1. KHOSROW MINUCHER, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS
AND ARTHUR SCALZO, RESPONDENTS.
[ G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003 ] Vitug, J:

Doctrine of the Case:

State Immunity from Suit; A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the
host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.

Case Filed: Civil case for damages against Scalzo (US Agent)

FACTS: In May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of RA 6425 was filed against
Minucher and Abbas Torabian. A buy-bust operation was conducted in the house of Minucher, an
Iranian nation where heroin has been seized. Agent Arthur Scalzo acted as a buyer in the buy-bust.
The presiding judge Migrino acquitted the two accused.

Minucher then filed a civil case for damages on account of what he claimed to be trumped-up charges
of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Suson and Manas,
filed a special appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer, this was
granted. Scalzo then filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he,
not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes
of the court. This was denied by the court, holding that the motion filed by Scalzo for extension of
time to file an answer was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons. Scalzo filed a
petition for review with the CA assailing the denial but this was denied and it affirmed the ruling of
the trial court.

After almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that he was a special agent of the US Drug Enforcement Administration,
and that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached on his motion a Diplomatic Note
addressed to the DFA of the Philippines. However, the TC denied the motion to dismiss. The CA
promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of
the complaint against him.

Minucher then filed a petition for review with the SC appealing the judgment of the CA, the SC
reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The
RTC gave credence to the claim of Scalzo that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity
nevertheless, he should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official
duties. CA reversed this decision and sustained the defense of Scalzo. Hence this recourse by
Minucher.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity

RULING:

Scalzo contended that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, granted him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the US
Drugs Enforcement Agency to conduct surveillance operations on suspected drug dealers in the
Philippines. The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include: Ambassadors
or nuncios accredited to the head of state, Envoys, inisters or internuncios, Charges d’ affairs
accredited to the minister of foreign affairs. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
diplomatic staff are accorded diplomatic rank. Under the terms of the Convention, only “diplomatic
agents” are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Consuls do not
enjoy the immunities and privileges accorded to diplomats because they are not charged with the duty
of representing their states in political matters.

In this case, Although the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo is contentious, it was sufficiently established
that he worked for the US Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of
suspected drug activities within the country, hence if Scalzo was acting within his assigned functions,
the present controversy is resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although
not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred
by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a
state is believed to be suing the state inself in whose service he is. Par in parem, non habet imperium.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as it
can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The official exchanges
of communications between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
DFA, and the participation of the PH Narcotics Command in the buy-bust may be inadequate to
support the “diplomatic status” of Scalzo, but it is enough indication that the PH Govt has given
imprimatur to the activities of agent Scalzo. Hence, he is entitled to the defense of state immunity.
 2. JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 125865, 28 January 2000, FIRST DIVISION (YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.)

Doctrine of the Case

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys
immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or
commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already
mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

FACTS

Jeffrey Liang is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral
defamation.

Jeffery Liang was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing his bail, the MeTC
released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.

The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of
the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the
ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that
petitioner is immune from suit.

METC RULING: without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

RTC RULING: set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of
arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,

petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by
immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
cases were filed in court

ISSUES

1. Was it correct for the METC to dismiss the criminal cases?

2. Was Jeffrey Liang immune from suit?

RULING
1. NO. courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.

2. NO. the immunity mentioned in Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if
petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given
the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do
not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The imputation
of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused
by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is
such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action
relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving
state outside his official functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part
of official duty.
3. NORMA DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOT CHILD
RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, PETITIONER, VS. ERNST JOHAN
BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Territoriality Principle in criminal law, provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations."

FACTS
Norma A. Del Socorro (petitioner) married Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem in
Holland on September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, They had a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem. When Roderigo was 18 months old, Del Socorro and Van Wilsem divorced. Del
Socorro moved back to the Philippines with her son. She alleged that Van Wilsem promised
to provide monthly support of 250 Guildene (Php 17,500.00) to their son, which Van Wilsem
never gave. Few years later, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines and was remarried in
Pinangmungahan, Cebu. He and his new wife established a catering busines (Paree Catering)
located in Brgy. Tajao, Pinangminahan, Cebu. It is important to note that Del Socorro and his
son were also residing in Cebu.
Del Socorro sent a demand letter requesting support from Van Wilsem which he refused.
Thus, Del Socorro filed a complaint with the provincial prosecutor of Cebu. RTC- Cebu
granted Van Wilsem’s Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction
and (2) prescription of crime charged.

Petitioner’s Argument/s
Del Socorro alleged that Van Wilsem violated Sec. 5, Par. E(2), of R.A. 9262 for the angels
refusal to support his minor child with Del Socorro. She also invoked Art. 195, FC which
provides the parents’ obligation to support his child. Petitioner also contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree it should in relation to Art. 26 of the FC,
Van Wilsem is not excused from complying with the obligations support his minor children
with the petition

Respondent’s Argument/s
Van Wilsem argued that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by Del Socorro that
she, as well as Roderigo, are entitled for support. Van Wilsem also added that by the reason
of the divorce decree, he is not obligated to Del Socorro for any financial support
ISSUES
1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine
law? (YES)
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child. (YES)

RULING
1. YES. While the SC agrees with the RTC that since Van Wilsem is a citizen of Holland
and is subject to the laws of his country and not the Philippine law, it does not mean that Van
Wilsem is not obliged to support his son altogether.
The Court stated that in international law, the party who wants to have the foreign law applied
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In this case, Van Wilsem hey
silly concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of incapacity support. However, he never proved the same. it is incumbent
upon Van Wilsem to plead and prove the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child.
Due to Van Wilsem’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
Doctrine of Processual Presumption shall apply. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our court will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local/domestic/international law.

2. YES. Respondent may be made liable under Sec. 5(e) and (i) of R.A. 9262 which states
that:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
 xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children

Further, since Van Wilsem is currently living in the Philippines, the Court finds strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against the respondent. It is likewise irrefutable
that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
 4. OPHELIA HERNAN v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 217874, 05 December 2017, EN BANC (Peralta, .J.)
Doctrine of the Case
When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law imposing penalties
more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable
judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

FACTS
Petitioner Ophelia Hernan was promoted to the position of Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue
of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement and collection officer. As such, petitioner
received cash and other collections from customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic
transfers, toll fees, and special message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank
account of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) at the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.
Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), conducted a cash
examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her superior, Sherelyn Narag.
Lopez came across deposit slips dated September 19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the
amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, respectively. She noticed that said deposit slips did not bear
a stamp of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. She and Narag verified all the reports and
other documents turned-over to them by petitioner. Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the
remittances made by petitioner. Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits
were made by petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of
₱11,300.00 and November 29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20.
The LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller, Catalina Ngaosi,
to conduct their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on September 19, 1996, the only
deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.
This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances were
not acknowledged by the bank. The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the
₱81,348.20 remittance but not for the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the
whereabouts of the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the COA Regional Director who,
in turn wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit on
September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC. Thus, the COA demanded that
she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the COA filed a complaint for
malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon which,
after due investigation, recommended her indictment for the loss of ₱11,300.00. Accordingly,
petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City.
 The RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information.
The Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction but modified the penalty imposed. Upon
motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over
the case. Instead, it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner
occupying a position lower than Salary Grade 27.
The Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty
imposed.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the
Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent
Resolution, that the case be reopened for further reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of
Judgment dated June 26, 2013. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition for lack of merit. According to
the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading
under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds raised therein were merely a rehash of those raised in the
two previous motions. The claims that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely
relied on for appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence to
present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013 Resolutions.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in concluding that the motion to reopen was filed
out of time considering the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances surrounding the case
and in finding that the evidence intended to be presented by petition should her motion for
reopening be granted, was passed upon by the trial court.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in pronouncing that the motion to reopen and the
petition for reconsideration filed by petitioner are considered as the second and third motions
to the denial of the decision.

RULING
1. NO. Section 24, Rule 119 and existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements
for the reopening a case: (l) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2)
the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after
a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation
of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of
the order.
The absence of the first requisite that the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment
of conviction already cripples the motion. The August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory and, in fact,
was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Moreover, petitioner's
supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present witnesses and documents should
have been advanced before the trial court. It is the trial court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the
Court, which receives evidence and rules over exhibits formally offered. Thus, it was, indeed, too late
in the day to advance additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower
court. An appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters except
only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to substantiate the lower
court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

2. NO. The motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court due to the fact that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a rehash
of those raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. the fact that the pleadings filed by
petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution
and Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution
of Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the rules on prohibited pleadings.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant
case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan in order to modify
the penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. When, however, circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, the Court may sit en
bane and give due regard to such exceptional circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine
of immutability. The same is in line with Section 3(c), Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, which provides that cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane.
To the Court, the recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount
or the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed Under the Revised Penal
Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which
accordingly reduced the penalty applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such
exceptional circumstance. Section 40 of said Act provides:
SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
 1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty thousand
pesos (₱40,000.00).
xxxx
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein the
judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and executory and yet
the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage of said law. Because of this,
not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive effectivity
of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused, she may even apply for probation, as long as
she does not possess any ground for disqualification.
Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a possible
multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the instant case and recall
the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, which imposed the penalty of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-
one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum. Instead, since the amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00,
which does not exceed ₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
(1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of petitioner. Hence, taking into
consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance and the presence of one (1) mitigating
circumstance, the range of the penalty that must be imposed as the maximum term should be prision
correccional medium to prision correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in accordance
with Article 64 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the minimum
term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of arresto mayor, maximum
to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and
four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision
correccional, as maximum.
Judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such other officers of the
law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. 10951 whenever it is, by reason of
justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. Hence, said recent legislation shall find
application in cases where the imposable penalties of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft,
estafa, robbery with force upon things, malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the
penalty of which is dependent upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been
reduced, as in the case at hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances
attending its commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find
application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of conviction
is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in these applicable
instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to serve a lesser sentence, or
to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous sentence, and said service already
accomplishes the term of the modified sentence.
Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory
law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct
the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much
the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.
 5. JAMES IENT AND MAHARLIKA SCHULZE, PETITIONERS, VS. TULLETT
PREBON (PHILIPPINES), INC., RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 189158, January 11, 2017 ] LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Doctrine of the Case:

Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced
with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to
him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.

Case Filed: Violation of Section 31 and 34 against the Officers; Conspiracy against Ient and
Schulze

FACTS: Ient is a British national and the CFO of Tradition Asia in Singapore. Petitioner Schulze is a
Filipino/German who works for Tradition London. Tullett and the Tradition Group are competitors
in the inter-dealer broking business however Tullett was the first to establish a business presence in
the Philippines. Sometime in August 2008, petitioner Ient and Schulze were tasked with the
establishment of a Philippine subsidiary of Tradition Asia to be known as Tradition Philippines. It
was registered with the SEC, and they were named as incorporators and directors.

In October 2008, Tullett filed a Complaint-Affidavit against the officers of the Tradition Group for
violation of the Corporation Code, Ient, Schulze, Harvey, Villalon and Chuidian were impleaded as
respondents. They were charged with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage the company
by orchestrating a mass resignation of its staff in order for them to join Tradition Group.

Schulze denied the charges against her because the Corporation Code is not a “special law” within the
contemplation of Article 10 of the RPC on the supplementary application of the RPC to Special laws,
since said provisions apply to Special Penal Laws. Thus, she concluded that a charge of conspiracy
which has for its basis Article 8 of the RPC cannot be applied to the provisions of the Corporation
Code. Ient alleged that the charges against him were filed to harass Tradition PH and prevent it from
penetrating the PH market. Similar to Schulze, Ient believed that the RPC could not be made
suppletorily applicable to the Corporation Code.

The Acting City Prosecutor dismissed the criminal complaints, reasoning that the acts of Villalon and
Chuidian did not constitute any of the prohibited acts of directors or trustees under Section 31. Even
assuming for argument that the brokers were induced to leave their employment, such inducement
may only give rise to civil liability for damages. On the issue of conspiracy, the charge against Schulze
and Ient had no basis.

Tullett filed a petition for review with the SOJ to assail the resolution, which ruled that there is
probable cause and that there is prima facie evidence to show that the respondents acted in bad faith
in directing the affairs of complainant. As for Ient and Schulze, they conspired with the other
respondents.

Two informations were then filed against the respondents; one for violation of Section 31 and the
other for Section 34. Petitioner Ient and Schulze then brought the matter to the CA via petition for
certiorari in which, the CA affirmed the SOJ’s Resolutions

ISSUE:
1. Whether Ient and Schulze could be criminally liable

RULING

No, Ient and Schulze could not be criminally liable. The Corporation Code was intended as a
regulatory measure, not primarily as a penal statute. Considering the object and policy of the
Corporation Code to encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic growth, the
SC did not espouse a strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses.

When Congress intends to criminalize certain acts it does so in plain, categorical language, otherwise
such a statue would be susceptible to constitutional attack. The SC did not agree with Tullett that the
previous decisions, that “the prohibition against doing business is now given penal sanctions is also
applicable to other violations of the Corporation Code under the general provisions of Section 144 of
the Code” is obiter dictum.

The Supreme Court applied the rule of lenity as a principle related to liberal interpretation in
favor of the accused in criminal cases. The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another
that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more
lenient to the accused. According to SC, a close reading Section 144 shows that it is not purely a
penal provision because it provides that when the violator is a corporation, an administrative
penalty is imposed in the form of dissolution, which is not a criminal sanction. The Court also added
that there is no provision in the Corporation Code using an emphatic language to compel the SC to
construe the provision as a penal offense.
 6. ORIEL MAGNO v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992, SECOND DIVISION (Paras, J.)

Mentioned in Prosec Notes

Doctrine of the case

Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment
is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it
can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations
should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be falling prey to such a vicious
transaction

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation
. . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally
founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an
external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment

FACTS

Magno was in the process of putting up a car repair shop sometime in April 1983, but did not have
complete equipment that could make his venture workable and also lacked funds with which to
purchase the necessary equipment to make such business operational. Thus, Magno representing Ultra
Sources International Corporation, approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice President
of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment
of which Mancor was a distributor,

Corazon Teng referred Magno to LS Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity)
advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate the petitioner and provide him credit facilities.

The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has to put up a warranty deposit
equivalent to thirty per centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be purchased,
amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not come up with such amount, he requested Joey
Gomez on a personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the equivalent amount of the
warranty deposit, however, unknown to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short term loan at 3% interest

As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered into a leasing agreement whereby LS
Finance would lease the garage equipment and petitioner would pay the corresponding rent with the
option to buy the same. After the documentation was completed, the equipment were delivered to
petitioner who in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez who, unknown to the
petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested
through Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no longer banking with Pacific Bank.

To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2)
checks were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which were the subject of the four counts
of the aforestated charges subject of the petition

Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly rentals, thus it pulled out the garage
equipment. It was then on this occasion that the petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng was the
one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with his wife went to see Corazon Teng and
promised to pay the latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks were deposited
they were returned for the reason "account closed."

RTC RULING: Magno was convicted for violations of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases\

CA RULING: affirmed

Appeal by Certiorari under rule 45.

ISSUE

Is magno guilty of ‘BP 22?

RULING

NO. It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed funds for the
"warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry
and doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the
equipment in the name of her corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods as in
this case, and at the same time, privately financing those who desperately need petty accommodations
as this one. This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized unsuspecting businessmen, who
likewise need protection from the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" not
realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement
when it is a scheme designed to skim off business clients.

This maneuvering has serious implications especially with respect to the threat of the penal sanction
of the law in issue, as in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full harshness of the
special law in question, using the "mala prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted
with materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function
of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear
whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished
in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina
Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point
in time in order that the unwary public will not be falling prey to such a vicious transaction

Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that
moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This
disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain
concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means
of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of
punishment

Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused,
the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential
wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value"
as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in
question. Following the aforecited theory, in petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose
operation could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by convicting the petitioner.

Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From the very beginning,
petitioner never hid the fact that he did not have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit
and as a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of the transaction, Joey Gomez,
to whom petitioner was introduced by Mrs. Teng.
 7. MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 126480, 10 August 2010, SECOND DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue
of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses.

FACTS
Dr. Francisca Santiago (complainant) alleged that on February 10, 1980, she and Aurora Jose
went to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by Maria Tin, to pawn some jewelry. Santiago asked for Php
250,000.00 but Tin only offered PhP 220,000.00. Php 200,000 first and Php 20,000.00 after a week.
The pieces of jewelry pawned where then listed and both Santiago and Tin signed the list as evidence
of her receipt of the jewelry. From 1980 to 1982, Dr. Santiago made 19 payments amounting to Php
95,600.00. Santiago said that the loan was under a “white paper system” wherein there is no
maturity/expiration date and that the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided that the interests
were paid.
On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago together with Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga went to the pawnshop
to redeem her jewelry. She brought Php 450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, Tin told her that the
jewelry was already sold. Dr. Santaigo consulted Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote a letter to Tin
asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the jewelry. Maria Tin, through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo
T. Dy, replied acknowledging Dr. Santiago’s unsettled obligation of Php 220,000.00 and demanded
payment. The reply also stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for the loan

Petitioner’s Argument/s
Maria Tin argued that she was merely a guarantor of the loan and that the real parties to the loan were
Dr. Santiago and her (Tin) daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. Tin merely introduced them to one another
and that it was Mia Chan who signed the receipt and actually received the jewelry.

Trial Court
Found the petitioner GUILTY of Estafa. Tin was sentenced to an imprisonment of 6 years + 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accused is also ordered
to pay Dr. Santiago Php 280,000.00 + 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and
Php 40,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Court of Appeals
Affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES
1. Whether Maria Tin is guilty of Estafa? (NO)
RULING
1. First, it was erroneous of the CA to consider as evidence the letter of Aurora Jose to
Fiscal Jumino, as Aurora was never presented to testify the veracity of the letter. A
private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never
presented as a witness. The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence.

Second, the signature in the receipt was different from the signatures provided by Maria
Tin in open court. It resembles Mia Chan’s signature more. Third, petitioner did not deny
that she received payments and made demands for payment from private complainant.
They do not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan and accepted
the jewelries. Lastly, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan
and received the jewels, deserves weighty consideration and could not be ignored.

Dr. Santiago claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But Dr. Santiago
averred that it was extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an
indefinite term. Maria Tin presented her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the
loan was only for a three-month period. Dr. Santiago did not present evidence to
substantiate her claim, other than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied
solely on the acknowledgment receipt.

Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule,
where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty,
and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof
to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case, the
petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.
 8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,
CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
JOHN DOES
G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001, THIRD DIVISION (Melo, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule
on territoriality in criminal law.

FACTS
"M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation,
loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel
oil, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates
led by Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber
handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Loyola ordered
three crew members to paint over the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the
vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the
name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all
the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine
Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship
arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel
which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines, arriving at
Calatagan, Batangas where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical
miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio
Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi
Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March
30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at
sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning
not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days, otherwise they would
be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite
and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes.
The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were
brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were
brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements
regarding the incident.
An Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy
in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants. After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered
convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy
in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659, which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree
No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters.
He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1
[d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only
apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas
Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.

ISSUES
1. Whether the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy.
2. Whether Republic Act No. 7659 obliterated the crime committed by accused-appellant
Cheong.
3. Whether accused-appellant can Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not
charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside Philippine waters and territory.

RULING
1. NO. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the
crime.
 The trial court's finding of conspiracy was also affirmed. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part
in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of
the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate
and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and
collective effort to achieve a common criminal design. Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao"
off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the
members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to
Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food
provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he
performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.

2. NO. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential
Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or
not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the presidential decree did
was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as
neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses
of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

3. YES. The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing that the
accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its
cargo; that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
and its cargo; and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and
its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of
the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532. The ruling of the trial court is within
well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that
of an accomplice and not as principal Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility.
The attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and
its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done
under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires
that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition
by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need
not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is
an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in
the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under
a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
 9. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE,
VS. LOL-LO AND SARAW, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
[ G. R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922 ]MALCOLM, J.:

Doctrine of the Case:

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he
may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it
be punished by all.

Crime Committed/ Case filed: Piracy - Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.

FACTS: On June 1920, Two boats left Matuta, a Dutch Possession, for Peta, another Dutch
possession. In one of the boats was one individual and in the other boat, eleven people likewise Dutch
subjects. After days of navigation, the second boat arrived at an island in the Dutch East Indies. The
boat was surrounded by Moros all armed. Once they were on the boat, they took all of the cargo and
attacked some of the people there. They took two women and repeatedly violated them, upon their
arrival at Maruro, a Dutch possession, the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw, who were two of the Moro marauders, later returned to their home in Sulu,
Philippines. They were arrested and were charged in the CFI of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A
demurrer was interposed by the counsel for the Moros, based on the grounds that the offense charged
was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI or any court of the Philippines. The Demurrer was overruled
and a judgment was rendered finding the defendants guilty and sentenced them to life imprisonment

ISSUE: Whether the CFI had jurisdiction

RULING: Yes. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state
but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country whether the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other
crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that
the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state.
B. Article 3 Felonies
10. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON DELIM, LEON DELIM,
MANUEL DELIM alias "BONG" (At Large), ROBERT DELIM (At Large), and
RONALD DELIM alias "BONG"

G.R. No. 142773, 28 January 2003, EN BANC (Callejo, Sr. J.)

Doctrine of the Case

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to
engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not
prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and
absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.

FACTS

Accused-appellants Marlon, Ronald and Leon, together with Manuel alias "Bong" and Robert, all
surnamed Delim, were indicted for murder

Marlon, Manuel and Robert Delim are brothers. They are the uncles of Leon Delim and Ronald Delim.
Modesto Manalo Bantas, the victim, was an Igorot and a carpenter. He took the surname Delim after
he was "adopted" by the father of Marlon, Manuel and Robert. However, Modesto's wife, Rita, an
illiterate, and their 16-year old son, Randy, continued using Manalo Bantas as their surname.

Modesto, Rita and Randy considered Marlon, Robert, Ronald, Manuel and Leon as their relatives.
Manuel and Leon were the neighbors of Modesto. Marlon, Robert and Ronald used to visit Modesto
and his family.

On January 23, 1999, at around 6:30 in the evening, Modesto, Rita and Randy were preparing to have
their supper in their home. Joining them were Modesto and Rita's two young grandchildren, aged 5
and 7 years old. They were about to eat their dinner when Marlon, Robert and Ronald suddenly barged
into the house and closed the door. Each of the three intruders was armed with a short handgun.
Marlon poked his gun at Modesto while Robert and Ronald simultaneously grabbed and hog-tied the
victim. A piece of cloth was placed in the mouth of Modesto.4 Marlon, Robert and Ronald herded
Modesto out of the house on their way towards the direction of Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan. Rita and
Randy were warned by the intruders not to leave the house. Leon and Manuel, who were also armed
with short handguns, stayed put by the door to the house of Modesto and ordered Rita and Randy to
stay where they were. Leon and Manuel left the house of Modesto only at around 7:00 a.m. the
following day, January 24, 1999.

As soon as Leon and Manuel had left, Randy rushed to the house of his uncle, Darwin Niño, at Sitio
Labayog, informed the latter of the incident the night before and sought his help for the retrieval of
Modesto. Randy was advised to report the matter to the police authorities. However, Randy opted to
first look for his father. He and his other relatives scoured the vicinity to locate Modesto to no avail.
They proceeded to Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan, around 200 meters away from Modesto's house, to locate
Modesto but failed to find him there.

At around 3:00 in the afternoon of January 27, 1999, Randy, in the company of his relatives, Nida
Pucal, Pepito Pucal, Bernard Osias and Daniel Delim, returned to the housing project in Paldit, Sison,
Pangasinan and this time they found Modesto under thick bushes in a grassy area. He was already
dead.

Rita and Randy were at a loss why the five malefactors seized Modesto and killed him. Rita and Randy
gave their respective sworn statements to the police investigators.6 Police authorities proceeded to
arrest Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Manuel and Leon but failed to find them in their respective houses.

The stab wounds sustained by Modesto on his left arm and forearm were defensive wounds. The
police investigators were able to confirm that Marlon, Ronald, Robert, Leon and Manuel had no
licenses for their firearms.8

Records of the PNP Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Baguio City show that Marlon
had pending cases for robbery in the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 16193-
R, and for robbery in band

The defenses used:

Ronald: his wife and children, his mother, his brothers and sisters were in their house at Asan Norte,
Sison, Pangasinan about two kilometers away from Modesto's house.

Leon: he was in Ilocos Norte and has beend a stain-in worker there.

Marlon: he was on vacation in Dumaguete City from December 26, 1998 up to January 29, 1999.
During his stay there, he lived with his sister, Francisca Delim. Upon his return to Manila on January
29, 1999, he immediately proceeded to Baguio to visit his cousin.

RTC RULING: they are all guilty of murder. The trial court appreciated treachery as a qualifying
circumstance and of taking advantage of superior strength, nighttime and use of unlicensed firearms
as separate of aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. Marlon, Ronald and Leon

ISSUE

What was the crime committed?

RULING

HOMICIDE. Philippine and American penal laws have a common thread on the concept of specific
intent as an essential element of specific intent crimes. Specific intent is used to describe a state of
mind which exists where circumstances indicate that an offender actively desired certain criminal
consequences or objectively desired a specific result to follow his act or failure to act. Specific intent
involves a state of the mind. It is the particular purpose or specific intention in doing the prohibited
act. Specific intent must be alleged in the Information and proved by the state in a prosecution for a
crime requiring specific intent.Kidnapping and murder are specific intent crimes.

Specific intent may be proved by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. It may be inferred
from the circumstances of the actions of the accused as established by the evidence on record.

Specific intent is not synonymous with motive. Motive generally is referred to as the reason which
prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. Motive is not an essential element of a
crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the
commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does
not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.The history of crimes
shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely
rational. In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to
deprive the victim of his/her liberty. If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be
convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom. Where accused kills the
victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge.

In this case, it is evident on the face of the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was seized precisely to kill him with the
attendant modifying circumstances. The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto was merely
incidental to their primary purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation in the information
that the primary intent of the malefactors was to deprive Modesto of his freedom or liberty and that killing him was
merely incidental to kidnapping.Irrefragably then, the crime charged in the Information is Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and not Kidnapping under Article 268 thereof.

The Court however finds that Marlon, Ronald and Leon are guilty only of homicide defined in and
penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Qualifying circumstances such as treachery and abuse of superior strength must be alleged and proved
clearly and conclusively as the crime itself. Mere conjectures, suppositions or presumptions are utterly
insufficient and cannot produce the effect of qualifying the crime.
 11. ESMERALDO RIVERA, ISMAEL RIVERA, EDGARDO RIVERA, PETITIONER,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 166326, 25 January 2006, FIRST DIVISION (Callejo, Sr., J.)
Doctrine of the Case
In People v. Delim, the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, of the
means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime
was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent
to kill is presumed.

FACTS
Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo, all surnamed Rivera were charged of attempted murder of Ruben
Rodil. Ruben Rodil was a taxi driver who stopped driving after a would-be rapist threatened his life.
Rodil was given an citation as a Bayaning Pilipino for saving the would be victim. Rodil’s wife works as
a manicurist and they have 3 children. Rodil and his family resides in Brgy. San Isidro Labrador II,
Dasmariñas, Cavite, near the house of Esmeraldo Rivera and his brothers Ismael and Edgardo.
At noon of May 2, 1998, Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food when he encountered Edgardo.
Edgardo mocked him of being jobless and dependent on his wife, soon heated exchange of words
ensued. The next day, at about 7:30 p.m. Rodil together with his daughter went to the store to buy
food and look for his wife. They encountered Esmeraldo and his 2 brothers emerging from their
house. Esmeraldo and his brothers proceeded to beat Rodil and Esmeraldo managed to hit Rodil three
times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The beating continued until the police arrived and the
three fled to their house.
Rodil was brought to the hospital and was attended to by Dr. Cagingin Jr. In the medical certificate
he said that Rodil sustained lacerated wounds on the parietal area, cerebral concussion or contusion,
hematoma on the left upper buttocks, multiple abrasions on the left shoulder and hematoma
periorbital left. The doctor declared that the lacerated wound in the parietal area was slight and
superficial and would heal from one to seven days.
Trial Court
RTC found all the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and are sentenced
to an imprisonment of 6 years one day to 8 years of prision mayor. They are also ordered to pay, jointly
and severally, civil indemnity to the complainant in the amount of Php 30,000.00.
Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the decision with MODIFICATIONS. The appellants are convicted of attempted
murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision coreccional as minimum to 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.
CA held that the prosecution was able to prove the petitioners’ intent to kill Rodil. As earlier stated
by Dr. Cagingin, appellants could have killed the victim had the hollow block directly hit his head, and
had the police not promptly intervened so that the brothers scampered away. When a wound is not
sufficient to cause death, but intent to kill is evident, the crime is attempted. Intent to kill was shown
by the fact that the (3) brothers helped each other maul the defenseless victim, and even after he had
already fallen to the ground; that one of them even picked up a cement hollow block and proceeded
to hit the victim on the head with it three times; and that it was only the arrival of the policemen that
made the appellants desist from their concerted act of trying to kill Ruben Rodil.
Petitioners’ Argument/s
Petitioners argues that the prosecution failed to prove that they had the intent to kill Rodil when they
beat him and hit him with a hollow block as based on Dr. Cagingin’s testimony Rodil sustained only
a superficial wound in the parietal area.

ISSUES
1. Whether there was intent to kill? (YES)
2. Whether the CA is correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted
murder? (YES)
3. Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied? (YES)

RULING
1. Yes, there was intent to kill Rodil. An essential element of murder and homicide is
intent of the offenders to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the
infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent which the prosecution must prove
by direct or circumstantial evidence, while general criminal intent is presumed from the
commission of a felony by dolo.

In People v. Delim, the Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against
persons may consist, of the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was
committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of
the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.
In this case, while the head wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and
could not have produced his death does not negate petitioners’ criminal liability for
attempted murder.

2. Yes, the CA is correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a
felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
(a) That there be external acts;
(b) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance
The Court elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act in People v. Lizada which
states:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
In the case at bar, petitioners, who acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by
mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a hollow block; they narrowly missed
hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would surely have
died.
 3. Yes, treachery was properly applied.
Petitioners attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as Ruben was walking
with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He had no
chance to defend himself and retaliate. He was overwhelmed by the synchronized assault of
the three siblings. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the
victim. Even if the attack is frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for
the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.

The sentencing of the appellate court is erroneous, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Hence,
petitioners should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision
correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
 12. ISIDORO MONDRAGON v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-17666, 30 June 1966, EN BANC (Zaldivar, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the same degree of certainty as is required
of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances
sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt

FACTS
At about 5:00 in the afternoon of July 11, 1954, while complainant Serapion Nacionales was
opening the dike of his ricefield situated in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, to drain the water therein and
prepare the ground for planting the next day, he heard a shout from afar telling him not to open the
dike, Nacionales continued opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again, "Don't you dare open
the dike." When he looked up, he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him. Nacionales informed
appellant that he was opening the dike because he would plant the next morning. Without much ado,
Mondragon tried to hit the complainant who dodged the blow. Thereupon, appellant drew his bolo
and struck complainant on different parts of his body. Complainant backed out, unsheathed his own
bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and forearm and between the middle and ring fingers in order
to defend himself. The appellant retreated, and the complainant did not pursue him but went home
instead. The following day, the complainant was treated by Dr. Alfredo Jamandre, Municipal Health
Officer of Miagao, Iloilo, for lesions.

Also upon the evidence, the offense committed is attempted homicide. Appellant's intention
to kill may be inferred from his admission made in court that he would do everything he could to stop
Nacionales from digging the canal because he needed the water. However, it was established that the
injuries received by the complainant were not necessarily fatal as to cause the death of said
complainant.

The petitioner, Isidoro Mondragon, was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo of
the crime of frustrated homicide.

The Court of First Instance of Iloilo found him guilty of the crime of attempted homicide and
sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of from 4 months and 21 days of arresto mayor to 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law and the costs.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the CFI of Iloilo.

ISSUE
 Whether the petitioner is guilty of attempted homicide.

RULING

NO. The intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party has not been conclusively
shown. The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended
party is simply the result of an inference from an answer made by the petitioner while testifying in his
own behalf.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals do not establish the intent to kill on the part of the
petitioner. Rather, what happened was that the petitioner and the offended party had a quarrel over
the matter regarding the opening of the canal which would drain the water away from the land of the
petitioner, and because of this quarrel a fight between them took place. The fight started with the
petitioner first giving first blows to the offended party and later he drew his bolo and inflicted on the
offended party the injuries which the Court of Appeals found to be not necessarily fatal and which
were certified by a government medical officer that they would heal in less than 30 days. The facts as
found by the Court of Appeals also show that the offended party drew his bolo and hit the petitioner
on different parts of his body, and that the petitioner retreated and did not insist on hitting the
offended party with his bolo. It may be assumed that the petitioner drew his bolo and hit the offended
party with it only when the offended party had shown a defiant attitude, considering that the offended
party himself had a bolo, as in fact the offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit the petitioner
with it. We consider that under the circumstances surrounding the fight between the petitioner and
the offended party the intention of the petitioner to kill the offended party was not manifest.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the petitioner had the intention to kill the offended party
when the petitioner answered in the affirmative the question as to whether he would do everything
that he could do to stop the offended party from digging the canal because he needed the water.

The intent to kill being an essential element of the offense of frustrated or attempted homicide,
said element must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. That element must be proved with the
same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to
kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond
reasonable doubt.

The element of intent to kill not having been duly established, and considering that the injuries
suffered by the offended party were not necessarily fatal and could be healed in less than 30 days, We
hold that the offense that was committed by the petitioner is only that of less serious physical injuries.
 13. FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019 ] Mentioned in Prosec Notes

Doctrine of the Case:

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be convicted if there is
reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced by the
prosecution otherwise the accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even if
there is no other possible or identifiable perpetrator in the records despite there having been a crime committed.

While motive is generally immaterial when it comes to considering intent in a criminal case,
it can help facilitate the intrusion into the accused’s mind especially when there is an issue as to the
identity of the latter.

Case Filed: Garino was Charged for Frustrated Murder (Article 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the
RPC)

FACTS: Garino and an unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney parked in front of
Fernandez’s house. Garino saw someone go out of the gate. When they heard a gunshot, they
alighted from the jeepney then they saw who fired the shot wasFernandez. He fired his gun a second
time, hitting Garino. Garino was near death when he was taken to the hospital and had to undergo
two operations because his large vessel, external iliac vein and intestines were injured. When he was
questioned if he knew the assailant, he testified that he previously saw him at a salon where he
worked and he found out the assailant’s name only after his surgery after a co-worker told him.

Fernandez denied the prosecution’s version and claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the time
of the incident and was unaware of any unusual incident outside his house at the time. He denied any
knowledge of Garino and said he first saw him only during the trial proper.

The RTC convicted Fernandez of the crime charged. The CA denied Fernandez's appeal for lack of
merit and affirmed the conviction of Fernandez with modifications as to the amount of damages.

ISSUE: Whether Fernandez is guilty of the crime of Frustrated murder for shooting Garino

RULING: No. Fernandez was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lower courts
committed grave abuse of discretion in hastily convicting Fernandez on the basis of questionable
evidence.

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be convicted if
there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the accused must be acquitted, even if, on face, he or
she appears to be most suspicious or even if there is no other possible or identifiable perpetrator in
the records despite there having been a crime committed.

People v. Claro: Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere
suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against
him. Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused was not overcome.

No other witness was presented to narrate the events of that fateful night, even though Garino had a
companion and there were inconsistencies in his testimony. These may not be enough to decimate his
testimony, however, the prosecution relied solely on the narration of events of Garino, the presence
of reasonable doubt is substantial enough to acquit the accused.

The testimony is anchored on Garino’s positive identification of Fernandez, even though at the time
he did not know his name. However:
1) The condition of visibility at the time was not specified by Garino, the incident happened after
midnight, and there was no mention that the area was illuminated. It was highly doubtful that
Garino was able to identify Fernandez.
2) The lower courts did not question the circumstances or even the identity of the companion of
Garino during the night of the shooting. Garino allegedly did not know his name or at least
could not identify him.
3) The prosecution only presented three witnesses: Garino, his brother who was not present, and
Dr. Sanchez, who testified as to the severity of wounds. that circumstantial evidence is
necessary in order to bolster his narration, corroborative testimony from either his unnamed
companion during the shooting, or even from Barcenas herself.
4) It was not shown that Fernendez had any motive for shooting Garino. While motive is
generally immaterial when it comes to considering intent in a criminal case, it can help facilitate
the intrusion into the accused’s mind especially when there is an issue as to the identity of the
latter. In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other
beforehand, and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that Garino zeroed
in on Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas.
5) The lower courts hastily brushed off Fernandez's defense of alibi, to the latter's detriment.
After all, considering the fact that the accused and the victim did not know each other and
had not heard about each other prior to the incident, with even Fernandez stating that the first
time he saw Garino was during the trial, it makes complete sense that Fernandez's flat denial
that he was a participant in the offense, and his whereabouts during that time would be his
only defenses.
 14. THE UNITED STATES v. AH CHONG

G.R. No. L-5272 , 19 March 1910, EN BANC (Carson, J)

Doctrine of the case

discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no
crime;

Viaada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt from criminal
responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of
negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code
that in general without intention there can be no crime.

FACTS

Ah Chong, was employed as a cook and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed
as a house boy or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters
from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No
one slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear
of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building,
by which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the
knee by the edge of the chair which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion
the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open,
whom he supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was
merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing
a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at
the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and amicable
terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night, he
should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity.

The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it under
the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

RTC RULING: The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by
the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

ISSUE

Was Ah Chong not guilty since there was lack of intent, hence no crime committed?

RULING

YES. Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the contrary shall
appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in this
article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word
"voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition
of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as Pacheco
insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary."
Viaada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime.

That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another,
"without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that ordinarily in
a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In
English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously," and "malice
aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the
difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require
general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our legal
justification.

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good
faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or
in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened
his person and his property and the property under his charge.
 15. SALVADOR YAPYUCO Y ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES, AND VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA,
PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. AND ERNESTO PUNO, PETITIONER, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 120744-46; G.R. 122677; G.R. 122776, 25 June 2012, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never justified when
their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized
society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the
cost of human life

FACTS
These are petitions for review on certiorari assailing the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in three
Criminal Cases. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident in San Fernando, Pampanga which
caused the death of Leodevince Licup and injured Noel Villanueva. Accused were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder. Accused were all members of the
Integrated National Police stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga, barangay
captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, members of the Civil Home Defense Force or civilian
volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan.
On April 5, 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De
Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations.
The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession. With Licup
in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva
allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve
on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely. Both Flores and Villanueva allegedly did not see any one on the road flag them
down. After the shooting, Flores jumped out of the jeepney when he saw petitioner Pamintuan
emerging. Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when flagged. Villanueva cried out and told
Flores to summon Salangsang for help as he and Licup were wounded. Flores dashed back to
Salangsang’s house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also
there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney by two armed men together
with Pamintuan, to be taken to the hospital. As soon as Flores and his companions had been dropped
off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed
companions. Licup later expired at the hospital. Flores claimed that all the accused had not been
known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle
and with whom he denied having had any rift. The bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were all on
the passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the
vehicle.
Salangsang testified that he caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney
idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he remembered to be that
frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. Only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense.
He identified himself as the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando,
Pampanga. He narrated that he and his men received a summon for police assistance concerning a
reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco decided to respond and instructed
his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them. Yapyuco and his group met
with Pamintuan who told him that he had earlier spotted four men carrying long firearms. As if sizing
up their collective strength, Pamintuan intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes had also
brought in a number of armed men and CAFGU members. Moments later, Pamintuan announced
the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road
at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the
jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so they allegedly
flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping, the jeepney accelerated
and swerved to its left. This inspired them to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing
forward, hence they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly
came bursting from the direction of a nearby house directly at the subject jeepney. Yapyuco recalled
that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at Pamintuan that they were San
Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his men then immediately searched
the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured passengers whom they loaded into his
jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene
supposedly to investigate and look for the people who fired directly at the jeepney. They found no
one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone.
Petitioners’ Argument/s:
On the other hand, the accused stated that they allegedly received information concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA
members, the accused opened fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident
caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused
were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
Upon conviction, Yapyuco disputed that he cannot be exonerated since he responded to the scene in
fulfillment of his duty as a member of the police force and he invoked mistake of fact as caused by
his co-accused in the belief that the victims are members of the NPA.
SANDIGANBAYAN
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners guilty only of HOMICIDE for the eventual death of Licup, and
of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva. The Sandiganbayan found that the
qualifying circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was not shown how the
aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and Licup began and developed,
and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of
the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately
preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident premeditation because between the
time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance and the time he and his men responded at the
scene, there was no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that
circumstance.

ISSUES
1. Whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them?
2. Whether or not Yapyuco and his men and the offense committed is the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right?

RULING
1. The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co- principals in the
crimes of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and
for the non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal
together with the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the
unharmed victims.
Judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed,
the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver and in fact even the driver himself of being
hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This demonstrates
the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the passenger
side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences
arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that
the firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill.
2. At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where
it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense
charged requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A
proper invocation of this defense requires: a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable;
 (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the
crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an
element of the offense.

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v.
Ah Chong, but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the
physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which
it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the
sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder
after having demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to
kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the
door and, perceiving that he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder
who turned out to be his roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his
honest mistake of fact. Finding that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the
Court explained.
 16. JOHN ERIC LONEY, STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152644, 10 February 2006, THIRD DIVISION (Carpio, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is
criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.

FACTS
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President
and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation ("Marcopper"), a corporation engaged in mining in
the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the
base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnel’s end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of
or near the tunnel’s end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings
into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
The Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque ("MTC") with violation of Article 91(B), sub-paragraphs 5 and 6 of Presidential Decree
No. 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines ("PD 1067"), Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
984 or the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 ("PD 984"), Section 108 of Republic Act No.
7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 ("RA 7942"), and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
("RPC") for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations on the following grounds: (1) the Informations
were "duplicitous" as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act; (2)
petitioners John Eric Loney and Steven Paul Reid were not yet officers of Marcopper when the
incident subject of the Informations took place; and (3) the Informations contain allegations which
constitute legal excuse or justification.
The MTC issued a Consolidated Order granting partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the
Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 94 granted public respondent's appeal but denied
petitioners' petition. Branch 94 set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the
Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated. Branch 94
affirmed the Consolidated Order in all other respects.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed Branch 94’s ruling.

ISSUES
1. Whether all the charges filed against petitioners except one should be quashed for
duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property should stand.
2. Whether Branch 94’s ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People
v. Relova.

RULING
1. NO. There is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more
than one offense. Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of
offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of
such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the
prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one
offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the
Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.
A single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only
limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense."
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present.
In P.D. 1067 (Philippines Water Code), the additional element to be established is the dumping
of mine tailings into the Makulapnit River and the entire Boac River System without prior permit from
the authorities concerned. The gravamen of the offense here is the absence of the proper permit to
dump said mine tailings.
In P.D. 984 (Anti-Pollution Law), the additional fact that must be proved is the existence of
actual pollution. The gravamen is the pollution itself. In the absence of any pollution, the accused
must be exonerated under this law although there was unauthorized dumping of mine tailings or lack
of precaution on its part to prevent damage to property.
In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be established is the willful
violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to abide by the terms and conditions of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate, particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the
containment of run-off and silt materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no
violation or neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved that Marcopper had done everything to
ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be liable. It does not follow,
however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised
Penal Code because violation of the Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element
of these laws.
On the other hand, the additional element that must be established in Art. 365 of the Revised
Penal Code is the lack of necessary or adequate precaution, negligence, recklessness and imprudence
on the part of the accused to prevent damage to property. This element is not required under the
previous laws.
On petitioners’ claim that the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC "absorbs" the
charges for violation of PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942, suffice it to say that a mala in se felony (such
as Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such
as those violating PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent
(dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them.
2. NO. The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging
one Manuel Opulencia ("Opulencia") with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencia’s right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the offenses
punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges was punished
by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against multiple
prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners’ claim against multiple prosecutions based on a
single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also because, as
the Court of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident punished by four
national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short, petitioners, if ever, fall under
the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits multiple prosecution for the same offense,
and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the same incident.
 17. ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, Vs. THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.
Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988; PER CURIAM:

Doctrine of the Case: The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding
that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent
(mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.

Case Filed: Admin complaint for rending a manifestly erroneous decision due to gross incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal case “Pp v. Lo Chi Fair” smuggling of foreign currency
out of the country.

FACTS: Dizon rendered a decision of acquittal in favor of Lo Chi Fair, a tourist who was caught by
a Customs guard at the Manila Intl Airport while attempting to smuggle foregin currency and foreign
exchange instruments out of the court. He was found carrying with him foreign currency and 380
pieces of foreign exchange instruments ($355,349.57) in various currency denominations, without any
authority as provided by law.

An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai and the case was raffled to Branch 113 presided by
respondent Judge Dizon. At the trial the accused said that he was a businessman and that the reason
for his coming to the PH was to invest and to play in the casino. He said that he had a group of
associates who decided to invest in business with him, and they started putting their money for this
purpose in a common fund and all declarations were kept by him. However, he did not present these
declarations when he was apprehended in the airport. Alleging that he was not required to present
them and that he did not understand English.

Judge Dizon acquitted the accused because according to him, the accused had no willful intention to
violate the law.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of law in
rendering the decision in question

RULING: Yes. The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law
in holding that to convict the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution
must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to
know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punished by
special laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent has by his gross
ignorance allowed the accused to go scot free. It did not matter to the respondent that the foreign
currency and foreign currency instruments found in the possession of the accused when he was
apprehended at the airport-380 pieces in all-and the amounts of such foreign exchange did not
correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by the accused at the trial. It did not matter
to the respondent that the accused by his own story admitted, in effect, that he was a carrier of foreign
currency for other people.

Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R. Dizon, guilty of
gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious misconduct affecting his
integrity and efficiency, and consistent with the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper
administration of justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the people's faith in
the judiciary (People vs. Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby ordered that the Respondent Judge
be DISMISSED from the service.
 18. ARSENIA B. GARCIA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 157171, 14 March 2006, THIRD DIVISION (Quisimbing, J.)

Doctrine of the Case

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in
crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law
says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

FACTS

Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr filed an information against Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and Garcia for violation Section 27(b).

It was alleged that during the canvassing period the respondents conspired with, confederated together
and mutually helped each other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 votes to 1,921 votes. with a
difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

RTC RULING: Acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence except for Garcia. Garcia was found
guilty.

CA RULING: Affirmed with modifications.

Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals’ judgment is erroneous, based on speculations,
surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2) there was no motive on her part to
reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the violation of an
election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUE

Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could
good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

RULING
It is mala in se but it does not require criminal intent.

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime;
otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal
acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden.
With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary
where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be
counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to
happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors.
However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
burden of proving its existence.

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private complainant,
Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate does not relieve petitioner of
liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a
candidate in an election is already punishable under the said provision.

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the members of the board
of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any error on their part would result in the
disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its
supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private complainant of 6,921
votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy
may be validly attributed to mistake or error due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as
reflected in the Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to
remain on record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of totals from
one document to another.
 19. AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 171951, 28 August 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Article 4(1) of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of
this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended
albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
In the case of US vs. Brobst
where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the diseased or
weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal
responsibility.

FACTS
Petitioner was charged with murder and upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Garcia,
Fidel Foz, Jr. and Armando Foz had a drinking spree at the apartment unit of Bogie Tacuboy, which
was adjacent to the house of Manuel k. Chy. At around 7:00 p.m. Chy pleaded to the group to quiet
down the noise from the videoke machine and it was not until the second time that Chy pleaded that
the group acceded. Such encounter left Garcia irate with Chy and was heard saying "Talaga a napangas
ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen daytoy," (This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long.)
On Septemner 28, 1999, the group met again to celebrate the marriage of Ador Tacuboy not far from
Chy’s apartment. Maya Mabbun advised the group to stop singing lest they be told off againt. This
further angered Garcia and was heard saying "Talaga a napangas ni Manny saan ko a pagbayagen
daytoy," (This Manny is really arrogant, I will not let him live long.)
On September 29, 1999, at around 12:00 p.m. the group had another drinking session in the house of
Foz and Garcia where they mused their confrontation with Chy. Garcia was again heard saying "Talaga
a napangas dayta a day[t]oy a Manny ikabbut ko ita." (This Manny is really arrogant, I will finish him
off today). Later that afternoon, they went to the store of Aurelia Esquibel, Chy’s sister, and decided
to have some drinks. Garcia ordered Esquibel to call Chy. When Chy approached, Garcia punched
him in the face. Petitioner kept assaulting Chy even when Foz attempted to pacify him. Garcia then
grabbed a bottle of beer and struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head, then shoving Foz to Chy
causing them to fall.
Chy managed to escape and ran towards his house. Chy called his wife, Josefina, and instructed her to
call the police. Chy also complained to his wife that he has trouble breathing. When the policemen
came to Chy’s house nobody answered, after a few minutes Josefina arrived and they found Chy lying
unconscious on the kitchen floor. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital, the cause of
death was myocardial infarction.
Trial Court
RTC found Amado Garcia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of 10 YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum, to 14 YEARS 8 MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum;
He was also ordered to pay the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of ₱50,000.00, as death indemnity;
₱200,000.00, representing expenses for the wake and burial; ₱300,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱332,000.00, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
Court of Appeals
CA affirmed the conviction.

Petitioner’s Argument/s
Petitioner insists on a review of the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who penned
the decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. Petitioner denies laying a
hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the author of the victim’s injuries.
Corollarily, he challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning his sole
culpability. In support, he amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio that Chy’s medical
condition could have resulted in his death anytime.

ISSUES
1. Whether Garcia is liable for the death of Manuel Chy? (YES)

RULING
The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from
a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not
present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just decision.
From the statements of Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan, it can be reasonably inferred that the emotional
strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to his death. The inevitable
conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a
felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The essential
requisites for the application of this provision are: (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting
act is likewise a felony; and (c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts. In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim and hit him
with a bottle. Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioner’s liability for his death.
In the case of US vs. Brobst
where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that
the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not
relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
A person committing a felony is responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from
it although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended. "El que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). Thus,
the circumstance that petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not
exempt him from criminal liability. Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said
condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court properly imposed upon the petitioner the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision
mayor, as minimum to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. However, the Court
modified the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy for his loss of earning capacity in the
amount of ₱332,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution dated March 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of moral damages is reduced to ₱50,000. Petitioner is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Manuel K. Chy ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱200,000, representing expenses for the wake and burial;
and ₱1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity.
 20. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANNY B. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 250140, 15 February 2021, SECOND DIVISION (Hernando, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an
event, and without which the event would not have occurred."

FACTS
Appellant Danny B. Agustin asks the Court to reverse the verdict of conviction for parricide
rendered against him by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 11, Laoag City 1 and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Although appellant does not deny that it was he who inflicted the fatal stab wounds on his
wife Mely "Nelly" Agustin (Mely), he claims to have acted in self-defense. He asserts that it was Mely's
guests who initially mauled him and it was Mely herself who initially stabbed him several times. He
further posits that the stab wounds he inflicted on Mely were not the proximate cause of her death,
hence, he should not be held liable therefor.

ISSUES
1. Whether the appellant is guilty of the crime of Parricide.
2. Whether the appellant may invoke self-defense to escape criminal liability.
3. Whether the stab wounds inflicted by the appellant was the proximate cause of Mely’s
death.

RULING
1. YES. Parricide is committed when: ( 1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.

As discussed, 1) Mely got killed; 2) it was appellant who killed her; and 3) Mely was appellant's
legitimate wife as evidenced by the marriage contract presented in evidence by the prosecution.

2. NO. When an accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes
the burden to establish his plea through credible, clear, and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction
would follow from his admission that he or she harmed or killed the victim. For self-defense to be
appreciated, appellant must prove the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and ( c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable
element of self-defense. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense
is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that appellant failed to prove the elements
of self-defense, specifically the element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is defined as the
actual or imminent threat to the person invoking self-defense. To repeat, appellant avers that it was
Mely's guests who initially mauled him and it was Mely who initially stabbed him several times in the
arms. But, aside from his bare allegations, appellant did not present any proof to corroborate his claim
that he got mauled by Mely's purported guests. Notably too, despite having been charged with the
killing of his wife, appellant never tried to find and identify these men who supposedly beat him up.
Further, appellant failed to prove that Mely truly stabbed him.
Self-defense cannot be appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence, or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. If unlawful aggression is not proven, self-defense
will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated,
even if the other elements are present. For this reason, therefore, there is no more need to discuss the
other elements of self-defense.
In any event, appellant's theory of self-defense is strongly negated by the number and nature
of the wounds sustained by Mely, to wit: 1) a stab wound on the epigastric area; 2) a stab wound on
the upper left quadrant of the abdomen; 3) a stab wound on the 8th ICS between the 7th and the 8th
and 9th inter postal space between the 8th and 9th ribs on the left; and 4) several stab wounds on
both breasts. Mely's spleen and one of her kidneys were badly injured and had to be removed. There
was also injury in the jejunum of the small intestines and colon. The stab wound in her ribs also caused
profuse bleeding in her chest.

2. YES. Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred." Clearly, it was
the stab wounds inflicted by appellant which led Mely to get hospitalized and develop infections in
her bloodstream and respiratory distress syndrome that eventually caused her death. It cannot be
denied, then, that the root cause of Mely's death, as testified to by Dr. Quilala, were precisely the stab
wounds appellant inflicted on her.
 21. EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 235071, January 07, 2019 ]

Doctrine of the Case:

She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view of the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that
a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Case Filed: Child Abuse - refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of
the following: (1) psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) any
act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) failure to immediately give
medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.

FACTS: In two informations, Patulot was charged with child abuse (RA 7610) for throwing on one
AAA (three year old) and one BBB (two month old), a boiling oil. During the arraignment, he pleaded
not guilty to the charges. According to this case, while CCC (the mother) was gathering clothes from
outside her house, as she was about to enter the house, she was surprised to see Patulot holding a
casserole. Patulot then poured the content of it on CCC. She tried to dodge it but to no avail. AAA
and BBB who were nearby were likewise hit by the hot cooking oil.

Patulot denied the allegations against her. She stated that prior to the alleged incident, she was on her
way to the market to sell her merchandise when CCC bumped her on the arm and uttered foul words
against her. Due to the impact, her merchandise fell and because of this Patulot cursed back. She was
again taunted after that and this prompted her to file a complaint against CCC but she was ignored.
She then went to Barangay South Signal, Taguig but upon reaching the location, she was apprehended.

The RTC found Patulot guilty of child abuse, it found that while Patulot did not intent to cause harm
on AAA and BBB, nonetheless she caused injury on them, which left visiblr scars. The CA did not
deviate from the ruling of the RTC but clarified that the index of whether a crime is malum prohibitum
is not its form, that is, whether or not it is found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC) or in a special penal
statute, but the legislative intent. Nevertheless, this reasoning still cannot help Patulot's case because
even if she did not intend on inflicting harm on the children, there was still intent to harm CCC. Thus,
criminal liability is incurred although the wrongful act is different from that which Patulot intended.

ISSUE: Whether Patulot can be convicted of violating Section 10(A) RA 7610 despite the fact the she
had no intent to degrade and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the private complainant’s
children
RULING: Yes. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that when a child is subjected to physical
abuse or injury, the person responsible therefor can be held liable under R.A. No. 7610 by establishing
the essential facts above. Here, the prosecution duly proved the following allegations in the
Information charging Patulot of child abuse:
(1) the minority of both AAA and BBB;
(2) the acts committed by Patulot constituting physical abuse against AAA and BBB;
(3) the fact that said acts are punishable under R.A. No. 7610.

In particular, it was clearly established that at the time of the incident, AAA and BBB were merely
three (3) years old and two (2) months old, respectively; that Patulot consciously poured hot cooking
oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA and BBB; and that said act constitutes
physical abuse specified in Section 3(b)(1) of R.A. No. 7610.

The pronouncement in Bongolan is not applicable in this case, Bongolan was only held liable for slight
physical injuries because there was absence of proof that he intended to humiliate or debase the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the victim. In this case, there is no similar allegation because here, they
charged Patulot for willfully commiting acts of child abuse. She cannot also argue that there was
absence on her part to harm the minors because she merely intended on committing physical injuries
against CCC. Her criminal intent is not wanting as she expressly admitted that she intended to pour
the hot oil on CCC. She cannot escape liability from the same view of the settled doctrine mentioned
in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended.
 22. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR RABELAS

G.R. No. 253603, 14 June 2021, SECOND DIVISION (NOTICE)

Doctrine of the Case

Statutory Rape. It requires the following elements: (1) the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (2) the
accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation, whether the victim was
deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is also settled
that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below twelve (12) years old, constitutes
Statutory Rape.

FACTS

Rabelas admitted having had carnal knowledge of AAA during their alleged romantic relationship over
a span of 3 yrs. He even acknowledge that he is the father of AAA’s son, which fact was reflected in
the boy’s birth certificate.

Dr. Marzan confirmed that AAA had an IQ of 38 (moderate mental retardation) and a mental age of
10.8 yrs old. She also noted that the only detail that AAA knew about herself is her name, and she
cannot give any other details about herself nor her family.

On his defense, Rabelas insists that he had a romantic relationship with AAA and the latter willingly
had sexual congress with him as a consequence of their love for each other.

RTC RULING: guilty of qualified statutory rape

CA RULING: affirmed

ISSUE

Is Rabelas guilty of qualified statutory rape?

RULING

YES. Statutory Rape. It requires the following elements: (1) the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age; and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force,
threat or intimidation, whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness, or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is also settled that sexual intercourse with a woman
who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below twelve (12) years old, constitutes Statutory Rape.

Additionally, Statutory Rape can be qualified by the circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended,among which is "[w]hen the of ender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the of ended party at the time of the commission of
the crime."

All of the elements are present in this case. Against the testimonial and scientific evidence against him,
appellant merely interposed denial and the "sweetheart theory. " Denial is the weakest of all defenses.
It easily crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime
 23. FILOMENO URBANO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 72964, 07 January 1998, THIRD DIVISION (Gutierrez, Jr., J.)
Doctrine of the Case
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

FACTS
At around 8 a.m. on October 23, 1980, Filomeno Urbano went to went to his ricefield in Brgy.
Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan, which was located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed
of Marcelo Javier. There he found that the place where he stored his palay was flooded and upon
further investigation, found out that the water came from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion of the canal where he saw Javier and Erfe cutting grass, he asked them who opened
the irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one who opened it.
Enraged, Urbano demanded that Javier pay for the soaked palay and an argument ensued. Urbano
unsheathed his bolo (2 feet long, including the handle and 2 inches wide). He hacked Javier hitting
him on his right palm. Javier ran away and Urbano chased him, Urbano also hit the left leg of Javier.
When Urbano tried to further injury, Urbano’s daughter prevented him from causing another injury
to Javier.
Thereafter, Antoni, Emilio and Felipe Erfe brough Javier to their house. Emilio then went to Brgy.
Captain Solwen’s house but was unable to find him, he found councilman Solis instead. Solis advised
them to go to the police to report the incident, which they did. The group also went to Dr. Padilla,
the rural health official of San Fabian, he was unable to treat Javier because he had no medicine
available, instead he instructed the group to go to Dr. Mario Meneses. After being treated by Dr.
Meneses, the group went back to Dr. Padilla who conducted the medico-legal examination. Upon the
intercession of Councilman Solis, Javier and Urbano entered into an agreement to settle their
differences, Urbano agreed to pay Javier ₱700.00 for Javier’s medical expenses.
On November 14, 1980, at around 1:30 a.m. Javier was rushed to the hospital as he was experiencing
lock jaw and convulsions, Dr. Exconde who was attending to Javier found that Javier’s serious
condition was tetanus toxin, he noticed the already healing wound in the right palm of Javier.
Unfortunately, Javier died at around 4 p.m. the next day.

In April 10, 1981, Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide, which he plead “not guilty.”
Petitioner’s Argument/s
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due
to his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got
infected with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants
with his bare hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.
Trial Court
Trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term
of from 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and one day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo
Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of
the decision, in view of the nature of his penalty.
Court of Appeals/ Intermediate Appellate Court
CA affirmed RTC’s ruling but raised the award of indemnity to ₱30,000.00.
The claim of appellant that there was an efficient cause which supervened from the time the
deceased was wounded to the time of his death, which covers a period of 23 days does not
deserve serious consideration. True, that the deceased did not die right away from his wound,
but the cause of his death was due to said wound which was inflicted by the appellant. Said
wound which was in the process of healing got infected with tetanus which ultimately caused
his death.
Dr. Edmundo Exconde of the Nazareth General Hospital testified that the victim suffered
lockjaw because of the infection of the wound with tetanus. And there is no other way by
which he could be infected with tetanus except through the wound in his palm. Consequently,
the proximate cause of the victim's death was the wound which got infected with tetanus. And
the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that an accused is liable for all the consequences of his
unlawful act.

ISSUES
1. Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death.
(NO)

RULING
 1. Urbano was acquitted. The evidence does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by
Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. It merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the
symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However, as to when
the wound was infected is not clear from the record.
In Vda. De Bataclan vs. Medina, the Court defined proximate cause as:
"That cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In this case, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on
November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The
following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If the wound of Javier inflicted by Urbano was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days
after the infliction of the wound. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was
inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a
few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. Since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by
tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
In addition, Urbano’s criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After the
hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise
agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This
settlement of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No.
1508, Section 2(3).
The respondent court increased the P12,000.00 indemnification imposed by the trial court to
P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely on the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not thoroughly examined.
This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime of homicide. Costs de oficio.
 24. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ORLITO VILLACORTA
G.R. No. 186412, 07 September 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."

FACTS
The prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja and Dr. Domingo Belandres, Jr.
Mendeja narrated that she was tending her sari-sari store. Both Cruz and Villacorta were
regular customers at Mendeja’s store. At around two o’clock in the morning, while Cruz was ordering
bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on
the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in
Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to
catch Villacorta. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the
broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical
Center.
Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz
sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he
was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14, 2002,
where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally
treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical chart and diagnosis, that Cruz
died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.
The defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted that
he was on his way home from work at around two o’clock in the morning of January 21, 2002. Upon
arriving home, Villacorta drank coffee then went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. When
Villacorta was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted
Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got hurt.
Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of
conviction against Villacorta.

ISSUES
1. Whether the proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab
wound.
 2. Whether the aggravating circumstance of treachery is present.

RULING
1. YES. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."
In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January
23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On February
14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection,
where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. The prosecution did not present evidence of
the emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by
Cruz to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab
wound, or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.
Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the
incubation period of the disease.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried
the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22
days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms.
The following day, November 15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild
case of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident
or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than
six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is
that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the
hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been
infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking
incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court
that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano
that:
The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof
that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The
medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his
death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

2. YES. Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without
risk to the offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets
out what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment
of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate, the
essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that the
attack will take place, thus depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while ensuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Likewise, even when the victim was
forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that treachery was duly proven in this case,
and we sustain such finding. Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without
provocation. It was two o’clock in the morning of January 23, 2002, and Cruz, who was out buying
bread at Mendeja’s store, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard down and was totally unprepared for an
attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo
stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the left side of his body, then swiftly ran away.
Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no opportunity at all to defend himself or
retaliate.
 25. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
[ G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000 ]

Doctrine of the Case: Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus
principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful
act be different from that which he intended.
Alibi - For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was
not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene at the time of its commission.
Treachery - (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of execution which would ensure the offender's
safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) such means, method or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously chosen by the offender.

Case filed: Double Murder and attempted murder

FACTS: Hermogenes and Edwin Flora attended a dance party. The dancing went on past midnight
but about 1:30, Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber twice. It shot Flor Espinas on the shoulder,
the second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte. Rosalie Roma, who identified Hermogenes Flora by calling out
his name, was then approached by Edwin Flora poking a knife at her neck, threatening to kill her.
Hermogenes and Edwin then fled the scene. The victims were then brought to the Rural Health
Unit. The same morning. The police arrested Edwin Flora at his house, Hermogenes was able to
escape. Three criminal charges were then filed against the Flora brothers and they both pleaded not
guilty, providing their alibis that they were sleeping at the time of the incident. They were then
convicted of the crime of double murder and attempted murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Flora Brothers can be convicted despite the failure of the prosecution to
morally ascertain their identities and guilty for the crime charges

RULING: Yes. The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration are disfavored in law since both
could be very easily contrived. In the present case, appellants' alibi is patently self-serving. Although
Edwin's testimony was corroborated by his common-law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive
testimonies of eyewitnesses and surviving victims who contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi
becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the
accused himself and his immediate relative or relatives. Appellants' defense of alibi should have been
corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. Said uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face
of positive identification made by eyewitnesses.

Asto the criminal responsibility of the appellants, Hermogenes Flora first fired his gun at Ireneo, but
missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable for Emerita's death and
Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio ictus principle.
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended. Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides since the
acts were qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that appellant Hermogenes
Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and
Ireneo Gallarte, and guilty of attempted murder of Flor Espinas.

As for Edwin Flora, Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his conduct indicated
cooperation with his co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably gave encouragement
and a sense of security to the latter, his liability is that of a co-conspirator. However, we cannot find
Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas.
The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside
the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable.
 26. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. ROLLY ADRIANO, LEAN ADRIANO @
DENDEN, ABBA SANTIAGO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE

Doctrine of the Case

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which
is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or
logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not.

FACTS

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder, one for each victim.

According to the Police, a speeding blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading
towards the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon Honda CRV.
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front seat of the Corolla shot
the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4)
armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who
was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who was standing near
the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet.

Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was pronounced dead
on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the
left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.

During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was registered under the name of
Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry, Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but
clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business, which he leased
to Adriano.

On his defense, he contended the following:

At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari (Mallari), to ask for a
lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went
home and brought his child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-in-
law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's house, Adriano went to the
cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights,
he left the cockpit at about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest. Then when he returned home,
the was arrested by the police

RTC RULING: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes. And guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia
Bulanan
CA RULING: affirmed

ISSUE

Should Adriano be held accountable for the death of Bulanan?

RULING

YES. In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the following elements:

1. That a person was killed.

2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art.
248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the elements of murder: (1)
the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2) the positive identification of Adriano as one of
perpetrators of the crime; and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as generic aggravating
circumstances.

Nonetheless, Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes criminal liability for the acts committed in
violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may
not have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not exculpate him. Bulanan' s
death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's
felonious deadly assault against Cabiedes.

As we already held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Hilario, "[t]he fact that accused killed a
person other than their intended victim is of no moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was
to kill Cabiedes. However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit and
killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his act of shooting Cabiedes. This is
the import of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v.
Ural:

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be
different from that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible
for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen
or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la
causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a
complex crime.

As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office recovered six (6)
cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm. This does not indicate discharge by a single burst.
Rather, separate shots are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed
Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts resulted in two separate and
distinct crimes.
 27. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLUSAPE
SABALONES ALISA “ROLING”, ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA,
TEODURO ALEGARBES, AND EUFEMIO CABANERO, ACCUSED,
ROLUSAPE SABALONES ALISA “ROLING” AND ARTEMIO TIMOTEO
BERONGA, ACCUSED-APPELANTS
G.R. No. 123485, 31 August 1998, FIRST DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
The case is better characterized as error personae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus
which means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the blow.

FACTS
Edwin Snatos (witness), stated that he was at the resident of Rogelio and Inday Presores at Rizal Ave.,
Cebu City at 6:00 p.m. to attend a wedding. He then went to the house of Ma. Tiempo where is small
gathering was also taking place. There he saw Nelon Tiempo, Glenn Tiempo, Rogelio Presores,
Rogelio Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. Stephen Lim, who was also at the
party, called the group and asked them to drive his car to his house in Mansueto Compounnd, Bulacao,
Talisay, Cebu. Nelson Tiempo drove Lim’s car while Nardo drove an owner-type jeep in order to
bring them back as a group.
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car. when they arrived at
the gate of the house of Lim, they were met with a sudden burst of gunfire. Santos looked at the
direction where the gunfire came and identified 2 persons who fired at the jeep. The shooting incident
led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries to Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo,
and Rogelio Presores.
Rolusape Sabalones was recognized as the one who fired at the jeep. Teodulo Alegarbes, Teodoro
Beronga and another person, whom he only recognized by face.

Petitioner’s Argument/s
Sabalones and Beronga denied their presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones
presented numerous witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place
[since he got tired watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-
derby in Cebu, and was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones
even escaped from place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two
victims. The defense even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the
place where the incident happened is dim and not lighted.
Trial Court
Trial Court found the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The
dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE SABALONES and
(ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Glenn Tiempo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years,
[e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum, to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months
and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased,
Alfredo Nardo, the sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art.
248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to
suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years
and [e]ight (8) months of [re]clusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey
Bolo, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art.
248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to
suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years
and [e]ight months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio
Presores, the sum of P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and penalized in Art.
248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to
suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years
and [e]ight (8) months of [r]eclusion [t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson
Tiempo, the sum of P20,000.00; and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall be credited
to each accused in full.

SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Decision convicting appellants of two counts of
murder and three counts of frustrated murder. Like the trial court, it appreciated the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and rejected appellants' defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial court were erroneous.
Hence, for each count of murder, it sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of
frustrated murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision mayor (medium), as
minimum, to seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal (medium), as
maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of
the victims of frustrated murder. However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the
trial court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.

ISSUES
1. Whether the witnesses are credible and the sufficiency of evidence? (YES)
2. Whether the alibis are acceptable? (NO)
3. Whether the correct penalty is imposed? (NO)

RULING
1. Yes. RTC findings were binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses.
There was positive identification by survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in
gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial
confession has no bearing because the conviction was based on positive identification. It is
binding though to the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial evidence corroborated by
one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which strengthen credibility
of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does not diminish
culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.
It must be stressed that the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why
the appellants staged the ambush, not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes.
Even assuming that the trial court did err in explaining the motive of the appellants, this does
not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and sustained by this Court
in the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
2. No. It was still quite near the crime scene.
The established doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that he was at some other
place at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically impossible for
him at the time to have been present at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity. The
appellants failed to do so.

3. No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period, to death.

There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance
of treachery, the appellate court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA
erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article
50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next lower in degree than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony. Because there are no mitigating or aggravating conspiracy
between the two accused. It does not matter that the prosecution has failed to show who was
between the two who actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They are liable as co-
conspirators since the act of a conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the precise
degree of participation in the act.

However, the Court agrees with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of
murder for the deaths of Glenn Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of treachery as
charged in the Information was duly proven by the prosecution. "Treachery is committed
when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and that
such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by
the accused without danger to his person." These requisites were evidently present when the
accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who were inside their vehicles and
were in no position and without any means to defend themselves.
 28. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL T. SALES
G.R. No. 177218, 03 October 2011, FIRST DIVISION (Del Castillo, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
In order that a person may be criminally liable for a felony different from that which he intended to commit, it
is indispensable (a) that a felony was committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct
consequence of the crime committed by the perpetrator.

FACTS
On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old,
respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the
permission of their parents. They did not return home that night. When their mother, Maria Litan
Sales (Maria), looked for them the next day, she found them in the nearby Barangay of Magsaysay.
Afraid of their father’s rage, Noemar and Junior initially refused to return home but their mother
prevailed upon them. When the two kids reached home at around 8 o’clock in the evening of
September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick
which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar’s and Junior’s
hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, the appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood.
During the beating Maria stayed inside the house and did not do anything as she feared for her life.
When the beating finally stopped, the three walked back to the house with appellant assisting
Noemar as the latter was staggering, while Junior fearfully followed. Maria noticed a crack in Noemar’s
head and injuries in his legs. She also saw injuries in the right portion of the head, the left cheek, and
legs of Junior. Shortly thereafter, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him
and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told the appellant that their son was
already dead. However, the appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told the appellant to call a
quack doctor. He left and returned with one, who told them that they have to bring Noemar to a
hospital. Appellant thus proceeded to take the unconscious Noemar to the junction and waited for a
vehicle to take them to a hospital. As there was no vehicle and because another quack doctor they met
at the junction told them that Noemar is already dead, the appellant brought his son back to their
house.
The trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove
that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the
manner described in the Informations.
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the appellate court denied the appeal and
affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

ISSUE
 Whether the appellant is guilty of the crime of Parricide.

RULING
YES. Prior to whipping his sons, the appellant was already furious with them because they
left the family dwelling without permission and that was already preceded by three other similar
incidents. This was further aggravated by a report that his sons stole a pedicab thereby putting him in
disgrace. Moreover, they have no money so much so that he still had to borrow so that his wife could
look for the children and bring them home. From these, it is therefore clear that appellant was
motivated not by an honest desire to discipline the children for their misdeeds but by an evil intent of
venting his anger. This can reasonably be concluded from the injuries of Noemar in his head, face and
legs. It was only when Noemar’s body slipped from the coconut tree to which he was tied and lost
consciousness that appellant stopped the beating. Had not Noemar lost consciousness, the appellant
would most likely not have ceased from his sadistic act. His subsequent attempt to seek medical
attention for Noemar as an act of repentance was nevertheless too late to save the child’s life. It bears
stressing that a decent and responsible parent would never subject a minor child to sadistic punishment
in the guise of discipline.
Appellant attempts to evade criminal culpability by arguing that he merely intended to
discipline Noemar and not to kill him. However, in order that a person may be criminally liable for a
felony different from that which he intended to commit, it is indispensable (a) that a felony was
committed and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of the
crime committed by the perpetrator. Here, there is no doubt appellant in beating his son Noemar and
inflicting upon him physical injuries, committed a felony. As a direct consequence of the beating
suffered by the child, he expired. Appellant’s criminal liability for the death of his son, Noemar, is thus
clear.
Appellant’s claim that it was Noemar’s heart ailment that caused his death deserves no merit.
This declaration is self-serving and uncorroborated since it is not substantiated by evidence. While Dr.
Salvador Betito, a Municipal Health Officer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur issued a death certificate
indicating that Noemar died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, the same is not sufficient to prove that
his death was due mainly to his poor health. It is worth emphasizing that Noemar’s cadaver was never
examined. Also, even if appellant presented his wife, Maria, to lend credence to his contention, the
latter’s testimony did not help as the same was even in conflict with his testimony. Appellant testified
that Noemar suffered from a weak heart which resulted in his death while Maria declared that Noemar
was suffering from epilepsy. Interestingly, Maria’s testimony was also unsubstantiated by evidence.
Moreover, all the elements of the crime of parricide are present in this case.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants,
 or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
"Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of accused."
In the case at bench, there is overwhelming evidence to prove the first element, that is, a
person was killed. Maria testified that her son Noemar did not regain consciousness after the severe
beating he suffered from the hands of his father. Thereafter, a quack doctor declared Noemar dead.
Afterwards, as testified to by Maria, they held a wake for Noemar the next day and then buried him
the day after. Noemar’s Death Certificate was also presented in evidence.
There is likewise no doubt as to the existence of the second element that the appellant killed
the deceased. Same is sufficiently established by the positive testimonies of Maria and Junior. Maria
testified that on September 20, 2002, Noemar and his younger brother, Junior, were whipped by
appellant, their father, inside their house. The whipping continued even outside the house but this
time, the brothers were tied side by side to a coconut tree while appellant delivered the lashes
indiscriminately. For his part, Junior testified that Noemar, while tied to a tree, was beaten by their
father in the head. Because the savagery of the attack was too much for Noemar’s frail body to endure,
he lost consciousness and died from his injuries immediately after the incident.
As to the third element, appellant himself admitted that the deceased is his child. While
Noemar’s birth certificate was not presented, oral evidence of filial relationship may be considered.
As earlier stated, appellant stipulated to the fact that he is the father of Noemar during the pre-trial
conference and likewise made the same declaration while under oath. Maria also testified that Noemar
and Junior are her sons with appellant, her husband. These testimonies are sufficient to establish the
relationship between appellant and Noemar.
Clearly, all the elements of the crime of parricide are obtaining in this case.
 29. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE,
VS. GINES ALBURQUERQUE Y SANCHEZ, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.
[ G.R. No. 38773, December 19, 1933 ]AVANCEÑA, C.J.:

Doctrine of the Case: Article 49 article is a reproduction of article 64 of the old Code and has been
interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime committed befalls a different person

Case filed: Homicide

FACTS: Appellant has been suffering from partial paralysis for some time. He has been unable to
work and has been living with Maria along with his other daughters. Unknown to the appellant, one
of the daughters, Pilar, had intimate relations with the deceased Manuel Osma, it culminated in Pilar’s
giving birth to a child. Because the appellant was deeply affected, wrote letters that were hostile and
threatened the deceased to legitimize the union or at least to support the child, the deceased then
agreed to give a monthly allowance but he never complied with his promise.

The Appellant then went to the office where the deceased worked. Nobody witnessed but the
undisputed fact is that on that occasion the appellant inflicted a wound at the base of the neck of the
deceased, causing his death. According to the testimony of the appellant, the proposed that the
deceased marry his daughter but the latter refused. The appellant then tried to seize him by the neck
and stab him on the face with a penknife but due to his lack of control of the movement of his arm.
The weapon landed on the base of the neck of the deceased.

The TC found that the appellant did not intend to cause such grave an injury as the death of the
deceased. Therefore, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as
the death of the deceased as well as those of his having voluntarily surrendered himself to the
authorities, and acted under the influence of passion and obfuscation, should be taken into
consideration in favor of the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether Gines acted in legitimate self-defense

RULING: No. The Court did not entertain the contention that he acted in legitimate self-defense
inasmuch as he provoked and commenced the aggression by whipping out and brandishing his
penknife. Article 49, which refers to cases where the crime committed is different from that intended,
does not apply in this case. Article 49 is a reproduction of Article 64 of the old Code and has been
interpreted as applicable only in cases where the crime befalls a different person which is not the case
here. The crime committed here is Homicide, Article 249 with three mitigating circumstances and
without aggravating circumstance.
 30. SULPICIO INTOD v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992, SECOND DIVISION (Campos, Jr. J.)

Doctrine of the Case

Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission
of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

FACTS

February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's housend asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya
and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he
wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany
the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his
companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her
home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the
shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.

RTC RULING: convicted Intod of attempted murder.

CA RULING: affirmed
Contention of Intod: seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citing Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code

People’s contention: he crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of
its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and
his accused's own spontaneous desistance
ISSUE

Should Intod be held liable for an impossible crime?

RULING
YES. The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal tendencies.

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to
perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a
performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime.

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his
hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.
 31. GEMMA T. JACINTO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
G.R. No. 162540, 17 July 2009, THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is
the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing
the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

FACTS
Jacinto, together with two other women, Anita Busog de Valencia and Jaqueline Capitle was charged
with the crime of qualified theft.
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Petitioner, Gemma
Jacinto, along Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle, conspiring together and
mutually helping one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL
INC., and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with grave abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and deposited in
their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum of
P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
Prosecution's evidence
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check in the amount of P10,000.00. The check was payment for Baby
Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam and petitioner was then the collector of Mega Foam. The
check was deposited in the Land Bank account of Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline
Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former pricing, merchandising and inventory
clerk of Mega Foam.
Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of
Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the call was
to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking
the latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced
check.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to
ask Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the
cash and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
Ricablanca, upon the advice of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega
Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00. Verification from company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had
already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his
bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman
arrived at his house to have the check rediscounted. He parted with his cash in exchange for the check
without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her address. When he was
informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he didn’t know where to
find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an
entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were
marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca,
who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 21, 2007, Ricablanca went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and Jacqueline
Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia; Jacqueline
Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping.
Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino, pretending that she
was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out from the premises
was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca divided the
money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner. Thereafter,
petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent
powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and
Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two
and one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
Version of the defense
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but
claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her
resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to
her mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca)
to Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General
Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to
Baby Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait
in their jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when
Ricablanca placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997. According to her, on the morning of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone,
asking if she (Valencia) could accompany her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia
claims that she agreed to do so, despite her admission during cross-examination that she did not know
where Baby Aquino resided, as she had never been to said house. They then met at the house of
petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's
place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the
jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so
she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents arrested them.
The RTC finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa, Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and
Jacqueline Capitle guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
Three appealed to the CA, but the latter only modified the ruling of the RTC. CA modified that the
sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands; the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is
reduced to 4 months arresto mayor medium; and the accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft (NO)
RULING
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the
crime of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal
Code:
1) the taking of personal property;
2) said property belonged to another;
 3) the taking was done with intent to gain;
4) it was done without the owner’s consent;
5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and
6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain
from the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether
the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
Intod vs. Court of Appeals is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the
accused, intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended
victim was not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty
of attempted murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized by Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code, because of the factual
impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provision read as follows:
Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:
1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property;
2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible
of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended
by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1)
legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify
the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the marked money, which she thought was the
cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The crime of theft is committed or
produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain.
Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing,
even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took possession
of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft,
had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.
Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched
only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a
continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a
continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money
was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash
by its issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not
included or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on
the accused; otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that
fraudulent scheme could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
Thus, the petition is granted. The decision of the CA was modified. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is
found guilty of an impossible crime.
 32. Michie
33. RENATO BALEROS, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. NO. 138033, January 30, 2007 ]GARCIA, J.: Mentioned in Prosec Notes

Doctrine of the Case: Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense.

Case Filed: Attempted Rape

FACTS: Baleros was charged with the case of attempted rape. The Information stated that about 1:50
AM, Baleros, with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, laid on top of Albano
with the intention to have carnal knowledge but he was unable to perform all acts of execution. Malou
struggled to free herself in the hands of Baleros and succeeded to free herself by kicking him until her
right hand got free, she then grabbed his sex organ and squeezed it. She later informed the security
guard that something had happened to her but she did not make out who did it other than what the
assailant was wearing. About 6:30 in the morning, the police came and questioned the tenants and
people inside the building. Alcala and his roommates were then asked by the police to look for
anything not belonging to them in their Unit. They found a gray bag that they identified to be
belonging to Baleros, who was a visitor of the occupants at around 1:30 AM that same day. The bag
contained a white shirt, short pants, a handkerchief, among others.The items in the bag were
submitted for laboratory examination and it tested positive for chloroform. Baleros pleaded not guilty
but the TC rendered its decision convicting the petitioner of attempted rape. CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of attempted rape.
2. Whether the act of the petitioner lying on top of her and pressing a cloth soaked in
chloroform constitutes an overt act of rape

RULING: No. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has
carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using
force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the
aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
 1. Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M.
Recto in People vs. Lamahang,] stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that
which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of
the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation
of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what
obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from
the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual
intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case.
2. It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the
mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and
necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of
any act indicative of an intent orattempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that the
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let
alone touch her private part. For what reason the petitioner wanted the complainant
unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody's guess.

Perez v. CA - Petitioner's act of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing
her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene
and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually
commenced to force his penis into the complainant's sexual organ.

Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier
discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of
Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an
innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation,
torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.
 34. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. EMELIANO TRINIDAD
G.R. No. 79123-25, 09 January 1989, SECOND DIVISION (Melancio-Herrera, J.)

Doctrine of the Case

the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about
death

FACTS

The deceased victim, Lolito Soriano, was a fish dealer based in Davao City. His helpers were TAN, a driver,
and the other deceased victim Marcial LAROA. On 19 January 1983, using a Ford Fiera, they arrived at Butuan
City to sell fish. In the morning of 20 January 1983 SORIANO drove the Fiera to Buenavista, Agusan del
Norte, together with LAROA and a helper of one Samuel Comendador. TAN was left behind in Butuan City
to dispose of the fish left. He followed SORIANO and LAROA, however, to Buenavista later in the morning.

While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National Police, asked for a
ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao City.

TRINIDAD was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver.
SORIANO, LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan bound for Davao City. TAN was driving the
Fiera. Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they
reached the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because, according to
him, the place was dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped
dead. TAN did not actually see the shooting of LAROA but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having
been alerted by the sound of the first gunfire. Both were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in
killing the two victims.

TAN then hurriedly got off the Fiera, and hid himself in the bushes.

After about twenty (20) to thirty (30) minutes, when a passenger jeep passed by, TAN hailed it and rode on the
front seat. After a short interval of time, he noticed that TRINIDAD was seated at the back. Apparently
noticing TAN as well, TRINIDAD ordered him to get out and to approach him (TRINIDAD) but, instead,
TAN moved backward and ran around the jeep followed by TRINIDAD. When the jeep started to drive away,
TAN clung to its side. TRINIDAD fired two shots, one of which hit TAN on his right thigh. As another
passenger jeep passed by, TAN jumped from the first jeep and ran to the second. However, the passengers in
the latter jeep told him to get out not wanting to get involved in the affray. Pushed out, TAN crawled until a
member of the P.C. chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for Butuan City.

Trinidad’s defense: evolved around denial and alibi. He contended that he was in Cagayan de Oro City on
the date of the incident,

RTC RULING: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.

ISSUE
What is the crime committed against Tan? Frustrated murder or attempted murder? (attempted murder)
RULING
Attempted murder. TRINIDAD had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but
was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other than
his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a
spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body. Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the
doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
only Attempted Murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought
about death

PENALTY: For, with the abolition of capital punishment in the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for Murder is
now reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua

With no attending mitigating or aggravating circumstance, said penalty is imposable in its medium period or
from eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.

The penalty next lower in degree for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is prision mayor, maximum,
to reclusion temporal, medium, or from ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months (Article 61 of the RPC)
 35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. REGIE LABIAGA,
APPELLANT
G.R. No. 202867, 15 July 2013, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated
and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and
it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano vs. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as
a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the
perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or
accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance.

FACTS
At around 7:00 p.m. on 23 December 2000, Gregorio Conde, and his two daughters, Judy and
Glenelyn Conde, were in their home at Barangay Malayu-an, Ajuy, Iloilo. Gregorio stepped outside.
Glenelyn was in their store, which was part of their house. Labiaga, who was approximately five meters
away from Gregorio, shot the latter. Gregorio called Judy for help. When Judy and Glenelyn rushed
to Gregorio’s aid, appellant shot Judy in the abdomen. The two other accused, Alias Balatong Barcenas
and Cristy Demapanag, were standing behind the appellant, when Labiaga said, "she is already dead,"
and the three fled the crime scene.
Gregorio and Judy were rushed to the Sara District Hospital. Judy was pronounced dead on arrival
while Gregorio made a full recovery after treatment of his gunshot wound.
Petitioner’s Argument/s
Labiaga that it was self-defense and Gregorio Conde armed with a shotgun challenged him into a fight.
Labiaga tried to take away the firearm from Conde and during the struggle the firearm discharged.
Labiaga also stated that he did not know if anyone was hit by the gunshot.
Trial Court
RTC acquitted Demapanag due to insufficiency of evidence. Appellant, however, was convicted of
murder and frustrated murder. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga
@ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Crime of Murder in Crim. Case No.
2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777, the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to a prison term ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, together with
the necessary penalty provided by law and without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
Accused’s entire period of detention shall be deducted from the penalty herein imposed when
the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crimes charged
in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some
other valid or lawful cause.
Court of Appeals
CA upheld the conviction for murder and frustrated murder. However it modified the decision by
imposing moral and exemplary damages in both criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Joint Decision dated March 10,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Barotac Viejo, Iloilo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. The dispositive portion of the said Joint Decision should now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the court hereby finds the accused Regie Labiaga
@ "Banok" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No.
2001-1555 and hereby sentences the said accused to reclusion perpetua together with the
accessory penalty provided by law, to pay the heirs of Judy Conde ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 2002-1777 the court finds accused Regie Labiaga @ "Banok" GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
 together with the accessory penalty provided by law, to pay Gregorio Conde ₱25,000.00 as
moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs Accused(’s) entire period of detention shall be deducted
from the penalty herein imposed when the accused serves his sentence.
For lack of sufficient evidence, accused Cristy Demapanag is acquitted of the crime(s) charged
in both cases. The Provincial Warden, Iloilo Rehabilitation Center, Pototan, Iloilo is hereby
directed to release accused Cristy Demapanag from custody unless he is being held for some
other valid or lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUES
Whether or not the CA was correct in upholding the conviction of frustrated murder (NO)
RULING
Labiaga is guilty of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.— Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In Serrano vs. People, we distinguished a frustrated felony from an attempted felony in this manner:
1) In a frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in an attempted felony, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the
acts of execution.
2) In a frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in an attempted felony, the
reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s
own spontaneous desistance.
In frustrated murder, there must be evidence showing that the wound would have been fatal were it
not for timely medical intervention. If the evidence fails to convince the court that the wound
sustained would have caused the victim’s death without timely medical attention, the accused should
be convicted of attempted murder and not frustrated murder.
In the instant case, it does not appear that the wound sustained by Gregorio Conde was mortal. This
was admitted by Dr. Edwin Figura who examined Gregorio after the shooting incident. Since
Gregorio’s gunshot wound was not mortal, we hold that appellant should be convicted of attempted
murder and not frustrated murder.

Justifying Circumstances of Self-defense

Appellant’s attempt to invoke self-defense was correctly rejected by the RTC and the CA-Cebu. This
Court, in People v. Damitan, explained that:
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts
to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. However,
appellant’s version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions
cannot prevail over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the
prosecution.
Appellant’s failure to present any other eyewitness to corroborate his testimony and his unconvincing
demonstration of the struggle between him and Gregorio before the RTC lead us to reject his claim
of self-defense. Also, as correctly pointed out by the CA-Cebu, appellant’s theory of self-defense is
belied by the fact that:
x x x The appellant did not even bother to report to the police Gregorio’s alleged unlawful
aggression and that it was Gregorio who owned the gun, as appellant claimed. And, when
appellant was arrested the following morning, he did not also inform the police that what
happened to Gregorio was merely accidental.
In contrast, we find that the Condes’ account of the incident is persuasive. Both the CA-Cebu and the
RTC found that the testimonies of the Condes were credible and presented in a clear and convincing
manner. This Court has consistently put much weight on the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court.
 36. Michie
37. JOVITO CANCERAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015 ] MENDOZA, J.:

Doctrine of the Case:

"[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the
complaint or information and on which he was tried. It matters not how conclusive and convincing
the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted in the courts of any offense, unless it is
charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried, or necessarily included therein. He
has a right to be informed as to the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put
on trial, and to convict him of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information
on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right."

Case filed: “Frustrated Theft”; but only convicted of Attempted Theft

FACTS: Canceran along with Frederick Vequizo, and Marcia Diaz were caught trying to steal and
carry away 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream valued at P28,627.20 at the Ororama Mega
Center. They tried to checkout two boxes of Magic Flakes which they paid 1,424.00 but upon
inspection of the security guard and the packer, it was found that it were not Magic Flakes but 14
smaller boxes of Beauty Cream. Canceran tried to run away but upon reaching the gate, stumbled as
he attempted to ride a jeepney.

Canceran denied the allegation stating that he was at the Mega Center to buy medicine for his wife
when a male person approached him and asked him to pay for the two boxes of Magic Flakes and
he obliged. He denied knowing the contents, after paying, he went out to take a jeepney but he was
stopped by the employees who mauled him and took his belongings.

The RTC found Canceran guilt beyond reasonable doubt of consummated Theft, in line with the
ruling in Valenzuela v. People, holding that under Article 308 0f the RPC there is not crime of
Frustrated Theft. As to his contention that there was no taking, CA held that unlawful taking is
deemed complete from the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if he had no
opportunity to dispose of the same.

ISSUE: Whether Cancersan should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the
information

RULING: As stated earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be
read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the indictment itself stated that the crime
was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was being
charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the
lesser crime of Attempted Theft.

The crime of theft in its consummated stage undoubtedly includes the crime in its attempted stage.
In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial proves the crime of consummated
Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming evidence to
convict him for consummated Theft, because the Information did not charge him with
consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests.
 38. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito,"
G.R. No. 88724, 03 April 1990, FIRST DIVISION (Medialdea, J.)

Doctrine of the Case

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when
the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply
to the crime of rape.1âwphi1

FACTS

Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College at Borongan, Eastern Samar.
Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC) soldier.

In the early morning, Abayan arrived at her boarding house. All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a
knife to her neck. She then recognized Lito who was a frequent visitor of another boarder

With his left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant
dragged complainant up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded her to look for a room.
With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room.

Lito undressed himself. He then ordered Abayan to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then
he pulled off her bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. At said
position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept
on moving (

Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part
again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor.
Complainant thought of escaping

When the policemen who were inside the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on
the stairs crying. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her.
When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen rushed to the boarding house.
They heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody running away. Due to darkness, they failed to
apprehend appellant.

Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital where she was
physically examined.

Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant.

RTC RULING: the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.
Lito’s contention: assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show remarkable and
vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore casted doubt to its candor, truth
and validity and that there is no crime of frustrated rape.

ISSUE
Is there an frustrated rape?

RULING

NO. Only consummated and attempted rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

xxx xxx xxx

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman

On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. — Consummated felonies as well as those which are
frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present;
and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply
to the crime of rape.1âwphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of
rape.

The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any
penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,
without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil.
694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced
the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of
the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can
ever be committed.

The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not exist. On the
contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous (which means marked by
abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that
Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was
uncertainty whether or not there was penetration.

PENALTY
Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The trial court appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is death. In view,
however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R.
Nos. L-38968-70, February 9, 1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the
death penalty but merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987
not imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead reduced
the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14, 1990). Reclusion perpetua,
being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is imposed regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code;
 39. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y
BELLO
G.R. No. 149433, 20 March 2000, EN BANC (Bellosillo, J.)
Doctrine of the Case
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," but has
also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," or "the
bombardment of the drawbridge." But, to our mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic
potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to
stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of
the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.

FACTS
In April 25, 1996, around 4 p.m. Ma. Corazon Pamintuan, mother of 4 year old Crysthel Pamintuan
went downstairs to prepare Milo chocolate drink for her 2 children. She met Primo Campuhan, helper
of Conrado Plata Jr. (Corazon’s brother). As Corazon was preparing the drinks she heard one of her
daughters cry “Ay’oko ay’oko” she rushed upstairs and found Campuhan inside the children’s room
kneeling before Crysthel whose and underwear were already removed, while his short pants were down
to his knees.
According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the
accused, and punched him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants and ran.
Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who
were living within their compound, to chase the accused. Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by
those who answered Corazon's call for help.
On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the
court a quo to the extreme penalty of death, hence this case before us on automatic review under Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
Petitioner’s Argument/s
Campuhan argues that the assailed the charge as a mere scheme of Crysthel's mother who allegedly
harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. He asserted that in truth Crysthel
was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing
both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them
and became hysterical.
Campuhan assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not
be given any weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and
improbabilities. He claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that
Crysthel's younger sister was also in the room playing while Corazon was just downstairs preparing
Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the
episode happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and
responded to, would have been enough to deter him from committing the crime.
Trial Court
The trial court found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death,
and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary
damages, and the costs.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw
Primo with his short pants down to his knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were
supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina." The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as
provided in Art. 335, par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when
sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion perpetua to death, to the single indivisible
penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old.

Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the
extreme penalty of death, hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.

ISSUES
1. Whether the accused is guilty of consummated rape? (NO)

RULING
The accused is only guilty of attempted rape.
Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the
female organ," but has also progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ
into the labia of the pudendum," or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." But, to our mild, the case
at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing
of the citadel of passion.
In People v. De la Peña, the Court clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the
attacker's penis merely touched the external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context
of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused failed to
achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the
victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's
testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all
likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or
that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to
rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush
or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into
the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted
of consummated rape.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not
merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape.
In this case, the prosecutor failed to show that Primo's penis was able to penetrate Crysthel's vagina
however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually
molesting her daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital
contact between Primo and Crysthel. In addition, based on Crysthel’s testimonies, she made a
categorical statement denying penetration. The Court has to to conclude that even on the basis of the
testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated rape; worse, be
sentenced to death.
Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no
external signs of physical injuries on complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical
perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although the absence
of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that
there was no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN
Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED.
He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term
of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum. Costs de oficio.
 40. Michie
41. NORBERTO CRUZ Y BARTOLOME, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014 ] Mentioned in Prosec Notes

Doctrine of the Case:

It isobvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender's
intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts
of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness
is committed.

Case filed: Attempted Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness; Convicted of: two charges of Acts of
Lasciviousness

FACTS: The petitioner was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving
diffferent vicitms. He pleaded not guilty to both charges.According to this case, AAA and BBB was
employed by Norberto and his wife to help them sell their wares.On December 21, 1993, AAA was
awakening when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and
touchiching her private part, AAA realized that she was totally naked and was ordered by Norberto
not to scream or she’ll be killed. She fought back and kicked him twice. When Norberto ws not able
to pursue his lustful desires, he offered her money and told her not to tell anyone. She then went out
to seek help but was unable to wake the house boy. When she returned to their tent she saw Norberto
touching the private parts of BBB. BBB was awake but her hands were shaking.

AAA and BBB then told Jess about the incident and they went straight to the municipal hall where
they met policeman Sabas. Norberto was summoned to the police station where he was confronted
by his accusers. Thereafter, AAA and BBB still worked for them until December 30, 1993 and left
January 1994 when they executed their respective sworn statements.

The RTC found Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
On Appeal, CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of attempted rape but acquitting
him of the acts of lasciviousness due to insufficiency of evidence. The basis of the complaint for acts
of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the effect that the accused-appellant likewise
molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However, she was not presented
to testify.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the petitioner of climbing on top of the undressed AAA with mashing her
breasts and touching her genitalia constituted attempted rape
RULING: No. He is guilty only of acts of lasciviousness. The basic element of rape is carnal
knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge is defined simply as “the act of a man having sexual bodily
connections with a woman,” in other words, rape is consummated once the penis capable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female. There must be sufficient
and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape.

Rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility. Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage.
In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of
execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates
rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony
directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce
the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a
causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the
female.

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his
hands and mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his
designs on her. Yet, inferring from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony
would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being
fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation," such
that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular
injury.

His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with
her. The lack of evidence showing his erected penis being in the position to penetrate her when he
was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected
lewdness and lust for her.