NuScale Standard Plant

Design Certification Application

Chapter Four
Reactor

PART 2 - TIER 2
Revision 5
July 2020
©2020, NuScale Power LLC. All Rights Reserved
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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 4 REACTOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.1-1

4.1 Summary Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-1
4.1.1 Reactor Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-1
4.1.2 Load Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-3
4.2 Fuel System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-1
4.2.1 Design Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-1
4.2.2 Description and Design Drawings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-10
4.2.3 Design Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-14
4.2.4 Testing and Inspection Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-29
4.2.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-35
4.3 Nuclear Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-1
4.3.1 Design Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-1
4.3.2 Nuclear Design Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-5
4.3.3 Analytical Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-24
4.3.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-26
4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-1
4.4.1 Design Basis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-1
4.4.2 Description of Thermal and Hydraulic Design of the Reactor Core . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-2
4.4.3 Description of the Thermal and Hydraulic Design of the Reactor Coolant
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-12
4.4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-16
4.4.5 Testing and Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-21
4.4.6 Instrumentations Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-22
4.4.7 Flow Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-23
4.4.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-26
4.5 Reactor Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-1
4.5.1 Control Rod Drive System Structural Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-1
4.5.2 Reactor Internals and Core Support Structure Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-3
4.5.3 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-5
4.6 Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-1
4.6.1 Description of the Control Rod Drive System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-1
4.6.2 Evaluations of the Control Rod Drive System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-3

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

4.6.3 Testing and Verification of the Control Rod Drive System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-5
4.6.4 Information for Combined Performance of Reactivity Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-5
4.6.5 Evaluations of Combined Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-6

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report List of Tables

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1-1: NuScale Reactor Design Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-4

Table 4.1-2: NuScale Core Design Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-5
Table 4.1-3: NuScale Reactor Control Rod Assembly Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-6
Table 4.1-4: NuScale Core Design Analytical Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1-7
Table 4.2-1: Fuel Design Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-37
Table 4.2-2: Fuel Assembly Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-38
Table 4.2-3: Control Rod Design Parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-39
Table 4.3-1: NuScale Reactor Core Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-27
Table 4.3-2: Nuclear Design Parameters (for Equilibrium Cycle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-28
Table 4.3-3: Reactivity Requirements for Control Rods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-29
Table 4.3-4: Reactivity Requirements for Long Term Shutdown Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-30
Table 4.3-5: Modes of Operation Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-31
Table 4.3-6: Range of Doppler Coefficient for NuScale Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-32
Table 4.3-7: Individual Control Rod Assembly Worth with Control Rod Assemblies
Fully Withdrawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-33
Table 4.3-8: Individual Control Rod Assembly Worth with Regulating Groups Inserted
to Power Dependent Insertion Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-34
Table 4.3-9: Stability Indices for Axial Oscillation Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-35
Table 4.3-10: Stability Indices for Radial Oscillation due to Radial Perturbation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-36
Table 4.3-11: Stability Indices for Axial Oscillation due to Radial Perturbation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-37
Table 4.3-12: Typical Fast Neutron Flux Levels (n/cm2-sec) in the Reactor Core and
Reactor Pressure Vessel at Full Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-38
Table 4.4-1: Geometries of Reactor Coolant System Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-27
Table 4.4-2: Plant Reactor Design Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-28
Table 4.4-3: Applicable Ranges of Existing Critical Heat Flux Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-29
Table 4.4-4: Subchannel Methodology Parameter Biases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-30
Table 4.4-5: Summary of Reactor Coolant System Loop Flow Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-31
Table 4.4-6: Reactor Operating Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-32
Table 4.4-7: Void Fraction at Exit of Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-33
Table 4.4-8: Peak Fuel Pellet Temperatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-34
Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-35
Table 4.5-1: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-6
Table 4.5-2: Reactor Vessel Internal Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5-7

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report List of Figures

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.2-1: Fuel Assembly General Arrangement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-40

Figure 4.2-2: Top Nozzle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-41
Figure 4.2-3: Bottom Nozzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-42
Figure 4.2-4: Guide Tube Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-43
Figure 4.2-5: Guide Tube Quick Disconnect Top Nozzle Connection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-44
Figure 4.2-6: Cap Screw Bottom Nozzle Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-45
Figure 4.2-7: HTP™ Spacer Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-46
Figure 4.2-8: HTP™ Spacer Grid Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-47
Figure 4.2-9: HMP™ Spacer Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-48
Figure 4.2-10: Fuel Rod Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-49
Figure 4.2-11: Control Rod Assembly General Arrangement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-50
Figure 4.2-12: Control Rod Assembly Cut-Away . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-51
Figure 4.2-13: NuScale Control Rod Assembly Design. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-52
Figure 4.3-1: Loading Pattern for Reference Equilibrium Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-39
Figure 4.3-2: Power Dependent Insertion Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-40
Figure 4.3-3: Axial Offset Window. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-41
Figure 4.3-4: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at
Beginning of Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-42
Figure 4.3-5: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at
Middle of Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-43
Figure 4.3-6: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at
End of Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-44
Figure 4.3-7: Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Fuel Assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-45
Figure 4.3-8: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 1 Fuel
Assembly at Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-46
Figure 4.3-9: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 2 Fuel
Assembly at Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-47
Figure 4.3-10: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 3 Fuel
Assembly at Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-48
Figure 4.3-11: Assembly Radial Power Distribution at Beginning, Middle, and End of
Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-49
Figure 4.3-12: Axial Power Distribution at Beginning, Middle, and End of Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-50
Figure 4.3-13: Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity at Full Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-51
Figure 4.3-14: Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity at Zero Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-52

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.3-15: Maximum and Minimum Power Defect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-53

Figure 4.3-16: Maximum and Minimum Power Coefficient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-54
Figure 4.3-17: Boron Letdown Curve for Equilibrium Cycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-55
Figure 4.3-18: Control Rod and Incore Instrument Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-56
Figure 4.3-19: Differential Rod Worth at Beginning, Middle and End of Cycle from
0% to 100% Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-57
Figure 4.3-20: Integral Regulating Bank Worth for Withdrawal from the Power
Dependent Insertion Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-58
Figure 4.3-21: Boron Worth Coefficient. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-59
Figure 4.3-22: Flow Coefficient of Reactivity (Maximum and Minimum). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-60
Figure 4.3-23: Control Rod Position versus Time after Trip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-61
Figure 4.3-24: Reactivity Worth versus Control Rod Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-62
Figure 4.3-25: Cross-section view of MCNP6 Model for Vessel Irradiation Flux
Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3-63
Figure 4.3-26: Typical Axial Xenon Oscillation for 100% Power at Beginning of Cycle. . . . . . . . . . 4.3-64
Figure 4.4-1: Critical Heat Flux Ratio Limits and Thermal Margins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-40
Figure 4.4-2: Radial Power Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-41
Figure 4.4-3: Not Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-42
Figure 4.4-4: Maximum Rod Clad Outer Wall Temperature (F). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-43
Figure 4.4-5: Maximum Rod Heat Flux (MBtu/hr-ft2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-44
Figure 4.4-6: Average Channel Mass Flux (Mlbm/hr-ft2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-45
Figure 4.4-7: Maximum Channel Equilibrium Quality (fraction). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-46
Figure 4.4-8: Exit Channel Fluid Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-47
Figure 4.4-9: Analytical Design Operating Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-48
Figure 4.4-10: Not Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-49
Figure 4.4-11: Thermal Margin Limit Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-50
Figure 4.4-12: Illustration of the Geometry Representation for the Stability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 4.4-51
Figure 4.6-1: Overview of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Locations in Relation to
the Reactor Pressure Vessel and Containment Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-7
Figure 4.6-2: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Coils and Housings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-8
Figure 4.6-3: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Drive Coil and Cooling Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-9
Figure 4.6-4: Layout of Sensor Coil Assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-10
Figure 4.6-5: Overview of Latch Mechanism Assembly. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-11

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.6-6: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Drive Shaft Interface with Control Rod
Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6-12

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CHAPTER 4 REACTOR

4.1 Summary Description

The NuScale Power Module (NPM) is a self-contained nuclear steam supply system comprised
of a reactor core, a pressurizer, and two steam generators integrated within the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) and housed in a compact steel containment vessel.

This section provides a brief summary of the reactor and the reactor core designs, the fuel rod
and fuel assembly design, the core control and monitoring components, and the nuclear and
thermal-hydraulic design.

Table 4.1-1 presents a summary of the principal NuScale reactor design parameters. Table 4.1-2
presents the core and fuel assembly design parameters.

4.1.1 Reactor Overview

The reactor vessel internals (RVI) support the reactor core, the control rod assemblies
(CRAs), and the control rod drive shafts. The RVI channel the flow from the reactor core to
the steam generators within the RPV.

The core configuration consists of 37 fuel assemblies and 16 CRAs. The fuel used in the
NuScale design is NuFuel HTP2™. The NuScale fuel assembly design is a 17x17 design that is
approximately one-half the length of typical pressurized water reactor fuel. The assembly is
supported by five spacer grids, 24 guide tubes, and a top and bottom nozzle that together
provide the structural skeleton for the 264 fuel rods. Each fuel assembly has a central
instrument tube. The fuel is uranium dioxide (UO2) with gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3) as a
burnable absorber homogeneously mixed within the pellet in select locations.

A seamless M5® fuel rod cladding encapsulates ceramic UO2 pellets which are cylindrically
shaped with a spherical dish and chamfer at each end. Each fuel rod has an internal spring
system which axially restricts the position of the fuel stack within the rod. The upper end
cap has a grippable top-hat shape that allows for the removal of the fuel rods from the fuel
assembly if necessary. The fuel rods are pressurized with helium.

The core is surrounded by a stainless steel heavy neutron reflector which improves fuel
utilization by preventing the escape of neutrons radially from the core. The reflector also
provides the core envelope and directs the flow through the core.

Four HTP™ spacer grids occupy the top four grid positions of a fuel assembly and are
formed from interlocking strips that are welded at all intersections and welded to the side
plates. Each grid strap is made from a pair of strips welded back-to-back to produce flow
channels. The design creates a flow path that is slanted at its outlet creating a vortex flow
pattern under normal operating conditions. The spacer grid design provides line contact
with the rods, and an enhanced grid-to-rod interface with superior mechanical
performance. The bottom spacer grid is an HMP™ design made of Alloy 718 and is similar to
the top four grids with respect to spring design, rod-to-grid surface contact, and

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manufacturing processes. The bottom spacer grid, however, has enhanced strength and
resistance to relaxation and straight (non-mixing) flow channels.

The MONOBLOC™ guide tubes have a constant outer diameter and a reduced inner
diameter near the bottom of the tube that forms the guide tube dashpot. The reduced
inside diameter of the dashpot creates a hydraulic resistance to decelerate the CRA during
rod insertion resulting from a reactor trip. The added thickness in the dashpot of the guide
tube also increases the lateral stiffness of the fuel assembly.

The 304 stainless steel bottom nozzle consists of a cast frame of ribs connecting the guide
tube locations. The bottom nozzle includes a mesh filter plate that prevents debris from
entering the fuel assembly. The top nozzle consists of a machined stainless steel frame that
is attached to the guide tubes with quick disconnect features at each of the 24 guide tube
locations. The quick disconnect feature allows removal of the top nozzle to gain access to
the individual fuel rods if needed.

The fuel cycles are designed for a nominal 2-year length. Gadolinium oxide is used to
establish a favorable radial power distribution. The uranium enrichment of individual fuel
assemblies varies depending on the position of the fuel assembly in the core. Typically, the
assemblies with higher enrichment are placed on the periphery of the reactor core to lower
peaking factors. This “out-in” loading pattern is described in Section 4.3.

There are two independent means of reactivity control -- control rods and soluble boron.
The CRAs are organized in two banks: a regulating bank and a shutdown bank. The
shutdown bank, consisting of eight CRAs symmetrically located in the core, is used during
shutdown and reactor trip events. The shutdown bank is organized into two groups of four
CRAs each. The regulating bank with eight CRAs (also two groups of four CRAs each) is used
during normal plant operation to control reactivity. Each CRA contains 24 individual control
rods containing B4C and Ag-In-Cd (AIC) in the rod tip. The CRA parameters are provided in
Table 4.1-3. Movement of the control rod assemblies is provided by the control rod drive
system described in Section 3.9.4 and Section 4.6. The boron concentration is adjusted by
the chemical and volume control system. Control rods are used for rapid reactivity
adjustments and boron concentration is varied throughout the cycle to compensate for
fuel burnup.

The core is monitored by the neutron monitoring system (NMS) and the in-core
instrumentation system. The NMS is a safety-related instrumentation and controls system
that monitors neutron flux from reactor shutdown to full-rated power by the use of three
subsystems: 1) source range, 2) intermediate range, and 3) power range.

Neutron flux levels detected by the NMS are used by the module protection system (MPS)
to generate reactor protection trips, operating permissives, indication, and alarms for
various phases of reactor operation including shutdown conditions.

The in-core instrumentation system continuously monitors neutron flux (including axial
offset) within the core and inlet and outlet coolant temperature and provides the
parameter values to the module control system and post-accident monitoring system for
display and evaluation in the control room.

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Core exit temperature provides indication to the MPS as described in Section 7.0.4. The
number and location of core exit thermocouples ensure an accurate indication of core exit
temperature within each core quadrant.

The thermal-hydraulic design analyses establish that adequate heat transfer is provided
between the fuel clad and the reactor coolant. The thermal design takes into account local
variations in dimensions, power generation, flow distribution, and mixing. The
thermal-hydraulic design is described in Section 4.4.

The NuScale reactor is inherently stable with respect to xenon stability as described in
Section 4.3.2 and with respect to thermal-hydraulic stability as described in Section 4.4.7.

A description of the performance and safety functions of the reactor vessel internals is
presented in Section 3.9.5.

The analytical techniques used in Chapter 4 are summarized in Table 4.1-4 and are
discussed in more detail in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4.

4.1.2 Load Conditions

The fuel assembly component evaluations demonstrate that the primary stresses are lower
than the material allowable stresses for both normal operation and faulted conditions for
all evaluated components. The fuel load conditions considered in the fuel assembly and
CRA design are discussed in Section 4.2.1.5 and Section 4.2.1.6. The dynamic analyses for
the control rod drive system and reactor vessel internals are provided in Section 3.9.4 and
Section 3.9.5.

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Table 4.1-1: NuScale Reactor Design Parameters

Key Reactor Parameter Value
Core thermal output (MWt) 160
System pressure (psia) 1850
Inlet temperature (°F) 497
Core average temperature (°F) 543
Average temperature rise in core (°F) 100
Best estimate flow (lb/hr) 4.66E+6
Core bypass flow (%)(best estimate) 7.3
Average linear power density (kw/ft) 2.5
Peak linear power for normal operating conditions (kw/ft) 5.0
Normal operation peak heat flux (Btu/hr-ft2) 170,088
Total heat flux hot channel factor, FQ 2.0
2
Heat transfer area on fuel surface (ft ) 6275.6
Normal operation core average heat flux (Btu/hr-ft2) 85,044
Core flow area (ft2) 9.79
Core average coolant velocity (ft/sec) 2.7

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Table 4.1-2: NuScale Core Design Parameters

Parameter Value
Core
Diameter of active core (ft) 4.94
Number of fuel assemblies 37
Height-to-diameter ratio of active core 1.33
Total cross section area of active core (ft2) 18.42
Core barrel ID/OD (in) 74/78
Reflector
Height (in) 91.75
Width (in) 2.5 to 12.2
Fuel Assembly
Fuel design NuFuel HTP2™
Length (in) 95.89
Nominal UO2 per assembly (lb) 549.48
Rods per fuel assembly 264
Fuel assembly pitch (in) 8.466
Fuel rod pitch (in) 0.496
Number of grids per assembly 5
Span of grids (in) 20.1
Number of guide tubes per assembly 24
Number of instrument tubes per assembly 1
Guide tube dashpot region ID (in) 0.397
Guide tube dashpot region OD (in) 0.482
Guide tube above dashpot ID (in) 0.450
Fuel Rod
Peak rod exposure core design criteria for UO2 rods (GWd/MTU) 62
Gd2O3 concentration Up to 8%
Cladding outside diameter (in) 0.374
Cladding inside diameter (in) 0.326
Cladding thickness (in) 0.024
Pellet-cladding diametral gap (in) 0.0065
Cladding material M5®
Fuel column length (in) 78.74
Overall fuel rod length (in) 85
Fuel pellet material Uranium Dioxide (UO2)
Fuel pellet diameter (in) 0.3195
Fuel pellet density (%theoretical density) 96.0
Fuel pellet length (in) 0.4
Fissile enrichment < 4.95%

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Table 4.1-3: NuScale Reactor Control Rod Assembly Parameters

Parameter Value
Silver-indium-cadmium length (in) 12
B4C length (in) 62
CRA total length (in) 94.37
Neutron absorber material B4C and AIC
CRA clad material 304 SS
Maximum CRA bank withdrawal speed (in/min) 15
Number of absorber rods per CRA 24
B4C outside diameter (in) 0.333
Control rod outside diameter (in) 0.381
Control rod inside diameter (in) 0.344
Silver-indium-cadmium outside diameter (in) 0.336

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Table 4.1-4: NuScale Core Design Analytical Tools

Code Name Type Application Additional Discussion
CASMO5 2D lattice transport Perform fuel design calculations and Multi-group, two-dimensional, lattice
generate nuclear data required by physics transport theory code for
SIMULATE5. assembly burnup calculations
COPERNIC Fuel performance Perform the thermal and mechanical The European TRANSURANUS code is
analyses necessary to accurately used as a basis for COPERNIC.
simulate the behavior of a fuel rod
during its irradiation.
SIMULATE5 3-D, steady-state, two- Steady state reactor analysis including
group nodal reactor calculation of reactivity coefficients,
analysis code core control rod worth, axial and radial
simulator power distributions and core physics
inputs for transient analyses.
SIMULATE-3K 3-D two-group nodal Transient reactor physics analysis Same calculational foundation as
reactor analysis code core SIMULATE5 extended for transient
simulator applications.
MCNP6.1 Monte Carlo collision Evaluate neutron flux distributions for
probability the reactor vessel and containment
vessel.
VIPRE-01 Core thermal hydraulics Steady-state and transient subchannel Solves the mass, momentum and
analyses and minimum critical heat energy conservation equations.
flux ratio.
ANSYS Finite element structural Fuel assembly structural analysis General purpose finite element code
analysis used for fuel assembly component
structural evaluations, and for guide
tube and fuel rod buckling.
CROV Creep analysis of fuel rod Evaluates the resistance of fuel Inputs to the analysis include
cladding. cladding to creep collapse. differential pressure, temperature
gradients, and fast flux.

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4.2 Fuel System Design

The NuScale Power, LLC fuel system is designed to satisfy the following criteria:
• The fuel system will not be damaged as a result of normal operation and anticipated
operational occurrences (AOOs) [General Design Criterion (GDC) 10].
• Fuel damage during postulated accidents will not be severe enough to prevent control rod
insertion when it is required [Principal Design Criteria (PDC) 27].
• Core coolability is always maintained, even after postulated accidents (PDC 35 and
10 CFR 50.34).
• The number of fuel rod failures is not underestimated for postulated accidents
(10 CFR 100).

The NuScale fuel assembly design features are similar to those of existing pressurized water
reactor (PWR) 17x17 fuel assemblies. The only significant difference between the NuScale fuel
design and other PWRs is the shorter fuel assembly length. The effect of the length on fuel
design analyses is tested in full-scale fuel assembly tests and analyzed using NRC-approved
methods. The results summarized in this section show that the NuScale fuel design, with its
shorter length, demonstrates acceptable fuel performance consistent with the other proven
features that make up the NuScale fuel design. Because this is a new application of a proven
fuel design, post-irradiation inspection will be performed during the initial three cycles of
operation of the first licensed module, as described in Section 4.2.4.6.

Section 4.2.1 presents the design bases for the cladding, fuel material, fuel rod performance,
spacer grids, fuel assembly structural design, control rod assembly (CRA), and the surveillance
programs that will confirm the adequacy of the design. Section 4.2.2 provides a detailed
description of the fuel, the components that comprise the fuel assembly, and the CRA.
Section 4.2.3 provides the detailed design evaluation that demonstrates how the design bases
are met. Section 4.2.4 discusses fuel and CRA testing and inspection.

The fuel system design evaluations include a fuel rod cladding fatigue analysis that considers
power maneuvering in Table 4-3 of Reference 4.2-1. Additional analysis will be performed as
part of the detailed design of the cycle-specific core using the methodologies described in
Technical Specification 5.6.3. This analysis will include the effects of power maneuvers on CRA
absorber depletion, fission gas release, fuel melt limits, transient strain limits, fuel rod
components (other than cladding), and guide tube and CRA wear.

COL Item 4.2-1: A COL applicant that references the NuScale Power Plant design certification and
wishes to utilize non-baseload operations will provide justification for the fuel
performance codes and methods corresponding to the desired operation.

4.2.1 Design Bases

The fuel rod and fuel assembly design bases establish the performance requirements and
damage criteria to satisfy the criteria in Section 4.2 of the NUREG-0800 Standard Review
Plan.

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The fuel assembly structural integrity is assured by setting limits on stresses and
deformations due to various loads and by preventing the assembly structure from
interfering with the functioning of other components. Three types of loads are considered:
• non-operational loads, such as those due to shipping and handling
• normal loads during normal operation and AOOs
• abnormal loads during infrequent events and postulated accidents

The following are discussed:

• Cladding
• Fuel Material
• Fuel Performance
• Spacer Grids
• Fuel Assembly Structure
• Control Rod Assembly
• Surveillance Programs

4.2.1.1 Cladding

The fuel rod cladding is an advanced zirconium alloy called M5® that was approved for
use in the “Evaluation of Advanced Cladding and Structural Material (M5®) in PWR
Reactor Fuel” report (Reference 4.2-2). The applicability of this topical report to the
NuScale fuel design is described in the “Applicability of AREVA Fuel Methodology for
NuScale Design” topical report (Reference 4.2-3).

4.2.1.1.1 Mechanical Properties

The fuel rod cladding properties are defined in Reference 4.2-2.

4.2.1.1.2 Stress-Strain Limits

The methodology and design criteria for analyzing cladding stress are provided in
Reference 4.2-2.

The cladding stress analysis follows the guidelines of Section III of the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),
which provides guidance for establishing stress intensity limits. The stress states
modeled for the M5® cladding are maximum compression and maximum tension.
To determine the stress limits for M5® cladding applications, the design criteria for
fuel rod cladding stresses are based on unirradiated yield strength, as approved in
Reference 4.2-2. The use of unirradiated values is conservative because irradiation
increases the yield and ultimate tensile strengths for M5® and other zirconium
alloys.

A cladding buckling analysis determines that the cladding does not buckle when
the rod internal pressure is at a minimum, and the system pressure is at a

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maximum. The method and equations used for the buckling analysis are presented
in Reference 4.2-2.

For cladding strain, the maximum uniform hoop strain (elastic plus plastic) in the
cladding does not exceed one percent. This cladding strain criterion has been
approved in Reference 4.2-2.

4.2.1.1.3 Fatigue and Vibration

The effect of cyclical loadings on the clad is determined by calculating the clad
cumulative fatigue usage factor and ensuring it does not exceed 0.9. The analysis
method is consistent with the procedure for fatigue analysis provided in Section III
of the ASME BPVC.

The design criterion for fretting is that wear at the fuel rod and grid contact points
is limited and precludes fuel failure. Fretting of the clad surface can occur due to
flow-induced vibration (FIV) between the fuel rods and fuel assembly grid springs.
Forces between the fuel rods and fuel grid springs vary during the fuel life due to
clad diameter creep-down combined with grid spring relaxation. Life and Wear
testing as described in Section 4.2.3.5.7 demonstrates acceptable grid-to-rod
fretting wear performance.

4.2.1.1.4 Chemical Properties

Chemical properties of the cladding are discussed in Reference 4.2-2.

Maintaining the oxide thickness on the cladding within a prescribed limit precludes
external hydriding as a cladding failure mechanism. The external cladding oxide
thickness limit is established in Reference 4.2-2.

4.2.1.2 Fuel Material

4.2.1.2.1 Thermal-Physical Properties

The thermal-physical properties of the fuel presented in the COPERNIC Code

topical report (Reference 4.2-4) are applicable to the NuScale design as
demonstrated in Reference 4.2-3.

4.2.1.2.2 Fuel Densification and Fission Product Swelling

Fuel densification and swelling are modeled using the methodology in

Reference 4.2-4. The COPERNIC code evaluates cladding strain, fuel temperature,
and rod internal pressure using the fuel densification model and the swelling
model. The applicability of the COPERNIC code and its thermal models to the
NuScale fuel design is demonstrated in Reference 4.2-3.

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4.2.1.2.3 Fuel Pellet Chemical Properties

Fuel pellet chemical properties are controlled through a rigorous testing and
inspection program to demonstrate that each lot of pellets conforms to design
requirements and criteria as described in Section 4.2.4.3.

4.2.1.3 Fuel Rod Performance

The basic fuel rod models and the ability to predict fuel rod operating characteristics
are described in Reference 4.2-4. The COPERNIC computer code is used to perform the
thermal-mechanical analyses to simulate the behavior of the fuel rod during
irradiation, and is also used to verify that the fuel rod design meets design and safety
criteria. The critical design bases addressed with COPERNIC include fuel rod internal
pressure, cladding temperatures, cladding strain, corrosion, and centerline fuel melt
under conditions of normal operation, AOOs, and postulated accidents. Reference 4.2-1
provides additional details concerning the design basis for normal operations and
AOOs.

Section 4.4 addresses critical heat flux design criteria. Section 15.4 addresses
reactivity-initiated accidents, reactivity insertion accidents, and fuel centerline
temperatures. Creep collapse is analyzed with the methods and codes described in
Reference 4.2-8. The applicability of Reference 4.2-8 to the NuScale fuel design is
justified in Reference 4.2-3.

4.2.1.4 Spacer Grids

The spacer grids are designed to maintain the fuel rods in a coolable configuration
(PDC 35 and 10 CFR 50.34), and ensure CRA insertion for AOOs and postulated
accidents (PDC 27).

Structural evaluations of the grids determine that the grid strength is sufficient to
maintain a coolable geometry and ensure control rod insertion for all resulting impact
loads. The evaluation methodology (Reference 4.2-5) uses the load limits that are
derived from testing, which are provided in Reference 4.2-1 for the fuel assembly
mechanical design.

4.2.1.4.1 Mechanical, Chemical, Thermal, and Irradiation Properties of Grids

The strength criteria of the fuel assembly grid components are based on
mechanical strength testing of prototypes, including static and dynamic crush
testing.

The design limits are detailed in Reference 4.2-1. The grids are tested to establish a
95 percent confidence level of the mean allowable crushing stress limit for both the
unirradiated and a simulated irradiated condition. These limits are sufficient to
demonstrate that, under worst-case combined seismic and loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA) events, the fuel assemblies will remain in a coolable geometry
(PDC 35 and 10 CFR 50.34) and CRA insertability (PDC 27) is maintained. These
criteria are met by showing that the spacer grids experience no significant plastic

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deformation exceeding the limit in Reference 4.2-5 as a result of the combined

events.

The allowable grid clamping loads during fuel shipment are based on static crush
strength testing for static stiffness and elastic load limits. The spacer grids maintain
their structural integrity under the maximum lateral shipping loads and the
maximum clamping loads. The spacer grid springs are designed to maintain
acceptable fuel rod grip forces from the limiting 6 g lateral (transverse) and 4 g axial
(longitudinal) shipping loads.

Spacer grid slip load input to the analytical models of the fuel assembly used in the
horizontal and vertical faulted analyses are established by mechanical testing.

4.2.1.4.2 Vibration and Fatigue of Grids

The interface between the fuel rods and the spacer grids is maintained throughout
the life of the fuel assembly and prevents fuel rod fretting failure. Full-scale fuel
assembly testing and a grid-to-rod fretting evaluation detailed in Reference 4.2-1
show that fuel rod cladding wear is expected to be acceptable (see
Section 4.2.1.1.3). The grid-to-rod fretting evaluation is performed in accordance
with NRC approved methods.

4.2.1.4.3 Chemical Compatibility of Grids with other Core Components

The Zircaloy-4 and Alloy 718 materials of the spacer grids are compatible with the
reactor coolant based on extensive operating experience in US PWRs.

4.2.1.5 Fuel Assembly Structural Design

The design bases for evaluating the structural integrity of the fuel assemblies is
established by setting design limits on stresses and deformations due to various
non-operational, operational, and abnormal loads.

The thermal-hydraulic design basis is presented in Section 4.4.

4.2.1.5.1 Non-Operational Loads

The non-operational load limit is 4 g axial (longitudinal) and 6 g lateral (transverse)

with dimensional stability.

4.2.1.5.2 Normal Operating Conditions and Anticipated Operational Occurrences

For AOOs, the fuel assembly component structural design criteria are established
for the two primary material categories, austenitic steels and zirconium alloys. The
stress categories and strength theory presented in Section III of the ASME BPVC are
used as a general guide. The maximum shear theory (Tresca criterion) for combined
stresses is used to determine the stress intensities for the austenitic steel
components. The stress intensity is defined as the largest numerical difference
between the various principal stresses in a three-dimensional field. The design

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stress intensity value, Sm, for austenitic steels and zirconium alloys is given by the
lowest of the following:
• one-third of the specified minimum tensile strength or two-thirds of the
specified minimum yield strength at room temperature
• one-third of the tensile strength or 90 percent of the yield strength at
operating temperature, but not to exceed two-thirds of the specified minimum
yield strength at room temperature

The stress limits for the austenitic steel components are given below using
nomenclature that follows the ASME BPVC, Section III.
• general primary membrane stress intensity limit is Sm
• primary membrane plus bending stress intensity limit is 1.5 Sm
• total primary plus secondary stress intensity limit is 3.0 Sm

The zirconium components, which consist of the Zircaloy-4 guide tube and M5®
fuel rod cladding, are divided into two categories because of material differences
and functional requirements:
• The fuel rod cladding design criteria are addressed in Section 4.2.1.1.
• The maximum shear theory is used to evaluate the guide tube design. For
conservatism, the unirradiated properties are used to define the stress limits.

4.2.1.5.3 Infrequent Events and Postulated Accidents

Seismic loadings typically produce the worst-case faulted loads. For the NuScale
Power Plant design, primary system pipe breaks do not result in significant
hydraulic loads on the fuel assembly. The design criteria for this category of
loadings are as follows:
• Deflections or failures of components cannot interfere with the capability to
insert the CRA or emergency cooling of the fuel rods.
• The fuel assembly structural component stresses under abnormal conditions
are evaluated primarily using the methods outlined in Reference 4.2-5.

For austenitic steel fuel assembly components, the stress intensity is defined per
the rules described above for normal operating conditions. The faulted condition
stress limits for fuel assembly structural components are:
• General primary membrane stress intensity limit is the smaller of 2.4 Sm or
0.70 Su, ultimate strength.
• Primary membrane plus bending stress intensity limit is the smaller of 3.6 Sm or
1.05 Su.

Due to the requirement to maintain a path for CRA insertion, the guide tube
stresses in the faulted condition are evaluated using the Level C criteria in

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Subsection NG of the ASME BPVC. For guide tubes, the faulted condition stress
intensity limits are:
• The stress intensity limit for the general primary membrane is Sy, yield strength.
• The stress intensity limit for the primary membrane plus bending is 1.5 Sy.
• The axial loads of the guide tubes are limited by buckling limits.

For fuel rod cladding, the faulted condition stress allowables are set based on the
provisions in Reference 4.2-2.

4.2.1.5.4 Growth Allowance

A fuel assembly nozzle-to-fuel rod shoulder gap allowance is provided to maintain

positive clearance between the fuel rods and the nozzles during the entire fuel
assembly lifetime.

A fuel assembly-to-reactor internals gap allowance is provided to maintain a

positive core plate gap during the entire fuel assembly lifetime.

4.2.1.5.5 Fuel Assembly Liftoff

The fuel assembly does not unseat or lift off during worst case hydraulic loads
during normal operation and AOOs.

4.2.1.5.6 Guide Tube Buckling

Guide tube evaluations demonstrate that buckling does not occur. In addition, the
primary and primary-plus-secondary stresses are confirmed to be lower than the
material allowable stresses in the ASME BPVC.

4.2.1.5.7 Interface with Adjacent Assemblies

Axial alignment of the spacer grids on adjacent fuel assemblies is maintained for
the life of the fuel assembly.

4.2.1.5.8 Fuel Rod Fretting and Wear

As discussed in Section 4.2.1.1.3, the fuel assembly is designed to provide the

support needed to limit fuel rod vibration and fretting wear. In addition, core
analysis shows that crossflow between assemblies is minimal due to the low axial
flow, and testing has shown resistance of the fuel assembly to fretting wear.

4.2.1.5.9 Fuel Rod Bow

Fuel rod bowing is evaluated with respect to the mechanical and thermal-hydraulic
performance of the fuel assembly (Reference 4.2-6). The fuel assembly design
precludes excessive rod bow during its operational lifetime.

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4.2.1.5.10 Control Rod Drop Times

The fuel assembly does not experience any permanent deformations during AOOs
that would cause the CRA drop time to increase beyond the drop time used in
Chapter 15. This criterion is met by demonstrating the fuel assembly guide tube
stresses remain below the limits defined in Section 4.2.1.5.2.

4.2.1.5.11 Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Seismic Loading

The fuel assembly is designed to remain operable during and after an operating
basis earthquake (OBE) and to maintain structural integrity, a coolable geometry,
and CRA insertion capability during and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE)
and LOCA.

4.2.1.5.12 Shipping and Handling Loads

The fuel assembly is designed for the maximum loads occurring during shipping
and handling, as presented in Reference 4.2-1. The fuel rods do not slip through the
spacer grids under the maximum axial shipping loads.

4.2.1.5.13 Material Compatibility

Table 4.2-2 provides a list of fuel assembly components and their materials. The
selection of fuel assembly materials is based on extensive operating experience
and their compatibility with the service environment and with each other. Each
material has been optimized for resistance to adverse changes in material
properties from irradiation, and has been evaluated for strength and mechanical
properties for the operating temperatures and for the full service life anticipated
for each component.

Each material is based on an industry standard and is modified according to

specific engineering requirements, such as lowering the cobalt content in stainless
steel and nickel-based alloy components, without changing their material
performance, in order to reduce activation levels.

4.2.1.5.14 Corrosion

The fuel assembly structural design evaluation considers the effects of thinning
from corrosion and the effects of oxide layer formation. Guide tube material
corrosion allowances are established from operating experience, design
verification testing, and similarities with existing designs. The corrosion allowances
for fuel assembly components are presented in Reference 4.2-1.

4.2.1.6 Control Rod Assembly and Burnable Poison Rods

To ensure efficient performance and safe shutdown of the reactor, CRAs are designed
such that:
• No significant wear in the control rod cladding occurs during the CRA 20 effective
full power year lifetime.

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• Insertion of the CRA is not interrupted by misalignment of the CRA guide tubes
during normal operation.
• The CRA can be inserted into the fuel assembly during the design basis earthquake
that imparts the limiting design load on the fuel assembly, CRA and core internals
restraining the CRAs.

Maintaining CRA insertability with respect to the fuel assembly is discussed in

Section 4.2.3.5 for both normal operating and faulted conditions, as the fuel assembly
is shown to maintain a path for CRA insertion under these conditions. The CRAs are
shown to be acceptable given the stresses imparted by the maximum misalignment of
the fuel assembly and CRA during a design basis earthquake in which the CRAs are at
least partially inserted into the fuel assembly guide tubes.

In addition, the CRAs are designed to ensure that:

• Internal pressure is within limits during normal operation.
• Cladding stresses are within limits during normal, transient, and accident
conditions.
• The absorber material is stable considering both thermal expansion and irradiation.
• There is no potential for waterlogging rupture.

There are no discrete burnable poison rods in the fuel design. Burnable poison is
integral to some portions of the fuel as discussed in Section 4.2.2.7.

The neutron sources are designed to meet mechanical strength requirements at both
ambient and elevated temperatures, to be compatible with the materials and reactor
coolant, and to be resistant to radiation degradation. Neutron sources are discussed in
Section 4.2.2.9.

4.2.1.7 Surveillance Program

The fuel system surveillance program verifies the adequacy of the fuel design. This
program subjects fuel rods and fuel assemblies to post-irradiation examinations that
generally include measuring cladding oxide thickness, fuel rod diameter, fuel rod
length, fuel rod bowing, fuel rod-to-nozzle shoulder gap, fuel assembly bow and twist,
and overall fuel assembly length. The overall fuel rod and assembly conditions are also
visually examined during post-irradiation examinations for indications of mechanical
damage or abnormalities.

The CRA surveillance program monitors control rod integrity. Visual inspections are
performed to determine the presence and extent of cladding wear from interactions
with reactor vessel internals and fuel assembly guide tubes. Verification of the cladding
integrity also includes monitoring for the absence of excessive cladding strain and
potential cracking from silver-indium-cadmium (AIC) absorber swelling. The CRA rod
drop time testing is performed prior to and during reactor operation.

Section 4.2.4 discusses the testing and fuel surveillance program that is implemented
to ensure the adequacy of the fuel performance and satisfy the design bases. Fuel

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surveillance and testing results, as they become available, are used to improve fuel
design and manufacturing processes and to confirm that the design bases and safety
criteria are satisfied.

4.2.2 Description and Design Drawings

A summary of the fuel assembly and CRA design is provided in Table 4.2-1 through
Table 4.2-3 and in Figure 4.2-1 through Figure 4.2-13. Additional details of the fuel
assembly and CRA design are provided in Reference 4.2-1.

4.2.2.1 Fuel Assembly Description

The fuel assembly is a 17x17 array of fuel rods that has been designed specifically for
use with the core configuration of the NuScale reactor. The main fuel assembly
parameters are listed in Table 4.2-1 and the fuel assembly and fuel rods are illustrated
in Figure 4.2-1.

The fuel assembly uses five spacer grids, 24 guide tubes, and a top and bottom nozzle,
to provide the structural support for the 264 fuel rods. The fuel assembly also includes a
central instrument tube in each fuel assembly. The bottom grid is constructed of Alloy
718 strip material and uses the AREVA HMP™ design, while the remaining four HTP™
grids are constructed from Zircaloy-4 strip material. The HMP™ and HTP™ grids provide
lateral support for the fuel rods.

Each fuel assembly can be placed in any core location. Proper orientation of the fuel
assembly in the core is established by a hole in one corner of the top nozzle which
ensures proper interface with the refueling machine via a mating pin on the refueling
machine grapple. The refueling machine then provides the correct orientation of the
fuel assembly in storage, during refueling transport, and in the reactor core operating
position.

4.2.2.2 Spacer Grids Description

The fuel assembly uses HTP™ spacer grids at the intermediate and top spacer locations
and an HMP™ spacer grid at the bottom location of the assembly. The HTP™ grids are
constructed of Zircaloy-4 alloy strips. The HMP™ grid is constructed of Alloy 718 strips
for enhanced strength and low cell relaxation during irradiation.

Each HTP™ grid is a structure of interlocking strips that are welded together at each
strip intersection to form a 17 x 17 matrix of square cells (Figure 4.2-7). Each cross-strip
is formed by resistance spot welding two stamped halves to form a doublet. The
assembled doublet contains channels, slanted at the outlets, which induce a swirling
pattern in the coolant flow, as illustrated in Figure 4.2-8. The channels are arranged so
that there is no net hydraulic torque on the fuel assembly. These channels also provide
the contact surfaces that hold the fuel rods in place. Sideplates are welded to the ends
of the doublets and have top and bottom lead-in tabs to avoid assembly hang-up
during fuel movement.

The HMP™ grid (see Figure 4.2-9) is constructed of low cobalt, precipitation-hardened
Alloy 718 strip material. Resilient spring features are stamped into the strips that

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provide frictional axial restraint of each interfacing fuel rod by an interference fit of the
fuel rods within each grid cell. Spring and friction contact with each fuel rod is
maintained throughout the life of the fuel assembly up to the design burnup. Each
HMP™ spacer grid maintains eight individual line contacts per cell with each fuel rod
(similar to the HTP™ spacer) and relaxation of the spring within each cell due to
irradiation is minimized by the low relaxation properties of Alloy 718 material.

The HMP™ spacer grid is similar to HTP™ spacer grids, except for the material of
construction and the flow channels created by the doublet are straight in the HMP™
spacer grid, and do not produce swirling flow around the fuel rods.

To maintain axial alignment of spacer grids with adjacent fuel assemblies, all of the
HTP™ grids are spot-welded to the guide tubes. Short Zircaloy-4 sleeves are
spot-welded to the guide tube at locations above and below the HMP™ grid to fix its
axial position.

4.2.2.3 Quick Disconnect Mechanism Description

A quick disconnect (QD) mechanism attaches the top nozzle to the guide tubes (see
Figure 4.2-4 and Figure 4.2-5). The QD design allows the top nozzle to be removed for
fuel assembly reconstitution without loose parts. The design consists of a double-spline
sleeve made of Zircaloy-4 attached to the guide tube via multiple spot-welds.
Machined keyway-type features within the guide tube attachment holes in the top
nozzle provide either clearance for removal or restraint for securing the nozzle, based
on the radial orientation of the guide tube assembly QD features.

The reconstitution tooling rotates the guide tube QD ring 90° to lock or unlock the
guide tube connection and provides a rigid connection when the ring is rotated to its
locking position.

4.2.2.4 Top Nozzle Assembly Description

The top nozzle structure (see Figure 4.2-2) consists of a stainless steel frame that
interfaces with the reactor upper internals and the core components while providing
for coolant flow. The top nozzle flow-hole pattern provides low pressure drop while
satisfying strength requirements. The top nozzle design also incorporates a QD feature
to attach to the 24 fuel assembly guide tubes, as presented in Section 4.2.2.3. The top
nozzle assembly includes four sets of two-leaf hold-down springs.

The leaf springs are made of Alloy 718. The spring system maintains positive fuel
assembly contact with the upper core plate under normal operating conditions and
AOOs and also minimizes fuel assembly liftoff during seismic events to reduce fuel
assembly dynamic stresses. The leaf spring sets are fastened to the top nozzle with
Alloy 718 clamp screws. The upper leaf has an extended tang that engages a cutout in
the top plate of the nozzle. This arrangement maintains spring leaf retention in the
unlikely event of a single leaf spring or clamp screw failure.

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4.2.2.5 Bottom Nozzle Description

The NuScale fuel assembly uses a debris-resistant bottom nozzle that includes a filter
plate (see Figure 4.2-3). The nozzle frame is constructed of stainless steel, has a frame of
deep ribs connecting the guide tube attachment bushings, and has a lower frame and
legs with radii that interface with the reactor internals. The frame distributes the
primary loads on the fuel assembly through the bottom nozzle. A high strength A-286
alloy filter plate is pinned to the top of the frame. During assembly, the guide tube
lower end plugs and shoulder screws clamp the filter plate to the frame (See
Figure 4.2-6).

The guide tube lower end plugs are threaded to rigidly connect the guide tubes to the
bottom nozzle with cap screws.

4.2.2.6 Guide Tube Description

MONOBLOC™ guide tubes are fabricated from Zircaloy-4 alloy. Each MONOBLOC™
guide tube (see Figure 4.2-4) has two inside diameters (IDs) and a single outside
diameter (OD). The larger ID at the top provides a relatively large annular clearance that
permits rapid insertion of the CRA during a reactor trip and also accommodates coolant
flow during normal operation with inserted CRAs. The reduced ID section (i.e., the
dashpot located at the bottom end of the tube) provides a close fit with the control
rods to facilitate deceleration toward the end of the control rod travel. This
deceleration limits the magnitude of the CRA impact loads on the fuel assembly top
nozzle. The guide tube wall thickness at the bottom is greater in the dashpot region
than at the upper end to maintain the same OD with the smaller dashpot ID. The
MONOBLOC™ design provides a rigid tube and robust guide tube structure that helps
to minimize fuel assembly distortion and bow.

Four small holes in the guide tube located just above the dashpot allow both outflow
of water during CRA insertion, and coolant flow to the control components during
operation. There is also a small flow hole in the guide tube cap screw that enables some
coolant flow through the reduced diameter section and drainage of the guide tube, as
well as displaced coolant venting during CRA deceleration.

The QD sleeve (Figure 4.2-5) is attached to the upper end of the guide tube and
connects to the top nozzle. A stainless steel cap screw threads into a threaded
Zircaloy-4 lower end fitting that is welded to the bottom end of each guide tube. The
filter plate and bottom nozzle frame are captured and compressed by the fastener to
form the joint (see Figure 4.2-6).

4.2.2.7 Fuel Rod Description

The NuScale fuel rod design consists of uranium dioxide (UO2) pellets contained in
seamless M5® zirconium alloy tubing, with end caps welded at each end (see
Figure 4.2-10). The use of M5® material is approved in Reference 4.2-2. Compared to
earlier zirconium alloys, M5® cladding significantly increases the resistance to
corrosion. The fuel rod length and void volume provide acceptable margin against
failure by internal pressure buildup. The fuel rod uses one stainless steel spring in the

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upper plenum to prevent the formation of fuel pellet stack gaps during shipping and
handling, while also allowing for the expansion of the fuel stack during operation. The
fuel stack rests on a lower end cap.

The lower end cap has a bullet-nose shape to provide a smooth flow transition in
addition to facilitating insertion of the rods into the spacer grids during assembly. The
upper end cap has a grippable feature that allows removal of the fuel rods from the fuel
assembly if necessary.

The cylindrical fuel pellets are a sintered, high-density ceramic with a dish at each end.
The edges of the pellets have chamfers that ease the loading of the pellets into the rod,
and the dish and chamfer help reduce the tendency for the pellets to assume an
hourglass shape during operation.

The fuel rod design can also utilize axial blanket and gadolinia fuel configurations. The
geometry and design of gadolinia fuel rods is identical to the UO2 fuel rod design. The
only variations are in the composition of the fuel stack.

The fuel rods contain a central axial zone of enriched UO2 pellets or UO2 plus Gd2O3
pellets and axial blanket zones at each end of the stack. The axial blanket region
consists of sintered UO2 pellets with a lower 235U enrichment. The gadolinia serves as a
burnable poison to control power peaking or core reactivity.

Table 4.2-1 provides a summary of the major fuel rod design parameters.

4.2.2.8 Control Rod Assembly Description

Each NuScale CRA consists of a group of 24 individual control rods fastened to a spider
assembly (see Figure 4.2-11). The individual rods (see Figure 4.2-13) contain B4C pellets
in the upper portion of the rod, and silver-indium-cadmium (AIC) absorber in the tip of
the rod. This hybrid configuration of AIC and B4C is commonly used in commercial
PWRs, and is adapted to the NuScale design to reduce the total weight of the CRA.
Unlike the AIC material, the B4C can produce helium gas under neutron fluence leading
to the potential buildup of gas pressure in the rod. Thus, the use of B4C is restricted to
the low flux region at the top of the rod where helium production is minimal, and the
AIC material is used in the high flux region. The rod internals are sealed within a
304 stainless steel cladding tube to protect the absorber from the coolant. The tube is
plugged and welded at each end.

The top ends of the control rods are fastened to a spider using a threaded and pinned
joint. The upper end plug is designed with a flex joint which provides the ability to
accommodate misalignment between the control rods and the fuel assembly.

The CRA spider (Figure 4.2-12) is a one-piece, stainless steel cast array of vanes on a
hub. A spring is located in the lower part of the hub to absorb the kinetic energy of the
CRA and driveline following a reactor trip. The spring is preloaded and maintained
within the hub by a retaining ring and tension bolt. The CRA is coupled to the control

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rod driveline through the coupling section which is machined within a cavity in the top
of the hub.

The lower portion of the control rod contains a stack support that resides within a
central hole in the AIC. The stack support is comprised of a support column that passes
through the AIC central hole and a support platform, upon which the solid portion of
the AIC rests (Figure 4.2-13, Item 8). The purpose of the stack support is to prevent the
weight of the B4C column and the plenum spring preload from compressing the lower
AIC, which is susceptible to deformation through creep mechanisms at elevated
temperatures. By eliminating the axial load acting on the AIC, the stack support
reduces the creep mechanism of the lower absorber and thereby reduces cladding
strain.

During a refueling outage or after a reactor trip, the spring retainer rests on the fuel
assembly top nozzle.

Table 4.2-3 provides the critical nominal design parameters for the CRA, spider, and
individual control rods.

4.2.2.9 Stationary Component Assemblies Description

The NuScale design includes primary and secondary sources. The purpose is to provide
a minimum detectable neutron flux level at the source range detectors for the initial
core and to allow monitoring the change in core multiplication factor during fuel
loading and approach to criticality. The primary sources are used in the initial, and
possibly second, operating cycle. The secondary sources are used as the controlled
neutron source for subsequent cycles.

Primary source material is Californium (Cf-252) and the secondary source material is
comprised of antimony and beryllium. The source material is contained in individual
stainless steel rods that are connected to a spider hub similar to the CRA. The rods
containing the source material are hermetically sealed. The neutron source assemblies
are located in diametrically-opposed core positions near the core periphery as close as
possible to the ex-core detectors. The neutron source assemblies are statically installed
in fuel assembly locations not occupied by a CRA.

The NuScale design does not include the use of thimble plugs. As discussed previously,
discrete burnable poison rods are not part of the NuScale design.

4.2.3 Design Evaluation

The fuel rods, fuel assemblies, and control components conform to the guidance of the
NUREG-0800 Standard Review Plan 4.2.

Analyses are performed to consider rod operating history, model uncertainties, and
dimensional variations. To verify adherence to the design criteria, the evaluation also
considers the effects of power transients. The performance of the fuel during AOOs and
postulated accidents is presented in Chapter 15 (GDC 10). NuScale addresses anticipated
transients without scram in Chapter 15 also.

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4.2.3.1 Cladding Evaluation

4.2.3.1.1 Vibration and Wear

Because of the low fuel assembly axial flow and low cross-flow between
assemblies, there is little flow energy available to cause vibration in the fuel rods.
The grids provide sufficient fuel rod support to prevent significant wear of the clad
during the life of the fuel assembly based on operating experience, design
analyses, and testing as shown in Reference 4.2-1.

A bending stress is induced in the cladding when coolant flow causes the rod to
vibrate against the spacer grids. This FIV bending stress is taken into account in the
cladding stress analysis of Section 4.2.3.1.2.

A life and wear test was performed on the NuScale fuel assembly design. The life
and wear results, as well as the PWR operating experience of HMP™ and HTP™ grids
with M5® clad fuel rods, show that the NuScale fuel design has significant margin to
fretting failure for the expected operating conditions (See Reference 4.2-1). See
Section 4.2.3.5.7 for additional discussion on the fretting evaluation.

Based on these evaluations as summarized in Reference 4.2-1, the NuScale fuel is

not expected to experience flow induced vibration or wear issues.

4.2.3.1.2 Fuel Rod Internal Pressure and Cladding Stresses

The following types of stresses are considered in the cladding stress analysis:
• pressure stresses - membrane stresses from external and internal pressures
acting on the fuel rod cladding
• FIV - longitudinal bending stresses from vibration of the fuel rod caused by
coolant flow around the rod
• ovality - bending stresses from external and internal pressure on the fuel rod
cladding that is oval. This stress does not include the stress resulting from creep
ovalization into an axial gap.
• thermal stresses - secondary stresses that arise from the temperature gradient
across the fuel rod during reactor operation
• differential growth stresses - localized stresses resulting from the fuel rod
slipping through the spacer grids. The slip loads can be caused by differences
in the fuel assembly and fuel rod axial expansion rates due to heat-up or
irradiation.
• fuel rod to spacer grid interaction - secondary stresses from contact between
the fuel rod cladding and the spacer grid
• plenum spring force stress - primary membrane stress; the axial stress is load
dependent.

A burnup-dependent fission gas release model in Reference 4.2-2 is used in

determining the internal gas pressure as a function of irradiation time.

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The classifications of the stresses are as follows:

• pressure stresses - Pm, general primary membrane
• ovality stresses - Pb, primary bending
• fuel rod to spacer grid interaction - Pl, local primary membrane
• FIV - Pb, primary bending
• thermal stresses - Q, secondary
• differential growth - Q, secondary
• plenum spring force - Pm, general primary membrane

The fuel rod cladding is analyzed for the stresses induced during operation using
the approved methodology in Reference 4.2-2. Conservative values are used for
cladding thickness, oxide layer buildup, external pressure, internal fuel rod
pressure, differential temperature, and unirradiated cladding yield strength in
accordance with the approved methodology. The fuel rod stress analysis calculates
the worst-case cladding stress state based on the thinnest cladding wall and largest
cladding ovality allowed by the design. The likelihood of these two conditions
occurring at the same location on the cladding is remote; therefore, the
consideration of these two conditions together to calculate the cladding stress
state is conservative. The analyses of the fuel rod cladding stresses demonstrate
positive margins for all operating conditions. The cladding stress safety margins are
presented in Reference 4.2-1.

Analysis shows that fuel rod cladding buckling does not occur. Two critical buckling
limits, Pcr and qyp, are calculated. Buckling limit qyp is the bifurcation buckling
pressure of a perfectly circular shell and is calculated to check the elastic stability of
the cladding. Pcr is the critical load at which buckling occurs. The maximum
differential pressure is less than the buckling pressure and the maximum
compressive load on the fuel rod is less than the buckling critical load, thereby
proving that the cladding will not buckle.

Analysis in Reference 4.2-1 also shows that the maximum internal pressure of the
fuel rod over its designated lifetime will not exceed the reactor coolant system
pressure. This criterion assures that there is no cladding liftoff or reorientation of
hydrides in the radial direction of the cladding.

4.2.3.1.3 Material and Chemical Evaluation

Using the methodology in Reference 4.2-4, the maximum oxide thickness is

predicted to be much less than the limit established in Reference 4.2-4. Bounding
power histories are used in predicting the oxide thickness. The maximum predicted
oxide thickness is provided in Reference 4.2-1.

The absorption of hydrogen on the inside of the cladding is minimized by tight

controls on the moisture and hydrogen impurities in the rod during fabrication.
The specific moisture and hydrogen content limits are provided in Reference 4.2-1.

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4.2.3.1.4 Fretting and Crevice Corrosion

As described in Section 4.2.3.1.1, fretting due to FIV is not expected due to the low
axial flow rates during normal operation natural circulation conditions.

PWR operating experience has shown that crevice corrosion is not a likely corrosion
mechanism for zirconium alloy cladding material. In general, zirconium alloys are
resistant to crevice corrosion. In addition, NuScale coolant chemistry specifications
impose tight controls for dissolved oxygen and chlorides, the contaminants that
are often associated with crevice attack. See Section 5.2 for the limits on oxygen
and chlorides.

4.2.3.1.5 Stress-Accelerated Corrosion

Stress corrosion cracking is addressed for M5® in Reference 4.2-2. M5® cladding
improves resistance to stress-accelerated corrosion relative to Zr-4 cladding.

4.2.3.1.6 Cycling and Fatigue

The fuel rod cladding is analyzed for the total fatigue usage factor using the
methodology approved in Reference 4.2-2 and the procedure outlined in the ASME
BPVC. Testing has determined the fatigue performance of M5® cladding. These
tests have shown similar fatigue endurance performance for recrystallized cladding
(including M5®) as compared to Zircaloy-4, with the lower yield strength of the
recrystallized claddings limiting the applied stresses. A fuel rod life of ten years and
a vessel life of 60 years are assumed. The fuel rod cladding will, therefore,
experience approximately 16 percent (10/60) of the number of transient cycles the
reactor pressure vessel will experience.

The expected normal operating, upset, and test transients are evaluated to
determine the total fatigue usage factor experienced by the fuel rod cladding. In
accordance with the ASME BPVC, faulted conditions are not included in the fatigue
evaluation. Conservative inputs in terms of cladding thickness, oxide layer buildup,
external pressure, fuel rod internal pressure, and differential temperature across
the cladding were assumed. The results of the fatigue analysis (Reference 4.2-1) for
the NuScale fuel rod show that the cumulative fatigue usage factor is well below
the allowable limit of 0.9.

4.2.3.1.7 Material Wastage Attributable to Mass Transfer

An oxide thickness limit is established in Reference 4.2-2, and the predicted

corrosion is significantly lower than the limit as discussed in Reference 4.2-1.

4.2.3.1.8 Rod Bowing Attributable to Thermal, Irradiation, and Creep Dimensional

Changes

Rod bowing is addressed in Reference 4.2-6. This methodology is demonstrated to

be applicable to the NuScale fuel in Reference 4.2-3.

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4.2.3.1.9 Consequences of Power-Coolant Mismatch

The consequences of power-coolant mismatch are addressed in Section 4.4.

4.2.3.1.10 Irradiation Stability of the Cladding

Considerable operating experience using M5® cladding has proven its irradiation
stability. The effects of irradiation on the mechanical integrity of the cladding has
been accounted for using the approved COPERNIC model (Reference 4.2-4) for
performing the mechanical and thermal analyses, and the effects are shown to be
acceptable for the currently approved burnup limit of 62 GWd/MTU established in
Reference 4.2-4.

4.2.3.1.11 Creep Collapse and Creepdown

Reference 4.2-2 includes an analysis of creep to evaluate the resistance of the

NuScale fuel rod cladding to creep collapse. Inputs to the analysis include
differential pressure, temperature gradients, and fast neutron flux.

The following conservatisms are used in determining creep collapse over the life of
the fuel rod:
• minimum fuel rod pre-pressure
• no fission gas release
• worst-case or enveloping power history
• worst-case cladding dimensions (including ovality)

Fuel rod creep collapse is determined when either of the following is predicted to
occur:
• The rate of creep ovalization exceeds 0.1 mil/hr.
• The maximum fiber stress exceeds the unirradiated yield strength of the
cladding.

Using the methodology described above, the fuel rod creep collapse lifetime is
greater than the maximum design burnup defined in Reference 4.2-2.

4.2.3.1.12 Cladding Strain

The cladding strain evaluation is discussed in Reference 4.2-1. The calculated linear
heat rate for transients that induce one percent cladding strain does not limit the
plant operation and is much greater than the maximum transient the fuel rod is
expected to experience.

4.2.3.1.13 Pellet-Cladding Interaction

The criterion for transient-induced cladding strain discussed in Section 4.2.1.1.2

also precludes Pellet-Clad Mechanical Interaction (PCMI). The criterion is much
greater than the maximum transient the fuel rod is expected to experience. This

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method has been previously approved in the "COPERNIC Fuel Rod Design
Computer Code" topical report (Reference 4.2-4). The applicability of this topical to
the NuScale design is established in Reference 4.2-3.

As discussed in Section 4.2.3.2.3, fuel melting does not occur during normal
operation or AOOs. Fuel melting results in a large volume increase which may
cause a pellet with a molten center to exert a stress on the cladding. The no
centerline melt criteria precludes this type of PCI failure and is used to show an
acceptable fuel rod design.

4.2.3.2 Fuel Material Evaluation

4.2.3.2.1 Dimensional Stability

Fuel pellet dimensional stability is provided by a quality inspection program that is

used for fuel pellets. Pellets are tested for resinter behavior according to criteria
stipulated in the pellet manufacturing specifications. Pellets are also inspected for
abnormalities such as discoloration, inclusions, pits, unground areas, cracks, and
chips. One hundred percent of the pellets are measured for diameter. To maintain
the integrity of the fuel, the other dimensional attributes are measured based on a
statistical sampling over the course of pellet grinding and inspection.

4.2.3.2.2 Potential for Chemical Interaction

Standard manufacturing testing is performed to verify fuel pellet stoichiometry

(oxygen-to-uranium ratio), uranium content, and isotopic content (234U, 235U, 236U,
and 238U). For fuel rods with gadolinia, the gadolinia content and stoichiometry are
also measured. Microstructural examinations for grain size and internal porosity
provide verification of pellet properties for limiting fission gas release.

Pellet hydrogen and fluorine content are tightly controlled to minimize the
potential for hydride blister formation on the cladding inner surfaces. Introduction
of unacceptable levels of hydrogen from contamination sources is further
prevented by implementing visual inspections of pellets immediately following
grinding and immediately prior to loading into the fuel rods. Testing for nitrogen,
carbon and oxygen verify sorbed gas limits within the pellets. Testing for elemental
impurities and calculation of the equivalent boron content is also performed to
prevent unwanted neutron absorption by tramp elements.

4.2.3.2.3 Thermal Stability

Fuel melting does not occur during normal operation or AOOs (Reference 4.2-2).
The COPERNIC fuel performance computer code (Reference 4.2-4) is used for the
centerline fuel melt analysis. COPERNIC determines the local linear heat rate
throughout the fuel rod lifetime that results in centerline temperature exceeding a
specified temperature limit (Reference 4.2-4). Staying below this local linear heat
rate limit provides a high degree of assurance that fuel melting will not occur.

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The local linear heat rate throughout the rod lifetime determined in the centerline
fuel melt analysis is used as input to determine the limiting conditions for
operation and reactor set points. During normal operation and AOOs, the fuel will
not melt because the linear heat rate does not exceed the limit established in the
centerline melt analysis.

4.2.3.2.4 Irradiation Stability

The irradiation stability of the fuel rod is confirmed by performing analyses using
the COPERNIC code (Reference 4.2-4) that analyzes the fuel throughout the life of
the fuel rod.

4.2.3.3 Fuel Rod Performance Evaluation

4.2.3.3.1 Fuel Rod Performance Predictions

COPERNIC is the fuel rod design computer code used to perform thermal and
mechanical analyses to accurately simulate the behavior of a fuel rod during
irradiation, and to verify the fuel rod design meets design and safety criteria.
COPERNIC calculates fuel melting, fuel rod internal gas pressure, cladding strain,
cladding peak oxide thickness, and initialization parameters for the cladding creep
collapse. The following phenomenological models are utilized in the COPERNIC
code:
• radial power distribution
• fuel and cladding temperature distribution
• axial burnup distribution in the fuel
• thermal conductivity of the fuel, cladding, cladding crud, and oxidation layers
• densification of the fuel
• thermal expansion of the fuel and cladding
• fission gas production and release
• solid and gaseous fission product swelling
• fuel restructuring and relocation
• fuel and cladding dimensional changes
• fuel-to-cladding heat transfer coefficient
• thermal conductivity of the fuel rod internal gas mixture
• thermal conductivity in the Knudsen domain
• fuel-to-cladding contact pressure
• heat capacity of the fuel and cladding
• growth and creep of the cladding
• rod internal gas pressure and composition
• sorption of helium and other fill gases

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• cladding oxide
• cladding-to-coolant heat transfer coefficient
• thermal conductivity degradation

4.2.3.3.2 Failure and Burnup Experience

Fuel using M5® cladding material was first inserted in a domestic reactor core in
1995, has been used in 22 reactors and more than 7500 fuel assemblies as
described in Reference 4.2-1.

4.2.3.3.3 Fuel and Cladding Temperatures

Fuel and cladding temperature analyses are described in Section 4.4.

4.2.3.3.4 Potential Effect of Temperature Transients

The fuel rod experiences many operational transients during its residence in the
core. A number of thermal effects must be considered when analyzing the fuel rod
performance.

The clad can be in contact with the fuel pellet at some time in the fuel lifetime.
Clad-pellet interaction occurs if the fuel pellet temperature is increased after the
clad is in contact with the pellet. Clad-pellet interaction is discussed in
Section 4.2.3.1.13.

Potential differential axial thermal expansion between the fuel rods and the guide
tubes during a transient is considered in the design. Excessive bowing of the fuel
rods is precluded because the grid assemblies allow axial movement of the fuel
rods relative to the grids. Specifically, thermal expansion of the fuel rods is
considered in the grid design so that axial loads imposed on the fuel rods during a
thermal transient will not result in excessively bowed fuel rods.

4.2.3.3.5 Analysis of Temperature Effects

Section 4.4 discusses the impact of temperature effects during anticipated

operational transients and the effect from fuel rod bow, as well as other fuel rod
thermal design bases.

4.2.3.4 Spacer Grids Evaluation

Structural evaluations are performed to ensure the grids maintain their configuration
under postulated accidents. These analyses of the grids determined that the resulting
impact loads are lower than those allowed to maintain a coolable configuration and
control rod insertion. The methodology used to perform these evaluations uses the
load limits that are derived by testing, which are provided in Reference 4.2-5.

The maximum impact load on the spacer grids due to a combined SSE and LOCA is
provided in Reference 4.2-1. Impact loads were evaluated for scenarios in which both
the fuel assembly and spacer grid were either in a beginning of life (BOL), unirradiated

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condition or an irradiated condition. An intermediate grid location on a peripheral fuel

assembly produced the maximum impact force. The combined loads for seismic and
LOCA are below the AREVA-defined limits for plastic deformation of the grid. The
requirements to maintain a core coolable geometry and control rod insertion are
shown to be met in this worst-case condition in Reference 4.2-1.

The OBE severity for the NuScale Power Plant design is one-third of the severity of the
SSE. In accordance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix S that specifies that an OBE earthquake
does not need to be evaluated if its severity is less than or equal to one-third of the SSE
severity, a separate OBE evaluation of the fuel assembly is not performed.

4.2.3.4.1 Spacer Grid Dimensional Stability

The spacer grids are suitable for use in terms of both irradiation and corrosion
effects. This conclusion is based on PWR operating experience with Zircaloy-4
HTP™ and Alloy 718 HMP™ grids in combination with M5™ fuel rods and Zircaloy-4
guide tubes.

The chemical, thermal and irradiation behavior of the Zircaloy-4 HTP™ spacer grids
has been determined by extensive operating experience in US PWRs. The operating
experience has shown no operating problems associated with the chemistry of the
spacer grids. The spacer grids at elevated temperature and with irradiated
properties have demonstrated acceptable mechanical performance.

4.2.3.4.2 Spring Loads for Grids

The forces required to slip the HTP™ and HMP™ grids relative to the fuel rods were
measured at BOL conditions. These data, which represent the friction force
between the grids and fuel rods, were used as input in the analytical models of the
fuel assembly.

4.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly Design Evaluation

The NuScale fuel assembly design is evaluated to demonstrate that the fuel assembly
satisfies the requirements outlined in the Standard Review Plan. The fuel assembly
design evaluation, including the fuel rods, is detailed in Reference 4.2-1 in relation to
the Standard Review Plan criteria for fuel system damage mechanisms, fuel rod failure
mechanisms, fuel coolability, and CRA insertion. A summary level description of the
evaluation is provided in the following sections. A similar summary of the evaluations
for the fuel rod design is also presented in Section 4.2.3.1.

Methodologies for the fuel assembly structural and mechanical analyses adhere to the
codes and methods used by AREVA (listed below), as demonstrated to be applicable to
the NuScale design by Reference 4.2-3 and Reference 4.2-9:
• design criteria for PWR fuel (Reference 4.2-7)
• LOCA-seismic analysis (Reference 4.2-5)
• fuel rod bow evaluation (Reference 4.2-6)

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The results of the analyses in Reference 4.2-1 are applicable to fuel assembly operation
in the NuScale Power Module.

4.2.3.5.1 Fuel Assembly Structural Design Evaluation

The design criterion for the structural evaluation of the NuScale fuel assembly
design is that stress intensities are less than the stress limits based on Section III of
the ASME BPVC. The structural design requirements for the NuScale fuel assembly
are common to current AREVA PWR fuel designs and incorporate AREVA's design
and incore operating experience with similar PWR fuel designs.

The requirements are consistent with the acceptance criteria in the Standard
Review Plan. Evaluation results show that the calculated stress intensities are less
than the applicable stress limits. Fatigue usage is evaluated and found to be
acceptable. ASME Code Service Level A criteria are used for normal operating
conditions and Service Level D criteria are generally used for the LOCA and seismic
(i.e., faulted) analyses. An exception to this classification is the use of Service Level C
criteria for guide tubes when CRA insertability is required for the faulted analyses.

The fuel assembly component evaluations show that the calculated stresses are
lower than the material allowable stresses for both normal operation and faulted
conditions for all evaluated components. The evaluation of components for LOCA
conditions conservatively considered the square root of the sum of the squares
combination of the LOCA and SSE loads.

The fuel assembly components evaluated include:

Guide tubes: The guide tubes do not buckle and remain elastic, thereby ensuring
the CRAs can be inserted during normal operation. A positive guide tube buckling
safety margin is determined for axial loading for all normal operating conditions.
The hot zero power condition was determined as the limiting normal operating
case for compressive loading compared with hot full power operation. CRA impact
loads due to a scram were considered. The critical buckling load was determined
with a classical Timoshenko buckling stress model, with results compared to the
material yield strength at operating temperature. Initial lateral deflection (column
eccentricity) was imposed on the guide tube model at mid-height in the
magnitude of the available assembly and baffle clearance in the most limiting row
with added limiting manufacturing variance, to account for potential reduction in
the critical load due to fuel assembly bow. A positive buckling stress margin was
predicted by implicit solution of the Timoshenko buckling stress formulation.
Guide tube corrosion, load maldistribution, and temperature effects on material
properties were also considered. Guide tube boiling is not predicted to occur
during normal operation. Guide tube stresses were also evaluated for faulted
conditions and shown to maintain CRA insertion capability by meeting the
applicable criteria.

Spacer grids: The spacer grids do not deform beyond the approved limits in
Reference 4.2-5 during normal operation and faulted conditions. The mechanical
design bases of the spacer grids are confirmed through a series of tests on
prototype 17x17 HTP™ grids as discussed in Section 4.2.4.

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Bottom nozzle: The evaluation for normal operating conditions is performed in

accordance with Subsection NG-3228.2 of the ASME BPVC using a design limit of
two-thirds of the collapse load limit obtained by testing and adjusted for operating
temperature.

The limit based on the maximum test load is further reduced for operating
temperature conditions. Axial loading only is considered because the normal
operating loads on the bottom nozzle are applied axially by the guide tubes. The
maximum normal operating load used in the evaluation accounts for impact loads
from a CRA scram, hold-down spring loads, and the fuel assembly mass.

The evaluation of the bottom nozzle for faulted operating conditions is performed
in accordance with Appendix F, Paragraph F-1440(a) of the ASME BPVC using a
design limit based on the maximum cold test load. The limit based on the
maximum cold test load is further reduced for normal operating temperature
evaluations. The maximum normal operating loads used in the evaluation included
moment loads, plus the assembly weight, plus LOCA, plus SSE axial loads. Moment
loads were considered by calculating the axial load equivalent of the moment
couples created by the position of the guide tubes in relation to the center of the
bottom nozzle. Margin to the design limit was demonstrated in Reference 4.2-1.

Top nozzle: The top nozzle structure is evaluated for normal operating and
shipping and handling loads in accordance with Subsection NG-3228.2 of the
ASME Code using a design limit of two-thirds of the collapse load limit obtained by
testing and adjusted for operating temperature. The limiting case is evaluated for
an axial scram load applied to the top nozzle structural framework and showed that
positive margin to the design limit was maintained.

Hold-down spring: Stress analysis of the fuel assembly hold-down spring examines
stresses, strains, and fatigue usage to confirm that it does not fail. The evaluation
confirmed that the ASME BPVC criteria are satisfied. The spring stresses are treated
as secondary stresses since the hold-down spring stresses are controlled by the
total separation between the lower and upper core plates.

The secondary stress limits are satisfied by performing a plastic analysis in

accordance with Subsection NG-3228.1 of the ASME BPVC. The hold-down springs
remain within the elastic range. The maximum normal operating loading bounds
the faulted condition loading because the fuel assembly lifts off the lower core
plate during some severe seismic events. Therefore, satisfying the normal
operating conditions criterion also satisfies the faulted condition. The known
spring displacements were converted to stresses to demonstrate the criterion is
met.

Structural Connections: The guide tube-to-spacer grid weld connections are

evaluated for the limiting applied normal operating condition loads which are
caused by the grid slip loads. The applicable load limit was established in
accordance with Subsection NG-3228.4 of the ASME BPVC, and is 44 percent of the
ultimate collapse load limit obtained by testing and reduced for operating
temperature. The connections between the guide tubes, guide tube upper sleeves,
and QD sleeve retainers are evaluated with similar NG-3228.4 criterion but with

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applied normal operating condition loads of hold-down springs, assembly weight

and scram, and conservatively neglecting flow lift loading. The strength of the
welded connections between the guide tubes and the guide tube lower end plugs
are qualified by the manufacturing specification which bounds the predicted loads
from the guide tube analysis. Stress analysis of the guide tube cap screws, threads
of the guide tube lower end plugs, and seating interfaces of the guide tube upper
sleeve and guide tube lower end plugs found these designs to be acceptable with
positive design margins.

Fuel Rod Cladding: The structural evaluation of the fuel rod cladding for normal
operation is discussed in Section 4.2.3.1.

4.2.3.5.2 Analysis of Combined Loss-of-Coolant Accident and Seismic Loading

The structural integrity of the fuel assembly has been verified to withstand seismic
and LOCA events under both unirradiated (BOL) and irradiated conditions using
the methodology described in Reference 4.2-1. The fuel assembly meets the criteria
to maintain structural integrity, CRA insertion and a coolable geometry during and
after an SSE and a LOCA. The horizontal and vertical loads on the components were
first determined with analytical models, and these loads were then combined in
the evaluation of each component.

The horizontal component of the faulted analysis determines the structural

integrity of the NuScale fuel assembly in the horizontal direction. Loading
conditions are evaluated at unirradiated (BOL) and irradiated conditions for an SSE,
LOCA, and a combined seismic and LOCA event.

The fuel assembly response to seismic and LOCA excitations is determined using
the methodology described in Reference 4.2-5. The NuScale fuel assembly models
used for seismic and LOCA analysis were benchmarked using properties
established through full-scale prototype testing. Lateral fuel assembly models were
combined to represent row configurations of fuel assemblies in the core. Row
models with three, five and seven assemblies were created, matching the NuScale
core configuration. NuScale seismic SSE and LOCA displacement time histories at
the lower core plate and upper core plate were applied to the reactor core model,
and the resulting fuel assembly impact loads and deflections were evaluated.

The fuel assembly was evaluated for the vertical SSE and LOCA conditions with a
single assembly model described in Reference 4.2-5. Fuel assembly axial stiffness
properties and drop impact characteristics were obtained from testing and were
used to benchmark the fuel assembly axial model. The evaluation used vertical core
plate displacement time histories determined by the NuScale Power Plant seismic
model (Section 3.8).

The maximum grid impact forces that were obtained for SSE and SSE plus LOCA
conditions for a full-core configuration of NuScale fuel assemblies were less than
the allowable limits established by testing, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.4. Other
fuel assembly components were evaluated for combined loads and stresses under
vertical and lateral SSE plus LOCA conditions. The loads and stresses resulting from
lateral SSE and LOCA excitations are the result of fuel assembly deflections under

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those excitations. The component stresses were shown to be less than the
allowable limits based on Section III of ASME BPVC criteria. The core coolable
geometry and CRA insertability are maintained for all the faulted loads and the
component stress intensities are less than the allowable limits.

The fuel assembly response to seismic excitations during refueling while the core is
located in the reactor flange tool (RFT) was also studied. This evaluation was
performed using the methodology described in Reference 4.2-5 with adjustments
to account for the lower temperatures experienced in the RFT (Reference 4.2-9).
While in the RFT, the fuel is already in a safe shutdown condition and therefore the
RFT evaluation serves to confirm the structural integrity of the fuel rod in order to
protect against the release of fission products. The same fuel rod analysis criteria
from Section 4.2.1.5.3 were conservatively applied to the fuel in the RFT and the
fuel rod stresses were shown to be less than the allowable limits as defined in
Section 4.2.1.5.3.

4.2.3.5.3 Load Applied in Fuel Handling

Both the fuel assembly and individual components are evaluated for structural
adequacy for shipping and handling loads in the amount of 6 g in the lateral
direction and 4 g in the axial direction. The evaluations result in positive design
margins to the stress limits.

4.2.3.5.4 Axial Growth

A fuel assembly top nozzle-to-fuel rod shoulder gap allowance is provided that
maintains positive clearance during the assembly lifetime. The evaluation
determined that a positive fuel rod shoulder gap occurs at end of life (EOL) hot
conditions and considers the upper tolerance limit for fuel rod growth, minimum
guide tube growth, and worst-case tolerances on the length of the fuel rods and
guide tubes. The evaluated minimum fuel rod shoulder gap is presented in
Reference 4.2-1 and is acceptable.

A fuel assembly-to-reactor internals gap allowance is provided that maintains a

positive core plate gap clearance throughout the life of the fuel assembly. The core
plate gap allowance considers combined worst-case internals-fuel assembly
differential thermal expansion and irradiation-induced axial length changes to the
guide tubes. The evaluation determined that a positive fuel core plate gap occurs
at EOL cold conditions and considered the upper tolerance limit guide tube growth
and worst-case tolerances on the length of the fuel rod and core plate separation.
The evaluated minimum core plate gap is presented in Reference 4.2-1 and is
shown to be acceptable.

In order to ensure axial alignment of the spacer grids with adjacent fuel assemblies,
the HTP™ grids are spot welded to the guide tubes. Sleeves of Zr-4 are spot welded
to the guide tubes above and below the HMP™ grids for axial location and restraint.
The height of the grids is greater than the worst-case differences in grid elevation
at BOL and end of life (EOL). Therefore, grid overlap between adjacent assemblies is
maintained for the life of the fuel assembly. Those differences in grid elevation arise
due to irradiation-induced length changes of the guide tubes.

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4.2.3.5.5 Assembly Liftoff

The fuel assembly liftoff evaluation is performed by comparing the fuel assembly
weight and the fuel assembly spring hold-down load with the hydraulic forces
under normal operating conditions and AOOs. Hydraulic forces are calculated
using pressure loss coefficients from testing a prototypical, full scale NuScale fuel
assembly. Results of the analysis show significant margin to liftoff for all AOOs.

4.2.3.5.6 Fuel Rod Bow

Fuel rod bowing is evaluated with respect to the thermal-hydraulic performance of

the fuel assembly. The NuScale fuel rod bow performance is expected to be similar
to that of other AREVA designs and the analysis methodology discussed in
Reference 4.2-6 is applicable. This topical report is demonstrated to be applicable
to NuScale fuel in Reference 4.2-3.

4.2.3.5.7 Fuel Rod Fretting

The primary design criterion with regard to fuel rod fretting is that the design must
limit fretting to preclude fuel rod failure. The NuScale fuel rod fretting and wear
performance is based on the following tests and evaluations:
• full-scale 1000-hour life and wear testing performed on a prototypical,
full-scale NuScale test fuel assembly with HMP™ grids modified to simulate EOL
conditions
• favorable domestic operating experience with PWR fuel assemblies
incorporating M5® fuel rods, and HTP™ and HMP™ grids used on the NuScale
fuel design

The fretting operating experience for AREVA 17x17 fuel assemblies can be
extended to the NuScale fuel design due to the design similarities and the lower
reactor coolant system flow velocity of the NuScale Power Module (the lower flow
velocity results in much lower cross flow velocities compared with typical PWRs).
The NuScale HTP™ and HMP™ spacer grid designs are identical to those used in
AREVA 17x17 fuel assemblies, along with M5® fuel cladding. Operating experience
demonstrates that no fretting failures have occurred in the AREVA 17x17 HTP™
PWR fuel design.

The NuScale fuel design does not introduce additional features or characteristics
other than the change to the overall length to the evaluation, which is not
considered a significant variable in fuel rod fretting. Span lengths are no greater
than those used on the existing PWR fuel designs.

No significant fretting marks were found on the life and wear test assembly. The life
and wear testing was performed in a full-scale test channel under flow conditions
that bound the NuScale operating conditions.

The life and wear test results, as well as the PWR operating experience of HTP™
grids with M5® clad fuel rods, show that the NuScale fuel design has significant

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margins against fretting failure for the expected operating conditions including
irradiation to extended burnup.

4.2.3.5.8 Corrosion

The corrosion resistance of the alloys used in the fuel assembly has been
demonstrated by extensive operating experience as discussed in Reference 4.2-2.
This corrosion resistance is the result of both material selection and manufacturing
techniques. Rigorous material standards provide high-quality base material, while
controlled manufacturing processes produce components with a minimum of
surface contamination.

Manufacturing, handling, and assembly procedures prevent contaminants from

coming into contact with the metals during fabrication, welding, or annealing
operations.

The low carbon in the 304L stainless steels provides resistance to intergranular
corrosion and sensitization of the metal. The activity levels caused by neutron
activation of non-fuel components in the reactor is minimized by reducing the level
of cobalt in the 304L stainless steel and Alloy 718 components used in the fuel
assemblies.

Section 5.2.3 provides information on those aspects of the reactor coolant

chemistry that provide corrosion protection for stainless steels and nickel alloys.
Monitoring and control of primary water chemistry is based on industry experience
and the EPRI PWR Primary Water Chemistry Plan.

The selection of corrosion resistant materials proven through extensive in-reactor

operation, stringent manufacturing processes, water chemistry controls, and
post-irradiation inspections provide assurance that corrosion is not an issue for
NuScale fuel.

4.2.3.6 Reactivity Control Assembly and Burnable Poison Rods Evaluation

As described in Reference 4.2-1, the following items are evaluated for the CRAs and
shown to be acceptable for their 20 effective full power year lifetime:
• Internal pressure is within limits during normal operation
• Cladding stresses are within limits during normal, transient, and accident
conditions
• Thermal stability of the absorber material
• Irradiation stability of the absorber material, taking into consideration gas release
and solid and gaseous product swelling

In addition, the design of the CRA precludes the potential for chemical interaction,
including possible waterlogging rupture.

Wear rates on the NuScale CRA rods, which are designed with stainless steel cladding,
are expected to be low in comparison to those of typical operating PWR plants with

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stainless steel cladding given the lower core flow rates (<3 ft/sec) in the NuScale
design. In addition, the absence of vessel outlet flow nozzles is also expected to
decrease the cross-flows that contribute to control rod wear in typical PWRs. In a typical
PWR the flow exits the core and then turns to flow out the nozzles. In the NuScale
design the much lower velocity flow continues directly upward into the riser and then
into the steam generators. Prototype testing using a full-scale CRA is performed to
assess CRA susceptibility to wear. After initial irradiation and operation of the CRA
design, inspections are performed so that actual rod wear rates can be compared with
the predetermined wear limits to demonstrate acceptable performance.

The CRA structure is also analyzed for loads due to operational stepping, reactor trip,
stuck rod, fatigue, and shipping and handling. All stresses in all of the components of
the CRA are within limits. The CRA spring is analyzed to show that it can accept all of
the energy from a reactor trip without the spring compressing completely and without
the spider hub contacting the top nozzle. These analyses are described in more detail
in Reference 4.2-1.

In addition, in-reactor surveillance of CRA insertion times is performed in accordance

with the Technical Specification to demonstrate satisfactory performance.

As discussed previously, there are no discrete burnable poison rods in the NuScale
Power Plant design. The burnable poison is integral with the fuel pellet in selected rods
as described in Section 4.2.2.7.

4.2.4 Testing and Inspection Plan

The NuScale fuel design is similar to existing 17x17 designs that have been used
successfully in PWRs in the industry. The only significant design difference is the fuel
assembly length. The following sections address operating experience, prototype testing,
manufacturing testing and inspection, onsite receipt inspection, on-line fuel monitoring,
and post-irradiation monitoring that provide confidence that the fuel will meet design
requirements.

4.2.4.1 Operating Experience

AREVA has both domestic and international experience with fuel design features that
are pertinent to the NuScale fuel assembly design. All of the components in the
NuScale fuel assembly design have relevant experience in operating plants, and both
components and methods that have been accepted by the NRC for commercial
operation. AREVA has extensive PWR operating experience with all of the components
and features of the NuScale fuel assembly, including the MONOBLOC™ guide tubes,
HTP™ and HMP™ spacer grids, the QD top nozzle assembly, and a mesh filter bottom
nozzle. M5® fuel cladding also has extensive operating experience (currently in use in
16 domestic PWRs), including AREVA's 17x17 PWR fuel designs.

HTP™ Grid Experience

The HTP™ spacer is a proven concept in spacer design for PWR fuel. The HTP™ spacer
features strip doublets that are shaped such that they not only serve as spring elements
to firmly hold the fuel rods in radial alignment, but also produce curved internal flow

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channels to achieve the desired thermal-hydraulic performance. The HTP design was
first used in a domestic plant in 1988, and the HTP™ design now has 25 years of
operational experience in a number of different fuel assembly design variations that
include Westinghouse-type 17x17 fuel.

HMP™ Grid Experience

The initial use of the current version of Alloy 718 spacers with straight flow channels,
designated HMP™, occurred in 1988. A large operating experience base with fuel
featuring the HMP™ spacer is available. Fuel assemblies with HTP™ grids and a lower
HMP™ spacer have not had a grid-to-rod fretting failure.

M5® Cladding Experience

M5® is an advanced zirconium alloy developed and implemented by AREVA to improve

corrosion resistance, reduce hydrogen uptake, and reduce irradiation growth. In 1999,
the NRC approved M5® for domestic use. Since then, extensive operational experience
has been gained using M5® material.

As documented in Reference 4.2-3, the above experience applies to the NuScale fuel
assembly design.

4.2.4.2 Prototype Testing

A prototype testing program was undertaken to determine the performance

characteristics of the NuScale fuel assemblies, CRAs, and fuel assembly components
such as grids, upper nozzle, and lower nozzle.

4.2.4.2.1 Assembly Testing

Testing was conducted on full-sized prototype fuel assemblies and on various

assembly components. The full-size fuel assemblies were used for structural and
thermal-hydraulic testing. The fuel assembly structural tests included lateral
deflection tests and axial deflection tests, baffle impact tests, fuel assembly
free-and forced-vibration tests, and vertical drop tests. All of these tests were
conducted on two prototypical test assemblies, one with grids having BOL
characteristics and one having grids with EOL characteristics and the rods seated
on the bottom nozzle assembly.

The fuel assembly thermal-hydraulic test scope included assembly pressure drop
tests and life and wear testing for 1000 hours.

These tests, summarized in Reference 4.2-1, were conducted in accordance with

approved test plans at AREVA test facilities. The test results were used in
benchmarking analytical models for the fuel assembly design evaluation addressed
in previous Section 4.2.3.5.

Static Stiffness Testing - Forces versus deflection tests were conducted to

determine the axial and lateral stiffness of the prototype fuel assembly. In an axial
stiffness test, the fuel assembly was compressed along its longitudinal axis by an

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application of forces at the nozzles. The lateral stiffness test consisted of loading
the fuel assembly laterally near the center of the assembly at the middle spacer
grid. The results of this testing are used in the fuel seismic model.

Free- and Forced-Vibration, and Baffle Impact Testing - The vibration tests
determine the fuel assembly lateral, dynamic response. The use of free- and
forced-vibration tests together cover higher and lower modes of the assembly
natural frequency. The baffle impact test determines the assembly response to
impacts with the baffle plate (or reflector). This information is used in the fuel
assembly seismic model.

Fuel Assembly Drop Testing - Fuel assembly drop tests were performed to obtain
impact loads against which the vertical seismic model was benchmarked. The fuel
assembly was dropped against an unyielding surface and the impact loads, bottom
nozzle displacement, and assembly velocity were recorded. The effects of multiple
drops in succession were accounted for in the model benchmark and a suitable
correlation to the test results was obtained.

Fuel Hydraulic Flow Testing - Flow testing on a full-scale prototype fuel assembly
was performed to establish flow component loss coefficients and other related
flow characterization parameters for the NuScale fuel assembly. The form loss
coefficients are used in the fuel assembly liftoff analysis.

Fuel Fretting Testing - The prototype fuel assembly with EOL spacer grids was also
used to evaluate the fretting and wear performance at the grid-to-rod interfaces.
The test was conducted for over 1000 hours under flow conditions that bound
those of the NuScale reactor. At the conclusion of the test, several test rods were
inspected and showed minimal wear.

4.2.4.2.2 Fuel Assembly Component Testing

In addition to full-scale prototype testing, various components were also

characterized by testing. The spacer grid design was subjected to static buckling
and dynamic crush tests. The strength of the top and bottom nozzles were also
tested. These test results are incorporated into the analytical models used to verify
the NuScale fuel design.

4.2.4.2.2.1 Spacer Grid Testing

The mechanical design bases for the spacer grids were confirmed through a
series of structural tests on prototype grids. The testing, summarized below,
found that the grids provide the necessary design margins:

Dynamic Impact - Dynamic crush tests were performed on HTP™ spacer grids at
unirradiated hot and cold conditions and irradiated hot conditions. The tests
determined the through-grid stiffness and damping values for the lateral
seismic models and the crushing load limits for the grids.

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Static Impact - The static crush characteristics (static stiffness and elastic load
limit) are used to establish allowable grid clamping loads applied during
shipping.

Slip Load - The forces required to slip the grid relative to the fuel rods were
measured at BOL conditions for both the HTP™ and HMP™ grids. The slip load
values are used in the fuel assembly evaluation.

4.2.4.2.2.2 Strength Test of Top and Bottom Nozzles

Bottom Nozzle - Strength testing of the bottom nozzle was performed to

establish the axial load limit for evaluation. A prototype bottom nozzle was
tested at room temperature in static axial compression by applying a load to
24 springs on the guide tube positions. The spring stiffness was set to be equal
to the guide tube stiffness in order to simulate the load distribution of the
guide tubes.

A room temperature test at maximum load was applied without collapse of the
structure. This tested maximum load was used to demonstrate the structural
adequacy in the design evaluation by comparison with the normal operating
and faulted loads, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.5.1 and Section 4.2.3.5.2.

Top nozzle - Strength testing of the top nozzle was performed to establish the
axial load limit for evaluation. A prototype top nozzle was tested at room
temperature in static axial compression by applying a load to the upper surface
of the top nozzle, which was set on 24 springs at the guide tube positions. The
spring stiffness was set to be equal to the guide tube stiffness in order to
simulate the real load distribution of the guide tubes.

A room temperature test was performed in which a load was applied that
exceeds a 4 g assembly load and resulted in no plastic deformation of the
structure. This tested maximum load is used to demonstrate the structural
adequacy in the design evaluation by comparison with the shipping and
handling, normal operating and faulted loads, as discussed in Section 4.2.3.5.

4.2.4.2.3 Control Rod Testing

The NuScale CRA is similar to existing 17X17 CRAs except for the shorter length.
The CRA drive shaft is longer than typically used in the industry. Prototype testing is
performed to confirm CRA drop times, assess the propensity for wear, and to assess
the impact of the maximum expected misalignment of the fuel assembly guide
tubes predicted to occur during a joint LOCA and seismic event.

The CRA drop times are calculated using a fluid dynamic computer model that
predicts insertion time and impact velocity. When CRAs are dropped into a fuel
assembly, the water in the guide tube is displaced through several flow paths. The
NuScale fuel assembly design has twenty four guide tubes, each containing two
pairs of side flow holes. In addition, water is forced out through the top annulus of
the guide tube and through the hole in the cap screw at the bottom of the guide
tube assembly. The computer analysis for the CRA drop time is primarily best

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estimate but does include some conservatism. The drop time is provided in
Figure 4.3-23. The control rod drop time used in Chapter 15 analysis is a more
conservative bounding value. The results from the CRA drop testing, described in
Section 1.5.1.7, validate the use of the calculated SCRAM curve shown in
Figure 4.3-23 as a conservative basis for the CRA drop time.

For the impact velocity, the rod drop calculation is also primarily best estimate but
does include conservatism that predicts a higher impact velocity. Testing provides
confirmation that these values are conservative for their respective application.
This testing is described in more detail in Section 1.5.

The ability of the CRA to insert under conditions of fuel assembly misalignment is
assessed in a test that deflects the fuel assembly at the mid-height location. The
CRA insertion time is measured and compared to the CRA insertion time testing
performed with no deflection of the fuel assembly. The testing is performed to
confirm that the CRA insertion is not significantly affected by the maximum
expected misalignment.

4.2.4.3 Manufacturing Testing and Inspection

Fuel assemblies and CRAs are manufactured and inspected in accordance with a
10CFR50, Appendix B quality assurance program as described in Chapter 17. In general,
components and assemblies are tested and inspected to verify compliance with all
design drawing and specification requirements. Quality control procedures are
prepared and used for all inspection operations. Quality control maintains a gauge
control system for tooling, gauges, templates, and other equipment used to perform
inspections. Inspection plans range from 100 percent inspection plans to statistical
process control procedures, which require either upper and lower tolerance limits,
upper and lower confidence limits, or other statistically-based (attribute or variable)
sampling plans.

The quality assurance program requires audits of suppliers and internal audits of
manufacturing and inspection operations. Materials are procured from approved
suppliers using approved material specifications, which may include
industry-approved standards, such as ASME and American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) materials specifications or internal specifications. Certified material
test reports are required for all safety-related materials and are reviewed for
conformance to the specification requirements.

Depending on the particular design requirement to be verified, non-destructive

examinations (dimensional, visual, radiographic, ultrasonic, and eddy current
inspection) and destructive examinations (chemical composition and metallographic
sectioning) are employed for in-process inspections or in support of qualifications.

Manufacturing operations require adherence to cleanliness controls for all components

and assemblies. The cleanliness program includes controls for all expendable and
consumable materials that come in contact with core components.

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Fuel pellets are extensively tested and inspected, including:

• dimensional inspections
• visual examinations to check for surface contamination and surface defects,
including the presence of missing pellet surface
• destructive examinations for microstructure (grain pore size distribution)
• resinter densification
• chemical composition
• impurity checks (including hydrogen determination and isotopic content)

Fuel rod cladding tubes are inspected for external and internal defects by approved
non-destructive methods. Ultrasonic methods are used for dimensional
measurements. Fuel rods have the end cap welds tested by both destructive and
non-destructive means, are leak tested using helium detection equipment, and are
then gamma-scanned to verify the integrity and position of the internal components
and the absence of unacceptable pellet gaps. Automated computer equipment is used
to maintain traceability of all fuel components. Fuel pellets, fuel rod end caps and
springs are traced on a lot basis. Traceability of fuel cladding and fuel rod assemblies is
accomplished by serial number.

Fuel assemblies undergo inspections for bow, twist, dimensional envelope, and fuel
rod spacing. Visual examinations are performed as a final check on cleanliness control.

Verification of CRA and component attributes is very similar to those of the fuel
assemblies and will be the same for NuScale as for AREVA's typical domestic PWR
control components. The absorber composition is verified by an approved supplier
through chemical examination. Control rod cladding tubes are inspected for external
and internal defects using approved non-destructive methods. The CRAs have the end
cap welds tested by both destructive and non-destructive means and are leak tested
using helium detection equipment.

4.2.4.4 Onsite Receipt Inspection

When fresh fuel and CRAs are received on site, written procedures are used for
inspection of the new fuel assemblies and control rod assemblies. Specific fuel
handling procedures define the sequence in which handling and inspection take place.

Fuel shipping containers are externally inspected when received to ensure there was
no damage during shipping. This inspection includes examination of the
instrumentation that measures acceleration forces during shipping to ensure the forces
were within limits.

Removal of the fuel from the shipping container is performed in accordance with
written procedures. Following removal of the fuel assembly from the shipping
container, a detailed visual inspection of the fuel assemblies and CRAs is performed. All
onsite fuel receipt procedures are based on the fuel fabricator's recommendations. The
inspection plans for new fuel are essentially the same as those for previously approved
plants.

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4.2.4.5 On-line Fuel System Monitoring

The chemical and volume control system (Section 9.3.4) contains radiation detection
instrumentation that continuously monitors for radioactivity and is capable of
detecting a fuel leak. In addition, the process sampling system (Section 9.3.2) contains
grab sample capability that allows for more detailed assessment of the radionuclides in
the primary system water. Detection of a fuel leak may result in more frequent grab
sample analysis.

4.2.4.6 Post Irradiation Monitoring

A detailed surveillance program is planned following the irradiation of the fuel

assembly and CRAs from the first licensed module. This program includes the schedule
and criteria for inspection of selected fuel assemblies and CRAs. The program includes
complete visual inspections of selected assemblies and detailed measurements to
capture key attributes such as those listed below. The detailed measurements are taken
to confirm that the fuel is performing according to the design analyses described in
Section 4.2. The key attributes that are assessed as part of the post-irradiation
monitoring program include:
• fuel rod growth
• fuel rod bowing
• fuel assembly growth
• fuel assembly bowing
• crud deposition
• fuel rod cladding corrosion (oxide)
• fuel rod cladding diameter

In addition, visual inspection of guide tubes and control rod cladding is performed for
indications of wear.

The post-irradiation program makes sure that the above characteristics are within
expected values. This surveillance program is expected to span the initial three cycles
of operation of the initial licensed NuScale Power Module, with provisions for
during-cycle inspections if operation indicates the presence of fuel abnormalities. The
surveillance program includes guidance on the disposition of failed fuel.

4.2.5 References

4.2-1 NuScale Power, LLC, "NuFuel-HTP2TM Fuel and Control Rod Assembly Designs,"
TR-0816-51127-P, Revision 3.

4.2-2 AREVA Inc., "Evaluation of Advanced Cladding and Structural Material (M5) in
PWR Reactor Fuel," BAW-10227P-A, Revision 1, June 2003.

4.2-3 NuScale Power, LLC, "Applicability of AREVA Fuel Methodology for the NuScale
Design," TR-0116-20825-P-A, Revision 1.

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4.2-4 AREVA Inc., "COPERNIC Fuel Rod Design Computer Code," BAW-10231P-A,
Revision 1, January, 2004.

4.2-5 AREVA Inc., "PWR Fuel Assembly Structural Response to Externally Applied
Dynamic Excitations,” ANP-10337P-A, Revision 0, April 2018.

4.2-6 AREVA Inc., "Computational Procedure for Evaluating Fuel Rod Bowing,"
XN-75-32-P-A, Supplements 1-4, February 1983.

4.2-7 AREVA Inc., "Generic Mechanical Design Criteria for PWR Fuel Designs,"
EMF-92-116(P)(A), Revision 0, February 1999.

4.2-8 AREVA Inc., “Program to Determine In-Reactor Performance of BWFC Fuel

Cladding Creep Collapse,” BAW-10084P-A, Revision 3, August 1995.

4.2-9 NuScale Power, LLC, “NuScale Applicability of AREVA Method for the Evaluation
of Fuel Assembly Structural Response to Externally Applied Forces,”
TR-0716-50351-P-A, Revision 1.

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Table 4.2-1: Fuel Design Parameters

Parameter Nominal Value
Fuel Assembly Parameters
Fuel rods per fuel assembly 264
Guide tubes per fuel assembly 24
Spacer grids per fuel assembly 5
Number of instrument tubes per assembly 1
Pin pitch (in) 0.496
Guide tube OD (in) 0.482
Guide tube ID (Above Dashpot) (in) 0.450
Guide tube ID (In Dashpot) (in) 0.397
Fuel Assembly Length (including springs)(in) 95.89
Fuel Rod Parameters
Fuel stack height (in) 78.74
Fuel rod length (in) 85.00
Fuel rod OD (in) 0.374
Fuel rod ID (in) 0.326
Fuel pellet OD (in) 0.3195
Pellet length (in) 0.400

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Table 4.2-2: Fuel Assembly Materials

Component Material
Top nozzle AISI 304 L stainless steel
Bottom nozzle frame AISI 304 L stainless steel
Mesh Filter plate Alloy 286
Guide tube and QD sleeves Zr-4
Top connection (quick disconnect) Zr-4 and Alloy 718
Bottom cap screw AISI 316 L stainless steel
HMP™ grid Alloy 718
HTP™ grid Zr-4
Fuel rod cladding M5®
Fuel assembly leaf springs Alloy 718
Fuel rod plenum springs AISI 302 stainless steel
Fuel pellets UO2 and UO2 plus Gd2O3
Note: Stainless steels are low cobalt.

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Table 4.2-3: Control Rod Design Parameters

Dimension Nominal Value
CRA total mass (lb) 43
CRA total height (in) 94.37
Control rod OD (in) 0.381
Control rod ID (in) 0.344
Control rod bottom end plug length (in) 1.913
B4C OD (in) 0.333
B4C stack length (in) 62.0
AIC composition (weight percent) 80% Silver, 15% Indium, and 5% Cadmium
AIC OD (in) 0.336
AIC stack length (in) 12.0
Cladding material 304 stainless steel
Height of CRA spider assembly (in) 10.387
CRA shaft OD (in) 1.804

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-1: Fuel Assembly General Arrangement

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-2: Top Nozzle

(nominal dimensions)

,1&+(6
,1&+(6

&22/$17)/2:+2/(6

*8,'(78%(326,7,21

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-3: Bottom Nozzle

(nominal dimensions)
,1&+(6

,1&+(6
,1&+(6

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-4: Guide Tube Assembly

(nominal dimensions)

48,&.',6&211(&7$66(0%/<

,1&+(62'

*8,'(78%(

,1&+(6,'

*8,'(78%(/2:(5
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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-5: Guide Tube Quick Disconnect Top Nozzle Connection

5(7$,1(56/((9(

/2&.,1*/8* /2&.,1*5,1*

/2&.,1*635,1*
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*5,//$*( *8,'(78%(
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*8,'(78%(

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-6: Cap Screw Bottom Nozzle Connection

*8,'(78%(

:(/'
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(1'),77,1*
%2772012==/(
$66(0%/<

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&$36&5(:

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Figure 4.2-7: HTP™ Spacer Grid

(nominal dimensions, one-quarter grid shown)

,1&+(6

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Figure 4.2-8: HTP™ Spacer Grid Characteristics

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-9: HMP™ Spacer Grid

(nominal dimensions, one-quarter grid shown)

,1&+(6

Tier 2 4.2-48 Revision 5

Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.2-10: Fuel Rod Assembly
(nominal dimensions)

,1&+(6 ,1&+(6

,1&+(6
4.2-49

Fuel System Design

Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-11: Control Rod Assembly General Arrangement

(nominal dimensions)

,1&+(6
,1&+(6

,1&+(6
,1&+(6

,1&+(6
,1&+(6
,1&+(6

,1&+(6
,1&+(6

,1&+(6

,1&+(6

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Fuel System Design

Figure 4.2-12: Control Rod Assembly Cut-Away

(nominal dimensions)

63,'(5635,1*

63,'(50$&+,1,1*
187

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&21752/52'

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Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.2-13: NuScale Control Rod Assembly Design
(nominal dimensions)
,7(0 '(6&5,37,21
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Fuel System Design

Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

4.3 Nuclear Design

This section describes the nuclear design of the NuScale Power Module (NPM), including the
design bases, the nuclear design of the fuel and reactivity control systems, and the analytical
methods used to perform the nuclear design. Detailed analytical results for an equilibrium fuel
cycle are presented at the end of this section. The equilibrium cycle is representative of a
typical fuel cycle design with limits placed on the core design that are applied to the design of
other cycles, including the initial and transition cycles.

Section 4.3 is divided into three sections, Design Basis (Section 4.3.1), Nuclear Design
Description (Section 4.3.2), and Analytical Methods (Section 4.3.3).

4.3.1 Design Basis

The nuclear design bases for the fuel and reactivity control systems are as follows:
• The reactor core and reactivity control systems are designed with appropriate margin
to assure that the specified acceptable fuel design limits (SAFDLs) are not exceeded
during normal operation or anticipated operational occurrences consistent with
GDC 10.
• The reactor core is designed so that in the power operating range the net effect of
prompt inherent nuclear feedback tends to compensate for rapid increase in reactivity
consistent with GDC 11.
• The reactor core and reactivity control systems are designed to assure that power
oscillations which can result in conditions exceeding SAFDLs are not possible or can be
reliably and readily detected and suppressed consistent with GDC 12.
• The reactivity control system withdrawal rate is designed to assure that SAFDLs are not
exceeded for accidental withdrawal of control rods consistent with GDC 25.
• There are two independent reactivity control systems based on different design
principles, control rods and soluble boron. The control rods and associated rod control
system are designed with a positive means for inserting the rods and reliably
controlling reactivity changes during normal operation, including anticipated
operational occurrences. The control rod design provides assurance that the SAFDLs
are not exceeded during an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) assuming a
single stuck control rod. CRAs, with all rods inserted, are capable of holding the reactor
subcritical during normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences, in
accordance with GDC 26.
• The control rods and soluble boron system are capable of reliably controlling reactivity
changes to assure that under postulated accident conditions and with appropriate
margin for stuck rods the capability to cool the core is maintained consistent with
Principal Design Criteria (PDC) 27. CRAs, with all rods inserted, are capable of holding
the reactor subcritical under postulated accident conditions in accordance with
PDC 27.
• The reactivity control systems limit the potential amount and rate of reactivity increase
to assure that the effects of postulated reactivity accidents do not result in damage to
the reactor coolant pressure boundary greater than limited local yielding nor impair
the capability to cool the core consistent with GDC 28.

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GDC 13 and GDC 20 also provide requirements that ensure that SAFDLs are met. GDC 13 is
discussed in Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, and 12. GDC 20 is discussed in Chapter 7.

4.3.1.1 Fuel Burnup

Fuel burnup is a measure of the depletion of the fuel based on the energy output and is
measured in GWd/MTU (gigawatt days per metric ton of uranium). Core loading
patterns are developed with initial excess reactivity to maintain the core critical at full
power throughout the cycle as fission products in the fuel build up and fissile material
depletes. Burnable poisons and soluble boron are used to compensate for this initial
excess reactivity. The end of design cycle life occurs when soluble boron is essentially
zero with the control rods positioned to meet operational requirements (fully or close
to fully withdrawn). In terms of boron concentration, this end of cycle condition is
typically 20 ppm boron or less.

While there is no specific design limit on cycle average burnup, the core average cycle
exposure is designed such that the peak fuel rod exposure is less than the approved
value in the “Applicability of AREVA Fuel Methodology for the NuScale Design” topical
report (Reference 4.3-3).

Section 4.2 discusses the fuel rod design bases.

Meeting the peak rod burnup limit along with the design basis in Section 4.3.1.3
satisfies GDC 10.

4.3.1.2 Negative Reactivity Feedback

The Doppler coefficient and the moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are the two
primary reactivity feedback mechanisms that compensate for a rapid reactivity
increase. The Doppler coefficient is characterized by the broadening of absorption
peaks with an increase in fuel temperature. The Doppler coefficient is negative for the
NuScale fuel design. The MTC is a measure of reactivity feedback associated with a
change in the moderator temperature, where changes in density change the neutron
energy spectrum. The MTC is negative in the power operating range. The inherent
Doppler reactivity characteristics of the fuel provide rapid negative reactivity effects
with an increase in fuel temperature. A corresponding increase in moderator
temperature which decreases moderator density, provides additional, but slower
negative reactivity feedback. The power coefficient, which includes the effects of both
the Doppler coefficient and MTC, is discussed in Section 4.3.2.3.3 and is negative for all
power levels.

The MTC and the Doppler coefficient together provide inherent reactivity control and
satisfy GDC 11.

The moderator and Doppler effects are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.3.

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4.3.1.3 Power Distribution

The power distribution and the reactor protection system are designed to ensure that
the following SAFDLs are met at a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence
level:
• Fuel will not exceed the critical heat flux limits under normal operating and
anticipated operational occurrences as described in Section 4.4.
• Peak fuel power under abnormal conditions, including the maximum overpower
condition, will not result in fuel melting as discussed in Section 4.4.
• Fuel management is such that the values of fuel rod power and burnup meet the
fuel rod mechanical integrity assumptions in Section 4.2.
• Fuel is not operated at a linear power density greater than the design limit for the
fuel.

These restrictions along with the burnup restriction in Section 4.3.1.1 satisfy GDC 10.
The power distribution limits are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.2.

4.3.1.4 Maximum Controlled Reactivity Insertion

The NuScale design places limits on the worth of the control rod assemblies (CRAs),
CRA insertion depth, and maximum CRA withdrawal rate. The maximum controlled
reactivity addition rate is limited, such that the SAFDLs are not violated during normal
operation, AOOs, or postulated accidents.

For an accidental withdrawal of a bank of CRAs or a single CRA, the maximum

withdrawal rate is established such that critical heat flux (CHF) limits are not exceeded
as discussed in Section 15.4, consistent with GDC 25. The design maximum rod
withdrawal rate is 15 inches/minute as described in Section 3.9.4.1.

The maximum worth of the CRAs and the limits on CRA insertion preclude rupture of
the reactor coolant pressure boundary due to a rod withdrawal or rod ejection accident
(Section 15.4). The design basis presented in this section satisfies GDC 28. Control rod
worth is discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.5.

4.3.1.5 Shutdown Margin and Long Term Shutdown Capability

The NuScale design employs two independent means for reactivity control: CRAs and
soluble boron. The concentration of soluble boron in the reactor coolant system (RCS)
is controlled by the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). These two reactivity
control systems satisfy the portion of GDC 26 that requires two independent reactivity
control systems of different design principles. Each of the two independent means of
reactivity control is capable of controlling the reactivity changes resulting from
planned, normal operation.

Shutdown margin (SDM) is defined as the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which

the reactor is subcritical, or would be subcritical from its present condition, assuming
all CRAs are fully inserted with the highest worth CRA assumed stuck out of the core.
Shutdown margin is maintained in accordance with the technical specifications for all

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modes of operation, including: operations, hot shutdown, safe shutdown, transition,

and refueling. For the operations mode, the technical specification for SDM is based on
the limit used for safety analysis. A comparison between the SDM limit used for safety
analysis and the available SDM for the equilibrium fuel cycle is presented in
Section 4.3.2.5.

During power operations, the CVCS is used to adjust soluble boron concentration to
account for reactivity changes due to core burnup and due to power maneuvering, in
order to maintain the CRAs within the power dependent insertion limits (PDIL). The
PDILs ensure that sufficient SDM is maintained. Using soluble boron preserves the
capability of the CRAs to rapidly reduce power and protect fuel design limits upon a
reactor trip, and provides a means for controlling the rate of reactivity changes
resulting from planned, normal power changes (including xenon burnout) to assure
SAFDLs are not exceeded.

For AOOs, rapid CRA insertion after a reactor trip provides protection of fuel design
limits. Consistent with GDC 26, the calculation of SDM includes a provision for the
highest worth CRA remaining fully withdrawn from the core.

For postulated accidents comprised of infrequent events and accidents as described in

Section 15.0, rapid CRA insertion after a reactor trip provides protection of the core. As
with AOOs, the CVCS is used to adjust soluble boron concentration and maintain SDM
prior to the event. Thus, for postulated accidents, the combined capability of the CVCS
and CRAs control reactivity and ensures that the capability to cool the core is
maintained as described in Section 15.0. CRAs reliably control reactivity changes after a
postulated accident without the need for poison addition.

For design basis events (DBE), the insertion of all CRAs provides the safety related
means to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a shutdown condition. Long term
shutdown capability is defined as the amount of reactivity by which the reactor is
subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all CRAs are fully
inserted and the RCS is cooled to equilibrium conditions. Long term shutdown
capability is evaluated assuming that the core is xenon-free, no decay heat or voiding is
present, and equilibrium samarium is accounted for. Insertion of all CRAs satisfies the
portion of GDC 26 and PDC 27 requiring that one of the systems shall be capable of
holding the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions.

Conservative analysis indicates that a return to power could occur following a reactor
trip under the condition that the highest worth CRA does not insert, coincident with
the CVCS system being unavailable. The probability of such a return to power is
insignificant because the probability of failure of a CRA to insert and the CVCS being
unavailable is less than 1E-5 per reactor year. Furthermore, even in a return to power
scenario, fuel damage does not occur because the resultant power level is limited and
the associated heat generated is within the capacity of the passive heat removal
system, as discussed in Section 15.0.6.

LOCA events can result in condensation of unborated water in the CNV and RPV
downcomer once the steam generator tubes become uncovered. The ECCS actuation
signals on high CNV level and low RCS pressure are specifically designed to ensure
ECCS actuation occurs prior to the development of conditions that could result in a

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core dilution event following ECCS actuation. For small RCS leaks where ECCS actuation
setpoints are not reached within 72 hours, boron mixing is maintained through diverse
flow paths until RPV level drops below the riser holes. After the riser holes are
uncovered, some downcomer dilution may occur, however, core boron concentration
remains above the initial RCS boron concentration. This function supports the
exemption to GDC 33 discussed in Section 6.3 and Section 9.3.4.1.

In some Non-LOCA scenarios, DHRS can cool the RCS such that the level drops below
the top of the riser and the natural circulation loop is interrupted. Without natural
circulation flow, condensation of steam could reduce the downcomer boron
concentration. Diverse flow paths through four holes located in the riser promote
mixing to preclude positive reactivity insertion when natural circulation is restored. The
riser holes are located at the SG midpoint, which is below the level resulting from RCS
fluid contraction from DHRS cooldown. The method for evaluating the flow through
the riser holes is described in Section 15.0.5.

4.3.1.6 Stability

The design of the reactor and associated systems, and the administrative controls on
CRA position provide an inherently stable core with respect to axial and radial power
stability.

In addition, oscillations in core power can be readily detected by the fixed in-core
detector system which continuously monitors the core flux distribution.

The stability analyses are provided in Section 4.3.2.7.

This stability design satisfies GDC 12.

4.3.2 Nuclear Design Description

4.3.2.1 Nuclear Design Description

The NuScale core design is comprised of 37 fuel assemblies, each arranged in a 17x17
lattice and containing 264 fuel rods, 24 CRA guide tubes, and one central
instrumentation tube. The fuel rods are supported by five spacer grids; each fuel rod
consists of a column of stacked, cylindrical ceramic pellets of enriched uranium dioxide
(UO2) with gadolinium oxide (Gd2O3) as a burnable absorber homogeneously mixed
within the fuel in selected locations. The fuel pellets are encapsulated in M5® cladding
(a zirconium-based alloy) with an active fuel length of 78.74 inches. The fuel is enriched
up to 4.95 percent.

Sixteen (16) of the fuel assembly positions contain CRAs. The CRAs are organized into
two banks: a regulating bank and a shutdown bank. The regulating bank contains two
groups of four (4) CRAs arranged symmetrically in the core. The regulating bank groups
are used during normal plant operation to control reactivity and provide axial power
shaping. The shutdown bank contains two groups of four (4) CRAs. The shutdown bank
is fully withdrawn during power operation. The shutdown bank is used in the event of a
reactor trip and to maintain the reactor shutdown. Each CRA contains 24 individual

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rods fastened at the top end to a common hub or spider. The rods contain two neutron
absorbers, silver-indium-cadmium at the bottom of the rod, and boron carbide (B4C) in
the upper portion of the rod. The CRA rods are clad with stainless steel. More
information on the fuel and CRAs is provided in Section 4.2 and Section 4.6.

Power dependent insertion limits restrict the amount by which the two regulating
bank groups can be inserted at power. When the regulating groups are inserted, both
groups in the regulating bank move together until the Group 2 PDIL is reached. Once
both groups reach the Group 2 PDIL, Group 1 can insert further, up to the Group 1 PDIL.
When the CRAs are withdrawn, Group 2 cannot be withdrawn from the Group 2 PDIL
limit until Group 1 has been withdrawn to meet Group 2. From there, both regulating
banks move together for the remainder of the withdrawal. The PDILs are shown in
Figure 4.3-2.

The fuel cycles are nominally two years and equivalent to a 12 GWd/MTU cycle length.
The nuclear design includes axial and radial enrichment zoning within an assembly.
Each fuel rod has a reduced enrichment axial blanket at the top and bottom, with a
central fully enriched zone. Assemblies may also incorporate radial zoning to ensure
that the peak power rod in any assembly is not on the assembly periphery.

The reload fuel management scheme places fresh fuel on the periphery of the core and
shuffles burned fuel into the middle of the core in an "out-in" approach. The "out-in"
fuel management, in conjunction with NuScale's heavy reflector design, lowers power
peaking and maximizes thermal margin. In this scheme, the maximum power does not
reside in the central assemblies and a flatter radial power distribution across the core is
achieved. This approach provides for analysis and operational simplicity compared to
the more traditional low-leakage core loading patterns. Additionally, the "out-in"
approach minimizes the burnable poison loading requirement because of the
inherently flatter power distribution. As a result, boron concentration and power
peaking are usually greatest at the beginning of the cycle.

The NuScale reactor is designed with a heavy reflector (Figure 4.3-25) to improve
neutron economy. The reflector is made of stainless steel, which reflects fast neutrons
back into the core and flattens the power distribution to improve fuel performance.
The reflector is located between the core periphery and the core barrel and provides
the core envelope and directs flow through the core.

The soluble boron concentration is adjusted throughout the cycle to compensate for
the reactivity changes due to fuel burnup, fission product poisoning, and burnable
poison depletion. The higher concentration at beginning of cycle balances the excess
reactivity that is designed into the cycle to achieve the nominal two-year cycles. The
equilibrium cycle has an initial boron concentration of 1235 ppm.

Burnable poison in the form of gadolinia (Gd2O3) is used in strategic locations within
the fuel assemblies. The gadolinia is homogeneously mixed with the UO2 in selected
fuel rods to provide a favorable radial power distribution, hold down reactivity, and
minimize power peaking within an assembly. Although gadolinia is physically
compatible with UO2, its addition to the fuel degrades some of the material properties
of the UO2. For this reason, fuel containing gadolinia is limited to a lower power

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generation rate than fuel containing only UO2 based on consideration of centerline
melting.

The equilibrium cycle is the reference for which analysis is presented in this section. The
exact loading patterns, the initial and final positions of assemblies, and the number of
fresh assemblies and their placement will ultimately depend on the energy
requirements and the specific power history of the individual cycle. The loading
pattern for the reference equilibrium cycle is shown in Figure 4.3-1.

Table 4.3-1 and Table 4.3-2 summarize the reactor core design parameters used in the
analysis. Table 4.3-5 summarizes the plant operating modes for the NuScale design.

4.3.2.2 Power Distribution

Power distribution calculations are discussed in the “Nuclear Analysis Codes and
Methods Qualification” topical report (Reference 4.3-1). This report contains a
discussion of power distribution uncertainty, including application and a means for
updating the uncertainty values.

4.3.2.2.1 Definitions

Maximum FΔH

The maximum enthalpy rise hot channel factor, FΔH, is defined as the ratio of the
maximum integrated fuel rod power to the average fuel rod power. The limit on
FΔH is established to ensure that the fuel design criteria are not exceeded and the
accident analysis assumptions remain valid. This limit ensures that the design basis
value for the CHF ratio is met for normal operation, anticipated operational
occurrences, and infrequent events. The FΔH limit is representative of the coolant
flow channel with the maximum enthalpy rise. This channel has the highest power
input to the coolant and therefore the highest probability for CHF.

The NuScale design limit for FΔH is 1.50 and is based on the safety analysis.

Maximum FQ

The heat flux hot channel factor (or total peaking factor), FQ, is the ratio of
maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod to the average fuel rod heat
flux for the entire core. The maximum FQ value is used to calculate the peak linear
heat generation rate (LHGR). The maximum value of FQ is used to ensure the
specified acceptable fuel design limit for fuel centerline melting is not exceeded.

Axial Peaking Factor Fz

The axial peaking factor, Fz, is the maximum relative power at any axial point in a
fuel rod, divided by the average power of the fuel rod.

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Engineering Hot Channel Factor, FE

The engineering heat flux hot channel factor, FE, accounts for manufacturing
tolerances on such parameters as enrichment, pellet density, and pellet diameter.

Measurement Uncertainty Factor, FM

The measurement uncertainty factor, FM, accounts for the measurement error
associated with power distribution predictions. FM is accounted for in the nuclear
reliability factor (NRF) determined for FQ. The NRF is discussed in more detail in
Section 4.3.2.2.7 and in Reference 4.3-1.

Additional uncertainties on the limiting FΔH value which is used in the CHF ratio
calculation are included in the subchannel analysis discussed in Section 4.4.

Peak Linear Heat Generation Rate

The peak LHGR is the maximum heat flow per unit length of the fuel rod. A design
limit is placed on the peak LHGR to ensure that the fuel performance limitations are
not exceeded.

Axial Offset

Axial offset (AO) is the ratio of the difference in power between the top half of the
core and the bottom half of the core to the total core power as shown in the
equation below:

Power in Top of Core – Power in Bottom of Core

Axial Offset (fraction) = ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Power in Core Eq. 4.3-1

The axial offset window is defined as a function of reactor power and the AO
analytical limit is provided in Figure 4.3-3.

The AO typically becomes more negative during a cycle and also as power
increases from hot zero power (HZP) to full power.

4.3.2.2.2 Radial Power

The core radial power distribution is a function of the core loading pattern, control
rod pattern, control rod insertion, and location of fresh and burned fuel assemblies.

Figure 4.3-4, Figure 4.3-5, and Figure 4.3-6 show the total and radial peaking factors
(FQ and FΔH) at the beginning of cycle (BOC), the middle of cycle (MOC), and at the
end of cycle (EOC) as a function of power level based on a nominal cycle depletion
with all CRAs out, followed by an instantaneous insertion of the regulating bank
CRAs to the PDIL. As can be seen from the results, the peaking factors are higher
with CRAs inserted to the PDIL. Also, peaking factors generally decrease as the cycle
proceeds.

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Figure 4.3-11 provides the fuel assembly relative radial power distribution at BOC,
MOC, and EOC. A conservatively flat power distribution within the fuel assembly is
assumed in the CHF subchannel analysis as described in Section 4.4.

4.3.2.2.3 Assembly Power

A typical radial power distribution within a fuel assembly relative to average core
power is shown in Figure 4.3-7. This pin-by-pin power distribution is for a center
fuel assembly at BOC and EOC for the equilibrium cycle.

Figure 4.3-8, Figure 4.3-9, and Figure 4.3-10 show a pin-by-pin power distribution
relative to average core power for a first batch (fresh), second batch (once burned),
and third batch (twice burned) fuel assembly. These are also shown for BOC and
EOC. In the case of the central assembly, the power distribution within the
assembly is symmetric. For the non-central assemblies, the power distribution
within the assembly is non-symmetric.

4.3.2.2.4 Axial Power

The axial power shape is influenced by the position of the regulating bank, the
moderator density, fission product distribution, fuel burnup, and the Doppler
effect. An axial offset window is developed that encompasses axial offsets
achievable during normal operation by considering depletion over various
durations. The depletions consider different power levels and CRA insertions.
Swings in axial xenon distribution and concentration resulting from these CRA
insertions and withdrawals produce a wide range of axial offsets to be enveloped
by the AO window. The range of axial power shapes that may be achieved while
operating within allowed conditions is also used to evaluate the appropriateness of
the AO window. During an operating cycle, the axial offset is maintained within the
analytically based AO window (see Figure 4.3-3) by controls specified in the
Technical Specifications. The axial power shape can also be determined from the
in-core instrumentation system described in Section 4.3.2.2.9.

Figure 4.3-12 provides the core average axial power shape for the equilibrium cycle
at BOC, MOC, and EOC. The effect of neutron absorption by the spacer grids can be
observed in the power shapes in the figure.

4.3.2.2.5 Local Power

Fuel densification has been observed in nuclear power plants due to irradiation.
Densification causes the fuel pellets to shrink and in some cases results in gaps in
the fuel column. These gaps, if significant, can cause reduced neutron absorption
and can result in power peaking in nearby rods. Modern fuel designs and
manufacturing practices have eliminated this phenomenon. No penalty is taken for
local power spikes due to fuel densification in the NuScale fuel design.

4.3.2.2.6 Limiting Power Distributions

Limiting power distributions are used for the steady state and transient analyses
that are performed in Section 4.4 and Chapter 15.

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Radial Power Distribution

The radial power distribution is primarily determined by the cycle design.

For each cycle core design, a limit is imposed on the maximum allowed FΔH. This
design limit is then conservatively applied in the subchannel analysis as described
in Section 4.4. Except for events in Section 15.4 (Reactor and Power Distribution
Anomalies) that do not involve CRA motion, radial power distributions are held
constant through the evolution of the transient. Additionally, for Section 15.4
events that do involve CRA motion the radial power shapes account for the
possible radial asymmetry of the event and radial power information specific to
each event is provided for the subchannel analysis.

Axial Power Distribution

The core average axial flux shape (FZ) can be affected by operator action. The core
average axial power profile can experience significant and rapid changes because
of control rod motion and load changes, and slower changes because of changes in
the xenon distribution and cycle burnup.

An analysis of the possible axial power shapes is performed to identify the

bounding axial power shapes for use in the CHF and transient analyses. These
shapes are generated as a function of cycle burnup, control rod position, xenon
distribution, and core thermal-hydraulic conditions. Bounding axial power shapes
are held constant through the evolution of transients analyzed in Chapter 15, with
the exception of some events in Section 15.4 that involve CRA motion. The axial
power shapes for these Section 15.4 events account for the change in axial shape
caused by the movement of one or more CRAs, as characterized by the event.

The specific assumptions related to power distribution used in the steady state and
accident analysis for power distribution are described in more detail in Section 4.4
and Chapter 15. The values of FΔH and Fz are conservatively selected for use in the
transient analysis such that they are expected to be bounding for all cycles. If the
calculated power distributions for a given cycle are not bounded by the values
assumed in the accident analysis, the core design is revised to bring the calculated
power distribution within the bounding value or the transient analysis is
reperformed.

The limiting power distributions are confirmed during operation by technical

specifications that require operation within the AO window and within the PDILs. In
addition the fixed in-core flux measurements and resulting power distribution that
continuously display in the control room provide further assurance that the power
distributions both axially and radially are not deviating from those expected and
assumed in the analysis.

4.3.2.2.7 Verification of Power Distribution Analysis

The NuScale analytical methods have been benchmarked against other

higher-order computer codes, experimental reactors, and against measured data

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from operating commercial reactors. The results of the benchmarking are

discussed in detail in Reference 4.3-1 and are used to derive NRFs. The NRF
accounts for calculational error in the nuclear methods and ensures conservatism
in the safety-related application of the parameter. The NRFs may be adjusted as
measurements are collected and benchmarked against the nuclear methods.

4.3.2.2.8 Testing

A startup testing program is implemented for the initial startup to confirm that the
nuclear design analyses are in agreement with predictions. The initial startup
program is described in Section 14.2. Since not all limiting situations can be created
at the beginning of core life (BOL), the main purpose of the tests is to provide
confirmation of the calculation methods used for predicting the test conditions.
Tests performed at the beginning of each reload cycle verify the selected
safety-related parameters of the reload design.

The purpose of startup physics testing (low-power testing and power-ascension

testing) is to measure the neutronic characteristics of the core and compare those
measurements with predictions to verify that the core is operating as designed,
validate the analytical models, and verify the correctness or conservatism of
assumptions used in the safety analyses. Also, as discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.7, the
comparison between measured and calculated values during start-up testing is
used to assess the continued applicability of the NRF values, or the data is used to
update the NRF values depending on the agreement between the measured and
calculated values.

There are five characteristics that must be confirmed for each newly loaded core:
• reactivity balance
• reactivity control
• power distribution
• shutdown capability
• shutdown requirement

The reactivity balance is confirmed by the measurement of the HZP all rods out
(ARO) boron concentration. Agreement between the measured value and the
predicted value means that the total amount of fissile material and absorbing
material in the core is consistent with the design. Reactivity control is determined
by measurement of the HZP isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC) and
comparison to the predicted value. Agreement means that the response of the
core to temperature changes is consistent with the design. Power distributions are
confirmed by measuring the neutron flux throughout the core at low, intermediate,
and higher power levels and comparing the measurements to design predictions.
The power distribution at lower power levels must be confirmed before increasing
to higher power levels. Control rod worth measurements confirm the capability of
the core to be shut down, and the shutdown requirement is confirmed by
measuring the power defect (reactivity difference between zero power and full
power).

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Additional detail on startup physics testing is provided in Reference 4.3-1.

4.3.2.2.9 Monitoring

The in-core instrumentation system (ICIS) continuously monitors core neutron flux
distribution and core inlet and outlet temperatures. The core neutron flux
information is provided to the module control system to ensure that power
distribution is in agreement with predictions. The core inlet and outlet temperature
information is provided to the module protection system to ensure that adequate
core cooling is being provided for post-accident conditions.

During normal operation, the ICIS is used to synthesize core-wide

three-dimensional power distributions. These power distributions are compared to
predicted core power distributions to verify the core is operating as designed. Axial
power distributions are continuously monitored to validate the AO operating
window, and actions required by the technical specifications are initiated based on
this information. Also, power distributions from the ICIS are used to calibrate the
ex-core neutron flux detectors. When the rod position indication system is not
working properly, the ICIS has the capability to determine the relative position of a
stuck or misaligned control rod.

The ICIS processes raw input signals from the in-core neutron flux detectors and
sends the processed signals to the module control system which uses algorithms to
determine the three-dimensional power distribution. The module control system
displays this information to the operators. The module control system provides
alarms to alert the operators to power distributions that are approaching limits.

During reactor startup, the in-core neutron flux detectors are used to verify proper
fuel loading, calibrate the ex-core detectors, measure core peaking factors, and
confirm core behavior. During normal power operation, the ICIS is used to measure
the power distribution to ensure the peaking factors are within limits.

During post-accident conditions, the core inlet and core outlet thermocouples are
used to monitor adequate core cooling and provide the operating staff information
to assist them in monitoring critical safety functions.

The ICIS uses self-powered neutron detectors (SPNDs) that require no external
power supply. SPND type instrumentation has been widely used in the industry for
over 40 years. The self-powered neutron detectors are designed to withstand
design temperatures and pressures.

The ICIS instrument strings operate in twelve (12) core locations. The reactor vessel
internals provide guide tubing and structural support for the ICIS instrument
strings to be properly inserted and retracted when appropriate. The 12 ICIS
instrument strings are inserted at the beginning of the cycle and remain in place
until the end of the cycle. The ICIS instrument strings are withdrawn for refueling.
Figure 4.3-18 shows the 12 in-core locations, designated as ICI1 through ICI12. The
in-core instrument strings are inserted in the center instrument tube location of a
fuel assembly.

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During startup, the core inlet and core exit thermocouples are calibrated against
the reactor coolant system narrow- and wide-range temperature measurements.
The neutron flux detector synthesized power distribution is compared against
analytical predictions.

The ICIS is comprised of four SPNDs that are fixed in evenly-spaced axial positions;
they are placed in twelve well-distributed fuel assembly locations in the core with a
spatial density comparable to other plants in the industry that use fixed in-core
detectors. The NuScale SPND detector signals occur from neutron activation,
generating an electrical current proportional to the incident neutron flux. These
signals are then synthesized into three-dimensional assembly and peak rod power
distributions through the use of pre-fit coefficient data from detailed SIMULATE5
code calculations. Core power and peak rod power distributions are continuously
updated from SPND signals in the control room, and verified to remain within
Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs).

The following uncertainties are considered in the determination of the power

distribution:
• Uncertainty in the measured detector signal
• Uncertainty in the relationship between the detector signal and power
• Uncertainty in the predicted relationship between assembly power and peak
rod power

4.3.2.2.10 Power Distribution Controls

Design basis events are analyzed from bounding initial conditions and analytical
limits. Operation within these bounding conditions and analytical limits is ensured
using a variety of mechanisms including TS Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCOs), continuous monitoring, and surveillances. Operation within the limiting
power distributions is ensured by the following:
• Position of the shutdown and regulating CRA banks is determined via the rod
position indication system; operation of the regulating bank within the PDILs
and operation of both banks within the TS modes is ensured via a pre-defined
limit and control room alarms as the limit is approached.
• Axial offset is surveilled by continuous monitoring of the flux and power
distribution; axial offset is an LCO and alarms are used to indicate if the AO
window limit is approached.
• CRA alignment is an LCO.
• In addition to power distributions, the core pressure, flow rate, and
temperature are continuously monitored and used to verify LCO limits on FΔH.

The collective combination of administrative controls, continuous monitoring, and

alarms provides assurance that analytical limits are not exceeded and the most
limiting power distributions assumed for analysis of design basis events remain
bounding.

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4.3.2.3 Reactivity Coefficients

The kinetic characteristics of the reactor core determine the core response to a change
in plant conditions or to operator adjustments made during normal operation, as well
as the core response during AOOs or accidents. These kinetic characteristics are
quantified in the reactivity feedback coefficients. The reactivity coefficients reflect the
changes in the neutron multiplication due to varying plant conditions, such as thermal
power, moderator and fuel temperatures, flow rates, or soluble boron concentration.
Since reactivity coefficients change during the cycle, ranges of coefficients are
employed in transient analysis to determine the response of the plant throughout life.
The results of these analyses and the reactivity coefficients used are presented in
Chapter 15.

The reactivity coefficients are calculated with approved nuclear methods. These
methods are described in Section 4.3.3. These models and methods have been
qualified and benchmarked for core design and analysis as described in
Reference 4.3-1.

The effect of radial and axial power distribution is implicit in the reactivity coefficient
calculations.

4.3.2.3.1 Doppler Coefficient

The Doppler fuel temperature reactivity coefficient is a measure of the reactivity

change associated with a change in fuel temperature. The Doppler coefficient is
also referred to as the Fuel Temperature Coefficient. The Doppler coefficient is
negative for the NuScale design. The decrease in reactivity with increasing
temperature is due the Doppler broadening of 238U and 240Pu resonance
absorption peaks. The Doppler coefficient is calculated by uniformly perturbing the
fuel temperature. The variation in Doppler coefficient is small over the range of
exposure, power level, flow, and temperatures of the NuScale core. The Doppler
coefficient becomes more negative as a function of burnup as the 240Pu content
increases, thereby increasing the effective 240Pu resonance absorption. The
Doppler coefficient is calculated for a range of fuel temperatures by varying the
time in cycle, coolant temperature, and power level, with the regulating bank in
both the ARO and PDIL positions. Table 4.3-6 demonstrates the range of the
Doppler coefficient over this spectrum of parameters.

4.3.2.3.2 Moderator Coefficients

The MTC is a measure of the relative change in reactivity associated with a change
in moderator temperature. The MTC is calculated over the range of powers and
burnup by increasing the moderator temperature by 5 degrees Fahrenheit above
the mean temperature. The calculation of MTC includes the effects of moderator
density changes.

The MTC is constrained by design, operational practices, and administrative

controls to be negative during power operations so that increases in moderator
temperature in the core are accompanied by decreased reactivity.

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The primary parameters that affect MTC are soluble boron concentration, burnup,
burnable poison, CRA position, and power level. At the higher soluble boron
concentrations, the effect of increasing temperature (and decreasing moderator
density) results in decreased boron density, which tends to increase reactivity,
making the MTC more positive. The maximum MTC typically occurs at the
beginning of a cycle at low power levels. Burnup tends to make the MTC more
negative because of the decrease in boron concentration and buildup of
plutonium and other fission products. The minimum MTC is typically achieved at
the end of a cycle.

The MTC is shown in Figure 4.3-13 and Figure 4.3-14 for a range of moderator
temperatures at full power and at zero power for the reference equilibrium cycle.
While the MTC may be slightly positive at some conditions, as discussed in
Section 4.3.2.3.3, the power coefficient is negative at all power levels.

The moderator pressure coefficient is a change in reactivity in relation to a change

in reactor coolant pressure. A change in pressure causes a change in reactivity
through a change in the coolant density.

The effects of voiding are accounted for in the density portion of the MTC.

The isothermal temperature coefficient (ITC) is the change in reactivity due to the
combined change in core average moderator and fuel temperature when the
temperature is uniform across the core. This is distinguished from the MTC which is
the change in reactivity due to a change only in moderator temperature. The ITC is
important because it is the quantity that can be measured in the plant and is used
to develop the NRFs for MTC as described in Reference 4.3-1.

4.3.2.3.3 Power Coefficient

The power coefficient is the sum of the moderator temperature, fuel temperature,
and void coefficient, and is measured over the percent change in power. The power
defect is the sum of the reactivity contributions of each of these feedback
mechanisms for a cumulative change in power down to 0 percent power. A
three-dimensional calculation is performed in determining total power coefficients
and total power defects, and as a result, axial redistribution is implicitly included.

The maximum and minimum power defect for a typical equilibrium cycle is shown
in Figure 4.3-15. The maximum and minimum power coefficient is shown in
Figure 4.3-16. As can be seen from Figure 4.3-16, the power coefficient is negative
at all power levels.

4.3.2.3.4 Boron Worth Coefficient

The boron worth coefficient is a measurement of the change in reactivity

associated with a change in the boron concentration. The boron worth coefficient
for the equilibrium cycle is provided in Figure 4.3-21.

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4.3.2.3.5 Flow Coefficient

The flow coefficient of reactivity is a measure of the relative reactivity change

associated with a core flow change. The flow coefficient is determined by
calculating the change in reactivity that results from a perturbation of the core
average flow. This coefficient is determined at BOC, MOC, and EOC, and for a
number of initial power levels, both in ARO and PDIL CRA configurations. Results
for minimum and maximum flow coefficient are shown in Figure 4.3-22.

4.3.2.3.6 Comparison of Calculated and Experimental Reactivity Coefficients

A comparison of calculated and experimental reactivity coefficients is provided in

Reference 4.3-1.

Uncertainty factors developed from the reactivity coefficient comparison results

are used to derive NRF as described in Reference 4.3-1.

Reactivity coefficients are verified during startup testing.

4.3.2.3.7 Reactivity Coefficients in Transient Analysis

The reactivity coefficients, specifically the moderator temperature and Doppler

coefficients, are analysis inputs to Chapter 15 transients.

The bounding values are used as design limits in the transient analysis. The exact
values of the coefficient used in the analysis depend on whether the transient of
interest is examined at the beginning of life or end of life, whether the most
negative or the most positive (least negative) coefficients are appropriate to
provide conservatism, and whether spatial non-uniformity must be considered in
the analysis. Conservative values of coefficients, considering various aspects of
analysis, are used in the transient analysis. The details and assumptions for each
transient are described in Chapter 15.

The conservative values for reactivity coefficients are selected in such a way that
the need for a reevaluation of any accident in a subsequent cycle is minimized.
However, if the coefficients fall outside of the conservatively selected values, the
core design is changed or reanalysis of the transient is performed.

The list of limiting physics parameters, and the direction that is conservative for
each Chapter 15 event is provided in Reference 4.3-1.

4.3.2.4 Control Requirements

Soluble boron is added to the coolant to maintain the required SDM when a cooldown
to ambient conditions is required. Table 4.3-2 shows the boron concentrations for
various core conditions for the equilibrium cycle.

The CRAs are required to provide negative reactivity to account for the power defect
from full power to zero power and to provide the required SDM, assuming the highest
worth CRA is stuck out of the core. The reactivity addition resulting from power

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reduction includes contributions from Doppler, moderator temperature, flux

redistribution, and reduction in voids as discussed in the following sections. The CRAs,
with all control rods inserted, provide negative reactivity to maintain long term
shutdown capability. Reactivity addition accounted for when evaluating long term
shutdown capability includes power defect (from full power to zero power), change in
moderator temperature during cooldown and xenon decay as discussed in the
following sections. The ability to accomplish shutdown and to maintain long term
shutdown capability is demonstrated in Table 4.3-3 and Table 4.3-4 for BOC, MOC, and
EOC conditions for the reference equilibrium cycle. The SDM and long term shutdown
capability include an uncertainty of 12 percent in the CRA worth. This uncertainty is
discussed and shown to be acceptable in Reference 4.3-1.

4.3.2.4.1 Doppler Effect

The Doppler effect is the result of the narrowing of the 238U and 240Pu resonance
cross-sections as the fuel temperature decreases. This effect is most noticeable over
the range of full power to zero power due to the significant decrease in fuel pellet
temperature over the full power range.

4.3.2.4.2 Moderator Temperature

The moderator temperature decreases significantly from 100 percent to 0 percent

power. When the MTC is negative, reactivity is added with power reduction. Since
the MTC becomes more negative with fuel depletion, this has a significant effect on
SDM at the EOC and the long term shutdown capability is also affected.

4.3.2.4.3 Flux Redistribution

During normal operation, the coolant density decreases with higher elevation in
the core. This density profile results in less fuel depletion near the top of the core,
resulting in an axial power distribution skewed slightly towards the bottom of the
core. At HZP, the coolant density is uniform and the power distribution is skewed
towards the top of the core. Since a three-dimensional calculation is performed in
determining the total power defect, flux redistribution is inherently included in the
calculation. The bottom peaked flux shape in the beginning of the cycle results in
more burnup in the bottom of the core, causing power to shift towards the top of
the core at EOC.

4.3.2.4.4 Void Content

There is a very small void presence in the core due to nucleate boiling at full power
and the impact of collapsing of voids on a reduction in power is minimal.

4.3.2.4.5 Rod Insertion Allowance

At power, the regulating bank is moved within a prescribed band to compensate

for small changes in boron concentration, changes in moderator temperature, and
small changes in xenon. When the CRAs reach the PDIL, changes in soluble boron
are required to compensate for additional reactivity changes. The PDIL prevents

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large axial offsets and reduces reactivity insertion for a rod ejection accident.
Alarms alert the operators when the regulating bank is approaching the PDIL.

4.3.2.4.6 Excess Reactivity for Depletion

Excess reactivity is designed into the cycle to provide sufficient reactivity to

compensate for fuel depletion and fission product buildup throughout the cycle.
This reactivity is controlled by the addition of soluble boron to the coolant and by
burnable poison that is integral with the fuel. The soluble boron concentration for
several core configurations and the boron worth are given in Table 4.3-2 for the
equilibrium cycle. Since the excess reactivity for burnup is controlled by soluble
boron and burnable poison, it is not included in control rod requirements.

4.3.2.4.7 Xenon and Samarium Poisoning

Changes in xenon and samarium concentration take place at a slow rate and the
resulting change can be controlled by changing the soluble boron concentration.

4.3.2.4.8 pH Effects

Reactor coolant system chemistry is maintained within a narrow band and changes
in reactivity due to changes in coolant pH are small enough and change slowly
enough to be controlled by soluble boron.

4.3.2.4.9 Experimental Confirmation

The nuclear design methods are described in Section 4.3.3. The benchmark of these
methods against calculated and experimental results is provided in
Reference 4.3-1.

4.3.2.4.10 Control

Core reactivity is controlled by soluble boron in the reactor coolant, CRAs, and
burnable poison that is integral to the fuel pellets, as described in the following
sections.

4.3.2.4.11 Soluble Boron

NuScale uses natural boron for soluble boron control. The soluble boron
concentration is changed to control relatively slow reactivity changes due to:
• moderator temperature changes from ambient conditions to HZP.
• transient xenon and samarium poisoning due to planned power changes.
• reactivity effects of fissile inventory depletion and buildup of fission products.
• depletion of burnable poison.

The boron concentration variation for the reference equilibrium cycle is shown in
Figure 4.3-17.

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4.3.2.4.12 Control Rod Assemblies

There are 16 CRAs in the core design. The CRAs provide control and shutdown
capability for:
• shutdown margin for HZP with the highest worth rod stuck out of the core.
• reactivity compensation as a result of an increase in power above HZP (power
defect, including Doppler, and moderator reactivity changes).
• fluctuation in boron concentration, coolant temperature, or xenon.
• reactivity changes from load changes.
• design basis events with a stuck rod.
• long term shutdown capability.

CRA insertion is restricted to ensure that there is sufficient negative reactivity

available to maintain shutdown capability and to limit the amount of reactivity
insertion possible during the rod ejection accident. The PDILs are set sufficiently
high to meet these criteria while also being low enough that operators have a
reasonable range of CRA movement for power maneuvers. In general, deeper CRA
insertion is allowed at lower power levels. Operators are alerted if the PDIL is
approached. The PDILs are shown in Figure 4.3-2.

Power distribution, rod ejection, and CRA misoperation analyses are based on the
arrangement of CRAs shown in Figure 4.3-18.

During a startup, the shutdown bank is withdrawn before the regulating bank
withdrawal is initiated. The approach to criticality is initiated by a combination of
boron dilution to the appropriate boron concentration and withdrawal of the
regulating bank. Additional detail on startup is provided in Section 14.2.

4.3.2.4.13 Burnable Poisons

Gadolinia (Gd2O3) is used as an integral burnable absorber in selected fuel rods to

provide partial control of the excess reactivity available during the cycle. In
addition, the burnable absorber also reduces the requirement for soluble boron at
the beginning of the cycle, eliminating the possibility of a positive MTC during
power operations at the beginning of the cycle (at power). In addition, burnable
absorbers reduce power peaking within the fuel assembly.

4.3.2.4.14 Peak Xenon

Startup from the peak xenon condition is accomplished using CRAs and boron
dilution.

4.3.2.4.15 Burnup

Cycles are designed with excess reactivity to offset the effect of burnup during the
cycle. Control of this excess reactivity is accomplished using soluble boron and
burnable poison. The boron concentration is limited during operating conditions

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to maintain the MTC negative. The end of a fuel cycle is reached when the soluble
boron concentration approaches 20 ppm or less as discussed in Section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.2.4.16 Power Maneuvering

Power changes are normally accomplished by means of regulating CRA position or

soluble boron concentration. The CRA position is limited by the PDIL and helps
maintain the core within the axial offset limits. While power maneuvering
operations within the capabilities of the rod control system are anticipated to
support power system demands, continuous power maneuvering of the NuScale
Power Module where the CRA position is used to achieve power changes was not
assumed in the analysis of the representative equilibrium cycle. However, planned
power maneuvers will be considered as part of a cycle-specific core design using
the methodologies described in Technical Specification 5.6.3. The analysis of the
impact of power maneuvering on the nuclear design will include the effects on
axial and radial flux shapes that are used in the safety analysis in Chapter 15.

4.3.2.5 Control Rod Patterns and Reactivity Worth

The NuScale reactor module design utilizes 16 of the possible 37 assembly locations for
CRAs. There are two CRA banks, a regulating bank and a shutdown bank. The
regulating bank contains two groups of four CRAs each. The shutdown bank contains
two groups of four CRAs each. Figure 4.3-18 shows the location of the CRA banks.
Additional details on the CRAs are provided in Section 4.2 and Section 4.6.

The SDM is the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or
would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all CRAs (shutdown and
regulating banks) are fully inserted (while accounting for the power defect, CRAs being
at the PDIL, SDM uncertainties, and flux redistribution), except for the single CRA of
highest reactivity worth, which is assumed to remain fully withdrawn.

The design limit on minimum SDM is set by the safety analysis for all power levels
(including HZP) and operating modes. The limit assures that there is sufficient negative
reactivity following a reactor trip, under all credible operating conditions, to shut the
reactor down and prevent exceeding the specified acceptable fuel design limits.

Allowable deviations due to misaligned CRAs are controlled by the technical

specifications. The allowance for CRA misalignment is based on the assumed
uncertainty in the rod position indication (RPI) system. The nominal RPI system
performance requirement is that the position is measured within three steps (out of
224 total); the acceptable analytical CRA misalignment is six steps and accounts for
abnormal operating conditions such as a failure of half the sensor coils in the system or
failure of an AC power source to the RPI system.

The reactivity insertion during a reactor trip is determined from the CRA drop time and
differential reactivity worth versus CRA position. The CRA position versus time of travel
after rod release is provided in Figure 4.3-23. This curve is based on a calculation
described in Section 4.2. The results from the CRA drop testing, described in
Section 1.5.1.7, validate the use of the calculated SCRAM curve shown in Figure 4.3-23
as a conservative basis for the CRA drop time. A more conservative bounding CRA drop

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time is used in the Chapter 15 analyses. The reactivity worth versus CRA position is
calculated by a series of steady-state calculations at various CRA positions, assuming
the CRAs are at the PDIL as the initial position in order to minimize the initial reactivity
insertion rate. The CRA with the highest worth is assumed stuck out of the core, and the
flux distribution is assumed to be skewed to the bottom of the core. The reactivity
worth versus CRA position at BOC and EOC is provided in Figure 4.3-24.

The individual CRA worth is calculated for the reference equilibrium cycle starting from
hot full power (HFP) and HZP at BOC, MOC, and EOC. In addition, individual CRA worth
is also calculated with the regulating groups at the PDILs at HFP and HZP at BOC, MOC,
and EOC. These best estimate results are summarized in Table 4.3-7 and Table 4.3-8.
The results are calculated for all 224 steps of CRA travel. Figure 4.3-19 shows the
differential CRA worth for BOC and EOC at multiple power levels for the equilibrium
cycle. Figure 4.3-20 shows the integral regulating bank worth (from the PDIL).

The loss of CRA worth due to the depletion of the absorber material is negligible. A
conservative calculation over a 20 EFPY CRA lifetime demonstrates that less than
2 percent of the boron in the upper portion of the CRA is lost due to depletion. The
silver-indium-cadmium in the lower portion of the CRA is also evaluated for a loss of
worth due to depletion and found to have an insignificant impact on the available
worth of the CRAs over their lifetime. Typical reactor operation with the rods
withdrawn from the core while at full power limits the potential for CRA absorber
depletion. Rod worth is confirmed at the beginning of each cycle during start-up
physics testing.

Past PWR operating experience has identified a phenomenon associated with potential
boron build-up on the fuel rods that could affect shutdown margin. Build-up of boron
in crud at the top of the core can cause the reactivity at the bottom of the core to
increase. Such a redistribution of power adversely affects the worth of the CRAs. The
NuScale uncertainty analysis of the CRA worth includes comparisons to operating data
from existing PWRs. Also, constant monitoring of core axial offset and comparison of
that offset to predicted values, identifies any build-up of boron on the cladding surface
during operation. Further, post-irradiation examinations as described in Section 4.2
measure oxide build-up and crud deposition on the fuel rods to ensure that boron
deposits on the cladding do not adversely affect the rod worth.

4.3.2.6 Criticality of the Reactor During Refueling

Criticality during a refueling is prevented by maintaining an effective neutron

multiplication factor (keff) of 0.95 or less at all times. Refueling is performed with CRAs
inserted in the fuel assemblies. Calculation of the required boron concentration for
refueling assumes that the two highest worth CRAs are not inserted.

4.3.2.6.1 Criticality Design Method Outside the Reactor

Criticality of fuel assemblies outside the reactor is precluded by adequate design of

fuel transfer and storage facilities and by administrative control procedures. The
two principal methods of preventing criticality are limiting the fuel assembly array
size and limiting assembly interaction by fixing the minimum separation between

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assemblies or inserting neutron poisons between assemblies. The details of the

methodology used for the fuel storage rack criticality analysis are included in
Section 9.1.

4.3.2.6.2 Soluble Boron Credit

See Section 9.1.

4.3.2.7 Stability

The NuScale reactor core is designed to assure that power oscillations that can result in
conditions exceeding SAFDLs are not possible and can be readily detected and
suppressed. The NuScale reactor is inherently stable with regards to power oscillations
due to the overall negative reactivity coefficients at power. Therefore, only
xenon-induced power distribution oscillations require evaluation. There are three
potential modes of oscillations that are possible in PWRs - azimuthal, radial, and axial.
Azimuthal oscillations are not likely due to the inherent symmetry of the NuScale core
loading pattern. Radial and axial oscillations are evaluated at BOC, MOC, and EOC for
the equilibrium cycle.

The parameter used to characterize the stability of an oscillation is the stability index,
which measures the rate of decay of the oscillation over the oscillation period. The rate
at which the oscillation decreases is expressed by an exponential function of the form:

αt
A ( t ) = A0 e Eq. 4.3-2

Where A(t) is the time dependent oscillation amplitude (1/hr), and A0 is the initial value,
and t is time.

The oscillation stability index, α, is obtained using equation:

1 A 
n+1
α = --- ln  ------------- Eq. 4.3-3
T  An 

Where T is the oscillation period (in hours), n is oscillation number.

A positive stability index indicates that the oscillations are diverging and therefore,
unstable. A negative stability index indicates that the oscillations are converging, and
therefore, stable. A stability index of zero indicates a neutrally stable oscillation.

There are two modes of xenon oscillation that are evaluated, axial and radial
oscillations. The stability calculations are performed using the SIMULATE5 code at
various times during the equilibrium cycle.

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4.3.2.7.1 Axial Oscillations

The oscillations are initiated by instantaneously inserting the regulating bank to

the PDIL. The axial xenon oscillations are then observed. Stability calculations are
performed at various times in core life and from 25 percent to 100 percent power.
The resulting stability indices are summarized in Table 4.3-9.

4.3.2.7.2 Radial Oscillations

Radial oscillations are initiated by instantaneously inserting a single CRA, which

results in both radial and axial oscillations. The stability indices are shown in
Table 4.3-10 and Table 4.3-11.

For both axial and radial oscillations, all stability indices are negative (i.e. stable)
and the oscillation periods are large (on the order of 50 hours). The NuScale reactor
is stable with respect to xenon oscillations.

The ICI system continuously monitors power distribution in the core and allows
prompt detection of an axial or radial xenon oscillation.

Figure 4.3-26 shows the axial offset peaks from a typical xenon oscillation at
100 percent power at BOC. As can be seen in the figure, the oscillation is quickly
damped, and a second peak is hard to distinguish, meaning the core returns to
near equilibrium within one oscillation period. Figure 4.3-26 is representative of
both the axial and radial behavior seen for all cases, and demonstrates the inherent
stability of the NuScale core.

4.3.2.7.3 Stability Methodology Comparison with Experimental Data

As discussed in Section 4.3.2.7, SIMULATE5 calculations are used to demonstrate

the NuScale core is stable with respect to axial and radial xenon oscillations. The
ability of SIMULATE5 to accurately predict xenon oscillations is dependent on the
code’s ability to accurately predict reactivity feedback effects, including Doppler
and moderator temperature feedback. Validation of the SIMULATE5 code to
accurately predict xenon transient behavior is performed by modeling xenon
transient behavior from operating PWRs, and comparing predictions against
measured data (Reference 4.3-4). The code vendor, Studsvik Scandpower,
compared SIMULATE5 predictions of transient xenon behavior from Westinghouse
3-loop PWRs Ringhals-2, Ringhals-3, and Ringhals-4. The code was used to model
load follow and coast down maneuvers, and results showed the ability of
SIMULATE5 to accurately predict xenon transients. The code is demonstrated to
accurately predict moderator and fuel temperature reactivity effects for the
NuScale core in Reference 4.3-1.

The ability of the code to predict xenon transient behavior for the NuScale design is
demonstrated by the accurate predictions against measured data for operating
PWRs, and the accurate predictions of reactivity feedback affects for the NuScale
core.

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4.3.2.8 Vessel Irradiation

The vessel irradiation and surveillance program is provided in Section 5.3.1.

The heavy neutron reflector, the core barrel, and the water annuli protect the vessel
from radiation damage by attenuating neutrons originating in the core and gamma
rays originating from both the core and structural components.

The Monte Carlo N-Particle transport code (MCNP6) version 1.0 (Reference 4.3-2) is
used to perform the vessel fluence calculations. The specific cross-section set used is
based on ENDF/B-VII. The calculations are performed for 60 years of operation at a 95
percent capacity factor. The values are based on the reference equilibrium cycle. A
cross-section view of the MCNP6 model used to calculate vessel flux is provided in
Figure 4.3-25.

Neutron flux distribution values (in units of n/cm2-sec) are summarized in Table 4.3-12.
The core average flux value in Table 4.3-12 is calculated using SIMULATE5 instead of
MCNP6. SIMULATE5 is used because it provides a more accurate calculation of neutron
flux in the core. This SIMULATE5 calculation is based on exposure averaged axial and
radial power profiles with soluble boron concentrations that correspond to the
nominal middle of cycle concentration. The other Table 4.3-12 values are calculated
with MCNP6 using assumptions consistent with Reference 4.3-6. The flux and radiation
damage estimates are verified through the analysis of actual surveillance test samples
from the irradiation surveillance program as described in Section 5.3.1. The
methodology used by NuScale to calculate neutron fluence on the NPM pressure vessel
and containment vessel is provided in Reference 4.3-6.

4.3.3 Analytical Methods

The NuScale nuclear analysis is performed with the Studsvik Scandpower Core
Management Software simulation tools. These simulation tools include the lattice physics
code CASMO5, the linkage code CMSLINK5 for nuclear data library generation, and the core
simulator code SIMULATE5 for power distribution and stability calculations. These codes
and the modelling methodology are described in detail in Reference 4.3-1. The
SIMULATE-3K code is used for transient core physics calculations and is described in detail
in Reference 4.3-5. In addition, the MCNP6 code is used to perform fluence calculations.

These codes are used to perform both steady-state and transient neutronic analyses of
light water reactors for core design and input to safety analysis.

As described in Reference 4.3-1, the methodology for the design and analysis of a single
core is independent of the presence of other NPMs. A conservative neutron flux
attenuation analysis, which considers the barriers between modules (several feet of both
borated water and concrete wall) confirms that the neutron flux contributed by the next
closest NPM operating at full power has an insignificant neutronic impact on the reactor
core of a neighboring NPM.

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CASMO5

CASMO5 is a multi-group transport theory physics code which uses two-dimensional

methods of characteristics transport theory for fuel assembly analysis and isotopic
depletion. Cross sections and group constants are generated based on a wide range of
potential conditions and cover several hundred energy groups and isotopes. CASMO5 uses
the ENDF/B-VII cross section library. CASMO5 calculates eigenvalue results, power and flux
distributions, reaction rates, and flux discontinuity factors for individual or multiple
assemblies in two dimensions. Multi-group cross section and discontinuity factor data is
required for the generation of a cross section library.

CMSLINK5

CMSLINK5 collects input generated by CASMO5 and compiles the data into a single binary
library with functional dependencies represented in multi-dimensional matrices of data.
The format of the library is readily available for downstream use in both SIMULATE5 and
S3K.

SIMULATE5

SIMULATE5 performs steady-state three-dimensional reactor analysis using the

multi-group nodal diffusion equation. Thermal-hydraulic capabilities are coupled to the
neutronic solution and over depletion state points; neutronic and thermal-hydraulic
iterations ensure convergence and agreement of operating conditions, nuclear data,
power distributions, and assembly exposure. SIMULATE5 is used to perform core design
and optimization, develop a neutronic characterization of the core by determining
reactivity feedback coefficients and CRA worth, calculating axial and radial power and flux
distributions, and calculation of other values required as input for safety analysis.
SIMULATE5 is also used as input to plant monitoring systems.

CASMO5 and SIMULATE5 are used together to perform stability calculations.

S3K

S3K is used for transient reactor core analysis for calculations where time-dependent
kinetic behavior is more important on small time scales. S3K has the same computational
foundation as SIMULATE5 and requires a model that is initialized in SIMULATE5 as input,
but has been extended for transient applications.

MCNP6

MCNP6 is a general-purpose code that can be used for neutron, photon, electron, or
coupled neutron photon electron transport. The code treats an arbitrary three dimensional
configuration of materials in geometric cells bounded by first and second degree surfaces
and some special fourth-degree surfaces. Point-wise (continuous energy) cross section
data are available with MCNP6. The MCNP6 code is a higher order code than
CASMO5/SIMULATE5 and is used for code-to-code comparisons of the CASMO5, CMSLINK,
SIMULATE5 suite of codes in Reference 4.3-1.

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4.3.4 References

4.3-1 NuScale Power, LLC, "Nuclear Analysis Codes and Methods Qualification,"
TR-0616-48793-P-A, Revision 1.

4.3-2 Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Initial MCNP6 Release Overview - MCNP6
Version 1.0," LA-UR-13-22924.

4.3-3 NuScale Power, LLC, "Applicability of AREVA Fuel Methodology for the NuScale
Design," TR-0116-20825-P-A, Revision 1.

4.3-4 Krimer, M., G. Grandi, and M. Carlsson, "PWR Transient XENON Modeling and
Analysis Using Studsvik CMS," Proceedings of 2010 LWR Fuel Performance/Top
Fuel/WRFPM, Orlando, Florida, September 26-29, 2010.

4.3-5 NuScale Power, LLC, "Rod Ejection Accident Methodology," TR-0716-50350-P-A,

Revision 1.

4.3-6 NuScale Power, LLC, “Fluence Calculation Methodology and Results,”

TR-0116-20781-P, Revision 1.

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Table 4.3-1: NuScale Reactor Core Description

Parameter Value
Core
Core diameter (in) 59.25
Active fuel height (in) 78.74
Mass of UO2 per foot (lb/ft) 0.3172
Fuel Assemblies
Number 37
Rod array 17x17
Fuel assembly length (in) 94
Fuel assembly pitch (in) 8.466
Fuel rod pitch (in) 0.496
Number of spacer grids 5
Grid height (in) 1.75
Number of Fuel rods 264
Number of Guide tubes 24
Number of Instrumentation tubes 1
Fuel Rods
Number 264
Diametral gap (in) 0.0065
Cladding material M5®
Cladding outside diameter (in) 0.374
Cladding inside diameter (in) 0.326
Cladding thickness (in) 0.024
Fill gas helium
Fuel Pellets
Density, % TD 96
Material UO2 (sintered)
Diameter (in) 0.3195
Length (in) 0.40
Control Rod Assemblies
Number 16
Upper absorber material boron carbide
Lower absorber material silver-indium-cadmium
Cladding 304 stainless steel
Fill gas helium
Burnable Absorbing Material
Type integral with fuel
Material gadolinia (Gd2O3)
Number Up to 32 per assembly

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Table 4.3-2: Nuclear Design Parameters (for Equilibrium Cycle)

Core Average Linear Power (kw/ft) 2.5
Total Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor 1.860
Nuclear Enthalpy Hot Channel Factor 1.386
Reactivity Coefficients
Best Estimate Design
Doppler temperature coefficient (pcm/F) -1.63 to -2.07 -1.4 to -2.25
Moderator temperature coefficient (HZP-HFP) (pcm/F) 0 to -32.5 +6 to -43
Boron coefficient (pcm/ppm) -7.6 to -13.7 -10
Effective Delayed Neutron Fraction and Prompt Neutron Lifetime
ßeff BOC 0.0059
ßeff EOC 0.0052
-6
Prompt lifetime BOC (10 seconds) 18.35
Prompt lifetime EOC (10-6seconds) 21.91
Control Rods
CRA requirement See Table 4.3-3
Maximum ejected rod See Section 15.4
Bank Worth BOC EOC
Regulating bank (from the PDIL) ($) 0.630 1.261
Shutdown bank
Boron Concentration BOC EOC
Design Basis Refueling 2000 2000
Reduction with fuel burnup (ppm) See Figure 4.3-17
Safe Shutdown, keff=0.98, Highest Worth CRA Out, No Xenon 1164 240
Refueling, keff=0.95, 2 Highest Worth CRAs Out, No Xenon 1746 736

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Table 4.3-3: Reactivity Requirements for Control Rods

1. Control Rod Assembly Worth (pcm) BOC MOC EOC
a. Total Available CRA Worth 14414 14800 15553
b. Power Dependent Insertion Limits 381 502 663
c. Worst Rod Stuck Out 4766 4922 5249
d. Uncertainty 0.12 0.12 0.12
e. Subtotal (a-b-c)*(1-d) 8154 8250 8484
2. Power
a. Defect 1637 2595 3740
b. Axial Redistribution 391 180 7
c. Subtotal (a+b) 2028 2775 3747
3. Worth Balance
a. Required Shutdown Margin 2041 2041 2041
b. Gross Margin (1e-2c) 6126 5475 4737
c. Net Margin to Shutdown Margin (b-a) 4085 3434 2696

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Table 4.3-4: Reactivity Requirements for Long Term Shutdown Capability

1. CRA Worth BOC MOC EOC
a. Total Available CRA, pcm 14414 14800 15553
b. PDIL, pcm 381 502 663
c. Uncertainty Factor 0.12 0.12 0.12
d. Subtotal, pcm (a-b-c)*(1-d) 12349 12582 13103
2. Reactivity Insertion
a. Defect, pcm 1637 2595 3740
b. Axial Redistribution, pcm 391 180 7
c. Moderator Cooling, pcm 3019 4293 5886
d. Xenon Worth 2203 2381 2515
e. Subtotal 7250 9449 12148
3. Worth Balance
a. Net Margin to Critical, pcm (1d-2e) 5099 3133 955

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Table 4.3-5: Modes of Operation Definition

Mode Mode Title keff Average Coolant Temperature (°F)
1 Operations ≥ 0.99 > 420
2 Hot shutdown < 0.99 ≥ 420
3 Safe shutdown < 0.99 < 420
4 Transition < 0.95 N/A
5 Refueling N/A N/A

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Table 4.3-6: Range of Doppler Coefficient for NuScale Design

Value Doppler Coefficient (pcm/°F) Time in Cycle
Maximum Doppler coefficient -1.63 BOC
Minimum Doppler coefficient -2.07 EOC

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Table 4.3-7: Individual Control Rod Assembly Worth with Control Rod Assemblies Fully
Withdrawn
Time Condition CRA Location Worth (pcm)
BOC HFP ARO Group 2 3575.1
Group 4 4832.3
Group 3 4825.6
Group 1 1352.8
MOC HFP ARO Group 2 3683.2
Group 4 4967.4
Group 3 4967.4
Group 1 1478.9
EOC HFP ARO Group 2 4184.1
Group 4 5288.6
Group 3 5290.7
Group 1 1781.9
BOC HZP ARO Group 2 3561.0
Group 4 4824.2
Group 3 4817.0
Group 1 1291.2
MOC HZP ARO Group 2 3675.0
Group 4 4945.4
Group 3 4944.2
Group 1 1364.3
EOC HZP ARO Group 2 4199.0
Group 4 5257.3
Group 3 5257.3
Group 1 1569.8
Note: See Figure 4.3-18 for CRA Locations

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Table 4.3-8: Individual Control Rod Assembly Worth with Regulating Groups Inserted
to Power Dependent Insertion Limits
Time Condition CRA Location Worth (pcm)
BOC HFP PDIL Group 2 3577.6
Group 4 4834.3
Group 3 4827.7
Group 1 1361.0
MOC HFP PDIL Group 2 3682.6
Group 4 4970.2
Group 3 4970.2
Group 1 1494.6
EOC HFP PDIL Group 2 4178.8
Group 4 5289.4
Group 3 5292.6
Group 1 1813.6
BOC HZP PDIL Group 2 3564.6
Group 4 4826.0
Group 3 4818.9
Group 1 1303.6
MOC HZP PDIL Group 2 3678.7
Group 4 4951.9
Group 3 4950.7
Group 1 1389.6
EOC HZP PDIL Group 2 4198.8
Group 4 5266.8
Group 3 5268.0
Group 1 1618.6
Note: See Figure 4.3-18 for CRA Locations

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Table 4.3-9: Stability Indices for Axial Oscillation Analysis

Time-in-Life Rated Power (%) Stability Index (hrs-1)
BOC 100.00 -0.071
BOC 75.00 -0.023
BOC 50.00 -0.012
BOC 25.00 -0.005
EOC 100.00 -0.040
EOC 75.00 -0.029
EOC 50.00 -0.013
EOC 25.00 -0.005

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Table 4.3-10: Stability Indices for Radial Oscillation due to Radial Perturbation
Time-in-Life Rated Power (%) Stability Index (hrs-1)
BOC 100.00 -0.074
BOC 75.00 -0.101
BOC 50.00 -0.090
BOC 25.00 -0.095
EOC 100.00 -0.090
EOC 75.00 -0.082
EOC 50.00 -0.071
EOC 25.00 Stable

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Table 4.3-11: Stability Indices for Axial Oscillation due to Radial Perturbation
Time-in-Life Rated Power (%) Stability Index (hrs-1)
BOC 100.00 -0.063
BOC 75.00 -0.011
BOC 50.00 -0.005
BOC 25.00 -0.002
EOC 100.00 -0.013
EOC 75.00 -0.017
EOC 50.00 -0.006
EOC 25.00 -0.002

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Table 4.3-12: Typical Fast Neutron Flux Levels (n/cm2-sec) in the Reactor Core and
Reactor Pressure Vessel at Full Power
Location E ≥ 1.0 MeV
Core average 3.41E+13
Reflector block at mid-height 2.81E+13
Upper core plate 1.34E+11
Lower core plate 1.12E+12
Pressure vessel inside diameter azimuthal peak 9.57E+09

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Figure 4.3-1: Loading Pattern for Reference Equilibrium Cycle

C-01 B-02 C-01

C-02 B-01 A-01 B-01 C-02

C-01 B-01 A-02 A-01 A-02 B-01 C-01

B-02 A-01 A-01 C-03 A-01 A-01 B-02

C-01 B-01 A-02 A-01 A-02 B-01 C-01

C-02 B-01 A-01 B-01 C-02

C-01 B-02 C-01

A-01: Batch A Type 1, 4.05 wt% 235U

A-02: Batch A Type 2, 4.55 wt% 235U, with Gadolinia
B-01: Batch B Type 1, 4.05 wt% 235U
B-02: Batch B Type 2, 4.55 wt% 235U, with Gadolinia
C-01: Batch C Type 1, 4.05 wt% 235U
C-02: Batch C Type 2, 4.55 wt% 235U, with Gadolinia
C-03: Batch C Type 3, 2.60 wt% 235U
A - Twice burned, B - Once burned, C - Fresh

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Figure 4.3-2: Power Dependent Insertion Limits

225

200
Position (steps withdrawn, 224 total)

175

150

125

100
4.3-40

Group 1
75 Group 2

50

25

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Power Level (% rated)

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
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Figure 4.3-3: Axial Offset Window

100
(-0.25, 100) (0.10, 100)

75
(-0.40, 75) (0.15, 75)
% Rated Power

50
(-0.40, 50) (0.20, 50)
4.3-41

25
(-0.40, 25) (0.25, 25)

0
-0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Axial Offset Fraction

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-4: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at Beginning of Cycle

% of Rated Power
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2.7

2.5

2.3
Peaking Factor

2.1

1.9
4.3-42

1.7

1.5

1.3
FǻH ARO FǻH PDIL FQ ARO FQ PDIL

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-5: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at Middle of Cycle

% of Rated Power
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2.7

2.5
Peaking Factor

2.3

2.1

1.9
4.3-43

1.7

1.5

1.3
FǻH ARO FǻH PDIL FQ ARO FQ PDIL

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-6: Power Peaking as a Function of Power Level and Rod Position at End of Cycle

% of Rated Power
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
2.7

2.5

2.3
Peaking Factor

2.1
4.3-44

1.9

1.7

1.5

1.3
FǻH ARO FǻH PDIL FQ ARO FQ PDIL

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

Figure 4.3-7: Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Fuel Assembly

Equilibrium Cycle, BOC, Central Assembly
0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.93

0.95 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.01 0.98 0.95

0.97 1.01 1.06 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.11 1.06 1.01 0.97

0.99 1.04 1.11 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.11 1.04 0.99

1.00 1.06 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.06 1.00

1.01 1.09 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.09 1.01

1.01 1.07 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.07 1.01

1.01 1.07 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.07 1.01

1.02 1.09 1.16 1.17 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.17 1.16 1.09 1.02

1.01 1.07 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.07 1.01

1.01 1.07 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.19 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.13 1.13 1.07 1.01

1.01 1.09 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.09 1.01

1.00 1.06 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.06 1.00

0.99 1.04 1.11 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.11 1.04 0.99

0.97 1.01 1.06 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.11 1.06 1.01 0.97

0.95 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.06 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.01 0.98 0.95

0.93 0.95 0.97 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.93

Equilibrium Cycle, EOC, Central Assembly

1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.05

1.05 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.05

1.06 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.06

1.07 1.08 1.13 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.13 1.08 1.07

1.08 1.10 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.10 1.08

1.09 1.13 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.13 1.09

1.09 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.10

1.09 1.11 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.11 1.09

1.10 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.13 1.10

1.09 1.11 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.11 1.09

1.10 1.11 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.09

1.09 1.13 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.16 1.13 1.09

1.08 1.10 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.17 1.15 1.10 1.08

1.07 1.08 1.13 1.17 1.16 1.15 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.13 1.08 1.07

1.06 1.06 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.13 1.09 1.06 1.06

1.05 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.05

1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.05

Tier 2 4.3-45 Revision 5

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

Figure 4.3-8: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 1 Fuel Assembly at
Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle
BOC Batch 1
1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.82 0.74

0.98 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.20 1.23 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.09 1.05 0.99 0.91 0.69

0.97 1.15 1.17 1.22 1.25 1.22 1.21 1.18 1.16 1.12 1.07 0.98 0.88 0.65

0.97 1.15 1.21 1.24 1.22 1.17 1.16 1.18 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.00 0.87 0.64

0.96 1.15 1.21 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.06 1.04 0.98 0.87 0.63

0.95 1.17 1.19 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.11 1.09 1.04 1.00 0.86 0.61

0.93 1.11 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.14 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.05 1.04 1.04 0.98 0.94 0.91 0.82 0.60

0.91 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.07 1.06 1.07 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.95 0.91 0.89 0.79 0.58

0.88 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.01 0.99 0.93 0.90 0.77 0.55

0.84 1.00 1.04 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.52

0.81 0.97 1.01 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.69 0.50

0.78 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.89 0.87 0.82 0.79 0.67 0.47

0.74 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.63 0.45

0.70 0.83 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.68 0.59 0.43

0.65 0.76 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.79 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.61 0.54 0.40

0.59 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.48 0.36

0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.31

EOC Batch 1
1.06 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.78

1.03 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.14 1.15 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.06 1.02 0.96 0.90 0.72

1.01 1.11 1.13 1.17 1.19 1.16 1.15 1.12 1.12 1.07 1.04 0.95 0.87 0.69

1.00 1.11 1.15 1.18 1.16 1.12 1.11 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.06 0.96 0.85 0.66

1.00 1.12 1.16 1.17 1.14 1.14 1.10 1.09 1.10 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.01 0.95 0.85 0.66

0.99 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.05 1.00 0.97 0.84 0.63

0.97 1.08 1.10 1.08 1.07 1.09 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.92 0.88 0.81 0.62

0.95 1.06 1.08 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.03 1.02 1.03 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.78 0.60

0.92 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.02 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.77 0.58

0.89 0.99 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.79 0.72 0.55

0.87 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.70 0.53

0.84 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.68 0.50

0.79 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.71 0.64 0.48

0.75 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.69 0.60 0.46

0.69 0.77 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.68 0.62 0.55 0.42

0.63 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.58 0.54 0.50 0.38

0.55 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.33

Tier 2 4.3-46 Revision 5

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

Figure 4.3-9: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 2 Fuel Assembly at
Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle
BOC Batch 2
0.82 0.85 0.89 0.92 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.06

0.86 0.96 0.98 1.01 1.05 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.11 1.11 1.12 1.14 1.12 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.04

0.90 0.99 1.02 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.11 1.11 1.04

0.93 1.02 1.07 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.13 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.12 1.05

0.96 1.07 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.11 1.14 1.12 1.14 1.16 1.15 1.19 1.17 1.15 1.06

0.99 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.18 1.07

1.01 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.07

1.03 1.13 1.15 1.13 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.17 1.15 1.16 1.18 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.07

1.05 1.17 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.08

1.07 1.17 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.19 1.17 1.17 1.20 1.18 1.19 1.20 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.19 1.08

1.08 1.20 1.22 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.19 1.20 1.21 1.20 1.08

1.10 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.23 1.22 1.09

1.09 1.21 1.24 1.25 1.22 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.20 1.21 1.23 1.22 1.24 1.22 1.19 1.08

1.10 1.21 1.25 1.27 1.25 1.22 1.21 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.25 1.25 1.22 1.18 1.07

1.10 1.19 1.20 1.24 1.25 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.23 1.18 1.16 1.06

1.12 1.21 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.25 1.22 1.22 1.24 1.22 1.22 1.24 1.21 1.19 1.16 1.17 1.06

1.16 1.12 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.08

EOC Batch 2
0.79 0.82 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 1.02

0.83 0.92 0.94 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.07 1.02

0.86 0.95 0.99 1.03 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.08 1.03

0.90 0.99 1.03 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.04

0.93 1.02 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.09 1.11 1.10 1.11 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.06

0.96 1.06 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.07

0.97 1.07 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.08

0.99 1.08 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.08

1.00 1.11 1.13 1.14 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.17 1.17 1.09

1.01 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.14 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.14 1.15 1.16 1.16 1.09

1.03 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.17 1.09

1.04 1.15 1.17 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.18 1.20 1.19 1.10

1.04 1.14 1.17 1.19 1.18 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.18 1.16 1.17 1.19 1.18 1.21 1.19 1.17 1.09

1.05 1.14 1.18 1.21 1.20 1.18 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.19 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.17 1.09

1.05 1.13 1.15 1.19 1.20 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.16 1.15 1.08

1.07 1.15 1.16 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.19 1.21 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.16 1.09

1.11 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.11

Tier 2 4.3-47 Revision 5

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

Figure 4.3-10: Typical Radial Relative Power Distribution within a Batch 3 Fuel Assembly at
Beginning and End of Equilibrium Cycle
BOC Batch 3
0.94 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.89 0.93

0.90 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.91

0.89 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.90

0.89 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.89

0.88 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.89

0.88 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.89

0.88 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.89

0.88 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.89

0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.89

0.88 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.89

0.88 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.89

0.89 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.89

0.88 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.89

0.90 0.96 0.99 1.02 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.97 0.90

0.90 0.96 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.98 0.97 0.90

0.91 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.92

0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.96

EOC Batch 3
0.95 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91

0.94 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.91

0.93 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.95 0.91

0.93 0.98 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.91

0.93 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.91

0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.91

0.93 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.92

0.93 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.92

0.93 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.92

0.93 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.92

0.94 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.92

0.94 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.92

0.93 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.92

0.94 0.99 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.92

0.94 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 0.99 0.97 0.92

0.95 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.92

0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94

Tier 2 4.3-48 Revision 5

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Nuclear Design

Figure 4.3-11: Assembly Radial Power Distribution at Beginning, Middle, and End of Cycle

BOC 0.895 0.911 0.888

1.033 1.137 0.957 1.135 1.033
0.888 1.135 1.054 0.967 1.054 1.136 0.895
0.911 0.957 0.967 1.091 0.967 0.957 0.911
0.895 1.136 1.054 0.967 1.054 1.135 0.888
1.033 1.135 0.957 1.137 1.033
0.888 0.911 0.895

MOC 0.887 0.907 0.883

1.053 1.119 0.965 1.118 1.052
0.883 1.118 1.057 0.983 1.057 1.118 0.887
0.907 0.965 0.983 1.112 0.983 0.965 0.907
0.887 1.118 1.057 0.983 1.057 1.118 0.883
1.052 1.118 0.965 1.119 1.053
0.883 0.907 0.887

EOC 0.886 0.915 0.883

1.029 1.105 0.980 1.105 1.029
0.883 1.105 1.064 1.003 1.064 1.105 0.886
0.915 0.980 1.003 1.123 1.003 0.980 0.915
0.886 1.105 1.064 1.003 1.064 1.105 0.883
1.029 1.105 0.980 1.105 1.029
0.883 0.915 0.886

Tier 2 4.3-49 Revision 5

Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-12: Axial Power Distribution at Beginning, Middle, and End of Cycle
1.50

1.25

1.00
Axial Peaking Factor (Fz)

0.75 BOC
MOC
4.3-50

EOC

0.50

0.25

0.00
1 5 9 13 17 21 25
Axial Position

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-13: Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity at Full Power

Moderator Average Temperature (°F)

430 450 470 490 510 530 550
5

-5

-15
MTC (pcm/°F)

-25
4.3-51

-35

-45

-55

-65

Minimum MTC Maximum MTC

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-14: Moderator Temperature Coefficient of Reactivity at Zero Power

Moderator Temperature (°F)

50 150 250 350 450 550

-15
MTC (pcm/°F)

-30
4.3-52

-45

-60
Minimum ZPMTC Maximum ZPMTC

Nuclear Design
Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.3-15: Maximum and Minimum Power Defect

2700

1800
Defect (pcm)
4.3-53

900

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% Power
Minimum Power Defect Maximum Power Defect

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Figure 4.3-16: Maximum and Minimum Power Coefficient

% Power
0 25 50 75 100
0
Power Coefficient (pcm/% Power)

-10

-20

-30
4.3-54

-40

-50

-60

-70
Minimum Power Coefficient Maximum Power Coefficient

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Figure 4.3-17: Boron Letdown Curve for Equilibrium Cycle
1400

1200

1000
Boron Concentration (ppm)

800
4.3-55

600

400

200

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Cycle Burnup (GWd/MTU)

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Figure 4.3-18: Control Rod and Incore Instrument Locations

Regulating
Bank
Group 2

Shutdown Shutdown
ICI 12 Bank ICI 1 Bank ICI 9
Group 4 Group 3

Shutdown Regulating Shutdown

Bank ICI 8 Bank ICI 2 Bank
Group 3 Group 1 Group 4

Regulating Regulating Regulating Regulating

Bank ICI 7 Bank Bank ICI 3 Bank
Group 2 Group 1 Group 1 Group 2

Shutdown Regulating Shutdown

Bank ICI 6 Bank ICI 4 Bank
Group 4 Group 1 Group 3

Shutdown Shutdown
ICI 11 Bank ICI 5 Bank ICI 10
Group 3 Group 4

Regulating
Bank
Group 2

Regulating CRA Bank Location

Shutdown CRA Bank Location
In-Core Instrumentation Location
Empty Fuel Assembly Location

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Figure 4.3-19: Differential Rod Worth at Beginning, Middle and End of Cycle from 0% to 100% Power


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Figure 4.3-20: Integral Regulating Bank Worth for Withdrawal from the Power Dependent Insertion Limits










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Figure 4.3-21: Boron Worth Coefficient

Soluble Boron Concentration (ppm)

0 500 1000 1500 2000
-7.0
Boron Worth Coefficient (pcm/ppm)

-8.0

-9.0

-10.0

-11.0
4.3-59

-12.0

-13.0

-14.0

-15.0

Minimum BWC Maximum BWC

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Figure 4.3-22: Flow Coefficient of Reactivity (Maximum and Minimum)

80
Flow Coefficient (pcm/% Flow)

70

60

50

40

30
4.3-60

20

10

0
0 20 40 60 80 100
-10
% Flow
Minimum FC Maximum FC

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Figure 4.3-23: Control Rod Position versus Time after Trip

90

80

70
90% Insertion
Control Rod Insertion (inches)

60

Dashpot Insertion
50
4.3-61

40

30

20

10

0
-0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5
Time (seconds)

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Figure 4.3-24: Reactivity Worth versus Control Rod Position

1.0

0.9
Relative Cumulative TRIP Worth

0.8

0.7

0.6
BOC Worth
0.5
EOC Worth
0.4
4.3-62

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Relative Insertion Depth

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Figure 4.3-25: Cross-section view of MCNP6 Model for Vessel Irradiation Flux Calculation

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Figure 4.3-26: Typical Axial Xenon Oscillation for 100% Power at Beginning of Cycle

0.12

0.1
Axial Offset (fraction)

0.08

0.06

0.04
4.3-64

0.02

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
-0.02
Time (hours)

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Thermal and Hydraulic Design

4.4 Thermal and Hydraulic Design

The thermal-hydraulic design of the NuScale Power Module (NPM) provides cooling for fuel
and core components and protects the fuel and cladding during off normal conditions.
Adherence to a set of specified acceptable fuel design limits (SAFDLs) preserves the integrity of
the fuel and cladding and prevents release of fission products from the fuel.

The NPM is a natural circulation pressurized water reactor (PWR) with integral, once-through,
helical coil steam generators (SGs). The driving force for natural circulation flow is the pressure
head caused by the lower density water in the core and the higher density water in the
downcomer. This pressure head varies with power and as a result there is a unique steady-state
flow at each power level.

The methodology and analysis tools (i.e., licensing methodology) used in the thermal-hydraulic
design are summarized in this section and described in detail in the referenced NuScale topical
reports. The VIPRE-01 code is used for steady-state and transient subchannel fuel and
temperature calculations. The PIM code is used for thermal-hydraulic stability calculations. The
subchannel steady state results provided in this section and the transient results in Chapter 15
are performed in accordance with the methodology, including all restrictions, defined in
Reference 4.4-3. The methodology is used to establish the power peaking limits and protect
SAFDLs without using thermal margin-specific trips. Fuel rod thermal evaluations are
performed at rated power and during transients up to the design limit burnup to verify the fuel
temperature and integrity design bases described in Section 4.2.1 are satisfied. These analyses
also provide input for the initial fuel rod thermal conditions used in Chapter 15 transient
analyses.

Hydraulic flow instabilities are precluded by a regional exclusion solution. Detection and
suppression of hydraulic instabilities is not required.

4.4.1 Design Basis

The design bases for the thermal-hydraulic design of the reactor are discussed below. The
design bases for the mechanical design of the fuel are discussed in Section 4.2.1. The
instrumentation and controls system design features that address the monitoring
requirements in General Design Criterion (GDC) 13 and the protection system
requirements in GDC 20 are described in Section 7.1.

Consistent with GDC 10, the thermal-hydraulic design of the reactor core includes sufficient
margin to critical heat flux (CHF) to ensure adequate heat transfer with a 95-percent
probability at the 95-percent (95/95) confidence level so that SAFDLS are not exceeded
during any condition of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational
occurrences (AOOs) and conditions that result in unstable power oscillations with the
reactor trip system available.

Consistent with GDC 12, the thermal-hydraulic design of the core includes design and
operational limits that preclude power instability such that fuel design limits are not
exceeded.

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The following are the design bases for the NuScale thermal-hydraulic design:

4.4.1.1 Critical Heat Flux

Adequate heat transfer from the fuel cladding to the reactor coolant is provided by
assuring that critical heat flux limits are met during normal operation, AOOs, and
infrequent events (IE). NuScale-specific CHF correlations are used to ensure that CHF
does not occur with a 95 percent probability at a 95 percent confidence level during
normal operation and abnormal operating occurrences. For some accidents, some rods
may be predicted to exceed CHF criteria as long as the requirements of 10 CFR 100 are
met.

4.4.1.2 Fuel Temperature

For normal operation and AOOs, the fuel melting temperature is not exceeded in any
part of the core. These analyses are performed at rated power and during transients up
to the design limit burnup as described in Section 4.2.

4.4.1.3 Core Flow

The core flow design basis is that 91.5 percent of the minimum design flow passes
through the core and provides fuel cooling. This is based on a bypass flow of
8.5 percent which accounts for flow through the fuel assembly guide tubes, the
reflector block, and the gap between the reflector block and the core barrel.

4.4.1.4 Hydrodynamic Stability

The hydrodynamic stability design basis is that normal operation and AOO events do
not lead to hydrodynamic instability as discussed in Section 4.4.7.

4.4.2 Description of Thermal and Hydraulic Design of the Reactor Core

The NPM uses natural circulation to drive the flow in the reactor coolant system (RCS) to
provide core heat removal during normal plant operation, AOOs, infrequent events (IEs),
and accidents. A description of the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the core is provided
in the following sections.

4.4.2.1 Summary Comparison

Figure 5.1-3 shows the significant hydraulic features of the natural circulation flow
path. Table 4.4-1 provides geometrical information on the key components of the RPV
flow path.

Table 4.4-2 and the Subchannel Analysis Methodology topical report (Reference 4.4-3)
provide the relevant parameters for the thermal-hydraulic evaluation of core
performance of the NPM. Table 4.4-2 also provides similar information for other recent
PWR designs for comparison purposes.

Table 4.4-3 summarizes the applicable ranges for some of the existing CHF and
departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) correlations in the public domain. The Babcock

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and Wilcox B&W-2 and Westinghouse W-3 CHF correlations were developed for their
specific fuel assembly applications. The Electric Power Research Institute EPRI-1 critical
heat flux correlation and the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) critical heat flux
look-up table were developed for general applications. The NuScale natural circulation
flow conditions include conditions that are outside of the CHF test data provided by
the B&W, EPRI, and Westinghouse correlations. Therefore, several test programs were
conducted to obtain CHF test data for the NuScale reactor fuel design. These programs
culminated in the development of the NuScale NSP2, NSP4, and Extended Hench-Levy
CHF correlations which are described in Section 4.4.2.7.

4.4.2.2 Critical Heat Flux

The overall margin for protecting the fuel cladding SAFDLs is established by an analysis
limit that accounts for testing uncertainties, manufacturing tolerances, and
consideration of non-testing variations, such as rod bow, measurement uncertainties
and instrumentation delays. Figure 4.4-1 provides a depiction of the NSP2 and NSP4
critical heat flux ratio (CHFR) limits and thermal margins.

For subchannel analysis, the key fuel failure mechanism is clad overheating in
off-nominal conditions, such as AOOs, infrequent events, and accidents. Fuel rod failure
occurs when the heat transfer coefficient between the fuel rod clad and coolant
degrades significantly to due to the formation of a continuous vapor layer on the fuel
rod. The degradation of the heat transfer coefficient in a two-phase flow condition is
dependent on local conditions such as pressure, flow rate, coolant quality, and boiling
regime. Various terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, including CHF,
departure from nucleate boiling, critical power ratio, boiling crisis, boiling transition,
burnout, and dryout.

The low flow steady-state nominal conditions and hypothetical transient and accident
conditions in the NPM suggest that both the "DNB" and "Dryout" CHF mechanisms are
relevant. "CHF" is a more general term, including both "DNB" and "Dryout," which are
specific CHF mechanisms. For internal consistency in modeling the range of
NuScale-specific phenomena, NuScale thermal margin analyses use the generic term
CHF.

The parameter of interest for preventing the occurrence of CHF is the ratio of the
critical heat flux to local heat flux, or CHFR:

CHFR = q'' CHF ⁄ q'' Eq. 4.4-1

local

where

q''CHF = critical heat flux, 106 btu/hr-ft2, and

q'' local = local heat flux, 106 btu/hr-ft2.

The NuScale CHFR limit for the NSP2 correlation that corresponds to a 95 percent
probability of CHF at a 95 percent confidence level is 1.17. The NuScale CHFR limit for

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the NSP4 correlation that corresponds to a 95 percent probability of CHF at a

95 percent confidence level is 1.21. The NSP2 and NSP4 critical heat flux correlations
are used to evaluate thermal margin for normal operation, AOOs, infrequent events,
and accidents, with the exception of those characterized by rapid depressurization.
Events exhibiting a rapid depressurization are evaluated to a CHFR limit using the
Extended Hench-Levy critical heat flux correlation. The Extended Hench-Levy critical
heat flux correlation limit and range of applicability are provided in Appendix B of
Reference 4.4-8.

The range of applicability of the NSP2 CHF correlation is:

Pressure, psia 300 to 2300

Local Mass Flux, 106lbm/hr-ft2 0.110 to 0.700
Local equilibrium quality, % ≤ 90.0
Inlet equilibrium quality, % ≤0

The range of applicability for the NSP4 correlation is:

Pressure, psia 500 to 2300

Mass flux, 106 lbm/hr-ft2 0.116 to 0.635
Local equilibrium quality, % ≤ 95
Inlet equilibrium quality, % ≤0

The transient response of the reactor system is dependent on the initial power
distribution. Limits provided by the core system and the protection system ensure that
the design meets CHF design bases for AOOs. The core operating limits report (COLR)
specifies the cycle-specific, power-peaking limits that maintain the core power
distribution within prescribed limits during power operation. These power-peaking
limits are expressed as limits on total heat flux (FQ), enthalpy rise (FΔH), and axial peak
(FZ). These power peaking factors are functions of burnup and power level. Section 4.3
provides additional discussion about the development and use of these limits.
• Enthalpy rise hot channel factor (FΔH) is the ratio of the power in the hot rod
divided by the power in the average rod. This all rods out (ARO) limit ensures that
the design basis value for the CHFR is met for normal operation, operational
transients, and IEs.
• The heat flux hot channel factor (or total peaking factor), FQ, is the ratio of
maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod to the average fuel rod heat
flux. The maximum FQ value is used to calculate the peak linear heat generation
rate. The maximum FQ value is utilized to ensure the specified acceptable fuel
design limit for fuel centerline melting is not exceeded.
• Axial Peaking Factor (FZ), is defined as the maximum relative power at any axial
point in a fuel rod divided by the average power of the fuel rod. FZ can be defined
for a rod, an assembly, or the entire core.

The Module Protection System (MPS) automatically initiates and controls the
protective actions necessary to mitigate the effects of the design basis events (DBEs)

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identified in Table 7.1-1. The MPS reactor trip functions are listed in Table 7.1-3,
including the associated parameter and analytical limits.

The core design and thermal limits are developed such that the thermal margin criteria
are not exceeded for normal operation and AOOs. Specifically, there is a 95-percent
probability at the 95-percent confidence level (95/95) that the hot rod in the core does
not experience a CHF condition. For the purpose of this analysis, the CHF is assumed to
occur if the subchannel analysis-calculated CHFR is less than the allowable limit. For IEs
and accidents, the total number of fuel rods that exceed the criteria are assumed to fail
and are used in determining the radiological dose source term.

4.4.2.3 Linear Heat Generation Rate

Limits on axial peaking factor are not required because the limits on FQ and FΔH
maintain a sufficiently flat power distribution, and axial peaking is treated in a
multi-layered approach involving both operational restrictions and analysis.

A limit on peak linear heat generation rate (PLHGR) is specified to help ensure that fuel
performance limits are not exceeded. The design limit on PLHGR maintains the fuel
temperature below the centerline melt criterion and limits the peak cladding
temperature so cladding-coolant chemical interactions remain within the acceptable
range.

The total heat flux peaking factor (FQ) is used to calculate the PLHGR. Section 4.3
provides a discussion on the calculation of the PLHGR based on the linear heat
generation (LHGR) and the design FQ.

4.4.2.4 Subchannel Analytical Results

Figure 4.4-2 through Figure 4.4-8 provide maps of the typical distribution of thermal
hydraulic parameters throughout the NuScale core. These steady state analyses are
performed using VIPRE-01 and are based on an equilibrium cycle power distribution at
100 percent power. The equilibrium cycle is the reference cycle described in
Section 4.3. Each rod and subchannel in the one-eighth core is modeled in this analysis.
Figure 4.4-2 provides the enthalpy rise hot channel factor for each individual rod (FΔH)
in the one-eighth core. For the best estimate analysis, the MCHFR for the entire core
(using the NSP4 correlation) is 9.6 (compared to the 95/95 design safety limit of 1.21).
Figure 4.4-4 shows the maximum clad outer wall temperature for each rod in the core.
Figure 4.4-5 shows the maximum rod heat flux, Figure 4.4-6 the average channel mass
flux, and Figure 4.4-7 the exit equilibrium quality for each subchannel. Figure 4.4-8
provides the coolant temperature at the exit of each subchannel. These values are best
estimate values in that they do not include the uncertainties that are discussed later in
this section and that are applied in a subchannel analysis. A figure for void fraction is
not provided because the channel exit void fractions are zero except for the hot
channel which is 0.01. Table 4.4-7 shows the exit void fractions for the core average and
hot channel for the equilibrium power distribution in Figure 4.4-2. In addition,
Table 4.4-7 shows the same void fraction values using the conservative 24-channel
subchannel model with all uncertainties applied. The 24-channel model is described in
Section 4.4.4.5.2 and in Reference 4.4-3.

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It is important to maintain subcooled margin in the riser (area above the control rod
guide tubes) during normal operation to ensure that margin-to-thermal-hydraulic
stability is maintained as discussed later in Section 4.4.7. A reactor trip actuates
5 degrees F before the core outlet average temperature reaches saturation
(Section 7.1).

4.4.2.5 Core Coolant Flow Distribution

The NuScale design uses natural circulation, and there is no active control of the core
flow. The core inlet flow distribution is dependent upon the geometry of the RCS loop,
including the lower core plate and bypass flow paths. The core bypass flow paths are
discussed in Section 4.4.3.1. There are flow inlets for each of the fuel assemblies in the
core, similar to currently licensed PWR fuel designs. However, the design of the NPM is
unique because the flow distribution is dependent upon the buoyancy-driven flow rate
and vessel design. The core inlet flow distribution changes based on power level, axial
and radial power distribution, and core average temperature. The inlet flow
distribution is determined by computational fluid dynamics. The analysis indicates that
at full power the peripheral assemblies receive from 3.5 to 4.5 percent less than
average flow, the central assembly receives up to 3.5 percent less than average, and the
assemblies located between the central assembly and the peripheral assemblies
receive up to 3.6 percent more flow than the average assembly.

Several inlet flow distributions are evaluated in Reference 4.4-3 to understand the
effect on CHF. For up to a 15 percent inlet flow reduction to the hot fuel assembly, the
flows equalize after the flow reaches approximately one-third of the active fuel length,
resulting in an insignificant decrease in MCFHR. Additionally, for a given radial power
distribution, there was no sensitivity observed to the inlet flow distribution. A 5 percent
reduction in the flow to the hot assembly is used in the subchannel analysis.

4.4.2.5.1 Core Coolant Temperature Distribution

As discussed in Reference 4.4-3, the core inlet temperature distribution is a

boundary condition input for steady-state and transient subchannel analysis that is
dependent on nuclear steam supply system design geometry. In the helical coil SG
design, the primary RCS flow is on the shell side and the secondary feedwater flow
is through the tubes. The concentric geometry of the SGs relative to the core
removes any asymmetric helical coil SG influences on the coolant through the
downcomer into the core inlet. A computational fluid dynamics calculation for the
RCS loop determines the core inlet temperature distribution for several power
levels and power distributions in the NPM design. The largest deviation in core inlet
temperature to a fuel assembly is less than 0.25 degrees F from the average inlet
temperature. A uniform core inlet temperature that is 5 degrees F higher than
design is assumed in the subchannel analysis for AOOs, infrequent events, and
accidents.

4.4.2.5.2 Turbulent Mixing

The turbulent mixing model within VIPRE-01 accounts for the exchange of
enthalpy and momentum between adjacent subchannels caused by turbulent
flow. The coefficient for turbulent mixing and the turbulent momentum factor are

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the two inputs needed for this model. This mixing model is incorporated into the
VIPRE-01 energy and momentum equations, which is dependent on the amount of
turbulent crossflow per unit length.

The NuScale turbulent mixing coefficient is determined from thermal mixing tests
and the value is fuel-design specific. This value is further justified based on
parametric sensitivity analysis described in Reference 4.4-3.

The value for the turbulent momentum parameter is not measured and is justified
based on parametric sensitivity analysis provided in Reference 4.4-3. The sensitivity
study results demonstrate that the NPM base model is not sensitive to the
turbulent momentum parameter.

4.4.2.6 Core Pressure Drops and Hydraulic Loads

4.4.2.6.1 Hydraulic Loads

The NuScale fuel assemblies do not experience liftoff from the lower core plate
under normal operating conditions and AOOs as described in Section 4.2. A liftoff
analysis is performed using the hydraulic flow loads from zero percent to
102 percent power. The analysis considers the weight of a fuel assembly, the
displaced fuel assembly volume, the fuel assembly springs, the maximum design
flow rate, and the core average temperature. The calculated maximum hydraulic lift
force is a small fraction of the assembly weight.

4.4.2.6.2 Core Pressure Drop

Flow testing on a full-scale prototype fuel assembly was performed to establish

flow component loss coefficients and other related flow characterization
parameters for the NuScale fuel assembly. The form loss coefficients are used in the
fuel assembly liftoff analysis and the subchannel analysis. Fuel assembly pressure
drop tests were performed for a range of steady-state conditions as part of the CHF
testing program. The pressure drop across the core at full power conditions is
provided in Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.2.7 Correlations and Physical Data

As discussed in the Critical Heat Flux topical report (Reference 4.4-1), CHF tests were
performed at Stern Laboratories and at the AREVA KATHY test facility. These tests
obtained steady-state CHF data used in the creation and validation of the NSP2 and
NSP4 critical heat flux correlations. The Stern tests were performed on an assembly
comparable to the NuScale fuel design, but with simple non-mixing spacer grids rather
than the HMP™ and HTP™ spacer grids. As described in Section 4.2, the NuScale fuel
assembly contains four intermediate spacer grids (HTP™) which induce a swirling flow
pattern in the coolant and a single HMP™ non-mixing grid at the bottom of the
assembly. The three Stern tests provide data over a range that encompasses the NPM
operating parameter values and are used to develop a base CHF correlation. A set of
CHF tests from the AREVA KATHY facility tested an assembly design that included the
HMP™ spacer grids. The test was conducted with two different axial power profiles as
described in Reference 4.4-1. The tests included both unit cell (four fuel rods) and cells

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containing guide tubes (three fuel rods and a guide tube). The Stern data provides the
basis for the NSP2 correlation and the AREVA data validates the NSP2 correlation and
provides the basis for the NSP4 correlation that conservatively predicts NuFuel HTP2™
critical heat flux performance.

The Extended Hench-Levy correlation (Reference 4.4-8) is based on Stern data with the
KATHY data providing validation to conservatively predict NuFuel HTP2TM critical heat
flux performance for an inadvertent opening of a reactor pressure vessel valve event.

Comparisons between Stern Laboratories and KATHY data can be found in

Reference 4.4-1.

The limiting non-loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) analyses in Chapter 15 are performed

using NRELAP5 code. Once the limiting cases for each transient are identified, the
determination of the thermal margin is performed using the VIPRE-01 subchannel core
model with the NSP4 critical heat flux correlation. This subchannel model is described
in detail in Reference 4.4-3. It is used with a conservative radial and axial power
distribution and with all uncertainties applied deterministically as described in the
reference.

The limiting rapid depressurization analyses in Chapter 15 are performed using the
NRELAP5 code. Determination of thermal margin is also performed using the NRELAP5
code with the Extended Hench-Levy critical heat flux correlation as detailed in
Appendix B of Reference 4.4-8.

4.4.2.8 Thermal Effects of Operational Transients

The subchannel analysis approach described below demonstrates that thermal-margin

specific trips are not necessary to mitigate AOOs. The CHF analyses demonstrate that
safety limits are met with the minimal operational constraints described in
Section 4.4.3.2.

This section also demonstrates that hydraulic flow instabilities are precluded by reactor
trip signals that occur prior to the development of any flow instabilities so that
detection and suppression of hydraulic instabilities is not required.

4.4.2.9 Uncertainties in Estimates

Uncertainties or biases are incorporated into the subchannel methodology to provide

conservatism. These uncertainties establish the design limit for the CHF correlation as
shown in Figure 4.4-1. The derivation of the penalties or conservative bias are
discussed in Reference 4.4-3. Uncertainties in the CHF correlation, analytical methods,
operating conditions, physical inputs, core inlet flow distribution, and core exit
pressure are considered in the subchannel analysis.

4.4.2.9.1 Correlation Uncertainties

There are uncertainties that are accounted for in subchannel safety analysis
calculations, including those from the analysis method, physical manufacturing

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design inputs to the model, and operating conditions. The application of

uncertainties in the NuScale subchannel methodology is deterministic, which
means that the uncertainty associated with a parameter is applied in the
conservative direction without considering the statistical combination of the
uncertainties.

4.4.2.9.1.1 Analysis Method Uncertainties

The analysis method uncertainties include the computer code uncertainty and
CHF correlation uncertainty. The computer code uncertainty comes from axial
and radial modeling and the approximations in the governing constitutive
equations in the VIPRE-01 code. The adequacy of the axial and radial models
were confirmed with sensitivity studies.

Code comparisons to data in applicable ranges are used to reduce code

uncertainty. Most of this test validation is by benchmarking to COBRA-FLX
(Reference 4.4-5), an approved subchannel analysis code with an approved
Safety Evaluation Report (Reference 4.4-6). The benchmark results for VIPRE-01
compare well for conditions anticipated for NuScale Power Plant applications
and establish that no penalty is needed for computer code calculation bias.

The CHF correlation uncertainty is included in the 95/95 minimum critical heat
flux ratio (MCHFR) safety limit of the NuScale-specific NSP2 and NSP4 CHF
correlations. The CHF correlations are developed from the local conditions
derived from a simulated subchannel model of the CHF test, using the
subchannel software, in this case VIPRE-01. Therefore, the uncertainty in the
computer code is included in the CHF correlation itself.

The CHF correlation development inherently accounts for VIPRE-01 code

uncertainty and the 95/95 CHF design limit accounts for this uncertainty. For
this reason, no additional penalties for uncertainty in analysis method are
added to the subchannel calculations.

4.4.2.9.1.2 Uncertainty in Operating Conditions

The operating boundary conditions are input into the subchannel analysis to
account for measurement uncertainty. The values for these uncertainties are
based on the instrumentation used for monitoring and are plant specific. The
measurement uncertainties consist of those related to core power, system flow,
core inlet temperature, and core exit pressure. The operating uncertainties are
comparable to those used in the industry and are discussed in Reference 4.4-3.

The core bypass flow is important because bypass flow is not available for heat
transfer from the cladding. The core inlet flow boundary condition accounts for
the appropriate bypass flow. The bypass values used for safety analysis are
determined as analytical maximum values rather than best-estimate values.

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4.4.2.9.2 Uncertainties in Physical Data Inputs

The following uncertainties in physical data used in the VIPRE-01 subchannel

analysis are accounted for in the VIPRE-01 subchannel analysis model:

• enthalpy rise engineering uncertainty (FEΔH)

• heat flux engineering uncertainty (FEQ)

• LHGR engineering uncertainty (FELHGR)

• radial power distribution uncertainty
• fuel rod bow and assembly bow uncertainty
• core inlet flow distribution uncertainty
• core exit pressure distribution uncertainty

The enthalpy rise engineering uncertainty (FEΔH) is applied to the hot channel to
account for small fabrication uncertainties related to allowable manufacturing
tolerances. This factor accounts for variations in pellet diameter, pellet density,
enrichment, fuel rod diameter, and fuel rod pitch.

The FΔH hot channel factor uncertainty penalty factor is directly applied to the hot
rod FΔH. For transients that use the fully detailed model and pin-by-pin FΔH
distribution, the hot channel factor for enthalpy rise is applied to the hot rod,
independent of the location.

The heat flux engineering uncertainty factor (FEQ) accounts for the small
manufacturing uncertainties (pellet density, enrichment, fuel rod surface area) that
affect the local heat flux. For application of the heat flux engineering uncertainty,
the heat flux from the conduction model is applied as a direct penalty to the
VIPRE-01-calculated MCHFR by increasing the CHF 95/95 limit.

The LHGR hot channel factor is very similar to the heat flux hot channel factor,
except that the fuel rod surface area uncertainty is excluded because the fuel rod
outer diameter does not significantly impact the LHGR of the pellet. The LHGR
engineering uncertainty (FELHGR) is used directly in the subchannel analysis.

The (FELHGR) hot channel factor is applicable for PLHGR fuel centerline melt
calculations. This uncertainty factor is used as a penalty on the PLHGR. The radial
power distribution uncertainty is related to the neutronics code that is used for the
radial power distribution inputs. The power of rods a few rows away from the hot
rod/channel have a negligible impact on the MCHFR. With the hot rod in the
subchannel model placed at the design limit FΔH, and any neutronic code
uncertainty accounted for in the core design, no radial power distribution penalty
needs to be applied.

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For the asymmetric events that use augmentation factors to account for a larger
FΔH due to the asymmetry, the relative change in FΔH is applied to the hot rod and
negates the need for bias or uncertainty impacts on results. For calculations that
use a pin-by-pin or fully detailed power distribution for FΔH, it is conservative
without additional factors in that the peak rod conditions are conservative. A radial
distribution uncertainty is not applied because conditions far away from the hot
rod have a negligible effect on MCHFR.

Fuel rod bowing can have a negative impact on CHF because of reduced flow area
in the hot channel. Determination of the necessity of a rod bow penalty is
performed for MCHFR and LHGR applications. For MCHFR, a penalty is derived
based on the magnitude of the gap closure and the reduction in CHF to reach
failure in bowed rods.

The penalty for rod bow is applied externally to VIPRE-01 by increasing the CHF
analysis limit that is used for margin comparison. The penalty is applied and
determined for the highest exposure of any assembly in the core, regardless of
where the hot channel MCHFR occurs. The CHF analysis limit used for thermal
margin evaluations biases the 95/95 MCHFR design limit by the penalty for
potential rod or assembly bowing. The penalty for rod bow is 3 percent as
described in Reference 4.4-3. This penalty is a conservative value based on the
AREVA methodology for rod bow in Reference 4.4-2, which was demonstrated to
be applicable for the NuScale fuel design in Reference 4.4-7.

The FEQ and rod bow penalties are both applied to the MCHFR design limit in
accordance with the methodology in Reference 4.4-3. As shown in Figure 4.4-1, the
95/95 MCHFR design limit for the NSP4 CHF correlation is 1.21. The CHF analysis
limit becomes 1.284 with the FEQ and rod bow penalties applied.

As discussed in Reference 4.4-3, the RCS pressure bias is not consistent across all
conditions. As a result, case dependent bias directions on pressure are utilized to
ensure a conservative calculation of MCHFR.

Core Inlet Flow Distribution Uncertainty

The core inlet flow distribution is discussed in Section 4.4.2.5. For the subchannel
analysis methodology, inlet flow distribution uncertainty is applied to the hot or
limiting assembly as shown in the distributions presented in Reference 4.4-3. The
open lattice of the NuScale core allows flow redistribution to occur for inlet flow
imbalances and the 5 percent reduction to the hot assembly assumed has a
minimal effect on MCHFR.

Core Exit Pressure Distribution Uncertainty

The open upper plenum design allows for pressure equilibrium and no core exit
pressure distribution uncertainty is necessary for the subchannel analyses.

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4.4.2.10 Flux Tilt Considerations

Radial tilt is a condition where the power is not symmetric between azimuthally
symmetric fuel assemblies. Azimuthal power tilt is an allowable limit on operation.
Once the flux tilt is beyond an allowable threshold, actions are required to remedy the
condition.

The design FΔH safety limit inherently accounts for the radial tilt, expressed as:

TS
F = F ΔH ( 1 + T q )
ΔH

where,

TS
F = COLR enthalpy rise design peaking factor,
ΔH

F ΔH = Design limit for core design calculations, and

T q = azimuthal tilt.

The design limit is met by accounting for radial tilt due to asymmetric power peaking.
Radial tilt is evaluated in core design calculations by inducing xenon oscillations or
transients. Xenon transients are triggered by inserting control rod banks or single
control rods as discussed in Section 4.3.2.7. The maximum calculated radial peaking
factor after the resulting tilt is then compared to the COLR FΔH design peaking factor to
ensure that it is below the limit.

The subchannel analysis methodology requires no additional factor to account for

radial tilt as described in Reference 4.4-3. Table 4.4-4 lists the uncertainties used in the
subchannel analyses of AOOs. The development of the uncertainties and the values
used in the subchannel analysis are provided in Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.3 Description of the Thermal and Hydraulic Design of the Reactor Coolant System

The NPM is a self-contained nuclear steam supply system comprised of a reactor core, a
pressurizer, and two SGs integrated within the RPV. The RPV is an approximately cylindrical
steel vessel. The upper and lower heads are torispherical. The pressurizer baffle plate is
integrated with the steam plenums, and has orifices to allow surges of water into and out
of the pressurizer, and acts as a thermal and hydraulic barrier.

Figure 5.1-1 is a diagram of an NPM and shows the RPV within the containment vessel.
Figure 5.1-2 provides a simplified diagram of the RCS. Figure 5.1-3 denotes and describes
the major RPV loop flow paths during normal, steady-state, and full-power operating
conditions.

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4.4.3.1 Plant Configuration Data

Table 5.1-2 lists the nominal operating parameters of the RCS at various power levels.
Table 4.4-1 provides geometrical information on the key components of the RPV flow
path.

4.4.3.1.1 Core Bypass Flow

The subchannel analysis considers the flow through the heated core and does not
consider the flow that effectively bypasses the fuel rods and is not available to
remove heat.

The following flow paths allow flow to bypass the core and reduce flow through
the fuel assemblies:
• reflector block cooling channels
• fuel assembly guide tubes and instrument tubes

Best-estimate flow, maximum flow, and minimum flow are calculated for the
applicable design considerations. These calculations account for the uncertainties
in the component flow resistances and the thermal head.

4.4.3.1.1.1 Reflector Cooling Channel Bypass

The reflector blocks surrounding the core have several cooling channels that
allow flow to pass through the reflector blocks. A conservative value for the
reflector cooling channel bypass fraction for steady-state and transients is
provided in Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.3.1.1.2 Guide Tube and Instrument Tube Bypass

The maximum amount of bypass flow for the guide tubes and instrument
tubes for the fuel assemblies is provided in Reference 4.4-3.

The total bypass flow used in the subchannel analysis is 8.5 percent.

4.4.3.2 Analytical Design Operating Restrictions

Figure 4.4-9 provides the operating map showing analytical and normal operating
conditions. The green dotted line with Tcold, Tavg, and Thot identified represent nominal
full power operating conditions. Tavg remains fixed above 15 percent rated thermal
power (RTP); Tcold and Thot vary along the green dotted line as power is increased or
decreased. The solid blue and black dotted lines illustrate the normal Tavg and RCS
pressure operating ranges, excluding the Tavg during startup with the reactor at less
than 15 percent RTP.

The analytical limits on the operating range that are illustrated as the outer box (red on
three sides, blue at minimum critical temperature) constrained by the following
considerations:

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• Upper RCS pressure bound: analytical limit protects against exceeding RPV
pressure limits for reactivity and heatup events
• Lower RCS pressure bound: analytical limit ensures riser subcooling is maintained.
• Left-hand temperature boundary: analytical limit on minimum temperature for
criticality
• Right-hand average temperature limit: analytical riser temperature limit protects
against exceeding MCHFR limits for reactivity and heatup events.

If hot leg temperature is below 600 degrees F, the low pressure analytical limit is
constant at 1600 psia. If hot leg temperature is above 600 degrees F, then the low
pressure analytical limit increases to 1720 psia. The saturation curve and a parallel,
5 degrees F margin are illustrated on the right side of the figure showing the margin to
saturation in the riser based on the analytical limits shown.

4.4.3.3 Thermal Margin Limit Map

A series of CHF calculations are performed for a range of power levels between hot zero
power (HZP) and HFP to establish trends and operating conditions of the limiting
MCHFR, and to determine the limiting axial flux shapes for subchannel calculations.
The limiting axial flux shape is determined based on a nuclear analysis (Section 4.3) of
all of the possible axial flux shapes that could occur during the equilibrium cycle from
operation within the operating limits. The operating limits in this context are the axial
offset window, the power dependent insertion limits, and the cycle burnup. The
analysis of axial flux shapes is described in Section 4.3. From these axial shapes, limiting
top-peaked, middle-peaked, and bottom-peaked shapes are identified at 5 percent,
25 percent, 50 percent, 75 percent, and 102 percent. At each power level, a subchannel
analysis is performed using VIPRE-01 to determine the MCHFR for a top-peaked, a
middle-peaked, and a bottom-peaked shape. The MCHFR calculations are performed
including the deterministically combined uncertainties discussed in Section 4.4.2.9 and
summarized in Table 4.4-4. The results of this analysis identify a unique limiting shape
for each power level. These limiting axial flux shapes are used to develop the thermal
margin limit map.

The thermal margin limit map provides the inlet temperature and power level where
operation is allowed to ensure that there are no fuel failures due to CHF and that the
core exit conditions are not at saturation. The CHF limit prevents fuel failures and the
core exit saturation limit ensures margin for thermal-hydraulic stability.

Using the limiting axial shapes determined from the power-flow analyses described
previously, a set of thermal margin limit cases are performed with the VIPRE-01
subchannel model. These cases vary inlet temperature, pressure, and power level that
result in a MCHFR at the 95/95 limit. These cases provide the MCHFR component of the
thermal margin limit map.

A set of thermal margin limit cases are also performed with VIPRE-01 to determine the
core inlet temperature that results in core exit saturation temperature as a function of
power.

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Figure 4.4-11 provides a plot of the resulting thermal margin limit map that includes
both the MCHFR and core exit saturation components. The saturation limits (dashed
lines) correspond to the combination of core inlet temperature and power that result in
core average outlet temperature being at the saturation temperature. There are two
dashed lines based on the natural circulation flow rates that correspond to the allowed
minimum and maximum core average temperature at each power level. The solid
curve is the combination of inlet temperature and power level that results in a MCHFR
being at the design limit. The MCHFR calculations are performed assuming the limiting
radial and axial power distributions previously discussed. These calculations are also
performed including the deterministically combined uncertainties discussed in
Section 4.4.2.9. As can be seen from the figure, the CHF analysis limit portion of the
thermal margin limit map is well above 100 percent power.

4.4.3.3.1 Flow Stability Exclusion Regions

The NuScale flow stability protection solution uses a regional exclusion solution as
described in the “Evaluation Methodology for Stability Analysis of the NuScale
Power Module” topical report (Reference 4.4-4). The region is defined by a single
point specifying riser subcooling margin. The stability exclusion region is protected
by automatic MPS protective action.

Section 15.9.2 describes stability analysis application methodology using the PIM
computer code. The methodology specifies the type and scope of the generic
analysis used to define the exclusion region as well as the margins and the
analytical limit for the reactor protection trips required to prevent unstable flow
oscillations.

4.4.3.4 Power-Maneuvering Characteristics

While power maneuvering operations within the capability of the rod control system
are anticipated to support power demands, continuous power maneuvering is not
assumed in the analysis of the reference equilibrium cycle, as indicated in Section 4.3.
However, planned continuous power maneuvering will be considered as part of a
cycle-specific core design using the methodologies described in Technical
Specification 5.6.3. The limiting axial flux shape that is described in Section 4.4.4.3 will
include the impact of planned power maneuvering. Power control is accomplished
using boron control and control rod positioning.

Section 4.3.2 describes the analysis used to generate the wide range of normal
operation axial power shapes used to establish operating limits for normal steady state
and power control operations. These limiting power distributions are controlled during
operation by technical specifications that require operation within the axial offset (AO)
window and within the power dependent insertion limits (PDILs).

The fixed in-core flux measurements and resulting power distribution continuously
displayed in the control room and provide further assurance that the power
distributions both axially and radially are not exceeded. Operation outside these limits
is not allowed by the plant technical specifications.

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4.4.3.5 Thermal and Hydraulic Characteristics Summary Table

Table 4.4-2 summarizes the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of the NPM.

4.4.4 Evaluation

Conformance to GDC 10 requirements is demonstrated by establishing SAFDLs and

ensuring that the plant stays within the SAFDLs. These limits ensure that the fuel clad is not
breached (and thus this fission product barrier remains intact), that fuel system dimensions
remain within operational tolerances, and that functional capabilities are not reduced
below those assumed in the safety analysis. The subchannel core thermal-hydraulic
analysis determines that the MCHFR is maintained above the 95/95 limit during normal
operation and AOOs, ensuring the SAFDLs are satisfied and fuel cladding integrity is
demonstrated. The thermal margin criteria are not exceeded for normal operation and
AOOs. For IEs and accidents, the total number of fuel rods that exceed the criteria and are
assumed to fail is used as input for radiological dose calculation purposes.

4.4.4.1 Critical Heat Flux Correlation

The functional form of the NSP2 and NSP4 critical heat flux correlations are expressed
as a curve fit to a number of physical parameters including:
• pressure
• cold wall factor
• boiling length
• local mass flux
• local equilibrium quality

The coefficients of the critical heat flux correlations are determined with a
cross-validation process and linear least-squares regression based on local condition
parameters calculated with the VIPRE-01 subchannel thermal-hydraulics code. The
form of the equation and correlation coefficients and the details of the development of
the correlations are provided in Reference 4.4-1. Details of the development for the
Extended Hench-Levy critical heat flux correlation are provided in Appendix B of
Reference 4.4-8.

4.4.4.2 Core Hydraulics

As discussed in Section 4.4.2.5.1, a uniform inlet temperature distribution is assumed

that is 5 degrees F above the expected inlet temperature.

Table 4.4-5 lists the principal flow elements in the RPV flow path and describes the flow
path.

4.4.4.3 Influence of Power Distribution

The subchannel analysis basemodel is developed to conservatively represent a

cycle-specific core as described in Reference 4.4-3. The model preserves limiting core

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conditions along with the operational envelope specified in the cycle-specific COLR.
The envelope accounts for power distribution throughout the core using design
peaking factors in combination with the limiting RCS parameters such as flow and
pressure. An eighth-core symmetric subchannel analysis model is used to capture the
limiting conditions of the cycle-specific core.

The radial power distribution for the core is characterized by the enthalpy rise hot
channel factor FΔH, which is the ratio of the maximum integrated rod power within the
core to the average rod power. FΔH is variable depending on the cycle design, the
exposure, fuel composition, burnable poison loading, operational history, and
thermal-hydraulic conditions. As a result, the location of the peak FΔH fuel rod changes
throughout an operating cycle.

A conservative core power distribution that bounds the cycle-specific or time-in-life

dependent radial power distribution is used to make the radial power distribution
independent of specific cycle core designs. The analysis for each cycle loading pattern
confirms that this limiting radial power distribution is bounding for the fuel cycle.

The Core Operating Limit Report (COLR) imposes a limitation on the peak value of FΔH,
and therefore limits the highest value for any fuel rod at hot full power. The FΔH
peaking design limit, also known as the core operating limit peaking factor, is increased
for lower power levels, allowing a linear increase to HZP.

The total peaking factor (FQ) is the ratio of the maximum local heat flux on the surface
of a fuel rod to the average fuel rod heat flux. The maximum FQ value is used to
calculate the peak LHGR.

A limiting axial flux shape is used in the subchannel analysis. Similar to the radial power
distribution, the limiting axial flux shapes are developed to be bounding for most
cycles, however, the conservatism of the axial flux shapes used in the subchannel
analysis is confirmed for each cycle.

In summary, the subchannel methodology is developed to use bounding radial and

axial power distributions. It should be noted that the radial power distribution used in
the subchannel analysis is higher (i.e. more conservative) than the value in the COLR.
This is because of the application of the biases to account for uncertainties due to
engineering hot channel factors are applied as multipliers on the FΔH value from the
COLR as described in Reference 4.4-3.

The development of bounding axial and radial flux shapes is explained in detail in
Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.4.3.1 Influence of Power Distribution During Transients

For most Chapter 15 transients that do not involve CRA motion, the bounding axial
and radial power distributions developed in the previous sections are conservative
and are used. If the events occur from reduced power, the radial power distribution

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is augmented in accordance with the higher FΔH allowed at lower powers. Similarly,
the limiting axial flux shape for the analyzed power is used.

For Chapter 15 events that involve CRA motion, such as Section 15.4 events, the
radial power distribution at the time of peak core power is determined from the
event-specific nuclear analysis. The bounding power distribution determined for
the steady state analysis is then augmented to reflect the higher peak FΔH. This is
conservative because the bounding radial power distribution used in the
basemodel and most transients is characterized by a very flat power distribution
around the peak rod, which minimizes energy transfer out of the channel
containing the peak rod. This is described in more detail in Reference 4.4-3.

An adjustment to the bounding radial power distribution also includes penalties

for FΔH measurement and engineering uncertainty on the hot rod. These penalties
include the measurement uncertainty on the radial peaking as well as the
engineering uncertainty for enthalpy rise. The radial power distribution prior to
applying uncertainty penalties retains the conservative peak-to-average for the hot
assembly, while the rod in which MCHFR is determined accounts for the applicable
uncertainties.

The CHF limiting axial power shape based on core-average axial power is sufficient
to be used for most transient analyses. Generally, the core-average axial power
shape does not deviate significantly from the spectrum of shapes already
considered within the power shapes analysis, and the subchannel limiting axial
power shape is held constant during these events. The combination of the
core-average axial power shape of initiating power level with the conservative
radial power distribution and core hydraulic boundary conditions from NRELAP5
provides a conservative MCHFR calculation. For events where the axial flux shape
changes, a specific analysis is performed to determine the axial flux shape that is
conservative for the event.

4.4.4.4 Core Thermal Response

The core thermal response during AOOs, IEs, and accidents is presented in Chapter 15.

Low power and shutdown operation is described in Section 19.1.6 and the probabilistic
risk assessment for the operation is addressed. The NPM natural circulation design does
not require mid-loop operation during shutdown conditions. The core is always
submerged in a pool of water so the core is not subjected to mid-loop
thermal-hydraulic conditions during refueling operations.

4.4.4.5 Analytical Methods

4.4.4.5.1 Reactor Coolant System Flow Determination

The reactor coolant system (RCS) flow loop is comprised of the fuel assembly
region, core bypass region, upper core plate, CRA guide tubes, CRA guide tube
support plate, riser transition, control rod drive shaft support, upper riser turn to
annulus, steam generator, downcomer transition, downcomer to lower plenum

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turn, and the lower core plate. The volumes, flow areas, and volume lengths used
to perform the flow calculation are provided in Table 4.4-1. The driving force for
flow is the buoyancy arising from the density differences around the RCS flow loop.
The primary contributors to pressure loss in the system are the fuel assembly and
steam generator regions. These pressure losses are confirmed by testing. The
remaining pressure drops are determined analytically. The steady state flow is
calculated using the thermal-hydraulic software NRELAP5 as discussed in
Section 5.1.4.

Three RCS flow rates are defined as a function of reactor power level, maximum
design, best estimate, and minimum design. The best estimate flow is the most
likely value for the primary coolant flow rate. This flow is based on the best estimate
values of the friction and form losses in the RCS loop, and the amount of core
bypass flow. Maximum design flow is the highest expected value for the primary
coolant flow rate. The maximum design flow accounts for uncertainties in the RCS
loop form losses, the uncertainty in the core bypass flow, and the uncertainty in the
heat transfer capability of the SG. The minimum design flow is the lowest expected
value for the primary coolant flow rate. The minimum design flow accounts for
uncertainties in the RCS loop friction and form losses (including the influence of
crud and corrosion), the uncertainty in the core bypass flow, and the uncertainty in
the heat transfer capability of the SG. At full power, the maximum design flow is
12.5 percent greater than the best estimate flow and the minimum design flow is
8.3 percent less than the best estimate flow. The minimum design flow is used in
subchannel calculations and is provided in Table 4.4-2. Bypass flow is discussed in
Section 4.4.3.1.1.

RCS flow is measured continuously using four sets of ultrasonic transducers located
in the four quadrants of the RPV wall in the downcomer region. These instruments
are discussed further in Section 7.1.1. The ultrasonically determined flow is
calibrated against a heat balance calculated flow. The ultrasonic flow is displayed in
the control room. Increased pressure drop due to long term effects such as crud
deposition would be identified by trending of the continuous flow measurement.

The thermal design analysis methodology encompasses the basis for the
subchannel model and its application. The thermal hydraulics of the reactor core
are modeled using VIPRE-01 with a one-pass approach in which all the
characteristics of the hot channel are captured, including inter-channel feedback.
The core is analyzed using eighth-core symmetry. Analyzed core designs may not
necessarily be eighth-core symmetric; however, the conservatisms used in the
model account for the insignificant non-symmetries in the core design as further
described in Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.4.5.2 Subchannel Model

The subchannel analysis basemodel is developed in a conservative manner such

that it bounds specific cycle core designs. The subchannel model is a 24-channel,
one-eighth core model. The model is detailed in the region surrounding the peak
power rod with decreasing detail farther away from the hot rod. The decreasing
detail is accomplished by combining channels (called lumped channels). Sensitivity
studies show that the rod power a few rods removed from the hot rod has minimal

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effect on the MCHFR. Other aspects of the basis for the model are discussed in
Section 4.4.3 and Section 4.4.4. The design inputs to construct the subchannel
model are:
• RCS conditions
− core thermal power
− flow rate and core bypass fraction
− core inlet temperature, turbulent mixing and temperature distribution
− system pressure
• power distribution
− radial peaking
− axial peaking
• mechanical fuel design information
− fuel array geometry and loss coefficients
− pellet and clad dimensions
− material properties for the fuel, clad, and the pellet-to-clad gap
• fuel performance data
− gap width, fill gas volume, composition, and pressure
− fuel centerline and volumetric average fuel temperatures
− fuel and clad surface temperatures

The effect of crud on the flow and enthalpy distribution in the core is directly
modeled in the VIPRE-01 subchannel analyses with respect to fuel rod heat transfer.
In addition, conservative analysis of the effects of crud deposition on the fuel rod
surface over a range of pellet-to-clad gap conductances, crud thicknesses, and crud
conductivities are explicitly included in the fuel heat transfer inputs used in the
subchannel analysis methodology to bound the effect on CHFR calculations. The
effect of a reduced flow area as a result of crud deposition on the outer surface of
the fuel rod is not directly modeled in the VIPRE-01 subchannel evaluations as it is
an insignificant reduction in flow area, and thus an insignificant impact on
calculated CHFR.

Reference 4.4-3 provides details about the methodology used to analyze the
thermal and hydraulic response of the fuel and core coolant, including the
correlations used for heat transfer, void fraction, and pressure drop.

4.4.4.6 Fuel Rod Conduction

Conduction of heat through the fuel rod directly impacts thermal margin to CHF for
transient analyses. The VIPRE-01 one-dimensional conduction model is used for the
fuel rod starting from the centerline of the fuel pellet outward to the cladding surface.
VIPRE-01 does not model the phenomenon associated with fuel rod behavior changes
caused by fuel exposure. The VIPRE-01 fuel and cladding temperatures are calibrated to

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match or conservatively bound the fuel performance code (COPERNIC) results as

described in Reference 4.4-3. Fuel conduction temperature calculations include the
effects of crud deposition on the fuel rods.

Table 4.4-8 provides the peak fuel temperature at the core average linear heat rate of
2.5 kw/ft. In addition, the peak fuel temperature is also shown at the peak linear heat
rate of 6.5 kw/ft, both values demonstrating significant margin to fuel melting.

4.4.4.7 Fuel Design-Specific Inputs

Fuel design-specific information is used in the subchannel basemodel. Spacer grid loss
coefficients and friction factor are derived from pressure drop tests. These are applied
in the subchannel analysis as described in Reference 4.4-3.

Operating conditions covering normal operation, AOOs, IEs, and accidents were
translated into the ranges listed in Table 4.4-6 as the nominal (full-power), non-LOCA
and LOCA operating states.

4.4.5 Testing and Verification

Testing is performed in accordance with the plant test program described in Section 14.2.

4.4.5.1 Testing Prior to Startup

An RCS flow test is conducted following fuel loading but prior to criticality. This flow
test is conducted using heat from the CVCS system to provide the motive force for
natural circulation. The purpose of this test is to provide confirmation of the
thermal-hydraulic aspects of the design prior to going critical.

4.4.5.2 Initial Power and During Operation

During power ascension, core power distribution measurements and inlet and outlet
thermocouple measurements are taken to confirm that the peaking factors used in the
thermal-hydraulic design are conservative. In addition, RCS flow measurement is
performed during power ascension following refueling outages. This flow
measurement, with analytical biases applied to account for flow uncertainties related
to allowable secondary side perturbations and core axial flux offset ranges, provides
confirmation that the RCS loop resistance used in the thermal-hydraulic design and
Chapter 15 transient and accident analyses remains bounding.

4.4.5.3 Component Inspections

Fuel assembly component surveillance is performed during refueling outages as

described in Section 4.2.4.6.

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4.4.6 Instrumentations Requirements

4.4.6.1 Incore Instrumentation System

The in-core instrumentation system (ICIS) uses neutron flux measurements in twelve
(12) fuel assemblies to determine a three-dimensional power distribution in the core
(see Section 4.3). During startup testing (Section 14.2), this power distribution is
compared to the power distribution assumed in the thermal-hydraulic analysis to
ensure that the peaking factor used in the analysis is conservative.

In addition, temperature is continuously monitored at the inlet and outlet of the 12 fuel
assemblies and this information is used to verify that proper flow rates are being used
in the thermal-hydraulic analysis. The location of the 12 assemblies that contain the
incore flux and inlet and outlet temperature detectors is shown in Figure 4.3-18.

The conservatism of the VIPRE-01 subchannel code is established by comparison

against experimental data and other computer code analyses as described in
Reference 4.4-3.

4.4.6.2 Module Protection System

The following MPS reactor trips provide automatic protection of the reactor core safety
limits:
• RCS high pressure
• RCS low pressure (above 600 degrees F) and low-low pressure
• nuclear high power trip

These protective trips ensure that MCHFR limits are not exceeded and that fuel
centerline temperature stays below the melting point. These trips also ensure that
average enthalpy in the riser is less than the enthalpy of saturated liquid and that core
exit quality is within the limits defined by the CHF correlation.

There is no CHF related trip in the NuScale design because the CHF limits are at high
power levels and the reactor is tripped before CHF limits are approached (see
Figure 4.4-11).

A detect and suppress system is not used for stability in the NPM design because MPS
protective actuations are achieved prior to reaching the flow stability exclusion region
as discussed in Section 4.4.7.3.

The technical specifications include operating limits and system operability

requirements, which ensure the thermal-hydraulic performance of the core. The
reactor trip setpoints in the MPS include margin-to-safety limits for the monitored
parameters. The MPS and reactor protective trips are described in Section 7.1.

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The NPM design does not include a loose parts monitoring system because:
• The low fluid velocities resulting from natural circulation flow combined with a
design that has only small lines entering the RPV minimizes the potential for loose
parts entering or being generated in the RPV.
• The NPM design uses corrosion-resistant materials and has a flow-induced
vibration program (Section 3.9) that further minimizes the potential for loose parts
being generated in the RPV.
• During startup operation, a foreign materials exclusion program minimizes the
potential for loose parts entering the RPV.
• Underwater vessel inspections during refueling outage verify that there are no
loose parts in the RPV.

In addition the NuScale fuel assembly has a mesh filter at the bottom of each fuel
assembly (Section 4.2) that filters out loose parts that could enter the fuel assembly.

4.4.7 Flow Stability

This section describes the evaluation of flow stability for the NPM.

4.4.7.1 Approach

The evaluation of unstable flow oscillations in the NPM includes a detailed

phenomenological review of possible modes of instability and operating conditions
that may result in instability. Details of the methodology are provided in
Reference 4.4-4, including generic boundary conditions of anticipated transients where
unstable oscillations may occur. Section 15.9 demonstrates that the NPM-specific
design is protected from unstable flow oscillations when operation is limited to a
defined pressure-temperature exclusion zone.

The phenomenological review identifies the limiting instability mode as natural

circulation instability.

The approach for stability protection in the NPM is regional-exclusion rather than the
detection-and-suppression. The operational domain identified with potential
instability is characterized by loss of subcooling in the riser that leads to vapor
generation above the core. This condition is excluded by the MPS protective actions.

In the demonstration of the methodology, no instabilities are identified to occur over

the range of power evaluated because riser subcooling margin is not lost. The MPS
actuation precludes onset of instability on loss of subcooling with sufficient margin to
accommodate instrumentation time delays.

4.4.7.1.1 Phenomenological Description of NuScale Power Module Stability

There are several key design and arrangement considerations of the NuScale
design that define the stability phenomena of importance.

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The NPM design is a small modular integrated PWR. The helical coil SGs are
integrated within the RPV and the primary coolant flow is driven by natural
circulation. The density difference between the relatively high-temperature flow
exiting the core and the lower-temperature flow returning through the
downcomer annulus creates the natural circulation driving head.

Various feedback mechanisms are possible and special consideration is given to

coupling the SG dynamics and the flow stability in the primary loop. Feedback
coupling between the thermal-hydraulic phenomena and the neutron kinetics is
important. This is particularly the case where coolant and fuel rod temperatures
provide reactivity feedback, and the core power response affects the coolant
temperature and the density head that drives the flow and influences its stability.

4.4.7.1.2 Instability Mode Classification

The instability modes are broadly classified as static or dynamic. A list of the
instability modes under each category and the mechanism for each mode is
described in Table 4.4-9. The relevance of each instability mode to the NuScale
design is designated as not applicable, excluded as limited by other phenomena, or
applicable.

4.4.7.2 Analysis Methodologies

4.4.7.2.1 PIM Code

The PIM code simulates the flow dynamics in the NuScale RCS loop with optimal
resolution of its stability. The extensive experience in the field of boiling water
reactor stability analysis, both numerical and first principle understanding, is used
in addressing single-phase natural circulation stability, which is unique to the NPM.

The PIM code applies the general theory and numerical methods of the RAMONA
code, but is not a direct derivative of the coding. The PIM code has been developed
independently to suit the geometry and specific needs of the NuScale reactor. The
main advantage of the RAMONA-type algorithm used in PIM is the absence or
insignificance of numerical damping that affects other time-domain codes, and
requires extensive study and adjustment before they can be successfully
benchmarked and reliably used.

Frequency-domain methods are not affected by numerical damping as much as

some time-domain methods, but they are not used for NuScale as they require
linearization of the governing equations. While linearization is accurate for small
perturbations, and properly identifies the decay ratio and the conditions at the
onset of instability, it is not suitable to analyze the stability of a highly-nonlinear
system such as a natural circulation loop. A linearized model would not be able to
discover the importance of nonlinearities that may be manifested at relatively small
perturbation amplitudes. However, the RAMONA-type algorithm used by PIM is
fully capable of representing the nonlinear interactions inherent in the natural
circulation flow.

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The PIM code approximates the reactor vessel geometry and flow. The
approximations are founded on basic assumptions regarding the geometry, the
representation of the flow fields, and various interactions and feedback
mechanisms. The major assumptions are listed below. More details about
modeling assumptions, their impact, and justifications are given in Reference 4.4-4:
• The flow around the primary loop is one-dimensional, while the flow area
varies along the flow path.
• The flow in the core is represented by a single channel. This assumption is
reasonable given that the individual fuel assemblies are not closed channels
and cross flow between assemblies is allowed.
• Power generation in the core is represented by a point-kinetics model.
Accordingly, the axial power shape is invariant.
• The flow in the RCS loop is modeled as non-equilibrium, two-phase flow in
which a drift flux formulation accounts for mechanical (velocity) differences
between the liquid phase and the vapor phase (if any vapor exists).
• The pressurizer is not modeled. Pressure is specified by code input and the
dependence of thermodynamic properties on pressure is uniform.
• A simplified model for ambient heat losses along the downcomer to the
containment vessel provides representative estimates for this small effect on
natural circulation driving head, which has some effect on stability at
low-power conditions.
• The solid structures within the RPV, with the exception of the fuel rods in the
core and the SG tubes, are assumed to have no heat exchange with the
circulating fluid.
• The total core thermal power, flow rate, pressure, and inlet temperature are
specified initial conditions for the RCS and SG secondary side. The specified
conditions are based on plant performance operational predictions associated
with plant design activities, or as chosen for sensitivity studies.

The geometry representation of the NPM pressure vessel for the numerical
simulation is given in Figure 4.4-12. The core is represented by a heated section at
the bottom of the riser. The cold leg annulus is represented as a one-dimensional
pipe with a generally-varying cross section area. The helical coils of the SGs fill part
of the cold leg volume and heat is exchanged between the downward flow in the
RCS loop and the secondary side (inside the helical coil SG tubes). The dashed line
represents a pressure boundary condition that is imposed by the pressurizer.

4.4.7.3 Stability Protection Solution

Section 4.4.3.3.1 describes how the NPM meets GDC 12 requirements by using an
operating domain that is protected by MPS reactor trips in the exclusion region where
the reactor is not allowed to operate. The exclusion region, defined by the area in the
operating map where stability criteria are not met, is enforced automatically by the
MPS trip setpoints.

The reactor operating maps for the NuScale reactor are described in Section 4.4.3.3.

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In summary, a detection and suppression solution is not used for the NuScale design.
Flow stability is ensured by maintaining a suitable operating region using an exclusion
region solution.

4.4.8 References

4.4-1 NuScale Power, LLC, “NuScale Power Critical Heat Flux Correlations,”
TR-0116-21012-P-A, Revision 1.

4.4-2 AREVA Inc., "Computational Procedure for Evaluating Fuel Rod Bowing,"
XN-75-32(P)(A), Supplement 1-4, February 1983.

4.4-3 NuScale Power, LLC, "Subchannel Analysis Methodology," TR-0915-17564-P-A,

Revision 2.

4.4-4 NuScale Power, LLC, "Evaluation Methodology for Stability Analysis of the
NuScale Power Module," TR-0516-49417-P, Revision 1.

4.4-5 AREVA NP Inc., “COBRA-FLX: A Core Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis Code Topical

Report,” ANP-10311P-A, Revision 0.

4.4-6 Bahadur, Sher, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Pedro Salas,
AREVA NP, Inc., January 29, 2013, Agencywide Document Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13135A053.

4.4-7 NuScale Power, LLC, “Applicability of AREVA Fuel Methodology for the NuScale
Design,” TR-0116-20825-P-A, Revision 1.

4.4-8 NuScale Power, LLC, “Loss-of-Coolant Accident Evaluation Model,”

TR-0516-49422-P-A, Revision 2.

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Table 4.4-1: Geometries of Reactor Coolant System Components

RCS Region Total RCS Region RCS Sub-region Average Flow Area Length (ft)
Volume (ft3) Description (ft2)
Riser 635 Lower riser and
24.9 9.4
transition
Upper riser and riser
15.4 26.0
turn
Downcomer 1199 Downcomer (including 25.7 46.0
steam generators)
Core 89 Fuel assemblies 10.3 7.9
Reflector cooling 0.9 7.9
channel
Pressurizer 578 Pressurizer heaters / 36.1 1.7
main steam plenums
Cylindrical pressurizer 61.4 6.9
Reactor pressure vessel 41.2 2.2
top head
Note: Nominal values

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Table 4.4-2: Plant Reactor Design Comparison

Parameter NuScale US-EPR US-APWR
Key Reactor Parameter
Core thermal output (MWt) 160 4590 4451
System pressure (psia) 1850 2250 2250
Number of loops NA 4 4
Inlet temperature (°F) [best estimate (BE) flow] 497 563.4 550.6
Core average temperature (°F) (BE flow) 543 596.8 588.8
Average temperature rise in core (°F) (BE flow) 100 62.7 72.1
Minimum design flow (lb/hr) 4.27E+6 173E+6 168E+6
Maximum design flow (lb/hr) 5.24E+6 195E+6 188E+6
Best estimate flow (lb/hr) 4.66E+6 180E+6 175E+6
Core bypass flow (%) 8.5 5.5 9.0
Average linear power density (kW/ft) 2.5 5.22 4.65
Peak linear power for normal operating conditions (kW/ft) 5.0 13.6 12.1
Normal operation peak heat flux (106 Btu/hr-ft2) 0.171 .460 0.421
Total heat flux hot channel factor (FQ) 2.0 2.60 2.60
Heat transfer area on fuel surface (ft2) 6,275 86,166 91,360
Normal operation core average heat flux (Btu/hr-ft2) 85,044 177,036 162,000
Core flow area (ft2) 9.79 63.6 68.0
Core average coolant mass velocity (106 lbm/hr-ft2) (BE) 0.49 2.8 2.25
Core average coolant velocity (ft/sec) 2.7 16 14.1
Core
Equivalent diameter of active core (in) 59.28 148.3 119.7
Number of fuel assemblies 37 241 257
Fuel Assembly
Effective fuel length (in.) 95.89 165.4 165.4
Nominal fuel weight per assembly (lb) 550 1182 1350
Rods per fuel assembly 264 264 264
Fuel Assembly pitch (in.) 8.466 8.466 8.466
Fuel rod pitch (in.) 0.496 0.496 0.496
Number of grids per assembly 5 10 11
Fuel Rod
Cladding outside diameter (in.) 0.374 0.374 0.374
Pellet-cladding gap (in.) 0.00325 0.0033 0.0033
Cladding material M5® M5® ZIRLO
Fuel column length (in.) 78.74 160 165.4
Fuel pellet diameter (in.) 0.3195 0.3195 0.322
Fuel pellet density (% theoretical density) 96.0 96.0 97
Note: These values are provided for comparison purposes only. More detailed information is provided for NuScale in
Table 4.1-1, Table 4.1-2, and Reference 4.4-3. Table 5.1-1 provides additional information on NuScale RCS flow.

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Table 4.4-3: Applicable Ranges of Existing Critical Heat Flux Models

B&W-2 W-3 EPRI-1 AECL CHF Look Up
Table
Pressure (psia) 2002 to 2393 1001 to 2306 203 to 2451 15 to 2901
Mass flux (lb/hr-ft2) 749,880 to 4,000,080 999,840 to 4,999,920 199,840 to 4,100,360 0 to 5,898,740
Thermodynamic quality -0.03 to 0.20 -0.15 to 0.15 -0.25 to 0.75 -0.50 to 1.00
Note: Ranges are approximate

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Table 4.4-4: Subchannel Methodology Parameter Biases

Parameter Conservative Bias Direction Location Applied
Reactor power measurement uncertainty Increase VIPRE-01 or NRELAP5 input
Core inlet flow rate uncertainty Decrease VIPRE-01 or NRELAP5 input
Core bypass flow Decrease VIPRE-01 or NRELAP5 input
Core exit pressure Case Dependent VIPRE-01 or NRELAP5 input
Core inlet temperature Increase VIPRE-01 or NRELAP5 input
Core inlet flow distribution uncertainty Decrease VIPRE-01 model hot assembly
FUΔH Uncertainty Increase Hot rod peaking (root-sum-square)
FΔH Rodded peaking Increase Limiting assembly peaking
FEΔH Engineering uncertainty Increase Hot rod peaking (root-sum-square)
FΔH Augmentation for asymmetric events Increase Limiting assembly peaking
FEQ Engineering uncertainty Increase CHF analysis limit
Fuel rod bowing Increase CHF analysis limit
Notes:
1) The uncertainty bias for measurement of core power, system flow, system pressure, and core inlet temperature are
accounted for in NRELAP5 transient analysis boundary conditions provided using non-LOCA transient methodology.
These uncertainties are applied when performing steady-state analyses or analyses that do not involve NRELAP5 Non-
LOCA methodology. Uncertainty values are provided in Reference 4.4-3.
2) Core inlet flow bias is zero because the minimum design system flow rate accounts for uncertainties throughout the RCS
loop. The NRELAP5 transient simulations include the implementation of the flow loss uncertainties.
3) The rodded peaking value is used for all MCHFR analyses except those that start from HZP. The HZP cases use a PDIL-
ARO factor at HZP conditions.
4) Augmentation for asymmetric events varies based on the event-specific neutronic calculation.

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Table 4.4-5: Summary of Reactor Coolant System Loop Flow Elements

Flow Element Hydraulic Phenomena
Core support blocks in Flow over obstructions and drag due to four blocks in annulus
downcomer
Downcomer-to-lower plenum Flow turning through 180 degrees along thickened corners. Forward and reverse losses are
turn considered due to possible flow reversal during plant startup.
Lower core plate Flow through thick-edged orifice. Forward and reverse losses are considered due to possible
flow reversal during plant startup.
Core Flow through nozzles and spacer grids
Upper core plate Flow through thick-edged orifice. Forward and reverse losses are considered due to possible
flow reversal during plant startup.
Control rod assembly Guide Parallel flow in interstitial area of tube bundle
Tubes
Control rod assembly guide Flow through plate which resembles a screen
tube support plate
Riser transition Flow through converging nozzle
Control rod drive shaft support Flow through plate which is treated as six round edges
Pressurizer baffle Flow through sudden contraction and sudden expansion. Forward and reverse losses are the
same.
Upper riser turn to annulus Flow turning through 180 degrees and drag from eight hanger braces
Downcomer through steam Flow over tubes
generator
Downcomer transition Flow through converging nozzle
Upper core support blocks Flow over obstructions and drag due to four blocks in annulus

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Table 4.4-6: Reactor Operating Conditions

Operating State Pressure Mass Flux Inlet Subcooling
(psia) (lb/hr-ft2) (°F)
Nominal (full-power) operation 1,850 442,400 135
Non-LOCA 1450 to 2180 36,870 to 589,870 36 to 135
LOCA 73 to 1,850 0 to 37,340 0 to 135

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Table 4.4-7: Void Fraction at Exit of Core

Parameter (at core exit) Equilibrium Cycle 24-Channel
(without uncertainties) Subchannel Analysis
(with all uncertainties applied)
Core Average Void Fraction 0.0 0.0
Hot Channel Void Fraction 0.01 0.36

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Table 4.4-8: Peak Fuel Pellet Temperatures

Parameter Value
Core Average Centerline Pellet Temperature (2.5 kw/ft) 1375
Hot Rod Centerline Pellet Temperature (6.5 kw/ft) 2075

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Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms

Instability Mechanism Applicable to Rationale for Determination
NuScale
Static Governed by steady-state characteristics of the
Instabilities system
Flow excursion Determined by the relationship between the Yes There is no possibility for negative slope
or Ledinegg pressure drop characteristic of a boiling channel ·
of the ΔP ( m ) in the case of single-phase
instability and the pressure drop characteristic imposed by an
natural circulation and it can be
external system (e.g., a pump).
demonstrated that in a substantially
unconstricted flow path like the primary
circuit in the NPM that this condition is
also absent even under two-phase
conditions.
Reference 4.4-4 demonstrates there is
no negative slope at any power at the
steady-state balanced loop operating
points where ΔP = 0 . Moreover, no
negative slope was found anywhere on
the curve. Therefore, the flow excursion
mode is not possible in the NPM.
Boiling crisis Higher heat flux than the flux that can be No Reactor operation is restricted such that
transferred by nucleate boiling. a margin to boiling transition is
achieved by maintaining the minimum
CHF ratio above correlation limits.
Flow pattern Flow regime transitions influence the pressure drop No Flow regime transitions cannot cause
(relaxation) and create inflections of the pressure drop versus instabilities in the NPM.
instability flow rate that may result in instability. Flow regime Bubbly-to-annular flow regime
transition transitions include laminar-to-turbulent transitions transitions occur at high steam qualities
and bubbly-to-annular flow transitions. and are well outside the operational
range of the NPM, which is single-phase
flow with minimal, if any, local
subcooled boiling. Other instability
modes become excited at lower steam
quality in the NPM riser and, therefore,
the boiling regime transitions are
bounded by these other phenomena.
Flashing Relevant for heaters located under a tall riser Yes Observed only in low-pressure systems
instability Hot (at or near saturation) liquid rises to lower with pressures much lower than NPM
pressure elevation. operating pressure
Evaporation at reduced pressure (flashing) drives
flow disturbance.
Bumping Periodic or chaotic oscillations caused by cyclical No Possible only in low-pressure systems,
Geysering vapor generation in a tall riser. and therefore not a primary instability
Similar to flashing instability, except vapor is mode in NPM.
generated in the heater and expands in the riser.
Possible liquid thermodynamic metastable state
(superheated) caused by low flow and lack of
nucleation sites.

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Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms (Continued)

Instability Mechanism Applicable to Rationale for Determination
NuScale
Dynamic Governed by inertia, feedback, and overall system
instabilities response.
Pressure-drop Oscillations are the dynamic extension of Ledinegg Yes The necessary condition of a multi-
oscillations static instability. Pressure drop versus flow rate is a valued pressure drop versus flow rate
multi-valued function. has been excluded in the NPM as shown
Transition from one flow state to the other is in the Ledinegg analysis.
accompanied by a storage mechanism, such as
compressing a volume of vapor, which causes a
delayed rebound and cyclical transitions ensue.
Acoustic Resonance of pressure waves. No There is no mechanism for feeding and
oscillations Thermal energy feeds and sustains the instability. In sustaining this type of instability in the
the compression phase, direct contact between the NPM as discussed in Reference 4.4-4.
liquid phase and the heated surface is forced by
collapsing a vapor film and heat transfer is
enhanced while in the rarefaction phase the vapor
film is reestablished, and the cycle is repeated. High
velocity flow may also provide the mechanical
energy to excite the standing waves.

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Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms (Continued)

Instability Mechanism Applicable to Rationale for Determination
NuScale
Density-wave Occurs in vertical heated channels with or without Yes Density wave instability is seldom
oscillations boiling. Any flow perturbation at the inlet generates observed without compounding factors
effects that propagate (wave) up the channel. in nuclear systems. While density waves
Decreasing inlet mass flow rate results in increasing are present normally in a heated
the flow enthalpy and lowers the density either by channel, they can occur in a heated
liquid expansion in the case of single-phase flow or channel connected to a tall adiabatic
through increased vapor generation. riser as in the simplified boiling water
reactor natural circulation.
At steady state or quasi-steady state, or for very low
frequency perturbation, the inlet flow perturbation Density wave instability is a concern for
generates a negative feedback so that the system the flow in the secondary side of the SG
returns to its initial state and is stable. Specifically, a of the NPM and must be addressed.
perturbation decreasing the inlet mass flow rate Density waves in the primary circuit are
results in lowering the density in the channel, thus part of a compound interconnected
increasing the buoyancy pressure head, which phenomena of a potential natural
tends to restore the original flow rate. circulation riser instability and must be
However, dependent on the frequency of the addressed as an integral process with
perturbation, sufficiently strong delayed feedback various components.
can be destabilizing. Delay mechanism is the time
to propagate the density wave to transverse the
heated channel length.
For resonant frequency, the delayed effects of
perturbation reach the channel exit at the time the
inlet perturbation reverses phase and the original
perturbation is reinforced.
At this frequency, the system is destabilized given
sufficiently strong feedback, which can occur when
the power is increased. For a single-phase heated
channel, instability is conceivable only for long
heated channels as the density change of liquid due
to change in enthalpy is relatively small.
Conversely, boiling increases the mixture density
response to enthalpy change, making a boiling
channel less stable compared to the single-phase
case. In addition, in the two-phase case, the
feedback from an initial inlet flow perturbation is
not limited to density head, but includes the
response of friction pressure drop, which is
significant due to the two-phase multiplier.
Xenon Pure neutronic phenomenon. No Xenon stability calculations for the NPM
instability core demonstrate that these oscillations
are highly stable as a pure instability
mode. Refer to Section 4.3.

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Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms (Continued)

Instability Mechanism Applicable to Rationale for Determination
NuScale
Natural Natural circulation system includes two legs: a riser Yes Natural circulation instability is a
circulation and a downcomer. The dynamics of the flow in the possible mode for the NPM and is
instability two legs depends on the heater source and heat evaluated in depth. The evaluation
sink, and their respective location. The natural includes other compounding
circulation instability mechanism of interest for the phenomena not discussed in the
NPM has the heater located under a tall riser and description of the fundamental
the heat sink located near the top of the cold leg. instability given above. These
A perturbation increasing the flow rate results in a compounding phenomena include the
reduction in the heater exit temperature and an feedback from nuclear reactivity and the
increase in its density. The density perturbation dynamics of the heat exchanger.
travels up the riser and there is a time delay before
the new density is distributed throughout the
length of the riser. This delayed feedback is
negative because the difference in temperature
between the riser and the cold leg is diminished
reducing the density difference that drives the flow.
If this delayed negative feedback is sufficiently
strong, the flow is destabilized and undergoes
growing oscillations. The riser boils in the case of
high friction in the loop that reduces flow, or if
power input is sufficiently increased. The density
response to an enthalpy perturbation is much
higher in the case of phase change than in the case
of single-phase thermal expansion. The boiling
natural circulation loop can be destabilized more
readily than a single-phase loop.
Coupled Compound instability modes include secondary
compound phenomena that influence or modify the primary
instability mechanism significantly.
modes
Parallel Common headers alter the boundary conditions No Parallel channel instability in the NPM
channel under which a single channel would have operated. core has been dispositioned in
instability The common pressure drop boundary condition Reference 4.4-4 and is not a concern.
allows for multiple oscillation modes depending on
the phase difference among the oscillations in each
channel.
The fixed pressure drop boundary condition is
destabilizing and, therefore, a set of two channels
connected in parallel are less stable than a single
one.
For two channels oscillating out of phase, the
common pressure drop fluctuation is eliminated (in
the linear limit) as the effects of the flow oscillations
in the two channels cancel out.
Primary circuit See discussion in Reference 4.4-4. Yes SG secondary-side flow coupling to the
flow coupling RPV-side flow is restricted to the effects
to secondary of the total secondary flow. Out-of-
side of SG phase flow oscillations in the tubes are
self-cancelling and result in no net
oscillatory effects.

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Table 4.4-9: Applicability of Instability Mechanisms (Continued)

Instability Mechanism Applicable to Rationale for Determination
NuScale
Neutronic Takes effects of the neutron reactivity feedback into Yes The reactivity-to-power and power-to-
coupling with account. A flow increase perturbation at the core heat flux phenomena are important and
natural inlet reduces the core exit temperature at constant are included in stability evaluations of
circulation power. Reduced moderator temperature adds the primary coolant flow in the NPM.
instability positive reactivity and the power is increased if the Reference 4.4-4 provides the rational for
moderator temperature coefficient is negative. this conclusion.
Power increase offsets core exit temperature
reduction and the reactivity response becomes
milder (reduced gain). However, the time delay
involved in these processes could reinforce the
perturbation if the resulting phase shift is large.
NPM Stability of the flow in a natural circulation loop with Yes The main NPM instability mode is
circulation constant heater power and constant density cold natural circulation instability, also called
instability leg is compounded to include reactivity-to-power riser instability mode. Evaluations rely
feedback. Ideal SG assumption is relaxed with more on detailed numerical techniques in
realistic modeling of the heat transfer dynamics. which a dynamic system is constructed
System operating conditions may include parts in using nonlinear equations the
which the flow is two-phase because of subcooled conservation of mass, momentum, and
boiling in the core and flashing in the riser. energy. Equations and governing
equations for fission power dynamics
and heat transfer.

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Figure 4.4-1: Critical Heat Flux Ratio Limits and Thermal Margins
Tier 2 4.4-40 Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Thermal and Hydraulic Design
Figure 4.4-2: Radial Power Distribution
(Ratio of Peak Rod Power to Average Rod Power)
Tier 2 4.4-41 Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Thermal and Hydraulic Design
Figure 4.4-3: Not Used
Tier 2 4.4-42 Revision 5
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Figure 4.4-4: Maximum Rod Clad Outer Wall Temperature (F)
Tier 2 4.4-43 Revision 5
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Figure 4.4-5: Maximum Rod Heat Flux (MBtu/hr-ft2)
Tier 2 4.4-44 Revision 5
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Figure 4.4-6: Average Channel Mass Flux (Mlbm/hr-ft2)
Tier 2 4.4-45 Revision 5
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Figure 4.4-7: Maximum Channel Equilibrium Quality (fraction)
Tier 2 4.4-46 Revision 5
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Figure 4.4-8: Exit Channel Fluid Temperature (Degrees Fahrenheit)
Tier 2 4.4-47 Revision 5
Tier 2

NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.4-9: Analytical Design Operating Limits

2100

High Temperature Analytical Limit (610°F)

High Pressure Analytical Limit (2000 psia)
2000

High TAvg Initiatl Condition (555F)

High Pressure Operating Limit (1920 psia)
Pressurizer Pressure (psia)

Low Normal TAvg (535F)

Minimum Critical Temperature (420°F)

1900

Normal Operating Pressure (1850 psia)

TCold TAvg THot

1800
4.4-48

Low Normal Pressure (1780 psia)

Low Pressure Analytical
Limit (1720 psia)
1700

1600
Low Low Pressure Analytical Limit (1600 psia)

Subcooled Margin 5°F

Saturation Curve

1500

Thermal and Hydraulic Design

400 450 500 550 600 650

Reactor Coolant System Temperature (°F)

Revision 5
NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Thermal and Hydraulic Design
Figure 4.4-10: Not Used
Tier 2 4.4-49 Revision 5
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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report

Figure 4.4-11: Thermal Margin Limit Map

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Thermal and Hydraulic Design

Figure 4.4-12: Illustration of the Geometry Representation for the Stability Analysis

Superheated Steam

Steam Generator

Feedwater

Core

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4.5 Reactor Materials

4.5.1 Control Rod Drive System Structural Materials

The control rod drive system (CRDS) consists of the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs)
and the related mechanical components that provide the means for control rod assembly
insertion into the core as described in Section 4.6. Portions of the CRDS are a part of the
reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) as described in Section 5.2.

The CRDS materials discussed in this section include the CRDMs and extend to the coupling
interface with the control rod assemblies (CRAs) in the reactor vessel. Figures 4.6-1, 4.6-5
and 4.6-6 are illustrations of the CRDM-to-CRA interface. Materials for the
pressure-retaining components of the CRDMs are listed in Table 5.2-4 and include the latch
housing, the rod travel housing, and the rod travel housing plug.

Section 3.9.4 provides the details of the mechanical testing, seismic analysis of the CRDS,
components life cycle testing, and mechanism functional tests. Operating experience of
the CRDS design is discussed in Section 3.9.4 and Section 4.6.

4.5.1.1 Materials Specifications

The CRDMs are mounted above the pressurizer of the reactor pressure vessel and
inside the containment vessel. The CRDM internal components can be exposed to
primary coolant or saturated steam and non-condensable gases. Prior to module
movement for refueling, the containment vessel is partially flooded with borated
water, but the CRDMs are not normally submerged. However, the material design of
the external surfaces of the CRDM include consideration of inadvertent submergence
into borated water during module movement or refueling. The inside surface of the
CRDM cooling tubes and cooling water connector is exposed to component cooling
water. CRDM materials are selected to be compatible with the applicable fluid
environments.

Portions of the CRDM that establish the RCPB are classified as Quality Group A and are
designed, fabricated, constructed, tested, and inspected as Class 1 in accordance with
Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code (BPVC) and the applicable conditions promulgated in 10 CFR 50.55a.(b).
The CRDM materials, including weld materials, conform to fabrication, construction,
and testing requirements of BPVC, Section III, Subsection NB. The materials selected for
fabrication conform to the applicable material specifications provided in BPVC, Section
II and meet the requirements of BPVC, Section III, Article NB-2000.

As a conservative measure to minimize the potential for leakage of the fluid system
inside containment, the CRDM coil heat exchangers, cooling tubes, and cooling water
connectors are classified as Quality Group B (Section 3.2) and are designed, fabricated,
constructed, tested, and inspected as Class 2 in accordance with Section III of the ASME
BPV Code and the applicable conditions promulgated in 10 CFR 50.55a.(d). The CRDM
coil heat exchanger, cooling tubes, and cooling water connector materials, including
weld materials, conform to fabrication, construction, and testing requirements of ASME
BPV Code, Section III, Subsection NC. The materials selected for fabrication conform to

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the applicable material specifications provided in ASME BPV Code, Section II and meet
the requirements of ASME BPV Code, Section III, Article NC-2000.

Table 4.5-1 lists the CRDM materials, including the material grade, class, or type, as
applicable. Materials exposed to borated pool water, primary reactor coolant, saturated
steam and non-condensable gases, or component cooling water are
corrosion-resistant stainless steels, nickel-based alloys, and, to a limited extent,
cobalt-based alloys. These materials are selected from materials proven in light-water
reactor operation and for their compatibility with the reactor coolant as specified in
ASME BPV Code, Section III, Paragraphs NB-2160 or NC-2160 and Subsubarticles
NB-3120 or NC-3120, as applicable.

CRDS pressure-retaining components are not fabricated or manufactured from cast

austenitic stainless steel. Use of cold-worked austenitic stainless steel is avoided to the
extent practicable during fabrication of CRDS structural components. Austenitic and
martensitic stainless steel with yield strength greater than 90,000 psi, as determined by
the 0.2 percent offset method, are not used in the fabrication of the CRDS structural
components.

4.5.1.2 Austenitic Stainless Steel Components

Processing and welding of unstablized American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) Type
3XX series austenitic stainless steels for pressure-retaining parts comply with
Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.44, Revision 1, to prevent sensitization and stress corrosion
cracking. Austenitic stainless steel is procured in the solution-annealed condition.
When rapidly cooled by means other than water quenching, non-sensitization of base
materials is verified by test in accordance with Practice A or Practice E of American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A262 (Reference 4.5-1) as required by RG 1.44.

For AISI Type 3XX series austenitic stainless steel subjected to sensitizing temperatures
subsequent to solution heat treatment, the carbon content is limited to no more than
0.03 weight percent (wt%).

CRDM weld filler metals listed in Table 4.5-1 are in accordance, as applicable, with
SFA-5.4 and SFA-5.9, of ASME BPV Code, Section II, Part C. They are analyzed for delta
ferrite content and limited to a ferrite number (FN) of 5FN to 20FN in accordance with
RG 1.31, Revision 4, and ASME BPV Code, Section III, Paragraphs NB-2433 or NC-2433, as
applicable. Carbon content of austenitic stainless steel weld filler metals is limited to no
more than 0.03 wt%.

Section 5.2.3 describes the controls used to minimize the introduction of potentially
harmful contaminants including chlorides, fluorides, and low melting point alloys on
the surface of austenitic stainless steel components. Such controls are also applicable
to stainless steels used in the CRDM. In accordance with RG 1.44, cleaning solutions,
processing equipment, degreasing agents, and other foreign materials are removed
during processing prior to elevated temperature treatments. Acid pickling is avoided
on stainless steel and not used on sensitized austenitic stainless steel.

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4.5.1.3 Other Materials

The use of martensitic stainless steel is limited to Type 410 with a minimum tempering
temperature of 1050 degrees F to prevent temper embrittlement and stress-corrosion
cracking.

Nickel-chromium based alloy X-750 is used for the CRDM springs and cobalt-based
alloys Haynes 25 and Stellite 6 are used for wear-resistant parts as identified in
Table 4.5-1. These materials have been used in existing pressurized water reactor (PWR)
CRDMs for the same function with satisfactory performance. The material of the rod
drive expansion plug and pins associated with gripper components is Haynes 25.
Stellite 6 material is limited to hardfacing of the CRDM gripper latch arm tips. To
minimize the possibility of stress-corrosion cracking failures, the CRDM springs and
wear-resistant parts are procured in the same heat treatment condition as previously
used in the industry. Alloy X-750 spring material and heat treatment conform to the
requirements of AMS 5698 or AMS 5699. There have been no operating experience
reports of stress-corrosion cracking of Alloy X-750 CRDM springs fabricated from
AMS 5698 and AMS 5699. For Alloy X-750, the cobalt impurity is maintained as low as
possible and does not exceed 1 percent. To minimize cobalt intrusion into the reactor
coolant, low-cobalt or cobalt-free alloys may be used for wear-resistant CRDM parts if
their wear and corrosion resistance are qualified by testing.

4.5.1.4 Material Cleaning and Cleanliness Control

Cleaning of CRDMs complies with the ASME NQA-1 requirements (Reference 4.5-2). The
final surface cleanness meets the requirements for "Class B" of Subpart 2.1.

Handling, storage, and shipping of CRDMs comply with ASME NQA-1-2008, Part 1,
Requirement 13. Packaging, shipment, handling, and storage of CRDMs meet the
requirements of "Level B" of ASME NQA-1a-2009, Part II, Subpart 2.2 (Reference 4.5-2).

4.5.2 Reactor Internals and Core Support Structure Materials

Figures 3.9-1 through 3.9-4 show the reactor vessel internals (RVI) subassemblies with
components that comprise the RVI. The RVI consist of core support assembly, lower riser
assembly, upper riser assembly, flow diverter, and pressurizer spray nozzles. The RVI do not
contain any cast austenitic stainless steel components.

4.5.2.1 Materials Specifications

Table 4.5-2 lists the RVI materials and associated specifications, including the material
grade, class, or type as applicable. The portions of the RVI performing a core support
function are designed and fabricated as Class CS in accordance with ASME BPV Code,
Section III, Subsection NG. The materials for core support structures and threaded
structural fasteners conform to the requirements of ASME BPV Code, Section III,
Subsubarticle NG-2120, and the applicable requirements of ASME BPV Code, Section II,
Part D, Tables 2A, 2B, and 4. The remaining portions of the RVI are designated as
internal structures and are designed to conform to ASME BPV Code, Section III, Article
NG-3000 considering the requirements of Paragraph NG-1122(c).

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The design of RVI has considered peak neutron fluence in the materials surrounding
the core. Neutron irradiation-induced degradations such as irradiation-assisted stress
corrosion cracking, void-swelling, stress-relaxation, and irradiation embrittlement have
been evaluated using material aging degradation mechanism screening criteria of the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) materials reliability program (Reference 4.5-3).
The components meeting the screening criteria are the incore instrumentation guide
tube (ICIGT) flags and welds, fuel pins and caps, shared fuel pins and nuts, the
intermediate reflector blocks and alignment pins, the lower core plate, and the core
barrel. In addition, components identified as susceptible to irradiation-induced stress
relaxation are also included for potential wear due to loosening. Components
screening in for neutron degradation are included for augmented visual inspection.

4.5.2.2 Control on Welding

The welding of RVI materials conform to the applicable requirements of ASME BPV
Code, Section III, Articles NG-2000, NG-4000, and NG-5000. Welding is conducted
utilizing procedures qualified according to the rules of ASME BPV Code, Sections III,
Subarticle NG-4300 and Section IX. Welders and welding operators are qualified in
accordance with ASME BPV Code Section IX and RG 1.71, Revision 1.

Electroslag welding is not permitted on RVI and core structural supports. Additional
information regarding welding of austenitic stainless steel RCPB materials provided in
Section 5.2.3 is also applicable to the welding of RVI and core support components.

4.5.2.3 Nondestructive Examination

Nondestructive examinations of core support structure materials, including tubular

products, conform to the requirements of ASME BPV Code, Section III, Subarticle
NG-2500 utilizing the methods of ASME BPV Code, Section V and acceptance standards
of Subarticle NG-5300.

4.5.2.4 Fabrication and Processing of Austenitic Stainless Steel Components

Most RVI base metal is fabricated from Type 304/304L austenitic stainless steel.
Austenitic stainless steel parts are fabricated from materials procured in the
solution-annealed condition. Use of cold worked austenitic stainless steel is avoided to
the extent practicable during fabrication of the RVI and core support structure.
Austenitic stainless steel used in the RVI and core support components does not
exceed a yield strength of 90,000 psi as determined by the 0.2 percent offset method.

Processing and welding of unstablized AISI Type 3XX series austenitic stainless steels
comply with RG 1.44 to prevent sensitization and stress-corrosion cracking. When
rapidly cooled by means other than water quenching, non-sensitization of base
materials is verified by test in accordance with Practice A or Practice E of ASTM A262
(Reference 4.5-1) as required by RG 1.44.

For AISI Type 3XX series austenitic stainless steel subjected to sensitizing temperatures
subsequent to solution heat treatment, the carbon content is limited to no more than
0.03 wt%.

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RVI weld filler metals and associated specifications listed in Table 4.5-2 are in
accordance with ASME BPV Code, Section II, Part C. They are analyzed for delta ferrite
content and limited to a ferrite number of 5FN to 20FN in accordance with RG 1.31 and
ASME BPV Code, Section III, Paragraph NG-2433. Carbon content of austenitic stainless
steel weld filler metals is limited to no more than 0.03 wt%.

Tools for abrasive work such as grinding, polishing, or wire brushing are not permitted
to be contaminated by previous usage on ferritic carbon steel or other materials that
could contribute to intergranular cracking or stress-corrosion cracking.

Section 5.2.3 describes the controls used to minimize the introduction of potentially
harmful contaminants including chlorides, fluorides, and low melting point alloys on
the surface of austenitic stainless steel components. In accordance with RG 1.44,
cleaning solutions, processing equipment, degreasing agents, and other foreign
materials are removed during processing prior to elevated temperature treatments.
Acid pickling is avoided on stainless steel and not used on sensitized austenitic
stainless steel.

4.5.2.5 Other Materials

Materials exposed to primary reactor coolant are corrosion-resistant stainless steels,

nickel-based alloys, and, to a limited extent, cobalt-based alloys. These materials are
selected from materials proven in light-water reactor operation and for their
compatibility with the reactor coolant as specified in ASME BPV Code, Section III,
Paragraph NG-2160 and Subsubarticle NG-3120.

Alloy 600 base metal and Alloy 82/182 weld metal are not used in the RVI and core
support structure design.

Washers used in the RVI upper riser assembly are nickel-based Alloy 718. These washers
utilize the same final solution annealing and precipitation-hardening treatment
process as used for Alloy 718 threaded fasteners. Refer to Section 3.13.1 for further
discussion regarding the annealing and precipitation-hardening treatment for Alloy
718 materials. The RVI upper riser assembly washers are not in tension and, as a result,
they are not susceptible to stress corrosion cracking.

4.5.3 References

4.5-1 American Society for Testing and Materials, “Standard Practices for Detecting
Susceptibility to Intergranular Attack in Austenitic Stainless Steels,” ASTM
A262-15, West Conshohocken, PA.

4.5-2 American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Quality Assurance Requirements for

Nuclear Facility Applications, ASME NQA-1-2008/1a-2009 Addenda, New York,
NY.

4.5-3 Electric Power Research Institute, "Materials Reliability Program: PWR Internals
Material Aging Degradation Mechanism Screening and Threshold Values
(MRP-175)," EPRI #1012081, Palo Alto, CA, December 2005.

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Table 4.5-1: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Materials

Component Material Designation
(Grade, Class, or Type)
Latch Mechanism Assembly
Magnetic parts: plungers, poles, keys Type 410
Springs Alloy X-750 (UNS N07750), AMS 5698 or AMS 5699
Wear parts: latch pins, pivot pins, plunger pin, key pins Haynes Alloy 25
Latch links Type 304
Latch arms
Lock plungers
Guide tubes, support tubes
Shims and lock cups
Hardfacing for latch arm tips Stellite 6
or
Low cobalt or cobalt-free material
Lock screws Type 316
Water-Cooled Coil Stacks
Magnetic parts: housings and flux rings Type 410
Cooling tube
Housing through bolts
Non-magnetic parts Type 304
Wire Class N insulated copper
Drive Rod & Remote Disconnect Assembly
Drive rod Type 410
Drive rod coupling, coupling sleeve
Remote disconnect rod
Remote disconnect button and button insert
Drive rod lower spring retainer Type 304
Remote disconnect coupling expansion nut
Drive rod collar dowel
Remote disconnect rod union
Remote disconnect upper spring retaining collar
Remote disconnect shoulder nut
Remote disconnect lower and upper springs Alloy X-750 (UNS N07750), AMS 5698 or AMS 5699
Remote disconnect expansion plug Haynes Alloy 25
Latch Housing Assembly
Flux rings, shield rings Type 410
Housing thermal shield Type 304
CRDM Weld Filler Metals (Note 2)
Welding electrode materials E308, E308L, E316, E316L
Welding rod materials ER308, ER308L, ER316, ER316L
CRDM RCPB Components Refer to Section 5.2

Note 1: All listed materials, except the water-cooled coil stacks, are exposed to RCS coolant.
Note 2: 0.03% maximum carbon

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Table 4.5-2: Reactor Vessel Internal Materials

Component Specification Material Designation
(Grade, Class, or Type)
Core Support Assembly
Core barrel SA-965 Type 304/304L; Grade F304/F304L
Reflector blocks SA-965 or SA-182 Type 304/304L; Grade F304/F304L
Lower core plate SA-965 or SA-240 Type 304/304L
Alignment pins for reflectors SA-479 Type 304/304L
Shared fuel pin and fuel pin nuts
Alignment pins for lower core plate SA-193 Type 304; Grade B8
Upper support blocks SA-479 or SA-240 Type 304/304L
Socket Head Cap Screw SA-193 Grade B8, Class 1
Alignment Dowel SA-193 Grade B8, Class 1
Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Assembly
Capsule basket, protection guide, support SA-240 Type 304/304L
Specimen enclosure
Screw locking caps
Plugs and dowel pins SA-479 Type 304/304L
Screws
Upper Riser Assembly
Upper riser transition and section SA-240 Type 304/304L
Riser backing strips
Upper CRD supports
Upper riser hanger ring and hanger braces
Chemical volume and control system (CVCS)
injection piping support
Incore instrumentation centering plate
Flow diverter
Upper riser hanger threaded structural SA-479 Type 304
fasteners
Upper riser hanger alignment pins
Upper riser bellows N/A Type 304L
CVCS injection flexible pipe
CVCS injection piping SA-312 Seamless; Grade TP304/TP304L
CVCS injection piping end cap SA-182 Grade F304/F304L
CVCS injection piping elbow
Incore instrumentation guide tubes (ICIGTs) - SA-213 Grade TP304/TP304L
1-12
Pressurizer spray nozzles SA-479 Grade TP304/TP304L
Washers SB-637 Alloy 718 (UNS N07718)

Lower Riser Assembly

Lower riser section, transition, and spacer SA-240 Type 304/304L
Upper core plate
ICIGT support
ICIGT flags
CRA guide tube support plates
CRD alignment cones, CRA cards, CRA lower
flange
Lower riser trunnions SA-479 Type 304/304L
Fuel pins and fuel pin caps
ICIGTs - 1 SA-213 Grade TP304/TP304L
ICIGTs - 2 inner and outer assemblies
CRA guide tubes SA-312 Seamless; Grade TP304/TP304L

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Table 4.5-2: Reactor Vessel Internal Materials (Continued)

Component Specification Material Designation
(Grade, Class, or Type)
RVIs Weld Filler Metals
Welding electrode materials SFA-5.4 E308, E308L, E316, E316L
Welding rod materials SFA-5.9 ER308, ER308L, ER316, ER316L
Flux and metal cored welding electrode/rod SFA-5.22 E308TX, E308LTX, E316TX, E316LTX
materials

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4.6 Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

The design of the control rod drive system (CRDS) and its supporting structures, systems, and
components provides the functional capability to achieve safe shutdown and maintain the fuel
cladding acceptance criteria during anticipated operational occurrences (AOOs), infrequent
events and accidents.

The CRDS performs the following safety-related functions:

• releases the control rod assemblies during a reactor trip
• maintains the pressure boundary of the reactor pressure vessel

The CRDS performs the following non safety-related functions:

• latching, holding, and maneuvering the CRAs during reactor startup, power operation, and
shutdown
• provides rod position indication
• protects fuel integrity during reactor disassembly and reassembly prior to and after
refueling

4.6.1 Description of the Control Rod Drive System

The CRDS includes the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs) and all electrical and
instrumentation and controls components, including rod position indicators, to operate
the CRDMs. The CRDM includes the control rod drive shaft, which extends to the coupling
interface with the control rod assemblies (CRAs) in the reactor pressure vessel. The CRDS
supports the CRA by latching, holding, and maneuvering the CRA during reactor startup,
power operation, and shutdown in response to signals from the control rod drive power
converter and controller assembly, and in releasing the CRA during a reactor trip. The CRDS
also includes the rod position indicator cabinets and cables, CRDM power cables, and
cooling water supply and return piping inside containment. The mechanical design of the
CRDM is described in Section 3.9.4 and the design of the CRA is described in Section 4.2.2.
The instrumentation and controls for the CRDS are described in Section 7.0.4.

Figure 4.6-1 through Figure 4.6-5 illustrate the principal features of the CRDS. Figure 4.6-1
is a simplified drawing showing an overview of the location of the various components of
the CRDS relative to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the containment vessel (CNV). It
includes the CRDMs and supports, control rod drive shafts, internal CRDS supports, and
CRA guide tubes. The CRDMs are located on top of the RPV and laterally constrained at two
elevations above in order to limit relative lateral seismic motion, yet allow for unrestricted
axial expansion. The long control rod drive shafts are located inside the RPV, and aligned
laterally by CRDS support structures that are part of the reactor vessel internals (RVI).
Further details are provided in Section 3.9.4.1. The electromagnetic load transfer across the
primary pressure boundary is facilitated by electromagnetic coils on the outside
(Figure 4.6-3) that engage a set of magnetic poles connected to latches on the inside
(Figure 4.6-5), in order to move the control rod drive shaft in a predetermined stepping
sequence (refer to Section 3.9.4.1.2). Figure 4.6-2 provides an illustration of the CRDM
electromagnetic coils and housings, including the pressure housings. The major
components of the CRDM are annotated, and detailed in the subsequent figures. The
power and cooling water connectors are located on top of the mast assembly and sensor

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coil for ease of access through the removable cover on top of the CNV (Figure 4.6-1).
Figure 4.6-3 illustrates the CRDM drive coil and embedded cooling coils shown on the right
view without the coil stack housings and mast assembly. The electrical connector on top of
the left view is located above the cooling water fittings for separation purposes.
Figure 4.6-4 shows the layout of the rod position indicator sensor coil assemblies which are
located directly above the rod travel housing. Rod position indication is facilitated by
means of electromagnetic induction in the sensor coils, as the top of the control rod drive
shaft travels upwards or downwards within the pressure boundary. Figure 4.6-5 provides
an overview of the latch mechanism assembly (LMA), with the remote disconnect latch
shown separately for better illustration. The three magnetic poles, latches and grippers on
the left represent an industry-standard LMA design that performs the rod
withdrawal/insertion/reactor trip functions, whereas the remote disconnect grippers (RDG)
are relied upon during the remote disconnection/re-connection for NPM refueling only.
Figure 4.6-6 illustrates the remote disconnection of the control rod drive shaft from the
CRA that is not available in the operating NPM location, in order to preclude inadvertent
CRA disengagement.

The CRDM assembly is a hermetically sealed electro-mechanical device, which moves the
CRA in and out of the reactor core, and holds the CRA at any elevation within the range of
CRA travel. If electrical power is interrupted to the CRDM, the control rod drive shaft is
released, and the attached CRA drops into the reactor core.

The CRDMs are mounted on the RPV head, and the CRDM pressure housings are
safety-related American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 1 pressure
boundaries. The CRDS components internal to the reactor coolant pressure boundary are
designed to function in borated primary coolant with up to 2000 ppm boron at primary
coolant pressures and temperatures ranging from ambient conditions to 650 degrees F
design temperature and 2,100 psia RPV design pressure. During normal operating
conditions the upper portion of the RPV and the CRDM pressure housing are in contact
with saturated steam on the inside at 625 degrees F and 1850 psia. The lower portion of the
drive rod is submerged in the primary coolant at hot leg temperature flowing upward
through the upper riser and CRA guide tubes. The electric coil operating conditions require
active cooling by water through a CRDS cooling water distribution header to cooling tubes
in the drive coils of each CRDM as shown in Figure 4.6-3. The cooling requirements for the
CRDMs are provided by the reactor component cooling water system (RCCWS) in
Section 9.2.2. The RCCWS is designed to maintain the CRDM winding temperature below
the design maximum temperature of 356 degrees Fahrenheit.

The CRDS cooling line is branched into supply lines inside the containment vessel to each
individual CRDM. After passing through the CRDM cooling tubes, the flexible return lines
rejoin into a single return header leaving containment. A thermal relief valve is provided on
the return header to provide overpressure protection for the CRDS cooling piping during a
containment isolation event.

The structural materials of construction for the CRDS are discussed in detail in Section 4.5.1.

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4.6.2 Evaluations of the Control Rod Drive System

This section describes how the design of the CRDS conforms to General Design Criteria
(GDC) 4, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. The design also conforms to Principal
Design Criteria (PDC) 27.

GDC 4 is applicable to the CRDS design as it requires the structures, systems, and
components important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be
compatible with the environmental conditions during normal plant operation as well as
during postulated accidents as a result of equipment failures and external events. The
CRDS provides the capability to safely shut down the reactor during normal operations and
AOOs and either prevents or mitigates the consequences associated with postulated
accident scenarios. The CRDS design features comply with GDC 4 requirement for
designing the CRDS to be compatible with the environmental conditions. The CRDS
components located inside the containment are protected against dynamic effects as
described in Section 3.6. The CRDS structures, systems, and components are located inside
the Reactor Building, which is a Seismic Category I structure designed to protect from
events and conditions outside the NuScale Power Plant. The CRDS ability to perform the
required safety-related functions will not be compromised by adverse environmental
conditions. The control rod drive shafts are immersed in 590 degrees F water during normal
full power operation. The upper portion of the control rod drive shafts penetrate the
pressurizer and are exposed to a steam environment at about 625 degrees F. The control
rod drive shafts and latch mechanisms are designed to 650 degrees F and are able to
operate without the typical liquid drag forces experienced by CRDMs in the current PWR
fleet.

GDC 23 requires that the protection system be designed to fail into a safe state in the event
of adverse conditions or environments. The CRDM provides positive core reactivity control
through the use of movable CRAs. The movable CRAs provide reactivity control for modes
of operation when the NPM is installed in its operating location. During transition to the
refueling area, and during refueling activities, the CRA are inserted and the associated
CRDM is disconnected from the CRDS. The CRDM, in conjunction with the module
protection system, actuate the control rods to perform safety-related functions when
necessary to provide core protection during normal operation, AOOs, and accidents. The
CRDM is designed to fail in a safe condition, even under adverse conditions, that prevents
damage to the fuel cladding and excessive reactivity changes during failure. Loss of
electrical power to the reactor trip breaker will initiate a reactor trip, causing rods to drop
into the core to shut down the reactor.

GDC 25 requires that the protection system be designed to ensure that specified
acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded for any single malfunction of the reactivity
control systems. Chapter 15 safety analyses demonstrate that the CRDS with any assumed
credible failure of any single active component is capable of performing a reactor trip when
plant parameters exceed the reactor trip setpoint, in accordance with GDC 25.

GDC 26 is applicable to the CRDS design, as the CRDS is one of the independent reactivity
control systems. It is designed with appropriate margin to assure its reactivity control
function under conditions of normal operation including AOOs. The CRDS facilitates
reliable operator control by performing a safe shutdown (i.e., reactor trip) via
gravity-dropping of the CRAs on a reactor trip signal or loss of power. The CRDS is designed

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such that core reactivity can be safely controlled and that sufficient negative reactivity
exists to maintain the core subcritical under cold conditions.

PDC 27 requires that the two independent reactivity control systems (control rods and
soluble boron system) are capable of reliably controlling reactivity changes to assure that
under postulated accident conditions and with appropriate margin for stuck rods the
capability to cool the core is maintained. The analyses in Chapter 15 demonstrate that, with
a stuck rod, the capability to cool the core is maintained. The insertion of all CRAs is
required to hold the reactor core subcritical under cold conditions.

GDC 28 requires that the effects of postulated reactivity insertion accidents neither result in
damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary, nor cause sufficient damage to impair
the capability to cool the core. A postulated failure of the CRDS causing a rod ejection has
the potential to result in a relatively high rate of positive reactivity insertion, which could
challenge specified acceptable fuel design limits. The rod ejection accident is not analyzed
as a loss-of-coolant accident event. To prevent a mechanical failure of the CRDM housings,
the CRDM nozzles are designed to be an integral part of the RPV. The CRDM pressure
housings are full penetration welded to the safe ends of the CRDM nozzles. The
safe-end-to-CRDM nozzle welds and safe-end-to-CRDM pressure housing welds are
inspected to ASME Class 1 requirements. However, a failure of the CRDM pressure housing
is postulated to provide a limiting reactivity insertion event in Section 15.4. The REA
analysis presented in Section 15.4 demonstrates that GDC 28 is met by ensuring that the
effects of a postulated rod ejection event meet the acceptance criteria in the SRP.

GDC 29 is applicable to the CRDS design, as the CRDS, in conjunction with reactor
protection systems, is designed to assure an extremely high probability of accomplishing
its safety-related functions in the event of AOOs. The CRDS fulfills its safety-related
functions to control the reactor within fuel and plant limits during AOOs despite a single
failure of the system. The CRDS accomplishes safe shutdown (i.e., reactor trip) via
gravity-dropping of the CRAs on a reactor trip signal or loss of electrical power. The CRDM
pressure housing is an ASME Class 1 pressure boundary for the reactor coolant for all ASME
service levels.

The safety-related reactor trip function of the CRDS is initiated by the module protection
system through the reactor trip system, which isolates the CRDS power converter and
controller assembly from the normal direct current power system. Failures of the CRDM
have been evaluated in a failure modes and effects analysis. Effectiveness of the CRDS,
despite possible single failures, is demonstrated in Chapter 15, which shows the CRDS
performs a reactor trip when plant parameters exceed the reactor trip setpoint. Therefore,
the reactor is placed in a subcritical condition with any assumed credible failure of any
single active component.

Section 3.6 demonstrates that all CRDS essential equipment is protected from
common-mode failure caused by leakage or rupture of moderate- and high-energy lines,
the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated breaks, and potential jet
impingement to ensure compliance with GDC 4.

The CRDS instruments are not covered by ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, but
instrument lines are subject to these requirements. The CRDM components inside the CNV
are located near high- and moderate-fluid system piping, such as reactor coolant system

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

piping, feedwater piping, and steam piping. Loads from moderate- and high-energy line
breaks are included in the stress analysis for CRDS components that are designed per the
rules of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

The jet impingement loads generated from high energy line breaks inside the CNV are
analyzed as described in Section 3.6. The main steam and feedwater system lines meet the
criteria for leak-before-break (LBB) (see Section 3.6.3). Therefore, circumferential and
longitudinal breaks that could impinge on the CRDMs are not postulated. For the other
high energy lines inside containment that do not qualify for LBB, these lines are small (NPS
2). The line size limits the energy of jet impingement loads. Based on the low jet pressure
load and heavy walled construction of the CRDMs, jet impingement does not adversely
affect CRDM scram functionality.

There are also jet impingement loads expected from opening the reactor safety valves and
the emergency core cooling system reactor vent valves, which vent to the containment. A
fluid jet diffuser is provided at the outlet of these valves to dissipate the energy of the fluid
jet in order to protect the essential SSC in the region of containment near the RPV head.

The essential control elements of the CRDS (those required to provide reactor trip) are
provided by the module protection system and are isolated from nonessential portions of
the rod control system provided by the module control system, as described in Section 7.0.

4.6.3 Testing and Verification of the Control Rod Drive System

The CRDS prototype testing is described in Section 3.9.4 and Section 4.2.4. The testing of
the prototype includes conceptual (mock-up) testing, prototype performance testing,
stability testing, endurance testing and production testing.

The pre-operational and initial startup tests that are performed to verify the proper
function of the CRDS are described in Section 14.2. They include insertion, withdrawal and
drop time testing, and hydrostatic tests. Inservice tests are conducted to verify the
operability of the CRDS on a periodic basis and are described in the Technical
Specifications.

4.6.4 Information for Combined Performance of Reactivity Systems

Single or common cause failures of the CRDS do not prevent proper operation of the
reactor trip function. There are no reactor trip function failures that prevent proper
functioning of the engineered safety features actuation system. Section 7.2 provides the
details that support this conclusion.

As indicated in Section 4.3, there are two independent reactivity control systems in
accordance with GDC 26; the CRDS and the addition of soluble boron by the CVCS. The
CVCS is not a safety-related system, so boration is not credited for reactivity control in the
safety analyses presented in Chapter 15. The design bases and capabilities of the CVCS are
discussed in Section 9.3. The CRDS is the reactivity control system that is credited in the
design basis safety analyses.

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

4.6.5 Evaluations of Combined Performance

Chapter 15 demonstrates that for all design basis events, the CRDS is capable of
maintaining the reactor within acceptable limits, assuming that the most reactive control
rod is stuck out.

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

Figure 4.6-1: Overview of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Locations in Relation to the Reactor
Pressure Vessel and Containment Vessel

CRDM SUPPORT FRAME

CRDM
CRDM SUPPORT STRUCTURE

CNV

TYPICAL CONTROL ROD DRIVE (CRD) SHAFT

PRESSURIZER

RPV

TYPICAL CRD SHAFT SUPPORT

TYPICAL CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLY

GUIDE TUBE

TYPICAL FUEL ASSEMBLY

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

Figure 4.6-2: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Coils and Housings

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System
-

Figure 4.6-3: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Drive Coil and Cooling Detail

ELECTROMAGNETIC
DRIVE COIL

COOLING COILS

OUTER DRIVE
COIL HOUSING

ISOMETRIC VIEW WITH OUTER DRIVE

COIL HOUSINGS NOT SHOWN
ISOMETRIC VIEW
DRIVE COIL ASSEMBLY

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

Figure 4.6-4: Layout of Sensor Coil Assembly

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

Figure 4.6-5: Overview of Latch Mechanism Assembly

THREADED(N0N-SEALED)
JOINT TOBOTTOM OF
LIFT POLE ROD TRAVELHOUSING

LIFT POLE
LIFT POLE
RDG POLE
SHIM

RDG POLE
LIFT PLUNGER RDG POLE SHIM
RETURN SPRING

LIFT PLUNGER - MG POLE

GUIDE TUBE
RDG
PLUNGER

RDG PLUNGER RETURN SPRING

RDG PLUNGER
RDG LATCH ARM
RDG PIVOT PIN
RDG LATCH PIN

RDG SUPPORT
TUBE
RDG LATCH LINK

RDG
PLUNGER
PIN ZDKd/^KEEd
MG POLE SHIM
'Z/WWZ;Z'Ϳ

RDG
SUPPORT
MG PLUNGER

MG PLUNGER TUBE
RETURN
MG LATCH ARM SPRING
MG PIVOT PIN
MG SUPPORT TUBE

MG LATCH PIN MG SUPPORT TUBE

MG LATCH LINK 5(027(',6&211(&7/$7&+
MG PLUNGER MG PLUNGER
PIN
DKs>'Z/WWZ;D'Ϳ

SG POLE
SG POLE

SG POLE SG PLUNGER
SHIM
GUIDE TUBE

RETURN SPRING
SG UPPER PLUNGER

SG PLUNGER SG UPPER PLUNGER

SHIM
SG LOAD
TRANSFER SG
SPRING SPRING
CUP
PLUNGER
SG LOCK
SG SUPT
TUBE

SG LATCH ARM
SG PIVOT PIN
SG LOCK PLUNGER
GUIDE TUBE

SG SUPT
TUBE

PLUNGER
SG LOCK

SG ADJUSTABLE ^dd/KEZz'Z/WWZ;^'Ϳ
STOP (SGAS)

SGAS SHIM

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NuScale Final Safety Analysis Report Functional Design of Control Rod Drive System

Figure 4.6-6: Control Rod Drive Mechanism Drive Shaft Interface with Control Rod Assembly

CONTROL ROD
DRIVE SHAFT

DISCONNECT ROD

FINGERS

PLUG
CONTROL ROD
ASSEMBLY HUB

CONNECTED AND DISCONNECTED AND FINAL DISCONNECTED

LOCKED POSITION RELEASED POSITION RESTING POSITION

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