SSRN Id2460166
SSRN Id2460166
March 2016
Tom Y. Chang
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business
Samuel M. Hartzmark
Chicago Booth School of Business
David H. Solomon
University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business
Eugene F. Soltes
Harvard Business School
Abstract: We present evidence consistent with markets failing to properly price information in
seasonal earnings patterns. Firms with historically larger earnings in one quarter of the year
(“positive seasonality quarters”) have higher returns when those earnings are usually announced.
Analysts have more positive forecast errors in positive seasonality quarters, consistent with the
returns being driven by mistaken earnings estimates. We show that investors appear to overweight
recent lower earnings following positive seasonality quarters, leading to pessimistic forecasts in
the subsequent positive seasonality quarter. The returns are not explained by risk-based
explanations, firm-specific information, increased volume, or idiosyncratic volatility.
*University of Southern California †Chicago Booth School of Business ‡ Harvard Business School
Many firms have predictably greater earnings at certain points in the year, usually due to
the underlying cyclical nature of the firm’s business. To avoid misidentifying seasonal patterns as
genuine earnings news, the accounting literature has long examined seasonally adjusted earnings,
often by methods such as subtracting off same-quarter earnings from prior years (e.g., Bernard and
Thomas (1990)). By contrast, relatively less consideration has been given to how earnings
seasonality itself is priced. One likely reason for this divergence is that earnings seasonality
appears to be a straightforward concept. The fact that ice cream producers generate more earnings
in summer and snow blower shops generate more earnings in winter would strike most people as
obvious to the point of being trite. Investors have ample opportunities for learning about
seasonality, as information on earnings is easily available and repeated frequently for each firm.
An expected seasonal change is not “news” in the sense of Samuelson (1965) and should not move
Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence that many similarly obvious repeating
firm events are associated with puzzling abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are evident in months
forecasted to have earnings announcements, dividends, stock splits, stock dividends, special
proposition that recurring firm events are generally associated with abnormal returns.
seasonal quarters may be easy, calculating a precise seasonal correction for a given firm is rather
complicated. Models of seasonal adjustments impose significant structure and are sensitive to a
investors, like academics, pay less attention to it and are unlikely to understand its complexity. A
problem that seems easy to solve, but is actually quite difficult, is one that is likely to reveal
behavioral biases.
In this paper, we present evidence of abnormal returns consistent with markets failing to
properly price information contained in the seasonal patterns of earnings. Some companies have
earnings that are consistently higher in one quarter of the year relative to others, which we term a
positive seasonality quarter. We find that companies earn significant abnormal returns in months
when they are likely to announce earnings from a positive seasonality quarter.
The basic empirical pattern, whereby firms have higher stock returns around earnings
announcements covering periods of seasonally higher sales, was documented by Salamon and
Stober (1994), with anecdotal mentions as far back as Keynes (1936). Salamon and Stober (1994)
argue that the pattern is consistent with a greater resolution of uncertainty in positive seasonal
quarters but do not directly test this explanation or consider the possibility of mispricing. Using
1
The returns in expected earnings announcement months are explored in Beaver (1968), Frazzini and Lamont (2006),
Savor and Wilson (2011), and Barber, George, Lehavy and Trueman (2013). Hartzmark and Solomon (2013)
document high returns in months with an expected dividend. Bessembinder and Zhang (2014) document high returns
in months predicted to have stock splits, stock dividends, special dividends, and increases in dividends.
since the initial publication and find that mispricing better explains the patterns in returns.
Consider the example of Borders Books, which traded from 1995 to 2010. Borders had a
highly seasonal business, with a large fraction of earnings in the fourth quarter. Out of Borders’
63 quarterly earnings announcements, the 14 largest were all fourth-quarter earnings. Not only did
these quarters have high levels of earnings, but they also had high earnings announcement returns.
The average monthly market-adjusted return for Borders’ fourth-quarter announcements was
2.27%, compared with -3.40% for all other quarters. Borders’ earnings seasonality is a persistent
property of its business due in part to increased sales over Christmas. Thus, an investor could easily
forecast when these high returns would occur. We show that the pattern in earnings announcements
returns for Borders holds in general for seasonal firms: high earnings announcement returns can
be forecast using past information about which quarters contain higher than usual earnings.
earnings announcements over a five-year period beginning one year before portfolio formation.
We then calculate the average rank in the previous five years of the upcoming quarter. The highest
possible seasonality in the third quarter, for instance, would be for a company for which the
previous five announcements in the third quarter were the largest out of the 20 announcements
considered. To make sure the simplicity of our measure is not missing important nuances of
seasonality, we also explore more formal structural estimates of seasonality and find, if anything,
stronger results. 2
2
In the internet appendix we replicate the entire paper using measures of seasonality from a structural seasonal
adjustment model.
earnings seasonality earns abnormal returns of 65 basis points per month relative to a four-factor
model, compared with abnormal returns of 31 basis points per month for the lowest seasonality
quintile. This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level, and, unlike most asset pricing
anomalies, it becomes stronger (55 basis points) when the portfolio is value weighted.3
The earnings seasonality measure makes it unlikely that these returns are driven by
seasonal firms having different fixed loadings on risk factors. If earnings are higher than average
in one month, then they will be lower than average in other months of the year, so firms tend to
cycle through both the long and short sides of the portfolio. To emphasize this point, we obtain
similar results by sorting a firm’s four announcements according to seasonality regardless of the
overall level (ensuring that each firm is in each portfolio once per year, generating only time-series
variation within the difference portfolio). For risk to explain the results, it must be that firms are
more risky in months of positive seasonality. The risk cannot simply come from increased
exposure to the standard four factors, as these are controlled for in the regressions.
We examine a number of alternative risk-based explanations and fail to find support for
them. First, the portfolio of positive seasonal firms is not more volatile than the portfolio of
negative seasonal firms. Savor and Wilson (2011) argue that the earnings announcement premium
is driven by a common earnings announcement risk factor. We show that the seasonality effect is
not driven by positive seasonality quarters having a greater exposure to a common source of
earnings announcement risk. The returns also do not appear to be driven by increases in
3
As expected, earnings announcement months tend to have positive abnormal returns (Frazzini and Lamont (2006)).
One interpretation of the main finding of this paper is that the earnings announcement premium is larger in positive
seasonality months.
are similar between firms with high and low expected idiosyncratic volatility.
seasonality returns are driven by risk, as in the discount rate explanation of Salamon and Stober
(1994), it is not clear why average analyst forecast errors should be related to earnings seasonality.
Instead, we find that analyst forecast errors are more positive in positive seasonality quarters. For
firms that shift between high and low quintiles of seasonality, the median analyst correctly
forecasts 93% of the seasonal shift in earnings and misses 7%. This implies that, although analysts
take seasonality into account, they do not completely correct for seasonal changes. Additionally,
in positive seasonality months, analysts’ forecasts are also more likely to undershoot predictions
from econometric models of earnings seasonality. This reinforces the notion that the biased
forecasts are due to analysts not properly accounting for the seasonal shift itself. To the extent that
individual investors make the same mistakes, or take analysts’ mistaken forecasts at face value,
the portfolio returns are consistent with mispricing rather than risk.
If investors are making systematically biased forecasts of earnings, then the returns to
earnings seasonality should be concentrated in the period when earnings news is revealed.
Examining daily characteristic adjusted returns around earnings announcements, we find that most
of the abnormal returns occur in the short event window that surrounds the announcement. This
pattern is consistent with investors and analysts being positively surprised by the earnings news.
By contrast, the general returns to earnings announcement months tend to accrue in the pre-
earnings when forming estimates of future earnings. If an upcoming quarter has positive
seasonality, the level of earnings in the three most recent announcements was likely lower than the
announcement four quarters prior. If investors suffer from a recency effect, whereby recent
information is easier to recall than is old information (Murdock (1962), Davelaar et al. (2005)),
they will be more likely to overweight recent lower earnings compared to the higher earnings from
the same quarter in the prior year.4 This would cause them to be overly pessimistic about the
upcoming announcement and would lead to greater positive surprises. Investors who suffer from
a recency effect will not completely ignore information from more than three quarters prior, but
recent earnings will be overweighted if more recent events are more salient.
Consistent with a recency effect, we find that the seasonality effect is larger when earnings
in the three most recent announcements (typically 3, 6, and 9 months before portfolio formation)
are lower than earnings 12 months prior. In contrast, when earnings are lower before the seasonal
quarter 12 months prior (typically 15, 18, and 21 months before portfolio formation), there is no
spread in returns. The seasonality effect is not present when the firm has broken an earnings record
in the prior 12 months, an instance of highly salient recent good news. This suggests that recent
low earnings make investors overly pessimistic about positive seasonal quarters.
We conduct a number of tests to show that seasonality is not simply proxying for other
time-series effects within the firm, including return seasonality (Heston and Sadka (2008)),
momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), short-term reversals (Jegadeesh (1990)), or the
dividend month premium (Hartzmark and Solomon (2013)). Earnings seasonality effects are not
4
Related to the recency effect, the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman (1973)) describes how individuals
estimate probabilities according to the ease with which instances of an event can be brought to mind.
to proxies for earnings management. The returns to seasonality survive controlling for other
determinants of earnings changes, including past earnings surprises (Bernard and Thomas (1990)),
firm financial condition (Piotroski (2000)), and high accruals (Sloan (1996)). Earnings seasonality
is not some general driver of returns, as it does not forecast higher returns outside of earnings
months. Seasonality is also unlikely to be proxying for recent information about the firm.
Seasonality is highly persistent across years, and lagging the measure by up to 10 years produces
similar results. The existence of abnormal returns around historically high earnings levels points
toward an emerging and puzzling stylized fact about asset returns, namely that predictably
Overall, our results are consistent with investors having an excessive focus on recent
events, leading to insufficient attention to longer-term patterns in earnings. This contributes to the
distraction from competing events (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009, 2011)) and underweighting
Our finding that earnings seasonality predicts earnings announcement returns also
contributes to the literature on how market participants form estimates of firm earnings. A number
of papers document how markets underreact to earnings news (Ball and Brown (1968), Bernard
and Thomas (1989,1990)), form mistaken forecasts of earnings autocorrelation (Bernard and
Thomas (1990), Ball and Bartov (1996)), fail to fully price changes in earnings announcement
dates (So (2014)), and miss predictable shifts in fiscal quarter lengths (Johnston, Leone, Ramnath
and Yang (2012)). We extend this literature by showing evidence that is consistent with mistaken
2.1 Data
The data for earnings come from the Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly file. The data on
stock prices come from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly stock file. In
our return tests, we consider the common stock (CRSP share codes 10 or 11) of firms listed on the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ exchanges. We exclude stocks with a price less than $5 or a missing
market capitalization at the end of the previous month. The data on analyst forecasts use quarterly
earnings per share forecasts from I/B/E/S. Data on the excess market return, risk-free rate, SMB,
To capture the level of earnings seasonality, we wish to measure the extent to which
earnings in a given quarter tend to be higher than other quarters. Conceptually, this includes both
how often earnings are higher in a given quarter and by how much they are higher in a given quarter.
The main measure that we construct prioritizes the first component, counting companies as having
To construct this measure of predicted seasonality in quarter t, we use five years of earnings
data from quarter t−23 to t−4. We compute firm earnings per share (excluding extraordinary items)
adjusted for stock splits.5 We then rank the 20 quarters of earnings data from largest to smallest.
We require non-missing values for all 20 quarters of earnings to construct the measure. The main
measure, earnrank, for quarter t is the average rank of quarters t−4, t−8, t−12, t−16, and t−20. This
5
The main results of the paper are robust to alternative measures of earnings, such as total earnings, raw earnings per
share, earnings per share divided by assets per share, or earnings per share divided by share price.
A high value of earnrank means that, historically, the current quarter of the year has larger earnings
than other quarters, while a low value of earnrank means that the current quarter typically has
lower earnings relative to other quarters. A firm whose earnings are randomly distributed will tend
being measured. In addition, it manages to avoid a number of confounding empirical issues without
having to make significant assumptions about the underlying data-generating process. First,
earnrank is not affected by the existence of negative earnings in some periods, unlike measures
that involve percentage changes in earnings. Second, it is relatively invariant to the existence of
large outliers in earnings numbers, such as from a single very bad quarter. Third, by ranking
earnings over several years, earnrank is less sensitive to trends in overall earnings growth.6 In
Table I, we present summary statistics for the main variables used in the paper.
Although we use earnrank as our main variable of analysis, clearly there are other estimates
of seasonality with different strengths and weaknesses. To make sure that the simplicity of
earnrank is not driving our results due to a lack of precision or through some aspect of the
using variations of the X-12 seasonal adjustment model. The internet appendix replicates all of the
tests in the paper using X-12 forecasts. The results are materially similar and, if anything, slightly
6
If each quarter were ranked only relative to other quarters that year, then companies with uniformly growing earnings
would appear to have the maximum possible seasonality in the fourth quarter. By contrast, under the current measure,
the rankings of the fourth quarters would be 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20, yielding an average rank of 12. This is considerably
less than the maximum rank of 18 and, empirically, only 0.35 standard deviations above the median value (11) and
0.40 standard deviations above the mean (10.85).
10
Given that firms tend to either cycle between extreme quintiles (if they have seasonal shifts
in earnings) or stay within the middle quintiles (if they have stable earnings), a question arises as
to which firms have seasonal patterns in general.8 In Table II, we take as the dependent variable
the change in earnrank between a firm’s highest and lowest announcement over the calendar year
(for firms with four announcements). We then examine how this varies with stock characteristics
from the previous year: log market capitalization, share turnover, log book-to-market ratio,
The results in Table II indicate that seasonal shifts in earnings are more common for large
firms, value firms, old firms, firms with low turnover, and firms with higher accruals. Nearly all
of these results are statistically significant at the 1% level when clustered by firm and year. The
results are considerably reduced in magnitude when industry fixed effects are added (48 industries
from Fama and French (1997)), consistent with industry factors being a significant driver of
The requirement of five years of earnings data to form earnrank means that our sample is
tilted toward older firms, so the results may not generalize to young firms. This requirement is
unlikely to drive our results for several reasons. First, the main examination of return differences
is between firms in the extreme quintiles, so the characteristics in Table II are common to both
positive and negative seasonality firm/month observations and therefore should not have an
7
Available online at http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~dhsolomo/seasonality_appendix.pdf
8
Transition probabilities for earnrank are reported in the internet appendix and confirm that firms tend to either cycle
between extreme quintiles or stay in the middle of the distribution. The most likely transition from quintile 1 is to
quintile 5 and vice versa (33.0% and 33.1% of cases, respectively).
11
omitted firms, the results presented in Table II imply that the extreme quintiles are more likely to
be filled with older firms. As such, firms for which we do not have earnrank data are less likely to
have large seasonal earnings patterns. In the Internet appendix, we present further details of the
Most importantly, the conditioning on firm survival occurs entirely in the period before
returns are measured, meaning that the one-month measured returns should be an unbiased sample
of the relevant firms over the month in which returns are measured (with delisting returns
accounting for firms that disappear during that month). In this respect, the results are not driven
by the problems with long-horizon conditioning discussed in Kothari, Sabino and Zach (2005).
We first examine whether information about earnings seasonality is fully incorporated into
stock prices. If the market has not fully accounted for the fact that earnings tend to be higher in
certain quarters, then the revelation of actual earnings will result in price movements. By contrast,
if markets are correctly forecasting the effect of seasonality, then the higher earnings in a given
Because the timing of an announcement may contain information, such as when a firm
delays an earnings announcement due to bad news (Frazzini and Lamont (2006); So (2014)), we
do not condition ex-post on whether a firm has an earnings announcement in the month in question.
Instead, we predict whether a firm will have an earnings announcement in the current month, based
on whether it had an earnings announcement 12 months prior. The portfolio of all stocks predicted
12
12 months prior and sort firms based on earnrank. As a result, all earnings information is at least
11 months old at the time of portfolio formation. We form portfolios of returns for each quintile
of earnrank, using breakpoints calculated from the market distribution of earnrank in that month,
with quintile 5 being firms for which earnings in the upcoming announcement were historically
larger than other months. We include only months in which the portfolio has at least 10 firms and,
in the case of the difference portfolio, in which both the long and short leg have at least 10 firms.
Because the earnings announcement premium predicts that portfolios sorted on earnrank will have
positive abnormal returns in general, the main question is whether positive seasonality causes
We consider this question in Table III Panel A. For the equal-weighted portfolio, the
highest seasonality quintile earns returns of 175 basis points per months, compared with 146 basis
points per month for the lowest seasonality quintile. The gap is larger when value-weighted
portfolios are formed. Importantly, the positive seasonality portfolio is not more volatile. The
standard deviation of returns for the negative seasonality portfolio (5.28 equal weighted, 5.18 value
weighted) is actually the same or slightly higher than the standard deviation of the positive
seasonality portfolio (5.14 equal weighted, 5.18 value weighted). The lack of higher volatility
somewhat ameliorates the concern that the returns are driven by differences in risk. The positive
seasonality portfolio also does not have more extreme negative returns, such as the crash risk
13
We again sort firms into quintiles based on their level of earnrank for the upcoming announcement,
and examine the average three-day characteristic-adjusted return over the actual earnings
announcement date. The characteristic-adjusted returns are computed similarly to the method in
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) by subtracting the returns of a value-weighted
portfolio matched on quintiles of market capitalization, ratio of book value of equity to market
value of equity (book-to-market ratio), and cumulative stock return from 2 to 12 months prior
(momentum). We compute the return for the upcoming announcement and the subsequent four
announcements. We compare whether the returns in quintile 5 are significantly different from
those in quintile 1 by taking observations from these two quintiles and regressing returns on a
dummy variable for quintile 5, clustering by firm and date. As in Table III Panel A, the results
indicate that firms with positive seasonality have significantly higher returns than firms with
negative seasonality. Consistent with firms switching quintiles, the returns have the opposite sign
for the following announcement. They retain the original sign and similar magnitude in four
Although the results presented in Table III indicate that the positive seasonality portfolio
is not more volatile or skewed, these are not the only measures of risk. Because positive seasonality
firm-months may be more exposed to other economy-wide risks, in Table IV we consider whether
the returns to portfolios formed on earnrank are explained by exposure to standard factors. We
examine portfolios sorted into quintiles of seasonality, and compute abnormal returns relative to a
four-factor model (Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997)). The seasonality portfolio returns are
regressed on the excess returns of the market, SMB, HML, and UMD portfolios.
14
basis points per month when equal-weighted (with a t-statistic of 3.35), while the highest
seasonality quintile portfolio has an alpha of 65 basis points per month (with a t-statistic of 6.98).
The long-short portfolio has abnormal returns of 35 basis points per month, with a t-statistic of
3.13.9 As in Table III, the value-weighted abnormal returns are larger, with the difference portfolio
It is noteworthy that the effect is driven by the long side of the portfolio, as a number of
effects are concentrated in the short side (Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012)). Further, the largest
distinction is between the highest seasonality quintile and the remainder, with quintiles 1–4
showing similarly abnormal returns to each other. The abnormal returns are not monotonic across
the quintiles, which is partly due to the fact that firms with little seasonal variation (the middle
quintiles) tend to be younger and smaller, yielding different earnings announcement returns. The
main variable of interest is the difference between high and low levels of earnrank, which is less
Second, the difference portfolios in Table IV Panel A have low loadings on the standard
factors, with small and statistically insignificant loadings on excess market returns and UMD, and
moderate but negative loadings on SMB and HML.10 These low factor loadings arise because the
long and short portfolios are comprised of roughly the same firms at different points in the year.
9
In untabulated results, the abnormal returns to the difference portfolio are larger when using more extreme values of
earnrank. Sorting portfolios based on the top and bottom 10% of earnrank produces equal-weighted alphas of 44.6
basis points (t-statistic of 2.99), and sorting at 5% produces abnormal returns of 62.9 basis points (t-statistic of 3.44).
10
As a robustness check, we compute the time series changes in factor loadings between positive and negative seasonal
months using daily betas calculated as in Lewellen and Nagel (2006). The changes in betas are generally negative and
small (between -0.080 and 0.006, depending on the factor in question and the model). This supports the conclusion
that positive seasonal months are not more exposed to common factors. Lewellen and Nagel (2006) argue that asset
pricing models using time-varying betas have difficulty explaining some basic stylized facts of security returns.
15
earnrank over a year. Specifically, for each firm with four values of earnrank in a given year, we
rank the firm’s four predicted earnings announcements according to whichever had the highest,
second highest, second lowest, and lowest percentile value of earnrank. Because all information
is at least 12 months old, this ranking is computable by an investor before the start of the year over
which returns are measured. The resulting portfolios include each firm in each of the four portfolios
for one month per year. Any variation in seasonality is only from variation within the firm, rather
than cross-sectional variation from the types of firms that have positive seasonality at some point
in time. The long and short portfolios cycle through the same set of firms. Thus, fixed loadings on
factors will cancel out, and only time-varying exposure to factors will remain.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table IV Panel B. The abnormal returns for the
difference portfolios are similar to those of Panel A: 33 basis points equal-weighted (with a t-
statistic of 3.40) and 66 basis points value-weighted (with a t-statistic of 3.91). When this within-
firm variation is examined, the alphas are monotonic across the four announcements.11
The results in Table IV indicate that the abnormal returns are not driven by either fixed or
time-varying loadings on the market, SMB, HML, or UMD. For example, if firms have a higher
market beta in positive seasonal months, then the difference portfolio buys firms in their high beta
months and shorts them in their low beta months. The difference portfolio will have a positive
market beta, but the four-factor regression controls for this, and it will not contribute to the alpha.
Controlling for different factor loadings is important, as firms have different betas around earnings
11
Four categories, rather than five quintiles, are used as the split is now across the four earnings quarters each year.
16
results also are not driven by fixed loadings on any other omitted factors. 12 The results could still
be driven by time-varying exposure to risks that we are not measuring (e.g., something other than
the market, SMB, HML, or UMD), with firms in positive seasonality months being riskier than
the same firms in negative seasonality months. We return to this issue in Sections 3.1 and 3.4.
Figure 1 presents a plot of the annual returns to the long-short portfolios examined in Table
IV. The results show that the returns to the strategy have become larger and more consistently
positive since Salamon and Stober (1994) first documented the effect. From 1973 to 1994, the
annual returns were, on average, 1.46% equal weighted and 3.70% value weighted, as compared
to the 1995–2013 period, when they were 7.89% equal weighted and 13.44% value weighted. This
is in contrast to the result in McLean and Pontiff (2016) that anomalies generally decline after their
publication. In the internet appendix, we find that the seasonality returns are not significantly
related to the sentiment index of Baker and Wurgler (2006). This is consistent with Stambaugh,
Yu and Yuan (2012), who find that the correlation between sentiment and anomaly returns is
driven by the short leg of the portfolio, but the long leg of anomaly portfolio returns (which drives
While Table IV documents that seasonality is associated with abnormal returns relative to
a four-factor model, it is possible that by sorting on seasonality we are selecting for some other
anomaly that drives returns. Of particular concern are factors that involve predictable changes in
the firm over time. These include the dividend month premium (Hartzmark and Solomon (2013)),
12
We continue to utilize the main univariate sorting on earnrank throughout the paper to better fit the intuition behind
our hypotheses, which rely on the existence of a meaningful level of seasonal variation to begin with.
17
and return seasonality (Heston and Sadka (2008)), whereby returns 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months
prior positively predict returns in the current month. We also examine the effect of other variables
known to affect returns: log market capitalization, log book-to-market, momentum, and last
month’s returns. Finally, we examine whether earnings seasonality predicts returns outside of
predicted earnings announcement months. If positive seasonality earnings months merely coincide
with a general period of increased exposure to economy-wide risks, then higher returns may be
In Table V we test these possibilities by examining the effect of earnings seasonality using
Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions. In Columns 1–4, we consider only the
cross-section of firms with a predicted earnings announcement in the current month, meaning they
had an earnings announcement 12 months prior. The earnrank variable shows univariate
significant predictive ability, with a coefficient of 0.034 and a t-statistic of 2.78. A one standard
deviation increase in seasonality (2.85) corresponds to an increase in returns of 9.6 basis points.
When additional controls are included in Column 2 for predicted dividends, Heston and Sadka
(2008) seasonality, log market cap, log book-to-market, momentum, and one-month reversal, the
coefficient is unchanged at 0.034, with a t-statistic of 2.95. The results are similar in Columns 3
and 4 when the percentile value of earnrank is used instead of the raw value.
those without a predicted earnings month. Here, seasonality is matched to the predicted earnings
month (i.e., 12 months after the measure is formed) and the subsequent two months (13 and 14
months afterward). Column 5 is the all-firm equivalent of the univariate regression, including only
seasonality, a predicted earnings dummy, and the interaction between the two. The regression
18
of 0.051 and a t-statistic of 3.71. Earnings seasonality has a somewhat negative effect in non-
earnings months, although this effect becomes only marginally significant with the inclusion of
controls in Column 5. These results indicate that seasonality is not simply proxying for other
drivers of returns, nor does it predict high returns outside of predicted earnings-months.
Although the results presented in Subsections 2.3 and 2.4 suggest that the seasonality effect
is not proxying for some fixed property of firms, it is possible that seasonality is correlated with
other recent firm-specific information that is announced in earnings months, such as earnings
growth or post-earnings announcement drift. Rather than trying to control separately for all
possible sources of such information, we test a common prediction of such models: firm-specific
shocks should become less relevant over time. Seasonality, by contrast, is property of a firm’s
To test whether firm-specific information explains our results, in Table VI we lag the
earnrank measure over different lengths of time. In Panel A we consider the effects of seasonality
from the same quarter of the year, but using various lagged multiples of 12 months to a period of
10 years. This retains the seasonality prediction for the current quarter but omits increasing
amounts of recent earnings news, so that any correlated information is more stale. Although this
test is necessarily conditioned on firms having a longer time series of data, the selection effect is
13
The timing of earnings announcements is strongly persistent over time (Frazzini and Lamont (2006)), which is
important because our test is a joint test of the persistence of seasonality and earnings announcement months.
19
The results show that statistically significant abnormal returns are evident even when using
information from 10 years to 14 years before the portfolio formation date. The equal-weighted
difference portfolio has positive returns that are significant at a 5% level or more when lagged up
to 10 years, while the value-weighted portfolio drops below the 5% level only at the 10-year mark.
Interestingly, the returns get slightly larger when lagged two and three years. 14
information. If our results are driven by seasonality in earnings, then earnrank will positively
predict returns for the same quarter as the measure but not similarly predict returns for other
quarters. If seasonality effects were driven by a slow response to correlated earnings news (e.g.,
earnings growth, post-earnings announcement drift), the effect should be similar when earnrank
is lagged at other multiples of 3 months and, indeed, ought to be stronger for horizons of less than
12 months. When earnrank is lagged 3 months (i.e., using the most recent earnings information),
there is no spread in returns. At 6 months, the returns are similar when equal weighted but smaller
and insignificant when value weighted. At 9 months, the spread is significantly negative when
value weighted but not when equal weighted. These results are difficult to reconcile with
14
The fact that the big increase comes from excluding earnings information from 12 to 23 months prior suggests that
earnings levels at this specific time may have contaminating factors. This is consistent with the fact that abnormally
high earnings from four quarters prior (roughly 12 months prior) tend to forecast low current month returns, as the
post-earnings announcement drift reverses at the fourth-quarter horizon (Bernard and Thomas (1990)).
20
Perhaps the most standard potential explanation for higher expected returns in positive
seasonality months is that they represent compensation for risk. This is related to the argument
presented in Salamon and Stober (1994), whereby high seasonal quarters involve more resolution
of uncertainty, which could come from either systematic or idiosyncratic factors. Although
Salamon and Stober (1994) do not distinguish between these two cases, we test both possibilities
The first way that announcement risk could explain the results is if seasonality were
announcements that represent more of the firm’s earnings generate a larger exposure to this factor.
This systematic announcement risk must be separate from exposure to market returns over the
month, as the four factor regressions already control for different market betas across the long
(positive seasonal) and short (negative seasonal) portfolios. In addition, the results in Table IV
indicate that firms do not have significantly higher market betas in positive seasonality months
relative to negative seasonality months, and the findings in Table III Panel A indicate that the
positive seasonality portfolio does not have more volatility than the negative seasonality portfolio.
Systematic risk factors related to earnings announcements are not implausible. Savor and
Wilson (2011) argue that there is a systematic component to earnings announcement risk and that
the portfolio of firms with expected earnings announcements represents a priced factor that proxies
for the systematic component of earnings announcement risk. If highly seasonal firms have more
exposure to this earnings announcement risk factor, this could be driving the returns.
21
but, in addition to the standard four factors, we also include the excess returns of an equal-weighted
portfolio of firms with a predicted earnings announcement that month (EARNRF). This captures
the exposure of each seasonality portfolio to announcement risk. The results indicate that exposure
to an overall earnings risk factor does not drive the seasonality effect. The difference in alphas
(now a five-factor alpha, including the earnings announcement factor) between positive and
negative seasonality portfolios is still large and significant: 34 basis points equal weighted in Panel
A (with a t-statistic of 3.00), and 48 basis points value weighted in Panel B (with a t-statistic of
2.67). These numbers are similar to those in Table IV, indicating that exposure to an earnings risk
factor is not a major driver of the seasonality effect. Indeed, the seasonality difference portfolio
If seasonality returns are driven entirely by compensation for risk, then market participants
should not be more positively surprised on average in positive seasonal quarters. Earnings risk
operates only through the discount rate channel: investors require higher returns in positive
seasonal months due to risk in these months, not because average news is more positive. We
examine this proposition using analysts’ earnings forecasts. These have been argued to be a
reasonable proxy for the views of investors (So (2012)), but even without this assumption they are
a sample of opinions from informed market participants. There may be greater variability in
forecast errors in positive seasonal months, but any increase in the mean forecast error is prima
facie evidence that analysts are relatively more pessimistic in these months.
15
In untabulated results, we show that other proxies for earnings risk (e.g., a value-weighted EARNRF or a difference
portfolio between expected announcers and non-announcers) produce similar spreads in abnormal returns.
22
earnings in positive seasonality quarters. Observations are at the firm-date level, and the dependent
variable is the median forecast error for quarterly earnings per share, taken over all analysts who
make forecasts between 3 and 90 days before the announcement. The measure of forecast error is
(Actual EPS – Forecast EPS) / Price (t−3). In Table VIII Panel A we regress the panel of firm-date
observations of earnrank and various controls. In Columns 1–4 we control for the log number of
estimates, the standard deviation of forecasts scaled by price three days before the announcement,
a dummy variable for if there is only one analyst’s forecast, the log market capitalization in the
previous month, the log book-to-market ratio, stock returns for the previous month, stock returns
for the previous 2 to 12 months cumulated, and the previous four forecast errors.
The results presented in Table VIII are consistent with analysts being more positively
surprised by firm cash flows during positive seasonality quarters. In the univariate specification in
Column 1, the coefficient on earnrank is 0.032, with a t-statistic of 11.43 when clustered by firm
and day. This shows that the earnings forecast error is more positive when seasonality is higher.
In Columns 2–4 we show that the effect of seasonality survives adding firm-level controls, with a
coefficient of 0.012 and a t-statistic of 5.19 when all firm controls are used. In Columns 5–7 we
add date and firm fixed effects to control for omitted fixed firm differences and aggregate time-
series changes in the analyst mistakes. The effects are very similar in all cases, indicating that the
effect of seasonality on forecast errors is not due to particular firm characteristics or time periods.
In the Internet appendix, we show that there is also a significant spread in analyst forecast errors
To gauge the magnitude of the forecast errors related to seasonality, we compare the
forecast error in positive seasonal quarters with the overall change in earnings across seasonal
23
by analysts. We take firms that were in the highest quintile of seasonality in the current quarter,
and were also in the lowest quintile of seasonality at some point in the previous 12 months. For
these firms, we compute the fraction of the seasonal shift that was forecasted as follows:
𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑
Among firms that shifted from the lowest to the highest quintile of seasonality, the median
fraction forecast was 0.93, meaning that analysts correctly forecasted 93% of the seasonal shift in
earnings but missed 7%. This reinforces the notion that the returns in positive seasonal quarters
Having shown that forecast errors are correlated with seasonality, we also wish to know
whether analysts deviate from econometric models of seasonal adjustments. In Table VIII Panel B
we estimate such a benchmark using a structural X-12 additive seasonal adjustment model of
earnings per share. We discuss the details of the estimation procedure at length in Section 5. We
take these estimates and subtract the median analyst’s earnings forecast. This yields an estimate
not of forecast error but, of whether analysts are more likely to undershoot a formal seasonal
Table VIII Panel B utilizes this measure and finds similar results. In all specifications, we
find coefficients roughly between 0.40 and 0.45, all highly statistically significant. This suggests
that, in positive seasonality periods, analysts’ forecasts are lower than both actual earnings and a
24
surprises is consistent with both investors and analysts making cash flow mistakes. So (2012)
provides evidence that investors overweight analysts’ forecasts when forming expectations of
earnings, implying that analysts’ forecasts are a good proxy for investors’ forecasts. The results in
So (2012) raise the possibility that investors may be following the mistakes of analysts, but the
two groups may also be making independent correlated errors. Both possibilities would be
consistent with our results. In the Internet appendix, we show that seasonality returns are larger
among firms with analyst coverage, but the difference is only marginally significant.
To further understand what is driving the returns that we observe in an earnings month, we
examine the daily returns that surround earnings announcements. Barber et al. (2013) and Johnson
and So (2014) show that the earnings announcement premium is actually concentrated prior to the
earnings announcement itself. If we are capturing a variant of this premium, we expect the returns
to be concentrated several days before the announcement. The returns at the monthly horizon also
may be capturing effects after the initial announcement due to post-earnings announcement drift.
To the extent that seasonality is a proxy for a predictable positive surprise, we expect to see returns
concentrated at the time of the announcement itself. While a concentration of returns on the
announcement day also would be consistent with a risk explanation, the evidence in Section 3
announcements. We take the daily return for the stock and subtract the average return for a
portfolio of stocks matched on the same quintile of size, book-to-market, and momentum (using
25
concentrated around the earnings announcement itself. The first three columns show the average
daily characteristic returns for the highest quintile of seasonality, the lowest quintile, and the
middle three quintiles. Similar to Barber et al. (2013), we find that the positive abnormal returns
around earnings announcements in general begin several days before the announcement itself.
between the top quintile and the bottom quintile of seasonality. The largest difference in returns
occurs on the announcement day itself (9.7 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.37). Adding the
adjusted returns from t−2 to t+1 yields roughly 26 basis points of returns. Because this is similar
to the equal-weighted portfolio result of 35 basis points in Table III, it suggests that most of the
returns due to seasonality come from the announcement itself. Columns 4 and 5 show the
equivalent difference in returns for more extreme sorts on earnrank. For more extreme cutoffs, the
returns are again earned mostly between t−2 and t+1, but the magnitudes are larger, consistent with
the greater level of seasonality. For the top 10% minus the bottom 10%, the sum of the adjusted
returns over the four days is roughly 39 basis points. For the top 5% minus the bottom 5%, the
sum from t−1 to t+1 (as t−2 is not significant here) is roughly 47 basis points.
earnrank. The coefficients that are both economically and statistically significant are around the
announcement from t−2 to t+1. The largest effect occurs on the announcement date itself, and the
second largest occurs on the day after the announcement. The differential returns to seasonality
are limited to a short period around the announcement, consistent with a predictable positive
26
The second class of explanation for seasonality affecting stock returns is that markets are
underweighting earnings seasonality information. If investors do not fully account for the fact that
earnings are predictably higher in certain quarters, then they may be positively surprised when
upcoming earnings are at high levels, consistent with the results in Table VIII.
As Ball and Bartov (1996) note, just because investors are making mistakes in forecasting
earnings does not mean that they are ignoring earnings news entirely. Similarly, the fact that
investors do not seem to be properly pricing earnings seasonality does not mean that seasonality
is being ignored altogether. This is reinforced by the analysts’ forecasts results presented above in
section 3.1. Our results also do not require that investors are being especially naïve, as the problem
of precisely estimating seasonal effects for each firm is far from straightforward. Nonetheless, our
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) argue that individuals estimate probabilities according to the ease
with which instances of the particular event can be brought to mind, which they call the availability
heuristic. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) describe various attributes that may make a particular
16
This is particularly important in light of the Fama (1998) critique that apparent underreactions are about as common
as apparent overreactions and the argument in Kothari (2001) that claims of inefficiency are more convincing if they
are constrained by testable predictions that relate to specific causes of mispricing.
27
the recency of data. Their theory builds on an earlier literature in studies of memory, which
documented a finding known as the serial position effect (Murdock (1962), Davelaar et al. (2005)),
whereby individuals are more likely to recall the last items in a list (the recency effect). In the
context of baseball, Green and Zwiebel (2015) find that baseball teams overreact to very recent
batting performance. The recency effect and the availability heuristic imply that investors are more
likely to recall recent earnings announcements and more likely to overweight those announcements
In addition, there are a number of examples that show that, when individuals make
decisions in a sequence, behavioral biases due to previously viewed events often manifest
themselves with respect to recently viewed observations. For example, in the context of speed
dating, men exhibit contrast effects with respect to the most recently observed women but not those
further in the past (Bhargava and Fisman (2014)). In the context of earnings announcements,
Hartzmark and Shue (2015) demonstrate that firms exhibit contrast effects with respect to
announcements from the previous day but, again, not further in the past.
Our measure of seasonality captures the long-run relative size of earnings in the upcoming
quarter relative to other quarters. Mechanically, relatively higher earnings in the upcoming quarter
imply relatively lower earnings in the other quarters. If the historical pattern in earnings continues
as before, then positive seasonality firms will typically have announced large earnings 12 months
prior but lower earnings over the subsequent three announcements. If investors suffer from a
17
This is not the only possible behavioral mistake that investors could make, of course. It is possible, counterfactually,
that the seasonal trend itself might be salient to investors and that they overreact to this. To some extent, it is an
empirical question whether investors overreact or underreact and, if so, why. Importantly, however, we propose a
specific microfoundation for underreaction in the current context, which generates additional testable predictions
about the role of recent earnings.
28
expectations of the upcoming earnings announcement. On average this will cause investors to be
seasonality quarter will on average have three recent announcements that are lower than the
announcement 12 months prior. Importantly, if the recency effect drives the seasonality returns,
then the returns should be higher when subsequent earnings actually were lower ex-post. If the
more recent earnings were actually higher than those from 12 months prior, then a recency effect
would not cause investors to be pessimistic about the upcoming positive seasonal quarter.
We test this prediction in Tables X and XI, by examining how the seasonality effect is
impacted by recent earnings levels. In Table X, we examine whether the returns in the seasonality
long/short portfolio depend on the difference between recent earnings and those from 12 months
prior. We form a two-way sort of stocks. The first sort is whether the firm is above or below the
median value of earnrank that month. For the second sort, we define a new variable as the
difference between the average of the three most recent earnings announcements (typically 3, 6, 9
months prior) and the announcement 12 months prior (with earnings scaled by firm assets per
share).18 We then sort stocks by whether they are above or below the median of this measure.
Table X presents these results, which are consistent with the predictions of the recency
effect. When recent earnings are more negative relative to earnings 12 months prior, the seasonality
effect is larger: 65 basis points equal weighted and 76 basis points value weighted, both significant
18
Similar results are obtained (not tabulated) if we instead sort on the gap only between the last earnings announcement
and the announcement 12 months ago.
29
28 basis points equal weighted and 6 basis points value weighted. The returns of the double
One possible concern with the previous results is that conditioning on low recent earnings
may select firms that are more seasonal overall. To address this possibility, in Panel B we perform
a placebo version of the same regression. We use a similar double sort as before, but for the second
sorting variable we use the gap between the three earnings announcements before the
announcement 12 months prior. In other words, the gap is computed using announcements that
are, on average, 15, 18, and 21 months before portfolio formation, instead of in Panel A where
they are, on average, 3, 6, and 9 months before portfolio formation. If the recency effect is driving
our results, low earnings in this period should not produce the same spread in returns. This double
sort produces a gap in returns that is smaller in magnitude, statistically insignificant when value
weighted, and marginally significant (with a t-statistic of 1.67) when equal weighted. What matters
is the level of the most recent earnings, consistent with the predictions of the recency effect.
In Table XI, we consider an alternative measure of when investors are less likely to be
pessimistic about upcoming news—when the firm has broken an earnings record in the prior 12
months. Since earnings records are a salient indicator of improved firm performance, they are
likely to be highly weighted under a recency effect, thereby reducing the effect of seasonality.
Similar to Table X, we sort stocks according to earnrank and whether a previous earnings record
was broken in the prior 12 months (excluding the first two years of observations for each firm).
Consistent with recency, we find that the effects of seasonality are significantly higher
among firms that have not recently broken a record. The double difference portfolio has abnormal
30
value weighted (with a t-statistic of 2.22). In addition, the seasonality difference portfolio among
firms that have recently broken a record has abnormal returns that are very close to zero (-2 basis
points and 3 basis points). These results confirm the view, based on Table X, that the seasonality
Recency also explains the result in Table III Panel B that earnrank negatively predicts
characteristic-adjusted announcement returns one quarter after the main sort (i.e., lagging by one
quarter more than the main specification). This is consistent with their having experienced recently
higher earnings due to the positive seasonal quarter just past. This leads to the spread being the
The recency bias appears to contrast with the explanation in Bernard and Thomas (1990)
of why post-earnings announcement drift reverses at the fourth quarter. They argue that investors
overweight earnings surprises from four quarters prior and underweight earnings surprises from
the most recent periods. In the current setting, low recent earnings levels cause investors to form
forecasts that are too pessimistic. This may occur even if the low recent earnings do not involve a
substantial surprise (e.g., when low earnings are mostly predictable, as seasonality implies that
they are). The empirical results in Bernard and Thomas (1990) are clearly distinct from the results
here (earnrank predicts returns consistently up to a 10-year horizon, for instance). Nonetheless,
the difference in relative weighting of recent versus older earnings is somewhat of a puzzle.
One possible explanation is that there are different groups of investors who are responsible
for the mistakes in each case. Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) examine the trades of different
groups of investors and find that the trades of small investors seem to exhibit the mistake described
31
the finding that post-earnings announcement drift is stronger for small firms (Ball and Bartov
(1996), Brown and Han (2000)). By contrast, Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) find that large
investors trade more in line with the views of analysts, and neither group seems to underweight
recent earnings surprises. Similarly, Ke and Ramalingegowda (2005) and Campbell, Ramadorai
and Schwartz (2009) find that larger institutional investors are more likely to trade to take
If larger investors are more likely to be trading based on the most recent three quarters (to
take advantage of post-earnings announcement drift), they may be the group that ignores longer-
term seasonal information. This would explain several facts, namely (a) analysts also make
systematic mistakes based on seasonality and (b) large firms have bigger seasonality effects, and
are likely to have more trading by larger investors. This argument is rather speculative, however.
On face, the fact that seasonality returns are bigger for large firms is puzzling. Many theories of
behavioral mistakes posit that institutional investors are less likely to be biased than retail
investors, which would predict bigger anomaly returns for small firms (opposite to what we find).
Given that the seasonality effect occurs within the set of predicted earnings firms, the
returns may be driven by factors associated with the earnings announcement premium. Frazzini
and Lamont (2006) argue that earnings announcement returns are driven by predictable increases
in volume, as firms with historically higher volume in earnings announcement months have higher
earnings announcement returns. Barber et al. (2013) argue that the earnings announcement
32
related to the argument in Ball and Kothari (1991) that earnings announcements have high returns
because they resolve investor uncertainty. Positive seasonal quarters may have higher returns due
In Table XII, we examine the effect of increases in volume on seasonality. We take the
same set of earnings announcements from one year prior to six years prior, used to form the
earnrank measures, and examine the relative level of trading volume in the upcoming quarter. We
form a ratio of the average volume from the past five announcements in the same fiscal quarter as
the upcoming announcement, divided by the average volume from the 20 announcements starting
Lamont (2006), as it measures whether the current quarter’s earnings announcement is likely to
have higher volume than other quarters (whereas those authors examine whether earnings
announcements as a whole have higher volume than non-earnings months). Similar to Table X and
XI, we double sort firms into portfolios according to the expected level of the volume in the
upcoming quarter and the earnings rank. If the seasonality effect is merely proxying for the
increase in volume, we should see a spread when sorting on volume but not see a seasonality effect
Table XII suggests that increases in trading volume do not drive the higher returns in
positive seasonal months. The seasonality difference portfolio shows similar returns when formed
among firms that have a relatively high trading volume in that month or firms that have a relatively
low trading volume that month. The double-difference portfolio earns a statistically insignificant
14 basis points when equal weighted and 18 basis points when value weighted. Overall, the results
33
seasonality. For idiosyncratic announcement risk to be associated with higher returns, investors
must be somehow prevented from diversifying this idiosyncratic risk away by holding a portfolio
of seasonal firms. This is assumed in Barber et al. (2013), who relate idiosyncratic risk to earnings
announcement returns, and Johnson and So (2014), who examine liquidity provision in the lead-
up to earnings announcements. In this view, the low volatility portfolio of positive seasonal firms
is not obtainable by the investors, as they can hold only some subset of the firms and, thus, face
idiosyncratic risk. Whether or not investors are so constrained is a question beyond the scope of
this paper. We remain agnostic on this issue and instead focus on examining whether there is a
If seasonality returns represent compensation for higher idiosyncratic risk, then the
expected idiosyncratic volatility of the upcoming announcement should explain the returns to
seasonality portfolios. To test this, we compute the daily abnormal idiosyncratic volatility around
each earnings announcement, as in Barber et al. (2013). We first regress daily stock returns on a
market model (including three lags) for the 100 days ending 11 days before the announcement.
This is used to generate a squared residual return on the announcement day, which is divided by
the average squared residual from the 100-day regression period to obtain the announcement
period increase in idiosyncratic volatility. We predict the firm’s abnormal idiosyncratic volatility
in the upcoming quarter by taking the average of the previous five announcements in the same
quarter. Table XIII shows that idiosyncratic volatility does not explain seasonality returns.
Although announcements with higher expected idiosyncratic volatility have higher returns,
consistent with Barber et al. (2013), the seasonality difference portfolio returns are similar between
high and low expected idiosyncratic volatility. In untabulated results, controlling for expected
34
results: the effect of seasonality is not subsumed by the extra controls. Overall, predictable
As noted earlier, the seasonality returns are unlikely to be explained by fixed loadings on
risk factors, as firms tend to cycle through both the long and short legs of the difference portfolio.
In addition, the abnormal returns cannot be explained by firms having a predictably higher time-
varying loading on the factors that are being controlled for (Mkt-Rf, SMB, HML, and UMD). On
the other hand, the abnormal returns could be caused by the difference portfolio itself having time-
varying loadings on the factors. For example, positive seasonality firms might tend to be high-
momentum firms in some months and high-value firms in other months. If this were to occur, the
regression would not control for it, as it estimates a single portfolio loading on each factor for all
calendar months. Keloharju, Linnainmaa and Nyberg (2013) argue that such a process explains the
calendar seasonality in Heston and Sadka (2008), whereby firms with high returns 12, 24, 36, 48,
and 60 months prior have high returns in the current month. It is possible that positive seasonality
firms have higher exposure to factors in ways that vary over the year.
To test whether this explains our results in Table XIV, we run a similar regression to that
in Table IV but allow for different factor exposures in each month of the year. The regression is:
where Jan through Dec are dummy variables for each of the months of the year. The regression
thus estimates a single abnormal return but allows for month-of-the-year variation in exposure to
35
The results indicate that time-varying loadings on standard factors do not explain the
seasonality effect. The portfolio of high earnrank minus low earnrank earns abnormal returns in
this setting of 35 points equal weighted (with a t-statistic of 1.97) and 32 basis points when value
weighted (with a t-statistic of 2.74). This suggests that the seasonality effect is not proxying for
It is difficult to rule out all possible variations on risk-based explanations that involve time-
varying expected returns. One way of interpreting our results is that if earnings seasonality is in
fact proxying for a risk exposure, then there is a considerable puzzle as to how to measure the risks
A large literature in accounting has examined what variables predict earnings surprises and
announcement returns. Bernard and Thomas (1990) show that positive earnings surprises predict
high abnormal returns for the next three quarters’ announcements and low abnormal returns for
the fourth quarter. Piotroski (2000) constructs a measure called the F-score using nine accounting
measures that capture variation in profitability, financial leverage, and operating efficiency and
shows that this predicts future announcement returns. Sloan (1996) documents that accruals (the
gap between earnings recognized this period and cash flows received) are associated with lower
future returns. Seasonality may be proxying for these known determinants of earnings surprises.
We examine this question in Table XV. The dependent variable in the regressions is the
characteristic-adjusted returns from t−1 to t+1 surrounding earnings announcements, and the
36
F-score, and accruals. The first column shows that earnrank positively and significantly predicts
announcement returns. The next column adds controls for the earnings surprise from a seasonal
random walk model for each of the previous four quarters. The coefficient on earnrank is basically
unchanged when these variables are included, suggesting that seasonality is not just proxying for
recent earnings surprises. Column 3 uses median analyst forecast errors as an alternative measure
of past earnings surprises. Again, earnrank remains positive and significant. The effect of
earnrank is similar when controlling for the F-score from Piotroski (2000) (Column 4), the decile
of accruals as in Sloan (1996) (Column 5), and all the accounting variables in combination
(Column 6). Earnings seasonality returns are not explained by these accounting variables.
4.4 Robustness
whether seasonality returns are related to earnings management by firms and find that seasonality
does not have a significant relation with the various proxies for earnings management. We examine
the role of industry factors in seasonality and find that seasonality relative to industry averages has
a strong relation to returns, while average industry seasonality has somewhat less predictive power.
Finally, we examine seasonality returns separately for each calendar quarter of the year and find
the largest returns in the first quarter but directionally positive returns in all four quarters.
Our results so far measure seasonality using earnrank, which is simple, easy to replicate,
quarters without making the parametric assumptions necessary to estimate the size of the seasonal
37
designed to forecast the size of the seasonal trend (rather than its reliability). While both measures
broadly identify similar seasonal firms and quarters, it seems likely that both aspects should
contribute to the effect. Consistent with this, in untabulated results, taking the intersection of both
size and reliability measures produces stronger results. The results are similar across all of our
measures, suggesting that our findings are not due to specific modeling assumptions.
The estimates of seasonality in this section are based on the X-12 seasonal adjustment
model used by the U.S. Census Bureau. The X-12 model is based on an autoregressive integrated
moving average (ARIMA) framework (Findley et al. (1998)). The model estimates the seasonal
component of earnings relative to a time-trend, adjusts for the presence of outliers, and chooses
the optimal moving average to measure seasonal components. In addition to the assumptions
underlying the ARIMA model, a number of additional modeling decisions must be made.
One such assumption is whether to model the seasonal relation as additive (e.g., earnings
are $10 million more in the fourth quarter) or multiplicative (e.g., earnings are 20% higher in the
fourth quarter). For many firms, it seems that seasonality should be modeled as multiplicative. If
a firm doubles in size, it seems likely that the point estimate of seasonality will not stay a consistent
additive component but will double in size as well. Nonetheless, multiplicative X-12 models can
be used only when the entire series is positive. Because this is not the case for any firm that
experiences negative earnings, we model seasonal earnings terms using additive models and scale
by different variables to adjust for changes in firm size: earnings per share, earnings divided by
share price, and earnings divided by assets. We also examine seasonal components for both sales
and revenue, which are never negative and thus can be estimated using the multiplicative model,
38
five years of data to form our estimates, and our baseline estimates take the average of the seasonal
term for all five past observations of the upcoming quarter. We find similar results if we simply
use the seasonal term forecast just for the upcoming quarter.19
Table XVI presents alphas from portfolios that sort on a variety of X-12 estimates. The
alphas are from the strategy going long firms in the top quintile and short firms in the bottom
quintile of seasonality. Recall from Table IV that sorting on earnrank produced alphas of 35 basis
points when equal weighted and 55 basis points when value weighted. The first three columns
utilize an additive X-12 model of earnings per share, earnings/price, and earnings to assets. Equal-
weighted estimates range from 29 to 37 basis points, and value-weighted estimates range from 59
to 87 basis points. Using our preferred multiplicative model on revenue and sales, we find equal-
weighted alphas from 34 to 35 basis points and value-weighted alphas of 62 to 71 basis points.
In the internet appendix, we repeat the entire analysis presented in this paper, utilizing the
multiplicative model based on sales. The results are similar and slightly stronger in some cases.
This suggests that, while more complicated estimates of seasonality can improve returns, most of
the variation in returns is evident even when using the simple earnrank measure.
6. Conclusion
Stocks exhibit higher returns in months when they are predicted to announce seasonally
larger earnings. This effect does not appear to be driven by risk factors or a delayed reaction to
19
The large number of non-obvious modeling choices required to implement these models reinforces the conclusion
that estimating seasonal adjustments is quite complicated and is something that investors may plausibly get wrong.
39
We present evidence that the effect is linked to the tendency of investors to underreact to
predictable information in earning seasonality. We hypothesize that investors who suffer from a
tendency to overweight recent data may place too much weight on the lower average earnings that
follow a positive seasonal quarter, causing them to be too pessimistic by the time the positive
seasonal quarter comes around again. Consistent with this view, the effects of seasonality are larger
when earnings since the last positive seasonal quarter are at lower levels.
It is worth noting that our findings do not imply that adjusting for seasonality is a trivial
task or that investors ignore seasonality altogether. Indeed, the results would not tell an analyst or
investor exactly how much to adjust for seasonality for each firm. Instead, we show that whatever
seasonal adjustment investors are using does not fully account for seasonal shifts.
The results in this paper are consistent with investors being less likely to process
information when it is not salient. Even when earnings information is widely available and
opportunities for learning are frequent, investors may still face other behavioral constraints that
prevent them from fully incorporating such information into asset prices. Our results, in
combination with other findings in the literature, point to a general but not commonly appreciated
stylized fact, namely that predictably recurring firm events tend to be associated with abnormally
high returns. The implications of this for behavioral finance are well deserving of future study.
40
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43
46
VW 1 (Low) 1.37 5.18 0.18 -21.91 -6.54 -4.43 -1.51 1.21 4.45 7.31 9.89 22.15
VW 5 (High) 1.76 5.18 0.26 -18.33 -5.89 -4.50 -1.54 1.71 4.66 7.78 10.12 32.15
VW 5 -1 0.39 3.75 0.10 -14.88 -4.94 -3.79 -1.82 0.31 2.36 4.61 6.30 18.44
47
48
2 0.159 0.278 *** 1.004 *** 0.701 *** 0.281 *** -0.025 0.908 492
(1.24) (3.37) (53.52) (26.36) (9.83) (-1.39)
3 0.452 *** 0.291 *** 1.001 *** 0.686 *** 0.178 *** -0.041 ** 0.904 492
(2.82) (3.43) (51.86) (25.07) (6.05) (-2.19)
4 0.216 * 0.375 *** 0.986 *** 0.653 *** 0.179 *** 0.031 * 0.912 492
(1.69) (4.77) (55.24) (25.81) (6.59) (1.82)
5 (High) 0.909 *** 0.653 *** 0.936 *** 0.473 *** 0.292 *** -0.049 ** 0.854 492
(6.03) (6.98) (44.02) (15.69) (9.03) (-2.41)
5-1 0.551 *** 0.347 *** -0.011 -0.093 *** -0.077 ** -0.010 0.020 492
(3.14) (3.13) (-0.45) (-2.61) (-2.02) (-0.42)
49
Firm-Level
Earnrank Weighting Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD R2 N
1 (lowest Earnrank VW 0.163 0.992 *** 0.013 -0.021 0.083 *** 0.770 489
that year) (1.36) (36.44) (0.33) (-0.51) (3.16)
2 VW 0.291 ** 1.040 *** 0.001 0.032 0.044 0.714 489
(2.02) (31.75) (0.01) (0.65) (1.40)
3 VW 0.344 *** 1.009 *** -0.003 0.017 0.055 ** 0.799 489
(3.10) (40.09) (-0.09) (0.44) (2.26)
4 (highest Earnrank VW 0.822 *** 0.935 *** 0.058 -0.119 ** 0.046 0.709 489
that year) (5.96) (29.88) (1.32) (-2.50) (1.53)
4-1 VW 0.659 *** -0.057 0.046 -0.098 * -0.037 0.010 489
(3.91) (-1.48) (0.84) (-1.68) (-1.00)
50
51
EW 5 (High) 0.653 *** 0.709 *** 0.692 *** 0.688 *** 0.642 *** 0.576 *** 0.552 *** 0.558 *** 0.561 *** 0.622 ***
(6.98) (7.81) (7.39) (7.27) (6.27) (5.79) (5.33) (5.28) (5.19) (5.54)
EW 5 - 1 0.347 *** 0.542 *** 0.548 *** 0.502 *** 0.475 *** 0.381 *** 0.275 ** 0.314 *** 0.271 ** 0.400 ***
(3.13) (4.83) (4.86) (4.50) (4.06) (3.07) (2.33) (2.63) (2.25) (3.16)
VW 1 (Low) 0.358 *** 0.218 * 0.173 0.263 * 0.223 0.297 * 0.299 ** 0.253 * 0.153 0.321 **
(2.77) (1.69) (1.26) (1.86) (1.46) (1.76) (2.01) (1.68) (0.98) (1.98)
VW 5 (High) 0.909 *** 0.900 *** 0.810 *** 0.736 *** 0.693 *** 0.796 *** 0.716 *** 0.688 *** 0.665 *** 0.706 ***
(6.03) (6.28) (5.31) (4.96) (4.46) (4.66) (4.23) (4.35) (3.93) (4.26)
VW 5 - 1 0.551 *** 0.682 *** 0.637 *** 0.473 ** 0.470 ** 0.500 ** 0.418 ** 0.435 ** 0.513 ** 0.385 *
(3.14) (4.00) (3.25) (2.53) (2.31) (2.09) (2.03) (2.11) (2.37) (1.71)
52
EW 5 (High) 0.221 *** 0.425 *** 0.300 *** 0.653 *** 0.153 * 0.399 *** 0.249 *** 0.709 ***
(2.69) (5.20) (3.66) (6.98) (1.82) (4.78) (2.98) (7.81)
EW 5 - 1 0.001 0.344 *** -0.016 0.347 *** -0.223 ** 0.261 *** -0.211 * 0.542 ***
(0.01) (3.53) (-0.17) (3.13) (-2.15) (2.69) (-1.93) (4.83)
VW 1 (Low) 0.461 *** -0.014 0.673 *** 0.358 *** 0.519 *** -0.040 0.748 *** 0.218 *
(3.23) (-0.10) (5.06) (2.77) (3.26) (-0.24) (5.25) (1.69)
VW 5 (High) 0.388 *** 0.367 ** 0.081 0.909 *** 0.359 *** 0.352 ** -0.009 0.900 ***
(2.92) (2.17) (0.63) (6.03) (2.93) (2.21) (-0.07) (6.28)
VW 5 - 1 -0.073 0.381 -0.593 *** 0.551 *** -0.160 0.393 * -0.757 *** 0.682 ***
(-0.40) (1.60) (-3.28) (3.14) (-0.79) (1.70) (-4.13) (4.00)
53
2 0.010 0.064 0.040 0.104 *** 0.010 0.965 *** 0.939 492
(0.14) (1.03) (0.84) (4.02) (0.69) (15.70)
4 0.120 * 0.092 0.024 0.011 0.065 *** 0.917 *** 0.941 492
(1.81) (1.56) (0.54) (0.45) (4.57) (15.69)
5 (High) 0.361 *** -0.089 -0.248 *** 0.100 *** -0.011 1.051 *** 0.899 492
(4.50) (-1.24) (-4.53) (3.34) (-0.62) (14.82)
5-1 0.344 *** -0.024 -0.102 -0.080 * -0.010 0.013 0.020 492
(3.00) (-0.23) (-1.30) (-1.87) (-0.40) (0.12)
Panel B - Value-Weighted
Earnings
Rank Intercept MKTRF SMB HML UMD EARNRF R2 N
1 (Low) 0.232 * 0.544 *** -0.319 *** 0.042 0.072 ** 0.450 *** 0.733 492
(1.77) (4.65) (-3.57) (0.86) (2.54) (3.87)
2 0.114 0.864 *** 0.020 0.076 0.029 0.162 0.757 492
(0.86) (7.33) (0.23) (1.54) (1.01) (1.38)
3 0.401 ** 0.872 *** -0.045 -0.170 *** 0.027 0.185 0.697 492
(2.43) (5.93) (-0.40) (-2.77) (0.77) (1.27)
4 0.134 0.764 *** -0.126 -0.157 *** 0.083 *** 0.297 ** 0.780 492
(1.02) (6.53) (-1.41) (-3.22) (2.95) (2.55)
5 (High) 0.716 *** 0.205 -0.542 *** -0.198 *** 0.049 0.695 *** 0.646 492
(4.72) (1.52) (-5.25) (-3.51) (1.51) (5.19)
5-1 0.483 *** -0.338 ** -0.223 * -0.240 *** -0.023 0.245 0.032 492
(2.67) (-2.10) (-1.81) (-3.56) (-0.58) (1.53)
54
55
56
Value Weighted
Gap Between Earnings
(3,6,9) Months Ago Earnings Rank Level
and 12 Month Ago All 1 (Low) 2 (High) 2-1
All 0.269 *** 0.557 *** 0.288 **
(3.00) (5.05) (2.16)
{493} {493} {493}
1 (Non-Annual earnings 0.306 *** -0.098 0.642 *** 0.757 ***
more negative) (2.81) (-0.70) (4.86) (3.96)
{492} {462} {483} {462}
2 (Non-Annual earnings 0.359 *** 0.287 *** 0.405 *** 0.060
more positive) (3.61) (2.62) (2.61) (0.34)
{492} {473} {467} {466}
Value Weighted
Gap Between Earnings
(15,18,21) Months Ago Earnings Rank Level
and 12 Month Ago All 1 (Low) 2 (High) 2-1
All 0.269 *** 0.557 *** 0.288 **
(3.00) (5.05) (2.16)
{493} {493} {493}
1 (Non-Annual earnings 0.477 *** 0.071 0.616 *** 0.535 ***
more negative) (4.70) (0.48) (4.89) (2.73)
{489} {462} {481} {462}
2 (Non-Annual earnings 0.278 ** 0.205 * 0.582 *** 0.337
more positive) (2.40) (1.85) (3.15) (1.62)
{489} {474} {466} {466}
59
Factor (MKTRF,
Earnings (VW) (EW) SMB, HML, UMD) (EW) (EW)
Rank Intercept Intercept * Month Controls R2 N
1 (Low) 0.419 *** 0.313 *** Yes 0.889 492
(3.02) (3.30)
63
64
Model x-12 Add. x-12 Add. x-12 Add. x-12 Mult. x-12 Mult. x-12 Mult.
5 yr avg 5 yr avg 5 yr avg 5 yr avg 5 yr avg 1 yr forecast
Measure Earnings Per Earnings / Earnings /
Share Price Assets Revenue Sales Sales
Weighting Portfolio
EW 1 (Low) -0.057 0.185 ** 0.209 ** 0.189 ** 0.193 ** 0.203 **
(-0.66) (2.01) (2.34) (2.11) (2.17) (2.28)
EW 5 (High) 0.315 *** 0.548 *** 0.494 *** 0.531 *** 0.545 *** 0.541 ***
(3.73) (6.18) (5.86) (6.02) (6.25) (5.96)
EW 5-1 0.372 *** 0.363 *** 0.285 ** 0.342 *** 0.352 *** 0.338 ***
(3.39) (3.11) (2.48) (3.05) (3.15) (2.94)