The Reason for Reason

“The hardest problem is convincing people the problem is not hard at all but simple.”
Fr. Deacon Dr. Ananias Sorem
Carroll College, Department of Philosophy

This paper provides a philosophical analysis into the necessary conditions for the possibility of
knowledge and explores what could satisfy these conditions so as to provide a sufficient
justification criterion for the existence of knowledge. More specifically, I look at two possibilities
for grounding and justifying knowledge: theonomous epistemology (revelatory theism) and
autonomous epistemology (what the mind could know apart from assuming divine revelation). I
make a distinction between knowing (1st order knowledge) versus claims about knowledge (2 nd
order knowledge) to show that establishing “that knowledge exists” requires justification at the 2 nd
order. I acknowledge that while it is possible to know something (1 st order) without knowing that
one knows (2nd order), claims about the existence of knowledge reveal a unique epistemic problem
that requires justification at the 2nd order. The consequence of this is that one can never affirm 1 st
order knowledge statements without making 2nd order knowledge statements, which results in
epistemic-bootstrapping and vicious circularity. I argue that these problems specifically arise
from autonomous epistemology and they make grounding and justifying claims that knowledge
exists impossible. I show that theonomous epistemology avoids these problems and provides a
solution to establishing the necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge.

What is our reason for reason? First, let’s inquire into what is meant by reason. Typically, in
philosophy, reason means the faculty or processes by which we make logical inferences, acquire
knowledge, etc. It can also mean the a priori principles that stand opposed to sensation and
perception, that which the empiricists obviously deny. For our purpose, we will be talking about
the former and not the latter.1 Therefore, when we ask: “what is our reason for reason?”, we are
asking whether the cognitive processes by which we make logical inferences, deductions,
arguments, acquire knowledge, etc. are normative2 and legitimate. Second, we are asking what
the reason, evidence, or argument would be to support the fact that our cognitive logical
processes are normative and indeed epistemically legitimate.3 Furthermore, how would we go
about establishing that the supposed reasons, evidence, or arguments are in fact acceptable?
These considerations fall within the domain of what is called meta-epistemology and seek to

1
“Reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences. The term “reason” is also used in
several other, narrower senses. Reason is in opposition to sensation, perception, feeling, desire, as the faculty (the
existence of which is denied by empiricists) by which fundamental truths are intuitively apprehended. These
fundamental truths are the causes or “reasons” of all derivative facts. According to the German
philosopher Immanuel Kant, reason is the power of synthesizing into unity, by means of comprehensive principles,
the concepts that are provided by the intellect. That reason which gives a priori principles Kant calls “pure reason,”
as distinguished from the “practical reason,” which is specially concerned with the performance of actions. In formal
logic the drawing of inferences (frequently called “ratiocination,” from Latin ratiocinari, “to use the reasoning
faculty”) is classified from Aristotle on as deductive (from generals to particulars) and inductive (from particulars to
generals).” https://www.britannica.com/topic/reason
2
We can take “normativity” to simply refer to the idea that something is justified, a belief or action that one “ought”
to hold or do, or a state one “ought” to be in.
3
I use the term “legitimate” as opposed to valid, since validity has a technically meaning in logic and philosophy.
We could call an argument formally valid and still wonder, or ask further questions, about whether validity gets us
knowledge (assuming the argument is sound, i.e., has all true premises), whether valid deductive arguments should
be used, etc. Therefore, it seems that the term “legitimate,” being connected to normatively, is a more appropriate
term to use in this context.

1
discover what would truly be a nonproblematic epistemic 1st principle, that is an ultimate
epistemic principle that is appealed to justify all other epistemic and normative claims but is not
itself contingent upon and/or justified by other epistemic principles.

What is Justification?

There is quite a bit of literature on the topic of epistemic justification, what precisely justification
is, what qualifies as justification, etc. For the purposes of this paper, there is no need to go into
the details of these debates. Assuming a general notion of justification that could fit various
philosopher’s theories on epistemic justification will suffice. Justification is generally thought to
be "a reason" or "a correct reason" to hold a belief or make an inference to another belief. In
other words, epistemic justification is the “right standing”4 belief with respect to knowledge.
Because we are enquiring into what makes knowledge possible and what would serve as a
justification for believing knowledge and reason5 exist, we are asking metalogical and meta-
epistemological questions. Moreover, we assume logic and reason to be normative and
legitimate. In fact, we assume we can know things. However, when we ask for justifications for
the normativity and legitimacy of these two things, we are asking, "what makes these
fundamental assumptions true?" and "what possible answers could serve to be the reason why
logic is true, normatively binding, and legitimate; what is the reason knowledge is possible and
what reasons would legitimately explain how can we know ‘knowledge exists’?" Ultimately,
these questions hinge on what constitutes as the necessary preconditions for knowledge and how
is it possible to have access to these conditions.

The Failure of Autonomous Epistemology

When we consider the existence of knowledge, facts, the validity of logic and arguments,
conclusions derived from experience, an important question arises for the reflective inquirer.
How does one determine that human reason, unaided by any other powers, can actually
accomplish what it sets out to do, that is, to know reality and what is true? In other words, within
the sphere of human reason alone, can we ever determine whether knowledge exists?6 Since
everyone presupposes something, a precommitment in using logic, reason, evidence, arguments,

4
“Epistemic justification (from episteme, the Greek word for knowledge) is the right standing of a person’s beliefs
with respect to knowledge, though there is some disagreement about what that means precisely.”
(https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/)
5
“Because of its evaluative role, justification is often used synonymously with rationality. There are, however,
many types of rationality, some of which are not about a belief’s epistemic status and some of which are not about
beliefs at all. So, while it is intuitive to say a justified belief is a rational belief, it is also intuitive to say that
a person is rational for holding a justified belief. This article focuses on theories of epistemic justification and sets
aside their relationship to rationality.” (https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/)
6
“One may be tempted here to respond that, because no counter example can be imagined, the universality of logic
is undeniable. But, does the mere fact that we are psychologically so disposed that we cannot think of the world in
other than logical categories, justify us in concluding that the world is bound by those categories? Why should we
think our psychological limitations are descriptive of the entire universe? A psychological inability to modify the
way we think about the universality of logic does not prove it is in fact universal. It merely means we cannot modify
the way we think about it.” (Russell M. Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,”13)

2
etc., there is no one who is presuppositionally neutral when it comes to factual questions and
experience. Consequently, the use of reason, logic, evidence, arguments, etc. is not something
proven by experience or reason.7 It is that by which one proceeds to prove everything else. What
we find in such an analysis is that rather than proving facts, one inevitably begs the question.
Therefore, two questions immediately arise: (1) what are the necessary preconditions of
intelligibility, science, logic, experience, and morality that must be presupposed to ground and
justify the use of reason, logic, evidence, arguments, etc., and (2) can human reason, when
isolated solely within its own space of reason, ever determine whether its processes are
legitimate such that we can know anything at all without falling into the vicious circularity of
epistemic bootstrapping.

Because there is no one that is presuppositionless, and since our presuppositions will determine
how we see man, the world, knowledge, science, ethics, et. al., we will evaluate what possible
presuppositions there are that would determine how we see these things. All worldviews,
positions, epistemologies, and philosophies boil down to either being autonomous systems or
theonomous. I will discuss what each of these two positions entail and their consequences for the
possibility of knowledge later. However, let us turn to several fundamental difficulties with what
I call autonomous epistemology.

There are several fundamental problems with what I call autonomous epistemology. By
autonomous epistemology, I mean any attempt to construct a philosophical account of the world
on the assumption that it is possible God does not exist or that it is possible for man to possess
knowledge and give a coherent and justified account of this knowledge independent
(autonomous) from the existence and revelation of God. Either one sees human reason as
grounded in God’s revelation, the precondition for the possibility of any knowledge (theonomous
epistemology), or one sees human reason as independent (autonomous).8 There is much talk
about various epistemic theories, world views, and positions regarding the world; however, there
are really only two possible epistemic starting points or presuppositions that can be taken.9

7
As Clement of Alexandria points out, “If anyone should suggest that scientific knowledge is provable by the help
of reason, he must realize that the first principles are not able to be proved…. By faith alone is it possible to arrive at
the first principle of the universe.” (Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, Bk. II, Ch. 4, 13.4-14.1)
8
“The first story is of an epistemology in which man is aided. It is an epistemology that is grounded, not by man,
but by someone who is in a position to know. It is grounded by God. It is a theonomous epistemology. The second
story is of an epistemology in which man is not aided. It is an epistemology that is grounded in man and by man. It
is an autonomous epistemology.” (Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 1)
9
“These two kinds of worldviews describe very different worlds. They tell different stories about how the world
came to be, about the nature of the world and about the nature of man. They give different accounts regarding man’s
relationship to the world and how the world can be known by man. These two accounts of man’s knowledge present
us with two very different epistemological stories. The first story is of an epistemology in which man is aided. It is
an epistemology that is grounded, not by man, but by someone who is in a position to know. It is grounded by God.
It is a theonomous epistemology. The second story is of an epistemology in which man is not aided. It is an
epistemology that is grounded in man and by man. It is an autonomous epistemology.” (Ibid.)

3
Putting your Epistemological Horse before your Metaphysical Cart

In one sense metaphysics is prior to knowledge, since it would be the ontological structures of
the world that determine whether knowledge is possible, how it is acquired, and under what
conditions knowledge is obtained. However, the difficulty is that one has to “know” what
metaphysics is correct in order to determine what epistemological account is correct. In other
words, since metaphysics will determine epistemology (how and what we can know), we will
have to “know” (i.e., epistemology) what the correct metaphysics is first; however, we cannot
answer the first part, without establishing a correct epistemology (the second part), and we
cannot establish a correct epistemology (the second part) without establishing the first part, and
so on. Therefore, autonomous man cannot make any justified claims that knowledge exists or
claim to be in possession of knowledge. I will address this issue later, but it is enough to point
out that this dilemma occurs because of the finitude of man and the fact that he does not stand in
an epistemic and metaphysically privileged position to resolve this dialectical tension between
these two categories.
I have made an important distinction elsewhere10 between 1st-order knowledge (e.g., S knows
that p) and 2nd-order knowledge (e.g., S asserts that he knows that p; S knows that he knows that
p), which is often misunderstood or overlooked. In inquiring into what possible justification(s)
would serve to ground knowledge and our claims that knowledge exists, we are asking a 2nd-
order question about knowledge and justification that is distinguished from 1st-order statements,
regardless of whether their (1st and 2nd-order) content is the same. Furthermore, these distinctions
are not to be confused with the familiar issues in epistemology concerning what is called the KK-
thesis.11 In pointing this out, we avoid the whole debates between internalism and externalism,
et. al. We can grant that it is possible that a person S knows that p, and if they know that p, then
it is also possible for S have the 2nd-order knowledge that they know that they know. In other
words, we acknowledge that 1st-order knowledge is not contingent upon 2nd-order knowledge but
rather the other way around. However, our question and concern are not about knowing
particular propositions, but about knowledge in general and how it is possible to ground and
justify the existence of knowledge, which is a 2nd-order issue. Any assertions about the existence
of knowledge at the 1st-order will inevitably be a 2nd-order statement that necessitates knowledge
exists at the 1st-order. Therefore, our 2nd-order statements about knowledge can only be justified
if we first provide justification for the existence of knowledge in general at the 1st-order.
However, we have a serious and insurmountable problem. Consider the following argument:
1. If it is true that knowledge exists (1st-order), then our beliefs/statements ‘that knowledge
exists” is also true.
2. The 1st -order must be affirmed if we are to affirm the 2nd-order.
3. However, any affirmation or statement about the 1st-order is a 2nd-order statement.
4. Therefore, one can never affirm the 1st-order statement because one is always making 2nd-
order statements.

“An Orthodox Critique of Natural Theology,” IOTA Conference 2023, Volos, Greece.
10
11
KK-principle: in its standard formulation the KK-principle says that, if S
Knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P. We can write this formally as follows: KsP -> KsKsP
(where “Ks ” is read “S knows that …” and “…” is to be replaced by a proposition). Christoph Kelp, “Second Order
Knowledge,” 2.

4
 5. Therefore, autonomous man cannot establish if knowledge exists.
Much of this critique hinges on the vicious circularity12 that autonomous epistemology is
committed to when claiming knowledge exists. To see this with more clarity, let (1) stand for
“knowledge exists” and (2) stand for the statement “‘knowledge exists’.” (2) can only be true if
(1) is true; however, we are enquiring into whether (1) is true and all attempts to confirm (1) is
true will involve (2). In other words, I can’t get to (1) without (2) but (2) is dependent upon (1);
therefore, I never get to (1). Consequently, autonomous epistemology either resorts to trivialness
(i.e., knowledge exists if knowledge exists) or it assumes what it wants to prove (i.e., 2nd-order
statements are assumed in order to prove 1st-order statements and 1st-order statements are
assumed in order to prove 2nd-order statements), which is viciously circular and an example of
epistemic bootstrapping.
Critics of my argument have claimed that I am erroneously asserting that there is a demand for
justification for 2nd-order beliefs, and that this can be objected to on the grounds that people will
have different conditions for what qualifies as justification or different models of justification;
however, this misses the point entirely. The problem isn’t simply that 2nd-order beliefs require
justification, but rather epistemic models of justification at the 1st-order can never be justified on
any model because of the fact that autonomous epistemology is always going to result in either
trivial tautologies or vicious circularity when attempting to provide whatever sort of justification
for 1st-order statements about knowledge. Again, to state that there isn’t a difference in content
or mental acts between 2nd-order "meta-beliefs" and 1st-order "regular" beliefs by pointing out
that they're instead constitutive does not deal with the issue at hand. My argument does not hinge
on 2nd-order beliefs being distinct, independent mental acts that require additional beliefs as their
supporting relation. The point is that there is no way to provide justification (on any model) for
knowledge from an autonomous starting point. The question will always be, “how do we
determine that knowledge exists and provide justification for this belief?” and the answer from
any autonomous epistemological starting point will be, “well if my made-up story about
knowledge is true, then this is how we would know and justify that knowledge exists, although I
have no justification that my made-up story is true.”13 As Manion points out, “the history of
epistemology demonstrates that man, unaided, has not, and cannot, attain a foundation on which
to base a theory of knowledge. We will see that any theory of knowledge that originates solely
from man must be characterized as arbitrary, ambiguous, and incoherent. But, if man has no
12
There is not a problem with circularity per se, since words will be employed to give an account of words and
semantics, arguments will be used to discuss other arguments, and philosophical paradigms will be self-referential.
The problem occurs when we attempt to use, or inevitably invoke circularity, as a means to justify something when
it is unable to provide a justification. In other words, circularity is only problematic (vicious) when it cannot
accomplish what it sets out to do, that is, provide a sufficient reason or justification for knowledge.
13
Epistemic Circularity: According to Alston, we cannot suppose ourselves to be justified in holding the premises
unless we somehow assume the conclusion. (1993, 15)
1. If S’s belief that p is justified (P) [1st-order], then S’s belief ‘that p’ is justified ⸧ p is justified (R) [2nd-
order]
2. p is justified (P) [1st-order]
3. Therefore, S’s belief is justified (R) [2nd-order]
In other words, P ⸧ R/ P//R
But this (R) in the conditional of the first premise is true only if p is justified (P).
However, if we ask: how or why is p justified, we get the following: (P ⸧ R) & (R⸧ P)
Since the formal definition of epistemic circularity is: (P ⸧ R) & (R⸧ P), autonomous epistemology is always
committed to epistemic circularity and cannot provide justification for the existence of knowledge.

5
coherent theory of knowledge, then his beliefs are without warrant, and if his beliefs are without
warrant, then he can make no claim to be in possession of knowledge.”14 Therefore, autonomous
epistemology cannot give a reason for reason and can make no claims that knowledge exists.
Meaning and Narrative Construction

What does meaning have to do with knowledge and our concerns for justification and epistemic
grounding? There is no need to go into the various philosophical theories of meaning in this
paper. For our purposes we can simply assume a common notion of meaning within our ordinary
language (e.g., “this sentence has meaning”). Our language performs the function of conveying
information (cognitive meaning) and serves to provide an explanation of things in the world.
This is why, as Russ Manion states, “Any attempt to interpret the world, whether in part or as a
whole, involves us in narrative construction. We seek to formulate coherent sets of propositions
which fit easily with available data points.”15 Proposed justifications, metaphysical accounts, and
epistemological systems do not exist atomically in a vacuum apart from a narrative. Yes, not
every narrative will be seen as a proposed justification, metaphysical account, or an
epistemological system, but every proposed justification, metaphysical account, or
epistemological claim will imply a narrative. All of this relates to our current considerations
because we cannot say that something is true, justified, or counts as knowledge while at the same
time assuming those things are meaningless; therefore, truth, justification, knowledge, etc. all
presuppose that they are meaningful. However, not all narratives are the same. “Some fit easily;
some not so easily. And, some self-stultify; that is they contain propositions which preclude the
possibility of narrative construction itself. We should consider then, that all such self-stultifying
narratives are meaningless and therefore useless; and therefore need not be explored as possible
interpretations of the world.”16 Nevertheless, there really are only two narratives to consider, and
with that - only two possible proposed justifications - that could possibly be offered.

Theism versus Accidentalism

There are only two stories. One is a story where there is no God and the world, laws, arguments,
logic, et. al., ultimately have to be explained from the assumption that there is no God. The other
story is where there is a God who purposefully (and intentionally) creates the world, the laws,
arguments, logic, and man who can know and have access to these things. These are antithetical
stories. One is a story of purpose and intentionality (not in the technical philosophical/linguistic
sense, but as synonymous with purpose). The antithesis of this is accident. Therefore, accident is
the presupposition of the other narrative.17In this story, you have accidental knowledge,

14
Russ Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 1.
15
Russ Manion, “Demarcation and a Meaningful Research Project,” 5.
16
Ibid.
17
"‘The world is an accident,’ says everything there is to say about the world. Only if this statement is not true does
it mean anything, and that is what we mean by self-stultifying. Any narrative which starts this way is meaningless.
We cannot proclaim the world to be an accident and then go on to describe it as some kind of a secular sacrament
declaring itself manifest to scientists and all who have eyes to see. Nature is either revelatory or it is not, if it is just
an accident it is not a revelation at all, neither secular nor sacred. Any narrative which seeks to impute meaning to

6
accidental meaning, accidental laws, accidental logic, et. al., which are all an oxymoron and self-
defeating, since knowledge, meaning, laws, logic, inference, etc. all preclude accident in their
definitions. Consequently, the nontheist view cannot justify any of its assumptions about the
world, knowledge, arguments, laws, and logic; in fact, it assumes the theistic view of
purpose/intentionality to even talk about these things. Therefore, by impossibility of the contrary,
revelatory theism is true and the only thing that could possibly serve as a justification, or the
reason for reason, is God and His revelation.18

Transcendentally Deducing Theism

Since the use of reason, logic, evidence, arguments, etc. is not something proven by experience
or deduction, but that by which one proceeds to prove everything else, the task of discovering the
necessary conditions for the possibility of knowledge lies within in the domain of transcendental
arguments.19 In other papers, 20 I have provided several arguments whereby it can be shown that
God can be transcendentally deduced. I have illustrated this using both a modus ponens and
disjunctive argument.21 Many critics accuse me of arbitrarily assuming God as the necessary
condition for the possibility of knowledge and state that although the argument is valid, God
simply serves as a term (placeholder) for the argument. They conclude that, therefore, any term
or axiom could serve to make such an argument work, defeating the theist’s argument that God is
the necessary condition. However, I would like to point out that God is categorically different
than axioms or terms (atheist's axioms or otherwise). Axioms are finite, contingent, not self-

accident is itself meaningless. And only if the world is meaningful does it make sense for us to argue with one
another as to what that meaning is. Thus, the one thing we know, if we know anything, is that it is not accidental.”
(Manion, “Demarcation and a Meaningful Project,” 6)
18
“As it is meaningless to interpret the world as accidental, then the only meaningful way to interpret the world is as
intentional. There are, at bottom, only two ways to view the world, as Theistic or as meaningless. Christians choose
Theistic. There really isn't any other choice.” (Manion, “Atheism: Two Portraits,” 1)
19
Transcendental arguments, first coined by Kant in the transcendental deduction of his Critique of Pure Reason, are
arguments attempting to establish the transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge. For Kant, this is
the mind’s attempt to establish a conclusion, not by means of deduction, but rather to arrive at a conclusion
transcendentally, that is, the process whereby one shows that if the conclusion is not true, knowledge itself would
not be possible.
20
See my paper, “An Orthodox Theory of Knowledge: The Epistemological and Apologetic Methods of the Church
Fathers.”
21
1. Y ⸧ X (Modus Ponens) 1. If (knowledge exist), then God exists
Y (knowledge exist)
X Therefore, God exists
This can be translated into the modal argument form:
1. □(◊Y) ⸧ □X 1. If necessarily (the possibility of knowledge), then necessarily God
□(◊Y) Necessarily (the possibility of knowledge)
□X Therefore, necessarily God exists
Since one can question whether the existence of God (Y) is in fact a necessary condition for the possibility of
knowledge and experience (X), as opposed to something else that would satisfy for the necessary condition for the
possibility of knowledge, we form the second argument (disjunctive syllogism):
2. A v -A (Disjunctive) 2. Either God is a nec. cond. (A) or not (God) [-A] is nec. cond.
-(-A) not (not God [-A])
A Therefore, God is a necessary condition for knowledge

7
explanatory nor self-justifying. Axioms are propositions and are nonpersonal (and do not possess
knowledge). Furthermore, we are not using God simply as a term. As I have argued in my paper,
“An Orthodox Critique of Natural Theology,” the term ‘god’ is not a rigid designator and cannot
possess a meaning independently from the special semantic and logical behavior (the rules and
instructions) in which it is used within a particular religion. 22 Therefore, when we use the word
God in a transcendental deduction, we are referring to the meaning of that term as it is defined
and conditioned within the Eastern Orthodox Christian Faith. This is why the transcendental
argument for the existence of God has rightly been identified as an argument for an entire
paradigm and not a generic god or term.

The second critique is related to the first. It is objected that transcendentally deducing God is
circular, since we cannot know He exists by some other prior epistemic means, that is, He can
only be known by assuming He exists and is the necessary condition for the possibility of
knowledge. In other words, we must assume He exists in order to “know” He exists, which is
circular. The problem, however, isn’t with circularity per se or whether circularity is ever
allowed, since circularity can simply be an instance of self-reference.23 In principle if one did
truly find an epistemic 1st principle, it would be self-referencing and self-authenticating (it
wouldn’t be known by some prior epistemic principle). The problem is whether one's supposed
epistemic 1st principle does the work that one wants it to do. If we don't recognize that there are
presuppositions that are categorically different than what we mean by God (acknowledging that
some presuppositions certainly wouldn’t work as 1st principles), then anything and everything
could be presupposed as a necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge. Consequently, if
anything and everything could be presupposed, then there would be no critique of theism, since
every presupposition would be no better or worse than any other presupposition.

So why can’t a presupposition other than God serve to be the reason for reason, an epistemic 1st
principle that can ground knowledge? The easy answer, which never seems easy (hence my
quote at the beginning of this paper), is that autonomous epistemology, as I have shown earlier,
cannot accomplish this task. And since it is either autonomous epistemology or theonomous
epistemology (revelatory theism), the only possible reason for reason that could serve to provide
justification for the existence of knowledge is God and His revelation.24 The difficulty is getting
people to see the reality of this true disjunction and to accept that all their attempts are simply ad
hoc and autonomous system building projects that are doomed to epistemic failure. People like
their idols and are often reluctant to give them up.

22
As György Geréby points out, “there is no such identifiable individual, that would qualify for the single referent
of the term (or there are as many, as there are describing a certain identity). The term “god” is therefore a “flaccid
designator” even for the monotheists, which could pick up different values in different religious frameworks.”
(Geréby, “Theistic Fallacies,” 8)
23
See footnote 12 on the difference between virtuous and vicious epistemic circularity.
24
Manion states, “our epistemology is validated by the revelation of God and the story contained in that revelation.
God’s revelation is self-authenticating, because, by it, everything else is authenticated.” (Manion, “The Contingency
of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 18)

8
Another objection is that transcendentally deducing God does not prove the existence of the
Orthodox Christian God. What about other religions? This is similar to another objection: that in
order to prove God exists as the only necessary condition for the possibility of knowledge, and
therefore, prove His existence by a transcendental deduction, you would have to demonstrate that
all other world views are false. Since this is impossible, given that there can be potentially an
infinite number of worldviews, one cannot prove that the Christian God exists via a
transcendental argument. The problem with this objection, however, is that most
worldviews/positions can be reduced to a few more general options/principles and ultimately
reduced to either the position of intentionalism (revelatory theism) or accidentalism (the negation
of revelatory theism). So we are back where we started from. Since accidentalism is a defeater
for knowledge, it must be revelatory theism. However, there are only a few options here to
consider, religions that claim to be special revelations from God,25 which I will not deal with
here, but which can fairly easily be shown to be defeaters for knowledge as well. Therefore, they
too can be eliminated, and Orthodoxy can be shown to be true. Furthermore, how is it that one
can dictate what is required for demonstration, when it was shown that they are not in a position
to account for knowledge, make epistemic claims, and cannot provide justification for the truth
and the normativity of logic, inferences, demonstrations, etc.?26

What I think most of these objections illustrate is a phenomenon I call “Missing the
Epistemological Forest for the Epistemological Trees.” Most focus on the details of the formal
arguments: whether or not transcendental arguments can prove God, whether true disjunctives
are trivial,27 and various other epistemological issues, ignoring the main problem outlined earlier
that autonomous epistemology cannot account for knowledge. They want to reduce everything to
the one thing that was shown to be epistemically bankrupt and then force all discussions and

25
For example, Talmudic/Rabbinical Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Mormonism, varieties of Protestantism, Roman
Catholicism, et. al. It has been objected that it is possible that one could miss a religion (e.g., an unknown religion)
and not be able to show that it too is a defeater for knowledge so as to establish by impossibility of the contrary that
Orthodoxy is true; however, if it is a hidden unknown religion, then it obviously isn’t revelatory theism, and we are
back at autonomous epistemology, which was shown to be false.
26
Of course, one can simply respond that they are doing an internal critique based on the normative epistemic
standards assumed in our own paradigm/religion while acknowledging that they are not in a position to give an
account and justification for knowledge. However, this seems absurd, since a person is assuming they can know
what is being said, know what demonstrations are, know what one’s paradigm/religion believes, etc. before they can
justify if knowledge exists, or worse, in a world in which knowledge is impossible. A common response to this is
that one can simply assume knowledge exists without having to justify that it exists (because it either exists or it
doesn’t), and perhaps find out later possible justification for the existence of knowledge, but nevertheless use the
assumption that it exists to form critiques of given positions; however, it isn’t clear how this would have any
normative force. It ultimately amounts to accidental knowledge: it might be an argument or critique. If it turns out to
be one, then it is an accidental argument, and accidental arguments carry no justificatory or normative force.
27
One objection is that the transcendental argument for the existence of God is either not a true disjunctive argument
(committing a false dichotomy), or if it is a true disjunctive (either A or not A), then it is trivial. What is meant here
is that a true disjunctive syllogism doesn’t prove anything, since denying “not A” is logically equivalent to asserting
A. So all true disjunctive syllogisms reduce to the following: A/A//A. However, this is only true if there are no
reasons or evidence to deny (not A), which if affirming (not A) leads to a contradiction (e.g., reduction ad
absurdums) or makes knowledge and meaning impossible, then we have a reason beyond simply affirming A to
deny (not A).

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arguments to be filtered through their autonomous epistemology/philosophy that is incapable of
providing justification for their epistemic claims. However, this is all to get caught up in the
insignificant details of arguments while missing the larger epistemic issue (the meta-epistemic
issue): what grounds and makes knowledge possible? What makes logical inferences,
deductions, arguments, etc. normative and legitimate? In other words, what comes first
(epistemically speaking): arguments, including transcendental arguments, or the necessary
condition for arguments? Therefore, whether the technicalities of the argument work or fail at
some level is simply irrelevant to the larger issue at hand, since we are asking a meta-logical
question that is epistemically prior to the details of individual arguments themselves. The larger
issue is this: it is either an intentional world of purpose with God who purposely creates and
sustains that world, or it is a world of accident. If it is a world of accident (not God), then there
are no meaningful statements, no knowledge, and nothing that can be said. However, in order to
affirm that it is accidentalism (not God), one must presuppose a world in which meaning and
knowledge are possible, which is not possible on the accidentalist's view; therefore, one cannot
affirm accidentalism (not God). Hence, by impossibility of the contrary God and Revelatory
Theism is the only option.

This also shows why God is not something that is strictly proven, since this would mean we
would have to first be able to justify the possibility of knowledge (discover the correct
epistemology before we have the correct epistemology) by which we would "prove" God.
Rather, God is that by which everything else is proven.28 As Manion perfectly states, “There is
no purely rational case for theism, but there is only a theistic account of rationality.”29 Therefore,
strictly speaking, God is not something deduced, since this would depend on our man-made
unjustified systems, which would in turn assume that there is something prior and independent of
God by means of which He can be proven. “God’s revelation is not validated by some
autonomous epistemology. Rather, our epistemology is validated by the revelation of God and
the story contained in that revelation. God’s revelation is self-authenticating, because, by it,
everything else is authenticated.”30 God is the Lord and He has revealed Himself. 31 He does not
reveal Himself as a generic god. He reveals Himself in Orthodoxy as the Triune God. And His
revelation demonstrates He is the only reason for reason. “Blessed is God who enlightens
everyone who comes into the world.”

28
“God is proven, not as the conclusion of rational or empirical theistic arguments, but as the very ground of
argument itself. It is with the surrender to God’s view of Himself, the world, and ourselves that one can articulate a
coherent theory of knowledge.” (Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 18)
29
Manion, “Atheism: Two Portraits,” 1.
30
Manion, “The Contingency of Knowledge and Revelatory Theism,” 18.
31
“God is the Lord, and He revealed Himself to us.” (Psalm 117:27)

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