Cogn Process (2010) 11:133–142

DOI 10.1007/s10339-009-0345-0

RESEARCH REPORT

Complex problem solving: a case for complex cognition?

Joachim Funke

Received: 11 January 2009 / Accepted: 21 October 2009 / Published online: 10 November 2009
 Marta Olivetti Belardinelli and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract Complex problem solving (CPS) emerged in the define complex cognition; second, I introduce conceptually
last 30 years in Europe as a new part of the psychology of related concepts like macrocognition or operative intelli-
thinking and problem solving. This paper introduces into gence to show the overlap of the concepts as well as their
the field and provides a personal view. Also, related con- specific contributions. Third, the assessment of CPS is
cepts like macrocognition or operative intelligence will be illustrated by two measurement approaches, Tailorshop and
explained in this context. Two examples for the assessment MicroDYN. Fourth, I point out the interaction between
of CPS, Tailorshop and MicroDYN, are presented to illus- cognition and emotion in complex situations. Finally, some
trate the concept by means of their measurement devices. conceptual problems with the term ‘‘complex cognition’’
Also, the relation of complex cognition and emotion in the are discussed and an answer to the question in the title will
CPS context is discussed. The question if CPS requires be given.
complex cognition is answered with a tentative ‘‘yes.’’

Keywords Complex problem solving
Complex cognition

Operative intelligence
Macrocognition
Emotion

Complex cognition According to Knauff and Wolf (2010), complex cognition
deals with all mental processes that are used by an indi-
vidual for deriving new information out of given infor-
Introduction mation, with the intention to make decisions, solve
problems, and plan actions. This approach assumes an
In the last 30 years, a new part of the psychology of active and goal-directed information processing by human
thinking and problem solving emerged in Europe under the beings who are able to perceive their environment and to
label of complex problem solving (CPS). This paper use their memory. The term ‘‘mental processes’’ is not
introduces into this field and provides a review of related restricted to cognitive ones but includes motivational and
concepts from my personal perspective. A major goal of emotional processes at the same time.
this selective review is a presentation of research findings In this understanding, complex cognition can be con-
and specific (German) research traditions that are not so trasted to simple cognition: the latter refers to the study of
much recognized internationally up to now (for an excep- elementary cognitive processes like perception, memory,
tion, see Osman 2009). or learning in isolation and without asking for broader
Central for this paper is an analysis of the question if context. But are simple and complex cognition two
CPS requires complex cognition. Therefore, I first try to dichotomous categories or rather two extremes of a com-
plexity continuum? Is there a line of demarcation between
them or is the complex case simply an extension of ele-
J. Funke (&)
mentary processes?
Psychologisches Institut, Universität Heidelberg,
Hauptstr. 47-51, 69117 Heidelberg, Germany An example of simple cognition is the analysis of
e-mail: [email protected] color perception—for example, the perception of a red

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light—under conditions of reduced brightness. In contrast, What is a complex problem?

complex cognition could be found in a case where a
ship’s captain oversaw a red warning light in the dark and In current theories of problem solving, a problem is con-
is now confronted with the immediate task of accident ceptualized as composed of a given state, a desired goal
prevention. state, and obstacles between given and goal state (Mayer
Whereas in the first case, a theory of color perception 1992, p. 5). According to Anderson (2005), ‘‘any goal-
might help to predict the circumstances under which a red directed sequence of cognitive operations’’ is classified as
light might be overseen, in the second case, a theory of an instance of problem solving. Other authors supplement
complex cognition would put the issue of an overseen red this view by emphasizing that overcoming barriers toward
light in a broader context and might predict short-term a desired state may involve both cognitive and behavioral
consequences like stress, shame, and guilt processes, means, and that these means should imply novelty and
together with activities for error correction, and long-term originality. Operations triggered by a problem go beyond
consequences like increased attention to warning lights in routine action and thinking (Frensch and Funke 1995a, b).
general. The first case illustrates a cognitive process of a A complex problem is said to occur when finding the
‘‘pure’’ isolated psychic function without a meaningful solution demands a series of operations which can be
action goal; the second case shows the orchestration of the characterized as follows (Dörner et al. 1983): Elements
whole set of cognitive functions including, for example, relevant to the solution process are large (complexity),
emotions and serves an overarching goal of action regu- highly interconnected (connectivity), and dynamically
lation like accident prevention. changing over time (dynamics). Neither structure nor
Is the complex process completely understandable in dynamics are disclosed (intransparency). Finally, the goal
terms of the addition of simple elements? Yes and no— structure is not as straight forward as suggested above: in
yes, for sure, simple processes are involved in the com- dealing with a complex problem, a person is confronted
plex situation; no, because the result of this summation with a number of different goal facets to be weighted and
follows the Gestalt principle, whereas the whole is more coordinated—a polytelic situation.
than the sum of its parts (von Ehrenfels 1890). In the One approach to complex situations falls under the label
complex situation, the result is more than the sum of of ‘‘Naturalistic Decision-Making’’ (Klein 2008; Klein
perceptual, learning, and memory processes—it is an et al. 1993; Lipshitz et al. 2001; Zsambok and Klein 1997).
organized, hopefully well-orchestrated stream of actions According to Zsambok (1997, p. 5), ‘‘the study of NDM
serving goals of an acting individual. It is not perception asks how experienced people working as individuals or
or memory on its own—it is perception as part of a higher groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced envi-
structure; it is embedded into and tuned to other psychic ronments, identify and assess their situation, make deci-
processes, which serve action goals. The context delivers sions, and take actions whose consequences are meaningful
the meaning: in our example from above, the (neutral) to them and to the larger organization in which they
color red becomes a warning sign in the context of a operate.’’ The four markers of this research approach—(a)
control room, its detectability and meaning are not only complex task in real-life setting, (b) experienced decision-
given by itself but in combination with other signs and makers, (c) actual decision-making, and (d) situation
signals. The contextual embedding allows also to inte- awareness within an decision episode—are quite different
grate cultural effects (Nisbett and Norenzayan 2002) and, to the approach frequently chosen in psychology using
thus, transcends a simple addition of the underlying artificial decision situations with a focus on option selec-
microprocesses. tion, student subjects, and a rational standard (e.g., Kahn-
The move from the level of elementary processes to eman et al. 1982).
complex cognition is a shift in the hierarchy level of Another approach falls under the label of ‘‘Complex
explanation (see for more details Rasmussen 1983): instead Problem Solving’’ (Dörner 1980, 1996; Frensch and Funke
of talking about the detectability of red lights as a signal 1995a, b; Funke 1991; Funke and Frensch 2007).
(level 1), one is talking about the red light as a stop sign According to Buchner (1995, p. 28), laboratory studies on
(level 2) or even further about the stop sign as part of a problem solving such as chess or the famous Tower of
broader concept of traffic regulation (level 3). The pre- Hanoi ‘‘… were criticized for being too simple, fully
dictions (and the corresponding assessments) would be transparent, and static, whereas real-world economical,
different according to these three types of ‘‘situation political, and technological problem situations were said to
awareness’’ (Endsley 1995a, b). The line of demarcation is be complex, intransparent, and dynamic.’’
a matter of different levels: staying on the lowest level To realize such complex situations under lab conditions,
means simple cognition, going up the hierarchy level Brehmer and Dörner (1993) recommended the use of
implies increasingly more complex cognition. computer-simulated microworlds. In the last 30 years, such

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microworlds have been used in numerous studies (for points to construct options, attention management, and
reviews, see Funke 1991, 1995; Funke and Frensch 2007; uncertainty management. They contrast these issues with
Osman 2009). There is a still ongoing debate if complex topics from microcognition research: puzzle solving,
problem solving is a competence on its own (the related strategies for searching problem spaces, serial versus par-
concept of operative intelligence is presented below), or if allel processing models, or estimating probabilities of
it is merely a subpart of ‘‘intelligence’’ (Dörner and uncertainty values.
Kreuzig 1983; Kluwe et al. 1991; Kröner et al. 2005; Rigas To be clear: the main difference between both types of
and Brehmer 1999; Strohschneider 1991; Süß 1996, 1999; research is not the time axis of the focused processes, but
Süß et al. 1991; Wenke and Frensch 2003; Wittmann and the ill-defined conditions of the tasks and problems under
Hattrup 2004). I will not answer this question here but consideration. And to clear another potential misunder-
point to one central question: Is complex problem solving a standing: both approaches (‘‘types of description’’) are seen
good case for complex cognition? Does dealing with as complementary to each other.
complex environments require a special kind of complex With respect to the question ‘‘inside or outside lab?’’,
cognition or is CPS possible by simply adding elementary proponents of the macrocognition approach seem to
cognitive processes? This question is important, because if believe that these processes can only be analyzed outside
there does exist a second type of cognition besides simple ‘‘in the wild’’—to quote the famous book title from
cognition, then many questions arise—for example, about Hutchins (1995). But is that really true? I do agree that
the applicability of research results from the first area to the many lab studies use simplified experimental paradigms for
second or about the validity of theories from one area to the testing hypotheses about specific processes. The reason for
other. Before giving an answer, similar and related con- this procedure comes from the striving for internal validity
cepts to CPS like macrocognition and operative intelli- (see, e.g., Shadish et al. 2002), which guarantees correct
gence are presented and discussed shortly. evaluation of postulated causal relationships. But, what
about ‘‘user labs’’ or simulators (Gray 2002)? These setups
allow for much more external validity in the lab, at the
Concepts related to complex problem solving same time giving control over complex conditions and
processes (Brehmer and Dörner 1993). Additionally, pro-
The previous section showed that the term ‘‘Complex gress in methodology allows for better data analyses in
Problem Solving’’ is used in at least three different ways nonrandomized field situations (Shadish and Cook 2009).
(thanks to an anonymous reviewer for clarification): (1) as From my point of view, lab research is not necessarily
a paradigm to study cognition under real-life conditions restricted to microcognition but could be opened for mac-
(with different foci such as learning, knowledge acquisi- rocognition; also, macrocognition could be studied in field
tion, and decision-making), (2) as a descriptor of behavior situations. Due to new analytic developments from our
exhibited while dealing with a certain class of problems methodology, more accurate estimations of effect sizes can
usually presented on a computer, and (3) as an ability be used than before for analyzing such data. Also, by
construct that is related to intelligence. means of ‘‘ecological momentary assessment’’ new ways of
To clear the different understandings of CPS, it seems data collection in real environments become possible
necessary to elaborate its connection to other related con- (Hoppmann and Riediger 2009).
cepts. I will consider in more detail the two concepts of (a)
macrocognition and (b) operative intelligence.
Operative intelligence

Macrocognition In an influential paper, Dörner (1986) developed the con-

cept of ‘‘operative intelligence’’ as a collection of those
Pietro Cacciebue and Erik Hollnagel first introduced the factors that determine strategic processes like flexibility,
term ‘‘macrocognition’’ in 1995. They used it as a foresight, circumspection, or systematic behavior. His main
descriptor for cognitive activities in natural decision- point is a claim for the concentration on thinking processes
making settings. Klein et al. (2003) used it for contrasting a instead of on their results. To a certain extent, the theory
research program outside the lab with the traditional lab makes a micro examination of the details of information
research on microcognition that is interested in the dis- processing, while also considering a macro approach on
tinctive building blocks of cognition. action theoretical concepts. By using computer-simulated
To illustrate their understanding of macrocognition, scenarios, as proposed by Dörner and colleagues (Dörner
Klein et al. (2003, p. 82) mention phenomena like the 1980), large datasets are collected which should not be
following: planning and problem detection using leverage directly reduced to a single score (‘‘quantificatio praecox’’).

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Instead, changes and stabilities of the system variables as integrate this information into his model of the system.
well as changes and stabilities in participants’ behavior Typically, the system does not deliver any required infor-
(asking questions, making interventions) should be identi- mation automatically. This forces the agent to ask specific
fied. Thus, the term ‘‘operative intelligence’’ comes from questions or to conduct experiments that examine the way
an interest in the details of the psychic processes under- in which the variables work. This component of informa-
lying CPS. tion retrieval and information integration is taken into
To give an example: Dörner’s (1986), p. 301ff) pro- account in the Multiple-Space Models by the experiment
posals for process indicators are divided in those related to space. Goals in complex problems are often formulated
questions asked by participants (only available if a thinking only globally and unspecifically, for example, ‘‘Manage
aloud method is used for data collection) and decisions this town successfully!’’ Therefore, the problem solver is
made by them in the course of the simulation. Concerning required to render the nonspecific goal concretely. Addi-
questions, he differentiated between questions for states tionally, goals might contradict each other, which makes it
(‘‘what is the value of … ?’’), for dependencies (‘‘what necessary to balance them by working out compromises or
does … depend on?’’), for effects (‘‘what happens abandoning goals. Dörner (1986) calls this (2) the ability of
if … ?’’), for components (‘‘what do … exist of?’’), for goal elaboration and goal balancing. To achieve this
subordination (‘‘what types of … do exist?’’—specific subgoal in turn, (3) the agent has to plan measures and
formings of a variable), and for superordination (‘‘what make decisions. These measures might conflict with the
is … ?’’—embedding of a specific object or event in a agent’s own system of values. This conflict can cause
more abstract context). All these questions help a subject to unpleasant emotions that affect the process of problem
identify the objects and their interrelations within the given solving. Likewise, the agent has to cope with frustration,
domain. Concerning decisions, he distinguished the place time pressure, and stress. In order to succeed in all this, (4)
of a decision from its dosage; for example, an intervention he or she needs to be capable of self-management.
in the ‘‘Tailorshop’’ scenario could be made in the area of The importance of Dörner’s contribution to European
advertising, and the dosage could be the specific amount of research on problem solving (e.g., Bach 2003; Dörner
money spent for that activity. Also, the sequence of deci- 1986; Dörner and Schaub 1994) cannot be overstated.
sions could contain interesting patterns, and the transitions Nevertheless, the theory of operational intelligence offers
from questions to decisions (and vice versa) are worthwhile neither a fully elaborated theory nor a measuring device,
analyzing. although Dörner repeatedly emphasizes the necessity of
The breadth of questions, the depth of exploration, the such a diagnostic device. Despite its stimulating character,
consistency of decisions, and the coordination of different the approach is not complete, resulting in a fascinating but
action types are interesting indicators for describing the loosely formulated theory, which still requires refinement.
problem-solving behavior of subjects in complex situa- Because the status of a concept is sometimes best under-
tions. These indicators go far beyond variables that eval- stood by pointing to the measurement approaches, the next
uate solution quality of a complex situation in a rather section presents two assessment procedures from the field
coarse manner. For example, analyses of transition fre- of CPS.
quencies between questions and decisions show significant
differences between successful and unsuccessful problem
solvers (Dörner and Wearing 1995, p. 74f). Assessment of complex problem solving
Both in traditional and in contemporary European
research on problem solving (e.g., Buchner 1995; Dörner For the assessment of CPS, two different approaches exist
and Wearing 1995), experiments are conducted using (Buchner 1995): On the one hand, semantically rich ad-hoc
complex dynamic scenarios such as the commonly cited simulations of complex microworlds (Brehmer and Dörner
‘‘Lohhausen’’ scenario (Dörner et al. 1983). Sternberg 1993), on the other hand, formally constructed artificial
(1995) states that this contrasts American research on systems, which allow systematic variation of difficulty
problem solving which is mainly concerned with static (Funke 2001). As an example of the first approach, the
paradigms (e.g., Chi et al. 1982) despite some exceptions system ‘‘Tailorshop’’ will be presented. As an example for
(Anzai and Simon 1979). To come back to his theory of the second serves the ‘‘MicroDYN’’ approach.
Operational Intelligence, Dörner postulates four process
components of dynamic situations, which were derived Tailorshop
from empirical observations and are presented in the fol-
lowing section. In 1981, the first papers about a computer-simulated scenario
In order to successfully manage a complex system, (1) called ‘‘Tailorshop’’ (in German: ‘‘Schneiderwerkstatt’’)
the agent has to gather information about the system and were published (Putz-Osterloh 1981; Putz-Osterloh and Lüer

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1981). The scenario was originally programmed by Dietrich the following month. - The system is build around a set of
Dörner who started at that time a new paradigm in the psy- (non)linear equations dealing with variables representing
chology of thinking which later was labeled ‘‘complex the flow of money (e.g., into investments or from sales), the
problem solving’’ (Dörner and Reither 1978). No one could production (e.g., raw material, machinery, and workforce)
imagine at that point that ‘‘Tailorshop’’ would become a and the turnover factors (e.g., prices, advertisement,
Drosophila for problem solving researchers. Numerous demand, and sales). From a system analytic point of view,
studies have been published (and are in the process of being the scenario is centered on two subsystems, one being
published) since 1981 (Endres and Putz-Osterloh 1994; responsible for production (depending on machines,
Funke 1983, 1986; Hörmann and Thomas 1989; Hussy 1991; workers, salaries, social security contributions, and main-
Kersting and Süß 1995; Klocke 2004; Leutner 1988; Meyer tenance), the other one being responsible for sales
et al. 2009; Putz-Osterloh 1981, 1983; Putz-Osterloh et al. (depending on price, demand for shirts, advertising, utility
1990; Putz-Osterloh and Lüer 1981; Strauß 1993; Süß et al. vans, shop location, and restricted by the number of pro-
1991; Wittmann and Hattrup 2004). duced shirts).
Tailorshop is a microworld, which realizes the produc- Pseudo-random processes (i.e., for all participants, the
tion conditions of a small factory. The participant takes on same sequence of random numbers) determine the price for
the role of a manager of a small shirt factory. By means of raw material, the production, and the demand in previously
changing the input variables (number of workers, number defined value regions. For all variables, interventions into
of machines, raw material, salaries, social security contri- the system become functional in the next cycle, with one
butions, maintenance, advertising, shop location, utility exception: the demand function becomes functional in the
van, and sales price), participants can increase the satis- next but one cycle instead of a direct effect.
faction of the workers, the production conditions, the
demand for shirts, and the sales figures. Figure 1 shows the MicroDYN
connection diagram of the 24 variables.
A monthly report gives the participant all the necessary A shortcoming of CPS research (as it was introduced by
information for making decisions whose effects show up Dörner in the 1970s) is its ‘‘one-item-testing’’ (Funke and
Frensch 2007). Virtually all devices consist of one large
and rather complicated scenario, the participant has to
work through. At the end, either overall performance or
various status and process indicators are calculated and
evaluated. Thus, CPS instruments are tests which contain
exactly one excessive item or at best one bundle speaking
in IRT-terms (Embretson and Reise 2000) if various
independent subsystems are considered as some authors do
(i.e., Müller 1993). Other tests allow subjects to explore a
given system over a period of time and then ask several
questions about this one system. That does not make the
answers any less dependent.
Bearing these limitations in mind, the question arises
how dynamic problem solving could possibly be measured
with psychological tests. One possible approach to indi-
vidual differences might come from the formal framework
of linear structural equation systems (LSE-systems), which
is called the MicroDYN approach (see Greiff and Funke
2009). This type of items has been used considerably in
experimental research as indicators for problem solving
performance (Funke 2001). The basic approach, however,
is now a different one as outlined below.
Items based on this approach require participants to
detect causal relations and control the presented systems. It
is assumed that the everyday examples mentioned earlier
can be modeled by MicroDYN systems, since advanced
Fig. 1 Diagram of the connections within Tailorshop. Variables in
bold boxes can be changed directly by participants (=exogenous skills in strategic planning, internal model building, and
variables), the others only indirectly (=endogenous variables) system control are crucial in the specified situations as well

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as those tested within the framework of MicroDYN sys-

tems. To solve the problem of one-item-testing, various
completely independent systems are presented to the sub-
jects (see below).
In summary, Greiff and Funke choose to work within the
formal framework of linear structural equation systems.
The MicroDYN approach may be able to overcome some
of the shortcomings mentioned earlier: (a) the lack of
sound theoretical frameworks calls for a different kind of
framework, which MicroDYN systems offer formally
(theoretical foundation). (b) MicroDYN systems are easily
constructed and can be freely varied in difficulty (scala-
bility). (c) An infinite number of independent items can be
presented (unlimited item generation). (d) Many everyday
activities can be described by MicroDYN items (ecological
validity). Because of these features and because of its
excellent psychometric properties, MicroDYN has become Fig. 2 Underlying structure of a MicroDYN item with all possible
effects displayed. To the left are the exogenous variables, which can
the first choice for the PISA 2012 consortium for the be manipulated directly by the participant. To the right are the
world-wide assessment of problem solving. It helps to endogenous variables, which have to be controlled by the subject
measure the ability to identify the unknown structure of
artifacts in dynamic, technology-rich environments to is provided. Exploration strategies can thus be assessed. (2)
reach certain goals. Stage 2, externalization of the mental model: simultaneous
MicroDYN systems consist of exogenous variables, (or subsequent) to their exploration, participants are asked
which influence endogenous variables, where only the to draw the connections between variables according to
former can be actively manipulated. Possible effects their assumptions. This helps to assess acquired causal
include main effects, multiple effects, multiple dependen- knowledge. (3) Stage 3, control phase: participants are
cies, autoregressive processes of first order, and side asked to reach given target values on the endogenous
effects, which all can be freely combined. Main effects variables by entering adequate values for the exogenous
describe causal relations between exactly one exogenous variables. During this phase, the practical application of the
variable and exactly one endogenous variable. If an acquired knowledge is assessed.
exogenous variable is involved in more than one main To summarize: two measurement approaches, Tailor-
effect, this is labeled a multiple effect. Effects on an shop and MicroDYN, illustrate two different understand-
endogenous variable influenced by more than one exoge- ings of CPS. Whereas Tailorshop stands for a broad
nous variable are labeled multiple dependence. Participants interpretation of CPS but has some weak points from a
can actively control these three effects as they manipulate psychometric point of view, MicroDYN represents the
the values of exogenous variables within a given range. psychometric sound realization of selected but important
Effects merely incorporated within endogenous variables CPS aspects. In both cases, complex cognition seems
are called side effects when endogenous variables influence necessary, because it is not merely a sequence of simple
each other, and autoregressive processes when endogenous operations, which are however part of it, but a series of
variables influence themselves (i.e., growth and shrinkage very different cognitive operations like action planning,
curves). Participants cannot influence these two effects strategic development, knowledge acquisition, and evalu-
directly; however, they are detectable by adequate use of ation processes, all of which have to be coordinated and
strategy. Additionally, all effects may differ in path organized around the action goals.
strength. Figure 2 shows examples of the presented effects.
Participants see between 8 and 12 of these items each
lasting about 6 min summing to an overall testing time of The connection between cognition, emotion,
approximately 1 h including instruction and trial time. The and motivation
MicroDYN items are minimally but sufficiently complex
and at the same time sufficient in number. Each item is One of the fascinating aspects of complex cognition is its
processed in three stages: (1) Stage 1, exploration phase: neatless connection to emotion and motivation. From our
participants can freely explore the system. No restrictions own experience with cognitive processes, we do not dif-
or goals are presented at this time. Participants can reset the ferentiate between cognition, emotion, and motivation—
system or undo their last steps. A history to trace prior steps instead, we experience an integrated course of (internal as

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well as external) actions with varying degrees of will and according to that position, complexity could be computed
varying degrees of affection. The driving forces behind any by simply counting the required elements. But what is the
cognition and the affective states accompanying them are basic element of a psychological process? Is it a transition
more than a by-product of cognition. The founder of the between two neuronal states? The overwhelming com-
modern experimental psychology of motivation, see Lewin plexity of neural processes prohibits such a simple
(1935), connected the dynamics of action with his concept approach.
of personality. Today, the neuropsychology of motivational A primitive complexity indicator could be reaction time
processes is better understood (see, e.g., Kalis et al. 2008), (Welford 1980): the longer the time needed for an operation
but the integration of the separate modules is still an open the more complex must be the underlying process. This
question. Interestingly, in studies with simple cognitive statement assumes the sequential processing of composed
processes emotions are normally blanked out, because they elements—a proposition which is questioned by many
do not play an important role, for example in a visual parallel processing models of cognition (see, e.g., Bechtel
discrimination task; but in studies with complex situations, and Abrahamsen 2001; Mcclelland and Rumelhart 1985).
the interactions become highly visible and inevitable: if the To make things even more complicated, issues for psy-
manager of the ‘‘Tailorshop’’ does not succeed with her chological research have a broad range of time. Newell
investment strategy, bad feelings emerge which in turn (1990) differentiated between 12 time scales of human
influence information processing. In a recent experiment actions, coming from four different ‘‘worlds’’ (see Table 1).
with ‘‘Tailorshop’’, Barth and Funke (2009) showed that The Biological Band is currently more intensively
‘‘nasty’’ environments (where participants could hardly focused than before due to the progress of neuroscience;
enhance the capital and received negative feedback most of the Cognitive Band has been an issue for microcognition
the time) increased negative and decreased positive affect. since the Cognitive Revolution; and the Rational and
The reverse was true for nice environments where it was Social Band could be the ones for macrocognition.
easy to increase capital and to receive positive feedback. But, does this differentiation on the time scale really
Furthermore, nasty environments influenced CPS by lead- help? What else besides time could be used for discrimi-
ing to a higher information retrieval and to a better CPS nating simple from complex processes? Instead of con-
performance than nice environments. centrating on the cognitive process, a totally different
At least three different approaches—the ‘‘affect as approach would be to focus on the demands posed to the
information’’ approach by Schwarz (1990), the ‘‘assimila- cognitive system by the task. Cognitive task analysis
tion–accommodation’’ approach by Fiedler (2001), and the (CTA) has a long tradition in psychology (see Crandall
‘‘affect-infusion’’ model by Forgas (2001)—compete with et al. 2006). It tries to determine the thought processes that
each other to explain the interaction between cognitive subjects follow to perform tasks at various levels of diffi-
processes and affective states. All three approaches dem- culty, from novice to expert. CTA looks at a specific sys-
onstrate the necessity to connect cognitive processes with tem from the viewpoint of the subject performing a specific
affective states. In a more elaborated phase of theory task. The number and variety of required tasks could be
development, instead of generally speaking about positive helpful in separating simple from complex cognition.
or negative affects, it might be even possible to qualify the
differential effects of different emotions (e.g., happiness or
Table 1 Newells (1990) time scales of human action in the version
proudness; fear or anger) on information processing and from Anderson (2002, p. 88)
vice versa. Research on complex cognition would miss its
goal if this interaction would not be an integral part of the Scale (sec) Time units System World
next generation’s theory. Especially, the aspect of emotion 107 Months Social band
regulation (Koole 2009) might become a promising area. 106 Weeks
105 Days
104 Hours Task Rational band
Cognition: simple versus complex 103 10 min Task
102 Minutes Task
Is there a clear border between simple and complex cog- 101 10 s Unit task Cognitive band
nition, and if yes, how can one determine the degree of 100
1s Operations
simplicity or complexity of a cognitive process? The 10-1 100 ms Deliberate act
founder of Experimental Psychology, Wilhelm Wundt
10-2 10 ms Neural circuit Biological band
(1832–1920), believed that psychological processes could
10-3 1 ms Neuron
be reduced to their basic elements (and provoked strong
10-4 100 ls Organelle
critique for this proposition by Gestalt Psychologists)—

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Another proposal, made by Halford et al. (1998), defines manuscript. Thanks! Finally, Ann Wolf helped to improve the quality
processing capacity by the relational complexity given by of my English. Part of this research was funded by a grant from the
DFG to the author (Az. Fu 173/11-1).
the number of related dimensions or sources of variation
that can be processed in parallel. This approach would
argue for a continuum between simple and complex pro-
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