflict, 72 174
technique, 77 defies UN inspection, 43 South Korea
reactive strategies, 63 Iraqi interests, 14 forces in Vietnam, 499
readiness, 99, 304. See also military Iraqi Liberation Act targets, 173 U.S. restricts offensive weaponry
preparedness as kingpin, 43 of, 64
Reagan, President Ronald proliferates weapons of mass de- U.S. forces as tripwire, 76
disregards War Powers Resolu- struction, 124, 125, 126, 129, Soviet Union
tion, 90 130 civil control of armed forces,
doctrine, 37-38 under sanctions, 224 49-50
undeterred after Desert Storm, loses veto power in UN Security
forbids assassination, 90
158 Council, 220
Star Wars program, 225
Saint-Just, Louis, justifies violence, technological espionage, 226
unilateral nuclear reductions, 110
193 Special Air Service (SAS), hostage
Red Brigades (Italian), rise and fall,
SALT. See Strategic Arms Limitation rescue, 211
213
Talks special operations forces, military
Red Square (Moscow), unautho-
sanctions operations other than war,
rized aircraft lands in, 235 Cold War use, 222 103-4
reforms, counterinsurgency tech- as economic warfare tool, special operations school of
nique, 183-84 222-24 thought, 62
refugees, Bosnia and Kosovo, 268, Sandinistas Spetsnaz, quality, 25
282 defeat Somoza, battle Contras, Sputnik I, 16, 83
Reinhart, General Klaus, occupation 174 stability
of Kosovo, 284-85 Soviet-Cuban support for, 243 national security interest, 16-17
resistance, 174-75 See also Contras objective of deterrence, 136, 138
World War II, France, 168 schools. See strategic education; Stabilization Force
World War II, Yugoslavia, 188 strategic schools of thought areas of responsibility, 276
See also insurgencies Schwarzkopf, Gen. H. Norman, co- replaces IFOR in Bosnia, 275
resource allocation, 7-8 alition commander, 242-43 Stalin, Joseph
intervention checklist, 286 Scipio Africanus nonaggression pact with Hitler,
related to preparedness, 102 defeats Hannibal, 82 220-21
See also ends and means shifts strategic center of gravity, nonlethal warfare successes, 219
revolutionary warfare. See insur- 42,89 on military power, 53
gencies search and destroy, as counterinsur- purges senior officers, 49-50
risks gency technique, 186-87 second front as horizontal escala-
calculated risks, 294 sieges, as attrition warfare, 88 tion, 89

329
INDEX

Stalin, Joseph, continued strategy, 2-3 whether, when, what to control,

spurns Baruch proposal, 111 assumptions influence, 7, 64-65, 113
"Uncle Joe" as coalition partner, 260, 293 termination. See conflict termi-
239 compared with tactics, 4, 5 nation
START. See Strategic Arms Reduc- formulation described, 7 terrorism, 306
tion Talks main aim, 9 abductions, 197-98, 200, 213
Star Wars, 225. See also Strategic six-step process, 5-8 agro-terrorism, 196
Defense Initiative times, places influence, 7 assassinations, 42, 90, 197
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks See also grand strategy; military atypical terrorists, 193-94
allowed force increases, 110 strategies; national strategies; biological warfare, 195-96
complex counting rules, 112 theater strategies; tactics cellular organizations, 171, 194
negotiating teams, 115 Sudan, suspected terrorist site at- chemical warfare, 196
Soviets disregard linkage, 116 tacked, 212 demolitions, 199
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks sufficiency, force-sizing standard, hijacking, 198-99
prospects, 136 139 hostage-taking, 198
Soviet views, 116 Sultan, Prince Khalid bin Khobar Towers attack, 199
successes, 136 coalition commander, 243 nightmare scenarios, 200
strategic centers of gravity, 305 limits U.S. base rights, 158 nuclear weapons, 195
basic purpose, 7 SunTzu purpose, 88, 193
cities, 41-42 attack enemy's strategy, 65 preferred weapons, 194-95
coalitions, 43 avoid urban combat, 141 self-restraint, 195
continents, 42-43 on deception, 76, 221 sponsorship and support, 200
disbelievers, 43 Mao's mentor, 172 tactics, 197-99
hearts and minds, 42 offense vs. defense, 86 targets, 196-97, 208-10
in space, 43 net assessments, 28 textbooks for, 195
kingpins, 42 Principle of Concentration, 83 at World Trade Center (1993),
Monroe Doctrine, 42-43 strategic trailblazer, 251 199
strategic concepts, 59, 61, 305 See also counterterrorism
value of initiative, 63
Strategic Defense Initiative, first- theater nuclear weapons, and tradi-
win without fighting, 38, 85
strike implications, 87, 128 tional warfare, 110, 116, 162
surprise, Principle of War, 83
strategic education theater strategies, 4-5
surrender, conducive conditions,
deficiencies, 258 theories. See strategic theories
91-92
National Center for Strategic Stud- threats, 306
surrogates
ies, 258-59 assessments, 30
strategic principles, 60, 305 counterproxy warfare, 242 intelligence estimates, 6-7
See also Principles of Deterrence; value of, 241-42 intervention checklist, 285-286
Principles of Preparedness; survival, national security interest, key questions, 21
Principles of War 14-15 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 114
strategic research, 260-61 sustainability, 99, 306 Tiananman Square, failed rebellion,
See also strategic trailblazers Symbionese Liberation Army, 197- 169
strategic schools of thought 98, 213 Time, Principle of War, 85
cybernetic warfare, 230-31 Tito (Josip Broz)
land, sea, air, and space, 61 tactics. See military tactics caches weapons, 273
special operations, 62 technological warfare forms modern Yugoslavia, 268
strategic theories, 59, 60, 306 dangers of overdependence on, Toffler, Alvin and Heidi, strategic re-
chaos and complexity, 261 227 search, 260
contributors, 59, 251, 253 espionage, 226 Tojo, Hieki, overcommits Japanese
strategic trailblazers forecasting, 106, 224 Armed Forces, 157
common characteristics, 251 high costs, 226 Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 35
coveted characteristics, 253-54 how to control, 114 traditional warfare
creative environments, 257-58 progress in, 225-26 compared with counterinsurgenc-
role models, 251-53 purposes, 224 ies, 182

330
 INDEX

"conventional" a misnomer, 155 sanctions against Afghanistan, war termination. See conflict termi-
deterrence, 156-59 North Korea, and Iraq, 223-24 nation
forward presence, 158 War Crimes Tribunal, 576 Washington, President George,
insurgents assist, 175-76 United Nations Protection Force quantity vs. quality, 100
limited wars, 159-61 established, 268 Washington Naval Treaty, 110, 113
net assessments, 156-57 safe havens, 273 weapons of mass destruction
nuclear nexus, 161-62 vulnerabilities, 272 denned, 123, 307
power projection, 158-59 UNPROFOR. See United Nations program indicators, 126-27
roles and functions, 155-56, 162 Protection Force proliferation, 124-26
Treaty of Versailles undergrounds, organizations and Weinberger, Caspar W., interven-
Hitler repudiates, 117, 121 functions, 170 tion rules, 91, 285
terminates World War I, 221 unity of command, Principle of Westmoreland, Gen. William C.
tripwires, deterrent technique, War, 84 fuzzy objectives, 84
76-77 on national will, 39
Truman, President Harry S search and destroy, 186-87
Van Riper, Lt. Gen. Paul, on casu-
defends South Korea, 75 White House, unauthorized landing
alty avoidance, 284
objectives in Korea, 27, 160 on lawn, 235
verification, arms control require-
sacks Gen. MacArthur, 39 Wilson, President Woodrow
ment, 116-17
Twining, Gen. Nathan F. on general disarmament, 64
vertical escalation, 89
decries limited war policies, 159 League of Nations, 238
victory
nuclear strikes against North Ko- WMD. See weapons of mass de-
Churchill on, 14
rea, 160 struction
MacArthur's view, 38-39
regrets nuclear test moratorium, women. See servicewomen
Pyrrhic, 39, 81, 304
114 World Disarmament Conference,
values of, 38-39
failure of, 110
Vidal, Gen. Emilio Mola, Spanish
U.N. See United Nations World Trade Center, terrorist attack
Fifth Columns, 175-76
Uncertainty, Principle of, 73 (1993), 199
Vietnam War
unifying school of strategic Wylie, Rear Adm. J. C.
competing objectives, 39
thought, 62 importance of contingency plans,
costly communist strategy, 66
United Nations 283
horizontal escalation, 89
arms embargo against Yugoslavia, strategic theory, 219
negotiating techniques, 230
272
phoenix program, 186 Yugoslavia
arms embargo against Serbia, Ko-
strategic center of gravity, 42 cultural crazy quilts, 267-68
sovo, 278
time favored communists, 85 German vs. insurgent force ra-
assists war termination, 92
U.S. policies, 48, 53 tios, World War II, 188
coalition in Korea, 160, 220
guarantees humanitarian ship- secessions from, 268
ments in Bosnia, 272 Walesa, Lech, 36 successive rulers, 267
interests in Bosnia, 268-69 Wang Xiansui, on nonlethal war- Tito's federation, 268
Kosovo refugees, 282 fare, 219 See also Bosnia-Herzegovina;
no exit strategy for Kosovo, 284 War Crimes Tribunal, U.N. estab- Kosovo
objectives in Bosnia, 271 lishes, 282
objectives in Kosovo, 278, 280 War Powers Resolution, causes and Zhukov, Marshal Georgy
peacekeeping a specialty, 75 effects, 90 insurgents assist, 176
Khrushchev sacks, 50

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 About the Author

C olonel Collins, a Distinguished Visiting Re-

search Fellow at National Defense University,
began to build a solid foundation for Military Strat-
Group at the National War College from 1968 until
1972. He thereafter furnished Congress with wide-
ranging politico-military assessments for twenty-
egy in 1942, when he enlisted in the U.S. Army as four more years as Senior Specialist in National De-
a private. He prepared contingency plans for the fense at the Congressional Research Service, with
82d Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, Spe- particular attention to the U.S.-Soviet military bal-
cial Operations Task Force Europe, and Military As- ance and strategic options. Flag officers in every
sistance Command Vietnam that focused on the Mid- U.S. military service, foreign counterparts, members
dle East, Cuba, Soviet-occupied Europe, and of the news media, defense industries, think tanks,
Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. All involved and academicians frequently solicited Colonel Col-
close collaboration with counterparts in the Navy, lins's opinions throughout his lengthy tenure on
Air Force, and Marine Corps. Colonel Collins culmi- Capitol Hill. He continues to analyze and write about
nated his military career as Director of Military Strat- military matters in retirement. He lives in Alex-
egy Studies, then as Chief of a Strategic Research andria, Virginia.

333