Journal of Family Business Management

Corporate social performance in family firms: a meta-analysis

Sergio Canavati,
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CSP in
Corporate social performance in family firms
family firms: a meta-analysis
Sergio Canavati
School of Business and Economics, Sonoma State University, Rohnert Park,
California, USA
Received 10 May 2018
Abstract Revised 30 June 2018
Accepted 1 July 2018
Purpose – Empirical studies provide conflicting conclusions regarding the corporate social performance
(CSP) of family firms. The purpose of this paper is to synthesize the existing empirical evidence and examine
the potential role of research design and contextual factors.
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Design/methodology/approach – A meta-analysis of existing empirical studies was performed to examine

the role of sampling, measurement and contextual factors in explaining the different and often conflicting
results of empirical studies in the family business literature.
Findings – The overall relationship between family firms and CSP is positive. The relationship between
family firms and CSP is positive for private family firms but is negative for public family firms. The
relationship between family firms and CSP is positive when family involvement includes both family
ownership and management as opposed to only family ownership or family management. Private
family firms care more and public family firms care less about the community, environment, and employees
than private and public nonfamily firms. The relationship between family firms and CSP is stronger in
institutional environments with weak labor and corporate governance regulatory frameworks.
Research limitations/implications – The operationalization of both the family firm and CSP constructs
significantly predicts the magnitude and direction of the relationship between family firms and CSP.
Practical implications – Family firms should become more skilled at measuring and disseminating
information about the firm’s CSP. Family firms should work to improve public perceptions about the CSP of
family firms.
Social implications – Policy should encourage family firms to remain privately owned by the family.
Policy should also incentivize the involvement of family owners in the management of family firms.
Originality/value – Although several literature reviews address the relationship between family firms and
CSP, this is the first review to use the meta-analysis method. The authors contribute to the family business
literature by analyzing how differences in study-, firm- and country-level factors can explain some of the
variance in the results of the studies in the literature.
Keywords Sustainability, Family business, Corporate social performance
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Social and environmental issues such as rising income inequality (Piketty, 2014; Davis and
Cobb, 2010), record-high environmental degradation (United Nations Environment
Programme, 2012) and the increase in corporate governance scandals (Davis, 2009) have
become more pressing in recent years. The debate on the potential causes, outcomes, and
solutions for these issues has led to a substantial growth of the literature focused on the
relationship between business and society. A topic of growing importance for policy
makers, business leaders and academic researchers is whether the corporate social
performance (CSP) of family firms is different from the CSP of nonfamily firms. The fact that
family firms are the most common form of business organization in the world makes
research on whether family firms “care” more about their stakeholders even more relevant
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999). Despite the recent growth of the literature
on the CSP of family firms, there is a lack consensus in both the theoretical arguments and
empirical studies on the relationship between family firms and CSP.
Arguments for and against the superior CSP of family firms relative to nonfamily firms have
Journal of Family Business
been formulated based on multiple theoretical perspectives including the resource-based view, Management
© Emerald Publishing Limited
2043-6238
JEL Classification — D640, M140, G340 DOI 10.1108/JFBM-05-2018-0015
 JFBM agency theory and stewardship theory. The importance of nonfinancial goals in strategic
decision-making in family firms is at the core of the arguments that support a positive
relationship between family ownership and CSP (Chua et al., 1999). The emphasis on the role of
socioemotional wealth (SEW) as a reference point in the framing of decision-making processes is
a valuable contribution that the family business field has made to larger debates in the
management and organizational sciences (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The application of
the concept of loss-aversion to the study of family firms helped expand our understanding of
the role of nonfinancial motives in decision-making processes within the firm. A central theme
of the family business literature is that SEW preservation concerns may lead managers and
owners of family firms to make decisions based on goals other than profit-maximization.
The rationale for this line of inquiry is twofold. First, due to the desire of family owners to leave
a legacy for future generations through the firm’s success, family firms seek to improve the
treatment of stakeholders as well as community relationships. Second, there exists evidence
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that suggests that family firms may avoid socially irresponsible practices because of the
concern of how such practices may negatively affect their family’s reputation (Deephouse and
Jaskiewicz, 2013).
The theoretical arguments for a negative relationship between family firms and CSP
include the existence of conflicts of interest between family owners and the rest of
the shareholders, and conflicts among members of the controlling family. Through the
concentration of equity holdings, family owners can be effective in addressing agency costs
emerging from opportunistic behavior within the firm, in particular management’s
opportunism (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). However, family firms can also engage in
predatory practices against minority shareholders. For example, principal-principal
conflicts emerge when members of the owning family who may control a majority of the
firm’s equity are able to extract benefits from the firm by abusing their power over
nonfamily minority stockholders (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Morck et al., 2005). Concurrently,
conflict among members of the controlling family can also have a detrimental impact on the
firm and its relationship with stakeholders.
The focus on the role of nonfinancial objectives in decision-making processes and the
study of principal-principal conflict are some of the most salient contributions the family
business literature has made to other disciplines in economics and organizational sciences
(Gedajlovic et al., 2012). The application of the concepts of SEW preservation and owner-
owner conflict has helped family business scholars gain a deeper understanding into why
and how the socially responsible practices of family firms differ from those of nonfamily
firms. However, multiple researchers in the field have underscored the need to expand the
scope of the research agenda on the relationship between family firms and CSP to include
country-level formal and informal institutional factors. For example, Van Gils et al. (2014)
concluded that “future researchers should consider the effect of national context on the
scope and level of social practices of family businesses” (p. 201).
The incorporation of institutional analysis in family firm research can benefit the field
through: enhanced explanatory power, as well as improved ability to contribute to larger
debates in more established organizational sciences. First, widening the scope of the family
business research agenda beyond SEW factors to include environmental factors such as
cultural and political motivations may improve its explanatory power (Cennamo et al., 2012,
p. 1167). A top priority for family business research is addressing the wide heterogeneity
across family businesses and “this variation includes […] their performance goals and
outcomes in different institutional environments” (Salvato and Aldrich, 2012, p. 132).
Through the examination of additional motives and goals guiding decision-making
processes, institutional analysis can help better explain the wide variance in family firm
behavior and outcomes. “Indeed, ‘institutional logics’ […] may all drive family preferences
and behavior of family firms. Their study may add precision and scope to discussions of
 family motives” (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2014, pp. 715-716). However, Le Breton-Miller CSP in
and Miller (2016) recently noted that “there has been very little empirical work in family firms
the area” (p. 30).
Second, incorporating the institutional environment into family business research will
enable scholars in the field to make more contributions that are meaningful to larger debates
in management and other organizational sciences. Focusing on the performance
implications of family firms, Gedajlovic et al. (2012) argued that because family firms
exist across a wide variety of institutional settings, “they provide an excellent basis for
studying how a common organizational form adapts and evolves in different institutional
contexts” (p. 1024). The limited focus on the institutional environment has stifled the ability
of the family business literature to contribute to long-standing debates in other
organizational sciences. Although “the literature has not yet focused on these fundamental
questions,” scholars have suggested that this shortcoming can be addressed through “the
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use of meta-analytic techniques that harvest effects from the many primary studies
conducted on firms in diverse settings” (Gedajlovic et al., 2012, p. 1024). A recent review of
empirical studies in family business research called for “more attention to cross-border and
internationally comparative issues” and suggested the use of meta-analysis as an
“underrepresented, yet potentially useful, technique” to promote theory development, make
relationships more generalizable, and address conflicting results (Evert et al., 2016, p. 30).
In addition to the lack of theoretical consensus regarding the relationship between
family firms and CSP, the results of the empirical studies vary substantially and there is a
lack of agreement regarding the direction and magnitude of the relationship. A recent
summary of the empirical studies on the relationship between family ownership and
socially responsible practices found that, not only are there conflicting conceptual views
on this relationship, but “the empirical results also fail to provide a fully conclusive
picture” (Faller and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2018, p. 32). Differences in the results of the
empirical studies conducted to date are due to differences in the sample sizes and data
collection methods used in the various studies, “making it difficult to compare the results
and variables involved” (Faller and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 2018, p. 32). Jain and Jamali’s
(2016) literature review of corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
also found “mixed results” (p. 260) regarding the relationship between family ownership
and CSR. As Carney and Nason (2018) summarized it, “the mixed findings with respect to
family managed firms and their governance practices suggest that business families could
either mitigate or aggravate inequalities” (p. 1208).
This lack of consensus in the empirical studies is further exacerbated by the fact that the
“institutional context is likely to play an influential role in the relationship between family
firm governance and inequality” (Carney and Nason, 2018, p. 1209). The evidence for a
negative relationship between family firms and CSR is “more pronounced in [liberal market
economy] LME countries (e.g. the US) than in [coordinated market economy] CME
countries” ( Jain and Jamali, 2016, p. 260). A study of large publicly traded firms across
25 countries found that the legal regime at the country level is a significant predictor of CSP
in family firms (Labelle et al., 2018). According to Labelle et al. (2018), family firms
in countries with a legal regime based on code law have higher CSP than family firms in
countries with legal regimes based on common law.
Meta-analysis has been particularly helpful in areas of research in which several
individual studies have produced contradictory or insignificant results (Hunter and
Schmidt, 2004). Meta-analysis is a research method that allows researchers to synthesize
empirical findings in the literature by aggregating results and correcting for sampling and
measurement error. Although Faller and Knyphausen-Aufseß (2018) have correctly
identified sampling and measurement error as causes for the inconclusive findings in the
existing studies, their use of the “vote counting” technique for summarizing empirical
 JFBM results in the literature stifles their ability to effectively synthesize results. The “vote
counting” technique has been shown to be incorrect for multiple reasons (Hunter and
Schmidt, 2004). By reporting the final results of different studies without considering crucial
differences between the studies, the “vote counting” technique is likely to yield incorrect
insights. Also, several of the studies that provide evidence for both a positive and negative
relationship between family firms and CSP in Faller and Knyphausen-Aufseß (2018)
are based on overlapping samples and thus are not statistically independent. Comparing
the number of studies that find that family ownership has a positive effect on CSR vs the
number of studies that find that family ownership has a negative effect on CSR can be
misleading, particularly if those studies are based on data from overlapping samples.
In the following sections, we seek to fill this gap in the literature by performing a
meta-analysis of the relationship between family firms and CSP. Section 2 provides an
overview of our conceptual model (Figure 1), the literature on CSP in family firms, and our
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hypotheses. Section 3 provides a summary of our methods including our sample selection,
coding procedures, variable definitions, and statistical analysis. Section 4 provides a
summary of the results of our empirical analysis, which are further discussed in Section 5.

2. Theory and hypotheses

2.1 CSP in family firms
A central proposition of the family business literature is that family firms’ behavior is
influenced by both financial and nonfinancial goals (Chua et al., 1999). Because family
owners perceive their firms to be repositories of SEW, the preservation of SEW becomes the
key reference point from which decisions are framed (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The desire to
prevent the loss of SEW can lead to decisions that diverge from profit-maximizing behavior.
Family members’ efforts to preserve SEW can lead to suboptimal performance and greater
risk (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), as well as the reluctance to incur risky investments that are
crucial to the renewal of family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
For example, family firms tend to avoid investments in explorative R&D, and their reliance
on exploitative R&D investments leads to riskier and more unreliable sales outcomes
(Patel and Chrisman, 2014). This in turn can lead to inferior operational processes and
outcomes within the firm and ultimately jeopardize the long-term ability of the firm to
remain a going concern (Block, 2012). Dyer and Whetten (2006) applied a SEW loss-aversion
lens to explain why family firms were more reluctant and less likely to perpetrate
environmental offenses. Dyer and Whetten (2006) emphasized how concerns over the
family’s image and reputation can influence publicly traded family firms to avoid practices
that have a negative impact on the environment.
One of the main drivers of socially responsible practices in family firms is the concern
over reputational effects of socially irresponsible actions. Family members care about the
reputation of their firm because they associate the reputation of the family firm with their
family’s reputation (Chrisman et al., 2007); thus, the higher the reputation of their firm
the better that family members feel about themselves (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013).

Regulatory Internal
Stringency Stakeholders

Family + – +
Figure 1. CSP
Diagram of conceptual Firm
+ +
relationships in the
theoretical model Uncertainty Long-Term
Avoidance Orientation
 This effect is stronger when the family name is included in the name of the firm and when CSP in
the role of the family in managing the firm is more visible (i.e. Zellweger et al., 2012). family firms
Because of the desire of family owners to leave a legacy for future generations through
the firm’s success, family firms seek to improve the treatment of stakeholders as well as
community relationships. Consequently, family firms avoid short-term strategies that
have a detrimental effect on the firm’s stakeholders (Berrone et al., 2010, 2012; Cruz et al.,
2014), emphasize investments in reputational capital (Fombrun, 1996), and build positive
relationships with outside stakeholders (Arregle et al., 2007). A study of high-tech family
firms in Korea found that family firms tend to be more successful at fostering employee
engagement as well as developing positive relationships with other stakeholders
(Miller et al., 2009). Likewise, a comparison of small lone-founder and family firms in
Canada suggested that family firms outperform their lone-founder counterparts because
of their focus on the continuance of their markets, the development and allocation of
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employees’ capabilities, and the nurturing of long-term relationships with suppliers

(Miller et al., 2008).
Family owners, through the concentration of ownership, can be effective in addressing
agency costs emerging from opportunistic behavior within the firm (Anderson and
Reeb, 2003). However, family firms can also be prone to principal-principal conflicts that
emerge when family owners are able to extract benefits from the firm at the expense of
stockholders with more dispersed equity holdings and less control over the firm (Morck and
Yeung, 2003). Family owners may engage in rent-seeking behavior and steer the strategic
management process of the firm to accomplish their own personal goals, which may bear no
relationship to the continued success of the firm (Morck et al., 2005; Le Breton-Miller and
Miller, 2016). After differentiating between publicly traded family and lone-founder firms,
Miller et al. (2011) found that family firms do not outperform their Fortune 1,000 peers, a
finding that suggests that family members’ meddling in the operations of the business can
be detrimental for publicly traded family firms.
Despite the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for why the relationship
between family firms and CSP should be negative, we expect the positive impact of family
firms’ reputational concerns, intergenerational legacy desire, and corporate governance
advantages to outweigh the “dark side” of family firms such as principal-principal conflicts
and intrafamily conflict. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
H1. There will be a positive relationship between family firms and CSP.

2.2 Internal vs external stakeholders

Family control will be more strongly correlated with CSP intended toward internal
stakeholders than activities that affect external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders include
employees and investors, while external stakeholders include consumers, community
members, and the environment. Cennamo et al. (2012) argued that family members that hold
key ownership or management positions will seek to secure and extend their control over
the firm through maintaining positive relationships with internal stakeholders who they
perceive to be critical in order to preserve the family’s control over the firm. In contrast to
nonfamily firms, family firms are less likely to downsize their labor force irrespective of
financial performance (Stavrou et al., 2007), emphasize the importance of the quality of life of
their labor force (Stavrou and Swiercz, 1998), provide more stable employment (Block, 2010),
and grant more favorable employment contracts to nonfamily hires (Cruz et al., 2010).
Thus, we hypothesize that:
H2. The relationship between family firms and CSP will be stronger for internal
stakeholder CSP and weaker for external stakeholder CSP.
 JFBM 2.3 The role of the institutional environment
2.3.1 Regulatory. A study based on a sample of publicly traded firms in Europe during the
2001–2010 period found a negative relationship between family firms and CSR ratings
(Cruz et al., 2014). Cruz et al. (2014) also found that family firm status was not a significant
predictor of socially responsible activities directed at external stakeholders, a finding at
odds with prior studies (Berrone et al., 2010). Cruz et al. (2014) attributed the differences
between their results and those of previous studies to country-level formal and informal
institutional differences. They found that differences in the institutional environment,
which they measured using the CAGE index of national standard distance between each
country and the USA, was a significant predictor of socially responsible activities in
nonfamily firms but not in family firms. They concluded that differences at the
“regulatory level (e.g. specific environmental laws and norms, regulatory stringency, and
enforcement mechanisms) may explain the different results. Future research should
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investigate to what extent these differences interact with the identity of the owners
(i.e. family vs. nonfamily) to explain cross-national variations in company responses to
stakeholder claims” (Cruz et al., 2014, p. 1310).
According to Steier (2009), family firms can serve as an informal institution to protect
entrepreneurs and investors from the hazards inherent in countries with weak corporate
governance and/or property rights protection. Other meta-analyses have found that
informal institutions can fill the void created by weak institutional environments.
For example, the results of a meta-analysis of the effect of business group membership on
firm performance from studies in 27 countries found that, as an informal institution,
business groups fill the institutional void caused by weak financial and labor institutional
environments (Carney et al., 2011). Similarly, as an informal institution family firms can fill
the institutional void that exists in countries where the formal institutional framework
provides weak property rights and investor protection (Khanna and Palepu, 1997;
Steier, 2009). Jiang and Peng (2011) found that family management benefited firm
performance in institutional environments where shareholder protection laws and
regulations are weak. Jiang and Peng’s (2011) results suggest that family involvement in
the firm can serve to improve the family firm’s corporate governance practices toward
majority and minority shareholders in institutional environments with weak minority
investor protection. However, Jiang and Peng’s (2011) findings contradicted the findings of a
previous study by Peng and Jiang (2010) which concluded that family management and
family pyramid ownership are less detrimental to firm value in countries with strong rule of
law, low corruption and highly efficient judicial systems. According to Luo and
Chung (2013), the contradictory findings of Peng and Jiang (2010) and Jiang and Peng (2011)
can be explained by differences in how the family firm construct is operationalized. Luo and
Chung (2013) found that family firms fill the institutional void created by weak investor
protection by formal institutions only when family control involves both ownership and
management of the firm. Essen et al. (2015) found that the performance of family firms is
higher in environments with weak rule of law index scores, which suggests that family
firms fill the institutional void and deliver superior results to investors in environments with
weak legal and judiciary enforcement institutions.
Writing from a corporate responsibility framework, Westermann-Behaylo et al. (2014)
argued that if corporate responsibility is defined as social action beyond what is legally
required, the removal of regulations that protect labor would, by definition, make firms seem
more socially responsible. However, there exists empirical evidence suggesting that family
firms fill the institutional void in weak institutional environments even when CSP toward
employees is defined using objective measures such as protection from layoffs or wage cuts.
For example, Essen et al. (2015) found that family firms are more likely to provide stability
 of employment and less likely to reduce employee wages in institutional environments with CSP in
weak labor protection laws and regulations. Family firms in institutional environments with family firms
weak labor protection laws are more likely to protect employees from layoffs, particularly
during economic downturns (Essen et al., 2015). Thus, we hypothesize that:
H3a. The strength of corporate governance regulation will negatively moderate the
relationship between family firms and corporate governance CSP.
H3b. The strictness of labor protection will negatively moderate the relationship
between family firms and employee-related CSP.
H3c. The stringency of environmental policy will negatively moderate the relationship
between family firms and environmental CSP.
2.3.2 Normative. A recent review of the literature on socially responsible behavior by
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family firms suggested time orientation and risk-aversion as country-level cultural variables
that could explain some of the variance in the CSP of family firms across different
institutional environments (Van Gils et al., 2014).
2.3.2.1 Long-term orientation. A considerable number of characteristics differentiating
family firms from other firms are related to the concept of time (Sharma et al., 2014). Short-
and long-term considerations and concerns permeate family business research (Yu et al.,
2012). Intergenerational legacy and reputational concerns are some of the reasons for why
family firms are particularly effective at preserving values such as honesty and
responsibility across multiple generations (Koiranen, 2002). The family business literature
has emphasized long-term orientation as a defining characteristic of family firms (Sharma
et al., 2014). Brigham et al. (2014) proposed and validated a construct for firm-level long-term
orientation and found that family firms scored higher than their nonfamily counterparts.
They concluded that the study of long-term orientation “could deepen understanding of the
mechanisms underlying many of the theories that are important to comprehending family
business phenomena” (p. 83). Long-term orientation (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006;
Lumpkin et al., 2010), legacy concerns and firm succession are time-related concepts that
play an important role in explaining why family firms care more about their stakeholders
than other firms (Cennamo et al., 2012). Thus, we hypothesize that:
H4. The long-term orientation in the country’s culture will positively moderate the
positive relationship between family firms and CSP.
2.3.2.2 Risk-aversion. A central premise of SEW preservation theory is that family owners
are willing to make strategic decisions that increase the risk of financial loss if they help
decrease the risk of SEW loss. Family firms engage in activities to improve their CSP in
order to prevent losses to their stock of SEW even though the financial return
on investment on CSP activities is uncertain. Berrone et al. (2010) studied firms in
pollution-intensive industries and found that family firms release fewer pollutants into the
environment than other firms, particularly when embedded in tightly knit communities.
They attributed the difference in pollution emission levels to the desire of family firms to
preserve SEW – the family’s image in this case. Dyer and Whetten (2006) compared KLD
scores on both positive initiatives and areas of concerns of family and nonfamily S&P
500 companies. They found that although family firms received a slightly lower average
rating for positive initiatives, they ranked substantially better by having significantly
lower scores for social responsibility concerns than nonfamily firms. Thus, we
hypothesize that:
H5. The risk-aversion in the country’s culture will positively moderate the positive
relationship between family firms and CSP.
 JFBM 3. Methods
3.1 Search procedure
A four-stage approach to search for sample studies was followed in order to identify the
sample studies included in the meta-analysis. First, we performed targeted searches in the
top journals in the fields of management, economics, and finance (i.e. SMJ, AMJ, ASQ, ETP,
JBV, JoM, Org. Sci, JFE, JCF) as well as the top family business, corporate governance, and
CSP journals (i.e. JMG, JBE, CGAIR, BSE, SBR, JFBS). Second, we searched for published
articles in academic databases including EBSCOHost, Scopus, ScienceDirect, ABI/Inform
and WebOfScience. We also used the snowballing technique to identify sample studies
through searching in the references section of articles identified in the first and second
stages (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). Third, we searched for working papers and conference
proceedings in academic repositories including RePEC, Google Scholar, IEEE Explore,
SSRN and Econis. Fourth, we searched for dissertations in the ProQuest Dissertation
Database and Google Scholar. We used the terms “family firms,” “family owner*,” “family
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CEO,” and combined them with terms that refer to the relationship between business and
society such as “CSP,” “CSR,” “sustainability,” “stakeholder relationships,” “corporate social
actions,” “corporate citizenship,” “employees,” “environmental management,”
“ecoinitiatives,” “ecological embeddedness,” “human resources,” “resilience,” and social
responsibility. We alternated the use of family firms with CSP keywords to maximize the
efficiency of each search.

3.2 Inclusion criteria

Strict inclusion guidelines were followed in the process of selecting the articles included in
the final sample. First, studies had to report an effect size statistic such as the correlation
coefficient, independent t-test scores, or differences-in-means. Consequently, we excluded
conceptual manuscripts. Second, studies had to report statistics that allowed a comparison
between family and nonfamily firms. Thus, we excluded studies that focused solely on
family firms without providing statistics to compare them to nonfamily firms. Third, studies
had to define the focal variables in ways that are conceptually consistent with broadly
accepted definitions of family firms and CSP. Thus, we excluded studies that did not
explicitly define their measures of CSP and family firms. Studies that only reported effect
size statistics for founder characteristics were also excluded from the sample. Our search
resulted in 98 studies based on 77 statistically independent samples.

3.3 Operationalization of variables

3.3.1 Corporate social performance. We categorized each sample effect size to denote the
stakeholder group that it belonged to. The CSP categories initially used in this meta-analysis
were: Governance, economic, operations, consumers, employees, suppliers, community,
environment and overall. The overall dimension is used for effect sizes belonging to a
combination of several of the CSP categories. In an effort to reduce the number of CSP
categories, we: eliminated the economic dimension of CSP; and merged the operations effect
sizes with the environment ones. First, because only two studies provided effect sizes for the
economic dimension of CSP, we eliminated this category. Second, there were only six effect
sizes belonging to the operations CSP category; thus, we reclassified the operations effect
sizes and merged them with the effect sizes in the environment category of CSP.
There were 150 effect sizes belonging to CSP toward external stakeholders:
49 community effect sizes, 34 consumer effect sizes and 67 environment effect sizes.
Another 167 effect sizes belonged to CSP toward internal stakeholders: 82 employee effect
sizes, 80 governance effect sizes and 5 supplier effect sizes. An additional 67 effect sizes
belonged to the overall category. Our final sample included a total of 384 effect sizes.
 3.3.2 Family firms. Consistent with prior meta-analyses (i.e. Arregle et al., 2017; CSP in
Duran et al., 2016; Wagner et al., 2015) we categorized sample effect sizes into four family family firms
firm categories: family ownership, family management, a combination of both ( family
ownership and management) and other types of operationalization of the family firm
construct. Family ownership measures ownership of firm equity and/or voting rights by
family members. It includes binary variables equal to 1 if the family owns a certain
percentage (i.e. 5, 10, 20 or 50 percent) of the firm’s equity and otherwise equal to 0, as well as
the percentage of the firm’s equity owned by the family. Second, family management
measures family members’ involvement in the management of the firm. Examples include
binary variables equal to 1 if there are family members serving as employees, managers, or
directors in the firm and equal to 0 otherwise, continuous variables that indicate the number
of board directors that are family members, and the ratio of family member directors to the
total number of directors. Family ownership and management indicates family members’
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simultaneous involvement in the ownership and management of the firm. It includes binary
measures equal to 1 if the firm has both family ownership and management and 0 otherwise;
as well as binary variables equal to 1 if the firm has both a certain percentage of family
ownership and family members in key management positions and 0 otherwise. The other
category measurement of family firm characteristics refers to all other family firm
operationalizations, such as intergenerational intentions, first vs later generation family
firms, lone-founder firms, and family name in the firm’s name. It also includes instances in
which studies do not specify their definition of family firms.
3.3.3 Institutional variables. To control for differences in effect sizes resulting from
differences in the institutional environment at the country level we used country- and
year-specific moderating variables. Environmental policy stringency is an index provided
by the OECD that measures the explicit or implicit cost of air and water pollution based on
14 country-specific policies and regulations. Employment protection strictness is a
measure of the severity of country-level regulations and policies that prevent employers
from dismissing employees and hiring labor on a part-time basis; data for this variable
was obtained from the OECD Employment Protection Database. The antidirector rights
index is a commonly used measure of investor protection (La Porta et al., 1998); values for
1997, 2005 and 2008 were obtained from Spamann (2010). Minority investor protection is a
country-level index of the strength of regulations that protect minority shareholders from
abuse by majority shareholders by limiting the ability of majority owners to extract
benefits from the firm at the expense of minority owners. Data for this variable were
obtained from the Global Competitiveness Index Historical Data set provided by the
World Economic Forum. In line with Peng and Jiang (2010), we measured the level of
institutional development at the country level as a composite index of: the rule of law
index provided by the World Bank; and the government integrity measure of government
transparency and control of corruption ranking provided by the Heritage Foundation.
Values for uncertainty avoidance and future orientation practices (as is) were obtained
from House et al. (2004).
3.3.4 Control variables. To control for differences in effect sizes stemming from
differences in the operationalization of the CSP variables, we divided our sample of effect
sizes into three categories. In line with Orlitzky et al.’s (2003) typology, we categorized
effect sizes as: disclosure, reputation indexes, social audits, corporation behaviors,
processes and outcomes and CSP values and attitudes (see Allouche and Laroche, 2005)
for a similar taxonomy of CSP effect sizes). We also controlled for the method used to
collect the CSP data used in each study. In line with Wang et al. (2016), we categorized each
study as based on data from either: a social audit, content analysis, proxy variable,
reputation ratings or surveys.
 JFBM Public is a binary variable equal to one if the effect size is from a sample of firms publicly
traded in the stock market and zero otherwise. Firm size was measured as the firm’s asset
value, or total revenue in millions of dollars; alternatively, number of employees was also
used. For studies with firm size values not in USD, we used the exchange rate for the last
date in which the data were collected; for studies not indicating a date range we used the
exchange rate for three years prior to the publication date. We also distinguished between
published and unpublished sample studies. Publication bias is a binary variable equal to one
for published studies and zero for unpublished studies. Published studies are those accepted
for publication in peer-reviewed journals and unpublished studies include dissertations,
book chapters, working papers, and conference proceedings. At the country-level, we
controlled for GDP per capita and whether the country’s legal system is based on common
company law or (French/German) commercial code (Labelle et al., 2018; La Porta et al., 1998).
Based on the seven world regions used by the World Bank Group (2018), we created binary
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variables equal to 1 if the country where the data for each sample study were collected
belonged to that geographic region and equal to 0 otherwise.

3.4 Statistical procedures

The statistical analysis was conducted in two sequential stages. In the first stage, we
performed a bivariate analysis using the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) approach, and in the
second stage, we performed a meta-regression analysis based on the method proposed by
Berkey et al. (1998) and following the best-practice recommendations by Gonzalez-Mulé and
Aguinis (2018). The effect size we used is the Pearson product-moment coefficient that
measures the correlation between two variables. In instances in which only effect sizes other
than correlation coefficients were reported, we used the formulas in Lipsey and
Wilson (2001) to convert them to correlation coefficients. Prior to starting the statistical
analysis, we performed two corrections to each effect size. First, to control for sampling
error we divided every effect size by the inverse of its sample size. Second, to address
measurement error we corrected for effect size attenuation due to unreliability of
the dependent and/or independent variables by dividing the effect size by the product of the
root square of the reliability coefficient estimates for both the family firm and CSP variable.
We used Cronbach’s α as the measure of composite reliability. If a reliability coefficient
estimate for an effect size was not provided, we used the average for all other effect sizes
for which it was provided (e.g. Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis, 2018). After correcting for
sampling and measurement error and in accordance with Hunter and Schmidt (2004),
we averaged the effect sizes of studies that included more than one effect size
(multiple-endpoint studies) to include only one effect size per study in the bivariate analyses.
This was done to avoid violating the assumption of independence of the effect sizes
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Lipsey and Wilson, 2001).
We subsequently estimated the mean weighted effect size as well as 95 percent
confidence intervals, I2, and the Q-statistics for the overall relationship between family firms
and CSP based on all effect sizes in our sample. The Q-statistic is a χ2 test of the null
hypothesis of effect size homogeneity; significant Q-statistic p-values suggest effect size
heterogeneity. I2 reflects the percentage of total variance resulting from between-study
variance as opposed to within-study sampling error. I2 values above 50 percent (Higgins and
Thompson, 2002) and 75 percent (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004) suggest the need for further
moderator analyses. Confidence intervals that include zero also suggest the need for
moderator analyses (Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis, 2018).
In the first step of our statistical analysis, we performed a bivariate analysis to test
differences between subsamples with low and high scores of each moderating
variable. We grouped effect sizes into two subsamples: a low subsample containing
 effect sizes with moderator variable scores below the median value; and a high subsample CSP in
including effect sizes with moderator variable scores above the median value of each family firms
moderator variable. We subsequently estimated mean weighted effect sizes, I2,
Q-statistics, and 95 percent confidence intervals for each low and high subsample.
To test for the statistical significance of the difference between the mean effect sizes of the
low vs the high subsample, we used Fisher’s r-to-z transformation; significant z-scores
suggest that the difference between the mean weighted effect size of each subsample is
statistically significant.
In the second stage of our meta-analysis we performed a series of meta-regressions. In a
meta-regression, the effect size is the dependent variable and the moderator variables are
the independent variables. Effect sizes were weighted by the inverse of the within-study
variance. Fixed effects models assume that the between-study variance estimate, T2, is zero,
an assumption that requires that all studies from which the effect sizes were extracted were
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performed using the exact same methods. Because this assumption is unrealistic in our case
(Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis, 2018; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004), we used a random-effects
maximum-likelihood estimation meta-regression model which estimates a between-study
variance component, T2, to account for differences between the studies such as
research design and methodological differences. Because many of the studies in our sample
reported more than one family firm and/or CSP variable, we used the method outlined by
Berkey et al. (1998) to account for the correlation between effect sizes that are extracted from
the same study. Thus, we included all effect sizes from all studies and then estimated an
unstructured covariance matrix with within-study construct-level covariance estimates in
the diagonal. T22 is an estimate of within-study construct-level variance. Because we
estimated random-effects variance components at the effect size- and sample-level, our
study represents a form of multi-level meta-analysis. To control for the presence of studies
based on overlapping samples (i.e. same source of CSP data and overlapping time period), all
meta-regressions were performed under the assumption that only effect sizes from
nonoverlapping samples were statistically independent rather than assuming that effect
sizes from each study are statistically independent. The three-level model used in this
meta-analysis allows us to include all effect sizes from all studies even from studies based on
overlapping firm-year level data while accounting for the correlation between effect sizes
based on overlapping firm-year samples. Berkey et al.’s (1998) meta-regression model
helps overcome the “biases or lack of efficiency in statistical inferences” inherent in
bivariate meta-analysis by simultaneously allowing for the inclusion of as much
information as possible while controlling for the correlation between effect sizes (Olkin and
Gleser, 2009, p. 374).

4. Results
As shown in Table I, the relationship between family firms and CSP is positive (r ¼ 0.005),
thus providing support for H1. Because the I2 estimate (93.1 percent) is above the 75 percent
threshold, the results of the Q-statistic test are statistically significant (p-value ⩽ 0.001),
and the 95 percent confidence interval includes zero (lb ¼ −0.007; ub ¼ 0.017), we proceeded
to examine boundary conditions through bivariate and meta-regression moderator analyses.
The results of the bivariate analyses reported on Table I suggest the presence of study-,
firm-, and country-level boundary conditions regarding the magnitude and direction of the
relationship between family firms and CSP. First, the focal relationship is positive for
private family firms (r ¼ 0.019) but negative for public family firms (r ¼ −0.025) and this
difference is statistically significant (z-score ¼ −12.33; p-value ⩽ 0.001). Second, mean
weighted effect sizes are different for each source of CSP data and these differences are
statistically significant. Third, the magnitude and direction of the family firms-CSP
relationship is different in each of the geographic regions and these differences
 JFBM Hypothesis K N R z-score I2 Q-statistic

Overall relationship 97 359,446 0.005 93.1 1,389***

Geographic region
North Africa and Middle East 2 80 0.393 4.02*** 28.1 1
East Asia and Pacific 17 16,494 −0.044 −2.27* 93.9 262***
Europe and Central Asia 31 19,546 −0.020 −5*** 82.3 169***
North America 36 274,038 0.017 4.23*** 94 580***
South Asia 2 1,073 −0.112 −2.64** 93 14***
Multiple Regions 9 48,215 −0.031 95.7 184***
Public vs private firms
Public 56 115,817 −0.025 −12.33*** 94.5 1,005***
Private 41 243,629 0.019 82.8 232***
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Firm size
Small 42 35,356 −0.005 3.4*** 92.8 568***
Large 20 28,357 −0.032 88.3 162***
Source of social performance data
Audit 17 44,827 0.005 4.45*** 95.5 356***
Content analysis 29 15,982 −0.036 −5.25*** 83.7 172***
Proxy 15 19,494 0.020 9.06*** 74.6 55***
Ratings 14 52,366 −0.056 −15.9*** 96.4 369***
Surveys 27 228,332 0.021 86 185***
Country governance orientation
Code Law 41 27,958 −0.027 −6.86*** 88.1 336***
Common Law 43 280,851 0.016 93.6 652***
Level of institutional development
Low 41 31,213 −0.028 −6.22*** 86.9 304***
High 38 270,985 0.009 93.7 588***
Table I.
Results of bivariate Notes: K, number of studies; N, number of firm-year observations; R, mean weighted effect size; z-score, test
analyses for the of statistical significance of differences between two mean weighted effect sizes; I 2, percentage of variance
relationship between attributed to between-study variance; Q-statistic, χ2 test of the null hypothesis of effect size homogeneity.
family firms and CSP *p ⩽ 0.05; **p ⩽ 0.01; ***p ⩽ 0.001; ****p ⩽ 0.10

are statistically significant. Fourth, the mean weighted effect size is negative (r ¼ −0.027)
for studies performed in code law countries and positive for studies performed in common
law countries (r ¼ 0.016) and these mean weighted effect sizes are significantly different
from each other (z-score ¼ −6.86; p-value ⩽ 0.001).
We used random-effects maximum-likelihood estimation meta-regressions to test the
robustness of some of our bivariate analyses. First, as shown in Table II, we found that
the relationship is strongest when there is both family management and family ownership
(pe ¼ 0.037; p-value ⩽ 0.05) than when there is only family ownership (pe ¼ −0.022;
p-value W0.10) or family management (pe ¼ −0.016; p-value W0.10). Second, the
results shown in Table III suggest that only private family firms care more about their
stakeholders than their nonfamily counterparts; public family firms care less about
their stakeholders than other public firms. Thus, we only found support for H2 in private
family firms but not in public family firms. Finally, Table IV provides results regarding the
difference between the family firms-CSP relationship in public vs private family firms and
these results are consistent with those of the bivariate analysis.
Table V reports the results of our meta-regression analyses of country-level institutional
environment moderators. The results of Model 5.1 in Table V suggest that both corporate
 governance institutional-level variables, minority investor protection (pe ¼ −0.010; CSP in
p-value ⩽ 0.001) and anti-director rights (pe ¼ −0.086; p-value ⩽ 0.001), negatively family firms
moderate the relationship between family firms and governance-related CSP. Thus, we
found support for H3a. The results of Model 5.2 shown in Table II suggest that the
strictness of labor protection at the country level (pe ¼ −0.331; p-value ⩽ 0.05) negatively
moderates the relationship between family firms and employee-related CSP. Thus, we found
support for H3b. The results of Model 5.3 suggest that the moderating effect of the

Variables Internal stakeholders External stakeholders All effect sizes

Family Ownership + Family Management 0.074** 0.005 0.037*

Family Ownership −0.043**** −0.006 −0.022
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Family Management (or Board Involvement) −0.037 0.017 −0.016

Other 0.032 0.023 0.033****
Audit T22.1 (m) 0.039 (76) 0.013 (104) 0.020 (245)
Table II.
Disclosure T22.2 (m) 0.021 (44) 0.008 (27) 0.028 (68)
2 No intercept meta-
Values T2.3 (m) 0.029 (47) 0.022 (18) 0.019 (71) regression results for
K 50 38 78 each stakeholder
Notes: m, number of effect sizes; T22 construct-level random-effects variance component; K, number of group (standardized
statistically independent samples. *p ⩽ 0.05; **p ⩽ 0.01; ***p ⩽ 0.001; ****p ⩽ 0.10 coefficients shown)

Variables Public family firms Private family firms All family firms

Community −0.021* 0.083** 0.026

Consumer 0.001 0.008 0.048**
Employees −0.037*** 0.109*** 0.012
Environment −0.047*** 0.052**** 0.002
Governance −0.089*** 0.090** −0.037*
Overall −0.050*** 0.208* −0.001
Suppliers n/a 0.089**** 0.046 Table III.
Audit T22.1 (m) 0.016 (191) 0.018 (56) 0.019 (245) No intercept meta-
regression results for
Disclosure T22.2 (m) 0.009 (58) 0.039 (10) 0.029 (68)
studies based on
Values T22.3 (m) n/a 0.018 (69) 0.030 (71) public and private
K 38 40 78 family firms
Notes: m, number of effect sizes; T22, construct-level random-effects variance component; K, number of (standardized
statistically independent samples. *p ⩽ 0.05; **p ⩽ 0.01; ***p ⩽ 0.001; ****p ⩽ 0.10 coefficients shown)

Variables All studies

Public Family Firms −0.081***

Private Family Firms 0.070***
Management T22.1 (m) 0.011 (88)
Ownership T22.2 (m) 0.013 (105) Table IV.
No intercept meta-
Management and Ownership T22.3 (m) 0.018 (135)
regression results for
Other T22.4 (m) 0.021 (56) public and private
K 78 family firms
Notes: m, number of effect sizes; T22, construct-level random-effects variance component; K, number of (standardized
statistically independent samples. *p ⩽ 0.05; **p ⩽ 0.01; ***p ⩽ 0.001; ****p ⩽ 0.10 coefficients shown)
 JFBM Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4
Variables Governance Employees Environment All studies

Minority Investor Protection −0.010*** −0.003

Anti-Director Rights −0.086*** −0.018*
Employment Protection Strictness −0.331* 0.018
Environmental Policy Stringency 0.055 −0.071***
Future Orientation 0.575*** −0.677*** 0.050 −0.002
Uncertainty Avoidance −0.286*** −0.294*** −0.071 −0.032
Public −0.075** 0.190* −0.042 −0.014***
Publication Bias −0.016 0.341*** −0.049 0.033***
GDP 0.000**** −0.000*** −0.000 0.000*
Common Law −0.211* −0.603 0.019 0.112****
Data Source Controls Included Included Included Included
Management T22.1 (m) 0.002 (14) 0.000 (22) 0.000 (7) 0.000 (70)
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Table V. Ownership T22.2 (m) 0.000 (21) 0.001 (13) 0.005 (15) 0.010 (59)
No intercept meta- 2
Management and Ownership T2.3 (m) 0.010 (14) 0.176 (26) 0.000 (13) 0.019 (68)
regression results for
institutional Other T22.4 (m) 0.041 (7) 0.000 (9) 0.002 (15) 0.018 (30)
environment variables K 22 18 21 44
(standardized Notes: m, number of effect sizes; T22, construct-level random-effects variance component; K, number of
coefficients shown) statistically independent samples. *p ⩽ 0.05; **p ⩽ 0.01; ***p ⩽ 0.001; ****p ⩽ 0.10

stringency of a country’s environmental policy (pe ¼ 0.055; p-value W0.10) is not

statistically significant. Thus, we failed to find support for H3c. The results of Model 5.4
suggest that neither future orientation (pe ¼ −0.010; p-value ⩽ 0.001) nor uncertainty
avoidance significantly moderate the relationship between family firms and CSP. Thus, we
did not find evidence in support of H4 and H5 regarding the moderating effect of the
country-level cultural dimensions.

5. Discussion
Examining CSP in family firms, we categorized family firms into four categories based on
the presence of members of the owning family on the firm’s ownership and management
structure. We found that both family ownership and family management should be present
in order for the relationship between family firms and CSP to be positive. We also found that
only private family firms achieve greater CSP than their nonfamily counterparts; the CSP of
public family firms is lower than the CSP of other public firms.
Regarding the influence of the source of data on the family firms-CSP relationship, we
found a positive relationship when data from audits, proxy variables, and surveys was used,
and a negative relationship when data from content analysis and reputation ratings was used.
This finding is noteworthy because CSP data from audits, proxy variables, and surveys is
considered to be more objective than CSP data from content analysis and reputation ratings
(Wang et al., 2016). The negative relationship between family firms and CSP reported by
studies based on reputation rankings data could be explained by two reasons. First, there may
be a negative bias against family firms by members of society who perceive them as obscure
and exploitative toward minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Second, it may be that
reputation data are most often used to assess the CSP of public firms and is less often used to
assess the CSP of private firms. The fact that the relationship between family firms and CSP is
negative for effect sizes obtained from studies that used content analysis data to measure CSP
variables can be explained by two potential reasons. First, it may be that family firms are less
adept at reporting information about their CSP processes and outcomes. Second, it may be
that family firms are more reluctant to point up their CSP, which they may view as a moral
obligation rather than something to brag about.
 5.1 Research implications CSP in
Our meta-analysis provides insights into how the use of different definitions of family family firms
firms can influence the results of empirical studies. As explained in the previous section,
we found that the family firms-CSP relationship is positive only when family firms are
defined as simultaneously family owned and family managed firms, as opposed to only
family owned or family managed firms. These results are in line with those of previous
meta-analyses such as Arregle et al. (2017) who reported that family firms engage in
significantly less internationalization only when researchers define family firms as
simultaneously family owned and family managed. We contribute to a growing body of
literature that provides evidence suggesting that the operationalization of family firms
used in research studies has an impact on the results obtained. Future research studies
may benefit from: including definitions of family firms that require both family ownership
and family management; while also including definitions of family firms based only on
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either family ownership or family management. Researchers can subsequently compare

the results of both definitions of family firms and test whether different definitions of
family firms lead to different results.
Our finding that public family firms have a lower CSP than other public firms while
private family firms have a higher CSP than other private firms suggests that the stock
market has a negative effect on the CSP of family firms. Although recent research studies
have studied how the presence of other ownership types influences the CSP of family firms
(Berrone et al., 2010; Kabbach de Castro et al., 2017; Lamb and Butler, 2016), further research
is needed to expand our understanding of how other ownership types interact with family
ownership and management. Future research should clarify how the stock market can exert
influence on the CSP of family firms, and whether variables such as share turnover ratio,
investor activism, and poison pills influence the CSP of public family firms differently than
they influence the CSP of other public firms. Are differences between how stock market
related variables predict the CSP of public family firms vs how stock market related
variables predict the CSP of other public firms explained by firm-level differences or are
these differences explained by the particular way in which stock markets approach public
family firms? Beyond the effect of the stock market, what characteristics unique to public
family firms can explain why public family firms have lower CSP than other public firms?
Similarly, what differences between private and public family firms predict the difference in
the CSP of private vs public family firms? What role do differences in family generation, the
presence of the founder, or equity ownership dispersion play in explaining differences in the
CSP of private vs public family firms? What lessons can public family firms learn from
private family firms that may help public family firms improve their CSP? Addressing some
of these questions will likely require the use of balanced samples that include data on both
public and private family firms.

5.2 Managerial implications

The differences in the results stemming from differences in the sources of data have
important implications for managers and practitioners. The relationship between family
firms and CSP is positive for studies that used data from social audits, surveys, and proxy
variables and is negative for studies that used content analysis as a source of data to
measure CSP variables. This implies that family firms should improve how they
communicate information about their CSP processes and outcomes to internal and external
stakeholders. Family firms need to become more proficient at communicating information
about their CSP efforts in their marketing materials and corporate reports. Informing the
public about the firm’s CSP can benefit family firms by improving corporate reputation as
well as the firm’s attractiveness as an employer (Turban and Greening, 1997). Relaying
information about the family firm’s CSP through internal communication channels can help
 JFBM motivate internal stakeholders such as stockholders and employees. This may require
hiring employees who are skilled at measuring, tracking, and reporting data on the firm’s
CSP processes and outcomes. It may also involve training of current employees on how to
measure and transmit CSP information.
We also found that the relationship between family firms and CSP is negative for studies
based on reputation rankings data. Although studies that used more objective CSP
measures, such as social audits or proxy variables (Wang et al., 2016), report a positive
relationship between family firms and CSP, studies based on reputation rankings report a
negative relationship. Negative stereotypes regarding the CSP of family firms may be one of
the underlying causes of the low CSP scores assigned to family firms in reputation rankings.
Family firms should work to change the public perception of family firms and address
negative stereotypes. Educating the public about the evidence of the higher CSP of family
firms vis-à-vis other firms is an important step in this direction. Efforts to improve public
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perceptions about the CSP of family firms can be carried out through firm-level initiatives or
through joint efforts using business associations and institutes. Countrywide as well as
state- or regional-level family firm associations, institutes and centers, can be effective
vehicles for family firms to work collectively to educate various stakeholder groups on the
CSP of family firms. Industry associations in industries predominantly composed of family
firms can also help educate the public on the empirical evidence of the CSP of family firms.
Although our results suggest that there is some truth to popular culture stereotypes
regarding the negative CSP of family firms, this only holds true for publicly traded family
firms. Distinguishing between private and public family firms can benefit most family firms,
since the vast majority of family firms are privately owned. Developing a brand image and
social identity as private family firms, and not just family firms, may also be beneficial to
private family firms.

5.3 Social and policy implications

Our finding that family firms can help fill the institutional void caused by weak labor or
investor protection by formal institutions draws attention to a social benefit of family firms
that is often overlooked. Our framework complements previous frameworks in the family
business literature (i.e. Carney and Nason, 2018) and helps explain seemingly
counterintuitive results such as Essen et al.’s (2015) who found that the CSP of family
firms is higher in institutional environments with weaker labor laws and regulations.
Similarly, the counterintuitive results of Cruz et al. (2014) that suggest that family firms are
less socially responsible than nonfamily firms can be explained through the firm-, study-,
and country-level boundary conditions for the relationship between family firms and CSP
suggested by this meta-analysis. The results of the study by Cruz et al. (2014) are less
counterintuitive when considering that they are based on a sample of large publicly traded
firms, using CSP ratings data, and in countries with a strong regulatory environment.
By examining when family firms care more about their stakeholders, our meta-analysis can
help explain some of the inconsistent results in the family business literature.
The results of our meta-analysis also have important policy implications. Because family
ownership has the weakest relationship with CSP of all operationalization types of family
firms studied in this meta-analysis, absentee ownership of family firms should be
discouraged. Despite the argument that the separation of ownership and control can lead to
improved financial performance in modern corporations, the evidence provided in this study
suggests that the separation of ownership and control in family firms may not be optimal
from a social perspective. The recent increase in the importance of CSP as a measure of
performance makes questions regarding the efficiency of the separation of ownership and
control in family firms more relevant for policymakers. Policy can play a role in encouraging
family owners to remain involved in the management of family firms. Policy options include
 providing: incentives for family firms in which members of the owning family are involved CSP in
in managing the firm; and/or penalties for family firms in which members of the owning family firms
family are not involved in managing the firm.
Tax policy can encourage family firms to remain private. For example, estate taxes can
be reduced for equity holdings in private family firms and can be increased for equity
holdings in public family firms. Increasing tax benefits to private family firms may also
incentivize family owners to keep their firms private. For example, reduced estate tax rates
can be granted to inheriting family owners who have been involved in the management of
the family firm for a certain number of years. Alternatively, tax deductions can be granted
to inheriting family owners who remain involved in the management of the family firm for a
certain number of years.

6. Conclusion
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The family business literature provides theoretical arguments for and against the
hypothesis that family firms care more about their stakeholders. A large number of
empirical studies have studied the relationship between family firms and CSP. Even though
a large amount of empirical evidence has accumulated in recent years, the results of the
studies fail to provide a conclusive answer as to whether the CSP of family firms is higher
than the CSP of nonfamily firms. We synthesized the existing empirical evidence through a
meta-analysis of 98 studies from 27 countries. We found that the relationship between
family firms and CSP is positive, but it differs significantly across firm types,
operationalization types of the family firm and CSP constructs, sources of data, world
regions and institutional environments. The various boundary conditions identified in this
meta-analysis also yield significant managerial, research and policy implications.

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Corresponding author
Sergio Canavati can be contacted at: [email protected]
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Table AI.

meta-analysis
Characteristics of
studies included in the
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables
Appendix

Abdullah Malaysia 2007 100 Annual reports Board gender diversity Family board presence binary
(2014) variable
Abdullah et al. Malaysia 2007 100 Authors CSR disclosure index; Number of CSR Family board presence (%)
(2011) calculations pages in annual report
Adams et al. USA n/a 544 Structured Has a code of ethics binary variable Family controlling ownership binary
(1996) interview data variable
Amann et al. Japan 2007–2009 196 CSR Directory of Employment and human resource Family management or board
(2012) Japanese Toyo management; Environmental presence binary variable
Keizai protection; Corporate governance;
Social contributions
Aoi et al. Japan 2007–2009 2,026 Toyo Keizai Employment and human resource Family ownership (%)
(2012) Shinpousha management; Social contributions;
Security and product safety; internal
governance and risk management;
environment; Composite CSP
Atkinson and USA 1981–1982 69 Case study of Annual total tax-deductible cash Percentage of stock owned by the
Galaskiewicz companies in St contributions single largest family group
(1988) Paul and
Minneapolis
Metro in
Minnesota
Belak et al. Slovenia n/a 49 Survey Reward system based on ethical Family majority ownership and
(2012) standards; Non-ethical behavior of enterprise is perceived by top
employees is punished; manager to be a family enterprise
Communication of stories about binary variable
ethical employees
Berrone et al. USA 1998–2002 194 EPA Toxic Emissions measure using the Human Family ownership ⩾5% binary
(2010) Release Toxicity Potential (reverse coded) variable
Inventory

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Bingham et al. USA 1991–2005 4,663 KLD Community strengths; Diversity Sum of 8 family involvement binary
(2011) strengths; Employee Relations variables; Sum of 3 founder
strengths; Human Rights Strengths; involvement binary variables
Product strengths; Community
weaknesses; Diversity weaknesses;
Employee Relations weaknesses;
Human Rights weaknesses; Product
weaknesses
Block and USA 1993–2003 1,472 KLD Community-Sum of strengths and Family ownership (%); Founder
Wagner (2014) concerns; Diversity-Sum of strengths ownership (%); Family CEO binary
and concerns; Emp. Relations-Sum of variable; Founder CEO binary
strengths and concerns; Ecological- variable
Sum of strengths and concerns;
Product-Sum of strengths and
concerns
Block (2010) USA 1994–2003 2,638 Annual reports Change in workforce (%) Family CEO or chairman binary
variable; Family ownership (%)
Block et al. Germany 714 WCA of annual Economic dimension of CSR; Social Family management or board
(2015) reports dimension of CSR; Environmental presence binary variable
dimension of CSR; Stakeholder
dimension of CSR; Philanthropic
dimension of CSR; CSR corporate
culture; length of the CSR mission
statement
Blodgett et al. USA 2006 98 WCA of Social responsibility; Honesty; Family control of ownership and
(2011) corporate mission Environmentalism; Fairness management involvement binary
statements variable
Blombäck et Sweden 2010 254 Annual reports Value statement binary variable Family largest shareholder, voting
al. (2011) shares ownership ⩾20%, and
management and/or board presence
binary variable; Family board

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

presence binary variable; Family

TMT presence binary variable
Cabeza García Spain 2004–2010 733 Annual reports Abides by ILO Declaration on Family ownership ⩾10% binary
et al. (2014) Fundamental Principles and Rights at variable; Family CEO or chairman
Work; Social or environmental binary variable; Founder ownership
information included in annual report binary variable
binary variable; Provides GRI report
binary variable; Social or
environmental information included in
annual report binary variable OR
provides GRI report binary variable;
Social or environmental information
included in annual report binary
variable AND provides GRI report
binary variable
Cabrera Spain 2001–2002 112 Survey Influence of environmental defenders 2nd generation firm binary variable;
Suárez and on the firms’ goal achievement; 3rd generation or greater firm binary
Santana Influence of suppliers on the firms’ variable
Martín (2003) goal achievement; Influence of
customers on the firms’ goal
achievement; Influence of employees
on the firms’ goal achievement
Campopiano Italy 2011 98 WCA of CSR Values and general interests; Family ownership ⩾10% and TMT
and De Massis reports Environmental and ‘Green’ issues; presence binary variable
(2015) Processes and products/services;
General issues on stakeholder
management; Philanthropy
Campopiano Italy 2012 136 E-mail survey of Perception of relevance of CSR Family ownership (%); Ratio of
(2012) SMEs in (knowledge of the CSR definition family managers to family
Lombardy region binary variable) employees; Number of family owners;
First generation family binary

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

variable; Second generation family

binary variable
Campopiano et Italy 19 Survey Socially responsible evaluation criteria Family ownership and management
al. (2012) to select suppliers in order to verify binary variable
the fairness of the suppliers’ processes
binary variable; Provides flexible
work hours
Campopiano et Italy 2014 148 E-mail survey of Philanthropic initiative in the past Family ownership (%); Number of
al. (2014) SMEs in year binary variable family owners; Family managers and
Lombardy region employees (%)
Cheng et al. USA 1996–2011 7,640 KLD Total CSR scores across seven issue Family members managers,
(2016) areas (sum of strengths and concerns); directors, or blockholders binary
CSR scores in employee relations and variable
corporate governance dimensions
(internal); CSR scores in community
relations, diversity, environment,
human rights, and product dimensions
(external)
Chrisman et al. USA 2007 216,768 Survey of Benefits index (sum of firm offers Family majority ownership binary
(2017) business owners health insurance, retirement benefits, variable
and paid holidays to employees)
Craig and USA n/a 396 Survey of Environmental policy Family ownership and/or
Dibrell (2006) businesses management binary variable
Cruz et al. Europe 2008–2012 1,771 CSRHub ratings Governance; Employees; Family or individual ownership
(2014) Environment; Community; Customers ⩾20% and board presence binary
variable
Cuadrado- 13 developed countries 2003–2009 3,086 CSR reports Quality and quantity of CSR Family ownership ⩾10% binary
Ballesteros et indicators shown by companies variable
al. (2015)

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CSP in

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Cui et al. USA 2003–2010 2,950 KLD CSR score (strengths – weaknesses); Family ownership (%); Family CEO
(2016) CSR strengths score; CSR concerns binary variable; Family chairman
score binary variable; Family board
members (%)
Deephouse 8 countries 2007 194 RepTrak™ Pulse Corporate reputation index Family name in firm name binary
and Jaskiewicz variable; Family ownership (%);
(2013) Family board presence binary
variable
Dekker and Australia 2007–2009 2,817 Business Environmental performance focus: Family firm binary variable
Hasso (2016) longitudinal “To what extent did this business
database focus on the following when assessing
overall business performance:
environmental measures?”
Delgado‐ Spain 2000–2007 361 MERCO Corporate reputation (economic Family or individual largest owner
García et al. performance, product quality, culture binary variable
(2010) and workplace quality, ethics and
corporate social responsibility,
international and global presence, and
innovation)
Delmas and USA 2014 281 Survey of Percentage of production that is Family ownership binary variable;
Gergaud California eco-certified Heir succession intention binary
(2014) Wineries variable
Ding and Wu USA 2003 622 2003 SSBF Corporate misconduct (I reverse Family ownership binary variable
(2014) (Board of coded it)
Governors of the
Federal Reserve)
Ding et al. 61 Countries 1999–2000 2,285 World Business Contract value paid in bribes (%) Major decisions are controlled by a
(2016) Environment (reverse-coded) family binary variable
Survey

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Dou et al. China 2009 2,821 Survey Firms’ donation amount Family ownership (%);
(2014) Transgenerational intentions binary
variable; Count of family CEO and
board members; Duration of family
control (age of the private firm)
Ducassy and France 2011 41 French Corporate Overall CFIE rating (out of 100) Family largest shareholder binary
Montandrau Information variable
(2015) Center Ratings
Duh et al. Slovenia 49 In-depth case Positive attitude toward core values Family majority ownership and
(2010) studies with ethical content; Caring climate perceived control binary variable
Dyer and USA 1991–2000 2,610 KLD CSR strengths; Community strengths; Classified as a family firm by
Whetten Diversity strengths; Employee BusinessWeek binary variable
(2006) strengths; Environmental strengths; (significant ownership and/or
Non-US operations strengths; Product management/board presence)
strengths; Other strengths; CSR
concerns; Community concerns;
Diversity concerns; Employee
concerns; Environmental concerns;
Non-U.S. operations concerns; Product
concerns; Other concerns
Elbaz and Morocco 60 Phone survey CSR orientation (discussion of CSR Family involvement degree index
Laguir (2014) principles) (ownership, managerial and
intergenerational)
File and Prince USA 1994 478 Survey Philanthropy as opposed to cause Family owner binary variable
(1995) related marketing
Galbreath Australia 2012 300 GES CSR ratings Environmental dimension, social Family ownership ⩾20% binary
(2017) dimension variable
Garcés Ayerbe Spain 2010 1,916 Encuesta sobre Environmental investment Family control or management
et al. (2014) Estrategias (investment on pollution control binary variable
Empresariales equipment)

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Gavana et al. Italy 2004–2013 2,300 WCA of Environmental info sub-index Family CEO binary variable; Family
(2017) sustainability disclosure; Society sub-index ownership (%); Family name in
reports disclosure; Labor practices sub-index company name binary variable;
disclosure; Product responsibility sub- Presence of the founder binary
index disclosure; Human rights variable; Multiple family board
respect sub-index disclosure members binary variable
Greenwood et Spain 1994-2000 4,495 Encuesta Sobre Employee downsizing binary variable Family active in management binary
al. (2010) Estrategias (reverse-coded it) variable
Empresariales
Herrera Spain 2010–2011 509 Company reports Has a social responsibility code Family majority ownership binary
Madueño et al. or report variable
(2013)
Herrera Spain 2010–2011 480 Survey of Murcia Ethical reasons for implementing Manager perceives company as
Madueño et al. SMEs socially responsible practices; Social family firm, family ownership ⩾50%,
(2014) and environmental values are more and family board members binary
important than profitability; variable
Employee satisfaction and motivation
as reasons for implementing socially
responsible practices; Customer
satisfaction as a reason for
implementing socially responsible
practices; Improving supplier
relationships as a
reason for implementing socially
responsible practices; Community
relations reasons for implementing
socially responsible practices;
Attention to employee demands as a
reason for implementing socially
responsible practices

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Herrera Spain 2010–2011 509 Survey of Murcia Socially responsible practices toward Family majority ownership binary
Madueño et al. SMEs clients; Socially responsible practices variable
(2016) toward suppliers; Environmental
responsible practices; Corporate
governance responsible practices
Hirigoyen and Europe, North America, 2001–2010 363 Vigeos database Overall CSR score; Human resources; Family ⩾5% ownership and family
Poulain-Rehm and Asia-Pacific Human rights; Corporate governance; firm and has served in management
(2014) Community involvement; binary variable
Environment; Business Behavior
Huang et al. USA 2008–2012 3,880 Glassdoor Employee satisfaction Family ⩾33% ownership and
(2015) executive or board presence binary
variable; Founder ⩾33% ownership
and executive or board presence
binary variable
Huang et al. China 2004–2007 673 WCA of Annual Product focused proactive Family ownership ⩾10% binary
(2014) Reports environmental management practices; variable; Family ownership >20%
Process focused proactive binary variable
environmental management practices;
EMA index of environmental mission
statements and policies; employee
training; and establishment of an
environmental department
Huang et al. Taiwan 2004–2007 640 Company reports Environmental capabilities index of Family ownership (%); Percentage of
(2016) ten environmental management family board members
practices
Iyer and USA 2010 397 Sustainability Sustainability report issued binary Family owned or controlled as
Lulseged reports from the variable reported in BusinessWeek binary
(2013) GRI disclosure variable
database

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Kabbach de UK, Germany and 2007 227 Annual reports Noncompliance index: Sum of Family ownership (%) 1-year lagged
Castro et al. Spain noncompliance with shareholder
(2017) proposals in six governance categories
(reverse-coded it).
Kashmiri and USA 2002–2006 650 KLD Social strengths; Social weaknesses Family ownership (%)
Mahajan
(2010)
Kashmiri and USA 2000–2009 2,750 KLD Social strengths; Social weaknesses Family ownership ⩾5% and
Mahajan executive and/or board presence
(2014) binary variable
Kashmiri USA 2001, 2008 685 KLD Employee strengths; Employee Family ownership (%); Family name
(2012) weaknesses; Social strengths; Social on company binary variable; Family
weaknesses; Product strengths; CEO or chairman binary variable
Product weaknesses; Product
strengths; Product weaknesses
Kashmiri USA 2005–2007 1,294 KLD Product strengths; Product Family name on company; Family
(2012) weaknesses management involvement binary
variable
Khan et al. Fiji 2009–2010 6 WCA of Annual Social Disclosure (Number of Family ownership binary variable
(2013) Reports Sentences); Environmental Disclosure
(Number of Sentences)
Kim et al. USA 1996–2005 601 KLD; WCA of Proactive environmental actions; Family management and ownership
(2017) letters to TMT attention to natural binary variable; Lone-founder firm
shareholders environmental issues binary variable
Labelle et al. Multiple countries 2008 1,264 SiriPro Ratings Aggregate CSR score Family ownership ⩾10% binary
(2018) variable; Family largest owner at the
10% threshold binary variable;
Family blockholder votes (%);
Founder is CEO or chairman
binary variable

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Laguir and France 2005-2011 68 Authors Social performance index Family largest owner and family
Elbaz (2014) calculations CEO binary variable
Laguir et al. Morocco n/a 20 WCA of in-depth Health and Safety; Social partnership Family majority decision-making
(2016) interviews of and dialog; Training; Fair rights binary variable; One or more
CEOs compensation; Fight against family manager; Family own >25%
discrimination; Work-life balance; of voting rights binary variable
Pollution reduction; Waste Treatment;
Preservation of natural resources;
Environmental management systems;
Environmental labeling and
certification; Protection of
biodiversity; Support of local
communities; Philanthropy; Quality
labels/management; Innovations to
solve social or environmental issues;
All of the above
Lamb and USA 1994–2006 1,478 KLD CSR Strengths; CSR concerns Family ownership ⩾5% and family
Butler (2016) management presence binary
variable; Family CEO binary
variable; Founding family binary
variable
Landry et al. Canada 2004–2008 551 CSID CSR ratings CSR overall rating Family/founder largest shareholder
(2013) (now and holds ⩾20% voting rights binary
Sustainalytics, by variable
MJRA SiRi)
Lee and USA n/a 231 Survey Importance of contributing to our Family ownership and two or more
Rogoff (1996) society as a goal of the firm family employees binary variable
Li et al. (2015) China 2009 1,923 Annual reports Amount of charitable donations Family chairman or CEO binary
variable; Family ownership (%)
Litz and USA 1995 307 Survey of small Community involvement Expects firm to be owned and
Stewart (2000) hardware stores managed in future by family

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

López- UK, Germany, France, 2000–2004 2,426 Dow Jones Listed in DJSI binary variable Family largest owner binary variable
Iturriaga and Italy and Spain Sustainability
López-de- Index
Foronda
(2009)
Marques et al. Spain 2011–2012 12 Case study Number of CSR actions; Workplace Family ownership (%); Family
(2014) CSR ranking; Marketplace CSR management (%); Family CEO
ranking; Environment CSR ranking; binary variable; Family generation
Community CSR ranking
Martín Spain 2015 123 Survey of Carries out actions related to CSR (ten- Family enterprise binary variable
Castejón and managers point Likert scale); CSR report binary
Aroca López variable
(2016)
Martin et al. USA 2001–2010 633 Corporate CSR-oriented shareholder proposal Family ties, ownership and board
(2017) Library’s Board success presence binary variable; Family
Analyst database CEO binary variable; Founder
involvement binary variable;
Founder not involved binary variable
Martínez- 20 countries 2002–2010 9,594 EIRIS ratings CSR overall rating; Socio-Labor CSR Family largest shareholder and
Ferrero et al. index; Environmental CSR index ⩾10% ownership binary variable
(2015)
Martínez- 20 countries 2002–2010 9,594 EIRIS ratings CSR average index Family largest shareholder and
Ferrero et al. ⩾10% ownership binary variable
(2016)
McGuire et al. USA 2000 473 KLD CSR strengths; CSR weaknesses Firm listed in Family Business
(2012) Magazine’s 100 Largest Family
Businesses or family ⩾5% ownership
and management
binary variable
Miller et al. South Korea 2004 170 Survey of high Organizational commitment to Family largest owner and influenced
(2009) tech companies employees decision-making binary variable

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Muttakin and Bangladesh 2005–2009 580 Authors CSR disclosure index Family ownership (%)
Khan (2014) calculations
Muttakin and India 2007–2011 493 Authors CSR disclosure index Controlling family/founder
Subramaniam calculations ownership (%)
(2015)
Neubaum et al. USA and Australia n/a 221 Survey Stewardship climate Family ownership or management
(2017)
O’Boyle et al. USA 2007 526 American Family Ethical focus index Family ownership (%); Family
(2010) Business Survey participation index (management and
transgenerational intentions); Family
values congruency
Piedra-Muñoz Spain 2014–2015 55 Survey of Efficiency of water usage index: Sum Number of generations that have run
et al. (2018) intensive of (1) water use environmental the family farm; Farmer thinks the
greenhouse certification (5 point scale), (2) water next generation will inherit the family
family farms in use efficiency plan binary variable, farm binary variable
Almería and (3) improvement, innovation or
new technology for reducing water use
binary variable
Rees and 46 countries 2002–2012 23,902 ASSET4 ESG Social CSR index; Environmental CSR Family Ownership (%)
Rodionova data index; Governance CSR index
(2015)
Rees (2011) 56 countries 2002–2010 19,360 ASSET4 Social ESG scores; Environmental Employee/family holdings ⩾10%
ESG scores; Governance ESG scores
Reid and Northern Ireland 219 Survey Negotiates with trade unions on pay Family own >50% and active in
Adams (2001) and conditions binary variable management binary variable
Richards et al. USA, Canada, UK and 2013 86 Computer-aided Investment in sustainability Individual or family ownership
(2017) Ireland, Italy, Germany, text analysis of certifications (UTZ Certified, the ⩾15% binary variable; First
Switzerland, the archived website Rainforest Alliance and/or Fairtrade generation family ownership ⩾15%
Netherlands and content International) binary variable; Family main
Scandinavia blockholder for at least two
generations binary variable

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Table AI.
Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Rodríguez- Canada, Denmark, 2004–2010 2,583 Ethical CSR score (non-weighted sum of all Family ownership ⩾10%
Ariza et al. Finland, France, Investment items)
(2017) Germany, Italy, the Research Service
Netherlands, Spain, (EIRIS)
Sweden, UK and USA
Singal and USA 1991–2011 10,375 MSCI’s ESG Diversity strengths; Diversity Family board presence binary
Gerde (2015) (KLD) weaknesses; Diversity average variable
Singal (2014) USA 1991–2011 580 MSCI’s ESG Overall CSR score; CSR strengths; CSR Family ownership and board
(KLD) Weaknesses presence binary variable
Song et al. China 2008–2009 1,881 Survey of Donations to sales ratio; Ratio of Family own >50% and have
(2015) Chinese Private expenditure on labor protection to firm transgenerational intention binary
Enterprises sales variable
Stavrou et al. USA 2000–2002 540 KLD Generous giving; Innovative giving; Family ownership and control binary
(2007) Downsizing layoff ratio; Family variable
benefits; Cash profit sharing;
Employee involvement; Strong
retirement benefits
Testera Spain 2008 109 GRI CSR reports Transparency index: Sum of 130 Family largest owner binary variable
Fuertes and WCA binary variables that indicate whether
Cabeza García the company reports on each item
(2013) suggested by the GRI
Uhlaner et al. The Netherlands 2008 382 Survey of family Environmentally sustainable Family ownership binary variable
(2010) firms entrepreneurship index
Uhlaner et al. The Netherlands 2006, 2008 689 Survey of family Environmental management practices Family influence index of ownership,
(2012) firms index family management, and
transgenerational intentions
Uhlaner et al. The Netherlands 1999–2000 40 WCA of in-depth Supplier CSR Later generation family firms
(2004) interviews

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Time Sample
Author(s) Country period size Source of data CSP measurement variables Family measurement variables

Wagner (2010) USA 1993–2003 3,697 KLD Firm pursues innovation with high Fam firm per BusinessWeek list; Fam
social benefits binary variable; CSR firm per BusinessWeek list
score
Webb (2004) USA 2000–2001 788 DSI DSI Listed Family CEO binary variable; Family
board members binary variable
Yu et al. (2015) Taiwan 2007–2012 229 Report on Corporate governance rating; Long- Family board chair binary variable
Excellence in term commitment rating, Social
CSR participation rating; Environmental
protection rating
Zachary et al. USA 2003–2007 224 WCA of annual Long-term focus Family/founder management/board
(2011) reports presence binary variable
Zhang et al. China 2008 542 Annual reports Philanthropic giving activities toward Ownership of largest shareholder (%)
(2012) the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in
China
Zhou (2014) China 2010 351 Survey CSR to outsiders values/recognition; Family ownership (%); Family
CSR to insiders values/recognition; commitment
CSR to the public values/recognition
family firms
CSP in

Table AI.