INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES AND

PRINCIPLES OF LEGISLATION

Introduction-

The reason for ambiguity or vagueness of legislation is the fundamental nature of language. It
is not always possible to precisely transform the intention of the legislature into written
words. Interpreting a statute to determine whether it applies to a given set of facts, often boils
down to analyzing whether a single word or short phrase covers some element of the factual
situation before the judge. The expansiveness of language necessarily means that there will
often be equally good or equally unconvincing arguments for two competing interpretations.

Interpretation is the primary function of the court, the court interprets the legislature
whenever the dispute comes before it.

The will of the legislature is expressed generally in the form of a statute, the prime concern of
the court is to find out the intention of the legislature in the language used by the legislature
in the statute.

The court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and consequently there have to be certain
principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by the courts. These principles
are sometimes called rules of interpretation.

According to Salmond, “Interpretation” is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain
the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is
expressed.

Kelson’s Grund norm theory- Every norm is a hierarchical system, that derives its
existence and validity from its superior norms. The highest norm in this legal system is called
basic norms or Grundnorm. At the top level of such hierarchy, there is to be a basic norm or
Grundnorm. This basic norm does not derive any existence or validity from any other source
therefore it is supreme.

Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay, AIR 2022 SC

A rule made under a statute could not override or supersede a provision of the parent statute
itself. (Para 7)

Ashwani Kumar Singh v. U. P. Public Service Commission (2003, SC)

Supreme Court remarked that while interpreting words, phrases and statutes it may become
necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussion but this is meant to explain and not to
define. Judges interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.

Interpretation and Construction

Article 142 of the consturion lays down the following-.

Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc

(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and
any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India
in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until
provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

This empowers the judiciary to interpret the statute in order to do complete justice to the
citizens.

The words interpretation and construction are generally used synonymously even though
jurisprudentially they are perhaps different.

Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by giving the
words their natural and ordinary meaning.

Construction means drawing conclusions on the basis of the true spirit of the enactment even
though the same does not appear if the words used in the enactment are given their natural
meaning.
 Interpretation and Construcution

Act/ Statute

Language Purpose/ Spirit/Objective

Saltentia hegis

1. RENAISSANCE HOTEL HOLDINGS INC. vs B. VIJAYA SAI, 2022 (SC)

• It is thus trite law that while interpreting the provisions of a statute, it is necessary that the
textual interpretation should be matched with the contextual one. The Act must be looked
at as a whole and it must be discovered what each section, each clause, each phrase and
each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part
of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.
• Regarding the High Court’s construction of Section 29, the bench observed thus:

“One of the purposes for which the said Act has been enacted is prohibiting the use of
someone else’s trade mark as a part of the corporate name or the name of business
concern. If the entire scheme of the Act is construed as a whole, it provides for the rights
conferred by registration and the right to sue for infringement of the registered trade mark
by its proprietor. The legislative scheme as enacted under the said statute elaborately
provides for the eventualities in which a proprietor of the registered trade mark can bring
an action for infringement of the trade mark and the limits on effect of the registered trade
mark. By picking up a part of the provisions in sub-section (4) of Section 29 of the said
Act and a part of the provision in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the said Act and giving it
a textual meaning without considering the context in which the said provisions have to be
construed, in our view, would not be permissible. We are at pains to say that the High
Court fell in error in doing so.”

2. Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh, 1955 SC

• “Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction,
leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction
may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the
sentence.”

3. Ajoy Kumar Ghose vs State Of Jharkhand & Anr, 2009

The Supreme Court, has interpreted the meaning of the expression "at any previous stage of
the case" occurring in section 245 (2) of the Code and has opined that the discharge prayer on
behalf of the accused under section 245 (2) of the Code is maintainable even before
appearance of the accused. Under Section 245(2) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can discharge the
accused at any previous stage, i.e., even before any evidence is recorded under Section 244(1)
Cr.P.C.

Purpose and Broad Approaches of Interpretation

The purposive approach sometimes referred to as purposive construction, purposive
interpretation, or the "modern principle in construction" is an approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a
statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it
was enacted.

Purpose, object and intent of the legislature behind enactment of the law can be found in the
preamble of the statute.

Kotak Mahindra Bank ltd. v. A. Balakrishna, 2022 SC

All the provisions in the Statute have to be construed in context with each Other and no
provision can be read in isolation - The provisions of a statue ought to be interpreted in such a
manner which would advance the object and purpose of the enactment. (Para 39-41)

Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. v. Axis Bank Ltd., 2022 (SC)

First and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute is the rule of literal interpretation -
Purposive interpretation can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are
ambiguous or if construed literally, the provision would nullify the object of the statute or
otherwise lead to an absurd result. (Para 65 - 69)

Deepika Singh versus Central Administrative Tribunal and Others, 2022 SC

The facts of the present case indicate that the spouse of the appellant had a prior marriage
which had ended as a result of the death of his wife after which the appellant married him.
The fact that the appellant’s spouse had two biological children from his first marriage would
not impinge upon the entitlement of the appellant to avail maternity leave for her sole
biological child.

COURT-
Unless a purposive interpretation were to be adopted in the present case, the object and intent
of the grant of maternity leave would simply be defeated. The grant of maternity leave under
Rules of 1972 is intended to facilitate the continuance of women in the workplace. It is a
harsh reality that but for such provisions, many women would be compelled by social
circumstances to give up work on the birth of a child, if they are not granted leave and other
facilitative measures. No employer can perceive child birth as detracting from the purpose of
employment. Child birth has to be construed in the context of employment as a natural
incident of life and hence, the provisions for maternity leave must be construed in that
perspective.

Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, 2014

The purpose is to achieve "social justice" which is the constitutional vision, enshrined in the
Preamble of the Constitution of India. The Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly
signals that we have chosen the democratic path under the rule of law to achieve the goal of
securing for all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights
achieving their social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the courts to
advance the cause of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision,
the court is supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.

COMMENCEMENT AND OPERATION OF STATUTES

3 powers of the government

1. Notify the date of commencement in the act; or

2. Specify or delegate it to someone else; or
3. If nothing from above 2 options, then according to the General Clauses Act.

Commencement clause is necessary- that all affected persons know that from which date, a
law takes effect.

Section 3 (13) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 says that

'commencement', used with reference to an Act or Regulation, shall mean the day on which
the Act or Regulation comes into force.

Since this Act does not insist on promulgation or publication of a statute to come into force, it
comes into force immediately after the zero hour on that particular date on which it is
expressed to come into force. Where no particular day of commencement is mentioned, a
statute comes into force at the first moment of the day the assent of the President of India is
received, that is to say, at zero hour on the date of assent.

Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 states that

(1) where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it
shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent

a) in the case of a Central Act made before the commencement of the Constitution, the
Governor-General, and

(b) in the case of an Act of Parliament, of the President.

(2) Unless the Contrary is expressed, Central Act or Regulation shall be construed as coming
into operation immediately on the expiration of the date preceding its commencement.

Legislature may expressly appoint a particular future date on which a law shall come into
force.

For e.g. The 3 new criminal laws, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam were passed in December during the winter
session of the year 2023, and the enforcement of the statutes was delegated to the Ministry of
Home Affairs to specify when the act shall come into force.

The Central Government has appointed July 1, 2024 as the effective date on which the
provisions of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 shall come into force.

Common Cause v Union of India, 2003

Section 5 of the General Clauses Act has no application when the act provides that it will
come into force on a date to be notified by the central govt.

Hiralal v State of Rajasthan, 1951

SC observed that in the absence of specified date mentioned by the statute of its
commencement, it will come into force from the date of assent of the President of India or
Governor of the state is received.

Union of India v Prakash Hinduja, 2003

When enforcement of a statute or a provision wherein is left to the discretion of the govt.,
without laying down any objective standards, no writ of mandamus can be issued to the govt.
to enforce the statute or the provision.

TOMLINSON v. BULLOCK, 1879,

The only point which this act makes material is the day on which the royal assent was given

Law recognizes no notice of the fractions of a day, and except where there are conflicting
rights between subject and subject, for the determination of which is necessary to ascertain
the actual priority, such is the universal rule- an act which comes into operation on a given
day becomes law as soon as the day commences.

REPEAL AND SAVINGS

Every legislation has a life span.

After repeal, law will become a dead letter.

The effect of an Act which had expired or was repealed was that for all purposes it would be
presumed that the Act never existed, unless the contrary intention appeared, and all matters
already decided under the Act were closed, if, therefore, during the pendency of a case a
statute expired or was repealed, all transactions under it were closed even though the
transaction under it had begun when the repealed statute was in force.

State of U.P. v. Jagmandar Das, 1954

"The Apex Court held that when a statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux
of time, no prosecution for the acts done during continuance of repealed/expired act can be
commenced after date of its repeal/expiry because that would amount to enforcement at
repealed or dead Act".
For e.g. Section 531 of The Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanshita, 2023, Repealed the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, while mentioning that some provisions of the Code will
still be valid.

Section 358 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, Repealed the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Life span

Temporary Perpetual

Where life span is mentioned Express Implied

TEMPORARY STATUTES

No formal abrogation is necessary.

The legislature is competent to further increase the life span of a temporary statute.

When temporary statute expires, section 6 of GCA has no application.

MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS

Deontology- Jurisprudence helps the judges, lawyers and law students in asserting the true
meaning of the law passed by the legislature by providing the rules of interpretation.

The intention of the legislature is expressed using expressions like may, shall and must etc.

Mandatory

The use of the words shall and must mean that intention is that the enactment is imperative or
obligatory.
An Act done in violation of a mandatory statute will be invalid. Non compliance of
mandatory provisions results in nullification of the act, but it is subject to atleast two
exceptions-

1. Impossibility (e.g. Force Majeure)

2. Performance is excused (e.g. where punishment for non-compliance is absent)

Directory

Ordinarily, the use of the word may mean that the legislature intends the enactment to be
directory or obligatory or permissive.

An Act done in violation of a directory statute will be valid even though it could be
punishable if the statute so provided.

LORD CAMPBELL: No universal rule can be laid down as to whether mandatory

enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for
disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the
Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be considered.

1. Language of the provision: The language used in the provision itself is often the starting
point for determining whether it is mandatory or directory. If the provision uses words
such as “shall” or “must”, it is likely to be mandatory, while provisions that use words
such as “may” or “should” are generally directory.
2. Purpose of the provision: The purpose of the provision can also be an important factor in
determining whether it is mandatory or directory. If the provision is designed to protect
fundamental rights or ensure public safety, for example, it is more likely to be mandatory.
3. Consequences of non-compliance: The consequences of non-compliance with the
provision can also provide clues as to whether it is mandatory or directory. If the failure to
comply would result in serious legal consequences, such as the invalidation of a contract
or the loss of a right, it is likely to be mandatory.
4. Legislative intent: The intent of the legislature when enacting the provision can also be a
relevant factor in determining whether it is mandatory or directory. If the legislature
clearly intended the provision to be mandatory, courts are likely to interpret it as such.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhanlal, 1957, SC

➢ The interpretation of Article 320 (3) of the Constitution was involved which says, 'the
Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case
may be, shall be consulted.' The Supreme Court held the provision permissive mainly
because it has nowhere been mentioned either expressly nor is it deducible by necessary
implication that in case of non-compliance of the provision the proceedings will be
invalidated.

But there have been many occasions where the Courts have held an enactment directory even
though the legislature has used expressions such as shall and must. Similarly, many
enactments have been held mandatory even though the word may have been used by the
legislature.

Rule- No universal rule can be laid down while construing statutes to determine whether
mandatory enactments should be considered directory or obligatory with an implied
nullification.

H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh vs The State Of Delhi (1955, SC)

➢ The SC has time and again stressed that the ques whether the statute is mandatory or
directory is not capable of generalisation and in each case the courts should try and get at
the real intentions of the legislature by analysing the entire provisions of the enactment
and the scheme underlying it.

Jurisprudence can teach lawyers to look, if not forwards, atleast five days around him, to
realise that the answers of new legal problems must be found by consideration of the present
social needs rather than in the distilled wisdom of the past.

Lalita Kumari vs Govt. Of U.P.& Ors, 2013, AIR 2014 SUPREME COURT 187

Lalita Kumari, a minor was kidnapped.

Peitition for issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the
respondents was moved by the father.

A written report was submitted by the petitioner before the officer in-charge of the police
station concerned who did not take any action on the same. Thereafter, when the
Superintendent of Police was moved, an FIR was registered. According to the petitioner, even
thereafter, steps were not taken either for apprehending the accused or for the recovery of the
minor girl child.

ISSUE

Whether a police officer is bound to register an FIR upon receiving any information relating
to the commission of a cognizable offence under section 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 or the police officer has the power to conduct a preliminary inquiry in order
to test the veracity of such information before registering the same?

Petitioner's Contentions

• The use of word 'Shall' in Section 154(1) indicates that there is no discretion left to the
police officer except to register the FIR.
• Section 154(1) mentions the word 'Information' without prefixing the words 'reasonable' or
'credible' which indicates that genuineness or credibility of the information is not a
condition precedent for registration of case.

Respondent's Contentions

• States of West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh contended that the
registration of FIR is mandatory u/s 154 of the CrPC, if the information discloses a
cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is allowed in such situations.
• States of Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra contended that a preliminary inquiry should be
conducted before the registration of FIR on the following basis:
The provisions of Section 154(1) must be read in the light of Articles 14, 19 and 21 which
provides that no citizen shall be subjected to malicious prosecution and an innocent shall
not be implicated in a criminal case. The liberty of a citizen would be in jeopardy if a
police officer proceeds to register an FIR, despite not being satisfied about the commission
of a cognizable offence.
• No single provision of a statute can be read and interpreted in isolation, but the statute
must be read as a whole. Accordingly, the provisions of Sections 41, 57, 156, 157, 157,
167, 190, 200 and 202 of the Code must be read together.
• Section 154(3) enables the complainant to approach the Superintendent of Police to
register the FIR if the same is refused by the officer in-charge of the police station. This
indicates that the police officer is not bound to register the FIR if he has doubts about the
veracity of the complaint.
• The recording of FIR under Section 154 in the book is subsequent to the entry in the
General Diary, maintained in police station. Therefore, information is a document at the
earliest in the General Diary, then if any preliminary inquiry is needed, the police officer
conduct the same and thereafter, the information is recorded as FIR.

Judgment

In view of the aforesaid observations, the hon'ble Supreme Court gave various directions-

• It is mandatory to register an FIR u/s 154 of the Code, if the information discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation. If the information does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted to ascertain whether
information reveals any cognizable offence.
• If the inquiry discloses a cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. If not, a copy of
the entry of closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not later than one
week.
• Cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made before the registration of FIR
a) Matrimonial disputes/Family disputes
b) Commercial offences
c) Medical Negligence cases
d) Corruption cases
e) Cases where there is abnormal delay in initiating criminal prosecution.
• The completion of preliminary inquiry must not exceed 7 days and all the information
related to the same shall be recorded in the General Diary, maintained in the police station.

State Represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai vs. N.S. Gnaneswaran, 2013 SC

MAIN QUESTION

I) Whether an FIR registered on the basis of recorded information disclosing commission to

cognizable offence and under Section 154(1), Cr.P.C. for the purposes of conducting
investigation of the case under Sections 156 and 157, Cr.P.C. is permissible in law?

II) Whether the High Court in its impugned decision has correctly interpreted Section 154,
Cr.P.C. with reference to its ambit and scope of and has correctly read the said Section in
juxta-position with Sections 156 and 157 Cr.P.C?

Court’s observation

• State of U.P. & Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751
“For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia,
the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from
construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the
necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance,
namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the
provisions, the fact that the non- compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by
some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all,
whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered.”
• In Sharif-Ud-Din Vs. Abdul Gani Lone, AIR 1980 SC 303, this Court, while considering
the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 89 of the J&K Representation of People Act,
1957, held that the difference between a mandatory and directory rule is that the former
requires strict observance while in the case of latter, substantial compliance of the rule
may be enough and where the statute provides that failure to make observance of a
particular rule would lead to a specific consequence, the provision has to be construed as
mandatory.
• In State of Haryana & Anr. v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995) 1 SCC 133, this Court observed as
under:– “If by holding them to be mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to
innocent persons or general public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the
same would be construed as directory.”
• The law on this issue can be summarised that in order to declare a provision mandatory,
the test to be applied is as to whether non-compliance of the provision could render entire
proceedings invalid or not. Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, depends upon
the intent of Legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is clothed. But the
 circumstance that Legislature has used the language of compulsive force is always of great
relevance.
• If we apply this test to the provisions of Section 154 Cr.P.C., we reach inescapable
conclusion that the provisions of Section 154(2) are merely directory and not mandatory as
it prescribes only a duty to give the copy of the FIR.

Held-

• The court allowed the appeal of the petitioner and set aside the order of the high court.
• Therefore, non compliance of the mandatory provisions, under Section 154, Cr.P.C. if the
case is registered on the basis of the information received suo-motu after specifying that
the information reveals prima facie cognizable offence against the respondent herein and
found that the matter is fit for investigation to be taken by the appellant herein, in not
following the provisions of Section 154 does not vitiate the registration of FIR and further
proceedings in the matter of registration.

Kailash vs Nanhku & Ors, 2005

If object of the enactment will be defeated by holding the same directory, it will be construed
as mandatory, whereas if by holding it mandatory serious general inconvenience will be
created to innocent persons without very much furthering the object of enactment, the same
will be construed as directory.

Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order VIII in the present form
and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has
to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the court may
extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days,
referred to in the provision, has expired.

Dalchand v. Municipal Corporation, Bhopal and Anr, 1982

Held-

• There are no ready tests or invariable formulae to determine whether a provision is

mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the statute is important. The object of the
particular provision must be considered. The link between the two is most important.
 • The weighing of the consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory or directory
is vital and, more often that not, determinative of the very question whether the
provision is mandatory or directory.
• Where the design of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public mischief, but
the enforcement of a particular provision literally to its letter will tend to defeat that
design, the provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of prejudice in
addition to non-compliance of the provision is necessary to invalidate the act
complained of. It is well to remember that quite often many rules, though couched in
language which appears to be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those
entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for public benefit.

State of Gujarat v. Utility Users Welfare Association, 2018

The Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Act’) provides for Central and
State Regulatory Commissions. Insofar as the appointment of the Chairperson of these
Commissions is concerned, the relevant provisions stipulate that the Chairperson “may” be a
Judge of a High Court for the State Commission, a Judge of the Supreme Court or the Chief
Justice of a High Court for the Central Commission.

Question- whether the expression “may” should be read as “shall”, i.e., whether it is
mandatory to have a judicial mind presiding over these Commissions in the form of a Judge.

State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) SCC 634

"It appears to be well settled that in order to judge the nature and scope of a particular statute
or rule, i.e., whether it is mandatory or directory, the purpose for which the provision has
been made, and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious
general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one
way or the other, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a
particular provision is mandatory or directory”.

Nitin Singhvi v Chattisgarh State Information Commission and Anr, 2023

The appellant filed a complaint under Section 18(1)(c) and (f) of the RTI Act before the
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission (SIC) on the ground that information sought was
not provided to him within a period of 30 days as specified under Section 7(1) of the Act.

Therefore, as per Section 20(1) of the Act, he sought a penalty of Rs. 250/- per day to be
imposed upon the Public Information Officer (PIO), which amounts to Rs. 16,500/- (Rs. 250
x 66). However, the SIC imposed a penalty of Rs. 2000/- only which was challenged by the
appellant before the High Court through a writ petition.

On behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the penalty to be imposed upon the PIO in
terms of Section 20(1) of the Act of 2005 is mandatory in nature and once negligence is
found to have been made by the PIO in supplying the information, then the SIC does not have
the discretion not to impose penalty as prescribed under the provision.

The Court held-

“…unless one of the three findings are recorded that the Public Information Officer has
without any reasonable cause and persistently failed to receive an application for information
or has not furnished within 30 days under Section 7(1) of the Act of 2005 or malafidely
denied the request for information or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading
information or destroyed information which was the subject of the request or obstructed in
any manner in furnishing the information, the Commission shall not impose penalty upon the
Public Information Officer.”

HELD- that the word “shall” appearing in Section 20(2) of the Act of 2005 before
'recommend' has to be read as “may”.

Having regard for the aforesaid position and taking into consideration the fact that provisions
relating to penalty or penal consequences have drastic civil consequences upon the PIO, the
Court was of the considered opinion that it is not mandatory on the part of the SIC to impose
the prescribed amount of penalty as provided under Section 20(1).

Safiya Sultana vs State of U. P. (2020) All. HC

Giving notice of Marriage under Special Marriage act- Not Mandatory

Requirement of publication of notice of intended marriage under Section 6 and
inviting/entertaining objections under Section 7 of the Special Marriage Act is not mandatory.

Justice Vivek Chaudhary observed that making such publication mandatory would invade in
the fundamental rights of liberty and privacy, including within its sphere freedom to choose
for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned.

While giving notice under Section 5 of the Act of 1954 it shall be optional for the parties to
the intended marriage to make a request in writing to the Marriage Officer to publish or not to
publish a notice under Section 6 and follow the procedure of objections as prescribed under
the Act of 1954, the court observed. The court added that, in case they do not make such a
request for publication of notice in writing, while giving notice under Section 5 of the Act,
the Marriage Officer shall not publish any such notice or entertain objections to the intended
marriage and proceed with the solemnization of the marriage.